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NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

Microfilm Publication M976

RECORDS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RELATING TO POLITICAL RELATIONS
BETWEEN CHINA AND JAPAN, 1930-1944

Roll 3

1930-39

739.94/2341-2560
Oct.-Nov. 1931



**THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**

WASHINGTON: 1975

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

INTRODUCTION

On the 96 rolls of this microfilm publication are reproduced the records from the decimal file of the Department of State, 1930-44, that relate to political relations between China and Japan. The records are mostly instructions to and despatches from diplomatic and consular officials; the despatches are often accompanied by enclosures. Also included in these records are notes between the Department of State and foreign diplomatic representatives in the United States, memorandums prepared by officials of the Department, and correspondence with officials of other Government departments and with private firms and persons. The State Department divided the decimal file into chronological segments to retire inactive records. This division has been maintained in this microfilm publication. The records for the period 1930-39 are filmed on rolls 1-88 and those for 1940-44 on rolls 89-96.

The Lists of Documents or "purport lists" filmed on rolls 345 and 346 (1930-39), roll 532 (1940-June 1944), and roll 628 (July-Dec. 1944) of M973 give brief abstracts of the documents reproduced in this microfilm publication and serve as a finding aid to the documents themselves. The arrangement of the entries on these lists generally corresponds to the arrangement of the documents in the file.

From 1910 to 1963 the State Department used a decimal system for its central files, assembling and arranging individual documents according to subject and assigning decimal file numbers. The decimal file consists of nine primary classes numbered 0 through 8, each covering a broad subject area. The records reproduced in this microfilm publication are in Class 7, political relations of states. Each country had been assigned a two-digit number. The country numbers assigned to China and to Japan, for example, are 93 and 94, respectively. Thus, documents bearing the file number 793.94 concern political relations between China and Japan.

When one or more digits follow the second country number, they represent a specific subject. This number, in turn, may be followed by a slant mark (/). In such cases the numbers after the slant mark were assigned to individual documents as they were accumulated on a specific subject. For example, a decimal file number taken from a document reproduced in this microfilm publication is 793.943/5. The number 3 following the country number for Japan (94) signifies that the subject is extraterritoriality, and the number after the slant mark indicates the number of documents on this subject.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

The documents under one subject classification are generally in chronological order, coinciding with the assigned document number, which follows the slant mark. There are instances, however, when a document file number was not assigned until a date considerably later than the one on which the document was received.

In July 1944 the number after the slant mark began to reflect the date of the document instead of the number of documents; for example, a document dated November 20, 1944, would be numbered /11-2044. Documents dated as early as 1939 but not indexed until after July 1, 1944, also have been assigned date numbers.

Cross-reference sheets referring to related records under other subject classifications in the decimal file have been reproduced as they occur, and appropriate cross-reference notations appear in the Lists of Documents.

The file contains documents that were security classified by the State Department, as well as those received from and classified by foreign governments and other Federal agencies. Documents that have not been declassified are not available as part of this microfilm publication. The National Archives and Records Service (NARS) does not have authority to make reproductions of such documents available to searchers. Documents that remain classified have been removed from the file and replaced by a withdrawal notice that identifies the document and indicates the reason for its removal.

The records reproduced in this microfilm publication are part of General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, and are a continuation of the records concerning political relations between China and other states, 1910-29, which have been microfilmed as NARS M341.

In the same record group are several diplomatic correspondence series containing documents on relations between China and the United States. They are copies of instructions from the State Department to U.S. Ministers to China, 1843-1906 (rolls 38-43 of M77); notes to the Chinese Legation in the United States from the Department, 1868-1906 (rolls 13 and 14 of M99); despatches from U.S. Ministers to China to the Department, 1843-1906 (M92); and notes from the Chinese Legation in the United States to the Department, 1868-1906 (M98). Also related to matters concerning China are communications to special agents of the United States from the Department, 1852-86 (roll 154 of M77).

Several series of volumes contain material on relations between Japan and the United States. There are copies of instructions from the State Department to U.S. Ministers to

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

Japan, 1855-1906 (rolls 104-108 of M77); despatches from U.S. Ministers to Japan to the Department, 1855-1906 (M133); notes to the Japanese Legation in the United States from the Department, 1860-1906 (rolls 66 and 67 of M99); and notes from the Japanese Legation in the United States to the Department, 1858-1906 (M163). Also related to matters concerning Japan are communications to special agents of the United States from the Department, 1823-86 (rolls 152 and 154 of M77); and despatches from special agents to the Department, 1794-1837 (roll 10 of M37).

Despatches from U.S. consular officials in China and Japan before 1906 are available as separate microfilm publications for each post. Complementary to the despatches from consuls are instructions to consuls.

The method of arranging the diplomatic and consular series cited above was discontinued in 1906, when the State Department adopted the practice of filing incoming and outgoing correspondence, memorandums, and other documents by subject in a single numerical series. Information on documents relating to China and Japan for the 1906-10 period may be found through the use of card indexes and Lists of Documents in the National Archives of the United States. The Numerical File is available as microfilm publication M862.

Several series in the State Department decimal file, 1910-29, that relate to Chinese and Japanese affairs are available as microfilm publications. In Class 7 there are two series regarding Chinese affairs: one concerning political relations between the United States and China (M339) and the other concerning political relations between China and other states (including Japan) (M341); and two series regarding Japanese affairs: one concerning political relations between the United States and Japan (M423) and the other concerning political relations between Japan and other states (M424). Class 8, internal affairs of states, has records concerning internal affairs of China (M329) and internal affairs of Japan (M422). Additional documents are in the remaining classes of the State Department decimal file:

- Class 0. General. Miscellaneous.
- Class 1. Administration, Government of the United States.
- Class 2. Extradition.
- Class 3. Protection of Interests.
- Class 4. Claims.
- Class 5. International Congresses and Conferences. Multi-lateral Treaties. League of Nations.
- Class 6. Commerce. Customs Administration. Commercial Relations, Treaties and Conventions. Commercial and Trade Agreements.

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
In Records of Boundary and Claims Commissions and Arbitrations, Record Group 76, there are records relating to the Claims Commissions of 1858 and 1901 between the United States and China.

In Records of International Conferences, Commissions, and Expositions, Record Group 43, are records of several conferences in which the United States and Japan participated. There are records of the Washington Conference on Limitation of Armament, 1921-22, which met to consider the limitation of armaments and certain questions relating to Pacific and Far Eastern problems. There are also records of the Commission To Represent the United States at the Grand Exhibition of Japan, 1917. The exhibition was planned for 1912 but had been postponed, and the records relate mainly to the visit of U.S. Commissioners to Japan in 1908 and to their conferences with Japanese officials. Other relevant records in Record Group 43 are those concerning the Sino-Japanese Dispute, 1930-32 (documents gathered by Gen. Frank McCoy, U.S. representative on the Lytton Commission), those of the U.S. Element, Allied Council for Japan, 1946-52, and those of the Far Eastern Commission, 1945-51.

In Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Record Group 84, are records originally kept at U.S. diplomatic and consular posts. Among these are records of the U.S. Legation (later Embassy) in China, 1843-1945, and of the U.S. Legation (later Embassy) in Japan, 1855-1936, as well as those of various consular posts in those countries.

The records reproduced in this microfilm publication were prepared for filming by Ralph E. Huss, who also wrote these introductory remarks.

THE UNDER SECRETARY
OCT 22 1931
DEPARTMENT OF STATE



October 21, 1931.

Digest of
Newspaper Items.

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NEW YORK TIMES

Geneva despatch, October 20 (Lansing Warren) reports that "action by the League of Nations Council toward a settlement of the Sino-Japanese conflict in Manchuria appeared to be paralyzed for the second day in succession,--though news was received that Tokyo had suggested a possible basis for negotiations".

"The Japanese delegation would not admit that any written memorandum putting their demands into rigid terms had been communicated to Briand---maintaining their demands for direct negotiation with China and hold that any fixed statement of terms would constitute an acceptance of the Council's intervention, which they decline to recognize.

"China has not changed her attitude. She continues to insist on League intervention."

Delegates at Geneva are exhibiting impatience at the delays, but there is no assurance that after an adjournment Japan will not renew her struggle against American representation on the Council. Japan now contends she is no longer bound to consider the Manchurian question in the light of the Council's resolution of September 30.

Washington despatch of October 20, reports that the
United States

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- 2 -

United States has joined five other governments in sending identic notes to Japan and China.

Tokyo despatch, October 20 (Hugh Byas), states that Geneva advices indicate that Briand approves the first four of the five demands, allegedly put forth by Japan as a basis for settlement.

"Eugene Chen, Foreign Minister at Canton, . . . favors direct negotiations with Japan on the Manchurian issue." Chen has stated that, "We believe in recognizing facts, and Japan's position in Manchuria is a fact."

Shanghai despatch, October 20 (Hallett Abend), reports that General "Ling In-ching" is heading a new "independence" movement in Manchuria, according to Japan accounts, with 60,000 men. Chang Hsueh-liang's supporters at Tsitsihar are having difficulty in maintaining their position against an "independence" faction in that section.

NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE

Geneva despatch, October 20, (John T. Whitaker), reported that "members of the League of Nations Council were increasingly of the opinion that Japanese diplomacy had regained control of the Manchurian negotiations.-----The result is confusing, with fear frankly avowed among leading statesmen that the League and the United States - despite America's observer sitting with the Council - are drawing apart.

"Geneva understands-----that the United States will take no part in discussion of possible sanction against either Japan

or

- 3 -

or China. This, it is feared here, has weakened that very authority and power to apply pressure which the League received when America entered the Council".

Attention is directed to the HERALD TRIBUNE'S editorial in today's issue.

CBL

On the subject of the conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations to meet today at Shanghai.


The NEW YORK TIMES also has an editorial supporting the action we have taken under the Paris Pact and ridiculing the fears of those who were opposed to our taking such action in conjunction with the Council of the League.

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THE UNDER SECRETARY
OCT 24 1931
DEPARTMENT OF STATE



October 23, 1931.

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Digest of
Newspaper Items.

NEW YORK TIMES

Manchurian developments are summarized as follows:

"The League Council moved to take decisive action yesterday in the Manchurian dispute, but both the Chinese and Japanese delegates expressed dissatisfaction and definite action was put off until today.

"Meanwhile it was learned that Japanese planes had again bombed Chinese troops in Manchuria.

"Washington received Nanking's answer to the note invoking the Briand-Kellogg pact, in which China gave assurance of her intention to observe the peace treaty.

"Tokyo continued to maintain its policy of insisting on negotiations before withdrawal of troops."

Tokyo despatch, October 22 (Hugh Byas), reports that Japanese Government officials seem hopeful that the efforts of Briand, at Geneva, may evolve a settlement.

"The practical objection to immediate evacuation is the fact that the Japanese Army in Manchuria is outnumbered fifteen to one and cannot afford to place itself in an inferior strategic position before the quarrel is settled.

"In

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- 2 -

"In reality there are but two points at issue: Recognition of treaties and evacuation and, according to the attitude here, they cannot be solved separately."

A further Tokyo report (A. P.) quotes the JIJI as alleging that Marshal Chang Hsueh-Liang is seeking Soviet support.

Shanghai despatch, October 23 (Hallett Abend), reports that Japanese airplanes bombed Taoshing and Kwangchengtze, north of Changchun.

Mention is made of the return of Consul General Hanson to Harbin.

Shanghai reports, October 22, that General Chiang Kai-shek flew from Nanking to confer with the delegates from Canton, returning to Nanking the same day.

EDITORIALS:

1. "Organizing Peace", referring to the visit of Premier Laval, approves of American peace efforts.

2. "The Shanghai Conference", lauds the decision of the Institute of Pacific Relations for holding its fourth biennial conference, the threatening international situation notwithstanding.

NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE

Tokyo despatch, October 22, states that should the League Council demand the withdrawal of Japanese troops in Manchuria

- 3 -

Manchuria into the South Manchuria Railway Zone, Japanese officials declared that "Japan would be forced to withdraw from the League."

"Japan is prepared, officials said, to make a declaration before the League pledging withdrawal of the Japanese troops, without setting any definite date."


"The Chinese program for four points presented to Briand . . . was declared to be completely unacceptable."

"Geneva is inclined to agree that M. Briand's 'judgment of Solomon' is fair to both sides."

BBJ

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



My dear Mr. Undersecretary:

In acknowledging the receipt of your note of
October 20, I wish to thank you for your courtesy in
sending me a copy of an identical note which has been
sent for communication by the American Chargé at Tokyo
to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs and by
the American Minister to China at Nanking to the Act-
ing Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I note that the text of this note is, for the
present, not being given to the press.

I am, my dear Mr. Castle,

Very sincerely yours,

W. R. Castle, Jr.

The Honorable William R. Castle, Jr.,
Undersecretary of State.

793.94/2343

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 450

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, China.

September 30, 1931

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

RECENT INCIDENTS ON THE PEKING-MUKDEN RAILWAY.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping, China.

Sir:

I have the honor to submit for the Legation's information the following brief account of the incidents which have occurred on the Peking-Mukden Railway during the past few days as a result of the unusual situation now obtaining in southern Manchuria.

On September 24, machine gun fire from a Japanese military aeroplane, flying near the Peking-Mukden train No. 102 (the morning south bound train) at a point about thirty miles west of Mukden killed several Chinese passengers and wounded others. The exact number of killed and wounded is not known. The Japanese military authorities admit the occurrence but explain that the machine gun fire was directed

against

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- 2 -

against Chinese soldiers, adding that it is possible that some of the bullets struck the train since the soldiers upon whom they were firing were located near the railway. The explanation is obviously unsatisfactory since it would have been merely a matter of seconds for the attacking planes to wait for the train to pass out of danger. There are also unconfirmed reports that other Peking-Mukden trains were fired upon by aeroplanes and that two bombs, which failed to explode, were dropped on a train near Jacyangho.

On September 26th at one p.m. the south bound train which had left Mukden in the morning was badly wrecked by the action of bandits near Jacyangho, a station on the Peking-Mukden Railway about sixty miles west of Mukden. Foreign railway engineers who proceeded immediately to the scene, described it as one of the worst wrecks they had ever seen. The bandits, number unknown, had raised the rails which had the effect of throwing the engine completely off the track and causing the cars to "telescope" into each other and turn over. The bandits after shooting some of the passengers and doing a thorough job of looting, retreated into the interior.

It is still impossible to ascertain the number of killed as the railway engineers have not been

able

- 3 -

able to remove some of the overturned cars. An Indian silk merchant, Pinyamal by name, was the only foreigner killed. His body has been brought to Mukden and was still lying in the railway station awaiting inquest yesterday. Another Indian of the same name who was wounded was brought to the hospital here.

A Japanese armoured train which was stationed at Hsinmintun with the Japanese troops there, was sent to the scene of the wreck and brought back the body of Pinyamal.

The work of clearing up the wreck is still in progress. A detour track was constructed immediately, thereby allowing north and south bound trains to pass through on the next day, September 27th.

Yesterday, September 28th, the south bound Peking-Mukden train was turned back because of a bandit threat, near a small station west of Hsinmintun called Peichepu, about fifty miles from Mukden. Trains, to-day, however, have both left and arrived at Mukden over the Peking-Mukden line. The Chinese are guarding trains between Jacyangho and a station just west of Hsinmintun by means of an armoured car and from Hsinmintun to Mukden, Japanese soldiers board the train at each station to conduct a thorough inspection of the cars and passengers. The latter system has been in effect since the Japanese occupation of Hsinmintun last week. The Chinese guard was made effective to-day.

It

- 4 -

It is understood that the Japanese have offered to allow the Chinese to guard the trains into Hsinmintun station if the Chinese will permit (or more likely, request) the placing of Japanese military guards on all trains between Huangkatun (the present terminus of the railway) and Hsinmintun. It is quite probable that the Japanese will take the latter action whether or not the Chinese permission (or request) is forthcoming.

In connection with the guarding of the Peking-Mukden trains, it is interesting to note the attitude of the Japanese developing from the train wreck incident of September 26th. At a meeting of September 28th, between press correspondents now in Mukden and Major Watari, the official Japanese liaison officer between the press and the Japanese military authorities, the Major stated that the Japanese had been approached by Mr. Steel, British traffic director on the Peking-Mukden Railway, with the idea of furnishing protection for trains running through the bandit infested area. The press correspondents were led to believe that what Mr. Steel had requested was Japanese guards for the trains. They were informed that the Japanese military authorities did not feel justified in furnishing guards for the trains on the basis of Mr. Steel's request but that if the local consuls would request the Japanese military authorities to guard the trains, it could

be

- 5 -

be arranged. When Mr. Steel was questioned with respect to the report shortly after the conclusion of the press conference, he flatly denied having made a request for Japanese guards on the trains. He stated that on the contrary he had been placed in the position, since the military occupation of Hsinmintun, of having constantly to resist Japanese pressure that a request be made for a Japanese guard at Huangkutun station. Mr. Steel, in the absence of Chinese officials has been placed in charge of the railway's interests in Mukden. His authority, however, does not permit his making requests for Japanese protection to Chinese trains.

The press correspondents interpret Major Watari's statements at the conference as a willful attempt on the part of the Japanese military authorities to mislead them into sending out reports which would indicate a possibility of united foreign consular cognizance of and interference in the present situation. A report, such as that envisaged by the Japanese military authorities, even though subsequently denied, would have placed the present deplorable and dangerous conditions along the railway in the best possible light so far as the Japanese are concerned.

Respectfully

- 6 -

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers.
American Consul General.

Original and two copies to Legation.
Five copies to Department.
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.

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A true copy of
the signed orig-
inal.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Peking, September 30, 1931.

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No. 1200



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The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit herewith a
1/ copy of a report on the Japanese occupation of
South Manchuria, dated September 26, 1931, which
was prepared by Lieutenant C. C. Brown, United
States Marine Corps, who was sent to Mukden by
the Naval Attaché of this Legation.

This report corroborates the information
received by the Legation from other sources,
most of which has already been communicated to
the Department by telegraph.

Respectfully yours,

For the Minister:

C. Van H. Engert

C. Van H. Engert,
First Secretary of Legation.

Enclosure:
1: Report dated September 26, 1931.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1
 Despatch No. 1200

THE JAPANESE MILITARY OCCUPATION OF SOUTH MANCHURIA

With dramatic rapidity and with a high degree of efficiency the Japanese military occupied all important centers and strategic railheads in South Manchuria within a matter of hours on the early morning of 19 September. At 2300 on the night of the 18th, Japanese railway guards clashed with Chinese soldiers in the vicinity of the large Chinese barracks at Peitaying, near Mukden, precipitating the crisis which still obtains, although the situation in general has resolved from a military phase into a state where negotiations between competent authorities are highly necessary. If the Japanese action is to accomplish its stated object it is essential that the economic and industrial life of this area be immediately restored to some semblance of normality.

The Japanese cite an imposing list of irritating incidents on the part of the Chinese military to interfere with vested interests in the South Manchuria zone. During the past summer these have been on the increase, particularly in so far as attempts to interfere with traffic on the railway are concerned. Added to these is the murder of Captain Nakamura, which is reported to have occurred at the hands of the Chinese military in the Taonan region some weeks ago, and which was lightly regarded by the Chinese authorities. Underlying all, is, of course, the long-standing deep-seated Sino-Japanese Manchurian question.

Foreign observers while not unprepared for the extension of Japanese control, were almost without exception, taken unawares that it should occur at this time and with such completeness. Even the Japanese Consular Officials in Manchuria were uninformed. The Chinese maintain that they had envisaged the present development some weeks ago, and that at that time secret orders were issued by Chang Hsueh-liang to his ranking commanders that under no circumstances were the Japanese to be opposed in the event of an attack or untoward incident.

The Japanese official version of the incident at the North Barracks is that a small patrol, while holding night maneuvers along the South Manchuria right-of-way in the vicinity of Peitaying, heard an explosion, saw and fired on Chinese soldiers running from the spot, were in turn fired upon by other Chinese soldiers under cover nearby, and, after being reinforced, attacked and occupied the Chinese camp. This resulted in coincidental occupation of the Mukden arsenals, Mukden city, Liaoyang, Yingkou, Tunhua, Kirin city, Changchun (not without serious resistance), Hsinmin and Antung, together with other points. The Kuantung army headquarters was moved from Port Arthur to Mukden, Korean reinforcements, gendarmes and reservists, were all employed to establish control of the bulk of this area by Saturday noon,

the

- 2 -

the 19th. Chinese casualties are unknown, while the official statement of Japanese headquarters is 167 casualties, almost fifty percent being killed. At Mukden 2 privates were killed and 23 officers and men were wounded. The remainder of the casualties were incurred at Changchun. So far as is known no foreigners were injured.

Following the first signs of trouble the Chinese civilian population commenced an exodus which was augmented by soldiers who had discarded their uniforms, and reliable estimates are that 100,000 have left Mukden and points to the South up until the present time. The foreign traffic manager of the Peiping-Mukden Railway states that 20,000 have left via that road within the past two days (24-25). A complete absence of municipal government ensued and as the responsible Chinese officials had disappeared the Japanese organized a local government with a Japanese mayor, gradually recruiting some 2000 of the former Chinese police force, though not furnishing them arms. It is impossible to obtain a responsible Chinese version of the incident at the present time and the Japanese authorities have little information to offer concerning the number of Chinese troops involved, total casualties and other pertinent details.

The cessation of business has resulted in a state of depression among the people and a certain amount of suffering due to scarcity of foodstuffs and rising prices. Seizure of deposits and bullion in the native banks also caused the foreign banks to suspend business. It is stated, however, that all institutions will be able to resume regular banking hours on the 28th of September. Transportation and communications being in the hands of the Japanese military, or else completely interrupted, has caused considerable inconvenience. American firms suffered some minor molestations at the hands of the Japanese military and at the present time are unable to function normally.

While the Japanese concentrated the 2nd Division less one brigade, at Changchun, preparatory for a dash up the southern section of the Chinese Eastern Railway to Harbin in case their nationals there were threatened, it is generally presumed in Mukden that the Soviet officials prevailed against this. Today the Japanese official release states that Soviet troops to the number of several thousand are at Manchuli preparing to enter Chinese territory and garrison the Chinese Eastern Railway.

Speculation

- 3 -

Speculation is now rife at this point as to the future status of the Japanese forces in the occupied area, the general view being that they will in all probability take over the operation of the Chinese railways they now garrison. This viewpoint is also expressed by Japanese officials.

The truth of the matter of the actual "incident" will remain hidden in the midst of claims and counter-claims presented by both factions. Sufficient that it occurred and that the Japanese military are now in control of South Manchuria. Chang Hsueh-liang's material powers have been seriously weakened but it is doubtful that any prestige has been lost by him among his Manchurian followers.

(Signed) C. C. Brown,
1st. Lieut. U.S.M.C.

Mukden, Manchuria.
26 September, 1931.

A true copy: JS.



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
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Peiping, October 1, 1931.

No. 1203



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The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

Referring to recent telegraphic reports from this Legation regarding the invasion of South Manchuria by the Japanese, I have the honor to transmit herewith the following twelve Memoranda of conversations I have had with various people on the subject of Sino-Japanese Relations in general, and the events in Manchuria in particular. The Department's special attention is invited to the first three conversations which took place before the Japanese occupation:

1. Conversation with Dr. J. G. Ferguson, September 11, 1931.
2. Conversation with Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, September 16, 1931.
3. Conversation with the French Minister, September 17, 1931.
4. Conversation with Mr. W. H. Donald, September 19, 1931.
5. Conversation with Mr. Yano (Japanese Legation), September 19, 1931.

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- 2 -

6. Conversation with Dr. Wellington Koo,
September 19, 1931.
7. Conversation with Dr. Wellington Koo,
September 21, 1931.
8. Conversation with the British Minister,
September 23, 1931.
9. Conversation with the British Minister,
September 23, 1931.
10. Conversation with Mr. W. H. Donald,
September 25, 1931.
11. Conversation with Dr. Wellington Koo,
September 25, 1931.
12. Conversation with Mr. Hayes (Presbyterian
Mission), September 25, 1931.

I trust that these Memoranda will assist the Department in obtaining a picture of the opinions prevailing among well-informed persons in Peiping immediately prior to and after the decision of the Japanese Government to occupy portions of Manchuria.

Respectfully yours,

Nelson Thrusler Johnson

NELSON THUSLER JOHNSON.

✓
12 enclosures as listed.

CVHE/js.

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Enclosure No. _____
Despatch No. 1203

Conversation.

Peiping, Sept. 11, 1931

Dr. J. C. Ferguson

Subject: Sino-Japanese Relations

Dr. Ferguson called today and after some conversation about various matters and before leaving he said that he felt very much concerned about the situation that was growing up between Japan and China. He suggested that I might not wish to go south to resume negotiations in regard to extraterritoriality in view of the fact that Japan was bound to take drastic action vis-a-vis China very shortly. I asked him what he meant by drastic action. He said his information was that Japan would occupy Manchuria within the next three months. He said that a high Japanese official had made a tour in China for the purpose of investigating the situation here and had reported to his Government that the opportunity for taking this action had now arrived and he had recommended it.

I told Dr. Ferguson that I thought such action on the part of the Japanese highly improbable; it seemed fantastic that at this time the Japanese would act in this way, particularly as they were able to exploit Manchuria while all of the expenses of administration and government would remain on Chinese shoulders.

Dr. Ferguson stated that nevertheless he believed his information was correct.

Nelson Trusler Johnson
American Minister

NTJ/hp

Enclosure No. _____
Document # 1203

Conversation.

Peiping, Sept. 16, 1931

Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang

Subject: Sino-Japanese Relations

I called upon Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang this afternoon to present Admiral Taylor. In the course of our visit I asked the Marshal if he had any information about the Nakamura case and he said that he had received nothing new, that an investigation was being made. He said that this incident had occurred in an area where it was very difficult to give protection to people. It was a lawless area in the neighborhood of Taonan. He said that Nakamura, who was an officer in the Japanese army, had applied for a passport to visit this area but had been refused such a passport at Mukden; that he had later gone to the Kirin authorities and there, giving another name, had described himself as a professor of archeology or agriculture and had received a permit to make the journey. He indicated that he was awaiting information as to just what had happened and did not seem worried as to the results.

Nelson Trusler Johnson
American Minister

NTJ/hp

1203

Conversation.

Peiping, Sept. 17, 1931

Mr. H. A. Wilden, French Minister

Subject: Sino-Japanese Relations

I called upon the French Minister this morning in company with Admiral Taylor and in the course of conversation I asked the French Minister whether he had any information in regard to Sino-Japanese relations, particularly as it might apply to the Nakamura case.

Mr. Wilden went and got a despatch which he had received from the French consul at Mukden in which the French consul quoted a conversation he had had with the Japanese Consul General in the course of which the latter had stated that they had positive proof that Captain Nakamura had been executed by the Chinese authorities. The French consul quoted the Japanese Consul General as stating that the Japanese Government took this matter very seriously and intended to take drastic action unless the Chinese made proper amends. The French consul quoted the Japanese Consul General as stating that they had ample evidence in the shape of eye witnesses to prove their case and that all of this would be available for use at the appropriate moment.

Nelson Trusler Johnson
American Minister

NTJ/hp

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1203

Conversation.

Peiping, Sept. 19, 1931

Mr. Yano, Counselor of Japanese Legation

Subject: Sino-Japanese Relations

I went to see Mr. Yano at 12 noon today to ask him if he had any information regarding the events at Mukden last night. He said that his information so far was extremely meager but that the latest telegrams would seem to indicate that the incident arose owing to the action of some three or four hundred Chinese soldiers who were attempting to blow up the line of the South Manchuria Railway immediately to the north of the city of Mukden. When the news was received by the Japanese headquarters they immediately sent some forces to investigate and prevent further damage or interruption to traffic. When they arrived on the scene they were opposed by the Chinese soldiers and a brief engagement ensued. The Japanese forces thereupon decided, as a precautionary measure and to prevent a possible attack on their own garrison in Mukden, to occupy certain important sections of the city. This occupation was completed early this morning.

In reply to my question whether the incident had any connection with representations made to the Chinese Government by the Japanese Government as a result of other incidents that had occurred in Manchuria, Mr. Yano replied that there was no connection whatsoever and that, on the contrary,

they

- 2 -

they were very much encouraged by the conciliatory attitude which the Chinese had recently shown in connection with the Nakamura affair.

Again in reply to my question whether the rumor was true that the railroad junction at Kaopangtzu had been occupied by Japanese troops, he replied that he had no information and that he doubted it very much.

CVHE/hp

C. Van H. Engert,
First Secretary of Legation.

Conversation.

Peiping, Sept. 19, 1931
2:30 a.m.

Mr. W. H. Donald, Advisor to Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Relations

Mr. Donald just called me by telephone and said that Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang had received a telegram from Mukden stating that a little before 10 p.m. the evening of the 18th a squad of Japanese soldiers had left the Japanese area and proceeding southeast of Mukden had commenced firing with rifles at the east camp and at the arsenal. He said they were also using a cannon and were apparently firing shells on the city at the rate of one every ten minutes; that one had landed somewhere near the Japanese monument. He said that at that time it was reported that some seventy Chinese soldiers had been killed in the east camp but they had no information as to what damage had been done in the city. He informed me that Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang had issued orders restricting troops to barracks and depoting all arms and had forbade any retaliatory measures.

Mr. Donald stated that he had received a personal message to the effect that firing was continuing at one o'clock this morning and that Japanese soldiers had been seen marching in the direction of the west gate of the city, the inference being that the Japanese were making a move to occupy the city of Mukden. Mr. Donald stated that their information

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

tion was that apparently the Japanese military had
got completely out of hand at Mukden, that the Japanese
civilian authorities, namely the consul general, were
powerless to do anything.

Nelson Trusler Johnson
American Minister

NTJ/hp

6.

1203

Conversation.

Peiping, Sept. 19, 1931

Dr. Wellington Koo

Subject: Sino-Japanese Relations

Dr. Wellington Koo called upon me this morning. In the course of conversation he confirmed statements made previously to me by Mr. Donald, advisor to Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, as to events in Mukden and in Manchuria last night. He stated that all this had come as a complete surprise to Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang who had given strict orders to his forces not to resist any attacks by Japanese.

Dr. Koo brought up the possibility of action under the Covenant of the League, the Nine Power Treaty of 1922, concerning principles and policies and the Kellogg Pact. He asked whether there was any indication as to action by the United States Government, either under the Kellogg Pact or under the Nine Power Treaty.

I told Dr. Koo that I was without any information as to possible action by the United States Government in regard to this question; that it was a little soon for the United States Government to take action as it was without adequate information as to the facts. Dr. Koo stated that he was merely thinking out loud in regard to the possibilities of the situation and hoped that I would inform him of any reactions which my Government might have.

Nelson Trusler Johnson
American Minister

NTJ/hp

Conversation.

Peiping, Sept. 21, 1931

Dr. Wellington Koo

Subject: Sino-Japanese Relations

Dr. Koo called upon me again today and I gave him such information as to the situation in Manchuria as I had. He asked me whether I had had any word from Washington as to possible action by Washington and I said that I had none. He referred to a statement which appeared in the press today to the effect that someone in the Department of State had said that events in Manchuria did not appear to justify or require action under the Kellogg Pact.

I told Dr. Koo that I did not believe that this emanated from responsible authorities in the Department. I said I felt sure that the Department had made no statements on the subject and was waiting for complete data before making a statement one way or the other.

Nelson Trusler Johnson
American Minister

NTJ/hp

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Conversation.

Peiping, Sept. 23, 1931

Sir Miles Lampson, British Minister

Subject: Sino-Japanese Relations

I called on the British Minister this morning and told him that I had received from Nanking a copy of a formal appeal to the United States Government from the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs under the Kellogg Pact in relation to the occupation of Manchuria by Japanese military forces.

Sir Miles told me that he had received nothing from Nanking except a general appeal which he said he had forwarded without comment to London. He said that he had purposely refrained from taking any action in London as he did not wish to give the appearance of bias in the matter.

I told Sir Miles that I had telegraphed my Government my personal views on the situation to the effect that the action taken by Japan in Manchuria appeared to me to be premeditated and carried out according to a very well worked-out plan; that force was used and I felt that it must be considered as falling within any definition of war; that in any case under Article II of the Kellogg Pact it could not be interpreted as a pacific method of settling a dispute between Japan and China. Sir Miles agreed with me that this was so; said that he was interested to know that I had taken this action and said he would so inform his Government. I promised him a copy of the appeal which had been sent to us by the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Nelson Trusler Johnson
American Minister

NTJ/hp

Conversation.

Peiping, Sept. 26, 1931

Sir Miles Lampson, British Minister

Subject: Sino-Japanese Relations

After dinner this evening I accompanied the British Minister to his house where he read to me certain messages from London and Geneva in relation to action being taken before the League in connection with the occupation of Manchuria by Japan. It appeared from these messages that it was being urged before the League that the League ask the Japanese to withdraw all military from points now occupied in preparation for an impartial investigation. I understood that it was being recommended ^{that} ~~in~~ the United States Government be given the documents describing League action for its information, it being hoped that the Government of the United States would cooperate with the members of the League in bringing influence to bear at Tokyo in the interest of moderation.

Nelson Trusler Johnson
American Minister

NTJ/hp

1203

Conversation.

Peiping, Sept. 25, 1931

Mr. W. H. Donald, Advisor to Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang

Subject: Sino-Japanese Relations

Mr. Donald, advisor to Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, came this morning as he has come on several occasions recently and, as on previous occasions, I gave him such information as I had in regard to conditions in Manchuria. Mr. Donald read to me a series of telegrams transmitted to him by Mr. T. V. Soong, Minister of Finance, generally covering the action of the League and possible action by Japan in response to the League's action over the situation in Manchuria. This information was generally to the effect that the Japanese Government was disposed to reject the suggestions of the League, particularly any suggestion of a commission of investigation.

Mr. Donald showed me in confidence a personal letter which he had received from Mr. T. V. Soong in which T.V. referred to the fact that he was repeating information by telegraph to Donald and was urging the Young Marshal to continue his present policy. T. V. in this letter expressed the fear that some of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang's subordinates might, because of their desire to save their property in Manchuria, be willing to make peace with the Japanese. T. V. expressed the hope that the Manchurian forces would be able to withstand all overtures on the part of the Japanese. He stated that he

felt

- 2 -

felt that in the discussions of the League China had won a complete victory and that if they could only hold out now with all the Powers behind them they would find a complete settlement of all their difficulties with Japan.

I told Mr. Donald that I was afraid this statement on the part of Mr. T. V. Soong revealed too great an optimism. I felt fairly certain that T.V.'s feeling was that Japan had made a great mistake by what she had done in Manchuria and had given the Chinese an extraordinary opportunity, supported by the League and the Powers signatory to the Kellogg Pact, to force Japan out of Manchuria, out of the railway zone and out of the Kwantung Leased Territory. This was the interpretation which I put upon T. V. Soong's use of the words "what apparently is a great calamity may prove a blessing in disguise" preceding his statement that with the support of the League, China would obtain a settlement of all difficulties. Donald agreed with me that if this was what was in T.V.'s mind, then it was very sad because in our opinion there was no chance that the Chinese could by these means obtain all of the ends aimed at in Manchuria looking to the ousting of the Japanese from possession of the railway, ~~and~~ the railway settlements and the Leased Territory. I stated that I was the more prepared to believe that T.V. Soong entertained

- 3 -

entertained this view inasmuch as I had been informed
that this was the attitude of Dr. C. T. Wang in the
negotiations relative to extraterritoriality.

Nelson Trusler Johnson
American Minister

NTJ/hp

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1203

Conversation.

Peiping, Sept. 25, 1931

Dr. Wellington Koo

Subject: Sino-Japanese Relations

Dr. Koo called and in the course of conversation I gave him such information as I had received up to today in regard to conditions in Manchuria. I informed Dr. Koo that according to a message I had received from Washington, the Department had seen the Japanese Ambassador and the Chinese Charge on three separate occasions and on all three occasions had urged cessation of hostilities. I stated that the Department had received the Chinese appeal under the Kellogg Pact and was giving it consideration. I said that my Government, in response to a communication from the Council of the League of Nations, had assured the Council that it was in wholehearted sympathy with the attitude of the League and that it would despatch to Japan and to China notes along lines similar to those contained in paragraphs one and two of the League Council's resolutions adopted on September 21st.

Dr. Koo stated that on behalf of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang he wanted to express his sincere appreciation of the way in which the consul at Mukden had conducted himself, his sincere and unbiased attempts to get at the facts in the matter and in keeping the Legation and his Government informed. He said that news of the action of the United States was having a good effect locally.

Nelson Trusler Johnson
 American Minister

NTJ/hp

12.
1203

Conversation.

Peiping, Sept. 25, 1931

Mr. Hayes, Presbyterian Mission

Subject: Chinese Student Activities

Mr. Hayes called to state that for the past two years the Christian students of Peiping had been working together for the purpose of trying to change their activities in regard to foreigners and foreign relations from an attitude of destruction to one of constructive understanding of the whole situation and that he had been meeting with groups of these students to that end. He said that recently, with the occurrence of events in Manchuria he had been invited and had accepted the invitation to join a committee to advise a group of students organized for the purpose of investigating the facts connected with Japanese activities in Manchuria. He said that this business had been going on very quietly now that the students were publishing a daily periodical giving the facts as they learned them and that this was proving very useful to them and the public generally; that however, recently the matter had been going a step further; that he had been asked to join with a number of others in a group to be sent to Mukden for relief purposes. He said he had the feeling in this connection that the students had some ulterior purpose to serve, just what purpose he did not know but he thought it was for the purpose of assisting in getting a number
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

of the students or other Chinese into Mukden under the protection of foreigners and the Red Cross not so much for purposes of relief as for the purpose of acquiring first hand information.

I told Mr. Hayes that I hoped he would be able to steer clear of any such enterprise. I said that it did not make any difference what we thought about the ethics of Japanese action in Manchuria, the actual fact was that the Japanese were in occupation of Manchuria and that any attempt on the part of American citizens to go into that area at the present time should be carried out along thoroughly bonafide lines; that no good purpose could be served by attempting in deceit or fraud to visit places or to acquire information which the Japanese in actual military occupation did not wish acquired. I said that sofar as I knew there was no cause for relief in Mukden at the present time. Conditions were normal and the only difficulty was that the Japanese had gone in and ousted the Chinese administration.

Mr. Hayes said that he agreed with my views on this subject and that in any case he was leaving tonight for Shanghai where he would not be under the necessity of making any decision in this matter one way or the other.

Nelson Trusler Johnson
American Minister

NTJ/hp

No. 140

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

AMERICAN CONSULATE
GENERAL

Mukden, China, October 6, 1931.

OCT 26 31

SUBJECT: Japanese Occupation of South Manchuria.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FEB 1 - 1932
ASSISTANT SECRETARY
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON.

Division of
EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 27 1931
Department of State

SIR:

1/ I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy
of my despatch No. 451, dated September 30, 1931,
to the Legation, Peiping, entitled "Japanese Occu-
pation of South Manchuria.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers
M. S. Myers
American Consul General.

1/ Enclosure: Copy of despatch No. 451.

Original and four copies to Department.

MSM:AAB
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FILED

No. 451.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, China.

September 30, 1931.

SUBJECT: Japanese Occupation of South
Manchuria.

CONFIDENTIAL.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping, China.

Sir:

In continuation of my despatch No. 449 of
September 26, 1931, under the title "Japanese
Occupation of South Manchuria", I have the honor
to refer to my telegrams of yesterday and to re-
port upon further developments. Although the mili-
tary situation appears stabilized the political
situation is becoming more complex, or at least out-
wardly so.

Quiet reigns at Mukden, but in spite of the ef-
forts of the Japanese, confidence is slow to revive.
Several Chinese banks resumed business on the 28th
(Bank of China and Bank of Communications) but most
of the native shops in the city are still closed.
The municipal office, under the direction of Major

Doihara

- 2 -

Doihara, is functioning with the assistance of the former Chinese staff. The police department of the municipal office, under Feng Ching-yi as Chief, has recruited 3,000 Chinese policemen, about 500 of whom are now reported to be armed. The spread of armed robbery in and about the city and the desire of the Japanese to restore confidence are probably responsible for the arming of part of the force.

In my telegram dated September 29th, 10 a.m. it was reported that a new government at Kirin was organized on September 26th under the title of "Provisional Provincial Government of Kirin" with Hsi Ch'ia (熙 洽) - not Ch'i Sha as given in my telegram -, acting Chairman in the absence of General Chang Tso-hsiang, as Governor. Most of the other provincial government officials were re-appointed to their former posts. The official announcement in regard to the change states that the public bodies and official bureaux decided at a meeting to establish in Kirin city a provisional provincial government which shall control the civil, military and judicial administration of the province, for which the governor shall assume full responsibility. The regulations governing the organization of the government provide, inter alia, that the office of the governor shall be called (吉林省長官公署) and that the governor is vested with full authority over civil and military

affairs

- 3 -

affairs and with the superintendence of the judicial affairs of the whole province.

Hsi Ch'ia, who has been Chief of Staff under General Chang Tso-hsiang, is a member of the young Kirin party which advocates "government by Kirinites" and is opposed to the influence of Mukden. Chang Tso-hsiang, it will be remembered, is a Fengtien man and it is believed, therefore, that the formation of this government marks the termination of his control of the province. The General is in mourning at his home in Chihhsien on the Peking-Mukden railway or, at least, was there at the outbreak of the trouble.

Hsi Ch'ia was educated in Japan and his action in removing Chou Yu-pin, Mayor and Delegate for Foreign Affairs at Changchun, who handled the Wampaoshan case, and the Mayor and Delegate for Foreign Affairs at Yenchi (in Chientao), officials regarded as antagonistic to the Japanese, is an indication that the new government has adopted a more friendly attitude to the Japanese and probably has been given their blessing if not active assistance. This government is, for the present at least, independent of Mukden and Nanking. It will be noted that the old form of government rather than the committee form, prescribed by Nanking, has been adopted. It is claimed, furthermore, that this government is unfavorably disposed toward Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang. In the opinion of a well informed

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- 4 -

and reliable Japanese, the friendly attitude of this government toward the Japanese may be described as "window dressing" and when conditions change an entirely different front may be shown. The Japanese troops at Kirin, it has been learned, will be further reduced within a few days but their complete withdrawal is not to be expected in the near future.

- 1/ As of possible interest, there is enclosed herewith a copy of a statement from an American regarding the occupation of Kirin city. The description of the Chinese reaction to Japanese occupation is of particular interest. For obvious reasons, this statement should be regarded as confidential.

The Chinese committee for the maintenance of peace and order at Mukden which was formed on September 25, as already reported, comprises the following ex-officials: Yuan Chin-K'ai (袁金凱), - an official of long experience who has been a member of the Political Council at Mukden; Yu Ch'ung-han (于冲汉) a returned student from Japan, formerly Chief of the Special Administration Area at Harbin and one time associated with Japanese in the operation of electric light works and iron mines; K'an Chao-hsi (閻朝璽), a military commissioner in Manchuria and later Tutung of Jehol; Li Yu-lan (李友蘭), a former director of the local government bank and a

director

- 5 -

director of Sino-Japanese enterprises; Ting Chien-hsiu (丁鑑修), a returned student from Japan and a director of a Sino-Japanese iron mine; Sun Tsu-ch'ang (孫祖昌), a former director of the Mukden Cotton Mill and a departmental chief in the Ministry of Interior, Nanking; Chang Ch'eng-chi (張成箕), a former chairman of the Provincial Assembly; Chin Liang (金梁) a scholar and the director of the Palace Museum, Mukden; Tung Chao-yuan (佟兆元), one time director of the Sino-Japanese Yalu River Timber Company and later Commissioner of Foreign Affairs at Newchwang. Four of the nine men have been closely associated with Japanese. With the understanding and probably with the assistance of the Japanese military, this group is reliably reported to be organizing a new provincial government at Mukden. Propaganda in this connection appear in the press almost daily in one form or another. The declaration of a Committee of Gentry for the Settlement of the Situation (its composition unknown) which appeared on the 28th was to the effect that the people of the Northeastern provinces have been oppressed by militarists for many years and now the opportunity exists for the establishment of an independent government that will promote the welfare of the people. The declaration further stated that they (the committee) oppose both Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang and Chiang Kai-shih and will not recognize the new provincial government

at

- 6 -

at Chinh sien.

It seems to be the opinion of well informed Japanese that Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang will not be able to return to Mukden and it is doubted that he has any intention of coming here. Too, there is reason to believe that the Japanese are not anxious to have him return. His father (Chang Tso-lin) was not in later years popular with the Japanese as his end proved and the great effort that the Japanese made in 1928 to prevent the son's aligning himself with Nanking and subsequent events in this connection are sufficient evidence of their hearty disfavor. With two Manchuria provinces organizing independent provincial governments with a personnel outwardly favorable to the Japanese and under circumstances that may force these governments to rely upon Japan for support and guidance, Japan is at last, it would seem, face to face with a situation that it was desired to create in 1928. It is doubted if China's proposed method of meeting the existing situation, that is, by refusing to negotiate and by carrying on a wholesale boycott, will have any but unfortunate effects. During the boycott of Japanese goods a few years ago, a responsible Japanese expressed the view that if China continued to harrass Japan and destroy its trade by boycotts on every occasion it would be far better to forego all trade with China proper and in its stead concentrate

on

- 7 -

on the extension of Japanese interests in Manchuria which it could dominate if necessary.

A few sidelights on the Japanese occupation may be of interest. As was reported, many of the officials bolted as soon as they realized what had happened. Tsang Shih-yi (臧式毅), the Chairman of the provincial government, remained at his residence until he was placed under detention by the Japanese military and removed to the Commercial Settlement. He was subsequently released but shortly thereafter was re-arrested because of the despatch of a telegram, according to Chinese information. Liu Ho-lin (劉鶴齡), the Commissioner of Industry, was arrested at Newchwang and was brought to Mukden but was later released. All government offices and establishments were seized, sealed or occupied by the Japanese military and according to reliable information documents and other property have been removed from them. The office of the Special Delegate of Foreign Affairs, the representative of the Nanking Foreign Office, was labeled as occupied by the Japanese military and some documents, it is so claimed, were removed from its archives; others were placed under seal. The same treatment was accorded to the Marshal's headquarters, from which, it is said, 15 private motor cars were removed. The private residences of a number of prominent officials who were absent from Mukden were also occupied by the Japanese military. The arsenals were naturally seized and

some

- 8 -

some parts of them destroyed or damaged. Much military equipment, it is alleged, has been removed as also some plant equipment. The Chinese banks were closed and their vaults sealed, and since then only the Bank of China and Bank of Communications were opened (on September 28th) for limited business. The Provincial Bank and the Frontier Bank are still closed. As has been admitted in the case of government banks at Changchun, it seems likely that the Japanese are thoroughly investigating the resources of the banks, more particularly in respect to note issues. The Mukden Electric Light Works and the Fengtien Cotton Mill, government enterprises, have been taken over by the Japanese, the former now being operated under Japanese management while the latter is closed. At Antung, the new electric light plant, entirely equipped with American machinery which has not been fully paid for, has been closed by the Japanese and current is now being supplied to the Chinese city by the Japanese plant in the Settlement. The radio stations at Mukden, one communicating with San Francisco and the other with Hauen, Germany, have been closed. Some of these actions seem to lack adequate justification and in any event can only be explained by the existence of a state of war which the Japanese deny.

The sudden closing of Chinese official offices and of such government enterprises as the arsenals and cotton mill has thrown large numbers of laborers

out

- 9 -

out of work - an estimate places the number at 30,000 - whose limited resources are quickly exhausted. The pay of the workmen in the large arsenal was two months in arrear and of the operatives of the trench mortar arsenal was to have been distributed on the following day (September 19). The funds for this purpose were seized at the time of the capture of the arsenal by the Japanese and the other organizations no doubt have credit balances in the Government banks which could be utilized for paying the wages due and relieving the distress on this account. Philanthropic societies and the Chamber of Commerce, with the sanction and cooperation of the Municipal Office, are affording relief to the needy in the form of food which is now being furnished to about 10,000 persons per day. Chinese military stores are also being used for this purpose. This condition of affairs is no doubt partly responsible for the increasing robbery in the city.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers.
American Consul General.

1/ Enclosure: Statement regarding the occupation of Kirin.

Original and two copies to Legation.
Five copies to Department.
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo,
Copy to Consulate General, Harbin.

MSM:AAB
800.

Enclosure No. 1, to despatch No. 451, of H. B. Myers,
American Consul General, Mukden, China, to the Legation,
Peiping, dated September 30, 1931, on the subject
"Japanese Occupation of South Manchuria."

The news dispatches which you see are probably recording fairly accurately what has been happening in Kirin, as elsewhere. (As I write this paragraph I am also watching an airplane flying about over our city.) Plain clothes soldiery arrived Sunday night and with clubs and guns patrolled the streets Monday. Two military trains of 40 cars each arrived Monday night and on Tuesday morning field pieces and supply wagons were lined up on the wide street leading from the city's main east gate past the Japanese Consulate to the RR station. Mounted soldiers in company of 50 or 100 rode through the streets. At noon Monday a military airplane flew over the city distributing leaflets on which was printed the military proclamation of the Japanese Commander-in-Chief. Since that date an airplane (not always the same machine) has made one or more flights over the city and surrounding country daily. Communications were at once paralyzed by the seizure of all three railroads by the forceful closing of the Chinese Telegraph Administration, and by the refusal of the military to transport the mails. All banks were sealed save the one Japanese financial institution in this city and important centers occupied, beginning with the government yamen and the provincial party headquarters.

Succeeding days brought only greater uncertainty and military demonstrations by artillery and cavalry parades through the principal streets and by the flying airplanes overhead. Droskies drove by filled with soldiers carrying guns with fixed bayonets guarding one or more terror-stricken Korean students. A line of such carriages told us of a "big haul" that had been made in one of the schools of the city, all of which have some Korean students.

Beginning Thursday conditions improved. Newspapers from the outside are coming in; two telegrams were dispatched by us with the aid of the Japanese Consul-General; and it is reported that the Bank of China opened for business for two hours yesterday afternoon. Passenger trains on the Kirin-Changchun RR are now running and the house-to-house search for "weapons" and Korean people is about over. And yesterday the removal of \$800,000 from the provincial depositories to the Japanese Consulate was completed, so that the streets are now all open to ordinary traffic.

The

- 2 -

The first thing to be recorded about this terrible affair is the utter and complete humiliation that is felt by everyone. One cannot witness bitter weeping by strong men in financial and educational circles without realizing that the rancor of this experience will last a lifetime. Secondly, one is moved by the confession of personal failures and the general condemnation of the folly and worse, committed by official leaders in the face of terrible suffering within the country and invasion from without. "What as educationalists and business men have we done. to prepare our people to meet these disasters, and where are the guardians of our homes and country?" - such are some of the questions that are now being asked of individual hearts and concerning the public officers at present in Peiping, in Nanking and in Canton.

Finally, there is wide and troubled speculation concerning the ability of the military forces and government thus to violate completely the provisions of the Paris Peace Treaty and not be brought to accountability by the League of Nations. The people of Manchuria realize that Japan has grievances which have not received the attention of Moukden and of Nanking that they deserve; but they know, as all the world should know, that what has been happening in Manchuria this past week is WAR, and that both Japan and China are signatories of the Paris Peace Pact OUTLAWING WAR. They understand the cunning that is behind the telegram from Tokyo announcing that the Japanese government has instructed that this affair be treated as a "local issue"; but they are puzzled by a Reuter's dispatch from Washington that the officials of the Department of State do not feel that the Kellogg-Briand Peace Treaty has been violated.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 41

AMERICAN CONSULATE

Mukden, China, October 6, 1931.

SUBJECT

Independence Movement at Mukden

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

NOV 10 1931

Department of State

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

OCT 27 1931

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

1/ I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy
of my despatch No. 452, dated October 2, 1931,
to the Legation, Peiping, entitled "Independence
Movement at Mukden."

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers
M. S. Myers,
American Consul General.

1/ Enclosure: Copy of despatch No. 452.

Original and four copies to Department.
1 copy attached to note APR 4

MSM:AAB
800.

793.94/2348

NOV 14 1931
RECEIVED

NO FE
11/14/31
RH

No. 452.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, China.

October 2, 1931.

SUBJECT: Independence Movement at Mukden.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping, China.

Sir:

793.94/2347 Referring to my confidential despatch No.
451 dated September 30, 1931, on the subject of
the Japanese occupation of South Manchuria and to
my strictly confidential telegram dated October 2,
1931, 10 a.m. regarding the independence movement
at Mukden, I have the honor to report further par-
ticulars concerning this movement.

As was stated in my telegram Japanese press re-
ports are giving much publicity to this independence
movement and are representing it as being promoted
by Chinese, with the Japanese authorities maintaining
a strictly impartial and neutral attitude. The names
of Yuan Chin-k'ai, K'an Chao-hsi and several others
who are described as being opposed to General Chang

Hsueh

- 2 -

Hsueh-liang are prominently mentioned in connection with this movement. One Japanese report was to the effect that these men had appealed to the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese forces for assistance in overthrowing Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang and establishing an independent government. These statements are believed to be a gross misrepresentation of facts which may have been put out to screen the^{real}/authorship because the Chinese have not responded to these advances as readily as had been anticipated. Mr. Yuan Chin-k'ai is known to this office and yesterday one member of the staff (a Chinese) called on him. Mr. Yuan, it may be added, is the head of the Chinese Committee of Centry for the Maintenance of Peace and Order which was formed on September 25 at the solicitation of the Japanese.

In substance, Mr. Yuan stated that he has been strongly urged by the Japanese military to organize an independent government at Mukden and that he has repeatedly refused to do so; that if this pressure is continued he will be obliged to resign from the above mentioned committee. He thought it likely that the Japanese have also approached others for the same reason but professed to have no knowledge on this point. The names of Chang Tsung-ch'ang, the ex-Emperor Hsuan T'ung and several others, as given in press reports, were mentioned. He further stated that the Japanese are strongly opposed to the return

to

- 3 -

to Manchuria of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang and desire to eliminate his influence here; also that the Japanese have said to him that they were not concerned over the personnel of the government so long as it does ^{include} not Chang Hsueh-liang or one of his followers. Mr. Yuan realizes that any independent government that may be set up will have to look to Japan for support. Naturally this information was given as confidential.

During the conversation the attitude of the Japanese towards the local official banks, which are still closed, was brought up. The view was expressed that the opening of the Frontier Bank might be delayed for a considerable time in view of Chang Hsueh-liang's large interest in it. Discussions regarding the opening of the Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces are going on, he said, and as soon as certain questions are settled the bank is likely to resume business. The Japanese are investigating the silver reserves held by these banks against their respective note issues and the opinion was expressed that adequate steps will be taken to support these note issues and prevent any losses.

Mr. Yuan's statements, it is believed, can be relied upon. Generally they substantiate the observations which were made in my despatch of September 30, 1931, in regard to the Japanese attitude towards Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang and Japanese connection with the independence movement. The Chinese, it

would

- 4 -


would seem, would do well to enter upon negotiations with the Japanese at once and demand that the provincial chairman of this province, Tsang Shih-yi, an official with an excellent record, be released and be permitted to resume his functions. The longer the delay in re-establishing Chinese authority in Mukden, the greater the chance of a government being set up by irresponsible persons who will be the puppets of the Japanese.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers.
American Consul General.

Original and two copies to Legation.
Five copies to Department.
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.

MSM:AAB
800.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

October 24, 1931.

Dear Mr. Henry:

For the information of the French
 Embassy, I send you herewith a copy of
 the identic note sent by the American
 Government to the Japanese and the
 Chinese Governments on October 20.

The text of this note has not yet
 been made public.


Very truly yours,

[Handwritten signature]

Enclosure:
 Copy of note.

Mr. Jules Henry,

Counselor of French Embassy.



OR *[Handwritten mark]*
 Oct. 26, 1931.

SKH/VDM

793.94/2348A

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

TEXT OF IDENTIC NOTES TO THE JAPANESE AND THE
 CHINESE GOVERNMENTS DESPATCHED OCTOBER 20, 1931.

The Government and people of the United States have observed with concern the events of the last month in Manchuria. When the difference between Japan and China came to a head on September 19th one of the parties to the dispute referred the matter to the League of Nations and since that time the American Government by representations through diplomatic channels, has steadily cooperated with the League in its efforts to secure a peaceful settlement. A threat of war, wherever it may arise, is of profound concern to the whole world and for this reason the American Government, like other Governments, was constrained to call to the attention of both disputants the serious dangers involved in the present situation.

This Government now desires, as do other signatories of the Treaty for the Renunciation of War, particularly to call to the attention of the Japanese and the Chinese Governments the obligations which they voluntarily assumed when they became parties to that Treaty, especially the obligations of Article II, which reads:

"The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means."

The American Government takes this occasion again to express its earnest hope that Japan and China will refrain from any measures which might lead to war and that they will find it possible in the near future to agree upon a method for resolving by peaceful means, in accordance with their promises and in keeping with the confident expectations of public opinion throughout the world, the issues over which they are at present in controversy.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 28, 1931.

~~SECRET~~ *RCM*
SHE:
The enclosures to this despatch are "bulletins" issued by the Japanese military authorities at Tientsin, copies of which were sent to the Commander of the American troops at Tientsin and thence to the Legation.

The information we have had from a number of sources. The only point of interest is to note the thorough manner in which the Japanese military authorities attempt to justify their actions. This is the chief characteristic of the Japanese propaganda while that the Chinese seems to me to be: "We have done and can do no wrong".

[Signature]

JEJ



AM 7:30

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Peiping, September 30, 1931.

No. 1198

SEP 28 1931



793.94

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

793.94/1794

Referring to the Legation's telegram No. 599
of September 19, 2.30 a.m., and to subsequent re-
ports of the Japanese occupation of Southern Man-
churia, I have the honor to transmit herewith a
1/ copy of a letter dated September 19, 1931, which
Lieutenant Colonel Takeuchi, the Chief of Staff of
the Japanese forces in Tientsin, addressed to the
Commanding Officer, United States Army Forces in
China. (Enclosure No. 1).

This letter was followed by five subsequent
"bulletins" from the same source (Enclosures Nos.
2-6), all of which give the official Japanese ver-
sion of the events in Manchuria between September
18th and 21st, as furnished by the military au-
thorities

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NOV 5 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

thorities on the spot.

These documents were put at the Legation's
disposal by Colonel James D. Taylor at Tientsin.

Respectfully yours,

For the Minister:


C. Van H. Engert
First Secretary of Legation.

✓
Enclosure:

1: Copy of letter from
Lieutenant-Colonel T. Takeuchi,
September 19, 1931.

CVHE/js.

800.

COPY

Enclosure No. 1
Despatch No. 1198

HEADQUARTERS.
IMPERIAL JAPANESE FORCES IN CHINA,
TIENTSIN.

Tientsin, September 19, 1931.

Sir:

For your information, I beg to let you have an official information addressed to these Headquarters by the Japanese military organ at Mukden on the 18th instant, at 11.00 p.m.

"On the 18th September, at about 10.30 p.m. the outrageous Chinese troops destroyed the S.M.Ry line at the north end of Mukden, the west side of Pei Tai Ying, and also they attacked the Japanese guards, thus resulting to a skirmish between the Chinese troops and a part of the Japanese guards who were immediately despatched there. This being informed, the 2nd battalion of the Japanese Independent Garrison at Mukden is now moving to the spot."

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

(Signed) T. Takeuchi,
Lieutenant-Colonel,
Chief of Staff.

Chief of Staff,
American Troops in China,
Tientsin.

A true copy: JS;

Enclosure No. 2

Despatch No. 1198

INFORMATION NO. 2

Regarding the sino-Japanese military situation at Mukden and some other parts of Manchuria, the following informations have been received by these Headquarters:-

1.- The walled city of Mukden.

The 29th Japanese infantry regiment overcame the resistance of the Chinese troops and they occupied the inner walled city of Mukden on the early morning of this 19th September, and then the Commanding General of the 2nd Division, after having the different units of the Division successively arrived under his direct command, succeeded in driving out the Chinese troops at the eastern area of Mukden.

2.- Pei Ta Ying.

The 2nd Battalion of the Japanese Independent Garrison occupied Pei Ta Ying on the early morning of the 19th after they have overcome the stubborn resistance of their enemies. Later on, the Commanding General of the Japanese Independent Garrison was ordered to sweep away the Chinese troops stationed near Tung Ta Ying, having under his direct command the different units of the Independent Garrison successively arrived and also about one half of the 2nd Regiment of the Field Artillery.

3.- Chang Chun.

The 1st Battalion of the Japanese Infantry 4th Regiment had a brush with the Chinese troops stationed near

Kuan Cheng Tze and a fighting is now going on.
Hq.I.J.Forces in China.Tientsin. 19th September, 1931.

Enclosure No. 2

Despatch No. 1198

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Hq.I.J.Forces in China, Tientsin, 19th September, 1931.

106

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 3
Despatch No. 1198

INFORMATION NO. 3.

September 20.

I. Japanese Military authorities stationed here have made strict precaution against the present condition in co-operation with Gendarmerie and Police authorities and ordered every man not to do provocative acts.

II. Wan Shu Cheng, Commanding General of the 2nd Army, ordered the 44th Regiment (less one Battalion) and the 643rd Regiment stationed at Ta Cheng to Tientsin in haste. (These Regiments are expected to reach Tientsin by this evening.)

Then the whole strength of Chinese troops is estimated at about 15,000 men including Chinese Armed Polices.

III. Considering the fact that Chinese Troops are characteristic of doing unexpected and unreasonable acts whenever they find an opportunity to make advantage of, Japanese Troops must be strictly on the alert on this occasion.

INFORMATION NO. 4

- 1.- It is confirmed that 10,000 cases containing shells which were coming from Mukden have arrived at Tientsin to-day at 10 a.m. and that they are forwarded to Peking successively.
- 2.- The Chinese 29th Brigade stationed at Yang Liu Ching is ordered to prepare a movement and all men of the Brigade are now strained.
- 3.- One battalion of the Bodyguards arrived here from Mukden moved away towards Peking passing through the East station this morning, at 10.00 o'clock.

Hq. I.J. Forces in China,
Tientsin, 21st Sept. '31.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

5
1198

INFORMATION NO. 5

I.- The cause of the recent Sino-Japanese clash in Manchuria has gradually become clear.

On the 18th September, at about 10.30 p.m., about two companies of the Chinese troops led by an officer blew up the S.M.Ry line at the south-west side of Pei Ta Ying and they proceeded taking an offensive position towards Liu Tiao Ho where there were the Japanese railway guards. The Japanese Infantry company at Ho Shih Tai, being informed of this, immediately rushed outward for help, marching on the railroad, but the Chinese troops then retreated into their own barracks from the south-west side of Pei Ta Ying and the main force of the Chinese troops opened a fire against the Japanese troops in pursuit from the east side of the barracks. The latter occupied a corner of the barracks and responded to a fire at once, informing at the same time the Headquarters of Battalion of the event. The above company was immediately reinforced by the Headquarters of the Battalion and they continued to attack Pei Ta Ying.

It is thus revealed that the Chinese troops should be held responsible for the motive of the clash and that they had an intentional plan for doing so about a week before.

II.- The Japanese Troops in Kuan Tung leased territory cleared up Tung Ta Ying and Pei Ta Ying where there were the Chinese troops by making use of a portion of the 2nd Division and the main force of the Independent Garrison

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lutz NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

respectively. At Chang Chun, the main force of the 30th Infantry Regiment and the 1st Infantry Battalion were dispatched there to reinforce the Japanese troops as the Chinese troops at Nan Ling were making a stubborn resistance and it was feared that the Japanese troops might be isolated.

Our troops in Manchuria are now concentrated at Mukden, leaving a portion of them at Tung Fa Ying, and the peace and order in the native city of Mukden are kept by the Japanese gendarmes as well as a portion of our 29th Infantry Regiment, while the protection of the S.M. Railway is carried out as effectively as possible.

3. The Japanese troops in Manchuria took their actions so promptly and positively this time. It was simply because the general attitude of the Chinese authorities in Manchuria and comparatively small strength of the Japanese troops distributed in the vast territory of Manchuria required our prompt actions in order to prevent far greater disorders which were anticipated all over Manchuria.
4. According to a telegram received from Mukden the Japanese troops who occupied the North Camp (Pei Fa Ying) found a great many heaps of cast-off cartridges inside the barracks in which the military cadets corps and the special corps for training purpose were stationed. Judging from this fact, it was almost certain that a large quantity of the ammunition was distributed to the barracks beforehand and we cannot help of thinking of the Chinese plan traced out in anticipation. Hq.I.J.Forces in China, Tientsin - 21st September, 1931.

6
1198

INFORMATION NO. 8

The following informations have been received up to the evening of the 21st. September, 1931.

I. Chi Lin.

The general situation has become more threatening and the Chi Lin troops seemed to have started a movement. Some of these troops fired upon the houses of the Japanese residents. It is also reported that the Deputy-Governor of the Province notified the Japanese authorities that he is unable to give any more protection to the Japanese residents, who, therefore tried to make their families evacuate Chi Lin but as it was impossible for a large Japanese community to make a wholesale evacuation they asked the General Officer Commanding for protection on the spot.

2. Kung Chu Ling.

On the morning of the 21st September, the Chinese troops tried to destroy the Japanese pumping station (reservoir), where they have entered into a clash with the Japanese guards. The Japanese troops at Chang Chun despatched a detachment for reinforcement.

3. Peking.

An aeroplane of unknown nationality flew over the Japanese barracks on the afternoon of the 20th September. On the afternoon of the 21st instant, members of anti-Japanese organs and the Chinese students made road-side speeches advocating the breaking off Sino-Japanese economical relations.

4. Barbin.

- 2 -

4.-Harbin

According to the Chinese report received by the police station of the Japanese consulate at Harbin, the Chinese police authorities at Harbin were notified by the Chi Lin authorities a few days prior to the Sino-Japanese clash that "a Sino-Japanese clash in the Sou. Manchuria is inevitable".

Hq. I.J. Forces in China,

Tientsin, 22nd, 1931.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAM

GREEN

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OCT 29 1931

DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Dated October 26, 1931

Rec'd 5:12 p.m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

OCT 27 1931

Secretary of State

Washington, Department of State

259, October 26, 5 p.m.

The following is a brief summary of the chief elements of the action of the Council as I see them in regard to the Sino-Japanese conflict from its convening on October 13 to its adjournment on October 24.

One. The Council convened on October 13, one day in advance of the date originally set, at the request of China based on an aggravation of the situation in Manchuria as shown notable by the bombardment of Chinchow.

Two. In spite of the strong opposition of Japan, based ostensibly on juridical grounds the Council in a private session on October 15 decided to invite the United States to appoint a representative to sit at the Council table to take part in the discussions relating to the application of the provisions of the Pact of Paris to the situation in Manchuria and to follow the proceedings of the Council in regard to the controversy as a whole. On October 16 this decision was confirmed in a public session and on the same date the invitation was issued, accepted and

793.94/2350

NOV. 2, 1931

MAM

2- #259, from Geneva, October 26,
1931

and acted upon.

Three. As a result of the discussions on the Pact of Paris in which the representative of the United States took part the Foreign Ministers of France, Great Britain and Italy sent identic notes by telegram on Saturday October 17 at 10 p.m., through diplomatic channels to the Governments of Tokyo and Nanking invoking the Pact of Paris, in particular Article two thereof. At the same time Germany and Spain agreed to follow with similar action.

Four. From the very beginning of the Council's session convened on October 13 Briand, taking as a point of departure the Council's resolution of September 30 carried on private negotiations with the disputants in an endeavor to reach a satisfactory compromise. With the assistance of a few members and Drummond and in consultation from time to time with all the members of the Council, except the disputants, in private session, Briand continued these negotiations from hour to hour and from day to day up until a few minutes before the last meeting of the Council on Saturday October 24 six p.m. In the meanwhile the Council in its private meetings prepared a resolution frequently modified in accordance with the progress of negotiations which, in case the negotiations failed, would be finally presented as representing the unanimous views of the
the

MAM

3- #259, from Geneva, October 26,
1931

the Council members with the exception of the disputants in regard to what was considered just and right in the circumstances.

Five. It soon became evident in the course of the negotiations that the Chinese position presented less difficulty than that of the Japanese since the former was more conciliatory and seemed to be readily adaptable to the terms and spirit of the Council resolution of September 30.

Briand's chief concern therefore was to obtain from the Japanese an exact statement of their demands, and subsequently to induce them to modify those demands to meet the minimum demands of China and so as to conform to the spirit of the Council's resolution of September 30. It was felt that this resolution which formed the basis of the Council's negotiations could not be abandoned, not only because this would have meant a loss of ground, but also because as a result Chinese public opinion would have probably forced China to go to war.

There was in existence at one period a draft interim resolution (the purport of which has been reported to you) upon which for a short time negotiations with Japan were based. Certain features of this were framed with a view to meeting more nearly Japan's general demands. Upon Japan's refusal of this resolution however it seemed desirable

MAM

4- #259, from Geneva, October 26,
1931

desirable to withdraw these concessions and to go back in spirit to the terms of the September 30th resolution in order that there should be no sign of the Council weakening in its position without tangible results being obtained thereby. There was moreover always a question as to whether China would have accepted this interim resolution.

The Japanese position was not made clear even to Briand until after long delay. Only after the negotiations were well under way were Briand and Drummond informed in strict confidence that the Japanese demanded as a preliminary to evacuation an agreement with China through direct negotiations on certain points (reported in a previous telegram) which Japan stated were essential in order to guarantee the safety of Japanese lives and property. It was evident to Briand that the crucial point of these demands did not involve simply measures connected with "immediate security" as envisaged by the Council resolution of September 30th, but related to a general settlement of problems of a more permanent nature between China and Japan in Manchuria including particularly questions connected with the South Manchurian Railway: The acceptance of this demand would have signified an acquiescence in the occupation of Manchuria by Japanese troops for an indefinite period. Such a course would have been rejected not only by the Chinese

MAM

5- #259, from Geneva, October 26,
1931

Chinese but also by the Council as representing a complete abandonment of its resolution of September 30th. Briand was obliged therefore to bend his efforts towards obtaining from the Japanese the abandoning or at least a very substantial modification of their demands. Realizing that it would be easier for the Japanese to do this if they could negotiate with him in private without being embarrassed by commitments made in public from which it would be difficult to recede, Briand did not urge them to divulge the nature of their demands to the other members of the Council and also refrained from calling public meetings of the Council and even reduced the number of private meetings as far as he could without giving rise to discontent among the smaller states represented thereon. It was only after every effort to bring about a solution in private had been exhausted that he finally convened a public meeting on October 22 at 4 p.m. This action was taken as a last resort,

(one). In the hope that in the face of public opinion the Japanese would become more conciliatory, and,

(two). Because after these long and apparently fruitless negotiations the public and particularly the press was becoming impatient and suspicious.

Six. In a series of four public meetings efforts were made

MAM

6- #259, from Geneva, October 26,
1931

were made to induce the Japanese representative to abandon or at least to define what he meant by the "fundamental principles" concerning which he insisted upon having an agreement with China prior to evacuation. All efforts in this direction having failed the Council on October 24 voted unanimously with the exception of Japan in favor of the resolution quoted in the Consulate's 242, October 22, 6 p.m. Since in matters brought before the League under Article 11 of the Covenant, complete unanimity is required for a resolution to go into effect, this resolution can only serve as a record of what the Council with the exception of Japan considers to be just and right in the premises. Technically, therefore the situation is the same as that which existed at the close of the Council session of September 30. In reality however the situation has changed to this extent:

(a) The members of the Council other than Japan have expressed in definite terms their will that the evacuation be completed before the next meeting of the Council fixed for November 16;

(b) The public opinion of the world as represented at Geneva seems to be unanimously in support of the Council's position;

(c) The responsibility for the present situation is in the public mind definitely fixed on Japan.

FW
OX

GILBERT

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




AM RECD

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Peiping, September 30, 1931.

No. 1201

SEP 30 1931



The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that on September 17th I had a conversation with Mr. Makoto Yano, Counselor of the Japanese Legation in Peiping, in the course of which we discussed the situation in Manchuria. The Department will observe that this conversation took place just twenty-four hours before the occupation of Mukden by the Japanese. (See enclosure #1).

On September 21st the Japanese newspaper Keishin-Nichinichi Shimbun in Tientsin published what purported to be a statement made by me to Mr. Yano, in which I am quoted as suggesting that "Japan should avoid military and political measures in dealing with Manchuria and Mongolia". This item was copied by the Chinese newspaper Ta Kung Pao

(Tientsin)

793.94/2351

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NOV 4 1931

- 2 -

(Tientsin) of September 22nd. (See enclosure #2).

On the following day Mr. Nakayama, First Secretary of the Japanese Legation, called on Mr. Engert to say that Mr. Yano was extremely sorry this publicity had been given to his informal interview with me, and that he had at once taken steps to deny it. As a result the Japanese paper had published a denial on September 22nd, and the Tientsin Ta Kung Pao on September 23rd. (See enclosure #3). He added that Mr. Yano would express his regrets to me in person.

Mr. Yano called on me on September 24th to explain the matter. (See enclosure #4). I assured him that as far as I was concerned no harm had been done.

Confidential. Curiously enough, no English language newspaper in Peiping or Tientsin appears to have noticed the original item in the Japanese and Chinese papers. Had they done so, far greater publicity would doubtless have been given to the interview - especially in the light of subsequent events - and the Japanese Legation would have found it much more embarrassing. Both Yano and Nakayama seemed distinctly nervous lest my alleged expression of opinion prove damaging to the Japanese cause.

2 Carbon Copies

Received

2 copies RPH.

CVHE/js.

800.

4 ^{✓ RPH} enclosures.

4

Respectfully yours,

Nelson Trusler Johnson
NELSON TRUSLER JOHNSON.

Enclosures:

- 3 -

Enclosures:

1. Memorandum of conversation with
Mr. Yano, September 17, 1931.
2. Translation of news itemⁱⁿ/TA KUNG PAO,
September 22, 1931.
3. Translation of denial in TA KUNG PAO,
September 23, 1931.
4. Memorandum of conversation with
Mr. Yano, September 24, 1931.

1201

Conversation.

Peiping, Sept. 17, 1931

Mr. Yano, Japanese Counselor of Legation

Subject: Sino-Japanese Relations

I saw Mr. Yano, Counselor of the Japanese Legation, at the home of Mr. Engert this evening and after dinner we discussed the question of the Nakamura case and the Japanese attitude toward Manchuria. I told Mr. Yano that my information was that the Japanese were preparing to occupy Manchuria but that I was not disposed to credit this information.

Mr. Yano stated that such information was of course absurd. They were now awaiting a second investigation into the Nakamura case and it was to be expected that this matter would be settled amicably between the two countries. He said it was fantastic to think that Japan would take physical possession of Manchuria at this time when it was so easy for Japan to exploit the country economically without any of the burdens contingent upon administrative expense. He stated that this was the view of Japanese military authorities in spite of the fact that there might be a few minor military officials who were given to talk of a disturbing character.

Nelson Trusler Johnson
American Minister

NTJ/hp

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

2.

1201

Translation of a news item appearing in the
TIENTSIN TA KUNG PAO of September 22, 1931.

(Trans. EFS)

THE ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES.

The PEKING AND TIENTSIN DAILY NEWS (NICHU NICHU),
a newspaper in the Japanese language, states that the
Honorable Nelson T. Johnson, American Minister to China,
called on Mr. S. Yano, Counselor of the Japanese Legation,
a couple of days ago, and made the following statement:

"I am informed that Japan has availed herself
of the opportunity presented by the case of Captain
Nakamura to realize her plan for the seizure of
Manchuria and Mongolia within three months, and that
the case of Captain Nakamura is merely a measure to
entice another to take action. I deem it much
better to settle the case locally. Japan's
occupation of Manchuria and Mongolia is also not
an easy matter. Future difficulties will certainly
be more serious. Should this information be true,
I am really at a loss to understand the attitude of
Japan in this instance. Japan should avoid military
and political measures in dealing with Manchuria
and Mongolia, but she should study a plan for
economic development."

EFS:T

1201

Translation of an item appearing in the TA KUNG
PAO of Tientsin for September 23, 1931.

(Trans. EFS)

CORRECTION.

With reference to the translation published yesterday of a report appearing in the PEKING AND TIENTSIN DAILY NEWS (NICHU NICHU), a newspaper in the Japanese language, concerning the issuance of a statement by the American Minister to China to Mr. S. Yano, Counselor of the Japanese Legation, a responsible Japanese organization yesterday declared that the contents were entirely contrary to the actual facts, and that the newspaper mentioned had been ordered to publish a correction. We accordingly have to make this correction.

EFS:T

4.
1201

Conversation.

Peiping, Sept. 24, 1931

Mr. Makoto Yano, Counselor, Japanese Legation

Subject: Conditions in Manchuria and Interview
with American Minister

Mr. Yano called on me and referred to the publication, in a Japanese newspaper at Tientsin, of a conversation between him and myself, saying that he desired to express his very sincere regrets. He said that what happened was that after our conversation on the evening of September 17th, he had had a conversation with a member of the staff of the Japanese Consulate General at Tientsin who had come to Peiping for the purpose of discussing with the Legation the present status of affairs in north China arising out of the Nakamura case and the attitude which the Japanese should adopt under the circumstances. He said that in the course of the discussion he had pointed out to his staff and the representative from the Consulate General at Tientsin the fact that the trouble between China and Japan over the Nakamura affair seemed susceptible to an early settlement; that there was no reason to be disturbed about the situation. He said that he had quoted foreign opinion on these questions and to his great regret he had quoted me as having said to him that in spite of reports that Japan intended to occupy Manchuria within the next three months, I could not believe that Japan entertained any such plan as I be-

lieved

- 2 -

lieved that wisdom lay on the side of economic development rather than forceful occupation. He said that unfortunately some account of this conversation must have been repeated in Tientsin to some member of the staff who, in turn, spoke to the Japanese press. He pointed out that it had been denied both in the Japanese and the Chinese papers.

I told Mr. Yano that I hoped he would not worry about it any longer; that no harm had been done so far as I was concerned; I had merely been surprised that a conversation which I had had with him, presumably private, should appear so quickly in the newspapers.

Mr. Yano stated that he had no apprehensions as to the safety of Japanese subjects in Peiping, on the contrary, Peiping appeared to be the most peaceful of all the Chinese communities. It was at Shanghai and Nanking that agitation was causing the greatest difficulty. Japanese subjects had been evacuated from Nanking. With reference to Manchuria, Mr. Yano stated that there were many outstanding questions between China and Japan. Furthermore the Chinese soldiers were assuming a very overbearing attitude toward Japanese soldiers, constantly boasting of the superiority of their arms over Japanese arms and stating that they were more experienced

- 3 -

experienced in the actual art of war than the Japanese. He said that there had been one incident after another; that at a place very near the point where the tracks of the South Manchuria Railway had been destroyed on the night of September 18th, a Japanese soldier patrolling the line had been shot and robbed of his weapons. In all of these events and reasons for friction was to be found the cause of the present conflict between the Japanese and the Chinese.

Nelson Trusler Johnson
American Minister

NTJ/hp

793.94/2351




LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Peiping October 1, 1931.

No.1202

OCT 26 31



CONFIDENTIAL

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

793.94 In confirmation of the Legation's telegram
No. 645 of September 24, 1 pm, I have the honor to
1/ transmit herewith a Memorandum of the conversation
I had with Colonel James D. Taylor, 15th Infantry,
Commanding United States Army Troops in China,
which formed the subject of the above-mentioned
telegram.

Colonel Taylor was of the opinion, and I agreed
with him, that if as a result of anti-Japanese feel-
ing there should be a general attack upon foreigners,
the American force at Tientsin would not place itself
under the Japanese general (who is the Senior Com-
mandant), and that the latter would be responsible
for the protection of Japanese interests in Tientsin.
The American troops would, of course, cooperate with

the

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793.94/2352

- 2 -

the British, French, and Italian forces in the
protection of the foreign residential area.

Respectfully yours,

Nelson Trusler Johnson
NELSON TRUSLER JOHNSON.

✓ Enclosure:

1: Copy of Memorandum
of Conversation September
23, 1931.

CVHE/js.

800.

2 Carbon Copies

Received *R.P.*

2 copies A.P.A.

Enclosure No. 1
Despatch No. 1202

CONFIDENTIAL

Conversation.

Peiping, Sept. 23, 1931

Colonel James D. Taylor, Commanding 15th Infantry
Tientsin

Subject: Responsibility of U. S. Army Troops in China

Colonel Taylor called to say that the present situation developed by strained relations between Chinese and Japanese over occupation of Manchuria has brought up certain embarrassing features of the position of himself and his command at Tientsin which he desired to communicate to me.

Colonel Taylor informed me that on September 22nd the consuls of the nations having troops at Tientsin, with the exception of the Japanese, had met for the purpose of discussing the situation which might arise should a clash between Japanese and Chinese occur at Tientsin. He informed me that the result of the discussion at this meeting was a conclusion to the effect that if an attack were made on foreigners in general by the Chinese, the whole plan for the defense of the foreign residential areas at Tientsin would be put into effect, the consular body stepping out of the picture and leaving the problem to be handled by the military. Colonel Taylor and the American Consul General understood that in such a situation the American force at Tientsin would not be under the command of the Japanese and so informed their colleagues, it being understood that the American force ^{was} ~~were~~ prepared to cooperate with the British,

French

- 2 -

French and other nationals except the Japanese, it being also understood that the Japanese would be responsible for their own interests at Tientsin.

Colonel Taylor asked me whether I considered his attitude in this matter correct and also asked whether I thought he should tell the Japanese commandant that the American forces could not be responsible for Japanese mills within the areas assigned to the American forces under the defense plan if those mills should be attacked by Chinese on the ground that they were Japanese owned and operated.

I told Colonel Taylor that I approved of his attitude in this matter. I said it seemed to me that he and I, in examining any problem involving the American military contingent at Tientsin, should remember that it has two missions to perform, first a mission to maintain communications between Peiping and the sea, primarily in the interest of the American Legation, and the second mission, now more important than the first, to protect American lives and property in Tientsin; that of course it was necessary to consider the probability that we would have to cooperate with other nationals in defending ourselves against a general attack, but that these were our primary purposes and under the circumstances I felt that he was absolutely right; nothing should be done to involve us in the quarrel between the Japanese and Chinese. I further stated that it did not seem to me necessary for him to take the initiative in telling the

Japanese

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

commandant that the American troops were not pre-protect Japanese within the American defense area to an attack directed at Japanese alone and not in- other foreigners. This relates specifically to certain Japanese mills located in a purely Chinese area just beyond the ex-German Concession of Tientsin.

Colonel Taylor also asked me what his attitude should be in case the Japanese military should see fit to take control over all of the area included in the ex-Russian, German and Austrian Concessions, including Chinese territory, part of which area, namely, the ex-German Concession, was within the territory assigned to his command in the scheme for the defense of the foreign residential areas at Tientsin against general Chinese attack.

I told Colonel Taylor that it seemed to me that this was a question which we would have to meet when it arose, that my own horseback judgment was that he should do nothing to prevent Japanese occupation of Chinese property or areas under Chinese jurisdiction; that should such a contingency arise he should have his command remain within barracks, keep in touch with the American consul general and the Legation for the purpose of maintaining contact with any Japanese authorities that might be available with a view to seeing, through such contacts, that American lives and property were not endangered in the process.

Nelson Trusler
 American Min'

CC to Colonel Taylor, Tientsin
 CC to Mr. Lockhart, Tientsin

NTJ/hp

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75



LEGATION OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Peiping, October 2, 1931.

EE

No. 1205

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The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
 Washington.

Sir:

793.94 / 1899

1/7

Referring to the Legation's telegram No. 670,
 of September 26th, I now have the honor to transmit
 herewith seven editorials from the Peiping LEADER,
 all dealing with Japan's recent occupation of por-
 tions of South Manchuria.

In this connection it must be remembered that
 the LEADER is a propaganda organ of the Nanking
 Government and that the language of its editorials
 is at times apt to be somewhat exaggerated.

8/

There is also enclosed the text of President
 Chiang Kai-shek's speech on September 22nd, excerpts
 from which were quoted in the Legation's telegram

9/

No. 659, of September 25th, and the text of a mani-
 festo issued on September 23rd by the National Gov-
ernment

FILE

1931 OCT 3 1931


793.94/2353

- 2 -

ernment to the Chinese people, relating to the crisis
produced by the situation in Manchuria.

Editorials and news items from other news-
papers will be found among the clippings which are
being forwarded without covering despatch in to-day's
pouch.

Respectfully yours,



NELSON TRUSLER JOHNSON.

✓
Enclosures:

1/7: Editorials from the Peiping

LEADER:

September 23, 1931.
September 24, 1931.
September 25, 1931.
September 26, 1931.
September 29, 1931.
September 30, 1931.
October 1, 1931.

8/ : Speech by President
Chiang Kai-shek,
September 25, 1931.

9/ : Manifesto issued by the
Nationalist Government,
September 25, 1931.

CVHR/js.

800.

1-9
1705
THE LEADER, Wednesday, September 23, 1931.

JAPAN'S VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

The sudden invasion of south Manchuria by Japanese troops—culminating in the brutal massacre of hundreds of innocent Chinese civilians and policemen; the dropping of bombs on various cities; the burning of private dwellings; the occupation of the Northeastern University; the forceful entry into banks; the shelling of the city of Mukden; the shelling of the North camp without provocation; the destruction of the Mukden Arsenal; the seizure of 250 airplanes; the holding of considerable rolling stock; the arrest of administrative and railway officials; and the disarming of Chinese soldiers who were under strict orders not to retaliate—is in effect a gross violation of a number of treaties and agreements to which Japan is a signatory.

In the first place, Japan has violated the "Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land" of both the 1864 and 1907 Hague Conventions. By shelling the city of Mukden and the North Camp without warning, the Japanese military authorities have violated Article 26, Section II of the Annex Regulations of the Convention relating to Land warfare:

"The officer in command of an attacking force must, before commencing a bombardment, except in cases of assault, do all in his power to warn the authorities".

The Hague Convention goes on to say that: "The pillage of a town or place, even when taken by assault, is prohibited." This is violated by the pillage and occupation of certain banks in Mukden and the burning and destruction of private dwellings and property, which can not be too strongly condemned.

By manoeuvring warships and troops to strategic positions and suddenly swooping down upon Yingkow, Koupangtze, Tahushan, Antung, Mukden and Changchun without warning, Japan has entirely ignored the existence of the following clause of the Convention Relative to the Opening of Hostilities of the Hague Peace Conference of 1907, which, to the Japanese militarists, is merely another scrap of paper:

"The contracting Powers recognize that hostilities between themselves must not commence without previous and explicit warning, in the form either of a reasoned declaration of war or of an ultimatum with conditional declaration of war."

Again, in attaching her signature to the Anti-War Kellogg Pact of August 27, 1928, which binds the contracting parties to declare "in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies,

and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another," Japan declared in her note to the United States dated May 26, 1928:

"The Government of Japan sympathize warmly with the high and beneficent aims of the proposal now made by the United States which they take to imply the entire abolition of the institution of war, and that they will be glad to render their most cordial cooperation towards the attainment of that end.....

"The Imperial Government firmly believe that unanimous agreement on a mutually acceptable text for such a treaty as is contemplated is well capable of realization by discussion between the six Powers referred to, and they would be happy to collaborate with cordial good will in the discussions with the purpose of securing what they are persuaded is the common desire of all the peoples of the world—namely, the cessation of wars and the definite establishment among the nations of an era of permanent and universal peace."

In becoming a member of the League of Nations, "by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war", Japan, as a permanent member of the Council, must respect Article X of the League Covenant which says:

"The members of the League undertake to respect and preserve us against external aggression, the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League."

Japan's obligations to observe peace and refrain from making aggressions upon China is further put down in black and white in the Nine Power Treaty signed by the United States, Great Britain, Belgium, China, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and Portugal at the Washington Conference, binding these nations to adopt "a policy designed to stabilize conditions in the Far East, to safeguard the rights and interests of China, and to promote intercourse between China and the other Powers upon the basis of equal opportunity." The following resolutions were agreed upon by the Powers, including Japan:

"(1) To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China;

"(2) To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government;

"(3) To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China;

"(4) To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly States and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such States."

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Japan has violated the law of nations by invading Chinese territory without previous warning, and has committed acts of barbarity which should brand her as a criminal in the eyes of the world. Who is the aggressor is only too self-evident—when Japan slapped one cheek, China turned the other. Will the signatories of the Anti-War Kellogg Pact who attached their signatures to high-sounding phrases outlawing aggressions upon weak and unoffending states continue to fold their hand while the Chinese people are being massacred by the thousands and their land forcibly taken from them by the Japanese military brigands? Will the League of Nations do nothing and advance a few technical excuses for inaction? How long will these treaties respecting the integrity of China be treated as mere scraps of paper by Japan? These are the questions which every intelligent Chinese and foreigner in this country are asking themselves.

E.B.-S.I.

2.

September 24, 1931.

THE LEADER, Thursday

DOES PEACE WITH JAPAN PAY?

Days have passed since the unwarranted invasion of Chinese territory by Japanese troops. There is now not a shadow of doubt that the Chinese authorities and their troops have maintained steadfastly the role of martyr to the rapacity of an international bird of prey. Chinese soldiers, paid to defend their positions, have been sacrificed to the fury of the vulture of the rising sun. And what is the result?

Yesterday we published a letter from "A Neutral" expressing the opinion that it is Japan and not China who should stand humiliated before the world. We wish this was a universal opinion, but facts do not point that way. The opinion expressed in circles that do count in this world of iniquity is that there is no war in the Far East in the same way as there is no street fight when a gangster shoots dead a bank clerk and robs his till. To make a street fight onlookers must be gathered to inhale the dust which might be raised or may be to receive a stray bullet. To make a war of the type of the Kellogg Peace Pact, there must be some public fighting which would bring into play the international law of neutrality. There was no war in 1918 when the Japanese troops occupied Tsinan and massacred, among thousands, a Chinese diplomatic officer and his staff. It was an affair of Japan and China alone in the same way as a savage would regard a thief and his victim. It was right to kill several thousand people and destroy millions worth of property including a hospital and its inmates in order to prevent possible accidents happening to a few of the two hundred Japanese subjects residing in places where the Chinese troops might pass through. That was the opinion held by the world nations gathered at Geneva. They have not the courage to tell the bully that he was wrong. Considering China's present attitude we do not wonder at this at all. However, encouraged by the apparent incapacity of the League of Nations to see where wrong is wrong and where right is right and not might makes right, the Japanese militarists have become more daring than ever. Tearing up a piece of railway track and planting the crime on the poor unarmed defenseless Chinese soldiers in Mukden, the Japanese troops set about to massacre them in cold blood, occupy Chinese cities and do every thing to violate the territorial integrity and independence of China. Has not Japan by these acts violated her solemn undertaking before the world powers assembled in Washington in 1922? Has she not treated the Washington Treaties like so many scraps of paper? There was a semblance of international sense of justice in 1914 when Belgium's neutrality was violated, but after more than a decade of peace talk and world co-operation where is that "Victory of Justice" acclaimed in the fall of 1918? Let not the nations of the world be blind to the activities of the robber next door! Their turn may come one day if they allow this international vulture to go as he will!

Yesterday was observed throughout China as "humiliation day." Public attention was drawn to the apparent uselessness of remaining a dove for peace offering. Our efforts against war have brought us no good but further aggression. Our neighbors will not take any notice of a bully who chose to occupy our

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

hearth and home because we have not created a rumpus by making no attempts at resistance. The Signatories of the Kellogg Peace Pact are indifferent because war has not been created by Japan's unwarranted invasion of Chinese territory. Public sentiment is being worked up and sooner or later the Chinese nation, if it is going to remain one at all, will have to rise and create a rumpus to turn this international aggression into an international war—to conform to the requirements of the Anti-War Kellogg Pact.

We had hoped the Japanese Government would disown the misdeeds of its troops, but since its *post facto* recognition of the further dispatch of troops into Chinese territory from Korea, we are compelled to hold the whole Japanese nation responsible for starting a war against this country. Under the circumstances and if Japan refuse to give a satisfactory reply to our protests, China should at once declare the existence of war between the two countries as a result of Japan's invasion of Chinese territory. She should sever all treaty and diplomatic relations with Japan and treat her people in China as enemy subjects according to international law and usage.

P. C. T.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lutz NARS, Date 12-18-75

3.

THE LEADER, Friday, September 25, 1937.

MUST CHINA FIGHT JAPAN?

The Japanese military maniacs are still running amuck and are still shooting right and left in spite of orders from Tokyo to stop. Despite brutalities on the part of the Japanese soldiers that are comparable to South African savages, the Chinese soldiers were under orders to carry out the policy of non-resistance and made no retaliation to Japanese provocations. No one can say that China has been the aggressor. No one can say that China is not observing the Anti-War Kellogg Pact. No one can say that China is precipitating a conflict.

The Japanese militarists must have felt pretty confident of the League of Nation's inability to punish the Nippon Empire before taking such a bold step. One can well remember the technical excuses given by the League for taking no action when China appealed to that cumbersome body to take appropriate steps to bring Japan to task for the ghastly Tsinan massacre of 1928 when thousands of innocent Chinese men, women and children were mowed down ruthlessly with Japanese machine-guns and cannon.

Japan did not choose a more opportune moment for invading Manchuria. The disastrous floods in Central China had completely paralyzed trade and commerce in the Yangtze valley, wiped out a considerable portion of the population, rendered millions homeless and considerably affected the financial equilibrium of the entire country. The Japanese military tiger decended upon Manchuria without warning, contrary to international law and usage, at a time when the people of the country are utilizing all their available resources to afford succor to the destitute flood victims. What would the world have said to the nation that was uncivilized enough to invade Japan at a time when she had her great earthquake? But when Japan invades China for no reason at all during a great national catastrophe, the United States came out with the astounding statement that Japan has not yet violated the Anti-War Kellogg Pact. From the technical point of view, the United States State Department was right in stating that Japan has not violated the Anti-War Kellogg Pact because the Chinese soldiers offered no resistance owing to orders from above: and since the Chinese made no resistance, a state of war does not really exist between the two countries, especially when no ultimatum was issued by Japan. But is not non-resistance the right way to observe the so-called pact against aggression? Or must China fight in order to conform to the requirements of the Anti-War Kellogg Pact? It is quite possible that the United States State Department made this absurd statement without having seen adequate reports of the extent of Japan's invasion in Manchuria, especially in view of prevaricating Japanese official reports that Japan is endeavouring to "localize" the "incident" in a huge piece of territory equal in size to Germany, Austria and Poland put together. The latest piece of official Japanese eyewash is that the invasion is not an invasion.

The situation looks hopeful now that the American State Department is stirred to the extent of sending a note to Japan and China asking

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

the two countries not to engage in hostilities. Another hopeful sign is the interest demonstrated by the League of Nations Assembly at Geneva toward the Japanese invasion. But a disquieting factor is the rejection by Japan of the League of Nations proposal to send military attaches to investigate the origin of the Japanese invasion. In the meantime, no decision has been reached between the Chinese and Japanese delegates and the Japanese representatives are still adopting a policy of procrastination on the plea that they have not yet received instructions from their government. This is the first real case of aggression that the League of Nations has to deal with, and if Japan rejects League mediation, it remains to be seen whether the signatories of the Covenant for world peace will uphold their high-sounding principles and punish the culprit.

If Japan refuses to withdraw her troops from Chinese soil, and if the Powers cannot persuade her to do so, the only alternative is for China to acknowledge that a state of war exists with Japan, for although no ultimatum was delivered, the invasion and blockade of the harbours is in itself an act of open warfare. It is our opinion that Japanese soldiers on Chinese soil should be disarmed; all Japanese citizens should be ordered to leave the country; all Japanese property should be taken over by the Chinese Government pending developments; while diplomatic and economic relations should be severed until such time as Japan withdraws her troops and battleships from China. In the meantime, China must adopt a defensive attitude. Pending evacuation, there must be no mob violence towards the Japanese. If necessary, the Chinese people must fight to the last man to preserve the land for posterity. At this stage when the Japanese militarists are still war-mad, all peaceful persuasions for the Japanese troops to withdraw from Chinese territory will be ignored. How far the savage Japanese militarists may go no person can tell.

E.B.-S.L.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE LEADER, Saturday, September 26, 1937

A FAMINE UNDER JAPANESE AUSPICES

Another famine area has arisen in China. It is not, like that of central China, the result of a natural disaster which the greatest efforts of men had proven powerless to control. It is the result of a deliberate policy of the Japanese Government, through their army in China, and it has placed hundreds of thousands of persons in a most desperate plight, facing starvation if they cannot get away from the stricken area.

The taking of Mukden by the Japanese a week ago was not merely a military occupation, with some massacres which soon ended and left the condition of the people much as before under local officials. The Japanese attack was definitely upon soldiers and police, though of course including any Chinese civilians who happened to get in the way. They did not get all the police, owing to most of the latter getting wind of the atrocities and disappearing in time, but they certainly drove them all from the streets. They occupied all the Chinese banks and closed them. With the Chinese banks closed, the foreign banks in Mukden had also to close, excepting only the Japanese. The five Japanese banks are doing business as usual—in fact, we understand, far more than usual now that they have a monopoly—which is of course just what the Japanese want.

It is this double policy—the destruction of the local government and the police force and the closing of the banks—which has resulted in the present famine in Mukden. Shops closed the day of the occupation later feared to open because of the lack of police protection from the hungry poor, and at the same time were hampered by the tie-up of larger business. The bigger firms were unable to do anything, for as everyone knows the whole of commerce is so tied up today with banking and credit that when the banks close business must suspend generally. But besides credit operations there is the matter of ready cash. It is impossible for depositors, big or small, to draw money from the funds in the closed banks. Firms cannot pay their employees. There is nothing, literally, to live upon. Petty shopkeepers do some business with familiar neighbors behind closed doors, but will not show their face to a stranger. But there are few who can buy, for there is little money, and what there is, is almost worthless. There is no idea as to whether the Japanese closing of the banks will be permanent or not. Perhaps they will keep them closed permanently, in order to switch all banking business in Mukden to the Japanese banks, with the yen as standard. Every shopkeeper who charges five dollars for a couple of pounds of rice after cautious haggling behind closed doors is taking a chance on the five dollars being so much paper, and even silver coin has dropped tremendously in value, being literally just so much silver.

Early this week the Japanese made a show of starting a municipal government, under a Japanese officer, Doihara, as mayor, and managed to get a number of the Chinese police back on duty again. The

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972

By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Japanese gave the number as six hundred, and there were in fact perhaps half that number. But with the night coming on these police, forbidden firearms and armed only with sticks, disappeared, and next day few returned to duty. With the mass of the population slowly starving—tens of thousands have been absolutely without food for days—it may be understood that the streets are unsafe at night. And the Japanese sit, quiet and serene, watching the sufferings of these people. And at the same time, to advertise their “goodness” and “generosity,” they send money for famine relief in Hankow (and send wires all over the world about it), and are foremost in their humanitarian appeals at the League of Nations! Can any lower, more contemptible hypocrisy be imagined?

Mukden is fast becoming a deserted city, so far as the old Chinese section is concerned. That is probably what the Japanese want. The number who have left the city already is estimated at as high as forty thousand. On every train they are crowded, men, women, and children, from one thousand to two thousand to a train, packed in so tightly that those inside cannot get out for the most urgent physical needs, and without water or food—and so for twenty-four or thirty-six hours. But they must get away, anywhere where there are friends or relations, anywhere away from the stalking specter of famine—famine under Japanese auspices. Some die en route, once the Japanese have shot people on a train, and once bandits (reported to be Koreans) looted a train and took the last belongings from these miserable homeless refugees. In the city looting is rife—under Japanese auspices. No life is safe upon the streets—under Japanese auspices. Bodies of slaughtered police or soldiers or workmen lie around the streets still unburied—under Japanese auspices. A whole great city is perishing—under Japanese auspices. And Japan still, at the League of Nations, has the insolence to stand up and plead for help for the flood victims of central China, who they think should have assistance—under Japanese auspices!

F. G.

THE LEADER, Tuesday, September 29, 1931

THE JAPANESE TERROR IN MANCHURIA

Today, almost a week after her solemn assurance to the League of Nations that she was withdrawing her troops from Chinese territory, Japanese airplanes are creating a reign of terror along the Peiping-Mukden Railway. New places have been occupied, new troop movements made, trains stopped and passengers searched, and machine-gun fire from Japanese planes has killed passengers on these trains.

As the crowning atrocity comes the wrecking of the Peiping-bound train near Joyangho on Saturday. The most neutral foreign observers have strong suspicions of the Japanese in this respect, and among the Chinese people there is no doubt whatsoever. It is natural, indeed, that people from western countries should be reluctant to believe a "modern" and "progressive" nation guilty of atrocious crimes of this kind. But the firing on passenger trains and murder of passengers is now fully attested by foreign travelers, the slaughter of non-resisting Chinese on the streets of Mukden is an equally well-attested fact (bullets having even gone through the crowded ball-room of the International Club there), the instigation of Koreans to the murder of Chinese residents in Korea is indicated by both foreign and Japanese reports, and from these things to the wrecking of a train is no great step. Why should not the ruthless murderers of defenceless people turn to train-wrecking?

With all the atrocities committed by Japanese against Chinese recently, it seems clear that it is up to them to show their innocence if they can. The evidence points unerringly to them. The original report received stated definitely that the track was torn up by plain-clothes men, Japanese subjects. The place is close to Hsiumin, where there is a Japanese armored train and Japanese troops, and where passenger trains have been stopped and searched by Japanese. The Chinese railway guards in this district were unarmed as a result of the Japanese invasion. The only armed force on the line at this point is Japanese. And when the wreck occurred the Japanese were on the spot at once, according to their own report from Hsiumin. Can the Japanese, under these circumstances, deny responsibility for this wreck, and for the human lives lost, Chinese and foreign? Will the world believe their oily, lying tongues, as they believed last week when the glib spokesmen of the Japanese plunderbund declared their troops were being evacuated from Chinese territory?

So have these enemies of society now turned to train-wrecking? And how about the bandits who plundered the train? Were these Chinese or Koreans? There are both Chinese and Korean bandits in that territory. If Chinese, they were undoubtedly from the bands of hungry soldiers which spread over the country when the Japanese massacred and

scattered the Chinese forces in Mukden and vicinity. But the bandits who plundered Thursday's train are said to have been Koreans. In either case, how can Japan disclaim responsibility?

So the Japanese continue their intervention "for the protection of Japanese lives and property." It is not war they are carrying on. It is terrorism. It is designed to put not only every Chinese in South Manchuria, but every passenger on a Chinese train whether foreign or Chinese, in mortal fear of his life. It is reckless and ruthless and indiscriminate murder by a gang of uniformed criminals

A week ago, immediately after the occupation of Mukden, Japanese officials approached the stationmaster of the Peiping-Mukden station at Huangkutun, which is now the northern terminus of this line since the Japanese have cut the tracks between here and the Mukden Central Station, and offered their "protection," which the stationmaster declined. As this is a railway with heavy investments of foreign capital, the Japanese apparently hesitated about simply stealing it as they did with purely Chinese property, and desired an "invitation." This was not forthcoming, however, and two days later they sent an armored train and a troop train down the line on the Peiping-Mukden Railway tracks, and obliged the railway officials to give them the use of their telephone and telegraph facilities for communication. On Wednesday the troops went down. Since Thursday no passenger train has been safe. That day one was held up and plundered between Chiliuho and Hsinmintun, at which points the Japanese have troops and armored cars. The following train was fired at and two passengers killed and many wounded by machine-gun fire from a Japanese plane, and then this proceeding, and the bombarding trains by grenades from the air, became a regular thing. Then, Saturday, came the crowning horror. These enemies of civilization have apparently wrecked a train, and the bandits operating under their protection plundered the unfortunate survivors.

Will the railway officials ask for protection? Will they extend the invitation which the Japanese are still coolly waiting for as they go on with their terroristic campaign of murder and destruction? The Japanese have nothing to lose. They want these passengers to travel by the South Manchuria Railway, and it is quite certain that every foreigner learning the dangers of the Peiping-Mukden line under the Japanese military terror will prefer the safety of the Japanese line. But what an appalling way to get business! By murder and destruction, murder and destruction!

The Japanese military plunderbund has shown its true face to the world at last. The last survival of military feudalism in the world, its evil face shows itself behind the mask of platitudes of its oily representatives at Geneva. Can the world longer doubt the fearful reality of the Japanese terror in Manchuria?

F. G.

6.

THE LEADER, Wednesday, September 30, 1931.

THE COMMON ENEMY

The Chinese people are not alone in their fight against the military plunderbund of Japan. The events of the last week, with the ruthless terrorism carried on by the Japanese military in Manchuria, the shooting and killing of passengers on railway trains, the deliberate ruin of a great city and all its commercial life Chinese and foreign, the complaisance with which the Japanese Army has assumed themselves to be above all international law, the utter mockery of every sworn obligation from the League of Nations Covenant to the Kellogg Pact, the cool cynicism with which Japan's official propagandists assumed that the world was so stupid and blind as to accept its mendacious accounts of what had happened in Manchuria, the contemptible cowardice shown in the massacre of troops who the Japanese know had orders not to fire in self-defence,—all these things have created and are creating a feeling that Japanese military autocracy is a menace not only to China but to the world, and to all that the world knows of civilization.

These creatures are beyond the pale. It is only two months since the massacres of peaceable Chinese in Korea, which there now can be no doubt was instigated by murder-bands with Japanese official connections. Now comes another massacre, this time in Manchuria. And it is apparently not at an end. Towns are being bombed, trains bombarded and shot at, and the same day that Japan gravely announces to the League that most of her troops have already been withdrawn and are being further removed, reports are confirmed of new towns occupied and new acts of terrorism and ruthlessness by these enemies of society.

The enemy is not the Japanese people. Let us understand this once and for all. The Japanese people had nothing to do with these outrages, except that they must bear the heavy burden of military expenditure, and they are the cannon-fodder. Everything has been the work of an irresponsible military clique, a survival of feudal Japan, which carries on regardless of the desires of the Japanese people or even of the civil government of Japan. This military plunderbund is the enemy not only of the Chinese people, not only of the whole outside world, but also of the crushed and exploited Japanese people. The Japanese people could not have stopped the seizure of Manchuria in any way except by revolution—and no people have ever been able to stop a military adventure by their own rulers in this way—at the beginning.

What news the Japanese people have today is that which their military despots permit them to have. The filthy, mendacious lies which the plunder-

bund has spread to cover their ruthlessness are the daily stock-in-trade of the Japanese papers, which are permitted to print nothing which may spoil this propaganda campaign. But in spite of this there are men and women in Japan, public-spirited organizations in Japan, which are protesting against this invasion. The military plunderbund and their patriotic soldier dupes do not represent all of Japan. There are people in Japan who know who their real enemy is,—the military absolutism of the Satsuma-Choshu feudal families which control the Army and Navy of Japan.

There are many people who do not realize what a genuine absolutism the Japanese government is. Seeing a country with much modernization, with practically universal education, with a Parliament and, strongly organized government machinery, they think that the Japanese Government is equally modern and advanced. This is utterly erroneous. Japan is an absolutism under constitutional forms. The Emperor can issue mandates having the force of law. Parliament can be dissolved at will. Within the government itself the militarists are absolute owing to the fact that no cabinet can be formed without them. The ministries of War and of the Navy can only be filled from the highest officials of the Army and Navy, and both these bodies are wholly in the hands of the Choshu and Satsuma feudal families which played the biggest part in setting the puppet Emperor on the Japanese throne sixty years ago, and hold power to the present day. When the Army moves, the government must approve or resign. At any time the Minister of War may resign, and the government is wrecked. A new government can be formed only by turning to the Army (a closed clique as regards the highest posts) for support.

It is the Army which has moved now. For the last two months they have been fighting for dominance and bringing the civil bureaucrats into line with their policy. But they were fighting because they were threatened at home. The Japanese people, crushed under the heaviest taxation in the world, have been year after year working for a reduction in military expenditure, and this year anticipated that the new budget would mean drastic reductions. The Japanese military saw their one hope was the stirring up of patriomania, and they have turned to it. They have turned to it before, but in spite of their control of the press and of popular education the response each time is feebler. The appeal to patriotism is the last refuge of the Japanese military plunderbund, which stands today as the enemy of the Chinese people, of the Japanese people, and of the world.

It is for this reason that we not long since apologized for the inadvertent use of the word "Japs" in a column in this paper. This is a term of contempt used by certain persons with a superiority complex as regards non-"white" peoples. It is in line with insulting expressions such as "Chinks" and "niggers." No self-respecting Chinese should ape this con-

1103

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

temptuous attitude. The foreigners who use the expression "Japs" are those who, among themselves, use equally contemptuous expressions as regards Chinese, negroes, and other non-"Caucasian" peoples.

And furthermore, we have no quarrel with the Japanese people. Their enemies are our enemies—the military plunderbund of Japan. They may be misled at times by official propaganda, as may people in other countries, but at bottom their interests are different and their feelings are different from those of their rulers. And when it is all over, and the bloody military autocracy of Japan has been overthrown—whether from inside or outside,—most grateful of all will be the crushed, swindled, oppressed, despised common people of Japan.

F. G.

7

THE LEADER, Thursday, October 1, 1931.

DAMNING FACTS AGAINST JAPAN

On Thursday, September 24, just one week ago, the Japanese Government dispatched a Note to the League of Nations, in response to a communication from that body with regard to the events in Manchuria, stating among other things that "Japan has withdrawn the greater part of its forces to the railway zone and only a few troops as a precautionary measure are quartered in Mukden and Kirin and at certain other points, to be withdrawn as the situation improves."

The same day the Japanese Government issued a declaration to the world stating, following their oft-repeated version of the events of September 18 and 19, that "these measures having been taken our soldiers were mostly withdrawn within the railway zone. There still remain some detachments in Mukden and Kirin and a small number of men in a few other places, but nowhere does a state of military occupation as such exist. Reports that the Japanese authorities have taken control of the Chinese railways between Mukden and Hsinmintun are entirely untrue."

The same day this declaration was made, a Japanese armored train which had arrived at Hsinmintun the previous day moved to Chuliuhoh and left a detachment of Japanese troops there. Four Japanese armored trains moved to Tahushan, further south, according to Japanese reports themselves. Japanese military planes, flying over the Peiping-Mukden railway, fired with machine-guns on passenger trains, killing two and wounding several civilians.

The following day, September 25, the Japanese continued this raiding again killing two persons and wounding six. They also began stopping and searching trains on the Peiping-Mukden line, either at Chuliuhoh or at Hsinmintun. Any armed railway guards found on board were disarmed by the Japanese, following which the train was held up (by bandits!) unless it risked sufficient speed to rush past them. Saturday, September 26, this last method was checked by the bandits (?) ripping up a part of the track near Hsinmintun and derailing the train, with many casualties. The same day the definite occupation of Chuliuhoh was reported, as well as the railway station at Hsinmintun.

Sunday, September 27, the Japanese news agency *Nippon Dempo* reported two raids by their war planes upon the Chinese soldiers at Tatientze. The same day planes bombed and damaged railway property at Tungliao.

Monday, September 28, more Japanese troops arrived at Hsinmintun. At Huangkutun station two Chinese railway guards were attacked with bayonets by ten Japanese soldiers and perhaps fatally wounded.

Tuesday, September 29, the railway telegraph office at Huangkutun, the Mukden terminus of the Peiping-Mukden line, since the central station there was occupied by the Japanese on the night of September 18, was taken over by the Japanese. The latter instituted a rigid search of all Chinese leaving Mukden, seizing any money found in their possession.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

On September 28 the *Nippon Dempo* news agency sent out a report from Tokyo stating that at a conference between Premier Wakatsuki, Foreign Minister Shidehara, and War Minister General Minami, it was decided "that the forces would not be withdrawn before order is perfectly maintained." And the same day the United States Government received a Note from Japan (in response to its own Note) stating that "the Japanese Government has acted very promptly in withdrawing its troops to the railway zone in Manchuria"!

It seems well, in concluding this outline of sordid and conscienceless telling of untruths, and ruthless invasion and terrorism, to quote Ambassador Yoshizawa's dramatic statement to the League of Nations; "The honor of Japan is engaged to carry out her undertaking to evacuate the territories outside of the South Manchuria Railway zone"!

Poor Mr. Yoshizawa! To have to make this statement in face of such sordid facts! The HONOR of Japan!

P. C. T.

THE LEADER. Friday, September 25, 1937

FULL SPEECH BY PRESIDENT IS PUBLISHED

**Says Manchurian Case
Will Test People's
Patriotism**

**Generalissimo Ready To Lead
Army If Necessary; All Must
Sink Differences**

At a mass meeting of the Kuomintang held on September 22 in the Auditorium of the Central University, Nanking, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek made a stirring speech in connection with the recent unprovoked invasion of Manchuria by Japanese troops. In the course of his address, the Generalissimo declared in strong terms that the National Government is prepared for a final struggle and that he would lead the army to fight for the preservation of our race and to uphold the dignity of our people, should the League of Nations and the signatories of the Kellogg Peace Pact fail to bring about justice for this country. The following is a translation of the full text of his speech:

"The recent military actions of Japan in Manchuria which have gone as far as to forcibly occupy Mukden, Changchun, Antung, Ying-kow and other strategic points in the Three Eastern Provinces come as a shock to the civilized world. It is the most unprecedented incident that has happened since the beginning of international relations and a grave insult to the sovereignty of our nation. Facing the gravity of the crisis, our comrades and fellow countrymen should thoroughly understand the origin and nature of the case and rise up *en masse* for the cause of national salvation.

"What is more, we must immediately make up our mind to adopt thoughtful measures in

dealing with the savage conduct of the invaders which is not only an indication of the breach of the harmonious relations of the Far East, but also a great menace to world peace. In my opinion, this will constitute a testing stone for the future of international relations and the extent of patriotism of our people.

Is There International Justice?

"In the first place, it will test whether or not there is such thing as international morality or justice existing between and among nations, and whether or not the Powers will sanction the punishment of international commitments and to preserve the peace of the world. However, I believe that the League of Nations and the signatories of the Kellogg Anti-War Pact will take appropriate steps to bring justice to the disgraceful conduct of the Japanese which is obviously contradictory to the Covenant of the League and the spirit that animates the pact.

"Secondly, the Japanese invasion into Manchuria will test our patriotism. A book entitled, 'The Complications of the Manchurian Problem' has been written by a Japanese, describing the lack of group spirit and patriotism of the Chinese as evidenced by the Sino-Japanese War of 1895 and the Boxer Rebellion of 1900, during which struggles our people, as observed by the writer, paid no attention to the populace in the war zones. This has therefore led to the aggression of our unscrupulous neighbours into our territories. However, at this juncture, I still believe that my fellow countrymen will rise in one body and present a united front against our aggressors so as to correct the wrong opinion of the Japanese writer.

Now Is The Time

"Now time has come when our nation should show our patriotism and do what we should do with the intruders. Deliberation, due preparations, organization and obedience are what we need in dealing with the situation. The National Government is now making careful investigations on the case and awaiting

the fair judgment of the world. For the moment we must suppress our indignation and remain calm, submitting to whatever our neighbors will treat us. The National Government is prepared for a final struggle and I will offer my life to lead the army to fight for the preservation of our race and to uphold the dignity of our people should international law and promises fail to do justice.

THE LEADER, Friday, September 25, 1937.

GOVERNMENT ISSUES NOTE TO CITIZENS

Addresses Statement To
Whole Country Re
Manchuria

Relates Japanese Outrages And
Pleads For Unification Of
Nation

Kuo Wen

NANKING, September 23.—
The National Government to-
day addressed the following
statement to the people in con-
nection with the Manchurian
crisis:

"Since the outrageous action
of the Japanese troops in
Manchuria became known, the
Central Kuomintang has
already issued detailed in-
structions as to what attitude
the people should take. The
National Government now
proposes to set forth for the
information of the people the
steps which it has taken in
dealing with the situation, and
also the hopes which it enter-
tains of the people in the
present emergency.

"The outrageous conduct of
the Japanese troops in Man-
churia in the present instance
is of such a grave character as
to be without precedent in his-
tory. Such an incident, indeed,
has an important bearing on
the life or death of China.

Insult to Entire World

"When the Japanese started
to bombard Mukden on
September 18, there was
absolutely no occasion for
such a move beforehand,
whereas their action is in
conflict with not only inter-
national usage but also with
every treaty. They openly
invaded and occupied our ter-
ritory, massacred our people,
murdered and humiliated our
officials and continued their
outrageous conduct with im-
pudence. The humiliation
which Japan has inflicted
on China constitutes an
insult to the entire civilized
world. The League of Nations
has been established for the

purpose of preventing warfare
between nations and employing
the united force of various
nations composing the League
to resist aggression. After the
present incident arose, the
Government immediately filed
a report with the League and
requested it to order the with-
drawal of the Japanese troops
as the first step.

"At the meeting of the
League Council on September
22 resolutions were passed
relative to the suspension of
military movements and the
withdrawal of the Japanese
army. The Government also has
requested the League to devise
a proper and equitable settle-
ment immediately after the
Japanese troops are withdrawn.
The National Government is
convinced that after an im-
partial investigation the League
will give us sufficient justice
and an equitable remedy.
Since the Government has ap-
pealed to the League for a fair
settlement, it has instructed
all its troops to avoid clashes
with Japanese soldiers.

Will Prepare Self-Defense

"Similar instructions have
been given to the people.
Under all circumstances they
should maintain an attitude of
calm and prudence. As regards
the Japanese residents in Muk-
den, orders have been issued to
the local authorities concerned
to render them adequate pro-
tection. This is a duty of every
civilized country. We should
meet barbarous conduct with
civilized acts and should
expose the iniquity of brutal
acts in a reasonable manner
to the end that the cause of
justice and law may be
vindicated. However, for the
purpose of preserving the in-
dependence of China, the gov-
ernment has decided to take
measures of self-defence and
will under no circumstances
disappoint the expectations of
the people."

Concluding, the statement
says that at this crisis all
should sink their personal dif-
ferences and place themselves
at the disposal of the govern-
ment. The government assures
the people that it will acquaint
them from time to time with
the steps to be taken in con-
nection with the present
emergency.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

RECEIVED

FROM

GREEN

Tokio

OCT 27 1931

DIVISION OF

Dated October 27, 1931

Rec'd 7:04 a.m.

Division of

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

OCT 27 1931

Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

197, October 27, 5 p.m.

The Japanese Government has issued a statement on the Japanese position at the League Council meeting. It has been telegraphed the missions abroad and the Department probably has already received a copy from the Japanese Embassy.

The statement consists of five paragraphs; the first paragraph relates to the resolutions which were proposed at Geneva; the second paragraph denies that the Japanese troops are to be used to bring pressure on Chinese in the course of negotiations. They are in Manchuria only to protect Japanese subjects; the third paragraph insists upon the Japanese rights and interests and Chinese disregard of them. The Japanese must have something more than a mere assurance of protection before the Japanese troops can be withdrawn; the fourth paragraph stated that some provision must be made to remove national antipathies and sets forth basic principles for regulating normal relationship with

China

793.94/2354

FILED

1931 OCT 28 1931

AM

2-#197, from Tokio, October 27, 1931
5 p.m.

China as follows: Mutual repudiation of aggressive policy and conduct, respect for China's territorial integrity, suppression of all organized movements interfering with trade and stirring up international hatred, effective protection throughout Manchuria of peaceful pursuits by Japanese subjects, and respect for treaty rights of Japan in Manchuria. In the fifth and final paragraph it is stated that the urgent need is to arrive at a solution by cooperation. The Japanese Government desires to open negotiation with China.

The statement is intended to explain their position at Geneva where they feel that the Japanese case was not understood and that an attempt was made there not to conciliate but to pass judgment.

Repeated to Peiping.

NEVILLE

WWC

JHR

No. 655

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE
American Consulate

Tsingtao, China, September 26, 1931.

OCT 26 31

COPIES SENT
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

SUBJECT: Tsingtao and the Mukden Affair.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
A-C/C

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON, D. C.

SIR:

1/- I have the honor to transmit herewith, copy
of the Consulate's despatch to the Legation at Pei-
ping, China, No. 487, dated September 25, entitled
as above.

Respectfully yours,

W. Rodarick Dorsey

W. Rodarick Dorsey,
American Consul.

✓
Enclosure:

1/- as stated.

Original and four copies to Department.

800.
WRD/FP

793.94/2355

FILED

NOV 5 1931

No. 487

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE
American Consulate
Tsingtao, China, September 25, 1931.

SUBJECT: Tsingtao and the Mukden Affair.

Honorable Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping, China.

Sir:

I have the honor to confirm receipt of the Legations' telegram of September 20, 1931, 11 A. M., advising that a Reuter despatch asserted that Japanese troops landed at Tsingtao on the 19th.

Reply was made the same day to the effect that no Japanese troops were here; that the Cruiser KUMA was in port but no blue jackets landed; that it was understood that the Japanese Consul General had warned the Chinese authorities to maintain order; that the Cruiser TSUSHIMA was being held for despatch to Tsingtao should Japanese lives and property be endangered; and that up to the time of telegraphing all was tranquil in Tsingtao.

The first reports of the sensational happenings at Mukden reached Tsingtao during the afternoon of the 19th. They came as a complete surprise and left a sensation of consternation generally.

The Japanese Consular authorities lost no time

in.....

- 2 -

in getting into touch with Mr. Hu Chiao-feng, the General Secretary of the Municipality, Acting as Mayor in the absence of Hu Jo-ya in Peiping, and intimating to him that the Chinese authorities were expected to maintain order and restrain Chinese nationals from demonstrations or other acts that might menace or endanger local Japanese interests.

The Japanese Consulate General has intimated to this Consulate that so long as the Chinese authorities succeed in keeping the situation in hand matters will be left entirely to their control; that no particular warship has been designated for reinforcements here in case of emergency, but that should need arise ships, naturally, could be despatched and arrive in a short time.

The Chinese authorities confirm that the Japanese have left all control in their hands, at the same time urging them to restrain all anti-Japanese demonstration that might precipitate incidents of which the Japanese authorities would be compelled to take notice.

The Japanese authorities have issued instructions to Japanese nationals to conduct themselves circumspectly and to go about their daily occupations as ordinarily, and to refrain from actions that might irritate the Chinese. It is understood unofficially, but reliably, that the Consul General has issued special cautions to all private volunteer organizations, such as the Kokusui Kai that was concerned in the recent Sino-Japanese incident here, and is seeking to accomplish their dissolution.

The.....

- 3 -

The Chinese authorities have taken similar precautions and on the day of mourning prescribed by the Central Government to invoke China's sorrow over the Mukden "humiliation" forbade all demonstration except the flying of flags at half mast. No meetings, parades or other outward expression was permitted.

The result has been that outwardly all has remained quiet and no untoward incident has arisen to afford an excuse for Japanese forces to land.

There was considerable nervousness among Chinese for a few days due to the persistent, but evidently unfounded, rumors of the presence of a number of Japanese warships in adjacent waters waiting to occupy Tsingtao. The Tangpu officials, with their families left headquarters on the water front and scattered through the city. That there was alarm in other official quarters was evidenced by the fact that the Secretary of one prominent member of officialdom called upon me to ascertain whether, in case of a Japanese occupation, the official and his family could take refuge in the Consulate. Of course, the answer was negative.

The city has been filled with rumors of all kinds as to the intended occupation of Tsingtao by Japan. The alleged activities of the American Consulate in opposition thereto have been extensively circulated, the Min Kuo Jih Pao (the organ of the local Kuomintang Committee) finally, on September 24, 1931, publishing the following:-

TSINGTAO.....

- 4 -

"TSINGTAO AMERICAN CONSUL WARNS JAPANESE TROOPS.

It is reported by the KUO MIN NEWS Agency that according to Diplomatic sources the American Consulate on the 22nd addressed a letter to the Japanese Consulate General, extracts of which are as follows:

"It is learned that the Japanese Army is going to land and occupy Tsingtao. If it is a fact it is hoped that the Japanese troops will not take such action arbitrarily. They must respect others and conduct themselves so as not to expand the Manchurian incident and so avoid unfavorable criticism of their principles".

Of course, the report was absolutely without foundation. The incident was at once taken up with the Acting Mayor who ordered a denial by the paper and undertook to induce the press to refrain from publishing unconfirmed reports concerning this Consulate in future.

The situation at Tsingtao may be summed up as follows:

The Japanese are watching events carefully and holding the Chinese Authorities responsible for the maintenance of order; the Japanese Cruiser KUMA, which is the flagship of the Japanese Second Overseas Squadron and permanently on this station, is here. In an emergency about 300 blue jackets could be landed. As long as Japanese lives and property are not threatened or endangered it is believed that no demonstration on shore will be made. Rear Admiral T. Suda is aboard the KUMA.

The Acting Mayor has stated to the writer that he is fully alive to the possibilities of the situation and is determined to do everything possible to control his nationals. He has the situation well in hand and with the passing of the first excitement believes

things.....

- 5 -

things will remain quiet.

There are no military forces in Tsingtao, but the Municipality has under its authority 1,600 ordinary police and 800 Pao Au Tsei.

Four Chinese warships of the North East Squadron are in port and their marines assist in night patrols. Admiral Shen Hung-lich is reported as being in Mukden, having arrived there two days before its occupation by Japan.

It is understood that a representative of Admiral Tsuda called at Admiralty House and came to an understanding with the Chief-of-Staff concerning the Chinese ships here. He is reported to have represented that as the relations between the Japanese and Chinese Naval vessels had always been so friendly here it was hoped that everything would be done at this time to assist in maintaining the pleasant relations.

The Japanese Consular Authorities have informed me that General Han Fu-chu, Chairman of the Shantung Provincial Government had assured the Japanese Consul General at Tsinan that he would be responsible for the safety and protection of Japanese lives and property along the Kiaochow-Tsinan Railway, at Tsinan and elsewhere in the Province.

I brought away from my interview with the Japanese authorities the impression that so long as Han Fu-chu succeeded in keeping things quiet in the Province and the Tsingtao Municipal Authorities were equally

successful....

- 6 -

successful here, no landing of Japanese forces would
be necessary.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

W. Roderick Dorsey,
American Consul.

Original and one copy to Legation,
Five copies to Department of State,
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo,
Copy to Consulate, Tainan,
Copy to Consulate, Chefoo.

806.
WRD/YF

A true copy of
the signed original.
FP

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 31, 1931.

~~MAIL:~~

~~SL:~~


REM

Nanking transmits as enclosures with the attached despatch some press releases by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Sino-Japanese crisis.

The only one I consider of interest at the present time is the one on page 8, the last paragraph of which indicates that China does not admit the right of Japan to station troops along the South Manchurian Railway.

The last paragraph of the release on page 7 is amusing--"the Bolivian Government will probably do something in the matter".


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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

No.D-114

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,
Nanking, China.



Confidential.

OCT 26 31

October 1, 1931.

743.44
Subject: Sino-Japanese Controversy in
Manchuria - Foreign Office
News Releases.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

In view of the Sino-Japanese controversy in Manchuria and the action in connection therewith taken recently by the United States and the League of Nations, it seemed to me that it might be of interest to learn what sort of news is being supplied to the public by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs relating to these subjects. I therefore applied to the Department of Intelligence and Publicity for permission to receive the Ministry's daily press releases. This permission was given me in a letter dated September 21, 1931, from Dr. M. T. Z. Tyau, who stated that he had been authorized by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. He added, however, the following sentence: "In return, he (i.e. the Minister,) hopes that you will promise to make such releases confidential and not to quote us in any way".

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-2-

There are enclosed herewith nine translations of so-called "Unofficial" releases issued on September 24 and 25. These have been selected as being possibly indicative of a desire on the part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to foster the view that international sympathy may be counted on as a factor in deciding the dispute between China and Japan.

Respectfully yours,

Willys R. Peck

Willys R. Peck,
American Consul General.

✓
Enclosure:

9 translations of unofficial releases
issued by the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs on September 24 and 25, 1931.

800
WRP:MCL

In quintuplicate to the Department.
In duplicate to the Legation at Peiping.

4

F. P.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure to despatch to the Department No.D-114 of
Willlys R. Peck, American Consul General at Nanking,
China, dated October 1, 1931, entitled "Sino-Japanese
Controversy in Manchuria - Foreign Office News
Releases".

Press Release issued by the Chinese Ministry of
Foreign Affairs.

Unofficial (Translation) . Sept.24,1931.

U.S.Considers that Japan Should be Held Responsible.
Has Sent Official Note to Japanese Ambassador.

There is a report from a certain reliable source in
Washington that the U. S. Government has today addressed
an official note to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington
stating that based on the reports which the U. S. Govern-
ment has received from various sources, Japan should
assume full responsibility for the Manchurian incident.

Enclosure

- 2 -

Press Release issued by the Chinese Ministry
of Foreign Affairs.

Unofficial (Translation) Sept. 24, 1931.

Soviet Russia Opposes Activities of Japan

Considers Movement of Japanese Troops to the
Chinese Eastern Railway Unreasonable

Moscow - Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs
officially notified Japanese Ambassador in Moscow on
September 22nd that Soviet Russia cannot continue to
keep silent in regard to the movement of Japanese
troops to the Chinese Eastern Railway, and considers
the activities of Japanese on the Railway absolutely
unreasonable and disadvantageous to Japan. He re-
quests the Japanese Ambassador to inform the Japanese
Government of his opinion and to advise him of the
reply from the latter.

Enclosure

- 3 -

Press Release issued by the Chinese Ministry
of Foreign Affairs.

Unofficial

(Translation)

Sept. 24, 1931.

Soviet Russia Sympathizes with China

Considers Activities of Japanese Troops
Affecting Peace in Far East

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has just received a telegram from Moscow reporting that Russian Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs states that the extensiveness of the activities of Japanese troops in Manchuria are beyond what has been expected by Soviet Russia, and that Soviet Russia sympathizes with China and considers the matter of great importance. He also states that he is watching carefully changes of conditions in the Far East, but that Soviet Russia will not take any step which ^{might} ~~may~~ make the situation still more difficult.

Enclosure

- 4 -

Press Release issued by the Chinese
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Unofficial

(Translation)

Sept. 25, 1931.

U.S. Government Considers Manchurian Incident
Regrettable

Japanese Ambassador Stated that Troops Will be
Withdrawn.

Washington - President Hoover hopes that China
and Japan may be able to settle the Manchurian incident
with minimum outside support.

Japanese Ambassador in Washington advised Stimson
that Japanese troops had not pressed northward from
Changchun, and that they will be withdrawn in the
nearest future.

It was stated in the note of the U. S. Foreign
Office that the American Government and citizens were
paying close attention to the Manchurian incident and
considered the matter regrettable, and hoped that both
sides would abide by the international measures and
give up armed force, as well as other activities which
might handicap an amicable settlement.

Enclosure

- 5 -

Press Release issued by the Chinese
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Unofficial

(Translation)

Sept. 25, 1931.

Manchurian Incident

Belgium Expects Prompt Settlement by League

Brussels, Sept. 24 - The Belgian Foreign Office, in order to indicate the friendly relations between Belgium and China, hopes that the Manchurian incident may be amicably settled. The Council of the League has been handling the matter and it is hoped that a prompt solution can be reached.

Enclosure

- 6 -

Press Release issued by the Chinese
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Unofficial (Translation) Sept. 25, 1931.

Panama Government Sympathizes With China.

Informal - The Ministry of Foreign Affairs received a telegram from Panama stating that the Panama Government sympathizes with China in respect of the Manchurian incident, and has telegraphed its delegation to the League of Nations to lodge a strong protest against the unreasonable occupation of the territory of a sister nation and requesting that justice be upheld.

Enclosure

- 7 -

C
Press Release issued by the Chinese
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Unofficial

(Translation)

Sept. 25, 1931.

South American Governments Sympathize With China.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has just received a telegram from Santiago stating that the Chilean Foreign Office has telegraphed its delegation to the League of Nations to render adequate assistance to the Chinese delegation in discussing the Manchurian incident, and that it hopes that the matter be settled satisfactorily.

Public opinion in Bolivia and Argentine also sympathizes with China. There is a report that the Bolivian Government will probably do something in the matter.

Enclosure

- 8 -

Press Release issued by the Chinese
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Unofficial

(Translation)

Sept. 25, 1931.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a formal
communique yesterday stating:

"The other day, when the Japanese Minister of War interviewed press reporters, he stated that according to the provisions of Sino-Japanese treaties, Japan may send 15 soldiers to each kilometer of the South Manchuria Railway. The total number of soldiers Japan may send would therefore be 16,500 for the whole railway. In fact, only 15,000 Japanese soldiers have been despatched to that railway. Judging from this, Japan intends to misrepresent facts which other nations have not been fully aware of.

"The strength of Japanese troops now in Manchuria has exceeded 50,000 and the Japanese parliament has appropriated 2,200,000 Yen per month for these troops, excluding emergency expenditures. Considering how many Chinese citizens have been killed, how vast an area has been occupied, how many cities have been taken and how much property seized, can there be any reason to support the statement that the activities of Japanese troops are in accordance with the provisions of existing treaties?

"What the Japanese Minister of War said might be based on Article 1 of the supplementary treaty of the Russo-Japanese Treaty of 1905. However, none of the Sino-Japanese treaties has ever recognized such a provision. Article 2 of the Supplementary Treaty signed during 1905 concerning Manchuria provides that "Japanese Government promises to take the same action if Russia promises to withdraw troops which have been stationed to protect the railway." Russian troops on the Chinese Eastern Railway had been withdrawn long ago. At present the Railway is protected by Chinese troops only. The stationing of Japanese troops on the South Manchuria Railway has absolutely no foundation in treaties. Whatever excuse Japan may have in the matter, there is no reason why her troops should occupy our territory, kill our people and seize our properties."

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure

- 9 -

Press Release issued by the Chinese Ministry of
Foreign Affairs.

Unofficial

(Translation)

Sept. 25, 1931.

Various Foreign Nations Sympathize With China --
Cuba and France

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs received a telegram from Havana stating that the Cuban Minister for Foreign Affairs considers the activities of Japan unreasonable and has telegraphically instructed the Cuban delegation to the League of Nations to assist the Chinese delegation in the matter.



Paris - French Foreign Office also sympathizes with China and has instructed its delegation to propose an amicable settlement. Simultaneously, the French Government agrees with the sending of a Committee to make investigations.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

No. 42

AMERICAN CONSULATE
GENERAL

Shanghai, China, October 6, 1931.



THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

1/ I have the honor to enclose herewith a
copy of my despatch No. 453, dated October 3,
1931, to the Legation, Peiping, entitled "Politi-
tical Conditions."

Respectfully yours,

L. S. Myers,
American Consul General.

✓ 1/ Enclosure: Copy of despatch No. 453.

Original and four copies to Department.

MSM:AAB
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No. 453.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, China.

October 3, 1931.

SUBJECT: Political Conditions.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping, China.

Sir:

12348

Referring to my strictly confidential despatch No. 452 dated October 2, 1931, under the subject "Independence Movement at Mukden", I have the honor to state that a news item in the Manchou Pao of October 1, 1931 (published in Dairen) is to the effect that both Yuan Chin-k'ai and K'an Chao-hsi informed its reporter in an interview that the reports regarding their connection with the independence movement are entirely groundless. K'an Chao-hsi, it may be added, was Tutung of Jehol at the time of the Kuo Sung-ling rebellion and owing to his failure to follow Marshal Chang Tso-lin's orders was dismissed. He has held no official position since then but has conducted a general import business at Mukden. At present he

is

- 2 -

is connected both with the Peace and Order Committee of the Gentry and a Committee (遼寧四民臨時維持會) which has been organized mainly for rendering relief to the needy, of which committee he is the Chairman.


It is reported in the local press today that the Liaoning provincial government was organized at Chin Hsien on October 1, 1931, and that Mi Ch'un-lin (米春霖), the acting Chairman appointed by Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, has assumed charge. Other members of the government who have reported for duty at Chin Hsien include Chang Cheng-lu (Finance Commissioner), Huang Hsien-sheng (recently Director of Police at Mukden), P'eng Chi-ch'un (Director of Hulutao Works) and Hsing Shih-lien.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers.
American Consul General.

Original and one copy to Legation.
Five copies to Department.
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.

MSM:AAB
800.



RECU

No. 43

AMERICAN CONSULATE

GENERAL

Mukden, China, October 6, 1931.

OCT 26 31

SUBJECT: Immediate Effects of Japanese Military Occupation of South Manchuria upon American Interests.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

OCT 27 1931

Department of State

1/ I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of my despatch No. 454, dated October 5, 1931, to the Legation, Peiping, on the subject "Immediate Effects of Japanese Military Occupation of South Manchuria upon American Interests." Copies hereto to be sent to

Respectfully yours,

H. S. Myers.
American Consul General.

1/ Enclosure: Copy of despatch No. 454.

Original and four copies to Department.

MSM:AAB
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MAY 18 1932

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 4454

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, China.

October 5, 1931.

SUBJECT: Immediate Effects of Japanese Military
Occupation of South Manchuria upon
American Interests.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping, China.

Sir:

I have the honor to submit for the Legation's information the following brief report on the immediate effects which the recent Japanese military occupation of certain areas of southern Manchuria has had upon American interests therein.

Preliminary to an enumeration of the cases where American interests have been affected, it is relevant to state that prior to the incidents of September 18th and 19th which resulted in the military occupation by the Japanese army, American business concerns, although sharing the general uneasiness concerning Sino-Japanese relations in Manchuria, were unprepared for the drastic move by the Japanese which has resulted in the paralyzation of the economic life of this territory.

Furthermore,

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Stutzman NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Furthermore, up to the present there has been no attempt on the part of local Japanese consular or military authorities, either officially or unofficially, to clarify the present unusual situation by giving the regime under which most of the cities of south Manchuria are now controlled a temporary de facto status of any kind. Military occupation, the term which seems most logically to describe the situation obtaining, has been denied by the Japanese. A state of warfare does not exist and yet public and private property (of the latter both Chinese and foreign) has been seized and is still being held more than two weeks after the incidents which precipitated the Japanese occupation. To date, this Consulate General has received no notification from the Japanese Consul General attempting to regularize these actions or to explain why (1) Japanese soldiers with fixed bayonets should be patrolling the streets in front of the Consulate General on the morning of September 19th and subsequently, (2) labels or certificates of identity were necessary for consular servants in order that they might pass through the streets unmolested by Japanese soldiers, (3) consular officials should be stopped in the Chinese city by Japanese soldiers and made to identify themselves, (4) requests should have to be made of the Japanese military authorities for Americans to visit such places as the Mukden (Chinese) radio station,

the

- 3 -

the Chinese aviation field, arsenal, railway station, and other places, or (5) why, to put it broadly, the Japanese military authorities should have to be approached, through the Japanese Consulate General, concerning practically all matters which prior to September 19th came within the province of Chinese officials.

This Consulate General has had, perforce, to recognize the existence of this unusual situation and adapt itself thereto as occasions arose which required action of one sort or another. The fact, however, that there has never been any official notification of an establishment of control by the Japanese has made it difficult to judge just where assumption might become presumption with respect to placing responsibility.

One of the first effects of the occupation by the Japanese military was requests from American firms for some form of identification for their Chinese employees in order to permit them to travel to and from their work without being molested by Japanese patrols. The Japanese Consulate General issued a paper in Japanese to each Chinese employee named on the various lists sent them, stating his occupation, et cetera. These documents were, in the main, necessary and effective.

On September 21, the Consulate General received a letter from Andersen, Moyer and Company, requesting

that

- 4 -

that appropriate action be taken, in view of the unsettled conditions, to protect its interest, amounting to over \$200,000 (U.S. currency) in unpaid accounts, in a number of Chinese government and semi-government concerns. The firm further requested advice concerning the action it should take with respect to large orders of materials for Chinese concerns which were en route to Mukden. On September 29, the firm again wrote to this Consulate General stating that the Antung (Chinese) Electric light plant, in which it has a large interest in the form of machinery unpaid for, had been closed on September 22 by order of the Japanese military authorities, and requesting the Consulate General to request the Japanese for a statement of their intention with respect to the plant and of the date when it might be returned to the Chinese owners.

Acting upon Andersen, Meyer and Company's first request, the Consulate General informed the Japanese Consul General, in general terms of the American Company's interest in the Chinese government and semi-government organizations and requested him to take what action he deemed appropriate, "in view of the unusual situation obtaining in certain areas of south Manchuria" (the term which this Consulate General has found it convenient to use for want of a more exact one), to insure the protection of the American interest in the organizations. In compliance with the Company's

second

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -

second request, the Consulate General expressed to the Japanese Consul General its concern, on behalf of the American company, over the future of the Antung-Electric Light Company, inviting his attention to the obvious fact that the closure of the plant by the Japanese made it impossible for the company to meet its obligations to Andersen, Meyer & Company. No reply has been received to either communication. Andersen, Meyer & Company was informed in reply to its request concerning shipments en route to Yumen that the Consulate General was not in a position to give definite advice on the subject but that it was of the opinion that the retention of such shipments at Dairen when possible would be advisable.

It is instructive to note, with respect to the closure of the Antung (Chinese) Electric Light Company, that since the opening of this company a year or so ago, there has been a continuous feud between it and the old established South Manchuria Electric Light Company of Antung, which prior to the opening of the Chinese plant had a monopoly for the supply of electric current and power in Antung. The arbitrary closing of the Chinese plant has no justification as a military or protective measure and can only be explained as an attempt by the South Manchuria Railway, supported by the Japanese military authorities, to take advantage

of

- 6 -

of the present unsettled conditions to further its commercial interests.

At the request of the Standard Oil Company which had heard of reports of possible danger to its large godown at Antung, the Japanese Consul General was notified on September 23, of the approximate value of the godown stocks and requested to take appropriate measures to insure the protection of the American property. Although no reply has been received to this communication, the Japanese Consul General has verbally informed an officer of this Consulate General that the Japanese military authorities were being requested to afford adequate protection.

On September 21 and 22, the Consulate General received letters from Wrezer, Federal Incorporated. requesting in the first that the Japanese military authorities be notified of its substantial interest in motor buses of a Chinese company which had been seized by the Japanese army occupying Newchwang, and in the second that a protest be entered against the seizure without payment by Japanese soldiers of gasoline at the company's office in Mukden and against the forced occupation of the office for a part of a day also by Japanese soldiers. The Consulate General made representations to the Japanese Consul General in both instances, stating with respect to the latter case that it was convinced that the situation obtaining did not justify the seizure and

occupation

- 7 -

occupation of American property. Replies have not yet been received but the Consulate General has been advised by Frazar, Federal Incorporated, that the trucks have been returned to the Chinese company and that the Japanese military authorities have promised to pay for the gasoline taken.

On September 24, the Consulate General received a letter, delivered in person, from Mr. George F. Shacklen, China Representative of the Radio Corporation of America, requesting that this office obtain from the Japanese authorities a statement as to whether the Mukden (Chinese) Radio Station was maintaining service with San Francisco and if not, what steps were being taken to resume service. He further requested that the Japanese during their occupation be asked to protect the receiving, sending, and central control stations from damage. As the Legation is aware, the Mukden Radio Station was built with Radio Corporation of America materials and assistance. Although the Radio Corporation of America has no financial interest now in the physical plant, its service (or traffic) agreement with the Northeastern Telephone, Telegraph and Radio Administration for radio communication between Mukden and San Francisco gives it a vital interest in the operation and welfare of the Chinese station.

An officer of this Consulate General delivered in person a communication to the Japanese Consul General

on

- 8 -

on the subject. The Consul General stated orally, in reply to Mr. Sheeklen's inquiries, that service was not being maintained and that he could not say when it might be resumed but that he would approach the Japanese military authorities with the matter. Later he replied by despatch, requesting a copy of the Radio Corporation of America's agreement with the North-eastern Administration. This Consulate General is of the opinion that the present situation does not warrant the Japanese in requesting a copy of an agreement between an American corporation and a Chinese government organization and has informed Mr. Sheeklen by telegraph to Shanghai and an officer of the Japanese Consulate General orally of its position.

The present status of the case may be stated briefly by quoting this Consulate General's telegram of October 3 to the Department: "Referring to the Department's telegram of October 2, 10 a.m. Radio station held by the Japanese military authorities who report it undamaged. Repeated representations to Japanese Consulate General relative to the reestablishment of service fail to elicit more than statement that the Japanese military are considering the matter."

Yesterday (October 4) an officer of this Consulate General visited the transmitting plant and the central control office of the Mukden Radio Station. At the former place he found that the Japanese soldiers had

been

- 9 -

been withdrawn, leaving only a few Chinese watchmen who admitted their inability to protect the plant from the large numbers of Chinese robbers who are operating in and about Mukden. However, the transmitting equipment appeared to have been undamaged. Its state of preservation was in marked contrast to the condition of the Three Eastern Provinces Radio Station (long wave - German equipment) which had been very badly demolished - by the Chinese as they evacuated the place, according to the Japanese. At the central control office, there was found billeted a detachment of Japanese soldiers, with machine gun and rifle equipment. The Japanese non-commissioned officer in charge stated that the equipment was broken but it is believed that he made this statement simply to support his point that messages could not be transmitted, as the Consulate General has had assurances from the Japanese Consul General that the equipment is not damaged.

The local Chinese representative of The L. E. Gale Company called at this office on September 25 and requested that it obtain information for him concerning a Waco aeroplane, the property of The L. E. Gale Company, which had been brought to Mukden for demonstration purposes and was at the Chinese aerodrome on September 19. The Japanese Consul General was requested to notify the Japanese military authorities that the

Waco

- 10 -

Waco plane was American owned and of the fact that the American owners were planning to fly it to Shanghai as soon as repairs could be made to the engine. Yesterday an officer of my staff requested permission to visit the aerodrome for the purpose of ascertaining the condition of the American plane. This permission, at first granted orally, was refused today by letter just before the visit was to be made, the reason given by the military authorities being that they had had trouble with Japanese newspaper correspondents visiting the aerodrome and arsenal - a very feeble reason in the opinion of this Consulate General.

McDonnell and Gorman, a firm of American engineers and building contractors, informed this office on September 26th by letter of the fact that they were building in the walled city a residence and office building for General Chang Hsueh-liang, payments on which did not cover the materials which they had put into the construction. The Japanese occupying the property had removed six scaffolding poles which the firm requested this Consulate General to endeavor to recover. Later the firm further requested that permission be obtained for the removal from the site of certain building materials not yet incorporated into the buildings, ^{on} the grounds that it wished to protect its equity ^{the} in buildings in so far as possible and to lessen the danger of losses by fire and theft. The

firm's

- 11 -

firm's loss and its desire with respect to the removal of the materials was brought to the attention of the Japanese Consulate General which promised to take the matters up with the military authorities with a view to securing reimbursement for the poles and permission for the removal of the materials.

In addition to the cases enumerated above, there are others including a request from the Chinese Engineering and Development Company that the Japanese authorities be notified of a substantial sum of money due the firm by the Chinese Trench Mortar Arsenal which has been closed by the action of the Japanese and is now occupied by Japanese soldiers, a letter from the Aeronautical and Engineering Company requesting that the Japanese be notified of certain aircraft instruments, the property of the Pioneer Instrument Company of Brooklyn, N. Y., which were at the Chinese aerodrome for demonstration purposes when it was occupied by the Japanese, a statement from the Automatic Telephones of China, Federal Incorporated, giving its outstanding accounts with Chinese public service companies in Manchuria payment of which it fears may be jeopardized by the Japanese occupation, and a claim from the Texas Company for small losses due in part to damage from rifle fire on the night of September 18th and to interference from the Japanese military with respect to taking delivery of cargo. These and similar cases are either being reported to the Japanese Consulate General or are being filed for possible future reference, depending upon their nature.

- 12 -

On October 1, the Consulate General received a letter from The Manchurian Mission of Seventh-Day Adventists stating that the Mission had on deposit in the Frontier Bank a sum of over fifty thousand dollars (Chinese currency) which it is unable to utilize due to the closing of the bank by the Japanese, and requesting that this office make representations to the Japanese with a view to making it possible for the mission to draw on its account. The Mission added that its inability to secure funds made it liable to a loss of approximately \$8,000 for failure to fulfill its part of an agreement with a building contractor who is constructing a hospital for the Mission. The Consulate General communicated the Mission's case to the Japanese Consul General, requesting that arrangements be made as soon as possible for the Mission to draw funds against its account.

Today the Consulate General is in receipt of a request, somewhat similar in nature to the above, from the Texas Company. The Company states that it at present holds and is daily receiving drafts drawn on accounts in the Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces and the Frontier Bank which it is unable to cash due to the action of the Japanese military authorities in keeping the two banks closed and their funds under custody, and requests the Consulate General to secure a statement from the Japanese of what action they are taking to

make

- 13 -

make it possible to cash drafts on the aforementioned banks. The Consulate General expects letters from other American firms in Mukden which hold drafts on the Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces and the Frontier Bank, requesting similar information.

The National City Bank of New York, which has large silver deposits in the two Chinese banks, has protested directly to the Japanese Consulate General against the prolonged closure of the banks and has requested that steps be taken to allow it to withdraw its deposits if the banks are not to be reopened soon. The National City Bank has quite naturally been very adversely affected by the situation. A large part of its business is with foreign firms selling to Chinese government and public service organizations. It is liable to substantial losses through business which it has financed involving orders placed by Chinese organizations which are now, practically speaking, non-existent and therefore incapable of taking delivery. A very large order which the Chinese arsenal placed some time ago with a foreign firm for a special type of machinery will illustrate the Bank's difficulties. The Bank financed the transaction on a twenty-five per cent basis. The machinery is now at Newchwang and the purchaser, the arsenal, is unable to take delivery. The return value of the machinery is hardly twenty-five per cent of its invoice value.

The

- 14 -

The Bank stands to lose the difference. These and other cases, not to mention concern over the future of business in south Manchuria, are the problems of the National City Bank.

The closing of the Frontier Bank and the Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces by the Japanese military authorities has had, and promises to have, a very serious effect upon the business and economic life of southern Manchuria. These two banks are responsible for practically the entire bank note issues in circulation in Manchuria, and the financing connected with the marketing of the agricultural produce of this area is almost entirely in their hands. The other two Chinese banks, the Bank of China and the Bank of Communications, play very little part in domestic financing and are not prepared to do so.

The financing of this autumn's harvest presents a very serious problem if the banks are not opened soon. The Japanese claim the opening of the banks now would seriously endanger the holders of their bank notes and even the continued existence of the banks because of insufficient silver reserves and securities. The fact remains, however, that the bank notes of these two banks were accepted at very little below Shanghai par prior to the occupation of Manchuria by the Japanese. If, as reported, the Japanese have taken that part of the silver reserves which they could identify as belonging to the Northeastern government officials it is quite probable that the opening of the banks now would result in a run

and

- 18 -

and the collapse of their note issues unless, as has been suggested, the Japanese banks in Mukden take steps to support them with ample credits. There is also the possibility that the two banks will be kept closed and that the Japanese banks, perforce, will have to take over the remunerative task of financing southern Manchuria and furnishing it with bank notes.


In conclusion, it should be stated that the general economic paralyzation of south Manchuria for the past two weeks has naturally affected American business from the standpoint of collections and new business. Both have all but ceased. American firms stand to lose large amounts due them by ^{the} Chinese government, semi-government, and private organizations due, in some cases to the seizure of the organizations by the Japanese, and in others to voluntary closing of firms and the hasty departure of debtors. The Japanese have thrown a wrench in the economic machinery of Manchuria, occasioning losses running into many millions to both Chinese and foreigners. They may be able to repair the damage but the greater part of the losses will probably never be recovered.

Respectfully yours,

M. G. Myers,
American Consul General.

Original and one copy to legation.
Five copies to Department.
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.

JCV: AAB
340/800



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 30, 1931.

RECEIVED

NOV 10 1931

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

The attached despatch from Mukden gives a résumé

of the immediate effects of the Japanese military occupation of South Manchuria upon American interest in that area. It will be necessary to read the entire despatch to get a clear picture of the situation. It appears, however, that, in addition to the Radio Corporation, which is the only American firm that has yet approached the Department for assistance, other American firms are experiencing difficulties in the conduct of their business as a result of the Japanese occupation, as follows:

Andersen, Meyer and Company,
Standard Oil Company,
Frazar, Federal Incorporated,
The L. E. Gale Company,
McDonnell and Gorman,
Chinese Engineering and Development Company,
Aeronautical and Engineering Company,
Automatic Telephones of China, Fed. Inc.,
Texas Company,
Seventh-Day Adventists Mission,
The National City Bank.

These difficulties arise chiefly as a result of:

- (1) The closing of the Chinese Government bureaus which had purchased materials, some already received and some en route;
- (2) The taking over of electric light plants, airplanes and motor cars in which American firms have interest, and

(3)

Mukden

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- 2 -

(3) The closing of the Frontier Bank and the Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces with which the American firms had deposits or held checks and drafts thereon. (Note: These two banks were reopened under Japanese supervision subsequent to the preparation of the despatch under reference but their transactions are restricted.)

While there is no indication that the actual losses to date are large, it is possible, if the occupation continues, that American firms will suffer to a far greater extent.

With regard to such action as the Department might take at this time to protect the American interests involved, I am inclined to the view that we should do no more at the present time than:

(1) Instruct the Consul General at Mukden to continue to bring to the attention of the Japanese authorities, as he has been doing, such phases of the situation as occasion may require;

(2) Instruct the Consul General at Mukden to keep a record of the losses suffered by American interests; and

(3) Remind the Japanese Ambassador here, on some occasion when the Secretary discusses with him the general situation in Manchuria, that we have substantial interests in Manchuria which we hope the Japanese Government will make every effort to safeguard in the areas under its control.

I do not believe that we should make any more direct and positive representations to the Japanese authorities at the present time because (1) it might antagonize the Japanese military and result in incidents calculated to damage American interest; and (2) it might

- 3 -

might give both the Chinese and Japanese an idea that we recognize Japanese control in this area. In expressing this opinion I am presuming that ultimately any losses suffered by American interest as a result of the present crisis in Manchuria may be made the subject of representations either to the Japanese or Chinese Government or to both with a view to obtaining compensation.



JEJ/VDM

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM Copy for the Department

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE

American Consulate, Dairen, Manchuria, September 28, 1931

CONFIDENTIAL

Edwin L. Neville, Esquire,

Charge d'Affaires ad interim,

American Embassy,

Tokyo, Japan

Sir:


As of possible interest to the Embassy, I venture to make certain observations on the recent Japanese coup in Manchuria.

Circumstances of Occupation

Nobody here, not even the Japanese themselves, appears to credit the Japanese claims that the Chinese provoked hostilities and that the Japanese forces acted in self-defence. The very nature of the Japanese measures, punitive from the outset, precludes belief in their self-defensive character. Outside of stereotyped statements for foreign consumption, the local Japanese authorities, residents, and press seem to have forgotten the original charge of Chinese aggression, and look upon the occupation of South Manchuria as a political measure to settle international disputes of long standing.

Anyone familiar with the low level of intelligence and initiative of the Chinese soldier dismisses as absurd the claim that he mined and blew up a railroad bridge

and



RECEIVED

OCT 29 1931

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

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- 2 -

and attacked the Japanese soldiers guarding it. Such an enterprise could only have originated and been directed by the high Chinese command, but this theory too cannot be supported with logic. Why would the high Chinese command, knowing the temper of the Japanese Army over the murder (or irregular shooting as a spy) of Captain Nakamura in Eastern Inner Mongolia, challenge Japan and yet be so absolutely unprepared to fight? There appears to be no question about the completeness of the surprise of the Chinese. On the other hand, the evidence that the Japanese had a carefully laid plan of action is overwhelming.

The recent propaganda regarding Japanese injuries in Manchuria conducted by the War Office, the urgent conference in Tokyo of the Supreme Military Council just prior to the occupation, the reported opposition of the Japanese Foreign Minister to the War Office's "plan for dealing with the Manchurian situation", the coincidence of the coup with the arrival in Mukden from Tokyo of Colonel Doihara, the special representative in Mukden of the General Staff, the precision and suddenness of military movement, the simultaneous occupation of so many strategic centers, in fact every phase of the incident points to careful preparation in every detail.

Causes of Occupation

The cause of the Japanese occupation of South Manchuria is not believed to lie in military men's in-

dignation

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

dignation over the murder of a fellow officer, or in any one or a cumulation of disputes with the Chinese, although the recurrence of such disputes and their exaggerated publicity made Japanese public opinion favorable to extreme action. The cause is unquestionably of more fundamental character: the growth of Chinese economic and political independence in Manchuria and Japan's declining influence there. Regarding Manchuria as her special field for capital investment and economic exploitation, Japan has viewed with envy and concern the exclusive economic activity of the Chinese, some of it reserved to her by treaty and some of it actually competitive with her own enterprises. Particularly has she been dismayed over the declining receipts of the South Manchuria Railway in contrast to the prosperity of the new Chinese railroads, and over the dullness of cargo movement in Dairen compared with the relative activity of Newchwang and Chinwangtao. Having a forward political policy also, Japan has with difficulty concealed her displeasure at the increasing liberty of action of the Chinese, such as their adoption of the Nationalist flag and union with Nanking over Japan's opposition, the construction of railways and harbors to compete with Dairen and the South Manchuria Railway system, and finally the isolation of Dairen from domestic trade by Customs legislation. The occupation of Manchuria is believed to be an effort to halt Chinese control before it becomes absolute, and to establish Japanese political and economic mastery in

the

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

the region. To sum up my views, the recent coup was deliberately planned to shear the rising Northeastern Government of all power as well as to crush the increasingly dangerous and hostile Northeastern Army, and to clear the way for renewed Japanese economic activity.

Effects of Occupation

While it is idle to speculate on the outcome of the Japanese occupation of Manchuria, it is reasonably certain that the Northeastern Government for some time to come will be devoid of any real fiscal, constructive, or administrative power. An important buyer of American construction material and equipment will thus be lost for the time being. American and European firms and banks which have supplied the Northeastern Government with credits may lose sums of money besides. Forwarding agents in Dairen state that up-country import business, which was improving somewhat in anticipation of the winter season, has come to a standstill as a result of consignees' and dealers' anxiety over future political developments. The question of specie cover for Northeastern Government banknotes in circulation with the Northeastern Government no longer functioning is also a disturbing thought to merchants. There is no doubt that the Japanese coup has dislocated, for some time at least, well-established and smoothly running economic arrangements in a wide area, and added a small measure

to

- 5 -

to the world's distress at the moment. On the other hand, the severity of the Japanese Government at this time may give the Chinese authorities a greater sense of responsibility in foreign relations, with ultimate benefits to foreign trade and residents in China.

Respectfully yours,

Wm. R. Langdon,
American Consul.

800
WRL:L

Copy to Department.
Copy to Legation, Peiping.
Copy to Consulate General, Tokyo.

718 Carbon Copies
Received L. J. M.

A true copy of
the signed origi-
nal. A. M. L.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 5257

COPIES SENT TO
O.C.I. AND M.I.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

HARBIN, CHINA, October 2, 1931.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 27 1931
Department of State

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3-7 NOV 1931
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
A.S.C.
1

SUBJECT: CHINESE PROTEST AGAINST JAPANESE
PLANE FLYING OVER HARBIN.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

SIR:

1/ I have the honor to enclose herewith, for the
information of the Department, a copy of my despatch
No. 2274, of even date, with enclosures, to the
Legation on the subject of the Chinese protest against
Japanese plane flying over Harbin.

Respectfully yours,

G. C. Hanson
G. C. Hanson
American Consul General.

1 enclosure as above indicated.

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TH/th

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1931 NOV 5

FILED

NO. 2274

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

HARBIN CHINA, October 2, 1931.

SUBJECT: CHINESE PROTEST AGAINST JAPANESE
PLANE FLYING OVER HARBIN.

The Honorable

Nelson Trueter Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping, China.

Sir:

For the information of the Legation, I have
1/ the honor to enclose herewith a copy, in translation,
of an official communication dated September 30, 1931,
with enclosure, received by me from the local Special
Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, relative to Japanese
plane flying over Harbin.

Respectfully yours,


G. C. HANSON

G. C. Hanson
American Consul General.

800
TE/th

1 enclosure as above indicated, with sub-enclosure.

5 copies have been sent to the Department;
1 copy has been sent to the American Consulate
General at Mukden.



(Translated by SGO)

Official letter No. 442 to Consul General Hanson
from Chung Yu, Special Commissioner for Foreign
Affairs at Harbin)

Dated: September 30, 1931. Rec'd: October 1, 1931.

SUBJECT: Protest Against Japanese
Planes Coming to Harbin.

1/ There was a Japanese plane flying over Harbin
on the 25th, 26th and 27th instant, of which the
Chinese were not informed in advance. Such flying
over Chinese territory is in violation of China's
sovereign rights, especially at this time when such
action is apt to cause consternation on the part of
the public. A protest has been lodged with the
Japanese Consul General with the request that he wire
to the authorities concerned not to allow Japanese
planes to come to Harbin again, and there is enclosed
herewith, for your information, a copy of the letter
addressed to the Japanese Consul General in this
connection.

(SEAL)

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(Translated by SCC)

Letter addressed to the Japanese Consul General by
 the Special Commissioner for Foreign Affairs at Harbin.

Dated: Sept. 27, 1931. Rec'd: -----

SUBJECT: PROTEST AGAINST JAPANESE
 PLANES FLYING OVER HARBIN.

As you were recently assured by me, the local military and police have taken joint measures to maintain local peace and order, which is thus perfectly assured, and they have further categorically assumed all responsibility for the proper protection of your nationals.

On the 25th and 26th instant successively a Japanese plane was flying over Harbin, from which leaflets were dropped. Such flying over Chinese territory, without having secured in advance the permission of the Chinese authorities, is in violation of China's sovereign rights; and at this time of disturbed political conditions it is apt more easily to cause consternation on the part of the public. You were then, therefore, verbally asked to wire to prohibit such flying, which you promised to do.


However, at 11 a.m. today a Japanese plane again appeared over Harbin and was seen flying very low. As a misunderstanding of a serious nature might be caused, I have hereby to lodge a protest and to ask you immediately to wire the authorities concerned to see to it that such flying is discontinued.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


NO. 5258

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

HARBIN CHINA October 3, 1931.



SUBJECT: CONDITIONS IN NORTH MANCHURIA.



SIR:

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy
of my despatch No. 2275, with sub-enclosure, of
even date, sent to the Legation on the subject of
an interview that General Linson Tsao had with me
on September 22, 1931, concerning the local situation.

Respectfully yours,

G. C. Hanson
G. C. Hanson
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

Despatch No. 2275 of October 3, 1931, to the Legation.

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TH/th

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FILED

1931 5 NOV

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 2275

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

HARBIN CHINA, October 3, 1931.

SUBJECT: CONDITIONS IN NORTH MANCHURIA.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
 American Minister,
 Peiping, China.

Sir:

1/ I have the honor to enclose herewith, for the
 information of the Legation, my memorandum dated
 September 22, 1931, embodying an interview that
 General Linson Tsao had with me on that day, in
 regard to the local situation.

Respectfully yours,


G. C. Hansen
 American Consul General.

Enclosure:

Memorandum dated September 22, 1931.

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 TH/th

5 copies have been sent to the Department of State;
 1 copy has been sent to the Consulate General at Mukden.



MEMORANDUM

At 10 A.M. on September 22, 1931, General Linson Tsao (Dzau), a West Point graduate formerly connected with the Chinese military but now engaged in land development work in North Manchuria, called on me to discuss the situation which has arisen between the Japanese and Chinese in Manchuria. He informed me that he was in close touch with the leading Chinese officials at Harbin and that they feared local disturbances. They were not sure of the local Chinese police and Chinese soldiers. They thought that there might be an interval after the possible running away of the Chinese military and the arrival of Japanese forces during which Harbin would be in the hands of lawless elements. He wondered if there were not some way in which the Consular Body could approach the Vice Consul in charge of the Japanese Consulate General to put him on record as stating that Japanese soldiers were or were not coming to Harbin. If they were coming, then the Japanese consular officials should be requested to state what measures they think necessary to take to maintain peace and order at Harbin. He further stated that the Chinese officials at Harbin had the idea that the American Government, despite its professed friendship for China, in cases of crises, failed to show evidence of this friendship. He cited the case of an agreement between the United States and Korea whereby the United States promised to come to the aid of Korea in case its sovereignty was threatened, but when Japan annexed Korea, the United States Government did not even protest. General

-Tsao-

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Tsao stated that the local Chinese authorities were of the opinion that Japan and Soviet Russia had reached an understanding whereby Japan would receive the southern section of the Chinese Eastern Railway, from Changchun to Harbin. They expected that the Japanese would occupy Tsitsihar, the capital of Heilungchiang Province, thus securing control of all Manchuria. He stated that he had information that Japan had already granted to Soviet Russia long term credits of several hundred million Yen. After the occupation of Tsitsihar, according to the views of the local Chinese officials, the Soviet officials would cause an incident which would give them an excuse to send their troops into North Manchuria. The Japanese would then return back to Harbin and control South Manchuria, while Soviet Russia would control North Manchuria. General Tsao felt that the Chinese authorities, who had already instructed their troops to withdraw upon the approach of the Japanese troops, would appeal to the League of Nations to settle this dispute between China and Japan.

In reply to my question in regard to who would support the Manchurian troops drawn off into the interior and those inside the Wall, he stated that the latter were being supported by the Frontier Bank, which was owned by young Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, who had received hardly any revenues from Manchuria, which were going into the hands of General Chang Tse-hsiang, the Governor of Kirin Province. The young Marshal in recent times had been withdrawing his funds and valuables to places inside the Wall because the old conservative

-crowd-

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Dutzelm NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

crowd in Mukden had told him that he could not come back and that he must seek his sphere of action in other fields. This was the principal reason why the young Marshal was so dependent upon General Chiang Kai-shek.

I informed General Tsao that in the afternoon of September 19th, the day after the events happened in Mukden, I had called up Mr. Major, the British Consul General who is the Senior Consul, and talked with him about the advisability of having a Consular Body meeting to discuss the local situation, and that Mr. Major and I decided, in view of the fact that the Harbin Foreign Office had assured us that the Chinese police would give due protection to foreigners, including Japanese, it would be precipitous and cause uneasy rumors if a Consular Body meeting were held on that day. I added that by Monday the situation at Harbin appeared to have quieted down and there seemed to be no necessity for a Consular Body meeting.

Mr. Tsao also mentioned the case of the Chinahow-Aigun Railway, concerning which the local Chinese believed that America was afraid to proceed in the construction of because of a simple protest made by Japan. I briefly outlined the true history of this case, which General Tsao said he understood, but he added that nevertheless the local Chinese believed that the United States Government was afraid to act contrary to the wishes of Japan. I informed General Tsao that I could only rely upon the assurance of the local Chinese officials for the maintenance of order at Harbin, that nothing untoward had happened

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
in the city, and that I did not feel inclined to put myself in a position of asking the Japanese consular representatives to request the presence of Japanese troops at Harbin to maintain order.

It was evidently General Tame's desire and the desire of the officials he represented, to have me come forward in a manner that might be at least of moral assistance to the Chinese and as opposing the Japanese in their recent actions in South Manchuria.

G. C. HANSON

G. C. Hanson
American Consul General.

Harbin, China,
September 22, 1931.



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OCT 28 1931
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

AM

FROM

A portion of this telegram
must be closely paraphrased
before being communicated
to anyone.

GENEVA

Dated October 27, 1931

Rec'd 12:45 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

260, October 27, 9 a.m.

FOR THE SECRETARY

The session of the Council which had before it
the Sino-Japanese dispute adjourned as I have already
reported late Saturday afternoon October 24 to meet
again on November 16 unless summoned to reconvene
before that date by the President of the Council either
because in his view the exigencies of the situation
demand an earlier meeting, or upon the request of
China.

In looking back over recent happenings here
especially those with which the possibilities the
United States was more or less directly concerned I
feel that certain comments on the atmosphere and on
the background of some of these developments might be
of interest to you in connection with your under-
standing the situation in particular and in a more
general sense the operations of the League in handling
such a matter.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 23 1931
Department of State

FILED

NOV. 2 1931

793.94/2362

AM

2-from Geneva, October 27, 1931
9 a.m.

One. The circumstance that Briand presided over the Council was regarded as extremely fortunate. The position of President of the Council is held in turn by the representatives of each State member of the Council, the term of office continuing throughout each single session. The representative of Spain was under this arrangement president of the 65th session, and as the recent meetings were held under adjournment he technically remained in office. It happened however that by rotation the representative of France would be president of the 66th regular session convening during January next. Leroux did not come to Geneva for this adjourned meeting, Madariaga taking his place. Leroux's statement was that affairs in Spain prevented his attendance. While this is probably true, it nevertheless rendered possible the realization of a universal desire that Briand preside over the Council in the face of the extremely delicate and difficult question which was before it. A plausibility was given to this arrangement in that it could be said

that the

AM

#260 3-from Geneva, October 27, 1931
9 a.m.

that the representative of France was merely occupying a little in advance the position which would be his at the next session. It is probable that this arrangement could not have been made had the representative of some other State been next in line for the presidency. (END GREEN)

Leroux had made an extremely poor presiding officer and Madariaga who as representing Spain would have presided is regarded as clever but impractical and "flighty".

(GREEN) Two. It is universally felt that Briand's conduct of the meetings more than justified anticipations. Although the tension at the Council table was at times very high Briand's personality had a softening effect and his timely interjection of a few words often relieved the strain. In my view his lucidity in summing up the current situation from time to time for the benefit of the Council, the press and the spectators, and his unswerving impartiality in handling the Chinese and Japanese representatives are points particularly worthy of note. (END GREEN).

Three. Shortly before I took my seat at the table for the first time I called upon Briand and very
carefully

AM

#260 4-From Geneva, October 27, 1931
9 a.m.

carefully went over with him my position as I saw it and solicited his assistance as presiding officer in sparing me any personal embarrassment and of averting any untoward incident which might prejudice or create a misunderstanding of the position of the United States. I envisaged such a possibility arising from an inept statement on the part of some members of the Council or of my being put to the position of having to refuse to answer a question outside the limits of my competence which might be addressed me by a Council member or be implied in some statement. While no such incident of any importance arose a careful analysis of the minutes of the proceedings will perhaps reveal how alive Briand was to the situation and what assistance he rendered.

(GREEN) I may add that although Drummond as Secretary General sits at the Council table he does not except in administrative matters participate in the proceedings.

Four. As I have indicated in various previous telegrams it developed that Briand chiefly conducted the private

AM

260 5-from Geneva, October 27, 1931
9 a.m.

the private negotiations with the Chinese and Japanese assisted by Drummond and at times by Reading (the fact that Reading knew he would probably have to leave before the conclusion of the meetings brought Briand more to the fore in this). Grandi who left Geneva before Reading played a relatively small part in these negotiations.

While opinion may differ as to the skill with which the public and private negotiations were conducted it seems very pertinent to point out that in Briand's conduct of these affairs he was subject to certain very definite limitations. He was not acting as Foreign Minister of France but only in the name of the members of the Council with whom he stood on an equal footing. Thus respecting the secrecy of the negotiations which he was conducting in private, he could assume responsibility in this only so far. A point was constantly being reached when he had to reveal to the other Council members the status of the negotiations, what commitments he had made in their ^{names and obtain their} concurrence in what he was next to say. There also in turn came times when,

#260 6-from Geneva, October 27, 1931
9 a.m.

when, in view of the interest of States members of the League not represented on the Council but a party to the instrument under the auspices of which the Council was acting, these states must also be informed of the relationship of their interest to this affair. Briand I believe fully appreciated the oriental psychology which is more responsive to private negotiations but aside from acquainting public opinion with the situation and aside from the expediency of holding a public meeting as part of the strategy of the negotiations, there were quasi-technical reasons why some meetings had to be held in public.

(END SECTION ONE)

GILBERT

WSB

AM

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be _____
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone.

GENEVA

FROM

Dated October 27, 1931

Rec'd 2:55 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

260, October 27, 9 a.m. (SECTION TWO)

Moreover, before the last adjourning Yoshazawa
had already given to Briand Japan's "final answer"

Although I have no way of checking this I am of
the opinion that virtually all of the details of the
private negotiations came in the course of time
(particularly when developments in the situation
rendered secrecy no longer necessary) to be known
to all of the members of the Council except the
"fifth point" of the Japanese demand. I believe that
fifth point has been more or less accurately "guessed"
but not known with certainty by any one except Briand,
Drummond, Reading and myself. The Chinese representative
was "technically" not informed.

As to the skill with which the negotiations were
conducted a certain advantage was afforded me in
judging of this not only because my position at the
table enabled me to follow closely what transpired
at the sessions of the Council but also because of my
being

AM

2-#260, from Geneva, October 27, 1931
Section Two 9 a.m.

being currently informed I believe of the essentials of every thing which went on behind the scenes. With respect to this it may be observed that every detail of the negotiations slowly narrowed down to the problem of the fifth point. While in private Briand could discuss this with the Japanese and urge a modification or a withdrawal, in the public negotiations Briand while maneuvering the Japanese into the last ditch in their defenses, he was safe in the Japanese not making it public and he did not bring it forward himself except by very carefully worded implications. Thus at the end of the negotiations Japan was left in the position where she could withdraw or modify this crucial demand if she so desired.

Five. The French and British Delegations both informed me that in their opinion the Japanese representatives on the Council were disregarding certain more conciliatory instructions which he was receiving from Tokio. This idea is also gaining general currency in Geneva.

I was also informed that in view of their belief that this was the situation the French and British Ambassadors in Tokio were being kept in touch with developments in Geneva which they could employ in Tokio as might be found desirable.

(GREEN)

AM

3-260, from Geneva, October 27, 1931
(Section Two) 9 a.m.

(GREEN) Six. Another element ~~which~~ had a bearing on the negotiations is that while in theory the Council could remain in session indefinitely there was the continual danger of it being "weakened" by the necessity which the Foreign Ministers of the greater powers were under of returning to their capitals. I reported Grandi's leaving; he was replaced by Scialoja. Cecil replaced Reading a few days before the meetings ended, and there was a limit to the time Briand could remain.
(END GREEN)

As an undercurrent there was always the feeling that for this among other considerations Japan was following a policy of retarding the progress of the proceedings.

Seven. With respect to American participation on the Council and Japan's juridical objections thereto, there was a serious and honest preoccupation in the minds of some of the representatives of the smaller powers as to its effect as a precedent on the League's position and League solidarity. The smaller powers in a large number of instances look to the League as a guardian of their sovereign rights.

Their foreign policy is oriented by a strong attachment to it. Thus anything which they feel jeopardizes the integrity of the League touches them closely.

With this

AM

4-7260, from Geneva, Oct. 27, 1931
(Section Two) 9 a.m.

With this in mind I feel that the distress which they showed in speaking to me of this matter, while assuring me that they have the friendliest feeling for the United States, was genuine. The sum of their feelings may be described as follows: They had undoubtedly sacrificed something for the immediate and perhaps greater purpose of a hope of putting an end to the Sino-Japanese conflict in return looking to the United States to go with them in this to the end.

(END SECTION TWO)

GILBERT

WSB

OSB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAM

FROM

A portion of this telegram
must be closely paraphrased
before being communicated to
anyone.

GENEVA

Dated October 27, 1931

Rec'd 4:45 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

260, October 27, 9 a.m. (SECTION THREE)

(GREEN) Eight. There was a definite atmosphere of defeatism which suddenly sprung up during the day following that on which we took our place at the Council table. This continued for two or three days and then gradually abated toward the end of the meetings.

This was obviously due in part to the dark outlook which was being taken respecting the possibility of solving the Manchurian question in any satisfactory manner but in my opinion was much more due to the quickly spreading rumors of a "split" between the United States and the League. The wildest conjectures were advanced. (END GREEN)

The source of such a development are difficult to determine. The understandable motives of the Japanese in such connections, the tone of the American press at the time, and the possibility of a "leak" respecting certain elements of the position we were then taking, may be considered. It is my belief that to a degree all played a part.

There were

MAM

2- #260, from Geneva, October 27,
1931, section three.

There were other possibilities expressed by responsible people. There is of course a paradox in Japan and other states employing the same means for opposite ends. At the same time an incentive may be seen for an activity on the part of the powers particularly interested in obtaining a maximum American support for the League in this matter. Their objective would be to bring the United States more into the open by invoking denials from Washington. Also there may be seen the incentive of throwing on the United States the responsibility for a possible lack of success in Geneva. I wish to make it clear, however, that in this I am far from drawing conclusions nor do I derive anything whatsoever of this character from my relations with the French and British delegates in which an exceedingly frank and friendly atmosphere always was imminent. I only consider it my duty to call your attention in so delicate a situation every possibility affecting it, however remote.

Nine. In response to the position which we took at that time respecting our relationship to Council meetings Briand finally found a solution of the problem with which our action confronted him in the following adjustment.

→ The private meetings of the Council were discontinued. The meetings of the Committee of Five were resumed and the other members of the Council entertained by Briand at a "tea

MAM

3- #260, from Geneva. October 27,
1931, section three

"tea party" in which he acquainted them informally with the situation. I was of course not present at meetings of either of the types described. My absence was I believe but little noted and as far as I can ascertain was not commented on in the newspapers.

Six. I wish to report the evolution of one circumstance in connection with the vexing question of Japan's objection to our participation in the Council meetings. Before the meeting of the Council at which I first took my seat I had prepared answers to a number of questions which I thought possibly might be addressed to me. Among other possibilities I envisaged the Japanese representative saying that he had objected to the presence of the United States there purely on juridical grounds. I thus prepared an answer for use in such a case as there was no time to consult you currently as these possibilities occurred to me. After this meeting Yoshizawa called on me and expressed to me the statement privately which I had conceived he might make publicly in the Council. I told him, while I was glad to hear what he had to say, that a private statement of that nature would not reach the public and thus would have no effect in abating the course which I understood public opinion was taking in both countries in view of the situation. I had in mind
that a

MAM

4- #260, from Geneva, October 27,
1931, section three

that a public statement on the part of Japan in this respect might assist us with the American press. I then told him that I had envisaged that he might make such a statement in the Council and that I had prepared a reply. As he looked skeptical I showed him my reply as an evidence of good faith. A day or two later I noted from press reports that some such announcement had been made in Washington. The next day the Japanese Ambassador called on me again and handed me the text of a statement which he would make at the next meeting of the Council. I could observe that this text exactly fitted my reply. At this unexpected development I read to you on the telephone the reply which I had prepared.

(END SECTION THREE)

GILBERT

FW

OX

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

cib

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be- **FROM**
fore being communicated
to anyone.

Geneva

Dated October 27, 1931

Recd 5 p.m.

Secretary of State

SECRET
DIVISION

Washington.

260, October 27, 9 a.m. (SECTION FOUR).

Eleven. I trust that the action taken here on
the Pact of Paris was in line with your desires as I
envisaged them from your instructions. Perhaps how-
ever certain unsatisfactory elements remain which were
beyond any action on my part to arrange.

In the first place it will be noted that in Briand's
report to the Council in its meeting of October 22nd
on the ^{invoking of the} Pact he gave no list of states who had taken
pertinent action. This was explained to me by the
French delegation after the meeting as being due to
the fact that they were unable to ascertain just what
states had so acted. Thus to attempt to submit a list
would have had most obvious disadvantages.

In the second place (because of reasons of procedure
which I will not go into) Paris sent notifications of
the action of France, Great Britain and Italy only to
states signatory to the Pact who were not represented
on the Council. It was left to the Council members to
inform

*2- #260, from Geneva, October 27,
9 a.m. (SECTION FOUR).

inform their respective governments. I thus have grave doubts if all signatories received notifications at their respective capitals. I question for example whether the Guatemala representative notified his government. The representative of Panama however told me that he had done so. In this general connection I was recently informed that certain middle and eastern European states were engaged in conversations with a view to determining what action they should take in the matter of invoking the Pact. I regret that I am unable ^{here} to give you more complete information affecting this matter.

Twelve. A summary of the more sober views expressed here with respect to the results of the Council action in the Sino-Japanese dispute is that it has as a minimum prevented the situation from possibly developing into a war and that moreover an advantage is obtained in that the elements of the dispute have been clarified.

Our participation in this is felt to be of the utmost significance. I am also very reliably informed that at one period Japan was very close to withdrawing her representative from the table and that it was only our presence there that restrained her from taking this course.

Thirteen. It would appear probable that the adjourned meeting of

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3- #260, from Geneva, October 27,
9 a.m. (SECTION FOUR).

meeting of the Council will be called to meet in Paris
on or before November 16. I venture to suggest that if
the meeting be held in Paris this might render any change
which we might see fit to make in our relations with the
Council less noticeable and more easy of adjustment.
(END MESSAGE.)

GILBERT.

FW

OX

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

FROM

GREEN

RECEIVED

Tokio

OCT 28 1931

Dated October 28, 1931

DIVISION OF

Rec'd 5:33 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.



198, October 28, 3 p.m.

Department's 208, October 27, 5 p.m.

Foreign Office informed me that the French note
and Japanese reply are the only correspondence on the
Pact of Paris which has been published.

NEVILLE

WSB

793.94/2363

FILED

OCT 29 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

PLAIN

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 28, 1931

Rec'd 4:22 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



825, October 28

Kwo Wen report from Nanking twenty-seventh quotes from
President Chiang Kai Shek's address same day as follows:

"Although from standpoint of our people the League of
Nations resolution naturally fails to meet our demands
yet when we consider position and difficulties of League
we cannot but admit that it has done its duty. We are
confident that after having passed the resolution, League
will see to it that it be carried out. Furthermore we
believe that as a result of efforts of League Council
during last few weeks the cause of world peace has been
further strengthened. While accepting the resolution we
should voice our appreciation of the efforts of the
League and particularly work of Briand and his colleagues
on Council.

America

793.84/2364

FILED

REP

2- #825, from Peiping, Oct. 28, 1931

America is not a member of League of Nations but her willingness to cooperate with that body deserves of gratitude.

It has now become clear that recent actions of Japanese in Manchuria do not represent wishes of great majority of Japanese people but were committed by a few unscrupulous and ambitious militarists. We cherish no enmity toward the peacefully inclined people of Japan. We hope that they will bring pressure to bear on their military leaders for the execution of the League resolution thereby facilitating early restoration of friendly relations between the two countries. We also hope that Japanese people will realize this point and be able to remove one of the most unfortunate shadows on Far Eastern horizon before November sixteenth, thus insuring peace of the world."

For the Minister

ENGERT

WSB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

FROM

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

GENEVA

Dated October 27, 1931

Rec'd 9:28 a.m. 28th

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

262, October 27, midnight.



STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY

Late last night Drummond handed me a copy of a note from Sze to Briand dated October 24 and informed me of two conversations which have a relationship to the note in question.

One. Note from Sze to Briand. The text of this note is as follows:

"With reference to the negotiations on treaty obligations made in the Council this morning by the honorable delegate for Great Britain with which I am in hearty agreement, I am authorized by my Government to make the following declaration.

China like every member of the League of Nations is bound by the Covenant to a 'scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations'. The Chinese Government for its part is determined loyally to fulfill all its obligations under the covenant. It is prepared to give proofs



793.94/2365

NOV 27 1931

AM

2-#262, from Geneva, October 27, 1931
midnight

proofs of this intention by undertaking to settle all disputes with Japan as to treaty interpretation by arbitration or judicial settlement as provided in Article 13 of the Covenant.

In pursuance of this purpose the Chinese Government is willing to conclude with Japan a treaty of arbitration similar to that recently concluded by the United States and China or to those concluded of recent years in increasing numbers between members of the ~~(League)~~ *(League)*.

Note: As this will be circulated today to the Council it is not confidential. The delay in circularization has been due to obtaining Briand's concurrence
(END GREEN)

Two. Conversation between Drummond and Sze.

The following are the essential points in a conversation between Drummond and Sze the most important part of which bears on the note cited above.

(a) Drummond stated that he observed in the note no mention was made respecting the validity of the treaties. Sze answered that this was so because Briand had advised him not to raise any question as to validity of treaties as it might lead to a further dispute.

(b) - Sze showed Drummond a telegram from the Chinese Minister in Tokyo of which the following is the purport:

AM

3-#262, from Geneva, Oct. 27, 1931,
midnight

purport:

A severe struggle is going on between the military and civil elements in Japan. A military plot has been discovered and arrests have been made. There was talk of a military dictatorship and the forcible removal of the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The Japanese army in Manchuria has been instructed to act independently and the Navy might ultimately take independent action.

(c) - Sze stated that he would very much regret having the next meeting of the Council held in Paris. The Komingtang branch in Paris was very strong and inclined to violence. There are many Chinese students in Paris. He was apprehensive of demonstrations in front of his residence and in front of the foreign missions. Thus he would be placed in a most difficult situation and perhaps his position prejudiced.

Three. Conversation between Drummond and Sato.

Sato has been summoned to Japan in connection with preparations for the Disarmament Conference. He is in Geneva for a few days on that business. The following are the essential points of this conversation:

Sato said after discussing the Council's draft
resolution

AM

4-#262, from Geneva, October 27,
1931, midnight

resolution that Japan having rejected it could hardly now change her view and accept it as to do so would look like a complete defeat. Drummond replied that there still might be a way out if Japan were willing to accept it. In this the Chinese note cited above might be of the greatest importance. Japan might say that her action in the Council had been intended to obtain an admission from China that she was ready to respect her treaty obligations and that as this admission had now been secured and the Japanese thesis thus vindicated Japan was ready to begin and to continue the withdrawal her troops on condition that the Council obtained from the Chinese representative an undertaking that the direct negotiations referred to in paragraph 6 of the Council's resolution should begin on the very day that evacuation had been completed. The case might be presented in Tokyo in such a manner as to look like a Japanese victory because much could be made out of the Chinese engagement to respect treaties; and the point respecting direct negotiations could be framed as a request to the Council from Japan to which the Council could then give effect.

Drummond informed me that Sato seemed rather impressed
by this

AM

5-#262, from Geneva, Oct. 27, 1931,
midnight

by this idea and that he believes that when he reaches Japan, which will be before November 16, he will do his best to put it forward as a possible solution.

Drummond commented in respect to the foregoing that if the Japanese did not accept this it would mean to him that they were determined to hold Manchuria.

Four. Drummond told me that in his conversations with Sato the ideas which he put forward were entirely his own and they should not be construed as voicing the opinion of Briand or of others. He asked that his conversation with Sze be kept confidential. With respect to his conversation with Sato he told me that Sato had particularly requested that it be kept in the strictest possible confidence. Drummond added that the reasons why Sato should be protected in this were obvious.

GILBERT

WSB

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 29, 1931.


It is assumed that this was handed to the Secretary or to the Under Secretary by an officer of the French Embassy.

The hand-written note on page 1 states that it contains the text of the cable addressed to the French Minister at Peiping. Perusal of the text, however, indicates that it was an instruction to the French Embassy at Tokyo. It may have been sent in identical form to the French representatives at Tokyo and at Peiping.

An interesting part of its contents is the statement which it contains of Japan's five points -- in what may be presumed to have been the form in which they were communicated to M. Briand. The text of the fifth point is quite different from the form which the Japanese Government has subsequently given to that point. This will be the subject of a separate memorandum.

SKH


SKH/ZMF



TELEGRAMME RECU DU MINISTERE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES
PAR L'AMBASSADE DE FRANCE ET CONCERNANT LE REGLEMENT
DU CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS.

*(Le Telegramme. Transmet à l'Ambassade le texte du
cable adresse au Ministre de France à Pékin.)*

Après avoir arrêté le cours immédiat des événe-



ments de Chine et réglé en procédure la question d'ad-
mission des représentants des Etats-Unis au Conseil
de la Société des Nations, il importe, pour compléter
l'action de conciliation entreprise, de régler d'ur-
gence les questions mêmes relatives au rétablissement
de relations normales entre la Chine et le Japon.
Les chances de succès de ce règlement seraient grave-
ment compromises par des manoeuvres dilatoires qui
suffiraient à justifier les inquiétudes de l'opinion,
à lasser la patience des gouvernements représentés
au Conseil et qui multiplieraient les risques d'inci-
dents locaux.

Vous laissant le soin de poursuivre, comme il
vous paraîtra opportun, auprès du Gouvernement japonais
une action personnelle dont j'apprécie toute l'effica-
cité, je tiens toutefois à vous communiquer les pre-
mières suggestions que mes collègues m'ont autorisé
à formuler comme base d'accord, au cours de mes négocia-
tions avec les représentants de la Chine et du Japon:

Le Conseil
OCT 31 1931
FILED

793.94/2366

Le Conseil, après avoir pris acte de l'intention à nouveau affirmée par le Japon de respecter la souveraineté et l'intégrité territoriale de la Chine, ainsi que des assurances que les deux parties ont déjà données de s'abstenir de toutes nouvelles hostilités, établirait en premier lieu les conditions du rétablissement immédiat des relations normales entre les deux pays. Les questions de fond seraient aussitôt après abordées.

A cet effet, les deux parties étant rappelées à l'exécution intégrale de leurs engagements du 30 Septembre dernier, il conviendrait que toutes dispositions permettant d'assurer pratiquement l'évacuation et la réoccupation fussent prises sans délai à la suite d'une entente directe entre les représentants des deux Gouvernements. Le retrait des troupes japonaises devrait s'effectuer dans un délai de trois semaines à dater de la résolution du Conseil. En même temps le Gouvernement chinois prendrait effectivement toutes les mesures nécessaires pour assurer la sécurité de la vie et des biens des sujets japonais en Mandchourie, sous la surveillance de représentants neutres qui seraient attachés aux autorités chinoises.

L'évacuation terminée, des négociations directes devraient alors être engagées sur les questions de fond. (Ces négociations porteraient en particulier sur la recherche d'une solution pratique de la question des

chemins

chemins de fer en Mandchourie.)

Ce compromis peut soulever de fortes objections de la part du Japon, ----- en ce qui concerne notamment le principe d'un délai d'évacuation et la reprise après ladite évacuation des négociations directes sur les questions de fond, mais il fait d'autre part abstraction de certaines exigences chinoises nettement contraires à la pratique du droit international et aux précédents de la Société des Nations.

Toutefois, le Conseil ne pouvant différer plus longtemps l'heure d'engager son autorité dans la recherche d'une conclusion décisive, il importerait, si la formule ci-dessus exposée paraissait trop éloignée des conceptions japonaises, de lui en substituer une autre susceptible également d'entraîner l'adhésion immédiate du représentant chinois.

D'après une information confidentielle de M. Yoshizawa, dont je n'ai pas encore été autorisé à faire état auprès de mes collègues, le Gouvernement japonais (en ce moment par l'entremise du Ministre de Chine à Tokio), semblerait prêt à proposer au Gouvernement chinois un projet plus sommaire qui consisterait à subordonner l'évacuation immédiate à l'acceptation d'un accord en cinq points:

1o - Engagement mutuel de s'abstenir de toute politique ou action agressive.

2o - Engagement mutuel de prendre les mesures nécessaires pour supprimer toute agitation hostile.

3o -

3c - Réaffirmation par le Japon de son respect de l'intégrité territoriale de la Chine, y compris la Mandchourie.

4c - Engagement de la Chine d'assurer une protection efficace à tous les sujets japonais résidant dans toutes les parties de la Mandchourie et s'y livrant à des occupations pacifiques.

5c - Conclusion par les deux gouvernements des accords nécessaires entre les administrations japonaise et chinoise pour mettre fin à une concurrence ruineuse et permettre la mise à exécution du traité sino-japonais relatif aux chemins de fer en Mandchourie.

Seul ce dernier point serait probablement considéré comme inacceptable, car il consacrerait le précédent inadmissible d'une question d'intérêt national négociée sous la pression d'une occupation militaire. J'ai donc suggéré à M. Yoshizawa d'obtenir de son Gouvernement une nouvelle rédaction de ce cinquième point de manière à lui donner la forme d'une simple garantie de protection étendue à la ligne même et à l'exploitation du chemin de fer. Il entrerait ainsi dans le cadre général des conditions normales de sécurité. Dans ce cas, la contre-proposition japonaise qui offrirait l'avantage de son extrême simplicité, pourrait être immédiatement et utilement prise en considération


par

Par le Conseil; le règlement s'en trouverait facilité.

Il y aurait le plus grand intérêt, à mon avis,
à ce que vous puissiez faire prévaloir ce point de
vue./.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TRANSLATION OCT 23 1931



TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
BY THE FRENCH EMBASSY REGARDING THE SETTLEMENT OF THE CHINESE-
JAPANESE CONTROVERSY.

(This telegram transmits to the Embassy the text of
the cablegram sent to the French Minister at Peking.)

Now that the course of events in China has been arrested
for the time being and the question of admitting the repre-
sentatives of the United States into the League of Nations
Council has been settled as respects procedure, it is im-
portant, in order to complete the conciliatory action under-
taken, that the questions themselves relative to the restora-
tion of normal relations between China and Japan be promptly
adjusted. The chances of success of such adjustment would
be seriously jeopardized by dilatory maneuvers which would
suffice to justify the uneasiness of public opinion, tire
the patience of the Governments represented on the Council,
and increase the risks of local incidents.

While leaving to you the care of pursuing [your]
personal action, in such manner as you may deem fit, with
the Japanese Government, - and I fully appreciate the
efficacy of such action - I wish, nevertheless, to communi-
cate to you the first suggestions that my colleagues have

authorized

F.W. 793.94/2366

-2-

authorized me to frame, as a basis for agreement, during the course of my negotiations with the representatives of China and Japan.

The Council, after noting the intention, reaffirmed by Japan, of respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China, as well as the assurances which both parties have already given that they would refrain from any further hostilities, would first lay down the conditions for the immediate restoration of normal relations between the two countries. The questions of substance would be taken up immediately afterwards.

For this purpose, the two parties being warned fully to carry out their pledges of September 30 last, it would be proper that all measures calculated practically to insure the evacuation and reoccupation should be taken without delay following a direct understanding between the representatives of the two Governments. The withdrawal of the Japanese troops should take place within a period of three weeks from the date of the Council's decision. At the same time the Chinese Government would take, effectively, all measures necessary to insure the safety of the lives and property of Japanese subjects in Manchuria, under the supervision of neutral representatives to be attached to the Chinese authorities.

Once

-3-

Once the evacuation were terminated, direct negotiations should then be begun on the questions of substance. (These negotiations would consist particularly in seeking a practical solution of the question of the railroads in Manchuria.)

This arrangement may give rise to strong objections on the part of Japan, especially as regards the idea of an evacuation period and the resumption of direct negotiations on the questions of substance after such evacuation, but on the other hand it waves aside certain Chinese demands which are clearly contrary to the practice of international law and the precedents of the League of Nations.

However, as the Council can no longer delay the time of asserting its authority in seeking a decisive conclusion, it would be important, if the course described above seemed too far removed from Japanese conceptions, to substitute in its stead another which would likewise be capable of winning the immediate adhesion of the Chinese representatives.

According to confidential information from Mr. Yoshizawa, which I have not yet been authorized to utilize before my colleagues, the Japanese Government (at this moment through the intermediation of the Chinese Minister at Tokio) would seem ready to propose a more summary plan to the Chinese Government, consisting in making immediate evacuation contingent upon the acceptance of a five-point agreement as follows:

1.

-4-

1. Mutual pledge to refrain from any aggressive policy or action.
2. Mutual pledge to take the necessary measures to suppress any hostile agitation.
3. Reaffirmation by Japan of her respect for the territorial integrity of China, including Manchuria.
4. Pledge by China to insure effectual protection to all Japanese subjects residing in any parts of Manchuria and engaged there in peaceful occupations.
5. Conclusion by the two Governments of the necessary agreements between the Japanese and Chinese administrations in order to put an end to ruinous competition and permit the carrying out of the Sino-Japanese treaty regarding the railroads in Manchuria.

This last point alone would probably be considered as unacceptable, for it would sanction the inadmissible precedent of a question of national interest being negotiated under the pressure of a military occupation. I therefore suggested to Mr. Yoshizawa that he obtain from his Government a new wording of this fifth point so as to give it the form of a mere guaranty of protection extending to the line itself and to the operation of the railroad. It would thus come within the general scope of normal conditions of security. In this case, the Japanese counterproposal, offering the advantage of its extreme simplicity, might be

immediately

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-5-

immediately and usefully taken into consideration by the Council; the settlement would thereby be facilitated.

In my opinion, it would be of the greatest advantage that you be able to cause this view to prevail.

TR-WS:MLS.

12 J



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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
AM RECD

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Tientsin, China, September 28, 1931.



SUBJECT: Developments in Tientsin Incident to
Japanese Occupation of Mukden.



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THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy, in
quintuplicate, of my despatch No. 23, dated September
26, 1931, to the Legation at Peiping, on the above
mentioned subject.

Respectfully yours,

F. P. Lockhart
F. P. Lockhart,
American Consul General.

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Enclosure:

1/, to Legation at Peiping, September 26, 1931.

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Original and 4 copies to Department.

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No. 25.

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Sept 28/31
AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Tientsin, China, September 26, 1931.

Subject: Developments in Tientsin incident to
Japanese Occupation of Mukden.

The Honorable Nelson T. Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping, China.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my telegram of September 22, 3 p.m., on the above mentioned subject, and to supplement, as follows, the information contained therein:

The first report of the occupation of Mukden by Japanese military forces reached Tientsin through the railway administration early on the morning of September 19. The news, which quickly spread throughout the city, created a profound sensation. Speculation was rampant as to the immediate cause of the sudden move on the part of the Japanese military. No reliable information was at hand on the last named point and in consequence unfounded and ridiculous reports began to circulate immediately. These reports, most of which seemed to have a local origin, served for several days to keep the Chinese population as well as foreigners in a very unsettled state of mind. Not until now has the hysteria of the press begun to subside. While no attempt will be made to enumerate the scores of fictitious reports published in the local newspapers, it might be of interest to cite a few such items

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-12-75

-2-

picked at random.

The CHUNG WAN PAO (Chinese) on September 22 reported that a telegram had been received from Harbin stating that

"over 30,000 Soviet Russians arrived this morning at Tawuli, outside Manchuria at the eastern railway and declared that they must protect their nationals."

The same issue reported that

"the Japanese troops at Tangku have been digging trenches since last night. Another 30,000 Japanese soldiers arrived here at 8 o'clock this morning."

The same newspaper also reported that

"according to an urgent telegram from Chinwangtao despatched at 8 a.m. 8 American warships arrived at Chinwangtao yesterday and another 12 gunboats with over 1,000 marines arrived this morning. It appears that they are here to watch the movements of the Japanese warships."

The TA KUNG PAO (Chinese) also reported in its issue of September 22 what purported to be the substance of a conversation between the American Minister and First Secretary Yano of the Japanese Legation at Peiping, the chief points of which were that the American Minister had informed Mr. Yano

"that the Nakamura incident is merely an excuse for the present situation, that he is of the opinion that the present trouble would best be settled locally, that the seizure of Mongolia and Manchuria by Japan is not an easy task, that Japan will even experience much more trouble in the future, that should the information he had obtained be true, he could hardly understand the attitude of the Japanese Government shown in this incident, and that Japan should try to avoid military and political action towards Manchuria and Mongolia, and should pay more attention to the development on a line of economics."

This statement is one of the few which formed the subject of a subsequent correction by the TA KUNG PAO.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

The YI SHIH PAO (Chinese) of September 23 stated that

"The Ministry of Communications has received an urgent telegram from the Chefoo Telegraph Administration to the effect that the Japanese marines landed and occupied the port on the 21st, and that General Liu Chen-nien has withdrawn his forces."

Other Chinese newspapers also reported the occupation of Chefoo and Tsingtao by Japanese forces, as well as various other places. Among other misleading reports were two which caused some embarrassment to this Consulate General and to the Commandant of the American troops in this area. A Rengo statement under Tientsin date line of September 19 read as follows:

"The Japanese military authorities at Tientsin held an extraordinary meeting at once on receipt of the report concerning the clash of Chinese and Japanese soldiers at Mukden. It was decided to make every preparation to meet all emergencies, and asked the understanding of foreign contingents in Tientsin, regarding the steps to be taken by Japanese force in case of necessity. The commanders of the foreign troops are learned to have given the assurance to the Japanese military authorities that they would unite their strength and help protect the Japanese Concession in case Chinese troops attempt to break into the Japanese area."

This statement was without any basis of truth whatever. The YI SHIH PAO on September 24 in an item purporting to give the result of an informal discussion between the British, French, Italian and American Consuls General at Tientsin at the British Consulate General reported, among other false statements, as follows:

"It was unanimously agreed that peace and order should be maintained jointly, that representations should be made separately to the Chinese and Japanese authorities, that the former should be asked to instruct their nationals not to disturb the public, pending a settlement of the whole affair, while the latter should be asked to order the Japanese forces and Japanese

nationals

-4-

nationals not to cause any trouble, and not to make any preparations affecting the local peace and order and not to spread rumors agitating the people, and that British Consul General Jamieson should approach the Chairman of the Provincial Government and the Mayor of Tientsin, who have assured the British Consul that the Chinese authorities would be held responsible for the lives and property of all foreign nationals in the port of Tientsin. Mr. Lockhart, American Consul General, was requested by the Consular Corps to see the Japanese Consul General, who, in the presence of the Japanese Commandant, promised that the necessary orders would be issued in accordance with the request of the foreign consuls."

The sole action taken at the meeting in question was an informal discussion of plans for the protection of the various foreign residential areas at Tientsin in case of any local disturbances growing out of the Mukden development. It was informally agreed that a policy of aloofness in the Sino-Japanese controversy would be maintained, and that the military forces of the respective consuls would be employed only for the protection of the lives of their own nationals, and of other foreigners resident in the areas delimited under the General Defense Plan, the only exception being that the American army forces would not extend their operations beyond Woodrow Wilson Park, and that they would not concern themselves with any difficulties which might arise at the Japanese cotton mills on the south-eastern boundary of the ex-German Concession. A discussion also took place between the British, French and Italian representatives as to the means which would be employed in regulating the admission of Chinese refugees into their respective concessions. It was agreed among them that bona fide refugees, in case of emergency, would be admitted in limited numbers, but that armed soldiers, agitators or any large groups of trouble

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

-5-

trouble makers would be denied admission. It was also understood that these arrangements contemplated only developments which might possibly arise incident to the present strained relations between the Chinese and Japanese, and that if the Chinese army should attempt any general massed attack on the foreign areas as a whole at Tientsin, the General Plan of Defense heretofore agreed upon between the several military commanders of foreign troops would prevail and that if any change was deemed advisable in this regard it would be by agreement among the military commanders themselves, since it would then become primarily a military problem.

Due credit must be given to the Chinese and Japanese authorities for their effort to maintain peace and order as between their respective nationals. . . The Chairman of the Hopei Provincial Government sent a representative to me to say that every precaution would be taken to afford adequate protection to the lives of Chinese and foreigners, and that agitation against the Japanese would be suppressed as far as it was possible so to do. In this regard the Chinese have been very successful, except that Chinese students at Nankai University and Peiyang University have held mass meetings and scathingly denounced the Japanese. At Peiyang University the students were particularly enraged and it appeared at one time as if the Chinese authorities might not be able to control their activities. Refugees and soldiers arriving at the Tientsin East Station from Mukden also indulged in speech making on the station platform,

but

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-4-

but this was finally curbed by the Chinese police authorities. The Japanese Acting Consul General who called to see me on the afternoon of September 24 stated that these activities on the part of propagandists from Mukden constituted the gravest danger to the maintenance of peaceful relations between the Japanese and Chinese civil and military population at Tientsin. In the course of the conversation the consular representative assured me that no Japanese troops would be despatched to Tientsin, and that the Japanese authorities have no intention whatever of extending their military authority over any area at Tientsin. He deplored the misrepresentations that have been printed and the propaganda that has been disseminated, and expressed the hope that means would shortly be found to solve the present difficulty. He invited my attention to a statement which was published in the TA KUNG PAO (Chinese) on September 24 reporting an interview with a Japanese Vice Consul which interview, he stated, was authorized and in its main details correct. A copy, in translation, of the interview is enclosed herewith.

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As pointed out in my telegram of September 23, 3 p.m., efforts were made to persuade certain American missionaries to proceed to Mukden with a view to giving moral support to Chinese christians there who were believed to be suffering either mental or physical distress. A representative of the railway administration called to see me on Saturday morning, September 19, and requested that a representative of the Consulate General proceed to Mukden on the train which was being despatched that morning. It was understood

that

-7-

that transportation would be provided gratis. I could not see that any benefit would accrue from sending a representative to Mukden, especially since I knew that the Consulate General there would keep the Legation fully informed, nor could I consistently recommend to the American missionary authorities that they permit a small group of their mission workers to proceed to Mukden for the purpose named. I felt certain that both instances either represented gestures towards acquiring the support of the American Government on the side of the Chinese or that the action would be subject to speculation and misrepresentation.

Traffic on the Peiping-Mukden Railway has been seriously delayed since the day of the occupation. All trains arriving from Mukden are crowded to the limit of their capacity by refugees. Many of these refugees leave the trains here while others proceed to Peiping.

The local financial situation as concerns the notes of The Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces and the Frontier Bank was seriously disturbed. The Hopei Provincial Government notified the Consulate General on September 23 that such notes bearing the word "Tientain" would be redeemed at par at the two banks named for a period of three days from September 23, after which no notes would be accepted. Notices to this effect were published in the local newspapers.

There appears to be a divergence of opinion among American residents of the port and other foreigners as regards the merits of the controversy, but some with whom the undersigned has talked have dropped hints that, in their opinion,

the

-2-

the persistent disregard by the Chinese of certain treaty rights of foreigners residing in China brought about the present situation; that the Japanese have simply displayed less patience than the western powers, and that the accumulation of grievances in the past few years has been so steady that China is gradually losing the sympathetic support to which it has so long been accustomed. This opinion is by no means unanimous but there are those who hope that some salutary effect will result from the drastic steps taken.

Last evening the Commandants of the various foreign military forces in Tientsin dined with Lieutenant-General Kashi, Commanding the Imperial Japanese Army Forces in China, at which time a "Summary of the Sino-Japanese Clash in Manchuria" was furnished the guests. Colonel Taylor, Commanding the U. S. Army Forces at Tientsin has very kindly supplied me with a copy of the summary, which is

2/ herewith enclosed.

3/ As of further possible interest there is enclosed a detailed account of a trip from Tientsin to Mukden on the express train which left Tientsin at 11:30 a.m. on September 19. The article was written by Mr. W. V. Ponnell, editor of the PEKING & TIENTSIN TIMES (British). The two statements referred to in the second paragraph of the preliminary note

4/ are ~~also~~ enclosed to complete the record.

Respectfully yours,

F. P. Lockhart,
American Consul General.

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Enclosures:

- 1/ Copy, in translation, of statement in TA KUNG PAO,
- 2/ "Summary of the Sino-Japanese Clash in Manchuria",
- 3/ Account of Tientsin-Mukden trip from PEKING & TIENTSIN TIMES,
- 4/ Statements referred to in enclosure No. 3.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Original and 1 copy to Legation.
In quintuplicate to the Department.

(TA KUNG PAO)

September 24, 1931.

Japanese Consul declares that no troops will be despatched to Tientsin.

Vice Consul Hou T'ang Lu Lang (Name in English unknown) of the local Japanese Consulate General stated yesterday when interviewed that there are still some rumors spread among the Chinese and foreigners in Tientsin concerning the Mukden trouble, that the attitude of the Japanese Government toward this incident is to minimize the trouble as repeatedly declared by the Japanese Government, that no troops would be despatched north of Changchun in Manchuria, that the 100 soldiers despatched to Chiehtae and Lungkingtsun were merely for self-protection and have now returned to their original position, and that there are no single Japanese in those places.

The Vice Consul adds that the statement of the Chinese that there are over 10,000 Japanese soldiers in Tientsin is without foundation, that the tranquil state in Tientsin and Peiping does not need such a large force, that the Provincial Government and the Bureau of Public Safety which are responsible for the local peace and order would agree with the Japanese Consulate General on this point; that both the Chinese and Japanese authorities have carefully ordered their nationals not to create any trouble and have taken appropriate action in maintaining peace and order with a view to preventing this port from being involved in the present Manchuria incident, that all Japanese subjects have been warned to avoid conflict with Chinese, that it is believed that similar instructions have been issued to Chinese nationals by the Chinese authorities, and that it is hoped that all people and subordinate military officers will not be agitated by rumors and live peacefully and quietly pending settlement through official channels.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Duntz NARS, Date 12-18-75

Summary of the Sino-Japanese Clash in Manchuria.

I.

During the last few years anti-Japanese feeling in Manchuria has been increased to a very large extent among the Chinese people and it resulted in series of so many unhappy events such as accidents at Wan Pao Shan, Tsingtao, Korea, etc., etc., followed by Nakamura affair of which the Chinese Authorities have shown their attitude in the way most insincere. In addition to these unfriendly attitude towards Japan, the Chinese people, especially young military officers, who have not understood the real power of the Japanese Army since the Russo-Japanese War, often insulted the Japanese troops in Manchuria.

The infestation of Chinese bandits in the districts along the South Manchurian Railway and the gradual increase of insulting attitude of the Chinese troops towards the Japanese troops or Japanese military people have been nothing but a result of the aforesaid ignorance of the Chinese younger generations, and the Kwantung Japanese troops, facing such a state of things somehow serious, have been taking full precautions to avoid any sort of accident.

It was during these times, on September 18th at about 10.30 p.m., that about two companies of the Chinese troops led by their officers had blown up the S.M. Ry line at the south-west side of Pei Ta Ying (North Barracks) and also they proceeded towards Lia Tiao Kung where about one section of the Japanese railway guard was stationed.

Being informed of this, the Japanese company at Ho Shih Tai hurried to the spot for reinforcement, taking their way southward on the railway line. But, as the Chinese troops retreated into their own barracks at Pei Ta Ying through the south-west gate of the barracks before the Japanese troops were reinforced, the Japanese troops on pursue pressed upon them and occupied a corner of the barracks.

The strength of these Chinese troops was then supposed to be from 500 to 600 men and they opened fire upon the Japanese troops from inside of the barracks by making use of the various sorts of fire arms which were gradually increased in number. It was naturally a hard fighting for the Japanese troops.

The main force (at Mukden) of the 2nd Infantry Battalion of the Japanese Independent Garrison, to which an alarm was also given, wasted no time in proceeding for reinforcement, and having determined to attack Pei Ta Ying in order to discharge their duties, they took the offensive action and finally overcame the Chinese troops. It was in the early morning of the same day that Pei Ta Ying was occupied by the attacking force.

The General Officer Commanding the Japanese Independent Garrison then ordered to give further reinforcement

successively

-2-

successively and he made up his mind to clear up the enemies near Tung Ta Ying (East Barracks) having, in addition to his own troops, one half of the 2nd Regiment of the Field Artillery then arrived under his direct command, because it seemed to him that to take the initiative against the Chinese troops far larger in number was the unique action to be taken by the Japanese troops under such circumstances.

II.

On receipt of the alarming news, the 29th Infantry Regiment of the 2nd Division stationed near Mukden was also concentrated in their full strength. It was the main force of this Regiment that occupied the inner walled city of Mukden in the early morning, where they have been concentrated some time in the midnight in order to give full protection to the Japanese residents inside the city-wall whose condition was reported at that time to have been very serious.

The Commanding General of the 2nd Division, being informed of the clash between the Japanese and Chinese troops, left Liao Yang at 2.00 a.m. and hurried to Mukden with the Japanese units (about only 500 men) then stationed at Liao Yang as he thought that unless the Japanese troops at Mukden, which were much smaller in number than the Chinese troops, be immediately reinforced, they might be put under a condition very dangerous, and he ordered his troops to start early in the morning a clearing-up of the enemies still remained in the eastern area of Mukden.

III.

There were the other Chinese troops still remaining in Tung Ta Ying barracks gave a stubborn resistance to the Japanese troops. The main strength of the Kwantung Japanese Troops attacked and drove them away by 2.00 p.m. or so as it was necessary to do so to have the peace and order maintained.

In the afternoon, the main force of the Japanese troops was concentrated near Mukden and took charge of maintaining the peace and order. However, a portion of these troops was probably despatched to Chang Tu for protection of the Japanese living there as it was reported that the situation of Chang Tu looked very threatening.

IV.

At Chan Chun, one of the battalions of the Japanese 4th Infantry Regiment was attacked by the Chinese troops then stationed near Kuan Cheng Tse on the 19th instant at about 3.00 a.m. but our troops which were reinforced later on finally drove the enemies away and succeeded in occupying the area near Kuan Cheng Tse. The Japanese troops remained near Kung Chu Lin were attacked by the powerful Chinese troops.

V.

The General Officer Commanding the Kwantung Japanese
Troops

-3-

Troops arrived at Mukden on the 19th instant at noon and he despatched at that night the Mixed Infantry Brigade commanded by the General Commanding the 2nd Division to Chang Chun where it was reported that the situation looked very serious.

VI.

The Chinese troops stationed near Chang Chun evacuated the place on the 20th instant as they were informed of the arrival of the Japanese 2nd Division.

VII.

A report has been received on the 20th instant to the effect that the Chinese troops stationed near Kirin was under mobilization to take an offensive action against the Japanese troops after they have moved on to a certain direction. One Infantry Brigade was despatched to Kirin therefore as it was thought necessary to clear up these Chinese troops before they will take any positive action. The Chinese troops still remained there were disarmed by the above Brigade.

VIII.

The Japanese troops in Korea despatched one Mixed Brigade to Manchuria. It was simply because the strength of the Kwantung Japanese Troops was considered to have been far smaller in number than the Chinese regular troops in Manchuria, numbering more than 140,000 men, especially it was reported to Korea that the condition of defence at Mukden seemed to be in danger. The main force of these Japanese troops is now taking charge of maintaining the peace and order in the Mukden districts.

IX.

At some other places such as Newchuang, Feng Huang Cheng, etc., unrest was also anticipated due to the existence of the disorderly Chinese troops and therefore the Japanese troops were despatched to these places to protect our national and also to maintain the peace and order in these districts. Moreover, some small detachments were sent to Cheng Chia Tun, Shin Min Tun and Chui Liu Ho as side-covering forces under amical arrangement with the Peking-Liaoning Railway Authorities.

X.

The provisional municipal administration organized by Sino-Japanese cooperation has been put in force at Mukden on the 22nd instant in order to maintain the peace and order of that city. Mostly the former Chinese staff was appointed for the new administration and it is reported

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-4-

that the Chinese citizens are now engaging in their business placing full confidence in the new municipal administration.

II.

It is absolutely untrue that the Japanese troops were despatched to Tsingtao, Ha In Tao, C.W.T., etc., etc.

The action which was taken in Manchuria by the Kwantung Japanese Troops was nothing but for the sake of their self-protection and they carried out their proper missions entitled them by the treaty. It was also to be recognized that owing to the very small strength of the Japanese troops in Manchuria they were obliged to act as promptly as possible against the Chinese troops which are far larger in number before the situation becomes more serious.

The despatch of a portion of force to Manchuria from the Japanese troops in Korea means simply reinforcement for the Kwantung Japanese Troops, the strength of which was always used within the limit authorized by the treaty. It must also be understood that the Japanese troops have never tried to move beyond the railway zone unless they were obliged to extend their activities further than usual.

Tientsin, 25th September 1931.

NOTE: These informations simply tell you the outline of the recent Sino-Japanese clash, from its outbreak to the several other events which were reported to have developed in Manchuria. It is understood, however, that they might be subjected to any supplements or corrections in the future.

PEKING & TIENTSIN TIMES

Tientsin, China, September 23, 1931,

CONDITIONS ALONG THE RAILWAY.

Sidelights on the Outward and Homeward Trips.

[The article below described conditions as the Editor found them on his trip to and from Mukden. It was proposed to deal with the situation as it was found in Mukden, to describe the appearance and atmosphere of the place, the deplorable assault by a Japanese soldier on Mr. Sugden, of the P.M.R., and the tearing up of and trampling upon the Union Jack—an affront for which honourable amends were made—and other sidelights. But this must be left till the next issue. It was literally impossible to find the time to do it.

We add two important statements, one giving the first detailed story of the explosion and related events which formed the pretext for action, and the other a translation of the Proclamation by the Japanese G.O.C.]

(By the Editor).

There was no clear indication when I hurriedly left for Mukden on Saturday as to what had happened, or why. Hasty snatches of conversation on the phone indicated that Mukden city had been occupied by the Japanese. Had the Nakamura negotiations, which seemed so promising the day or two before, broken down after all? Obviously it was a big situation, possibly one of the most important that had developed in the Far East for many years. Consequently, though time was short and the circumstances here difficult, I decided to go down and conduct a personal investigation.

More definite news gradually came as we proceeded. Along the line as far as Shanhaikuan, however, there was little indication that the most crushing blow China has suffered for a generation had been delivered. The people for the most part had heard but little. But the whispering galleries soon began to function, and at Shanhaikuan we saw the first signs of that profound agitation which was sweeping across the great face of Manchuria as a storm sweeps across the ocean.

At Shanhaikuan two lone Japanese sentries marched backward and forward through the pressing crowd on the platform, neither jostling others nor being jostled, careful of their way and very self-conscious, but erect and discharging their routine patrol as usual. Here I heard that the British troops remaining in camp at Shanhaikuan had been given orders to return to Tientsin earlier than intended. The message from the alert C. G. at Mukden evidently had got through to the Legation, and prompt orders were issued accordingly. In view of what happened afterwards, and the concentration of the Chinese troops inside the Wall, this is a wise precaution.

We left Shanhaikuan an hour or so late, and heard that General Chang Tso-hsiang had given

orders to all Kirin troops to retire to their own province immediately, and to the Fengtien forces garrisoning the centres south of Mukden outside the Wall, to retire immediately to Shanhaikuan and southwards, leaving the entire territory destitute of regular armed forces, with the obvious determination to prevent any clashes, and avert pretexts for a possible wholesale occupation of Manchuria south of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Evidence soon began to be given of the truth of this report. Troop trains were encountered moving southward, and in consequence of various delays thereby we reached Kaopangtze several hours late.

One studied the faces of the troops with special interest. Many were young, healthy-looking peasants, a few looked like "characters" of the whimsical good-humoured type, and others had countenances of such brutishness as to explain why the things that are done in China can be done. For in the Chinese armies there are good and bad as in other armies, only when they are bad they are very bad.

Then began a discussion as to the wisdom of proceeding farther toward Mukden. The air was thick with rumours, a spirit of fear was abroad even at this distance and traffic on the branch line to Yingkow had already ceased owing to the action of the Japanese troops at the Yingkow terminus.

A couple of armoured trains were patrolling up and down the line, we were told, but there was a fear that the Japanese might advance up the branch line to Kaopangtze. The stationmaster was perturbed because of the lack of information from Mukden. Many of the Chinese aboard were feeling the fear that was in the very atmosphere. I was afraid at one time that the train would actually turn back, but after a long wait it was decided to send it on.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
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 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

From Kaopangtze we had a free and quick run to Hsinminfu. Here the Magistrate came aboard with three or four officials. The Hsien Chang himself was a typical Manchurian type, large-framed, with big, round, smooth face beaming benevolence. He told us that a small posse of Japanese had visited the city that morning, presumably to see whether their countrymen were safe, and had then returned. Later on a Japanese aeroplane had come over, circled round several times apparently for observation purposes and fired off a burst or two of machine-gun fire. The intention, presumably, was merely to frighten, for though one person alleged that a Chinese woman had been wounded, another said the only casualty was a pig. The Magistrate did not know any of the details of events in Mukden, for all communications of the usual official character had stopped. There were indeed no Chinese officials functioning in Mukden.

At Huangkutun we got out on the platform to find ourselves in the midst of a seething mass of people jammed like sardines in a box, a few standing around with no obvious motive for being there, except for comfort and curiosity, the majority hoping to get clear away from the city. The track to the Settlement station had, of course, been taken up by the Japanese. It was a task to get through the mob and find our way through to the road outside, where we set out, over an atrocious road which tossed our rickshaws from side to side, for the Mukden Settlement.

Huangkutun presented an amazing appearance when I reached there early on Monday morning in order to take the morning train back. There was a seemingly endless queue at the small booking-office, while all the platforms and every truck in the station were packed with people. This was two hours before the train was due to go. In the way things get about, the refugees got to know that the

train was being cleaned and washed in the shed almost half a mile away, and a steady stream of people set out for it and within half an hour the cars were packed to the ceiling.

There were no railway police functioning. Nobody appeared to be in uniform of any sort. And of course no official appeared to try to calm down the panic-stricken people and to tell them there was no occasion for a flight so disastrous to themselves, since it involved leaving all their possessions, save their bedding, behind. The crowd did not seem to have any fixed destination. Anywhere within the Wall, and the farther in the better, seemed to be the spirit.

The station staff must have had a terrible time. But when I saw the Stationmaster I learned that Mr. Steele had arrived and was in a Service train in the shed. Naturally I made for this at once, and found him sprucing up for action, with the General Manager (Mr. Thomson) and the Engineer-in-Chief, Mr. Leitch. There was no doubt about the relief with which their presence was received by the Chinese staff. And when the big Traffic Manager began to take a hand in traffic arrangements the atmosphere in the place changed immediately. He radiated confidence and assurance. Most of us have seen Steele (for so we know him) in many moods, guises and situations in these troubled years in North China, but he is always at his best in an emergency. The British chiefs on the Railway do not find things so comfortable as in the old days, and most of them probably feel—though not one of them has ever suggested it to me—that their Chinese colleagues would often prefer to be rid of them. But when an emergency like this arises it is the British personnel who prevent a collapse of moral among the sorely-tried station staffs and by their example encourage them to carry on. I could tell a story

- 3 -

of what has just happened at one centre to illustrate this, but it would be like telling tales out of school.

Everything possible was done at Huangkutun to cope with the seething mobs of people and to get them away, since there was none to persuade them to stay, as quickly as possible. Even goods cars were requisitioned for the purpose. But the sight at that station and all along the railway for some miles was one of the most pitiful I have ever witnessed. Most of the refugees looked like country folk. They wanted nothing except to get away, and to do this they had taken nothing but their bedding, and some not even that. There were women with babies at their breast by the roadside, and people of all ages trudging along, trying to get away from the terror.

There were rumours as we left that the Japanese had decided to send troops to occupy Hsin-minfu, but whether that occurred or not I am unable to say. We had a fast and normal run as far as Kaopangtze, though at every stopping-place people would try to get on a train already crowded to capacity. Here panic was spreading owing to the departure of the troops. It is, perhaps, ironical, in view of scant pity the military have for the common people and the shockingly callous way in which they so often treat them, that the people felt bereft by their departure. Of course, there were bandits to fear after they had gone, and the wildest apprehensions were entertained about the Japanese troops. They were still afraid that they might move up the branch line from Yingkow. So as the far side of the station was filled with troops and camels and military impediments and troop trains, the other side and the spaces between the tracks were thronged with people all hoping to get away somehow. Only the camels were quiet. Over all sounded the confused murmur of agitated voices, all seeming to talk at once. It was like a sea of sound. To get out of the train was impossible. All the way along the inner and outer doors, the doors of the compartments and even the doors of the corridors, were kept locked when we

were at the stations, for fear that soldiers would rush in.

At this station, however, they had their own trains and they were keeping good order. But the refugees found it hard to get in, and began to pile themselves up on the buffers, on the roofs, on the coal-tender—anywhere, however precarious. The locked doors were banged furiously. At every station this occurred, and very often it seemed certain that soldiers would use the butt-ends of their rifles and break a way in.

Between Kaopangtze and Shanhaikuan we stopped repeatedly owing to troop movements and the long waits in the stations were somewhat nerve-racking. The lights were not yet on, and the curtains were kept down by the carboys. If one had got out for a breather or a short stroll, it was more likely than not that it would have been impossible to get back again. (Incidentally I was the only foreigner of any sort on the train, and I saw no foreigner from the time I left Huangkutun — where I met Oostermeyer and Ford, of the A.P.C., the latter being the aviator who flew out to the Far East on his return from Home leave—until we reached Kuyeh). The danger was, of course, ever-present, that the military might "pinch" the engine and leave us stranded, but this fortunately did not occur. But all along till we got to the Wall there were frantic attempts by both military individuals and refugees to get aboard.

Of course there were one or two minor tragedies on the way. One little infant was seriously burned by some accident in a crowded car. At one place, I believe, two or three persons were knocked off the roof owing to carelessness when passing under bridges, but I fancy they were not badly hurt. As the crowd on the roofs became thicker we were greeted with frantic shouts and warnings by station staffs whenever we moved into a place with an overhead bridge.

I managed to get a couple of hours' sleep and awoke at Shanhaikuan to find the station thick with troop trains. Six minutes later (we must have been there quite a time before I awakened)

- 4 -

CONDITIONS ALONG THE RAILWAY.

(Continued from page 5.)

I heard the deep tone of the big station bell—the bigger the station the bigger the bell, it seems—and noticed in the inevitable hum of conversation outside a more assured and serene note. We were in China Proper at last and with it evidently was a sense of security. Manchuria is, after all, outside the Wall, and as a part of the national home is relatively recent and now less than ever assured.

Troops were in evidence as far in as Kuyeh, but they were few, and the rest of the journey to Tientsin was uneventful, though the people all along the route turned out to see the crowded train and the unusual spectacle of hundreds of people sitting and lying on the roofs.

THE PRETEXT.

A hasty glance at the papers after my return from Mukden gives me the impression that no detailed account of the original incident which is the immediate pretext for the action of the Japanese Military Authorities has yet appeared. I obtained the following from responsible Japanese Military Authority, who illustrated his explanations with a rough pencilled map:—

The explosion occurred at about 10.30 p.m. in the vicinity of Peitiaokou (sometimes rendered Peitiaoying), on the S.M.R. main line, some ten kilometres north of Mukden. A section of Japanese Railway Guards, numbering 50 (it was previously stated to be about 30) were in charge of a bridgehead there, under the command of a subaltern. Some little distance from this place are the North barracks and the North-eastern barracks, on either side of the railway, these forming the base of a triangle with the railway bridgehead the inverted apex. In the north barracks were the 7th Infantry Brigade under Brigade Commander Wang, and the other barracks contained one regiment.

When the explosion occurred the Japanese detachment went forward to inspect and encountered a body of Chinese troops, who fired on them before they even had time to load their rifles.

The subaltern in charge clearly realised that hostilities had begun, and decided to take the proper measures to protect the line. The Chinese were reinforced by one regiment, gradually.

A number of casualties occurred among the Japanese detachment, attributable to their unpreparedness.

The Chinese soldiers stationed in the immediate neighbourhood were about 10,000. The Japanese numbered 50.

In spite of the overwhelming numbers against them, the small Japanese detachment advanced to the attack, under the orders of the subaltern, before reinforcements arrived. The party succeeded in reaching the barracks on the north-east, held by one regiment.

Then the 7th Infantry Brigade from the North Barracks moved out of their barracks to the direction of the Japanese detachment, menacing the rear of the section, which was entirely surrounded.

Reinforcements were sent for by the Japanese and arrived in about three hours, proceeding from the barracks in Mukden at the double and at walking pace, all on foot. Fighting then started between the Chinese Brigade and the Japanese reinforcements, numbering about one battalion. The Chinese gradually retired northward and retreated behind the wall of the barracks, where they dug trenches, fighting continuing till dawn.

Then the Chinese Brigade retreated and the Japanese completely occupied the North barracks.

It was added that one regiment only remained in the stone barracks. The rest fled.

The Japanese casualties in these operations were 18, including one killed.

The above forms the gist of the statements regarding the Peitiaokou affair. Comment upon it will be made in due course elsewhere.

- 5 -

THE MILITARY PROCLAMATION.

One of the reasons why I remained behind overnight and did not return with other members of the Tientsin Press party was the desire to secure a translation of the official Proclamation of the Japanese Commander-in-Chief, as well as other important information. This Proclamation I duly obtained and it reads as follows:—

"On September 18th, 1931, at about 10.30 p.m., a portion of the troops belonging to the Chinese North-Eastern Army blew up the S.M.R. line in the vicinity of the North Barracks, north-west of Mukden, and then attacked the Japanese detachment there, thus committing an act of hostility against the Japanese troops.

"The S.M.R. is a possession of the Japanese Empire. It was obtained legally, in accordance with Treaty rights, and the Japanese Empire will not tolerate any molestation of these rights.

"The Chinese North-Eastern Army has not only violated these Treaty rights, but also opened fire on Japanese troops. This was clearly an action on the part of that Army with the object of opening hostilities against the Japanese Empire.

"Considering the various insulting actions which have occurred along the Railway and actions in violation of Japanese rights and interests which occurred very frequently recently, this outrage against the Japanese troops clearly was not caused by any sudden and momentary ebullition of bad feeling, but is held to be nothing but the clearest premeditated action on the part of

the North-Eastern Military Authorities, who are accustomed to disregard international morality and to commit insults against the Japanese.

"If nothing is done at present to stop this noone can tell what will be the consequences in the future. The results will be the most serious imaginable.

"But I reflect at the same time that such outrages formed no part of the intentions of the Chinese people, and were committed by the Military with some ulterior ambitions.

"In view of the heavy responsibility of protecting the S.M.R., and in order to ensure the protection of the vested interests and rights, and also the prestige of the Imperial Japanese Army, I have no hesitation in adopting drastic measures. It is not the Chinese people we seek to discipline, but the North-Eastern Army.

"As for the welfare and happiness of the Chinese population, it is a matter that has my deep concern, and I have requested my troops to do their utmost to ensure the protection of their well-being.

"It is therefore my desire that the Chinese people will not give way to fear but will go about their business as usual. There is no necessity for them to give way to suspicion or to flee.

"At the same time I again wish to declare that if anyone attempts to do any harm to, or obstruct the actions of, the Kwantung Army, the most drastic action will be taken against such persons."


The Proclamation, which is primarily addressed to the Chinese people, is signed by Lieut.-General Honjo, the Kwantung G.O.C.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

RECEIVED

OCT 24 1931

SECRETARY'S OFFICE



MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR
OCTOBER 22, 1931.

OCT 28 1931

DIVISION OF

COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

OCT 26 1931

The Ambassador came in simply to report on the Manchurian situation. He had nothing new to add.

He said that the reported fight with Chinese soldiers which appeared in the press this morning was a fight with bandits who were preparing to loot a city. I told him that at the press conference correspondants had asked me whether the Japanese planes alleged to have bombed a town were among the planes which had been reported as having left Manchuria.

The Ambassador had not heard this report, and said that if it was true it would certainly be very embarrassing for him, that he had informed us as to the departure of the bombing planes as the result of an official instruction from Tokyo. He said that if any such thing had happened, he could not believe that it was a case of regular airplane bombing, but that the pilots of scouting planes might have dropped little bombs which they carried in their pockets. I told him that I was afraid that instances of this kind would continue to happen unless the Japanese airplanes stayed within the railroad zone.

U WRC:GMH

793.94/2368

FILED

OCT 28 1931

WRC

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Huntzger NARS, Date 12-18-75

RECEIVED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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OCT 24 1931

OCT 28 1931

THE UNDERSECRETARY

DIVISION OF

COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

OCT 26 1931

October 23, 1931.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

OCT 26 1931

Department of State

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR

The French Ambassador took up the subject of the present Manchurian dispute and of the apparent weakness of the League in handling it. This, however, does not particularly trouble him because he believes that the world would be better off if Japan had an even stronger hold on Manchuria than it has at present, or rather than it had before the beginning of the trouble. He says that he thinks it would be a bad thing for the world if Japan's hold on Manchuria were materially lessened.

In this, I imagine, he reflects the general French attitude.

U WRC:GMH

OCT 28 1931


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793.94/2369

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM




Geneva

Dated October 28, 1931

Rec'd 2:30 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



264, October 28, noon.

743.44/254

Consulate's 235, October 22, 5 p. m., final paragraph,
and 230, October 27, 9 a. m., paragraph 11.

One. There is no information available here respecting action of Government in making public notes invoking Pact of Paris. The Secretariat's position is that this question has passed into the hands of the Governments signatories and any information that might reach Geneva would be purely unofficial and incidental.

Two. I am informed, however, that with respect to states represented on the Council those known to have invoked the Pact are Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Spain, Portugal, Yugoslavia and the Irish Free State. Panama is believed to have done so. There is no information respecting Guatemala and Peru.

GILBERT

RR
OSB

793.94/2370

AM

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GENEVA

RECEIVED
OCT 28 1931

FROM

Dated October 28, 1931

Rec'd 2:08 p.m.

DIVISION OF

Division of

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS


OCT 28 1931

Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

263, October 28, 11 a.m.



At the request of the Japanese Government Drummond is communicating by telegraph to the members of Council the following telegram received from Tokyo and published there October 26.

"One. On October 22 Japanese representative in Council of League of Nations proposed certain amendments to resolution then before the Council with regard to two questions;

(1)- Withdrawal of Japanese troops to the railway zone and;

(2)- Direct negotiations between China and Japan.

However, these suggested amendments as well as resolution itself fell through having failed to obtain unanimous approval of Council.

"Two. As has been repeatedly emphasized by Japanese Government whole Manchurian affair was occasioned solely by violent and provocative attack launched by Chinese army on railway zone. Certain small contingents of Japanese

793.94/2371

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NOV 4 1931

AM

2-#263, from Geneva, October 28, 1931
11 a.m.

Japanese soldiers still remaining at few points outside that zone are insistently demand by danger to which large population of Japanese in that region are exposed in life and property. Presence of such limited number of troops is quite incapable being represented as means of dictating to China Japan's terms for settlement of present difficulties. Nothing is farther from thoughts of Japanese than to bring armed pressure to bear upon China in the course of these negotiations.

"Three. Japanese Government have on various occasions given expression to their firm determinations to suffer no abridgment or diminution of rights and interests of Japan which are vital to her national existence and which are woven into complex fabric of her political and economic relations with China. Unfortunately so called "recovery of rights" movements in China have recently attained extravagant developments while feelings antagonistic^{to} Japan has been openly encouraged in text books used at various schools in China, have become deeply seated in Chinese mind. In defiance of treaties and regardless of all history, vigorous agitation has been carried on in China with object of undermining rights and interests of Japan even most vital. As things stand

AM

3-#263, from Geneva, October 28,
1931, 11 a.m.

stand at present complete withdrawal of Japanese troops to South Manchurian Railway zone under mere assurance of Chinese Government would create intolerable situation exposing Japanese subjects to gravest dangers. Risk of such dangers is clearly evidenced by past experience and by conditions which actually obtain in China.

Four. The Japanese are persuaded that in the present situation safety of Japanese subjects in Manchuria can hardly be insured without provision being made to remove national antipathies and suspicion existing in mutual relations of two powers. With this end in view the right already expressed in note of Minister of Foreign Affairs October 9 to Chinese Minister at Tokyo their readiness to enter into negotiations with the Chinese Government on certain basic principles that should regulate normal inter-relationship between two countries. That note was communicated at the time to the Council of the League. Convinced that this method of procedure is alone calculated to open a way to relieve the Japanese Government have held to their proposals in that sense throughout recent discussions at Council of League. Basic principles which they have had in mind relate to:

(1) - Mutual repudiation of aggressive policy and conduct;

(2)

AM

4-#263, from Geneva, October 28, 1931
11 a.m.

- (2)- respect for China's territorial integrity;
- (3)- Complete suppression of all organized movements interfering with freedom of trade and stirring up international hatred;
- (4)- effective protection throughout Manchuria of all peaceful pursuits undertaken by Japanese subjects;
- (5)- Respect for treaty rights of Japan in Manchuria.

The Japanese Government believe that all these points being in entire accord with aims and aspirations of League of Nations and embodying natural basis upon which peace in Far East must depend will command themselves to approval of public opinion of the world. Refusal by Japanese representative to lay these points on table of Council was due to consideration that they should in their nature properly form subject of negotiations between parties directly involved.

Five. With future welfare of both nations in mind Japanese Government feel that urgent need at present moment is to arrive at solution of problem by cooperation of two countries and thus seek path of common happiness and prosperity. Their willingness remains unaltered and unabated

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM

5-#263, from Geneva, October 28,
1931, 11 a.m.

and unabated to open negotiations with Chinese Government
on subject of basic principles above formulated relating
to normal relations between Japan and China and on subject
of withdrawal its troops to South Manchuria".

GILBERT

WSB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased before
being communicated to
anyone.

GENEVA

Dated October 28, 1931

Rec'd 3:05 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

265, October 28, 2 p.m.



One. Drummond asked me to come to see him this

morning. He discussed the situation as he saw it.

in view of the Japanese note reported in Consulate's
793.94/2371

263, October 28, 11 a.m. He said that the Japanese

note presented the five points of the Japanese demands

virtually as they had stated them here during the

negotiations; but that the note might be construed as

carrying inferences of more extensive claims. He then

referred to recent press reports from Tokyo, apparently

emanating from official Japanese sources, in which were

mentioned embodied in ~~as likely to affect~~ the five points, two

additional demands, namely, a payment of a sum of money

and the question of leases.

This he said left Paris and Geneva not knowing where

they were (by this expression he referred to Briand

and himself).

793.94/2372

NOV 25 1931

RECEIVED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM

2-#265, from Geneva, Oct. 28, 1931
2 p.m.

and himself). He said that Briand did not know which of the two versions of the demands was correct or whether the Japanese note did not in effect include the demands cited in the press reports.

Drummond had just finished talking to Briand by telephone as I entered his office. Drummond is preparing an answer to the Japanese note in line with that conversation. Drummond told me that as the Japanese note was an appeal to public opinion he felt the League must make an immediate counter move.

Two. Drummond then speculated a little concerning the possible American action in connection with the Council's draft resolution of October 24th and subsequent developments. He stated that he believed that the Japanese were stiffening in their position and that their next move will be to set up a puppet government in Manchuria. He wondered whether Washington were holding conversations with Paris and London on the subject of possible action. I told him that no intimations whatsoever had reached me from Washington in the premises.

I speak

AM

3-#265, from Geneva, Oct. 28, 1931
2 p.m.

I speak of this in view of the impression I gain here that Briand and Drummond are still handling the negotiations for the Council and that Drummond will continue to play an important role. Inasmuch as the Japanese and Chinese official communications are addressed to the Secretary General it is possible that Geneva will at least for the present remain the central point for the Council's action in this connection.

GILBERT

CSB

123

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FILE

TELEGRAM SENT

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

1-128

TO BE TRANSMITTED
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Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

Department of State

Washington,

October 30, 1931.

AMERICAN CONSUL

GENEVA (SWITZERLAND).

793.94/2372

122 Your 265, October 28, 2 p.m., section two. This
matter is being discussed with the French Ambassador
here.

Strinson
Wly

793.94/2372

FE:RSM:EJL FE

Enciphered by _____


Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 80.

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
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
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No. 150

1002331



793.94

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that considerable interest has been aroused in Holland by the cooperation of the United States with the League of Nations as regards the Chino-Japanese question. The MAASBODE of the thirteenth states:

"It is a fact to be rejoiced at that America is working with the League to preserve peace. This cooperation greatly increases the League's power."

I...

793.94/2373


1931.6.10N

- 2 -

I gather from informal conversations with members of the Foreign Office that the Dutch Government is also delighted at America's cooperation with the League. A high official remarked to me today that he did not think Japan had the least basis for argument against the presence of an American representative at the present meeting of the Council.

I am enclosing, as of possible interest to the Department, the translation of a leading editorial on this subject which appeared in yesterday's edition of the TELEGRAAF.

Respectfully yours,



Laurits S. Swenson.

Enclosure:
Translation of
Editorial

File No. 710

In quintuplicate

HJ:RIM:ekd

ENCLOSURE TO DESPATCH NO. 130

Translation
from TELEGRAAF
of October 15, 1931.

AMERICA SUPPORTING GENEVA

An entirely new factor has entered into the Chino-Japanese conflict over Manchuria - America's readiness to work in hitherto unknown close contact with the League of Nations.

Such readiness of course arises, in first instance, from the desire on the part of American statesmen also to have a say now that such great East Asiatic interests are at stake. Formally, however, is America joining in with the Nine Powers Treaty of Washington (1922) in which the signatories (in addition to the great powers Belgium, Holland and Portugal are also parties to this treaty) bind themselves to respect the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of China.

After China had lodged the complaint with the League that its territory had been infringed by a Japanese invasion, both on land and in the air, it is perfectly comprehensible that such great powers as signed the Washington treaty but do not belong to the League should be invited to participate in the deliberations that equally affect the application of the League Pact and the agreement of 1922.

It is not entirely incomprehensible that from a Japanese source opposition should arise in this special case to cooperation by America, for it has always been America that has defended China against any attempts at aggression by Japan (one has only to remember the Shangtung affair).

But...

- 2 -

But the impression cannot be overcome that Japan is not strengthening its point of view in the present Manchurian question by continually protesting against every attempt of third parties to intervene in that conflict. The principal tenet of the League of Nations - and Japan was one of the founders of that organization - is just that disputes between nations not only affect those nations themselves, but are of significance for the entire community of nations and that this community is justified, even bound, to intervene in such disputes for the purpose of terminating them.

Hence it is perfectly in accord with the spirit of the League that China should again make an appeal to Geneva and has even invited the League to send a commission of inquiry to Manchuria. The commission would then receive there, on the spot, an explanation from all sides of the previous history of the incidents, the incidents themselves, and their results. The Japanese grievances too, principally connected with the disinclination of the Chinese, under the prevailing circumstances, to purchase Japanese goods, would then be investigated by impartial persons.

The dislike which the Japanese appear to entertain for any interference on the part of third parties, appears to be inspired by a militarily tinted nationalism that feels any intervention as a loss of prestige. Here a great task awaits the League of Nations' friends in Japan. They would be making themselves extremely meretorious as regards the community of nations should they be able to cause the idea to penetrate that the prestige of the League ought to weigh heavier than the prestige of any one member whatsoever.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
OCT 29 1931
DIVISION

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 29, 1931

Rec'd 6:40 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 29 1931
Department of State

Tel. to Peiping
OCT 31 1931

830, October 29, 3 p. m.

British Minister who returned yesterday from Nanking informs me he has just been authorized by his Foreign Office to advise the Chinese Government that he is holding some members of his staff in readiness to proceed to Manchuria on or about November 16th as observers should their services be required in connection with a Japanese withdrawal. This in response to a request from the Chinese Government.

Sir Miles himself expects to be back in Nanking by November 16th.

Minister in Shanghai informed.

For the Minister

ENGERT

WSB

793.94/2374

FILED
NOV. 4 1931

123

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT *AM* *FILE*

TO BE TRANSMITTED
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Department of State

Collect
Charge Department

OR
Charge to
\$

Washington,

October 31, 1931.

793.94/2374

OCT 31 31

AMERICAN LEGATION

PEIPING (China).

401

Your 830, October 29, 3 p. m., and Department's telegram to Nanking for the Minister No. 103, October 27, 5 p. m.

Please inform Department promptly, (1) whether the, British Minister, has actually advised the Chinese Government and (2) of ^{similar} ~~any~~ action taken, or ^{which may} ~~to~~ be taken by, the French Government, and other interested Governments.

Consult Minister before replying.

St. Cath
any

793.94/2374

CR
Oct. 31, 1931

FE:REJ:REK

REK *FE* *SKT*

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1916 1-125

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/2375

TRANSFERRED TO

125.3973/137

YT

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE
 412

JS

Green

GENEVA

Dated October 29, 1931

Rec'd 7:02 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D.C.

URGENT, 266, October 29, 9 a.m.

Consulate's 223 October 26, noon, and Department's

120 October 27. Earnestly request favorable consideration for temporary additional assistance requested in Consulate's telegram under reference.

I feel it essential to get off to the Department a large amount of material as soon as possible and also to prepare for possible eventualities in Sino-Japanese situation which urgently necessitates stenographic work.

GILBERT

JS

To be transferred
 to Mrs. Wailer.

Catch

743.94/220

125.3973/137

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 125.3974/95 FOR Tel. #267-10 am

FROM Geneva (Gilbert) DATED Oct. 29, 1931
 TO NAME 1-1172 ...

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese dispute
 Requests that allotment for telegraphing in connection
 with -- be increased to \$10,000, and that cost of telephone
 conversation with Secretary of State on Oct. 20 be authorized

793.94/2376

JS

Green

GENEVA

Dated October 29, 1931,

Rec'd 7:07 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

267, October 29, 10 a.m.

Consulate's 123 and Department's 68 October 8, 6 p.m.

To date approximately seven thousand five hundred dollars has been spent for telegrams. As it appears likely that telegraphing in connection with Sino-Japanese dispute will continue to be heavy, respectfully request that allotment be increased to ten thousand dollars.

The cost of the telephone conversation with the Secretary of State on October 20th approximately three hundred and seventy five dollars. Please authorize payment.

GILBERT

JS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NOTE

THE PAPER INDEXED UNDER 793.94 has been transferred to 125.3974

793.94/2376

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

JS

Green

GENEVA

Dated October 29, 1931,

Rec'd 7:07 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

267, October 29, 10/a.m.

Consulate's 123 and Department's 68 October 8, 6 p.m.

To date approximately seven thousand five hundred dollars has been spent for telegrams. As it appears likely that telegraphing in connection with Sino-Japanese dispute will continue to be heavy, respectfully request that allotment be increased to ten thousand dollars.

The cost of the telephone conversation with the Secretary of State on October 20th approximately three hundred and seventy five dollars. Please authorize payment.

GILBERT

JS

*To be transferred
to Mrs. Wailers.*

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
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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



No. 1096.



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EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
October 16, 1931.

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The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

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FROM: [blank]

Sir:

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With reference to my despatch No. 1069 of
October 2, 1931, regarding Italian press comment on
the Sino-Japanese difficulties in Manchuria, I have
the honor to inform the Department that while the
newspapers have in the last few days manifested some
interest in the controversy, it cannot be said that
Italian press opinion has evidenced any particular
sympathy for one side or the other.

The newspapers have printed some excellent short
explanatory articles for the benefit of their readers,
setting forth the reasons for the conflict and the aims

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of each nation. The aggressive character of the recent Japanese measures in Manchuria is not condoned, however, even though the Italian press is inclined to regard them as natural manifestations of the revival in Japan of Realpolitik, which is also favored by Fascism. While the POPOLO DI ROMA alleges the necessity for Japanese expansion because of demographic pressure and the closing of the doors against Japanese immigration in America and Australia, the POPOLO D'ITALIA ^{stata} denies this demographic need as grossly exaggerated and points to statistics of actual Japanese emigration. The real reason for Japanese expansion, says this newspaper, is fundamentally political. Most of the articles stress the fact that in the face of all the pressure which will be brought to bear by the League of Nations and the United States, Japan will remain firm in her assumed position, as she cannot afford to surrender what she has already achieved in Manchuria -- two thirds of the commerce of that region, bought at the price of two wars and two big victories. The ability of China as a diplomatic tactician in Geneva is not, however, underrated, although the CORRIERE DELLA SERA remarks with some truth that China, which not long ago was inveighing against the intervention of the "white foreign devils" in her affairs, is now clamoring for that very thing.

The CORRIERE DELLA SERA, in a special article contrasting the national characteristics of the two countries in the mouths of two of their citizen spokesmen, attributes to the Chinese an utter scorn for Japan

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as an imitative and parvenu nation which has in the past profited only by the civilization of first China and then the Occident, and a desire to show that nation its place. The Japanese viewpoint, continues this writer, is one of depreciation for a worn-out country lacking in cohesion, patriotism, and courage. That is why, says the writer, all of Japan's military measures do not appear to a subject of that nation to be acts of war, since they cannot conceive of China as an enemy upon an equal footing. The descendants of the veterans of Port Arthur, he continues, cannot think of "fighting" China any more than a gentleman duelist of the old days would have crossed swords with a peasant. The POPOLO DI ROMA remarks, however, in humoristic style, that even if armed conflicts and bombardments do not constitute warlike measures in Japan's eyes, the resultant Chinese boycott of Japanese goods is to her a real "act of hostility".

Although the press reflects a definite lack of direct interest in the actual Manchurian imbroglio, there is another phase of the question which does hold its attention, and that is the attitude of the League of Nations in the premises. M. Briand's statement that "the important thing is to take prompt action" is ridiculed and the question put "Why didn't the League take action weeks ago when the difficulties first arose?" The TEVERE says that the League of Nations can this time not avoid drinking the "bitter chalice of responsibility" as she has so successfully done in the past. "This time

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the chalice is already at its very lips." The League, continues the newspaper, must satisfy the policies of several interested European nations as well as the United States, which, more than any nation on this continent, is interested in things Chinese. The article goes on to say that for once it will not be enough for M. Briand to make a speech eulogizing peace among nations generally and proposing in particular the nomination of a committee to study the origins of the conflict.

In connection with the foregoing, I have the honor to add that Signor Grandi is quoted as having declared prior to his departure for Geneva that his Government had no definite policy as regards the Sino-Japanese controversy which might guide his participation in the actual discussion within the Council.

Respectfully yours,

Alexander Kirk

Alexander Kirk,
Charge d'Affaires ad interim.

Enclosures: Clippings.

Copies to E.I.C. Paris.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LA TRIBUNA, Rome.
 October 13, 1951.

Despatch No. 1096.



Estremo Oriente: Marte si diverte.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELETYPE, Rome.
 October 13, 1931.

Despatch No. 1096.

Ginevra beve il calice

Quest'oggi si riunisce il Consiglio della Società delle Nazioni; e, senza ombra di ironia, si può dire che l'attenzione del mondo è precisamente rivolta a Ginevra. Altre volte, in occasioni analoghe a questa, se pur meno gravi, l'istituto ginevrino ebbe modo di allontanare da sé l'amaro calice delle responsabilità; stavolta lo accosta alle labbra. Si tratta di vedere in qual modo e, soprattutto, in quanto tempo la S. d. N. può intervenire nel conflitto cino-giapponese per comporlo e risolverlo; quanto meno per mettere con le armi al piede i belligeranti. Perché è proprio di belligeranti che si deve parlare, repugnando alla logica e alla serietà ogni circonlocuzione eufemistica.

La S. d. N. si trova di fronte a una grossa questione di fatto e di diritto, alla quale aggiunge drammaticità l'atteggiamento degli Stati Uniti, quale risulta dalla comunicazione che il signor Stimson avrebbe fatto a Ginevra. Il sig. Stimson dichiara che il suo governo si riserva il diritto di agire indipendentemente dalla S. d. N. e si richiama al Patto Kellogg. Il Consiglio ginevrino dovrebbe dunque dare soddisfazione alla legittima ansietà degli Stati Uniti, più interessati di qualunque paese europeo alle cose cinesi. Altre difficoltà nasceranno — si può prevederlo — per

l'atteggiamento della Francia. Il signor Briand sarà capace di fare un discorso inneggiante alla pace fra i popoli, in generale; e in particolare proporrà la nomina d'una commissione di studio sulle origini del conflitto. Giacché pare — non soltanto dalle indiscrezioni che circolano, ma dalla logica stessa delle cose — che il prolungarsi e l'aggravarsi d'un conflitto armato in un qualunque punto del globo non possa che soddisfare il desiderio francese di dimostrare all'universo mondo la ineluttabile necessità degli armamenti. Nessuno vorrà negare che il conflitto manciuriano si presti egregiamente come tema per un discorso alla Maginot. In questa occasione, non sarà male rilevare che le idee espresse recentemente a Roma da Lord Cecil intorno al disarmo hanno avuto in Francia le più ostili accoglienze anche su giornali di linguaggio solitamente temperato.

Anche per queste considerazioni, l'odierna straordinaria sessione del Consiglio ginevrino suscita la più grande curiosità e qualche preoccupazione.

POPOLO DI ROMA, Rome.
October 14, 1931.

Despatch no. 1096.

Il Giappone e la S.d.N.

Gli avvenimenti di Manciuria hanno commosso Ginevra. Il Consiglio della Società delle Nazioni si è riunito e sta per prendere decisioni storiche e rapide. Soprattutto rapide: il signor Briand lo ha detto al momento di partire: « quel che importa è di agire rapidamente ». Chi avrebbe mai pensato che la S. d. N. si preoccupasse tanto di far presto? Solo resta da spiegare perchè non abbia agito qualche settimana fa, quando il problema dei rapporti fra la Cina e il Giappone venne per la prima volta alla ribalta di Ginevra. In quella occasione il Presidente del Consiglio, il signor Lerroux, espresse il suo compiacimento per il modo con cui la Lega aveva agito. Tutti sapevano che non aveva fatto niente. Ma, probabilmente, nel pensiero del signor Lerroux la Lega allora agisce ottimamente quando non agisce affatto. E il signor Lerroux non è solo a pensare così; vi è qualche grande paese, a questo mondo, che condivide esattamente il suo pensiero: il Giappone, per esempio.

Il quale Giappone ha assunto, per necessità di schermaglia diplomatica, una posizione di una ipocrisia senza pari. Le sue truppe hanno invaso la Manciuria, le sue navi da guerra son partite per la Cina, i suoi aeroplani hanno bombardato Kinceu. Non sembra che questi atti si possano dire amichevoli, nè che possano conciliare le simpatie cinesi al Giappone. E infatti dimostrazioni popolari hanno avuto luogo a Nankino o altrove. Subito il Giappone ha protestato: perchè mai simili atti di ostilità contro un paese amico? I commercianti o i consumatori cinesi hanno boicottato i tessuti giapponesi. E il Giappone ha protestato: « i trattati sono violati », e ha intimato a Nankino: « ci risponderete di tutto ». Conclusione: rifiutarsi di comprare le cotoneate giapponesi è atto ostile, tirar bombe è atto amichevole.

Quali strane concezioni dell'amicizia fioriscono mai all'ombra dei palmizi della diplomazia!

Ma se il Ministro degli Esteri di Tokio o, meglio, se un qualsiasi cittadino di quel lontanissimo Impero potesse dir le ragioni del suo paese fuori di tutte le ipocrisie e di tutte le ambagi diplomatiche, parlerebbe forse così: « Or sono molti anni, noi sostenemmo una terribile guerra contro la Russia per niente altro che per la Manciuria; vincemmo la guerra, ma non avemmo la Manciuria, perchè le grandi potenze ci obbligarono a rinunziarvi. Prendemmo parte alla guerra mondiale, sperando nella riconoscenza degli alleati; e infatti l'America chiuse le porte in faccia ai nostri emigranti, i quali, a dire il vero, hanno il pessimo difetto di rimaner giapponesi sempre e dappertutto, per via di quel certo loro colore piuttosto giallognolo. Ma soprattutto noi abbiamo tre gravi colpe agli occhi dei paesi ricchi: siamo in troppi, siamo troppo poveri ed abbiamo un paese troppo piccolo. Gravi colpe, d'accordo! Abbiamo tentato di emigrare: America, Australia, tutti ci han chiuso le porte in faccia. Che fare? Non ci resta che o soffocare nella casa troppo angusta o conquistarci, con la spada, un po' di posto al sole. E' quello che abbiamo intenzione di fare ».

Ma la diplomazia non potrebbe mai ascoltare un discorsetto così semplice e così veritiero. E perciò il Giappone dichiara che finchè i cinesi non smettono di boicottare le sue cotoneate, sarà costretto a rimanere in Manciuria; salvo a chiedere i danni, beninteso.

A. G.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

LAVORO FASCISTA, Rome.
 October 15, 1931.

Despatch No. 1096.

Le ragioni di un conflitto

Nell'aggravarsi del conflitto cino-giapponese sta avvenendo questo: che si moltiplicano sempre più gli elementi della fase attuale e se ne ricordano sempre meno i precedenti e le cause.

Come è stato provocato tutto questo diavolerio? Come mai il Giappone, che occupa città e zone cinesi, può quasi atteggiarsi a vittima ed accusar la Cina di nuocere ai suoi interessi? E come va che il Governo di Nanchino, dopo essersi veduto piombare addosso un nubifragio di questa specie, minaccia addirittura lui di dichiarare la guerra? Insomma: quale è il perché di tante polemiche e di tante complicazioni?

Proviamoci a precisare i termini della competizione. Ma senza voler capire chi ha ragione o chi ha torto. Poiché in situazioni così aggrovigliate, eredità di tempi passati e incrocio di enormi interessi presenti, le ragioni e i torti sono distribuiti a piene mani, ed è ben difficile raccapazzarsi. La legalità è dominata dalla politica: la politica si intreccia alla forza: e su tutto gravano le supreme leggi delle competizioni di razza, per cui ogni popolo lotta con buona ragione anche quando ha torto!...

Dobbiamo quindi limitarci ai dati di fatto e alle asserzioni dei due contendenti. I quali, naturalmente, sostengono e dimostrano di essere entrambi nel vero e nel giusto: ed entrambi di difendersi, l'uno dalle prepotenze dell'altro.

I cinesi dicono: i giapponesi invadono la Manciuria e ci minacciano la Mongolia con la loro penetrazione. Se non facciamo presto a trattenerli sulle posizioni raggiunte, perdiamo intere regioni.

I giapponesi protestano: è la nuova Cina che non rispetta gli impegni del passato, sabotta i « diritti speciali » che ci sono riconosciuti e rovina i nostri interessi. Bisogna che Nanchino si decida a smetterla; altrimenti dobbiamo difendere i sacrosanti diritti acquisiti.

No — strillano i cinesi — siete voi che ci invadete con le emigrazioni organizzate dalla Corea e ci affamate col monopolio dei commerci. Rispettate i trattati e statevene a casa vostra!

E' l'inverso — controbattono i giapponesi. — Siete voi cinesi che perseguitate la nostra emigrazione e fate concorrenza al nostro movimento commerciale. Noi stiamo ai patti: gli ostruzionismi e le violazioni vengono dalla parte vostra.

...E giù polemiche, per questa strada. Dopodiché ce n'è d'avanzo per suscitare a decine gli incidenti locali e i conflitti internazionali. E, infatti, gli incidenti hanno fioccato negli ultimi anni. Dal 1925 ad oggi — cioè dalla ripresa e dal rinnovamento della politica cinese — si è sviluppata tutta una serie di contrapposizioni, che, un giorno o l'altro, dovevano per forza portare qualche urto più vivo. Le vicende di oggi non rappresentano che un aspetto, più clamoroso, del profondo conflitto esistente. Ed è per questo che prese isolatamente, appaiono tanto confuse agli osservatori lontani: così come qualunque soluzione, all'infuori di nuove intese tra

se, i giapponesi esercitano il controllo su tre linee cinesi e si ricordano alla rete dell'Est-Cinese.

Come si vede, questo insieme di interessi giapponesi, stabiliti dopo una guerra vittoriosa e abilmente organizzati ed estesi attraverso un venticinquennale lavoro, è veramente ingente: e ciò spiega l'inconsueta energia di mezzi con cui il Giappone intende garantirli.

Di contro, da parte della Cina esistono altri fatti di indubitabile consistenza e di altrettanto vasta portata politica. Il principale si chiama *rinascimento della nazione* e ripresa politica della sua attività internazionale. Ora il Governo di Nanchino è in posizione ben diversa dall'antico regime di Pechino: e mostra di volere sviluppare sempre più la politica intrapresa da quattro o cinque anni. All'interno e di fronte alle Potenze. E' appunto di oggi la notizia dell'accordo realizzatosi con Canton: e son di ieri le azioni diplomatiche svolte su tutta la linea delle questioni inerenti alla situazione e agli interessi delle Potenze in Cina.

In tal senso, può dirsi che la competizione attuale sia germinata nel 1928, cioè da quando la Manciuria di Chiang-Tsu-Lin — fino ad allora mantenutasi in regime separato — aderì e si aggregò alla nuova Cina di Nanchino. L'espansionismo giapponese non poteva a meno di allarmarsi per una

unificazione, che riacutizzava i problemi del suo consolidamento nella regione.


E, infatti, dal 1928 — come lamentano i cinesi — che l'emigrazione di Corea vigilata dalle autorità nipponiche, ha portato circa un milione di soggetti giapponesi ad insediarsi in Manciuria. Peggio — dicono sempre i cinesi — poiché già in Mongolia, sotto forma di centri agricoli per allevamenti, si infiltrano e si estendono i tentacoli della penetrazione nipponica. In questi territori, che sono sotto la sovranità e l'amministrazione della Cina, i giapponesi pretenderebbero addirittura che il Governo cinese rinunziasse a qualunque progresso, di uomini e di iniziative. Con quale diritto si protesta, se masse cacciate dalla carestia o dai banditi dalle altre provincie passano in Manciuria? Forse il Giappone vuol proibire ai cittadini cinesi di passare da un luogo all'altro del proprio paese? Si vuol forse vietare al Governo di provvedere a strade, commerci e ferrovie, come fanno i governi di tutto il mondo?... E così di seguito.

Ora da una parte e dall'altra tutte queste ragioni trovano ottime basi e solidi argomenti: ma si vede ben chiaro che i veri termini del conflitto hanno radici più profonde, cause più gravi, scopi più lontani...

E per questo si fatica tanto a Ginevra!

G. S. S.

Secondo Briand, fra Cina e Giappone, a proposito della Manciuria, non si tratterebbe che di un « malentendu ».
 (dai giornali)



Despatch No. 1096.

Tokio e Nanchino) sembra nel momento attuale ben difficile anche ai più esperti diplomatici.

 Il Giappone, dunque, avrebbe fatto la mossa che tutti sanno a garanzia dei suoi *diritti speciali* in Manciuria e per indurre Nanchino a cambiare politica nei suoi riguardi. I giapponesi si lamentano anzitutto del vasto piano politico intrapreso a loro pregiudizio, come del *tono* col quale il governo cinese avrebbe cominciato a trattarli e farli trattare dalle autorità locali in Manciuria. C'è stata la denuncia unilaterale del Trattato del Commercio riguardante la extra-territorialità e c'è stato il rifiuto di gradimento per il rappresentante diplomatico Obata. Ci sono le nuove costruzioni ferroviarie promosse con capitale esclusivamente cinese (tre linee) e i grandi lavori per il nuovo porto di Hu-Su-Tao, destinato a far concorrenza a quello di Daireu in mani nipponiche. Ci sono gli incoraggiamenti all'emigrazione cinese in Manciuria e gli sforzi di assorbimento di quella coreana, cioè di marca giapponese, per contrapporre masse pure alla espansione del Giappone larvata attraverso i Coreani.

Infine si sono avuti recenti e misteriosi incidenti in Mongolia, dove nello scorso giugno un capitano giapponese fu ucciso.

Il Giappone si lagna per i grandi sacrifici incontrati per la valorizzazione e lo sfruttamento della Manciuria e che ora si cerca di insidiargli. Cospicui sono i capitali che vi ha investito e notevoli le industrie e le opere e i centri che ha costruito. Si tratta di un grande sistema, a fondo economico, creato intorno alle famose *Ferrovie della Manciuria del Sud*, passate dalla Russia al Giappone nel 1905, col

i giapponesi esercitano il controllo su tre linee cinesi e si raccordano alla rete dell'Est-Cinese.

Come si vede, questo insieme di interessi giapponesi, stabiliti dopo una guerra vittoriosa e abilmente organizzati ed estesi attraverso un ventinquennale lavoro, è veramente inerte; e ciò spiega l'inconsueta energia di mezzi con cui il Giappone intende garantirli.

Di contro, da parte della Cina esistono altri fatti di indubitabile consistenza e di altrettanto vasta portata politica. Il principale si chiama *rinascimento della nazione* e ripresa piena della sua attività internazionale.

Il Governo di Nanchino è in piena sintonia ben diversa dall'antico regime pechino: e mostra di volere svistare sempre più la politica intrapresa da quattro o cinque anni. All'inizio di fronte alle Potenze. E' apparsi oggi la notizia dell'accordo siglato con Canton: e son di ieri le note diplomatiche svolte su tutta la linea delle questioni inerenti alla sovranità e agli interessi delle Potenze in Cina.

Al senso, può dirsi che la compagine attuale sia germinata nel 1928, da quando la Manciuria di Wang-Tsu-Lin — fino ad allora mandata in regime separato — aderì e si unì alla nuova Cina di Nanchino. L'espansionismo giapponese non aveva a meno di allarmarsi per una

unificazione, che riacutizzava i problemi del suo consolidamento nella regione.

E, infatti, dal 1928 — come lamentano i cinesi — che l'emigrazione di Corea vigilata dalle autorità nipponiche, ha portato circa *un milione* di soggetti giapponesi ad insediarsi in Manciuria. Peggio — dicono sempre i cinesi — poiché già in Mongolia, sotto forma di centri agricoli per allevamenti, si infiltrano e si estendono i tentacoli della penetrazione nipponica. In questi territori, che sono sotto la sovranità e l'amministrazione della Cina, i giapponesi pretenderebbero addirittura che il Governo cinese *rinunziasse* a qualunque progresso, di uomini e di iniziative. Con quale diritto si protesta, se masse cacciate dalla carestia o dai banditi dalle altre province passano in Manciuria? Forse il Giappone vuol proibire ai cittadini cinesi di passare da un luogo all'altro del proprio paese? Si vuol forse vietare al Governo di provvedere a strade, commerci e ferrovie, come fanno i governi di tutto il mondo?... E così di seguito.


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E per questo si fatica tanto a Ginevra!

G. S. S.

MALINTESI

Secondo Briand, fra Cina e Giappone, a proposito della Manciuria, non si tratterebbe che di un « malentendu » (dai giornali)



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CORRIERE DELLA SERA, Milan.
 October 15, 1931.

Despatch No. 1096.

Roma, 14 ottobre, notte.

L'on. Biagi ha diretto a tutti i dirigenti provinciali della Confederazione dei Sindacati dell'industria una circolare contenente norme intese a disciplinare l'azione predisposta dalle Unioni provinciali per fronteggiare la disoccupazione.

« Le iniziative che devono partire dai nostri Sindacati, — dice la circolare, — sono di tre ordini:

« 1) Contribuzione dei lavoratori occupati a favore dei disoccupati; 2) disciplina delle assunzioni e dei licenziamenti; 3) azione per la migliore e maggiore distribuzione del lavoro.

« Le contribuzioni degli operai e impiegati occupati devono essere deliberate da tutti gli organi direttivi di categoria e stabilite in misura equa, temperando la situazione dei lavoratori con i bisogni delle opere assistenziali che devono essere istituite. Per ovvie ragioni bisognerà evitare che, per consentire tali contribuzioni, si ricorra al lavoro straordinario.

« Quando, per agevolare l'assunzione e il controllo del contributo, sia ritenuto necessario stabilirlo in misura fissa e non mobile, devono essere rispettate le stesse proporzioni dette innanzi. Gli impiegati e i funzionari dei nostri uffici contribuiranno in misura doppia di quella fissata per tutti gli altri lavoratori della provincia. »

La circolare detta quindi le norme relative ai versamenti delle contribuzioni, e continua poi:

« Nelle assunzioni e nei licenziamenti bisogna tenere in grandissimo conto le condizioni del lavoratore, impedendo a tutti i costi che le famiglie leggino in cui uno solo dei membri sia al lavoro vengano private di ogni reddito. »

« La disoccupazione è sempre un male terribile, ma certo consente degli adattamenti a chi possa trovare nella propria famiglia un aiuto; sia che de-

re sordo e mortale che getta le sue radici nel fondo della storia. Il Giapponese, che si sente figlio di un paese organizzato, saldissimo e gagliardo, disprezza la Cina malata di anarchia cronica, la considera come un paese di *paria* decaduti, quelli che nella terminologia di Spengler prendono nome di *Fellahenvölker*. Il Cinese, dal canto suo, conosce le proprie condizioni, sa d'esser debole, tace, soffre, cerca l'appoggio altrui contro l'invadente minaccia del vicino. Ma in fondo alla sua abiezione sta l'orgoglio pertinace, invincibile, che gli deriva da un passato di gloria millenaria.

Stamane il comunicato della stampa inglese, che la nave intercetta su onda corta, recava i particolari del bombardamento aereo operato nella regione di Mukden. Questo suscitava i commenti del gruppo cinese.

— Chi sono i Giapponesi? — mi diceva un celestiale che rimpatria dopo soggiorno di un anno in America. — Sono dei selvaggi in veste civilizzata, sono dei prepotenti che hanno tratto profitto dalla nostra civiltà scopiazzandone tutte le forme, dall'alfabeto all'arte, alla letteratura. Oggi sfruttano l'Europa e l'America rifacendo il medesimo lavoro di plagio. Gente rifatta che sogna l'egemonia del mondo. Bisogna insegnare ai Giapponesi la creanza. Bisogna metterli a dovere!

Durante questo tragitto da Honolulu a Kobe è stato mio compagno di tavola un giovane medico laureato all'Università imperiale di Kioto, il quale ha prestato servizio sanitario in una clinica di Vancouver e ora torna al suo paese.

Egli si divertiva a motteggiare i Cinesi, come popolo imbecille e impotente a qualsiasi azione di vita mi-

impiegati, per 8.401 giornate, presso aziende e bonifiche nell'Italia settentrionale; 1924 sono stati impiegati, per 36.158 giornate, presso aziende e bonifiche nell'Italia centrale; e 2.995, per 63.346 giornate, sono stati impiegati presso aziende e bonifiche situate nell'Italia meridionale e insulare. I dati sopra riportati si riferiscono soltanto al quantitativo degli operai quale risulta dai settimanali di paga, con esclusione cioè del personale fisso delle aziende e bonifiche e di quanti vengono comunque adibiti in lavori agricoli a carattere continuativo.

il volume completo annuale dove, oltre a ora pubblicate, si trovano le vicende industriali, cave e particolari capitoli delle tecniche minerarie. Al fascicolo è una esposizione del mercato di alcuni prodotti che interessano l'Italia, mercurio, e ne fa sull'attività industriale ferro e dell'acciaio minerali metallici.

Le relazioni parlano

La nomina a ufficiale degli invalidi di guerra - I. Consiglio
 - La legge sullo stato degli ufficiali - Donazione di mater

Roma, 14 ottobre, notte.

A Palazzo Montecitorio, sotto la presidenza dell'on. Alberto de' Stefani, si è riunita nel pomeriggio di oggi la Giunta per le tariffe doganali e per i trattati di commercio. Sono stati esaminati e discussi vari disegni di legge e nominati i relatori.

Il ministro della Guerra ha presentato alla Camera vari disegni di legge, tra i quali quelli per la « nomina a sottotenente di complemento dei sottufficiali e militari di truppa mutilati e invalidi di guerra »; per la « conversione in legge del R. decreto contenente varianti e aggiunte alla legge riguardante i Consigli di disciplina » e per la « conversione in legge del R. decreto 25 giugno 1931, recante aggiunte e varianti all'art. 71 della legge sullo stato degli ufficiali ».

Sul primo disegno di legge la relazione del ministro della Guerra ricorda che le vigenti disposizioni sul reclutamento degli ufficiali dell'Esercito stabiliscono che i sottufficiali e militari in-

per tessere la sua tradizionale polemica di protesta. Oggi lo stesso segnacolo serve allo scopo contrario: diventa un titolo di ricorso alle Nazioni per garantirsi l'appoggio societario contro la minaccia di un'invasione nipponica.

Non sono passati che pochi mesi da quando alcuni gruppi scalmanati di studenti rivoluzionari inscenarono a Sciangai e a Nanchino atti di protesta contro i « diavoli bianchi » contro gli « abbominevoli uomini dell'Occidente ». Ora tutto sembra dimenticato: a quei diavoli bianchi, a quegli abbominevoli uomini, il Governo della democratica Repubblica rivolge petizione d'arbitrato. L'odio contro i vicini gialli è più forte di quello contro i bianchi lontani, perché è destino che le lotte tra fratelli siano sempre le più accanite. Il meccanismo ginevrino fa comodo agli ex-rivoluzionari xenofobi di Canton come baluardo giuridico, come scacchiera di compromesso contro la minaccia di un'avanzata giapponese sul territorio del vecchio Impero. Tra i due mali meglio il primo. Piuttosto che cadere sudditi di Tokio, meglio che restino le corazzate delle Nazioni a guardare gli sbocchi del Fiume Azzurro!

Ma il Giappone non cede. I piccolissimi tenacissimi uomini dell'Estremo Oriente seguono anche in questa manovra un loro piano di condotta politica metodico, calcolato, pertinace.

Il grande risveglio nazionale del Giappone data dal trionfo ottenuto sulla Russia. Più che l'estensione materiale del confine politico, la guerra è valsa al popolo vincitore la consapevolezza delle proprie capacità di lotta e di conquista. Sensazione di grandezza, orgoglio nazionale, coscienza di avere il destino in pu-

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
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CORRIERE DELLA SERA, Milan.
October 15, 1931.

Despatch No. 1096.

LA SITUAZIONE POLITICA IN CINA

Odio di razza gialla



A bordo del «Nagasaki».

Ogni giorno riceviamo per radio le notizie dell'acuito conflitto cino-giapponese. A bordo di questa nave viaggiano cittadini dell'una e dell'altra Nazione. Io, che ho il privilegio della neutralità, ne profitto per saggiare le opinioni delle due parti, facendo raccolta di osservazioni psicologiche.

Alla base del contrasto diplomatico sta un odio di razza, un rancore sordo e mortale che getta le sue radici nel fondo della storia. Il Giapponese, che si sente figlio di un paese organizzato, saldissimo e gagliardo, disprezza la Cina malata di anarchia cronica, la considera come un paese di paria decaduti, quelli che nella terminologia di Spengler prendono nome di *Fellahenvölker*. Il cinese, dal canto suo, conosce le proprie condizioni, sa d'esser debole, tace, soffre, cerca l'appoggio altrui contro l'invasione minacciosa del vicino. Ma in fondo alla sua abiezione sta l'orgoglio pertinace, invincibile, che gli deriva da un passato di gloria millenaria.

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Cina bandiera democratica? Dunque, signori dell'Occidente, in nome della democrazia accorrete al soccorso dell'agredito, date forza ai principi umanitari che il pontefice di Washington ha stilati in quattordici punti. C'è un fondo di tragica ironia in questo gioco diplomatico. Perché proprio dell'insegna repubblicana e democratica fino a ieri la Cina si è valsa per fronteggiare l'invasione delle Nazioni d'Europa e d'America, per tessere la sua tradizionale polemica di protesta. Oggi lo stesso segnacolo serve allo scopo contrario: diventa un titolo di ricorso alle Nazioni per garantirsi l'appoggio societario contro la minaccia di un'invasione nipponica.

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rancore collettivo possa agire sulla coscienza di queste anime chiuse e taciturne. E' una razza che rigurgita di energie silenziose ma terribili.

Credo sia del 1924 la costituzione della «Grande Società Asiatica» a Tokio per la difesa e l'incremento delle razze gialle nel mondo. Chi legga certi manifesti emanati da questo sodalizio ha l'impressione di trovarsi di fronte a programmi teorici di contenuto sentimentale. La realtà è ben diversa. Il Giappone offre protettorato, ma aspira all'egemonia. Gli scienziati fingono di far della filosofia, invece fanno della politica.

Diventare centro degli Stati Uniti d'Oriente, ecco il sogno. Creare un Impero nipponico dell'Asia, ecco la mèta. Ma resta a breve distanza il simulacro diroccato di un altro Impero asiatico a cui la tradizione storica dei millenni conferisce l'aureola di una gloria superstita che la rotta dei tempi non è riuscita a cancellare del tutto. Resta la Cina: fantasma decaduto eppure risorgente; simulacro mummificato di grandezza antica dentro al quale continua a fervere la pulsazione di una vita arcana. Ancora nel vasto orizzonte che cinge l'Oceano non è spento il fulgore millenario irradiato dal Figlio del Cielo. Si ricorda che fino alla vigilia della catastrofe la Cina fu faro di civiltà sull'Estremo Oriente.

Gli scienziati di Tokio che hanno offerto con giusto orgoglio l'appoggio del loro nome agli statuti della «Grande Società Asiatica» non possono ignorare la storia. Sanno che la cronologia delle prime dinastie giapponesi è una falsificazione arbitraria. Sanno che il primato nel tempo spetta a Pechino. Di là infatti sono giunti i germi animatori della civiltà,

i monumenti delle lettere, i simboli della religione, le forme dell'arte, i numeri della scienza astrale. Sorda gelosia li coglie: gelosia del passato che consacra la gloria del nemico. I Giapponesi sentono d'essere spiritualmente figli della Cina. Oggi ancora l'antica madre prostrata al suolo rivendica tacitamente il suo diritto.

Ho letto il riassunto di un lavoro recente che si deve a un giovane filologo cinese. Esaminando a paragone delle altre formazioni linguistiche la struttura del patrio idioma egli esce in un'affermazione di implacabile orgoglio, e rivendica alla Cina un indistruttibile primato spirituale nei confronti di tutti i popoli del mondo. Pagine che ricordano le infatuazioni nazionalistiche di Fichte, il quale, al tempo della prostrazione napoleonica, rivendicava alla patria tedesca un fatale destino di supremazia, deducendolo dall'esame degli spiriti che animano l'idioma nativo. Fantasie d'eruditi! Ciò non toglie che siano documenti di uno stato d'animo. Per capire la realtà bisogna tenerne conto. Lo stato d'animo è uno dei massimi coefficienti di storia.

Il Giappone in un primo tempo ha favorito il moto rivoluzionario di Canton. Forse a Tokio si sperava che rivoluzione e repubblica significassero fine della Cina, sfacimento della Grande Muraglia. Speranza delusa! La Cina dissolta nell'anarchia si rivelò come la melma dei Laghi Malsuri: terra imprendibile. L'invasore che tenta di avanzare affonda nel pantano e resta prigioniero.

Poi la nuova Repubblica, per uno di quei paradossi macabri e grotteschi di cui è irta la storia politica

del mondo, fu attratta nell'orbita della Guerra mondiale. Il Giappone contrastò l'entrata perché prevedeva il rischio a proprio danno. Ma fu inutile.

Terminata la guerra, la Cina si sentì più forte: alzò la testa contro le Nazioni; fu invitata a Versailles e a Washington. I *coolies* di Sciangai sedettero a tavola d'onore a fianco dei diplomatici europei e americani. I Giapponesi videro e dovettero tacere. Ma prepararono la vendetta. Contro la Cina sferrarono anzitutto una campagna di conquista economica. La popolazione nipponica, esplodendo per la propria inesaurita vitalità dalle rive dell'arcipelago e dai confini della Corea, ha invaso, nel volgere di pochi anni, coi suoi traffici, coi suoi commerci, con le sue installazioni industriali, i territori del vicino. Oggi chi ridiscende dal confine russo verso la penisola coreana lungo il nastro della tanto contrastata linea ferroviaria ha la sensazione diretta visibile di questo immenso esodo etnico. Mezzo Giappone è trapiantato in terra cinese. Situazione delicatissima. Attrito di frontiera.

Tokio grida a Nanchino: «Se non rispetti i miei sudditi come è tuo dovere, sparo e massacro i tuoi giapponesi».

Nanchino, che ha già imparato le vie diplomatiche dell'Occidente, gira la cambiale a Ginevra:

— Siamo aggrediti. Se i principi della democrazia internazionale suggeriti nel congegno societario hanno da dimostrare la loro realtà, questo è il momento, questa è la prova. Signori Europei, evitate la guerra! Partita giocata bene.

V. Beonio-Brocchieri

POPOLO D'ITALIA, Milan.
October 14, 1931.

Despatch No. 109

Contrasti asiatici

Si è sempre detto che il fattore demografico giapponese è stato elemento importante della politica di quell'impero. Sessantaquattro milioni e mezzo d'abitanti su di una superficie di 381 mila kmq., cioè, 168 per chilometro quadrato. Però, il giapponese, malgrado il forte spirito d'iniziativa, non ama d'emigrare copiosamente all'estero. Si crede generalmente il contrario, ma nel 1928 i giapponesi all'estero erano solo 709 mila, di cui 292 mila in Asia, 267 mila in America e 146 mila in Oceania. Bisogna dedurre che l'espansione giapponese ha radici profondamente politiche.

La storia recentissima di essa si sintetizza in due guerre: quella cino-nipponica del 1894-95 e quella russo-nipponica d'un decennio appresso; ed in conquiste che si chiamano la Corea (229 mila chilometri quadrati e 21 milioni di abitanti), l'isola di Formosa (35 mila chilometri quadrati e 4 milioni di abitanti), e la parte meridionale dell'isola di Sakalin (36 mila chilometri quadrati e 295 mila abitanti). Adesso, possiede anche le isole Caroline, Marianne e altre sotto mandato, ed è insediato nel Kuang-Tung, in Manciuria, all'estremità meridionale (3500 chilometri quadrati ed un milione e 300 mila abitanti). Piccolo territorio, ma che comprende Porto Arturo grande fortezza navale, e Dairen, ora città di 200 mila abitanti, divenuta il primo porto mercantile di tutta la Manciuria, che ha già battuta la concorrenza con Vladivostok. Inoltre, è in mani giapponesi la zona delle ferrovie sud-manciariane che comprende le principali comunicazioni con Mukden e la Corea, con dodici chilometri di terreno per ciascun lato dei binari, e per una lunghezza di 1112 chilometri.

Malgrado la Manciuria faccia parte, almeno nominalmente, dello Stato Cinese, l'autorità di questo è stata sempre compromessa. I dittatori cinesi non l'hanno aumentata. D'altronde, i mancesi sono scarsissimi, appena un milione, e si lasciarono assimilare dai contadini cinesi. Questa grande regione, di quasi novemila chilometri quadrati, fra la più fertile dell'Estremo Oriente, sarebbe rimasta quasi deserta se la Russia, dopo la guerra cino-giapponese, favorita dalla Cina che sperava contrapporsi al Giappone, non avesse compiuta la sua realizzazione imperialistica, anche con la costruzione della doppia ferrovia transmanciuriana, fino a Vladivostok al Nord, e fino a Porto Arturo, al Sud. Un'immigrazione cinese, quasi automatica, si sviluppò proprio ai margini delle nuove linee ferroviarie; venne iniziata la coltivazione dei terreni e furono rinnovate, o create, città. Così, di pari passo con l'affermazione politica ed economica russa, si sviluppò la penetrazione demografica cinese.

Dopo la vittoria sulla Russia, il Giappone intensificò la sua penetrazione economica e politica in Manciuria; non come zona di popolamento, giacché i giapponesi sono appena 130 mila circa, ma come zona

deve tenere molto da conto, il proprio commercio d'esportazione che gli rappresenta il sessanta per cento della produzione totale; e l'87 per cento della seta giapponese va venduta agli Stati Uniti.

Dopo degli Stati Uniti, il miglior cliente del Giappone è la Cina; ed anche nei traffici con questa la bilancia commerciale era in notevole vantaggio del Giappone. Senonché, il boicottaggio attuale anti-giapponese, intenso e violento, non è cosa da poco; va a vantaggio del commercio nord-americano; e, in parte, anche russo. Poiché la Russia, la quale non ha molto a sperare dai traffici col Giappone che quasi si equivalgono nel dare e nell'avere, ha sempre considerato non solo la Manciuria, ma buona parte della Cina come probabili clienti dell'oggi, e sicuri clienti del domani: dove sfocierebbero, altrimenti, le produzioni russe progettate ed iniziate? Ma al piano quinquennale russo ha fatto riscontro ora un altro piano cinese, analogo negli scopi. Ove s'effettuasse la realizzazione parziale di esso, le contra-

stanti concorrenze dei traffici aggroviglieranno tutte le difficoltà politiche, già più o meno croniche, acute a causa della Manciuria alla quale taluno profetizza un avvenire come quello che valorizzò l'Ovest nord-americano.

Essa, trent'anni fa non aveva ferrovie, ora ne ha circa ottomila chilometri; e, pare, quasi milioni in cifra tonda di ettari fertili coltivabili. Dal grano al cotone, dalle foreste al carbone; dagli idrati bituminosi, cioè dal petrolio, al ferro ed all'oro, abbonda di tutto. Dodici milioni di cinesi immigrati l'anno scorso, vi si recarono quasi mezzo milione all'anno) che naturalmente sono e contro la Russia. Contro il Giappone, hanno veramente desiderio di costituirsi in Stato autonomo, come non sarebbe sgradito al Giappone che meno difficilmente potrebbe, così estendere ed intensificare la sua diretta influenza?

D'altra parte, la Russia, la quale non conobbe, nel passato, il regime del diritto che è limitazione degli appetiti, e che ne esagera la distanza in linea d'aria di 6 mila chilometri da Mosca a Vladivostok, come immaginarsi Roma che avesse un porto orientale mille chilometri più in là di Calcutta) quali azioni od accomodamenti potrebbe proporre al

Giappone o viceversa? E gli Stati Uniti, che si ripromettono affari e vantaggi nella Russia e grossi traffici in Cina, armi e proiettili compresi, e che del Giappone credono di conoscere progetti poco meno che catastrofici anche nel Pacifico, sarebbero i più attenti come intermediari?

Nè il Giappone può dimenticare che, quando nel 1895, pel trattato di Simonosaki con la Cina, ebbe anche Porto Arturo, fu obbligato dall'Europa a restituire quella preziosa conquista di terraferma che, viceversa, divenne preda russa tre anni dopo, ratificata dalla Cina medesima. Finché, dopo la vittoria nipponica sulla Russia, Porto Arturo tornò al Giappone.

Problemi gravi, adunque; connessi a situazioni delicatissime. Ma il Giappone, che ha già accaparrati i due terzi del commercio estero della Manciuria e che non vuole rinunciare alla gigantesca impresa della industrializzazione di questa approfittando dei bassi prezzi della mano d'opera e dell'abbondanza delle materie prime, saprà, in un modo o nell'altro, mantenere la sua posizione economica e sviluppare quell'epoca tenacissima di penetrazione per la quale non gli sono state di troppo due guerre e due grandi vittorie.

Battista Pellegrini

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
NOV 11 1931
ASSTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

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LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Riga, Latvia.
OCT 16 1931
DIV. COM. & REC.

October 16, 1931.

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Department of State

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No. 8156

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit herewith further translations from the Moscow PRAVDA of current references to the action of Japan in Manchuria. The other Soviet newspapers have contributed nothing noteworthy to the discussion during the last week.

1/ The PRAVDA'S "own information," given Berlin,

October 4

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-2-

October 4 date-line, but charged indirectly to Tokyo, included an appeal from the Japanese Communist Party to the workmen, peasants, soldiers and sailors of Japan, in the usual Communist International style.

2/ Editorial comment on a TASS telegram dated Peiping, October 4, directed attention to the gravity of the news that the Japanese are pushing the completion of the Kirin-Hoiren railway.

3/ 'In editorial comment on a TASS telegram dated Tokyo, October 6, the protest of the Japanese Government against "the present anti-Japanese movement in China," and warning that neglect on the part of the Chinese Government to check it will force the Japanese Government "to adopt effective measures for the protection of Japanese residents in China," is described as a "ferocious note."

4/ On October 9 the Telegram Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS) cabled from Tokyo seven points of a resolution said to have been taken by the Japanese military authorities in regard to terms of negotiation with a future government in Manchuria.

Respectfully yours,

For the Minister:

Felix Cole

Felix Cole,
Counselor of Legation.

Enclosures:

-3-

✓
Enclosures:

- 1/ The Toilers in China and Japan have
one Common Enemy, and that Enemy is -
the Bourgeoisie, Militarism, and Imperial-
ism!
(Moscow PRAVDA, No. 276, October 6, 1931.)
- 2/ Japan makes Haste to Complete the Con-
struction of the Kirin-Hoiren Railway.
(Moscow PRAVDA, No. 276, October 6, 1931.)
- 3/ The Kuomintang Hangmen on their Knees
before Japan.
(Moscow PRAVDA, No. 278, October 8, 1931.)
- 4/ The Ultimatum of the Military Clique.
(Moscow PRAVDA, No. 280, October 10, 1931.)

(In quadruplicate.)

Copy to E.I.C., Paris.

Copy to E.I.C., Paris, for Peiping.

Copy to E.I.C., Paris, for Tokyo.

Copy to American Consul, Harbin, via Department.

710 R - Japan-China.
(800 R - Japan.)

DBM/rk

ENCLOSURE NO. 1 TO DESPATCH NO. 0100 OF OCT 16 1931
FROM THE LEGATION AT RIGA, LATVIA.

SOURCE: Moscow PRAVDA,
No. 276,
October 6, 1931.
(Front page).

THE TOILERS IN CHINA AND JAPAN HAVE ONE
COMMON ENEMY, AND THAT ENEMY IS - THE
BOURGEOISIE, MILITARISM, AND IMPERIALISM!

Proclamation of the Central Committee of
the Japanese Communist Party.

(Translation)

Berlin, October 4. (The PRAVDA's own information.)
According to information received here from Tokyo, the
Central Committee of the Japanese Communist Party, on
September 22, in connection with the opening of military
operations in Manchuria, addressed an appeal to the
workmen, peasants, soldiers, and seamen of Japan.

In the proclamation it is said: "The imperialistic
war in Manchuria has been started after careful prepara-
tions at the initiative of the Japanese army.

"Workmen, peasants, and soldiers! The Japanese
bourgeoisie has taken the first step towards the occupa-
tion of the whole of Manchuria. This was by no means
an act of "self-defense," or an "unforeseen incident."
Japan's action is a challenge thrown by Japanese imperial-
ism to the Japanese and the Chinese proletariat, and
to the masses of toilers, and also to the masses of
toilers in the U.S.S.R. The occupation of Manchuria
is a carefully prepared step of relentless robbers and
hateful murderers. Even if the conflict will be

"settled"

ENCLOSURE NO. 1 TO DESPATCH NO. 0100 OF OCT 16 1931
FROM THE LEGATION AT RIGA, LATVIA.

SOURCE: Moscow PRAVDA,
No. 276,
October 6, 1931.
(Front page).

THE TOILERS IN CHINA AND JAPAN HAVE ONE
COMMON ENEMY, AND THAT ENEMY IS - THE
BOURGEOISIE, MILITARISM, AND IMPERIALISM!

Proclamation of the Central Committee of
the Japanese Communist Party.

(Translation)

Berlin, October 4. (The PRAVDA's own information.)
According to information received here from Tokyo, the
Central Committee of the Japanese Communist Party, on
September 22, in connection with the opening of military
operations in Manchuria, addressed an appeal to the
workmen, peasants, soldiers, and seamen of Japan.

In the proclamation it is said: "The imperialistic
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toilers in the U.S.S.R. The occupation of Manchuria
is a carefully prepared step of relentless robbers and
hateful murderers. Even if the conflict will be

"settled"

-2-

"settled" by coming to an understanding with the counter-revolutionary Nanking Government, the proletarians of the Far East will never forget this crime.

"Comrades and friends! The Japanese bourgeoisie is facing ruin in consequence of the unparalleled economic crisis. The bourgeoisie seeks a way out of this crisis at the price of the blood of broad strata of the toilers.

"Workmen! War will bring you more cruel exploitation to satisfy the whims and the fancies of the militarists -- bullets and bleeding wounds.

"Exploited and oppressed comrades! The bourgeoisie and the squires have deprived you of bread, of land, and of liberty. War for the interests of the bourgeoisie and the squires will lead you to new starvation and exploitation, and ultimately to perdition. Comrades! Do you mean to go shoulder to shoulder with that bunch of bankrupt capitalists to your doom, or do you prefer to throw off the yoke of capitalism, and to assure the victory of your own class? You must prepare for war against war. Use the arms which were forced into your hands only in conformity with the requirements of class struggle against capitalism. The day is approaching when you will rush in a heroic attack upon the bourgeoisie and the squires, against the murderers and parasites!

"Labor representatives in war industry and in the transport service! Let not as much as a single soldier be entrained for the front with your assistance; stop
the

-3-

the machines that make bullets, rifles, and swords.

"Workmen, toilers, peasants and unemployed! Unite in the conduct of the anti-war strike. Join hands with the Chinese proletariat!

"Workmen, peasants, and soldiers! Rise up, together with the workmen, peasants, and soldiers of China, for joint struggle! Display class solidarity. Struggle for the immediate evacuation of Mukden and of all other districts occupied by the imperialistic troops, and for the immediate withdrawal of all Japanese soldiers from Manchuria and from the whole of China. Do not permit a single soldier being sent to China, to the front. Struggle against the imperialism of Japan and all its military operations directed against revolutionary China. Struggle against the renewed menace of imperialistic war, for the defense of revolutionary China, for assistance to the Chinese red army, and for the defense of the U.S.S.R.

"Down with imperialistic Japan!

"Long live Soviet Japan!

"The proclamation has been printed and spread in the shape of leaflets."

js/hs

ENCLOSURE NO. 2 TO DESPATCH NO. 8166 OF OCT 16 1931
FROM THE LEGATION AT RIGA, LATVIA.

SOURCE: Moscow PRAVDA,
No. 276,
October 6, 1931.
(Front page.)

JAPAN MAKES HASTE TO COMPLETE THE CONSTRUCTION
OF THE KIRIN-HOIREN RAILWAY.

(Translation.)

Peiping, October 4. (TASS.) Harbin newspapers report that Japan, with the aid of its units of military engineers, pushes the completion of the Kirin-Hoiren railway. It is proposed to complete this railway in three months, 20 million yen having been assigned for this purpose, while building materials are supplied by the administration of the Southern Manchurian railway. At the same time, the narrow-gauge border railway Tsingtao-Hoiren is made over into a broad-gauge railway.

* *
*

The report to the effect that the Kirin-Hoiren railway is being completed with the aid of Japanese military engineering units deserves closest attention. The endeavors of the Japanese militarists to build this railway, and the stubborn refusal of the Chinese authorities to give their consent to this, have played not the least role in the events now going on in Manchuria.

The Kirin-Hoiren railway is of great importance in the matter of strengthening Japanese rule in
Manchuria

-2-

Manchuria. What is in reality the principal station of that railway is in Korea, near the port of Sieng-ohin. From there the railway (already completed) goes to Hoiren (in Korea), and further, on Chinese territory, to Changohun-Taonan-Solun. Thus a trunk-line is created which runs parallel to the Chinese Eastern Railway.

But the principal importance of the Kirin-Hoiren railway lies in those tremendous strategical advantages that will be in the hands of Japan after the construction of the railway has been completed. The entire border zone in the northern part of Manchuria will be within the sphere of influence of that railway. The valley of the Sungari River will be in the hands of the Japanese invaders.

The completion of the Kirin-Hoiren railway is therefore a manifestation, on the largest scale, of the predatory aims of Japanese imperialism in Manchuria.

js/fk

ENCLOSURE NO. 3 TO DESPATCH NO. 8156 OF OCT 16 1931
FROM THE LEGATION AT RIGA, LATVIA.

SOURCE: Moscow PRAVDA,
No. 278,
October 8, 1931.
(Front page).

THE KUOMINTANG HANGMEN ON THEIR KNEES BEFORE
JAPAN.

(Translation)

Direct threats.

Tokyo, October 6. (TASS.) The Simbun Rengo agency reports that the Japanese Government has instructed the Minister for Foreign Affairs, ^RSidehara, to direct in the note of protest addressed to the Nanking Government the attention of Nanking to the following subjects:

1) The present anti-Japanese movement in China is tantamount to an attempt at a de facto breaking off of diplomatic relations.

2) The Nanking Government must therefore exercise stricter control over the anti-Japanese agitation.

3) In the event the Nanking Government will, as heretofore, avoid checking* the anti-Japanese movement, or if it will encourage it, the Japanese residents will be in great jeopardy, and in this case Japan will be compelled to adopt effective measures for the protection of Japanese residents in China.

* *
*

Japanese

* literally: controlling.

-2-

Japanese imperialism is now busy fortifying its newly conquered position in the north of China. At the same time, Japanese imperialism is very embarrassed on account of the events taking place in Central China, which are a menace to the Japanese position.

The seizure of Manchuria could not but cause a huge wave of indignation and protest throughout the whole of China. Notwithstanding the efforts of the Kuomintang hangmen and of the generals' clique to suppress the anti-Japanese manifestations, and notwithstanding their attempts to prevent the masses of toilers from manifestations against the imperialists and, at the same time, against the Kuomintang, the national movement in Central China has already caused tremendous losses to Japanese exports, shipping, to the enterprises of Japanese capitalists in China, etc.

The Chinese markets are of colossal importance to Japanese industry. China absorbs about 30 per cent of all Japanese exports. The Chinese markets are now of particular importance in connection with the crisis which, as is well known, has accelerated also the seizure of Manchuria. In Tokyo they know very well that the ousting of Japanese goods from the Chinese markets leads automatically to these markets being seized by other imperialistic Powers, and more particularly by England. While Cecil in Geneva was supporting the occupation by Japan, the less notable Manchester manufacturers took advantage of the anti-Japanese movement

for

-3-

for increasing their exports to China, and taking the place of the Japanese importers. In the textile districts of England a certain revival may be noticed in connection with the increase of transactions with Chinese firms.

In the capitalistic world it is difficult to distinguish an "ally" from an enemy.

The Japanese Government also bears in mind that the further broadening of the anti-Japanese movement will be pregnant with still greater consequence, namely, the increased importation of American goods. That is why the recent steps taken by the Tokyo diplomats are so closely connected with the despatch of fresh naval squadrons to, and landing troopsⁱⁿ, central China.

Japanese imperialism threatens to extend the zone of its occupation! Japanese imperialism is dissatisfied with the groups that are boycotting Japanese goods! Japanese imperialism considers this a highly illegal attitude! According to the old imperialistic logic, China can be only an object of robbery, and this will always be legal. But when China attempts to defend itself, and thereby meddles with the interests of the imperialists, this is a crime. In truth, this is a fine example of capitalistic "International Law."

The ferocious note of the Japanese Government sent to Nanking has caused much alarm in the governing clique. The Kuomintang is prepared to make all and any concessions. It already is down on its knees before

Japanese

-4-

Japanese imperialism. The Japanese guns are trained on Shanghai, and the Nanking Government dares not think of showing resistance to the imperialists. But all the clearer we hear the powerful voice of the masses of toilers that are rising up for struggle against the imperialistic robbers and the Kuomintang.

js/hs

ENCLOSURE NO. 4 TO DESPATCH NO. 5100 OF OCT 16 1931
FROM THE LEGATION AT RIGA, LATVIA.

SOURCE: Moscow PRAVDA,
No. 280, p.1,
October 10, 1931.

THE ULTIMATUM OF THE MILITARY CLIQUE.

(Translation)

Tokyo, October 9. (TASS.) Today's newspapers report that yesterday, at the conference of representatives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and of the General Staff, it was decided to start negotiations about settling the Manchurian problem with any government that may be created in Manchuria. The newspapers further report that at the conference of the three highest military leaders — the Minister for War, the Chief of the General Staff, and the Chief of the Higher Military Training Institutions — the following resolution was adopted:

1. The principal condition for settling the Manchurian incident is that China recognizes its responsibility for the events.
2. The question of railway construction and of long-term lease must be solved immediately at any cost, the settlement of the remaining questions may be postponed.
3. Japan must not conduct any negotiations about the Manchurian problem with any central government of China, whatsoever. However, since there is at present no lawful government in Manchuria, with which negotiations may be conducted, Japan must wait until such a government

is

-2-

is created.

4. As soon as a government is created that is capable of assuring good order in Manchuria, the Japanese troops will be evacuated from the occupied districts. Pending this, the Japanese troops must remain in their present positions.

5. In the event that the Nanking Government fails to respond with sincerity to the memorandum of the Japanese Government (concerning the termination of the anti-Japanese movement), the Japanese Government must send another note of protest, stating that it will adopt measures of self defense. The Japanese Government must demand that the fostering of anti-Japanese sentiment at the schools be discontinued.


6. The Japanese Government will take steps to explain to the Council of the League of Nations the situation that has come about. If the Council of the League of Nations tries to interfere in the Japanese-Chinese affairs, and more especially in the local dispute literally: question concerning Manchuria, Japan must adopt measures to compel the Council of the League of Nations to see clearly in this matter.

7. In view of the special conditions prevailing in China, Japan must claim for itself freedom of action.




js/hs



No. 2289



OCT 28 31



793.94/2379

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to forward herewith translations of two editorials by William Martin appearing in the JOURNAL DE GENEVE on October 16 and 18 respectively. Both of these editorials deal with the general subject of United States collaboration with the League of Nations in the present exceptional circumstances.

It is unnecessary to remind the Department that William Martin is a political writer of exceptional perception and that his editorial opinion is very widely read and accepted in Europe.

Respectfully yours,

Two enclosures,
as stated.

Wittthrop S. Greene
Charge d'Affaires A.I.

FILED

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note to
580 C601
7/11/31 and 1/1/31

JOURNAL DE GENEVE

October 16, 1931

(Translation)

The news that the Government of the United States was ready to take part in the deliberations of the Council of the League of Nations if invited to do so was communicated to the press at Washington twenty-four hours before the Council itself had deliberated the question. It is as much as to say that this decision was entirely spontaneous and inspired by American interests.

The adversaries of the League of Nations in Europe will not fail to say that the League crawled at the feet of the United States, and that if it succeeds in putting a stop to the war in Manchuria, it will be thanks to America, which could have accomplished the task quite as effectively alone. This theory has only one fault, that it is radically false and contrary to fact.

The truth, as it will disclose itself to the eyes of all impartial observers, is the following: In 1919 the Americans created the League of Nations; in 1920 they believed that they could kill it merely by leaving it. It has lived without them. At that time the Americans thought that the League of Nations was good enough for Europe, but that it did not interest them. Then they perceived that in many domains they were running up against the League, and that their national necessities were obliging them to collaborate with it. Bah! they said among themselves, the day when we shall

want

- 2 -

want to enter, they will be only too glad to welcome us, the door will be wide open.

Now a serious affair arises in the Far East, in the region where America has most important interests. The Americans comprehend at once that it is to their interest to collaborate with the other nations; they rap at the door of the League of Nations, and before letting them enter, the permission of the Japanese must be asked! The lesson is a little severe for American pride and one can be sure that it will be understood. What is going on now proves perfectly simply that it is impossible for a great Power with world interests to remain outside the League of Nations, and that it is not worth of this Power, in the end, to participate by half measures.

The United States cannot tolerate that Japan should install itself in Manchuria; still less can it abandon the Chinese to their unhappy fate. On the other hand, if it acts alone in this affair, the American Government runs the greatest risks, whether it fails or whether it succeeds. If Japan resists, it means perhaps war, at the most inopportune moment and in the worst conditions. If Japan cedes, it means that a deep rancour comes to poison a little more the already heavily charged atmosphere called, perhaps derisively, the Pacific.

The United States has therefore a great interest in acting and a no less great interest in not acting alone.

- 3 -

alone. There is precisely the possibility offered by the League of Nations; the League gives America the guarantee that all démarches and, if it is necessary to go that far, all sanctions, would be taken in common. The existence of the League of Nations constitutes for America, in these circumstances, an unlooked for piece of good fortune; Geneva offers the solution of its difficult problem.

As for the League of Nations, its interest and its attitude have been, from the beginning, perfectly clear. The collaboration of the United States has always, in all matters been desired, and when it was offered, accepted with gratitude. It has always been considered at Geneva that the peace of the world and the security of nations would be entirely assured only on that day when they would be assured jointly by the League of Nations and by the United States. The first grave situation which presents itself proves how correct this view was.

Nothing has ever been done to force the entry of the United States into the League of Nations. It has always been believed that one day it would necessarily occur, but that the League could wait as long as might be necessary. By way of compensation, close collaboration on all bases acceptable to the Americans has been unremittingly sought after. Today, the League of Nations maintains the same attitude. If this form of collaboration is that desired by the Americans-- "all right". If at a future date the Americans believe

that

- 4 -

that a closer form of collaboration would conform still more to their interests and their dignity, that will be even better.

For the moment, the only thing which matters is that collaboration between Geneva and Washington is established. From the beginning of the Sino-Japanese conflict, contact has been made between the League and the United States. But this contact began by acting as a brake. The Americans were very preoccupied with doing nothing which might embarrass Baron Shidehara and this was one of the reasons for the apparent weakness of the Council in September. Today, the participation of an American Delegate--even observer, which, in practice, makes no difference--in the work of the Council will permit complete harmonization of action of the two powers. One can say without fear of exaggeration that this solves the Manchurian question. One cannot imagine that the Japanese military party is mad enough to close its eyes to so apparent a reality. If such were the case, so much the worse for them.

The deductions of the wicked are always false. The Japanese militarists certainly considered themselves profoundly clever politicians in loosing a war at the moment when China was flooded and when Europe and America were struggling in inextricable economic difficulties. And, it was precisely this unhappy state of affairs which drew Europeans and Americans

together

- 5 -

together and which rendered possible the establishment of this united front, without which efficacious action by the League of Nations would doubtless have been difficult.

To the same degree that sanctions without the United States and risking to conflict with the United States would have been dangerous, these sanctions become conceivable when the American and the British fleets are called to collaborate in them. Certainly we do not desire sanctions, for they are again a form of war, or in other words, an abominable thing. We hope that Jupiter will not blind the Japanese, But anything is better than that the Japanese should remain in Manchuria. It is noteworthy that, for the first time since the creation of the League of Nations, one begins to speak of the possibility of applying Article 16. It needed only the end of the dualism between the United States and the League of Nations to effect that.

The importance of this collaboration is thus at present considerable; it is perhaps still more so for the future. For it proves that in case of a grave world danger, the united front of the pacific nations establishes itself spontaneously. We have always believed it, and events confirm our belief. Certain persons feared that the Kellogg Pact would interfere with the exercise of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The contrary is true. They complement and reinforce

one

- 6 -

one another. And one watches this interesting spectacle of the United States being invited to the Council table as a signatory of the Kellogg Pact, and itself renouncing the possibility of invoking this Pact to avoid creating a duality of powers. The collaboration is thus touching--as cordial, confident and complete as one can imagine.

How will one still, after that, claim that the security of pacific nations remains precarious?

WILLIAM MARTIN

JOURNAL DE GENEVE

October 18, 1931

The Explanation of the Gesture of the United States

The Council meeting Friday evening, during which the representative of the United States was so warmly welcomed by his new colleagues, is the termination of a long evolution. We may be permitted, at this time, to recall briefly the various stages.

The League of Nations is an American creation. The American people fought the war to assure to the world a perpetual peace, and President Wilson, in coming to Europe, wished to realize the ideals of his people. It is not he who worded the Covenant, but it was drawn up in conformity with his ideology and it is he who demanded its insertion in the peace treaties--without which we should still be awaiting the realization of this ideal. It is thus to America and to America's great President that the League of Nations owes its existence.

There follows the rejection of the Treaty of Versailles by the Senate. At that time there was a wave of reaction against the idealism which had been abused during the war to the point of nausea. Party politics had recovered all its powers and the American people, rich, prosperous, was living in a sentiment of self satisfaction of a sort to give it an exaggerated idea of its strength and its independence of other nations.

The period which followed, from 1920 to 1924, was characterized by the public hostility of the United States against Geneva. The Department of State failed

to

- 2 -

to reply to the letters of the Secretary General; by its diplomacy, it contradicted everywhere the activities of the League and the Conference of Washington was called, in 1921, to illustrate to the world that real, practical work for peace was being accomplished outside the League.

Genuine isolation of a single nation is so impossible in the world today that the absence of the United States has exercised on the League of Nations an influence almost as great as its presence would have had. If the statesmen of Europe had believed at that time that the separation of the United States was definite, perhaps they would have let the League of Nations fall, as several of them were not enthusiastic about it. But they believed that it was a passing mood and thought that the League must be supported against the day when the United States would demand an account of it from the rest of the world.

That is why the League of Nations, weakened politically by the absence of the United States, threw itself back upon technical activities. And these activities have provided so agreeable a life that they have given to the League the will to live. The year 1924 marks, in its attitude toward America, a decisive turning point. Up to then, the League of Nations had only one idea--to appear small, modest; to avoid startling America, in order to facilitate its return. To this end every article of the Covenant was restrictively

interpreted

- 3 -

interpreted, one after the other, and it tried to deprive articles 10 and 16, and still others, of their meaning.

In 1924, a brusque change. The League of Nations came to understand that the absence of the United States would be prolonged, and to understand at the same time that it could live without the United States. Then it was that the Protocol of Geneva was adopted, which reinforced all the articles of the Covenant which until then an attempt had been made to vitiate.

An equal change took place at the same time in the attitude of the Americans. They had believed that their absence would kill the League, and they now perceived that it was living without them. They then took the attitude of considering it as a fact--a European fact--and of collaborating with it. This collaboration at first had a personal character and was officially ignored by the Department of State. Little by little, letters and documents were exchanged, then observers were sent, and finally real delegates. At the beginning, it concerned only certain humanitarian activities, such as the fight against opium, questions of hygiene, and so on. Later, America ventured as far as the technical organizations, and finally, under their relation to disarmament, as far as activities clearly political.

This collaboration is so much the development over a period of years that it would today be impossible to give statistics about it. It has been favored by two facts; the first is that the League of Nations has lost, in the eyes of the United States, its character of a "party issue" which it had in

- 4 -

1920. Many Democrats have dissociated themselves with it and many Republicans have rallied to its support. The number of the latter has increased measurably by the return to idealism which may be observed in the United States. After the materialistic period, psychologically explicable, of the post-war era, the Americans have ended by recovering their real nature. And they have become ashamed of having crossed their arms and having watched the other nations work for peace.

Then it was that two great pacifist movements began to develop in the United States. One, "Pro-League", bent its efforts primarily to bringing the United States closer to the Permanent Court of International Justice. The other, more "Anti-League", gave as its motto the "outlawry of war"--the putting outside the law of war. Neither of these two movements succeeded completely. But both contributed to the formation of a pacifist public opinion and when in 1928 they took common stand, they obtained very quickly, by uniting their efforts, an immense result--the Kellogg Pact.

From this moment on, close collaboration between the United States and the League of Nations was only a question of time and occasion. It was certain that in case of grave conflict, America would not be able to proceed in opposition to the efforts of the League of Nations and it would probably be to her interest to associate herself with them. But it was still

possible

- 5 -

possible to see that American public opinion was not yet fully awake to this.

Then came the economic crisis. Misfortune serves some useful purpose. The misery of all nations made them understand, and in particular made the Americans understand, the necessity for unity. The dogma of isolation, of economic independence, of self-sufficiency, which is often nothing more than plenty, was shaken. Reverses made the American people understand the necessity for economic and financial collaboration. Since there can be no collaboration without security and without disarmament, these reverses made them understand at once the necessity of aiding Europe and the necessity of doing something for disarmament in the domain of security.

This moral evolution, which goes far beyond what might have been hoped for and expected at the time when the admission of the United States to the World Court was mentioned without result, took definite form during the September Assembly. An American Delegate was seen to take a seat at the Third Commission, and the Government at Washington was seen to envisage seriously the possibility of participation in the guarantee of European security.

At this moment, on the eve of the Disarmament Conference, the Sino-Japanese incident arose, in a part of the globe where the United States has primary interests and where moreover the question of the

Monroe

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 6 -

Monroe Doctrine does not enter,--at a moment when the American people was more ready than ever to admit to a close and official collaboration with the League of Nations. Providential coincidences for the peace of the world!

WILLIAM MARTIN

128F

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Department of State

Washington,
 October 28, 1931.

5 pm

AMERICAN CONSUL

GENEVA (SWITZERLAND)

This telegram is confidential.
 It should be handled as such and should not be
 being communicated to anyone.

120 Reference first paragraph, Department's 119,
 October 27, 7 p.m.

793.94/2333

The following information is based on a report
 from Manchuria despatched and received on October 27:

One. Physical evidence of the immediate evacuation
 of the Japanese military from occupied areas is lacking.
 Barracks, offices, railway buildings, aviation fields
 and hangars are being reconditioned for winter occupancy.
 No efforts are being made to hide these activities.
 The Japanese have control of local government organs
 through Japanese advisers. At Kirin there is the best
 evidence of plans for permanent occupancy.

Two. There is much Japanese propaganda and the
 Chinese press is completely muzzled against this. The
 Japanese Consulate and military authorities are lacking
 in unanimity of viewpoint but they cooperate. Japan
 apparently intends to consolidate position in regard to
 the Manchurian railways by using argument of unpaid
 loans to obtain best settlement. Both sides apprehensive

Enciphered by _____ of
 Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

793.94/2379A

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Department of State

Washington,

- 2 -

of increased bandit activities. The Soviet Government is apprehensive of Japanese activities in Tsitsihar and Taonan areas and concentration of Soviet troops at Manchuli is reported.

Three. Department is sending you by mail information based on three reports of earlier recent dates.

Stinson
Smith

CE ✓
 Oct 28 1944
mm

SA
 FE:JEJ/VDM

RAM
 FE:m.m.W

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 60.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1939 1-126

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

October 28 1931.

Prentiss B. Gilbert, Esquire,
 American Consul,
 Geneva, Switzerland.

Sir:

There are enclosed herewith three summaries of
 information in regard to conditions in Manchuria,
 based on recent reports from that area, which you
 may give to Sir Eric Drummond, under the same con-
 ditions as to confidence as similar information
 telegraphed to you by the Department on various
 occasions for communication to him.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

W. R. CASTLE, JR.


Enclosures:
 Three summaries,
 in duplicate.

793.94/

FE-513/VDM

10/27/31
 Oct. 28 1931.

RAM
 FE 24.11.11



793.94/2379B

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

SUMMARY NUMBER ONE.

General Summary of the Situation in Manchuria from September 18 to October 20, 1931. Based on a Summary Despatched from Manchuria on October 20, 1931, and Received by the Department on October 22, 1931.

The first clash between the Chinese and Japanese took place on September 18, between 10 and 11 p.m., just outside of Mukden. Four companies (600 men) of the Japanese independent railway garrison at Mukden on September 19 attacked the north barracks and drove away 10,000 troops stationed there. At the same time a Japanese Regiment (six companies) stationed in the Japanese Concession at Mukden attacked the Chinese troops inside and outside the city and before the day was over Mukden was in the hands of the Japanese army. The second division of Japanese troops moved from Liaoyang to Mukden on the 19th and subsequently General Honjo, Commander of the Kuantung army, moved his headquarters from Port Arthur to Mukden.

Under orders of General Honjo, the Japanese military commanders directly concerned made surprise attacks on the 19th at the principal points on the South Manchuria Railway and either drove away or disarmed the Chinese soldiers and police in the railway area. By the afternoon of the 19th the Japanese had taken Mukden, Changchun, Newchwang, and Antung, which together with Dairen, are the key cities of the South Manchuria Railway area. Having consolidated their position in this area, the Japanese military on September 21 took Kirin, thus obtaining control of traffic on the Chinese Mukden-Hailung and Hailung-Kirin railways, which parallel the South

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

South Manchuria Railway on the east. On the morning of the 22nd they took over Chengchiatun and Tungliao, thus obtaining control of traffic on the Chinese Ssapingkai-Taonan and Tahushan-Tungliao Railways which parallel the South Manchuria Railway to the west. Tungliao was, however, evacuated on the 23rd. The Japanese military then began to advance along Chinese-owned railways. On September 23rd they occupied the Kirin-Tunhwa Railway and the city of Tunhwa, from which point they have been anxious to construct the Tunhwa-Kainei Railway. They withdrew, however, from this line and the city of Tunhwa on October 5. On September 25, the Japanese troops moved north from Chengchiatun to Taonanfu whence they were in a position to advance on Tsitsihar via the Taonan-Angangkai Railway. They withdrew from Taonanfu on the 26th. According to the latest reports these troops still control the Ssapingkai-Taonan Railway to Chengchiatun and are patrolling the branch of the railway to Tungliao. The Mukden-Hailung and the Hailung-Kirin Railway were for a while in Japanese hands, but are now run by the Chinese under Japanese financial supervision.

The Japanese at present control Kirin, the capital of Kirin Province, and Mukden the capital of Liaoning Province, and Newchwang, Dairen and Antung the three ports of entry into Manchuria. The all Chinese railway route from Tientsin to Tsitsihar is blocked by them thus isolating, so far as China proper is concerned,

Tsitsihar

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

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Tsitsihar

- 3 -

Tsitsihar and Harbin.

The fact that the Chinese forces withdrew or allowed themselves to be disarmed in most cases as the Japanese advanced, and the fact that in places like Harbin, where there is a Japanese population of about 4,000 and to which no Japanese forces were sent, the Chinese did not attack the Japanese residents, are evidences that there were other motives than self-defense for the Japanese attack. There is little evidence that the Japanese desire to withdraw their troops in such a manner as to forfeit control of the principal political and military centers.

The Japanese military are controlling the Chinese civil authorities, some newly appointed since September 18, who are functioning fairly adequately at Newchwang, Antung, Mukden, Changchun, Kirin, and other less important points. The bombing of the Liaoning Provincial Government offices at Chinchow by Japanese aircraft is evidence that the Japanese do not desire the formation of any Chinese government of Manchuria at or outside of Mukden which is not approved and controlled by them. There are rumors that they are scheming to place the ex-Emperor Hsuan Tung at the head of the new Manchurian Government. The Japanese military authorities are acting in relation to the Chinese military and civil population, government officers, foreigners and property, as if they were waging actual warfare and they are being guided by army regulations.

So far as is known, in all places taken by the
Japanese

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

Japanese military, the Chinese telegraph offices were closed; Chinese wireless stations were put out of commission; telephone lines were operated only under Japanese supervision and at several places censorship of Chinese addressed mail was established, although the Chinese post offices generally were not molested.

In some places like Antung and Changchun, the Japanese forces could be withdrawn into the railway zone without danger of Chinese reprisals or attacks from brigands, while in other places like Mukden and Kirin, the Chinese soldiers having been driven away, a dangerous situation has been created which the Japanese at first stated that they were anxious to avoid. Unless some provision is made to control the disbanded Chinese soldiers, Japanese troops cannot be withdrawn without exposing Chinese and foreign lives and property to danger.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Huston NARS, Date 12-18-75

SUMMARY NUMBER TWO.

Summary of Information in Regard to Banks in Manchuria,
the Bureau of Finance of Liaoning Province and the
Municipal Administration of Mukden based on Reports
Despatched on October 21, 1931. Received October 23, 1931,
and on October 22, 1931. Received October 23, 1931.

On October 19, Japanese military authorities published an instruction for the effective control over the Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces and the Frontier Bank by the Japanese Kuantung Army as follows:

Army approves the reopening of the Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces; measures must be taken to protect the interests of the army and to restore order; supervision appointed by the army must be employed by the Japanese and special investigator will be appointed by the army from time to time; army may suspend whole or part of bank's business at its discretion; army approval of the officers to be employed by the bank must be obtained; no business hostile to the army may be transacted; directions given the bank by the Peace Preservation Committee must be approved by the army; branch banks not to be permitted to hold large reserves; and instructions to apply also to the Frontier Bank.

The banks reopened on the 15th and are transacting business and making silver conversion on a limited and unsatisfactory basis.

The Bureau of Finance of Liaoning Province was reopened on October 19 under provisional regulations sanctioned by the Japanese military authorities. The regulations provide that the scope of the Bureau's authority is to be the same as before; Japanese advisers shall

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

shall be engaged and their views respected; that a committee consisting of Japanese representatives and Japanese advisers in addition to representatives of specified Chinese offices and organizations shall revise the taxation system; and that notices of the Chief of the Bureau must first be approved by the Japanese military authorities before issuance. It is believed that the reorganization of the Bureau of Civil Administration and Industry along similar lines is under way.

On the morning of October 20, the Mukden municipal administration was transferred to the Chinese by the Japanese mayor. Instead of Japanese officers the municipal offices will have four Japanese advisers.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

SUMMARY NUMBER THREE.

Summary of Military Matters Based on Reports from Manchuria
Despatched October 23, 1931, and Received on that Day.

Japanese authorities at Mukden report a clash between 1,000 Chinese troops and two companies of railway guards about eight miles south of Tiehling at ten o'clock on the 21st. Casualties were 60 Chinese killed and wounded. No Japanese casualties reported.

Japanese aircraft scouting over Taonan-Angangki Railway after having been fired upon by Chinese troops dropped bombs. The troops scattered and no material damage was done as the bombs fell in an open field. The bridges on this railway were recently destroyed by Chinese troops and the Japanese gave the necessity of protecting their interests in the railway as their reason for action. The Chinese troops were apparently retreating toward Chinhsien.

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Dated October 29, 1931

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FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 29 1931
Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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OCT 29 1931
DIVISION OF

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

837, October 29, 3 p.m.

Marshal Chang Hsueh Liang left this morning by
plane for Nanking at the request of Chiang Kai-Shek
to confer regarding Manchurian situation and Canton
negotiations. The latter are said to have reached a
deadlock.

For the Minister

ENGERT

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OCT 31 1931
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 29, 1931

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OCT 29 1931

Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

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839, October 29.

Newspaper reports from Nanking twenty-eighth state that Ministry of Foreign Affairs is proposing to conclude a treaty of arbitration with Japan immediately after withdrawal of Japanese troops from South Manchuria and before opening of formal negotiations.

This treaty to be along the same lines as Sino-American Arbitration Treaty and intended to insure pacific settlement of all outstanding questions between the two countries. Alfred Sze is said to have informed Briand that China is ready to conclude such a treaty with Japan and to have communicated to him text of Chinese proposal.

For the Minister

ENGERT

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DIVISION OF

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 29, 1931

Rec'd 1:45 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

833, October 29, 6 p. m.

Following from Consul at Swatow:

"October 27, 7 p. m. Forty-three Japanese men, women and children left Swatow yesterday for Formosa. Altogether seventy-eight of the one hundred fifty Japanese ordinarily residing in Swatow have left since September 20th. The Chinese newspapers state that the Japanese Government has instructed Japanese subjects to evacuate Swatow but the Japanese Consul has informed me that this is not true. The boycott of Japanese goods is still being strictly enforced but the Japanese are keeping their Chinese servants and are permitted to buy foodstuffs. There have been no personal attacks on the Japanese but anti-Japanese handbills are being distributed constantly by the Chinese students. There seems to be a distinct willingness on the part of the anti-Japanese organizations to accept bribes and to levy blackmail."

KLP CSB

For the Minister
ENGERT

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OCT 29 1931

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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OCT 29 1931 FROM
DIVISION OF

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 29, 1931

Rec'd 1:30 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 29 1931
Department of State

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832, October 29, 4 p. m.

Following from American Consul at Tsinanfu:

"October 29, 11 a. m. Yesterday Han Fu Chu took over
National Tax Bureaus here and it is rumored that the Mayor
of Tsinanfu may take charge Tsinanfu Government. There is
a run on Central Bank here."

For the Minister

ENGERT

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OCT 31 1931

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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
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GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 29, 1931

Rec'd 6:40 a.m.



FROM



Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

831, October 29, 4 p.m.

Following from American Consul General at Harbin:

"October 28, 1 p.m.

One. Situation in North Manchuria quiet at present. Wan Kuo Ping has returned to Tsitsihar and appears to be on good terms with General Ma Chang Shan who according to a local Chinese version was appointed Acting Chairman Heilungkiang Province by Nanking and Chang Hsueh Liang and whose troops kept forces of General Chang Hai Pen of Taonan, who is suspected of having received Japanese material support, from entering Tsitsihar.

Two. Three Japanese in plain clothes attempted October 24th to force General Ma to give way to General Chang Hai Pen. Japanese Consul General Ohashi here denies that but admitted to me that some Japanese from Mukden had attempted to see General Ma in regard to damage done by his soldiers to Tao -- Ang bridge across the

(END PART ONE)

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
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Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 29, 1931

Rec'd 6:40 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

831, October 29, 4 p. m. (PART TWO).
Noni River.

Three. Ohashi has informed me that he suspects that Soviet Army is materially aiding General Ma. Chinese officials deny this and recent arrivals, Chinese and foreign, from Tsitsihar, have stated that there is no evidence of such assistance at that place.

Four. Liu Tse Jung Chinese Eastern Railway official and member of Chinese Delegation to Moscow conference left Harbin for that city October 25th. He gave impression that an agreement would soon be made with Moscow. Local Chinese officers have become more friendly toward Soviet officers who undoubtedly have been asked to aid Chinese against Japanese and who are naturally using present situation to extract favorable terms from the Chinese.


Five. Local Chinese authorities are still loyal to Chang Tso Hsia.
(END PART TWO).

JHR

ENGERT

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Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 29, 1931

Rec'd 1:55 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

831, October 29, 4 p.m. (PART THREE)

Hsiang and at present are not obeying any orders of the new Provincial Government at Kirin city. General Ting Chao, Defense Commissioner here, was appointed presumably by Chang Hsueh Liang as acting commander of the 20,000 Kirin-Chinese Eastern Railway guards and of the 10,000 Heilungkiang-Chinese Eastern Railway guards, position before held by Chang Tso Hsiang. He informed me October 27th that, as he was under international obligations to guard railway and acting under orders of the Central Government, he would not retreat in case of Japanese advance on Harbin. He added he would refuse to allow disorganized Kirin troops, which some reports state are dangerously near, to approach this city and that in case new Government at Kirin could not provide for their upkeep he would assist in this direction".

End message.

For the Minister

JHR

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REP

FROM

PLAIN

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 29, 1931

Rec'd 2:16 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



836, October 29, 5 p. m.

Angasta report from Tientsin twenty-eighth.

"Chinese news agency Kwan Hua in North Manchuria regarding interview with Chang Shou Chin, member of Chinese Delegation in Moscow as follows: Reinstatement of normal relations between China and Soviet Russia I consider as expedient as diplomatic intercourse may be conducted regardless of political regimes existing in both countries, External policy should always correspond with changes in the international situation. During the Sino-Soviet conflict Chinese feeling was against the U. S. S. R. but at present conditions have undergone radical change. Japan now exercises violence and without declaration of war she occupied important cities in Manchuria following an identical policy as in Korea. In such circumstances whole

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OCT 31 1931

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2- #836, from Peiping, Oct. 29, 5 p.m.

whole Chinese nation desires the reinstatement of official relations with the Soviet Union.

In conclusion Mr. Chang Shou Chin stated that he intends to leave for Moscow early in November to take part in the further work of the conference".

For the Minister

ENGERT

OSB

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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DIVISION OF
LATIN AMERICAN AFFAIRS
NOV 3 1931
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FROM

Dated October 29, 1931

Rec'd 5:03 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

347, October 29, 4 p.m.

URGENT

Foreign Minister will sincerely appreciate it if the Department will inform him through this Embassy whether our government has named a representative in accordance with the resolution of the Council of League of Nations of October 24th to negotiate with the Chinese authorities regarding the Manchurian situation.

Confidential. My 341, October 17, 3 p.m. The Foreign Minister continues to work for a peaceful settlement of the Manchurian conflict and is in frequent conference with Japanese and Chinese Ministers here. He is, I believe, in sympathy with the Chinese point of view feeling Japan should withdraw and reduce its armed forces by November 16th before negotiations that promise any success, can take place. I do not think he is especially hopeful that Japan will do this.

Chinese Minister this morning showed me a cable from Chiang Kai Shek expressing sincere appreciation for Peruvian assistance, the action of the Peruvian representative is the

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FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 30 1931

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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DIVISION OF
WESTERN AFFAIRS

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DIVISION OF
LATIN AMERICAN AFFAIRS

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MAM

2- #347, from Lima, October 29,
1931

the League, et cetera. Chinese Minister is actively aiding with this government his country's interests in Manchuria. He confided to me day before yesterday that he saw no solution but is today just a shade more hopeful. Further report by mail.

DEARING

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Washington,
 October 31, 1931.

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2386

Your 347, October 29, 4 p.m., first paragraph.

It has not repeat not been proposed to the
 American Government that it name a representative
 QUOTE to negotiate with the Chinese authorities regarding
 the Manchurian situation UNQUOTE. If the inquiry
 refers to paragraph four of the resolution voted
 upon by the Council on October 24, it may be stated
 for your information and guidance that the Department
 feels that any action which may be proposed in connection
 with that paragraph should be taken in the first instance
 by the Council or Governments members of the League and
 that, while the Department has the matter under considera-
 tion, it prefers to refrain from commitment until it is
 informed specifically with regard to action taken by
 League members.

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Department of State
Division of Current Information

MEMORANDUM OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE, THURSDAY, OCTOBER 22, 1931

793.94
9387 At the press conference this morning Undersecretary Castle announced the release of a speech which will be delivered in New York this morning by M. Laval in response to the address of welcome by the Mayor of New York City. Asked if he would meet M. Laval at the station this afternoon, the Undersecretary said that he and the four Assistant Secretaries had been asked to be present at the Union Station.

SINO-JAPANESE TROUBLE

Observing that a news despatch from Tokyo this morning announced that some Japanese airplanes had bombed a Chinese town near Mukden and that, while the planes were supposed to have been officially withdrawn, some had apparently been forgotten, a correspondent asked if the Department had received any information concerning the incident. In reply, the Undersecretary said that no reports had been received pertaining thereto. The correspondent said that the incident apparently had caused quite a stir in League of Nations circles. Mr. Castle then said that he had not heard anything from the Orient or from the League of Nations concerning the matter.

A correspondent then asked if the Department had received any confirmation of press reports concerning a military clash yesterday near Mukden. He was informed, in reply, that, while the report in the press had been seen, no confirmation thereof had been received. The Department does not know if the clash was with bandits or with bona fide Chinese troops.

Asked if there was any indication from Geneva of dissatisfaction with the American position in failing, as it is interpreted in some quarters, to back up the League's action

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and playing a lone hand, the Undersecretary said he had no reason to think that the League had any such opinion.

Asked if any replies had been received from Japan to our recent note, Mr. Castle said that he did not know that any answer was expected. A correspondent asked if the Department had received the five fundamental principles which Japan maintains must be accepted before an agreement can be reached with China. The Undersecretary, in reply, said that he did not remember that there were five principles enumerated by Japan, but that we had seen the statement which Japan made at the Council concerning what she considered to be the principles necessary for agreement. Asked if we were in sympathy with Japan or if we approved any or all of the so-called principles, Mr. Castle said he had no comments whatever to make. A correspondent said the Japanese demands seemed to hook up with the famous twenty-one points, especially in respect to the military zone and certain mining and mineral rights. In reply, Mr. Castle said he understood that these latest principles laid down by Japan referred solely to Manchuria and that the twenty-one points had a much wider scope. The Undersecretary then asked the correspondent if there was anything in the five demands recently made by Japan which in his opinion would go beyond Japanese treaty rights in Manchuria. The correspondent replied in the negative, and Mr. Castle then said that he had no comments to make. The correspondent then added that the Japanese demand that an agreement be reached between the Chinese and themselves to avoid ruinous competition between the South Manchurian Railroad and the other roads which belong to Russia and China. The Undersecretary, in reply, said that such a demand was outside of any treaty rights, but that, after all, is exactly the sort of thing which is being done in all countries of the world to prevent ruinous competition between railroads. That appears, there-

-3-

fore, to be an economic matter and of no political importance. A correspondent said that according to a story from Tokyo both the Japanese and Chinese Governments had replied to our notes concerning the Kellogg Pact and asked if those replies would be made public. In reply, Mr. Castle said they would not be made public until our notes to those Governments had been released and that he did not know when that would be done because the notes sent by the other governments had not yet been given to the press. If the other governments make public their notes, we shall probably make ours public and, with the assent of China and Japan, their replies may also be made public. Asked if this Government had taken a position or intended to take a position on the time within which the Japanese troops should be withdrawn, the Undersecretary replied in the negative and added that the rumors which had been circulated to that effect were entirely false.

Referring to a statement made by Secretary Stimson yesterday, confidentially and purely for background, to the effect that the entire trouble was in a more or less fair way toward settlement, a correspondent asked if the situation today was the same. Mr. Castle, in reply, said he thought it looked hopeful and that we had received no telegrams today to show that the situation was less hopeful.

M. J. McDermott.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

7388

SEE 800.00 7.2.10 FOR Comp. #501

FROM Sweden (Crosby) DATED Oct. 14, 1951
TO NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese conflict.

Report on -

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793.94/2388

in putting the League out of function its prestige would be so undermined that it would hardly even be worth while for the forthcoming disarmament conference to meet. It is of very great importance to President Hoover that such a calamity be avoided. If, on the other hand, the League can assert its position thanks to cooperation with America this rapprochement between Geneva and Washington would mean a gain for the international peace work, the importance of which to the future of the League of Nations can hardly be overestimated."

The DAGENS NYMETER (Liberal), of October 14th, concludes an editorial giving an account of the Sino-Japanese conflict in Manchuria as follows:

"There is one single ray of light in this macabre affair: that is America's cooperation with the Council of the League of Nations so as to make Japan observe her obligations as a member of the League of Nations and a signer of the Kellogg Pact. If Japan should succeed

in

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

2389

SEE 641.00 P.R./201 FOR comp. #2318

FROM Great Britain (Atterton) DATED Oct. 12, 1931
TO NAME 1-117 ...

REGARDING: Manchurian Controversy - China and Japan.
Comments on -.

fo

793.94/2389

The serious turn which the bombing of Chinchow by Japanese aeroplanes and the gradual development southward of Japanese military operations has given to the armed dispute in Manchuria has stimulated a general call in Britain for some emphatic action by the League towards terminating the conflict. There has been a pronounced transfer of the sympathy of the British press from Japan to China, due more perhaps to the fact that the Chinese Government has sought to use the machinery of the League to bring an end to the dispute, and has in other ways assumed a passive attitude, than to the extravagances indulged in by the Japanese military authorities. The MANCHESTER GUARDIAN, which has been from the first severely critical of the aggressive measures taken by Japan, is now entirely convinced that they were systematically calculated to give a pretext for the occupation of Chinese territory. Even the London TIMES, which had expressed its sympathy with the position in which Japan had been placed, now condemns without qualification the failure of that country to fulfil its commitments to the League Covenant and the Kellogg Pact. It points out that the Covenant permits a member Power to take matters into its own hands only when a dispute has been submitted without success to the arbitration of the League; and it observes that Japan has clearly contravened the provisions of the Covenant by resorting repeatedly to acts of violence on the one hand, and by refusing to permit the League, on the other hand, to arbitrate between the disputants. No less flagrant a breach of its obligations, it adds, is its departure from the spirit of the Kellogg Pact, as there has been in fact the

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-12-75

use of force "as an instrument of national policy."

There appears to be full appreciation of the grave possibilities inherent in a war between the two countries as well as of the menace to the prestige of the League, and the press is agreed that the situation is serious enough to merit the personal attention of Lord Reading, who left for Geneva on October 12th to attend the meeting of the League Council.

Informed opinion here is inclined, through accumulated aggravations with China and the Chinese, to believe a stiff policy by Japan may force some sort of cohesion in the many warring elements in China.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

398

SEE 793.003/781 FOR Telegram #101 - 3pm

~~FROM~~ () DATED Oct. 26, 1931.
TO Nanking (for Minister) NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING:

Negotiations with Chinese Government relative to extra-territoriality being held up owing to Manchurian dispute.

Jr


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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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


GREEN

Geneva

Date October 30, 1931.

Rec'd 10 a.m.



Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

269, October 30, noon.

Consulate's 264, ^{793.94/2370} October 28, noon.

The Hungarian Minister here told me informally this morning that Budapest had received from Paris the notification respecting the invocation of the Pact of Paris by France, Great Britain and Italy. He said that his government was considering the matter but had taken no action.

GILBERT

RR

WSB

FILED

NOV 4 1931


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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM



GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 30, 1931

Rec'd 9:50 a. m.

793.94
note
893.516

Secretary of State,
Washington.



Tel. to Peiping
OCT 30 1931

URGENT.

840, October 30, 10 a. m.

Consul General at Mukden reports:

Following received yesterday by the manager of the
National City Bank Mukden:

This is to inform you that the Japanese military
authorities strictly forbidd~~en~~ the remittance of public
funds deposited or in your bank by the late Liaoning
Provincial Government and its subordinate office before
the outbreak of the recent hostilities, to Chang Shueh
Liang's agents in Peiping and Tientsin. Such remittances
would appear to be antagonistic or actions assisting our
enemies. We firmly believe that any wise foreign bank
would refrain from so doing.

We recently heard that means are under consideration
to have the

793.94/2392
2312

FILED
AUG 28 1931

REP

2- #840, from Peiping, Oct.30, 10 a.m.

to have the funds of the purchasing commission of the Liaoning Provincial Government, which were in your bank, secretly transmitted to Peiping and Tientsin. We request your proper explanation of this matter (signed) Chief of Staff of the Kuantung Army'.

Japanese authorities have issued no prior statement or regulations indicating an intention or desire to exercise control over foreign banking operation. Strong protest against the army's action has been made to the Japanese Consul General. Will report developments by telegraph."

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. Manager of the Peiping office of National City Bank informs me in confidence that some two million dollars Mexican of what he believed were the Young Marshal's private funds have recently been transferred to Tientsin and Peiping. He understands that most of it came from the frontier bank and that no public funds were involved.

Repeated to the Minister at Shanghai and Tokyo.

For the Minister

ENGERT

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-128
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Washington,

October 30, 1931.

OCT 30 31

AMLEGATION,

PEIPING (China).

793.94/2392
400

Your 840, October 30, 10 a.m., penultimate paragraph.

Inquire by whose order and to whose account funds
referred to were transferred, and report.

Stinson
SKH

793.94/2392

793.94/2392

FE:SKH/ZMF

SKH
FE:SKH

Oct. 30, 1931. M

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 60.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1926 1-128

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

CONFIDENTIAL
RECEIVED
OCT 30 1931

October 29, 1931

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON
AND THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR, MR. PAUL CLAUDEL

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 30 1931
Department of State

Manchuria.

793.94
The French Ambassador came in to tell me first of the appreciation and thanks of his government and the Laval and Petain Parties for all the courtesies that had been shown them in this country.

Secondly, the Ambassador brought up the question of Manchuria. He had in his hands a note in French from M. Briand which he translated, which in substance requested him to get us to make a demonstration of our approval of the action of the League in their final resolution, this to be done at Tokyo, and saying that it would be preferable if some publicity could be given to it as there were rumors that we did not agree with the action of the League. The note indicated that Lord Reading was to make a similar démarche upon us through the British Ambassador.

I told the Ambassador that I was already at work on the consideration of a note on that subject. I said there were two points which would seem to be the basic points, which I was most troubled over - one was the

time

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NOV 3 1931

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 2 -

time limit for evacuation set for November 16th which Japan would undoubtedly reject, and the other was the Japanese refusal to evacuate unless the Chinese discussed not only matters relating to the evacuation but fundamental treaties and treaty rights between the two nations. I said that on its face this last looked as if Japan was trying to force China to accept certain national policies of Japan's by the use of this military occupation, which would be a clear violation of Japan's treaty obligations under the Kellogg Pact and other treaties. I told him that I was more in doubt about the wisdom of the Council's action in setting the time limit because I had had news from Manchuria through our own observers that it would not be safe to withdraw the Japanese troops from certain points in Manchuria by November 16th owing to the state of anarchy which existed. He nodded his head and said he had impressions of the same kind. I said I had these matters under careful consideration and was trying to determine what sort of an answer I could send which would make clear my general support of the League position and yet possibly leave a ladder by which Japan could climb down.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 3 -

down. He laughed and said he appreciated my use of the word "ladder" because that was a term commonly used in Oriental negotiations and indicated my familiarity with it. He then asked me my views of the final result of the situation. I said that I thought Japan had made a great mistake; that she was now beginning to suffer from the Chinese boycott all through China and that this was likely to bring her to her knees because she would not have the moral support of any other nation. I said I regretted this because I regarded Japan's welfare in her position on the outskirts of the Asiatic continent as very important to the Western world and I was sorry that she had put herself in a position which would probably in the long run end up by doing her serious harm.

HL8.


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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




No. 1987

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Paris, October 23, 1931.



OCT 30 31



The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to the Embassy's
telegrams No. 669 of October 17, 11 a.m., and No.
672 of October 20, 5 p.m., regarding the Sino-
Japanese conflict in Manchuria, and to submit for
the information of the Department the following
report on the French reaction to this subject as
expressed in the press.

A review of the French press since an invitation
was extended by the League of Nations to the United
States to send a representative to collaborate with
the Council of the League in an endeavor to find

some . . .

793.94/2394

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NOV 3 1931

- 2 -

some settlement for the Manchurian situation, shows clearly that the French are much more interested in the events taking place at Geneva than in the actual situation in Manchuria. The reason for this attitude is apparent: Manchuria is a very remote section of the world in the eyes of the French, whereas the League of Nations is very close; French interests in Manchuria are almost negligible, whereas the League of Nations is extremely important in French eyes, and the rise or fall of its prestige and authority is vital to the interests of France. For this reason the local American newspapers have daily, since the beginning of the conflict in Manchuria, published generally fuller despatches from the Far East than any of the French papers, although the latter have published in full daily reports from the correspondents at Geneva.

Since October 14, when the League's invitation was extended to the United States, the Conservative press has spared no pains to make its criticism of the League's action felt. The ultra-Conservative papers, such as LIBERTE, AVENIR, the Coty owned FIGARO and AMI DU PEUPLE, and the Steel Trust's organ, JOURNAL DES DEBATS, have held to the view (1) that the prestige of the League itself has suffered greatly through its wishy-washy attitude in dealing with the Manchurian situation and (2) that . . .

- 3 -

that the action of the Japanese in opposing American participation in the League deliberations is justifiable on the ground that the United States has been offered the right to have its policy enforced through the action of the States which are members of the League, while at the same time evading to a certain extent the responsibilities for this enforcement by not actually being a member of the League and having to abide by the articles of the Covenant.

A partial reason for this attitude on the part of the Conservative press is the opposition of the latter to M. Briand himself. Undoubtedly this section of the press has deliberately used the method of the League in dealing with the Manchurian situation as a vehicle to vent its spite against the person of France's veteran Foreign Minister, whom they regard as their arch enemy. At the same time, however, part of the attitude taken by this section of the press must be accounted for by its express sympathy with the Japanese position as opposed to the Chinese. It frankly expresses the opinion that the Sino-Japanese conflict is largely due to the fact that Japan has been unable to achieve anything in its negotiations with China because of the chaotic conditions in that country, and that the Japanese have a perfect right to protect their interests and the lives of their citizens in a region like Manchuria, where anarchy is rife and where Japanese citizens are subjected to constant danger through brigandage, etc.

The first . . .

- 4 -

The first reaction of the more Moderate and Left sections of the French press to the League's action in inviting the United States to collaborate with it was one of sympathy with the League and of severe criticism of the Japanese for opposing the invitation. These papers, such as the semi-official TEMPS, PETIT PARISIEN, JOURNAL and the INTRANSIGEANT, were delighted at first that the United States had at last been persuaded to collaborate with the League, and they were unstinting in their praise for the latter in extending the invitation to the United States and in criticising the intransigent attitude of the Japanese.

The widely read PETIT PARISIEN held that in a case as grave as the Sino-Japanese conflict, the collaboration of the United States with the League could only be profitable to the success of the League's démarche in the cause of peace. The JOURNAL emphasized the coincidence of the American acceptance of the League's invitation on the eve of the departure of the French Premier for the United States, and inquired whether this double event might not really mark the beginning of a new and better era of a post-war policy. M. Léon Bailby, writing in INTRANSIGEANT, approved all the attempts made at Geneva to weaken the intransigent attitude both of the Japanese representative and the Emperor of Japan and expressed this paper's viewpoint in
the . . .

- 5 -

the following words: "Neither a man nor a nation can to-day play the rôle of solitary egotism. Japan, which has been modernized so quickly, should in this matter also evolve with the times."

The press of the Left, such as *ERE NOUVELLE*, *OEUVRE*, and *QUOTIDIEN*, was even more sympathetic with the League's attempts to settle the Manchurian situation by inviting the collaboration of America, although maintaining fairly consistently an impartial view as regards the Chinese and Japanese theses. The attitude of this section of the press is perhaps best expressed by *OEUVRE* on October 18, when the latter editorially expressed its delight at the acceptance by the United States of the League's invitation and called attention to the fact that a few years ago the United States would not have deigned to send anyone to Geneva. This paper praised the work of the League and stated that apparently the time is arriving when two or more powers will no longer be permitted merrily to conduct a war with each other unfettered by the rest of the world, which used to sit by and watch a holocaust take place without attempting to prevent it. A few days, however, after the League's invitation to the United States, a perceptible change occurred in the attitude of the Moderate section of the press, and even in some of the papers of the Extreme Left.

On October 20, despatches from the

Geneva . . .

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 6 -


Geneva correspondent of the PARIS-MIDI stated that the sentiment was growing among the League delegates to the effect that the invitation to the United States was issued a little too hastily. This correspondent asserted that the result of the invitation was to create a conflict of policy between Japan and the United States and a juridical conflict between the Council and Japan. He added sarcastically that the Manchurian conflict itself had almost ceased to exist in the face of these two controversies. The same day, LE TEMPS, which had been consistently very reticent to express a definite opinion regarding the merits of the controversy, gave a broad hint of its sympathy with the Japanese by stating editorially that it was high time that the Manchurian conflict should be liquidated under conditions safeguarding the moral authority of the League and taking into account the political realities which existed in the Far East and which it is not in the power of anyone to suppress. LE TEMPS felt that it would be deplorable that the cooperation of Japan with the Council should be troubled by a question of procedure even before the latter could get to the bottom of the Sino-Japanese difference.

This opinion was shared by the JOURNEE INDUSTRIELLE, JOURNAL DU COMMERCE, and even the organ of Daladier, the leader of the Left Wing of the Radical Socialists, who, on October 22, in REPUBLIQUE deplored the invitation extended . . .

- 7 -

to the United States, stating that this action could not help but offend Japan. Both the Moderate and Left press have taken up to some extent the theme of the Conservative press, stressing the chaotic conditions both in Manchuria and China and seriously questioning China's status as an independent nation able to negotiate and live up to the treaties which it has negotiated. The non-political JOURNEE INDUSTRIELLE of October 20 asserted that if the Chinese are really decided not only to give to Japan the necessary guarantees of security for its citizens but also to make a serious effort to clarify the political anarchy reigning in China by constituting a truly national government, the Council of the League can achieve even a better solution than a settlement of the present quarrel, namely, a new guarantee or consolidation of peace in the Far East.



Respectfully yours,



Williamson S. Howell, Jr.
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

Copies to E. I. C.

710.



MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE CZECHOSLOVAK MINISTER

The Minister said that he had come to ask me about the Manchurian situation, but that as he had met the Japanese Ambassador coming out of my office with a smile on his face, he felt the situation could not be any worse. •


I told him that we did not see any unfortunate developments, and that we hoped the matters were clearing up, that obviously the League was doing what it could.

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793.94/2395

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OCT 29 1931



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October 24, 1931.

OCT 27 1931
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The NEW YORK TIMES of this morning (October 24) carries a Tokyo despatch dated October 23 from Hugh Byas which states that new instructions were sent yesterday (October 23) to Yoshizawa, at Geneva, after the instructions had been approved by the Cabinet. According to Mr. Byas

"These instructions, it is announced, do not pledge unconditional and complete evacuation in three weeks, but do imply that the Japanese will begin evacuation immediately and will try to complete it before the next meeting of the Council.

"Japan, however, stands pat on the point that China undertake to respect her treaties and call off the anti-Japanese agitations.

"This development arises from the attempts to find a formula which have been proceeding at Geneva."

It would appear that these new instructions had not been received by Yoshizawa in time for the Council meeting held yesterday; but that they will be available for the Council meeting which is reported ^{re-scheduled for} to be held today.

If the above report be true it would seem to indicate that the Japanese Government is modifying the stubborn opposition which it has appeared to have ^{made} to the proposals of the League and that the Foreign Office is to that extent getting control of the military element.

The new instructions referred to at least appear to keep

793.94/2396

FILED

OCT 29 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

keep the door open for further consideration of the question and at least give ground for the hope that a formula may yet be found which will open the way for direct negotiations in some form between China and Japan.


FE:RSM:EVL



NEW YORK TIMES

October 24, 1931.

TOKYO WILL CONCEDE FEW POINTS ON CHINA

Agrees to Start Withdrawal of
Troops, but Demands Pledge
on Treaty Rights.

LEAGUE PLAN IS OPPOSED

Japanese Firmly Refuse to
Agree to Complete Evacua-
tion Before Negotiations.

BOMBING IS BELITTLED

Dropping of Explosives by Japanese
Plane on Chinese Troops Held
"Military Incident."

By HUGH BYAS.

Wireless to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

TOKYO, Oct. 23.—Japan is willing to make concessions in regard to the evacuation of occupied territory in Manchuria, but will not accept the resolution now before the League of Nations Council that she agree to withdraw wholly by Nov. 16.

Japan now accepts the proposal contained in the formula submitted by Sir Eric Drummond, Secretary-General of the League, that the Council meet Nov. 15 to hear the result of negotiations regarding evacuation and withdraws her counter proposal that "China and Japan undertake to keep the Council constantly informed of the progress of negotiations concerning evacuation and security."

This information is contained in new instructions sent today to Kenkichi Yoshizawa, Japanese delegate to the League, after they had been approved by the Cabinet. These instructions, it is announced, do not pledge unconditional and complete evacuation in three weeks, but do imply that the Japanese will begin evacuation immediately and will try to complete it before the next meeting of the Council.

Demands Respect for Treaties.

Japan, however, stands pat on the point that China undertake to respect her treaties and call off the anti-Japanese agitations.

This development arises from the attempts to find a formula which have been proceeding at Geneva. The first step was Tokyo's decision, telegraphed to Mr. Yoshizawa on Tuesday, to accept a formula on the basis of Japan's five points, which Foreign Minister Briand in conversation with Mr. Yoshizawa had broadly approved. No more was heard of that suggestion, doubtless because Mr. Briand discovered that recognition of treaty rights was anathema to the Chinese.

Two days later Sir Eric submitted to Yotaro Sugimura three alternative formulas for Japan's consideration. Tokyo cabled back in time for yesterday's meeting accepting the first formula, which broadly speaking, pledged Japan to evacuation and China to providing security. It was explained that those terms

came within the scope of the Council's resolution of Sept. 30. If they were accepted the Council was prepared to recommend direct negotiations and adjourn for three weeks, expecting evacuation to be complete by then.

Japan's acceptance was coupled with the important provisions that it should be understood and so stated in the Council's minutes, though not necessarily accepted by China at this stage, that security covered the essentials of Japan's five points cabled on Tuesday. Regarding evacuation, Japan suggested the phrasing quoted above, which is now withdrawn.

In view of Japan's acceptance of those two formulas, officials here were surprised at the news that the Council had decided to proceed by resolution today. The resolution as cabled in draft is not only not acceptable to Japan but, in Japanese opinion, is beyond amendment. Its most objectionable feature is that it proposes that evacuation be completed before negotiations begin.

Chinese Pledge Demanded.

That method is fundamentally opposed to Japanese ideas.

To put evacuation before negotiations, instead of coupling them, would leave Japan without assurance that her interests in Manchuria would be any more respected than before, it is held here.

The problem has now narrowed definitely to the point as to whether the Nanking Government is prepared to pledge respect for the treaties, and Japan has made clear there will be no evacuation until such a pledge is given.

Japan's reply to the United States note on the Kellogg pact is being sent tonight. It follows the answer given to other powers and is accompanied by a covering note which assures Washington that the Japanese Government remains "unshaken in the belief that a method of resolving the present difficulties can be found in direct negotiations between the two disputants in a spirit of mutual good-will and helpfulness."

It is agreed here that the United States State Department has shown a better knowledge of the Manchurian situation than any other foreign office, not excepting Great Britain's.

The Rengo News Agency reports that certain circles are dissatisfied with the attitude of the Marquess of Reading, British Foreign Minister. Those circles are not identified and Foreign Office officials disclaim any thought that they share that feeling, but they add that if disappointment exists it must be because the Japanese expected Great Britain to show a greater knowledge of the problem than others.

No further bombings have been reported since yesterday. The War Office states that the bridge over the Nonni was actually damaged by Chinese troops, and on this fact the commander justified his dispatch of scouting planes carrying bombs. General Honsho's bombing exploits have been singularly unfortunately timed, for they must have seemed to the peacemakers at Geneva deliberately intended to combat their efforts.

The best that can be said from the viewpoint of the Tokyo Government is that when negotiations actually begin such happenings soon will seem "military incidents" inseparable from the present conditions which can be forgotten.

To relieve the Japanese troops in Manchuria who are suffering from overwork, the War Office will send more machine guns, but will not increase the number of troops at present. This decision is only temporary. The troops may be brought up to the full treaty strength soon.

About 500 of the Chinese who attacked Luanshihsan have been pursued into the hills, where, according to a Mukden dispatch, they now are trapped and will be attacked.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

OCT 28 1931

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

October 28, 1931.



Digest of Newspaper
Items

WASHINGTON POST

Tokyo despatch, October 28 (A.P.), reports that in a memorandum to Moscow Japan requested that Russian troop demonstrations on the Manchuria-Siberia border be discontinued as these operations might be misinterpreted.

NEW YORK TIMES

Shanghai despatch, October 27 (Hallett Abend), states that the South Manchuria Railway confirmed Soviet Russian assistance to the troops supporting Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang in North Manchuria. According to official Japanese advices, a shipment of field guns, machine guns and ammunition has reached Manchouli from Chita, bound for Tsitsihar. The South Manchuria Railway offices at Harbin also confirmed Soviet military activities in Northwestern Manchuria. More than 150 railway cars are at Manchouli ready for the Russian military.

The Japanese admit the movement of 200 Japanese soldiers to Chengchiatun on the Taonan Railway.

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FILED
OCT 29 1931

-2-

The new Chinese Provincial Government, with headquarters at Mukden, is assuming responsibility for the Ssuningkai-Taonan Railway, now being operated by the South Manchuria, with 12,000 troops assigned to guard duty.

The power of General Chang Tso-hsiang is rapidly growing, with the aid of the Japanese and Chinese elements hostile to Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang.

Anti-Japanese demonstrations are reported from Peiping, Canton, Hankow and Soochow.

The attitude of General Chiang Kai-shek is stiffening, due to his stronger position resulting from the attitude of the League of Nations.

Moscow despatch, October 27, states that "it is officially denied that Russia has increased her military forces along the border of Manchuria".

Tokyo despatch, October 27 (A.P.), reports that the Chinese suggestion for a Sino-Japanese arbitration treaty was welcomed "in principle" in Japanese official circles

Paris despatch, October 27 (A.P.), states that negotiations will be carried on there between Japanese Ambassador Yoshizawa and Briand in regard to Manchuria, prior to November 16.

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-3-

NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE

Tokyo despatch, October 27 (Wilfred Fleisher), states that the Japanese Foreign Office has been advised that between 20,000 and 30,000 Russian troops are concentrated on the Northern Manchurian border and 800 railway cars are in readiness for military use.

Shanghai despatch, October 27 (Victor Keen), reports that the Canton-Nanking reconciliation conference continues, with the Cantonese insisting that Chiang Kai-shek relinquish either his civil or military posts.

Mukden article, September 28 (Victor Keen), is first of a series of four articles dealing with the situation in Manchuria.

NEW YORK TIMES

San Francisco despatch, October 27 (A.P.), "Arguing that the world had seen 'three distinct, solemn treaties brutally scrapped' in the occupation of Southern Manchuria by Japanese troops, Senator Hiram Johnson of California pleaded today for an adequate American navy and warned against relying upon international agreements for security.

"Addressing a Navy Day gathering here, the leader in the Senate fight against American membership in the League of Nations asserted that the League pact, the Washington Nine-Power Treaty and the Kellogg antiwar agreement had been overridden with impunity in the Far Eastern squabble."

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- 4 -

NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE

Moscow despatch, October 27 (Ralph W. Barnes),
reports that

"With regard to the new reports emanating from
Tokio that Soviet troops are being mobilized along
the Manchurian frontier with the object of armed
intervention in the present crisis in Manchuria
between China and Japan, this correspondent finds
Soviet Russia so deeply involved in the solution
of a great number of extremely difficult internal
problems that she is likely to employ every means
to avoid becoming entangled in anything resembling
a Manchurian War."

WBL

FE:CBG/VDM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

**JAPAN ASKS RUSSIA
TO END MANEUVERS**

**Shidehara Raps Operations
on Manchurian Border;
Stimson Opens Quiz.**

Tokyo, Wednesday, Oct. 28 (A.P.).—Baron Shidehara, the foreign minister, in a memorandum forwarded today to Moscow, requested that Russian troop demonstrations on the Manchuria-Siberia border be discontinued. He declared the military operations might be misinterpreted.

Shidehara's communication stated the Russian troop demonstrations were causing an unpleasant effect on Japanese as well as Chinese soldiers. The foreign minister said he was deeply concerned.

Chinese reports to the Japanese consul at Tsitsihar indicate that between 20,000 and 30,000 Russian troops are concentrated in the vicinity of Pogranitchnaya, or Sulfen-ho, north of Vladivostok, and also west of Manchouli on another front.

Tokyo vernacular newspaper today published Harbin dispatches stating the Russians have sent arms and ammunition to the Amur army, composed of Chinese and Mongols, which was reported aiming to establish Amur as an independent state, with Tsitsihar as the capital.

The dispatches said the Amur troops are endangering Japanese interests on the Taonan-Anganchi Railway.

Secretary Stimson began yesterday the examination of the final recommendations of the two American experts, who have been observing conditions in Manchuria as guests of the Chinese and Japanese governments. The experts, George Hanson and Laurence E. Salisbury, have been ordered to return to Harbin and Tokyo. Their final reports were immediately forwarded to the State Department and will constitute the basis of any further American action in the troubled region.

As the date for evacuation from Manchuria of Japanese troops grows nearer, November 16, the concern of the State Department is more acute.

The Washington Post.

WASHINGTON: WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 28, 1931

Navy Fete; Mark Set

**Largest Crowds in Its
Four, Plunged Off**

Collapsed

SPEAKER BOLT THREAT RAISED

FIGHT TO

JAPAN ASKS RUSSIA TO END MANEUVERS

Continued from Page 1.

While the United States as participating power in the deliberations of the league council, will naturally entertain the same desires as the other nations that requested the Japanese withdrawal by a fixed date, this Government did not sign the formal request to Japan. Japan at the present time shows no indication of evacuating the territory unless the Chinese agree to the terms formulated in an official statement issued by the Japanese Embassy here yesterday.

The formal Japanese statement was a reiteration of the various points that have been stressed by Ambassador Debuchi in his conferences with Secretary Stimson and Undersecretary of State William R. Castle, jr.

Halloween Plans Cost

HIRAM JOHNSON SEES LESSON IN MANCHURIA

Senator Pleads With Californians to Demand a Strong Navy, Not Peace Pacts.

SAN FRANCISCO, Oct. 27 (AP).—Arguing that the world had seen "three distinct, solemn treaties brutally scrapped" in the occupation of Southern Manchuria by Japanese troops, Senator Hiram Johnson of California pleaded today for an adequate American navy and warned against relying upon international agreements for security.

Addressing a Navy Day gathering here, the leader in the Senate fight against American membership in the League of Nations asserted that the League pact, the Washington Nine-Power Treaty and the Kellogg anti-war agreement had been overridden with impunity in the Far Eastern squabble.

Senator Johnson called upon the American people to follow the admonitions of Theodore Roosevelt for a strong navy and argued against American participation in any naval holiday in the face of "our absolute inferiority in naval equipment."

"Out of the horror of the Manchurian slaughter," he said, "comes the lesson and the solemn warning. Treaties with an idealistic purpose are well. None here but would welcome them. Only the foolish or willfully blind will accept them as the sole reliance in case of emergency or peril."

"We may proudly say that our country, never militaristic nor aggressive, seeking neither subject peoples nor territory, will ever observe them, but stern reality in this chaotic world cannot be blinked, and so it is we rededicate ourselves today to the Rooseveltian doctrine, 'Fear God and Take Your Own Part.'"

The Californian asserted that, despite the talk of American naval parity with Great Britain at the London conference, the United States fighting forces afloat were inferior to those of England and Japan.

He denounced American participation in the Geneva proceedings designed to settle the Manchurian dispute.

"The league meets in the crisis," he said, "and thus far it has halted no hostile force nor saved a single life."

"It was utterly unnecessary for the Government at Washington, if it desired to enter a protest under the Kellogg Pact, to go into the League of Nations. It could have performed that function, as it has now performed it, by a simple note from our Capital."

"It is no answer to pretend our representative in the Council of the League is but an observer. He sits there representing the United States of America by invitation duly accepted."

KILL 5 NICARAGUAN REBELS.

Guardsmen Wound Others in Battle—Sandino to Fight Again.

Via Tropical Radio to THE NEW YORK TIMES. MANAGUA, Nicaragua, Oct. 27.—Captain Frisbie and a patrol of Nicaraguan National Guardsmen killed five out of twenty-five insurgents in an engagement at Las Cruces on Oct. 23, it was learned today, and wounded several others. The guardsmen reported no cas-

Lone Voter Registers in Error; Discovery Saves City \$300

The City of New York will save \$300 as the expense of maintaining an election board in the thirty-eighth election district of the Tenth Assembly District through the action yesterday of Supreme Court Justice Glennon in striking from the list of voters the name of Samuel Lippman, the only person in the district who had registered, and who had described himself as a resident of 230 West Thirty-eighth Street.

Election authorities had learned that Lippman was a coat operator employed in the building from which he registered, and lives at 55 East 176th Street, the Bronx. He explained that he was advised to register in the entrance of the building but said he had subsequently learned that he had registered improperly.

The court order reduces by one the 3,425 voting districts in Manhattan.

CYPRUS RAIDERS RAZE BRIDGES IN INTERIOR

Telegraph Wires and Poles Cut and Police Stations Are Burned or Looted.

Wireless to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

NICOSIA, Cyprus, Oct. 27.—Minor disturbances continue to be reported from inland villages. Some bridges have been wrecked, telegraph wires and poles have been cut down and police stations burned or looted.

There has been no slackening of the picketing of towns by troops.

In the Famagusta district a small customs post was burned this morning.

The sunset curfew order still is in force here, but the business part of Nicosia today was more normal with the rioting element subdued.

LONDON, Oct. 27 (AP).—The Governor of Cyprus reported to the Colonial Office today that new disorders had broken out in the village of Pissouri, where the customs sheds were burned.

In another village, rioters attacked a detachment of British troops but were beaten off after several of their number had been wounded. The soldiers are breaking up numerous Communist meetings, but in most of the island the situation is distinctly easier, the Governor said.

Since the trouble began last week four civilians have been killed and thirty-one wounded. Thirty-five soldiers and policemen have been wounded.

Reports from Nicosia said three persons were killed and several wounded at Kyrenia on Sunday when a priest of the Greek Orthodox Church led a crowd in an attempt to haul down the British flag and replace it with the Greek colors. They were driven off by soldiers.

LEAGUE BODY REPORTS WAYSTO SAVE HUNGARY

Royall Tyler, American, Named as Financial Adviser Under Plan to Extend Loans.

BUDAPEST, Hungary, Oct. 27 (AP).—Findings of a League of Nations committee for stabilization of Hungary's financial situation, including recommendations for balancing her foreign trade and controlling foreign exchange, were announced today by the Hungarian Government.

At the same time it was announced that Royall Tyler, American expert, would serve as financial adviser to Hungary with an expert for the National Bank, in making effective the committee's recommendations, which call upon the country to prevent "every kind of inflation."

Hungary's state debt is placed at \$291,000,000 and debts of corporations, banks and private institutions are fixed at \$429,000,000. Most of the private debts are enjoying the benefits of a "freezing agreement."

Recommendations of the committee are as follows:

Imports should be reduced in order to balance foreign trade.

Private banks should be controlled by the National Bank.

Foreign exchange and currency should be controlled by the National Banks, in order that excessive imports may be checked.

Stability of the pengo should be maintained and Hungary should prevent every kind of the inflation.

All foreign loans received are to be entrusted to the Hungarian National Bank and the committee expressed the hope that Hungary's creditors would reach an agreement with that country not to recall their loans.

Hungary promised to keep the 1931 budget within its limit of \$192,000,000 and the 1932 budget within \$48,000,000.

SOVIET SENDS ARMS TO AID MANCHURIANS

By HALLETT ABEND. Continued from Page One.

clation, assisted by the police and the Quomintang Headquarters.

In Shanghai uncertainty prevails in political circles because of the stiffening attitude of General Chiang Kai-shek, who has apparently obtained a firmer grip on the situation as a result of the strong attitude of the League of Nations in the Manchurian dispute. Several additional regional generals are reported to be preparing circular telegrams favoring the retention of both civilian and military powers by General Chiang Kai-shek.

Moscow Denies Adding to Troops. Special Cable to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

MOSCOW, Oct. 27.—It is officially denied here that Russia has in-

SEES HOOVER "DEFECTIO

London Paper Says Laval Par Increase British Problems.

LONDON, Oct. 27 (AP).—The Morning Star said editorially today the Hoover-Laval conversation in Washington had increased the difficulties facing the British Government.

"The government we are electing today is faced with tremendous problems," the newspaper said. "At the last moment a huge addition has been thrown upon its work by the defection of President Hoover."

"That much-boomed man, at meeting with the French Premier which might have set the world's eyes toward international compromise, seems to have made a rearrangement about money and to have left France with a free hand to do her will in Europe."

"That means a bigger job for Mr. MacDonald and the men turned to power with him. It is a kind of work in which Mr. MacDonald will shine and in which has done so well before."

TROOPS MAY GO TO BURMA

Forces at Poona Told to Be Ready for the Movement.

POONA, British India, Oct. 27.—British troops have been ordered to stand by for orders to move to Burma in view of the possibility of renewed trouble there.

For several months there have been clashes in Burma between opposed religious sects and this year there was armed resistance in the Tharawaddy district to native whose followers called "Golden Crow." He is now in custody of the police.

BACKS BRINKLEY STATEMENT

But Mexican Department Points Out Broadcasts Are "Propaganda"

MEXICO CITY, Oct. 27 (AP).—The Department of Communications decided today that the broadcast-

increased her military forces along the northern border of Manchuria.

Sze's Suggestion Welcomed

TOKYO, Oct. 27 (AP).—Official circles here welcomed today, "in principle," the suggestion of Dr. Sze, Chinese spokesman, that Aristide Briand, chairman of the League of Nations Council, should arbitrate a treaty between Japan and China.

It was added, however, that it is not much point in negotiating treaties "until China has shown readiness to abide by existing international law."

Yoshizawa to Talk to Briand

PARIS, Oct. 27 (AP).—In response to Japanese queries it was said today that negotiations looking toward settlement of the Sino-Japanese conflict in Manchuria will be carried here between Kenkichi Yoshizawa, Japan's Ambassador, and Aristide Briand, French Foreign Minister, prior to the League of Nations Council meeting on Nov. 16.

Mr. Yoshizawa represented the Japanese government in the recent League of Nations Council meeting at Geneva. Briand was chairman of the meeting.

"All the News That's
Fit to Print."

The N

VOL. LXXXI...No. 26,940.

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ROOSEVELT WINS HEARING FOR STATE ON ST. LAWRENCE

Stimson Agrees a Settlement
Must Await Understanding
With New York.

WALSH TO SEE HIM TODAY

Power Chairman to Press for
Terms Safeguarding State's
Interests in Waterway.

ENDS BATTLE OF MONTHS

Long Correspondence With White
House and State Department
Brings Invitation From Latter.

The State of New York has won its battle with the Federal Government for the right to be consulted by Washington before conclusion of a treaty between the United States and Canada for the development of the St. Lawrence seaway. Negotiations for the treaty are now under way.

It was learned yesterday that President Hoover, through Secretary of State Stimson, has agreed that before the conclusion of any treaty the Federal Government would come to an understanding with the State of New York which would take into consideration the State's interests in the water-power resources of the St. Lawrence as defined by the Legislature in the creation of the State Power Authority.

The understanding is to be along the lines already reached between the Dominion of Canada and the Province of Ontario, whose interests in the St. Lawrence are similar to those of the State of New York.

The Federal Government's agreement to consult the State of New York follows prolonged correspondence between Frank P. Walsh, chairman of the State Power Authority, and President Hoover, begun last summer and continued more recently with Secretary Stimson. In response to insistent demands by Chairman Walsh, President Hoover has finally brought about a conference between Mr. Walsh and Secretary Stimson to be held at 11 A. M. this morning. Mr. Walsh, accompanied by Delos M. Cosgrove, vice chairman of the State Power Authority, who will also participate in the conference, left for Washington yesterday afternoon.

He Will Present Memorandum.

Armed with full credentials from Governor Roosevelt to act as spokesman for the State, Mr. Walsh will present to the Secretary of State a memorandum setting forth the State's interests in the situation, to be supplemented orally by him and Mr. Cosgrove. The memorandum was prepared at the request of the Secretary of State.

Today's conference of the State's representatives with Secretary Stimson is believed to conclude a controversy of several months, which at times assumed a bitter character. On Oct. 8 Chairman Walsh made a statement, apropos of an announcement from Washington concerning the intention of the Federal Government to begin at once the negotiations with Canada, charging that President Hoover had persistently ignored the request of New York State to be heard in the matter and refused to take into consideration the interests of the State.

Mr. Walsh then made public a letter he had addressed to the President on Oct. 3 recapitulating the State's side of the issue and repeating the request for a conference with the Federal authorities. No reply had been received to that letter from

Oxford and Harvard to Debate On Radio Across the Atlantic

The first international collegiate radio debate, in which the teams of Oxford University and Harvard will argue across 3,000 miles of ocean, was assured yesterday with the acceptance by Oxford of the Harvard challenge. Tentative plans provide that the contest be held the first week in December, on a subject yet to be chosen.

The debate has been arranged by the National Broadcasting Company, which will convey the voices of both teams back and forth across the Atlantic, and will re-broadcast the event in this country. The British Broadcasting Corporation has been invited to do the same in England. The event will mark the first debate between the two universities since 1925.

MCCOOEY EXAMINED; TAKES STAND TODAY

Leader Testifies on Judgeship
Deal in Private—Steinbrink
Was Heard on Monday.

HALF OF INQUIRY FUND USED

Slash in Pay of Seabury Aides
Demanded—Sherwood Not
Expected to Return Now.

With unusual secrecy, John H. McCooey, Democratic leader of Brooklyn, was examined privately yesterday by counsel to the Hofstadter legislative committee preparatory to his being called to testify at a public hearing today on the deal to nominate twelve for Supreme Court judgeships in the Second Judicial District.

Mr. McCooey was questioned by George Trosk, associate counsel to Samuel Seabury, at an undisclosed place in Brooklyn which had been agreed upon. The disclosure that he had been examined also brought to light the fact that Meier Steinbrink, former Republican leader of Brooklyn and one of the Supreme Court candidates in the deal, had been interrogated in the same manner on Monday.

Both will be witnesses at the public hearing today and it was expected that W. Kingsland Macy, Republican State chairman, also would be called. The secret examinations, it was said, had been agreed upon to avoid the publicity attendant upon the appearance of either of the men at the legislative committee headquarters.

Protests Counsel's Salaries.

Following reports from Albany that the investigation had, up to date, used \$220,780 of the \$500,000 appropriation made for it, Assemblyman Louis A. Cuvillier wrote a letter last night to Senator Samuel H. Hofstadter, chairman of the committee, asking for an executive session of the committee after the public hearings today at which, he said, he will urge that the salaries of the higher-paid associate and assistant counsel be halved.

He pointed out that the records of State Controller Tremaine showed seven associate counsel receiving \$1,000 a month. Others were shown to be receiving \$750, \$650 or \$540 a month. The salaries, he charged, were extravagant, and declared that the counsel receiving such pay were not earning it. He proposed that the highest paid be cut to \$500 a month, the next to \$400 and the lowest paid to \$250.

He said John R. Davies, Associate Counsel, was receiving in addition to the \$1,000 a month paid him by the

Continued on Page Four.

SOVIET SENDS ARMS TO AID MANCHURIANS IN OPPOSING JAPAN

Japanese State Russia Has
Moved Four Carloads for
Troops Supporting Chang.

SITUATION BELIEVED WORSE

New Movements of Japan's
Forces, Bandit Attacks and
Boycotts Augment Crisis.

CHIANG GAINS NEW POWER

Nanking Leader Gets Firmer Grip
and Peace Negotiations With
Canton Remain Deadlocked.

By HALLETT ABEND.

Special Cable to THE NEW YORK TIMES.
SHANGHAI, Oct. 27.—The South Manchuria Railway today officially confirmed Soviet Russia's activities in assisting Heilung-Kiang Province troops in Manchuria who are supporting Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang.

Today, according to official Japanese advices, four cars arrived from Chita, in Siberia, at Manchouli, on the southwest border of Manchuria, bound for Tsitsihar and loaded with field guns, machine guns and ammunition. When the Japanese Consul at Manchouli demanded an explanation from the Chinese military authorities he was at first met with silence and later with a reluctant denial.

The South Manchuria Railway offices at Harbin also today confirmed Soviet military activities in North-western Manchuria. On the Sino-Soviet border at Manchouli it was revealed today there are more than 150 railway cars ready for the use of the Russian military.

The Manchurian crisis has been further augmented by the admitted Japanese movement of more than 200 Japanese soldiers westward to Cheng-chiaun on the Taonanfu Railway, after verification of news of Chinese soldier and bandit attacks, the Japanese excuse being that the railway was built with Japanese loans of more than \$30,000,000, the principal and interest of which are in arrears. The Ssuningkal-Toanan Railway is now being operated by the South Manchuria. The new Chinese Provincial Government, with headquarters at Mukden, is assuming responsibility, with 12,000 soldiers assigned to guard duty. Many towns and villages in this area are overrun with bandits demanding huge sums for "protection."

Report Japanese Entrenched.

The power of General Chang Tso-hsiang, former Governor of Kirin, is rapidly growing in Manchuria, with the help of the Japanese and Chinese elements hostile to a resumption of authority by Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang. Chinese reports from the Chinchow area assert that the Japanese, 3,000 strong, are seemingly entrenching near by, preparatory to staying all winter.

Cables from Canton state that more than eighty Japanese women and children are hastening evacuation for Hongkong as tension increases. At Peiping, 20,000 students have enrolled in the Anti-Japanese Association and are busy searching shops. At Hankow 2,000 Chinese workmen have lost their jobs through the closing of Japanese cotton mills. More than 5,000 shops in Soochow were closed and sealed as a result of the searches of the Anti-Japanese Asso-

Continued on Page Ten.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Stutzman NARS, Date 12-18-75

1341

Versions Clash On Manchurian Conflict's Cause

Japanese Declare Blasting of Rail Line by Chinese Led to Military Activity

Alien Residents Disagree

Ensuing Events Dwarf First Move in War of the East

Victor Keen, correspondent of the New York Herald Tribune, begins today a series of four articles outlining the causes behind the clash of Chinese and Japanese interests in Manchuria.

By Victor Keen

A Staff Correspondent
Via Air Mail Mukden to Yokohama and Seattle to New York

MUKDEN, Sept. 28.—Operating with the swiftness and efficiency characteristic of a well-planned campaign, a Japanese force of approximately 12,000 men occupied most of the strategic cities on the Chinese railways in the Manchurian provinces of Fengtien and Kirin between the hours of 10:30 o'clock the night of Friday, September 18, and noon of the following day.

Within forty-eight hours after the first shot was fired, Japan was in control of a wide strip of Chinese territory in Manchuria stretching from near the Mongolian border eastward to the border of Korea, had shut off Manchuria's outlet to the sea by occupying the Chinese ports of Newchwang (Yinkow) and Antung, and had bottled up the Manchurian naval fleet at Newchwang. Antung, Antung, and had efficiently executed military coup, which took the world by surprise and set in motion the machinery of the Kellogg peace pact and the League of Nations Covenant to prevent war was occasioned, according to the Japanese version, by Chinese soldiers blowing up a section of rail on the South Manchuria Railway in the northern outskirts of Mukden.

Half an hour after this alleged explosion, artillery shells were falling in the vicinity of the Liaoning Trench Mortar Arsenal and the Chinese Trench Barracks, where were stationed a brigade of Chinese troops estimated at 10,000. Five hours later the Chinese brigade at North Barracks had been routed by a Japanese force not exceeding 670 men, and by dawn the Japanese had occupied Mukden, including the Trench Mortar Arsenal and the Mukden Arsenal (said to be the largest single arsenal in the world), and had silenced Chinese radio communications.

Surprise to Foreign Residents

In the early hours of the morning similar scenes were being enacted at widely diversified points in Fengtien and Kirin provinces, and September 21 a brigade of Japanese reinforcements and a squadron of bombing planes from Korea were en route to Manchuria. Changchun, the northern terminus of the South Manchuria Railway, and Kwantung, the actual junction between the South Manchuria and Chinese Eastern railways, fell before noon of September 18. Kirin, capital of the province of that name, was taken by the Japanese on September 21.

Many Chinese and foreign residents of Mukden were unaware of what was transpiring until they went to their offices on the morning of September 18 and found the streets barricaded with barbed-wire entanglements and sandbags guarded by Japanese soldiers with fixed bayonets. So accustomed had the residents of the Manchurian capital been to Japanese night maneuvers in the outskirts of Mukden accompanied by intermittent rifle and machine gun fire, that many thought the Japanese bombardment on the night of September 18 was only another night maneuver on a larger scale.

But in the morning there was plenty of visible evidence that the city had changed hands. Japanese armed soldiers with fixed bayonets were patrolling the streets, and the Chinese police force of approximately 2,000 men, who policed the so-called international section and the walled city, had disappeared. All the banks in the city excepting the Japanese Yokohama Specie Bank and Chosen Bank (Korea) were closed and Japanese flags were flying from all the Chinese provincial and municipal buildings.

Japanese Official Version
Early reports of the origin of the conflict abroad were conflicting. This is the official Japanese version. Lieutenant Karuma, attached to a Japanese infantry company stationed near the South Manchuria right of way a few miles north of Mukden and near the Chinese North Barracks at Peitaiyung, was holding night patrol exercises with a squad of soldiers along the railway on the night of September 18. Four soldiers who were practicing patrol duty were walking ahead of him, and he and two soldiers were bringing up the rear.

At approximately 10:30 o'clock the party heard an explosion a short distance up the track and, hurrying to the scene, saw two Chinese soldiers running from the railway right of way toward the Chinese barracks a quarter of a mile away. The Japanese patrol fired at the retreating figures and, according to Lieutenant Karuma, the fire was returned from Chinese soldiers hiding in the surrounding fields of killing (sorghum). The Japanese officer estimated that there were about 300 Chinese soldiers taking part in the firing.


The lieutenant dispatched one of his men to the Japanese barracks situated about a mile and a half from the spot where the explosion occurred. Captain Kawashima, who was in command of the Japanese company of 150 men stationed at the barracks, dispatched thirty rounds of ammunition to his soldiers and hastened to the assistance of the patrol. Information was sent to Colonel Shimamoto, commander of the Mukden Japanese military force, who was at his home, and he in turn sent word to Fushun, about thirty miles from Mukden, for reinforcements.

Another Version Set Forth
After Captain Kawashima arrived at the scene of the explosion with his company of reinforcements the Japanese succeeded in dislodging the Chinese from the kaoliang field and they fled to their barracks. On the arrival of Colonel Shimamoto with additional troops the Japanese attacked the Chinese barracks. Reinforcements arrived from Fushun at 3:30 in the morning, bringing the total Japanese force attacking North Barracks to approximately 670 men.


The Japanese claim that they succeeded only in capturing the Chinese military camp after five hours of hard fighting during which 300 Chinese soldiers were killed and many wounded. During the entire military operations involved in occupying Mukden, the Japanese report two privates killed and twenty-three officers and men wounded.

Japanese reservists armed with rifles and revolvers participated in the occupation of other strategic centers in the city.

As the Japanese Occupied Strategic Cities in Manchuria



Shinto priest and Japanese officers at the funeral at Changchun of Japanese soldiers killed in the fighting at Nanlino and Kwangchengtze, north of Changchun



Japanese troops of the 4th Infantry Regiment occupying Kirin, capital of Kirin province, on September 21.

Chinese soldiers in uniform, who are said to have been shot by the Japanese patrol when they were fleeing after the explosion.

From Chinese and non-Japanese foreign sources, the writer obtained another version of what happened on the night of September 18. Chinese witnesses who were engaged in night work at the arsenal on the night in question said that when the Japanese soldiers attacked the Chinese arsenal guards, who either fled or were shot, all the workmen escaped except two Chinese, one of whom hid in a flower bed near the building and another in an empty water receptacle.

According to these men, the Japanese soldiers threw hand grenades at all of the office buildings or living quarters, where lights were in evidence. One party of soldiers attacked a dormitory where a large number of workmen were quartered and hurled hand grenades into the building. Forty-two Chinese workmen were killed and a large number were wounded. It is, of course, possible that the Japanese soldiers thought the workmen were arsenal guards off duty.

In the early hours of the morning the Japanese removed from the arsenal all of the finished trench mortars and component parts for the manufacture of motor trucks, a recent addition to the plant activities. They also confiscated all of the finished trucks and loaded the safe containing the August 1,200,000 were to have been paid on the following day. Efforts to obtain this money to pay the workmen, who are now without work, have been unavailing.

Chinese Deny Resistance
According to Chinese reports, the Chinese brigade at North Barracks, a number of the Japanese-controlled Kirin-Tunhua railway, which Japan wishes to extend to the Korean border for strategic purposes.


The number of Chinese who were killed and wounded in Mukden during the occupation probably never will be known by any one except the Japanese military authorities. All responsible Chinese officials fled in the early hours of the morning of September 19, and it is estimated that 100,000 Chinese residents out of a total population of 400,000 deserted the city during the week just following the Japanese occupation.

All excepting the Japanese banks were closed until September 28, when the three foreign banks and the Bank of China opened for limited business. The Frontier Bank and the Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces, both provincial institutions, are still closed at this writing, their vaults having been sealed by orders of the Japanese military on the morning after the outbreak of hostilities.

Shops are gradually beginning to re-open in the Kuangtung (People's party) the basic fundamental principle being democratic government. The post of commander-in-chief of the national land and air forces, which Chiang Kai-shek holds, should be abolished, the demands say, and a separate supreme military organ should be established.

President Chiang's official reply, released today, does not touch upon the fundamental issues affecting his personal status, but stresses the necessity of a spirit of unity and harmony regarding foreign relations and suggests that the domestic issues be discussed at leisure.

Wang Ching-wei, veteran Left Wing leader and prominent member of the Canton delegation, issued the following comment on the Canton demands: "The main significance of the proposed issuance of two circular telegrams, one by Chiang Kai-shek announcing his retirement and the other by the Canton government announcing its dissolution, is that it will serve to end the complications of the last few years and open a new era."



Map of the Mukden area, showing the proximity of the Japanese and Chinese barracks to the spot where the blowing up of a railroad precipitated hostilities

hoisted a white flag in token of surrender. At Fushun, a coal mining town, thirty miles east of Mukden, Chinese police and patrols were disarmed by Japanese railway guards and Japanese police at midnight on September 18. Yingkow, the Chinese port of Newchwang, was occupied by the Japanese at 5 o'clock the morning of September 19, and at noon of that day a brigade of Japanese troops from Korea were entrained for the border. They did not actually cross the border until September 21, arriving at Mukden at midnight of that date.

Only Japanese Banks Left Open
Kirin was taken on September 20, and a battalion of Japanese infantry on September 23. The Japanese-controlled Kirin-Tunhua railway, which Japan wishes to extend to the Korean border for strategic purposes.

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Mr. Wang outlined the outstanding features of the "new era" as follows: "Liberation of politics from military domination. Any military man desirous of taking part in politics must resign and military position must be abolished. However distinguished his personal attainments, should be allowed to control simultaneously political and military affairs."

state of emergency existed. It is reported that Japanese residents in Changchun began to evacuate that city even before the Japanese troops attacked, some of the refugees arriving in Harbin on noon of the day the city was taken.

But, regardless of who was responsible for blowing up the rail which is supposed to have precipitated Japan's occupation of a large part of Manchuria, the incident has been dwarfed by the consequences of the ensuing events. Japan's occupation is now an accomplished fact. Chinese administrative machinery in the occupied territory has been disrupted and Chinese officials have fled.

Unless Japan is to be left in permanent control of the occupied area, some solution of the outstanding Sino-Japanese questions in Manchuria must be brought about as a basis for resumption of Chinese administration.

Japan's grievances against the Manchurian government and the historical background for Manchuria's problems will be discussed in subsequent articles, the second article appearing tomorrow.

Canton Insists Chiang Quit Civil Or Military Post

Peace Delegates at Shanghai Would End Army Domination of Political Affairs

By Victor Keen

From the Herald Tribune Bureau
Copyright, 1931, New York Tribune Inc.

SHANGHAI, Oct. 27.—The resignation of Chiang Kai-shek, President of the National government and commander-in-chief of its land and air forces, from either his executive or his military post constitutes the most important point in the proposals of the Cantonese peace delegation, the official text of which was issued here today.

The position of the Canton insurgents, now negotiating here with the Nanking leaders for reconciliation, was enumerated in seven points, addressed to President Chiang Kai-shek, covering both foreign and domestic policies.

The first point reads: "The Presidency of the National government should be filled, in accordance with the Presidential systems of France and Germany, by a comrade of venerable age and distinguished character and reputation. No military man in active service should be eligible for this post."

The Canton demands further urge centralization of the governmental functions in the Kuangtung (People's party) the basic fundamental principle being democratic government. The post of commander-in-chief of the national land and air forces, which Chiang Kai-shek holds, should be abolished, the demands say, and a separate supreme military organ should be established.

President Chiang's official reply, released today, does not touch upon the fundamental issues affecting his personal status, but stresses the necessity of a spirit of unity and harmony regarding foreign relations and suggests that the domestic issues be discussed at leisure.

Wang Ching-wei, veteran Left Wing leader and prominent member of the Canton delegation, issued the following comment on the Canton demands: "The main significance of the proposed issuance of two circular telegrams, one by Chiang Kai-shek announcing his retirement and the other by the Canton government announcing its dissolution, is that it will serve to end the complications of the last few years and open a new era."

Mr. Wang outlined the outstanding features of the "new era" as follows: "Liberation of politics from military domination. Any military man desirous of taking part in politics must resign and military position must be abolished. However distinguished his personal attainments, should be allowed to control simultaneously political and military affairs."

Canton's peace proposals do not mean that Chiang Kai-shek necessarily is to be eliminated from all his posts, but that he must choose between his political role and his military role. The Canton and Nanking peace delegations held a preliminary exchange of views in Shanghai this morning, and are to meet again tomorrow. In view of President Chiang's failure to commit himself definitely on the proposal that he resign, the outcome of the rapprochement negotiations remains problematical.

Russian Troops Ready to Guard Manchuria Line

Moscow Reported Awaiting Word of Danger to Railroad Jointly Operated

Tokio Fears Complications

Chinese Ordered to Repair Bridge Japanese Bombed

By Wilfrid Fleisher

By Cable to the Herald Tribune
Copyright, 1931, New York Tribune Inc.

TOKIO, Oct. 27.—Soviet Russia is preparing to send troops into northern Manchuria in the event the Moscow government believes the Chinese Eastern Railway, which it controls jointly with China, is endangered, according to official advices reaching the Foreign Office here from the Japanese Consul at Tientsin, northern Manchuria, who obtained the information from the Chinese Commissioner for Foreign Affairs there.

The Japanese Foreign Office has been advised that Russia is concentrating between 20,000 and 30,000 troops along the border of northern Manchuria and is holding in readiness 800 railway cars to transport troops and war material. The Russians are reported to be transferring part of this force to Pograrnichnaya, Siberia, at the eastern end of the Chinese Eastern Railway.

Complications Are Feared
General Ma Chan-han, commander of the provincial forces of Heilungkiang Province, northwestern Manchuria, is said to have informed the Japanese Consul at Tientsin that he was negotiating with the Russians to bring about the withdrawal of their troops farther beyond the frontier. General Ma is reported to believe that the Russians are preparing to protect the Chinese Eastern Railway.

The Nippon Dempo press agency reports that the Japanese military leaders at Mukden are "most concerned over the aggravation of the situation in Manchuria by defeated Chinese soldiers who have turned bandits," and that they "hope to avoid sending troops to Tientsin and Harbin to protect the Chinese there as they fear that they might involve Russia if Japanese troops approached the Chinese Eastern Railway."

Officials here say they feel that the reported Russian activities are creating "uneasiness which may give rise to complications."

Ultimatum Issued to Chinese
TOKIO, Oct. 27 (UP).—Japanese Consul Shimizu at Tientsin, Manchuria, issued an ultimatum to Chinese authorities today that unless a bridge over the Nonni River is repaired within a week the Japanese Army will "take effective measures." The bridge was damaged last week by bombs dropped from Japanese war planes. The Japanese claimed the bombing was started by Chinese troops who fired on the planes.

Japanese Ready to Occupy Road
MUKDEN, Manchuria, Oct. 27 (UP).—Japanese military forces are prepared to occupy the Chinese-controlled Tachan-Ankang Railway if necessary to enforce an ultimatum issued at Tientsin. It was indicated today. The Japanese-owned South Manchuria Railway holds a mortgage of 15,000,000 yen (about \$7,500,000) on the railway.

Soviet Extremely Busy, Avoids Manchurian Issue

Possibility of Russo-Chinese Entente Interests Foreign Circles

By Ralph W. Barnes

From the Herald Tribune Bureau
Copyright, 1931, New York Tribune Inc.

MOSCOW, Oct. 27.—With regard to the new reports emanating from Tokio that Soviet troops are being mobilized along the Manchurian frontier with the object of armed intervention in the present crisis in Manchuria between China and Japan, this correspondent finds Soviet Russia so deeply involved in the solution of a great number of extremely difficult international problems that she is likely to employ every means to avoid becoming entangled in anything resembling a Manchurian war.

Considerable importance is attached in foreign circles here to the suggestion in Shanghai dispatch to "The Times" of London, that an entente between China and Russia is possible as a result of the probable reconciliation between the Nanking government and the Canton insurgents.

The correspondent of "The Times" pointed out that a Kuomintang (People's party) with "Soviet leanings" is likely to play a conspicuous role in the government expected to be formed at the conclusion of the present Shanghai negotiations between the northern and southern leaders, and he added that "the possibility of an entente with the Soviet government is not to be ignored."

Mo Teh-hui, president of the Chinese Eastern Railway and head of the Chinese mission now engaged in negotiations here with the Foreign Affairs Commissariat, said today that, so far, he had received no new instructions from his government, and that the events in Manchuria, so far, had not changed the course of the Moscow conversations. He hinted, too, that the pace of these conversations—an extremely slow one—had not been changed.

The negotiations, in fact, began almost a year ago with the object of settling three questions: that of the ownership and management of the Chinese Eastern Railway, that of the commercial relations of the two countries and that of their future diplomatic relations. China and Soviet Russia have been without regular diplomatic relations since the raid on the Soviet Legation at Peking (now Peiping) several years ago.

Britons of North Cyprus Transferred to Warships

Renewed Disorders Reported; 4 Dead, 66 Hurt Is Told

ALEXANDRIA, Egypt, Oct. 27 (UP).—The transfer of Britons in northern Cyprus to warships because of renewed political disorders on the little Mediterranean island was reported tonight to have been ordered by the District Governor at Paphos. The advice said political agitators who have caused riotous demonstrations against British rule for the last week were threatening to renew the disturbances despite the fact that British troops and warships were sent to the island to maintain order.

Official announcement of casualties in the fighting listed four civilians killed and thirty-one wounded. Thirty-five police were wounded. Shops were re-opened in Nicosia and other districts following the arrest of many of the agitators.

Troops patrolled the villages where disorders were threatened and, in several instances, were forced to beat off attacking mobs. A members of the legislative council was arrested for instigating the burning of customs sheds at Pissouri.

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Department of State Letter, August 10, 1972
By MHA/D
NARS, Date 12-8-75

134

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

THE UNDER SECRETARY
OCT 26 1931
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OCT 29 1931
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
Digest of
Newspaper Items.

October 24, 1931.

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NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE

Tokyo despatch, October 23 (cable to HERALD TRIBUNE),
states that

"The Japanese government sent instructions this evening to Kenkichi Yoshizawa, its representative in the League of Nations Council at Geneva, to inform the Council that Japan 'will do her best' to complete within three weeks withdrawal into the South Manchuria Railway zone of the troops now occupying points in Manchuria outside that zone, and that Japan agrees to the proposal that the League Council shall reassemble then to hear the results of the negotiations and see what progress has been made."

"The decision came as a complete surprise, in view of the hitherto unalterable position of the Japanese government regarding withdrawal of its troops. It appeared to have been prompted by a desire to prevent the Council from adopting Aristide Briand's proposals."

Geneva despatch, October 23 (John T. Whitaker), reports that the Japanese delegate declared that Japan could not accept November 16 for complete withdrawal of troops into the South Manchuria Railway Zone. No date could be set until China first agreed by direct negotiations to certain fundamental principles.

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OCT 29 1931

- 2 -

The British delegate, Viscount Cecil, attacked the Japanese proposal hinting his suspicion that it confirmed China's fear of negotiations under duress. He inquired what was meant by "fundamental issues".

The Chinese delegate rejected the Japanese proposals, but Briand opined that there was no great difference of opinion between the two parties and rejoiced "that a service already had been done to mankind by the League", in averting war.

Harbin despatch, October 23 (U.P.), reports that adherents of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang are receiving arms from Russia, to oppose the so-called "independent" movement.

NEW YORK TIMES

Manchuria developments are summarized as follows:

"The League Council was blocked in its efforts at a Sino-Japanese settlement yesterday by Japan's refusal to agree to withdraw her troops by November 16. China accepted the League's plan.

"Tokyo expressed willingness to make slight concessions but stood by her demands that Nanking acknowledge her treaty rights and negotiate directly.

"Japanese officials in Shanghai asserted their country's withdrawal from the League is now 'highly probable'."

Shanghai

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

Shanghai despatch, October 23 (Hallett Abend), states that according to officials of the Japanese Legation, the withdrawal of Japan from the League is highly probable, as a result of the League's recommendation that Japanese troops evacuate occupied territory by November 16.

Shanghai despatch, October 23 (A.P.), reports that W. W. Yen, newly appointed Minister to the United States, will sail for America on October 25.

Seattle despatch, October 23, records the failure of the Pacific Commercial Bank, a Japanese institution, allegedly due to withdrawal of funds by Chinese depositors, as a boycott measure.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 2, 1931.

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
ROM - covering memo only.

This despatch from Canton gives the reactions in that city to the Japanese occupation of Manchuria. The important points are as follows:

1. Eugene Chen, in the Canton press, refers to a conversation which he had with Baron Shidehara and announces that the Canton Government cannot recognize any agreement which involves the annexation of Manchuria by Japan or which embodies terms and conditions humiliating to China.
2. Efforts in Canton to put the blame for the Manchurian crisis upon Chiang Kai Shek.
3. The ability of the Canton authorities to restrain anti-Japanese agitation.

[Handwritten signature]

JBJ

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gutzman NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 285

AM RECD
AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Canton, China, October 3, 1931.

793.94
SUBJECT: Reactions in Canton to Manchurian Crisis.

793.94
NOV 8 1931
The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 31 1931
Department of State

Sir:

1/- I have the honor to enclose herewith copies of
my despatch No. 77 (file No. 800), dated October 3,
1931, to the American Legation at Peiping on the
above subject.

Respectfully yours,

J. W. Ballantine
J. W. Ballantine,
American Consul General.

In quintuplet.

Enclosure:

1/- Despatch No. 77 to Legation.

800

JWB:CCW

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 77

Canton, China, October 3, 1931.

CONFIDENTIAL.

SUBJECT: Reactions in Canton to Manchurian Crisis.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to the Consulate General's telegrams of September 23, 3 P.M., September 24, 4 P.M., September 29 Noon, September 30, 6 P.M., and October 1, 5 P.M. in regard to the reactions in Canton to the Manchurian crisis, and to submit the following report in regard to this subject.

The Manchurian crisis first became a subject for official consideration on September 22, when, according to the local press, an extraordinary meeting of the State Council was held to discuss the matter. Possibly as an outcome of this meeting, a communication was addressed by Mr. Eugene Chen, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the "National Government" to the Japanese Government inquiring whether the "grave situation created in Manchuria was to be interpreted as a repudiation of the policy" defined by Baron Shidehara in their recent conversation. The text of 1/- this communication, copies of which are enclosed, was published in the local press on September 26, 1931, but

the

- 2 -

the date of the communication was not mentioned.

On September 29, 1931, the local press published the text of another message which Mr. Chen is said to have despatched to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs conveying the warning that "the National Government of the Republic of China will repudiate any agreement or settlement of the question which involves the annexation or the practical annexation of Manchuria, or which embodies terms and conditions subjecting China to national humiliation and dishonor." Copies of the text of this message are also enclosed.

There is, of course, no means of learning here whether these communications were actually despatched to the Japanese Government. One of the obvious purposes of the publicity given here to the Manchurian crisis and to the position of the Canton Government in regard thereto is to discredit Chiang Kai-shek. This purpose is also indicated in a recent resolution of the Kuomintang demanding that all the foreign relations of Nanking be first approved by the "National Government", it having been announced that this resolution was prompted by an apprehension that Nanking "may negotiate with Japan for the settlement of the Manchurian question by making Manchuria a gift to the land of the Rising Sun."

As stated in my telegram of October 1, 7 p.m., I was informed by the Chairman of the Kwangtung Provincial Government that the authorities here have not as yet formulated any plan for dealing with the Manchurian ques-

tion.

- 3 -

question, believing that their first task is to bring about the unification of China. Indeed, it is doubtful whether anything could have happened which would have given such a quick impetus as has the Manchurian crisis to the movement for healing the breach with Nanking.

While on the one hand the Cantonese authorities have made the most of the opportunity to arouse public opinion as a means of gaining support in their anti-Chiang campaign, they have been at the same time unremitting in their efforts to prevent popular demonstrations against Japan from getting out of hand. No attempt has been made to interfere with parades or the display of anti-Japanese posters, but effective protection has been accorded to Japanese residents and their property. I was told by the Japanese Consul General that there have been only two minor incidents - one of a Japanese girl being attacked by students and one involving slight damage to a Japanese shop. There has been, however, a run on the Bank of Taiwan, and Chinese in the employ of Japanese have been threatened unless they agreed to leave. So far no Japanese living in the Chinese city have been evacuated and even the Japanese hospital, a semi-official enterprise maintained in part by a Government subsidy, has continued to function. There have been many comments on the commendable restraint shown by the Chinese, notwithstanding the bitter resentment against Japan which is widely felt, and the Japanese residents are well satisfied with the manner in which the authorities have ensured their protection.

The tenor of the comments in the officially inspired Canton press regarding the Manchurian crisis reflects

clearly

- 4 -

clearly the desire of the leaders here to make capital of the situation primarily to discredit the present Nanking 3/- regime. There is enclosed an editorial from the Canton Daily Sun of September 29, 1931, charging Chiang with having created the recent incidents in Manchuria and blaming him also for the troubles of two years ago arising from the seizure by the Chinese of the Chinese Eastern Railway. The journal takes the position that there is every hope of an early adjustment of the difficulty with Japan if once the Nanking "warlord" is deposed. Chiang is also held responsible for the recent outrages against Japanese in Hongkong which it is averred were inspired by his agents as a means of embroiling the British Government with Japan. It is significant that the lack of animus against Japan revealed in this editorial is in marked contrast with the recent bitter denunciations of Germany for alleged supplying of Nanking with munitions, poison gas and military advisers and of the United States in connection with the American Bank Note Company case.

Although statements have appeared in the Shanghai press to the effect that some arrangement was reached by the Government here with the Japanese Government providing for military assistance to Canton in the way of munitions and military advisers, I have been unable to obtain any evidence corroborating such reports. I was told, however, by a Chinese who has a wide acquaintance in military circles that an effort had been previously made by the authorities here to obtain the services of a number of Japanese military advisers, but that preliminary arrangements with the Japanese War Office fell

through

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -

through on account of the opposition of the Japanese Foreign Office. It will be noted that in the enclosed editorial of the CANTON SUN, already referred to, there is a categorical denial of the statement that Canton has been supplied with arms by Japan.

- 4/- There is also enclosed as of possible interest a clipping from the CANTON GAZETTE of September 29, 1931, giving a statement published by the Japanese Consul General presenting the Japanese side of the present issue in Manchuria.

Sources of Information.

The information contained in the foregoing report was obtained through conversations with Chinese and foreign officials, American and other residents, and from the local press.

Respectfully yours,

J. W. Ballantine,
American Consul General.

Enclosures:


- 1/- Copy of text of communication published in the local press on September 26, 1931
- 2/- Copy of text of message published in the local press on September 29, 1931
- 3/- Copy of editorial from the CANTON SUN of September 29, 1931
- 4/- Copy of clipping from the CANTON GAZETTE of September 29, 1931.

Copies sent:

- 5 to Department
- 1 to Legation
- 1 to Nanking.

800

JWB:CCW



The Canton Daily Sun Sep. 26, 1931.

EUGENE CHEN ASKS TOKYO IF JAPAN CHANGES POLICY BY OCCUPATION OF MUKDEN

No Chinese Or Chinese Government Could Agree To A
Settlement Of The Manchurian Question Which Involved
The Practical Annexation Of Manchuria By Japan

Is The Forcible Occupation Of Important Centres In
Manchuria Interpreted As Repudiation Of Policy Of
Recognizing Manchuria As Part Of China, Eugene Chen Asks

The following is the text of the communication which Mr. Eugene Chen, Minister for Foreign Affairs, has cabled to Baron Shidehara, Japanese Foreign Minister, in connexion with the Manchurian situation:

In our conversations held during my recent unofficial visit to Tokyo, I stated that relations between China and Japan had been unsatisfactory for nearly a generation, and I suggested that the time had probably come for a new orientation in policy in the sense of the teachings of Dr. Sun Yat-sen whose conception of the relationship between the two countries, linked in certain respects by a common culture, envisaged a regime of understanding and friendliness instead of mistrust and misunderstanding in their international intercourse. And I referred to what is known as the "Manchurian question" as the crux of all relations between China and Japan.

Manchuria Can't Be Annexed

I emphasized that no Chinese or group of Chinese or Chinese Government could agree to a settlement of the Manchurian question which involved the annexation or the practical annexation of Manchuria by Japan. I stressed another point. I said that no settlement of the question would be effective and real unless the Chinese Nation as a whole approved of it; and I indicated that such approval would have to be secured through the submission of the terms of settle-

ment to the Kuomintang in National Congress assembled.

Japan Respects Chinese Sovereignty

You replied that nothing could be further from the thought of the Government of Japan than the annexation of Manchuria and, if and when it should become necessary, your Government would be prepared to declare categorically that Japan recognised Manchuria as an integral part of the Republic of China and had no wish or intention to infringe Chinese territorial sovereignty in that region. At the same time you pointed out that Japan had "rights and interests in Manchuria, most of which are vested in her by treaty and all of which are the outcome of a long historical background." In further conversations with responsible members of the General Staff Headquarters and the War Office in Tokyo as well as with the official leader of the Seiyukai, I satisfied myself that, on this crucial point, you appeared to express the governing mind of Japan.

Occupation Angers China

Events, however, are taking place in Manchuria which are a denial of the plain meaning

of the foregoing definition of Japanese policy. A great historic city and other important centres in Manchuria have been forcibly occupied by Japanese troops, and deeds are being done on Chinese soil which would move even the weakest of nations to indignation and resistance.

As the National Government established at Canton is prepared to cooperate in realizing Dr. Sun's conception of Chinese-Japanese relations, it has a right to know whether the grave situation created in Manchuria is to be interpreted as a repudiation of the policy stated by you in the course of our recent exchange of views, or (which is a view held in some informed quarters) is it to be treated as only the reckless action of the less-modern section of the Japanese High Command whose ideas about the vital needs of Japan as a modern state and whose views on the relationship of nations are a survival from the Ages of Feudalism?

EUGENE CHEN

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

The Canton Gazette Sep. 29, 1931.

**NATIONAL GOVERNMENT WILL
NOT AGREE TO JAPANESE AN-
NEXATION OF MANCHURIA**

**SAYS MR. EUGENE CHEN, MINISTER OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, IN WARNING
TO BARON SHIDEHARA**

Mr. Eugene Chen, Minister for Foreign Affairs, has communicated the following warning to Baron Shidehara, the Japanese Foreign Minister, in connexion with the present situation in Manchuria:

In view of the possibility that General Chiang Kai-shek may initiate or may authorize negotiation for the settlement of the present grave situation in Manchuria, I have the honor to warn Your Excellency that the National Government of the Republic of China will repudiate any agreement or settlement of the question which involves the annexation or the practical annexation of Manchuria, ~~or which~~ embodies terms and conditions subjecting China to national humiliation and dishonor.

I am constrained to communicate this warning because the Japanese Military Authorities know to what length Chiang Kai-shek, if pressed, may go in regard to Manchuria. In the course of my conversation on July 30 last with members of the General Staff Headquarters in Tokyo, I was told—in the sense of an objective historical fact—that Chiang Kai-shek, during his exile in Japan in 1927, sought the assistance of the late General Tanaka (then head of the Japanese Government) and stated that he would not be too critical of what Japan might do with Manchuria in the event of his return to power in China.

(Signed) EUGENE CHEN

The Canton Daily Sun

Tuesday, September 29, 1931

THE REAL TRUTH

The stumbling block to permanent peace rests on the shoulders of the Nanking dictator, Chiang Kai-shek. The hope of a true unification of China will never be realized unless and until the Nanking warlord is overthrown. The disastrous Sino-Russian "incident" two years ago was due to the greed and avarice of Chiang. He ordered the seizure of the Chinese Eastern Railway because there was a yearly surplus of \$20,000,000. Chiang thought that the Russians would tamely submit to his illegal act. He was sadly mistaken. The Russians retaliated most effectively. Chang Hsueh-liang wired to Nanking for assistance when the Soviets invaded Manchuria. No help was forthcoming from Chiang Kai-shek. The Mukden warlord was helpless in face of Russian attacks and lost "face." He was obliged to submit and the Russians are now more firmly established over the control of the C.E.R. than before the seizure. The matter is still unsettled between China and Russia.

Now Chiang has created another "incident," and this time is with Japan. We hold no brief for the Island Empire, for we do not believe that occupation of the territory of another country is a solution of international misunderstandings, but, as Mr. Sun Fo says, Chiang Kai-shek is behind all the troubles. The Manchurian incident is undoubtedly grave, but there is every hope of an early adjustment with Japan. The incident will continue to be grave unless the Nanking warlord is overcome. His immediate resignation is demanded by the National Government and is up to him to show his patriotism by relinquishing his post and save the country from further bloodshed. It was Chiang Kai-shek's bombastic speech delivered at the weekly memorial

service in Nanking on September 7 in reference to Japanese problems that angered Tokyo. In the course of the speech Chiang declared among other things that as the result of the recent visit to Japan by Mr. Eugene Chen, Foreign Minister of the National Government, Japan has supplied the Canton Government with a large quantity of arms and ammunition. It being utterly false and without foundation that Mr. Chen had gone to secure help from Japan, it was natural that the Japanese authorities took a very serious view on such statement especially coming from the head of the Nanking regime. Canton has ample supply of arms and ammunition, and does not have to send its Foreign Minister abroad for that purpose. Chiang tried to discredit the National Government in the eyes of the world by making false statements and naturally he himself has been repudiated by the whole Chinese nation as a traitor to the cause of the Nationalist revolution and they demand his elimination.

Chiang Kai-shek is also behind the anti-Japanese agitation in Hong Kong. It is his intention to embroil the British Government with Japan. Chiang's highly-paid propaganda agents have been very busy in Hong Kong in the last few days scattering pamphlets on the streets and labeling the walls of houses in the British Colony with inflammatory slogans against the Japanese. We regard such tactics of the Nanking dictator as utterly base and contemptible and the Hong Kong authorities should take note of it. We condemn the cowardly acts of those Chinese who assaulted peaceful Japanese citizens in Hong Kong, and in one case five members of a Japanese family were cruelly done to death by a Chinese mob in Kowloon. The National Government in Canton should be warmly congratulated for the effective way in which order and peace were maintained in these troublesome days because Japanese citizens could safely walk the streets in Canton without fear of molestation.

There are nearly 200,000 of our compatriots in Japan, and we are happy to say that such disgraceful street incidents as were witnessed in Hong Kong are absent in Japan. The Chinese people in Hong Kong and elsewhere must not take the law into their own hands, but leave the matter for settlement with Japan in the hands of the National Government. The propaganda agents of Chiang Kai-shek have also been very active among the students in Canton and Hong Kong in their anti-Japanese agitation. It is needless to say that every citizen is expected to be patriotic and to fight for one's country against any foreign aggression, but students should remember that to take the law into one's hands and to be patriotic is quite a different thing. A gentleman is a gentleman everywhere, no matter where he may be; in his own home or outside of it. All street scenes should be carefully avoided.

Chiang Kai-shek is now reaping what he has sown. His four years' dictatorship has turned out to be as barren as the Gobi Desert, with corruption and maladministration staring him at every turn. His dictatorial powers know no bounds. He ordered the imprisonment of Mr. Hu Han-min, his colleague and friend, because Mr. Hu refused to be a party to perpetuate Chiang's dictatorship. General Li Chi-sen was also imprisoned by the Nanking warlord on the flimsy charge that General Li was plotting for his downfall. Chiang Kai-shek can show nothing of a constructive character since his regime was established in Nanking. He has squandered Tls 800,000,000 of the people's hard earned money to keep himself in power. His foreign policy has been "macaronic" and all important issues with foreign countries are getting more and more complicated every day and remain unsolved. The abolition of extraterritoriality, the retrocession of concessions, the Chinese Eastern Railway dispute and now the Manchurian incident, all these are too big a matter for Chiang Kai-shek to straighten out. We again emphasize the urgent necessity for the Nanking warlord to immediately relinquish his post in order that the country may achieve real unity, to secure the blessings of peace and to present a united front against all aggressors. Chiang Kai-shek must therefore go.

The Manchurian Gazette Sep. 29, 1931.

Japanese Side Told By Their Consul

Statement Issued After The
Extraordinary Cabinet-
Meeting On Sept. 24th.

(1) The Japanese Government constantly has been exercising honest endeavors in pursuance of its settled policy to foster friendly relations between Japan and China, and to promote common prosperity and well-being of the two countries.

Unfortunately conduct of officials and individuals of China some years past has been such that our national sentiment has frequently been irritated. In particular, unpleasant incidents have taken place one after another in regions of Manchuria and Mongolia in which Japan is interested in especial degree, until impression has gained strength in minds of the Japanese people that Japanese fair friendly attitude is not being reciprocated by China in like spirit.

Amidst this atmosphere of perturbation and anxiety thus created a detachment of Chinese troops destroyed tracks of the South Manchurian Railway in the vicinity of Mukden, and attacked our railway guard at midnight of September the 13th. A clash between Japanese and Chinese troops then took place.

(Continued on Page 10)

Japanese Side Told By Their Consul

(Continued from Page 1)

(2) Situation became critical as a number of Japanese guards stationed along the entire railway did not then exceed ten thousand and four hundred while there were in juxtaposition some two hundred twenty thousand Chinese soldiers. Moreover hundreds of thousands of the Japanese residents were placed in jeopardy. In order to forestall imminent disaster the Japanese Army had to act swiftly.

The Chinese soldiers garrisoned in neighboring localities were disarmed and duty of maintaining peace and order was left in the hands of the local Chinese organizations under the supervision of Japanese troops.

(3) These measures having been taken by our soldiers were mostly withdrawn within the railway on the 20th. There still remain detachments in Mukden and Kirin and small number of men in few other places, but nowhere does any state of military occupation as such exist.

Reports that the Japanese authorities have seized customs or salt gabelle office in Yinkou or that they have taken control of the Chinese railway between Supigkai and Chenchiatung or between Mukden and Sinmintun are entirely untrue nor has the story of our troops having ever been sent to the north of Changchun or into Chirtau any foundation in fact.

(4) The Japanese Government at the special Cabinet-meeting on September 19 took decision that all possible efforts should be made to prevent any aggravation of the situation and instructions to that effect were given to the Commander of the Manchurian Garrison.

It is true that a detachment was despatched from Chungchun to Kirin on September the 21st, but it was not with a view to military occupation, but only for the purpose of removing menace to the South Manchurian Railway on the flank.

As soon as that object has been attained the bulk of our detachment will be withdrawn.

It may be added that while a mixed brigade of four thousand and ten men was sent from Korea to join the Manchurian Garrison, the total number of men in garrison at present still remains within the limit set by the treaty and that fact can not therefore be regarded having in any way added to seriousness of the international situation.

(5) It may be superfluous to repeat that the Japanese Government harbors no territorial designs in Manchuria.

What we desire is that Japanese subjects shall be enabled safely to engage in various peaceful pursuits and be given opportunity in participating in development of that land by means of capital and labor.

It is the proper duty of a Government to protect its rights and interests legitimately enjoyed by nations or individuals.

Endeavors to guard the South Manchurian Railway against any wanton attacks should be viewed in no other light.

The Japanese Government true to its established policy, is prepared to cooperate with the Chinese Government in order to prevent the present incident from developing into disastrous situation between the two countries and to work out such constructive plans as will once for all eradicate causes for any future friction.

The Japanese Government would be more than gratified if the present difficulty could be brought to a solution which will give a new turn to the mutual relations between the two countries.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM RECD

No. -----

AMERICAN CONSULATE,
GENERAL,

Mukden, China, October 9, 1931.

NOV 30 31

SUBJECT: Further Developments in the Situation.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

NOV 4 1931

THE HONORABLE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy in
quintuplicate of my despatch No. 457 of October 8, 1931
to the Legation, Peiping, on the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers
M. S. Myers
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 457

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NOV 5 1931

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure to despatch of M. S. Myers, Consul General at Mukden, China, dated October 8, 1931 on the subject "Further Developments in the Situation."

No. 457

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, China.

October 8, 1931.

SUBJECT: Further Developments in the Situation.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping, China.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my previous despatches regarding the situation created by the Japanese military occupation of certain areas outside the South Manchuria Railway zone and to report further developments.

The situation at Mukden is unchanged. Japanese troops, I have been reliably told, have been withdrawn almost entirely from the walled city but those remaining in and around Mukden, exclusive of the Japanese railway zone, number 2000. They are distributed mainly between the arsenals, the aerodrome, the military camps and the suburbs including the Commercial Settlement. From the same source - my Japanese Colleagues - it was learned that the gendarmerie in Mukden, including those in the railway settlement, number 180. Changchun, it

is

135

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

is understood, is still the chief concentration point of the Japanese troops in Manchuria which are officially given as 15,000.

Outside the railway zone and the Chinese cities adjacent thereto (all have been occupied), units of the Japanese forces are now found at Hsinmin, Liaoyuan, and Kirin. The detachment in the Hsinmin area is entrenched on the eastern bank of the Liao River at Chü-ljuho, 7 miles east of Hsinmin along the Peiping-Liaoning railway. Re-enforcements numbering 300 infantry and some field artillery which had been requested by the Japanese Consul at Hsinmin owing to bandit activities in the neighborhood were despatched from Mukden early yesterday morning. At daybreak a squadron of 6 aeroplanes left Mukden in that direction for the purpose, it is thought, of reconnoitering and possibly bombing the bandits. The strength of the detachment at Liaoyuan has been given as one battalion and according to a report of an eyewitness the Japanese are now engaged in laying out a landing field for aeroplanes at that point, which, it is believed will be used in connection with military operations against the so-called "bandit troops". At Kirin there is one brigade, detachments of which are distributed along the Kirin Changchun railway. According to a private report, believed to be reliable, there is also a small force of 30 Japanese gendarmes at Taonan but

this

136

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

this is officially denied by the Japanese military authorities.

There have been only two recent military operations reported by the Japanese, one against "bandit troops" to the northeast of Mukden (the Japanese troops were despatched from Kaiyuan and Tieling) because of the killing of Koreans, and the other against another group of these troops northeast of Fushun in the neighborhood of Yingp'an for the same reason. Both expeditions have returned to the railway zone after apparently having accomplished their objects, and according to press reports the expedition sent to Yingp'an has secured a pledge from the Chinese Garrison Commissioner at Shanch'engtzu, on the Mukden-Hailung Railway, guaranteeing the safety of Japanese and Koreans in his district. The two companies which were despatched on this mission travelled by armored train over the Mukden-Hailung Railway to Yingp'an.

The Japanese battalion which was sent to Tunhua, the eastern terminus of the Kirin-Tunhua railway, at the time of the occupation of Kirin was reported to have been withdrawn to Kirin on October 3. This battalion, it has been learned, is being held in readiness for prompt despatch to Tunhua should an unfavorable change in the situation at that point occur. A small detachment was sent some days ago from the port of Newchwang (Yingkou) to the old city of Newchwang, about 25 miles

to

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

to the north, to suppress bandits and was withdrawn the following day.

The Japanese forces outside the railway zone, as of today, are officially given as follows: (Information secured by Lieutenant Brown)

At Kirin:

1 Infantry brigade
 1 field artillery battery

At Liaooyuan (Chengchiatun):

2 Infantry companies
 1 field artillery battery

At Chuliuh: "

2 Infantry companies
 1 field artillery battery

The strength of these forces is approximately 4,800, nearly one third of the reported total in South Manchuria.

Banditry in south Manchuria has become very serious since the Japanese occupation, due, in no small measure, to the presence in the interior of considerable numbers of armed robbers and police who have fled from their posts at the time of the Japanese military occupation of Mukden and other cities. The main concentration of Chinese troops affected was at Mukden and many of these soldiers and some policemen have turned to banditry as a means of gaining a livelihood. At Mukden, a feeling of insecurity has prevailed among foreigners during the past week as a result of numerous cases of armed robbery and the frequent shooting which accompanied

them.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 8 -

them. Fortunately better police protection is now being accorded and conditions in this respect have perceptibly improved in the past day or two. It is stated by responsible persons that among the armed robbers that have been shot some ex-policemen have been identified. So far only wealthy Chinese have been the recipients of their attentions, an indication that the robbers are well acquainted with the city. Mention may be made in this connection of the robbery of Yen 80,000 from the Bank of Chosen in the walled city at seven o'clock in the afternoon of October 6. According to the official press release, the robbers have not yet been apprehended.

As showing the seriousness of bandit depredations in the interior, first-hand information furnished by a foreign missionary who recently returned from the vicinity of Tamintun, south of Fsinmin, may be of interest. One of the villages in that region which offered resistance to the bandit soldiers was destroyed by fire and the inhabitants shot, while at a neighboring village where no resistance was offered the houses of the well-to-do only were looted and when the soldiers departed the poor were invited to help themselves to what^{ever} remained. This group was reported as numbering about 500. At some places in that general region, it was also learned that the farmers were warned against

cutting

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 6 -

cutting the high kaoliang stalks which would destroy the cover now used by the bandits. They were permitted to cut the heads of the stalks only. According to all reports, the bandits are extremely active on all sides, more particularly in the regions west of the main line of the South Manchuria Railway and northeast of Mukden.

The local Chinese police force (奉天自衛警察局) which is being organized by Feng Ching-yi, the head of the organization under the general direction of the municipal administration (Japanese controlled) now numbers 2000, of which 1700 are armed. At the end of last week the total force was only 1800. It is expected that the force will be raised to the required number of 3000 within a short period. Mr. Feng, who is a former Chairman of the defunct Provincial Assembly, seems to be working very earnestly for the organization of an adequate police force for this city.

Japanese censors were installed in the Chinese Post Office on October 4 or 5. They are not interfering in any way with foreign mail but are closely scrutinizing all mail matter addressed to Chinese and especially Chinese newspapers. It is believed that one of the main objects of this censorship at present is the stoppage of Chinese press reports regarding anti-Japanese developments in the south.

It

1364

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 7 -

It may be added that only one Chinese newspaper, the Tung San Sheng Kung Pao, has resumed publication since the Japanese military occupation. It is greatly reduced in size and naturally all news is subject to a strict censorship by the Japanese.

The Japanese now completely control the local press and maintain a censorship on press telegrams as well as mail matter. However, as stated above, there is no censorship of foreign mail.


The Chinese telegraphs in the occupied areas and the wireless stations at Mukden have been closed by the Japanese military authorities and according to available information there is no immediate prospect of these radio stations (one operated with San Francisco and the other with Germany) being opened. The only available telegraphic facilities with Mukden are Japanese.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers.
American Consul General.

Original and one copy to Legation.
Five copies to Department.
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.

MSMIAAB
800.



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75




No. 1983

IN
EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA



Paris, October 23, 1931.

OCT 30 31



793.94

FOR DISTRIBUTION - CHECK

To the File

In U. S. A.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

Sir:

500.A15A3 Press/659

In compliance with the Department's instruction No. 293 of August 19, 1930, I have the honor to transmit herewith clippings from the French press, on the subject of Sino-Japanese relations, covering the period from October 20 to October 23, 1931, inclusive.

Respectfully yours,

Williamson S. Howell, Jr.
Williamson S. Howell, Jr.,
Charge d'Affaires ad interim.

Enclosures.....

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1931 NOV 2

- 2 -

Enclosures (in original only):

Clippings from the following newspapers:

October 20, 1931.

- No. 1 - L'ECHO DE PARIS
2 - FIGARO
3 - HUMANITE
4 - LE PETIT PARISIEN
5 - LE TEMPS

October 21, 1931.

- No. 6 - EXCELSIOR
7 - FIGARO
8 - LE JOURNAL
9 - LA JOURNEE INDUSTRIELLE
10 - L'OEUVRE
11 - LE PETIT PARISIEN
12 - LA REPUBLIQUE
13 - LE TEMPS

October 22, 1931.

- No. 14 - L'AVENIR
15 - CORRESPONDANCE UNIVERSELLE
16 - L'ECHO DE PARIS
17 - EXCELSIOR
18 - FIGARO
19 - LE JOURNAL
20 - JOURNAL DU COMMERCE
21 - LE MATIN
22 - LE PETIT PARISIEN
23 - LE POPULAIRE
24 - LA REPUBLIQUE
25 - LE TEMPS

October 23, 1931.

- No. 26 - L'ACTION FRANCAISE
27 - L'ECHO DE PARIS
28 - FIGARO
29 - JOURNAL DES DEBATS
30 - LE MATIN
31 - LE PETIT PARISIEN
32 - LE POPULAIRE
33 - LE TEMPS

In quintuplicate.
710.
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 1983
of October 23, 1931
from the Embassy at Paris
EXTRACT from L'ECHO DE PARIS, October 20, 1931.

La guerre civile la guerre ou le guépier sino-japonais

La guerre civile qui dure depuis dix ans dans la Chine a coûté la mort de dix millions d'hommes d'après le *Times*.

Mais personne n'a songé à intervenir. De même si en Espagne, la Navarre ou la Catalogne ambitionnaient le sort d'un petit Portugal, nul n'aurait l'idée bizarre d'empêcher le gouvernement central de les mettre à la raison.

Si, par impossible, la Catalogne ou la Navarre conquéraient leur indépendance complète et la faisaient reconnaître par la Société des Nations, à partir de ce moment-là, toute guerre serait interdite entre l'Espagne et ces nouvelles puissances, même si une partie d'entre elles, repentante, se lançait dans une guerre civile, pour reconquérir la vieille patrie espagnole. Nous prenons à dessein des exemples théoriques.

Telle est la doctrine orthodoxe parmi les illuminés de Genève.

Nous ne sommes pas au bout des absurdités. Un nouveau partage de la Pologne semblable à l'ancien passerait sans protestations, puisque aucune guerre ne fut déclarée : En 1790, la Pologne n'avait pas d'armée et se flait à ses voisins. Mais si, dans la suite des temps, trois cent mille révoltés polonais étaient pendus, fusillés ou massacrés, comme autrefois, la Société des Nations demeurerait somnolente : questions intérieures, guerre civile.

Sans jeu de mots, nous ignorons en ce moment si le Japon veut courber la Chine ou les Chinois ; s'il pré-

PARIS. — *Caoutchoucs*. — Courant, 330
acheteur : prochain, 333 payé : déc., 340 à
350 ; 3 de janv., 370 vend. : 3 d'avril,
415 nominal. — *Marché inactif*.
PARIS. — *Farine de consommation* : 234.
LE HAVRE. — *Ouverture*. — *Colon*.
Courant, 209 ; novembre, 204 ; décembre, 209 ;
janvier, 212 ; février, 213 ; mars, avril, 215 ;
mai, 217 ; juin, 219 ; juillet, 220 ; août, 221 ;
septembre, 222 ; octobre, 223 ; novembre, 224 ;
décembre, 225 ; janvier, 226 ; février, 227 ;
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mai, 242 ; juin, 243 ; juillet, 244 ; août, 245 ;
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mai, 698 ; juin, 699 ; juillet, 700 ; août, 701 ;
septembre, 702 ; octobre, 703 ; novembre, 704 ;
décembre, 705 ; janvier, 706 ; février, 707 ;
mars, 708 ; avril, 709 ; mai, 710 ; juin, 711 ;
juillet, 712 ; août, 713 ; septembre, 714 ;
octobre, 715 ; novembre, 716 ; décembre, 717 ;
janvier, 718 ; février, 719 ; mars, 720 ; avril, 721 ;
mai, 722 ; juin, 723 ; juillet, 724 ; août, 725 ;
septembre, 726 ; octobre, 727 ; novembre, 728 ;
décembre, 729 ; janvier, 730 ; février, 731 ;
mars, 732 ; avril, 733 ; mai, 734 ; juin, 735 ;
juillet, 736 ; août, 737 ; septembre, 738 ;
octobre, 739 ; novembre, 740 ; décembre, 741 ;
janvier, 742 ; février, 743 ; mars, 744 ; avril, 745 ;
mai, 746 ; juin, 747 ; juillet, 748 ; août, 749 ;
septembre, 750 ; octobre, 751 ; novembre, 752 ;
décembre, 753 ; janvier, 754 ; février, 755 ;
mars, 756 ; avril, 757 ; mai, 758 ; juin, 759 ;
juillet, 760 ; août, 761 ; septembre, 762 ;
octobre, 763 ; novembre, 764 ; décembre, 765 ;
janvier, 766 ; février, 767 ; mars, 768 ; avril, 769 ;
mai, 770 ; juin, 771 ; juillet, 772 ; août, 773 ;
septembre, 774 ; octobre, 775 ; novembre, 776 ;
décembre, 777 ; janvier, 778 ; février, 779 ;
mars, 780 ; avril, 781 ; mai, 782 ; juin, 783 ;
juillet, 784 ; août, 785 ; septembre, 786 ;
octobre, 787 ; novembre, 788 ; décembre, 789 ;
janvier, 790 ; février, 791 ; mars, 792 ; avril, 793 ;
mai, 794 ; juin, 795 ; juillet, 796 ; août, 797 ;
septembre, 798 ; octobre, 799 ; novembre, 800 ;
décembre, 801 ; janvier, 802 ; février, 803 ;
mars, 804 ; avril, 805 ; mai, 806 ; juin, 807 ;
juillet, 808 ; août, 809 ; septembre, 810 ;
octobre, 811 ; novembre, 812 ; décembre, 813 ;
janvier, 814 ; février, 815 ; mars, 816 ; avril, 817 ;
mai, 818 ; juin, 819 ; juillet, 820 ; août, 821 ;
septembre, 822 ; octobre, 823 ; novembre, 824 ;
décembre, 825 ; janvier, 826 ; février, 827 ;
mars, 828 ; avril, 829 ; mai, 830 ; juin, 831 ;
juillet, 832 ; août, 833 ; septembre, 834 ;
octobre, 835 ; novembre, 836 ; décembre, 837 ;
janvier, 838 ; février, 839 ; mars, 840 ; avril, 841 ;
mai, 842 ; juin, 843 ; juillet, 844 ; août, 845 ;
septembre, 846 ; octobre, 847 ; novembre, 848 ;
décembre, 849 ; janvier, 850 ; février, 851 ;
mars, 852 ; avril, 853 ; mai, 854 ; juin, 855 ;
juillet, 856 ; août, 857 ; septembre, 858 ;
octobre, 859 ; novembre, 860 ; décembre, 861 ;
janvier, 862 ; février, 863 ; mars, 864 ; avril, 865 ;
mai, 866 ; juin, 867 ; juillet, 868 ; août, 869 ;
septembre, 870 ; octobre, 871 ; novembre, 872 ;
décembre, 873 ; janvier, 874 ; février, 875 ;
mars, 876 ; avril, 877 ; mai, 878 ; juin, 879 ;
juillet, 880 ; août, 881 ; septembre, 882 ;
octobre, 883 ; novembre, 884 ; décembre, 885 ;
janvier, 886 ; février, 887 ; mars, 888 ; avril, 889 ;
mai, 890 ; juin, 891 ; juillet, 892 ; août, 893 ;
septembre, 894 ; octobre, 895 ; novembre, 896 ;
décembre, 897 ; janvier, 898 ; février, 899 ;
mars, 900 ; avril, 901 ; mai, 902 ; juin, 903 ;
juillet, 904 ; août, 905 ; septembre, 906 ;
octobre, 907 ; novembre, 908 ; décembre, 909 ;
janvier, 910 ; février, 911 ; mars, 912 ; avril, 913 ;
mai, 914 ; juin, 915 ; juillet, 916 ; août, 917 ;
septembre, 918 ; octobre, 919 ; novembre, 920 ;
décembre, 921 ; janvier, 922 ; février, 923 ;
mars, 924 ; avril, 925 ; mai, 926 ; juin, 927 ;
juillet, 928 ; août, 929 ; septembre, 930 ;
octobre, 931 ; novembre, 932 ; décembre, 933 ;
janvier, 934 ; février, 935 ; mars, 936 ; avril, 937 ;
mai, 938 ; juin, 939 ; juillet, 940 ; août, 941 ;
septembre, 942 ; octobre, 943 ; novembre, 944 ;
décembre, 945 ; janvier, 946 ; février, 947 ;
mars, 948 ; avril, 949 ; mai, 950 ; juin, 951 ;
juillet, 952 ; août, 953 ; septembre, 954 ;
octobre, 955 ; novembre, 956 ; décembre, 957 ;
janvier, 958 ; février, 959 ; mars, 960 ; avril, 961 ;
mai, 962 ; juin, 963 ; juillet, 964 ; août, 965 ;
septembre, 966 ; octobre, 967 ; novembre, 968 ;
décembre, 969 ; janvier, 970 ; février, 971 ;
mars, 972 ; avril, 973 ; mai, 974 ; juin, 975 ;
juillet, 976 ; août, 977 ; septembre, 978 ;
octobre, 979 ; novembre, 980 ; décembre, 981 ;
janvier, 982 ; février, 983 ; mars, 984 ; avril, 985 ;
mai, 986 ; juin, 987 ; juillet, 988 ; août, 989 ;
septembre, 990 ; octobre, 991 ; novembre, 992 ;
décembre, 993 ; janvier, 994 ; février, 995 ;
mars, 996 ; avril, 997 ; mai, 998 ; juin, 999 ;
juillet, 1000 ; août, 1001 ; septembre, 1002 ;
octobre, 1003 ; novembre, 1004 ; décembre, 1005 ;
janvier, 1006 ; février, 1007 ; mars, 1008 ; avril, 1009 ;
mai, 1010 ; juin, 1011 ; juillet, 1012 ; août, 1013 ;
septembre, 1014 ; octobre, 1015 ; novembre, 1016 ;
décembre, 1017 ; janvier, 1018 ; février, 1019 ;
mars, 1020 ; avril, 1021 ; mai, 1022 ; juin, 1023 ;
juillet, 1024 ; août, 1025 ; septembre, 1026 ;
octobre, 1027 ; novembre, 1028 ; décembre, 1029 ;
janvier, 1030 ; février, 1031 ; mars, 1032 ; avril, 1033 ;
mai, 1034 ; juin, 1035 ; juillet, 1036 ; août, 1037 ;
septembre, 1038 ; octobre, 1039 ; novembre, 1040 ;
décembre, 1041 ; janvier, 1042 ; février, 1043 ;
mars, 1044 ; avril, 1045 ; mai, 1046 ; juin, 1047 ;
juillet, 1048 ; août, 1049 ; septembre, 1050 ;
octobre, 1051 ; novembre, 1052 ; décembre, 1053 ;
janvier, 1054 ; février, 1055 ; mars, 1056 ; avril, 1057 ;
mai, 1058 ; juin, 1059 ; juillet, 1060 ; août, 1061 ;
septembre, 1062 ; octobre, 1063 ; novembre, 1064 ;
décembre, 1065 ; janvier, 1066 ; février, 1067 ;
mars, 1068 ; avril, 1069 ; mai, 1070 ; juin, 1071 ;
juillet, 1072 ; août, 1073 ; septembre, 1074 ;
octobre, 1075 ; novembre, 1076 ; décembre, 1077 ;
janvier, 1078 ; février, 1079 ; mars, 1080 ; avril, 1081 ;
mai, 1082 ; juin, 1083 ; juillet, 1084 ; août, 1085 ;
septembre, 1086 ; octobre, 1087 ; novembre, 1088 ;
décembre, 1089 ; janvier, 1090 ; février, 1091 ;
mars, 1092 ; avril, 1093 ; mai, 1094 ; juin, 1095 ;
juillet, 1096 ; août, 1097 ; septembre, 1098 ;
octobre, 1099 ; novembre, 1100 ; décembre, 1101 ;
janvier, 1102 ; février, 1103 ; mars, 1104 ; avril, 1105 ;
mai, 1106 ; juin, 1107 ; juillet, 1108 ; août, 1109 ;
septembre, 1110 ; octobre, 1111 ; novembre, 1112 ;
décembre, 1113 ; janvier, 1114 ; février, 1115 ;
mars, 1116 ; avril, 1117 ; mai, 1118 ; juin, 1119 ;
juillet, 1120 ; août, 1121 ; septembre, 1122 ;
octobre, 1123 ; novembre, 1124 ; décembre, 1125 ;
janvier, 1126 ; février, 1127 ; mars, 1128 ; avril, 1129 ;
mai, 1130 ; juin, 1131 ; juillet, 1132 ; août, 1133 ;
septembre, 1134 ; octobre, 1135 ; novembre, 1136 ;
décembre, 1137 ; janvier, 1138 ; février, 1139 ;
mars, 1140 ; avril, 1141 ; mai, 1142 ; juin, 1143 ;
juillet, 1144 ; août, 1145 ; septembre, 1146 ;
octobre, 1147 ; novembre, 1148 ; décembre, 1149 ;
janvier, 1150 ; février, 1151 ; mars, 1152 ; avril, 1153 ;
mai, 1154 ; juin, 1155 ; juillet, 1156 ; août, 1157 ;
septembre, 1158 ; octobre, 1159 ; novembre, 1160 ;
décembre, 1161 ; janvier, 1162 ; février, 1163 ;
mars, 1164 ; avril, 1165 ; mai, 1166 ; juin, 1167 ;
juillet, 1168 ; août, 1169 ; septembre, 1170 ;
octobre, 1171 ; novembre, 1172 ; décembre, 1173 ;
janvier, 1174 ; février, 1175 ; mars, 1176 ; avril, 1177 ;
mai, 1178 ; juin, 1179 ; juillet, 1180 ; août, 1181 ;
septembre, 1182 ; octobre, 1183 ; novembre, 1184 ;
décembre, 1185 ; janvier, 1186 ; février, 1187 ;
mars, 1188 ; avril, 1189 ; mai, 1190 ; juin, 1191 ;
juillet, 1192 ; août, 1193 ; septembre, 1194 ;
octobre, 1195 ; novembre, 1196 ; décembre, 1197 ;
janvier, 1198 ; février, 1199 ; mars, 1200 ; avril, 1201 ;
mai, 1202 ; juin, 1203 ; juillet, 1204 ; août, 1205 ;
septembre, 1206 ; octobre, 1207 ; novembre, 1208 ;
décembre, 1209 ; janvier, 1210 ; février, 1211 ;
mars, 1212 ; avril, 1213 ; mai, 1214 ; juin, 1215 ;
juillet, 1216 ; août, 1217 ; septembre, 1218 ;
octobre, 1219 ; novembre, 1220 ; décembre, 1221 ;
janvier, 1222 ; février, 1223 ; mars, 1224 ; avril, 1225 ;
mai, 1226 ; juin, 1227 ; juillet, 1228 ; août, 1229 ;
septembre, 1230 ; octobre, 1231 ; novembre, 1232 ;
décembre, 1233 ; janvier, 1234 ; février, 1235 ;
mars, 1236 ; avril, 1237 ; mai, 1238 ; juin, 1239 ;
juillet, 1240 ; août, 1241 ; septembre, 1242 ;
octobre, 1243 ; novembre, 1244 ; décembre, 1245 ;
janvier, 1246 ; février, 1247 ; mars, 1248 ; avril, 1249 ;
mai, 1250 ; juin, 1251 ; juillet, 1252 ; août, 1253 ;
septembre, 1254 ; octobre, 1255 ; novembre, 1256 ;
décembre, 1257 ; janvier, 1258 ; février, 1259 ;
mars, 1260 ; avril, 1261 ; mai, 1262 ; juin, 1263 ;
juillet, 1264 ; août, 1265 ; septembre, 1266 ;
octobre, 1267 ; novembre, 1268 ; décembre, 1269 ;
janvier, 1270 ; février, 1271 ; mars, 1272 ; avril, 1273 ;
mai, 1274 ; juin, 1275 ; juillet, 1276 ; août, 1277 ;
septembre, 1278 ; octobre, 1279 ; novembre, 1280 ;
décembre, 1281 ; janvier, 1282 ; février, 1283 ;
mars, 1284 ; avril, 1285 ; mai, 1286 ; juin, 1287 ;
juillet, 1288 ; août, 1289 ; septembre, 1290 ;
octobre, 1291 ; novembre, 1292 ; décembre, 1293 ;
janvier, 1294 ; février, 1295 ; mars, 1296 ; avril, 1297 ;
mai, 1298 ; juin, 1299 ; juillet, 1300 ; août, 1301 ;
septembre, 1302 ; octobre, 1303 ; novembre, 1304 ;
décembre, 1305 ; janvier, 1306 ; février, 1307 ;
mars, 1308 ; avril, 1309 ; mai, 1310 ; juin, 1311 ;
juillet, 1312 ; août, 1313 ; septembre, 1314 ;
octobre, 1315 ; novembre, 1316 ; décembre, 1317 ;
janvier, 1318 ; février, 1319 ; mars, 1320 ; avril, 1321 ;
mai, 1322 ; juin, 1323 ; juillet, 1324 ; août, 1325 ;
septembre, 1326 ; octobre, 1327 ; novembre, 1328 ;
décembre, 1329 ; janvier, 1330 ; février, 1331 ;
mars, 1332 ; avril, 1333 ; mai, 1334 ; juin, 1335 ;
juillet, 1336 ; août, 1337 ; septembre, 1338 ;
octobre, 1339 ; novembre, 1340 ; décembre, 1341 ;
janvier, 1342 ; février, 1343 ; mars, 1344 ; avril, 1345 ;
mai, 1346 ; juin, 1347 ; juillet, 1348 ; août, 1349 ;
septembre, 1350 ; octobre, 1351 ; novembre, 1352 ;
décembre, 1353 ; janvier, 1354 ; février, 1355 ;
mars, 1356 ; avril, 1357 ; mai, 1358 ; juin, 1359 ;
juillet, 1360 ; août, 1361 ; septembre, 1362 ;
octobre, 1363 ; novembre, 1364 ; décembre, 1365 ;
janvier, 1366 ; février, 1367 ; mars, 1368 ; avril, 1369 ;
mai, 1370 ; juin, 1371 ; juillet, 1372 ; août, 1373 ;
septembre, 1374 ; octobre, 1375 ; novembre, 1376 ;
décembre, 1377 ; janvier, 1378 ; février, 1379 ;
mars, 1380 ; avril, 1381 ; mai, 1382 ; juin, 1383 ;
juillet, 1384 ; août, 1385 ; septembre, 1386 ;
octobre, 1387 ; novembre, 1388 ; décembre, 1389 ;
janvier, 1390 ; février, 1391 ; mars, 1392 ; avril, 1393 ;
mai, 1394 ; juin, 1395 ; juillet, 1396 ; août, 1397 ;
septembre, 1398 ; octobre, 1399 ; novembre, 1400 ;
décembre, 1401 ; janvier, 1402 ; février, 1403 ;
mars, 1404 ; avril, 1405 ; mai, 1406 ; juin, 1407 ;
juillet, 1408 ; août, 1409 ; septembre, 1410 ;
octobre, 1411 ; novembre, 1412 ; décembre, 1413 ;
janvier, 1414 ; février, 1415 ; mars, 1416 ; avril, 1417 ;
mai, 1418 ; juin, 1419 ; juillet, 1420 ; août, 1421 ;
septembre, 1422 ; octobre, 1423 ; novembre, 1424 ;
décembre, 1425 ; janvier, 1426 ; février, 1427 ;
mars, 1428 ; avril, 1429 ; mai, 1430 ; juin, 1431 ;
juillet, 1432 ; août, 1433 ; septembre, 1434 ;
octobre, 1435 ; novembre, 1436 ; décembre, 1437 ;
janvier, 1438 ; février, 1439 ; mars, 1440 ; avril, 1441 ;
mai, 1442 ; juin, 1443 ; juillet, 1444 ; août, 1445 ;
septembre, 1446 ; octobre, 1447 ; novembre, 1448 ;
décembre, 1449 ; janvier, 1450 ; février, 1451 ;
mars, 1452 ; avril, 1453 ; mai, 1454 ; juin, 1455 ;
juillet, 1456 ; août, 1457 ; septembre, 1458 ;
octobre, 1459 ; novembre, 1460 ; décembre, 1461 ;
janvier, 1462 ; février, 1463 ; mars, 1464 ; avril, 1465 ;
mai, 1466 ; juin, 1467 ; juillet, 1468 ; août, 1469 ;
septembre, 1470 ; octobre, 1471 ; novembre, 1472 ;
décembre, 1473 ; janvier, 1474 ; février, 1475 ;
mars, 1476 ; avril, 1477 ; mai, 1478 ; juin, 1479 ;
juillet, 1480 ; août, 1481 ; septembre, 1482 ;
octobre, 1483 ; novembre, 1484 ; décembre, 1485 ;
janvier, 1486 ; février, 1487 ; mars, 1488 ; avril, 1489 ;
mai, 1490 ; juin, 1491 ; juillet, 1492 ; août, 1493 ;
septembre, 1494 ; octobre, 1495 ; novembre, 1496 ;
décembre, 1497 ; janvier, 1498 ; février, 1499 ;
mars, 1500 ; avril, 1501 ; mai, 1502 ; juin, 1503 ;
juillet, 1504 ; août, 1505 ; septembre, 1506 ;
octobre, 1507 ; novembre, 1508 ; décembre, 1509 ;
janvier, 1510 ; février, 1511 ; mars, 1512 ; avril, 1513 ;
mai, 1514 ; juin, 1515 ; juillet, 1516 ; août, 1517 ;
septembre, 1518 ; octobre, 1519 ; novembre, 1520 ;
décembre, 1521 ; janvier, 1522 ; février, 1523 ;
mars, 1524 ; avril, 1525 ; mai, 1526 ; juin, 1527 ;
juillet, 1528 ; août, 1529 ; septembre, 1530 ;
octobre, 1531 ; novembre, 1532 ; décembre, 1533 ;
janvier, 1534 ; février, 1535 ; mars, 1536 ; avril, 1537 ;
mai, 1538 ; juin, 1539 ; juillet, 1540 ; août, 1541 ;
septembre, 1542 ; octobre, 1543 ; novembre, 1544 ;
décembre, 1545 ; janvier, 1546 ; février, 1547 ;
mars, 1548 ; avril, 1549 ; mai, 1550 ; juin, 1551 ;
juillet, 1552 ; août, 1553 ; septembre, 1554 ;
octobre, 1555 ; novembre, 15

1 368

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FIG 20

Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 1983
of October 23, 1931.
from the Embassy at Paris.
EXTRACT from **FIGARO** -----, October 20, 1931.

Le Conflit sino-japonais

Il n'y a guère de faits importants à signaler sur l'action de la Société des Nations en vue de mettre fin au conflit sino-japonais de Mandchourie. Le conseil devait tenir hier matin une séance plénière, au cours de laquelle les parties en cause auraient été saisies d'un projet officiel de règlement du différend. Mais, à la suite de nouvelles parvenues de Tokio et de Nankin, qui modifiaient légèrement la situation, il a paru préférable aux membres du conseil de tenir une pure séance de forme, en dehors de la présence des représentants de la Chine et du Japon. Il a été décidé que M. Briand poursuivrait les conversations qu'il avait déjà eues avec le docteur Szé et M. Yoshizawa. Les entretiens ont donc continué au cours de la journée d'hier.

Une très légère détente semble s'être produite. On signale que les états-majors des deux pays sont entrés en contact en divers points. On relève une certaine accalmie dans les polémiques de presse. On mande de Washington que les froissements qui avaient pu se produire entre le Japon et les Etats-Unis à la suite de l'admission au conseil d'un délégué du gouvernement américain ont été effacés après les entretiens que le secrétaire d'Etat a eus avec l'ambassadeur du Japon. On se plaît surtout à constater que le memorandum remis dimanche soir à la presse par le représentant du Japon au conseil de la Société des Nations permet d'espérer que l'on pourra trouver un terrain d'entente. Mais cette détente peut n'être que passagère ; on est, en effet, à la merci du moindre incident.

Diverses puissances signataires du pacte Kellogg de renonciation à la guerre ont fait des démarches à Tokio et Nankin pour rappeler aux deux puissances les engagements qu'elles ont contractés.

Il est probable que le Japon et la Chine feront connaître dès aujourd'hui s'ils acceptent les bases du projet de règlement qui leur a été soumis. On semble aller vers des négociations directes entre les deux pays, en même temps que le Japon évacuerait progressivement les régions occupées et que la Société des Nations s'assurerait du respect par la Chine de la vie et des biens des ressortissants nippons. Les négociations qui se poursuivent en Chine entre fractions politiques rivales laissent croire à un prochain accord. Le gouvernement de Nankin pourrait bientôt faire place à un gouvernement composé d'éléments cantonnais plus disposés à reconnaître les revendications japonaises en Mandchourie.

Le bruit avait couru hier que le cabinet de Tokio avait discuté du retrait éventuel du Japon de la Société des Nations. Cette information a été démentie de source officielle.

Huma 20

Enclosure No. 3 to Despatch No. 1983
of October 23, 1931.
from the Embassy at Paris.
EXTRACT from L'HUMANITE, October 20, 1931.

LA GUERRE EN MANDCHOURIE

Le conseil de la S. D. N. veut couvrir par le pacte Kellogg le brigandage impérialiste en Chine

On parle de « détente » à Genève au sujet de la situation épineuse créée par l'opposition hargneuse de l'impérialisme japonais à la présence d'un représentant des Etats-Unis aux discussions du Conseil de la S. D. N. Mais, en réalité, la tension est toujours égale entre Genève et Tokio, tant sur cette question qu'en ce qui concerne les prétendues tentatives de régler le conflit sino-japonais.

Nous avons signalé hier le memorandum émanant du Japon au Conseil. Briand y a répondu et sa réponse, sous une forme plus ou moins conciliante, est une fin de non-recevoir, rédigée sous la pression de l'impérialisme yankee. Avant l'arri-



Le général MORI
commandant en chef de l'armée
japonaise en Mandchourie

vée de Laval à Washington, il faut donner des gages.

Hier matin devait avoir lieu une séance publique du Conseil, mais la nouvelle que les Japonais s'étaient réunis en conférence et discutaient à l'avance la réponse de Briand, a fait que la séance n'eut pas lieu et une réunion privée des puissances, exclus le Japon et la Chine, s'est tenue.

La discussion a encore porté sur les suggestions que les membres du Conseil ont l'intention de soumettre aux deux parties. D'après ce qu'on en sait il s'agirait d'une proposition d'évacuation des troupes japonaises qui occupent les régions hors de la zone du chemin de fer sud-mandchourien. Les dispositions à prendre pour assurer la sécurité des résidents japonais et que doit assumer le gouvernement de Nankin, seraient contrôlées par des délégués des puissances « neutres » placés dans le camp chinois.

Ces suggestions ne riment pas à grand-chose, mais elles peuvent permettre de manœuvrer, de « trouver » que la Chine ne peut pas assurer la sécurité des Japonais sur son territoire » et partant de justifier une seconde fois l'occupation japonaise et aussi des actions de la part des autres puissances.

Cependant l'impérialisme japonais informé officiellement de ces suggestions, jusqu'à maintenant jugerait cette formule inacceptable. D'après un porte-parole du gouvernement de Tokio, le Japon n'accepterait pas non plus de négocier avec la Chine en présence d'observateurs « neutres ». Il considère que la question de l'évacuation et celle des négociations directes constituent deux problèmes différents.

C'est le refus renouvelé de toute ingérence extérieure. Mais les impérialistes du Conseil, qui n'ignorent rien des dispositions japonaises, font pression sur Nankin pour qu'il fasse les premiers pas et capitule devant Tokio. En effet, le Conseil demanderait au gouvernement chinois « de prendre des mesures pour faire cesser l'agitation antijaponaise qui se développe dangereusement en Chine, ainsi que des assurances nouvelles sur sa volonté de respecter les traités et les droits acquis qui en découlent ».

C'est dans cette dernière voie que s'engagent les pourparlers secrets de Genève. Le gouvernement des bourgeois du Kuomintang se prêterait, comme il l'a fait auparavant, à ces manœuvres dont le but principal est d'étouffer le mouvement révolutionnaire et d'écraser les soviets chinois, pour faciliter le partage de la Chine entre les puissances. C'est pourquoi les augures de la S. D. N. parlent de détente.

Situation de plus en plus compliquée

Mais cette opération de grande envergure ne va pas sans heurts entre les impérialismes rivaux. La question mandchourienne devient de plus en plus compliquée, car elle aiguise considérablement les antagonismes interimpérialistes.

Les impérialistes se préparent fiévreusement à la guerre, afin de procéder à un nouveau partage du monde. Le partage de la Chine est un de leurs nombreux objectifs. Le Kuomintang rend aux impérialistes à cet égard les plus grands services. Sa « lutte contre l'impérialisme » se manifeste exclusivement dans la répression des manifestations antijaponaises et dans la tentative d'étouffer le mouvement antiimpérialiste.

1 137

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

De son côté, la S. D. N. est l'instrument et l'organisateur de la guerre contre les peuples coloniaux et semi-coloniaux. La première session du Conseil organisa le bloc de l'impérialisme japonais et d'une partie des puissances européennes en vue du pillage de la Chine, ~~elle justifia~~ la guerre de la bourgeoisie japonaise contre le peuple chinois.

La phase des marchandages

A l'heure présente, nous sommes dans la phase des sordides marchandages pour le dépècement, sous une forme ou sous une autre, de cet immense pays, débouché formidable. Mais il faut cacher le jeu devant les larges masses et parler de paix pour mieux préparer la guerre. C'est pourquoi on met désormais en danse le pacte Kellogg dont on va se servir pour couvrir le brigandage impérialiste en Chine.

Le Conseil en appelle au pacte de Paris, l'Angleterre délègue ses ambassadeurs à Tokio et Nankin pour rappeler l'article 2 du pacte, l'Italie, l'Allemagne, la Norvège s'apprêtent à envoyer aux gouvernements japonais et chinois un télégramme rappelant à ces deux puissances qu'elles se sont engagées, aux termes de ce pacte, à régler tous leurs conflits par des moyens pacifiques.

Mais nous saurons démontrer que quelle que soit l'issue que la duplicité des Briand et consorts trouvera au litige impérialiste pour le butin mandchourien et chinois, il est d'ores et déjà acquis que cette lutte constitue une étape importante dans la préparation de la guerre pour un nouveau partage du monde.

En Chine, à l'heure actuelle, avec la nouvelle trahison du Kuomintang qui se négocie dans la coulisse, le seul gage de paix à côté de l'U. R. S. S. la seule force qui pourra empêcher l'écartèlement du pays, c'est le pouvoir soviétique qui englobe déjà plus de cinquante millions de travailleurs chinois, qui progresse chaque jour et qu'il faut soutenir de toutes nos forces pour briser les plans criminels des impérialistes.

M. MAGNIEN.

PP20

Enclosure No. 4 to Despatch No. 1983
of October 23, 1931.
from the Embassy at Paris.
EXTRACT from LE PETIT PARISIEN, October 20, 1931.

SOUVENIRS ET PRÉCISIONS POUR COMPRENDRE QUELQUE CHOSE A L'AFFAIRE SINO-JAPONAISE

PAR LOUIS ROUBAUD

Je ne suis jamais allé au Japon...
Et pourtant je suis entré un soir dans une belle gare japonaise, que l'on reconnaît en Orient à sa propreté, à son ordre, à l'exactitude de ses horaires, à la politesse et à la discipline de ses employés. Je suis monté dans un wagon-lit japonais, net comme une chambre de clinique, avec ses cabines à rideaux blancs, ses lavabos aux mille serviettes. J'ai trouvé sur ma couchette le kimono repassé, les sandales de paille neuve. Après une nuit confortable je me suis éveillé dans une ville nipponne. J'ai loué une chambre à l'hôtel Yamato. Dans le grand hall, une geisha souriante m'a vendu les magazines de Tokio. Je me suis promené dans les rues droites, bordées de maisons frêles. La circulation y était réglée par des agents de police japonais. Des soldats et des officiers japonais en uniforme me croisaient sur les trottoirs...

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En Mandchourie, j'étais donc en Chine... ?

Oui et non !

Ce souvenir de voyage m'aide à situer dans la vie les sérieux incidents qui préoccupent en ce moment Genève et le monde.

Dans l'abstrait, le dissentiment sino-japonais peut apparaître comme un conflit ordinaire entre deux Etats aux frontières parfaitement délimitées : « Pour protéger ses ressortissants lésés dans leurs biens ou menacés dans leur vie, l'une des deux nations a occupé militairement une partie du territoire de l'autre. »

La réalité est à la fois plus complexe et moins grave. Il suffit de parcourir Moukden pour commencer à l'apercevoir.

A la gare, à l'hôtel, dans la rue, je me trouvais effectivement en pays de pleine souveraineté japonaise. Toutefois, si je poursuivais le chemin, mon coolie-pousse s'arrêtait après vingt minutes de trajet devant une barrière. Je sortais du Japon et j'entrais « non pas encore dans la Céleste République » mais dans une sorte d'arrière-pensée internationalisée : le quartier des consulats où flottaient tous les drapeaux du globe.

Le coolie trottait encore et stoppait enfin devant un mur. Une ville chinoise est toujours entourée de murailles ! Les sentinelles chinoises gardaient la porte. Après minuit, il m'eût fallu exhiber un sauf-conduit pour pénétrer dans la capitale mandchoue où vivent cinq cent mille habitants et où m'attendait, pour déjeuner chez Kon Ki, l'actuel maître de la Chine du Nord, qu'on appelait alors le Petit Maréchal pour le distinguer du Grand Maréchal Tchang So Lin, son père.

Moukden n'est qu'une gare sur la ligne du Sud-Mandchourien. Il y en a d'autres de Kharbin à Dairen ; il y a aussi des villages, des champs. A droite et à gauche de la voie ferrée, où circulent les trains japonais, s'élèvent des casernes, des écoles, des hôpitaux, des hôtels, des entrepôts, des maisons de sports et de clubs... Si nous ne nous écartons pas trop de ce côté-ci ou de celui-là, nous pouvons marcher des jours et des nuits jusqu'à la mer sans sortir du Japon. Les fonctionnaires, les soldats et les sujets de Sa Majesté le mikado sont ici chez eux tout le long de l'étroit couloir ferroviaire.

Or cette colonie en longueur — notons le tout de suite — est une artère qui distribue la vie économique de toute une contrée.

Imaginez l'Angleterre possédant

Dans la zone qui nous préoccupe aujourd'hui, les Coréens, sujets et citoyens japonais — la Corée faisant partie intégrante du territoire nippon — ont essaimé depuis de longues années. La main-d'œuvre, l'industrie, le commerce chinois se trouvent en concurrence quotidienne avec la main-d'œuvre, l'industrie, le commerce coréens. Ce pays est peuplé, animé par deux catégories d'habitants : les uns gouvernés, de fort loin, par Nankin ; les autres, de beaucoup plus près, par Tokio. Les premiers ont des mairies, des préfectures ; les seconds, les stations de chemin de fer. Ici, un chef de police. Là, un chef de gare !

L'actuel différend sino-japonais ne doit donc pas être comparé aux autres conflits internationaux qui peuvent diviser deux Etats exerçant chacun sa puissance de l'un ou de l'autre côté d'une ligne nettement tracée, il commence par un litige intérieur entre le chef de police et le chef de gare.

Les ressortissants de celui-ci et de celui-là ont les uns et les autres des motifs de mécontentement. Les Chinois de Mandchourie se heurtent journellement sur place aux Japonais de Mandchourie : rivalité dans le travail et les affaires, frictions d'amour-propre, de préséance et d'autorité. Les premiers tiennent les douanes ; les seconds les tarifs de transports. On peut ici boycotter la vente et là boycotter le transit. L'administration ne peut se passer du réseau ni le réseau de l'administration...

Les incidents qui ont mis le feu aux poudres sont l'aboutissant d'un long frottement entre deux pouvoirs indépendants. Le sabotage d'une voie ferrée est un fait apparent... mais depuis longtemps les Japonais se plaignaient de voir leurs affaires paralysées par le mauvais vouloir ou la simple carence des administrateurs chinois. Ils ont ici de gros intérêts qui peuvent se chiffrer par près de 40 milliards de francs et ils ont à sauvegarder leurs biens, leurs hommes...

Les Chinois, d'autre part, impatientés d'échapper au joug ferroviaire, ont déjà projeté et entrepris la construction de lignes stratégiques qui pourraient, en dépit des traités, devenir demain commerciales.

Nous touchons ici aux causes profondes et permanentes du conflit :

Dans une vaste région, qu'habiterent autrefois les Mandchous aujourd'hui éteints, deux émigrations s'affrontent : la chinoise et la coréenne. Chacune joue ses atouts et se défend avec ses armes : droits politiques, droits économiques.

Le problème actuellement posé à Genève et en Asie ne paraît donc pas être de ceux qui se puissent résoudre sur le papier, j'entends par de simples traités entre deux Etats. A ce compte, il serait déjà résolu par les contrats existants.

Les Japonais peuvent affirmer de bonne foi qu'ils n'ont pas de visées territoriales et les Chinois protester sincèrement contre la violation de leur territoire... la contradiction n'est qu'apparente.

En fait, les maîtres du réseau prétendent que les maîtres de la police ne veulent plus ou ne peuvent plus les protéger et ils ont pris eux-mêmes des mesures de sécurité. L'administration chinoise, au contraire, affirme qu'il n'y a de sa part ni mauvais vouloir ni carence...

Les choses en sont là.

C'est précisément en d'aussi délicates occurrences que la S. D. N. peut et doit jouer son rôle de conciliation.

Il est évident qu'il ne lui est pas loisible de supprimer par une simple

PP20

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Or cette colonie en longueur — notons le tout de suite — est une artère qui distribue la vie économique de toute une contrée.

Imaginez l'Angleterre possédant un lacet de territoires qui serait précisément la ligne de chemin de fer du Havre à Saint-Lazare. Supposez que la Seine ne soit pas navigable et que nos belles routes ne soient pas tracées... La Normandie appartiendrait toujours à la France politiquement, mais elle serait sous l'absolue dépendance économique de nos amis d'outre-Manche.

Voilà la situation d'une partie de la Mandchourie commandée par la ligne japonaise du Sud-Mandchourien ; l'autre partie étant dans la même position vis-à-vis de l'U. R. S. S. qui tient la ligne de l'Est-Chinois.

Les deux lignes vitales sont un héritage des tsars à qui elles avaient été régulièrement concédées par de bons traités. Le Japon a obtenu la première en 1905 ; les Soviets ont eu la seconde lorsque leur régime a été institué en Russie (1).

Le litige russo-chinois de 1929 était, on s'en souvient, ferroviaire.

Le conflit sino-japonais ne l'est pas moins.

La Mandchourie, qui appartient politiquement à l'immense république de Chine, est donc partagée en deux zones économiques où s'infiltrant par le rail ses deux voisins de Corée et de Sibérie.

(1) En 1924, la convention de l'Est-Chinois a été modifiée sur les bases d'une collaboration sino-soviétique plus apparente que réelle et qui mériterait une autre étude.

Dans la zone qui nous préoccupe aujourd'hui, les Coréens, sujets et citoyens japonais — la Corée faisant partie intégrante du territoire nippon — ont essaimé depuis de longues années. La main-d'œuvre, l'industrie, le commerce chinois se trouvent en concurrence quotidienne avec la main-d'œuvre, l'industrie, le commerce coréens. Ce pays est peuplé, animé par deux catégories d'habitants : les uns gouvernés, de fort loin, par Nankin ; les autres, de beaucoup plus près, par Tokio. Les premiers ont des mairies, des préfectures ; les seconds, les stations de chemin de fer. Ici, un chef de police. Là, un chef de gare !

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Les incidents qui ont mis le feu aux poudres sont l'aboutissant d'un long frottement entre deux pouvoirs indépendants. Le sabotage d'une voie

cates occurrences que la S. D. N. peut et doit jouer son rôle de conciliation.

Il est évident qu'il ne lui est pas loisible de supprimer par une simple décision les causes profondes du litige, mais elle s'emploie d'ores et déjà à lui assigner ses limites juridiques. En les définissant nettement, elle obtiendra des deux parties l'accord sur les principes qui préparera l'entente sur les faits.

M. Aristide Briand a fait preuve ici d'autant de fermeté que de prudence. Nous pouvons être assurés que sa foi persuasive sauvera de nouveau la cause de la Paix.

Louis ROUBAUD

LE JAPON RENONCE A POLEMIFIER SUR LA COLLABORATION AMERICAINE

Genève, 19 octobre (dép. Petit Par.)

On annonce de Washington :

Faisant preuve de conciliation, le gouvernement japonais a renoncé à polémiquer plus longtemps sur la question de la collaboration américaine et il réservera ses objections juridiques pour un examen ultérieur.

Temp 20

Enclosure No. 5 to Despatch No. 1983
of October 23, 1931.
from the Emba-ssy at Paris.
EXTRACT from LE TEMPS, October 20, 1931.

La situation créée à Genève au conseil de la Société des nations par la controverse qui s'est instituée à propos de l'invitation adressée aux Etats-Unis de se faire représenter par un observateur n'est pas encore éclaircie. Le gouvernement de Tokio, évidemment tenu de ménager une opinion nationale très susceptible et très excitée par les événements de Mandchourie, réagit avec vigueur, non point, on l'a assez répété, parce qu'il voit de sérieux inconvénients politiques à la présence des Américains à la table du conseil — tout le monde est d'accord pour reconnaître, au contraire, l'importance de ce fait au point de vue général de la cordiale coopération des Etats-Unis avec l'institution de Genève, — mais parce qu'il y trouve des objections d'ordre juridique dont on n'a pas tenu suffisamment compte à son avis, et qui peuvent engager l'avenir en ce qui concerne l'interprétation du pacte. C'est là qu'est, pour l'instant, le point délicat du débat.

Dans la note remise hier par le représentant du Japon, M. Yoshizawa, le gouvernement de Tokio rappelle que l'action de la Société des nations doit toujours se conformer strictement aux dispositions du pacte, que lorsqu'il a été question d'inviter à la table du conseil un représentant des Etats-Unis le délégué du Japon a exprimé ses doutes quant au fait que la présence d'un observateur d'un Etat non membre de la Société des nations soit compatible avec une bonne interprétation du pacte. Le gouvernement japonais conteste que la situation actuelle soit telle qu'il existe un danger de guerre entre le Japon et la Chine — d'où on peut conclure qu'il n'y a pas lieu d'invoquer ici le pacte Briand-Kellogg contre la guerre, — mais il fait remarquer que, le pacte général de Paris étant un traité conclu entre plusieurs dizaines de puissances comprenant des Etats non membres de la Société des nations, le fait d'inviter les Etats-Unis seuls à s'asseoir à la table du conseil soulève une question délicate. Le gouvernement du Japon formule également des réserves quant aux conditions où a été prise « la décision de majorité », et il demande à être fixé sur ces différents points « afin, dit-il, de décider de l'attitude à prendre à l'égard de l'ensemble des questions soulevées actuellement ». Faut-il en conclure que le Japon se réserve éventuellement de modifier sa politique de collaboration avec la Société des nations? Rien ne permet de l'affirmer jusqu'ici, mais que l'on puisse se poser la question dans certains milieux, c'est déjà trop.

Le conseil a chargé aussitôt son président, M. Briand, de répondre à la note du Japon. On lira plus loin le texte de cette réponse, qui est conçue dans les termes les plus prudents. Il y rappelle les déclarations qu'il a faites aux séances

du 15 et du 18 octobre pour souligner que les propositions dont le conseil était saisi avaient un objet nettement limité, tendant simplement à compléter les dispositions déjà adoptées pour faciliter l'information du conseil, les questions de caractère juridique général ne se posant pas et devant, par conséquent, être entièrement réservées. Le président du conseil de la Société des nations fait remarquer, d'autre part, qu'il ne servirait à rien d'entreprendre, à l'heure actuelle, une étude juridique de problèmes qui ne se posent pas en l'espèce, mais qui peuvent faire l'objet d'un examen ultérieur.

Cette réponse mettra-t-elle fin à la controverse? Cela dépendra surtout de l'état d'esprit qui prévaut à Tokio et de ce que l'opinion publique dans ce pays permettra au gouvernement du mikado de faire dans le sens de la conciliation et de l'apaisement. Le deuxième memorandum japonais distribué hier soir à Genève projette quelque clarté sur les dispositions du Japon. L'attitude hostile et provocante des autorités chinoises y est soulignée avec force; le danger que constitue l'activité des soldats chinois fugitifs y est dénoncé; la situation militaire en Mandchourie y est précisée; on y retrouve la déclaration formelle que le Japon a la ferme intention de retirer ses troupes « dans les conditions qu'il a énoncées depuis le début », c'est-à-dire quand la sécurité de ses ressortissants sera assurée, et qu'il n'a pas de visées territoriales en Mandchourie; mais il est dit dans ce memorandum qu'« il serait regrettable que la nation japonaise eût l'impression qu'il existe ici une méconnaissance de ses droits et une incompréhension de la situation réelle ».

Il est grand temps que cette affaire soit liquidée dans des conditions sauvegardant l'autorité morale de la Société des nations et tenant compte des réalités politiques qui existent en Extrême-Orient et qu'il n'est au pouvoir de personne de supprimer. Il serait déplorable, en effet, que la coopération du Japon avec le conseil de Genève puisse être troublée par une question de procédure avant même que soit abordé le fond du différend sino-japonais.

Ex 21

Enclosure No. 6 to Despatch No. 1983
of October 23, 1931.
from the Embassy at Paris.
EXTRACT from EXCELSIOR, October 21, 1931.

L'OPTIMISME CONTINUE DE RÉGNER A LA S. D. N. QUANT AU CONFLIT SINO- JAPONAIS

*En réalité, nouvelle
journée d'attente.*

Le délégué japonais n'avait pas
encore reçu hier la réponse
de son gouvernement au projet
de règlement envisagé par
le conseil de Genève.

LES CINQ POINTS ESSENTIELS QUE TOKIO VEUT VOIR NANKIN RECONNAITRE EN PRINCIPE

[DE NOTRE ENVOYÉ SPÉCIAL]

GENÈVE, 20 octobre. — La journée
d'aujourd'hui a marqué une nouvelle
séance de « sur place », chacun des par-
tis restant sur ses positions, M. Yoshi-
zawa se bornant à faire connaître qu'il
n'avait pas encore reçu de nouvelles
instructions de son gouvernement.

M. Briand, qui semble mener à lui
tout seul les négociations, investi, on



M. PRENTISS GILBERT, consul général
des Etats-Unis à Genève, qui représente
son pays au Conseil de la Société des
nations, sortant de la salle des séances.

peut dire, des pleins pouvoirs de ses
collègues du conseil, n'a donc pu,
comme on le prévoyait, avoir une nou-
velle entrevue avec les délégués japo-
nais et chinois, mais il eut par contre
une longue conversation avec lord Rea-
ding. Celui-ci, qui est en complet ac-
cord avec notre ministre des Affaires
étrangères, commençait à s'inquiéter
des lenteurs de la négociation. Et par-
taga l'opinion de M. Briand, qu'il y
aurait danger à convoquer une séance
publique du conseil avant qu'une en-
tente soit intervenue, ne serait-ce que
pour éviter de froisser les susceptibi-
lités des délégués chinois et japonais.
Le secrétaire d'Etat au Foreign Office
préférerait certainement participer, à
l'heure actuelle, dans son pays, aux ba-
tailles électorales; et c'est pourquoi il
fut décidé de tout mettre en œuvre
pour hâter les négociations.

Le quart d'heure de Nogi

Les Japonais, eux, ne sont nullement
pressés. Ils excellent à la guerre
d'usure et ils savent que le temps tra-
vaille pour eux. De plus, des négocia-
tions simultanées n'ont-elles pas lieu à
Washington entre leur ambassadeur,
MM. Stimson et Castle, et même le pré-
sident Hoover ? Pour eux, nous l'avons
dit, il s'agit de gagner du temps et en
attendant, si nous croyons le document
remis aujourd'hui à la Société des na-
tions par la délégation chinoise, ils ne
le perdent pas.

Des délégués de l'Y. M. C. A. — lisez
la puissante organisation américaine
Union chrétienne de jeunes gens —
n'informent-ils pas que dans toute ville
qu'ils occupent hors la zone qui leur
est réservée, les Japonais saisissent
non seulement les bureaux des P. T. T.
et les banques, mais obligent les auto-
rités locales à se constituer en gouver-
nement autonome ?

Et si certains estiment ici que cha-
que jour nouveau est un jour gagné
pour la paix, d'autres croient plutôt
que chaque jour perdu permet aux Ja-
ponais d'affermir et de consolider leurs
positions en Mandchourie.

La belle confiance des fonctionnaires de la S. D. N.

Dans les milieux du secrétariat, l'op-
timisme règne et l'on est certain que
M. Briand parviendra à faire entendre
raison aux Japonais et aux Chinois. On
comprend toutefois que le sort de la
Société des nations se joue en ce mo-
ment à Genève. On reconnaît même
qu'une grosse erreur a été commise en
laissant le conflit s'aggraver au lieu de
tentier les démarques que l'on fait au-
jourd'hui en septembre dernier, alors
que l'assemblée était encore en ses-
sion, mais l'on admet aussi qu'à cette
époque, en l'absence de M. Briand, il
n'y avait personne capable de mener
à bien les difficiles négociations. On es-
père trouver une solution mixte légè-
rement ambiguë qui serait acceptable
à Tokio et à Nankin et l'on envisage
même de ne pas fixer de date défini-
tive pour l'évacuation de la zone inter-
dite par les Japonais, mais seulement
de convoquer un nouveau conseil qui,
cette fois, aurait lieu à Paris d'ici deux
ou trois semaines.

Les positions actuelles sont en effet
trop bien prises de part et d'autre
pour obtenir une décision rapide. On
connaît les thèses en présence : les
Chinois refusent toute négociation di-
recte et demandent à la Société des
nations d'agir. Les Japonais, eux, se
réfèrent à leur note du 12 octobre qui
insiste sur la nécessité de n'évacuer le
territoire situé au sud de la zone du
chemin de fer mandchou à eux réservé
qu'au moment où la sécurité de leurs
nationaux sera assurée. Ils ne le feront
que lorsqu'il aura été démontré que le
gouvernement chinois est en mesure de
protéger leurs ressortissants, et, bien
entendu, ils se refusent à accepter toute
date d'évacuation. Enfin les Japonais
exigent surtout que les Chinois ne re-
mettent pas en question les droits éten-
dus que les traités internationaux leur
donnent en Mandchourie.

En fait, on tâtonne toujours à Ge-
nève et de plus en plus l'affaire mand-
choue devient un véritable casse-tête
chinois.

Maurice RAYMONDE.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FIG. 21

Enclosure No. 7 to Despatch No. 1983
of October 23, 1931.
from the Embassy at Paris.
EXTRACT, from FIGARO, October 21, 1931.

Le Conflit sino-japonais

FIGARO ÉTENTE 21

Aucun fait nouveau ne s'est produit dans le règlement du conflit sino-japonais. Les réponses du Japon et de la Chine aux propositions du Conseil de la Société des nations ne sont pas encore parvenues à Genève. On en déduit, dans certains milieux, que le conflit est en voie de solution. Si les propositions du Conseil avaient été jugées inacceptables par les parties, elles n'auraient pas manqué, assure-t-on, de le faire aussitôt savoir. On s'attend à ce que les gouvernements de Tokio et de Nankin formulent des contre-propositions qui laisseraient la possibilité de s'entendre.

On mande du Japon, de source officielle, que le gouvernement nippon ferait dépendre l'évacuation de ses troupes de l'acceptation par la Chine des points suivants : reconnaissance explicite par le gouvernement chinois de toutes ses obligations découlant des traités ; reconnaissance et confirmation des droits et privilèges du Japon en matière ferroviaire ; cessation des agissements anti-japonais ; confirmation par les deux parties de leur intégrité territoriale ; confirmation du bail commercial octroyé au Japon en Mandchourie.

Il semble que le Japon tienne particulièrement à faire reconnaître par la Chine les traités qu'elle a jusqu'à présent méconnus, et plus particulièrement le traité sino-japonais de 1915. Le gouvernement de Tokio a été heureux d'apprendre qu'il était question de nommer l'actuel ministre des affaires étrangères de Canton, M. Eugène Chen, ministre des affaires étrangères de Chine. On ne cache pas que les négociations sino-japonaises seraient grandement facilitées si M. Chen accédait au pouvoir.

9022 21

Enclosure No. 8 to Despatch No1983
of October 23, 1931.
from the Embassy at Paris.
EXTRACT from LE JOURNAL, October 21, 1931.

VERS L'APAISEMENT DU CONFLIT

mal sino-japonais

21 Le Japon prend l'initiative
de mesures qui justifient
l'impression de détente
qui s'est manifestée à Genève

*Voici enfin le différend sino-japonais
entré dans une phase nouvelle qui est
celle d'une détente très nette.*

*Cet heureux résultat est d'abord in-
contestablement dû, pour une bonne part,
à l'action personnelle de M. Briand, qui,
avec cette force de persuasion qui est
dans sa manière, n'a pas cessé de multi-
plier les arguments auprès des deux par-
ties pour les amener à une compréhension
plus raisonnable de leurs véritables inté-
rêts. En lui confiant le soin de poursui-
vre seul les entretiens de conciliation, les
membres du conseil ont voulu rendre un
nouvel et éclatant hommage aux efforts
de l'homme d'Etat français.*

*Mais le mérite de l'amélioration d'une
situation qui, il y a quarante-huit heures,
apparaissait inextricable, revient aussi à
l'attitude très sage et très digne des au-
torités japonaises.*

*Après avoir énoncé les motifs d'ordre
juridique qui lui paraissaient s'opposer à
l'admission d'un délégué américain aux
travaux du conseil, le gouvernement de
Tokio, par un geste qui ne manque pas
d'élégance, a fait savoir à M. Stimson
que, tout en se réservant le droit de
soulever des objections sur les questions
de procédure soumises au conseil, il s'in-
clinait devant le fait acquis que consti-
tue la participation des Etats-Unis.*

*La voie est donc libre maintenant
pour la recherche d'un accommodement
nécessaire. Elle l'est d'autant mieux
qu'ayant compris la très grande valeur
psychologique que ne manquerait pas
d'avoir, de sa part, un acte spontané, le
Japon a déjà retiré ses troupes en deçà
du fleuve Yalou, rappelé ses escadrilles
de bombardement et commencé à réta-
blir les communications par voie ferrée.
Voilà des gages de bonne volonté et une
preuve d'intentions pacifiques auxquels
les Chinois ne peuvent point rester insen-
sibles.*

*Si ces derniers sont vraiment décidés,
non seulement à donner aux Japonais les
garanties de sécurité nécessaires, mais
encore à faire un effort sérieux pour
tirer leur pays de l'anarchie politi-
que qui est l'une des causes du conflit
actuel, en constituant un gouvernement
vraiment national, où des hommes com-
me M. Tcheng négocieraient avec au-
torité, le conseil pourrait enregistrer
beaucoup mieux que l'apaisement d'une
querelle dangereuse : une garantie nou-
velle de la consolidation de la paix en
Extrême-Orient.*

Enclosure No. 9 to Despatch No. 1983
of October 23, 1931.
from the Embassy at Paris
Extract from LA JOURNEE INDUSTRIELLE, October 21, 1931.

L'ÉNIGME DU PACIFIQUE

La Société des Nations se trouve devant la plus délicate des équations. Depuis que se développe le différend sino-japonais, le principe même de l'action internationale est en jeu. L'assemblée de Genève se doit évidemment d'exercer avec succès son rôle d'arbitre si elle ne veut laisser constater une carence à la veille de la conférence du désarmement.

Les causes de conflit s'additionnent volontiers le long des rails de l'Est mandchourien. Des races exaspérées dans leur rivalité millénaire ont ici leurs intérêts qui s'enchevêtrent, leurs émigrations qui s'affrontent, leurs civilisations qui se heurtent. Quelle que soit la subtilité des accommodements orientaux, les querelles naissent fatalement malgré les traités, les protocoles ou les usages. D'une part, la Chine, terre du nombre, vit à nouveau l'une de ces périodes d'anarchie qui forment le fonds de son histoire. Au XVII^e siècle, comme au dernier temps, des dynasties mongoles, de grandes compagnies cherchaient déjà à se partager les provinces. D'autre part, le Japon reflète dans ses mers intérieures l'Asie comme en un miroir, mais en réfléchit les philosophies pour ordonner les choses avec patience. Laborieux, il demande des garanties pour ses biens et ses nationaux. Le boycottage qui seconde la xénophobie paralyse ses affaires. Tout à côté, d'autres impérialismes enfin sont là qui guettent quelque proie.

Mais le problème n'est plus seulement de la nature de ceux qui se posaient au XIX^e siècle, alors que le monde se disputait des zones d'influence et des richesses enrobées encore de mystère. Nous vivons aujourd'hui une crise mondiale sans aucun précédent. Or tous les rapports développent à l'envi depuis quelques années le thème suivant : l'une des causes de nos difficultés de l'après-guerre résiderait dans le fait que l'Extrême-Orient ne consomme plus. A côté de « masses » de production qui furent peut-être trop au-

dacieuses, il est des « masses » de consommation qui se sont évaporées. La Chine, avec ses quatre cent cinquante millions d'habitants, était pour les cotonnades, le sucre, les métaux, les bougies, les lainages, etc. l'un des ventres du monde. Cette abstinence a sur notre Europe de graves incidences.

En voici un exemple. M. Paul Reynaud vient de commencer sa nécessaire mission d'études dans l'Union indochinoise. La traversée qu'il vient de faire lui a montré, égrenés en chapelet le long de l'Asie, des ports en marasme. Notre colonie n'est pas épargnée : les représentants indigènes et français de la Cochinchine nous révélaient hier encore son exacte situation. L'exportation, notamment celle du riz et du charbon, souffre du marasme dans le Pacifique, de l'anarchie de la Chine et des dépréciations monétaires voisines. Par contre-coup, la France d'Asie a un pouvoir d'achat diminué. Elle achète moins à la mère patrie qui perd un débouché précieux et aujourd'hui si indispensable.

Les Treize sont certes d'éminents diplomates. M. Aristide Briand vient de mettre à nouveau son autorité au service de la Société des Nations. On annonce que le retrait des troupes serait commencé et qu'ailleurs certaines concentrations se formeraient à nouveau, mais la cause de la paix nous impose encore d'autres tâches. Puisque l'Europe pâtit dans son désarroi des effets de l'anarchie chinoise, sans doute faut-il, sans être trop ambitieux, souhaiter que l'ordre règne un jour prochain en Extrême-Orient. Au delà de la querelle actuelle qu'on cherche à apaiser, il est un problème plus élevé : celui des troubles prolongés de l'énigmatique Asie, qui sont, quant à eux, depuis trop longtemps une menace pour l'équilibre économique du monde et l'une des raisons de l'universelle inquiétude.

Pierre LYAUTEY.

Deuxième

Enclosure No. 10 to Despatch No. 1983
of October 23, 1931
from the Embassy at Paris.
Extract from l'OEUVRE, October 21, 1931.

Le poids de la Paix

Dépêches de Genève :

« Tout le poids de la négociation repose en ce moment sur M. Briand. »

Quelle négociation ? Une des plus délicates qui soient, quand on songe à la subtilité orientale, proverbiale, des parties en présence. Et l'une des plus importantes...

— Vraiment ? Cette histoire sino-japonaise ?...

— Eh ! Il ne s'agit point que de la Chine et du Japon. Il s'agit de bien autres intérêts ! D'abord, du prestige de la Société des Nations et de tous les espoirs que les hommes de bonne volonté ont pu mettre dans la conférence du désarmement. Répétons-le : si la Société des Nations ne réussissait point à régler pacifiquement le différend mandchourien, ce n'est pas la Chine seule qui, comme elle l'a fait déjà pressentir, en tirerait argument pour dire : « S'il n'est pas d'autorité internationale pour faire accepter son arbitrage et ses sentences, chacun n'a plus à compter que sur ses propres forces. »

Et puis, un conflit — si un conflit armé éclatait — aux confins de la Chine et de l'Est sibérien n'intéresserait-il que la Chine ? Les Etats-Unis ont-ils jamais cessé de se préoccuper de ce qui se passait sur les rives du Pacifique ? L'U. R. S. S. n'a-t-elle pas, ou n'estime-t-elle pas avoir son mot à dire ? Et supposons la Russie qui, soviétique ou non, est toujours la Russie, impliquée dans une lutte en Extrême-Orient. Pouvons-nous répondre de ce qui se passera alors dans l'esprit de certains peuples ou, pour mieux dire, de certains gouvernements européens voisins de l'U. R. S. S. ? Qui peut prévoir ce que seraient en Europe centrale les répercussions d'un conflit — même, tout d'abord, purement diplomatique — entre tel Etat balkanique et Moscou ? L'Europe centrale ?... Mais nous voici tout près de nos propres frontières...

Tel est donc, tel peut être l'enjeu de cette négociation dont tout le poids repose sur les épaules de M. Briand. Et comment nierait-on que, depuis qu'il l'a prise lui-même en charge, de très nets progrès ont été enregistrés vers la « détente » ?

Pour un homme que ses adversaires accusent de faiblesse, d'épuisement physique et intellectuel, et, pour le reste, de manie utopique congénitale, voilà, n'est-ce pas ? qui est assez bien.

Mais croyez-vous que ces adversaires désarment ? Ce serait mal les connaître ! Tant qu'ils ont pu croire — oserai-je dire « espérer » — que M. Briand échouerait en cette occasion, ils n'ont eu que sarcasmes décourageants. Le voici qui obtient d'incontestables résultats ? Cela n'empêche pas le caricaturiste ordinaire de l'*Echo de Paris* de le représenter, en un dessin qui veut être irrévérencieux, comme « la dernière incarnation de Bouddha. » Quant à l'*Humanité*, elle ne veut voir dans l'action apaisante de la Société des Nations, entreprise sous la direction d'Aristide Briand, qu'un « camouflage » destiné à préparer « le partage de la Chine » entre les divers « impérialismes » (« impérialismes » au nombre desquels il faut compter, je pense, l'impérialisme russe, qui eût préféré la conquête totale au partage...)

De sorte que si Briand n'empêche pas la guerre, il est incapable de s'opposer aux « impérialismes », mais que, s'il parvient à l'empêcher, il les favorise sournoisement...

Devant ces sonnettes nationalistes et ces billevesées communistes, comme on comprend que le bon sens français reste fidèle à cette politique de progrès dans la raison et l'équilibre à laquelle, dimanche encore, il a marqué son attachement !

Jean Plot,

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

P.P. 21

Enclosure No. 11 to Despatch No. 1983
of October 23, 1931.
from the Embassy at Paris.
Extract from LE PETIT PARISIEN, October 21, 1931.

LE CONFLIT SINO - JAPONAIS

On attend à Genève les réponses de la Chine et du Japon

Genève, 20 octobre (dép. *Petit Parisien*.)

La journée d'aujourd'hui fut une journée d'attente. A la dernière minute M. Yoshizawa a fait savoir à M. Briand, avec qui il avait rendez-vous à 13 heures en compagnie de sir Eric Drummond, qu'il n'avait pas encore reçu des instructions de Tokio. L'entrevue fut donc décommandée. La conversation que le représentant de la France devait avoir ensuite dans l'après-midi avec M. Sze fut également ajournée, la réponse de Nankin n'étant pas arrivée non plus.

Ces retards inévitables prouvent que les gouvernements chinois et japonais soumettent à un examen sérieux les questions de principe que M. Briand leur a fait poser par leurs représentants à Genève. Malgré l'impatience manifestée par certaines délégations et qui s'est traduite par des commentaires pessimistes, on conserve l'espoir qu'un arrangement finira par intervenir avant la fin de la semaine. En tout cas M. Briand et ses collègues sont résolus à ne pas convoquer de séance publique du conseil avant qu'une décision soit en vue.

Malgré les démentis diplomatiques, on confirme de très bonne source la teneur des cinq points soulevés par la délégation japonaise touchant le règlement du différend et que le *Petit Parisien* a énumérés hier. On fait seulement remarquer qu'il s'agit d'une déclaration de principe ayant un caractère tout à fait général et non d'un programme de négociations. Cette déclaration a fait l'objet de démarches officieuses auprès des membres du conseil dont les pays ont des intérêts particuliers en Extrême-Orient.

D'autre part, la délégation chinoise a de nouveau communiqué aujourd'hui au secrétariat général de la S. D. N. une série de télégrammes datés de Nankin et signalant que « l'armée japonaise consolide fiévreusement son emprise dans toutes les principales villes de la Mandchourie et essaie d'amener les princes mongols à renoncer à leurs droits et d'instituer un gouvernement indépendant sous la protection du Japon ».

Bien qu'elles enregistrent la conclusion d'un armistice dans la région de Shan-Hai-Kouang — armistice que nous avons signalé hier — ces dépêches provoquent à Genève une certaine inquiétude. Ces inquiétudes sont encore confirmées par une information émanant des milieux chinois, information que nous reproduisons sous toutes réserves, et selon laquelle M. J. Sze aurait chargé l'un de ses collaborateurs, M. Hu, d'attirer l'attention de certains membres du conseil sur la nécessité d'en finir au plus vite si l'on veut épargner au gouvernement de Nankin de sérieuses difficultés avec le gouvernement rival de Canton.

Contrairement à ce qui se passait ces jours derniers, c'est du côté japonais qu'on se montre ce soir le plus optimiste. Invité à faire une brève déclaration pour un film d'actualités sonores destiné à l'Amérique, M. Yoshizawa a affirmé avec force ses intentions pacifiques :

— Nous faisons, dit-il, les meilleurs efforts pour une solution rapide et satisfaisante du conflit. Le Japon n'a aucune visée territoriale en Mandchourie. Nous n'avons qu'un seul désir : faire respecter les traités et assurer la sécurité de la vie et des biens des Japonais résidant en Chine. Nous demandons à l'opinion publique d'avoir patience et confiance et surtout de suivre nos délibérations avec calme et sang-froid.

Il est assez intéressant de constater que cette dernière phrase est textuellement empruntée au discours prononcé par M. Briand à l'ouverture de la session du conseil. Puisse M. Yoshizawa, en se l'attribuant, s'être pénétré aussi de son esprit !

Paul Du BOCHET.

1 138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Ref 21

Enclosure No. 12 to Despatch No. 1983
of October 23, 1931.
from the Embassy at Paris
Extract from LA REPUBLIQUE, October 21, 1931.

Un effort²¹ admirable Une campagne abjecte

Enfin !... Dans l'Extrême-Orient, menacé d'une guerre fratricide, un espoir de salut se lève. La possibilité d'une solution pacifique apparaît.

Certes, ce n'est encore qu'un début, et bien des obstacles restent à surmonter. Mais, quand on compare l'atmosphère d'aujourd'hui à l'atmosphère d'hier, on admire le progrès accompli. Deux peuples couraient au massacre : des mains fraternelles les ont retenus, et voici qu'ils hésitent, qu'ils délibèrent : demain, ils peuvent s'entendre.

A qui est dû ce premier résultat ?
A l'action de la Société des Nations.
A qui est due cette action ? A M. Briand.

Certes, il a trouvé des concours précieux. Mais c'est lui qui a eu la foi. C'est lui qui, à l'heure où d'autres désespéraient, a refusé de s'incliner. Il a eu l'ardeur et il a eu l'adresse.

Je suis inhabile à tresser des couronnes. Mais jamais homme d'Etat ne m'a paru plus « humain », plus véritablement grand que M. Briand luttant à Genève pour sauver la paix menacée. Beaucoup, je crois, ont pensé comme moi qu'en ces heures où la médiocrité et l'égoïsme semblent régner en souverains, il incarnait devant les nations la France généreuse, désintéressée, idéaliste, la vraie France. Par lui, notre pays s'est grandi dans le monde.

Alors, vous croyez peut-être, vous républicains ingénus, que devant cette œuvre de paix, utile au monde et à la France, messieurs les « nationaux » s'inclinent ?

Connaissiez mieux les nationalistes. A l'heure même où M. Briand lutte de tout son pouvoir pour retenir une partie de l'humanité sur la pente sanglante, à l'heure où l'univers anxieux suit ce grand effort, tremble, espère, l'*Echo de Paris* reprend son abjecte campagne contre le ministre des Affaires étrangères. De nouveau il s'efforce à le ridiculiser. De nouveau, il s'essaie à ruiner son œuvre.

Vous me direz que peut-être je suis bien bon de prendre garde à ce que disent et font ces messieurs. Mais le peuple de France fera bien de se rappeler qu'à l'instant même où M. Briand luttait désespérément pour la paix, il s'est trouvé en France des nationalistes pour faire contre lui le jeu des hommes de guerre.

Albert BAYET.

TEMPS 21

Enclosure No. 13 to Despatch No. 1983
08 October 23, 1931.
from the Embassy at Paris.
Extract from LE TEMPS, October 22, 1931.

LE DIFFÉREND SINO-JAPONAIS
~~LA CONFÉRENCE-BALKANIQUE~~

Les nouvelles qui nous parviennent de Genève découvrent de meilleures perspectives pour le règlement du différend sino-japonais. D'abord, toute crainte de complications entre le Japon et le conseil de la Société des nations paraît écartée du fait que le gouvernement de Tokio n'insiste pas sur les objections juridiques qu'il a formulées à la présence d'un observateur américain à la table du conseil; ensuite, M. Briand a été chargé par ses collègues du conseil de rechercher une base d'accord entre les parties et, dès hier, il a eu des entretiens particuliers avec le représentant du Japon, d'une part, et le représentant de la Chine, d'autre part. Lorsque M. Briand aura suffisamment préparé le terrain en vue d'une solution pouvant être admise par les deux parties, le conseil se réunira à nouveau en séance publique, soit demain, soit après-demain.

La question à régler est celle, on le sait, du retrait des dernières troupes japonaises dans la zone du chemin de fer sud-mandchourien et de l'organisation par les autorités locales chinoises de la sécurité des ressortissants japonais. Tandis que le gouvernement de Nankin prétend obtenir le retrait immédiat des forces nippones préalablement à tout règlement, les Japonais ne consentent point à retirer leurs dernières forces de police avant d'avoir obtenu pour leurs nationaux toutes les garanties nécessaires de sécurité. Un télégramme de Genève a indiqué hier ce qui constituerait des revendications du Japon : reconnaissance par la Chine des traités existants et des droits acquis par le Japon en Mandchourie; abstention par les troupes chinoises de toute attaque contre les troupes japonaises dans la zone du chemin de fer; garanties précises pour la vie et les biens des ressortissants nippons en Mandchourie; cessation de la campagne antijaponaise en Chine et, enfin, règlement des questions de fond par des négociations directes entre les deux gouvernements intéressés. C'est certainement ce dernier point qui est le plus important aux yeux du gouvernement de Tokio et qu'il sera le plus difficile faire admettre par le gouvernement de Nankin, dont toute la tactique a consisté jusqu'ici à éviter des pourparlers directs et à attendre un règlement d'ensemble de la seule intervention du conseil de la Société des nations.

Mais il pourrait y avoir à très bref délai un fait nouveau de nature à modifier sensiblement cet aspect de la situation. En effet, ce qui se passe à cette heure en Chine même peut changer les dispositions du gouvernement chinois. A la suite de l'appel à l'union lancé par Tchang Kai Chek, un rapprochement s'est accompli entre Nankin et Canton. Des pourparlers ont eu lieu dans cette dernière ville et plusieurs personnalités cantonnaises, dont M. Eugène Chen, ministre des affaires étrangères du gouvernement de fait de Canton, se sont rendues à Shanghai où elles rencontreront les représentants de Nankin pour y conclure avec eux une entente ferme. Certaines informations indiquent que M. Eugène Chen pourrait être appelé ces jours prochains à remplacer M. C.-T. Wang comme ministre des affaires étrangères du gouvernement national chinois. Or, M. Eugène Chen aurait déclaré qu'il était prêt à négocier directement avec le Japon. Encore qu'il n'y ait aucune confirmation officielle d'un changement immédiat dans le haut personnel politique de Nankin, il y a là une éventualité qu'on peut envisager et qui faciliterait singulièrement la solution du différend sino-japonais.

Enclosure No. 14 to Despatch No. 1983
of October 23, 1931
from the Embassy at Paris
Extract from L'AVENIR, October 22, 1931.

Pénélope à Genève



Il ne faut pas, paraît-il, excuser le Japon ; lui donner raison sur quelque point, c'est se montrer hostile à M. Briand. Voilà la dernière trouvaille. Il faudra bien pourtant qu'on en prenne son parti : le memorandum que la délégation nipponne a distribué hier aux journalistes présents à Genève expose avec beaucoup de force et de clarté la genèse du conflit, et les arguments que les Chinois avaient par avance opposés à ceux de leurs adversaires sont d'une faiblesse enfantine. Que le Conseil soit embarrassé, dans ces conditions, pour trancher dans le vif, cela se conçoit ; il ne peut guère faire pression sur le Japon, dont la position est excellente malgré le tort où il s'est mis en recourant à la manière forte. Et il ne sait trop quoi dire au délégué chinois, qui appelle au secours, prie qu'on se hâte tant le danger presse... et réclame une indemnité pour les dommages causés par les troupes nipponnes, sachant très bien qu'une telle prétention ne sera jamais acceptée par Tokio.

Que rien de tout cela ne soit imputé à faute à M. Briand, on y consent bien volontiers. L'erreur a été de vouloir se servir des Etats-Unis comme d'un croque-mitaine ; ils ne tenaient pas à jouer ce rôle ingrat et le Japon n'eût pas supporté qu'on essayât de lui faire peur. Mais cette fausse manœuvre n'est pas due à M. Briand seul et, l'affaire étant désormais aplaniée, il n'y a qu'à passer condamnation. On ne tient pas à charger la S. D. N. de tous les péchés d'Israël. Mais on lui demande d'agir vite et de ne pas perdre son temps en roueries inutiles ; ce qui postule une volonté claire.

Mais sait-elle où elle va ? Elle s'obstine à considérer la Chine comme une nation égale en droits au Japon. C'est confondre la géographie avec la politique. Qu'est-ce que la Chine ? Rien d'autre qu'une foule dont Albert Londres nous dépeignait, il y a quelques années, la permanente folie. Où est son gouvernement ? Il y en a un à Canton, un à Nankin. Pour le moment celui de Nankin a la faveur genevoise ; mais la mode en passera, comme celle du pantalon de même nom, et on traitera avec Canton, ou avec quelque coin de province où un général plus

actif que les autres parlera tout à coup plus fort. Car non seulement il y a deux gouvernements, ce qui revient à pas de gouvernement du tout, mais encore la puissance est à prendre, chaque jour que Dieu fait, par qui veut tenter la chance. Les gens de Genève pourraient aussi bien jouer à l'écarté le nom du Tching ou du Tchang auquel ils confieront le soin de s'entendre avec le petit Jap. L'heureux gagnant n'en aura ni plus ni moins d'autorité dans ce grouillement anarchique ; et tout sera à refaire à la prochaine lune.

On accuse le Japon d'impérialisme, de militarisme, et c'est peut-être juste. Mais il est encore bien gentil de discuter minutieusement avec ces Occidentaux contre lesquels il est assuré d'avoir toujours raison, puisqu'ils ne peuvent pas faire que la Chine ne soit pas ce qu'elle est. Il leur sauve la face. Que demande-t-il ? Des garanties qu'on respectera ses droits — car il a, en Mandchourie, des droits acquis, découlant des traités — et qu'on laissera travailler Coréens et Japonais sans les molester. Il désire aussi qu'on ne boycotte pas ses marchandises, ce dont la S. D. N. n'a pas à s'occuper ; mais passons. Ces garanties, qui les donnera ? La Chine ? Celle de Canton, celle de Nankin, celle de M. Tching ou celle de M. Tchang ? Si la S. D. N. se contente des assurances que télégraphiera Nankin, elle aura un aussi bon billet que La Châtre. Huit jours après les embrassements tokio-nankinois, quelque chef de bande trucidera un garde-barrière ou mettra le feu à une gare du côté de Moukden et la petite plaisanterie recommencera. Cela vaut-il que M. Briand se fatigue en Suisse ? Et le Japon n'est-il pas bien... oriental, et poli, en feignant d'attacher la moindre importance aux engagements réciproques que le comité rédigera solennellement ?

Le Conseil de Genève a entrepris là un travail digne de Pénélope.

Société des Nations. Tel est le nom de cette institution. Que s'occupe-t-elle de la Chine, qui n'est pas une nation ? Je vous dis qu'elle a tort. Tous les « symptômes de détente » du monde n'empêcheront pas que la toile d'Ithaque se défera chaque nuit, pendant que dormiront les prétentieux.

SENATUS.

1 138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 15 to Despatch No. 1986
of October 23, 1931.
from the Embassy at Paris
Extract from LA CORRESPONDANCE UNIVERSELLE, October 22, 1931.

La S. D. N. et l'affaire Mandchoue

Une solution provisoire en perspective

Les nouvelles, vieilles de 48 heures et basées sur des commentaires de la presse de Tokio que le Japon allait quitter la S. D. N. sont périmées. La détente attendue avec impatience est enfin signalée de Genève. Cédant aux pressions dont il a été l'objet, le Gouvernement Japonais s'est décidé à retirer ses troupes de Mandchourie. Celles-ci ont repassé le Yalou, les escadrilles de bombardement sont rap-
pelées.

Pour combien de temps ?

En tout cas, c'est le moment qui était attendu par la Chine pour entamer des négociations directes comme le désirait le Japon.

Est-ce à dire que le conflit sino-japonais soit aplani ? Qui le croirait ?

On a trouvé tout au plus une porte de sortie de l'impasse dans laquelle la Société de Genève avait été imprudemment engagée et un moyen en même temps de ménager grâce à une formule les susceptibilités de chacun.

Et tout l'honneur en sera laissé à M. Briand. Il importait avant tout de rassurer l'opinion publique alarmée par la perspective d'une grande guerre en Extrême-Orient et de sauvegarder le pouvoir chancelant du gouvernement de Tchang Kai Chek qui a trouvé moyen de liguer contre lui tout le Japon et la Russie.

Y a-t-on réussi et du même coup à dissoudre la formidable coalition des Nippons et des Soviets en vue d'un partage éventuel de l'ex Céleste Empire ? Peut-être, mais pas pour bien longtemps.

Enclosure No. 16 to Despatch No. 1983
of October 23, 1931
from the Embassy at Paris
Extract from L'ECHO DE PARIS, October 22, 1931.

Le Conseil de la S.D.N. réduit à un aveu d'impuissance

IL VA S'AJOURNER A TROIS SEMAINES

(De notre correspondant particulier.)

Genève, 21 octobre. — Ne sachant que faire, étant obligés quand même de prendre une décision et Lord Reading marquant toujours plus son impatience de quitter Genève, les membres du Conseil ont décidé en principe aujourd'hui, au cours de deux séances secrètes séparées, d'ajourner à trois semaines leurs travaux. Pour la deuxième fois depuis le 18 septembre — date à laquelle les Japonais déclenchèrent leur offensive — le Conseil confesse son impuissance malgré la présence des Etats-Unis à sa table.

Ce matin, M. Briand avait convoqué à son hôtel les délégués britannique, allemand et espagnol. Le comité des Cinq, qu'on avait cru supprimé, est rappelé à la vie. Peu avant la réunion, le délégué chinois avait remis à M. Briand un mémoire en quatre points. La Chine y affirmait :

1. Qu'une négociation directe avec les Japonais ne pouvait avoir lieu avant l'évacuation de la Mandchourie ;

2. Qu'une commission d'investigation neutre devrait fonctionner pendant et après l'évacuation ;

3. Que des réparations devaient être fixées pour les dommages commis par les Japonais ;

4. Qu'un organisme d'arbitrage et de conciliation devait être créé pour assurer le développement des relations pacifiques sino-japonaises.

M. Briand exposa à ses collègues les quelques points qu'il avait pu dégager au cours de ses récentes conversations avec les Japonais, tout en ajoutant que ces points n'étaient pas définitifs, car M. Yoshizawa n'avait toujours pas d'instructions formelles de son gouvernement. Il donna ensuite lecture du mémoire chinois.

Les deux thèses ne pouvaient pas être plus opposées. Lord Reading le souligna et déclara que, dans ces conditions, il était impossible de siéger indéfiniment. D'accord avec les autres délégués, il suggéra qu'un dernier effort fût tenté pour établir une résolution contenant, si possible, l'approbation unanime du conseil, y compris les parties en conflit. Cette résolution devrait aussi contenir l'annonce de l'ajournement à trois semaines. Pour être acceptée par tout le monde, elle n'avait qu'à reprendre ce que le conseil avait affirmé, le 30 septembre, en clôturant la première partie de sa session dédiée à la Mandchourie.

Faute de mieux, cette procédure fut admise. On chargea un petit comité de rédaction de mettre sur le papier un projet de résolution et l'on pria M. Briand d'exposer aux autres membres du conseil et à l'observateur américain les décisions prises. Au cours d'un thé que M. Briand leur offrit cet après-midi, cela fut fait.

Le projet de résolution, qui doit être d'ailleurs négocié avec les Japonais et les Chinois, n'a pas été distribué, mais on fit savoir aux Treize qu'il se baserait sur les promesses d'évacuation faites par les Japonais, sur la cessation de l'agitation anti-japonaise en Chine et sur la sécurité pour les ressortissants et pour les biens japonais en Chine et sur l'utilité de négociations directes sino-japonaises au sujet des questions découlant de l'occupation. Dans son préambule, cette résolution dirait, en outre, que le conseil, ayant examiné à nouveau la situation créée par le conflit, se considère en session permanente, donc susceptible d'être convoqué à chaque instant. L'état actuel de la question conseillerait cependant un ajournement des débats pour trois semaines. M. Briand ajouta qu'il resterait sous-entendu que la date de convocation du conseil devrait coïncider avec l'évacuation de la Mandchourie par les Japonais.

Si cette procédure ne devait pas

ment japonais du théâtre des opérations, avaient, disaient-ils, leur valeur.

Entre temps, les Japonais attendent des instructions définitives et la communication officielle du projet de résolution. Ils se disent prêts à partir dès vendredi. Dans la matinée, ils avaient d'ailleurs distribué à la presse un nouveau memorandum affirmant leur désir de s'entretenir directement avec la Chine.

Au cours de la séance secrète, les Cinq auraient examiné aussi l'attitude des Etats-Unis qui aurait, ainsi que l'on sait, subi un fléchissement sérieux dans l'exécution des promesses d'appui faites à la S.D.N. par M. Stimson.

M. Prentiss Gilbert a donné aujourd'hui des assurances renouvelées du désir qu'aurait Washington de voir la S. D. N. régler le conflit; à l'appui de cette information, il annonça que Washington avait finalement fait la démarche décidée samedi par le Conseil pour rappeler Tokio et Nankin au respect du pacte de Paris.

Le programme de demain ne sera fixé qu'à la suite de conversations qui auront lieu cette nuit avec les Japonais et les Chinois. On prête cependant à Lord Cecil l'intention de faire convoquer coûte que coûte une séance plénière et publique du Conseil pour demain.

Enclosure No. 16 to Despatch No. 1983
of October 23, 1931
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Extract from L'ECHO DE PARIS, October 22, 1931.

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Si cette procédure ne devait pas trouver son application, les cinq puissances auraient suggéré d'ajourner quand même la session extraordinaire sur un simple exposé de la situation fait par le président et sur des recommandations faites aux belligérants. En d'autres termes, sur un constat de carence.

L'émotion dans les milieux genevois

Sitôt ces nouvelles connues, elles créèrent une agitation considérable dans les milieux de la Société des Nations et à la délégation chinoise. Les préoccupations les plus graves se firent jour. Une telle conclusion disait-on, ne pourra qu'atteindre sérieusement le prestige de la S.D.N. et détruire ce qui reste d'espoir dans le monde entier pour l'organisation de la sécurité, de l'arbitrage et du désarmement. Seule la force des armes primerait désormais ouvertement.

Le docteur Sze déclare que jamais Nankin n'accepterait une telle résolution ou une telle procédure. « Cette décision, dit-il, serait contraire au droit garanti à la Chine par le pacte de la S.D.N. » Il ajouta qu'il avait averti M. Briand du fait que toute décision écartant les principes énoncés dans le memorandum chinois serait inacceptable. Les milieux chinois ajoutaient que le projet de résolution était une acceptation uniquement du point de vue japonais. Si elle devait être acceptée, il ne resterait plus à la Chine que de se retirer de la S.D.N. Le nouveau gouvernement chinois est déjà en partie formé par des russophiles. La défaite chinoise au Conseil signifierait la défaite des modérés en Chine et la reprise des relations avec les Soviétiques.

Ce pessimisme, en partie intéressé, n'était pas partagé par les Anglais qui affirmaient avoir des informations pouvant laisser croire que d'ici trois semaines les Japonais auraient évacué la Mandchourie. Des signes favorables, comme la reprise du trafic régulier sur le chemin de fer Moukden - Pékin et l'éloignement des avions de bombardement japonais du théâtre des opérations, avaient, disaient-ils, leur valeur.

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1 138 F

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 17 to Despatch No. 1983
of October 23, 1931.
from the Embassy at Paris
Extract from EXCELSIOR, October 22, 1931.

APRES AVOIR ATTENDU VAINEMENT HIER UNE RÉPONSE VENANT DE TOKIO, LES CINQ BRUSQUENT LA NÉGOCIATION

Un projet de résolution adopté
qui pourrait, aujourd'hui, être
soumis à une séance plénière.

LES NOUVELLES DE MANDCHOURIE SEMBLENT MEILLEURES

[DE NOTRE ENVOYÉ SPÉCIAL]

GENÈVE, 21 septembre. — Ce matin nous nagions dans l'optimisme lorsqu'un officieux porte-parole japonais affirmait que le gouvernement de Tokio avait décidé d'accepter les suggestions de M. Briand sur les cinq points qu'avait exposés la délégation japonaise. Ces cinq points constituaient les conditions préalables que pose son pays à l'évacuation de ses troupes. Il ne s'agissait, il est vrai, que des principes généraux.

Il fallut bientôt déchanter. M. Yoshizawa n'avait encore rien reçu de Tokio. M. Ito, autre délégué japonais, démentit formellement la nouvelle et le plus grand pessimisme régnait au secrétariat où l'on est sous l'impression que le Japon ne semble pas désireux d'arriver à une solution rapide.

Plus tard, on apprit que le texte des cinq conditions posées par le Japon n'était pas le même lorsqu'il circulait à Genève, à Washington ou dans les milieux de la presse internationale.

Dans ces conditions, le comité des Cinq, se réunissant pour la troisième fois de la journée, a pris ce soir une décision de la plus haute importance.

On sait que ce comité est composé de la France (M. A. Briand), de l'Angleterre (lord Reading et le vicomte Cecil), de l'Allemagne (V. von Mutius), de l'Italie (le sénateur Scialoja) et de l'Espagne (M. de Madariaga).

Sans attendre la réponse du Japon aux différentes précisions demandées par M. Briand sur les cinq questions préalables à l'évacuation de la Mandchourie, le comité a adopté un projet de résolution qui serait soumis dès demain à une séance plénière si la réponse japonaise est favorable. Dans le cas contraire, si aucune entente n'est possible, comme d'après l'article 11 du pacte l'unanimité est indispensable, le Japon, ou même la Chine, en refusant d'accepter la résolution, pourrait paralyser l'action de la Société des nations. Mais l'on se rend compte que ce serait là une bien périlleuse position à prendre.

Dans ce cas, toutefois, nous croyons pouvoir affirmer que le conseil se contenterait d'enregistrer son vote et d'inviter la délégation japonaise à en référer à nouveau à son gouvernement tout en soulignant la gravité de la situation. La séance serait alors suspendue pour n'être reprise que sur la convocation de M. Aristide Briand. Nous croyons pouvoir affirmer à ce sujet que l'observateur américain s'est, au nom de son gouvernement, entièrement rallié à cette procédure. Ajoutons également que les nouvelles qui sont parvenues de Mandchourie ce soir à Genève semblent meilleures.

On signale que de très nombreuses banques, qui avaient été fermées par les autorités militaires japonaises, ont été rouvertes et qu'à Antoung, point stratégique frontière des plus importants, les troupes japonaises qui avaient occupé le village et certains villages des environs se sont repliées en Corée. Dans l'ensemble, il semble donc que la situation s'améliorerait.

Lorsqu'elle fut informée, par l'envoyé spécial d'Excelsior, de la décision du comité du conseil, la délégation japonaise se refusa à tout commentaire et se borna à affirmer qu'elle attendait dans la nuit les précisions demandées par M. Briand.

Maurice RAYMONDE.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Luitfsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 18 to Despatch No. 1983
 of October 23, 1931.
 from the Embassy at Paris
 Extract from FIGARO, October 22, 1931.

Le Conflit sino-japonais et la S. D. N.

Les gouvernements de Tokio et de Nankin n'avaient pas encore fait connaître mercredi, à Genève, s'ils acceptaient de discuter sur les bases qui leur avaient été suggérées. Dans ces conditions, le Conseil n'a pu siéger.

Le gouvernement chinois a répondu hier à la note des puissances, qui lui ont rappelé les engagements contractés par lui en signant le pacte Briand-Kellogg de renonciation à la guerre. Il fait retomber sur le Japon, comme bien l'on pense, la responsabilité du conflit actuel. Il se déclare résolu à ne pas recourir à la guerre et à se conformer aux décisions de la Société des Nations. De son côté, le gouvernement japonais assure, dans sa réponse, qu'il a pris en Mandchourie des mesures purement défensives, qu'il est prêt à négocier avec la Chine, mais à la condition d'obtenir des garanties pour la sécurité de ses ressortissants et le respect des traités.

D'autre part, la délégation japonaise à Genève a publié un nouveau memorandum destiné à expliquer les causes des incidents de Mandchourie, qui auraient été provoqués par une méconnaissance systématique et des violations continues des droits et des intérêts que possèdent le Japon et ses ressortissants. Le gouvernement de Tokio déclare qu'il n'a aucune visée territoriale, mais qu'il doit veiller à la défense de ses droits dans une région qui présente pour lui une importance vitale. Il souhaite qu'une collaboration féconde s'établisse, en Mandchourie, entre la Chine et le Japon.

Malheureusement, des incidents continuent à se produire. On mande de Tokio que deux mille soldats chinois auraient déclenché une nouvelle attaque contre le chemin de fer sud-mandchourien. Des soldats japonais auraient été aussitôt envoyés en renfort et un violent combat s'en serait suivi. Les détails manquent.

Pendant que la Société des Nations délibère et inonde le monde de dépêches rassurantes, on continue à se battre en Mandchourie. On assure que le conseil est sur le point de se séparer après avoir enregistré de favorables déclarations des deux parties au différend. C'est évidemment tout ce qu'il peut faire. Mais il n'y a pas de quoi crier victoire.

1 138 f

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 19 to Despatch No. 1983
of October 22, 1931.
from the Embassy at Paris
Extract from LE JOURNAL, October 22, 1931.

JOURNÉE DE NEGOCIATIONS à Genève

En attendant la réponse de Tokio
le conseil de la S. D. N. a mis
au point un projet de résolution
à soumettre aux parties en cause

GENÈVE, 21 octobre. — La journée qui s'achève a été extrêmement laborieuse. Elle s'est déroulée tout entière en négociations délicates et difficiles, qui ont exigé de M. Aristide Briand qu'il fût sans cesse sur la brèche. Conversations au comité des Cinq, échange de vues au conseil des Treize, retour en entretiens entre les Cinq, nouvelles auditions des parties par M. Briand, puis confrontation générale cette fois.

Le conseil n'est pas en présence d'un différend dont la solution ressortit à l'article 15 du pacte, lequel prévoit le jugement qu'il doit rendre dès qu'il s'agit d'un acte de guerre — c'est en vertu de l'article 11 que le différend sino-japonais est évoqué ici, et le conseil n'a, dès lors, à rendre qu'une sentence de conciliateur en vertu de la disposition de cet article qui dit que tout membre de la Société a le droit, à titre amical, d'appeler son attention sur toute circonstance de nature à affecter les relations internationales et qui menace, par suite, de troubler la paix ou la bonne entente entre nations dont la paix dépend.

Cette distinction est capitale. Le Japon a protesté à maintes reprises qu'il n'y avait pas entre la Chine et lui l'état de guerre, ou un état de choses de nature à conduire à la guerre. La Chine s'est d'ailleurs adressée au conseil en vertu de l'article 11. Par conséquent, tout ce que peut faire présentement le conseil, c'est de dire aux parties comment il conçoit les possibilités pour elles de reprendre des relations normales.

Voilà à quelle étude s'est employé son président depuis plusieurs jours. Et l'on peut dire aussi ce soir que le conseil s'est suffisamment enquis des faits et se trouve suffisamment renseigné sur les vues des parties en cause, pour que la

redaction d'un projet de résolution a leur soumettre lui soit devenue possible.

Que sera la réponse du Japon ?

Ce projet de résolution est maintenant au point. Dès lors, que va-t-il se passer ? La réponse du gouvernement de Tokio à la demande d'instructions définitives de son porte-parole à Genève est encore attendue ici. Si elle est favorable à l'acceptation des suggestions du conseil, il apparaît infiniment probable que la Chine, de son côté, n'élèvera pas d'objections. Son représentant a certainement été tenu au courant de ce qui se passait, et il a d'ailleurs déclaré faire une entière confiance à la Société des nations.

Alors, dès demain après-midi, pense-t-on, une séance publique pourrait être tenue, au cours de laquelle le conseil, constatant l'accord des parties sur la résolution qu'il a préparée, enregistrerait leur acceptation immédiate, et leur laisserait un délai pour s'y conformer, auquel cas il serait prévu une nouvelle réunion du conseil qui se tiendrait, cette fois, à Paris, pense-t-on, dans trois semaines. Ou bien l'accord n'aura pas pu se faire sur-le-champ, et il ne restera au conseil qu'à laisser les parties à leurs réflexions, dans l'espoir que celles-ci les mèneront à s'y résoudre.

En tout cas, il apparaît certain que, dans cette dernière hypothèse, le conseil ne pourrait pas, son effort de conciliation prévue à l'article II ne s'étant pas réalisé, transporter immédiatement le débat sur le terrain de l'article XV, qui a trait à un état de guerre ou de menace de guerre.

Meilleures nouvelles de Mandchourie

En effet, depuis quelques jours, les nouvelles de Mandchourie sont meilleures. Le retrait des troupes japonaises s'accroît. L'administration de Moukden a été remise aux magistrats chinois. Les banques séquestrées ont été rouvertes. Comment serait-il possible que le conseil invoquât maintenant un article prévoyant les cas d'extrême gravité, alors que l'état de choses s'est, au contraire, amélioré depuis une huitaine de jours ?

En résumé, la journée de demain apparaît devoir être décisive. — *Tony Roche.*

Enclosure No. 20 to Despatch No. 1983
of October 23, 1931.
from the Embassy at Paris
Extract from LE JOURNAL DU COMMERCE, October 22, 1931.

LES TROIS VOYAGES

du Commerce

10/22

par Georges SUAREZ

Jamais un gouvernement n'aura autant voyagé que celui de M. Laval. Lui-même est à Washington, son ministre des Affaires étrangères est à Genève, son ministre des Colonies est à Saigon. Le président du Conseil municipal qui ne fait pas partie du gouvernement, a été aussi gagné par la contagion et est actuellement à Berlin ; ceci n'est pas une critique ; je trouve excellent que la France se montre sur tous les continents ; nulle politique ne peut en ce moment mieux nous servir que celle du sleeping-car et du transatlantique. Toutefois, il semble bien que nous ne devons pas cette génération spontanée de voyageurs à un plan précis ni à des buts communs. Nous savons pourquoi M. Laval s'est rendu aux Etats-Unis ; nous n'ignorons pas ce que M. Paul Reynaud se proposait en se rendant en Indochine ; mais l'un et l'autre étaient-ils au courant de ce que M. Briand allait faire à Genève et, l'étant, l'eussent-ils admis ? Il se trouve par hasard que la visite de M. Laval à Washington fait pendant à la présence de M. Paul Reynaud en Extrême-Orient. D'une part on se rapproche de l'Amérique, d'autre part on manifeste au Japon que l'intérêt que nous portons à nos colonies d'Indochine implique une collaboration éventuelle et nécessaire des deux pays, contre la menace russo-chinoise et quelques autres qui sourdent dans le Pacifique. Il y avait là un miracle d'équilibre que M. Briand a rompu brutalement en proposant d'inviter les Etats-Unis à participer aux travaux de Genève. M. Laval est allé en Amérique vraisemblablement parce que celle-ci refuse toujours de connaître un mode diplomatique différent de celui qui était en usage avant la guerre ; sinon, on ne voit guère pourquoi notre président du Conseil aurait pris la peine de traverser l'Atlantique. M. Briand ne pouvait ignorer que son invitation était condamnée d'avance et que, dans tous les cas, elle aurait pour conséquence inévitable de mécontenter le Japon. Nous ne pouvons prêter l'oreille aux propos malveillants qui assurent qu'il a voulu torpiller l'entrevue de Washington ; les mêmes propos répandent le bruit qu'il a voulu marquer ces semaines pendant lesquelles on était bien disposé à l'oublier, de son action personnelle, qu'il a voulu montrer qu'il était toujours là, solide au poste et qu'il ne dormait pas toujours, comme une ruineur infâme se plaît à le constater ; pas davantage, nous ne saurions ajouter foi aux insinuations qui le représentent comme un homme à bout de souffle. Ses amis ont proclamé le contraire et sans les quelques coïncidences qui lui ont fait commettre certaines bévues dans des événements capitaux, nous n'avons vraiment aucune raison de ne pas les croire. Mais que conclure alors ? Sans doute que M. Briand accepte mal le rôle de brillant second que les circonstances lui infligent et que son impatience à le faire sentir obscurcit cette fameuse vision d'homme d'Etat que l'on s'est plu si longtemps à louer chez lui : il y a aussi autre chose et qui compte. L'action de M. Briand n'est pas aussi sûre d'elle-même dans la diplomatie du tête-à-tête ; son charme n'opère plus ; sa voix est presque éteinte ; ce sont là des signes que tous ceux qui ont eu l'occasion de l'approcher ou de

l'interwiewer ont pu constater aisément. Ses échecs, dans les fameux entretiens de Locarno et de Thoiry avec Stresemann, en sont encore des témoignages. Il faut à M. Briand, l'étendue, l'espace et un auditoire pour qu'il retrouve ses moyens. A cet égard, Genève est certainement la scène la mieux agencée pour lui donner encore l'illusion de son pouvoir. A peine y était-il débarqué, que le souci de se montrer et peut-être aussi celui de sauver la fameuse assemblée de la vague d'impopularité qui l'assaille en ce moment, l'a incité à proposer cette invitation aux Etats-Unis qui ne nous fera pas que des amis au Japon.

Seulement, il y a là un écueil grave pour la politique française.

Déjà M. Briand n'a pas hésité à se servir de Genève pour faire pression sur notre politique intérieure. Aujourd'hui, il mène le jeu dans une toute autre direction que celle où nous conduit le voyage à Washington et la visite de Saigon. Il faudrait tout de même savoir si M. Briand, malgré tout le prestige dont il jouit encore, a des plans qui ne sont pas les nôtres, et une politique qui n'est que la sienne. Dans ce cas, il peut nous mener loin.

Et pour élever le débat, si l'on peut dire, je trouverais volontiers dans cet incident une nouvelle preuve que ce qui se passe à Genève n'a rien de commun ni de solidaire avec nos intérêts particuliers. Tous les règlements de comptes qui sont soumis à la Société des Nations impliquent par la solution qu'on leur donne — quand on leur en donne une — un antagonisme flagrant avec notre thèse. Au Bureau International du Travail, c'est la question du travail forcé dans les colonies, qui nous met en opposition avec tous les pays, sauf avec la Belgique. A la Commission du Désarmement, nous sommes plus isolés encore. On pourrait multiplier les exemples. A quoi ces isolements successifs et vultueux peuvent-ils nous mener ? A nous placer un jour dans une situation telle vis-à-vis de l'Assemblée, que nous serons contraints ou de nous soumettre en abandonnant nos droits, ou de partir en claquant les portes, ce que jamais nous n'oserons faire tant que M. Briand sera là.

Pour notre part, nous louons fort les Etats-Unis d'être restés à l'écart de ce guépier, puisque leur éloignement aujourd'hui nous permet de traiter directement avec eux et non sous le contrôle plus ou moins légitime des Nations. Cette diplomatie-là, ne l'oublions pas, nous a donnée pendant des siècles des avantages que M. Pierre Laval s'emploie à rétablir aujourd'hui : si la guerre ne nous a pas tout à fait surpris dans l'isolement, nous le devons à quelques entrevues célèbres dans l'histoire. Elles se faisaient dans le silence, à l'écart, loin de la meute de l'opinion et de la foule. Sait-on, par exemple, à quels résultats nous ont conduits la politique de Locarno ? A ceci, notamment qu'en Belgique, les socialistes comme Vandervelde et les flamingants comme Marck invoquent ces mêmes accords purement platoniques, du reste, pour empêcher leur pays de mettre en action la convention militaire franco-belge. Est-ce que cet exemple ne suffit pas à juger l'œuvre de Genève et de son homme : M. Briand ?

Enclosure No. 21 to Despatch No. 1983
of October 23, 1931.
from the Embassy at Paris
Extract from LE MATIN, October 22, 1931.

LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS

Le conseil de la S.D.N. s'ajournerait aujourd'hui

La réponse de Tokio aux suggestions
de M. Briand n'est pas encore par-
venue à Genève, mais dans un mémo-
randum le gouvernement japonais
répète qu'il n'a pas de visées ter-
ritoriales en Mandchourie

[DE NOTRE ENVOYÉ SPÉCIAL]

GENÈVE, 21 octobre. — *Par téléphone.*
— Ce matin, 11 heures : les « cinq »,
MM. Briand, von Mutius, de Madariaga,
Scialoja et Lord Reading, sont réunis
dans les appartements particuliers du
ministre français des affaires étrangères.
De Tokio, pas de nouvelles précises.
Le gouvernement, qui se tient en con-
tact étroit avec Washington et le Con-
seil des anciens, n'a pas encore arrêté
sa réponse définitive aux récentes sug-
gestions de M. Briand.

Du côté chinois, inquiétude et décep-
tion. Le docteur Sze achève de mettre
au point un memorandum qu'il ira, dans
un instant, porter à M. Briand. Dans
ce document, les représentants de Nan-
kin rappellent catégoriquement aux
membres du conseil que la Chine ne se
prêtera à aucune négociation avec la
partie adverse avant l'évacuation immé-
diate, préalable de son territoire par
les troupes nippones et le règlement de
justes indemnités. En outre, le docteur
Sze réclame l'institution d'une commis-
sion mixte sino-japonaise, qui serait
chargée dans l'avenir d'assurer le res-
pect et le contrôle des intérêts des deux
pays en Mandchourie.

Mais revenons auprès des « cinq ».
M. Briand lit à ses collègues les der-
nières informations que viennent de
lui transmettre les agents diplomatiques
des différentes puissances en Extrême-
Orient. Au demeurant, ces nouvelles sont
bonnes : le maire chinois de Moukden
a pu être rétabli dans ses fonctions.
Pas d'incident à signaler.

— Les forces japonaises accentuent-
elles leur mouvement de repli ? inter-
roge Lord Reading.

— A n'en pas douter, lui réplique-t-on.
Le Japon qui, d'après les traités en
vigueur, est autorisé à disposer de
15.000 hommes dans sa zone d'influence
a, présentement, ramené son contingent
à 3.000 hommes. Enfin, sur ces 3.000
hommes, 1.500 seulement, s'il faut en
croire la délégation japonaise, campe-
raient encore en territoire chinois. Pro-
gressivement l'état-major du mikado
procède à l'évacuation des localités
occupées depuis le 18 septembre.

Maintenant, les « cinq », que ces in-
formations ont quelque peu tranquilli-
sées, examinent une nouvelle note de
M. Yoshizawa.

Cette note a été rédigée à l'intention des délégués et de la presse. Il y est dit expressément que le cabinet de Tokio n'a pas de « visées territoriales » en Mandchourie, et qu'il entend seulement protéger la vie, le travail, les biens de ses ressortissants dans une région où il a engagé d'immenses capitaux.

Les résultats obtenus par la S.D.N.

Un des collègues de M. Briand fait alors le point :

— Visiblement, dit-il, l'action constante du conseil auprès du gouvernement japonais commence de porter ses fruits; n'avons-nous pas réussi à arrêter les opérations et à préserver ainsi deux grands pays d'une menace quasi certaine de guerre ? D'autre part, M. Yoshizawa nous rappelle par écrit que Tokio n'a pas de visées territoriales. C'est donc qu'il entend bien revenir, à plus ou moins longue échéance, au *statu quo ante*.

» Je pense donc que le moment est venu pour nous d'achever la mise au point d'un projet de résolution que, quoi qu'il arrive, nous soumettrons demain au conseil, en séance publique. Dans ce projet susceptible d'amendements, nous tiendrons compte : 1° de la résolution que nous avons votée le 30 septembre dernier, résolution qui invitait la Chine et le Japon à régler pacifiquement le conflit ; 2° du fait que l'état-major japonais réduit ses effectifs et évacue peu à peu le territoire chinois ; 3° des assurances de M. Shidehara sur le maintien du *statu quo ante*.

» Nous tournant alors vers le docteur Sze, nous lui recommanderons de donner au Japon des garanties effectives de sécurité. A l'esprit de conciliation de l'un doit répondre inévitablement l'esprit de conciliation de l'autre.

— Mais nous discutons dans le vide, souligne quelqu'un. Vous savez qu'aux termes de l'article 11, notre projet de résolution doit être adopté à l'unanimité des voix. Si le Japon, dont nous ignorons toujours la réponse aux suggestions de M. Briand, refusait de voter « pour », que ferions-nous ? Et si, à la fois, Tokio et Pékin s'insurgeaient contre notre projet ?

— Dans ce cas, déclare Lord Reading, nous abandonnerions les deux adversaires à leur sort jusqu'à ce qu'une menace de guerre — tout est à envisager — nous amène par la suite à prendre des sanctions en vertu de l'article 15 du pacte. Mais actuellement on ne peut pas prétendre qu'il y ait état de guerre. Notre rôle ici (article 11) est de concilier les parties en cause. Admettons que nous échouions.

» Eh bien, il ne nous reste plus qu'à déposer notre projet de résolution sur la table du conseil et à dire à la Chine et au Japon : « Voilà ce que nous pensons, voilà ce que nous estimons être juste et raisonnable ; faites-en votre profit. »

» Supposons que le Japon accepte nos suggestions et que la Chine refuse, qu'une seule des deux parties en cause soit hostile à notre projet. Alors nous nous ajournerions dans trois semaines à Paris. D'ici là, le temps et les bons conseils ne manqueraient probablement pas d'agir efficacement sur l'adversaire récalcitrant. Et lors de notre prochaine session, nous aviserions. »

Tel est le scénario de la journée de demain, sauf imprévu : séance publique, dépôt de projet de résolution et vote, puis ajournement, à trois semaines à Paris, au cas où soit la Chine — très probablement la Chine d'ailleurs — soit le Japon, n'accepterait pas le projet de résolution présenté par le conseil.

Aux dernières nouvelles, on annonce, dans l'entourage de la délégation japonaise, que la réponse de Tokio serait favorable. Mais encore faut-il savoir comment cette réponse est rédigée et si elle ne soulève pas des questions que le conseil n'a pas le droit de « connaître ».

droits et des privilèges du Japon en matière ferroviaire ;
3° Cessation des agissements anti-japonais ;
4° Confirmation par les deux parties de la reconnaissance de leur intégrité territoriale ;
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NANKIN, 21 octobre. — (Dép. Havas).

— Le ministre des affaires étrangères de Chine vient de répondre aux gouvernements signataires du pacte de Paris qui lui avaient adressé une note identique.

La Chine, dit le ministre, désireuse d'adhérer strictement aux engagements pris en vertu des traités, s'est judicieusement abstenue d'employer la force pour répondre aux agressions militaires du Japon, lequel, au mépris des accords signés par lui, a commencé, sans provocation, des attaques contre Moukden. Elle espère que les efforts pacifiques qui se poursuivent à Genève seront couronnés de succès et de son côté, elle persistera à donner au conseil toute l'aide nécessaire pour régler son différend avec Tokio.

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tacher à un retrait de ses troupes en Mandchourie sans obtenir préalablement la certitude que la Chine est en mesure de contrôler la situation. — En même temps que la Chine assurerait la Société des nations de son bon vouloir, le Japon garantirait l'évacuation immédiate du territoire mandchou.

M. Shidehara répond aux puissances

Dans sa réponse aux différentes notes des treize gouvernements co-signataires du pacte Briand-Kellogg, M. Shidehara, ministre des affaires étrangères déclare que rien n'est plus loin de la pensée du gouvernement japonais qu'un recours à la guerre.

De plus, il fait ressortir que l'approbation tacite accordée par le gouvernement chinois aux manifestations antijaponaises n'est pas en harmonie avec l'article II du pacte de Paris.

On annonce que les troupes japonaises sont actuellement aux prises avec 2.000 Chinois près de la ville importante de Tiehling, à 67 kilomètres au nord de Moukden.

Des renforts tirés des garnisons de Moukden seraient envoyés sur place. — (Copyright.)

Une déclaration du gouvernement de Nankin

[SERVICE SPÉCIAL DU « NEW YORK TIMES »]

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(Copyright.)

On sait que les cinq points des propositions japonaises sont les suivants :

- 1° Reconnaissance explicite par la Chine de toutes ses obligations découlant des traités à l'égard du Japon ;
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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 22 to Despatch No. 1983
of October 23, 1931.
from the Embassy at Paris
Extract from LE PETIT PARISIEN, October 22, 1931.

Le conflit sino-japonais

ON ESPERE A GENÈVE QUE LA RÉPONSE JAPONAISE SERA CONCILIANTE

La détente s'accroît en Mandchourie

On prévoit que l'action inlassable et bienfaisante de M. Aristide Briand portera ses fruits

Genève, 21 oct. (dép. Petit Parisien.)
La plupart des délégués ayant manifesté le désir de rentrer le plus vite possible dans leur pays, M. Briand s'est efforcé, aujourd'hui, d'accélérer les négociations.

Le comité des Cinq s'est réuni ce matin, ainsi qu'à la fin de l'après-midi. Entre ces deux séances, la conversation s'est poursuivie, plus intime, à un thé offert par M. Briand.

Sans attendre la réponse du Japon aux suggestions soumises à M. Yoshizawa par le représentant de la France, on s'est attaqué à la rédaction définitive du projet de résolution qui sera soumis aux deux parties. Il ne faut pas oublier en effet que la S. D. N. intervient dans cette affaire sur la base de l'article 2 du pacte qui compte les voix des pays intéressés dans le calcul de l'unanimité. Ainsi, le veto du Japon ou de la Chine suffirait à tenir en échec le conseil tout entier. Dans ce cas, la résolution adoptée prendrait la signification d'une simple recommandation n'ayant aucun caractère obligatoire.

Heureusement, on n'en est pas là. A moins d'un complet revirement de M. Sze, les membres du conseil sont sûrs de l'adhésion de la Chine. Quant au Japon, malgré la lenteur qu'il met à répondre, l'entente est évidemment cal-

culée mais qui s'explique aussi par des considérations d'ordre pratique — nécessité de convoquer le conseil des ministres, opérations du chiffre, difficulté des communications, etc. — rien n'infirme ce soir les renseignements optimistes dont nous nous sommes fait l'écho ce matin.

C'est ainsi qu'on signale en Mandchourie de nouveaux signes de détente. Non seulement le maire japonais de Moukden a cédé ses pouvoirs au maire chinois, mais des banques qui avaient dû fermer sont rouvertes et plusieurs notables qui avaient été emprisonnés ont été relâchés. Des détachements venus de Corée se sont repliés derrière la frontière ; les bombardements aériens ont complètement cessé depuis quelques jours. Ces nouvelles qui émanent de source neutre démentent les dépêches alarmantes venues de Nankin et que nous avons citées hier soir. Elles prouvent également que le gouvernement de Tokio fait pression sur les éléments militaristes qui faisaient jusqu'ici la loi en Mandchourie.

L'acceptation de principe des suggestions transmises au nom du conseil par M. Briand ne semble donc pas faire de doute.

Quoi qu'il en soit, on sera définitivement fixé demain. Les optimistes comptent même avec la possibilité de convoquer vers le soir une séance plénière du conseil qui pourrait être, sinon la dernière, du moins l'avant-dernière. De toute façon, la session du conseil sera close ou interrompue samedi selon qu'on sera arrivé à une entente complète ou à un accord conditionnel nécessitant une mise au point ultérieure.

Enfin, comme nous l'avons déjà dit, le conseil, avant de se séparer, donnera mandat à M. Briand, qui a mené les négociations de bout en bout et qui aura fait preuve au cours de ces deux semaines d'un ressort étonnant et d'une maîtrise diplomatique incomparable, de contrôler la marche des événements et de prendre toutes les mesures envisagées en pareil cas par le pacte et par les statuts de la S. D. N.

Paul DU BOCHET

L'affaire sino-japonaise devant la S.D.N.

LE POURQUOI DE LA « PRESENCE » AMERICAINE

En mars 1927, je descendais le Yang-Tsé-Kiang, d'Hankéou à Nankin, à bord du *Sui-Wo*, un petit vapeur de la compagnie Jardin.

Je n'avais pas choisi ce bateau pour son confort: sept cabines, trois cents passagers... Il me fallait disputer chaque soir la place de mon matelas sur le pont! Je l'avais choisi parce qu'il m'offrait une sécurité relative. Les soldats de Borodine, sur l'une et l'autre rive, mitraillaient et canonnaient les river-steamers où s'entassaient les réfugiés étrangers du haut fleuve.

Mes trois cents compagnons de voyage étaient américains... Dans le chaos de la guerre civile et du soulèvement xénophobe, leur nationalité me protégeait.

Aucun rapport, aucune enquête dans les chancelleries ne pouvaient mieux que cette méchante promenade sur le Fleuve Bleu me renseigner sur la situation morale et matérielle de la grande république américaine dans la vaste république d'Asie. Sans m'en douter, je m'apprétais alors à comprendre, plus de trois ans avant l'événement, pourquoi les Etats-Unis, demeurés à l'écart de la S. D. N., devraient néanmoins s'asseoir exceptionnellement au Conseil de Genève lorsqu'on porterait devant celui-ci un sérieux litige auquel la Chine serait l'une des parties intéressées.

Les passagers du *Sui-Wo*, tous citoyens de l'U. S. A., étaient tous des missionnaires représentant tous les cultes chrétiens, y compris le catholique, et ils avaient été envoyés ici avec leurs familles — d'ailleurs nombreuses — aux frais des diverses Eglises avec d'importantes subventions officielles. Je n'en comptai que trois cents sur un minuscule navire, mais ils étaient plusieurs milliers égaillés dans les provinces les plus éloignées de la côte et du contact occidental.

On sait la double et noble action de toutes les missions: les courageux pasteurs servent à la fois leur religion et leur patrie.

La patrie américaine était bien servie.

Elle n'a pas cessé depuis de propager son nom, son histoire et ses idées parmi les populations de l'intérieur les plus rétives à la civilisation blanche et de gagner chez elles, chaque jour, plus de sympathies.

En effet, ce n'est pas seulement par leur nombre et leur organisation que les apôtres d'Amérique se sont acquis en Chine une profonde influence; les principes mêmes qu'ils diffusaient ont dû séduire particulièrement leurs catéchumènes.

Tandis que les populations du vieil empire, éveillées à la conscience nationale, s'impatientsaient des fameux « traités inégaux », des droits et des « concessions » accordés à certaines puissances étrangères, le libéralisme américain avait transporté en Asie la doctrine de Monroe: « La Chine aux Chinois. »

D'autre part, en défendant, dans les conférences internationales, le principe de la « porte ouverte » les Etats-Unis avaient pris implicitement position, sinon contre les privilèges obtenus par les autres nations, du moins contre toute tentative d'en obtenir de nouveaux.

La Chine n'a pas manqué d'utiliser cette précieuse amitié, et c'est vers Washington que le délégué chinois au Congrès de Versailles dut porter son regard lorsqu'il refusa d'apposer sa signature à un traité de paix qui maintenait une province de son pays, le Chantoung, sous le contrôle japonais.

Cet appel muet dut être entendu puisque les Etats-Unis prirent l'initiative en 1922.

l'industrie américains en Asie — déjà considérables — ont pris une plus grande extension. Ils y occupent aujourd'hui la première place et le prestige des Etats-Unis s'est affermi davantage encore.

Ainsi il apparaissait au moins logique que la grande république américaine, qui possède en Chine les plus hauts intérêts moraux et matériels, ne fût pas absente d'une assemblée devant laquelle a été porté un conflit entre deux nations asiatiques. Les décisions du Conseil de Genève auront donc d'autant plus de force qu'elles auront été prises devant le représentant d'une puissance qui a joué, au cours de ces dernières années, un rôle de premier plan dans la politique internationale en Extrême-Orient.

Louis ROUBAUD.

Louis ROUBAUD.

Enclosure No. 23 to Despatch No. 1986
of October 23, 1931.
from the Embassy at Paris
Extract from LE POPULAIRE, October 22, 1931.

LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS DEVANT LA S. D. N.

Vers un nouvel ajournement

On nous annonce pour aujourd'hui une journée « décisive ». Autrement dit, on croit que le Conseil prendra, enfin, une décision. En attendant les négociations continuent.

Le différend subsiste encore sur le point capital. Tandis que la Chine demande la fixation d'un délai pour l'évacuation des troupes japonaises, le Japon refuse de se laisser lier et promet de retirer ses détachements le jour « où la sécurité de ses ressortissants serait garantie ».

A en croire le correspondant de l'Agence Havas, le Conseil de la Société des Nations essaiera de couper la poire en deux. Dans sa résolution finale, il ne fixerait pas de délai pour l'évacuation. Il se contenterait de prendre note de la promesse formelle du cabinet de Tokio d'évacuer... un jour. Mais la résolution manifesterait assez la volonté de ses membres en fixant à trois semaines une nouvelle réunion.

Ainsi, une fois encore, le Conseil ajournerait la décision, au lieu de trouver une solution du conflit. Pas de doute qu'une pareille suggestion puisse être facilement acceptée par le Japon. Ce qu'il cherche, ce n'est pas la guerre. Il voudrait naturellement s'en passer ou la retarder le plus possible. C'est l'occupation de la Mandchourie qui intéresse le gouvernement nippon. Et plus la situation actuelle se prolongerait, plus le Japon aurait l'espoir de transformer l'occupation de fait en annexion ouverte. Le temps travaille pour le Japon. Le Conseil de la S. D. N. ne semble pas le comprendre.

D'ailleurs, il faut le reconnaître, les principaux membres du Conseil de la S. D. N. sont dans une situation délicate. Le Japon justifie son action en Mandchourie par des arguments qui vont droit au cœur de tous les impérialistes. Le Japon défend « ses » droits en Chine, droits résultant de traités inégaux imposés à la Chine. Or, les grandes puissances représentées au Conseil, ainsi que les Etats-Unis, en possèdent aussi. Le Japon leur apparaît, par conséquent, comme défenseur des principes coloniaux qui leur sont chers. On se rappelle à ce sujet qu'en 1929, lors du conflit sino-soviétique, les Etats capitalistes avaient été unanimes à soutenir la thèse russe contre la Chine et cela, malgré leur hostilité au régime soviétique. Or, les Soviets défendaient alors leurs droits impérialistes sur le chemin de fer de ~~la Chine~~ et tous les journaux bourgeois, même les plus antibolchevistes, donnaient raison aux bolcheviks.

Au fond, les grandes puissances ne tiennent nullement à mettre le Japon dans une situation telle que les principes mêmes de ses droits sur la Mandchourie soient compromis.

D'autre part, elles redoutent — et les Etats-Unis en premier lieu — une trop grande extension du Japon au détriment des autres. Aussi le Conseil essaye-t-il de la limiter.

De là cette carence et cette faiblesse que nous n'avons cessé de dénoncer ici.

Seule une pression énergique de l'opinion publique, qui veut la paix et qui condamne l'agression, peut obliger le Conseil à sortir de son inaction et de sa politique de demi-mesures.

D'ajournement en d'ajournement le problème ne fera que se compliquer. La situation s'aggravera, engendrant de nouveaux conflits entre le Japon et ses voisins. Il sera trop tard pour rétablir le *statu quo* et pour sauver la paix.

O. ROSENFELD.

P.S. — Je viens de passer quelques

Enclosure No. 23 to Despatch No. 1983
of October 23, 1931.
from the Embassy at Paris
Extract from LE POPULAIRE, October 22, 1931.

LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS DEVANT LA S. D. N.

Vers un nouvel ajournement

Populaire... 22

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O. ROSENFELD.

P.S. — Je viens de passer quelques jours à Berlin où j'ai essayé de me renseigner plus amplement sur la situation dans le pays, où est engagée une des plus grandes batailles sociales. Dans la mesure où les questions d'actualité me le permettront, je tâcherai de rendre compte aux lecteurs de mes observations.

Enclosure No. 24 to Despatch No. 1983
of October 23, 1931.
from the Embassy at Paris
Extract from LA REPUBLIQUE, October 22, 1931

L'action de Briand

Ce serait mentir que de dire qu'il n'y a pas eu durant plusieurs semaines quelque chose comme une guerre en Mandchourie. On nous a parlé de bandits chinois, mais il semble bien aussi que des troupes régulières chinoises aient été engagées contre des troupes régulières japonaises naturellement. On s'est bel et bien battu et tous les Français ont eu sous les yeux des photos représentant des soldats faisant le coup de feu, des batteries en action et des fermes incendiées par les torpilles et flambant, tandis que les colons s'enfuyaient, terrifiés. Nous savons les massacres de Coréens (le Japon nous l'a dit) et le nombre des civils chinois massacrés (la Chine nous l'a crié sur les toits).

Pourtant, premier point, le Japon n'a pas déclaré la guerre, la Chine non plus. Il y a vingt ans, ça n'aurait pas traîné.

Second point : les voisins : Soviétiques ou U. S. A. ne sont pas intervenus. Il y a dix-sept ans, nous nous souvenons du carambolage.

Troisième point : tout le monde a essayé de s'entremettre.

Et il est bien entendu que l'on s'est entremis lourdement et avec une extrême maladresse, et que la S. D. N., sous la haute présidence de M. Alexandre Leroux et l'inspiration du vicomte Cecil, s'est montrée au-dessous de tout, mais quoi ! les hommes de talent et de caractère manquaient, ou alors ne se montraient pas, ne s'aventuraient pas, et surtout manquait l'homme qui, seul, a donné l'autorité à Genève, M. Aristide Briand.

Dès qu'il est venu, les choses se sont pas arrangées pour cela, mais enfin il y a eu détente. Et sans doute, avant qu'il vînt, toute une négociation avait été entamée avec les Etats-Unis, négociation qu'il ne pouvait pas ne pas poursuivre. Et cette négociation, en réussissant — il s'agissait de faire des Etats-Unis un juge dans une matière où ils étaient partie — ne pouvait que heurter le Japon.

Mais enfin, si blessé qu'il ait été, qu'a fait le Japon ? Il s'est jeté sur le terrain juridique. Et les Etats-Unis ? Ils ont observé et se sont tus. Et les Soviétiques ? Ils n'ont pas bronché, encore qu'on aurait pu les traiter à l'instar des Etats-Unis.

Le temps a coulé, le temps qui cicatrise toutes les blessures. M. Briand en est pour l'heure à répondre aux objec-

tions juridiques du Japon qui par ailleurs vient de faire distribuer un excellent mémorandum qui met au point certaines questions. Ainsi il apparaît que l'on ne discute sur des questions de procédure que justement pour se donner le temps d'aborder le problème de fond, dans des conditions meilleures que celles où l'on se trouvait il y a quelques jours. De quoi s'agit-il ? Nous le savons. De faire en sorte que l'ingénieur japonais et le capital japonais puissent coopérer avec le coolie chinois. D'amener ceux qui gardent le chemin de fer à coopérer avec ceux qui sont chargés de la police. En vérité, c'est un problème dont on entrevoit les solutions.

N'ayons crainte : il sera résolu. M. Briand trouvera là l'occasion d'une nouvelle victoire dont ne parleront pas ses détracteurs, à moins qu'ils ne l'insultent à ce propos, car il est entendu que lorsque le ministre des Affaires étrangères sert la cause de la paix, il est criminel d'après ces messieurs. — D. S.

Enclosure No. 25 to Despatch No. 1983
of October 22, 1931.
from the Embassy at Paris
Extract from LE TEMPS, October 22, 1931.

LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS

A LA SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS

L'attitude du Japon

(Par téléphone, de notre correspondant particulier)

Genève, 21 octobre.

M. Briand a reçu ce matin ce que l'on a appelé le comité des Cinq, qui fut, en septembre, chargé du règlement de l'affaire portée devant le conseil. Cette réunion a eu lieu au siège de la délégation française. Elle groupait, avec M. Briand, les représentants de la Grande-Bretagne, de l'Italie, de l'Allemagne et de l'Espagne, ainsi que sir Eric Drummond. On se refuse à donner des indications sur l'objet de cette réunion, mais tout fait supposer que M. Briand a mis ses collègues au courant de ses conversations avec les deux parties. On assure, en effet, du côté chinois, que M. Alfred Sze a fait faire une démarche auprès de la délégation française pour prier M. Briand de faire l'impossible afin que l'action du conseil ne subisse plus de retard. On sait que les demandes chinoises peuvent se résumer en deux points : indication par le conseil de la date extrême de l'évacuation des troupes japonaises encore stationnées sur le territoire chinois et paiement par le Japon d'une indemnité pour les dommages causés.

Une agence de presse ayant demandé hier à la délégation japonaise s'il était exact que M. Yoshizawa « basait le règlement du différend sur cinq points », la délégation japonaise a répondu négativement. Ce qui est vrai, c'est que la délégation japonaise a officiellement pressenti diverses délégations au conseil, sur « cinq conditions préalables que le Japon désire voir accepter par la Chine avant le retrait définitif des dernières troupes japonaises d'occupation ». Evidemment, le règlement du différend est réservé pour des négociations directes sino-japonaises.

D'autre part, le gouvernement japonais vient d'informer sa délégation à Genève qu'il était décidé à accepter certaines suggestions formulées par M. Briand, quant aux cinq conditions préalables exposées au président du conseil, au cours des dernières conversations Briand-Yoshizawa. On sait que ces cinq propositions consistent en l'énoncé des principes généraux qui, dans l'esprit de la délégation japonaise, aideraient à provoquer une véritable détente dans l'opinion publique aussi bien en Chine qu'au Japon. Cependant, du fait même que ces propositions n'ont encore qu'une forme générale, elles peuvent prêter à des confusions ou à des malentendus. M. Briand avait donc demandé à M. Yoshizawa des précisions sur certains de ces points. Aujourd'hui on affirme que M. Yoshizawa a reçu des précisions de son gouvernement et qu'il s'apprête à revoir M. Briand, de sorte que la négociation entre les délégations française et japonaise va entrer dans une phase décisive. On ajoute toutefois que M. Yoshizawa n'a pas encore reçu ses instructions en ce qui concerne les lignes générales d'une solution préconisée par les membres du conseil. On précise que la délégation japonaise n'est encore en mesure de discuter que sur des garanties préalables à un retrait complet des forces japonaises dans la zone du chemin de fer mandchourien.

Un nouveau mémorandum japonais pour l'opinion publique

La délégation japonaise a distribué à la fin de la matinée un nouveau document qui entre dans le détail de la situation de fait en Mandchourie. Ce document débute ainsi :

L'atmosphère de tension en Mandchourie, qui a été la cause des regrettables incidents actuels, a été amenée par la méconnaissance systématique et les violations continues des droits et intérêts immenses que possède le Japon et ses ressortissants dans ces parages. Le principal de ces biens est le réseau du chemin de fer sud-mandchourien. C'est, en somme, à cause de lui et autour de lui, qu'a pu se produire le prodigieux développement de la Mandchourie. C'est grâce au sentiment de sécurité qu'inspirait le maintien de l'ordre par les troupes japonaises que se sont développés le commerce, l'industrie et l'agriculture dans de vastes régions dont la production, il y a vingt ans, était insignifiante, et où les Japonais ont mis, depuis une vingtaine d'années, une valeur de plus de 5 milliards de francs suisses. La construction des chemins de fer a soulevé des questions ardues. En dehors des lignes du chemin de fer sud-mandchourien, le Japon a avancé des capitaux pour la construction de lignes chinoises dirigées soit par des Chinois, soit par des Japonais, soit par une administration sino-japonaise. Par le protocole de Pékin de 1905,

les Chinois s'engageaient, afin d'éviter une concurrence nuisible à tous, à ne pas construire de chemins de fer parallèles aux voies du Sud-mandchourien. Il y avait encore à construire de nombreuses autres voies dont la nécessité s'imposait et dont le rendement pouvait être très fructueux. Des accords avaient été également conclus à ce sujet. La Chine n'avait cependant pas tardé à violer ses engagements, malgré les protestations répétées du Japon. Les autorités des provinces du nord-est (Mandchourie) mettaient de nombreuses entraves à l'activité légitime des chemins de fer japonais, et des pourparlers avaient été engagés, au début de cette année, entre le chemin de fer sud-mandchourien et les autorités chinoises, cependant les Chinois recourant à leurs habituelles mesures dilatoires empêchaient que ces pourparlers n'aboutissent.

Le mémorandum japonais donne ensuite de nouvelles explications sur les attaques contre le chemin de fer sud-mandchourien et rend compte de l'irritation et de l'inquiétude provoquées par l'assassinat du capitaine d'état-major Nakamura, envoyé en mission officielle et porteur de papiers établissant son identité. D'autre part, les Chinois mettent de nombreuses entraves aux activités paisibles. C'est ainsi que malgré leur promesse d'accorder aux Japonais des facilités pour le paisible exercice de l'agriculture et de l'industrie, la Chine n'a jamais voulu prendre avec le Japon les dispositions nécessaires pour la mise à exécution de ses engagements, mais au contraire par des moyens indirects ou détournés, elle a constamment tenté d'entraver le travail des ressortissants japonais, édictant des lois ou arrêtés interdisant la vente ou la location de terrains publics ou privés aux étrangers.

Le mémorandum rend compte ensuite des mesures prises spécialement par les Chinois contre les Coréens, dont le nombre atteint environ 800,000, et il se termine par le passage suivant qui précise ce que désire obtenir le Japon :

Telles sont les circonstances qui ont amené la tension actuelle en Mandchourie. Telle est l'atmosphère qui barre la voie à une retraite immédiate des troupes japonaises. Il faut quelque chose pour rétablir une atmosphère de détente, de sécurité relative, afin que la vie laborieuse puisse se poursuivre dans des conditions normales. Le Japon estime qu'à cet effet il est essentiel que la Chine lui donne l'assurance qu'elle fera cesser les actes illégaux et hostiles des autorités militaires et civiles à l'égard des ressortissants japonais en Mandchourie et qu'elle leur garantisse la possibilité de se livrer en sécurité à leurs occupations pacifiques sans craindre de voir leur labeur à tout moment entravé par des mesures vexatoires ou arbitraires.

Le Japon n'a pas de visées territoriales en Mandchourie, mais il veut que ses ressortissants puissent continuer à travailler en paix dans ces régions qui ont pour lui une importance vitale. Il veut que la Chine observe les engagements qu'elle a pris envers lui et il veut que ses relations avec elle soient basées non pas sur une politique d'agression, mais sur une collaboration féconde et paisible dont l'essor actuel de la Mandchourie laisse entrevoir les magnifiques possibilités. Cette collaboration serait féconde non seulement pour la Chine, mais pour toutes les nations, et serait une garantie importante pour la paix du monde.

Enclosure No. 26 to Despatch No. 1983
of October 23, 1931.
from the Embassy at Paris
Extract from L'ACTION FRANCAISE, October 23, 1931.

Astuce et candeur

Devant le conflit mandchourien, le Conseil de la Société des Nations, après avoir jeté feu et flamme, vient de s'esquiver dans des conditions qui appellent un mot de commentaire.

On a pu voir que les torts, au début, étaient rejetés sur le Japon. Il était la puissance conquérante, impérialiste, qui voulait profiter de la crise générale et des embarras du monde, qui même, pour cuire son œuf, aurait mis le feu à l'univers. En sourdine, le Japon était accusé d'être un ennemi de la paix.

On s'y était trompé. L'astuce chinoise a abusé la candeur du Conseil de Genève, et la candeur mal instruite du Conseil a induit l'opinion publique en erreur. Quand on a examiné les faits de la cause pour concilier les deux parties, on s'est aperçu que celle qui avait le plus d'exigences, celle qui menaçait de quitter la Société des Nations, s'il ne lui était donné satisfaction sur tous les points, c'était la Chine.

Le gouvernement démocratique et nationaliste de Nankin est un pauvre gouvernement qui a pourtant la xénophobie, la vieille haine des « diables étrangers » pour principal ressort. On a découvert, à l'attitude qu'il a prise lorsque le Conseil en est venu à la conciliation, que les griefs du Japon étaient beaucoup plus fondés que ceux de la Chine. Agitation et propagande contre tout ce qui est japonais, boycottage, pillages, meurtres, le tout constitue un ensemble d'où un trait de lumière est sorti.

Le nationalisme chinois est en lutte ouverte, à la façon hitlérienne, contre les

« traités inégaux ». Ces traités, ce sont ceux qui donnent aux puissances, en Chine, des garanties spéciales et, jusqu'à présent, indispensables. A cet égard, la situation de la France et de l'Angleterre est la même dans les Concessions que celle du Japon en Mandchourie.

Provoquer les Japonais, les amener, par des attentats contre les personnes elles-mêmes, à prendre des mesures de sécurité et de représailles ; représenter ces mesures comme des actes de guerre et le Japon comme un agresseur ; faire condamner le Japon et avec lui les « traités inégaux » par quelques-unes des puissances qui sont, pour leur part, bénéficiaires de semblables traités, tel a été le calcul profond, telle a été la machination subtile des Chinois. L'évidence éclate aujourd'hui.

Le Conseil de la Société des Nations a été manœuvré par les nationalistes de la République céleste qui savent aussi bien se servir de l'idée de démocratie que de l'idée de paix. Supposons que la Société des Nations eût possédé les moyens moraux de prononcer une condamnation du Japon comme violateur des pactes et les moyens matériels de passer à l'exécution. Elle commettait une énorme erreur judiciaire qui eût été une immense erreur politique.

Car on avait encore peu pensé à ce risque, mais il n'est pas inexistant. L'erreur de ce haut tribunal, l'innocent pris pour le coupable, le pays mis en droit de légitime défense objet des sanctions réservées aux agresseurs, — c'est ce qu'on a failli voir dans le cas de la Chine et du Japon. Qui ne pensera aux autres cas qu'une astuce égale ou supérieure pourra produire ? —
J. B.

Enclosure No. 27 to Despatch No. 1983
of October 23, 1931.
from the Embassy at Paris
Extract from L'ECHO DE PARIS, October 23, 1931.

LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS

Le Conseil de la S. D. N. contrairement à son désir n'a pu clore sa session dès hier

*A la demande des deux parties en cause
la séance publique est renvoyée à aujourd'hui*

(De notre correspondant particulier.)

Genève, 22 octobre. — Les insistances de lord Cecil pour que le Conseil tienne une séance publique aujourd'hui ont eu gain de cause. Mais cette séance n'aura pas été la dernière de la session extraordinaire ainsi que lord Reading et d'autres membres du Conseil l'avaient souhaité.

La séance publique du Conseil avait été précédée ce matin par une réunion du Comité des Cinq (France, Grande-Bretagne, Allemagne, Italie, Espagne), qui avait définitivement adopté la résolution finale pour cette deuxième session du Conseil à propos du conflit mandchou.

La résolution du Comité des Cinq

La résolution adoptée par les Cinq prévoit, ainsi qu'on le disait hier, le renvoi du Conseil au 16 novembre. Elle établissait d'ailleurs une sorte de tableau des assurances données par le Japon et la Chine, aussi bien à propos des visées territoriales sur la Mandchourie que pour l'évacuation de ces territoires et pour la protection des ressortissants japonais en Chine. Le Conseil étant convaincu que l'exécution de ces assurances est « essentielle pour le rétablissement des relations normales entre les deux parties », demandait en outre dans sa résolution :

1° Que le gouvernement japonais commençât « immédiatement » le retrait de ses troupes « afin que le retrait complet puisse être effectué avant la prochaine réunion du conseil ».

La note ainsi approuvée fut communiquée vers midi à tous les membres du conseil y compris les parties intéressées. Un instant tous espérèrent que la séance publique fixée pour l'après-midi serait la dernière de cette session. Lord Reading annonça son départ pour ce soir. Les choses n'allèrent pas si facilement. Le Japon demanda avant tout que la résolution restât secrète jusqu'à demain, des modifications devant y être introduites. Les Chinois demandèrent aussi un délai pour obtenir de Nankin des instructions définitives.

Espérant exercer une pression considérable sur les Japonais, le secrétariat refusa cependant de retirer la résolution et leur annonça à deux heures que l'opinion publique en serait saisie par le Conseil.

Cette décision obligea les Japonais à modifier les déclarations qu'ils avaient préparées. Cela n'eut d'ailleurs que l'unique résultat de faire attendre le Conseil pendant 25 minutes que les Japonais fussent prêts. Tout le Conseil se réunit avec le représentant des Etats-Unis à 4 heures. A 4 h. 25 seulement, M. Yoshizawa fit son entrée lorsqu'on chuchotait déjà qu'il ne viendrait plus.

La manœuvre du secrétariat n'eut pas l'effet qu'on semblait escompter, car M. Szé, le Chinois, demanda le premier qu'on ajournât les débats. M. Yoshizawa, lui, l'appuya après avoir déclaré que les Japonais ne pouvaient pas s'engager pour une date fixe d'évacuation et après avoir lu une déclaration d'amitié pour les Etats-Unis négociée, ainsi que sa réponse, au cours de la matinée, avec l'observateur américain.

M. Briand échangea des coups d'œil rapides avec lord Reading et, ayant obtenu son approbation, il donna satisfaction aux requêtes chinoise et japonaise, ajournant en principe à demain, 5 heures, la séance publique du Conseil.

**Une séance privée
en l'absence de l'observateur
américain**

Immédiatement après la séance publique, les membres du Conseil se réunirent en séance privée pour

tion de l'article 16 qui envisage les sanctions.

On prévoit que le problème surgi à la dernière minute n'est pas des moindres.

Le communiqué de la section d'informations a, parait-il, été donné pour ne pas blesser les Etats-Unis dont on n'avait pas invité l'observateur à cette discussion de procédure strictement de la Société des Nations.

Au cours de cette séance privée, différents membres du Conseil suggérèrent Paris comme lieu de réunion du Conseil au 16 novembre et lord Reading annonça son départ.

La position des Etats-Unis est toujours sujette à controverse. Les Américains se défendent d'avoir diminué leur collaboration avec la Société des Nations. Bien que la résolution communiquée au Conseil mentionne, à côté du Pacte de la Société des Nations, le Pacte de Paris, il est un fait que depuis 48 heures, l'observateur américain ne participe plus aux réunions privées des membres du Conseil. Contrairement à ce qu'on avait affirmé hier, M. Prentiss Gilbert n'était pas invité au thé offert par M. Briand. Il ne participe pas aux autres délibérations et ce soir il fut exclu du Conseil privé où l'on examina « certaines questions de procédure ».

Les Chinois et les Japonais ne sont pas satisfaits de la résolution. Les Chinois veulent qu'une date soit fixée pour l'évacuation. Les Japonais ne veulent ni date ni commission

dans la zone du chemin de fer, mesure où la sécurité de la vie des ressortissants japonais et la protection de leurs biens seront effectivement assurées, ainsi que la déclaration du représentant de la Chine selon laquelle son gouvernement assumera la responsabilité de la sécurité des ressortissants japonais et de la protection des biens leur appartenant en dehors de la dite zone ; ce qui implique de la part du gouvernement chinois, l'engagement d'assurer la protection effective des ressortissants japonais résidant en Mandchourie.

2. — Rappelle en outre que les deux gouvernements ont donné l'assurance qu'ils s'abstiendraient de toute mesure susceptible d'aggraver la situation ; qu'ainsi ils sont tenus de s'abstenir de toute politique ou action agressive et doivent prendre les mesures propres à mettre fin à toute agitation hostile ;

3. — Rappelle la déclaration du représentant japonais selon laquelle le Japon n'a aucune visée territoriale en Mandchourie ; constate que cette déclaration est conforme aux termes du pacte de la Société des Nations ainsi qu'au traité des neuf puissances dont les signataires se sont engagés « à respecter la souveraineté, l'indépendance et l'intégrité territoriale et administrative de la Chine » ;

4. — Convaincu que l'exécution de ces assurances et de ces engagements est essentielle pour le rétablissement des relations normales entre les deux parties : a) demande au gouvernement japonais de commencer immédiatement et de poursuivre progressivement le retrait de ses troupes à l'intérieur de la zone du chemin de fer, afin que le retrait complet puisse être effectué avant la prochaine réunion du conseil.

b) demande au gouvernement chinois, en exécution de l'engagement qu'il a pris d'une manière générale en ce qui concerne la protection de la vie et des biens des ressortissants japonais en Mandchourie, d'adopter, en vue de la prise en charge du territoire évacué, toutes dispositions propres à assurer la sécurité de la vie des ressortissants japonais qui y résident et la protection de leurs biens ; invite en outre le gouvernement chinois à attacher aux autorités chinoises désignées à ces fins des représentants d'autres puissances, afin que ceux-ci puissent suivre l'exécution des dispositions dont il s'agit ;

5° Recommande aux gouvernements chinois et japonais de désigner immédiatement des représentants pour régler les détails d'exécution de l'évacuation et de la prise en charge des territoires évacués, afin que ces opérations puissent s'accomplir de façon régulière et sans retard.

6° Recommande aux gouvernements

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Il chuchotait déjà qu'il ne viendrait plus.

La manœuvre du secrétariat n'eut pas l'effet qu'on semblait escompter, car M. Szé, le Chinois, demanda le premier qu'on ajournât les débats. M. Yoshizawa, lui, l'appuya après avoir déclaré que les Japonais ne pouvaient pas s'engager pour une date fixe d'évacuation et après avoir lu une déclaration d'amitié pour les Etats-Unis négociée, ainsi que sa réponse, au cours de la matinée, avec l'observateur américain.

M. Briand échangea des coups d'œil rapides avec lord Reading et, ayant obtenu son approbation, il donna satisfaction aux requêtes chinoise et japonaise, ajournant en principe à demain, 5 heures, la séance publique du Conseil.

Une séance privée en l'absence de l'observateur américain

Immédiatement après la séance publique, les membres du Conseil se sont réunis en séance privée pour le règlement de la question sino-japonaise, n'ayant aucun rapport avec le règlement de la question sino-japonaise, annonce un communiqué de la section d'informations de la Société des Nations. En réalité, le Conseil privé s'est occupé du conflit sino-japonais, car il a considéré la solution de fond découlant des stipulations contenues dans le Pacte de la Société des Nations. On y fit remarquer en effet qu'il était « hautement désirable que la résolution fût acceptée par un vote unanime ». Cela seulement correspondrait à l'application de l'article II sous lequel l'affaire avait été évoquée, le Conseil ayant eu tendance à limiter le conflit en dehors de toutes sanctions. Si par contre la résolution devait passer sans l'approbation des parties au conflit on passerait presque automatiquement à l'article 15 qui prévoit un « arbitrage du Conseil » et, en conséquence, l'appli-

cation de l'article 16 qui envisage les sanctions.

On prévoit que le problème surgi à la dernière minute n'est pas des moindres.

Le communiqué de la section d'informations a, paraît-il, été donné pour ne pas blesser les Etats-Unis dont on n'avait pas invité l'observation. On a donc réaffirmé la volonté de relations normales entre les deux parties : a) demande au gouvernement japonais de commencer immédiatement et de poursuivre progressivement le retrait de ses troupes à l'intérieur de la zone du chemin de fer, afin que le retrait complet puisse être effectué avant la prochaine réunion du conseil.

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6° Recommande aux gouvernements chinois et japonais d'entamer, dès l'achèvement de l'évacuation, des négociations directes sur toutes les questions en suspens entre eux, notamment sur celles qui résultent des derniers événements et celles qui ont trait aux difficultés dues à la situation du chemin de fer de Mandchourie.

A cette fin, le Conseil suggère aux deux gouvernements de constituer une commission de conciliation ou quelque autre organisme permanent du même ordre.

7° Le Conseil décide de s'ajourner au 16 novembre, date à laquelle il procédera à un nouvel examen de la situation, mais autorise son président à le convoquer à une date antérieure, s'il l'estime opportun.

(Havas.)


Les membres du Conseil ont décidé de s'ajourner au 16 novembre.

Enclosure No. 28 to Despatch No. 1983
of October 23, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from FIGARO, October 23, 1931.

LA POLITIQUE

La résolution de la S. D. N.

 Les super-éloges que lui prodiguent les journaux de gauche n'empêchent pas M. Briand d'être las de l'incident sino-japonais et de ce trop long séjour au bord du lac : « Notre patience est inépuisable, a-t-il dit hier, à une séance publique du Conseil. Mais il faut en finir. Aussi avons-nous élaboré un texte de résolution. » Dans la langue de Genève, un texte de résolution est, comme on dit en argot de presse, « un papier », qui naturellement ne résoud rien. Celui d'hier demande aux parties adverses de faire précisément ce à quoi elles se sont refusées, et leur recommande d'entamer des négociations directes, ce qui, sans la S.D.N., serait fait dès longtemps. Ce texte de résolution, selon un commentaire officieux, constitue « le maximum de ce à quoi le Conseil pouvait aboutir » !

Mais cette définition de ce document va sans doute choquer les briandistes. Ceux-ci sont de mauvaise humeur. On le comprend. Ils s'en prennent à ceux qui constatent les résultats de l'Œuvre locarnienne et kelloggiste. Ils s'indignent et voient des blasphèmes dans les simples observations que suggèrent les lents efforts de la Société genevoise, même quand M. Briand conduit ses travaux. Il les accuse de se réjouir des difficultés qu'éprouvent les délégués des nations au maintien de la paix.

Non ! personne ne ressent de joie à l'humiliante pensée qu'il n'existe pas, qu'il n'existera pas d'ici longtemps, en matière internationale, un tribunal efficacement, fortement organisé. La justice, pour mettre un terme aux litiges, a des gendarmes. La

composition des cours n'est point modifiée pendant le procès et malgré les plaideurs. Elle n'est pas parfaite, cette justice privée, mais elle agit. La Société des nations est sans force. En cas de conflit, on ne doit pas compter sur elle. Elle ne peut que donner son avis et c'est tout. Cette vérité, l'affaire de Moukden, d'éclatante façon la démontre. Et la vérité, pénible ou désirable, doit être connue, proclamée. On peut la souligner sans avoir ni obus ni canons à vendre.

Les résolutions de la S.D.N. rappellent le mot fameux : « Je l'y forcerai... Mais voudra-t-elle ? » En d'innombrables discours, notre délégué à Genève nous a garanti qu'un petit télégramme, signé de lui, suffisait pour arrêter les peuples prêts à la guerre. L'événement le montre actuellement : si en Mandchourie, comme s'en félicite M. Briand, le conflit ne dégénère pas en « hostilités déclarées », c'est que le Japon — son représentant le répète tous les jours — veut faire non pas une besogne de conquête mais de police et de surveillance. « Depuis que nous sommes réunis, disait hier M. Briand, la situation ne s'est pas modifiée en mal ». Il reconnaissait lui-même que c'était peu. La Chine, cependant, trouvait que l'ordonnance signée en fin de consultation par les docteurs de la S.D.N. n'était pas fort satisfaisante. Le Japon se refusait à fixer une date d'évacuation sans garantie, ce qui a sans doute surpris M. Briand ; il aurait pu citer au gouvernement de Tokio, en la matière, son propre exemple.

Le Conseil de la S.D.N. s'est accordé un dernier délai jusqu'à ce soir, dans l'espoir d'une conclusion meilleure de la session extraordinaire. Un miracle, d'ici-là, peut-il changer l'attitude des Japonais, et permettre à M. Briand le retour que ses partisans espéraient triomphal ? Tokio lui fournira-t-il, enfin, une occasion de revanche intérieure ? La journée d'hier ne la préparait pas. La S. D. N. n'a fait que montrer le peu d'autorité qui lui reste, et la nécessité pour les nations de chercher ailleurs des garanties de paix et de sécurité.

1 1406

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 29 to Despatch No. 1983
of October 23, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from JOURNAL DES DEBATS, October 25, 1931.

N'ayant pas pu régler le différend sino-japonais, le Conseil de la S. D. N. va, dit-on, s'ajourner. Hier, M. Briand a présidé deux réunions des Cinq (c'est-à-dire des représentants de l'Allemagne, de la France, de la Grande-Bretagne, de l'Espagne et de l'Italie); il a reçu également, à l'heure du thé, les délégués de la Pologne, de la Yougoslavie, de la Norvège, de l'Irlande, du Pérou, du Guatemala et de Panama. A diverses reprises, il a conféré avec les Chinois et les Japonais. Il n'avait pas encore reçu la réponse du Japon aux suggestions qu'il lui avait faites, mais, sans aucun doute, il se rendait compte qu'elle ne serait pas favorable. Plusieurs des principaux membres du Conseil, en particulier M. Briand lui-même et Lord Reading, en ont assez de leur séjour à Genève et ne pensent plus qu'à rentrer chez eux. C'est un état d'esprit fréquent dans les conférences et qui détermine toujours leurs membres, pour peu que les discussions se prolongent, à en finir, coûte que coûte, sous quelque forme que ce soit; on peut voir là la raison de beaucoup de malfaçons dans les constructions internationales. Quoi qu'il en soit, M. Briand et Lord Reading seraient tombés d'accord au sujet de la procédure suivante: le Conseil s'ajournerait (sa session étant censée suspendue seulement pour quelques semaines); si c'était possible, il voterait une résolution exprimant l'espoir que les Japonais retireraient leurs troupes et que les Chinois cesseraient l'agitation antijaponaise et assureraient la sécurité des ressortissants japonais en Mandchourie; si l'on ne pouvait pas s'entendre sur un texte, M. Briand ferait oralement un exposé et adresserait des recommandations aux deux gouvernements en conflit.

La réponse japonaise, reçue ce matin, n'est pas considérée, paraît-il, comme satisfaisante. De leur côté, les Chinois maintiennent leurs revendications. On annonce un nouveau bombardement aérien en Mandchourie. D'autre part, M. Yoshizawa s'oppose à la séance publique du Conseil qui devait avoir lieu cet après-midi. Tout semble indiquer que le Conseil n'a pas pu trouver de solution et que sa principale préoccupation sera de dissimuler son échec. Le cas qui lui était soumis était évidemment difficile et plus complexe qu'on ne le supposait au début. Cependant, en attendant de l'examiner de plus près, on est en droit de constater que le fameux mécanisme de la S. D. N. n'a pas fonctionné comme on le promettait. Dans les circonstances présentes, l'impuissance de la Ligue n'a pas causé jusqu'ici de catastrophe. Mais il en serait autrement pour une affaire européenne dont, comme en 1914, les développements seraient très rapides. Il faut, dans l'intérêt même de la paix, qu'on ne cherche pas à égarer l'opinion au sujet d'une expérience qui est instructive. Ce qui est grave dans la vie, c'est de ne pas vouloir envisager les choses telles qu'elles sont, car on s'interdit alors de rechercher des remèdes pour les maux qui menacent les individus ou les peuples. — P. B.

1 1407

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 30 to Despatch No. 1983
of October 23, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE MATIN, October 23, 1931.

**Le Japon se refuse
à fixer la date
du retrait
de ses troupes
en Mandchourie**

**« Cela dépend des intentions
du gouvernement chinois »
dit Tokio dans le document
lu hier par son représentant
à la Société des nations**

[DE NOTRE ENVOYÉ SPÉCIAL]

GENÈVE, 22 octobre. — *Par téléphone.*
— Nous avons déjà exposé les conditions dans lesquelles le conseil de la Société des nations avait décidé de soumettre, dès aujourd'hui, en séance publique, un projet de résolution aux représentants de la Chine et du Japon, puis de s'ajourner à trois semaines à Paris, soit pour laisser le temps de réfléchir à celle des deux parties en cause qui persisterait dans son intransigeance, soit, enfin, d'être à même de constater avec le recul nécessaire si ces recommandations ont été strictement observées.

On voit que nous laissons délibérément de côté le cas où MM. Yoshizawa et Sze, repoussant toutes les suggestions de la Société des nations, le conseil n'aurait plus qu'à mettre son projet à la disposition des intéressés, sans autre forme de procès.

Ce scénario de la journée, en dépit des opinions contradictoires de délégués également influents, a été en partie, sinon dans sa totalité, observé. Et si la décision finale a été renvoyée à demain, c'est que les envoyés chinois et japonais ont vivement insisté auprès de M. Briand pour qu'ils pussent, une dernière fois, se mettre en rapport avec leurs gouvernements respectifs avant de se prononcer.

On lira, par ailleurs, le texte du projet de résolution finalement adopté à l'unanimité des membres du conseil. Et tout de suite, ceux qui ont suivi pas à pas les laborieuses négociations de Genève, ne manqueront pas de s'étonner que, contrairement aux indications des jours passés, le conseil ait :

1° Renoncé à faire dépendre l'évacuation du territoire chinois de négociations générales et préalables entre Nankin et Tokio ;

2° Fixé à la fin de l'occupation japonaise un délai précis : le 16 novembre.

Nous sommes en droit d'affirmer que, dans la pensée de M. Briand et de ses collègues, la date du 16 novembre n'a pas, ne saurait avoir un caractère unilatéral et exclusivement impératif. En d'autres termes, il est bien entendu — et sur ce point capital, M. Yoshizawa lui-même ne s'y est pas trompé — que le délai d'évacuation prescrit au commandement des forces nippones en Mandchourie reste politiquement lié aux mesures réelles de sécurité que, vis-à-vis des ressortissants japonais, les autorités chinoises auront prises pendant cette même période (art. IV de la résolution).

Tout à l'heure, en séance, le représentant du Japon, comprenant le point de vue du conseil, a déclaré simplement et, avec beaucoup de mesure, qu'il faisait toutes réserves sur la possibilité, pour son gouvernement, d'avoir terminé les opérations de repli à la date indiquée.

— Il est impossible, dit M. Yoshizawa, au gouvernement japonais de fixer aujourd'hui une date parce qu'il ignore quand la sécurité de ses ressortissants sera garantie. Une telle date dépend des intentions clairement manifestées du gouvernement chinois.

On doit maintenant se demander pourquoi M. Briand et ses collègues ont jugé raisonnable de renoncer à poser, comme première condition à l'évacuation, la mise en œuvre de négociations générales et préalables entre Chinois et Japonais.

La réponse est facile. Ce matin, en prenant connaissance des instructions envoyées à M. Yoshizawa, le conseil s'est rendu compte que le gouvernement japonais persistait à faire entrer dans des débats préliminaires des questions de fond, comme celle qui a trait au chemin de fer du sud mandchourien.

Or, pendant des mois, des années, Japonais et Chinois ont péniblement essayé d'aboutir à une entente sur l'unification du sud mandchourien. Jamais ils n'y sont parvenus.

En résumé, la Chine que — on ne saurait le cacher — certaines erreurs de Tokio, commises à l'instant critique, a tirée d'un assez mauvais pas, bien que ses obligations et ses devoirs demeurent dans toute leur intégralité et le Japon sont devant un texte qui se borne uniquement à évoquer les principes constants du droit international. C'est pourquoi ces deux grandes nations vont se trouver demain dans une situation difficile et qui mérite l'attention de leur gouvernement.

Le projet de résolution

GENÈVE, 22 octobre. — (Dép. Havas). — Voici la substance du projet de résolution lu cet après-midi, en séance publique au conseil de la S. D. N. :

Le conseil, comme suite à sa résolution du 30 septembre,

Constatant qu'en plus de l'appel fait par le gouvernement chinois en vertu de l'article 11 du pacte, l'article 2 du pacte de Paris a été invoqué par un certain nombre de gouvernements ;

1° Rappelle les engagements pris par les deux gouvernements dans la résolution du 30 septembre, notamment la déclaration du représentant du Japon, selon laquelle son gouvernement poursuivra aussi rapidement que possible le retrait de ses troupes pour les ramener dans la zone du chemin de fer dans la mesure où la sécurité de la vie des ressortissants japonais et la protection de leurs biens seront effectivement assurées, ainsi que la déclaration du représentant de la Chine selon laquelle son gouvernement assumera la responsabilité de la sécurité des ressortissants japonais et de la protection des biens leur appartenant en dehors de ladite zone ; ce qui implique de la part du gouvernement chinois l'engagement d'assurer la protection effective des ressortissants japonais résidant en Mandchourie ;

2° Rappelle en outre que les deux gouvernements ont donné l'assurance qu'ils s'abstiendront de toute mesure susceptible d'aggraver la situation, qu'ainsi ils sont tenus de s'abstenir de toute politique ou action agressive et doivent prendre les mesures propres à mettre fin à toute agitation hostile ;

3° Rappelle la déclaration du représentant japonais selon laquelle le Japon n'a aucune visée territoriale en Mandchourie ;

4° Convaincu que l'exécution de ces assurances et de ces engagements est essentielle pour le rétablissement des relations normales entre les deux parties : demande au gouvernement japonais de commencer immédiatement et de poursuivre progressivement le retrait de ses troupes à l'intérieur de la zone du chemin de fer, afin que le retrait complet puisse être effectué avant la prochaine réunion du conseil.

5° Recommande aux gouvernements chinois et japonais de désigner immédiatement des représentants pour régler les détails d'exécution de l'évacuation et de la prise en charge des territoires évacués, afin que ces opérations puissent s'accomplir de façon régulière et sans retard ;

6° Recommande aux gouvernements chinois et japonais d'entamer, dès l'achèvement de l'évacuation, des négociations directes sur toutes les questions en suspens entre eux, notamment sur celles qui résultent des derniers événements et celles qui ont trait aux difficultés dues à la situation du chemin de fer de Mandchourie.

A cette fin, le conseil suggère aux deux gouvernements de constituer une commission de conciliation ou quelque autre organisme permanent du même ordre.

7° Le conseil décide de s'ajourner au 16 novembre, date à laquelle il procédera à un nouvel examen de la situation, mais autorise son président à le convoquer à une date antérieure, s'il l'estime opportun.

Le Japon ne cédera pas avant d'avoir obtenu toute garantie de la Chine

[SERVICE SPÉCIAL DU « NEW YORK TIMES »]

TOKIO, 22 octobre. — Par câble. — Dans les milieux officiels japonais on a cette nuit l'espoir que les efforts de M. Briand pourront aboutir à la rédaction d'une formule, mais on maintient le plus grand secret au sujet des communications échangées entre Tokio et Genève. La situation est la suivante : la Chine réclame l'évacuation avant l'ouverture des négociations et le Japon demande avant tout l'ouverture de ces mêmes négociations.

Mais au-dessus de ce différend, il y a le point vital des droits du Japon sur la Mandchourie, droits reconnus par des traités dans le but de sauvegarder la position économique nipponne. Si la Chine accepte de respecter les droits découlant des traités, une formule d'évacuation pourra être très rapidement trouvée. Le Japon ne sera satisfait par rien d'autre et, à moins que la Chine ne soit prête à céder sur ce point, l'impasse restera entière. L'une des objections pratiques à l'évacuation immédiate est le fait que l'armée japonaise est dans un état d'infériorité de 15 contre 1 et ne peut pas se mettre dans une position stratégique inférieure avant que la querelle soit réglée.

D'après des nouvelles de Moukden, des avions japonais ont lancé des bombes sur des troupes chinoises se trouvant près de Taonan, dans la tête de pont de Tsitsikar. (Copyright.)

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 31 to Despatch No. 1983
of October 23, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE PETIT PARISIEN, October 25, 1931.

Le projet de résolution du conseil de la S.D.N.

Cette résolution, dont M. Briand a donné lecture, sera, on l'espère, acceptée finalement par le Japon et, dans ces conditions, l'adhésion de la Chine étant certaine, l'unanimité exigée par l'article 11 du pacte de la S.D.N. sera réalisée

Genève, 22 octobre (dép. Petit Parisien.)

Sur les instances de lord Reading qui désirait quitter Genève ce soir, le conseil de la S. D. N. a tenu cet après-midi la séance plénière et publique au cours de laquelle les délégués de la Chine et du Japon furent brusquement mis en présence de la résolution dont le texte définitif leur avait été adressé à midi par le comité des Cinq et dont ils avaient à peine eu le temps de prendre connaissance.

Pour protester contre cette procédure accélérée, M. Yoshizawa arriva avec un retard de près d'une demi-heure, et cette attente provoqua dans la salle un énervement considérable. La curiosité était donc à son comble lorsque le représentant du Japon sortit un papier de sa poche et demanda la parole. Mais il voulait seulement dissiper le malentendu que ses objections, concernant la venue des Etats-Unis, avaient pu provoquer.

Déclarations de M. Yoshizawa

— Tout en maintenant ma thèse juridique, je tiens, dit-il, à déclarer, en présence du délégué américain, que la politique de mon pays est de favoriser les relations d'amitié et de cordialité avec les Etats-Unis et que nous persévererons toujours dans cette ligne de conduite.

Répondant sur le même ton, l'observateur américain, M. Prentiss Gilbert, rassura M. Yoshizawa :

— L'idée ne m'est jamais venue, affirma-t-il, que l'attitude du Japon ait pu lui être dictée par d'autres considérations que des considérations juridiques et que la période de paix et d'amitié entre nos deux nations, qui compte parmi les pages les plus heureuses de notre histoire, puisse cesser.

M. Briand expose la position du problème

La controverse à laquelle donna lieu la collaboration américaine étant ainsi close, M. Briand rendit compte ensuite de la démarche simultanée faite à Nankin et à Tokio par les membres du conseil, agissant comme signataires du pacte, et à laquelle le gouvernement chinois a déjà répondu en des termes particulièrement chaleureux.

Puis, au milieu d'un profond silence, le représentant de la France expliqua le sens de la portée de la résolution par laquelle le conseil espère mettre fin au conflit en Mandchourie.

— Un premier point, dit-il, est d'ores et déjà acquis : le conflit est contenu et sera contenu jusqu'au bout dans les limites où il se trouve. Le premier effort de la S. D. N. et son premier devoir se trouveront consacrés par ce fait important que nous ne pouvons pas croire un seul instant que du conflit actuel puisse sortir une hostilité générale. Il faut que nous sortions de l'impasse actuelle ; pour cela, il faudra que les parties qui sont le plus intéressées mettent au service du conseil l'effort d'une assez longue patience. Je puis dire déjà que cette patience a été mise à une assez grande épreuve ; je ne veux pas parler de la nôtre ; comme membres du conseil, la patience dont nous devons user doit être inépuisable.

D'une part le Japon a dit et répète :
« Je ne veux porter aucune atteinte à l'intégrité territoriale de la Chine; j'ai été entraîné à des actes que j'ai expliqués; je voudrais pouvoir les faire cesser. Ces territoires où j'ai des troupes, je suis prêt à les évacuer.

Je n'ai que le souci de la sécurité de mes ressortissants et de leurs biens. Du jour où des garanties m'auront été données à ce point de vue, je suis prêt à faire partir mes troupes. »

Tel est le langage du Japon; je crois l'avoir traduit fidèlement.

D'autre part, le représentant de la Chine déclare :

« Des garanties de sécurité pour les personnes et les biens, nous comprenons ces demandes et nous sommes prêts à les donner; nous avons étudié et nous étudierons encore les meilleurs moyens de donner des garanties à cet égard et nous sommes pour cela à la disposition du conseil tout entier. »

Notre collègue représentant la Chine va jusqu'à dire :

« Nous serons à la disposition du conseil, tout prêt même à emprunter à sa bienveillante autorité pour nous faciliter les choses. »

Voilà, messieurs, quelle est la position du problème.

Nous ne nous sommes pas rebutés; nous avons cherché et finalement nous sommes arrivés à l'unanimité des membres du conseil — en dehors de nos deux collègues intéressés — à mettre sur pied un projet de résolution qui va vous être présenté.

Ce projet n'est pas ce qu'on peut appeler un projet *ne varietur* : il est susceptible d'être amélioré.

Dans d'autres circonstances, le conseil a discuté des projets de résolution et, après un effort de bonne volonté de part et d'autre, a fini par se mettre d'accord et par régler d'une manière satisfaisante le problème dont il était saisi. J'espère que cette fois-ci il en sera de même.

Ce langage simple et direct fit sur l'assistance une grande impression. Toutes les personnes présentes savaient, en effet, le rôle décisif qu'a joué depuis quinze jours M. Briand : la peine qu'il s'est donnée pour réparer les erreurs commises en septembre et pour convaincre les deux parties, la patience, la ténacité dont il a fait preuve, l'extraordinaire effort physique qu'il a fourni, le courage avec lequel il a assumé presque seul la conduite des négociations, cela dans une atmosphère empoisonnée qui contrastait passablement avec le ton ordinaire des discussions de Genève, la haute impartialité qu'il a montrée, et à laquelle Chinois et Japonais rendent un égal hommage. Aussi le silence se fit-il plus profond encore lorsque le représentant de la France donna lecture du projet de résolution dans lequel il a fixé, d'accord avec ses collègues, les conditions du règlement.

Malgré les observations formulées en fin de séance par M. Yoshizawa, qui affirma, dans une longue déclaration, qu'il ne pouvait accepter la fixation d'une échéance précise pour le retrait des troupes, on conserve donc l'espoir, dans les milieux du conseil, que le gouvernement de Tokio finira par accepter avec quelques réserves les conditions de la résolution qui lui est soumise.

L'adhésion de la Chine étant certaine, l'unanimité exigée par l'article 2 du pacte serait ainsi réalisée et, grâce à l'action personnelle de M. Briand, l'autorité du conseil, qui parut un moment compromise, s'en trouverait grandement renforcée.

LE PROJET DE RESOLUTION

Voici le texte du projet :

Le conseil, comme suite à sa résolution du 30 septembre, constatant que, en plus de l'appel fait par le gouvernement chinois en vertu de l'article 11 du pacte, l'article 2 du pacte de Paris a été invoqué par un certain nombre de gouvernements :

1° Rappelle les engagements pris par les deux gouvernements dans la résolution du 30 septembre, notamment la déclaration du représentant du Japon, selon laquelle son gouvernement poursuivra, aussi rapidement que possible, le retrait de ses troupes pour les ramener dans la zone du chemin de fer dans la mesure où la sécurité de la vie des ressortissants japonais et la protection de leurs biens seront effectivement assurées, ainsi que la déclaration du représentant de la Chine selon laquelle son gouvernement assumera la responsabilité de la sécurité des ressortissants japonais et de la protection des biens leur appartenant en dehors de ladite zone, ce qui implique de la part du

d'assurer une protection effective aux ressortissants japonais résidant en Mandchourie;

2° Rappelle, en outre, que les deux gouvernements ont donné l'assurance qu'ils s'abstiendront de toutes mesures susceptibles d'aggraver la situation; qu'ainsi ils sont tenus de s'abstenir de toute politique ou action agressive et doivent prendre les mesures propres à mettre fin à toute agitation hostile;

3° Rappelle la déclaration du représentant japonais, selon laquelle le Japon n'a aucune visée territoriale en Mandchourie; constate que cette déclaration est conforme aux termes du pacte de la Société des nations, ainsi qu'au traité des neuf puissances dont les signataires se sont engagés « à respecter la souveraineté, l'indépendance et l'intégrité territoriale et administrative de la Chine » ;

4° Convaincu que l'exécution de ces assurances et de ces engagements est essentielle pour le rétablissement des relations normales entre les deux parties :

a) Demande au gouvernement japonais de commencer immédiatement et de poursuivre progressivement le retrait de ses troupes à l'intérieur de la zone du chemin de fer, afin que le retrait complet puisse être effectué avant la prochaine réunion du conseil ;

b) Demande au gouvernement chinois, en exécution de l'engagement qu'il a pris d'une manière générale en ce qui concerne la protection de la vie et des biens des ressortissants japonais en Mandchourie, d'adopter en vue de la prise en charge du territoire évacué toutes dispositions propres à assurer la sécurité de la vie des ressortissants japonais qui y résident et la protection de leurs biens; invite en outre le gouvernement chinois à attacher aux autorités chinoises désignées à ces fins des représentants d'autres puissances, afin que ceux-ci puissent suivre l'exécution des dispositions dont il s'agit ;

5° Recommande aux gouvernements chinois et japonais de désigner immédiatement des représentants pour régler les détails d'exécution de l'évacuation et de la prise en charge des territoires évacués, afin que ces opérations puissent s'accomplir de façon régulière et sans retard ;

6° Recommande aux gouvernements chinois et japonais d'entamer, dès l'achèvement de l'évacuation, des négociations directes sur toutes les questions en suspens entre eux, notamment sur celle qui résulte des derniers événements et celles qui ont trait aux difficultés dues à la situation du chemin de fer de Mandchourie.

A cette fin, le conseil suggère aux deux gouvernements de constituer une commission de conciliation avec quel que autre organisme permanent du même ordre ;

7° Le conseil décide de s'ajourner au 16 novembre, date à laquelle il procédera à un nouvel examen de la situation, mais autorise son président à la convoquer à une date antérieure s'il l'estime opportun.

UN TELEGRAMME DES ETUDIANTS A M. BRIAND

M. Jean Dupuy, secrétaire général de la Fédération universitaire internationale pour la S. D. N., a adressé à M. Aristide Briand la lettre suivante, au nom des grandes organisations internationales d'étudiants, groupant deux millions d'étudiants :

Au nom des organisations internationales d'étudiants soussignées, représentant les jeunes universitaires du monde, de toutes convictions, de toutes races, de toutes confessions, vivement émus par les hostilités sino-japonaises, nous exprimons notre confiance au conseil de la S. D. N. pour que, par une action rapide et énergique dont l'efficacité s'est déjà fait sentir, le conseil ramène une atmosphère de paix et rétablisse complètement la confiance nécessaire à un heureux aboutissement de la conférence du désarmement. Les organisations soussignées, réunissant deux millions d'étudiants, désirent absolument que soit maintenue la foi en la Société des nations, afin que les jeunes générations puissent préparer leur avenir avec sécurité et confiance.

Confédération internationale des étudiants, Entraide universitaire internationale, Fédération internationale des femmes diplômées des universités, Fédération universitaire internationale pour la S. D. N., Union mondiale des étudiants israéliens.

P.F. 23

Enclosure No. 32 to Despatch No. 1983
of October 23, 1931.

From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE POPULAIRE, October 23, 1931.

LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS DEVANT LA S. D. N.

Le Conseil demande au Japon de retirer ses troupes avant le 16 novembre

Il accepte toutefois la thèse japonaise en ce qui concerne
- les négociations directes avec la Chine

Récapitulons.

Le 18 septembre, les troupes japonaises ont brusquement occupé Moukden, capitale de la Mandchourie. Depuis, l'armée nipponne, renforcée des détachements venus du Japon, a élargi la zone d'occupation.

La Chine a élevé une véhémente protestation. Elle s'est adressée à la Société des Nations. Le Conseil, qui tenait à ce moment une session ordinaire, s'est occupé de l'affaire. Après de longs conciliabules avec le délégué du Japon qui se retranchait cyniquement derrière l'absence de nouvelles officielles de son gouvernement, le Conseil s'est séparé en prenant acte d'une vague promesse de Tokio d'évacuer la Mandchourie.

Les membres du Conseil de la S. D. N. ayant quitté Genève, le Japon continua tranquillement ses opérations militaires. Il soumit à son contrôle le chemin de fer de Moukden à Pékin. A la suite du bombardement, par avions, de la gare de Kintchéou, la Chine a demandé, une deuxième fois, au Conseil de la S. D. N. d'intervenir. Le 13 octobre, le Conseil s'est réuni en session extraordinaire.

Après de laborieuses négociations, on réussit à imposer au Japon la participation des Etats-Unis aux travaux du Conseil. Après de multiples manœuvres et contre-manœuvres, le Conseil adopte une résolution.

On lira plus loin le texte, ainsi que le compte rendu de la séance que le Conseil a tenue hier. Rompant enfin avec sa timidité vraiment excessive, le Conseil a formulé quelques exigences pratiques. Il demande au Japon de commencer l'évacuation immédiatement. Il lui fixe un délai pour achever cette opération : le 16 novembre, date à laquelle le Conseil se réunira encore une fois.

Mieux vaut tard que jamais ! Sur ce point essentiel — je dirai même point névralgique — le Conseil essaie donc de donner satisfaction à l'opinion publique, émue aussi bien par le conflit lui-même que par la carence de la S. D. N.

Par contre, sur le fond du problème, le Conseil de la S. D. N. capitule, devant l'Empire du Soleil Levant. Le Japon refuse catégoriquement toute enquête et toute médiation. Il entend rester en tête à tête avec la Chine. Il ne veut pas que d'autres puissances se mêlent aux négociations qui auront pour objectif d'arracher à la Chine de nouvelles concessions en sa faveur.

Le Conseil de la S. D. N. a cédé. Renonçant à toute intervention dans le conflit, il laisse le Japon « s'entendre » avec la Chine. Il ne se réserve que le droit de revenir à la question lors de sa prochaine session.

Les délégués de la Chine et du Japon doivent déclarer aujourd'hui, à 17 heures, si leurs gouvernements réciproques acceptent les recommandations du Conseil.

Attendons cette communication. Espérons qu'ils la feront. Sinon, la situation s'aggravera et pourra devenir critique.

Mais ne nous faisons pas d'illusion. Même si les recommandations du Conseil sont acceptées par les deux parties, le conflit est loin d'être réglé et même localisé. Les nouvelles de Mandchourie sont inquiétantes. L'opinion publique doit rester vigilante. Qu'on ne l'oublie pas, seule la volonté déterminée des peuples peut imposer la paix aux impérialistes — à ceux qui opèrent en Mandchourie, comme à ceux qui sont représentés à Genève.

O. ROSENFELD.

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O. ROSENFELD.

Enclosure No. 33 to Despatch No. 1983
of October 23, 1931.

From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE TEMPS, October 23, 1931.

LE DIFFEREND SINO-JAPONAIS ET LA SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS

Cette journée de jeudi confirmera-t-elle l'impression de détente qui existait hier à Genève en ce qui concerne les possibilités de règlement du différend sino-japonais en Mandchourie ? Il faut le souhaiter, car il est hautement désirable que les efforts du conseil de la Société des nations aboutissent enfin et que toute menace de complications soit définitivement écartée en Extrême-Orient. M. Briand s'est employé avec une inlassable bonne volonté à tirer le meilleur parti possible pour l'autorité de la Société des nations d'une situation qui, du fait de certaines erreurs d'appréciation et de tactique commises au début, lorsque le conseil fut saisi de la question au cours de la session de septembre, ne laissait pas d'être singulièrement délicate.

Pour autant qu'on puisse en juger par les informations venues ce matin de Genève et de Tokio, on s'achemine vers un compromis qui sauvegarderait l'amour-propre national des deux parties et qui aurait pour résultat de débayer le terrain en vue d'un règlement direct entre les gouvernements chinois et japonais. C'est la seule solution raisonnable à laquelle on puisse s'arrêter. On est d'accord pour admettre qu'il n'existe pas d'état de guerre, ni même de menace de guerre proprement dite pouvant justifier l'intervention de la Société des nations en vertu de l'article 15 du pacte. Du côté nippon on n'a cessé de répéter que le Japon ne songe pas à faire la guerre à la Chine, qu'il n'a pas de visées territoriales en Chine et qu'il s'agit d'un incident local ayant nécessité une opération de police pour assurer la sécurité de la zone du chemin de fer sud-mandchourien qui est sous contrôle japonais, incident local pouvant être réglé sur place par les autorités chinoises et japonaises. Il est probable, en effet, que ce règlement direct serait intervenu déjà si le gouvernement chinois ne s'était pas laissé prendre à certaines apparences et s'il n'avait pas attendu, bien à tort d'ailleurs, de l'intervention du conseil de la Société des nations des avantages politiques qu'un règlement direct ne lui apporterait certainement pas.

Les polémiques qui se sont instituées à Nankin et à Tokio au sujet de l'initiative de Genève, venant s'ajouter à une information absolument tendancieuse et contradictoire sur la situation de fait en Mandchourie même, ont dangereusement embrouillé un débat qui, tel quel, était déjà très complexe. Le Japon tient de traités formels des droits spéciaux en Mandchourie qui ne sauraient être remis en discussion. Ayant à bail pour quatre-vingt-dix-neuf ans le chemin de fer sud-mandchourien, il a créé dans la zone placée sous son contrôle une œuvre formidable qu'il ne saurait songer à abandonner. Sans doute, en ayant recours à des moyens militaires en dehors de la zone du chemin de fer pour défendre ses droits menacés et assurer la sécurité de ses positions, il a forcé l'interprétation des droits que lui accor-

dent les traités; mais il faut tenir compte également des circonstances dans lesquelles il a cru devoir agir ainsi. Les attaques répétées de soldats chinois contre la voie ferrée, le boycottage des produits japonais s'étendant à toute la Chine, la campagne d'excitation contre le Japon créant un danger permanent pour les sujets du mikado résidant sur territoire chinois, tout cela a créé une situation exceptionnelle à laquelle les autorités japonaises en Mandchourie ont cru devoir faire face avec d'autant plus d'énergie qu'elles disposaient de forces relativement peu nombreuses.

Dans les déclarations que le ministre des finances du Japon vient de faire à Tokio pour répondre publiquement à des questions qui lui étaient posées par des personnalités américaines, il y a un passage qui ne peut manquer de retenir l'attention. C'est celui où le ministre japonais expose qu'en vertu des traités le Japon administre la zone du chemin de fer sud-mandchourien comme les Etats-Unis assurent la police et la protection de la zone du canal de Panama; une attaque nocturne s'étant produite, le 18 septembre, par des troupes régulières chinoises contre cette zone et une partie de la voie ferrée ayant été détruite, le Japon devait prendre des mesures énergiques et immédiates. « L'urgence était de celles, pressantes et menaçantes, qui ne laissent pas le choix des moyens ni le loisir de délibérer ». Il est évident que pour apprécier en toute équité la situation créée par le différend actuel, on n'a pas le droit d'oublier le fait brutal qui est à son origine et qui logiquement commande le développement de la crise sino-japonaise. Le Japon a usé en dehors de la zone soumise à son contrôle de moyens militaires que n'autorisent pas les traités, mais la Chine est responsable des attaques contre la voie ferrée placée sous la protection des Nippons et de l'agitation entretenue depuis deux ans contre le Japon au risque de provoquer les incidents les plus violents.

On comprend, dans ces conditions, que le Japon réclame des garanties de sécurité pour ses ressortissants avant de consentir à retirer ses troupes de police des localités encore occupées en dehors de la zone du chemin de fer. C'est une précaution commandée par la plus élémentaire prudence, surtout dans une région comme la Mandchourie où les autorités locales éprouvent la plus grande peine à maintenir l'ordre. Or, le gouvernement chinois promet bien de veiller à la sécurité des ressortissants japonais, mais il exige l'évacuation immédiate des points encore occupés et le paiement d'une indemnité préalablement à tout règlement du différend. Ce sont des conditions auxquelles le cabinet de Tokio, tenu par son opinion publique, ne saurait souscrire, et le problème ainsi posé serait impossible à résoudre si les deux parties devaient rester sur leurs positions.

D'une part, les efforts déployés personnellement

1 4 1 4
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ment à Genève par M. Briand dans ses conversations particulières avec les représentants du Japon et de la Chine; d'autre part, les entretiens que l'ambassadeur du Japon à Washington eut ces jours derniers avec le secrétaire d'Etat des Etats-Unis, M. Stimson, ont favorisé une détente. Lorsqu'on connaîtra, probablement ce soir, les réponses de Tokio et de Nankin aux suggestions de M. Briand, le conseil de la Société des nations pourra se prononcer sur une résolution ferme. Prendre acte de la déclaration du Japon qu'il n'a pas de visées territoriales en Mandchourie, qu'il s'engage à retirer ses troupes des localités chinoises aussi vite que le permettra la sécurité assurée pour ses ressortissants, et recommander à la Chine de prendre les mesures nécessaires à cet effet, c'est tout ce que le conseil peut faire pratiquement dans l'état présent des choses. Il aura ainsi accompli sa tâche immédiate, qui est d'empêcher un conflit armé et de préparer le terrain à des négociations directes entre Tokio et Nankin. Il y aurait de sérieux inconvénients à vouloir pousser les choses plus loin. Tout porte à penser que c'est à cela qu'on aboutira et que c'est par cette voie que la situation peut être définitivement éclaircie. Les changements politiques qui sont en cours d'accomplissement en Chine, par le rapprochement des dirigeants de Canton et de ceux de Nankin, faciliteront sans doute, dans une certaine mesure, comme nous l'avons indiqué déjà, une évolution à laquelle le gouvernement national actuel de la Chine peut difficilement se résoudre.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Warsaw, October 20, 1931.

No 1026

CONFIDENTIAL

NOV 30 31

DIVISION OF
EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

NOV 6 - 1931

COPY IN BE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Division of
EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
OCT 31 1931
Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE NOV 11 1931 A-C/C ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE	FOR DISTRIBUTION - CHECK <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No mjo
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The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

NOV 12 1931

Sir:

500.C/560

Supplementing despatch No. 1006 of October 9, 1931, I have the honor to report that interest in the Sino-Japanese conflict has not abated. Despatches on the subject are featured prominently in the press and the activity of the League of Nations has been followed with attention, even anxiety.

The official GAZETA POLSKA of October 17, defined the League invitation to America, notwithstanding the adverse vote of Japan, as having the character of a minor coup d' état. The concern felt by Poland over the precedent created by the League Council in taking action

70 FE
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793.94/2402

NOV 18 1931

- 2 -

action, despite the negative attitude of one of the parties involved, was echoed in the NASZ PRZEGLAD (October 18). This Jewish organ declared that the presence of the American Delegate at Geneva constituted a great menace to Japan. The question of the unanimity of the decision of the Council was of the utmost importance to Poland, especially in connection with German revisionist aims. The purpose of the declaration made by M. Sokol, the Polish Delegate, was, continued the NASZ PRZEGLAD, for the purpose of preventing the incident from creating a dangerous precedent.

Respectfully yours,

John N. Willys
John N. Willys

COPY TO E.I.C.

711

JCW:FH

4
✓ P.P.

141

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FE

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

HMP

FROM


GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 31, 1931

Rec'd 4:28 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



OCT 31 1931

845, October 31, 9 a. m.

Following from Consul at Tsingtau:

"October 30, 5 p. m. A mass meeting of Shantung Japanese representatives was held at Tsingtau October 28th which declared unanimously for an aggressive policy by Japan to enforce on Chinese all forms of anti-Japanese activities and rigid observance of all existing Japanese treaty rights in China and in particular those with respect to Shantung.

The resolutions as made public are serious enough to give cause for anxiety. However, it is reported that in addition to the publicity declarations the following secret resolutions were passed.

One. Efforts will be made to create disturbing incidents between Chinese and Japanese.

Two.

793.94/2403

FILED

NOV 5 1931

REP

2- #845, from Peiping, Oct. 31, 9 a.m.

Two. Representatives will be sent to Tokyo to appeal to the Japanese Government not to forget the special Japanese interests in Shantung.

Three. The Japanese Government will be petitioned to treat Shantung as it has treated Manchuria.

Secret plans are also reported to have been made for disposition of volunteers and ^{Concentration Safety} ~~(#) and Chinese seaport~~ points for Japanese citizens in case of emergency. This information comes from Municipal Government sources, it is supported by another apparently distinct source of information. My Japanese colleague informs me that it is absolutely untrue. I am inclined to believe that while the alleged resolutions may not have been officially adopted by the meeting as a whole, some understanding of the sort reported was reached between at least a portion of the delegates. Although there is no indication that the meeting was in any way encouraged by Japanese officials, who are thought to be still sincerely striving for maintenance of the status quo in Tsingtan, it is feared that if the reports of the secretaries resolutions are correct

even to the

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

3- #845, from Peiping, Oct. 31, 9 a.m.

even to the extent believed, incidents are likely to occur which would result in the landing of Japanese armed forces.

Whatever the truth of the allegations the Municipal authorities are obviously apprehensive of trouble in the near future. They feel that in view of the known American policy towards Shantung and the crisis they believe imminent, the presence here of an American war ship for observation purposes is very desirable".

Repeated to Shanghai and commander-in-chief.

For the Minister

ENGERT

KLP

RR

~~(#) Apparent omission.~~

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

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TO BE TRANSMITTED
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NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Collect
Charge Department

Department of State

Charge to
\$

Washington,

October 31, 1931.

AMLEGATION,

PEIPING (China).

Your 845, October 31, 9 a. m. / 2403

One. On the basis of Tsingtao's telegram Department considers it undesirable repeat undesirable that American naval vessel be sent to Tsingtao.

Two. Please repeat to Minister with request that he so inform Commander-in-Chief.

Three. Department desires that in matters of this sort you consult Minister prior to taking any action such as repeating to the Commander-in-Chief your telegram under reference.

Castle
Wing

Bur

FE:MMH:REK
MMH

24
FE *PAM*

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19_____, _____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 5-124

793.94/2403

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

✓
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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

A portion of this
 telegram must be closely
 paraphrased before being
 communicated to anyone.

PEIPING

Dated October 31, 1931

Rec'd 1:51 a. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.



848, October 31, 11 a. m.

793.94/2392
 Your 400, October 30, 5 p. m.

National City Bank Mukden has no knowledge of alleged
 transfers. (END GRAY).

Manager of the Peiping office states transfers made
 by frontier bank to private account of Marshal Chang
 Hsu Eh Liang.

For the Minister
 ENGERT

FILED

NOV. 4 1931

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 31, 1931

Rec'd 4:28 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington



847, October 31, 11 a. m.

Legation's 832, October 29, 4 p. m.

Tsinanfu reports October 30, 4 p. m.

"Tsinanfu National Tax Bureaus were restored to their former heads at noon today but Shantung retains collections to the extent of the amount due from the Chinese Government".

For the Minister

ENGERT

KLP

RR

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NOV 4 1931

793.94/2405

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FE

REP

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 31, 1931

Rec'd 4:28 a. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

846, October 31, 10 a. m.

Please see message re Mukden wireless station
 telegraphed by correspondent of The International News
 Service in Mukden October 30th.

For the Minister

ENGERT

JS

FILED

1931 NOV 6

793.94/2406

793.94
 note
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31 OCT

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 OCT 31 1931
 Department of State

Telegram drafted
 to Peiping, Nov. 5,
 1931
 NOV 5 1931

1424

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State



Washington,
November 5, 1931.

1-128
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

AMERICAN LEGATION NOV 5 31

PEIPING (China).

408 Your 846/2406
October 31, 10 a.m.

Neither the Washington nor New York office of
the International News Service ^{apparently} has any record of the
message. ~~Please telegraph text or summary of message~~

793.94/2406

Stamps
skm.

793.94/2406

NOV 5 1931 PM

FE:RPB/VDM

FE

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19

Index Bu.--No. 60.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-128

AM. RECD

No. —

AMERICAN CONSULATE


Mukden, China, October 7, 1931.

893-94
893-021
OCT 30 31

SUBJECT: Present Status of Local Foreign Office.

THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Copy in J.P.
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 31 1931



SIR:

- 1/ I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of my despatch No. 456, dated October 7, 1931, to the Legation, Peiping, on the subject "Present Status of Local Foreign Office."

Respectfully yours,

H. S. Myers
H. S. Myers,
American Consul General.

- 1/ Enclosure: Copy of despatch No. 456.

Original and four copies to Department.

MSM:AAB
800.

793.94/2407

FEB 13 1932

FILED

No. 456

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, China.

October 7, 1931.

SUBJECT: Present Status of Local Foreign
Office.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping, China.

Sir:

As of possible interest, I have the honor to report the result of my investigations in regard to the present status of the Office of the Special Delegate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Mukden.

At the time of the occupation of Mukden by Japanese troops, all Chinese government offices were seized and labeled "Occupied by the Japanese Army". Although the Foreign Office building was so labeled and its archives were sealed - some files, it is claimed, were removed - the office was not occupied in any manner by the military authorities but was kept open for the handling of visa work only. The established procedure requires that the Foreign Office report the particulars of each application

for

- 2 -

for visa to the Japanese Gendarmerie Headquarters for approval before visa may be granted. No Japanese officer is attached to the Foreign Office nor is any Japanese stamp placed on the visased passport signifying approval. Several American passports, it may be added, have been visased in this manner. All other functions of the Foreign Office are suspended for the time being.


The work of this office is being carried on by the Chief of the European and American Section with the help of a few assistants. Mr. Wang Ming-yü (王明宇) the Special Delegate, has not attended office since the occupation.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers.
American Consul General.

Original and one copy to Legation.
Five copies to Department.

MSM:AAB
800.



142

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

IN
WAR DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON

October 29, 1931.

OCT 30 31

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

OCT 31 1931

The Honorable,

The Secretary of State.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

*Letter drafted
to War, Nov. 9, 1931
mf November 9 1931.*

I take pleasure in inclosing herewith for your information a copy of an address transmitted to me by the Chairman of the Chamber of Commerce of Shanghai.

Mr. Wang Hsiao-lai, Chairman of the Chamber of Commerce of Shanghai, in his letter transmitting the address states that "you will find in it the presentation of views which represent the Chinese mind vis-a-vis the grave crisis in Manchuria."

Sincerely yours,

Harold J. Hurley
Secretary of War.

1 Incl.
Copy address of
welcome to Sec.War.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

The Honorable,

The Secretary of State.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I take pleasure in inclosing herewith for your information a copy of an address transmitted to me by the Chairman of the Chamber of Commerce of Shanghai.

Mr. Wang Hsiao-lai, Chairman of the Chamber of Commerce of Shanghai, in his letter transmitting the address states that "you will find in it the presentation of views which represent the Chinese mind vis-a-vis the grave crisis in Manchuria."

Sincerely yours,

1 Incl.
Copy address of
welcome to Sec.War.

Secretary of War.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

會商市海上

TELEGRAPHIC ADDRESS:
"CHAMBERCOM"
TELEPHONE:
40126 - 40129

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF SHANGHAI

NORTH SOOCHOW ROAD

ADDRESS OF WELCOME TO GENERAL HURLEY, AMERICAN SECRETARY
OF WAR, ON HIS FLYING VISIT TO SHANGHAI

Place: Chamber of Commerce Building, North Soochow Road.

Time: Thursday, October 1, 1931.

Hosts: Chamber of Commerce of Shanghai.

In the Chair: Mr. Wang Hsiao-lai, Chairman of the Chamber
of Commerce of Shanghai.

Honoured Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen:

It is a great honour to me to have this privilege of extending on behalf of the Chamber of Commerce of Shanghai a most cordial welcome to our guest of honour, General Hurley, to whose care the great American army is confided. Though this is only a flying visit on his part, this visit is rendered all the more significant and memorable by reason of the nation-wide skepticism of the Chinese people concerning the whole problem of world peace vis-a-vis the grave situation that has arisen in Manchuria.

General Hurley, your great country will shine in the history of all ages as the author of the international peace alliance known as the Kellogg Peace Pact. To America belongs the credit of the successful convocation of the memorable disarmament conference in Washington. To-day when the Far East is confronted with a very critical situation, it is only too natural that this Chamber warmly welcomes the visit to China of such a distinguished official as your good self

- 2 -

from a sister republic, well-known for her persistent and consistent advocacy of the peace of the world. The opportunity which is now yours for coming into personal contact with the Chinese people after you have made a special survey of conditions in the Philippine Islands will no doubt enable you to make a valuable contribution to the cause of world peace.

History testifies eloquently to the single object which underlies the American army the *raison d'être* of which is not to obstruct the progress of the world peace movement but to accelerate that momentous movement. It is in this light that we regard you as a strictly world peace advocate although you are a soldier. However, we crave your indulgence for the inadequate form in which your Chinese hosts have hastily managed to express in a modest way their sincere welcome.

The Chinese people believe in the total absence of ulterior motives on the part of the United States in getting the various Powers to become signatory parties to the Kellogg Peace Pact and to the Washington Disarmament Treaty. The Chinese people see in these monumental achievements of America invaluable signs of her genuine devotion to the cause of world brotherhood in order to vindicate the sacred principle of international goodwill. Nor is this all. America no doubt still carries a vivid memory of the horrors and appalling disasters from which Europe in particular and the world in general have suffered in consequence of the world war, horrors which

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

the world to-day has not yet completely survived. America, therefore wisely took upon herself the task of making literally true the claim that had been made by staunch pacifists to make the last war the very war that would actually end all wars.

General Hurley, you may be interested to know that there is a growing feeling, which is getting near the stage of a deep-seated conviction, that the next world war shall be fought not on the battlefield of Europe but on the peace-loving soil of the Far East. On all sides we see unmistakable signs which point to the fact that the dynamic explosion in the Balkan States which started the first world war will be re-echoed in the invaded areas, areas which may be referred to as the Balkan States of the Far East. We refer to the strategic centers of Liaoning (Fengtien) and Kirin. Indeed, the fuse has been ignited, and events are moving rapidly in such a manner as to give cause to the justifiable alarm that mankind is going to have another world war thrust upon it. Will this dreaded world conflagration come to pass? All depends on the swiftness and effectiveness with which the combustible materials are placed under control. Shall the world allow human civilization to degenerate by watching unmoved the events that have taken place and are taking place in Manchuria, and allow these events to intensify the horrors of actual warfare and thus to nullify the valuable achievements of America in connection with the making of the Kellogg Peace Pact and the Washington Disarmament Treaty? It is with thoughts such as these in mind that we venture to express our opinion that the Far Eastern question to-day

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

is ten times more significant and ten times more consequential than the great war in Europe.

General Hurley, you have no doubt been keeping in close touch with events in Europe although you have been spending your time in the Far East. You have, we presume, already read the statements made by the Japanese at Geneva and taken note of the evasive tactics employed by the Japanese at the League of Nations Council. You must have also seen the text of the Japanese cunning reply to the statement made by Colonel Stimson, the American Secretary of State. Japan has deliberately attempted to mislead the world in her pledges regarding the withdrawal of Japanese troops from the invaded areas in Manchuria. Japan has bluntly and unblushingly imposed upon the League of Nations her mandate that she will not consent to the sending of a Commission of Enquiry to the Far East to investigate the actual state of affairs in Manchuria. No, she has made it known that she would not consent to the coming of an unofficial mission. What accounts for such impudent attitude on the part of Japan? So far as we Chinese are concerned, we can have but one explanation for Japan's extremely unreasonable and singularly defiant attitude. She is afraid that the world shall hear the truth about her midnight stealthy invasion of Chinese cities, her seizure of Chinese munitions and military equipments—the withdrawal for China's National Defence—, her absolute lack of all control over her military hordes by whom appalling atrocities have been committed in their thirst for human blood and unscrupulous plunder, and her master-stroke of complete bluff in her

- 5 -

make-believe evacuation under a system of her own by which she still retains an aggressive grip upon the cities she had daringly occupied. The world, we believe, cannot be so easily duped. What's the use of talking of evacuation in the sense of withdrawing the Japanese troops into the South Manchurian Railway zone while leaving behind detachments of Japanese troops in such strategic centers as Shenyang (Mukden), Kirin, Hsinmintun, Cheng-chiatun and other cities, and doing all this under the flimsy pretext of warding off possible attacks upon Japanese residents that might come from bandits or Chinese soldiers in the neighbourhood! We fail to see how the Japanese rumour-mongers could possibly expect even the most credulous to believe that the Chinese soldiers, who exercised great forbearance when they refrained from firing upon Japanese soldiers at the time of the Japanese invasion, would now foolishly turn to a belligerent policy and indulge in shooting Japanese civilians? The Chinese people are spared of misgivings on this subject. Japan, a past master at coercive manoeuvres, wishes to firmly entrench herself in Liaoning (Fengtien) and Kirin in order to force the hand of China to swallow the poisonous pill of Japan's annexation of South Manchuria because as long as Japan's occupation of strategic centers in Liaoning and Kirin does not come to an end, it naturally follows that the administrative power of the two provinces must necessarily remain in the grip of Japanese dictatorship. The Japanese believe that by prolonging their invasion of these provinces they will ultimately attain their aggressive objective.

- 6 -

The Japanese Delegation at the League of Nations Council in Geneva has repeatedly emphasised on Japan's special position in Manchuria, and employed this argument as a pretext to brush aside all mediatory offers on the part of any third power. Such arrogant attitude is nothing short of an ill-disguised declaration that Japan expects the whole world to side with her in her audacious claim for herself an exclusive sphere of special influence of the kind coveted by insatiable Japanese ambition have no place in the normal order of world relations. The Russo-Japanese War of 1905 sprang from no other principal cause than the struggle between these two Powers for spheres of special influence while in the case of the Great War we found that the whole trouble began with the efforts made by two rival powers, Russia and Austria, for winning the upper hand in the Balkan States. But how this rivalry has led to disasters that are too sad for words is still something fresh in the minds of all of the present generation!

Secretary of State John Hay, one of the most distinguished statesmen of your country, is to this day highly venerated among the Chinese people in consequence of the far-sighted international doctrine which he enunciated among the nations. We refer to the policy of Open Door and Equal Opportunity in support of which Secretary Hay got together the leading powers of the world to make most definite commitments. In the Washington Treaty, to which no less than nine Powers constituted the signatory parties, the provisions are very specific on the subject of the preservation of China's territorial integrity and

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 7 -

the common adherence of the Powers to the Open Door Policy, and among these nine Powers Japan was included. The motive behind Japan's seizure of Liaoning and Kirin is self-evident. In brief, Japan's principal motive in occupying Manchurian cities is to push the whole South Manchurian question to the front in order to wring from China concessions of all kinds to satisfy Japan's insatiable greed. Among the more recent contributing factors of Japan's outrageous conduct, we might mention several. In the first place, Japan has become exceedingly jealous of the work of economic reconstruction on the part of the Manchurian authorities because the latter have built railways in Liaoning and Kirin to provide a competitive transportation service for these two provinces while at the same time elaborate preparations have been completed for the development of the Hulutao Harbour. In the past the phrase of "Particular Sphere of Influence" was amenable to but one interpretation, and it was this. Where one particular Power exercises her right in any single area to be known as her particular sphere of influence, no third Power is allowed to secure any political or economic advantage until the Super-Power in this sphere of particular influence has first exercised her claim to priority in the enjoyment of all these monopolistic advantages. But in the light of the Washington Conference, all spheres of special influence of the Japanese conception, which aims at the abridgement of the sovereign rights of the Chinese Republic, are direct attempts to depart from the letter and spirit of the Washington Treaty itself, which in the eyes of Japan is a mere scrap of paper. Hence this chamber main-

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 8 -

tains that there is no exaggeration in attaching to the present crisis an importance that outweighs the whole question of the Balkan States from the standpoint of the unlimitedly inflammatory character of the tragic invasion by Japan of Liaoning and Kirin.

General Hurley, as I have already mentioned, your great country took such an active part in bringing about the Kellogg Peace Pact and the Washington Treaty with but one aim in view, and that was to promote world peace and international harmony. In other words, the task thus accomplished, which has done monumental service to humanity, should be followed up by the avoidance of causes, either remote or immediate, that would eventually rock the very foundation of world peace. America has always taken a vigorous lead in opposing the setting up of spheres of particular influence because such spheres of influence are diametrically opposed to the policy of Open Door which America has all along consistently upheld. Now the world is watching for action of a corrective nature on the part of the Powers concerned, but especially on the part of the United States because Japan, in defiance of Chinese sovereignty and in utter violation of international pacts, has staged a shameless drama of international scandal by forcing, were it possible, a sphere of special influence to further her self-aggrandisement. General Hurley, this is the time for prompt action if we are all seriously anxious to avoid complications that are bound to lead to another world war of indispensible horrors. The Chinese sages of old gave us to understand the value of the time element in

- 9 -

action of consequence by leaving with us two proverbs. One of these is to the effect that "Why wait until you are badly burnt all over the body in a bitter fight with the flames when there is yet ample chance for you to devise preventive measures by transposing your chimney and moving away the firewood from the oven?" The other gives us the cheering assurance that "An ounce of exertion for the cause of peace accomplishes more than a ton of gunpowder dissipated on the battlefield". Ideals such as these are still in the power of man to make real. There are two courses of action which, in the opinion of this Chamber, will be conducive to a substantial improvement of the present critical situation. Firstly, let the Powers be bold enough to exercise common vigilance of the Japanese in the withdrawal of troops to bring about a complete evacuation in the sense of bringing about a revival of conditions which prevailed up to the Japanese invasion that took place on September 18th without any modifications by making the withdrawal a partial one in any shape or form. In the second place, following this wholesale, unconditional and unmodified evacuation of Japanese troops, the question of a settlement of all outstanding issues between China and Japan concerning South Manchuria may be taken up on the basis that two fundamental principles: namely, complete respect for China's sovereignty and absolute regard of the Open Door Policy, will be strictly adhered to as governing factors throughout all the negotiations, and so far as mode of procedure is concerned, we have already a fitting precedent in the settlement of the Tsingtao question which took place some years ago. On that

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 10 -

occasion, the settlement was brought about through the appreciated intervention of the friendly Powers. It is our firm belief that by virtue of a firm adherence to the two formulas laid down, it is possible to reach a stage of satisfactory liquidation of all problems affecting China's foreign relations as well as safeguarding at the same time the peace of the Far East.

Japan has on more than one occasion threatened to desert the League of Nations but we feel confident that even if she were actually to carry out this threat of hers, she would not be able to muster sufficient boldness for a wholesale defiance of the public opinion of the world, and thereby isolate herself from the family of nations. We should think that Japan would not likely throw overboard her foreign trade with your country. For example, the quantity of raw silk which she exports for disposal on the American market is the principal export of Japan. Timely action at this juncture on the part of America will indeed be an important factor for the avoidance of the transparent causes that are bound to culminate in another world war. The situation demands quick action and makes literally true the proverb which says "A stitch in time saves nine."

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 11 -

In conclusion, while apologising for the unusual length of this address, I wish to stress the fact that in saying what I have said on behalf of this Chamber, I, as spokesman of the Chinese business community of Shanghai, am not merely pleading for the peace and welfare of this country but with equal earnestness and sincerity, for the well being and culture of the whole human race.

General Hurley, we cordially thank you in advance for your kindness in placing our views before your government.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

November 8 1931.

In reply refer to
FE 793.94/2408

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I acknowledge with thanks the receipt of your letter of October 29, 1931, with which you forwarded, for my information, a copy of an address made by Mr. Wang Hsiao-lai, Chairman of the Chamber of Commerce of Shanghai, on the occasion of your visit to Shanghai, on October 1, 1931.

The information contained in Mr. Wang's address is indeed of interest as an indication of Chinese thought in regard to the existing Chinese-Japanese dispute.

Sincerely yours,

HENRY L. STIMSON

The Honorable

Patrick J. Hurley,

Secretary of War.

OR
NOV 9 1931

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793.94/2408

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. -----

AMERICAN CONSULATE.

Mukden, China, October 12, 1931.

100 30 31

SUBJECT: Forwarding Copies of Correspondence between Japanese Consulate General at Mukden and this Office Concerning Robbery and Banditry in the Commercial Settlement at Mukden.

THE HONORABLE
 THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of my despatch No. 459, dated October 11, 1931, to the Legation, Peiping, China on the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers
 American Consul General.

Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 459

MSM:HTW
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FILED

NOV 01 1931

793.94/2409

No. 459

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, China.

October 11, 1931.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping, China.

Sir:

- 1/ I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of my despatch of October 6, 1931, to the local Japanese Consul General concerning the increasing frequency of acts of armed robbery and banditry in the Commercial Settlement at Mukden and to the resultant anxiety of American citizens for their personal safety. A copy of his reply of October 9, 1931,
- 2/ is enclosed. I would add that my British Colleague made similar representations to the Japanese Consul General at the same time.

Existing conditions in this respect were briefly reported upon in my despatch No. 457 of October 6, 1931, under the subject "Further Developments in the Situation".


Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers.
American Consul General.

- 1/ Enclosure: Copy of despatch to Japanese Consul General.
2/ " : Reply to above despatch.

Original and one copy to Legation.
Three copies to Department.

MSM:AAB
800.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1, to despatch ^{#457} to Legation, Peiping, from
M. S. Myers, Consul General, dated October 12, 1931.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, China.

October 6, 1931.

Sir and dear Colleague,

I have the honor to state that several American citizens residing in the Commercial Settlement have expressed anxiety in regard to their personal safety owing to the growing frequency of acts of armed robbery and banditry in this area during the past week. Although fortunately no American citizen has been molested as yet several have reported themselves as being considerably perturbed by acts of armed robbery and shooting in their immediate vicinity. You will readily understand, of course, that the safety of American citizens is a matter of deep concern to me.

As Japanese are in charge of the local municipal administration and are responsible for the maintenance of peace and order I beg to express the hope that appropriate steps are being taken for the effective policing of this area.


I have the honor to be,

Sir and dear Colleague,

Your obedient servant,

M. S. Myers.
American Consul General.

K. Hayashi, Esquire,
Consul General for Japan,
Mukden, China.



44-

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

#457
No. 2, to despatch to Legation, Peiping, from
Consul General, dated October 12, 1931.

CONSULATE GENERAL OF JAPAN
MUKDEN

October 9, 1931.

Sir and dear Colleague,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated October 6, 1931, in which you state that anxiety has been expressed by American residents in the Commercial Settlement here in regard to their personal safety, owing to the growing frequency of acts of armed robbery and banditry during the past week. You also express therein the desire that appropriate steps are being taken for the effective policing of that area.

In reply, I beg to state that I have requested the Japanese Military Authorities to take necessary steps in compliance with your desire, as they actually are charged with the maintenance of peace and order in this town, inasmuch as the competent Chinese authorities remain inactive.

I have the honour to be,

Sir and dear Colleague,

Your obedient servant,


(SGD) K. Hayashi,
Consul-General of Japan.

M. S. Myers, Esquire,

Consul General of the United

States of America,

MUKDEN.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 2, 1931.

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In the attached report, Consul General Meyers deals with:

1. The bombing of Chinchow which he feels was unjustified.
2. The paramount influence of the Japanese military over other branches of the Japanese Government.
3. The Chinese independence movement in Manchuria which reveals the determination of the Japanese not to deal with Chang Hsueh-liang or any of his supporters.
4. Japanese intrigue among the Mongols.

[Handwritten signature]

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM RECD

No. —

AMERICAN CONSULATE
GENERAL
Mukden, China, October 10, 1931.

OCT 30 31

SUBJECT: Political Situation in South Manchuria

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

1661-49
THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.

Division of
FOR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 2 1931
Department of State

SIR:

- 1/ I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of
my despatch No. 458, to the Legation, Peiping, dated
October 10, 1931, on the subject "Political Situation
in South Manchuria."

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers.
American Consul General.

- 1/ Enclosure: Copy of despatch No. 458.

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793.94/2410

NOV 10 1931

No. 458

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, China.

October 10, 1931.

SUBJECT: Political Situation in South
Manchuria.

CONFIDENTIAL.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping, China.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my telegram of October 8, 8 p.m., regarding the bombing of Chinchien (Chinchow) by eight Japanese scout airplanes at noon of that day. The announcement made to the press that evening was to the effect that the Japanese had found incriminating evidence on Chinese passengers coming from Chinchien showing that the Chinchien government, the creation of Chang Hsueh-liang, is plotting disturbances in this area, that the Chinese barracks were the object of the bombing, and that the attack was only made after the Chinese had fired on their planes and that it was not directed against the civilian population. As far as could be learned yesterday the bombs were dropped on the barracks of the 9th and

12th

- 2 -

12th Chinese brigades and it is thought that much damage was done. The Peiping-Liaoning Railway sheds and one locomotive at that place were said to have been damaged. A translation of the statement in regard to this incident appearing in the local Japanese press this morning is enclosed herewith.

Inquiries made yesterday regarding the dropping of leaflets on Chihhsien failed to elicit any confirmation that that had occurred. It appears that when the information regarding the bombing was given out at Mukden the impression was gained that a similar statement in printed form had been dropped by the airplanes. Four scout planes, it may be added, were sent to Chihhsien yesterday morning for observation purposes.

Chihhsien, the temporary seat of the Liaoning Provincial Government, is approximately 150 miles southwest of Mukden on the Peiping-Liaoning railway and over 100 miles by airline. The flight of Japanese scout planes over Chinese military encampments at that distance from the Japanese railway zone seems to lack sufficient justification from the point of view of the protection of the Railway Zone. Reliable information, just received from Chihhsien, is that the new government buildings and the radio station, not the barracks, were the object of attack and that considerable damage was done to them; sixteen persons including two women were reported killed by the bombs.

General Honjo's reasons for the attack on Chihhsien appear flimsy and unconvincing. Every utterance and every act of the Japanese military authorities

betoken

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

betoken an unyielding purpose of overthrowing the government and the influence of Chang Kuang-liang in Manchuria as well as breaking up his military power in this territory. It is clear that the bombing of Chinghsien has sealed the fate of the Chang regime in Manchuria. Too, it seems to be an unmistakable act of interference in the internal affairs of China which is proscribed by the Nine Power treaty "relative to principles and policies concerning China" and a nullification of Japanese protestations that its military action was predicated on the attack by Chinese troops on the Japanese army and the destruction of the South Manchuria tracks and would be confined to the administering of a suitable punishment to the Northeastern forces.

This attack on Chinghsien tends to prove that the whole military move in Manchuria was dictated by purely political considerations, as has been apparent to close observers from the outset, and had no relation to the incident on the railway which the Japanese have endeavored to hold up to the world as a reasonable pretext for their action. In an article by Dr. Washio in the Japan Advertiser, dated September 29, under the heading "Dr. Washio says army's action in Manchuria was imperative" which discussed at some length the personality of the new War Minister, General Jiro Minami, it is stated that when the army secured irrefutable evidence regarding the murder of Captain Nakamura "he

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- 4 -

(the War Minister) said the army was considering the solution of this action as inseparable with that of all pending problems in Manchuria, which were violations of Japan's treaty rights and the main cause of unrest". It is evident that it was his strict adherence to this attitude that brought the issue to a climax in the Japanese Cabinet, as a settlement of the Nakamura case, satisfactory to the Japanese Foreign Office, had been reached in essentials when the Japanese army struck the blow on the night of September 18. That the Japanese have had many grievances against the Chinese for their utter disregard of agreements, official and private, and for their wanton procrastination in the handling of diplomatic questions and important issues cannot be gainsaid. On the other hand, there have been many grievances wherein Chinese rights and susceptibilities were ruthlessly disregarded by the Japanese with the resultant exacerbation of feelings and relations. Until both sides are willing to approach all questions with an open mind for the purpose of reaching a fair and just settlement, and the Chinese have shown no inclination to do this, there can be no improvement in these relations. Too, it may not be inappropriate to point out that the characteristic Chinese presumption that well-intended concessions are signs of weakness and therefore an invitation for greater pressure has been exhibited many times in the history of Sino-Japanese relations in recent years, as also in the relations with other foreign powers.

Although

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -

Although an exhibition of military strength may have been good policy on the part of the Japanese at this time to put a stop to the checkmating of its diplomacy, the question of interest is whether in the execution of this policy imperialistic designs are not becoming paramount notwithstanding the repeated assurances of the Japanese government. It has been remarked that the Japanese government seems to have been forced at times into unpremeditated and disagreeable situations by the powerful military group which it was obliged to accept. If that is so and, it is believed that events have occurred in Manchuria supporting it, it is not impossible that an over-zealous and ambitious army may not be entirely guided by instructions such as those forbidding the army to promote, or assist in any way in, the creation of an independent government or even to interfere in politics and diplomacy, as referred to in Lieutenant General Honjo's proclamation given below. My Japanese Colleague volunteered the information that the Japanese military authorities were now not only strictly complying with the government's instructions in regard to the independence movement but were cooperating with him in putting a stop to the activities of "Ronin" in this direction. He mentioned that it has been discovered that "Ronin" had approached K'an Chao-hsi in regard to this movement and that the Japanese government had threatened them with deportation if such activities were continued. In spite of this statement, I have

NO

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 6 -

no reason to doubt the information regarding the attempt on the part of the Japanese military to influence Yuan Chin-kai to organize an independent government, as was reported in my strictly confidential despatch of October 2, 1931. It is possible that strict instructions have obliged the military authorities to change their attitude, or it may be that such activities are now carried on covertly. In any event, the attitude of the military authorities, as expressed in the proclamation of Lieutenant General Honjo, the substance of which is enclosed herewith, seems favorably disposed toward the formation of a new government at Mukden.

The independence movement although still in a nebulous state may, it is thought in some quarters, develop very suddenly. The Peace Preservation Committee, headed by Yuan Chin-k'ai, a few days ago made a public announcement to the effect that it was a provisional organization and that its functions were limited to those indicated by its name, any intention of organizing a government being denied. It is rumored that Chang Hsueh-ch'eng, a cousin of Chang Hsueh-liang, who was involved in the Shih Yu-san rebellion last summer, is interested in this movement/^{as}also Prince Kung, a Manchu, who resides at Pairen. Both are now reported to be in Mukden. Some reports have coupled the name of the ex-Emperor Hsüan T'ung with this movement, but in view of the relatively small number of Manchus in Manchuria there is not likely to be much interest shown in

reviving

- 7 -

reviving the fortunes of the old Ch'ing dynasty or any of its members. On this general subject, my Japanese Colleague made the statement a few days ago that it is obvious that an independence movement could only succeed with Japanese support.

It is quite evident that the Japanese will not under any circumstances negotiate with Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang and that therefore before their troops can be withdrawn to the Japanese Railway zone in accordance with their announced purpose a Chinese administration to carry on the ordinary functions of government will first have to be formed. The spokesman of the local Japanese military authorities has repeatedly said that the only government that the Japanese will recognize and treat with must represent the people of Manchuria. This is another way of stating that the Japanese intend treating this incident as a local issue. It appears, therefore, that the Japanese will exert considerable influence on the organization of the government at Mukden, which, no doubt, at the outset will have to agree in principle to the implementing of all rights and privileges provided for in the various agreements between the Chinese national and provincial governments and Japan. According to reliable Chinese information, the Japanese demands relate to railways, duty (exact nature unknown), land leasing rights and the right of residence throughout Manchuria.

It

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 7 -

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lutz NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 8 -

It is reasonable to believe that the Japanese intend that an administration essentially of a civil character in contradistinction to the previous military ones be created. A report worthy of credence is to the effect that the Japanese are pressing Tsang Shih-yi, the present Chairman of the provincial Government, who is now under detention, to organize a government at Mukden and probably at the same time to subscribe to the above mentioned demands. According to responsible opinion General Chang Tso-hsiang, the leading official of the old conservative wing of the Fengtien party, is acceptable to the Japanese and it is thought that his personal influence would be a large factor in holding the three provinces together. A report has been heard also that the Japanese are avoiding giving embarrassment to T'ang Yü-lin, Chairman of Jehol Province, and that his stocks of opium, seized at Mukden, will be returned to him. Although confirmation of these reports is unobtainable at present, they do not appear incredible in view of the pronouncements and actions of the local Japanese military authorities.

This office has had reports from reliable sources regarding Japanese intrigues among the Mongols in the Liaoyuan and Taonan areas. Although it has been impossible to confirm these reports they are given for what they may be worth. A Mongol who is called Pao in Chinese has been in command of a small force of Mongols along the Liao River north of Sanchiangkou, on the Gaupingkai-Taonan railway, which has been in the pay

of

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 8 -

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 9 -

of the provincial government. A report states that Pao was recently bribed with 40 rifles and ammunition by the Japanese and that as soon as he received this equipment he disappeared with his small force, much to the chagrin and anger of the Japanese. He is reported to have sent them a message to the effect that he is a Chinese and is faithful to his people.

Another report is to the effect that at Taonan, in the quarters occupied by the South Manchuria Railway Company, frequent meetings between Japanese and nearby Mongol princes have been taking place in regard to the formation of an autonomous Mongol state. The organization of such a state would require Japanese assistance and no doubt it would be heralded as another case of the operation of the principle of self-determination of peoples. Chang Hai-p'eng, the Chinese Garrison Commissioner at Taonan, an ex-bandit and contemporary of the late Chang Tso-lin, is believed to be a party to this intrigue. He is reported to have taken over the troops (one or two regiments) of the Hsingen Colonization Bureau stationed in that region. There is still another report that several carloads of arms and ammunition were recently sent from Suijingkai to Taonan for the use of the Mongols.

Although confirmation of these reports is lacking, it has been understood that Japanese intrigues among the eastern Mongol princes have been going on, perhaps intermittently, for years. Too, Japanese travellers have gone into that territory, some of whom have never returned.

Captain

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 10 -

Captain Nakamura's trip is a case in point. It is reliably stated by a responsible Chinese that Captain Nakamura's notebook contained military data, such as available billeting quarters for troops at the different villages, distances between villages, etc., and was produced at Mukden as evidence of the actual character of his mission. That the Japanese are again devoting considerable attention to the Mongol princes at this time is, it is believed, not improbable.


Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers.
 American Consul General.

- 1/ Enclosure: Statement appearing in local Japanese press regarding bombing of Chinghsien.
 2/ " : General Benjo's proclamation.

Original and one copy to Legation.
 Five copies to Department.
 Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.

MSM:AAB
 800.



145

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 8 to despatch No. 458 of M. E. Myers,
American Consul General at Mukden, China, dated
October 10, 1931, on the subject of Political
Situation in South Manchuria.

News item from Chang Ching Chih Pao
of October 10, 1931.

Chang Hsueh-liang has ordered a movement of
troops from inside the Great Wall to Chinkhsien and
neighboring points and at the same time the troops
of Chinkhsien were ordered to entrench at Talingho,
north of that city. From this move it seems that
they intend to attack the Japanese position.
For the purpose of self-defense, the Japanese on
the eight instant sent several scouting planes to
observe their positions. Unexpectedly when the
planes reached Chinkhsien they were fired at by
Chinese troops and the Japanese dropped several
tons of bombs in reply. The losses suffered
by the Chinese side were very heavy.

News from the Pei-Ning Railway Office is to
the effect that at about 1:00 p.m. on the eight
instant Japanese airplanes suddenly appeared
over Chinkhsien to the great perturbation of the
Chinese troops. Some of them fired at the
planes to which the planes responded by dropping
bombs. Several tons of bombs were dropped on
the Communication University, near the railway
station, which is the seat of the government.
The first class car used by Mi Chun-lin was
destroyed. Much damage was done at other
places.

Enclosure No. 2 to despatch No. 458 of M. S. Myers,
American Consul General, Mukden, China, dated October
10, 1931, on the subject of Political Situation in
South Manchuria.

The Gist of Proclamation of
Lieutenant General Honjo.

(The Manchuria Daily News)
October 5, 1931.

Brigade Commander Wang-iche's command was feared
as the pick and flower of Marshal Chang's direct
command at East and North Barracks, Moukden. As they
were chastized by us as a sequel to their aggression
against us on the night of September 18, the fugitive-
soldiers got rallied at places trying to gather themselves
together. They indulged in excesses, assaulting women
and looting money. Particularly, Koreans were butchered
like dogs. At Tatientzu Village alone, over 100 of them
were massacred. We send our men against them, the fugitive-
soldiers will hoist a white flag or send a messenger to
capitulate. The dream of the Northeastern Army behaving
so, there is small wonder that the others made up of
inferior material should turn bandits, deporting themselves
worse than wild animals. Such men cannot be called
an army of a civilized State. A country which
keeps such a rabble for its army cannot be considered
to have the anatomy of an independent State.
The old Northeastern Government whose army they were
is unworthy of being regarded as an equal to discuss
or negotiate points of international justice and
honour.

The movements to set up a new government has
been started everywhere in Manchuria and Mongolia.
While the Chinese people are drawn to the Japanese
army because of its strict discipline, none of them
has manifested a wish to have their old heads back
over them. The accumulation of the long suppressed
indignation must have burst up at length against the
old war lords.

The Japanese army stands aloof from politics
and diplomacy, chiefly seeing to peace and order
preserved.

It goes without saying that the Japanese army
will tolerate no plot to found a government within
the wall of Moukden, but is sincerely anxious to
realize Manchuria turned into a paradise of mutual
solidarity for its 30,000,000 people.

From the principle of neighbourly friendship,
it seems a relief urgently needed to facilitate the
unification of all Manchuria and Mongolia that will,

at

(20-16)

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

at the same time, tend to consolidate the permanent
peace of the Orient. "

We shall trust that the just and humane world
will not grudge their support and cooperation to
the present movement of the Chinese people in
Manchuria and Mongolia, to the end of furthering
the welfare of these 80,000,000 people.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM RECD

No. -----

AMERICAN CONSULATE,

Mukden, China, October 12, 1931.

SUBJECT: Radio Corporation of America's Case
Against Japanese for Suspension of
Mukden-San Francisco Radio Service.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

DEC 5 1931

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of
my despatch No. 460, dated October 11, 1931, to the
Legation, Peiping, China on the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 460
to Legation, Peiping.

MSM:HTW
800/340

DEC 8 1931

FILED

793.94/2411

No. 460

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, China.

October 11, 1931.

SUBJECT: Radio Corporation of America's Case
Against Japanese for Suspension of
Mukden-San Francisco Radio Service.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping, China.

Sir:

I have the honor to request the Legation to refer to the exchange of telegrams between the Legation and this office during the past few days on the above subject.

Briefly, the action taken by this Consulate General on the Radio Corporation's case is as follows:

On September 24th, Mr. George F. Shecklen, China representative of the Radio Corporation, requested by letter and in person that the Japanese authorities be requested to state whether the Mukden-San Francisco direct radio circuit was in operation and if not what steps were being taken to put it into operation. This office transmitted his request and received a reply from the Japanese Consul General on September 25th stating that the matter had been brought to the attention

of

- 2 -

of the military authorities and requesting a copy of the Radio Corporation's contract with the Northeastern communications administration.

Several days later an officer of this Consulate General orally informed the Japanese Consulate General that it did not consider that the present situation justified the request for a copy of the agreement. Some days later the Japanese Consul General intimated orally that a general statement as to the nature of the agreement would suffice.

On October 1, 1931, a telegram and a letter were sent to Mr. Sheeklen at Shanghai informing him of the status of the case and of this Consulate General's opinion with respect to the agreement. Mr. Sheeklen wrote on October 2nd giving the principal points in the agreement and stating that I was at liberty to use the information as I saw fit. On October 5th, Mr. Sheeklen again wrote enclosing a copy of the agreement and quoting the following telegram from his head office in New York:

"Send to Consul General at Mukden copy of contract referred to in your message. The copy to be delivered by him at his discretion to the parties in control of the operation of the Mukden station. Delivery however to be subject to any instructions to the Consul General from the Department of State. These instructions are highly confidential."

Mr. Sheeklen had still not received my mail report on the matter when he sent this letter.

Needless

- 3 -

Needless to say, this Consulate General has not sent the copy of the contract to the Japanese Consulate General nor has it replied to the Japanese Consul General's communication of September 25th requesting a copy of the agreement. No further request has come from the Japanese Consulate General concerning the agreement and since the latter part of September this office has confined its references to the matter to oral inquiries with respect to the condition of the plant and the date when a resumption of service might be expected. In reply to the last inquiry of this nature made on October 9th, the Japanese Consul General stated that a telegraphic instruction which he had just received from the Tokyo Foreign Office for transmission to the Japanese military authorities would probably hasten the resumption of service. However, an officer of this Consulate has twice visited the transmitting station and central control office, once since the Consul General's statement referred to above, and has found no evidence of preparations being made for the reopening of the station. The transmitting station is unprotected except for a Chinese watchman and the central control office is occupied by Japanese soldiers. No signs of damage to equipment were observed at the former place and at the latter permission to see the equipment was refused.

In view of the fact that the Department has received through the Legation a statement of this office's

action

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -


action and position with respect to the Radio Corporation's case in my telegram of October 10, 11 a.m.,
I am awaiting the Department's instructions before taking any further action on the case.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers.
American Consul General.

Original and one copy to Legation.
Five copies to Department.
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.

JCV:AAB
340/800.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM RECD

No. -----

AMERICAN CONSULATE.

GENERAL

Mukden, China, October 13, 1931.

30 31

SUBJECT: Radio Corporation of America's Case
Against Japanese for Suspension of
Mukden-San Francisco Radio Service

DIVISION OF
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DEC 10 1931

Department of State

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

WASHINGTON.

ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF STATE
c/c

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of
my despatch No. 461, dated October 12, 1931, to the
Legation, Peiping, China on the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 461
to Legation, Peiping.

MSM:HTW
800/340

FILED

DEC 10 1931

793.94/2412

No. 461.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, China.

October 12, 1931.

SUBJECT: Radio Corporation of America's Case
Against Japanese for Suspension of
Mukden-San Francisco Radio Service.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping, China.

Sir:

I have the honor to request the Legation to
793.94/2411
refer to my despatch No. 460 of yesterday's date on
the above subject.

This Consulate has today received the following
letter dated October 8th from the China Representative
of the Radio Corporation of America at Shanghai:

" I beg to acknowledge with thanks and
appreciation your letter of October 1,
1931, your reference 340.

All the information you have given has
been carefully noted and with respect to
the last paragraph of your letter, you may
inform the Japanese authorities that, while
we do not own direct interest in the sta-
tion, the C.N.E.T.T.R.A. owes us approxi-
mately G\$10,000.00 for engineering ser-
vices and traffic balances. Further, that
during the operation of the Mukden-San
Francisco service from June until suspension
of service, my company was earning a revenue
of approximately G\$300.00 per day therefrom.

If

- 2 -

"If the Japanese authorities fail to permit resumption of the service we must look to them for equal compensation for damages incurred.

Thanking you again, I beg to remain, "

The following is the paragraph of the Consulate General's letter to which Mr. Shecklen refers:

"With respect to the request from the Japanese military that you furnish them with a copy of your agreement with the Chinese, it is the opinion of this Consulate General that the present situation does not justify the Japanese in expecting compliance with their request, nor does the Consulate General consider it advisable for you to comply. As stated in my telegram a general statement as to the character of the agreement from you in writing, which this office may transmit to the Japanese Consulate General, should suffice."

Although this office assumes that Mr. Shecklen wrote the above letter with the knowledge of his head office, it cannot assume that the Department has been notified and approves of communicating Mr. Shecklen's statements to the Japanese authorities. The Department's instructions transmitted to me in the legation's telegram of October 9, 11 a.m. while prohibiting commitments of any sort in reply to possible Japanese approaches concerning the radio station and traffic agreement without first receiving the Department's instruction, they do not mention action to be taken by this Consulate in response to requests from the Radio Corporation of America.

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- 5 -


I shall therefore appreciate the Legation telegraphically requesting the Department for instructions relative to the attitude which this Consulate General should take towards the transmission of Mr. Sheeklen's statements to the Japanese Consulate General. Ultimately, I should also reply to the Japanese Consul General's communication of September 28th asking for a copy of the agreement and should like to be informed of the Department's wishes with respect to the form my reply should take.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers.
American Consul General.

Original and two copies to Legation.
Five copies to Department.

JCV:AAB
340/800.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 7, 1931.

~~M. M. H.:~~

~~R. S. M.:~~

The attached despatch from the Mukden Consul General dated October 12, 1931, gives further information in regard to the Chinese radio station at that place, the substance of which information has already been communicated to us by telegraph through the Legation.

The substance of this information is as follows:

One: On October 8, the representative of the Radio Corporation at Shanghai informed the Consulate General that the Chinese radio station in Mukden was indebted to that Corporation in the sum of approximately \$10,000 for engineering services and traffic balances, and that the Corporation, during the operation of the station in its service to San Francisco, had earned approximately \$300 per day prior to the suspension of service. The representative of the Radio Corporation further stated that the Corporation must look to the Japanese authorities for compensation for the damages incurred.

Two: The Consul General stated that in the absence


F. W. 793.94/2412

DEC 10 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

of instructions from the Department, which he requests,
he will take no action in regard to the letter from the
representative of the Radio Corporation.


FE:JEF:KC

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GREEN

Geneva

Dated October 31, 1931

Rec'd 9:10 a. m.


Secretary of State,

Washington,

URGENT.

270, October 31, 9 a. m.

CONFIDENTIAL.



Drummond has handed me a copy of a note from Briand as President of the Council to Yoshizawa, in reply to the Japanese declaration dated October 26 (Consulate's 283, October 28, 11 a. m.). I understand that Briand handed this to Yoshizawa on the evening of October 29. It is being circulated to the members of the Council. The text of the note is as follows:

"As President of the Council of the League of Nations, I have examined most carefully the Japanese Government's declaration dated October 26, which Your Excellency was good enough to communicate by telegram to me and to the other members of the Council through the Secretary General.

I feel I must submit to you certain observations on this communication.

793.94/2413

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

2- #270, from Geneva, Oct. 31, 9 a.m.

this communication.

Since the last meeting of the Council, when the draft resolution on which my colleagues had asked me to report secured the approval of all the members of the Council except the Japanese representative, the position in regard to the question submitted to us for consideration has become clear. It may be stated as follows:

Independently of the vote taken at the last Council meeting, which retains its full moral force, we still have before us, from the juridical standpoint, a valid resolution, namely, that which was unanimously adopted on September 30th, and which retains its full executory force.

In that resolution the Council noted the statement made by the Japanese representative that the Japanese Government will continue as rapidly as possible the withdrawal of its troops which has already been begun, into the railway zone in proportion as the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals is effectively assured and that it hopes to carry out this intention in full as speedily as may be. No indication whatever was given at

that time

REP

3- #270, from Geneva, Oct. 31, 9 a. m.

that time by the Japanese representative that matters such as an agreement as to the treaty rights of Japan in Manchuria were in any way connected with the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals.

It is further to be noted that in the two draft resolutions submitted to the Council on the 24th October the first three paragraphs are exactly the same, Your Excellency having withdrawn the amendment to Paragraph Three which you had submitted. It may therefore be assumed that these paragraphs express the will of the two parties. In their declaration of October 26th the Japanese Government further stated that, when it referred to certain fundamental principles it had in mind the following:

One. Mutual repudiation of aggressive policy and conduct - Paragraph Two of the two drafts submitted on October 24 states that the two countries 'are bound not to resort to any aggressive policy or action'.

Two. Respect for China's territorial integrity. Paragraph Three of the two drafts records an undertaking to that effect.

REP

4- #270, from Geneva, Oct. 31, 9 a.m.

to that effect.

Three. Complete suppression of all organized movements interfering with freedom of trade and stirring up international hatred. Paragraph Two of the two drafts declares that the two Governments are bound to take measures to suppress hostile agitation.

Four. Effective protection throughout Manchuria in order to allow Japanese nationals to engage there in any peaceful pursuits. Paragraph One of both drafts declares that the Chinese Government are pledged to the effective protection of Japanese subjects residing in Manchuria.

The fact that on the one hand the Chinese representative accepted the terms of the resolution which I proposed on behalf of my colleagues and that on the other hand the counter-draft of the Japanese representative contained the three paragraphs to which I have referred show that the two Governments are in complete agreement on these four points.

There remains only the last point: "Respect for treaty rights of Japan in Manchuria".

With regard to that point I would call Your Excellency's
attention

REP

5- #270, from Geneva, Oct. 31, 9 a. m

attention to the letter addressed to me by the Chinese representative on the 24th October in which Doctor Sze declares that China, like every member of the League of Nations, is bound by the Covenant to a "scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations". The Chinese Government for its part is determined loyally to fulfill all its obligations under the Covenant. It is prepared to give proofs of this intention by undertaking to settle all disputes with Japan as to treaty interpretation by arbitration or judicial settlement, as stated in Article 13 of the Covenant.

It therefore appears to me, and I feel sure that my colleagues on the Council, including, I trust, Your Excellency, will agree that the Chinese Government have given to the Council of the League, on which Japan has a permanent representative, pledges which cover the various fundamental principles raised by the Japanese Government.

In these circumstances I feel confident that the Japanese Government, being desirous of fulfilling the undertaking which it solemnly contracted under the terms of the

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REF

FROM

6- #270, from Geneva, Oct. 31, 9a.m.

of the resolution of September 30th and which, moreover it repeatedly confirmed by its declarations during the last session of the Council, at the meetings of October 22, 23 and 24, will continue as rapidly as possible the withdrawal of its troops into the railway zone and that it will thus be able to carry out that intention to the full in the shortest possible time.

In view of the extreme importance which your Government attaches to the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals in the territories evacuated by its troops, I venture to call Your Excellency's attention to Paragraph Five of the resolution submitted to the Council on October 24, which recommends the two Governments, 'to appoint immediately representatives to settle the details relating to the carrying out of the evacuation and to the taking over of the evacuated territories, in order that these operations may be carried out in a regular manner and without delay'".

It is requested that this note be regarded as confidential until Monday, November 2nd when it will be made public.

GILBERT

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REF

GREEN

FROM

PARIS

Dated October 31, 1931

Rec'd 11:40 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington,

699, October 31, 2 p. m.

793.94/2231-
Embassy's 672, October 20, 5 p. m.

LE MATIN publishes today an article by Lausanne on the conflict between China and Japan in which it quotes an alleged report to the Department from one of its representatives in Peiping to the effect that the zone occupied by the Japanese in Manchuria is the only Chinese province in which order exists and that the Chinese in that zone desire nothing so much as the Japanese occupation for only this occupation secures respect for their goods and persons.

The article further states that the Department holds that the Council of the League of Nations had been unjust in asking for the withdrawal of Japanese troops before the commencement of negotiations between China and Japan.

As this article has just appeared it is too early for French comment.

HOWELL

RR
GSB



793.94/2414

FILED
NOV 4 1931

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 31, 1931. *file*

NOV 10 1933

DIVISION OF

A despatch from the Embassy at Paris dated ^{793.94/2394} October 23, 1931, gives a report on the French reaction, as expressed in the press, regarding the Sino-Japanese conflict in Manchuria. The despatch reports that "the French are much more interested in the events taking place at Geneva than in the actual situation in Manchuria" for the reason that Manchuria is so remote and the League is very close and extremely important in French eyes.

The Conservative press criticised the League's action because of its "wishy-washy" attitude in dealing with the Manchurian situation and because it felt that the action of Japanese in opposing American participation in the League's deliberations was justified. A partial reason for this attitude on the part of the Conservative press was the opposition of the latter to M. Briand himself. The Conservative press also believed that "the Japanese have a perfect right to protect their interests and the lives of their citizens in a region like Manchuria."

The more Moderate and Left sections of the French press were more sympathetic with the action of the League in inviting the United States and in criticising the attitude of Japan.

The

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NOV 10 1933

- 2 -

The press of the Left "was even more sympathetic with the League's attempts to settle the Manchurian situation by inviting the collaboration of America, although maintaining a fairly consistent and impartial view as regards the Chinese and Japanese thesis."

A few days later, however, a perceptible change had occurred in the attitude of the Moderate section of the press and even in some of the papers of the extreme Left, due to a growing sentiment that the invitation to the League was issued a little too hastily and growing sympathy with the Japanese position in Manchuria.

RSM:EJL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94
THE UNDER SECRETARY
OCT 31 1931
DEPARTMENT OF STATE



RECEIVED

OCT 31 1931

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 31 1931
Department of State

OCT 31 1931
NOV 4 1931

793.94/2415

While the Council of the League of Nations has been unable to solve by conciliatory means the Manchurian difficulties, the proposed resolution which was unanimously adopted, with the only exception of the Japanese delegate, constitutes a compromise which the French Government hopes, may guide the next move on the part of the Japanese Government.

Such a result would remove many risks of aggravation of the present situation and, at the same time, strengthen the moral authority of the Council which the British Government, as well as the French Government should endeavor to preserve. This would be attained more safely if the Japanese Government were more strongly convinced of the solidarity of the powers.

The American observer was not in a position to state publicly the opinion of his Government. His silence might be interpreted by the Japanese as a disapproval of the Council's action. It would be most important if Mr. Stimson, who, since the beginning of the discussions, has repeatedly shown his sympathy for the work of Geneva, would let the Japanese Government know

that

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

that the Council's recommendations meet with the views of the American Government. Should such an approval be given publicly, the result would be greater.

The British Government has given instructions to its Ambassador in Washington to ask the Secretary of State to send instructions to Tokio for that purpose./.

Washington, October 29th, 1931.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JOHN C. SCHAFER
4TH DISTRICT WISCONSIN

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

MRS. JOHN C. SCHAFER
SECRETARY

3313 WEST KILBOURN AVENUE
MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN

Oct. 30th, 1931.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

793.94
The Honorable,
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Letter dated
to Mr. Schaffer
Nov. 7, 1931
EAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV. 23 1931
Department of State

My dear Mr. Secretary:-

I enclose letter dated October 27th, written by
Hon. Otto A. Kehrein, Member of the Wisconsin Assembly, and would appreciate
a report on the matter mentioned therein.

Cordially yours,

bss

John C. Schaffer

793.94/2416

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY:REK

WISCONSIN LEGISLATURE

ASSEMBLY CHAMBER

Madison

October 27, 1931.

Hon. John C. Schafer,
Washington, D. C.

I read an article in the Milwaukee Sunday Sentinel, where one can read between the lines and even on the lines, that our Government contemplates meddling with the affairs of Japan and China and the League of Nations.

Did we not, as a Nation, get enough by meddling with the nations across the pond in the World War? I think we have all we can do in attending to the business worries and responsibilities of the United States.

I request and urge you to use your influence to keep the United States Government from interference, meddling or assuming any responsibilities in connection with the Japan-China situation.

What the people in China may decide to do about killing each other is NOT OUR BUSINESS. To keep them from killing us is our business and our Nation should be prepared to do that.

I ask you to protest against any interference in the Asiatic mess and oppose any effort to make this Country in any way responsible, or in any way negotiator between the two countries.

Yours very truly,

OTTO A. KEHREIN

Assemblyman,
9th Dist., Milwaukee, Wis.

OAK:HH

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

November 10 1931.

In reply refer to
FE 793.94/2416

The Honorable

John C. Schafer,

House of Representatives.

Sir:

I have your letter of October 30, 1931, with which you transmitted a letter received by you from the Honorable Otto A. Kehrein, Member of the Wisconsin Assembly.

I have read with interest Assemblyman Kehrein's suggestions in regard to the attitude which he feels this Government should take in the present dispute between China and Japan, and I appreciate your courtesy in bringing his views to my attention. I may add that this Department's efforts are directed solely toward seeing that the dispute is adjusted by pacific means in accordance with the requirements of the treaties to which we are parties.

I have had made, for the Department's files, a copy of Assemblyman Kehrein's letter; the original is returned herewith.

Very truly yours,

E. L. STIMSON

A true copy of
the signed letter.

Enclosure:
From the Honorable
Otto A. Kehrein,
October 27, 1931.

PPH
FE:RPB:REK


RAM
FE
11/6/31

793.94/2416

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CHARLES D. MILLARD
25th DIST. NEW YORK

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D. C.
October 30, 1931



The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.


Sir:

I am enclosing for your consideration a letter
which I have received from Mr. Charles W. Weir, 3 Hall
Avenue, White Plains, New York, protesting against inter-
ference by the United States in matters in Asia.

Very truly yours,

CDM:F

Charles D. Millard



793.94/2417

FILED
NOV 11 1931

1 4 8 0
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY:REK

October 19, 1931.

Hon. Charles D. Millard,
Representative in Congress
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

I think you have all you can do attending to the business worries and responsibilities of the United States. I request and urge you to use your influence to keep the United States Government out of interference, meddling or responsibility in Asia.

What the people in Asia may do about killing each other is not our business.

To keep them from killing us is our business, and our nation should be prepared to do that.

I ask you to protest against any interference in this Asiatic mess and oppose any effort to make this country in any way responsible, or in any way a negotiator between the two countries.

Very truly yours,

CHARLES WEIR

Charles W. Weir
3 Hall Avenue
White Plains, New York.

1495

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

November 10 1931.

In reply refer to
793.94/2417

The Honorable

Charles D. Millard,

House of Representatives.

Sir:

I have your letter of October 30, 1931, with which you transmitted a letter received by you from Mr. Charles W. Weir, 3 Hall Avenue, White Plains, New York.

I have read with interest Mr. Weir's suggestions in regard to the attitude which he feels this Government should take in the present dispute between China and Japan, and I appreciate your courtesy in bringing his views to my attention. I may add that this Department's efforts are directed solely toward seeing that the dispute is adjusted by pacific means in accordance with the requirements of the treaties to which we are parties.

I have had made, for the Department's files a copy of Mr. Weir's letter; the original is returned herewith.

Very truly yours,


E. L. STIMSON

Enclosure:
From Mr. Charles W. Weir,
October 19, 1931.

FE:RPB:REK
11/6/31

FE

m.m.h.



793.94/2417

1491

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JHR

GRAY

FROM Peiping, via N. R.

Dated November 1, 1931

Rec'd 2.40 a.m.

793.94
with
893.516
893.51. Salt
Funds

Office of Economic Adviser
NOV 4 1931
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Secretary of State,
Washington

849, November 1, 9 a.m.

Following from American Consul General at Mukden:

"October 31, 1 p.m. Reliable information has been received that a Japanese armed guard last night removed dollars six hundred seventy thousand of salt administration funds from the Bank of China, Newchwang, to the Provincial Bank, Newchwang".

For the Minister

JHR

ENGERT

Division of
EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 2 1931
Department of State
file
EA
TT

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
mf

F
793.94/2418

1931 9 NOV

1 1492

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138 TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Department of State

Washington, *Ray*

November 16, 1931. *5 pm*

NOV 16 31

793.94

AMLEGATION

PEIPING (CHINA)

420 CONFIDENTIAL -- STAFF USE ONLY. *2418*

Your 849, November 1, 9 a. m. in regard to salt revenue funds at Newchwang.

543.51. Salt funds

The Department desires that the Consul General at Mukden make discreet inquiries and report by mail (1) on the alleged seizure of the accumulated salt revenue funds at Newchwang and at Changchun and (2) on the disposition of the present salt revenue collections in Manchuria.

Stinson
SKH

FE:JEF:EMU

m.w.H.
FE

STAT

NOV 16, 1931.

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19 _____ *AM*


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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1930 1-138

149

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED



REP

FROM

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

GENEVA

Dated November 1, 1931

Rec'd 10:35 a. m.

793.94
893.01

Secretary of State,
Washington.

271, November 1, 9 a. m.

The following are the essential points in a letter from Sze to Drummond dated October 30.

One. Chinese Government is gravely concerned over multiplying evidence that the Japanese are employing their illegal occupation of Manchuria to organize "independence" movements by destroying all civil authorities and substituting administrations subservient to Japanese orders.

Two. The most recent example of this policy which was telegraphed to Sze by Chinese Government on October 28 was as follows: Chao Tseh Min, magistrate at Huaitehsien, was induced by Japanese to visit Kingchuling on South Manchuria Railway. There a party of Japanese tried to force him to sign an undertaking and promise to declare independence and to organize a committee for the preservation of peace like that already established at Lishuhsien. Upon his refusal he was assaulted by the Japanese, a payment of 200,000

FILED
1361.9 NOV

REP

2- #271, from Geneva, Nov. 1, 9 a.m

of 200,000 yen was demanded and he was incarcerated in Japanese Club. In the Club were other Chinese who had passed through similar ordeals. The magistrate finally obtained his release on the pretext that he must consult public opinion in his city. The magistrate says he will continue to resist if further attempts are made.

Three. The foregoing was learned by the Chinese Government direct from a Chinese subordinate official who escaped. It is requested that it be kept strictly confidential particularly as to names and localities since the life of the magistrate will be placed in jeopardy should the source of the report be traced.

Four. This is only a typical example of what is taking place in Manchuria at present.

GILBERT

JHR

1494

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

CORRECTED COPY


FROM

PLAIN

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 1, 1931

Rec'd 6:04 a.m.



Secretary of State,

Washington.

853, November 1.

Reuter report from Washington thirty-first:

"United States would feel compelled under the Treaties guaranteeing China's integrity to disapprove of permanent Japanese occupation of Manchuria", was the view expressed by Mr. Castle, Undersecretary of State, in reply to a question today.

Mr. Castle emphasized that United States had not endorsed demand of League that Japanese evacuate the occupied territories in Manchuria by November sixteenth because Washington was not asked to express its views and United States Government considered that, not being a member of League, it should not make any public comment without being invited.

For the Minister

ENGERT

JHR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JHR

PLAIN
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
Peiping, via N. R.

Dated November 1, 1931

FROM Record
Div. of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 2 1931
Department of State

Secretary of State,
Washington

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cause Washington was not asked to express its views and
United States Government considered that, not being a
member of League, it should not make any public comment
without being invited.

For the Minister

ENGERT

JHR

See corrected copy

FILED

NOV 3 1931

F/iv 793.94/2420

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

McL

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

FROM Geneva

Dated November 2, 1931.

Received 6.30 A. M.

793.94
Secretary of State,
Washington.

272, November 2, 9 A. M.

Briand's note to Yoshizawa, transmitted in
Consulates 270, ¹²⁴¹³October 31, 9 A. M., (see final paragraph of telegram) will not be made public today.

At the request of Yoshizawa publicity will be withheld until Japanese have submitted a reply and simultaneous publicity can be given to the two notes.

GILBERT.

McL
WSB

For Japanese reply

See 793.94/2650

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 2 1931
Department of State
FE
WE
FE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
NOV - 2 1931
DIVISION OF
OPERATIONS AND RECORDS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
NOV 4 1931
DIVISION OF
WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS

F/5 793.94/2421

NOV 5 1931

F/5

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GRAY

Ankara

Dated November 1, 1931

Rec'd 11:10 a. m.

Secretary of State,



Washington.

11, November 1, noon.

On October 21 Turkish Government sent identical telegrams to Chinese and Japanese Governments calling attention with respect to the Manchurian situation to Article Two of the Pact for the Renunciation of War and expressing the hope that both Governments would ~~the~~ *abstain* from acts which might compromise the efforts now being made to settle by peaceful means the differences which have arisen between them.

JHR
(#) Apparent Omission.

GREW



FILED

NOV 5 1931

F/M 793.94/2422

793.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CJH

~~CORRECTED COPY~~
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
GRAY

RECEIVED
FROM
NOV - 3 1931
DIVISION OF

Peiping, via N. R.

Dated November 1, 1931

Rec'd. 4:20 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

850, November 1, 10 a.m.

Your 400, October 31, 3 p.m.

One. Legation's 845, October 31, 9 a.m., was repeated to the Minister who is now in Shanghai. The Legation's message to the Department concluded "Repeated to Shanghai and Commander in Chief" but would be clearer if it read "Repeated to the Minister and Commander in Chief".

Two. Legation has long been in the habit as a matter of routine of repeating to the Commander in Chief telegrams such as Tsingtau for his information on the assumption that he would take no action without consulting the Minister. In this instance it was also repeated to him at the specific request of Naval Attache to facilitate consultation with the Minister.

Three. Department's view expressed in paragraph one of its Number 402 has been communicated to the Minister and Tsinanfu.

FOR THE MINISTER
ENGERT



793.94/2423

793.94/2423

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JHR

GRAY

FROM Peiping, via N. R.

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Rec'd 4.20 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington

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For the Minister

ENGERT

JHR



F 793.94/2423

FILED

1931 NOV 4

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 3 1931
Department of State

REF
793.94

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
NOV - 3 1931
DIVISION OF

FROM

PLAIN

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 2, 1931

Rec'd 6 a. m.

F/DEW

793.94/2424

Secretary of State,
Washington.

858, November 2, 3 p. m.

Press announces appointment by the National Government
of the following as members of the Commission "for taking
over Manchuria".

Wellington Koo Chairman, Chang Tso Hsiang, Chang Chun,
Wu Tien^{Erh} Cheng, Tang ~~Ma~~ Ho, Liu Che, Lo Wen Kan.

For the Minister

ENGERT

HPD

FILED

NOV 3 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Luntz NARS, Date 12-12-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED





REP

FROM

PLAIN

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 2, 1931



Secretary of State,
Washington.

860, November 2, 5 p. m.

Reuter report from New York, November first:

"Conflicting reports regarding cooperation between China and Soviet Russia and regarding the massing of Soviet troops on Manchuria border near Manchuli have resulted in United States sending an observer to investigate conditions in north Manchuria".

For the Minister

ENGERT

FILED

NOV. 4 1931

HPD

F/DEW
793.94/2425

793.94
with
761.92

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Copy for the Department

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE

American Consulate, Dairen, Manchuria, October 9, 1931.

CONFIDENTIAL OCT 31 1931

American Consulate General,

OCT 13 1931


Edwin L. Neville, Esquire,

TOKYO, JAPAN.

Charge d'Affaires ad interim,

American Embassy,

Tokyo, Japan.



Sir:

Referring to my despatch of September 23, 1931, commenting on the Japanese occupation of Manchuria, I have the honor to inform the Embassy that Mr. Eguchi, Vice President of the South Manchuria Railway Company, told me in the course of a conversation a few days ago, that Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, head of the Northeastern Government, would never hold this office in Mukden again. The statement was made in such a positive manner that it is beyond doubt that Mr. Eguchi meant that Marshal Chang would never again be permitted to have his headquarters in Mukden.

It is scarcely necessary to explain that an official as highly placed as Mr. Eguchi usually speaks with authority on Manchurian affairs. In this instance it is believed that his statement is particularly to be depended upon, inasmuch as he had just returned from Mukden, where it was reported he had had long conferences with Lieutenant General Honjo, Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese forces in

Manchuria.

F/DEW

793.94/2426

no FE
10/31
RH

504

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Manchuria. In view also of the relentless campaign of the Japanese forces to exterminate the Northeastern Army, it seems obvious that, regardless of assurances and propaganda that there will be no interference in the internal administration of Manchuria, the Japanese Government is determined

- (1) To expel the "Mukden clan", or strong political group organized by Chang Tso-lin, from Manchuria;
- (2) To destroy the Northeastern Army and not permit the building up of a new Chinese army in its place.

As the rise in the near future of a political group as powerful and united and popular as the Mukden clan is improbable, even assuming that Japan would permit it, it is evident that South Manchuria for some time to come will be administered by local bodies and peace and order maintained by local police and gendarmerie. This state of affairs will undoubtedly result in the temporary cessation of railroad building, harbor construction and other major development enterprise hitherto carried on so vigorously by the Mukden clan, inasmuch as local Governments in Manchuria have neither the influence or initiative to execute large public projects nor the revenue with which to finance them. By destroying the Northeastern Government the Japanese thus eliminate their only important competitor and leave the field free for economic exploitation in their own interest.

- - - - -

As

- 3 -

As regards the Japanese charge that the Manchurian occupation is the result of an unwarranted and pre-meditated attack on their railway and railway guards by Chinese soldiers from the Peitaiying barracks in Mukden, a European business caller the other day informed me that he spent the late afternoon of September 18 at the barracks in connection with some business transaction. He left the barracks at six o'clock - the alleged attack occurred at 10:30 -, and the soldiers were slouching about as usual or preparing to cease work for the day on inter-barrack roads. Not a sign of excitement, military preparation, or unusual activity of any kind was evident.

- - - - -

The Japanese authorities of Dairen and the Leased Territory are concerned at the uneasiness felt by the local Chinese population. Regardless of their measures to reassure the Chinese and prevent political discussion among them, the Chinese, rich and poor alike, are leaving the Territory hurriedly and in large numbers. It is said that the rumor is spreading among them that Koreans are being transported here to be settled among them, and that the fear of violence at the hands of these imaginary Koreans is the cause of their flight. The better class of Chinese are leaving in anticipation of war between China and Japan. Chinese departing from Dairen are estimated to be in the neighborhood of five thousand daily.

Respectfully

150

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


- 4 -

Respectfully yours,

Wm. R. Langdon,
American Consul.

800
WRL:L

Copy to Department.
Copy to Legation, Peiping.
Copy to Consulate General, Tokyo.
Copy to Consulate General, Mukden.



No.

Re.

JM

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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O.N.I. AND ~~RECEIVED~~

CJH



FROM

GRAY

PEIPING via N. R.

Dated November 2, 1931

Rec'd. 2:25 a.m.



Secretary of State
Washington.

854, November 2, 8 a.m.

Referring to recent press reports regarding Sino
Soviet relations the following excerpt from Lukden's
despatch October 27th is of interest:

"There seems to be little doubt that Chang Hai
Peng has received assistance from the Japanese military
and is being used as their pawn in an attempt to
establish Japanese influence in Heilungkiang. Reports
are not lacking that the Soviet military at Manchuli
are assisting General Ma Chan Shan of Heilungkiang
with arms and ammunition to resist this invasion".

For the Minister

ENGERT

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NOV 9 1931


F/DEW 793.94/2427

793.94
not
761.93

1508
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CJH




GRAY

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

PEIPING via N. R. *Smf*

Dated November 2, 1931

Rec'd. 4:05 a.m.



Secretary of State,
Washington.

PRIORITY 855, November 2, 11 a.m.

Military Attache ^{proposes} to send Captain Tenney, Assistant
Military Attache, to Harbin to report on conditions and
to establish contacts re Soviet activities along the
Chinese Eastern Railway. Legation sees no objection
provided he returns before November 16th so as to avoid
impression that his presence is in anyway related to the
question referred to in the Legation's 830, October 29,
3 p.m.

Repeated to Shanghai.

For the Minister,
ENGERT

HPD

F/DEW

793.94/2428

FILED


1931 9 NOV

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM



GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 2, 1931

Rec'd 6 a. m.



F/DEW

793.94/2429

Secretary of State,

Washington.

859, November 2, 4 p. m.

Legation's 830, ¹³⁷⁴October 29, 3 p. m.; and 858, ²⁴²⁴November 2, 3 p. m.

Wellington Koo, who returned here with the Marshal
October 31st, requests me to suggest that should the American
Government contemplate action similar to that taken by the
British it would be extremely helpful to the Commission
of which he has just been made chairman, if such decision
could be announced at the earliest date possible. He
feels it would lend moral support to the Commission when
it was most needed.

Repeated to Shanghai.

For the Minister

ENGERT

WSB

FILED
NOV 7 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gutzman NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated November 2, 1931

Rec'd 9:13 a. m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
NOV - 2 1931
DIVISION OF

Secretary of State,
Washington.

November 2, noon
My October 26, 7 p. m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 2 1931
Department of State

FROM NANKING. I received on the eve of my departure from Nanking a written request from the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, dated October 28th, asking the "American Government to designate representatives with whom the Chinese authorities will be pleased to associate in accordance with the terms of the resolution of October 24th of the Council of the League of Nations". The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs asks me to communicate to him as soon as possible the names of the representatives to be appointed by the United States. I communicated Department's attitude as set forth in the last sentence of Department's 103, October 27, 5 p. m., to Nanking, orally to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Repeated to Peiping.

JOHNSON

JHR
WSB

F/DEW

793.94/2430

FILED

NOV 6 1931

15
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CJH

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

NANKING

Dated November 2, 1931

Rec'd. 9:40 a.m.

RECEIVED
NOV 2 1931
DIVISION OF
RECORDS

Secretary of State,
Washington.

92, November 2, 7 p.m.

The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on November 1 announced to the press that the National Government had appointed a Commission of 7 members with Wellington Koo as Chairman to conduct negotiations necessary in connection with the reoccupation of territory in Manchuria handed back by the Japanese. The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me November 2, 5 p.m., that this action was taken in fulfillment of China's obligations under the resolution of the League Council passed October 24. He expressed anxiety to know whether the American Government intended to appoint observers.

Repeated to the American Minister.

PECK

WWC

HFD



F/DEW 793.94/2431

FILE

793.94
with
793.94118

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM RECD

NO. 5260



AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

HARBIN CHINA,


October 8, 1931

Division of

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

NOV 2 1931

Department of State



SUBJECT: CHANGCHUN-KIRIN TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE SYSTEMS.

THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

SIR:

1/ I have the honor to enclose herewith, for the information of the Department, a copy of my despatch No. 2276, of even date, with one sub-enclosure, sent to the Legation on the subject of regulations adopted by the Japanese military authorities to govern the restoration of the telegraph and telephone systems of Changchun and Kirin.

Respectfully yours,

(In the Absence of the Consul General)

Paul M. Dutko
Paul M. Dutko
American Vice Consul.

NOV 18 1931

FILED

1 enclosure as above indicated, with sub-enclosure.

800
TH/th

793.94/2432

F/DEW

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Slutzky NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 2276

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

HANKIN CHINA, October 8, 1931.

SUBJECT: REGULATIONS ADOPTED BY THE JAPANESE
MILITARY AUTHORITIES TO GOVERN THE
RESTORATION OF THE TELEGRAPH AND
TELEPHONE SYSTEMS OF CHANGCHUN AND KIRIN.

The Honorable

Nelson Tinsler Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping, China.

Sir:

1/ I have the honor to transmit herewith copy, in translation,
of REGULATIONS ADOPTED BY THE JAPANESE MILITARY AUTHORITIES
TO GOVERN THE RESTORATION OF THE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE SYSTEMS
OF CHANGCHUN AND KIRIN, which Consul General Hansen sent to this
office along with a copy in the Chinese from Kuanhongtan, with
an instruction that copies thereof be mailed to the Legation and
to the Department. Mr. Hansen suggested that the Legation
might find it desirable to lodge a protest with the Japanese
against this interference with normal telegraph and telephone
communication.

I sent a copy to-day of these REGULATIONS to the British
Consul General, who is Dean of the Consular Body, suggesting the
advisability of making a protest through the Japanese Consul
General, but have not yet heard from him. Although a local
Russian daily to-day reported a resumption of telegraphic

-communication-

- 2 -

communication, I have ascertained from the Telegraph Administration that this is untrue and that the line connecting Harbin with Kirm is open and in order, but a message, whether open or in code, when despatched thereto is held up by the Japanese military who do not permit its delivery. For the time being, the Consulate General is able to transmit its messages to the Legation and to the Department only by radio. The local Radio station returned a telegram last night which this office wished sent to the Embassy at Tokyo and which contained the same message as this Consulate's General telegram dated October 7, 8:00 p.m., to the Legation. Telegraphic communication with Europe via the Soviet Union has not been interrupted.

Respectfully yours,

(In the Absence of the Consul General)


Paul M. Dutko
American Vice Consul.

SOO
PMD/th

Enclosure:

Regulations Adopted by the Japanese Military Authorities to Govern the Restoration of the Telegraph and Telephone Systems of Changshun and Kirm, in translation.

2 copies to the Legation;
3 copies to the Department of State;
1 copy to the Consulate General at Harbin.



1515

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Translation

REGULATIONS ADOPTED BY THE JAPANESE MILITARY AUTHORITIES
TO GOVERN THE RESTORATION OF THE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE
SYSTEMS OF CHANGCHUN AND KIRIN.

GENERAL

1. These regulations are adopted to govern the restoration of the telegraph and telephone systems put out of working order by the recent incident.
2. Hereafter all telephone and telegraph communication in and with Changchun and Kirin shall be conducted in accordance with these regulations.
3. The special lines now reserved for military use shall not be utilized to transmit ordinary messages.
4. The use of the Chinese radio system shall continue to be prohibited.

TELEGRAPH

5. Incoming and outgoing telegrams shall be censored by the Japanese garrison commander or by anyone designated by him.
6. Censors will be stationed at the Chinese telegraph offices by the Japanese garrison commander, and these censors shall assist the telegraph personnel at Changchun now under the control of the Kwantung Government.
7. The receiving and sending of all code messages shall be prohibited.

TELEPHONE

8. Telephone communication will be allowed on the following conditions:
 - a/ From Changchun and Kirin to the other cities, conversations will be allowed in the telephone offices, and only in the Japanese language. However, the Chinese language may be allowed in the Bureau of Public Safety provided the conversation should be held in the presence of a supervisor.
 - b/ Telephone communication in the city will be allowed when the system for such communication is restored.

These regulations will be put into force on October 1st.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PM RECD

NO. 5261

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

HARBIN

CHINA,

October 31 1931.

Division of

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 2 1931

Department of State

OCT 31 31

SUBJECT: CHANGCHUN-KIRIN TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE SYSTEMS.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

SIR:

- 1/ I have the honor to enclose herewith, for the information of the Department, a copy of my despatch No. 2277, of even date, sent to the Legation on the subject of regulations adopted by the Japanese military authorities to govern the restoration of the telegraph and telephone systems of Changchun and Kirin.

Respectfully yours,

(In the Absence of the Consul General)

Paul M. Dutko
American Vice Consul.

1 enclosure as above indicated.

800
TH/th

F/DEW

793.94/2433

FILED

NOV 18 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

This telegram must
be closely paraphrased
before being communicated
to anyone.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

FROM

GENEVA

Dated November 2, 1931

Rec'd 11:35 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

273, November 2, 3 p.m.

The following is the substance of communication

recently received by Drummond from the source mentioned in
Consulate's 158, October 7, 9 a. m. /2015

One: The Chinese stated on October 27 that thoroughly
reliable troops would be sent from within the Great Wall
for occupation of evacuated districts; this would necessitate
a movement of troops in considerable numbers toward Chinchow
and it was thus very important that bombardment or other
incidents be prevented. It was felt to be essential that
these troops be accompanied by neutral observers.

To this Drummond telegraphed a reply in the following
sense: Remember that Council resolution October 24. has
no binding force as unanimity was not reached. The resolu-
tion of September 30 is alone valid. The Chinese Government
should therefore exercise great prudence for the present and
take all measures to avoid possibilities of an armed clash.

GILBERT

WSB

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793.94/2434

1931 NOV 9

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 033.5111 Laval, Pierre/191 FOR Despatch #1981

FROM France (Howell, Jr.) DATED Oct. 23, 1931.
TO NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Disarmament and the Sino-Japanese conflict. Summaries
of press comment during the period October 16th to
22nd inclusive, relating to Premier Laval's visit
to the United States,---.

793.94/2435

Jw

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND NOT FOR PUBLICATION



Dairen, Sept. 29, 1931 --- I left Mukden yesterday afternoon, as the situation seemed to be crystalizing rapidly so that no outstanding events of importance seemed likely to occur, the situation having evidently reached the stage of reconstruction. The position of the Japanese is now regarded as follows:

The original situation was initiated by an attack by the Chinese who invaded the S.M.R. railway zone and damaged the tracks. They were ejected by a small Japanese force which, when some reinforcements came, engaged Chinese soldiers who were firing at them from the kaoliang and pursued them into Chinese territory, meeting their challenge and ejecting them from their barracks. In order to prevent reprisals, other Chinese military points near Mukden were occupied, as was the Chinese area lying between them and the Japanese Settlement. This was the first phase of the situation. The second phase was the rendering innocuous of the Manchurian army within the area in which Japan has interests at Changchun and south thereof. As emphasized by General Honjo's proclamation the action was simply one between the Japanese army and that of the Manchurians, the former having been for some time past continuously exposed to hostile actions at various points, and of varied character, by the Chinese, who had been inflamed by anti-Japanese propaganda which was fostered by the Manchurian government.

The Manchurian army, having been scattered, partly with resistance, but mainly through voluntary withdrawal, the next phase was the establishment of protection for Japanese in the principal cities where Japanese settlers are numerous. This resulted in the sending of troops to Kirin and Tunghua, the latter being a point where communists and bandits have always been regarded as particularly dangerous. Troops are also being maintained at the time of writing at Chenchiatun, a point on the railway between Seupingka and Taonan, where there is a large Japanese community. Troop trains were also sent to Tungliao (Paiyantal) and Taonan, but they left immediately, taking with them the Japanese residents. At Taonan the Chinese requested this action, as the Chinese "reconstruction army" in this neighborhood has a very bad reputation. It has been definitely decided that troops will not be sent to Harbin, in spite of the bombing cases against Japanese which have taken place there. If necessity demands, the Japanese community, between 3500 and 4000, will be evacuated to Changchun. A Japanese military body has been established at Hsinmintun, a short distance west of Mukden on the Peking-Mukden line. Foreign military observers speak highly of the precision with which the Japanese carried out their movements, but state that, as a matter of course, all armies plan in advance in great detail such movements which

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793.94/2436

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- 2 -

there seems to be any likelihood that action may be called for, and in this case everyone in Manchuria was aware of the fact that trouble might occur as the result of the constant anti-Japanese propaganda and overt actions. Foreign military observers on the ground tell me that such action as the occupation of Hsinmintun as an advance post is correct military tactics.

The efforts of the Japanese are now directed towards withdrawing their troops, as soon as circumstances will allow, to within their own area, and it will be seen from the above that few points outside thereof are still being occupied. Numerous requests have been received from Japanese and, especially Koreans, scattered throughout Manchuria, for protection, but the petitioners have been informed that they must either come into safety zones or look after themselves, as the presence of the military cannot be extended. The total of the Japanese military in Manchuria is still below the number allowed by treaty.

A difficult situation has arisen owing to the fact that the Chinese armed forces which formerly gave some measure of protection, are now not functioning, which has given rise to increased activities on the part of the ever-present bandits, while a number of Chinese scattered soldiers have also taken to banditry. It may be mentioned that during the past few years, especially since the economic situation became bad, banditry had increased even before the present situation arose. As a consequence safety in the area in question exists practically only where Japanese troops are present. When these are withdrawn, as is being demanded by Chinese and foreign nations alike, an unfortunate situation may arise owing to lack of armed protection until such time when the Chinese armed forces may again begin to function. The Japanese troops are, however, being withdrawn as rapidly as possible, as requested, and the responsibility for protection must therefore rest with the Chinese.

The wreck of the Peking-Mukden train a few days ago, involving the death of one British national and the wounding of another, is illustrative. In this case the British traffic superintendent claims that the culprits were ordinary bandits, but newspaper correspondents who have interviewed the foreign passengers who returned to Mukden, tell me that these passengers say that at least many of the marauders wore Chinese military uniforms.

In every case, with the exception of Mukden, the Japanese have left civil administration in Chinese hands, in some cases, where regular Chinese officials are absent, by commissions of prominent Chinese. In Mukden a temporary commission of Chinese and Japanese was established for providing peace and order and general administration. This is to be relieved immediately by a purely Chinese commission of nine, which has already been formed. A couple of thousand Chinese policemen have been organized to act under this body. The situation will then stand as follows: The entire administration of Manchuria will remain in Chinese hands, with the exception that Japanese military, functioning in a purely military way,

- 2 -

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- 3 -

are remaining for the time being at such points as Hsinmintun, Kirin, Tunghua, Chenchiatun and Mukden, while by far the larger part of the Japanese armed forces remain in Japanese territory.

The declaration of General Honjo shows that the action of the Japanese troops was directed merely against the Manchurian military because of the direct attack following various hostile actions in the immediate past, while the declaration of the Japanese Cabinet shows that Japan has no intention whatever to enlarge the rights and privileges which she already holds by treaties and agreements. The situation has therefore practically passed out of the temporary military stage and has reached the diplomatic phase, it being Japan's hope that the very numerous outstanding questions which have been allowed to accumulate owing to Chinese procrastination and evasion, may be settled, in which case a firm foundation will be laid, which should have the effect of eliminating the causes of friction which have existed in the past, and thus stabilize the Manchurian situation.

The present complaint on the part of the foreign community seems not to be occasioned mainly by the failure on the part of the banks to function, which, of course, hinders normal business. The Japanese military immediately seized all the Chinese banks in order to prevent unauthorized persons from getting access to the funds contained therein. As a consequence the foreign banks closed also on the basis that they could get no exchange quotations on the local currency. The Japanese allowed the Bank of China and the Bank of Communications to open on Saturday, September 2, but as this was a Chinese holiday they elected to open on the following Monday, when the foreign banks also opened. It is being complained, however, that the principal deposits of silver which furnish such backing as exists for the local Chinese paper currency, are held in the Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces and the Frontier Bank. These were still closed when I left Mukden, as the military were engaged in examinations to ascertain which of these funds were government funds. They will be opened as soon as possible. It may be added that the Japanese, having large business interests, suffer quite as much as the foreign merchants or even more.

Efforts are being made to provide food for the poor Chinese and for the workers in the Arsenal and other government institutions which are now not functioning. This is being provided partly through Japanese and largely through Chinese sources, but the Japanese efforts are being somewhat hampered, owing to the suspicion of the Chinese who believe that the Japanese may pursue the ruthless tactics often employed by Chinese militarists. For instance, an American employed by the Arsenal told me that when the Japanese had offered to provide food for the arsenal workers, he could not persuade them to come to the place where food was being distributed, as they feared that the Japanese might be employing a ruse in order to get them together when they might be easily mowed down by machine guns, or that they might have poisoned the food supplies. Fortunately, however, the Chinese panic seems to be rapidly disappearing. The British traffic superintendent of the P-M line told me, for instance,

- 4 -

that on last Saturday the movement of refugees, who up till then had crowded the trains, even sitting on the roofs and on the couplings, was ceasing. Up till then his persuasions that no danger existed to civilians had been disregarded. The main body of the Chinese troops appears to have moved towards Shanhaikwan, while another group has gone in the direction of the mountainous region near Hailungcheng. A number of incidents have been reported where scattered groups of Chinese soldiers have fired on Japanese reconnoitring airplanes and that such have answered with machine guns, and where attacks have been made by small bodies of Chinese soldiers, but I have not been able to get the details of these reported incidents, as they occurred, according to report, far from the main bases. They are, however, in any case, minor incidents.

Henry W. Kinney

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustofson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PRESS RELEASE
Morning and Evening Papers
Friday, November 6, 1931.

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION
18 East 41st Street
New York, N. Y.

NOV 2 1931
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
Department of State

793.94
DEFENDS LEAGUE ACTION IN MANCHURIAN CRISIS
Foreign Policy Chairman Hails Council Intervention as First Attempt to Deal with a
Major Dispute by International Action

Declaring that "short of a futile gesture or unenforceable threats," the Council of the League of Nations, in the Manchurian crisis, "did all that reasonably could have been expected from it," Mr. James G. McDonald, Chairman of the Foreign Policy Association, last night defended the action of the League, though admitting that there may be some basis for criticism of its efforts as "weak and inadequate." Mr. McDonald's defense of the League was made in the course of a radio address over WEAJ and stations associated with the National Broadcasting Company. The address, entitled "The Manchurian Menace," was the 129th in "The World Today" series.

Mr. McDonald said in part: "Those who complain because the Council was not more strikingly effective ignore the enormous difficulties of the task. The situation in Manchuria is of the utmost complexity and involves the vital interests of ^{three} great countries. Moreover, the Council, thousands of miles from the scene, could not be certain of all the facts and in any case was not in a condition to impose its will. In Japan the military authorities, who are largely independent of the civil government, and who had initiated the aggressive action in Manchuria, made it impossible for the Japanese Cabinet to yield. Moreover, some of the strongest members of the League, notably Germany and Great Britain, were intensely absorbed with domestic crises. More disadvantageous still, from the League point of view, neither Soviet Russia nor the United States was a member. And perhaps the greatest difficulty of all was the novelty of the method of conciliation which the League undertook to use. Of course, small states, like Greece and Bulgaria, had frequently been called before the Council, but never before in the history of the League had a great power like Japan been asked to defend itself in public on an issue which it regarded as so vital. It

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

requires little imagination to see how difficult it would have been for any government to have yielded under similar circumstances. Snort of a futile gesture or unenforceable threats, the League did all that reasonably could have been expected from it."

Summarizing the issues and interests in dispute, Mr. McDonald said: "Manchuria affords what Japan most needs: limitless supplies of food for the people and raw materials for the factories and a constantly increasing market for Japanese goods. Furthermore, Japan exercises almost complete control over a part of this area by treaty right. In Manchuria its greatest single interest is the South Manchuria railroad, a thoroughly modern system operating nearly 700 miles of lines. Finally, it is estimated that Japanese investments in the whole of Manchuria amount to more than one billion dollars - a huge investment for a country so small and poor as Japan.

"On the other hand, China's interests are also regarded as vital. To the Chinese the issue is: 'Shall Manchuria, a part of our homeland, be Chinese or Japanese?' They are convinced that Japan plans to absorb at least a part of that territory. This they are determined to prevent. They contend, too, that Japan's position is illegal. They argue that the treaties of 1915, following the famous Twenty-One Demands of that year, are illegal and are not binding on the Chinese people."


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



ADDRESS
YOUR MAIL
TO
STREET AND
NUMBER



The Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D. C.



OCT 30 31

1 527

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gutzman NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Department of State

Collect
Charge Department

Charge to
\$

793-94/A
AMERICAN CONSUL,

GENEVA (Switzerland). OCT 31 31

Washington, 31
October 20, 1931.
48

124
Referring to that part of paragraph (b) of the resolution voted upon by the Council on October 24 which relates to association with the Chinese authorities of representatives of other powers,

One. The Chinese Government has asked this Government to name representatives who will be prepared to function in the capacity indicated. We have replied that we feel that any action taken in that connection should be in the first instance by the Council or Governments members of the League and that we prefer to refrain from commitment until we are informed specifically in regard to action taken by League members.

Two. The American Legation, Peiping, informs us that the British Minister states that he has been authorized by his Foreign Office to advise the Chinese Government that he is holding members of his staff in readiness to proceed to Manchuria on or about November 16 as observers in case their services are required in connection with a Japanese withdrawal, this being in response to a request from the Chinese Government.

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____, _____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1916 1-138

793.94/2437A

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lutefson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

1-128

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

- 2 -

Government.

Three. Department desires information concerning action taken by British and French and any other Governments members of the League in this connection. Please keep Department promptly informed by telegraph in relation thereto.

*Canth
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sum
Oct. 31, 1931

FE: SKH: REK

m.m.d. Rem
FE
Staf

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-128

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94
THE UNDER SECRETARY
OCT 29 1931
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 29 1931
Department of State

file
7/E
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OCT 31 1931
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Received October 2, 1931.

JAPAN ADVERTISER, Tokyo, September 27

Thousands of cabled words have gone forth between Japan and China during the past week reporting from one country to another the developments and reactions of the clash between the forces of the two countries in Manchuria. Upon such messages is moulded public opinion which in times of crisis as such as this is an all important factor.

With the arrival of newspaper clippings from China, it has come to light that dispatches sent from Japan to China have been distorted and have appeared in China in very different form from that in which they were sent out. For instance the clipping of a dispatch sent out by Reuter's correspondent in Tokyo, sent to the Foreign Office here by the Japanese Consul General in Shanghai, places the blame for starting the clash upon the "Japanese" forces whereas the correspondent here had cabled that the clash had been precipitated, in the opinion of officials here, by the "Chinese".

A comparison of the dispatch as printed in Shanghai and of the original message as sent out by Captain M. D. Kennedy, Reuter's correspondent in Tokyo, shows how this dispatch was changed to convey an exactly opposite meaning. Following is an excerpt of the telegram sent by Captain Kennedy:

"Regarding Chinese action destroying line which precipitated whole affair spokesman intimated official circles inclined belief was merely act bravado on part hot-headed juniors who were angered at what they considered weak-kneed policy their superiors in agreeing punish those responsible murder Nakamura."

And this is how this dispatch appeared in the Shanghai Times and other newspapers throughout China.

"Tokyo, September 20. Official circles now seem inclined to the belief that the action taken by Japanese troops was merely bravado on the part of hot-headed junior officers who were angered at what they considered the weak-kneed policy of their superiors over the alleged murder of Captain Nakamura."

While it is not possible off hand to determine exactly the circumstances which led to this twisting of the meaning, until the matter has been investigated in Shanghai, it is perhaps sufficient to point out that the telegraph in Shanghai is in control of the news.

F/DEW

793.94/2438

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OCT 31 1931

- 2 -


There has been a censorship on all news dispatches in China for some months past so that it has been necessary for a number of the foreign correspondents in China to mail their dispatches to correspondents of their newspapers in Japan to have them cabled from here. Censorship however usually means deletion of material considered detrimental and not substitution or deliberate falsification of dispatches.

Henry W. Kinney

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JS



FROM PL-IN

PEIPING

Dated November 3, 1931

Rec'd 2:30 a.m.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

861, November 3, 8 a.m.


PEIPING LEADER today published following from
Hanking, second:

"Speaking at weekly Sun Yat Sen
memorial service here this morning Mr. Tai Chi Tao,
President of examination Yuan, reported on the three
main points of policy decided upon at special Foreign
Affairs Commission towards Japan. They are one, to
preserve China's territorial sovereignty, two, to
maintain peace in Far East by conforming to resolution
of League Nations and, three, to uphold open door
policy and principle of equal opportunity for all."

For the Minister

ENGLETT

JS



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1931 NOV 21 AM

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R.Tsingtao/42 FOR Despatch #668

FROM Tsingtao (Dorsey) DATED Sept.30,1931.
~~TO~~ NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: The Mukden Affair : Japanese occupation of Mukden.
Gives full report on --.
(Copy attached)

fpb

793.94/2440

793.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

The Mukden Affair.

793.94

The first reports of the sensational happenings at Mukden reached Tsingtao during the afternoon of September 19th. They came as a complete surprise and produced a sensation of consternation generally. Following so closely upon the Korean incidents, that had aroused local feeling against Japan, there was fear of activities that might result in anti-Japanese demonstrations with embarrassing consequences.

The Japanese Consular authorities lost no time in warning the Municipal Authorities that they were expected to maintain order and to restrain Chinese nationals from acts that might menace or endanger local Japanese lives or interests. It was also intimated that so long as the Chinese authorities succeeded in keeping the situation in hand matters would be left entirely to their control, but that should need arise, the Japanese authorities would take all necessary steps for adequate protection.

At the same time the Japanese Authorities issued instructions to Japanese nationals to refrain from all action.....

- 3 -

action that might irritate the Chinese and steps were taken to control all private Japanese volunteer corps in the port.

The Chinese authorities have taken similar precautions towards their nationals and the forces of law and order at their disposal have been on the alert and active in the encouragement of calm outlook and vigilant in the enforcing of measures designed to prevent outward demonstration. For fuller details upon the subject refer Consulate's despatch to Legation No. 487 (Department No. 6539) of September 26, 1931.

The results of the efforts described has been that outwardly all has remained quiet and no untoward incident has arisen to afford an excuse for Japanese forces to come on shore.

Due to seemingly unfounded reports as to Japan's intention to land troops, there was considerable nervousness for a few days among Chinese residents, particularly among officials and merchants, but as days succeeded day with no force appearing, the tension passed and calm has been restored.

There is evidently a sincere desire on the part of both Japanese and Chinese authorities to prevent episodes that might prove embarrassing and the latter feel confident that this can be accomplished.

The student body which is comparatively small, following the activities of their colleagues in Shanghai, Hanking, Peiping and elsewhere, had planned agitation along similar lines here, but the educational and police authorities interferred. As the head of the Bureau of Education.....

- 4 -

Education expressed it they have been shown the extreme inadvisability of such action and have been convinced that its one result would be opportunity for Japanese interference. It is possible that they may be permitted to forward telegrams to other student bodies. This to satisfy the desire for outward show of patriotism, the absence of which they fear would lay them open to censure by their brethren elsewhere who by some means had registered their disapproval of the aggression against their country and had lent their voices in urging action in the matter.

The idea of war against Japan finds little favor here. The futility of such a course is generally admitted, and there is belief that military activity on the part of China as matters now stand would only serve to alienate the friendly attitude of the foreign powers that up to the present have sought to influence both sides away from the military attitude.

The identic American note to China and Japan has caused satisfaction locally and notwithstanding its unbiased expressions is regarded as friendly toward China and as an indication that America will continue to exert itself in China's behalf. The following episode illustrates the belief in America's protective attitude. The great fear here was the coming of Japanese troops. Rumor had it that a number of Japanese warships and transports had arrived outside to land forces and occupy Shantung. In the thick of these rumors, the local official organ of the Kuomintang declared under
bold.....

1534

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

beld headlines that the American Consul had warned the Japanese Consul not to land troops. As there was no foundation for the report, the authorities were requested to deny the statement through the same columns which was done. It is now learned from an official source that in spite of this denial local opinion remains convinced that nothing but the friendly action of the American Consul prevented the occupation of Tsingtao as part of Japan's concerted scheme to solidify its interests in North China. The episode is recorded merely to illustrate the general confidence of local Chinese in America's friendship for China and the belief that in some way through America's influence Japanese Aggression in China will be restrained.

Local opinion seems now to incline to the belief that, unless China herself insists upon military arbitrament, the incident brought about by precipitate Japanese military movement has passed to the realm of diplomacy where Japan will sit firm until not only the present incident is resolved but until the accumulation of sundry alleged aggressions against Japanese rights in China have been satisfactorily dealt with.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ALL AGREEMENTS CONTINGENT UPON STRIKES, ACCIDENTS OR OTHER CAUSES OF DELAY BEYOND OUR CONTROL

PRICES SUBJECT TO CHANGE WITHOUT NOTICE

Dant & Russell, Inc.

Pacific Coast Lumber and Shingles

TELEGRAPHIC ADDRESS
"DANTRUS"
PORTLAND, OREGON
ALL CODES

RECEIVED
OCT 28 1931
DIVISION OF
10/21/31

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 3 1931
Department of State

To the President of the United States,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

My dear Mr. President:--

In the present situation between Japan and China, it is a well knownfact to those interested in trade between the United States and those countries, that a boycott system has been built up in China during the past two years to exclude Japanese goods. This boycott, fostered under thinly veiled Chinese Governmental direction, has developed into an effective economic war. Grave losses to Japanese manufacturing interests serving China trade have been suffered. Very little difference exists between such an economic war and effective war.

Consideration must be given to the patience shown by Japan under trying circumstances in its relations with China. Every effort to adjust matters on a diplomatic basis having failed, public opinion in Japan called for the forceful measures lately adopted to protect her interests. Interference by America will only crystallize Japanese public feeling against us. Europe would benefit by this. Japan's position should be given the utmost consideration. Sympathy amongst those not acquainted with Oriental problems may be inclined to support China as the weaker country struggling to achieve Republican ideals, but common sense must outweigh sympathy. The fact is, China plays on our sympathy to gain support diplomatically, while utterly failing to play square with established trade interests in her country, be they American, British, Japanese, Russian, or any other nationality.

America has only a small trade interest in China as compared with a large and growing trade in Japan. China protests friendship for America but her valuable business is not placed with us. Japan proves her goodwill towards us by supporting American trade in her country. She is our best customer in the Orient. We desire to retain that goodwill.

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FOR CONSIDERATION

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NOV 4 1931

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793.94/2441

Page 2..... To the President of the United States 10/21/31

On behalf of American business interests in general, and the lumber interests of the Northwest in particular, I submit that the action taken by our State Department in Washington in authorizing our representative at Geneva to sit on the Council of the League of Nations calls for grave consideration. Is it to our interests to join in putting Japan on trial because she has, under duress, taken steps to protect her interests in China and Manchuria by military police methods when diplomatic means had failed? It should be regarded as a domestic affair between Japan and China. America should stay out of it. We have our own problems at home to attend to and can well allow Japan and China to adjust their own difficulties.


Our entry into the situation on the Committee of the League of Nations may so exasperate Japanese public opinion that it might result in actual war conditions against China, being brought about as an expression of defiance of foreign interference. Let us wait until Japan and China jointly ask us to mediate in a mutually friendly spirit of goodwill, should a deadlock arise as between the viewpoints of the Oriental and that of the Occidental as represented through the League.

I am,

Yours very truly,

L. E. Danks

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 29, 1931.

RECEIVED

OCT 29 1931

MANCHURIA SITUATION:
Japan's "Fifth Point".

OCT 29 1931

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

F/DEW

793.94/2442

1. Japan's fifth point as originally given to the
Secretary of State by the Japanese Ambassador on
October 14 read as follows:

"5. Arrangements to be reached between Japan
and China for the prevention of ruinous railway
competition and for the carrying into effect of
existing railway agreements."

2. This point as first given by the Japanese representa-
tive at Geneva to M. Briand previous to October 24 appears
to have been in substance as follows:

"5. Conclusion by the two Governments of the
necessary agreements between the Japanese and
Chinese administrations in order to put an end to
ruinous competition and permit the carrying out of
the Sino-Japanese treaty regarding the railroads
in Manchuria."

3. This point as given by the Japanese Government in
the memorandum which that government circulated on
October 26 read as follows:

"Respect for treaty rights of Japan in
Manchuria."

Comment: In some ways the new wording ("3" above) is
more broad and less precise than the earlier forms. The
principal point at issue is: What are the "treaty rights of
Japan in Manchuria"?

SKH:EJL

SKH

*The Japanese Ambassador
asked for a change in
word because he thought it
was too broad & less precise
than the earlier forms.
WJG*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

October 27, 1931.

THE UNDER SECRETARY

OCT 27 1931

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Digest of
Newspaper Items

NEW YORK TIMES

Tokyo despatch, October 26 (Hugh Byas), gives the official English text of Japan's statement of policy regarding the dispute in Manchuria. The text is quoted at length on Page 2 (attached). After restating the reasons for the occupation of areas outside the railway zone, it is held that "the presence of such a limited number of troops is quite incapable of being-----a means of dictating to China Japan's terms for settlement----. Nothing is further from the thoughts of Japan than to bring armed pressure on China in----the negotiations".

The Japanese Government will "suffer no abridgement or diminution of the rights and interests of Japan---vital to her national existence".

"The safety of Japanese subjects can hardly be insured without provision being made to remove the national antipathies and suspicions existing in the----relations of the powers". The Japanese Government is therefore prepared to negotiate with China on "certain basic principles that should regulate the normal interrelationship between the two countries", as set forth in the note of October 9 to the Chinese Minister in Tokyo and communicated to the League Council.

The five "basic principles" are given as follows:

"One,

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OCT 31 1931

-2-

"One, mutual repudiation of an aggressive policy and conduct.

"Two, respect for China's territorial integrity.

"Three, complete suppression of all organized movements interfering with the freedom of trade and stirring up international hatred.

"Four, effective protection throughout Manchuria of all peaceful pursuits undertaken by Japanese subjects.

"Five, respect for the treaty rights of Japan in Manchuria."

It is opined that these points will meet with the approval of the League of Nations and world opinion generally and it is stated that they were withheld at Geneva in the belief that they "should properly form the subject of negotiations between the parties directly involved."

The statement concludes that at the present moment there is urgent need to solve the problem of cooperation and reiterates the willingness of the Japanese Government to negotiate directly with China, to adjust normal relations and discuss the withdrawal of troops to the Railway Zone.

"A strong detachment of Japanese troops has been sent to Taonan, 200 miles west of the South Manchuria tracks, to protect the railway from the depredations of bandits."

"The principle--of protecting Japanese property rights--beyond the railway zone must lead to the expansion of the area under Japanese protection ultimately to an increase in

the

-3-

the number of troops. The Government is opposed to increasing the forces--above the treaty limits but the military policy of policing the outlying regions may force its hands." Japanese are aiding local Chinese committees to organize railway police and guards.

Reports that Russia is assembling troops near the Manchurian border lack official confirmation, but if true, officials intimate that Japan will not hesitate to send Russia a warning.

Tokyo journals suggest that Britain is trying to ingratiate herself with China in order to regain Lancashire trade and counteract Japanese competition.

Shanghai despatch, October 26 (Hallett Abend), states that the Japanese authorities are faced with caring for 60,000 destitute, as well as the problem of reopening schools which are closed in Mukden.

The request of Marshal Chang Hsueh Liang for funds for the northeastern navy and military expenses has been approved by Nanking.

Japanese officials are perturbed at Harbin reports that a Soviet agent is providing munitions for the Chinese forces opposing the "independent" movement. The Russian railway authorities have ordered 300 cars to Manchouli, presumably for troop movements. The Chinese in Harbin are

taking

-4-

taking a more resolute attitude, perhaps inspired by assurances of Soviet support.

The Nanking-Canton peace negotiations are dragging and the Cantonese delegates are apprehensive that they may lose the support of the Canton military faction. Yen Hsi-shan is resuming an active role by sending representations to Shanghai to uphold his views at the conference.

Moscow despatch, October 26 (Walter Duranty), indicates sharp disapproval of the League of Nations attitude in the Manchurian conflict, although there is still no direct comment.

Japan's position in Manchuria was likened to the stand of the United States on the Monroe Doctrine, by Hikoichi Motoyama of the Tokyo Nichi-Nichi. He inquires "would America gladly accept the interference of a third party, say Japan, in settling a possible dispute with any one of her neighboring countries? You have your Monroe Doctrine. Well, suppose Japan says she has her own Monroe Doctrine, what then?"

WASHINGTON POST

Nanking despatch, October 26 (A.P.) reports that Chiang Kai-shek in an address expressed confidence in the efforts of the League of Nations in causing Japanese evacuation of Manchuria. He urged that the Chinese practice patience and restraint and pointed out that
only

-5-

only the Japanese militarists, not the people of Japan as a whole, were responsible for the situation in Manchuria.

NEW YORK HERALD-TRIBUNE

Geneva despatch, October 26 (A.P.), reports that the Chinese representative on the League Council stated that China "was ready at any time to conclude an arbitration treaty with Japan--modeled after treaties between other members of the League."

Tokyo despatch, October 26 (U.P.), reports renewed Chinese bandit activities in South Manchuria.

EBL

FE: CBC: EMF

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GRAY

Nanking via N. R.

Dated November 3, 1931

Rec'd 2 a.m.

Division of

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

NOV 3 1931

Department of State

Secretary of State,
Washington.

93, November 3, 9 a. m.

The Chinese Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs called on me November 2, 5 p. m., and showed me a Reuter telegram dated Washington, October 31 (presumably supplied by the Associated Press) reporting remarks attributed to Under Secretary of State Castle. In view of the ambiguity of the message as received the Acting Minister asked that I ascertain by telegraph:

One. Whether Castle said that under treaties guaranteeing integrity of China the United States would feel compelled to disapprove permanent Japanese occupation of Manchuria and;

Two. If so, what were the treaties in reference;

Three. Whether the fact that the United States did not endorse the League resolution which demanded that Japan:

F/DEW

793.94/2444

1931 NOV 2

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2- #93, from Nanking, Nov. 3, 9 a.m.

Japan evacuate occupied areas in Manchuria by November 16th
should be taken as implying that the United States did not
approve of that stipulation. Doctor Lee observed that the
United States had announced its approval of previous actions
(in?)
taken by the League I connection with the present controversy.

Repeated to the American Minister.

PECK

HPD

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138 TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
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Collect

Charge Department

Charge to
\$

Department of State

Washington,

November 3, 1931.

793.94/2444
106
AMERICAN CONSUL,

NANKING (China). NOV 5 31
2444

Your 93, November 3, 9 a.m., questions one and two.

One. For your information. The question asked in press conference was: QUOTE Has the United States ever taken a position as to Manchuria which would preclude its approval of permanent Japanese occupation outside the Railway Zone? UNQUOTE After some discussion of the meaning of the question, the Under Secretary replied: QUOTE I should say yes because of various treaties we have signed to maintain the integrity of China UNQUOTE. Thereafter reference was made expressly to the Nine-Powers Treaty.

Referring to your question three, no inference should be drawn.

For your guidance.
Two. You may reply to the Acting Minister in the form of an expression of your own ^{informal and unofficial} opinion but not as giving replies by the Department to his questions. You should explain informally the nature of press conferences. The Department does not wish to have an attitude or position created for or ascribed to it by a process of question and answer suggested by and relating to newspaper reports. Its

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-138

793.94/2444

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR

Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Washington,

- 2 -

views will be disclosed as the development of the situation may in its opinion require. You have been informed with regard to its principal objective. In pursuit of this objective, ^{the Department finds it} ~~it is~~ necessary to pursue a course of impartiality and to avoid even the appearance of favoring either of the disputants or passing judgment on points in advance of the opportunity or necessity for action with regard to them.

Stinson
am

FE:SKH/ZMF

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator M., 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1958 1-138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

FROM

THE UNDER SECRETARY

NOV 3 1931

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Dated November 3, 1931

Rec'd 7:03 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

863, November 3, 4 p. m.

Legation's 862, November 3, 3 p. m.

Following from American Consul Mukden:

"November 2, 5 p. m. Chinese electric light plant Changchung closed by Japanese, current supplied by Japanese plant.

Reliably informed Japanese installing transformer leading to old Chinese plant Mukden with intention of closing it and supplying current from Fushun.

Above cases together with Antung plant case seem to indicate plan to secure electric power monopoly in South Manchuria".

For the Minister

ENGERT

WSB

FE

F/DEW 793.94/2445

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NOV - 3 1931
DIVISION OF

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 3 1931
Department of State

NOV 10 1931
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

THE UNDER SECRETARY
OCT 28 1931
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OCT 27 1931

Japan's "Five Points"

October 26 1931
RECEIVED
OCT 27 1931

AUG 15 1935
Department of State

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

F/DEW

793.94/2446

Much difficulty appears to have been encountered at Geneva in connection with a much-talked-of "Japan's fifth point".

Among the five points which the Japanese Ambassador informed Mr. Castle (on October 14) were an outline of Baron Shidehara's points for direct negotiations with the Chinese, the fifth point was indicated as follows:

"Arrangements to be reached between Japan and China for the prevention of the ruinous railway competition and for the carrying into effect of existing railway commitments".

For an account of what occurred at Geneva in reference to this point, reference is made to Mr. Miller's memorandum hereunder.

With regard to the meaning of this point, it should be noted that the terms are very broad. It should be understood that the problem of making "arrangements for the prevention of the ruinous railway competition and for the carrying into effect of existing railway commitments" is a problem which would involve the whole question of treaties, agreements, protocols and commitments alleged to have been made in secret, which have been and are the principal matters under dispute and which, in their entirety, constitute almost the whole of the issue between China and Japan.

SKH/ZMF

Skiffman

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 26, 1931.

SENT:

The "fundamental points" or "principles" of Japan's demands which were under discussion in the meetings of the League Council on October 23 and 24 evidently refer to the five points which were communicated to the Secretary in confidence by the Japanese Ambassador on October 14, 1931, as the bases upon which Baron Shidehara would like to have direct negotiations with the Chinese.

"Point 5" of these bases as stated by Mr. Debuchi read as follows:

"Arrangements to be reached between Japan and China for the prevention of ruinous railway competition and for the carrying into effect of railway agreements."

The Japanese proposed amendment to the League resolution on this point (paragraph 4) was to the effect that:

"The Government of Japan will proceed with the withdrawal into the railway zone of the troops that are still in a few localities outside the said zone as the pacification of public opinion and a detente is brought about by the conclusion of a preliminary agreement between the Chinese and the Japanese Governments as to the fundamental principles governing normal relations, that is to say, affording an assurance that the life of Japanese nationals and the protection of their property will be safeguarded."

These points had been made known in confidence likewise to some at least of the members of the League

Council

F.W. 793.94/2446

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OCT 31 1931

RECEIVED
OCT 27 1931
SECRETARY'S OFFICE

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- 2 -

Council and Geneva's 812 (October 23, 7 p.m.) reports that "the whole object of Briand's proposal was that the 'fifth point' should be so modified by the Japanese Government as to bring it under the terms of the September 30th resolution, particularly that portion which applies to security."

During the discussion the Japanese representative for some reason declined to define more precisely the reference to the "fundamental principles" in paragraph 4 of the Japanese counter proposal.

In conversation with Mr. Gilbert after the adjournment of the Council meeting Mr. Yoshizawa stated that the reason why he did not disclose this "fifth point" in Japan's demands was because he was not permitted to do so by his instructions; and added that "had he brought them forward the Chinese representative would have questioned the validity of the 'railroad treaties' and would probably have suggested the submission of them to the Permanent Court."

Press reports from Tokyo today state that Mr. Yoshizawa had misunderstood his instructions in this respect and that the Tokyo Foreign Office was reported to have been annoyed that he should have failed to have had Japan's proposed bases at least read into the minutes of the meeting.

FE:RSM:EJL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE UNDER SECRETARY
OCT 24 1931
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

RECEIVED
NOV 2 - 1931
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RESEARCH

October 26, 1931

OCT 27 1931

Manchuria Situation

F/DEW
793.94/2447

713.94

We now have evidence with regard to Japan's diplomatic objective in relations, connected with the Manchuria situation, with China. The principal objective is, apparently, to obtain effective ratification by China of certain treaties, agreements, and protocols (some of which have been matters of dispute both as to character and as to interpretation over a period of twenty-five years, some for fifteen years, and some for shorter periods), together with, presumably, various commitments -- the contents of which have not been made public -- alleged to have been made by Chinese officials in Manchuria.


The fact that, in the course of the various discussions at Geneva and elsewhere, Japan's representatives have been unwilling to declare these objectives, to state what engagements they have in mind or to say anything with regard to the nature of some of the commitments naturally arouses suspicion and puts everybody on guard.

The extreme delicacy of the whole problem, as regards interference and involvement by and on the part of other powers, becomes increasingly apparent.

SKH/Hombach
FEB 28 1932

SKH/ZMF


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 26, 1931



Manchuria Situation.
Action Taken by the Council
of the League.

793.94
It is believed that comment by the American Government upon the substance of the resolution adopted by the Council may to advantage be avoided. The importance of the action taken and the force of the resolution consist not in the conditions laid down in the resolution but in the fact that all of the nations represented, with the exception of the Japanese, after ten days of continuous discussion and conference, in the course of which China's and Japan's representatives were repeatedly heard, voted a resolution the plain implication of which is disapproval of the action of the Japanese authorities in Manchuria and demand for restoration of the status quo ante. In adopting the resolution, they expressed moral judgment founded on considerations of legality and world interest. Whether it was wise for them to lay down the conditions they did, and whether those conditions can be met, are questions of secondary importance. By way of supporting the efforts of the Council and avoiding impairment of their effectiveness, emphasis may best be laid, in any discussion of their action, upon its significance rather than upon its terms.

SKH/ZMF

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



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F/E

October 26, 1931.

Digest of Newspaper Items.

file
ER

792-94

NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE

Tokyo despatch, October 25 (Wilfrid Fleisher), states that

"The action of the League of Nations Council yesterday in voting 13 to 1 - unanimously except for the Japanese representative - in favor of calling upon Japan to draw her troops in Manchuria into the zone of the Japanese-owned South Manchuria Railway by November 16 came as a severe blow to this country, and Tokio officials do not conceal their disappointment. They say that Japan's case was badly presented at Geneva and blame the Japanese delegate, Kenkichi Yoshizawa, for failing to reveal the so-called fundamental principles of Japanese policy contained in the five points advanced by this country as the basis of a formula for settlement of the dispute.

"Because the Council's resolution lacked unanimity, it is not considered here to be binding upon Japan in any way."

The Japanese intend to refrain from further hostile action and will try to enter into direct negotiations with China. Troops will be withdrawn as safety is granted to Japanese nationals, but officials do not believe that the situation will improve sufficiently to permit complete evacuation of occupied territory by November 16.

Geneva despatch, October 25, follows:

"League

F/DEW
793.94/2449

NOV 2 1931

- 2 -

"League of Nations headquarters here are awaiting anxiously the reactions of Tokio, Nanking, Washington and the other capitals represented in the League Council's deliberations on Manchuria during the last two weeks. These reactions to yesterday's move of the Council will determine whether the Council will meet again on November 16 to congratulate the world and itself upon completed withdrawal of the Japanese troops now holding southern Manchuria, or whether it will assemble, perhaps sooner and in haste, to consider sterner methods than moral pressure.

"Japan, in handling a problem which she considered colonial in nature, met determined resistance here from governments whose own past actions had given her historical precedents for the occupation of Manchuria."

Geneva despatch, October 25 (A.P.) quotes William Martin in "Le Journal De Geneve", as stating that Japan has had the support of European chancelleries in the Manchurian dispute. He alleged that Japan received secret promises recognizing her special rights in Manchuria and this with the support of industrial interests has encouraged Japan's stand.

NEW YORK TIMES

The TIMES summarizes the situation in Manchuria as follows:

"Indications that Japan might confront the League of Nations with a fait accompli on Nov. 16 were seen in advices from Tokyo yesterday that she would seek direct negotiations with new administrative bodies now forming in Manchuria.

"Tokyo intimated that the League Council's move to bring about troop withdrawal by Nov. 16

would

- 3 -

would be opposed.

"Shanghai heard of new fighting near Changchun between Chinese and Japanese. All shops carrying Japanese goods in Peiping were shut down forcibly.

"Peace negotiations between Canton and Nanking reached a deadlock over the control of the military."

Tokyo despatch, October 25 (Hugh Byas),

"The government is greatly disappointed with the course of the debate at Geneva. It is realized that the League Council's resolution has no binding force, but it seems to make Japan bear the moral responsibility for the deadlock, which is at least held to be equally due to China's refusal to recognize existing treaties.

"Japan is not willing to break with the League of Nations at present, nor to change its attitude regarding Manchuria, but the situation has become distinctly more dangerous. Nothing has been done to expedite direct negotiations. The League has seemed to approve of China's repudiation of treaty obligations which are held vital to Japan's existence and progress."

The Cabinet is reported as agreed not to alter the present policy, but will seek direct negotiations with Nanking and the new administrative bodies now forming in Manchuria.

Tokyo despatch, October 25 (A.P.), states

"that while Tokyo is prepared to negotiate with responsible Chinese authorities, such a step is becoming increasingly difficult due to the reorganization now under way in the Chinese Government."

London comment, October 17 (Augur), states that Britain not only desires to cultivate Japan, but has
sympathy

- 4 -

sympathy with Japan's position in the present situation, due to experiences of a similar nature of the provocative attitude of the Chinese. Only reluctantly did Britain act to preserve the authority of the League of Nations and will now see that justice is done Japan. It is held to be "unfortunate that a situation has come to exist in which - - - it appears that the Council is definitely taking the side of China. - - - To the public it appears that the conflict is not so much between the two Asiatic states as between the League and the Government at Tokyo."

The participation of the United States in the action of the League Council has met with universal approval in Britain. The right of the United States to participate is regarded as a "moral one."

Shanghai despatch, October 25 (Hallett Abend), indicates that the peace negotiations between the Nanking and Canton Governments were at a standstill. A joint Nanking-Canton "foreign affairs committee" may be organized as a preliminary move.



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF EASTERN AFFAIRS



THE UNDER SECRETARY
OCT 20 1931
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

October 29, 1931.

Digest of Newspaper
Items

F/DEW

793.94/2450

NEW YORK TIMES

Tokyo despatch, October 29 (Hugh Byas), reports that "the Japanese and Russians are watching each other carefully in Northern Manchuria.

The letter of the Chinese delegate at Geneva to the League, offering to conclude an arbitration treaty with Japan is said to contain the statement that "China is bound by the covenant scrupulously to respect all treaty obligations" and is willing to leave questions of interpretation to the World Court or to arbitration. Sir Eric Drummond suggested that this in effect was a promise by China to respect her treaty rights and advised Japan to evacuate her troops and then open negotiations."

Japan has not replied but is preparing a full list of Sino-Japanese treaties regarding Manchuria to be communicated to the League, which at its next meeting will have an opportunity to ask China whether she will respect those treaties.

FILED
The NOV 4 1931

- 2 -

The Tokyo NICHU NICHU in giving the alleged reasons for the lack of British support to Japan in the League, opines that "the British Government now realizes Geneva went too far in opposition to Japan and suggests the British attitude can be modified if Japan gives assurances in regard to the disarmament conference."

Washington report, October 28, states that "information that Russia was engaging in - - - military operations along the Manchurian-Siberian border - - - was received with some evidence of disquiet."

"Officials said that no new move had been made by the United States in the face of the new phase now taking shape in the Manchurian controversy, nor was any step in immediate contemplation. This government - - - continued to feel that the moral pressure of the world on China and Japan for peace was the practical method of approach to the problem.

"This united world stand has already been registered through the invocation of the Kellogg anti-war treaty."

New York item, October 29, reports discussion of the situation in Manchuria at a luncheon of the New York League of Nations Association, on October 28. The Chinese viewpoint was expounded by Consul General Henry K. Gehang of New York, while Japan's position was sustained by Dr. Roy H.

Akagi,

- 3 -

Akagi, visiting lecturer on Japanese affairs at Columbia University.

Dr. James T. Shotwell, chairman of the luncheon, expressed the belief that the Manchurian question could have been settled on terms of a quiet analysis of the issues involved, had that been attempted, "but the two nations moved into the field of politics, where emotions dominate, and that is the tragedy."

NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE

The second of a series of articles on Manchuria, by Victor Keen, written from Mukden appears in the New York Herald Tribune of October 29.

EFJL

FE:CBC:HJZ:SS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 393.1154 (M) Anderson, Meyer & FOR Tel#862 Spam.
Company/1

FROM China (Engert) DATED November 3, 1931.
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING:

Antung Electric Light Plant. Japanese claim that closing
of - was a military necessity. Department's instructions
requested.

793.94/2451

793.94/2451

RECEIVED

TELEGRAM RECEIVED NOV 4 - 1931

REP

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

FROM NOV 4 1931

SHANGHAI

Dated November 3, 1931

Rec'd 5:04 p.m.

Division of
AFFAIRS
NOV 3 1931

Secretary of State,

Washington.

November 3, 1 p. m.

Peck reports interview with T. V. Soong on October 30th., in the course of which Soong expresses himself as somewhat anxious regarding French atmosphere in which Council of League would reconvene for consideration of Sino-Japanese controversy, explaining that China feels that French naval fleet favored support of Japanese Navy and that traditional French policy vis a vis China was contrary to attitude of Briand at Geneva. Soong asked Peck to ask me to urge Department to use its influence to have Council meet in Geneva rather than Paris. I am transmitting Soong's request but at the same time I am telling Peck to say to Soong that I doubt whether Department will wish to make a suggestion of this kind in League circles.

JOHNSON

WWC
HPD

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

RECEIVED

NOV 3 1931

DIVISION OF

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 3, 1931

Rec'd 6:40 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

PRIORITY.

866, November 3, 5 p. m.

Department's 401, October 31, 2 p. m. and the Minister's

March 2, noon, to the Department.

The Minister has been consulted. The British Minister tells me he has informally and orally advised the Chinese Foreign Office through the Counselor in Nanking. French and Italian Legations here have as yet received no instructions but both have observers in Manchuria who have been instructed to remain there until further notice though not necessarily in connection with the request from the Chinese Government.

For the Minister

ENGERT


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

KLP

GRAY

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 3, 1931.

Rec'd. 9:50 a.m.

793.94
note
393.114

RECEIVED FROM
NOV - 3 1931
DIVISION OF

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 3 1931
Department of State
NOV 25 1931

Secretary of State,
Washington.

864, November 3, 5 p.m. 793.94/2358

Reference pages 9 and 10 Mukden's despatch No.
454, October 5th, to the Legation copies of which were sent
direct to the Department.

One. Repeated efforts of Consul General Mukden to
ascertain present location and ^{Condition of} ~~commander~~ Waco airplane
belonging to L. E. Gale Company have been unavailing.
Japanese Commander in Chief recently issued public state-
ments to the effect that no private property can be removed
from Government buildings now occupied Japanese army.
Japanese Consul General referred Myers to this notice but
admitted that it obviously did not cover the case in
question.

Two. Myers requests reference of case to the
Department for such instructions or action as it seemed
appropriate.

Three. Myers is keeping Embassy at Tokio informed.

For the Minister

ENCERT

WSB

793.94/2454

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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Charge Department

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DM RECD
TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Washington,

November 25, 1931.

AMERICAN LEGATION

NOV 25 31

PEIPING (CHINA).

Your 864, November 3, 5 p.m.

One. The Consul General at Mukden should continue his efforts to obtain restoration of the plane to its American owners.

Two. Confidential. This matter is being taken up informally with the Japanese Ambassador here.

Stinson

793.94/2454

FE:MMH:EJL

FE

NOV 25 1931 P.M.

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19

Index Bu.—No. 60.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-128

156
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
NOV 3 1931
DIVISION OF

GREEN

Geneva

Dated November 2, 1931


Rec'd 3rd, 9:05 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

274, November 2, 11 p. m.


I have ^{just} had a very long talk with Drummond in which he discussed the present situation in Manchuria and expressed his views on the League's action thereon and possible American relationship therewith. I took up with him the question raised in the Department's 124, October 31, 4 p. m. His reply was so tied up with the general situation that I shall for the sake of clarity bring it in ⁱⁿ this telegram in its appropriate connection. The essentials of which Drummond had to say were as follows:

One. The immediate Sino-Japanese problem has obviously a most important bearing on disarmament and other world questions. In view of this the United States and the majority of the League States have a common objective in reaching



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793.94/2455



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REP

2- #274; from Geneva, Nov. 2, 11 p.m.

reaching a satisfactory solution in the shortest possible time. American cooperation in this is probably absolutely essential. This immediate objective is so important in the way of implications that questions of League prestige and similar considerations should be absolutely laid aside.

Two. The draft resolution of October 24 as pointed out in Briand's note to Yoshizawa (Consulate's 270, October 31, 9 a. m.) has no juridical force. It thus cannot technically be regarded as definite League policy which is still based on the resolution of September 30th. The draft resolution may be considered however as possessing a moral force as explicit of what the Governments represented on the Council (with the exception Japan) consider to be right and fair under the circumstances. Moreover, with the foregoing consideration in mind it may also be found to contain suggestions which individual governments might deem it desirable to take up in Tokyo and Nanking.

Three. The important part of the September 30th resolution is that which envisages a speedy withdrawal of Japanese troops to within the railway zone and the effective assurance

of the

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

3- #274, from Geneva, Nov. 2, 11 p.m.

of the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals
incident to evacuation.

Briand's note to Yoshizawa stressed this point and
indicates that in his views as President of the Council
the best method of effecting the foregoing would be that
the proposal contained in point five of the October 24th
resolution be adopted by the Japanese Government.

(END SECTION ONE).

GILBERT

WSB

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

GENEVA

Dated November 2, 1931

Rec'd 3rd, 11:20 a. m.

RECEIVED

Secretary of State, DIVISION OF
Washington.

274, November 2, 11 p. m. (SECTION TWO).

Once this proposal was in effect and the discussions between the Chinese and the Japanese representatives had begun and were proceeding satisfactorily the question of a given date such as November 16th (which as has been stated has no legal force) becomes of secondary importance.

The question at present of paramount importance is to obtain Japan's acceptance to representatives being appointed immediately and to the early beginning of direct conversations on points relating to evacuation.

It is understood that a note which the Chinese recently addressed to the Japanese Government requesting the appointment of representatives by Japan for that purpose remained unanswered on October 30th.

Four.

REP

2- #274, from Geneva, Nov. 2, 11 p.m.

Four. Drummond understands that the information contained in the Department's telegram referred to above respecting the British attitude on the appointment of neutrals in line with the October 24 resolution is correct. He also understands that the French Government has not yet been approached by the Chinese on this point. He believes however that should the French be approached they would agree. Nevertheless since the draft resolution of October 24th has no binding force they would probably limit their action to utilizing the services of their Military Attaches near the scene. Drummond has no information as to the action other members of the Council on this point but believes that they would be likely to follow the French lead.

Five. Drummond feels that the United States Government could perhaps perform a most useful service could it induce the Japanese to appoint representatives to hold conversations with Chinese representatives in line with the proposal discussed in paragraph three above. He expressed as his own opinion however that any demarche which Washington might deem it desirable to make in this connection might perhaps be more successful should the matter be taken up privately with the

REP

3- #274, from Geneva, Nov.2, 11 p.m.

with the Japanese, as publicity might make Japan's acceptance more difficult.

Six. Since the middle of October, although they are not recently so frequent, the press of various countries has carried articles purporting to be based on Washington information to the effect that Washington and Geneva are divided in their policies respecting the present situation. In particular these articles have intimated that Washington was not in agreement with the League in the latter's "demands" on Japan. Drummond feels that perhaps some statement from Washington indicating in general terms that no such a disagreement exists or if possible some communication to the League of a similar purport which could be made public would at this juncture serve a useful purpose.

Seven. I wish to make it clear that in our conversation Drummond made no direct request respecting possible American action. From the atmosphere of the conversation however I was aware that he would greatly appreciate any expression of your views in line with the questions implied in the foregoing which you could find it possible to give him.

(GREEN).

REP

4- #274, from Geneva, Nov. 2, 11 p.m.

(GREEN). Eight. In view of the circumstance that questions of policy have been raised in the foregoing I will add that the matter of possible American policy in the premises has been frequently brought up by diplomatic representatives of various Governments in Geneva in the natural course of my contact with them. As of possible interest I submit the gist of their expressions in this connection:

Although technically the League Council is taking publicly the lead in this matter it is erroneous to regard the Council or the League as something above or apart from the States composing it. Especially in a case of this character Council policy possesses strength only in proportion as it is supported or implemented by the League powers. In this instance the great powers are almost solely concerned.

A certain hesitancy appears to exist in the Foreign Offices of the great powers inasmuch as, regarded individually, they are looking to America for leadership because of its great prestige and its important position in relation to the Orient and also because it is more powerful than any single one of the European states. They look for this leadership

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

5- #274, from Geneva, Nov. 2, 11 p.m.

leadership to be extended privately or publicly, either
through a backing of Council policy, if Washington be in
agreement therewith, or perhaps through a more individual
form of leadership.

(END MESSAGE).

GILBERT

WSB

THE UNDER SECRETARY
NOV 4 1931
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 5 1931
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS

November 4, 1931.

NOV 5 1931

Gilbert reports that Drummond has expressed views as follows:

(a) That Briand's note to Yoshizawa stresses the point that the best method of getting forward would be adoption by the Japanese Government of the proposal contained in point five of the Resolution of the Council of October 24. (NOTE: Paragraph five, as reported in Geneva's 242, October 22, 6 p.m., "recommends that the Chinese and Japanese Governments should immediately appoint representatives to arrange the details of all points relating to the evacuation and the taking over of the evacuated territory so that they may proceed smoothly and without delay".)

(b) That as soon as that proposal is in effect and the discussions between Chinese and Japanese representatives have gotten under way, the question of the date November 16 ("which has no legal force") becomes of secondary importance.

(c) That the problem at present of paramount importance is to obtain Japanese acceptance to appointment of representatives and early beginning of direct conversations with the Chinese on points relating to evacuation.

(d) That the British Government has responded to the Chinese Government's request for appointment of officers to assist as observers in connection with evacuation; but that the

F.W.

793.94/2455

FILED

NOV 8 1931

- 2 -

*Might not
something
be said to
Mr. Claudel
about this?*

SKH.

*Might
not this
be done?*

SKH

*Might
not this
be
given?*

SKH

the French Government has apparently not yet been approached by the Chinese on this point. Drummond believes that the French, if approached, would assent.

(e) The United States could perhaps perform a most useful service if it could induce the Japanese to appoint representatives to hold conversations with Chinese representatives. Drummond thinks that this should be without publicity.

(f) That, in order to allay doubt and to put an end to rumors that Washington and the League are not in agreement, a statement might be made in Washington that there is no disagreement and a communication to that effect might be made to the League and be made public.

(NOTE: Gilbert states that Drummond made no direct request but that he, Gilbert, definitely inferred that Drummond would greatly appreciate an expression of the Secretary's views with regard to points as outlined above.)

Gilbert adds that there is a great deal of speculation at Geneva with regard to possible American policy. He points out that the view is expressed that "it is erroneous to regard the Council or the League as something above or apart from the States composing it. . . . Council policy possesses strength only in proportion as it is supported or implemented by the League powers . . in this instance the great powers are almost solely concerned". The foreign offices of the great powers are hesitant, as they are looking to America for

leadership

- 3 -

leadership because of its great prestige and its important position in relation to the Orient and because it is more powerful than any single one of them. They look for this leadership to be extended "privately or publicly, either through a backing of Council policy, if Washington be in agreement therewith, or perhaps through a more individual form of leadership".

It is
to
this
that
we are
committed.

SKE

It is clear that they must be channelled to transfer
the whole affair to us.

Why


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



AM 1:00

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Helsingfors, October 6, 1931.



Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 23 1931
Department of State

No. 520.

NOV 23 1931

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
NOV 23 1931

DIVISION OF
EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
NOV 10 1931
COPY IN RE. Fin. 6000
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 23 1931
Department of State

F/DEW

793.94/2456

CONFIDENTIAL.

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In the Office		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	

m.w.d.
7 093

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

NOV 18 1931

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit an enclosure in translation of a press release of the Finnish Foreign Office. The enclosed translation is from the Swedish language newspaper HUFVUDSTADSBLADET No. 269 of October 5, 1931.

The public comments of Baron Yrjö-Koskinen regarding armed clashes between China and Japan are rather interesting, and it may be noted that the Chief of the Finnish foreign office states that "....China....will not submit to such unequal negotiations." The Baron further

OFF
11-30-31

-2-

further says that "the sympathy of the public seems to be on the side of China."

In any case it may be gathered that the Minister and his associates had an interesting time at the meeting of the Assembly of the League and that the semi-annual trips of Finnish statesmen to Geneva appear to be in the nature of pleasant holidays.

Respectfully yours,

Edward E. Brodie
EDWARD E. BRODIE.

✓
Enclosure:

No.1.- HUFVUDSTADSEBLADET article of
Oct. 5, 1931 - press release from foreign office.

500

EEB/wly

4

Re: *OGN.*

Enclosure No.1.

Despatch No. 520
October 6, 1931.

SOURCE: Helsingfors
HUFVUDSTADSBLADET No. 269
(Swedish Conservative)
October 5, 1931
Translation.

TWO QUESTIONS DOMINATING IN GENEVA

The Financial Crisis and The Conflict Between China and
Japan.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Baron Aarne
Yrjö-Koskinen, returned home yesterday from Geneva.
Through the Finnish News Agency the Minister has sub-
mitted the following description of the League of
Nations latest general assembly.

The League of Nations twelfth general assembly met
without attracting any especially great attention. Its
program was less extensive than usual and did not take
up any such great questions which previously often drew
the attention of the world to the League of Nations
general meetings.

Contrary to expectations, however, this general
assembly also turned out to be an occasion of significance.
When the meeting was nearing its end, a couple of sur-
prising events took place which attracted general at-
tention and lengthened the term of the meeting. I refer
of course to the Japanese-Chinese conflict and the fall
of the English Pound. The former event awakened great
interest both among the members of the general conference
and among the general public. When China submitted the
matter to the League of Nations, it was considered at
numerous meetings for hours at a time, without the
interest of the public, which filled the auditorium to
overflowing,

-2-

overflowing, abating. The dispute appeared to be extremely difficult of solution although both sides declared their desire to avoid war and bring about a reconciliation. The differences of opinion concerned primarily the question as to whether the dispute should be settled by Japan and China themselves or whether it should take place by means of an intermediary agent, more particularly the League of Nations council. Japan insisted that only the two parties concerned should work out the problem while China, for entirely natural reasons, will not submit to such unequal negotiations. When Japan meanwhile had made assurances that it intended to evacuate the possessed territory and restore the status quo, and China on the other hand had promised to guarantee protection to the lives and property of Japanese residing in the territory, an agreement was finally arrived at whereby Japan was given respite until the fourteenth instant to remove its troops. Should it not take place at this time the council will again meet to deal with the matter. It should also be observed that after evacuation a number of questions of dispute remain to be cleared up so that the matter will continue to be of current interest to the council. It has been noted, while the problem has been under consideration, that the sympathy of the public seems to be on the side of China.

News of England's suspension of the gold standard came as a bolt from a clear sky. It was obvious that the English delegation had not expected such an occurrence. What consternation the information caused may best be gathered

-3-

gathered from the fact that the League's gold committee (Comité de l'or), which had met to discuss the questions connected with the gold standard and gold circulation and a report from which was shortly expected, immediately ceased its work and adjourned its meetings until next January, an action which was sharply criticized on many sides.

Under these conditions it is quite comprehensible that what England had to say about the financial situation of the world was awaited with great interest when the finance committee's report should be presented. On behalf of the English delegation its foremost financial expert, Sir Arthur Salter, gave an account of the reasons for the present financial crisis and recommended various expedients.

To begin with, he pointed out that while the economic crisis has already existed for about two years and the financial crisis only three months, it is of greater importance to have the latter surmounted first. In his statement of the reasons for the financial crisis, he maintained that its immediate cause was the fact that the debtor countries' ability to pay, in spite of regulating, appeared to be insufficient and thereby, in their payment balance has appeared a gap which it has been impossible to fill by means of excessive export or new loans. According to calculations, about \$2,000,000,000 yearly is required to fill this gap. A contributing factor to the present financial crisis is the circumstance that some of the debtor countries used a great part of their loans for unproductive ends and, in addition, prices in the world during recent years have lowered about 30%

which

-4-

which means that the debt burdens of the debtor countries have increased to the same extent.

For the surmounting of the crisis Sir Arthur suggested several methods, some of them, however, not consisting of anything new, as, for example, that debtor countries should decrease their imports and increase their exports, that they should rationalize the use of their capital by practicing thrift, that tariff walls should be lowered, etc. Greater attention is warranted for the idea expressed by him that until general confidence is restored the creditor countries' governmental resources should be used for the granting of credit to the debtor countries. Organization of this new international collaboration should be entrusted to the League's finance committee which would be in contact with the international bank in Basel.

In its resolution regarding questions of finance, the general meeting emphasized the significance of the finance committee's activity in straightening out the financial crisis and allowed it as well as the council extremely extensive powers to this end.

The general impression of the treatment of questions of finance at the general meeting was that very great confusion prevails and that no way has been found out of the chaos.

Among the matters which especially interest Finland was the proposal made by Finland for the re-organizing of a permanent international court of appeals for questions of arbitration between states. Notwithstanding the general support the proposal received differences of
opinion

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-5-

opinion arose regarding a mass of details not settled at that meeting and consideration of the question was postponed.

At the League of Nations council meeting the Finnish government's claims against the English government for losses sustained by certain Finnish shipping companies as a result of England's confiscation of their ships during the war were taken up for the first time. The matter was not settled inasmuch as certain formal objections were raised on the part of England which must first be settled. A special committee was appointed by the council consisting of members from Spain, Italy and Norway. The committee postponed settlement until the council's session in January of next year. Baron Yrjö-Koskinen is very hopeful with regard to the outcome.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

Department of State

Washington, *May*

1-128
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

NOV 2 50 November 2, 1931. *SPM*

AMERICAN CONSUL

HARBIN (MANCHURIA)

An Associated Press despatch from Tokyo dated November 2, ^{referred to} ~~quotes~~ a Harbin despatch of the same date to the effect that the American Consul General at Harbin has started for Tsitsihar, where he will spend several days; that later he will go to Hailar and then probably to Manchuli. The Tokyo report further intimates that this trip of investigation is being made under instructions from Washington.

^{and the Legation}
Please inform the Department promptly what basis of fact, if any, there may be for the above reports.

793.94/2456A

FE:RSM:EMU

FE

Carl
ACTING

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

1 158F

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Nov. 2, 1931

From the New York Times

OUR HARBIN CONSUL TO REPORT ON CHINA

Hanson Ordered to Tsitsihar to
Investigate Stories of Russo-
Japanese Conflict.

SAY JAPAN MOVED TROOPS

Dispatches to Tokyo Tell of Sending
Soldiers to North Manchuria,
but Report Is Denied.

TOKYO, Monday, Nov. 2 (AP).—Con-
flicting reports regarding the alleged
rapprochement of China and Rus-
sia and the massing of Russian
troops beyond the border at Man-
chuli has prompted the United States
to send an observer to make a per-
sonal investigation of conditions in
Northern Manchuria.

A Harbin dispatch today said
George Hanson, American Consul
General at Harbin, who speaks both
Chinese and Russian, started for
Tsitsihar, where he will spend sev-
eral days. Later he will go to Hallar
and then probably to Manchuli. His
observations will be telegraphed di-
rectly to Washington.

1 5 8

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RECEIVED

NOV 10 1931

FROM

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

Peiping

Dated November 4, 1931

Rec'd 1:10 a. m.

Division of
EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 4 1931
Department of State

Telegram drafted
to Peiping, Nov. 5,
1931

NOV 5 - 1931

F/DEW

793.94/2457

WP

RECEIVED

NOV 1 1931
DIVISION

Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

PRIORITY.

868, November 4, 10 a. m.

Department's 397, October 27, 5 p. m. Following
from American Consul General at Mukden!

"November 3, 2 p. m. Japanese military headquarters
reports that Mukden radio station has been restored to
working condition Japanese Consulate General to be advised
of wave length, operating periods, and other information
to facilitate resumption of Mukden-San Francisco service."

Legation assumes Myers will not reply pending
receipt of Department's instructions.

For the Minister,

ENGERT

JS

FILED

1931.12.18 NOV

1 158 f

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

November 5, 1931.

NOV 5 31

793.94/2457
note 893.74
AMLEGATION,

PEIPING (China).

410 Your 868/2457 November 4, 10 a.m. Also see Department's
397/2316 October 27, 5 p.m.

One. Please inquire of Consul General at Mukden
under what control and personnel the Mukden radio will
be operated.

Two. Who is expected to give to Japanese Consulate
General the technical information mentioned?

793.94/2457

FE:MMH/VDM

FE

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

NOV 5 1931
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 2-138

153
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

793-94
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FROM

NOV 3 1931

DIVISION OF

GRAY

HARBIN

Dated November 3, 1931

Rec'd 6:40 p.m.

Secretary of State


Washington

November 3, 5 p.m.

Your November 2, 5 p.m. /2456

One. On my own initiative, I in company with Vice Consul Lilliestrom and Richard Luther and Grim of the Certainteed Products Company, who were desirous of studying possibilities of selling their products in Tsitsihar, which is in my district, left Harbin for that city on October 31 at 3 p.m., to spend the weekend there.

Two. Our party arrived at hotel in Tsitsihar at 10:30 p.m., of the same day. The next morning I, Mr. Lilliestrom called on the Acting Chairman, General Ma and Messrs. Luther and Grim investigated business conditions with representatives of the Provincial Bank. In the afternoon a side trip was made to the bridges approaching the main bridge of the Tao-Ang railway across the Noni river. In the evening Chairman Ma entertained the entire party at dinner. Owing to the alarming reports received in regard to the Japanese-Chinese difficulties which might arise in regard to repairing Tao-Ang bridges damaged by Tsitsihar troops, I decided to stay Monday at Tsitsihar, although it was



F/DEW

793.94/2458

NOV 7 1931

MAN

2- from Harbin, November 3, 1931

was my original intention to return to Harbin at 8 a.m., Monday, November second. On this day I called on Japanese Consul and four American missionaries in whose welfare I am most naturally interested. The Manager of the Provincial Bank, who was interested in securing an American loan, entertained our party at luncheon and we bade Chairman Ma farewell at 6 p.m., left Tsitsihar and arrived at 8 a.m., this morning at Harbin.

Three. There is now being coded a telegram giving details of my visit, which will be forwarded by radio from the Legation to the Department.

Four. I have no intention of proceeding for the time being to Hailar or Manchuria station which places Captain Nimmer visited a few days ago and which appear to be quiet.

Legation informed.

HANSON

OX

1 1591

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

[Signature]
1-128
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Washington, 4
November 5, 1931.

11 am

793.94/2458
note
1234194

AMERICAN CONSUL,
HARBIN (China).

Your November 3, 5 p. m. */2458*

Your action approved. However, Department desires,
that, when leaving your post, in such cases you, make it a
rule to ~~inform~~ *notify in advance* the Department through the Legation.

Stinson
744

793.94/2458

DISTRICT

OR
NOV 5 1931 PM

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Holt
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244


Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 60.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-128

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



October 30, 1931.

Mr. Castle:

The writer states: "Either Japan has rights in Manchuria or she has not. China's demand that the Japanese evacuate Manchuria is right or wrong"

Correct.

He states, however, that it seems to him "that the question is one for Japan and China to settle on its merits without outside intervention."

This combination of views implies his belief that, although there is dispute between the two parties with regard to the character and extent of the alleged "rights", we should take sides by assuming that Japan's view is the correct view and leaving it to Japan, without interference, to enforce Japan's view.

That type of reasoning does not help very much with our problem.

SKH/ZMF

SKH
FILED
NOV 4 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

K. J. MIDDLETON
President

H. B. EARLING
Vice-President

A. F. HAINES
Vice-President

J. D. LOWMAN
Vice-President

CORWIN S. SHANK
Vice-President

A. E. HOLDEN
Secretary

E. W. BROWNELL
Treasurer

THE UNDER SECRETARY
OCT 16 1931
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

JAPAN SOCIETY
Skinner Building
WASHINGTON

Division of
EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 30 1931
Department of State
RECEIVED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
October 13, 1931
NOV 3 1931
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

OCT 16 1931

Honorable William R. Castle, Jr.
Under Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

My dear Sir:

Having recently returned from Japan and Manchuria, where I spent all of July and August, I am taking the liberty of giving you my views on the present situation in Manchuria. Entering Manchuria at Antung, I went by rail as far as Harbin, returning from there through Mukden to Dairen. Everywhere the atmosphere was very tense, and it was quite apparent that only a spark was needed to set off an explosion. Though Japan was maintaining order within the region of the South Manchuria Railway zone, there was a tendency on the part of the Chinese to antagonize Japan by a series of petty incidents which were extremely irritating. In Mukden I saw Chinese banners calling upon the residents to boycott the Japanese and drive them out of Manchuria. In Harbin, which is beyond the zone of Japanese influence, the Chinese refused to recognize the Japanese Consul General, Mr. Chuichi Ohashi, and they even threatened his life and stoned his car when he drove through the streets.

The contrast between conditions within the South Manchuria Railway zone, controlled by the Japanese, was very startling when compared with the situation along the Chinese Eastern Railway in northern Manchuria. In the territory controlled by the Japanese there was law and order, and the Chinese themselves seemed to appreciate the protection afforded by Japanese soldiers, as they were able to carry on their business without being molested by bandits and outlaws; whereas, north of Changchun, railway service to Harbin was slow and irregular and the Chinese troops seemed to be utterly unable to control the bandits.

Under the circumstances, Japan has displayed remarkable patience in handling a delicate situation. The Foreign Office, under Baron Shidehara, has at all times advocated a policy of conciliation, as opposed to the opposition party in Japan which has been demanding a stern policy toward China. In effect, China has been thumbing her nose at Japan for some time, secure in the belief that Uncle Sam and the League of Nations would rush to her rescue if Japan so much as threatened her.

In my opinion, instead of assuming an aggressive attitude in this crisis, Japan in reality has been only exercising her police power. If China could be made to realize that she cannot expect the support of the powers

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To promote friendly relations between the United States and Japan and to diffuse among the American people a more accurate knowledge of the people of Japan, their aims, ideals, arts, sciences, industries and economic conditions.

F/DEW

793.94/2459

793.94

FILED
NOV 4 1931


Page 2

Honorable William R. Castle, Jr.
October 13, 1931

and that Japan means to protect her economic investments in Manchuria granted her by treaty, the present disturbance will quickly quiet down. I am confident, also, that there are statesmen of sufficient vision and understanding in both China and Japan to ultimately work out a peaceful and satisfactory solution of the Manchurian problem.

Should China succeed in getting the support of the United States or the League of Nations, it would only serve to further postpone a final and definite understanding between Japan and China in Manchuria. Therefore, it seems to me that the question is one for Japan and China to settle on its merits without outside intervention. Either Japan has rights in Manchuria or she has not. China's demand that the Japanese evacuate Manchuria is right or wrong, and if a compromise is forced at this time it only means more trouble in the future.

Sincerely yours,


A. E. Holden, Secretary
JAPAN SOCIETY OF SEATTLE

AEH:M

1 1595

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

November 3, 1931.

Mr. A. E. Holden,
Secretary, Japan Society,
Skinner Building,
Seattle, Washington.

Sir:

The receipt is acknowledged, with thanks, of your letter dated October 13, 1931, relating to the situation in Manchuria.


I need not assure you that the situation to which you refer has been, and is receiving the solicitous consideration of the Department of State.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

W. R. Castle, Jr.

Under Secretary.



CR
Nov. 2. 1931

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FE

10/30/31

793.94/2459



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

J. HAMILTON LEWIS
ILLINOIS


United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D. C.

October 23, 1931.



Hon. E. J. Ayers, Chief Clerk,
Department of State,
Washington, D. C.



Ans'd
October 29 1931.

F/DEW

793.94/2460

My dear Mr. Ayers:

I enclose for your consideration letter from
a student in Marquette University in Milwaukee, Wiscon-
sin, requesting certain data as to the Japanese-Manchuria
dispute for use in connection with work in his class in
economics.

Very truly,

J. Hamilton Lewis
OCT 26 1931

Enclosure

COPY: REK

900 Wisconsin Avenue
Milwaukee, Wisconsin
October, 20, 1931.

Honorable Senator James H. Lewis
Senate House,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Senator Lewis:

At a recent date some of your unfeigned comment appeared in one of our local daily news papers. It was called to the attention of our economics class by our Professor, who in turn asked me to write you.

As shown by the attached clipping your recital dealt with the peril that the United States was taking in its own hands by intervening or trying to arbitrate (with the help of the League of Nations) the most serious question that confronts the World today.

Your Honor Senator Lewis our class of economics here at Marquette has a desire to get the facts in regard to this most important issue of the day. We have at the head of our class a man well qualified for his position, having taught at the Imperial University of Tokyo, and his experiences and travels are vast. I merely mention this for we feel that we are doing all we can to learn of the differences between the U. S. and the Far East.

With this in mind I wish you would have your secretary write or get from the Dept. of State all the data he can pertaining to the Japanese Manchuria dispute. Also all current information you can supply from your office.

Sincerely yours,

Per. JOHN A. SERAMUR
900 W. Wisconsin Avenue, Milwaukee

1 1598

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

In reply refer to
FE

October 28 1931.

The Honorable

J. Hamilton Lewis,

United States Senate.

Sir:

The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of October 23, 1931, enclosing a letter from Mr. John A. Seramur, requesting that he be furnished with information in regard to relations between China and Japan in Manchuria.

In reply there are enclosed herewith copies, as listed below, of recent statements given to the press by the Department on the subject mentioned above. It is suggested that Mr. Seramur may find it useful to consult the various volumes of FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES and the volume entitled CONFERENCE ON THE LIMITATION OF ARMAMENT. These volumes may usually be found in any large public library. There is also enclosed herewith a list of books pertaining to the Far East in which it is believed may be found information of interest in connection with the study which Mr. Seramur desires to make. You will appreciate,

of

793.94/2460

1 1590

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

of course, that this Department can assume no responsibility
for the statements contained in any of the books mentioned in
the enclosed list.

Mr. Seramur's letter to you is returned herewith.

Very truly yours,

B. L. STIMSON


Enclosures:

Copies of press releases of
September 23, 24, 28 (2), 1931;
October 3, 11, 16 (3), 20, 1931;
List of books;
Letter from John A. Seramur,
October 20, 1931.

47 OR
Oct 29, 1931
#11116

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10/28/31

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m.m.h.



LIST OF BOOKS.

- | | |
|----------------------------|--|
| Blakeslee, George H. ----- | The Pacific Area. |
| Dennett, Tyler ----- | Americans in Eastern Asia. |
| Hornbeck, Stanley K. ----- | Contemporary Politics in the Far East. |
| Kawakami, Kiyoshi K. ----- | Japan in World Politics. |
| Morse and MacNair ----- | Far Eastern International Relations. |
| MacMurray, J.V.A. ----- | Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China. |
| Norton, Henry K. ----- | China and the Powers. |
| Okuma, Count ----- | Fifty Years of New Japan. |
| Willoughby, W. W. ----- | Foreign Rights and Interests in China. |
| Young, O. Walter ----- | The International Relations of Manchuria.
Japan's Special Position in Manchuria.
The International Legal Status of the Kwantung Leased Territory.
Japanese Jurisdiction in the South Manchuria Railway Areas. |
| Orchard, John E. ----- | Japan's Economic Position. |
| ----- | The China Year Book. |
| ----- | The Japan Year Book. |

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GRAY

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 4, 1931

Rec'd 3:05 a. m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 4 1931
Department of State

F/DEW

793.94/2461

793.94
Secretary of State,
Washington.

PRIORITY.

867, November 4, 9 a. m.

One. Following from Consul General at Harbin:

"November 3, 5 p. m.


One. I returned early this morning from Tsitsihar, where I spent November 1st and 2nd, interviewing Chinese officials, Japanese Consul, American missionaries and Russians and inspecting Taonanfu-Anghsi Railway bridges near the Noni destroyed by Tsitsihar ~~troops~~. *troops.*

Two. There is but little doubt that General Chang Haipeng of Taonanfu, either instigated or forced by the Japanese military, who aided him with advice and supplies, started his cavalry force of about 5000 on the way north toward Tsitsihar on October 15th. General Hsiehke, Chief of Staff to Chairman Wan Fu Lin, who was and is in Peiping,

ordered

FILED

1661.01 NOV



REP

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y

2- #867, from Peiping, Nov. 4, 9 a.m.

ordered most of the Tsitsihar troops to retreat eastward along the Tsiko Railway and the destruction of smaller bridges approaching both sides of the main bridge across the Noni and a span of the latter. Wan Fu Lin directed that General Ma Chan Shan, garrison commander at Tahaiho, proceed to Tsitsihar, take command as acting chairman and resist Chang's approach. Ma arrived at Tsitsihar October 19th. Without fighting, Chang's troops began to retreat toward Taonan but a portion of them returned to Tailai and to the bridge over the Noni, Chang's and Ma's troops are now facing each other with this bridge between them".

793.94/2461

Two. Following from Consul General at Mukden November 3, 6 p. m., on the same subject:

"Yesterday Honjo issued an ultimatum to Chinese Government at Tsitsihar and Taonan each to withdraw ten kilometres from the Noni River to prevent interference with Japanese repair gangs who start work under protection of Japanese forces tomorrow on destroyed railway bridges. Taonan troops believed to be at Tailai."

For the Minister

ENGERT

(*) Apparent omission

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CJH

GRAY

FROM PEIPING via N.R.

Dated November 4, 1931

Rec'd. 9:11 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

871, November 4, 1 p.m.


Legation's 855/2428 November 2, 11 a.m.

In view of recent developments in North Manchuria
the Military Attache is very anxious to send his assistant
to Harbin as soon as possible. But in the light of
Legation's 860/2425 November 2, 5 p.m. and Hanson's recent
trip (see Legation's numbers 867/2461 November 4, 9 p.m.,
^{not yet received} and 870, November 4, noon) the Minister feels that the
authorization of the Department should first be obtained.
The Military Attache would therefore appreciate an early
expression of the Department's wishes.

For the Minister,

ENGERT

KLP



F/DEW

793.94/2462

FILED

1931-8-NOV

1604

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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OR
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PM
TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
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NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Washington,
November 4, 1931.

NOV 4 31

AMLEGATION,
PEIPING (China).

407 Your 871, November 4, 1 p. m.
Department approves the inquiry and perceives no
objection.

S. H. H.
Gustafson

793.94/2462

793.94/2462

SKH
FE:MMH:REK

M. M. H.
FE
Gustafson




Enciphered by

Sent by operator M.,, 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



October 21, 1931.

OCT 21 1931

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

F/DEW

FROM: TOKIO

TO: THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

CONFIDENTIAL

OCT 26 1931

Number 190

Oct. 21st

*
Full General Tanaka, Retired, calling at my house last night by appointment stated very emphatically "I ask you to cable your Secretary of War that the fighting men of Japan will not permit the League of Nations or America to intervene in any way that might weaken Japan's position in Manchuria".

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

McILROY

CSD letter, May 3, 1972
BY [signature] NARS Date 3/19/73

* Unable to identify definitely. Believed to be general Kunishige Tanaka* who was military attaché in Washington & London, and ch. Camp to the Emperor, headed military delegates to Washington Conference.

Notes
send to J. Z. H. K.

OCT 26 1931

UCC. (Major Case)

793.94/2463

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 28, 1931.

Mr. Castle:


As this statement comes from
Lieutenant Brown, U. S. Marine
Corps, who is attached to the office
of the Naval Attaché, Peiping, and
who has himself been present in
Manchuria, it may be that the
Secretary will wish to see it.

SKH *ART 10*
OCT 28 1931


Wolver
SKH/ZMF

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

In reply refer to No.
Op-16-B-12



Memorandum for the Department of State



The following communication, dated 27 October, 1931, was received by radio from the Naval Attache, American Legation, Peiping, China, at 10:20 A.M. this date, and is transmitted herewith for information:

5220 NRG
FROM NAVAL ATTACHE PEIPING
TO DIRECTOR NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
INFO CINC ASIATIC ---- AMERICAN MINISTER CHINA

OCT 28 1931
SECRETARY'S OFFICE

0027 LIEN T. C. C. BROWN USMC ATTACHED THIS OFFICE RETURNED FROM MUKDEN KIRIN FUSHAN CHANGCHUN REPORTS AS FOLLOWS PHYSICAL EVIDENCE JAPANESE IMMEDIATE EVACUATION OCCUPIED AREAS LACKING. RECONDITIONING BARRACKS OFFICES RAILWAY BUILDINGS AVIATION FIELDS AND HANGARS FOR WINTER OCCUPANCY. MAKING NO EFFORTS HIDE ACTIVITIES. CHINESE FIRMLY BELIEVE JAPANESE INTEND TO STAY AND THEY HAVE CONTROL LOCAL GOVERNMENT ORGANS UNDER JAPANESE ADVISERS. KIRIN DO NOT OBSERVANCE BY FOREIGNERS PARTICULARLY PRESENTS BEST EVIDENCE PERMANENCY OCCUPATION. MUCH JAPANESE PROPAGANDA AND CHINESE PRESS COMPLETELY MUZZLED CONTRA THIS. JAPANESE CONSULATE AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES LACKING UNANIMITY OF VIEWPOINT BUT COOPERATE. JAPAN INTENDS CONSOLIDATE POSITION MANCHURIAN RAILWAY NETWORK BY USING ARGUMENT UNPAID LOANS TO SECURE BEST SETTLEMENT. BOTH SIDES APPREHENSIVE INCREASED BANDIT ACTIVITIES. SOVIETS APPREHENSIVE RE JAPANESE ACTIVITIES TSITSIHAR AND TAONAN AREAS. REPORTED CONCENTRATION SOVIET TROOPS MANCHULI.

Recd in the Code Room in Service Cipher at 0600, 27 October, 1931.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
NARS Date

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
NARS Date 3/19/73

RECEIVED
OCT 28 1931

31

1 1608

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON

In reply refer to No. 27 October, 1931.
Op-16-B-12

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Memorandum for the Department of State.

The following communication, dated 27 October, 1931, was received by radio from the Naval Attache, American Legation, Peiping, China, at 10:20 A.M. this date, and is transmitted herewith for information:

5220 NPG

FROM	NAVAL ATTACHE PEIPING
TO	DIRECTOR NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
INFO	CINC ASIATIC -----AMERICAN MINISTER CHINA

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Read in the Code Room in Service Cipher at 0600, 27 October, 1931.

1 1609

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
OCT 29 1931
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
CONFIDENTIAL

In reply refer to No.
Op-16-B-12

27 October, 1931

CONFIDENTIAL

Memorandum for the Department of State.

The following communication, dated 27 October, 1931, was received by radio from the Naval Attache, American Legation, Peiping, China, at 10:20 A.M. this date, and is transmitted herewith for information:

5220 NPG
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TO DIRECTOR NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
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Recd in the Code Room in Service Cipher at 0600, 27 October, 1931.

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated FROM
to anyone.

TOKIO

Dated November 4, 1931

Rec'd 8:40 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RECEIVED

DIVISION OF

URGENT.

204, November 4, 5 p. m.

As the Ambassador is due in the morning I am taking
the liberty of holding the memorandum until his arrival.

The Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs told me last
night that the Japanese Government were preparing a state-
ment for the League on the 16th. He said that he was not
able to tell me what it is but that Baron Shidehara is
working with other members of the Government to find
a solution that will allow negotiations to begin.

I earnestly urge that we do nothing that will associate
us with the action of the League. The temper of the
Japanese public is such that the Government will not be
able to withdraw troops from Manchuria by the (#) unless
negotiations with China have begun by that time. I do

not believe

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 4 1931
Department of State

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NOV

REP

2- #204, from Tokio, Nov. 4, 5 p.m.

not believe that we can accomplish it by a note.

Local public is convinced that the League resolution was put through by the British with the aid of the French for the sole purpose of injuring Japanese interests in China. I do not see what American interest can be served by gratuitously supporting the resolution which we had no hand in framing and for which we are not responsible.

The strength of our position lies in the fact that we have held aloof and have not attempted to pass judgment. We can best help the disputants by preserving our strictly neutral attitude in the dispute so long as it does not lead to war, which I consider improbable. Neither side I believe suspects our motives at present. We can do more good by keeping an independent position and offering our help to get them together.

If we associate ourselves with the resolution which Japan voted against we place ourselves in the position of taking sides in a League dispute with which we are not concerned it would weaken our influence on the side of peace in Japan and will accomplish nothing that I can see in

settling

REP

3- #204, from Tokio, Nov. 4, 5 p.m.

settling the Manchurian question.

I earnestly request consideration of the advisability
of omitting from the memorandum all reference to the
League resolution.

NEVILLE

WSB

(*) apparent omission

1 161

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gutzfom NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
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Charge to
\$

Department of State

Washington,

November 5, 1931.

793.94/2465
AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (Japan).

219 *Confidential* 2465
Your 204, November 4, 5 p. m. and Department 218 Nov 4 East/Foreign

One. Adverting to, the points, which you, make, and for the,
Embassy's, information, and further guidance, you will, remember
that, I have, undertaken, to reenforce, action, taken by, the
League, as far as, may be, practicable, reserving, however, my,
right of, complete, independence of, action. I am, under no,
misapprehension, with regard to, the, probability, that the,
Japanese Government, will not be able to, withdraw, its, troops,
from, Manchuria, by the, date, specified, in the, Council's,
resolution, of October, 24. You will note, that I, have not,
repeat, not, given, unqualified, endorsement, of the, terms of,
the resolution, I have, deliberately, refrained from, mentioning,
a date, I feel, however, that the, League, made a, sincere,
effort, to offer, a, constructive, contribution, and I, do not,
overlook, the fact that, the Japanese, and the Chinese, representa-
tives made, definite commitments, respectively, for their,
Governments, in the, resolution, of September, 30, which was,
unanimously, adopted. The point on which we associate ourselves
with the action of the League is that settlement of long

outstanding

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

793.94/2465

1 1614

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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1-138
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Department of State

- 2 -

Washington,

outstanding issues should not be made a condition precedent to the withdrawal of Japanese armed forces and that the presence of those armed forces should not be availed of by the Japanese Government as an instrumentality for bringing pressure to bear upon China in the negotiations. This we regard as fundamental.

With regard to public opinion, I recognize the force of what you report, but I am at the same time of the impression that public opinion in Japan while not wholly within the determination of the Government, is susceptible of being guided and influenced in no small measure by the Government. And that, when the Japanese public is strongly of a particular opinion, especially in cases where that opinion relates to interpretation of an action such as that taken by the Council as expressed in the Resolution, the Government may with warrant be assumed to have contributed to its formation. However that may be, it is impossible to formulate our decisions as to action with solicitude solely for the views, right or wrong, of the public in one only of the several countries which are concerned. I do not believe that any government is attempting to injure Japan. The situation is of concern to the whole world and the various governments are trying to give due consideration and weight to a

Enciphered by very considerable number of factors, involving

Sent by operator M., 19

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1958 1-138

1 1615

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
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Department of State

Washington,

- 3 -

1-128
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a wide range.

There are evidences that, from the beginning, Japan's effort has been ~~made~~ to prevent concerted or cooperative action by the governments which are members of the League and the Government of the United States; also, to create the impression that there is a difference in objective. In seeking to prevent war and to bring about a solution by peaceful means, my objective and that of the Council are identical! It is imperative that it should be understood that we stand for the same principles. I have so far refrained from passing judgment, and I wish throughout the matter to maintain an impartial attitude. I have no desire to take sides as between China and Japan, but when twelve other powers have indicated that they differ

from

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M.,, 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-128

1 1616

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-100
PREPARING OFFICE
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1-138

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Department of State

Washington,

- 4 -

from Japan with regard to fundamental considerations, in connection with which obligations and interests of the United States are similarly involved, silence on the part of the United States would imply taking sides with Japan contra the views expressed by the others, and I do not intend to stand aloof and inactive leaving the whole burden of action to the others.)

Two. For your strictly confidential information, simultaneously with transmitting my views as expressed in the memorandum to the Japanese Government, and in connection with the suggestion made in the memorandum that there are several methods and agencies which might be invoked for relieving tension and achieving a peaceful settlement, I am bringing, through the French Ambassador here, to the attention of M. Briand, President of the Council, a suggestion, in line with a thought (which I understand to have been already in the minds of both the Japanese and the Chinese Governments and of M. Briand, that the impasse might be resolved by resort on the part of ^{the} two Governments to the method of direct negotiations in the presence of neutral observers, as was done in connection with the Shantung question. I hope that, sooner or later, a

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Sent by operator M., 19

1 1617

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

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1-138

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CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

- 5 -

a definite proposal of this sort will emanate from the Japanese Government.

Three. In summary, while I have associated the view of this Government with that of the League, in relation to, a point, which I believe, fundamental and against which I believe, that, Japan, cannot, hold out, without, forfeiting, the, good, opinion of the, whole world, I have, expressed my, views, moderately, and in conciliatory, terms, and I have, at the same time, suggested to, the President of the Council, a possible, and what, seems to me, practicable, method for, avoiding a deadlock.

Stimson

FE 9 ADH

CR

Nov 5, 1931.

FE:SKH/ZMF

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Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1930 1-138

1 1618

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
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Department of State

1-128

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Washington,

November 3, 1931.

793-94
P.C. 50
217
AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (Japan).

NOV 3 31

CONFIDENTIAL.

One. Please read and deliver to the Minister for Foreign Affairs immediately, as a memorandum, the text which follows:

QUOTE My Government acknowledges the receipt of the Japanese Government's note of October 24, 1931, in reply to its note of October 21, 1931. 2317 2245a

My Government notes with satisfaction the reference of the Japanese Government to the Pact of Paris and the assurance that it is the settled aim of the Japanese Government to compose its differences with China by none but pacific means.

My Government notes also the statement that the Japanese railway guards in taking military measures in Manchuria since the night of September 18 last have been actuated solely by the necessity of defending themselves and of protecting the South Manchuria Railway and the lives and property of Japanese subjects against attacks by Chinese troops and armed bandits.

It is clear that the events of the last few weeks affect the rights and interests not only of Japan and China, but of the many nations which have relations with these two countries,

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-128

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793.94/2465A

1 0619
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
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1-138
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Department of State

Washington,

- 2 -

and
which are associated with both by ties of friendship and of reciprocal advantage as well as by the more formal ties of treaty relationship, and it is because of this that the United States, along with other nations similarly situated, has felt not only free but in duty bound to express its views.

From the information in its possession, my Government cannot escape the conclusion that in the efforts to protect the South Manchuria Railway and the lives and property of Japanese subjects against attack a situation has been created in Manchuria which gives Japan substantial control of Southern Manchuria and has, temporarily, at least, destroyed the administrative integrity of China in this region. On this my Government neither attributes motives nor passes judgment, but desires solely to point out the fact.

It appears to my Government that there are two separate and distinct points to be considered. First, the peaceful solution of the present unfortunate situation in Manchuria, and, second, a solution through direct negotiation of the various matters at issue between Japan and China arising from misunderstanding as to the respective rights of the two nations as claimed under various treaties.

With regard to the first point, my Government cannot

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

1 1627

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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1-128
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Washington,

- 3 -

escape the conclusion that effective withdrawal of the Japanese troops within the railway lines would destroy ^{the} ~~any~~ idea, either on the part of China or of outside nations, that Japan intends to use military pressure to bring about a settlement of the broader issues. That it is not the Japanese Government's intention thus to exert pressure has already been clearly indicated in the statement issued by the Japanese Government in Tokyo on October 27. It is further the belief of my Government that the second and broader question cannot appropriately be settled until the first has been disposed of. The withdrawal of the troops, as soon as this can be safely accomplished in the present emergency, would inevitably create a more favorable atmosphere in which negotiations may be carried on, and would also constitute an impressive demonstration to the world of Japan's often repeated assertion that it has no territorial ambitions in Manchuria and that it intends strictly to abide by the treaties guaranteeing the administrative integrity of China and providing for the settlement of all controversies solely by pacific means.

It is in the light of the above that my Government
has

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Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1968 1-128

1 1621

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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1-128
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Department of State

Washington,

- 4 -

has noted with regret and concern that at the meeting of the Council of the League of Nations, the representative of the Japanese Government should have insisted that these broader matters, which would seem to have little direct bearing on the immediate situation, should be discussed and be disposed of by negotiations between Japan and China in advance of the withdrawal of Japanese troops from the points of occupation outside the railway zone.

As to the second point, the settlement of the broader issues involved in the treaty rights, my Government is in complete sympathy with the desire of the Japanese Government to obtain a solution which will be satisfactory to both parties and which, being so, would give promise of permanence. It cannot bring itself to feel, however, that the solution of these broader issues should be made a condition precedent to the solution of the present situation in Manchuria. My Government further takes occasion to state that if negotiation of these broader issues, subsequently undertaken, should not eventuate in a conclusion acceptable to both parties, there exist numerous

Enciphered by _____ methods

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

1 162

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
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Department of State

Washington,

- 5 -

methods or agencies of arbitral, conciliatory, or
judicial settlement, which might be invoked by Japan and
by China, including methods or agencies in the creation
of which both countries have participated. Recourse to
one or another of these might not only facilitate arrival
at an equitable settlement but would result in the
assurance to both the Japanese and the Chinese Govern-
ments that the settlement so arrived at would enlist
the approval and support of public opinion throughout
the world.

My Government finds confirmation of its views as
expressed above in its scrutiny of the position taken by
the Council of the League of Nations as expressed in the
resolution adopted by the Council on September 30 and in
the draft resolution upon which thirteen members of the
Council gave affirmative vote on October 24. My Govern-
ment hopes that the Japanese Government will find it
possible to share the view of those nations that
negotiations looking to the settlement of longstanding
issues between Japan and China ought not be made a
condition precedent to the evacuation of the occupied
positions

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M.,, 19.....

1 162

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

Department of State

Washington,

- 6 -

positions and by so doing avail itself of the opportunity presented to refute conclusively any implication that exertion of military pressure was in any way intended to affect the process of arriving at a settlement of the points at issue. My Government confidently hopes that both Japan and China will be guided by the spirit of the resolutions above referred to and will make every possible effort to follow a course consistent therewith.

UNQUOTE

~~Two. A copy of this text is being communicated in confidence to the Council of the League of Nations. It will not for the time being be made public.~~

Shinson
AM

FE:SKH/ZMF

FE

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 80.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1968 1-138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Hutzfem NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GRAY

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated November 4, 1931



793.94
 with
 293.94118

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

*Telegram
 drafted to
 Peiping to Minister
 Nov. 3, 1931*

November 4, 10 a. m.

Following from American Consul General at Nanking:

"November 3, noon. The following note in English was
 received November 3, 10 a. m.:

'Waichiaopu, Nanking, November 2.

Excellency: Referring to my note of October 28 in
 which the Chinese Government invited the American Govern-
 ment to designate representatives to associate with the
 Chinese authorities in the taking over of places in
 Manchuria to be evacuated by Japanese troops, I have the
 honor to inform Your Excellency that the Chinese Government
 has appointed a commission for the reoccupation of evacuated
 territories which is composed of the following members:

Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo, Chairman, General Chang Tsin
 Hsiang, Mr. Chang Chun, Mr. Wu Te Chen, Dr. Lo Wen Kan,

Mr. Tang Erh Ho,

F/DEW

793.94/2466

1931 NOV 7 AM

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2- # from Shanghai, Nov. 4, 10 a. m.

Mr. Tang Erh Ho, Mr. Lin Chi.

The Chinese Government takes this opportunity to request the American Government to expedite the appointment of its representatives who, it is hoped, will speedily proceed to Manchuria and associate with the above mentioned Chinese officials.

I avail myself, et cetera. Signed Ching Lun, Frank W. Lee, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

His Excellency Mr. Nelson Trusler Johnson, American Minister."

JOHNSON

JHR

WWC

162F

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
 Charge Department
 or
 Charge to
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TELEGRAM SENT

1-138
 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

November 5, 1931.

AMERICAN LEGATION

PEIPING (CHINA).

NOV 5 31

409

For the Minister. Your November 4, 10 a.m. See
 Department's 103, October 27, 5 p.m., to the American
 Consul at Nanking for the Minister.

One. If you deem it necessary you may instruct
 Peck to reply orally to the Acting Minister for Foreign
 Affairs as before (reference your November 2, noon).

Two. For your confidential information the Depart-
 ment understands that the Chinese authorities have been
 privately advised by officials of the League, through
 unofficial and confidential channels, that the Chinese
 Government should exercise great prudence for the present
 in this matter inasmuch as the Council resolution of
 October 24 ^{lacks} ~~has no~~ binding force as unanimity was not
 reached.

793.94/2466

793.94/2466

FE: ESM: E.J.L.

FE

Stinson

5204

NOV 5 1931

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 80.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-128

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 4, 1931

Reo

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND

870, November 4, noon.

Legation's 867, November 4, 9 a. m.

Following is continuation of Harbin's November 3, 5
p. m., dated November 3, 12 a. m., just received:

"Three. The Japanese Consul at Tsitsihar, Shigimidzu,
and a Japanese colonel (Chinese name Lin) representing
General Honjo, acting under instructions of the Japanese
Government and Honjo, have informed Tsitsihar authorities,
who have already started to repair damaged bridges north
of Nonni River, that the South Manchuria Railway Company
which has a financial interest in the Tao - Ang Railway
and which desires to facilitate the movement of the bean
crop over this and the South Manchuria Railway Lines,
desired to repair these destroyed bridges. According to

General Ma,

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 4 1931
Department of State

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 4 1931
Department of State

F/DEW

793.94/2467

1931 21 NOV

FILED

REP

2- #870, from Peiping, Nov. 4, noon.

General Ma, the Colonel stated that the South Manchuria Railway would commence repairs on November 4th, protected by one hundred Japanese troops if necessary.

Four. Last night General Ma gave me a copy in Chinese of the memorandum which he stated Colonel Lin left with the Commissioner of Foreign Affairs yesterday morning.

(END PART ONE).

ENGERT

GW

WWC

REF

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 4, 1931

Rec'd 7:51 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

870, November 4, noon, (PART TWO).

This memorandum states that the Chinese troops on both sides shall be withdrawn ten kilometres to the North and South from the bridge and during the period when the bridges are being repaired no troops of either shall be allowed to enter the region so set off between the two sides. The time when it is expected that the repair work will be finished shall be reported in advance to both sides. Refusal to accept the demands or any interference with the repair work will be considered as a hostile act toward the Japanese troops, in which case Japan will use military force".

Four. Although I am not positive that Colonel Lin handed such a memorandum to the Chinese authorities, circumstances are such that there appears much truth in the Chinese contention. General Ma said that his troops are outside of ten kilometre zone, that he would not resist the Japanese

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

(Part Two).
2- #870, from Peiping, Nov. 4, noon

the Japanese attempt to repair the bridges nor the Japanese
troops, but that he would resist any attempt of Chang's
troops to
(END PART TWO).

ENGERT

WWO

GW

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CJH

FROM GRAY
PEIPING via N. R.
Dated November 4, 1931
Rec'd. 9:20 a.m.

RECEIVED

NOV 4 1931

DIVISION OF

Secretary of State,

Washington.

870, November 4, noon. PART THREE.

cross the bridge after repairs had been made. He feared that the Japanese troops would get behind Chang's troops and force them over the bridge, causing a fight in which Japanese troops would be involved.

Five. Local Chinese wireless station states that it has received reports which confirm Ma's reports that about eight hundred Japanese soldiers have arrived at Taonanfu and adds that a Japanese armored train is now moving over the Tao-Ang line and approaching the bridge over the Noni River".

United Press reports from Geneva current here today that Japanese forces have occupied Tsitsihar are incorrect.

Repeated to Shanghai. End of message.

For the Minister,

ENGERT

WWC

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



PM RECD



LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Riga, Latvia.

NOV. 4 21

October 26, 1931. Division of



F/DEW

793.94/2468

793.94

CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 8169

FOR DISTRIBUTION - CHECK		Yes	No
To the Field			
In U. S.			

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to report for the information of the Department that, through the courtesy of a member of the Latvian Foreign Office staff, I have been enabled to glance at a memorandum which was left with the Latvian Foreign Office on October 10th by the Japanese Charge d'Affaires. I understand that the memorandum was purely in order to keep the Minister of Foreign Affairs

no FE
11/5/31
RH

NOV 11 1931

-2-

Affairs, as Minister of a member nation of the League of Nations, properly informed. The memorandum began by setting forth Japan's sincere desire, and constant efforts in recent years, to cultivate and forward amicable and mutually advantageous relations with China. Nevertheless, the document continues, many events have of late taken place in China which proved extremely "irritating to Japanese public opinion." These culminated recently by Chinese soldiers tearing up a portion of the southern Manchurian railway. Inasmuch as there were only very ^{small} numbers of Japanese troops in the railway zone, which were faced by overwhelming forces of Chinese soldiers, the Japanese military authorities found themselves under the necessity to disarm a portion of them. The memorandum states that Japan harbors no territorial ambitions in the region under discussion.

On the 21st of this month, the Charge d'Affaires delivered to the Foreign Office portions of a Note delivered by the Japanese Government to the League of Nations on October 10. The text of this is not complete, evidently having been delivered more or less as it came on the wire.

Respectfully yours,

Felix Cole

Felix Cole
Charge d'Affaires a.i.

710 Japan-China.

FC/mhg

JM

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 861.74/57 FOR #1223

FROM Germany (Gordon) DATED Oct. 21, 1931
TO NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Japanese intervention in Manchuria.
Translation of an article of October 19 from German press
commenting upon fact that now the Moscow radio is taking
strong stand against -- as result of enlistment in Japanese
army of former White Russian guards and troops.

leb

793.94/2469

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 841.00 P. R./202 FOR Despatch 2828

FROM Great Britain (Atherton) DATED Oct. 19, 1931
TO _____ NAME _____ 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Manchuria and League of Nations. No dissent to general view that League of Nations is being tried by most serious test of its existence in seeking a peaceful settlement of present dispute between Japan and China. Response in Great Britain to developments which led to attendance of a representative of U. S. Government at deliberations of League is entirely favorable.

793.94/2470

3

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Manchuria and the League of Nations.

There is no dissent to the general view that the League of Nations is being tried by the most serious test of its existence in seeking a peaceful settlement of the present dispute between Japan and China. The Council was called together on the 13th, one day in advance of the scheduled date, an occasion marked by the presence of Lord Reading for the first time since his appointment as Minister for Foreign Affairs. While the imminence of war was presumably sufficient to persuade Lord Reading of the need of his attendance at Geneva, it may be reasonable also to suppose that the fact of the League being required for the first time to prevent a breach of the peace over a dispute in which a Great Power is involved, made necessary the presence of one able to speak with the highest authority for Great Britain. It is apparent that it is this challenge to the organic purpose of the League that most concerns the British public, which feels that doubt over the ability of the League to impose its will upon the Great Powers must keep alive the universal sense of insecurity. The anxiety, therefore, to see the League give tangible evidence that it has substantial reasons for its existence has

predominated/

-16-

predominated over a disposition to sympathize with Japan's complaints of Chinese aggravation. The British press universally contends that, whatever the grievances may have been, the use of force to exact compliance is entirely repugnant to the principles which inspired the formation of the League and of the Kellogg Pact. The feeling prevails that if these two instruments are not effective in preventing war, further efforts towards reduction of armament and the settlement of disputes by pacific means will be useless.

The response in this country to the developments which led to the attendance of a representative of the American Government at the deliberations of the League is entirely favorable. It may be succinctly described by quoting the following paragraph from the ECONOMIST:

"This is an event of first-class importance; for it has removed, at a stroke, in this Manchurian crisis, one complication - the uncertainty about American intentions - which has always been reckoned among the League's major unsolved problems hitherto. In taking this line, the Administration at Washington can count upon carrying American public opinion with them; for the traditional American horror of foreign entanglements is limited, like the similar British feeling, to the European Continent. There is an instinctive assumption in American minds that the affairs of the Far East, unlike the affairs of Europe, are an American concern. Thus, though the League finds itself confronted this week with the task of prevailing upon one member which is a Great Power, it is fortified by the assurance that one of the two Great Powers outside the League is working whole-heartedly with the League on this occasion. As for the other non-League Great Power, Japan, she has

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

-17-

not yet made any sign. Yet it can hardly
be supposed that, with her heavy stakes in
North Manchuria, she wishes to see Japan get
her own way in South Manchuria by main force."

1 6 3 c

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 30, 1931.

Digest of
Newspaper Items.

THE UNDER SECRETARY

NOV 31 1931

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

793.94
NEW YORK TIMES:

Moscow despatch, October 29 (Walter Duranty):

"The Soviet Foreign Office today publishes the somewhat acid exchange of remarks between Acting Foreign Commissar Karakhan and Japanese Ambassador Hirota. Both sets of remarks contain one sharply pointed sentence."

"The Japanese remarks conclude with this sharp sentence:

'Thus arises the danger that the sphere of conflict might be enlarged.'

"This, following upon the assertion that it is the Japanese intention to 'take necessary measure of protection' for the safety of Japanese citizens and property in the Taonan-Tsitsihar zone, has clearly a threatening significance.

"M. Karakhan replies by a full denial of Soviet support to General Ma or any other group in Manchuria, and by reiteration of Soviet neutrality and Soviet determination faithfully to observe its treaties. Then, he adds, no less pointedly than the Japanese:

'The Soviet Government considers that the policy of military occupation, applied under whatever form of so-called protection of interests and nationals, is inconsistent with the peaceful policy of the Soviet Union and with the interests of world peace.'

CBC:EJL

F/DEW

793.94/2471

WALTER DURANTY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

U.
FE

Digest of
Newspaper Items
(Continued)

October 30, 1931.

NEW YORK TIMES

Shanghai despatch, October 29 (Hallett Abend), states that as Russian movements indicating an intention to intervene in North Manchuria become more definite, Japan's attitude is stiffening. It is anticipated that the first Russian action will be under the guise of restoring military guards on the Chinese Eastern Railway.

The Japanese Consul has demanded that the Chinese authorities of Heilungkiang Province grant immediate permission to repair damaged sections of the Taonan-Tsitsihar Railway. The Consul is leaving for Tokyo, after noting the arrival from the west of Chinese railway guards, armed with Russian munitions.

Serious clashes between Japanese and Chinese troops are reported from (1) Mokwantzu and (2) Wantafu near Ikwashou. Several hundred casualties are reported.

NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE

Moscow despatch, October 29 (Ralph W. Barnes), reports that Karakhan, acting Foreign Commissar, told the Japanese

Ambassador

- 2 -

Ambassador that the Soviet Government, was following and intended to continue to follow a policy of "strict non-interference" in the Manchurian crisis. He denied that Moscow was aiding Chinese armies operating in Manchuria.

The Ambassador is quoted as follows: "Were Soviet armies to be sent to the Chinese Eastern Railway Zone . . . the Japanese Government would be compelled to adopt necessary measures for the protection of its citizens . . . and of the Taonan-Tsitsihar Railway, which was constructed with Japanese money."

Nanking despatch, October 29 (A. P.), reports the arrival of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang at Nanking to confer with Chiang Kai-shek.

Mukden article September 30 (Victor Keen), is the third of a series of four articles appearing in the HERALD TRIBUNE, in regard to Manchuria.

NEW YORK TIMES

Tokyo despatch, October 29, reports an encounter between 1,000 Chinese "bandits" and 200 Japanese troops at Chenchiatun, resulting in the killing of 180 Chinese.

Paris despatch, October 29, states that Ambassador Yoshizawa, Japanese delegate to the League of Nations had a conference with Briand regarding the Manchuria situation. Briand is reported to have again suggested that Japan accept a general declaration from China, recognizing her
treaty

- 3 -

treaty obligations, but the delegate maintained that negotiations should take place directly between Japan and China. He agreed to refer the suggestion to Tokyo.

Shanghai despatch, October 29, states that the Canton delegation to the Nanking-Canton peace conference at Shanghai, condemned Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang "and the others responsible for the non-resistance policy against the Japanese in Manchuria. This is an indirect challenge to Chiang Kai-shek who concurred in the non-resistance policy, leaving China's case to the League of Nations.

Washington despatch, October 29, states that Gilbert, the American representative at the recent League of Nations session, has been instructed to ascertain whether the governments represented on the Council are willing to have the United States publish its notes to Japan and China and their replies.

EBL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

D
This message **TELEGRAM RECEIVED**
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone.

Tokyo,


Dated November 5 1931,

FROM

Rec'd 6:57 A. M.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

RECEIVED
NOV 5 1931
DIVISION OF



URGENT, 206, November 5, 4 p. m.

Your telegram number 218.

I delivered the memorandum at 3 p. m. I had a long
and conciliatory talk with the Foreign Minister a summary
of which I shall transmit later.

FORBES

HPD

F/DEW

793.94/2472

FILED
NOV 9 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

N. E. LEWITT
VICE-PRESIDENT

HARRY A. JUNG
PRESIDENT
R. W. BURTON
SECRETARY AND TREASURER

H. RALPH BURTON
GENERAL COUNSEL

NATIONAL PATRIOTIC LEAGUE
UNION TRUST BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D. C.

November 3, 1931.

Honorable Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

A distinct and very serious violation of solemn treaty obligations, incurred within the past four years, has been and still is being committed, by associating a representative of this government with the League Council whose deliberations must be under the provisions of the League Covenant by which it was created and by which it exists. It is no more nor less than an attempt to apply the principle of force to the Kellogg Peace Pact by lending to it the enforcement provisions of the League Covenant and this in spite of the fact that the fundamental basis is the renunciation of war and the repudiation of force in the settlement of disputes. To attempt justification of this act upon the basis that the Council of the League of Nations is acting only in accord with the Kellogg Peace Pact is useless, for the reason that the fundamental basis of the League Covenant and that of the Kellogg Peace Pact are diametrically opposed, one being based upon the renunciation of war and the use of force, and the other upon the use of force "to protect the covenants of the League". To become in

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 5 1931
CHICAGO OFFICE
WAY BUILDING

RECEIVED

NOV 13 1931
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

F/DEW

793.94/2473

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NOV 19 1931
FILED

anyway associated with the League of Nations is to violate the Kellogg Peace Pact, a solemn treaty entered into by this country, for the reason that the United States is the only signatory to the Kellogg Peace Pact which has not reserved the right to engage in war under the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations. It would therefore become an actual violation of the treaty in question for us to lend our moral or actual support to the League of Nations by having a representative present at the deliberations of the Council regardless of what limitations may be attempted as to his activities, because we as a nation, under the Kellogg Peace Pact agreed that:

"The settlement or the solution of all disputes or conflicts, or whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means."

Compare this un-equivocal repudiation of military force with provisions of Article XVI of the Covenant of the League, as follows:

"It shall be the duty of the council in such case (resort to war) to recommend to the several governments concerned what effective military, naval or air force the members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League.

The members of the League agree further that they will mutually support one another in the financial and economic measures, which are taken under this article, in order to minimize the loss and inconvenience resulting from the above measures, and that they will mutually support one another in resisting any special measures aimed at one of their number by the covenant-breaking state, and that they will take the necessary steps to afford passage through their territory of the forces of any of the members of the League which are cooperating to protect the covenants of the League."

How then would it be possible for this country to properly associate itself with the other nations of the world represented in the Council of the League of Nations, which has just acted in the Sino-Japanese situation

4

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

under the provisions of Article XI of the Covenant? It is quite absurd to attempt justification by saying that Mr. Gilbert as our representative, sitting with the Council did not vote for that resolution for he could not vote when the United States is not a member of the League. To even lend his presence in the deliberations of the Council, which clearly is acting under the provisions of the Covenant, is certainly out of accord with the basic principles enunciated in the Kellogg Peace Pact.

In corroboration of all that I have said with reference to the pledges of this government and the other signatories to the Kellogg Peace Pact, I refer you to the notes exchanged between the United States and other powers in June 20, 1927 -- August 27, 1928, which will be found in a publication issued by your Department, for therein you will find that every nation which signed the Kellogg Peace Pact, except the United States, reserved to itself the right to engage in war in support of its obligations under any former treaty to which it was a party, such as the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Locarno Treaties, for which reason it becomes impossible for the United States to associate itself in anyway with the activities of the League of Nations without deliberately violating its obligations under the Kellogg Peace Pact.

Just before adjournment, October 24, 1931, a resolution was approved by the Council, directed to Japan under the provisions of Article XI of the Covenant of the League with which the Kellogg Peace Pact has nothing whatever to do, and during the deliberations on that resolution, and at

4

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

the time it passed, Mr. Prentiss Gilbert was sitting with the Council. It is without point to say that his activities were limited to discussions based upon the Kellogg Peace Pact because he remained at the conference table until the moment of adjournment, and up until October 29 he had received no instructions to withdraw before November 16th when the ultimatum to Japan expires. There is but one other alternative, if Japan fails to comply with the terms of the resolution, provided of course that the League intends to continue to function, and that it is to proceed under Article XVI of the Covenant, quoted above. Certainly before such an event can occur, Mr. Gilbert should be instructed to disassociate himself from the deliberations of the Council.

Very truly yours,

H. Ralph Burton
Vice President and
General Counsel.

1 1648

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

November 17, 1931

In reply refer to
WE 793.94/2473

Mr. H. Ralph Burton,
Vice President, National Patriotic League,
Union Trust Building,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

At the direction of the Secretary, the receipt is acknowledged of your letter of November 3, opposing, as inconsistent with the terms of the Kellogg Pact, the participation of the United States in the deliberations of the League of Nations.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

Pierre del Boal, Chief,
Division of Western European Affairs.

W
WE:ES:FB:88

3R
Nov. 18 1931.PM



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gutzman NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

NOV 1 1931

October 30, 1931.

DIVISION OF

RELATIONS AND RECORDS

SKH:

1. So long as there is actual danger to life and property of foreigners and Chinese, as well as Japanese, in the territory now occupied by Japanese troops, should those troops be immediately withdrawn into the railway zone, we can not reasonably expect that Japan will effect such a withdrawal.

2. So long as there is a threat of armed intervention by Russia, either directly or indirectly, in the present dispute - an eventuality of which there have been a number of indications - it can not reasonably be expected that Japan will withdraw her dispositions made with that possibility in view.

3. The introduction of Chinese troops for the purpose of maintaining order in areas adjacent to the railway zone now occupied by Japanese troops would simply create new possibilities of further incidents. This danger would be increased rather than diminished if such Chinese troops were accompanied by neutral representatives.

4. We have contended that the status quo ante could not now be restored; and while we sincerely regret the steps that have been taken by the Japanese military in the occupation of positions outside of the railway zone and in the

F/DEW

793.94/2474

NOV 6 1931

- 2 -

the disrupting of communications and civil administrations, these things unfortunately are now an accomplished fact and it is "a condition and not a theory" which confronts us.

5. We have been cooperating with the Council of the League, in its attempts at settling this dispute, in so far as the Pact of Paris was concerned. Our obligations under that Pact have, for the time being, been carried out by our exchange of notes with the Japanese and Chinese Governments on that subject.

6. The League in the resolution adopted by thirteen members of the Council on October 24

(a). calls upon the Japanese Government to begin immediately and to proceed progressively with the withdrawal of its troops into the railway zone, so that the total withdrawal may be effected before the date fixed for the next meeting of the Council;

(b). calls upon the Chinese Government to make such arrangements for taking over the territory thus evacuated as will insure the safety of the lives and property of Japanese subjects there, and requests the Chinese Government to associate with the Chinese authorities designated for the above purpose representatives of other powers in order that such representatives may follow the execution of the arrangements.

7.

- 3 -

7. If our previous conclusions as to the nature and possibilities of the existing situation are correct, we could not reasonably expect either the Japanese or the Chinese Governments to carry out their obligations under this resolution by an early fixed date as contemplated in the resolution. This resolution seems to have been framed as much with the idea of supporting the authority of the Council as of meeting the existing situation with a practical solution.

8. In the meantime, the NEW YORK TIMES of this morning (October 30, 1931,) publishes a despatch from Paris dated October 29 to the effect that M. Briand and Mr. Yoshizawa are engaged in conversations along the line suggested by Mr. Drummond, personally and informally, to Mr. Sato, namely, that Japan accept the general declaration from China recognizing her treaty obligations as a first step toward an accord; and that while Mr. Yoshizawa was non-committal on the subject he agreed to make inquiries from his Government and to communicate with M. Briand. "The latter has not abandoned hope of arriving at a compromise."

9. It is suggested therefore that any communication or statement that is made at this time be directed toward assisting this hopeful effort to reach a compromise agreement between Japan and China to proceed to a settlement of their

- 4 -

their difficulties by negotiations based on treaties rather than to revive issues arising from the Pact of Paris (which for the time being have been disposed of) or by introducing new elements into the discussion by invoking the Nine-Power Treaty (which may be held in reserve for possible future use as the situation develops).

⇒ 10. To this end it is suggested that the best way to proceed would be

(a). to inform the Japanese Ambassador orally of our position as stated above in an endeavor to overcome Japan's apparently obstinate refusal to settle the question on any other than her own terms and only by direct negotiations with China without the assistance or advice of any outside parties;

(b). to be ready to impress upon the Chinese Government in a similar way our conviction that China must eventually accept her own accountability and settle the difficulty by direct negotiations with Japan rather than by shielding herself behind the League and the United States;

(c). to inform M. Briand, either through Drummond or through the French Ambassador here, of our attitude toward the Council's resolution of October 24 and to recall to him the method pursued in the settlement of the Shantung question which was suggested some time ago through Mr. Gilbert as a possible way out of the present situation.

RAM.
FE:RSM:EJL

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

793.94
note
500.0112
REP

FROM

RECEIVED

NOV 4 1931

DIVISION OF

WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Geneva

Dated November 3, 1931

Received 8:50 a. m. 4th

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

NOV 5 1931

Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

276, November 3, 10 a. m.

The following are the essential points in a conversation which took place between Drummond and Sze last evening:

One. Sze presented a note from the Chinese Government dated November 3 accompanied by a memorandum (the note and memorandum are being transmitted as sections two and three, respectively, of this telegram).

Two. Sze called specially attention to the seizure of the salt revenue by the Japanese military authorities and pointed out that this was a distinct interference with the Chinese administration and contrary to pledges given by the Japanese representative. He stated his fear that the situation was growing much worse. He declared he was considering whether he should not ask an earlier meeting of the Council. He feared that if the Council did not move until

793.94/2475

RECEIVED
NOV 11 1931

REP

2- #276, from Geneva, Nov. 3, 10 a.m

until November 16 it might be confronted with a most grave situation. He expressed his belief that the Japanese advance was causing anxiety to the U. S. S. R. and it might well develop that by November 16 additional complications might arise through difficulties between the U. S. S. R. and Japan. He envisaged that the Japanese might ask the Council for assurances for the safety and property of their nationals from Russian as well as from Chinese elements.

Three. Drummond replied that the news in the Chinese note under reference alarmed him and that he would transmit it at once to the members of the Council. He could not advise whether an earlier meeting of the Council was desirable or not but he felt that the President and members of the Council would take the note into consideration in this connection.

Four. Sze made clear that he was in no way presenting a request for an earlier meeting of the Council, as he preferred that such a decision should emanate from the Council.

(END SECTION ONE).

GILBERT

WSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GREEN

Geneva

Dated November 3, 1931

Rec'd 1 p. m. 4th.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

276, November 3, 10 a. m. (SECTION TWO)

The following is the text of the Chinese note of
November 3rd:

"The Chinese Government is gravely concerned over the developments in Manchuria since the adjournment of the Council. The attached memorandum which contains a summary of these developments shows that, although ten ~~days~~ have elapsed since the adjournment of the Council on October 24 and more than a month since the adjournment of September 30, not only has there been not the slightest preparation for withdrawal but on the contrary the Japanese Army is steadily extending and consolidating its grip on South Manchuria and is making attempts to penetrate into North Manchuria that are causing anxiety in Moscow.

It may be

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

"
 3-#276, from Geneva, Nov. 3, 10 a.m.
 "

It may be remembered that in the resolution of September 30 which was accepted by and is binding upon Japan it was stated that the Japanese Government "will continue as rapidly as possible the withdrawal of its troops which has already been begun into the railway zone in proportion as the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals is effectively assured." The declaration made over a month ago that withdrawal had already been begun is unfortunately not substantiated by the facts. Not only has withdrawal not been begun but the Japanese Government now refuses to honor the promise it made before the Council and declares that it will not begin withdrawal until it has negotiated an agreement with China on certain "fundamental principles". This new policy was set forth in the Japanese Government's note to the Chinese Government on October 9 and again before the Council on October 23 and 24. This position was reiterated a few days ago when the Japanese Government refused to appoint representatives to discuss with the representatives of the Chinese Government the details and methods of withdrawal as proposed in the resolution

REP

3- #276, from Geneva, Nov. 3, 10 a.m.

the resolution submitted by the Council on October 22 (referred to by this office as the October 24 resolution). The measures proposed in this resolution which retains its full moral force are merely indications of how to carry out the policy to which both parties were pledged by the resolution of September 30. It is this which makes the Japanese Government's changed attitude and insistence upon an agreement upon "fundamental principles" by means of direct negotiations as a preliminary to withdrawal, so profoundly disquieting.

This attitude of Japan as was pointed out in the Council on October 23 and 24 is in violation of Article 10 of the Covenant and Article 2 of the Pact of Paris. The Chinese Government must reiterate its firm determination never in any circumstances to agree to negotiations under the pressure of military occupation and confidently looks to the members of the League and the United States not to suffer the Covenant, the Pact of Paris and the Washington Nine Power Treaty to be trampled under foot."

(END SECTION TWO).

GILBERT

WSB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GREEN

Geneva

Dated November 3, 1931

Rec'd 3:55 p. m. 4th.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

276, November 3, 10 a. m. (SECTION THREE).

The following is the text of the memorandum accompanying the Chinese note of November 3rd:

"The following is a digest of the information received in cablegrams from Nanking during the last three days:

One. Means to assure withdrawal.

The Chinese Government has appointed a commission to arrange with the representatives of the Japanese Government the details of withdrawal, taking over the evacuated areas and assuring the safety of the lives and property of Japanese subjects in those areas. This Commission is composed as follows: Chairman Mr. V. K. Wellington Koo. Members: Messrs. Chang Tso Hsiang, Chang Chun, Wou Tieh Chen, Lo Wen Kan, Tang Er Ho and Lui Chi.

On being notified of the appointment of this commission and requested to designate its own representatives, in

accordance

REP

2- #276, from Geneva, Nov. 3, 10 a.m.

accordance with paragraph five of the resolution proposed by the Council on October 22, the Japanese Government replied that this resolution was not in force, and that, with reference to the taking over of occupied places by the Chinese, the attitude of the Japanese Government had been indicated in its note of October 9th in reply to the Chinese Minister's note of October 5th. In its statement of October 26th the Japanese Government had again indicated its policy with regard to the settlement of the Manchurian affair; and that it was hoped that the Chinese Government would agree to this policy and enter into immediate negotiations for an agreement upon fundamental principles for reestablishing normal relations between Japan and China and the withdrawal of Japanese troops to the railway zone.

Two. Consolidation of the Japanese hold on South Manchuria.

General Honjo's headquarters recently informed Mr. Pearson, who is in the employ of the Ministry of Finance, that the entire salt revenue of Manchuria (\$24,000,000 annually) must go to the Mukden Government. This revenue is the security for various foreign loans, and any tampering with it

REP

3- #276, from Geneva, Nov.3, 10 a. m.

with it is a violation of international obligations. The recent Japanese raid on the customs office at Mukden it is feared foreshadows such activity, in accordance with the "independence" program of cutting the three eastern provinces financially loose from China.

A cable received today confirms the fact of the forcible seizure by the Japanese troops of salt revenue of Newchwang to the amount of \$760,000.

In Mukden, as reported in the German Government's communications to the Council of October 23 and confirmed by later reports from Nanking, the Japanese have appointed Japanese advisers to all the local, banks of issue and commercial establishments and are in general closely controlling the whole public life of the city.

The Japanese have collected and transported to Japan in 600 cases \$1,200,000 in cash. Over 300 army sheds have been constructed at Mukden and 40 at Chuliuh, where an artillery regiment and a cavalry detachment are preparing for a lengthy stay.

The Ministry of Railways: The Chinese owned Mukden-Hailun Railway was taken over by the Japanese on October 15
and is being

REP

4- #276, from Geneva, Nov. 3, 10 a.m.

and is being operated under their control.

Japanese troops have built a platform by force between Manchuria and Shinglungtien stations on the Peking-Mukden Railway for loading and unloading military stores.

Three. Fomenting disorder and extending Japanese influence. Japanese airplanes aided Mongolian bandits against Chinese troops at Tung Liao on October 31 and on the same date a Japanese armored train and two troop trains with several carloads of material left Chenghiatun for Chenchiatien.

On November 1 four Japanese armored trains arrived outside Shutao station and fired several shots at the city. There are several thousand Mongol bandits behind the Japanese troops preparing an attack on Tungliao.

Mongolian troops and brigands are plundering the Tsitsihar-Taonan Railway with Japanese assistance.

The Japanese are supplying Lin Yin Chin with ammunition to help his so-called self-defense army in making an attack on Chinchow to exterminate the influence in Manchuria of Marshal Chang Hsueh Liang, the representative of the Chinese Government.

The Chairman of the Provincial Government of Heilunkiang, the most northern of the Manchurian provinces, was visited

MAM

5- #276, from Geneva, November 3,
1931

visited by the representative of General Honjo with the demand that he repair the bridge over the Nonni River within a week, failing which it would be repaired by the Japanese troops. This move was undertaken in order to facilitate the crossing of the river by the Japanese protege Chang Hai Peng who is preparing to attack Heilunkiang. Later two Japanese representing General Honjo called upon the Chairman of the Heilunkiang Provincial Government and told him that Japanese could not recognize his authority because he had been appointed by the Chinese Government and ordered him to hand over his office to Chang Hai Peng on pain of being turned out by force.

The Japanese troops in Kirin Province have compelled the local gentry to present a petition to the Japanese staff requesting that Japanese troops remain to insure order and protectorates and have forced the self-constituted Provincial Government to dismiss the head of the Tax Bureau and seized the salt revenues.

The above are merely a few salient facts. To them must be added a series of arrests and imprisonments and coercion of every description against all who in any way represent

MAM

6- #276, from Geneva, November 3,
1931

represent the lawful authority of the Chinese Government;
the arrival of more troops and military stores; the ac-
tivities military and political of Japanese airplanes; and
in general the unceasing attempts of the Japanese army to
convert their illegal military occupation into a political
and economic strangle-hold upon the unhappy country today
invaded.


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GILBERT

WSB

1664

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Stutzman NARS, Date 12-18-75



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

FROM

GRAY *mf*

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 5, 1931

Rec'd 5:10 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

873, November 5, 10 a. m.

Legation's 870, November 4, noon.

Following two telegrams from Harbin:

"November 4, noon. CONFIDENTIAL. Chinese officials here and at Tsitsihar deny that General Ma of Tsitsihar has received or is receiving military supplies or advice from Soviet Russia. During my two days stay at Tsitsihar, I could discover no details of such aid but that he had received a telegraphic communication from the Japanese Consul at Manchuria Station to the effect that a shipment of munitions had passed from Siberia through that place to the Chinese authorities.

Telephone reports received by me this morning from foreigners at Hailar indicate that there are no troop movement, Soviet or Chinese, nor unrest at or near that place



793.94/2476

NOV 6 1931

REP

2- #873, from Peiping, Nov. 5, 10 a.m.

place and Manchuria Station.

I am inclined to believe that Japanese reports of Soviet troop movements threatening the Japanese army in Manchuria are propaganda ^{lies} with the idea of enlisting outside sympathy for Japan and of ascertaining Soviet Russia's attitude and policy".

"November 4, 5 p. m. CONFIDENTIAL.

Chinese radio station here has informed that that it has received from Tsitsihar reports to the effect that in the afternoon of November 3rd a Japanese airplane dropped leaflets over trenches of Tsitsihar soldiers near Kingansing Station located on the Taoang Railway north of Noni River, that in the evening some Japanese soldiers crossed from the south the Noni and fired upon Tsitsihar soldiers, that early in the morning of November 4th Japanese soldiers (apparent omission) Chinese soldiers and that at one p. m. about 20 Japanese soldiers came over and fired, whereupon Tsitsihar troops returned a fire, causing the Japanese to retire.

Two. I have not been able to check this report but believe that it is substantially correct.

Three.

REP

3- #873, from Peiping, Nov. 5, 10 a. m.

Three. Local Japanese states that it has had no report of any fighting so far but that Japanese troops had departed from Taonan toward Noni River Bridge".

Repeated to Shanghai and Tokyo.

For the Minister


ENGERT

WSB



No. 2301

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Berne, October 25, 1931




NOV - 4 31



F/DEW

793.94/2477



The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

1 - I have the honor to forward herewith translation of
an editorial which appeared in the Journal de Genève on
October 25, 1931 under the initials of William Martin.
The Department will note that in the conclusion of this
editorial, Martin assumes that in the event that the
Sino-Japanese difficulty in Manchuria is not settled by
November 16, the League will be forced to compel the
adoption of its resolution drawn up on October 24.

FILED

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Respectfully yours,

Winthrop S. Greene
Winthrop S. Greene
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

Enclosure:
1. Translation, as stated.

WSG:MET

File No. 711

Translation of an Article in the JOURNAL DE GENÈVE of
October 25, 1931, by William Martin.

- - - - -
THE COUNCIL HAS DONE ITS DUTY

The Council of the League of Nations has not yet ended the Sino-Japanese conflict but has finished that share of the affair which has been submitted to it.

The Council has gone very far toward accepting the Japanese point of view, but it has not given way in the essentials and more cannot be expected of the League of Nations, in the circumstances, than that.

We felicitate it the more as in the course of last week it looked at times as if the Council members were facing an attack of heart failure in facing the Japanese. They appeared united and firm up to the moment when the question of United States admission was brought up. Sunday they were still so when they drafted the text of the resolution which was finally adopted.

But from Monday, following mysterious telephone conversations with Washington, several members seemed to lose all courage. A new draft of a resolution was worked up Tuesday with practically nothing new in it. If the Japanese had accepted this text immediately, the game would have been bagged to their entire satisfaction.

Mercifully, the Japanese Delegation did not appreciate the chance offered it; possibly they thought they could obtain further advantages; they refused their assent to the proposal--and then it was that the leading members of the Council, somewhat irritated at this uncompromising attitude, reverted to the resolution of Sunday. The replacement of Lord Reading by Lord Cecil did the rest. We had a lucky escape!

How

- 2 -

How can these shiftings, which have run the risk of paralyzing the action of the Council for peace, be explained? Probably by a difference of opinion which has developed during the crisis between the Chancelleries of the Great Powers and the machinery of Geneva.

Throughout this whole affair, the League of Nations has been pro-Chinese, partly from respect for international peace and partly from anxiety as to the fate of the Disarmament Conference. At Geneva one sees in the affair only one primordial interest, that is that juridical guarantees of security only appear effective for rendering disarmament possible.

The anxiety of national Chancelleries has been quite different. By instinct, European diplomats have been favorable to Japan, an aristocratic and military Power, by way of giving a lesson to the revolutionists. Japan has had on her side all the resident diplomats in Tokyo and perhaps some in China. She received from them encouragement and promises.

Certain Chancelleries furthermore have not a free hand. During the London Naval Conference certain pledges were made which in exchange for concessions in disarmament recognized for Japan certain special rights in Manchuria. These pledges have no juridical value as they are secret. But they cramp the style of those who pledged themselves.

If we add that the industrial interests are actively for Japan and that, by means upon which we do not have to comment, Japan is assured of the approval of a section of the European Press--this is a source of great embarrassment to Monsieur Briand--it can readily be seen that the

Japanese

- 3 -

Japanese diplomacy should be constrained to withdraw the whole affair from the League of Nations, to keep it in diplomatic and national channels in order to impede the cooperation of Washington and Geneva.

She was successful in part and at times, but was finally defeated. We understand perfectly that the Japanese should have the impression of having been played by European diplomacy. First they were encouraged, then dropped. We will admit a certain sympathy for them in this. What has been done in that way is not right.

Their error was in underestimating moral force in present day diplomacy. The military element will not see that voluntarily. They forgot the League of Nations. They had faith in old methods which were always successful in the good old days. What they did against China and against Russia, waging sudden war, seemed simple enough to them. They overlooked the fact that the world today is not the world of yesterday.

They are excusable, but they must learn. Let us hope that the lesson is clear, and that it will not be necessary to repeat it. It shows in any event that it is not so simple, in our day, even for resolute military people, even at the ends of the earth, even in a country as upset as Manchuria, to let loose a war. That is the lesson carried by this adventure.

We consider that the League of Nations has obtained a genuine success. There will be some who will not admit this, since the resolution of the Council was not accepted unanimously and has not been formally adopted. But this would be attaching too great importance to the juridical form. This result shows that the rule of unanimity

- 4 -

is inapplicable to international conflicts, that Article 11 of the Pact is in certain regards inadequate, that conciliation comes to grief against intransigence, but it does not at all prove that the League of Nations has failed.

A resolution unanimously and formally adopted would have had no value if the Powers had not been resolved to have it respected by the Japanese militarists. And if the Powers wish to put their active force to the application of the resolution which has received their vote, the result will be exactly the same.

It is a question of will and energy. Have the Powers both? It is the only question. But there is one thing certain; that is that if they do not have them today, they will have to have them and more tomorrow. Because if between now and the 16th of November it is not made actually clear to the Japanese generals that they must leave Manchuria, if they are allowed to remain in Chinese territory, and to build railways, throw bombs on those who impede them and organize Governments sympathetic to themselves, if, in short, they are permitted to do in Manchuria what they have already done in Korea, the question will come up again before the Council on November 16. But it will not come up under the same terms; it will come up under Article 15 of the Pact and the League will have to assume responsibility, even to the exercise of sanctions.

The resolution adopted by the Council fixes the principle from which the League of Nations cannot escape. If on November 16 the Japanese have not carried out this resolution, the League of Nations will be forced to find a means of compelling it.


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

GENEVA RESEARCH INFORMATION
COMMITTEE


4 RUE DE MONTHOUX, GENEVA
SWITZERLAND

J. MCC. STURGIS
SECRETARY

DCR
file



Mr. Stanley Hornbeck
U.S. Department of State
Washington, D.C.



October 15, 1931.

Acknowledged
Oct 27, 1931 mlf

Dear Sir: -

Under separate cover we are mailing you a complimentary copy of "The League and Manchuria", the October issue of Geneva Special Studies.

We trust you will find this Study of interest and a help in following this question so fraught with possibilities of far reaching concern to our own country.

We call attention to an error that appears in the note on the inside cover. In the last line, for September 13 please read October 13.

Faithfully Yours,

Geneva Research Information Committee

Per

JMS:EB

Secretary.

F/DEW
793.94/2478

FILED

NOV 13 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DLR
file

We desire to call attention to an error in the October issue of Geneva Special Studies "The League and Manchuria". In the last line of the note on the inside cover, in place of September 13 please read October 13.



1674

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Luitjens NAHS, Date 12-18-75

Return to FE
DCR file

In reply refer to
FE

October 28 1931.

Dear Mr. Sturgis:

I acknowledge with thanks the receipt of your letter of October 15, 1931, and of the copy, forwarded by separate cover, of "The League and Manchuria", being the October issue of Geneva Special Studies.

I appreciate your courtesy in sending me this copy and am looking forward with interest to reading it.


Very truly yours,

SKH

Stanley K. Hornbeck,
Chief,
Division of Far Eastern Division.

Mr. J. McC. Sturgis, Secretary,
Geneva Research Information Committee,
4 Rue de Monthoux,
Geneva, Switzerland.

FE



793.94/2478

Oct. 28. 1931.
CB:MMH:EMF
MML

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE LEAGUE AND MANCHURIA

THE FIRST PHASE OF THE CHINESE-JAPANESE CONFLICT
SEPTEMBER 18-30, 1931

GENEVA SPECIAL STUDIES
Vol. II. — No. 10
OCTOBER 1931

Price: One Swiss Franc or Twenty-five Cents

GENEVA RESEARCH INFORMATION COMMITTEE
4, Rue de Monthoux, Geneva

793.94/2478

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NOTE

The gravity of the dispute between China and Japan over Manchuria, both in itself and as a test of the world's system for maintaining peace and of the nations' will to support it, led to a decision to prepare this day-by-day analysis of events and of League action in dealing with them, from the outbreak of trouble to the close of the Assembly and Council sessions in September.

A second Study is in preparation for the next phase of the problem from September 30 to the close of the Extraordinary Council session which opened on September 13.

THE LEAGUE AND MANCHURIA

The First Phase of the Chinese-Japanese Conflict.

September 18-30, 1931.

Prepared under the supervision of the Geneva Research Information Committee.

THE most dangerous conflict which has ever confronted the League of Nations broke out in Manchuria on Saturday, September 19, like a flash of lightning from a clear sky. Just at the

sharpest way of portraying the situation and of reestablishing in fair perspective the main lines of action of unquestionably the most difficult public negotiation ever held would be to follow the thread day by day through the ten-day period from the first shots at Mukden on September 18th to the completion of the initial phase of the Council's action on September 30th and its two weeks' adjournment till October 14th as a provisional date.

With the compliments of the
Geneva Research-Information Committee

J. MCC. STURGIS
Secretary

SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 19th, 1931.

The first news to reach Geneva was a laconic Peking press despatch as follows:

"After having bombarded the arsenal Japanese troops occupied Mukden Saturday morning at 6 o'clock. Japanese police are assuring order in the city. The Japanese Army is now attacking the arsenal. . . . The two Japanese divisions composing the garrison of Korea have received 'urgent orders' in view of the gravity of the situation."

Geneva's first reaction was stupefaction, utter disbelief. No shadow of crisis had been cast before, no warning or indication that the peace of the East was in danger. The Assembly meetings had gone somewhat heavily on their course for three weeks, during which time, en route, as it were, China had been unanimously elected to the Council by the largest vote ever given a candidate-state; what little solace was possible had been offered for her staggering

THE LEAGUE AND MANCHURIA

The First Phase of the Chinese-Japanese Conflict.

September 18-30, 1931.

Prepared under the supervision of the Geneva Research Information Committee.

THE most dangerous conflict which has ever confronted the League of Nations broke out in Manchuria on Saturday, September 19, like a flash of lightning from a clear sky. Just at the moment when the Twelfth Assembly was drawing to a close and the leading statesmen were beginning to leave Geneva, came an incident which challenged the world's whole new and laboriously constructed mechanism for preserving peace and raised the great question as to what attitude the United States and Soviet Russia as non-Members of the League would take in a dispute vitally affecting their interests.

Press despatches brought word of the bombardment of Mukden, the advance of Japanese troops into Manchuria, the seizure of strategic points, all the ominous portents which in the past have been the prelude to open hostilities. The first fragments of news which reached Geneva from the Far East were passed about excitedly from person to person; the corridors of the League building began immediately to fill. In a twinkling the whole atmosphere was electrified; the lethargy and depression which had set in as a result of three weeks of endeavor recognised as sadly insufficient to meet the world's economic crisis, gave way to an alertness, a tension, even an alarm such as Geneva had never before experienced.

For ten long days the Council was in constant, strained negotiation, with the Assembly watching anxiously in the immediate foreground at Geneva, and beyond, world public opinion equally anxiously awaiting developments. Events moved so kaleidoscopically that the

sharpest way of portraying the situation and of reestablishing in fair perspective the main lines of action of unquestionably the most difficult public negotiation ever held would be to follow the thread day by day through the ten-day period from the first shots at Mukden on September 18th to the completion of the initial phase of the Council's action on September 30th and its two weeks' adjournment till October 14th as a provisional date.

SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 19th, 1931.

The first news to reach Geneva was a laconic Peking press despatch as follows:

"After having bombarded the arsenal Japanese troops occupied Mukden Saturday morning at 6 o'clock. Japanese police are assuring order in the city. The Japanese Army is now attacking the arsenal. . . . The two Japanese divisions composing the garrison of Korea have received 'urgent orders' in view of the gravity of the situation."

Geneva's first reaction was stupefaction, utter disbelief. No shadow of crisis had been cast before, no warning or indication that the peace of the East was in danger. The Assembly meetings had gone somewhat heavily on their course for three weeks, during which time, en route, as it were, China had been unanimously elected to the Council by the largest vote ever given a candidate-state; what little solace was possible had been offered for her staggering

- 4 -

flood disaster and loss of unnumbered millions of lives; the Emperor of Japan himself was known to have made a generous contribution in aid. The Far East, when thought of at all, was thought of only as a vast territory stunned by one of the most appalling natural calamities in history.

Japan Acts.

Now, suddenly, without warning, there came out of the East one of those events which every so often in history have caused a shudder to run around the world. Whatever the reason, whatever the justification, a Great Power had taken military action on its own responsibility; had occupied a neighbour's territory; had made no move towards arbitration or conciliation. The very things which the Covenant had been created to make unnecessary seemed to have occurred; the old measures of military coercion and punitive action were in full swing. The cables were not long in bringing confirmation of the first despatch. Tokio sent a report from Mukden that Japanese artillery had destroyed the village of Peitajing with considerable losses. Peking followed with a report that two Japanese battalions had arrived at New-Chwang. Tokio again announced a conflict between Chinese and Japanese troops on the outskirts of Mukden. The same source reported a Cabinet meeting to circumscribe the conflict and reduce it to a purely local affair.

Irrespective, however, of the actual details, information from various sides on this first day was sufficiently precise to leave beyond doubt that suddenly, in circumstances almost cruel, the League had come to a supreme test. Here, once again, as in the Corfu crisis, was the dreaded question feared by friends, and adversely answered in advance by enemies, of the League: What would, or could, the League do, if a Great Power took action on its own? The League would be quite satisfactory, even its enemies admitted, for small disputes of big States or big disputes of small States; it would be quite helpless and hopeless, however, if a Great Power were involved in a great issue. Suddenly, dramatically, everyone in Geneva realised that that issue had been drawn.

A World Unprepared.

A worse moment, or a worse situation, could scarcely have been imagined. First, in Geneva itself, the League meetings, Assembly, Council, European Commission and Financial Committee, had been grappling unsuccessfully for three weeks with a world economic crisis which seemed to pass the comprehension of statesmen. Despondency and depression had set in at the prospect of non-success. Adjournment was close at hand without a solution having been found. The individual nations were strangely incapacitated. Great Britain was almost demobilised by concentration on her own internal crisis and the approach to the abandonment of the gold standard. France and Germany were preoccupied with the forthcoming first visit to Berlin since Napoleon of the head of the French Government. The other nations, except for an Italian Armaments Truce proposal of uncertain future, seemed planless. The Assembly was slowing down to a perfunctory finish and the principal statesmen were either gone or going at just the moment when the gravest problem presented to the League burst upon it.

Second, the situation in Manchuria was equally difficult. Manchuria is a confused land, with Chinese sovereignty limited by Japanese control of the vital South Manchurian railroad. Until a half-century ago a rich and sparsely populated grazing ground, this vast territory has since become the crossroads of empires, the meeting ground of civilisations vastly different. At the end of the last century, imperialistic Russia had pushed her way downward to warm water and paid the price of a disastrous war with Japan in 1904. The Island Empire had succeeded to, and later prolonged until 2002, the Russian railroad concession; her soldiers, to a total allowed by treaty up to 16,000, had taken their places to safeguard the long 1200 kilometres of railroad through Manchuria. Emigrants had poured in, about a million and a half Japanese and Koreans and some twenty times that number of Chinese. Competition had become keen, administration complicated, for, in effect, two very different civilisations were interposed one on the other.

— 5 —

The sharp frontier demarcations which exist between other countries do not exist there; Japan has treaty rights and powers within Chinese sovereignty. Accordingly, events in Manchuria can hardly be judged by the same standards as elsewhere.

The United States and the Soviets.

Third, any possible League action was complicated by still another difficulty. The two other greatest Far Eastern Powers, the United States and Soviet Russia, are not Members of the League. Soviet Russia, though cooperating in League work such as Disarmament or the European Commission, is openly distrustful or hostile, regarding the League as the final expression of capitalism. The United States, while cooperating frequently and in general entirely friendly to the League as an agency of collaboration and peace, is nevertheless outside, at the very least uncertain in its reaction to a request for cooperation in a political issue. Indeed, the gravest question in the development of League jurisprudence and in its efforts to make war impossible has been this very doubt as to what the United States would do in the case of an emergency: whether she would act independently irrespective of the League, whether she would be inactive, or whether she would cooperate. Here, then, was an issue which without warning forced both these questions: on the one hand, a hostile Soviet with memories of the lost war of 1904, and on the other, the United States with an unpredictable policy of action.

Small wonder that Geneva was stirred as never before. Like a flash the world diplomats assembled there at the end of a discouraged session suddenly saw three great conflicts develop: in Manchuria between local Chinese and Japanese for the control of a vast territory; in Tokio between the civil and the military elements of the Government for control of Japanese foreign policy; in Geneva between the old diplomacy of single-handed punitive measures and the new diplomacy of organized conciliation. Huge questions stood out in everyone's mind. What did Japan really

intend; what would she do; which party would dominate her policy? And China; how would she reply; could she, even if she wished, restrain her people and prevent a collision? Would Russia move Eastward as she had before? Would the United States remain inactive?

The Forces at Issue

One fortunate coincidence in this dangerous chain was that the League was at the time in full session. Representatives of 52 Member States were present for the Assembly, and, during the following week, representatives of five other States non-Members of the League, including the United States, were to arrive in Geneva for the Disarmament discussions. A forum for world consultation and debate was therefore available, such as had only once before been available in a previous dispute, and then in less degree, when, in 1923, the Corfu crisis also developed in the midst of the full Assembly. What permanent organized machinery for peaceful settlement the world has been able to create since the Great War was, therefore, actually functioning.

Due to the fact of the Assembly, also, both Chinese and Japanese were represented in Geneva by large Delegations headed respectively by Dr. Alfred Sze, Minister in London, and M. Yoshizawa, Ambassador in Paris, and including experts in all the main branches of work on the Assembly agenda. These two countries, as the President of the Council later expressed it, are two of the most highly respected members of the family of nations; both had been original Members of the League.

Japan, one of the Principal Allied Powers in the World War, had seen her claim to the highest international equality confirmed in the Covenant by the granting to her of a permanent seat on the Council. As Lord Cecil observed, throughout all the years she had been a very sincere Member of the League, taking an active part in all its questions, whether of immediate concern to her or not, and aiding in many complicated questions such, particularly, as the minorities disputes between Germany and Poland or in the general development of international cooperation. Her mem-

- 6 -

bership in the League had not been perfunctory or formal. She had definitely taken her share of world responsibility and had received many deserved honours. Her people had been greatly interested in the League; her unofficial League of Nations Society was said by Lord Cecil to be the largest in the world next to the British; her public is the third largest purchaser, next to the United States and Great Britain, of League publications.

China, too, had been a Member of the League from the outset. She was not a permanent member of the Council, though she had been elected to it as a non-permanent Member from 1921-1923, from 1926-1928, and now from 1931 to 1934. At times her interest had not been very active; last winter, however, following certain very successful cooperation with the League in matters of health, President Chiang Kai Shek had telegraphed the Council requesting the most far-reaching technical cooperation in health, finance, economics, transit and education. As a result the Directors of the Health Section, Dr. Rajchman, of the Economic and Financial Section, Sir Arthur Salter, and of the Transit Section, M. Robert Haas, had each visited China, making suggestions for a unified medical service, a Nationalist Economic Council, the improvement of the Hwai and other rivers, and for harbor development at Shanghai. An Educational Commission, consisting of German, French, British and Polish experts, was en route to China, and the Medical Director, Dr. Rajchman, and the Assistant to the Secretary-General, Mr. Frank Walters, were in China, when the present incident broke out. At the present Assembly, China had again presented her candidature for the Council, which the two previous years had fallen just short of success, and had been the first state to be unanimously elected.

The Council Meets.

It was in these circumstances that the utterly unexpected news of the clash between Japanese and Chinese in Manchuria broke over Geneva. That very afternoon, as it happened, the 65th

Session of the newly-elected Council was to hold its first meeting. Would either party, or any other state, raise the question? Was it conceivable that the Council would pass the matter in silence? Throughout the day friends and foes debated this question; diplomats and officials were ceaselessly active; an historical moment clearly was at hand. For the Council to take up the problem meant the most serious consequences; to shirk it meant abdication, or, as many said, the moral death of the League and the collapse of its laboriously planned mechanism for peace. Even the Disarmament Conference was felt endangered, the *Journal de Genève* saying that, unless this affair were solved, it "would be quite useless to open the Conference on February 2", and a Washington dispatch to the *London Times* saying the incident would "reinforce the arguments of nations which consider armaments as essential guarantees of security".

Long before the Council came together at five o'clock, the corridors of the Secretariat were jammed. Assembly Delegates not usually on hand were present in large numbers; journalists were anxiously searching for advance indications; all that considerable group in Geneva who follow League work were present. As the Council Members came in, not a seat was vacant; the diplomatic section was crowded with observers, including the Minister of the United States; some 300 journalists were waiting to flash the smallest details around the world.

China Takes her Place.

The brief private meeting to approve the agenda opened with an odd coincidence, one of those accidents which often so deeply affect history. China, just elected to the Council without anyone for a moment suspecting the importance her election was so soon to have, was officially welcomed to her seat. Even had she not been a Member of the Council, she could, of course, have sat on the Council temporarily, under Article 4 of the Covenant, in a dispute affecting her interests; as a full Member, however, she undoubtedly was in a stronger position.

- 7 -

Japan Speaks.

The public session then began. An impressive silence reigned in the large room as M. Yoshizawa, most slowly and carefully, resolved the great question in everyone's mind by himself putting the matter before the Council. Obviously, the diplomatic work which had been going on behind the scenes had borne fruit; Japan herself, in accordance, moreover, with a desire expressed by the President of the Council, was ready to explain in Geneva what had happened in Manchuria.

An incident, M. Yoshizawa said, was reported to have occurred in Manchuria; he was anxious to communicate the first details he had received that morning. Unfortunately they were few; he had cabled for more. His Government had taken all possible measures to prevent this local incident from leading to undesirable complications; he was sure it would do everything possible to deal with the situation.

Mr. Sze, in his turn, said he would not conceal his great disturbance at the news from Manchuria. His information indicated that the incident had not been occasioned by any act of the Chinese. He would not fail to keep the Council informed of any news he might receive. Thereupon the President expressed the Council's satisfaction that Japan would take the necessary measures and their most sincere hope for a prompt settlement.

That was all. But it was immensely significant. It meant that the very day that a military clash had occurred in distant Manchuria, the Council of the League of Nations on the other side of the world was officially informed by both parties and the incident put before an international tribunal, in public session, with fourteen states at the table, another 43 in the immediate foreground, and 300 journalists waiting to flash the news to the world. The first question, then, had been answered affirmatively. The Council would take up the affair. Many people in Geneva asked, even if no one could answer: What might the existence of this mechanism of conference, consultation and world opinion have meant if it had been in operation when

a single revolver shot was fired at Sarajevo in the quiet summer months of 1914?

SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 20th.

The second day was, fortunately, a Sunday. No meetings were scheduled, no Assembly, Council or committees, none of the ordinary current work to occupy attention. There was, then, free time for consideration and concentration on this vital question which had so unexpectedly cut across the face of world life.

First, of course, was the actual news. Diplomats and press alike anxiously awaited the dispatches. Would the second day's developments fulfil the fears caused by the first? Would the Japanese attacks be local or general? Would the Chinese resist and precipitate a general clash?

Tokio announced the occupation of Kwang Cheng Tse, the complete control of the arsenal and aerodrome at Mukden, and the taking of 450 prisoners, casualties of 30 dead and 90 wounded at Chang-Chun, and the despatch to Mukden of a group of aeroplanes to establish liaison between the Japanese armies in Kwang Tung and Korea.

Nanking reported a demand for immediate suspension of hostilities and the retreat of Japanese troops. Washington entered cautiously on the scene with the impression that the conflict was with Chinese irregulars and not a violation of the Kellogg Pact. The fundamental contradiction as to responsibilities which always arises in such crises was clearly shown in the following despatches from Peking and Tokio respectively:

PEKING, September 19
(Special Correspondent
of the London Times):
A squad of Japanese
soldiers approached . . .
about 10 o'clock last night
and opened fire on the
camp, the arsenal, and the
city from the Japanese
Concession . . . one
shell falling every 10 mi-
nutes.

TOKIO, September 19:
The War Ministry states
that three or four compa-
nies of Chinese troops
bombed and destroyed a
section of the South Man-
churia line, north of Muk-
den, about 10.30 last night
and attacked the railway
guards. The guards re-
plied.

— 8 —

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 21st.

Division in Tokio.

One slight rift, however, appeared in the clouds. The question had at once arisen: Was this action due to the military commanders alone or did it represent a determined policy of the Government? If the former, it could be localised and terminated; if the latter, the consequences were unforeseeable. Almost from the outset, however, came indications that the Government was not behind the move, that it was indeed greatly taken aback by it. From Peking on the very first day the London *Times* correspondent reported that "the Japanese Consular authorities (in Mukden) were reported to be unable to induce the military to cease firing". From Peking also, on the 20th, came a despatch to the *Temps* "that a number of Japanese soldiers out of control of all authority had first opened fire on the arsenal at Mukden". From Tokio on the 19th came a despatch to the *Journal de Genève* that "the Minister of War states that, the situation being better in Manchuria, it has been decided not to send there the Japanese troops from Korea" which only the day before in the first despatch announcing the bombardment, had been said to have been given "urgent orders". Even more striking, however, was the London *Times* correspondent's despatch on September 20, that "it is scarcely an exaggeration to say that the Japanese Foreign Office was stunned by the news".

Thus, the lines began to be drawn. The advance was evidently a serious and widespread one; the Chinese were for the moment unresisting; the Japanese seemed divided between their military and civil parties. Geneva was pre-occupied not only by the gravity of the situation itself, but also by the extremely delicate question as to what course of action would be the most helpful. This was no moment for heroics or demonstrations; whatever was done had to be done with the most extreme caution, with the sole thought not of immediate appearances but of final result. Fortunately, the Council could be above questions of prestige.

On the third day of the dispute, less than 48 hours after the first news had reached Geneva, China officially brought the situation before the League under Article 11 of the Covenant, requesting an immediate meeting of the Council to "take such action as it may deem wise and effectual so that the peace of nations may be safeguarded." Dr. Sze, in a letter to the Secretary General immediately circulated to the Council, stated that since Saturday's meeting the situation had become even graver and the military occupation gone even further. China, therefore, requested the Council to take immediate steps "to prevent the further development of a situation endangering the peace of nations", to re-establish the *status quo ante*, and "to determine the amounts and character of such reparations as may be found due to China." China, he concluded, "is fully prepared to act in conformity with whatever recommendations it may receive from the Council and to abide by whatever decisions the League may adopt in the premises." This document is so clear a statement of the Chinese viewpoint and so basic to the situation, that it is given in full:

"I am instructed by the National Government of China to bring to your attention the facts stated below, and to request that, in virtue of Article Eleven of the Covenant of the League of Nations, you forthwith summon a meeting of the Council of the League in order that it may take such action as it may deem wise and effectual so that the peace of nations may be safeguarded.

"Through statements made to it at its meeting on September nineteenth, by the representatives of China and Japan, the Council was advised of the fact that a serious situation had been created in Manchuria. In his statement at that meeting the representative of China declared that the information which he then had, indicated that the situation had been created through no fault upon the part of the Chinese. Since September nineteenth, the undersigned has received from his Government information which discloses a situation of greater gravity than had appeared by the first report, and which

— 9 —

revealed that, beginning from ten o'clock of the night of September eighteenth, regular troops of Japanese soldiers, without provocation of any kind, opened rifle and artillery fire upon Chinese soldiers at or near the city of Mukden, bombarded the arsenal and barracks of the Chinese soldiers, set fire to the ammunition depot, disarmed the Chinese troops in Changchun, Kwanchengtse, and other places, and later took military occupation of the cities of Mukden and Antung and other places and of public buildings therein, and are now in such occupation. Lines of communication have also been seized by Japanese troops.

"To these acts of violence the Chinese soldiers and populace, acting under instructions from the Chinese Government, have made no resistance, and have refrained from conduct which might in any way aggravate the situation.

"In view of the foregoing facts, the Republic of China, a Member of the League of Nations, asserts that a situation has arisen which calls for action under the terms of Article Eleven of the Covenant. I am, therefore, instructed by my Government to request that, in pursuance of authority given to it by Article Eleven of the Covenant, the Council take immediate steps: to prevent the further development of a situation endangering the peace of nations; to re-establish the *status quo ante*; and to determine the amounts and character of such reparations as may be found due to the Republic of China.

"I will add that the Government of China is fully prepared to act in conformity with whatever recommendations it may receive from the Council, and to abide by whatever decisions the League of Nations may adopt in the premises."

"The Heart of the Covenant"

Article 11 thus invoked by China is the great mediatory Article of the Covenant. Indeed, as Mr. Conwell-Evans states in his excellent study of the methods employed by the Council to prevent war, it "has come to be regarded as the corner-stone of the Covenant and the bulwark of the world's peace." Even those

closest to the League have little appreciation of how often in the relatively few years since 1920 this Article has been called into play. Mr. Conwell-Evans records no less than twenty cases up to 1927: In eight hostilities or a resort to arms had, in fact, occurred, in four¹ of which one of the parties itself had appealed under Article 11, in the others² a party neutral to the dispute or the Council itself. Twelve other appeals not involving hostilities had also been made, four³ by one of the parties immediately concerned, two⁴ by Great Britain as an interested state, four⁵ by the Conference of Ambassadors representing Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan, and one⁶ by the Supreme Council. Since this enumeration a number of other cases have occurred, two during the last month, China-Japan over Manchuria, and Great Britain-Finland over the seizure of Finnish ships in the War.

Indeed, Article 11 would seem to provide exactly that machinery of consultation and mediation which it is now generally recognised is the great lack of the Kellogg Pact, threatening to make that document a general declaration of international policy rather than a living force in international life. So important is Article 11 both in the powers it gave the Council in the Sino-Japanese affair under review and in its establishment of a new type of international jurisprudence where States, whether parties to a dispute or not, are free to bring it before an international tribunal without as heretofore being charged with unfriendly action, that it is worth quoting in full:

"Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and

¹ Persia-Soviet Russia, 1920; Poland-Lithuania, 1920; Yugoslavia-Albania, 1921; Greece-Bulgaria, 1925.

² Costa Rica-Panama, 1921; Yugoslavia-Albania, 1921; Bolivia-Paraguay, 1928.

³ Finland-Soviet Russia (E. Karelia), 1923; Bulgaria and neighbouring States, 1922; Hungary-Rumania, 1923; Great Britain-Turkey, 1924.

⁴ Aaland Islands (Finland and Sweden); Yugoslavia and Albania;

⁵ Hungary and Yugoslavia, 1923; Hungary-Czechoslovakia, 1923; Poland and Czechoslovakia, 1923; Memel.

⁶ Upper Silesia.

See "The League Council in Action", by T. P. Conwell-Evans.

— 10 —

the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. In case any such emergency should arise the Secretary-General shall on the request of any Member of the League forthwith summon a meeting of the Council.

"It is also declared to be the friendly right of each Member of the League to bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstance whatever affecting international relations which threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends."

As these events were taking place in Geneva, despatches from various sides indicated an increasing diplomatic tension throughout the world.

While London despatches stated that "news from different Chinese and Japanese sources indicate that, after the occupation of Mukden and different strategic points, there was a cessation of the hostilities that broke out so dramatically", the diplomatic front was growing ever wider. A Tokio report announced a vigorous note of protest from China accusing Japan of ignoring the Kellogg Pact and demanding the immediate withdrawal of troops. A Nanking despatch stated that Foreign Minister Wang, in addition to direct protests to Japan, intended to notify the League of Nations and the Signatories of the Kellogg Pact of the situation. In Moscow M. Karakhan, Assistant Commissar of Foreign Affairs, was interviewing Mr. Hiroto, the Japanese Ambassador. Peking reported to London the rumour of an arrangement between Russia and Japan for the division of Manchuria. From Geneva, the Executive Committee in Europe of the Kwomintang issued a sweeping summary of the situation.

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 22nd.

One of the most dramatic and extraordinary international debates ever held occupied the whole morning of the fourth day of the Manchurian incident, when Mr. Sze and Mr. Yoshizawa, representing China and Japan respectively, faced each other for nearly three hours

across the Council table in the presence of a group of diplomats, officials and journalists which filled the large Glass Room to overcrowding. The atmosphere was extremely tense and highstrung as the delegates of the two great Oriental nations began to elaborate their views and positions. Practically nobody had any idea what course the discussions might take or what dangers might lie ahead.

Mr. Sze entered straightway into the heart of the matter by reading two cables just received from Nanking giving details of the occupation of various centres in Manchuria, the cutting of communications, the seizure of materials and especially the bombardment and conflagration in Changchun, with 600 casualties and 1,000 prisoners. Speaking tensely and dramatically, he stated that these places covered an area as extensive as the whole United Kingdom of Great Britain, Northern Ireland and the Irish Free State. The situation was becoming ever graver; it had become a serious question whether Articles other than Article 11 of the Covenant might not be required¹. In any case, he reiterated his request for immediate action to prevent the further development of a situation endangering the peace of nations and to re-establish the *status quo ante*.

Japan Explains.

Mr. Yoshizawa, speaking extremely slowly and carefully and betraying his tension only by pulling on his cigar, said he was the first to deplore the unfortunate incidents that had occurred. He would reply to the Chinese Representative's statements after he had received instructions from his Government. Meanwhile, however, he would like to clear up the problem somewhat. Manchuria is a vast territory where Japan has enormous interests and rights guaranteed by treaties. She also has some hundreds of thousands of nationals there but only some 10,000 soldiers as against 220,000 Chinese. The present incident had been caused by the destruction by Chinese troops of part of the Japanese railway near

¹ This was understood to mean Article 15 which would have given the Council greater powers.

— 11 —

Mukden; the small Japanese force had been obliged to take up arms to prevent further destruction and to protect the railway and nationals in the district. It was not accurate that the Chinese had offered no resistance; the dead and wounded amongst the Japanese in Changchun alone numbered over 150. The incident, however, was not an isolated event; for years Chinese activities have imperilled Japanese interests and rights, while deplorable events, like the murder of Staff-Captain Nakamura, have created a feeling of tension which led to the present explosion. Any Chinese claim for reparations is unintelligible; the *status quo ante* can be settled only by considering the factors in each locality. Japan, however, has taken steps to prevent the troubles from spreading and has no intention of provoking further collisions, least of all of making war on China. A proposal, he said, had been made in China for direct negotiations and Japan had welcomed it. Premature intervention would only needlessly excite Japanese opinion and impede pacific settlement. Mr. Yoshizawa promised to acquaint the Council with his Government's views as soon as he had received instructions, and in the circumstances requested adjournment.

China Requests Inquiry.

Mr. Sze immediately retorted that, as to the question of the accuracy of his statements, he was prepared to agree to an enquiry being carried out by a Commission appointed by the League and to leave the matter in its hands. As regards the Nakamura and other cases, he urged that such references were quite irrelevant, that the Covenant provided other means—diplomatic, judicial, or appeal to the Council. Similarly, defensive measures could not be pleaded, as the Council itself, including the Representative of Japan, had declared on previous occasions. China could not agree to direct negotiations with a country holding a large part of its territory in military occupation and having resorted to means other than diplomatic negotiation. Mr. Sze appreciated the assurance that Japan had no idea of war but could not, however, disguise his impression

"that we are very close to war and that immediate steps are imperatively necessary". In any case, he repeated, China will abide by whatever decisions the League may take.

Mr. Yoshizawa disagreed that reports from Manchuria were meagre; the first news had come from Peking and telegrams were appearing daily in the press. He then reiterated that one of the highest officials in the National Government at Nanking had proposed direct negotiations. That to him seemed the best course. He did not say that the question did not fall within the competence of the Council; he only asked adjournment until he had instructions.

Mr. Sze, suggesting there might have been a misunderstanding owing to the fact that they were not using their own language, pointed out that there were no direct negotiations in progress and that no one could make statements for his Government unless authorised. To this, Mr. Yoshizawa replied that the Chinese official in question held one of the most important portfolios in the Chinese Government and there was no reason why the Japanese Minister should regard his statement of policy as of no official importance. The Japanese Government still agreed with the suggestions made by this very responsible person.

The League Jurisprudence.

The British Representative, Viscount Cecil, at this moment at the end of the morning, cut across the debate to express the views of one of the chief authors of the Covenant itself. The matter was grave, he said, all the more so because of the present condition of the world. There are, however, some encouraging aspects. Japan has always been one of the great pillars of the League and pre-eminent amongst the nations in her adherence to international obligations. China similarly has taken great interest in the League, and had been only a few days ago unanimously elected to the Council. At the moment no question of the merits of the dispute arises. The necessary facts are not available; accounts of the two interested parties naturally disagree. There are, however, certain preliminary steps which

— 12 —

the Council may take, and which indeed it has taken in previous clashes of arms. The Council now has what may be considered a settled procedure: first, an appeal through its President to both sides not to do anything to aggravate the position and to avoid further fighting; and second, where the troops of either party have entered the territory of the other, an appeal to both sides to withdraw and to avoid anything which might lead to a clash. Beyond this, however, a definite jurisprudence has been developed which was expressed in M. Briand's statement before the Council in Paris in October 1925 (in the Greek-Bulgar dispute), which was approved by Sir Austen Chamberlain on behalf of the British Empire, Viscount Ishii, speaking for Japan, Mr. Scialoja speaking for Italy, and a number of others. This statement read:

"... He had understood the representative of Greece to indicate that all these incidents would not have arisen if his country had not been called upon to take rapid steps for its legitimate defence and protection. It was essential that such ideas should not take root in the minds of nations which were Members of the League and become a kind of jurisprudence, for it would be extremely dangerous. Under the pretext of legitimate defence, disputes might arise which, though limited in extent, were extremely unfortunate owing to the damage they entailed. These disputes, once they had broken out, might assume such proportions that the Government which started them, under a feeling of legitimate defence, would be no longer able to control them.

"The League of Nations, through its Council, and through all the methods of conciliation which were at its disposal, offered the nations a means of avoiding such deplorable events. The nations had only to appeal to the Council. It had been shown that the criticisms which had been brought against the League of Nations to the effect that its machinery was cumbersome and that it found it difficult to take action in circumstances which required an urgent solution, were unjustified. It had been proved that a nation which appealed to the League when it felt that its existence was threatened, could be sure that the Council would be at its post ready to undertake its work of conciliation."

The United States Informed.

Finally, Viscount Cecil drew attention to certain international instruments beyond the League which affect this dispute, the Pact of Paris and the so-called Nine-Power Treaty. In both, the United States of America are closely interested; the Council would do well, therefore, to communicate to that Government a statement of all its proceedings and of all the discussions which have taken place within it. The United States would then be fully informed of what the Council was doing and able to take any action it might think might in connection with the matter.

At this moment, at the end of a long morning session, with preliminary statements having been made by both parties and a general pronouncement of League policy by Viscount Cecil, the President proposed that, as it was hardly possible for the Council to adopt a resolution at once, he would ask time to prepare a draft. This was agreed to and the first great public debate on the question brought to an end.

Up to this point, public and press, even those hostile to the League, seemed satisfied. The matter had come before the Council; Japan and China had faced each other squarely across the table; Viscount Cecil had laid down League jurisprudence in no uncertain terms; the clash which humanity seems to like, curiously thoughtless of its dangers, had taken place. Those on the outside waited eagerly, even hungrily, for more, irrespective of the dire possibilities; those on the inside strove ceaselessly to find a way which, regardless of method or theatrics, would avert one of the gravest dangers since the World War and reestablish peace in one of the key-centres of international life.

The afternoon session opened in an atmosphere fully as tense as the morning's, for, now that each party had made declarations, the Council was face to face with the question of what action it would take. Speculation was rife, running all the way from the "strong action" which many people unthoughtful of the consequences urged, to complete inaction which certain enemies and sceptics loudly predicted.

— 13 —

The Debate Resumed.

At the outset, Mr. Yoshizawa fully endorsed Viscount Cecil's sentiments and expressed Japan's loyal adherence to various agreements, such as the League Covenant and the Briand-Kellogg Pact, and her determination to observe their stipulations in all respects. He wanted, however, to explain the conditions in Manchuria where Japan has enormous interests: apart from the railroad, more than a million Japanese nationals, and investments estimated at two thousand million yen. Unfortunately, there were hundreds of outstanding questions between the two governments; tension existed locally; relations between the two peoples had become acute. Despite regrettable incidents, Japan was doing its utmost for the friendliest possible settlement; the present incident must be viewed from that angle.

Mr. Sze recalled that the Chinese soldiers and populace had obeyed the government's instructions not to make any resistance to the acts of violence committed. Telegrams just received showed the situation was becoming worse and worse every minute; it required immediate attention; not a moment must be wasted. Many Chinese women and children had been killed; some of the details were of the most revolting character. If the Council agreed to the Japanese suggestion of adjournment, it should be only until tomorrow. China desired nothing more than that all outstanding questions with Japan or any other nation be settled amicably; if there were such questions with Japan, methods for settlement were provided in the Covenant in more than one Article and in more than one way. The immediate question, however, was the invasion of Chinese territory; no other question could be discussed at the moment. He again requested a committee of enquiry, despatches showing that the area of Chinese territory under occupation was being extended. That must be stopped immediately and the troops withdrawn.

The President of the Council intervened at this point. The parties had said all they could; it was now for the Council to express its view. Mr. Lerroux read a brief statement suggesting that the Council authorise him:

"(1) To make an urgent appeal to the Chinese and Japanese Governments to refrain from any action which might aggravate the situation or prejudice the peaceful settlement of the problem;

"(2) To endeavour, in consultation with the Chinese and Japanese representatives, to find adequate means of enabling the two countries to withdraw their troops immediately, without the lives of their nationals and the safety of their property being endangered."

He also asked that all minutes and documents on the subject be forwarded to the United States for its information, and suggested that the two parties be asked to meet immediately after the Council together with certain Members of the Council.

Various Members of the Council supported this resolution in turn. Dr. Curtius, German Foreign Minister, expressed his hope of unanimity including the parties. This action would be a first step, at a moment when world political and economic conditions were extremely difficult, but the Council should not rest content with a merely provisional measure; it should go further and take steps for a final settlement. It was of the greatest importance to show the whole world that such conflicts could be amicably settled by the Council.

Mr. Massigli of France associated himself with this statement. The steps proposed were only the first, indeed the very first. It was the Council's duty to exert all its authority to secure as expeditiously as possible a provisional settlement in order to permit a final solution in an atmosphere of confidence and calm. Time, however, was essential, distance great, communications difficult. It was essential the next meeting be held soon if the Council were not to find itself in an infinitely more delicate situation.

Mr. Braadland of Norway expressed keen anxiety at this incident between two Members of the League and his hope of early satisfactory communications from the two governments. Mr. Grandi, Foreign Minister of Italy, appealed to the parties for a solution which would not merely satisfy them both but would also be of the highest importance to the whole world. Mr. Sokal of Poland hoped that, with the good-

— 14 —

will of both governments, the Council would be able to find a solution with all possible speed.

Mr. Sze then spoke again. He emphasized that all speakers had urged that time was essential and that this was only the first of a series of steps. He also understood that in the consultations before the next meeting the work would be within the Council; there was no question of direct negotiation. He accepted the proposal as good as far as it went, even though it did not provide for immediate steps to reestablish the *status quo ante* which would not only prevent further loss of life and property but would also pave the way for an impartial examination under the auspices of the League to determine the responsibility and damages. He hoped and expected such further action as might be necessary and trusted the Council would resume its discussion on the following day.

Mr. Yoshizawa highly appreciated the sentiments of his colleagues and expressed his sincere thanks for the attention the Council had given the matter. As to the next meeting, he was making every effort to supply fuller information to enable the Council to discuss the matter in detail; he could not at the moment say whether he would be in a position to ask the President to convene another meeting on the following day.

Viscount Cecil accepted the President's proposal as a first step. As to the next meeting, it would be useless to come together unless the Council could take some action; if the Chinese information was correct, however, very grave incidents were still taking place in Manchuria and there must be no avoidable delay. He appealed to his Japanese colleague to hasten the necessary instructions as much as possible.

Mr. Yoshizawa replied that he was making every possible effort to obtain fuller information and would not fail to submit a comprehensive report at the earliest possible moment. As to Lord Cecil's statement, he understood that if the Chinese report of the slaughter of hundreds of men, women and children were true, the Council could not hesitate to meet as soon as possible: he hoped the interpretation was incorrect. Viscount Cecil explained that the

matter was extremely urgent and that he hoped the instructions from Tokio would arrive at the earliest possible moment.

Mr. Lerroux, speaking both as President and as representative of Spain, associated himself with his colleagues, assuring them that the question would be investigated with the utmost diligence. Finally, Mr. Garay of Panama said the American countries represented on the Council could not but view with concern a question which affected the peace of the world and that it was the Council's duty to take all necessary steps in conformity with the Covenant and other treaties to secure the immediate cessation of hostilities, to prevent any resumption of the fighting by either party and to bring about a restoration of peace in those countries which at the moment deserved every sympathy on account of the deplorable calamities they had recently suffered.

A Decision without Delay.

Thereupon the Council unanimously, including the parties, authorised the action proposed. That night, the very day after the Chinese appeal to the League, the following cable was formally sent by the President of the Council to Tokio and Nanking:

"I have the honour to inform you that at its meeting to-day devoted to the Chinese Government's appeal under Article 11 of the Covenant in connection with the situation in Manchuria, the Council of the League of Nations unanimously authorised me: (1) to address an urgent appeal to the Governments of China and Japan to refrain from any act which might aggravate the situation or prejudice the peaceful settlement of the problem; (2) to endeavour in consultation with the Chinese and Japanese representatives to find adequate means of enabling the two countries to withdraw their troops forthwith without the safety of their nationals and their property being endangered; (3) the Council further decided to forward the minutes of all the meetings of the Council and documents relating to this question to the Government of the United States of America for its information. I am firmly convinced that in response to the appeal which the Council has authorised me to make to you your Government will take all possible

— 15 —

steps to prevent the commission of any act which might aggravate the situation or prejudice the peaceful settlement of the problem. I am about to begin the consultations contemplated with the Japanese and Chinese representatives with a view to the execution of paragraph (2). For these consultations I have obtained the assistance of the representatives of Germany, Great Britain, France and Italy. The decision referred to under (3) has been carried out."

This cable, it should be noted, gave information as to the creation of a special group within the Council to keep in touch with the Manchurian affair. It was to be composed of the President, together with the representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy and Germany, and was to become known as "The Committee of Five". Some "discontent", as the *Journal de Genève* put it, was expressed, especially amongst the smaller States, that the League practice of including one or more small Powers in such mediatory action was not followed, and there was even suggestion of action to prevent this becoming a precedent for future cases. Whether or not such criticism was justified, the composition of the Committee left little doubt as to the seriousness with which the Council regarded the situation.

America Approaches.

Meanwhile, a new element dramatically appeared in the situation. The Council, it will be recalled, had decided to send all its material to the United States Government: little short of a sensation, however, was created when the American Minister to Switzerland, Mr. Hugh R. Wilson, who only the day before had been commissioned to represent the United States for the first time in the Assembly Committee discussions on the Armaments Truce, suddenly left that meeting to go upstairs to visit the Secretary-General. While Washington despatches this same day said that there seemed to be no violation of the Kellogg Pact and the Government did not at the moment intend to take position, it became very clear at Geneva that America's relationship to League action in Manchuria was not to be confined to the

receipt of documents. On the contrary, from almost the first moment, Mr. Wilson was seen frequently to go up the stairs to the Secretary-General's office to receive the latest information.

Tuesday, then, seemed to end satisfactorily in Geneva, though badly in the East. At the Geneva end the two parties had had a close debate, though the Japanese Delegate was handicapped by lack of instructions; the Council had unanimously agreed on an appeal to both Governments, an approach to collaboration with the United States, and the establishment of informal discussions amongst the Great Power representatives, while the United States Government itself was in close touch with Council proceedings.

The Military Speak.

From Tokio, however, the *London Times* brought news that the Japanese Cabinet had sat for seven hours in deadlock over the sending of reinforcements to Manchuria, Baron Shidehara, Foreign Minister, and Baron Inouye, Finance Minister, leading the opposition. Half an hour afterwards, however, General Minami, War Minister, was stated to have reported that the Korean Commander had sent a mixed brigade to Mukden. At the same time, General Honji, Japanese Commander-in-Chief in South Manchuria, was reported from Peking to have issued the following proclamation, important as illustrating the attitude of those responsible in the field:

"The violence perpetrated by the Chinese side at this time is no spasmodic outburst of feeling, but a premeditated action of the Chinese authorities, who have been accustomed to insult Japan. Were this left unchallenged, Japan's acquired rights and interests in Manchuria would most certainly be overthrown.

"The people of China are innocent, and ambitious militarists alone are responsible for the incident. In view of the heavy responsibility of protecting the South Manchuria Railway, I adopted determined steps. It being my object to chastise the authorities and not the people, the populace should carry on its occupations in peace."

— 16 —

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 23d.

Press despatches, which in the first days had been the most important source of news, tended by midweek to give way to official communications. Both Japan and China inaugurated a system of written statements to the League producing a constant flow of information.

On Wednesday, Japan transmitted her first official statement of what had happened in Manchuria, and China added thirteen more messages to the two sent the first day. Never before had there been such a continuous and up-to-the minute distribution of news by two parties engaged in a dispute.

The Japanese statement ascribed the incident to the blowing up by a detachment of some 350 Chinese of part of the main line of the South Manchurian railroad north of Mukden. The Japanese intervened, a battle ensued, Japanese headquarters took the steps necessitated by the gravity of the situation and the disproportion of forces, and occupied the Chinese barracks, the open town, the official buildings, and the arsenal. Concentration took place at Mukden; the Kwantung staff proceeded there; Changchun was occupied with 60 Japanese killed and 96 wounded as well as various strategic points and Kirin, where Japanese citizens were in danger. In these places order is being maintained in cooperation with the Chinese; outside the railroad zone Japanese consuls have applied to the local authorities to protect their nationals; so far foreigners in the occupied sections are safe. In view, however, of the disquieting situation caused by undisciplined bands, the attitude of the population, and the insufficiency of the Japanese forces to protect the railroad line and Japanese and foreign lives, the 39th army corps of 4000 men had been sent to Manchuria from Korea.

China's new cables gave added information on both the political and the military aspects of the situation. Number 3 stated that Mr. T. V. Soong, while considering a mixed Chino-Japanese commission when the affair seemed purely local, rejected it when it appeared to be warlike measures on a large scale. Number 4 described a tense situation in Harbin.

Number 5 gave details of further occupations, airplane demonstrations, and the death of over 100 Chinese police in Peitaying. Number 6 contained the text of President Chiang Kai Shek's proclamation to the nation that "an hour of unprecedented gravity" had struck and that China had entrusted her case to the League and her Army received the strictest orders to avoid any possible clash. Number 7 reported Chang Hsueh Liang as ordering Manchurian troops to barracks. Number 8 gave details of Kirin and other places, estimating seizures at Mukden at \$100,000,000. Number 9 reported the death of Brigadier Commander Fu and family. Number 10 disclaimed any attack on the railroad. Number 11 reported Kirin burning, with the 56th Chinese regiment exterminated and 60 Japanese casualties. Number 12 said that the National Government categorically repudiated direct negotiations with the matter now in the hands of the League. Number 13 reported the famine sufferers in Hankow and Wuchang as "too proud to accept relief from a country whose militarists have been permitted to slaughter our brethren in Manchuria and invade our territory when 16 of our provinces are suffering from the disastrous floods." Number 14 gave the text of a similar message to the Chairman of the Japan Flood Relief Commission. Number 15 cited a Tokio report of 65 soldiers killed and 93 wounded and 3 officers killed and 7 wounded.

Meanwhile, diplomatic negotiations seemed to be continuing on a wide scale. In Moscow Mr. Litvinoff had again seen the Japanese Ambassador; alarm was expressed there at the events, and surprise at Russia's not having been informed. In Washington both Japanese and Chinese representatives were reported conferring with State Department officials.

The Assembly Watches.

In Geneva itself, the Assembly was somewhat restive. As in the Corfu affair years before, the larger League body felt a certain uneasiness and hesitation lest the Council be too conservative and diplomatic. Many of its delegates, particularly the more active leaders from the smaller states, wished to make its voice heard

— 17 —

in order both to sustain the Council in the action which it had already taken and to urge it on against any possible temptation to draw back. The Council, on its part, was glad to have the moral support of the Assembly, even though it shrank from a general debate in so large a gathering.

The Assembly Approves.

In response to this very legitimate interest on the part of League Members not represented on the Council, the President of the latter body asked to appear before the Assembly to make a communication on behalf of the Council. The dispute between Japan and China, he said, is now under consideration by the Council. Consultations are taking place; the Council hopes they will lead to a satisfactory conclusion. The Council also hopes to make a statement to the Assembly as soon as possible. Meanwhile it wishes to assure the Assembly that it is devoting to the question all the time and attention required in the interests of peace and the respect the Council owes to both parties.

The President of the Assembly, Mr. Titulesco of Rumania, made a reply which he hoped would obviate an immediate discussion. The dispute, he said, had not been brought before the Assembly; the Council is competent in the matter. In circumstances like these, however, it is before all else necessary that the League be able to rely on the approval and help of public opinion in all countries. It is, therefore, not enough for the Council to sit permanently as much as possible in public session until peace is assured. The Assembly must also not finish its labours without having an opportunity of showing the interest which all the members of the League feel for the success of so vital an action. The Assembly hopes, therefore, that, before it ends, the Council will make a new communication so that it may express its opinion.

With this view the Assembly concurred. There was no further action or speech; those who had felt that the Assembly should manifest its interest and concern were satisfied for the moment with the fact that the President of the Council had come before them to promise a

further communication and that the President of their own body had reiterated its necessity. The Chinese-Japanese affair, while, therefore, not under negotiation by the Assembly, had nevertheless been presented to it in recognition of the importance it might have to every State Member of the League and of the value which the moral support of the League's largest and most authoritative organ would certainly afford.

Meanwhile the Council was keeping steadily at its task. The President conferred, separately in the morning, with both Mr. Yoshizawa and Mr. Sze. At 3 o'clock the Committee of Five met for a short time and at 5 o'clock again. A full public session of the Council was summoned for 6.45. A large attendance was on hand; several members of the Council were already at the table, including Dr. Sze, when at 7 the latter was suddenly called upstairs to a meeting of the Five and the public session adjourned without explanation.

For two hours the private meeting continued. Nothing was given out officially; it was fairly clearly understood, however, that the question at issue was the Chinese demand for a commission of enquiry. Here there was the greatest divergence of viewpoint.

The Chinese cited the precedent established in the Greek-Bulgar case when the Military Attachés of the Great Powers had been sent to the area of hostilities within a few hours of their outbreak. Japan, however, had an earlier precedent to recall in that no such action had been taken in the Corfu crisis between Italy and Greece. Moreover, Tokio despatches that same day brought further details of her proposal for direct negotiations through a committee of three Japanese and three Chinese and her unalterable opposition to an international commission as implying doubt of her good faith. Finally, the report began to get around that Washington, while approving the principle of League intervention in the matter, questioned the wisdom of pressing at the moment for an international commission.

Geneva and Washington Talk by Telephone.

At this moment another bit of startling news found its way through the crowded

— 18 —

corridors. It was reported that the American Minister, Mr. Wilson, who had been in constant touch with the Secretary-General, had also been in telephonic conversation with the Secretary of State in Washington. This had never happened before; the telephone had never been used for a communication from an American diplomat at the League to his chiefs in the State Department. Extreme rumours followed one another to the effect that the United States had already been formally invited to sit on the Council, that Mr. Wilson had actually sat there in private, that the United States had refused to sit, etc., etc. Any doubt, however, of America's intense interest both in the conflict itself and in the Council's relation to it was by now more than dispelled.

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 24th.

Early Thursday morning came one of the most far-reaching communications yet received by the League of Nations. Hardly had the Secretary-General reached his office when the American Minister handed him a communication from Secretary of State Stimson to the President of the Council to the effect that the United States not only was "in whole-hearted sympathy" with the Council's action but would itself take similar action. Washington's response to the Council decision to keep it informed of developments in Geneva was more complete and more friendly than even the most optimistic had dared to hope. The American Government took no middle course; the Secretary of State said:

"I have received from the American Minister at Berne the copy of the resolution of the Council of the League of Nations which you transmitted to him. I have noted the two parts of this resolution and the fact that they have been embodied in a note which you have addressed to the Governments of Japan and China.

"I assure you that the Government of the United States is in whole-hearted sympathy with the attitude of the League of Nations as expressed in the Council's resolution and will despatch to Japan and China notes along similar lines.

"I have already urged cessation of hosti-

lities and a withdrawal from the present situation of danger and will continue earnestly to work for the restoration of peace."

America Arrives.

By this single short message the greatest gap in the mechanism for peace was dramatically closed. Not only did America not object to League action; not only was she not indifferent to it; on the contrary, she approved and supported it in the most positive terms. The two principal agencies working for peaceful settlement were, therefore, united, not divided; they would work together rather than apart.

This news, spreading rapidly through the Assembly, which was just coming together, was greeted with the utmost gratification. On all sides it was given an immense significance both for the particular case in question and for the future. For the first time the United States was cooperating with the Council in an effort to prevent war. Once before, in the Bolivia-Paraguay case, the Council had put to the United States the question of what action it would suggest in case war actually broke out, as seemed likely; the necessity of a reply, however, was obviated by an unexpectedly quick settlement of the dispute. In the Manchuria case, however, the United States had taken position firmly and positively; no doubt was left but that the American Government was with Council in fact if not in form.

What this may mean for the future organisation of world peace is difficult to imagine. Delegates there were in Geneva who felt the precedent thus established was one of the most important in League development. No longer was America isolated, unattainable; clearly she had shown that, in case of world crisis, the Council might hope for her friendly collaboration. "This", as the London *Times* correspondent that day telegraphed, "brought the United States into closer co-operation with the League than at any other time".

Echoes

It may not here be inappropriate to set back the clock of history for twelve years to a

— 19 —

dramatic scene in the White House at Washington. On August 19, 1919, President Wilson had returned from Paris for a brief visit to secure Senate support for the League of Nations and the Peace Treaties then under negotiation. He was facing an almost openly hostile Foreign Affairs Committee from that body, some of whose members were obviously seeking to put embarrassing questions. After Senator Johnson of California had asked about the Japanese situation in Shantung, the following exchange took place:

Senator Knox: Mr. President, the economic privileges that the Japanese originally acquired in Korea, and subsequently in inner and outer Mongolia, and in northern and southern Manchuria, have almost developed into a complete sovereignty over those countries, have they not?

The President: Yes, Senator, in the absence of a League of Nations, they have.

Senator Knox: You think the League of Nations would have prevented that, do you?

The President: I am confident it would.

China Accepts.

On the same day that the United States signified its endorsement of League action, the Chinese Delegation transmitted to the Council China's complete acceptance of the suggestions contained in the Council's telegram to both parties of three days before. This was less than a week since the first shot at Mukden. The incident had started late on a Friday night; the news had reached Geneva Saturday morning; China had appealed to the League Monday; the Council had telegraphed to both parties Tuesday night; and on Thursday came China's reply. Whether the League will always succeed in averting hostilities is a hypothetical question which cannot be categorically answered; what its new method of international conference and consultation may mean for the mobilization of world opinion and moral pressure may be clearly seen, however, against the chaos and disorganization which existed before the League and which made it possible for the World War to break out without even an exchange of views.

China, as the appealing party, fully accepted the Council's recommendations. She regarded them, however, as only a first and preliminary step leading to a final settlement and complete satisfaction to the aggrieved nation. She agreed to abstain from any action likely to aggravate the situation and cited her President's proclamation that, as the case had been entrusted to the League, the National Army had the strictest orders to avoid all possibility of clash. She particularly welcomed the decision that troops on both sides should return immediately to their original positions, though China had taken no measures contrary to this view. She was gratified that the Council was seeking the most effective means of ensuring the immediate withdrawal of the Japanese troops; the situation was growing in gravity every hour and brooked absolutely no delay. China will assume full responsibility for the protection of life and property as soon as she regains control of the areas evacuated by Japanese troops. Finally, she noted with satisfaction the decision to forward all data to the United States Government.

More Chinese Telegrams.

On Thursday, also, the Chinese delegation had circulated to the Council 7 more telegrams covering six long typed pages and making a total to date of 22. Number 16 gave dangerous details regarding Kirin and Harbin. Number 17 brought disquieting news of unrest in Shantung, and Number 18 further details from Manchuria. Number 19 explained more fully the Chinese rejection of direct negotiations. Number 20 quoted Senator Johnson's declaration in San Francisco that Japan was waging war on China. Number 21 reported the occupation of Taonanfu, and Number 22 alleged further attacks in Kirin with 200 Chinese killed and total casualties in Mukden of over 5000.

Japan Counters.

The Japanese delegation also circulated further telegrams just received. The first, from Tokio, categorically denied the occupation

— 20 —

of Tsingtao or Chefu or the landing of marines in China proper. As, however, the Chinese nationalist party and others were organizing a strong anti-Japanese campaign, arrangements had been made to move Japanese women and children from Nanking to Shanghai in case of need. The second denied sensational reports that Japanese troops had occupied nearly all towns in Manchuria. On the contrary there had been no advance north of Changchun, and Kirin had been left with guards only. At Mukden the control of the municipality was temporary, the Chinese officials having fled. Elsewhere Chinese authorities were at their posts working in concert with the Japanese; nowhere had a military government been established.

Conflicting Press News.

Meanwhile, press despatches were pouring into Geneva from all sides. The League action seemed to be viewed differently in the two Eastern capitals. A Tokio despatch to the Times said it was regarded in Japan as well-meant but, in view of the actual facts, pointless: a Nanking message said it had been "warmly received there and has somewhat calmed anti-Japanese feelings". Nanking reported a third note to Tokio: Tokio reported a note from the United States, a Cabinet meeting to consider a reply to the League, and the drafting by Baron Shidehara of a declaration promising withdrawal of troops on condition of safety of Japanese lives and property.

In a military sense, the reports were very conflicting. Shanghai stated that Japan had renounced her intention to occupy Harbin: a Tokio despatch again said that the army at Kirin had refused to obey the Central Government: a further Tokio despatch said that, in view of the fact that the military had achieved their aims, Japanese troops had been withdrawn except at Mukden, Changchun and Kirin. Mukden reported that the Japanese had taken twelve leading citizens as hostages: Nanking forwarded a telegram from Chang Hsueh Liang that Soviet troops were moving on the frontier: Shanghai sent details of the first day of national grief and mourning, with a monster mass

meeting and proposals for a general strike and boycott.

The Council Replies.

At five o'clock that afternoon the Committee of Five, and immediately after at seven the full Council, met privately to approve a reply to the United States. The Council endeavoured to express its appreciation in the warmest possible terms and opened the door still wider for further co-operation. Some question there had been of an open invitation but this was abandoned, partly because, if a declaration were deemed necessary in Washington, it would be unfortunate for all sides and militate against the chances of a peaceful settlement. The reply to the United States was as follows:

"The Council of the League of Nations has requested me to express to the Secretary of State its appreciation of the friendly answer which he was good enough to make in regard to the situation which has unhappily arisen between two highly respected Members of the family of nations, China and Japan. The Council is gratified to note that the Government of the United States is in whole-hearted sympathy with the attitude of the League of Nations as expressed in the Council resolution, and that it will despatch to Japan and China, in addition to previous communications, notes on lines similar to those followed by the Council.

"The Council has no preconceived method for solving the difficulties which have arisen; no procedure or formula to which it is irrevocably bound other than its obligation to 'take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations'.

"To this end, the Council will gladly continue to keep the Government of the United States informed of any action it may take or any information it may secure, and ventures to hope that that Government will also be disposed to communicate with it. The Council feels confident that, irrespective of any individual effort which any Government may deem it desirable to make, it is by the continuance of common endeavour that a successful result is most likely to be achieved. The efforts which are now being made here will be continued by the Council in such form as circumstances may require."

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— 21 —

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 25th.

Just as the first week following the outbreak at Mukden was closing came Japan's acceptance of the Council's recommendation to both parties. The text is so clear and so brief that it is worth quoting in full:

"Acting on instructions received from my Government, I have the honour to acquaint Your Excellency with the reply of my Government to the telegram of September 22nd which Your Excellency was good enough to forward to it.

"1. As regards the first point mentioned in the message, the Japanese troops, since the beginning of the present events, have been careful to act only within the limits necessary to ensure their own safety, the protection of the Railway and the safety of Japanese nationals. The Japanese Government has firmly pursued the object of preventing an extension of the incident and the aggravation of the situation; it is profoundly desirous of ensuring the peaceful settlement of this problem as rapidly as possible by negotiations between the two countries, and it has the firm intention not to depart from this line of conduct.

"2. As regards the second point in the message, the Japanese Government desires to state that it has withdrawn the greater part of its forces to the Railway zone and that they are concentrated there. Outside that zone, only a few troops are, as a precautionary measure, quartered in the town of Mukden and at Kirin, and a small number of soldiers have been placed at certain points, these measures not constituting any military occupation.

"The Japanese forces are being withdrawn to the fullest extent which is at present allowed by the maintenance of the safety of Japanese nationals and the protection of the Railway. The Japanese Government, which intends to withdraw its troops to the Railway zone in proportion as the situation improves, feels confident that the Council will, in this matter, trust the sincerity of its attitude."

At the same time, the Japanese Delegation also forwarded a declaration made by the government in Tokio the day before. Despite Japan's constant efforts to foster friendly relations with China, it stated, the conduct of Chinese officials and individuals, particularly

in Manchuria, had been such that Japanese national sentiment was frequently irritated and the Japanese people brought to doubt whether its sentiments were reciprocated. It was in this atmosphere that a detachment of Chinese troops destroyed the railroad near Mukden and created a dangerous situation. Only 10,400 Japanese soldiers were on the ground against 220,000 Chinese, with hundreds of thousands of Japanese residents in danger. To forestall an imminent disaster the Japanese Army had to act promptly, disarming nearby Chinese garrisons and entrusting order to local Chinese under Japanese supervision. The troops were then mostly withdrawn. Nowhere does military occupation as such exist, nor have Japanese troops seized customs or the control of railroads or passed north of Changchun. The special Cabinet meeting of September 19th sent instructions to make all possible efforts to avoid an aggravation of the situation. Japan has no territorial designs in Manchuria; she seeks only the opportunity of participating safely in the development of that territory; she is prepared to cooperate with China to prevent the present incident developing into a disastrous situation and to work out "such constructive plans as will once for all eradicate causes for future friction."

Tokio Reactions.

Just what influence League action had had in Tokio was reported in different ways in despatches reaching Geneva. A despatch to the London *Times* of September 25 said that "the press displays irritation at the action of the League, but the Foreign Office says the League is not open to censure". A further despatch said that it was certain that the mediation of Geneva had contributed to the more conciliatory attitude adopted at Tokio. On the other hand, Viscount Ishii, President of the Japanese League of Nations Association was stated in the *Times* of the 26th to "have complained bitterly of the League's suspicions of Japan. "The whole structure of the disarmament plan", he said, "might be wrecked by a probably unintentional but inconsiderate act of suspicion which casts doubt on the accuracy

— 22 —

of the solemn statement made by the Japanese Government". "In any case", the same despatch stated, "a sense of relaxing tension pervaded the Government offices today".

America Acts Again.

This same day the United States Minister transmitted to the President of the Council, under instructions from the Secretary of State, the text of the Identical Note addressed to China and Japan in Washington. The text was as follows:

"The Government and people of the United States observed with regret and with concern events of the past few days in Manchuria. In view of the sincere desire of the people of this country that principles and methods of peace shall prevail in international relations, and of the existence of treaties, to several of which the United States is a party, the provisions of which are intended to regulate the adjustment of controversies between nations without resort to use of force, the American Government feels warranted in expressing to the Chinese and the Japanese Governments its hope that they will cause their military forces to refrain from any further hostilities, will so dispose respectively of their armed forces as to satisfy the requirements of international law and international agreements, and will refrain from activities which may prejudice the attainment by amicable methods of an adjustment of their differences."

Satisfactory though this and the previous communication from Washington had been, there were still not a few observers in Geneva who feared lest, if cooperation were limited to written communications after the fact, a gap might quite easily develop in which divergent policies might arise. A far greater certainty of the pursuit of similar action by both parties would undoubtedly exist if a method of consultation in advance could be arrived at. League authorities were naturally anxious to know what action the United States was contemplating; similarly, they frequently mentioned the possibility of having an American representative present to advise with them before their own action was taken.

Another Council Session.

That afternoon the Council came together for another public session. The President noted the replies of the two Governments to the Council's telegrams; expressed its appreciation for the promptness with which they had responded to its appeal; and expressed the view that the Council had every reason to be satisfied with the Japanese Government's statement that it had withdrawn the greater part of its forces to the railroad zone and that they were concentrated there. That improvement in the situation should be noted.

Mr. Yoshizawa then asked that, in view of the importance of the two documents, his Government's reply to the Council's telegram and its statement on the situation in Manchuria above mentioned be read. He said he felt that these statements had cleared the atmosphere, which up to then had been obscured by alarming and exaggerated reports, added that he must enter "an indignant protest against the abominable accusations" concerning the Japanese troops, and asserted his belief that the situation had now been reduced to its proper proportions where it could be examined in calm. He again summarised the situation in Manchuria, pointing out that protective measures had to be fairly far-reaching in scope if they were to be effective. He similarly reaffirmed Japan's pacific intentions, her previous withdrawal of most of her troops, and her intention of withdrawing the rest. The improvement in the situation seemed to him to militate in favour of the direct negotiation originally proposed by China. As to the Council, its essential mission was to bring about pacific settlement. The method might vary according to circumstances but must respect the wishes of the parties. If one of them clearly expressed its views as to the choice of procedure, it seemed to him the duty and the practice of the Council to respect these desires. In the present case the Council would do well not to intervene prematurely, as thereby it might risk adversely affecting the situation which already showed signs of improvement.

Mr. Sze then had the Chinese reply read. He thereupon added that China had placed herself unreservedly in the hands of the League and

— 23 —

agreed to accept any recommendations the Council might make. Already she had ordered her military and civilians not to resist, and was ready to assume full responsibility for the protection of life and property. He reiterated, however, that the Council's action was considered as but a first and preliminary step and that the next and immediate step should be to secure the complete withdrawal of troops and the re-establishment of the *status quo ante*. In accordance with precedent, China would like a commission of neutral members to observe the modes and times of such withdrawal. Also, he desired the Council to point out to Japan that, unless this withdrawal should take place, she would place herself in opposition to the categorical obligation assumed by her in Article 15 to submit to the Council disputes likely to lead to a rupture. If this Article should be brought into operation, the procedure would no longer be a matter of discretion but is definitely outlined. Should Japan claim that her citizens and property would not be safe, China had already given an assurance to this effect which was all the more valid because, despite intense indignation throughout China, Japanese living there had not been molested. Mr. Sze then commented on certain statements made by Mr. Yoshizawa, noting the admission that there was still a considerable occupation of Chinese territory — including Mukden and Kirin, very important cities, both capitals of provinces of Manchuria. Mr. Sze would ask what "a small number of men" and a "few other places" might mean. As regards defensive measures, Lord Cecil had already read an extract on that subject; it was a dangerous principle to assert that troops might occupy so many places, destroy so much property, and kill so many people. As regards direct negotiations, Mr. Sze read cable No. 19 previously submitted, the last sentence of which "that the invasion made any direct negotiations absolutely impossible" still held good.

Mr. Yoshizawa thereupon simply added that he had already replied in a previous statement to the accusations brought by the Chinese representative against Japan.

Defining the Position.

Viscount Cecil stated his understanding of the actual position of the Council. Its duty under Article 11 was "to take any action that might be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations". It had not to settle the dispute or pass any judgment on the action of the parties. It was only when peace had been safeguarded that any question as to the settlement of the actual dispute could arise. Lord Cecil agreed with his Japanese colleague that the question of the dispute itself was for the parties and not for the Council to deal with unless it came before the Council under Article 15 or some other contractual agreement. But at the present stage the business of the Council was to safeguard the peace of nations. It was with the greatest pleasure that he had learned that, even before receiving the Council's communications, the Japanese troops were being withdrawn. The Council would desire, and Japan too, he hoped, that the remaining troops be withdrawn as rapidly as possible. Both sides admitted the withdrawal was in progress; there was every reason to hope that the duty of the Council to safeguard the peace of nations might in a short time be regarded as fully accomplished. If the Council had any doubt on the question, it would have to consider its duty in these circumstances.

The President then made a brief statement. The Japanese forces were being withdrawn; and, if both sides made efforts to alleviate the situation, the Council might hope for a satisfactory settlement. It must rely first and foremost on the loyalty of the two parties. On the one hand it would wish to appeal to Japan to withdraw its troops as rapidly as possible; on the other, it would note China's assumption of responsibility, as and when the Japanese troops withdrew, for the safety of Japanese lives and property. The Council would, no doubt, wish to be kept informed of the measures taken; in the meantime, in view of the importance of the statements made, he would propose postponing the discussion to allow their study.

— 24 —

Geneva Doubts.

This session created the gravest difference of opinion and interpretation amongst both official and private observers. As the New York Times correspondent that night wrote, opinions were divided into two radically opposed schools of thought. The majority, he said, felt that the Council, and especially Lord Cecil, had lost face in trying to save the face of the Council, or Japan, or both. This group held that Japan had successfully defied both the League and the United States, and compared her promise to withdraw troops as rapidly as possible with that of Gladstone when the British occupied Egypt 50 years ago. The other school of thought, he continued, and especially that of League officials, was that the League had attained a victory. This group held that the principal object was to bring about the retreat of troops without attaching too much importance to the method, and that the best way of assuring the continuation of this retreat was that of Lord Cecil which, in effect, made Japan's promise more solemn. If in several days Japan did not keep its promises, the Council could employ more energetic measures. Japan's reply might be considered a rebuff to the League but in view of Japan's psychology it was, in effect, a great concession. In any case, he concluded, the Council definitely followed the policy which Washington was urging as the most wise.

A Wise Policy ?

The Council, at the moment, was banking everything on persuasion, mediation, and confidence. Constant reports of the division in Japan between the civil government and the military, constant urgings not to take any action which might weaken the former, especially Baron Shidehara, and develop a wave of ultra-patriotic reaction, as well as the now well-known judgment of the American government against immediately forcing the situation, fitted in with the personal desires of the members of the Council and of all their countries, preoccupied with acute

internal problems, to recommend a policy of friendliness and caution in the hope that, somehow, matters would right themselves and the world be spared further movement along the road to calamity. There were the strongest of reasons for this policy, not only in the difficulties of the various countries nor even in the fact that the League's chief purpose is to prevent rather than to stimulate sharp actions, but also in the faith and confidence which the Council felt it could place in both parties to the dispute. Whether or not this view was justified, whether or not those were right who pressed for action without perhaps sufficiently estimating possible eventualities, the rumor was not long in getting around that the Japanese delegation in Geneva had responded most generously to this method and had cabled urgently to Tokio that Japan must make very effort to reciprocate the goodwill and confidence shown by the League. If that were indeed the case, as seemed well established, the policy which led to it, and the temporary misunderstanding in China, would seem to have been justified. Certainly no effort could be spared or no opportunity left untried to secure peaceful settlement by persuasion and mediation.

SATURDAY AND SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 26th AND 27th.

Saturday and Sunday were relatively quiet, waiting days. Both parties had pledged themselves to follow the Council's recommendations; obviously a short delay was inevitable before the actual results would be clear. On the whole, however, the situation was distinctly better. Geneva was relieved, though anxious. Tokio reported a lessening of the tension and a belief that the military action was ended and the troops really in withdrawal. Nanking, however, was disturbed; the League's action was not understood; an impression prevailed that it had abandoned the affair.

What news there was, was calmer. The Chinese sent in but three telegrams over the week-end, numbers 23 to 25, without, however, startling new facts. The Geneva press pictured

— 25 —

the two parties as resting on their positions, China proposing but Japan refusing a Commission of Inquiry, and Japan proposing but China refusing direct negotiations. The situation seemed to come down to the question whether the Japanese would actually withdraw before another dangerous incident threw it into jeopardy again. In this connection disturbing reports came from Peking of the derailing of a train near Mukden by bandits, with the death of 30 people; from Hong-Kong of hostile demonstrations against the Japanese; and from various sources of incipient military republics in Manchuria and Mongolia.

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 28th.

Monday morning's dispatches brought news of an attack on Foreign Minister C. T. Wang in Nanking by students dissatisfied with his supposed failure to persuade the League of Nations to continue to support China. When the Council took up the Chinese-Japanese affair at its afternoon meeting, the President said that the Council had learned of this with deep emotion and expressed the unanimous desire of his colleagues to transmit their warmest sympathies to Dr. Wang. He then recalled a resolution submitted by his delegation to the present Assembly concerning the grave disturbance to international relations which might be caused by false news and made a fraternal appeal to the press to cooperate with the Council in its particularly delicate task by giving world public opinion accurate information. Mr. Yoshizawa expressed his deep emotion at the attack on Dr. Wang, a personal friend for many years. Mr. Sze thanked the Council, and particularly Mr. Yoshizawa, whose esteem Dr. Wang reciprocated.

The Secretary-General asked the Council's authority to send to the League offices in Tokio and Nanking a short resumé of the proceedings. This was agreed to by the Council, particularly the Japanese and Chinese delegates, and drew attention to a little appreciated fact that the League, as part of its new system of cooperation and liason, had, during the past years, built

up a chain of correspondents in many countries to keep it informed of developments and to serve in case of need. In Tokio, for instance, there has been for many years a very effective and valuable bureau for expediting collaboration between Japan and the League and for answering queries in a country possessing one of the largest League societies and purchasing the third largest amount of League publications. In Nanking, following the recent increase in collaboration with China, a correspondent similarly had been appointed.

Mr. Yoshizawa then expressed the view that the unfortunate situation was happily improving. He reiterated Japan's intention to withdraw her troops as and when the return to peaceful conditions should make such withdrawal possible without danger to her nationals, but drew attention to the fact that, despite China's assumption of responsibility for Japanese lives and property, unfortunate experiences compelled her to recognize that China's goodwill had not always been able to make itself heard in the provinces. The Powers had often been compelled to land and maintain troops in China or to send war vessels there. The situation in Manchuria was particularly difficult and could not be compared with that between countries with separate populations divided by a well defined frontier. Japan must, therefore, be careful before withdrawing her troops. Despite pressing appeals for protection, no more troops had been sent and the withdrawal was continuing. Japan had made every effort to supply the Council with accurate information; it had no object in concealing the facts; indeed, at the very moment, every facility was being given in Manchuria for foreign officers, for instance, Colonel Thornhill, British Military Attaché in Peking, and for newspaper correspondents. Any further measures, then, appeared unnecessary. Mr. Yoshizawa concluded with reaffirming that Japan had no territorial designs on Manchuria, that she intended to withdraw her troops as soon as her nationals and property could be safeguarded, and that it was his earnest hope that this would be "within the shortest possible time."

— 26 —

A New Method.

Then developed a long and very intricate debate between the Japanese and Chinese representatives, with two interventions by Lord Cecil, which was remarkable both for the diplomatic subtlety with which it was conducted and for the fact that two nations in the midst of a most dangerous dispute could thus negotiate publicly back and forth across the Council table in the presence of representatives of twelve other states and some 300 journalists representing the press of the world. No debate of this type had ever taken place before, nor, indeed, had the mechanism which alone made it possible existed before the establishment of the League. If there be value in open diplomacy, if there be such an element as world moral opinion, if, indeed, there is any hope of supplanting the old methods of force and disorganization with new methods of common world responsibility, the demonstration of world consultation and conference already so dramatically made in the present incident would seem to show, whatever the eventual result and even in case it should not finally succeed, that the world has entered into a new phase of international relationships.

Little enough was this appreciated at the time, even in Geneva, where many, especially those not responsible, pressed for sharp measures; much less did it seem to be appreciated outside, where the debates were too often regarded as mere talk. Vital lines were being laid, however, both for the particular case in question and for cases that may come in the future.

Mr. Sze began the debate with satisfaction at the continued withdrawal of Japanese troops, though he would have been happier if they had all been withdrawn, or at least a date set therefor. He then wished to ask some questions. Could the Japanese representative give the Council any information on Japanese airplane attacks on trains on the Peking-Mukden railroad, of which he understood there were four on Thursday and Friday, the trains carrying ordinary passengers, with no Chinese soldiers nearby, and the planes flying low and using machine-guns? Also he would like to

know if, in the places evacuated, the *status quo ante* had been reestablished, that is, persons arrested released and property restored. As regards Japanese in China, no report had been received that any had been attacked, despite high feelings; China was as anxious as Japan to live on friendly terms with all peoples, including Japan, as shown by her recent inauguration of a very active collaboration with the League. But the most important element in such a matter is goodwill and mutual appreciation. In regard to Mr. Yoshizawa's mention of two posts, Hsinmintung and Chengshiatung, as still occupied, he would like to ask if there were no others?

Mr. Yoshizawa interrupted to add Kirin and Mukden.

China Offers a Compromise.

Mr. Sze then asked Japan's intentions regarding these places and how soon the troops would be withdrawn. Everyone agreed on a speedy completion of the withdrawal; the question remained as to the method. China's desire for a neutral commission was well-known, but, in order to be conciliatory and meet the Japanese representative more than half-way, he would propose that the Council help the parties reach an agreement as to arrangements on the spot, which would make it possible to fix an early date for the completion of withdrawal and render it unnecessary for the Council to send a commission of enquiry from Geneva. Finally, as regards reports that the Japanese had disarmed Chinese railway guards on the Peking-Mukden line, he hoped also for information from the Japanese representative.

Mr. Yoshizawa replied that the most important points raised seemed to be immediate withdrawal and the commission of observers. He was convinced he had already explained, that day and Friday, why Japan was unable to agree to those suggestions. As to the statement that Chinese women and children had been massacred by the Japanese army, he had already denied that in the most formal manner.

Other accusations were beyond the practice of the Japanese army. As soon as he had any information, however, he would inform

— 27 —

not only the Chinese representative but the Council.

Mr. Sze then said he understood the Japanese could not agree to immediate evacuation: he protested in the strongest possible terms against longer occupation. He reiterated his preference for a commission of neutral observers, but, to be conciliatory, repeated his suggestion that the Council aid the parties to come to an agreement on the spot. The telegrams to which the Japanese representative had taken exception and the differences in the statements of the two parties proved conclusively the need for the early dispatch of such a commission to ascertain the true facts.

Approach ?

Mr. Yoshizawa observed that he had already replied to the suggestion that a date for the completion of the evacuation be fixed. He was, however, prepared to telegraph at once to Tokio Mr. Sze's suggestion for the organization of a Sino-Japanese commission on the spot to facilitate evacuation.

Mr. Sze wanted to be sure about this commission. He said that, as China had entrusted her case to the Council, he expected the commission would report to the Council in order that the latter might be informed of the speedy and complete withdrawal. Also, he would venture to ask if the Japanese representative could answer his other questions as to the release of Chinese officials and civilians and restoration of property. As regards the reasons given by Mr. Yoshizawa for the maintenance of Japanese troops, he would point out that Japanese in China far from Japanese soldiers were unmolested and that it was the presence of Japanese soldiers which created the tension against which Japan claimed it necessary to provide military protection. A vicious circle was thus created.

Mr. Yoshizawa said he would have to ask for information on these points. He would like to ask Mr. Sze, however, whether he had in mind a commission of Japanese and Chinese only, or one including other nationalities.

Mr. Sze replied that, as the Japanese representative had frequently denied the accuracy

of reports and there were matters on which the representatives of the two countries did not agree, it was possible the same thing might happen again regarding the withdrawal. Hence, as the Council was assisting the two parties, it should appoint a neutral representative or representatives to help settle differences or remove misunderstanding. In connection with this withdrawal, the statement that several hundreds of Japanese police had been left at Chientao had been made; their presence, however, was liable to aggravate the situation. He requested that arrangements be made to replace them with Chinese.

Mr. Yoshizawa responded that he had already explained his government's views on evacuation and a commission of observers. He had said that all other measures than those he had mentioned were unnecessary. He could not agree, therefore, to a commission constituted on the lines just indicated by Mr. Sze.

Mr. Sze replied that he had not used the words "commission of observers". He had not suggested a commission to proceed from Geneva, as there were neutrals on the spot. As the Japanese delegate had said his country was anxious to live on the most friendly terms with China, he would most certainly welcome someone to help remove any possible misunderstanding.

An Attempt at Mediation.

Viscount Cecil here intervened to attempt to bring some kind of agreement out of a debate which seemed to have gone as far as it could wisely go. He thought the Chinese suggestion an interesting one and hoped his Japanese colleague would be able to give it further consideration. As he understood it, there should be some kind of committee or meeting in Manchuria, consisting chiefly of Chinese and Japanese. The Chinese representative had also suggested that the League might do something to help the two parties to come to an agreement. If Mr. Yoshizawa agreed, the Council might begin by bringing the two parties together to see if they could arrive at an agreement. The chief business of the League was to promote an agreement between the two parties after they had

— 28 —

succeeded, if they did succeed, in avoiding all danger of the dispute developing into a war. The League was intensely interested in an agreement being reached between the parties; but in all previous experience, it had always been left for the parties to come to an agreement if they could. He hoped his Japanese colleague would carefully consider whether a meeting of Chinese and Japanese might not be of service; if that meeting should prove fruitless, the Council would have to consider whether anything else could be done to bring about agreement. Meanwhile, in order to avoid misunderstanding, he hoped Mr. Sze would put his proposal in writing.

Mr. Sze gladly assented. He added, however, that he had said the Council could help the parties come to an agreement by arrangements on the spot. He had not said that China or Japan alone could arrange matters, but that the Council could arrange them and that the Council might see fit to select its representatives.

Waning Hope.

Viscount Cecil said that in that case the Council would be unable to carry the matter further at the present stage.

Mr. Yoshizawa repeated that he was quite ready to submit Lord Cecil's suggestion to his government, but, if it were supplemented by the further suggestion of the Chinese representative, he could not do so. He appreciated Lord Cecil's motives; Japan had no intention of making war on China. He interpreted Lord Cecil's suggestion to mean that the Chinese and Japanese would endeavor to come to an arrangement without help from outsiders. If that were correct, he would not fail to transmit the suggestion to his government.

Mr. Sze said there seemed to be a misapprehension; he had made a proposal which Lord Cecil had sought to restate in his own words, and this restatement Mr. Sze had corrected.

Viscount Cecil regretted any misunderstanding. He had thought the Chinese proposal applied to the questions of method, time, etc. of the evacuation and nothing else. It was true that Mr. Sze had thought the League could help the parties to come to an agreement. The only

difference was that it was now suggested that the Chinese and Japanese should meet and try to come to an agreement. If they failed, the Council would be no worse off; it could then say what further steps could be taken. Lord Cecil was referring solely to the question of evacuation; he was not dealing with other matters. However, it would be very difficult to carry the matter further at the moment.

The President of the Council agreed. The statements made would need to be carefully studied. He would summon another meeting shortly but, as the Assembly was closing the following day, the Council would doubtless agree that he should explain the situation to it. He proposed to ask the Assembly's permission to give an impartial report on the question and on how the Council had so far carried out its duties under Article 11.

Thus ended a long and tortuous debate which had held a large attendance in complete silence throughout. At times it had looked as though appreciable progress were to be made, but each time efforts just failed. The Chinese delegate had pressed a number of difficult questions as to Japanese actions or policy in Manchuria, to which the Japanese representative had replied either by reference to previous declarations or by saying he would have to ask Tokio for further information. The Chinese representative had also offered a compromise on the subject of an agency on the spot to arrange evacuation, which at first it seemed the Japanese delegate would cable to Tokio. When precision was sought, however, it was found that, despite Lord Cecil's attempts for a still finer compromise, the two parties stood practically where they had been standing throughout, the Japanese for direct negotiations without any participants from outside, and the Chinese for negotiations initiated through the Council, with neutral assistance, and reporting to the Council. The hope for a bridge over this gulf, which at one moment was strong, faded decidedly at the end.

The Point at Issue.

The Japanese, indeed, from the very outset, had taken strong position against any kind of outside participation in the affair. The inci-

— 29 —

dent, they felt, was purely a local one between the two countries. Not only was there no need for neutral observers or assistants but their presence would imply distrust of Japan's word. Mr. Yoshizawa had made this clear in Geneva; the Japanese Government had repeatedly stated it in Tokio; Viscount Ishii, devoted friend of the League and President of the Japanese Society for the League, was quoted as rather bitterly affirming it.

America's Share.

Whatever the Council's views might have been in a field where it was free to act entirely on its own judgment, there can be but little doubt but that in this case its policy was deeply influenced by that of the United States. From the first, it had become known that its government, while most warmly supporting the League's effort for peace in principle, felt the method of a neutral commission, for the moment at least, to be unwise. A Tokio dispatch printed in the London *Times* of September 26 said: "Officials express appreciation of the refusal of the United States to join the League's proposal for a military commission of inquiry in Manchuria." The leading article in the same issue commented ":

"The Council's appeal has thus borne fruit already in the improvement of the local situation and in the encouragement which it has given to the moderate elements in Japan. And the prompt and efficacious assistance of the United States has contributed in no small measure to this initial success. It is no exaggeration to say that the American government, though not a member of the League, has been in closer collaboration with it during the last few days than at any previous time. In one respect, indeed, it has handled a difficult and obscure situation more skilfully than the Council was at first disposed to do. The manner of Mr. Stimson's intervention was as tactful as was the text of his communication to the Japanese and Chinese governments. His refusal to support the proposal mooted at a meeting of the League Council for the dispatch of a Military Commission of Inquiry to Manchuria showed a sagacious appreciation of the dangers inseparable from such a step. Any action which gave the proud and

sensitive islanders the impression, however unfounded, that their government was regarded with distrust by other Powers must have increased the embarrassments at Tokio and might have defeated the good intentions of Geneva."

This view, however, was far from universal. There were very bitter critics who felt that the League, in not taking steps on its own to find out exactly what was happening, was in effect abdicating its duty. And it was said that, in almost any case except one involving a Great Power, it would at once have taken this action. The United States naturally came in for its share of criticism from these quarters. Which ever view be correct, the decision was an extremely difficult one, with strong arguments to be advanced on both sides. It well illustrated the difficulties of the new diplomacy, the transition period, as it were, between past methods and future.

The News.

Meanwhile, information reaching Geneva on Monday was a shade less disturbing than theretofore, though still bad. It seemed to indicate a moment of waiting, from which, however, a sudden catastrophe might at any time develop. Press reports indicated a growing public unrest throughout China and Manchuria, with the possibility of anti-Japanese outbreaks on the one hand or the establishment of military governments on the other. Tokio dispatches gave details of independent republics in Manchuria and Mongolia, on which, however, the Japanese government was said to frown. Nanking reported demonstrations of students dissatisfied with the League's decision; Hong-Kong reported martial law, patrols in the streets, and mobilization of British volunteers; Canton announced the suspension of all circulation for three minutes, a period of silence, and mourning armbands for the period of the occupation.

The delegations in Geneva also communicated information to the Council. The Japanese transmitted the declaration of General Shimamoto, commanding the protective forces at Mukden, on the origin of the affair. The Chinese dele-

— 30 —

gation circulated ten more telegrams, making a total of 35, together with two unofficial telegrams from Chinese in Singapore and Germany. These messages gave further details of the Japanese occupation and military movements; reported all China as "seething with indignation", with the government hard put to quiet the population; claimed that the attack was premeditated and intended to cover annexation; and concluded that, "While Government fully recognizes earnest endeavour Council to maintain peace, the fact that neutral commission yet undispatched Manchuria and continued Japanese air attacks on Peking-Mukden railway, Japanese semi-official statement that Kwantung army should remain present positions pending completion negotiations, settlement present dispute, reported movement Japanese warships producing most unfavorable impression public opinion. Government most earnestly trust Council will exert its full authority before too late."

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 29th.

This was the closing day of the Twelfth Assembly. The President of the Council, at a previous meeting on September 23, had promised a full statement on behalf of his colleagues before the representatives of the 52 nations in the Assembly, including the 38 not in the Council, dispersed to their homes. Interest was high as Mr. Lerroux mounted the rostrum before the world's largest organized body. What would he say, what interpretation would he give, what assurance would he hold out to those who had so anxiously followed the development of the affair? And what, too would the Chinese do? Would they seize the occasion to precipitate another general debate, or would they let the matter rest as it was?

The Council Reports.

On the first point the Assembly was given as full satisfaction as was possible in the incomplete stage of the proceedings. In recognition of the high authority which the annual meeting of all League States has attained, the President

of the Council gave a full account of the development of the affair, how it had come before the Council, the action of that body, the replies from the two parties, the cooperation of the United States, the beginning of evacuation, and the developing hope of agreement. He then summarized the present situation and the plans and hopes for the future. He concluded;

"I only wish to allude to several essential points: Firstly, the affirmation by the Japanese Government and by its Representative that it never had or will have any intention of occupying Manchuria militarily; Secondly, the fact that the Japanese Government has on several occasions insisted before the Council on its intention to withdraw as soon as possible the Japanese forces to within the railroad zone gradually as the safety of its nationals and their property is effectively guaranteed; Thirdly, the fact that this intention, has, according to the declaration made yesterday to the Council by the Japanese Representative, been, during the last two days, translated into definite action and that outside the railroad zone Japanese troops are only stationed in a few localities.

"The Council has noted these reassuring statements by the Japanese Government. It feels certain that, in this very difficult affair as in other affairs which have been laid before it, the goodwill of the parties and their loyalty to international engagements constitutes the best guarantee for the peace of the world. Having had the matter laid before it on the basis of Article 11 of the Covenant, the Council will, after the Assembly's session, continue its efforts with the representatives of the two parties to aid them to obtain by such measures as both deem acceptable, a satisfactory settlement of the situation which has deeply affected the relations between two great nations and at one time even seemed likely, before the progress achieved in the last few days, to constitute a threat to international peace."

This statement was accepted as clear, impartial, and objective—open diplomacy, indeed, to the highest degree. Whatever had been the hesitation in certain quarters, whatever the doubts as to whether the Council's action had been sharp and determined enough, the Assembly was, on the whole, gratified. The President of the Assembly then expressed the appreciation of the Assembly and the view that, as the

— 31 —

statement was wholly objective, there was no need for the parties, nor for other members of the Assembly, to open a discussion upon it. He hoped the Council would continue its pacific mission and expressed the firm conviction of the Assembly that its efforts would rapidly be crowned with complete success. Thereupon the work of the Twelfth Assembly was brought to an end and the delegates went off to their homes after nearly a month of intense and at times alarming conference. As they left, they had a definite hope, but by no means a feeling of certainty, that the most serious dispute yet brought before the League, which had arisen so suddenly and unexpectedly, would be solved shortly and satisfactorily.

The Council Carries On.

If the Assembly concluded its labors that noon, the Council was destined to continue in session to complete its work resulting from the Assembly decisions and to consider what course of action to follow in the Chinese-Japanese affair. While the latter did not figure on the agenda of the Tuesday session, aspects of the general Chinese situation came before the Council in connection with relief measures and epidemic disease in the flooded areas. This is worth mentioning in that it shows the all-inclusive nature of the League's interest and the fact that its members are often bound to it not only in political crises but in the general development of their social life. On this occasion, the Irish representative, recalling the Assembly appeal to all states to cooperate in this relief, stated that two distinct problems faced the Council. As regards the first, that of relief, he reported that China had asked the Secretary-General to recommend a League expert in relief work, preferably one with experience in the Near East, to act as general director of the headquarters of the National Flood Relief Commission. The Council authorized this appointment and further requested all states to take every possible measure for the relief of the flood victims. As regards the second question, that of epidemic disease control, the Council pointed out the danger to

all nations, recalled the League's coordination of national actions in the typhus scourge in Eastern Europe in 1921, mentioned the fortunate fact of the presence in China of League health officials who were already cooperating in the work, urged all governments to give effect to appeals for aid, drew the attention of governments and public to the need for money as well, and instructed the Secretary-General to transmit the resolutions to all states.

In this same connection a cable was received from the League Medical Director, who happened to be in Nanking, that Colonel Lindbergh had taken Dr. Borcic of the League Health Section to Hankow by air, in order to get assistance to the stricken area in the quickest possible way. The interdependence of all these matters is again illustrated by the fact that several years ago, when the League was creating a committee to consider the question of international civil aviation, Colonel Lindbergh was one of the famous world flyers to respond to the League's request for his views as to what should be done.

In addition, a letter was read from the Delegate of Paraguay recalling that the Twelfth Assembly had invited the Nansen International Office for Refugees to devote particular attention to the precarious situation of more than 100,000 Russian refugees living in China and the possibility of finding employment for them in other countries. In response to this humanitarian appeal, Paraguay was prepared to receive 1000 refugees of German origin (Mennonites and Lutherans) who appeared to be particularly well adapted for colonisation in the Chaco, where flourishing Mennonite settlements already exist. This was conditional, of course, on the cost of transport and establishment being met out of special funds which might be provided in part by numerous charitable and religious organisations. In response to this suggestion, Mr. Sze said that, while China welcomed all refugees who sought her hospitality, she found that differences of language and customs made it difficult for them to earn their livelihood; he, therefore, supported the suggestion. As the refugees involved were German, Count Bernstorff also expressed his gratitude and the

— 32 —

matter was referred to the Refugee Office for action.

The final event of Tuesday was a session of the Committee of Five to consider what course of action to recommend to the Council at its session the following day. At that time a program was agreed upon to be submitted to the parties and the Council. Otherwise there were no developments. Press news was scarce: the Chinese delegation circulated but one more telegram, the 36th, giving a few more details of Japanese movements. A moment at least of pause, if not, as all hoped, of final settlement, seemed at hand as trains in all directions were taking the Assembly delegates out of Geneva.

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 30th.

This was to be the last day of the steady sessions and conferences which the Council had held on the Chinese-Japanese affair since it first took it up on September 19. The news was distinctly more calm and encouraging, both that reported in the Press and that sent in by the delegations. The latter, indeed, comprised but two brief telegrams from the Chinese delegation, making a total of 37 which that delegation had had distributed to the Council and the public since the outbreak of the affair.

Moreover, the Chinese compromise proposal for a Commission of Enquiry on the spot had been put in writing as requested and circulated to the Council. The text was as follows:

"Whereas the Chinese Government still believes that the best method that may be devised by the Council for securing the prompt and complete withdrawal of the Japanese troops and police and the full reestablishment of the *status quo ante*, is the sending of a neutral commission to Manchuria; and

"Whereas the Chinese Representative is desirous of being as conciliatory as possible and of meeting half-way the wishes of the Japanese Government;

"Therefore, the following proposal is made:

"That the Council shall help the parties to an agreement as to arrangements on the spot which will make it possible to fix an

early date for the completion of the withdrawal of all troops, police and aerial forces, thereby making it unnecessary to send a Commission of Enquiry in connection with the complete restoration of the *status quo ante*.

"That the Council in making the arrangements referred to shall appoint neutral persons on the spot to represent it, who shall participate in all arrangements made and report currently to the Council."

On Wednesday afternoon, after the Council had concluded all its other work, the Chinese-Japanese matter came before it for final discussion. The President pointed out that the Council, in view of its duty "to take such action as may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations", had singled out one object as of immediate and paramount importance, namely, the withdrawal of troops to the railway zone. Nevertheless, it could not but admit that, in the special circumstances, a certain amount of time, which the Council together with the parties wished to be as short as possible, had to be allowed to ensure the safety of life and property. He felt, therefore, that the best course would be for the Council to adjourn its discussions for a short time, holding itself always in readiness to render any assistance possible. He then proposed the following resolution, summarising the situation as it stood at the moment, including the pledges of both Governments, and suggesting adjournment till October 14th:

The Council

1. Notes the replies of the Chinese and Japanese Governments to the urgent appeal addressed to them by its President and the steps that have already been taken in response to that appeal;

2. Recognises the importance of the Japanese Government's statement that it has no territorial designs in Manchuria;

3. Notes the Japanese Representative's statement that his Government will continue as rapidly as possible the withdrawal of its troops which has already been begun, into the railway zone in proportion as the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals is effectively assured and that it hopes to carry out this intention in full as speedily as may be;

4. Notes the Chinese Representative's

— 33 —

statement that his Government will assume responsibility for the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals outside that zone as the withdrawal of the Japanese troops continues and the Chinese local authorities and police forces are reestablished;

5. Being convinced that both Governments are anxious to avoid taking any action which might disturb the peace and good understanding between the two nations, notes that the Chinese and Japanese representatives have given assurances that their respective Governments will take all necessary steps to prevent any extension of the scope of the incident or any aggravation of the situation;

6. Requests both Parties to do all in their power to hasten the restoration of normal relations between them and for that purpose to continue and speedily complete the execution of the above mentioned undertakings;

7. Requests both Parties to furnish the Council at frequent intervals with full information as to the development of the situation;

8. Decides, in the absence of any unforeseen occurrence which might render an immediate meeting essential, to meet again at Geneva on Wednesday, October 14th 1931, to consider the situation as it then stands;

9. Authorises its President to cancel the meeting of the Council fixed for October 14th should he decide after consulting his colleagues, and more particularly the representatives of the two Parties, that in view of such information as he may have received from the Parties or from other members of the Council as to the development of the situation, the meeting is no longer necessary.

The procedure thus suggested had been carefully worked out. It reaffirmed the commitments made by both Japan and China, provided for the continuance of information, and made possible a short breathing spell in which Japan would have the opportunity to withdraw her troops. A time-limit was not fixed, though there was some such connotation in the proposal for reconvening fourteen days later. There was little doubt but that the Council wished to evince complete confidence that within this period Japan would have been able to complete the withdrawal already begun.

Japan Suggests Information.

Mr. Yoshizawa accepted the President's resolution. With regard to information to be obtained on the spot, Japan felt it would be quite useless to take special measures, particularly as there were a great many people in Manchuria from whom the Council could obtain information. However, in order to facilitate this task, he suggested that each Member of the Council send the Secretary-General any information his government might have received on the spot which he thought useful and desirable to communicate to his colleagues.

Mr. Sze noted that the Japanese Representative now recognised that neutral information was required by the Council in order to facilitate its task. He further noted the Council's request that it be given complete and frequent information as to the progress of events and assured the Council of his government's willingness to comply therewith. Thereby he hoped that as a first step towards the restoration of normal relations the present unfortunate situation would speedily come to an end. He noted with satisfaction the Council's recognition of its responsibility for helping both parties to secure the complete and prompt withdrawal of Japanese forces and the full reestablishment of the *status quo ante*, and that it would remain in session until that responsibility had been fully discharged. If by October 14th, the complete withdrawal and reestablishment of the *status quo ante* had been effected, present measures would have proved adequate; if, however, contrary to everyone's hope, this happy result were not achieved by that date, the Council would have to examine what other measures might be required. Mr. Sze recalled his two suggestions: first, a Committee of Enquiry; and second, local arrangements, though he fervently hoped that when the Council met on October 14th no such action would prove necessary. He also emphasised that this withdrawal of troops and reestablishment of the *status quo ante*, while a distinct and separate matter, constituted but a single and preliminary step in the adjustment of the controversy which China had submitted to the Council. He, therefore, deemed it proper to say that, when

— 34 —

the *status quo ante* had been reestablished, China reserved all its rights under the Covenant and would continue to look to the Council for aid in determining the responsibilities of the two parties and in the fixing of damages.

Mr. Yoshizawa was unable to accept this interpretation. He only accepted the draft resolution as it stood.

The President then noted that the Council approved the resolution unanimously. There was, he thought, no need to go into matters of interpretation at the moment. The rights of both parties obviously remained intact. Either would be entitled, if necessary, to submit his point of view to the Council later.

The Council Adjourns.

Such, then, was the first phase of the Chinese-Japanese dispute in Manchuria. Events had gone rapidly indeed. Late in the evening of September 18 an incident had occurred near Mukden; on the morning of the 19th the news had reached Geneva; that afternoon the Japanese Representative, after consultation with the President of the Council, had reported it to that body; on September 20th China had appealed to the League under Article 11 of the Covenant; that afternoon the Council had met, and heard statements from both parties; the next day it had decided on a policy, and that night cables had gone to Tokio and Nanking urging measures to preserve peace and to withdraw troops, and to Washington to inform the United States; for the next ten days the

Council was in almost steady session or consultation; on Thursday the United States had given its "whole-hearted" support to the League's action; on the same day China, and on Friday Japan, accepted the Council's recommendations; on two occasions the Council reported to the Assembly; and on Wednesday, the 30th, with the withdrawal of troops already begun and its completion promised, the Council adjourned for a two weeks' period to allow the necessary time.

Never before in any dispute in world history had there been such immediate and public action. Both Assembly and Council happened to be in session when the incident broke out; both Japan and China, as well as other countries, had large delegations in Geneva, while an American delegation had arrived for the first time for an Assembly Disarmament discussion; over 300 journalists were on hand to send news broadcast throughout the world. In ten days of negotiations both sides had accepted solemn pledges for peace; Japan had denied any aggressive intentions or territorial aims; China had accepted responsibility for Japanese lives and property; and a beginning had been made for fuller information and future mediatory action.

Adjournment took place in circumstances undoubtedly serious but nevertheless encouraging. The two parties were given the full confidence of the Council to carry out their pledges; there seemed good reason to hope that, despite all the dangers of incidents, a satisfactory completion of this first phase of the dispute would be reached before the Council was scheduled to reconvene.

GENEVA SPECIAL STUDIES.

The Geneva Research Information Committee has issued the following studies in a regular series of which copies are procurable in single numbers or in bulk:

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* *Edition exhausted.*


In course of preparation:

Research Facilities in Geneva.


League Technical Cooperation with National Governments.

The subscription price of the Special Studies is three dollars per year (twelve numbers). The League of Nations in Review (monthly) may be subscribed to at two dollars per year, or a combination of the two publications may be had at four dollars per year. Further information in regard to these studies may be procured from the Secretary of the Committee, Mr. J. McC. Sturcis, 4, rue de Monthoux, Geneva.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE UNDERSECRETARY



November 2, 1931.



MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR.

The British Ambassador came to see me to ask about the Manchurian situation and as to whether we had sent a note supporting the League resolution. I told him that we were very carefully considering what our action should be, that we wanted to make it clear that we were in accord with the spirit of the League's action, but that I did not feel that we were called upon to concur in detail with the resolution. He said that parts of it seemed to him unfortunate, particularly the date of withdrawal. I told him that we had the same feeling here. I said that our aim would be to point out to the Japanese that it was exceedingly unfortunate for them to make as a sine qua non of withdrawal a demand for negotiation on subjects which had no relation or at least no immediate connection with the present dispute.

The Ambassador said that he felt the League's action to have been hurried and perhaps taken at a time when the members were not all thinking calmly. I also told him that when we had decided exactly what message to transmit to Japan, I would let him know.

Willy

U WRC:GMH

F/DEW

793.94/2479

NOV 6 1931

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR

Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

1-136
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

November 4, 1931.

793.94
AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (Japan).

218

Your 204, November 4, 5 p.m.

One. The memorandum should be delivered ^{as soon as possible and in any event} within ^{twenty-four} ~~hours~~ hours either by you or by the Ambassador, ^{and inform me} ~~immediately when delivered~~

Two. I welcome your frankly given counsel and I appreciate and understand the views which you express. They come too late, however, to have any effect with regard to the contents of the memorandum -- which, incidentally, is to be delivered as a QUOTE memorandum UNQUOTE and not as a QUOTE note UNQUOTE -- and which is to be read to the Minister for Foreign Affairs before being handed to him. It will not be necessary to make comments, as I have ^{given} ~~informed~~ the Japanese Ambassador ^{a copy of the memorandum} here ~~with regard to the contents~~ and have given him at length my interpretation.

Three. I shall give you later my comments on points raised in your telegram under reference.

Stimson
FE:SKH/ZMF

Enciphered by _____

NOV 4 1931

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 80.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-128

793.94/2479A

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

PLAIN

Nanking via N. R.

793-94
RECEIVED
DIVISION

UNDATED
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 5 1931
November 5, 1931
7:10 a. m.
Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

#99.

The following handed to me November 4, 6 p. m. by the
Chinese Foreign Office, understood also released to the
press:

"Mr. Tsiang Tso Ping, Chinese Minister at Tokyo, was
instructed on November third by the Minister of Foreign
Affairs to deliver a note to the Japanese Foreign Office
in reply to its note of October 31 regarding the evacuation
of occupied places in Manchuria. An English translation of
the note which was prepared in Chinese follows:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the
Japanese Government's note of October 31 and, under instru-
ctions from my Government, to make the following reply. The
resolution of October 24 of the Council of the League of
Nations calling upon Japan to withdraw completely before
November 16 her troops now in occupation of the different
places

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793.94/2480

FILED
NOV 7 1931

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2- from Nanking, Rec'd Nov. 5, 7:10 a.m.

places in the northeastern provinces in China, was adopted unanimously by thirteen members of the Council. Chinese Government is confident that the Japanese Government will respect the pronounced intention of the world's supreme organ for the maintenance of peace by carrying out the said resolution. It must also be pointed out that, inasmuch as Japan fully accepted the Council's resolution of September 30, the League of Nations had believed that the Japanese Government would have immediately begun the withdrawal of troops and completed such withdrawal within two weeks. However, the Japanese Government failed to carry out this resolution. The Council was therefore obliged on October 24, to reiterate the previous resolution and again set time limit in order to accomplish the restoration of the status quo ante. The Chinese Government, in accordance with the resolution of the Council, has invited the Japanese Government to designate representatives to discuss the details of evacuation and reoccupation. The Chinese Government is gratified to learn that the Japanese Government has also expressed its willingness, towards the end of its note under reply, to start immediately the discussion

REP

3- from Nanking, Rec'd Nov. 5, 7:10 a.m.

cussion of such details. The Chinese Government has already appointed a committee for the reoccupation of evacuated territories and informed the Japanese Government to that effect. The Chinese Government again requests the Japanese Government to appoint representatives immediately to discuss the above mentioned details with the Chinese representative with a view to the complete evacuation of the occupied areas before November 16. As regards the Japanese Government's view of the opening of negotiations concerning fundamental principles for reestablishing the normal relations between China and Japan, the Chinese Government is fully prepared, in accordance with the recommendations of the Council of the League of Nations, to commence negotiations, after completion of evacuation, on the questions outstanding between the two countries and to establish a conciliation commission of some such permanent machinery. But before the completion of the evacuation, the negotiations must be limited to the details of evacuation and reoccupation. Finally the Chinese Government wishes to refer the Japanese Government to its communication

of October

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

4- from Nanking, Rec'd Nov. 5, 7:10 a.m.

of October 31 to the League of Nations, in which its
views regarding this matter are clearly set forth."

PECK

WSB

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

November 11 1931

REP

FROM

New York, N. Y.

November 5, 1931

H. L. Stimson,
Secretary of State,
Washington.

Rec'd 11:20 a. m.
DIVISION OF
FOR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 5 1931
Department of State

*Letter drafted to Miss
Moulton Nov. 11, 1931*

Sherwood Eddy cables from China:

"Intimate observation China convinces action Japanese
military in defiance their own Government and world and
first step permanent occupation Manchuria. Strong belief
in China effective League action depends on strong backing
by Washington invoking Nine Power Treaty Kellogg Pact.
Unless checked if necessary by economic pressure will
defeat Disarmament Conference, close open door Manchuria,
drive China into arms Russia and Communism as last
desperate recourse".

Secretary to
Sherwood Eddy.

HPD

F/DEW

793.94/2481

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NOV 12 1931

*See
793.94/2110
2611
2654*

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lutz NARS, Date 12-18-75

November 11 1931.

In reply refer to
FE 793.94/2481

Miss Jessica M. Moreland,
347 Madison Avenue,
New York, New York.

Madam:

The receipt is acknowledged of your telegram of
November 5, 1931, addressed to the Secretary of State
and quoting a telegram emanating from Mr. Sherwood Eddy
in China, in regard to the situation in Manchuria.

The Department appreciates your courtesy in
transmitting Mr. Eddy's message and wishes again to
assure you that the situation is continuing to receive
the Department's careful and solicitous attention.

Very truly yours,


For the Secretary of State:

M. M. H.
Maxwell M. Hamilton,
Assistant Chief,
Division of Far Eastern Affairs.

CR ✓
Nov 11, 1931. P.

RFB
FE:RFB:REK
11/11/31

FE



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone.

FROM

PEIPING

Dated November 5, 1931

Rec'd 10:15 a.m.

Division of

FOR EASTERN AFFAIRS

NOV 5 1931

Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

874, November 5, 4 p. m.

Legation's 859, November 2, 4 p. m.

793.94
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. From an informal interview with
Wellington Koo I gather that the Chinese Government is great-
ly disturbed over the turn events are taking, especially
the uncompromising attitude of Shidehara and recent foreign
press opinions favorable to Japan. Koo emphasized "national"
character of the commission of which he is chairman, whose
members represent various sections of the country, and whom
he believes personally acceptable to the Japanese. I got
the impression that he implied the commission may ultimately
be called upon to deal with more serious problems than those
for which it was created and that Nanking had perhaps become
more reconciled to the possibility of negotiating with
Japan if not prior to at least simultaneously with a gradual
withdrawal of Japanese forces to the railway zone.

Minister informed.

For the Minister
ENGERT

KLP
RPD

F/DEW

793.94/2482

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NOV 12 1931

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

SK14
16

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 4 1931

Department of State

Handed by Mr Yung Kwan
to Mr. Steller, Nov. 4, 1931
672

THE UNDER SECRETARY
NOV 5 1931

FE
IGR
J

TELEGRAM FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AT SHANGHAI
DATED NOV. 3, 1931.

A seizure of the sale revenue deposited in the Bank of China at Newchwang was effected on October 30th by Shukuda, Japanese adviser to the so-called Provincial Financial Bureau of Liaoning, accompanied by Japanese soldiers. The Japanese first went to the Salt Inspectors' office, when unable to obtain cash proceeded to the Bank of China, and seized deposits amounting to over 670,000 dollars.

793.94/2485

Chinese Legation,

Washington, November 4, 1931.

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NOV 6 1931


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75


TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM



Dated November 5, 1931



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793.94/2484

FILED
NOV 10 1931

793.94
Secretary of State,
Washington.

278, November 5, 10 a. m.

The following is the text of a communication dated
November 3 from Sawada to Drummond:

"The Chinese Minister at Tokyo handed to Baron
Shidehara on October 27th a note in which the Chinese Govern-
ment requested the Japanese Government to appoint represent-
atives to settle the details of the evacuation and the taking
over of the evacuated territories in accordance with para-
graph five of the resolution adopted by the Council of the
League of Nations on October 24. In reply Baron Shidehara
sent the Chinese Minister the following note dated October
31 which was published in Tokyo on November 3:

'Sir:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your
Excellency's note dated October 27. In that note mention
is made of paragraph five of a resolution of the League of
Nations

REP

2- #278, from Geneva, Nov. 5, 10 a.m.

Nations dated October 24. The Japanese Government desires to draw the attention of the Chinese Government to the fact that no resolution was adopted by the Council of the League of Nations on October 24. Your Excellency's note also expresses the Chinese Government's desire that negotiations should at once be opened with a view to the taking over of the territories evacuated by the Japanese troops in the three eastern provinces. The Chinese Government had already expressed a similar desire in Your Excellency's note of October 5 to which I replied by a note dated October 9. The Japanese Government has announced the line of conduct it proposes to follow in order to settle the Manchurian incidents in a statement published on October 26 and it requests the Chinese Government to be so good as to refer to that document. The Japanese Government is most anxious that the Chinese Government should accept the views of the Japanese Government as expressed in that statement and should enter into negotiations with it as speedily as possible with a view to reaching an agreement on fundamental principles to form the basis for the restoration of normal relations between the two countries

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

3- #278, from Geneva, Nov. 5, 10 a.m.

countries and also into negotiations with regard to the withdrawal of the Japanese troops into the South Manchurian Railway Zone!."

The text quoted above has been made public by the Secretariat.

GILBERT

HPD

172-

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

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793.94/2484 1/2

November 3, 1931.

The Japanese Ambassador, in his conversation with Mr. Castle on October 28, submitted, among other papers, a memorandum quoting from the text of the "Secret Protocols" to the Sino-Japanese Treaty of December 22, 1905, Articles 3 and 10. There are in this Protocol a number of other interesting and pertinent Articles -- among them Article 14, which reads as follows:

"14. The Japanese Plenipotentiaries declare that the Railway Guards stationed between Changchun and the boundary line of the leased territory of Port Arthur and Talien, shall not be allowed, before their withdrawal, to unreasonably interfere with the local administration of China or to proceed without permission beyond the limits of the railway."

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793.94/2484 1/2

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE UNDER SECRETARY
NOV 2 1931
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
NOV 2 1931
DIVISION OF
Digest of
Newspaper Items.

November 3, 1931.

NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE:

743.94
Tokyo despatch dated November 2 (Wilfrid Fleisher), states information from a reliable neutral source indicates that Henry Pu-yi, 24, former Emperor of China under the name of Hsuan Tung, may be set up as the ruler of Manchuria, when conditions become stabilized.

NEW YORK TIMES:

Tokyo despatch dated November 2 (AP) states that Japanese troops have pushed farther north and west in Manchuria but have not entered territory in which Moscow is primarily interested.

Tokyo despatch dated November 2 (Hugh Byas) states that it is generally believed that the recent visit of Prince Kimmochi Saionji with the Emperor will strengthen the civil branch of the Japanese Government.

The hope of Briand and Drummond that the Chinese and Japanese positions may be conciliated on the basis of the Chinese delegate's recent "treaty respect" statement is not shared by Japanese authorities in Tokyo.

Japan is drafting a reply to China's suggestions for direct negotiations under the League resolution. The Japanese note will, it is understood, insist on the

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- 2 -

"five points". Reports of military activity on the part of the Soviet continue, but are discounted by the Japanese War and Foreign Offices.

"Dr. Louis W. Rajchman, chief of the League's Health Service, who is now in China, has informed Secretary General Drummond that Nanking is assembling picked troops at Shanhaikwan with the view to taking over from Japan the occupied districts under the terms of the League's resolution calling for withdrawal by Japan. Secretary Drummond reminded Nanking the resolution was not operative and warned against concentrating troops outside the Great Wall."

Dairen despatch dated November 2 (Hallett Abend), states that the Japanese authorities foresee the likelihood of the "military necessity" of sending strong forces to Chinchow to drive the remnants of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang's forces south. The Japanese authorities in Manchuria and the government leaders in Tokyo are devoting serious thought to measures which they interpret as basically necessary for a permanent solution of Manchurian banditry, unrest and impoverishment. The Japanese plan to provide silver bars for coinage in Mukden beginning November 15 and are redeeming the nearly worthless paper money with silver at a fixed rate. It is estimated that nearly \$7,000,000,000 paper money has been circulated in Manchuria, the present worth of which is approximately \$60,000,000 silver. Dairen business is reported suffering "the same paralysis which extends all over Manchuria".

The Japanese authorities assert that not a single

mile

- 3 -

mile of railroad has been built in Manchuria since September 18.

Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang's star is reported declining rapidly. The Japanese report an efficient independent government functioning at Kirin. All Japanese official circles unite in declaring impossible the evacuation of Chinese territory prior to November 16.

Shanghai despatch dated November 2 reports the collapse of the so-called Nanking-Canton peace conference. President Chiang Kai-shek is reported to have denounced the Canton delegates and accused them of hampering the settlement of the Chinese-Japanese dispute.


Shanghai despatch dated November 2 (AP) announces the closing on November 2 of the fourth biennial conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations. The delegates were unanimous in declaring the conference a success.

WASHINGTON POST:

Geneva despatch dated November 2 (UP) states that the Chinese delegate presented to the Secretary General of the League a note stating that neither good relations nor negotiations with Japan are possible as long as Japanese troops remain in illegal possession of Japanese soil.

RPM
FE:RFB:EJL *bsm*

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



Handed by Mr. Yung Kwai
to Mr. Miller, Nov. 5, 1931.
E.J.L.

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Sub-

TELEGRAM FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AT NANKING
DATED NOV. 4, 1931.

Major Hayashi, Acting Commanding Officer of Kwantung, has
notified Ma Chan Shan, Acting Chairman of Heilungkiang as follows:

(1) The Nunkiang Bridge on the Taonan-Ananchi Railway less
than sixty miles from Tsitsihar not to be used in war operations.

(2) From noon of November 3rd both the north and south armies
to be withdrawn to points ten kilometers from the bridge and not
to enter the zone thus cleared pending the completion of repairs.

(3) Failing to carry out above or obstructing the repairing
will be construed as a hostile act to Japanese troops which will
use force.

Ma's troops were originally stationed about eleven kilometers
from the bridge. He told the Japanese they had no right to repair
the railway and send troops there, and he was prepared to resist
if attacked.

The reported arrival of more Japanese troops at the Nunkiang
Bridge makes the situation in North Manchuria very threatening.
It appears to be Japan's intention to advance her troops or help
Chang Hai Peng to lead an opposing army south of the bridge under
Japanese protection and attack Tsitsihar after the bridge is
repaired.

Chinese Legation,

Washington, November 5, 1931.

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
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
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE



October 30, 1931.



Mr. Castle:

Mr. Secretary:

If I may suggest at this point, it seems to me that it might be advantageous to confer with the French Ambassador and suggest to him that he convey to M. Briand the suggestion that this Government feels that it would be advantageous if M. Briand would urge upon Mr. Yoshizawa the idea of direct negotiations between China and Japan in the presence of observers.

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J. Cannon
W. K.


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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



(NOT FOR THE PRESS)
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Department of State
Division of Current Information

MEMORANDUM OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE, THURSDAY, OCTOBER 29, 1931

At the press conference this morning Undersecretary Castle announced the release of a telegram from President Hoover to the President of the Turkish Republic on the anniversary of the founding of the Republic.

BELGIUM

A correspondent observed that an article was published this morning in one of the New York newspapers to the effect that E. Francqui of Belgium is believed to have laid before President Hoover a proposal for the conversion of German short term credits into long term credits. The story said that he proposed the creation of an international bank of credits, presumably along the line of the "prosperity pool" here, for the purpose of protecting the \$1,500,000,000 invested in Germany, of which \$600,000,000 represents American capital. The Undersecretary, in reply, said he had not heard of the alleged proposal and that it was impossible, therefore, to comment on it.

GERMANY

Observing that under the terms of the settlement of the German moratorium one of the provisions was for consideration of the conversion of short term credits into long term credits, a correspondent asked if the study of the proposal had been started. He was informed, in reply, that the different bankers concerned are probably studying the question, but there has been no international meeting on the subject. A correspondent asked what countries would be represented if and when the commission to determine the capacity of Germany to pay is created. Mr. Castle said, in reply, that he did not remember the exact terms of the Young Plan. Another correspondent volunteered the information that the Bank for International Settlements will ap-

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-2-

point a committee of experts from the banks which participated in the formation of the Bank for International Settlements. The Bank for International Settlements can appoint outsiders, and the Federal Reserve Bank may also be represented. That is the action the Bank for International Settlements took in the case of Mr. McGarrah and Mr. Wiggin. Aside from the creation of this particular committee, a correspondent asked if the Undersecretary knew of any other movement under way to meet the problem. Mr. Castle replied in the negative.

ARMAMENTS

Asked if the United States had yet informed the League of Nations whether it would accept the one year armaments truce, the Undersecretary replied in the negative and added that no definite decision had yet been reached. As the reply is due in Geneva by November 1, however, the newspaper stories to the effect that the note will probably go forward in the next few days appear to be sensible.

BOLIVIA-PARAGUAY

A correspondent said that sometime ago he asked Secretary Stimson regarding the salary paid to Mr. Walter Bruce Howe for his services on the Bolivian-Paraguayan Conciliation Commission. At that time the Secretary demurred about giving out the information. The correspondent enquired if it could be made public now. The correspondent continued by saying that the State Department has some latitude, where foreign governments are involved, whether such information shall be made public. The Undersecretary replied that if it is a purely domestic matter he saw no reason why it should not be made public. He promised to have the matter looked into, however, before giving any definite answer.

SINO-JAPANESE TROUBLE

Asked if there were any new developments in the Sino-

-3-

Japanese situation in Manchuria, the Undersecretary replied in the negative and added that the Department had received very little information recently in addition to what had appeared in the newspapers. A correspondent asked if we had received any official advices confirming the report that Baron Shidehara had despatched a note to Moscow. In reply, Mr. Castle said that the State Department had no confirmation of the report and neither had the Japanese Ambassador in Washington. The correspondent then said he understood that the Japanese memorandum outlining their position had been presented to the State Department. He was informed, in reply, that it was presented yesterday, but that there was no information pertaining thereto which could be given to the press. The correspondent said that from published accounts of the statement it appeared that a more conciliatory tone had been adopted in Tokyo. Mr. Castle, in reply, said he thought the Japanese statement looked conciliatory. Asked if the United States would do anything definite prior to November 16, when the Council of the League of Nations reconvenes, the Undersecretary said that our action would depend entirely on what happens in Manchuria. Normally, the situation would be allowed to remain more or less at peace--if peace is the right word to use. Asked if any agreement had been reached among the powers to make public the notes to Japan and China on the Kellogg Pact, Mr. Castle said that we had asked for that information and were waiting to see if the other powers are making their notes public. Asked if there was any reason for the apparent shyness in making the notes public, the Undersecretary replied in the negative and said there was nothing unpleasant in them. We sent a telegram yesterday to ask if the powers had published or were going to publish the notes. The telegram was addressed to Consul Gilbert at Geneva. A correspondent asked why the United States was waiting for the other

-4-

powers to give out their notes before making public our communications to China and Japan. The Undersecretary, in reply, said that we desire to learn if they have some special reasons why the notes should not be given out. We do not wish to embarrass them by giving out ours and thereby more or less forcing them to give out theirs. Asked if the request by the League that the Japanese evacuate their recently occupied positions by November 16 was contained in the first Kellogg Pact note or was made subsequently, the Undersecretary replied that it had nothing to do with the Kellogg Pact note. That request was merely a resolution of the League of Nations which was transmitted to Japan, or transmitted by the Japanese representative on the Council of the League. It had nothing to do with the negotiations under the Kellogg Pact and it occurred about a week after those negotiations. A correspondent asked if the American Government was of the opinion that the publication of the notes which were sent under the Kellogg Pact would have a tempering effect on the situation. Mr. Castle, in reply, said he did not think it would have any effect. Asked then regarding the purpose of publishing the notes, the Undersecretary replied that it was merely because the press appeared to want them.

Referring to the resolution of the Council of the League regarding the withdrawal of Japanese troops, a correspondent said it had been his understanding that this Government was more or less in sympathy with Japan's contention that she could not withdraw her troops and leave her nationals and property at the mercy of the bandits. The correspondent asked, if the above is true, where we stand with reference to the League. He was informed, in reply, that the League has not asked us to support its demand in toto and that it is not for us to comment on what

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
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
we think about the League's demand. We have not participated in that resolution and we have not been sounded out even unofficially. It was purely a League action with which we have no connection whatever.

CUBA

Referring to press despatches this morning to the effect that bands of unemployed in parts of Cuba were terrorizing the people, a correspondent asked if Ambassador Guggenheim had reported the matter to the Department. The Undersecretary replied in the negative. A correspondent then said that President Machado was quoted this morning as saying that 80 per cent. of Cuba's economic ills were caused by the American tariff. In reply, Mr. Castle said that he had no comment to make on the matter and that President Machado had a right to say anything he pleased.

M. J. McDermott.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



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Department of State
Division of Current Information

MEMORANDUM OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE, SATURDAY, OCTOBER 31, 1931

At the press conference this morning Undersecretary Castle announced the release of the Foreign Service changes made during the past week.

ARMAMENTS

Observing that press reports from Europe were rather pessimistic, a correspondent asked if the State Department still believed that the Disarmament Conference in February, 1932, would accomplish anything. The Undersecretary, in reply, said that while the question was a broad one there was no reason to believe there will be no Disarmament Conference and, of course, we hope it will accomplish something. As to how much will be accomplished is a matter for speculation by the newspaper correspondents. A correspondent asked if there was any reason to believe that any system of changing the levels of the various navies could be worked out. He said he had in mind particularly the attitude of France and certain other European nations which is to the effect that there can be no reduction of arms without political security. The correspondent continued by saying that one of the newspapers this morning had a story from Geneva that League of Nations circles had virtually abandoned hope of a successful conference. The correspondent then asked if that feeling had spread to the Department of State. Mr. Castle, in reply, said we had not discussed the matter of levels with the idea of working out a system. He added that the pessimistic reports from Geneva had not reached the Department and that we hope the Conference will accomplish something worthwhile. That, of course, depends on the negotiations after our representatives reach Geneva. Referring


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to the reservation on our acceptance of the one year armament truce and our statement that it does not bar the presentation of any plan which we might desire to propose at Geneva, a correspondent asked if that indicated that we have in mind some specific plan to present to the Conference. The Undersecretary, in reply, said it did not indicate any such thing but that we feel we have a right to present a plan if we have one and desire to present it. Asked if the Department had received any indication from Europe that the date of the General Disarmament Conference should be postponed, the Undersecretary replied in the negative and added that he had heard rumors that the French would like to see it postponed on account of the election, but that is merely the talk of people on the street and nothing official of that nature has come to the Department. Asked if the results of the British elections would have any effect on Great Britain's attitude toward the Conference and if he anticipated that Mr. Churchill would allow Mr. Henderson to set the British policy, Mr. Castle said that so far as we know Mr. Henderson may still be the Chairman of the Conference as there is nothing that would prevent it. Whatever policy Great Britain might have will be a Government policy and Mr. Henderson, if he is the Chairman of the Conference, will follow the policy of his Government.

Observing that, according to a press despatch this morning, Sir Eric Drummond will not go to London to confer on the matter of Mr. Henderson's chairmanship because he is afraid to leave Geneva on account of the serious situation in Manchuria, a correspondent asked if the Department had any information on that subject. The correspondent then added that there was apparently feeling in League of Nations circles that the United States had not backed up the League sufficiently on its note or resolution requesting the withdrawal of Japanese troops. The

-3-

Undersecretary in reply said he had no information on the subject

A correspondent asked if the United States had sounded out the European powers informally on the idea of holding a general conference to consider all phases of the world's condition, economic, political, etc. The Undersecretary replied in the negative. The correspondent then said information to that effect was contained in a press despatch this morning. He was informed in reply that we have not sounded out anybody, formally or informally, on such a proposition. ABSOLUTELY NOT FOR QUOTATION OR ATTRIBUTION, Mr. Castle said he thought that a conference of that sort, without any definite agenda, a conference called to settle all the ills of the world, would not get very far. A conference is more likely to succeed when it has specific objects in view. Asked if the Department felt that the Sino-Japanese dispute in Manchuria might affect disarmament possibilities at Geneva, the Undersecretary said that had been suggested in various newspaper reports from Europe but he did not know whether it had been considered by the League. A correspondent then asked if it was understood that, after Premier Laval's visit to the United States, the French would not oppose the meeting next February. Mr. Castle, in reply, said that he had seen many reports of the conversations during M. Laval's visit but that he did not believe the matter was raised in any way during the conversations. Observing then that Ambassador Claudel had suggested some months ago in an informal way that, because of the French elections next spring, France might not be ready for the disarmament conference, a correspondent asked if there had been any renewal of that suggestion. The Undersecretary replied in the negative and said that he had not meant to say last spring that Ambassador Claudel had made the suggestion that he thought the conference ought to be postponed; the Ambassador merely said that it was an unfortunate time to hold the Conference because of the French

-4-

elections. It was merely a statement in passing of his own opinion.

SINO-JAPANESE TROUBLE

Observing that rightly or wrongly the impression seems to be prevailing in some quarters that the United States, through its policy of temporary inaction in Manchuria, is siding with Japan, a correspondent asked if the Undersecretary would clear the matter up for him. Mr. Castle replied that he thought it was a very unfortunate idea to get abroad because if there is one thing on earth that we have tried to do it is to be completely neutral in the dispute. We are considering the whole situation in an effort to determine what, if anything, should be done on our part. These stories in the newspapers to the effect that the League feels that we are not backing it up have not been confirmed by anything that we have had from Geneva. Observing that the League obviously will have to consider on November 16 some move which may involve sanctions, a correspondent asked whether any League officials had sounded out this Government, formally or informally, on our policy after November 16. Mr. Castle, in reply, said that we have not been sounded out in any way and, furthermore, neither have we any suggestion that the League will consider sanctions. A correspondent asked if the United States had ever taken a position as to Manchuria which would preclude its approval of permanent Japanese occupation outside the railway zone. The correspondent added that we had approved of their taking possession of Korea and asked if there was anything in spite of the Korean incident which would preclude American approval. The Undersecretary, in reply, said he thought so because of various treaties which we have signed to maintain the territorial integrity of China, such as the Nine Power Treaty. Asked if any time had been set for the return of the American Ambassador to Tokyo, Mr. Castle

-5-

said that Ambassador Forbes is now on the Pacific Ocean enroute to Japan and that he should arrive in Japan within a few days. Ambassador Forbes came to the United States because of important private business. He expected to sail about the 4th of November but he felt that he ought to return as quickly as possible. He hurried up some of his business, left some unfinished, and sailed on October 24.

GREAT BRITIAN

Asked if the Department had received any protests from American business men against a possible British import tariff, the Undersecretary replied in the negative.

BRAZIL

A correspondent asked if the Department had received any advice concerning the attempted revolution in Brazil. He was informed in reply that the Department received a telegram this morning or last night to the effect that the revolution had been quelled and that the Government forces were in complete control.

M. J. McDermott.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Luitjens NARS, Date 12-18-75

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 30, 1931.
DIVISION OF

THE UNDER SECRETARY
OCT 30 1931
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MANCHURIA SITUATION
U.S. Participation at Geneva

RECEIVED

OCT 31 1931

NOV 3 1931

Mr. Gilbert reports that:

M. Titulesco, President of the Assembly, in his

closing speech (translation):

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"The readiness of the majority of non-member states to collaborate in the work of the Third Commission proves that when it is a question of answering the anxious expectations of peoples and of fortifying the foundations of peace, the same identity of will and conception exists among non-member states as among member states. I thank them all heartily, but I beg permission to thank particularly the United States of America for the valuable collaboration which it kindly bestowed upon the League in important matters concerning the maintenance and promotion of peace. Let us hope that this collaboration will continue and be amplified to the greatest possible extent.

"But let me make myself clear. We do not mistake the character of this collaboration; it is a voluntary collaboration which is not dictated by an engagement and which neither directly, nor indirectly, enlarges the

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NOV 4 1931

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

the obligations of the United States. I feel called upon to declare that as a result of this collaboration the prestige of both the League and the United States has been enhanced in the world."

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

October 30, 1931.

RECEIVED

MANCHURIA SITUATION

OCT 30 1931

OCT 30 1931

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

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In the NEW YORK TIMES of this morning, Walter
Duranty's despatch from Moscow contains the statement
that M. Karakhan has stated to the Japanese Ambassador,
Hirota:

"The Soviet Government considers that
the policy of military occupation, applied
under whatever form of so-called protection
of interests and nationals, is inconsistent
with the peaceful policy of the Soviet Union
and with the interests of world peace."

F/DEW

793.94/2491

OCT 30 1931

NOV 4 1931

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REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GREEN

Geneva

FROM

Dated November 5, 1931

Secretary of State,
Washington.

280, November 5, 6 p. m.

Consulate's 272, November 2, 6 p. m. / 2421

The Secretariat has given publicity to Briand's note
to Yoshizawa. It is believed that Briand took this ^{decision} (*)
with regard to publicity because he did not wish to wait
longer for a Japanese reply which, according to information
from the Secretariat, has not been received up to date.

GILBERT

HPD 793.94/2413

(*) Apparent omission.

In Japanese reply
See 793.94/2650

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 7, 1931.

THE UNDER SECRETARY

NOV 10 1931

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

U:
Mr. Castle:

The attached telegram, No. 279 of November 5, noon, contains the text of a Chinese statement with regard to Japanese seizure of salt revenues in Manchuria.

As certain obligations of the Chinese Government, in which Americans are interested, are secured on the salt revenues, any Japanese interference with these revenues would be of concern to us. The Hukuang Imperial Government Railway Loan of 1911, in which the American Banking Group is interested, (together with British, French and German banks) is partially secured on salt revenues. This loan is the only one secured on salt revenues in which American banks are interested.

The Chinese Reorganization Loan of 1913 is secured both on customs and salt revenues. American banks did not participate in floating this loan but there are known to be a considerable number of American bondholders. (For a number of years the service of this loan has been met entirely out of customs revenues.)

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NOV 10 1931
SECRETARY'S OFFICE

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GREEN

GENEVA

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with
893.51-Sub Fund

Secretary of State,
Washington.


279, November 5, noon.

Department's 276, November 4, 10

The following is the text of a communication
November 4 from Sze to Drummond, together with its enclosure
giving text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation
from Nanking, dated November 3, concerning Japanese
seizure of salt revenue in Manchuria:

"I beg to invite your attention to the attached information
from Nanking November 3 which unhappily more than
bears out that serious view of the situation in Manchuria
contained in the memorandum and covering note I handed you
yesterday.

It is now clear that the Japanese army of occupation
are pursuing a deliberate policy of trying to substitute
for the authority of the Chinese Government the rule of
various



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REP

2- #279, from Geneva, Nov. 5, noon.

various groups and individuals set up and maintained by the Japanese themselves.

Yesterday's memorandum predicted that a further step in this policy was imminent. It has now been taken: the Japanese military are confiscating the salt revenues and trying to divert them into the hands of the puppet authorities set up by themselves.

The serious harm to foreign interests need not be emphasized. It is further clear that this policy is a flat defiance of the Councils recommendations and a flagrant violation of the Covenant, the Pact of Paris, and the Washington Nine Power treaty. The situation is of the utmost gravity."

The text of the cablegram from Nanking reads as follows:

"Please inform the Secretary General of the League for circulation to the members of the Council and the representative of the United States that the Minister of Finance has received the following report from Dr. Frederick A. Cleveland, associate chief inspector of salt revenue:

The Japanese military authorities in Manchuria which have tied up the salt revenues since September 18th have
now forcibly

REP

3- #279, from Geneva, Nov. 5, noon.

now forcibly taken part of the accumulated revenues. The particulars are as follows: On September 19th the Japanese military authorities in Manchuria forcibly entered the district office at Newchwang since which time the Japanese military in occupation have exercised strict surveillance of all revenue transactions and revenue accounts in offices and collecting banks and have refused to permit remittances of funds to the National Government asserting however they did not intend to expropriate funds or deprive the Government of its revenues.

Since September 18th large revenue funds have accumulated which are of two kinds (one) duties paid in advance in free trade areas of Mukden (two) funds of the Government trading monopoly of Kirin and Heilungkiang Provinces called "Kihei". About October 8th Kihei monopoly sent to the district inspectorate of Newchwang its check for \$1,080,000 drawn on its depository bank but payment was interdicted. Ascertaining that check was fully covered by deposits the inspectorate continued to release salt required for distribution to Government monopoly on credit. Accumulated deposits of duty paid in advance at Newchwang amounted to \$670,000 and at Changchung for
Kihei

REP

4-279, from Geneva, Nov. 5, noon.

Kihei account to \$2,600,000 on October 29th.

October 31st at 10 a. m. Mukden district inspectorate telegraphed to the inspectorate that the manager at the Newchwang branch Bank of China handed us on the 30th at 8 p. m. a letter stating that at 11 a. m. today paymaster Iwase of the Japanese military headquarters, adviser Tamada Shigeji of the Provincial Government Bank and Provincial Finance Bureau (newly created office) and staff officers of Provincial Government Bank with armed men came to his bank, demanded handing over salt revenue collections. This was refused but finally at 4 p. m. \$672,709.56 was taken away. It was only after repeated negotiations that a Provincial Finance Bureau's sealed receipt signed by Tamada was obtained. Under such circumstances we could do nothing.

Changchuen

Demands Kihei deposit at/\$2,600,000 are being made by persons claiming represent certain groups, which have suddenly sprung, and monopoly since Japanese military occupation. Active agents of these groups, as in the case of expropriation of funds at Newchang, seem to be so-called

Japanese

REP

5- #279, from Geneva, Nov. 5, noon.

Japanese advisers. These representatives have threatened to use force in case said deposits at Changchuen are not released to them.

- Chief inspectors have instructed local representative that in no case are they to yield to demands for funds subject to its control for two reasons: first, because such consent would constitute breach of Trusteeship; second, because these large sums on deposit, if held under Japanese control or diverted to uses of persons who are unfriendly to recognized authorities, might be potent resource to stimulate opposition to Chinese National Government and foment revolution.

In addition to foregoing another form of exploitation is threatened, namely: diversion of revenues as they currently accrue. Average collections for the three north-eastern provinces have been approximately \$2,000,000 monthly. After deduction of expenses and quotas for service of foreign loans secured on salt, there is an average net balance of \$1,600,000 monthly. Repeated demands have been made that this monthly surplus be turned over to persons and groups who have support and cooperation of Japanese

military

REP

6- #279, from Geneva, Nov. 5, noon.

military authorities in occupation.

Salt inspectorate has been instituted as agency for collecting and conserving salt revenues for foreign loan service and other uses and purposes designated by National Government. Against estimated total annual collections \$170,000,000 various appropriations and commitments have been made which including expenses, service of foreign and domestic loans and authorized transfers to local authorities amount to about \$125,000,000 yearly about 70 per cent of estimated total salt revenue. In existing emergency chief inspectors deem it their duty to lay these important impairments of public revenue before you".

The texts of the above communication and telegram have been made public by the Secretariat.

GILBERT

WSB




No. 1104.

AM RECD


EMBASSY OF THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Rept. October 23, 1931.



NOV 5 31



F/DEW

793.94/2494

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

DISTRIBUTION - CHECK Yes No
To the Field ☒
In U. S. A. ☐

Sir:

In continuation of my despatch No. 1096 of October 16, 1931, regarding press comment on the Sino-Japanese crisis, I have the honor to inform the Department that although the Italian newspapers continue to follow the development of the situation both in Manchuria and in the Council of the League, there is a dearth of comment in the press with a definite alignment of opinion or policy.

With regard to the invitation extended to the United States to participate in the deliberations of

the

NOV 14 1931

-2-

the League Council, its acceptance, and the consequent entry of Mr. Gilbert into the Council, it may be said that while these events have aroused more than unusual interest in Italy and have been fully chronicled with a good deal of favorable interpretation by the Geneva correspondents of the Italian press, with special reference to Mr. Grandi's speech in this connection, there has been little comment of purely editorial nature. I am enclosing clippings from the newspapers demonstrating the prominence given to the Geneva news articles and the general tone of satisfaction in the headlines under which these despatches were featured.

The TRIBUNA, in one of the few editorials on this last-named phase, takes occasion to remark that the participation of the United States in the Council in the quality "of something more than an observer" is another proof of its visible modification of the thesis of "isolation". The article takes Japan to task for its objections to American participation, since the TRIBUNA feels that Japan's real interest is to have America pursue a joint policy rather than an individual one.

The OSSERVATORE ROMANO, the official Vatican daily, rejoices that America feels in this instance that she can harmonize her policy with that of the League, but doubts whether the United States would have approached the League if she had thought the mechanism of the Paris Pact sufficient to liquidate the crisis. The newspaper concludes by auguring a happy outcome from "the betrothal of our Uncle from overseas and the League" and adds that

"he

-3-

"he made the others wait for him and beg him to come, and finally moved. But then he moved so rapidly that if the others had not stood aside to let him enter, he would have entered through the window of the Paris Peace Pact."

I am also enclosing copies of two aide memoires in French which were left with me by the Japanese Ambassador and which he stated had been prepared for the Italian Foreign Office. He assured me that the Japanese Ambassador in Washington had sent copies of similar documents to the Department, and for that reason I am transmitting these without translation. In taking his leave, Mr. Yoshida, referring to the withdrawal of the Japanese objection to American participation in the League Council, said that he was glad that the recent "misunderstanding" between the United States and Japan at Geneva had not impaired the friendship between the two nations.

Respectfully yours,

Alexander Kirk
Alexander Kirk,
Charge d'Affaires ad interim.

✓
Enclosures: Aide memoires.
Clippings.

Copy to E.I.C. Paris.

SC/eh
710

Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 1104 of October 23, 1931,
from the Embassy at Rome.

C O P Y

Ambassade du Japon
R o m e

A I D E - M E M O I R E

D'après les dernières nouvelles reçues de Tokio concernant la situation en Mandchourie, il n'y a plus un seul soldat japonais au Nord de Chang-chun et le gros des troupes impériales se trouve maintenant dans la zone des chemins de fer sud-mandchouriens.

Hors de la zone, il y a encore des troupes japonaises à Kirin, Cheng-chia-tun, Chu-liu-ho (près de Hsi-min-fu) et Mukden, et - suivant les nécessités créées par les mouvements des bandits (brigands de profession et soldats abandonnés par leurs chefs) - les troupes de la zone envoient des détachements à An-tung, Chang-chun, Yin-kow et Ssu-ping-kai.

Dans les villes susnommées la situation est la suivante:

Mukden - Par le Comité Provincial pour le Maintien de l'Ordre un nouveau préfet a été nommé dans la province de Shen-yang avec les instructions de prendre les mesures nécessaires au rétablissement de l'ordre. Et, à l'heure actuelle, la ville est tranquille: les banques y ont, en grande partie, rouvert leurs guichets et les bureaux des "saltgabelle" ont repris à fonctionner depuis le 4 courant.

Kirin -

- 2 -

Kirin - Depuis le 30 septembre l'ordre y est maintenu sous la direction du Chef de Police de la ville aux ordres du préfet de la province. Mais il y a dans les environs beaucoup de soldats chinois qui se sont adonnés au brigandage et causent une grande panique parmi les habitants des campagnes; Les banques sont cependant ouvertes et les soldats japonais qui y montent la garde n'empêchent d'aucune façon les opérations normales. Et le préfet de la province a publié, le 5 courant, un communiqué invitant la population à avoir confiance dans la situation.

Chang-chun - Toutes les banques s'y sont rouvertes le 29 septembre et les Bourses ont recommencé à y fonctionner.

An-tung - Comme à Mukden l'ordre y est maintenu sous la responsabilité d'un comité provincial.

Ying-kow - La police chinoise a recommencé à y fonctionner le 3 courant; à l'heure présente, l'ordre y est maintenu et les affaires y ont repris leur cours normal.

Ssu-ping-kai - La Chambre de Commerce chinoise se prépare à y prendre les fonctions administratives.

Quant au mouvement anti-japonais en Chine, voici la situation:

Shanghai - Les banques chinoises ont interrompu leurs rapports avec les banques japonaises. Les employés chinois de celles-ci ont quitté leurs postes. Les banques et par suite les industriels japonais se trouvent ainsi dans une position très critique. Les affaires ne marchent

plus

- 3 -

plus et même les contrats déjà passés restent sans exécution. Les barques chinoises refusent de transporter les marchandises japonaises et même les chinois qui travaillent sur les barques japonaises sont menacés par leurs fédérations. Les marchandises japonaises ne peuvent donc plus être débarquées; les résidents japonais se trouvent dans l'impossibilité de se refournir de riz, de charbon et des autres denrées d'usage journalier; le lait et les journaux ne leur sont plus distribués. Les Sociétés anti-japonaises mettent des amendes aux marchands chinois qui vendent aux Japonais, font chercher dans tous les magasins les marchandises japonaises par de faux clients et obligent même ceux de ces négociants qu'elles retiennent responsables à porter les vêtements que l'on fait porter aux traîtres en publiant leurs photographies dans les journaux. Les journaux japonais ont été enlevés dans tous les magasins et les vendeurs chinois qui les distribuaient ont été battus.

Les cas de saisie de marchandises japonaises publiés le 14 courant pour les dix premiers jours du mois par les Sections de Contrôle appartenant à l'Association anti-japonaise se chiffrent à: "Nanshi" 43, "Chia-Pei" 54, "Nord" 17, "Ouest" 20, "Wu-sung" 37, spéciale 9.

La 1^{re} section "Nord" de Shanghai a convoqué les directeurs de toutes les écoles de sa juridiction et leur a communiqué les peines à appliquer aux élèves qui achètent des marchandises japonaises:

a) ne

- 4 -

a) ne pas punir les élèves âgés de moins de 12 ans, mais attirer l'attention de leurs parents sur leurs fautes;

b) quant aux autres, au cas où ils portent ou achètent des marchandises japonaises, leur confisquer ces marchandises et, de plus, notifier au public leurs noms comme ceux des non-patriotes;

c) punir les élèves qui font acheter des marchandises japonaises, punir aussi les acheteurs, punir plus gravement les récidivistes;

d) exposer dans une armoire les marchandises japonaises séquestrées pour que les élèves apprennent à les distinguer.

Dans les quartiers chinois de la ville, les magasins japonais qui avaient été fermés ont été saccagés et les sujets japonais sont insultés et frappés à coups de pierres. Deux Japonais y ont été gravement malmenés par les Chinois.

Nan-king - Un agent chinois d'une compagnie de navigation japonaise a été forcé de donner ses démissions le 5 octobre. Le Comité anti-japonais s'est emparé de trois Chinois qui achetaient des marchandises japonaises et les a fait traîner par la ville comme des traîtres.

Wu-hu - Le chargement et le déchargement des marchandises ainsi que le mouvement des passagers sont complètement arrêtés sur les bateaux japonais. Ceux-ci, de même que tous les résidents japonais se trouvent dans de graves difficultés pour se procurer de la nourriture.

Han-kow -

- 5 -

Han-kow - Le Comité anti-japonais a émis, le 3 courant une ordonnance que tous les marchands de la ville eussent à dénoncer les marchandises japonaises dont ils étaient détenteurs en payant un droit de 15% ad val. et à les vendre dans un délai de 20 jours s'ils ne voulaient pas qu'elles leur fussent séquestrées. En réalité une partie de ces marchandises a déjà été séquestrée avant le terme fixé.

Des membres examinateurs du susdit Comité examinent les colis postaux pour voir s'ils ne contiennent pas de marchandises japonaises. Sous les menaces du même Comité, les employés chinois des marchands japonais ont dû quitter leurs emplois.

Le 6 courant, les banquiers chinois ont annoncé qu'ils interrompaient leurs relations d'affaires avec les banquiers japonais. Et même les employés chinois des banques américaines, anglaises, françaises refusent de faire des opérations avec les banques japonaises. Les Japonais se trouvent ainsi dans l'impossibilité de faire des opérations de banque.

I-chang - Le 8 courant une dizaine de jeunes gens chinois ont lancé des pierres contre la canonnière japonaise "Futami". Et la nuit suivante la porte de l'hôpital japonais a été clouée à l'extérieur. Le 9 beaucoup de pierres ont été jetées contre le Consulat japonais, l'Ecole Primaire japonaise, le siège de la Compagnie de Navigation japonaise, la Maison des Matelots

japonais;

- 6 -

japonais; les portes et les fenêtres de ces établissements ont été brisées. Le 10 à minuit un des bâtiments de la Maison des Matelots a été incendiée.

Chung-king - Les vaisseaux de guerre et les sujets japonais se trouvent dans l'impossibilité de se procurer la nourriture nécessaire, parce que même quand ils réussissent à l'acheter elle est séquestrée pendant le transport. Les employés et les pilotes chinois des compagnies de navigation japonaise, ainsi que les interprètes du Consul Japonais ont été invités à démissionner. Les ouvriers chinois des fabriques japonaises sont pris de force et emmenés à travers la ville. Un groupe de vagabonds a attaqué deux Japonais d'une Compagnie de Navigation qui passaient dans la rue en leur jetant des pierres, de la boue et des cendres.

Fu-kien - Des décisions anti-japonaises ont été prises. Les banquiers chinois refusent de faire des opérations avec les Japonais et retirent les dépôts qu'ils avaient auprès de la Banque de Formose pour un montant de 500.000 dollars chinois. Les bateaux japonais ne peuvent charger des marchandises et toutes les transactions commerciales sont arrêtées pour les marchands japonais.

Swa-tow - Tout mouvement de marchandises est empêché aux bateaux japonais. Plusieurs marchands chinois ont été frappés d'amendes pour avoir tenu des marchandises japonaises. Des étudiants chinois sont entrés en groupe dans tous les magasins pour y séquestrer

les

- 7 -

les marchandises japonaises. Tout commerce entre le Japon et la Chine est arrêté.

Canton - Les paquebots chinois refusent de transporter en transit à Hong-kong les marchandises destinées au Japon. Les marchandises qui sont généralement transportées par les bateaux japonais ont beaucoup diminué en quantité. Les employés et les coolies qui étaient à la dépendance des Japonais ont dû quitter leurs travaux à la suite des menaces qui leur ont été faites.

Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 1104 of October 23, 1931,
from the Embassy at Rome.

C O P Y

Ambassade du Japon
R o m e

A I D E - M E M O I R E

Concernant la question de la Mandchourie, il y a évidemment une profonde incompréhension au sein du Conseil de la Société des Nations qui semble avoir l'idée que le Japon ait l'intention de s'emparer politiquement de la susdite région.

Le Japon a certainement de grands intérêts en Mandchourie, mais ce ne sont pas là ses seuls intérêts: ceux-là ne doivent donc être développés qu'en harmonie avec ceux qu'il a dans le monde entier. C'est pourquoi nous plaçons tous nos soins à le faire dans le cadre d'une politique de porte ouverte et d'égalité de chances pour toutes les Nations. De cette façon, en vertu de sa proximité géographique, le Japon pourra avantageusement poursuivre son expansion pacifique en Mandchourie sans causer de malentendus auprès des autres Puissances.

La Société des Nations semble craindre une ouverture d'hostilités entre mon pays et la Chine. Nous n'avons aucune intention de commencer une guerre. Tout ce que le Japon réclame est que les droits et les intérêts qui lui ont été accordés et reconnus par les traités soient respectés et que l'ordre soit maintenu. Le respect des droits et des intérêts et le maintien de l'ordre sont souci commun.

Il me semble qu'en Chine les hommes d'Etat placent tous leurs intérêts dans la lutte des partis. Et pour celle-ci

ils

- 2 -

ils n'hésiteront pas à sacrifier les affaires intérieures et extérieures de leur pays. C'est ainsi que, dans leurs mains, l'affaire de la Mandchourie, le boycottage contre le Japon et le recours à la Société des Nations sont devenus, me paraît-il, des pièces du jeu des factions, n'ayant d'autre but que de servir aux mouvements tactiques de l'une ou de l'autre. Voilà pourquoi le boycottage anti-japonais est plus intense dans les provinces qui se trouvent sous l'influence de Chang-kai-shek dont le représentant agit en ce moment à Genève auprès de la Société des Nations.

Si Chang-kai-shek était sérieusement soucieux d'une solution de l'affaire de la Mandchourie, il accepterait notre proposition d'en venir à des négociations directes. Les négociations directes constituent la méthode employée ordinairement pour la solution des différends qui surgissent entre les Nations; et ce n'est que lorsque cette méthode n'aboutit pas, qu'il faut penser à d'autres moyens.

Ce que la Société des Nations doit comprendre c'est que la véritable cause du conflit qui a surgi en Mandchourie comme de tous les fâcheux incidents qui arrivent en Chine, réside dans la grande désorganisation de ce pays, et que l'établissement chez lui d'un gouvernement fort et solide importe aussi bien pour sa situation intérieure que pour ses rapports extérieurs.

Il y a quelques années le Japon a contribué par son attitude à l'institution en Chine d'un gouvernement unifié et il maintient actuellement une politique de patience

vis-à-vis

175
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

vis-à-vis de la question chinoise dans son ensemble.

Si l'ordre était rétabli dans les provinces chinoises par un gouvernement central bien constitué, des questions du genre de celle de la Mandchourie ne surgiraient plus et la paix en Extrême-Orient serait assurée.

LA STAMPA, Turin.
October 17, 1931.

Despatch No. 1104.

Gli Stati Uniti al tavolo del Consiglio ginevrino

La storica importanza dell'avvenimento messa in rilievo dal Ministro Grandi

Ginevra, 16 notte.
Due sedute importantissime hanno caratterizzato l'odierna giornata ginevrina. La prima, per quanto destinata solo a consacrare la decisione di invitare gli Stati Uniti al tavolo del Consiglio (che, di fatto, è stata presa e portata a conoscenza del Governo di Washington fin da ieri sera), è venuta ad assumere una importanza eccezionale per la riaffermazione della posizione del Giappone che il delegato Yoshizawa ha tenuto a fare e precisare pubblicamente, contrariamente alle speranze, e per le dichiarazioni di principio degli altri più autorevoli delegati. Come il nostro delegato ha fatto rilevare, la decisione presa ieri a semplice maggioranza non deve intaccare il principio generale perché questo di oggi è soltanto un perfezionamento formale di una questione già definita all'unanimità nel settembre scorso, quando cioè il Consiglio decideva di associare gli Stati Uniti alla sua azione pacificatrice. La tesi ha raccolto il consenso generale e, su questo, anche il Giappone, questa volta, è stato pienamente d'accordo.
La seduta del pomeriggio, consacrata al solenne ricevimento del primo rappresentante degli Stati Uniti nel Consiglio, ha avuto naturalmente un accentuato carattere coreografico, ma questo non diminuisce in nulla l'importanza storica dell'avvenimento, che è grandissima. A meno di un mese dall'intervento dell'America alle discussioni della terza Commissione dell'Assemblea sulla tregua degli armamenti, un delegato del Governo di Washington prende parte ai lavori del supremo Consesso societario. La coincidenza è piena di significato. L'Italia, ripetiamo, è la prima a felicitarsi di questo avvenimento che realizza la tesi tante volte accennata alla tribuna ginevrina dai nostri delegati, dei legami fra le Nazioni e della universalità della Lega.

L'invito all'America

All'aprirsi della seduta di stamane, Briand ha dato lettura della proposta tendente ad invitare il Governo americano a delegare un suo rappresentante alle sedute del Consiglio. Briand, presidente del Consiglio, annuncia che egli ha preparato un invito che eventualmente potrà essere rivolto agli Stati Uniti.

In questo invito, dopo avere osservato che era stato espresso il parere che la questione portata davanti al Consiglio dalla Cina riguardava anche gli obblighi previsti dal Patto di Parigi, di cui cita l'art. 2 così concepito: « Le Alte Parti contraenti riconoscono che il regolamento e la soluzione di tutte le controversie o di tutti i conflitti, di qualunque natura o di qualunque origine esse possano essere, che potranno sorgere fra di esse, non dovranno mai essere ricercati che con mezzi pacifi-

sollecitazioni fatte dai suoi colleghi, un parere negativo.

Il Governo giapponese considera che la proposta di invitare uno Stato non membro a prendere parte alle deliberazioni del Consiglio con voto consultivo solleva questioni costituzionali di importanza estrema; ritiene che una decisione fondamentale di tale natura non possa essere presa per motivi di opportunità, per quanto elevati essi siano, senza che sia stata prima oggetto di un esame approfondito.

Il rappresentante del Giappone dice poi che non può non provocare meraviglia il modo affrettato col quale il Consiglio ha voluto prendere la decisione di invitare un osservatore, con voto consultivo, malgrado il fatto che questa azione sollevi dubbi seri relativamente ai principi costituzionali della Società.

Segue il rappresentante della Gran Bretagna, lord Reading, il quale osserva che ciò che preoccupa il Consiglio è il punto di vista costituzionale che si pone per quanto concerne il fatto, questione che è stata esaurientemente esaminata dal Presidente e dai suoi colleghi, ma se si riduce la questione alle sue esatte proporzioni essa appare assai semplice e non presenta difficoltà giuridiche.

Replica il rappresentante del Giappone, il quale dice che non può modificare la sua attitudine; egli ha già espresso la propria tesi: il suo Governo ritiene che la questione che si pone è di merito, e su questa il Consiglio non può prendere decisioni se non all'unanimità.

Le dichiarazioni di Grandi

Dopo le dichiarazioni del rappresentante polacco e di quello germanico, prende la parola il rappresentante dell'Italia, S. E. Grandi. Egli dice:

« E' mia intenzione attirare l'attenzione del Consiglio esclusivamente su di un punto che, tuttavia, appare nel mio giudizio essenziale. Non si tratta, oggi, di deliberare questioni che si riferiscono alla applicazione dell'art. 11 del Patto; è evidente che tutte le questioni di tale carattere sono sottoposte alla regola dell'unanimità. Non v'è, non può esservi alcun dubbio a proposito di ciò. Il Consiglio è chiamato oggi a risolvere il quesito, che è esclusivamente di procedura. La questione di sostanza è stata già decisa il giorno in cui il Consiglio ha deliberato, all'unanimità, di tenere al corrente il Governo degli Stati Uniti e di ricevere volentieri dal Governo degli Stati Uniti tutte le informazioni che da questo potranno essere giudicate utili per la soluzione conciliativa della grave questione sottoposta all'esame della Società delle Nazioni. Siamo quindi di fronte ad una procedura di consultazione vera e propria, già deliberata all'unanimità; proce-

tutto cuore una stretta intesa fra i popoli.

Il rappresentante americano, Princess Gilbert, dopo il saluto al Consiglio, dice:

« Il mio Governo non cerca di intervenire nelle misure che il Consiglio potrebbe proporre ai termini del Patto della Lega, e non è nella situazione di partecipare con gli altri membri del Consiglio alle decisioni delle misure necessarie che potrebbero essere prese a termine del Patto stesso allo scopo di mettere fine alla divergenza che divide due suoi membri.

« Ma il Patto di Parigi, che porta la firma del Presidente del Consiglio e della Società delle Nazioni, nonché dell'ex-Segretario di Stato, vale a dire delle due personalità che sono state gli autori del Patto, rappresenta per noi — in America — il mezzo effettivo per sollevare l'opinione pubblica del mondo intero in favore dell'impiego di mezzi pacifici quando si tratta di risolvere una divergenza fra due Stati.

« Noi pensiamo che questa pubblica opinione non è solo una forza potente per quanto concerne gli affari di ogni Paese, ma essa è di una influenza crescente nelle relazioni mutue tra membri della famiglia delle Nazioni. Se si utilizza la potenza di questa opinione, si può pervenire ad evitare rotture della pace internazionale, e le conseguenze saranno di importanza mondiale. Il mio Governo ha accettato il vostro invito pensando che in questo modo noi potremo più facilmente e più efficacemente intenderci con voi a questo proposito ».

E' la volta dei discorsi di saluto. Lord Reading si associa alle felicitazioni indirizzate dal Presidente al rappresentante degli Stati Uniti, dicendo che è un privilegio per lui rappresentare per la prima volta la Inghilterra al Consiglio, e vedere associato ai nostri lavori il rappresentante degli Stati Uniti.

Il compiacimento italiano

Ha quindi la parola il Ministro Grandi:

« Permettetemi — egli dice — di esprimere a mia volta il mio grandissimo compiacimento per vedere a questo stesso tavolo il rappresentante dell'America. L'importanza dell'avvenimento non può sfuggire a nessuno. Io vedo in esso un pegno prezioso della continuazione del perfezionamento di questa collaborazione che noi abbiamo augurato e ottenuta fin dall'inizio, e che io sono sicuro non mancherà di facilitare la realizzazione del compito importante, difficile, e delicato che incombe in questo momento al Consiglio. Io voglio vedere anche in questa pre-

CORRIERE DELLA SERA, Milan.
October 17, 1931.

Despatch No. 1104.

IL CONFLITTO CINO-GIAPPONESE A GINEVRA

L'America in persona di R. P. Gilbert presente al Consiglio Il Giappone è rimasto irriducibile - Possibile uscita dalla Lega?

Ginevra, 16 ottobre, notte.

Si sperava che il Giappone, di fronte alla ferma volontà di tutto il Consiglio di mandare un invito agli Stati Uniti, recedesse dalla sua opposizione e si trattasse dal motivare, in piena seduta pubblica, punto per punto le ragioni del suo dissenso. E' stato fatto tutto il possibile per cercar di avere una seduta tranquilla. Ma le cose dovevano passare ben diversamente.

Quando, alle ore 10, il presidente Briand apre la seduta, si diffonde la voce che nessun accordo è stato raggiunto. Briand inizia la discussione col ricordare che il Consiglio fu unanime nel desiderio di vedere gli Stati Uniti collaborare in certo modo con esso, allo scopo di ottenere una felice soluzione del conflitto, e fu deciso che questo avvenisse per mezzo di comunicazione scritta al Governo di Washington. Ma, per serrare ancora più la collaborazione, si è pensato che sarebbe stato più conveniente invitare gli Stati Uniti a prendere posto al tavolo del Consiglio.

L'invito all'America

In conseguenza egli ha elaborato il testo di una lettera da inviare agli Stati Uniti.

In questo invito, dopo aver osservato che è stato espresso il parere che la questione portata davanti al Consiglio delle Nazioni riguarda anche gli obblighi previsti dal Patto di Parigi, di cui cita l'art. 2 (che prevede il regolamento di qualsiasi conflitto con mezzi pacifici), è detto che gli Stati Uniti, firmatari del Patto di Parigi, sono particolarmente interessati ad assicurare un regolamento del presente conflitto con mezzi pacifici. L'azione che sarà intrapresa in virtù di questo Patto non potrebbe che rinforzare gli sforzi che fa attualmente il Consiglio. Invita quindi il Governo americano ad inviare un suo rappresentante in seno al Consiglio.

Il presidente soggiunge che il Giappone ha sollevato obiezioni d'ordine giuridico e costituzionale, a mezzo del suo delegato Joscisava, in una lettera oggi pervenuta a Briand.

I punti da chiarire sono se, prima di invitare un membro o uno Stato non membro della Società a sedere nel Consiglio, non si debba esaminare se esso non abbia interessi particolari nella questione portata davanti al Consiglio; e, quando il Consiglio decide di invitare uno Stato non membro a inviare un suo rappresentante al Consiglio in quale qualità tale rappresentante siederà nel Consiglio. Se esso siede in qualità di osservatore, ha egli il diritto di prendere parte alle deliberazioni? Se esso siede in piena egualanza con i membri del Consiglio ha egli gli stessi diritti e doveri di questi ultimi?

Se il Consiglio decide di invitare uno Stato non membro ad assistere alle deliberazioni della presente sessione, il Consiglio intende creare un precedente che potrebbe essere interpretato

chiarato ieri, la Nazione giapponese mantiene con la Nazione americana le relazioni più cordiali e tali rimarranno anche in avvenire. Comunque, il Giappone aderì molto volentieri alla proposta di comunicare tutti i documenti agli Stati Uniti per informazione; in tali condizioni Joscisava non può non provare meraviglia per il modo affrettato col quale il Consiglio ha voluto prendere la decisione di invitare un osservatore con voto consultivo, passando sopra ai principi costituzionali della Società delle Nazioni. Il voto negativo emesso ieri non proviene da ragioni di ordine politico; tuttavia il Governo giapponese non può decampare dal suo modo di vedere su questa questione, a meno che non veda risolti i dubbi che esso ha espressi a tale riguardo.

A Joscisava segue il rappresentante della Gran Bretagna, Lord Reading, il quale raccomanda che la questione rimanga entro le sue esatte proporzioni. Se si vuole domandare a uno Stato di partecipare alle discussioni del Consiglio e prendere parte al voto ai sensi dell'art. 11, ciò implicherebbe una questione costituzionale e richiederebbe l'unanimità. Ma nel caso attuale non si tratta di chiedere a uno Stato di divenire membro ma di invitarlo ai sensi dell'art. 4 ad ascoltare le deliberazioni del Consiglio, senza prendere, come membro del Consiglio, decisioni relative all'art. 11 o ad altro articolo del Patto. L'invito da mandare è dunque semplicemente una questione di procedura; e basta la maggioranza dei membri del Consiglio per deciderla.

Dopo una replica del rappresentante del Giappone, parlano i rappresentanti della Polonia e della Germania: quest'ultimo dice che la questione dell'invito agli Stati Uniti è risolta, e che conviene tornare alla questione fondamentale. Perché un accordo interveniva in Estremo Oriente è necessaria la buona volontà delle due parti. Invita queste a non irrigidirsi nelle loro inconciliabili tesi e a dare al mondo un esempio di saggezza.

Una dichiarazione di Grandi

Dopo alcune dichiarazioni del rappresentante della Jugoslavia, prende la parola l'on. Grandi il quale dice:

« E' mia intenzione attirare l'attenzione del Consiglio esclusivamente su di un punto che tuttavia appare nel mio giudizio essenziale. Non si tratta oggi di deliberare questioni che si riferiscono all'applicazione dell'art. 11 del Patto. E' evidente che tutte le questioni di tale carattere sono sottoposte alla regola dell'unanimità. Non vi è e non può esservi alcun dubbio a proposito di ciò. Il Consiglio è chiamato oggi a risolvere un quesito che è esclusivamente di procedura. La questione di sostanza è stata già decisa il giorno in cui il Consiglio ha deliberato ad unanimità di tenere al corrente il Governo degli Stati Uniti, e di ricevere volentieri dal Governo degli Stati

te la Cina contro il Giappone. Esso interverrà nella misura che il Consiglio proporrà in base al Patto della Società delle Nazioni, non essendo in grado di partecipare come membro del Consiglio alle decisioni che potranno essere prese, a termini di questo patto, allo scopo di mettere fine alla divergenza attuale fra due dei suoi membri. Il Governo degli Stati Uniti vi ha già fatto conoscere il suo apprezzamento simpatico per gli sforzi compiuti e il suo cordiale accordo per ciò che concerne lo scopo che vi proponete. Inoltre, agendo indipendentemente e attraverso le vie diplomatiche, il mio Governo ha già portato il suo appoggio morale agli sforzi compiuti dal Consiglio per pervenire a una soluzione pacifica della divergenza.

« Il Patto di Parigi, che porta la firma del Presidente del Consiglio della Lega, nonché quella del nostro ex-segretario di Stato, vale a dire delle due personalità che l'hanno creato, rappresenta per noi in America un mezzo effettivo per guidare l'opinione pubblica mondiale sulla via dei mezzi pacifici. Questa opinione pubblica non è soltanto una forza potente per ciò che concerne gli affari delle singole Nazioni, ma essa ha un'influenza sempre crescente nei mutui rapporti fra i membri della famiglia delle Nazioni. Utilizzandola, si può arrivare a evitare una rottura della pace, con conseguenze di importanza mondiale. Il mio Governo ha accettato il vostro invito, considerando che in tal modo noi potremo più facilmente e più efficacemente intenderci con voi a questo proposito ».

Alle rinnovate parole di saluto da parte di Briand si associano i vari membri del Consiglio, a cominciare da Lord Reading.

Il saluto del ministro italiano

Parla quindi S. E. Grandi, il quale dice:

« Signor Presidente, permettetemi di esprimere a mia volta la grandissima soddisfazione di vedere fra noi, seduto a questo stesso tavolo, il rappresentante del Governo degli Stati Uniti d'America. L'importanza di questo avvenimento non può sfuggire a nessuno. Io vedo in esso un pegno prezioso della continuazione e del perfezionamento di quella collaborazione che noi ci siamo augurati e abbiamo ottenuto fin dal principio e che, sono sicuro, non mancherà di facilitare il compimento dell'importante, delicato e difficile compito che incombe in questo momento al Consiglio. Io voglio vedere, anche in questa presenza, un significato di cui non possiamo che rallegrarci altamente, perché mostra una volta di più che il Governo e il grande popolo americano sono sempre pronti a lavorare con noi ogni volta che è necessario associarsi agli sforzi di tutte le Nazioni per risolvere le difficoltà e sormontare le crisi che toccano gli interessi di tutti i Paesi, come pure l'interesse comune della pace ».

LA TRIBUNA, Rome.
October 17, 1931.

Despatch No. 1104.

Annunziamenti Annotazioni

Gli Stati Uniti e Ginevra

L'invito agli Stati Uniti da parte del Consiglio ginevrino sarà senza dubbio cauteloso, ma più per l'opposizione recisa del Giappone, che per la preoccupazione di ottenere, come altre volte è avvenuto per richiamare indirettamente gli Stati Uniti a Ginevra, il consenso di Washington. Questa volta infatti, sin dalla prima risposta di Stimson alla comunicazione del Consiglio sul conflitto cino-giapponese, si è visto che gli Stati Uniti, chiamati in causa dagli avvenimenti mancesi, hanno volentieri messo la loro azione diplomatica in comune con quella del Consiglio della Società. Questo è, in un certo senso, il fatto nuovo, perché siamo a qualche cosa di più del solito «osservatore»; stibbene ad una partecipazione, per dir così, meno estranea.

C'è dunque da constatare che, dopo il primo secco rifiuto degli Stati Uniti a riconoscere l'impegno di Wilson per la partecipazione alla Società delle Nazioni, voluta proprio da Wilson, mano mano che problemi politici e finanziari di primo piano si sono presentati, Washington non ha potuto sottrarsi ad un interessamento, che ha assunto diverse denominazioni preoccupate di sfuggire a responsabilità, ma che è divenuto sempre più attivo e preciso.

Oggi, che nel conflitto mancese c'è un interesse diretto degli Stati Uniti, e che a Ginevra si agisce diplomaticamente prima che vi possa essere opportunità di richiamare il Patto del Pacifico, gli Stati Uniti hanno addirittura dimostrato la convenienza di non isolarsi dall'azione ginevrina. E cioè anche per questa parte si corregge visibilmente la tesi dell'isolamento.

Il Giappone per ora si oppone, attraverso un'eccezione procedurale (gli Stati Uniti non sono parte della Società e tanto meno del Consiglio, che ora agisce); ma non sappiamo comprendere l'irrigidimento della resistenza giapponese, poiché, se mai, è interesse del Giappone che un'azione degli Stati Uniti non sia isolata, ma si congiunga con quella della Società, della quale il Giappone è membro. Se un'azione isolata degli Stati Uniti oggi non può essere quale forse sarebbe stata qualche anno fa; ebbene è interessante per tutti che essa invece possa misurarsi nei vincoli di una condotta comune, qual'è quella di Ginevra. E il «no» giapponese è tutt'altro che persuasivo.

OSSERVATORE ROMANO, Vatican City.
October 18, 1931.

Despatch No. 1104.

Fatti e commenti

L'ospite ginevrino - Costituzione e legge in Spagna
Come prima se non meglio di prima?

Le sorprese... del divorzio - Dopo il voto al Reichstag

Il più notevole avvenimento del giorno è senza dubbio l'invito fatto dalla Società delle Nazioni e accettato dal rappresentante degli Stati Uniti per assistere alle discussioni sul conflitto tra la Cina ed il Giappone ed esporre il pensiero della grande Repubblica su qualsiasi deliberazione in proposito.

Il ricevimento del signor Prentiss Gilbert, dicono le notizie da Ginevra, fu veramente solenne. L'accoglienza al suo ingresso nella sala delle adunanze non poteva essere, secondo gli esperti che vedono sotto la crosta del ghiaccio diplomatico societario, più caloroso. Parea si dicesse: « Chi si vede? Finalmente!... Qualche cosa che assomigliava all'accoglienza di un prezioso fidanzato, dopo un'attesa tanto lunga da aver potuto ingenerare di già una sottile disperazione.

Il paragone non è fuor di luogo.

E' vero che al signor Briand che fece per primo gli onori di casa, siccome pacifista emerito e decano dei membri della Società, il signor Gilbert rispose subito precisando le ragioni della sua venuta e i limiti del suo intervento, ma è anche vero che l'on. Grandi, senza lasciarsi impressionare affatto dagli scrupoli del figliuol prodigo, ha fatto a nome della Società la parte del buon padre, di null'altro ansioso che di tener stretto al suo cuore il desiderato ospite.

« L'importanza di questo avvenimento — disse il Rappresentante dell'Italia — non può sfuggire ad alcuno. Io vedo in esso un pegno prezioso della continuazione e del perfezionamento di questa collaborazione che noi abbiamo domandato fin dall'inizio e che — ne sono sicuro — non mancherà di facilitare il compito importante delicato e difficile che incombe in questo momento sul Consiglio ».

Benissimo. Così.

Perchè quando si legge nelle dichiarazioni di Prentiss Gilbert: « noi abbiām già fatto i nostri passi diplomatici diretti; comunque come firmatari del Patto di Parigi, il nostro posto è anche qui », vien fatto di pensare a due cose. E cioè, che se l'America fosse convinta che i suoi diretti diplomatici passi fossero stati sufficienti alle sue vedute ed intenzioni, avrebbe declinato l'invito, e che se proprio il Patto di Parigi può decidere l'in-

POPOLO D'ITALIA, Milan.
October 17, 1931.

Despatch No. 1104.

Cooperazione intercontinentale

GINEVRA, 16 notte.

La partecipazione dei rappresentanti degli Stati Uniti d'America ai lavori del Consiglio della Società delle Nazioni, sanzionata col voto emesso nella seduta segreta di ieri sera, ha avuto immediato seguito oggi, dopo un dibattito chiarificatore del voto di ieri.

L'invito all'America

Nella seduta pubblica di questa mattina Briand, nella sua qualità di presidente del Consiglio, ha comunicato la motivazione concordata per l'invito all'America.

Nel corso dei dibattiti — dice testualmente la dichiarazione — era già stata espressa l'opinione che la questione molto importante di cui era stato incaricato il Consiglio si riferiva alle obbligazioni risultanti non solamente dal Patto della Società delle Nazioni, ma anche dal Patto di Parigi. Questa dichiarazione è incontestabilmente fondata, poichè, a termini dell'articolo 2 di questo Patto le alte parti contraenti riconoscono che il regolamento e la soluzione di tutte le controversie o conflitti, di qualunque natura o di qualunque origine essi possano essere, che potranno sorgere fra esse, non dovrà mai essere ricercato che per le vie pacifiche.

In prima linea fra i firmatari del Patto di Parigi figurano gli Stati Uniti d'America; essi sono stati fra i promotori, e deve essermi permesso — ha osservato Briand — di ricordare che io ho l'onore di essere, col segretario di Stato americano di allora, uno degli autori del Patto. Così gli Stati Uniti si trovano particolarmente interessati ad assicurare un regolamento della presente controversia con dei mezzi pacifici.

D'altra parte il Governo americano, col quale sono state scambiate delle comunicazioni in riferimento alla questione della quale siamo incaricati, ha espresso di recente e calorosamente la sua simpatia per l'atteggiamento adottato dalle Società delle Nazioni e ha affermato il suo desiderio di rinforzare l'azione della Società.

Io sono sicuro — ha continuato Briand, nell'interpretare i sensi della dichiarazione — di rispondere ai voti dei miei colleghi, proponendo di invitare il Governo degli Stati Uniti a inviare un rappresentante perchè esso si associi ai nostri sforzi, prendendo posto alla tavola del Consiglio. Esso sarà così posto in condizione di far conoscere la sua opinione sulla maniera in cui, sia nello stato attuale delle cose sia nel loro sviluppo ulteriore, potrà essere dato effetto alle disposizioni del Patto di Parigi; e gli sarà così data anche occasione di fornire le nostre discussioni sull'insieme del problema.

Io ho la convinzione che l'azione che sarà intrapresa in virtù di questo Patto non potrà che rafforzare e rinforzare gli sforzi che attualmente il Consiglio persegue, conformemente agli obblighi che risultano per esso dal Patto delle Società delle Nazioni, al fine di ottenere il regolamento pacifico del problema che si sta esaminando.

Un importante rilievo di Grandi

Briand aggiunge che il rappresentante del Giappone ha avuto certi scrupoli di ordine giuridico e costituzionale, condensati in una lettera il cui contenuto viene comunicato al Consiglio.

In sostanza in questi ultimi tentativi del delegato giapponese per infirmare la legalità del voto emesso sono ripetuti e rafforzati gli argomenti secondo i quali il Governo giapponese ritiene che la questione concernente l'invito a uno Stato non membro non abbia carattere costituzionale e procedurale, ma sia invece una questione di principio e di fondo, per cui l'unanimità dei consensi, secondo quanto stabilisce l'art. 11 del Patto — al quale si è riferito il Governo cinese invitando la Società delle Nazioni a intervenire per regolare il conflitto scoppiato in Manducuria — sarebbe legalmente necessaria.

Ma che si tratti realmente di una questione di fondo e che perciò l'unanimità dei consensi sia necessaria lo ha affermato più tardi il nostro ministro degli affari esteri, il quale ha anzi tenuto a far rilevare che le preoccupazioni del rappresentante giapponese erano infine superflue, dal momento che, in omaggio appunto alle disposizioni dell'art. 11, l'invito alla collaborazione e all'intervento del Governo degli Stati Uniti d'America era stato approvato fino dell'ultima seduta del Consiglio nel settembre scorso a unanimità dei voti e naturalmente col voto favorevole dello stesso rappresentante del Giappone.

riferiscano alla applicazione dell'art. 11 del Patto. E' evidente che tutte le questioni di tale carattere sono sottoposte alla regola dell'unanimità. Non vi è e non può esservi alcun dubbio a proposito di ciò. Il Consiglio è chiamato oggi a risolvere il quesito che è esclusivamente di procedura. La questione di sostanza è stata già decisa il giorno in cui il Consiglio ha deliberato all'unanimità di tenere al corrente il Governo degli Stati Uniti e di ricevere volentieri dal Governo degli Stati Uniti tutte le informazioni che da questo potranno essere giudicate utili per la soluzione conciliativa della grave questione sottoposta all'esame della Società delle Nazioni.

Siamo quindi di fronte a una procedura di consultazione vera e propria, già deliberata all'unanimità, procedura che oggi non si tratta che di perfezionare dal punto di vista formale.

A nome del Governo del mio paese sono particolarmente lieto che la nostra decisione possa facilitare la collaborazione in un caso così importante e delicato di una nazione come quella degli Stati Uniti d'America che verrà così ad associarsi più strettamente agli sforzi di noi tutti, e particolarmente a quelli che sono stati fatti e che saranno fatti dai nostri colleghi del Giappone e della Cina.

Pronta risposta di Stimson

Una curiosa motivazione di adesione alla proposta di invito all'America l'hanno data il delegato polacco e quello jugoslavo, il quale, per un'illeale e arbitraria interpretazione dei diritti di rappresentanza, crede di parlare e di agire in Consiglio in nome e per conto di tutti e tre gli Stati della cosiddetta Piccola Intesa. I due hanno dichiarato, cioè, che aderivano solo in via eccezionale alla deliberazione concernente l'ammmissione del rappresentante americano, ma che per l'avvenire, per questioni del genere, non si potrà richiamarsi al precedente attuale perchè in ogni caso sarebbe stata necessaria l'unanimità dei consensi.

E' chiaro che i due portavoce del sistema militare franco-balcanico pensavano a premunirsi contro l'eventualità dell'intervento di un delegato sovietico ai lavori del Consiglio della Lega; ma anche la loro preoccupazione è apparsa ed è stata superflua perchè il delegato italiano, come si è visto, ha tenuto a ben precisare che tutte le disposizioni dell'art. 11 del Patto sono soggette all'obbligo dell'unanimità.

Comunque il delegato giapponese, anche dopo le esortazioni di Lord Reading e Von Mutius, ha ripetuto che nulla aveva da aggiungere e da modificare di quanto aveva detto e dichiarato fino a quel momento.

Immediatamente, quindi, è stato trasmesso al Governo degli Stati Uniti d'America l'invito a partecipare alla riunione del Consiglio. Una breve lettera del presidente del Consiglio accompagnava la dichiarazione approvata. La risposta del Governo di Washington non si è fatta troppo attendere. Attraverso il console americano a Ginevra, signor Prentiss Gilbert, il segretario di Stato Stimson ha fatto conoscere al presidente del Consiglio della Società delle Nazioni il gradimento e l'accettazione del Governo americano all'invito rivolto.

Io sono incaricato — concludeva la lettera del console d'America — di accettare a nome del Governo degli Stati Uniti il vostro invito e inviare un rappresentante e di farvi sapere che esso mi ha designato per esplicare questa funzione.

Una riunione solenne

Una speciale riunione del Consiglio è stata subito indetta per le ore 18. La notizia dell'accettazione americana aveva fatto accorrere una folla enorme, desiderosa di assistere a questa che sarebbe stata una delle più solenni e storiche riunioni del Consiglio della Lega.

Per quanto l'ambiente non sia il più adatto a conferire decoro e solennità alle scene che vi si svolgono, pure il senso dell'importanza dell'avvenimento che stava per compiersi ha impresso all'ambiente e all'atteggiamento di attesa del pubblico di eccezione che gremiva la grande sala vetrata del Consiglio una certa aria di gravità, poco comune e in contrasto coll'usuale impressione di banale sciatteria che danno usualmente le riunioni societarie.

Quando, dopo aver dato lettura della risposta pervenuta dal Governo degli Stati Uniti d'America, il Presidente ha invitato il signor Prentiss Gilbert a prendere posto al tavolo del Consiglio, un movimento di attesa intensa e anche commossa cu-

all'estrema destra della grande tavola a forma di ferro di cavallo.

Il delegato giapponese è rimasto impassibile dietro lo schermo dei suoi grandi occhiali a stanghetta, orlati di tartaruga; di contro, invece, la faccia ampia e gioiosa del dottor Sze si è illuminata di un calmo e prolungato sorriso. Più tardi egli confesserà di essere più di ogni altro felice della presenza in Consiglio del delegato del Governo nord-americano.

Il signor Briand ha rivolto al rappresentante della Grande Repubblica degli Stati Uniti d'America un caldo saluto intonato alla circostanza, al quale Prentiss Gilbert ha risposto precisando i limiti e gli scopi della sua partecipazione ai lavori di questa sessione del Consiglio della Società delle Nazioni.

Parla il delegato americano

Prentiss Gilbert ringrazia il presidente dell'invito rivoltagli di prendere posto alla tavola del Consiglio, di assistere alle deliberazioni e di partecipare alle discussioni, per quel tanto tuttavia che possa entrare in giuoco il Patto di Parigi, di cui l'America è firmataria. Egli assicura che il Governo degli Stati Uniti d'America ha seguito con la più grande attenzione i dibattiti del Consiglio per raggiungere un componimento delle divergenze che, pur troppo, separano attualmente la Cina e il Giappone, ma non cerca di intervenire nelle misure che il Consiglio potrebbe proporre a termini del Patto della Società delle Nazioni e non è nella situazione di poter partecipare coi membri del Consiglio alla decisione delle misure necessarie che potrebbero essere adottate, a termine di questo Patto, per metter fine alla divergenza che esiste fra due dei suoi membri.

Trentis Gilbert continua ricordando che il Governo degli Stati Uniti ha già fatto conoscere la sua simpatia per gli sforzi compiuti e il suo accordo cordiale in quanto concerne lo scopo che la Società delle Nazioni persegue. Esso ha anche espresso la speranza che questa possa risolvere il problema in maniera soddisfacente per tutti.

Inoltre, — aggiunge il delegato americano — agendo indipendentemente e per via diplomatica, il mio Governo ha già portato il suo appoggio morale agli sforzi compiuti dal Consiglio per raggiungere una soluzione pacifica della controversia.

Ripeto — ha continuato Prentiss Gilbert — che noi non potremo partecipare alle vostre deliberazioni concernenti l'applicazione del meccanismo del Patto della Società delle Nazioni; ma il Patto di Parigi, che porta la firma del presidente del Consiglio della Società delle Nazioni come pure quella del nostro ex segretario di Stato, vale a dire di due personalità che ne sono stati gli autori, rappresenta per noi in America un mezzo effettivo di arrolare l'opinione pubblica del mondo intero in favore dell'uso di mezzi pacifici quando si tratta di risolvere una divergenza sorta fra degli Stati.

Pensiamo che questa opinione pubblica non sia soltanto una forza potente per ciò che concerne gli affari di ciascuna nazione, ma che essa abbia un'influenza crescente nelle mutue relazioni fra i membri della famiglia delle Nazioni. Se si utilizza la potenza di questa opinione, si può arrivare a evitare una rottura della pace internazionale e le conseguenze di ciò sono di un'importanza mondiale.

Crediamo sia forse questa la ragione per la quale il Consiglio ha esaminato le relazioni che esistono fra le stipulazioni del Patto di Parigi e la situazione attuale. Il mio Governo ha accettato il vostro invito, ritenendo che in questo modo potremo più facilmente e più efficacemente intenderci con voi.

Tutti i membri del Consiglio, a eccezione naturalmente del delegato giapponese, hanno preso la parola per congratularsi dell'intervento del rappresentante americano.

Lord Reading per primo ha fatto notare come la collaborazione del Governo degli Stati Uniti d'America ai lavori della Società delle Nazioni sia una conseguenza logica e fortunata della coincidenza degli scopi che essi si prefiggono di raggiungere e dello spirito che anima il Covenant e il Patto di Parigi.

Il compiacimento italiano

Subito dopo Lord Reading ha preso la parola S. E. Grandi.

Permettetemi di esprimere a questa volta — così si è espresso il ministro italiano — la mia soddisfazione di vedere fra noi seduto a questa tavola il rappresentante del Governo degli Stati Uniti d'America. L'importanza di questo avvenimento non può sfuggire ad alcuno. Io vedo in esso un pegno prezioso della continuazione e del perfezionamento di

calo di cui non possiamo che rallegrarci, perchè esso dimostra una volta di più che il Governo e il gran popolo americano sono sempre pronti a lavorare con noi, ogni qual volta si tratta di riunire gli sforzi di tutte le nazioni per risolvere difficoltà e superare crisi che toccano gli interessi di tutti i paesi e quello comune della pace.

Io sono convinto che, facendo ciò, il Governo degli Stati Uniti ha compiuto un atto di grande saggezza. Non solo come firmatario del Patto di Parigi, ma come uno dei promotori e come depositario di quest'atto, il Governo degli Stati Uniti è interessato al regolamento pacifico della controversia che ci è sottoposta nella stessa misura nella quale siamo interessati noi tutti come firmatari del Covenant.

Fin dall'Assemblea del 1930 la Società delle Nazioni si sforza di trovare i mezzi di mettere il Covenant della Società delle Nazioni in armonia col Patto di Parigi. La presenza qui del rappresentante del Governo americano ci prova che un'armonia di fatto esiste fra i due Patti, e che perciò i loro firmatari rispettivi possono e devono collaborare in istretta unione.

Il Governo italiano vede in questo avvenimento un buon presagio per il felice risultato dei nostri lavori.

Von Mutius e tutti gli altri membri del Consiglio hanno aggiunto brevi e intonate dichiarazioni; e solo il delegato norvegese, per un delicato riguardo al signor Joscisava, si è astenuto dal prendere la parola, per non far troppo risaltare la mancata dichiarazione del rappresentante del Giappone.

Atmosfera nuova

Il valore dell'intervento americano ai lavori della Società delle Nazioni, sia pure esso limitato e temporaneo, ha una portata che evidentemente sopravanza l'importanza del caso particolare e abbastanza grave che lo ha determinato. Senza abbandonarsi ad anticipazioni fuori luogo, prive di buon senso e anche di buon gusto, circa i futuri sviluppi nei rapporti fra il Governo degli Stati Uniti d'America e la Lega ginevrina, occorre però dare all'avvenimento il significato notevole che in sostanza esso ha e che rappresenta.

Il Governo di un grande, forte e ricco paese d'oltre Oceano esce dall'apparente e qualche volta ostentato isolamento per partecipare alla discussione attiva di problemi che interessano la totalità degli Stati civili di tutto il mondo.

Dinanzi a un recente e quasi ormai fallito tentativo di bloccare gli Stati europei, si erge ora la realtà viva e operante di questa collaborazione intercontinentale, che è una sanzione e un riconoscimento solenne delle relazioni di vasta interdipendenza che esistono nella realtà stessa dei grandi problemi politici ed economici del mondo moderno, secondo quanto più volte è stato espresso e affermato, anche in solenni occasioni, dai rappresentanti ufficiali del Governo italiano.

A tre settimane appena dalla partecipazione di un diretto rappresentante degli Stati Uniti d'America ai lavori di una fra le più importanti commissioni dell'Assemblea della Lega, questo nuovo intervento americano, desiderato e provocato per risolvere in armonia una spinosa vertenza che potrebbe compromettere la pace del mondo e intralciare e arrestare il difficile e delicato lavoro di ricostruzione della prosperità delle nazioni, mentre la grande conferenza per la limitazione e la riduzione degli armamenti sta quasi per avere inizio, è un sintomo della nuova atmosfera che è andata formandosi attorno ai gravi problemi della vita internazionale.

Un più vicino contatto del Governo americano, una sua più stretta partecipazione agli avvenimenti internazionali sono indubbiamente elementi moderatori ed equilibratori della situazione internazionale e garanzie solide ed attive contro i pericoli e i tentativi di egemonie soffocanti e provocatrici che, specialmente in Europa, tenterebbero di affermarsi e di estendersi.

Regolata la contesa cino-giapponese per la Manducuria, oltre l'interesse che l'istituzione ginevrina può assegnare a questa marcia di avvicinamento all'America, l'avvenimento segna una data nella storia e nella vita delle nazioni.

Lido Orlani

POPOLO D'ITALIA, Milan.
October 17, 1931.

Despatch No. 1104.

Cooperazione intercontinentale

GINEVRA, 16 notte.

La partecipazione del rappresentante degli Stati Uniti d'America ai lavori del Consiglio della Società delle Nazioni, sanzionata col voto emesso nella seduta segreta di ieri sera, ha avuto immediato seguito oggi, dopo un dibattito chiarificatore del voto di ieri.

L'invito all'America

Nella seduta pubblica di questa mattina Briand, nella sua qualità di presidente del Consiglio, ha comunicato la motivazione concordata per l'invito all'America.

Nel corso dei dibattiti — dice testualmente la dichiarazione — era già stata espressa l'opinione che la questione molto importante di cui era stato incaricato il Consiglio si riferiva alle obbligazioni risultanti non solamente dal Patto della Società delle Nazioni, ma anche dal Patto di Parigi. Questa dichiarazione è incontestabilmente fondata, poichè, a termini dell'articolo 2 di questo Patto le alte parti contraenti riconoscono che il regolamento e la soluzione di tutte le controversie o conflitti, di qualunque natura o di qualunque origine essi possano essere, che potranno sorgere fra esse, non dovrà mai essere ricercato che per le vie pacifiche.

In prima linea fra i firmatari del Patto di Parigi figurano gli Stati Uniti d'America; essi sono stati fra i promotori, e deve essermi permesso — ha osservato Briand — di ricordare che io ho l'onore di essere, col segretario di Stato americano di allora, uno degli autori del Patto. Così gli Stati Uniti si trovano particolarmente interessati ad assicurare un regolamento della presente controversia con dei mezzi pacifici.

D'altra parte il Governo americano, col quale sono state scambiate delle comunicazioni in riferimento alla soluzione del problema che si sta esaminando.

Un importante rilievo di Grandi

Briand aggiunge che il rappresentante del Giappone ha avuto certi scrupoli di ordine giuridico e costituzionale, condensati in una lettera il cui contenuto viene comunicato al Consiglio.

In sostanza in questi ultimi tentativi del delegato giapponese per infirmare la legalità del voto emesso sono ripetuti e rafforzati gli argomenti secondo i quali il Governo giapponese ritiene che la questione concernente l'invito a uno Stato non membro non abbia carattere costituzionale e procedurale, ma sia invece una questione di principio e di fondo, per cui l'unanimità dei consensi, secondo quanto stabilisce l'art. 11 del Patto — al quale si è riferito il Governo cinese invitando la Società delle Nazioni a intervenire per regolare il conflitto scoppiato in Manciuria — sarebbe legalmente necessaria.

Ma che si tratti realmente di una questione di fondo e che perciò l'unanimità dei consensi sia necessaria lo ha affermato più tardi il nostro ministro degli affari esteri, il quale ha anzi tenuto a far rilevare che le preoccupazioni del rappresentante giapponese erano infine superflue, dal momento che, in omaggio appunto alle disposizioni dell'art. 11, l'invito alla collaborazione e all'intervento del Governo degli Stati Uniti d'America era stato approvato fino dell'ultima seduta del Consiglio nel settembre scorso a unanimità dei voti e naturalmente col voto favorevole dello stesso rappresentante del Giappone.

E mia intenzione — dice l'on. Grandi — attirare l'attenzione del Consiglio esclusivamente su di un punto, che tuttavia appare nel mio giudizio, essenziale. Non si tratta oggi di deliberare su questioni che si

riferiscano alla applicazione dell'art. 11 del Patto. E' evidente che tutte le questioni di tale carattere sono sottoposte alla regola dell'unanimità. Non vi è e non può esservi alcun dubbio a proposito di ciò. Il Consiglio è chiamato oggi a risolvere il quesito che è esclusivamente di procedura. La questione di sostanza è stata già decisa il giorno in cui il Consiglio ha deliberato all'unanimità di tenere al corrente il Governo degli Stati Uniti e di ricevere volentieri dal Governo degli Stati Uniti tutte le informazioni che da questo potranno essere giudicate utili per la soluzione conciliativa della grave questione sottoposta all'esame della Società delle Nazioni.

Siamo quindi di fronte a una procedura di consultazione vera e propria, già deliberata all'unanimità, procedura che oggi non si tratta che di perfezionare dal punto di vista formale.

A nome del Governo del mio paese sono particolarmente lieto che la nostra decisione possa facilitare la collaborazione in un caso così importante e delicato di una nazione come quella degli Stati Uniti d'America che verrà così ad associarsi più strettamente agli sforzi di noi tutti, e particolarmente a quelli che sono stati fatti e che saranno fatti dai nostri colleghi del Giappone e della Cina.

Pronta risposta di Stimson

Una curiosa motivazione di adesione alla proposta di invito all'America l'hanno data il delegato polacco e quello jugoslavo, il quale, per un'illeale e arbitraria interpretazione dei diritti di rappresentanza, crede di parlare e di agire in Consiglio in nome e per conto di tutte e tre gli Stati della cosiddetta Piccola Intesa. I due hanno dichiarato, cioè, che aderivano solo in via eccezionale alla deliberazione concernente l'America. Attraverso il console americano a Ginevra, signor Prentiss Gilbert, il segretario di Stato Stimson ha fatto conoscere al presidente del Consiglio della Società delle Nazioni il gradimento e l'accettazione del Governo americano all'invito rivolto.

Io sono incaricato — concludeva la lettera del console d'America — di accettare a nome del Governo degli Stati Uniti il vostro invito e inviare un rappresentante e di farvi sapere che esso mi ha designato per esplicare questa funzione.

Una riunione solenne

Una speciale riunione del Consiglio è stata subito indetta per le ore 18. La notizia dell'accettazione americana aveva fatto accorrere una folla enorme, desiderosa di assistere a questa che sarebbe stata una delle più solenni e storiche riunioni del Consiglio della Lega.

Per quanto l'ambiente non sia il più adatto a conferire decoro e solennità alle scene che vi si svolgono, pure il senso dell'importanza dell'avvenimento che stava per compiersi ha impresso all'ambiente e all'atteggiamento di attesa del pubblico di eccezione che gremita la grande sala vetrata del Consiglio una certa aria di gravità, poco comune e in contrasto coll'usuale impressione di banale sciatteria che danno usualmente le riunioni societarie.

Quando, dopo aver dato lettura della risposta pervenuta dal Governo degli Stati Uniti d'America, il Presidente ha invitato il signor Prentiss Gilbert a prendere posto al tavolo del Consiglio, un movimento di attesa intensa e anche commossa curiosità ha pervaso gli astanti. Dal folto del pubblico degli esperti e dei componenti le varie delegazioni si è avanzato allora con aria disinvolta un giovane alto e robusto, che, dopo di essersi rivolto al Consiglio accennando un inchino, è andato a sedersi

all'estrema destra della grande tavola a forma di ferro di cavallo.

Il delegato giapponese è rimasto impassibile dietro lo schermo dei suoi grandi occhiali a stanghetta, orlati di tartaruga; di contro, invece, la faccia ampia e gioiosa del dottor Sze si è illuminata di un calmo e prolungato sorriso. Più tardi egli confesserà di essere più di ogni altro felice della presenza in Consiglio del delegato del Governo nord-americano.

Il signor Briand ha rivolto al rappresentante della Grande Repubblica degli Stati Uniti d'America un caldo saluto intonato alla circostanza, al quale Prentiss Gilbert ha risposto precisando i limiti e gli scopi della sua partecipazione ai lavori di questa sessione del Consiglio della Società delle Nazioni.

Parla il delegato americano

Prentiss Gilbert ringrazia il presidente dell'invito rivoltagli di prendere posto alla tavola del Consiglio, di assistere alle deliberazioni e di partecipare alle discussioni, per quel tanto tuttavia che possa entrare in giuoco il Patto di Parigi, di cui l'America è firmataria. Egli assicura che il Governo degli Stati Uniti d'America ha seguito con la più grande attenzione i dibattiti del Consiglio per raggiungere un componimento delle divergenze che, pur troppo, separano attualmente la Cina e il Giappone, ma non cerca di intervenire nelle misure che il Consiglio potrebbe proporre a termini del Patto della Società delle Nazioni e non è nella situazione di poter partecipare coi membri del Consiglio alla decisione delle misure necessarie che potrebbero essere adottate, a termine di questo Patto, per metter fine alla divergenza che esiste fra due dei suoi membri.

Prentiss Gilbert continua ricordando che il Governo degli Stati Uniti ha già fatto conoscere la sua simpatia per gli sforzi compiuti e il suo accordo cordiale in quanto concerne la buona che la presenza delle mutue relazioni fra i membri della famiglia delle Nazioni. Se si utilizza la potenza di questa opinione, si può arrivare a evitare una rottura della pace internazionale e le conseguenze di ciò sono di un'importanza mondiale.

Crediamo sia forse questa la ragione per la quale il Consiglio ha esaminato le relazioni che esistono fra le stipulazioni del Patto di Parigi e la situazione attuale. Il mio Governo ha accettato il vostro invito, ritenendo che in questo modo potremo più facilmente e più efficacemente intenderci con voi.

Tutti i membri del Consiglio, a eccezione naturalmente del delegato giapponese, hanno preso la parola per congratularsi dell'intervento del rappresentante americano.

Lord Reading per primo ha fatto notare come la collaborazione del Governo degli Stati Uniti d'America ai lavori della Società delle Nazioni sia una conseguenza logica e fortunata della coincidenza degli scopi che essi si prefiggono di raggiungere e dello spirito che anima il Covenant e il Patto di Parigi.

Il compiacimento italiano

Subito dopo Lord Reading ha preso la parola S. E. Grandi.

Permettetemi di esprimere a questa volta — così si è espresso il ministro italiano — la mia soddisfazione di vedere fra noi seduto a questa tavola il rappresentante del Governo degli Stati Uniti d'America. L'importanza di questo avvenimento non può sfuggire ad alcuno. Io vedo in esso un pegno prezioso della continuazione e del perfezionamento di quella collaborazione che noi abbiamo desiderato fin dall'inizio e che, ne sono sicuro, non mancherà di facilitare il compito importante, delicato e difficile che incombe in questo momento nel Consiglio.

In questa presenza vi è un signifi-

cato di cui non possiamo che rallegrarci, perchè esso dimostra una volta di più che il Governo e il gran popolo americano sono sempre pronti a lavorare con noi, ogni qual volta si tratta di riunire gli sforzi di tutte le nazioni per risolvere difficoltà e superare crisi che toccano gli interessi di tutti i paesi e quello comune della pace.

Io sono convinto che, facendo ciò, il Governo degli Stati Uniti ha compiuto un atto di grande saggezza. Non solo come firmatario del Patto di Parigi, ma come uno dei promotori e come depositario di quest'atto, il Governo degli Stati Uniti è interessato al regolamento pacifico della controversia che ci è sottoposta nella stessa misura nella quale siamo interessati noi tutti come firmatari del Covenant.

Fin dall'Assemblea del 1930 la Società delle Nazioni si sforza di trovare i mezzi di mettere il Covenant della Società delle Nazioni in armonia col Patto di Parigi. La presenza qui del rappresentante del Governo americano ci prova che un'armonia di fatto esiste fra i due Patti, e che perciò i loro firmatari rispettivi possono e devono collaborare in istretta unione.

Il Governo italiano vede in questo avvenimento un buon presagio per il felice risultato dei nostri lavori.

Von Mutius e tutti gli altri membri del Consiglio hanno aggiunto brevi e intonate dichiarazioni; e solo il delegato norvegese, per un delicato riguardo al signor Jostisava, si è astenuto dal prendere la parola, per non far troppo risaltare la mancata dichiarazione del rappresentante del Giappone.

Atmosfera nuova

Il valore dell'intervento americano ai lavori della Società delle Nazioni, sia pure esso limitato e temporaneo, ha una portata che evidentemente sopravanza l'importanza del caso particolare e abbastanza grave che lo ha determinato. Senza abbandonarsi ad anticipazioni fuori luogo, prime di ga, questo nuovo intervento americano, desiderato e provocato per risolvere in armonia una spinosa vertenza che potrebbe compromettere la pace del mondo e intralciare e arrestare il difficile e delicato lavoro di ricostruzione della prosperità delle nazioni, mentre la grande conferenza per la limitazione e la riduzione degli armamenti sta quasi per avere inizio, è un sintomo della nuova atmosfera che è andata formandosi attorno ai gravi problemi della vita internazionale.

Un più vicino contatto del Governo americano, una sua più stretta partecipazione agli avvenimenti internazionali sono indubbiamente elementi moderatori ed equilibratori della situazione internazionale e garanzie solide ed attive contro i pericoli e i tentativi di egemonie soffocanti e provocatrici che, specialmente in Europa, tenterebbero di affermarsi e di estendersi.

Regolata la contesa cino-giapponese per la Manciuria, oltre l'interesse che l'istituzione ginevrina può assegnare a questa marcia di avvicinamento all'America, l'avvenimento segna una data nella storia e nella vita delle nazioni.

Lido Gaiani

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

NOV 2 1931
DIVISION OF

November 2, 1931.

NOV 3 1931

Mr. Secretary:

Mr. Miller's two memoranda hereunder bring out some interesting points.

Nevertheless, it is my feeling that, considering what has gone before, M. Briand is handling the matter very skillfully. Regardless of the wisdom or unwisdom of the action of the Council on and before October 24, the thing that is being dealt with now is the situation as it is. We should not expect that the Japanese will evacuate by November 16. Our thought, plans and action should be based on the assumption that they will not and should be directed to the objective of dealing with a situation which will exist on and after that date if and as the assumption is proved to have been correct. This calls for the devising of an alternative to the action which the Japanese have been called upon to take before the date specified. Mr. Miller's suggestion (in marked paragraph hereunder) is in line with that idea.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 2, 1931.

[*General 276 (12.31)*]

M. Briand and the members of the Council appear to be making an effort, first, to uphold the authority of the League and, second, to make their action at the present time consistent with the action they had previously taken in the Resolution of September 30.

The Resolution of September 30, in turn, was largely framed in accordance with an established precedent of the League that the first step to be taken in a situation between any two members of the League, such as had arisen between China and Japan, was the withdrawal of troops by both sides into their own territory.

If, however, in this attempt to uphold the authority of the League and be entirely consistent with previous actions, they overlook the realities of the situation and impose conditions which are impossible of fulfillment either by China or Japan, they can hardly expect to facilitate a settlement of the situation.

On the contrary, by so doing, they give the parties an opportunity of refusing with apparent reason, to comply with recommendations of the Council.

RSM
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 2, 1931.

S. K. H.

M. Briand in reaching the conclusion that "the two governments are in complete agreement" on the first four points mentioned in his note to Mr. Yoshizawa, as reported in Geneva's 270 (October 31), including (point 4) "effective protection throughout Manchuria to Japanese nationals," appears to ignore the fact that it is highly improbable that under conditions, as they now exist, the Chinese authorities could possibly make good in their assurance to give such effective protection.

As to point 5, he appears to construe China's declared willingness "to settle all disputes with Japan as to treaty interpretation by arbitration or judicial settlement" as a sufficient answer to Japan's demands for "respect for treaty rights of Japan in Manchuria." It is doubtful whether Japan will accept that interpretation. There is every reason to believe that Japan will insist at least upon a formal assurance that China will meet her in direct negotiations upon the question of her treaty rights in Manchuria before she will accept the recommendations of the Council.

By the above course of reasoning, M. Briand reaches the
conclusion

- 2 -

conclusion that "the Chinese Government have now given pledges which cover the various fundamental principles raised by the Japanese Government," calls upon Japan to continue as rapidly as possible the withdrawal of its troops into the railway zone, and recommends that the two governments proceed "to appoint immediately representatives to settle the details relating to the carrying out of the evacuation and for the taking over of evacuated territories."

So long as the Council, in its attempts to uphold its authority, insists on what appear to be impracticable conditions precedent to the beginning of negotiations for the settlement of the questions at issue between China and Japan, I fear no real progress will be made toward such settlement.

Would it not be a more practical objective, and one in line with the position we have taken of the drafts of the proposed note to Japan, to hold that evacuation be begun simultaneously, and carried out pari passu, with direct negotiations between China and Japan, in the presence of neutral observers, if that be desired; and that the details relating to the carrying out of the evacuation and to the taking over of the evacuated territories be also taken up and carried out in connection with, and as a part of, such negotiations?

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 894.00 P.R./46 FOR Despatch #351

FROM Japan (Neville) DATED Oct. 9, 1931.
~~TO~~ NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Fighting in Manchuria - Manchurian situation:
Full report regarding - .
(Copy attached)

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Fighting in Manchuria:

793.94
On September 18th, a section of railway tracks of the South Manchuria Railway at Peitaying, near Mukden, was blown up by a force of about 200 Chinese troops, according to Japanese reports. Japanese railway guards, who hurried to the scene of the explosion, came into conflict with the Japanese troops.

This incident fanned into flame the feeling of irritation which has been smoldering in the minds of Japanese over a long series of unsettled problems affecting Japanese interests in Manchuria and China. Among these questions are the construction of railways by the Chinese allegedly in contravention of existing agreements, the problem of land rights, taxation, Koreans in Manchuria, and the boycott of Japanese goods. The most serious incident of this sort in the eyes of the Japanese military was undoubtedly the killing by Chinese soldiers of a Japanese staff officer, Captain Nakamura, on June 27th.*

Following the skirmish at Peitaying, Japanese troops occupied the city of Mukden and the arsenal, while, in the north, the Japanese garrison seized Changchun. Kirin was apparently occupied on the 21st. Subsequently a small Japanese force was sent on to Tunhua. On the west
Chienohatun

* Embassy's despatch No. 324 of September 12, 1931.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Chienchatau was occupied by a force sent out from Szepinkai, and Japanese forces of observation were reported as far as Taonanfu. Heimin has a small Japanese force, while Antung and Yinkow were occupied.

The total Japanese force as originally given was a little in excess of 10,000, which was reinforced by a mixed brigade of 4,000 from Korea. The total Japanese forces outside of the Leased Territory of Kwantung are given as something less than 15,000, or approximately 16,000 for the whole of Manchuria, including the garrison at Port Arthur.

There seems to have been some friction between the Army and other branches of the Government in this affair. The Foreign Office especially seemed to have received rather meagre reports of what actually took place in the regions where the Army was operating."

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By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS



October 29, 1931.

THE UNDER SECRETARY

OCT 30 1931

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SKH

Hugh Byas, Tokyo correspondent of the NEW YORK TIMES, in a report dated October 28 (NEW YORK TIMES, October 29, 1931) states that the letter of Alfred Sze, Chinese delegate to the League of Nations, to Sir Eric Drummond, offering to conclude an arbitration treaty with Japan and stating that "China is bound by the Covenant scrupulously to respect all treaty obligations", has been received in Tokyo.

Mr. Byas further states that "Sir Eric suggested that this in effect was a promise by China to respect her treaty rights and advised Japan to evacuate her troops and then open negotiations".

The report states that "the government is now preparing a full list of Sino-Japanese treaties regarding Manchuria to be communicated to the League, which, therefore, at its next meeting will have an opportunity to ask China whether she will respect those treaties".

It would appear, therefore, that this much of the conversation between Drummond and Sato, reported in Geneva's 262, October 27, has been given out in Tokyo notwithstanding the request for "the strictest possible confidence" made by Sato to Drummond (see paragraph 4 of

Geneva's

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- 2 -

Geneva's 262).

The JAPAN CHRONICLE of October 7, received by the last mail, quotes the TOKYO ASAHI as intimating that the military authorities, as well as the Foreign Office, desire to have the matter settled by negotiations as quickly as possible; that there is still a divergence of views between the military and the Foreign Office as to whether the negotiations should be conducted with the Nanking Government or with the local authorities in Manchuria; but that the military authorities are nevertheless uneasy because they realize it may take too long before any stable government emerges in Manchuria with which Japan can have dealings. The ASAHI adds:

"They also fear that when Japan's trade with China reaches a complete deadlock a few months hence an unfavorable change may come over the present determined attitude of the Japanese business world with the result that the present unique opportunity for opening negotiations with China will be gone."

It would appear from the above reports from Tokyo that the military authorities having attained their chief objectives in Manchuria now desire to have Japan's position in Manchuria confirmed by diplomatic negotiations; and that the Foreign Office is preparing to keep its case before the League (rather than to withdraw from or defy the League), along the line suggested personally and privately by Drummond to Sato; and, in their relations

- 3 -

tions with the League, to shift to China the burden of the responsibility of the existing situation which now rests upon Japan.

In the meantime it would appear that the Japanese ^{military} are "digging in" in Manchuria, prepared to remain all winter if necessary. ^{RSM}

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GRAY

Tokio

Dated November 6, 1931

Rec'd 8:35 a. m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 10 1931
Department of State

F/DEW
793.94/2498
FILED
NOV 10 1931

743.94
note

Secretary of State,
Washington.

209, November 6, 3 p. m.

My 206, November 5, 4 p. m.

In the presentation of the memorandum to Baron Shideh-
ara I had a long and friendly interview in which the
problems were very frankly discussed and the Japanese
position fairly clearly set forth. He requested me to
reply that the memorandum would receive the most earnest
consideration from himself and his Government. He out-
lined the Japanese position which was:

That before the withdrawal of troops they wanted an
agreement between the Chinese and Japanese, binding on
both, affirming the following five general principles:

One. No aggression on the part of either country
against the other.

Two. Obligating each country to respect the integrity
of the territory of the other.

Three.

REP

2- #209, from Tokio, Nov. 6, 3 p.m.

Three. Agreement on the part of the Chinese Government to prevent the enforcement of boycott by violence, and freedom on the part of Japanese and Chinese citizens to carry on their trade wherever they pleased and without intimidation. (He recognized the right of individuals to conduct a boycott by discontinuing purchases or trade relations when and where they pleased).

Four. Protection of lives and property of Japanese and Koreans resident in China. In this connection he said immediate or early withdrawal of troops until these points were agreed upon would result in general disorder and acts of violence against the Japanese and Koreans in Manchuria who would, he feared, be practically driven out.

Five. Recognition and reaffirmation of treaty rights.

He expressly excluded from these problems to be settled before withdrawal any of the details and points, numbering several hundred resulting from injuries, destruction of property, acts of violence or violations or evasions of treaty obligations.

I pointed out to him the emphasis laid by my Government upon the importance of not having these agreements reached
under

1 / 3
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

3- #209, from Tokio, Nov. 6, 3 p. m.

under military pressure and that while the troops were in occupation military movements and engagements were of more or less daily occurrence, they could not deny that military pressure was being exerted. He was however firm in the position that if the fundamental principles were agreed upon withdrawal would promptly follow.

844.00
It is the opinion of Mr. Neville, our Military and Naval Attaches and some close observers, that there is grave danger of the militant element obtaining control of the Government and ousting the moderate element, and that there is much public excitement and opposition to the conciliatory policies of Baron Shidehara.

FORBES

HPD

1785

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

PEIPING

Dated November 6, 1931

Rec'd 2:53 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

876, November 6, 10 a. m.

(GRAY). The former Shantung war lord General Chang Tsung Chang arrived here yesterday from Japan where he has been in exile since 1928. (END GRAY).



CONFIDENTIAL. As he was recently suspected of having treated with the Japanese in connection with the autonomy movement in Manchuria his return would indicate either that the Chinese Government offered him better terms or that he has come with Japanese support for the purpose of influencing a realignment in North China favorable to Japan.

Repeated to Shanghai.

For the Minister

ENGERT

WSB



F/DEW

793.94/2499

NOV 11 1931

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 125.3974/95 FOR Tel # -, 1PM

FROM _____ (_____) DATED Nov. 4, 1931.
TO Geneva NAME _____ 1-1127 are

REGARDING: Allotment for telegrams increased to \$10,000. Payment charges for telephone conversation with Secretary of State approved, chargeable against existing allotment. For increase required include estimate on Form 285 when submitted.

793.94/2500

WÜ

1 7 3 7

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

COPIES SENT TO
FROM
O.N.C. AND M. L. GRAY

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 6 1931
Department of State

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 6, 1931

Rec'd 1:30 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

DIVISION OF
EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS.

NOV 10 1931

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

PRIORITY.

877, November 6, 11 a. m.

Following two telegrams from Harbin:

"November 5, 10 a. m. CONFIDENTIAL. One. My telegram of November 4, 5 p. m. ²⁴⁷⁶ Local Japanese Consul General Ohashi telephoned me early this morning that a messenger who arrived this morning from Tsitsihar informed him that Japanese troops crossed Noni River on November 3rd and 4th for reconnoitring purposes, that they were fired upon by Tsitsihar troops, the withdrawal order had been agreed upon but not carried out, that shots were exchanged, that the noise of an airplane had been heard at Anghsi and that late at night at that place heavy artillery firing could be heard. Ohashi also said that the Japanese Consul at Tsitsihar had gone with a Chinese official to the scene of the fighting to stop the same, which appeared to be due to

793.94/2501

NOV 10 1931

REP

2- #877, from Peiping, Nov. 6, 11 a.m.

be due to the failure of the Chinese troops in the advanced positions of two kilometers from the bridge to receive in time orders to withdraw.

Harbin Chinese radio station has just informed that it learned at 10 p. m. last evening that serious fighting commenced at five p. m. last evening between Tsitsihar troops and Japanese soldiers, the latter being supported by airplanes, which dropped bombs and caused many casualties among the Chinese soldiers."

"November 5, 5 p. m. Local Chinese radio station has informed me that Tsitsihar troops have retreated from vicinity of Noni River toward Tsitsihar.


For the Minister

ENGERT.

WSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED



GRAY
FROM
PEIPING via N. R.

Dated November 6, 1931

Rec'd. 3:05 a.m.



F/DEW

793.94/2502

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
AND ALL D.

PRIORITY 878 November 6, noon.

Following from Consul General Mukden, November 5,
5 p.m.:

"Japanese headquarters this morning released a
message regarding fighting with Li Chun Shan's forces
which is substantially as follows:

"Japanese forces crossed Honi on ferry, found
two more bridges farther north destroyed and northward
still a third damaged, at which place they were approached
by Chinese with a flag of truce when suddenly fired up
from all sides by artillery, machine guns, and rifles,
killing 3 Japanese and wounding others. Fighting was
still in progress last night, Japanese forces reported
to be in a difficult position with estimated five thousand
Chinese supported by artillery occupying surrounding hills.
Bridges stated to be 50 and 35 miles south of Anganchi at
Chiangchiao Station and within 10 kilometre zone. Jap-
anese allege intercepting a telegram from Li to Marshal

Chung reports

1931.11.11-NOV

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CJH

Page 2 - #878 cont. from Peiping.

Chang reports the repulse of small Japanese detachment
and boasting that he (END PART ONE)

ENGERT

WWC

WSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 6, 1931

Rec'd 4:37 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

PRIORITY.

878, November 6, noon. (PART TWO).

will paint all Manchuria red with the blood of Japanese troops.

Information from another Japanese source indicates Japanese dead 15, troops engaged 500, Japanese forces pushed on to Tahsin, then retired South of Noni where they are awaiting reenforcement of two infantry battalions coming from Kirin. Fighting was preceded by parley between Japanese officers and Ma who gave assurance that Japanese repairing operations would not be interefered with".

Repeated to Shanghai.

(END MESSAGE).

For the Minister

ENGERT

KLP

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.99/11639 FOR Tel 879 -

FROM China (Rogert) DATED Nov. 6, 1931
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING:

The National Government order that all anti-Japanese activities cease.

ok

793.94/2503

REP

PLAIN

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 6, 1931

Rec'd 4:37 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

879, November sixth.

Reuter reports from Nanking fifth:

"Prospects of a definite settlement are again looming as result of decision by Nanking Government leaders to make important concessions among which is postponement of National Congress originally scheduled to open November twelve. This is stated to be due to fact that the Canton delegates have agreed to go to Nanking from Shanghai where Peace Conference has been in progress. General Chen Ming Shu with nineteenth route army has arrived Nanking. He is a Cantonese leader and his forces have been engaged in bandit. suppression in Kiangsi.

The National Government has ordered a complete cessation of all anti-Japanese activities".

For the Minister
ENGERT

JS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

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793.94/2503

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PLAIN

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The National Government has ordered a complete cessation of all anti-Japanese activities".

For the Minister
ENGERT

JS

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-128

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Collect

Charge Department

Charge to
\$

Department of State

Washington,

November 5, 1931.

AMERICAN CONSUL,

GENEVA (Switzerland).

For your confidential information, there is quoted below the text of a confidential telegram sent to the American Embassy at Tokyo as the Department's No. 217, November 3, 6 p.m. The memorandum was read and delivered to the Japanese Foreign Office November 5. Text follows:

QUOTE

UNQUOTE

(Telegraph Room: Follow text of Department's No. 217 to AMEMBASSY, TOKYO, hereto attached.)

You may read to Drummond in confidence the text of the memorandum.

You should explain to Drummond that I regard this memorandum as a representation by the American Government to the Japanese Government and am therefore not making the text available to others. I have read the text and made extended comment upon it to the French Ambassador here and he is to inform M. Briand of my action.

With regard to the contents of the memorandum, you should point out that my particular objective has been to

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-128

793.94/2503A

1-126
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Collect
Charge Department
OR

Department of State

Charge to
\$

Washington.

- 2 -

make it clear to the Japanese Government that, in seeking to prevent war and to bring about a solution by peaceful means, the objective of the American Government and that of the Council of the League are identical. Point out that I have indicated my endorsement of effort and action of the League as expressed in the Resolutions of September 30 and October 24, but that, in regard to the October 24 Resolution, while invoking the spirit thereof, I have deliberately refrained from mentioning the time limit and thus have avoided expression of any view either favorable or unfavorable with regard to that particular feature of the Resolution. Point out that what I have stressed is the view that the settlement of long-standing issues should not be made a condition precedent to withdrawal of Japanese armed forces and that the presence of those armed forces should not be availed of by the Japanese Government as an instrumentality for bringing pressure to bear upon China in the negotiations.

Say to him that I regard this as fundamental and I feel that it is imperative that it should be understood that we stand for the same fundamental principles.

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

TELEGRAM SENT

1-128

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Department of State

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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- 3 -

Washington,

[Further, inform Drummond that I am not giving publicity to the contents of this communication to Japan and that, while he may inform members of the Council that I have made representations in the sense indicated above, I trust that he will be very guarded in his disclosures regarding the substance. I suggest that he inform them only that I have made representations in support of the Council's position in regard to what I have referred to above as fundamental.

Stinson

✓
CR
Nov 5 1931 11

12 9 AM

FE:SKH/ZMF



Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19 _____

Index Bu.—No. 80.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-128



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 4, 1931.

Digest of
Newspaper Items.

F/DEW

793.94/2804

NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE:

Geneva despatch dated November 3 (John T. Whitaker) carries head lines "Geneva fears Russian clash with Japanese". The occupation by Japanese troops of Tsitsihar is reported, accompanied by a denial from Tokyo.

Note: It is not believed that Japanese troops have taken Tsitsihar.

Editorial considers the possibilities of the movement to put the former Manchu Emperor of China, Hsuan Tung (Henry Pu-yi) on a Manchurian throne of his own. Such a move would be "a form of self determination so fully justified by the country's historical background that China would not have a plea to file against it". With reference to the practical aspect, the "Corean precedent would be of more interest in the Occident than Manchu rights, and much more explanation would be demanded of Japan's activities than of China's claims.

NEW YORK TIMES:

Mukden despatch dated November 3 (Hallett Abend) states that a repair crew, escorted by 400 Japanese soldiers,

NOV 9 1931

- 2 -

soldiers, will make repairs to the dynamited bridges on the Taonan-Anganki railroad. The Japanese military have warned Generals Chang Hai-peng and Ma Chen-shan, Chinese rival generals, that Japan refuses to countenance further disruption of the railway on which Japan holds a heavy mortgage. Japanese leaflets and formal notification have pledged Japan not to use the railroad for military purposes.

Although trade throughout Manchuria is stagnant, the foreign powers are watching the situation carefully, fearing that the Japanese may take advantage of the present situation to create monopolies. The Chinese electric plant at Antung is held inoperative and the Japanese will soon be furnishing light and power for Mukden from the nearby Fushun (Japanese) collieries.

Japan is rapidly settling many outstanding disputes with the new managements of railways and the newly appointed Chinese authorities. Prior to September 18, Japan complained of more than 300 "unsettled cases" but this number is being considerably reduced.

WASHINGTON POST:

Tokyo despatch dated November 4 (AP) reports a clash between Japanese troops and Chinese bandits at a point near Toutackou, 75 miles north of Mukden.

Note:

- 3 -

Note: There is a city named Tentackou on the Korean border. The maps do not give Tentackou 75 miles north of Mukden.


An article by Harold J. T. Moran reports the Chinese-Japanese controversy on the verge of further complications involving Soviet Russia, while unofficial reports were to the effect that Japanese troops were occupying Tsitsihar. The American Consul General at Harbin, Mr. George C. Hanson, was reported at Tsitsihar. Mr. Hanson has received from the Secretary of State discretionary powers in moving about in North Manchuria.

The Japanese troops can not be strategically released from the occupation of Manchuria before November 16.

There is believed to be a strong possibility that economic sanctions will be threatened against China and Japan unless they mutually agree to carry out the League's peace-making program.


FE:RPB:EJL

WM. W. LANCASTER



October 30, 1931.

Hon. Stanley K. Hornbeck
Chief, Division of Far Eastern Affairs,
Department of State,
Washington, D.C.

November 6 1931.

Dear Mr. Hornbeck,

We have just had a cable from the Moukden Branch of The National City Bank of New York which I think may be of interest to the Department, although we do not ask for any action by the Department in relation to it. I am sending it to you simply in accordance with my practice of furnishing you with whatever information which comes to me and might be something which you would like to have in your files. Copy is herewith enclosed.

The account of the Netherlands Harbor Works referred to in the latter part of the cable is one opened in connection with the Hulutao Harbor Project and has been covered by credit balances in the Harbor Reserve Fund Account. The Peiping-Liaoning Railway, under whose direction the harbor work is being done, is reported to have very large credit balances in the Frontier Bank and undoubtedly our branch is trying to collect on these accounts in order to cover the overdraft of the Dutch company.

With kind regards.

Yours cordially,

RECEIVED

NOV 10 1931

Enclosure
WWL/sm

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

FILED

NOV 7 1931

F/DEW

793.94/2505

5

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FOR YOUR INFORMATION IN CASE MATTER DISCUSSED WITH YOU BY STATE DEPARTMENT JAPANESE MILITARY AUTHORITIES HAVE WRITTEN US THREATENING LETTERS STRICTLY FORBIDDING US TO REMIT ANY OFFICIAL FUNDS TO PEIPING CHINA MAKING SPECIAL REFERENCE TO PURCHASING COMMISSION FUND (STOP) PURCHASING COMMISSION HAVE NO ACCOUNT WITH US BUT WE HAVE ASKED U.S. CONSULATE TO REPLY THAT WE CANNOT ACCEPT JAPANESE ARMY SUPERVISION OUR BUSINESS (STOP) U.S. CONSULATE HAS TAKEN THE NECESSARY ACTION AND HAVE ALSO ADVISED STATE DEPARTMENT (STOP). JAPANESE ARMY HAS PREVIOUSLY REQUESTED US TO SUPPLY INFORMATION REGARDING YOUNG MARSHALL ACCOUNT WITH US AND HAVE PREVENTED US FROM COLLECTING CHECKS ON FRONTIER BANK IN CONNECTION WITH NETHERLANDS HARBOR WORKS CO. (NEEDERLANDSCHE MAATSCHAPPIJ VOOR HAVENWORKEN) HARBIN ACCOUNTS.

F/DEW

8.94/2565

November 5, 1931.

Dear Mr. Lancaster:

I acknowledge the receipt of your letter of October 31, 1931, enclosing a copy of a telegram from the Mukden Branch of the National City Bank of New York in regard to certain threatening letters received by that Branch from the Japanese authorities. The Department received a message of similar character from the American Legation at Peiping.

Your courtesy in sending a copy of this message for the Department's information is appreciated.


Yours sincerely,

Stanley K. Hornbeck
Stanley K. Hornbeck,
Chief,
Division of Far Eastern Affairs.

Mr. William W. Lancaster,
55 Wall Street,
New York, New York.

Nov 5 1931
FE:RFB/ZMF

m.m.b.
FE



793.94/2505

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GREEN

Geneva

Dated November 6, 1931

Rec'd 1:05 p. m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

NOV 10 1931

DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Secretary of State,


Washington.

284, November 6, 5 p. m.

Sze has sent a note dated November 4 of about 1000 words to Drummond commenting on the Japanese Government reply to the identic telegrams sent from Geneva on October 17th by signatories of the Pact of Paris. Inasmuch as that note seems to contain no new elements but a mere restatement of the Chinese on the points raised the text will not be sent by telegraph but is being forwarded by mail.

GILBERT

WSB



FK 793.94/2506

FILED

NOV 11 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 3, 1931.

JCR
file

SKH:

793.94

Of the various papers attached to the memorandum of conversation of Mr. Castle with the Japanese Ambassador on October 20 the first appears to be the most significant.

It states the essential points of the suggestion said to have been made by Sir Eric Drummond on October 20 and approved by Japan on October 22.

The main point of these suggestions, as interpreted by Japan, was that evacuation and direct negotiations should proceed together.

In pursuance of that suggestion Japan proposed, first, to evacuate as soon as possible; second, that China should provide security; third, that direct negotiations should be begun for the above purposes.

The above basis seems to be more practicable, in view of existing conditions, than does the recommendation adopted by the League that evacuation should be completed before direct negotiations are begun.

The other papers attached contain nothing which we have not already had. Mr. Castle in his conversation disposed of the letter addressed by Mr. Lamont to the Japanese Banking Group on the subject of railways in Manchuria by his statement that a letter from Mr. Lamont would hardly be put in the same class as a treaty.


RSM
RSM: EJJ

F/DEW

793.94/2507

NOV 6 1931

DEPARTMENT OF STATE



DCR
file

Mr. Castle:

Now that the memorandum for communication to the Japanese Foreign Office has been sent, it seems to FE that consideration should be given to the Geneva side of the problem.

M. Briand expressly asked us to act. We informed the French Ambassador last week that we were in process of preparing a communication to the Japanese. The French Ambassador has already asked for a copy of the communication. If we withhold it, they will assume that it contains something which we are not willing to disclose to them. The newspapers have already stated that the Council has a feeling that we favor the Japanese. The Council has communicated to us the text of M. Briand's communication to the Japanese. Would it not be distinctly to our advantage to reciprocate and to have them know exactly what we are saying to the Japanese; and, on the other hand, would it not be distinctly to our disadvantage not to do so? FE recommends that copies be given to the French Ambassador and to the British Ambassador for communication in confidence to M. Briand and Lord Reading; and that the text be telegraphed to Gilbert for confidential communication to Drummond. It is of course assumed that a copy will be given to the Japanese Ambassador.

SKH/ZMF

F/DEW

793.94/2508

793.94
You - in
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Geneva

SKH



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE UNDERSECRETARY

NOV 3 1931

October 30, 1931.

Mr. Secretary:

With regard to the projected note to Japan, I want to express one or two thoughts.

Inasmuch as I understand the French Ambassador has asked you to support the resolution of the League of Nations, I realize that we must take some action. I think the point you brought out over the telephone last night that the Japanese are wrong in insisting on the fifth point prior to evacuation is correct, and, it seems to me, that that should be the heart of our communication. In reading the note that was drafted yesterday, I could not help asking myself whether the certain irritation which would be caused in Japan against this country if this were delivered as a formal note might not more than out-balance the good which might be accomplished. It seems to me that in this note we were going well beyond the League, and that possibly both the League and Japan might feel that we were taking over on our own shoulders a settlement of the trouble. I still do not think there is going to be war in the Far East, and it has always been my hope that when the Japanese have rectified the error they made and the Chinese have shown some sign

of

NOV 6 1931

F/DEW

793.94/2509

ICR
file

-2-

of living up to treaty obligations, the United States might come out thoroughly friendly to both nations.

In the note, as it was written yesterday, the Japanese might well ask under what authority or what right we were offering advice and arguing the case. There is nothing under the Kellogg Pact to give us this right and we are not, I take it, acting under the Nine Power Treaty. The danger, therefore, would be that Japan would consider the note quite gratuitous.

I think the League resolution is poorly drawn and not constructive. They knew in advance that Japan could not accept a definite date of retirement. They apparently capitulated to the Chinese in saying that conversations need not begin until retirement of troops within the railway zone was completed. This merely puts off a settlement. If the League had said that they felt negotiations should begin immediately, even if they had added that they should be conducted with neutral observers present, they would put Japan definitely in the wrong if Japan should refuse. I doubt whether Japan could have refused and negotiations would have begun. Without in any way minimizing the fault of the military in their actions last month, I can not help feeling that we are inclined to forget that the Chinese have steadily made things

-3-

things almost intolerable for the Japanese in Manchuria and that the Chinese want to throw the burden of settlement on the shoulders of outside nations.

We know that people like Wakatsuki, Shidehara and Inouye are working earnestly for a peaceful settlement. We know that the action of the League and of the signatories of the Kellogg Pact have shown the Japanese the opinion of the outside world as to the actions of the military. We have no reason to think that these civil leaders are not working earnestly to present a case to the League on the 16th of November which will, at least, prove that Japan intends to live up to its own treaty obligations as well as to insist that China live up to hers, and I am a little fearful of the effect of a formal communication at this moment which might merely stir up bad feeling.

The Ambassador of Japan told Norman Armour this morning that Japan was greatly irritated against both France and Great Britain, and deeply appreciated the neutrality of this country. If we can do our duty without changing that feeling, I think we should make every attempt to do so.

There

-4-


There are, of course, equally good arguments for taking vigorous action at this moment, but I feel it only right that I should put down the case as I see it myself.

WRC

U WRC:GMH

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY



793.941

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR,
MR. PAUL CLAUDEL, NOVEMBER 4, 1931.

F/DEW

793.94/2510

I had requested the French Ambassador to come in; when he came, I told him that yesterday I had made representations, through my Embassy at Tokyo, to the Japanese Government in regard to the situation in Manchuria and I handed the French Ambassador the annexed aide memoire to explain to him what had been done. He read it over and as I found there was some danger of him misunderstanding exactly the nature of the representations which had been made in Tokyo, I read to him in full the memorandum which had been sent to Tokyo to be made the basis of its representations. I told the French Ambassador when he read this memorandum that it was to be given to the Japanese Government; after he read it he said he thought it was a strong memorandum. I told him that I had spent many days in trying to soften this language so as not to be deemed harsh. I explained to Mr. Claudel particularly that had not made to the Japanese the suggestion which is contained on the third page of the aide memoire as to the presence

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

-2-

presence of neutral observers in the negotiations. I explained to him that I had refrained from making any such suggestion because I wished to leave it to Monsieur Briand and not in any way to cross wires with him. I explained to Mr. Claudel several times so as to avoid any possible misunderstanding of the gist of the representations which were made to Japan. He noted that we had not mentioned the time limit. I said we had not done so because we had doubts as to whether it was wise on the part of the Council to impose any time limit. He seemed to feel himself the same doubt. I pointed out, however, that we had taken no position in our representations one way or the other on that point. I emphasized to him verbally the importance that a ladder should be found for the Japanese to climb down on in case of a deadlock on the point which we emphasized in our memorandum and he asked me whether we had any precedents for this suggestion of a ladder. I told him that the presence of neutral observers had been very useful in the case of the negotiations between China and Japan over Shantung. He asked me what nationality the observers were. I told him

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

-3-

him that I believed that one observer had been an American;
I was not sure of the others but thought that one had been
British and possibly one French.

HLS:

S:HLS:VGN

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Stutzman NARS, Date 12-18-75

014

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

AIDE MEMOIRE OF CONVERSATION WITH THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR,
NOVEMBER 4, 1931.

I have directed the American Ambassador at Tokyo to make representations to the Foreign Minister intended to show the concurrence of the American Government with the position of the Council of the League of Nations with respect to the point which we deem to be most essential in the present situation, namely, that the Japanese Government should not make its withdrawal into the railway some contingent upon the prior negotiations with China as to the mutual treaty rights of China and Japan in Southern Manchuria and in the Southern Manchurian Railway. We feel that should Japan persist in its contention, which its representative made at the Council in respect of this matter, it might well be deemed to be equivalent to the use of military pressure by Japan in order to force a solution of certain longstanding controversies which have no immediate relation to the present situation in Manchuria. If this course were persisted in, it might well be deemed to be a violation of the covenant of the Briand-Kellogg Pact to seek the solution of controversies only by pacific means

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

-3-

means and it might also possibly become a violation of the covenant of the Nine Power Treaty to respect the integrity of the administration of China in Manchuria.

It seems to us that this point constituted the most important question in the recent discussion before the Council over the resolution of October 24 and we have therefore concentrated our attention on this point.

I fear that Japan will not withdraw her forces before the 16th of November, the day set by the Council, and from some of the reports sent me by my own observers, I am inclined to believe that in case of certain towns in Manchuria now occupied by Japanese troops, it might well be impossible to withdraw those troops at so early a date without the likelihood of serious disorders. It may even be that Japan will not yield on the point which we have stressed in our recommendations. She may not be willing to withdraw her troops entirely before negotiations on the broader questions are actually entered into. Should this unfortunate situation arise, we have been earnestly considering what steps might be taken to furnish an alternative suggestion which might accomplish ostensibly the necessary result of preserving these

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

-3-

these negotiations from military pressure. It has seemed to us, that in case the League is faced with such a deadlock, Monsieur Briand might well resort to the suggestion that the direct negotiations between China and Japan should be conducted in the presence of neutral observers taken from one or more of the other nations. Such a method was adopted in the negotiation between China and Japan in respect to the evacuation of Shantung with success. I have made no such suggestion to the Chinese or Japanese in this case because I have deemed it most important not to run any risk of conflicting with the negotiations which have been conducted so skilfully by Monsieur Briand. Now having made the effort to support the position and the negotiations conducted by Monsieur Briand and the Council, I venture to make to Monsieur Briand this suggestion as a compromise for him to use in case of ultimate deadlock.

H.S.L.

S:BSL:VGN

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MEMORANDUM

My Government acknowledges the receipt of the Japanese Government's note of October 24, 1931, in reply to its note of October 21, 1931.

My Government notes with satisfaction the reference of the Japanese Government to the Pact of Paris and the assurance that it is the settled aim of the Japanese Government to compose its differences with China by none but pacific means.

My Government notes also the statement that the Japanese railway guards in taking military measures in Manchuria since the night of September 18 last have been actuated solely by the necessity of defending themselves and of protecting the South Manchuria Railway and the lives and property of Japanese subjects against attacks by Chinese troops and armed bandits.

It is clear that the events of the last few weeks affect the rights and interests not only of Japan and China, but of the many nations which have relations with these two countries, and which are associated with both by ties of friendship and of reciprocal advantage as well as by the more formal ties of treaty relationship, and it is because of this that the United States, along with other nations similarly situated, has felt not only free but in duty bound to express its views.

From the information in its possession, my Government cannot escape the conclusion that in the efforts to protect
the

- 2 -

the South Manchuria Railway and the lives and property of Japanese subjects against attack a situation has been created in Manchuria which gives Japan substantial control of Southern Manchuria and has, temporarily, at least, destroyed the administrative integrity of China in this region. On this my Government neither attributes motives nor passes judgment, but desires solely to point out the fact.

It appears to my Government that there are two separate and distinct points to be considered. First, the peaceful solution of the present unfortunate situation in Manchuria, and, second, a solution through direct negotiation of the various matters at issue between Japan and China arising from misunderstanding as to the respective rights of the two nations as claimed under various treaties.

With regard to the first point, my Government cannot escape the conclusion that effective withdrawal of the Japanese troops within the railway lines would destroy the idea, either on the part of China or of outside nations, that Japan intends to use military pressure to bring about a settlement of the broader issues. That it is not the Japanese Government's intention thus to exert pressure has already been clearly indicated in the statement issued by the Japanese Government in Tokyo on October 27. It is further the belief of my Government that the second and broader question cannot appropriately be settled until the first has been disposed of. The withdrawal of the troops

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Quitsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

as soon as this can be safely accomplished in the present emergency would inevitably create a more favorable atmosphere in which negotiations may be carried on, and would also constitute an impressive demonstration to the world of Japan's often repeated assertion that it has no territorial ambitions in Manchuria and that it intends strictly to abide by the treaties guaranteeing the administrative integrity of China and providing for the settlement of all controversies solely by pacific means.

It is in the light of the above that my Government has noted with regret and concern that at the meeting of the Council of the League of Nations, the representative of the Japanese Government should have insisted that these broader matters, which would seem to have little direct bearing on the immediate situation, should be discussed and be disposed of by negotiations between Japan and China in advance of the withdrawal of Japanese troops from the points of occupation outside the railway zone.

As to the second point, the settlement of the broader issues involved in the treaty rights, my Government is in complete sympathy with the desire of the Japanese Government to obtain a solution which will be satisfactory to both parties and which, being so, would give promise of permanence. It cannot bring itself to feel, however, that the solution of these broader issues should be made a condition precedent to the solution of the present situation in Manchuria. My Government further takes occasion to state that if negotiation of these broader issues, subsequently undertaken, should not eventuate in a conclusion acceptable to both parties, there exist numerous methods

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

methods or agencies of arbitral, conciliatory, or judicial settlement, which might be invoked by Japan and by China, including methods or agencies in the creation of which both countries have participated. Recourse to one or another of these might not only facilitate arrival at an equitable settlement but would result in the assurance to both the Japanese and the Chinese Governments that the settlement so arrived at would enlist the approval and support of public opinion throughout the world.

My Government finds confirmation of its views as expressed above in its scrutiny of the position taken by the Council of the League of Nations as expressed in the resolution adopted by the Council on September 30 and in the draft resolution upon which thirteen members of the Council gave affirmative vote on October 24. My Government hopes that the Japanese Government will find it possible to share the view of those nations that negotiations looking to the settlement of long-standing issues between Japan and China ought not be made a condition precedent to the evacuation of the occupied positions and by so doing avail itself of the opportunity presented to refute conclusively any implication that exertion of military pressure was in any way intended to affect the process of arriving at a settlement of the points at issue. My Government confidently hopes that both Japan and China will be guided by the spirit of the resolutions above referred to and will make every possible effort to follow a course consistent therewith.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

GENEVA

Dated November 6, 1931

Rec'd 2:10 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

DIVISION OF

281, November 6, 10 a.m. (GREEN)

Consulate's 260, October 27, 9 a. m., paragraph 13,

Drummond has just informed me that Briand has requested that the adjourned session of the Council set for November 16 meet in Paris.

Briand gives as his reason his inability to be absent from his duties in France. The issue seems to be: the meeting held in Paris with Briand, or without Briand in Geneva. Drummond is circulating this request to the members of the Council and believes that they will acquiesce.

With regard to current rumors that the date of the meeting may be advanced, Drummond gave me as his opinion that from present indications the meeting would not be held earlier than November 16th.

Rumors

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 6 1931
Department of State
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
NOV 12 1931
DIVISION OF
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
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note
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REP

-2 #281, from Geneva, Nov. 6, 10 a. m.

Rumors have also been current here with various explanations that Yoshizawa would not represent Japan at the next meeting of the Council and that Matsudara would take his place. (END GREEN).

The true situation respecting this appears to be as follows: Yoshizawa felt he had been placed in a false position by Tokyo's not permitting him to give to the Council the "five points" of Japanese demands and then making them public in Tokyo the following day. He felt particularly that he had been put in an "insincere" position before his colleagues. He asked to be relieved of further representing Japan on the Council. It is understood that this has been straightened out and that he will represent Japan at the November 16 meeting.

GILBERT

WSB

REP

-2 #281, from Geneva, Nov. 6, 1970 a. m.

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GILBERT

WSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

NOV 10 1931

DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

REP

FROM

GREEN

Geneva

Dated November 6, 1931

Rec'd

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note
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ARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
NOV 6 1931
DIVISION OF
EASTERN AFFAIRS

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 6 1931

F/DEW

793.94/2512

FILED

NOV 11 1931

Secretary of State,
Washington.

282, November 6, noon.

I have just received, delayed in transmission, from the Secretariat a copy of a memorandum of the Chinese Government transmitted by Sze on October 31st to Drummond in reply to the Japanese declaration of October 26th (Consulate's 263, ²³⁷¹October 28, 11 a. m.).

This forms part of a series of such exchanges which frequently assume importance through ^{being} cited later in the negotiations. The memorandum introduces no new elements but restates and emphasizes certain main principles of the Chinese position with particular reference to the Council's draft resolution of October 24th. The following is a brief summary of its contents:

One. The very presence of Japanese troops in Chinese territory creates the danger of which the Japanese now

complain

REP

2- #282, from Geneva, Nov. 6, noon,

complain in regard to anti-Japanese feeling and insecurity of Japanese nationals. In support of this view the memorandum cites Briand's statement on this point to the Council on October 24 and quotes the reply of Secretary Hughes to the Japanese statement to the Washington Conference to the effect that the Japanese Government could not withdraw its troops from Eastern Siberia without endangering the lives of its subjects and that it deemed necessary the occupation of Russian territory as a means of assuring a suitable adjustment with a future Russian Government.

Two. The memorandum reaffirms the ability of the Chinese Government to insure the safety of Japanese lives and property in proportion as the evacuation is effected and to that end reiterated its willingness to extend the system of neutral ^{affairs} ~~affairs~~ or with the help of the League to devise any other arrangements on the spot.

Three. The Chinese Government notes with satisfaction the Japanese denial of any intention to bring armed pressure

REP

3- #282, from Geneva, Nov. 6, noon.

pressure to bear in negotiations with China but points out that if this be the view of the Japanese Government the only way to give effect to it is to cease to demand as a condition precedent to the evacuation of its troops, that China come to an agreement with Japan on basic principles which are to govern the whole of the future relations of the two countries. Giving effect to evacuation and guarantees of security involves nothing more than local arrangements on the spot and could be accomplished in a few days.

Four. Suggests for settlement of Sino-Japanese questions the appointment of a permanent board of conciliation.

GILBERT

HPD
(*) Apparent omissions.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY



MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR,
MR. KATSUJI DEBUCHI. November 4, 1931.

F/DEM

793.94/2513

I sent for the Japanese Ambassador yesterday but he was out driving and was unable to come but came in this morning and excused himself for not coming yesterday by telling me that it was a great Japanese holiday.

I told him that I wished to see him in respect to representations which I was making to Tokyo in respect to the Manchurian situation. These represented long and careful and independent thought on the part of this Government and then I explained to him the position taken in the memorandum which we have drawn up for the Ambassador at Tokyo to give to Baron Shidehara. I told him that in our conclusions we did not enter into any of the minor questions involved in the action of the League but were bringing to the attention of the Japanese Government points which seemed to us to be the nub of the situation arising out of the position which Mr. Yoshizawa seemed to have taken at Geneva; that was that Japan would refuse to evacuate until she had concluded negotiations with China on certain longstanding controversies which did not relate, at least many of them, to the present situation in Manchuria. I said that if

Japan

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

-2-

Japan took this position, in our opinion, she would place herself in the wrong before the opinion of the whole world because she would be apparently using military force to secure the settlement of these controversies and she would be continuing the disrupted administrative condition of China for the same purpose. I told him that some way should be found to avoid this; that we did not suggest any method but we felt that Japan, with the aid of Monsieur Briand, should be able to find a method.

The Ambassador assured me that the Japanese Government recognized what you might call the friendly attitude of this Government in this matter; at one time there had been a misunderstanding in Japan and Japanese opinion had been excited but that was over and Japanese opinion, as well as the Government, recognized how fair we had been.

793.94/2515 He asked me whether I had heard about his talk with Mr. Castle the other day and I told him that I had carefully read the aide memoire of that talk and also the five or six papers which Mr. Debuchi had left with Mr. Castle. He said that he thought the League had acted hastily in certain matters. I said that in our present representations we did not go into those matters at all and that I expressed

no

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

-3-

no opinion on them but confined myself solely to the one point which I thought was the most important and I did not wish to have Japan get into a wrong position.

✓ He then asked whether he could take three or four minutes to tell me about the situation in Northern Manchuria in regard to the alleged issue between Russia and Japan and the reports which had come about Japanese occupation of Tsitsihar. He told me that the report that there had ever been any occupation of Tsitsihar was entirely erroneous. He told me that the Chinese General Ma, who had been fighting with another Chinese General Chang, had destroyed three bridges on the railway about thirty miles Southwest of Tsitsihar and that the Japanese had sent a small force of men to repair these bridges.

✓ He said that this railway had been built with Japanese money and was very important as a means of transportation of the Manchurian crops which were now being harvested and that this Japanese force had been sent up on the request of the authorities of this Chinese railway plus the authorities of the Southern Manchurian Railway; that they would take about three weeks to repair these bridges and

would

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

-4-

✓ would then be withdrawn. The Russians had become alarmed because these bridges were owned by the Chinese Eastern Railways, which was being operated by Russians, but that there was no truth in the report that the forces were there for any other purpose than as he described.

HLS.

S:HLS:VGN

MEMORANDUM

My Government acknowledges the receipt of the Japanese Government's note of October 24, 1931, in reply to its note of October 21, 1931.

My Government notes with satisfaction the reference of the Japanese Government to the Pact of Paris and the assurance that it is the settled aim of the Japanese Government to compose its differences with China by none but pacific means.

My Government notes also the statement that the Japanese railway guards in taking military measures in Manchuria since the night of September 18 last have been actuated solely by the necessity of defending themselves and of protecting the South Manchuria Railway and the lives and property of Japanese subjects against attacks by Chinese troops and armed bandits.

It is clear that the events of the last few weeks affect the rights and interests not only of Japan and China, but of the many nations which have relations with these two countries, and which are associated with both by ties of friendship and of reciprocal advantage as well as by the more formal ties of treaty relationship, and it is because of this that the United States, along with other nations similarly situated, has felt not only free but in duty bound to express its views.

From the information in its possession, my Government cannot escape the conclusion that in the efforts to protect the South Manchuria Railway and the lives and property

-2-

property of Japanese subjects against attack a situation has been created in Manchuria which gives Japan substantial control of Southern Manchuria and has, temporarily, at least, destroyed the administrative integrity of China in this region. On this my Government neither attributes motives nor passes judgment, but desires solely to point out the fact.

It appears to my Government that there are two separate and distinct points to be considered. First, the peaceful solution of the present unfortunate situation in Manchuria, and, second, a solution through direct negotiation of the various matters at issue between Japan and China arising from misunderstanding as to the respective rights of the two nations as claimed under various treaties.

With regard to the first point, my Government cannot escape the conclusion that effective withdrawal of the Japanese troops within the railway lines would destroy the idea, either on the part of China or of outside nations, that Japan intends to use military pressure to bring about a settlement of the broader issues. That it is not the Japanese Government's intention thus to exert pressure has already been clearly indicated in the statement issued by the Japanese Government in Tokyo on October 27. It is further the belief of my Government that the second and broader question cannot appropriately be settled until the first has been disposed of. The withdrawal of the troops as soon as this can be safely accomplished in the present emergency would inevitably create a more favorable atmosphere

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Luitjens NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

atmosphere in which negotiations may be carried on, and would also constitute an impressive demonstration to the world of Japan's often repeated assertion that it has no territorial ambitions in Manchuria and that it intends strictly to abide by the treaties guaranteeing the administrative integrity of China and providing for the settlement of all controversies solely by pacific means.

It is in the light of the above that my Government has noted with regret and concern that at the meeting of the Council of the League of Nations, the representative of the Japanese Government should have insisted that these broader matters, which would seem to have little direct bearing on the immediate situation, should be discussed and be disposed of by negotiations between Japan and China in advance of the withdrawal of Japanese troops from the points of occupation outside the railway zone.

As to the second point, the settlement of the broader issues involved in the treaty rights, my Government is in complete sympathy with the desire of the Japanese Government to obtain a solution which will be satisfactory to both parties and which, being so, would give promise of permanence. It cannot bring itself to feel, however, that the solution of these broader issues should be made a condition precedent to the solution of the present situation in Manchuria. My Government further takes occasion to state that if negotiation of these broader issues, subsequently undertaken, should not eventuate in a conclusion acceptable to both parties, there exist numerous methods

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

-4-

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My Government finds confirmation of its views as expressed above in its scrutiny of the position taken by the Council of the League of Nations as expressed in the resolution adopted by the Council on September 30 and in the draft resolution upon which thirteen members of the Council gave affirmative vote on October 24. My Government hopes that the Japanese Government will find it possible to share the view of those nations that negotiations looking to the settlement of long-standing issues between Japan and China ought not be made a condition precedent to the evacuation of the occupied positions and by so doing avail itself of the opportunity presented to refute conclusively any implication that exertion of military pressure was in any way intended to affect the process of arriving at a settlement of the points at issue. My Government confidently hopes that both Japan and China will be guided by the spirit of the resolutions above referred to and will make every possible effort to follow a course consistent therewith.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

WHO'S WHO IN AMERICA 1928-1929.

MOORE, Frederick, newspaper corr.;
b. New Orleans, Nov. 17, 1877; s. Frederick
and Annie Louise (Cook) M.; studied at
Harvard, 1906; m. Edith Mary Thomson, of
Plymouth, Eng., May 1, 1908; children--
David Lewis, Margaret Mary, John Stewart,
Jane Lucilla. As corr. for leading Am. or
English newspapers, was located in Washington
in 1900, Ol, London, 1902, the Balkan States,
1903-04, London, 1905, Morocco, 1907,
Turkey, 1908-09, China, 1910-16; mng.
editor Asia Magazine, New York, 1917; at
Peace Conf., Paris, 1919; at League of
Nations Assembly, Geneva, 1920; foreign
councillor to Japanese ministry for Foreign
Affairs, 1921-26; corr. in China, 1927.
Clubs: Century (New York); Cosmos (Washington)
Tokyo (Tokyo); Savage (London). Author:
The Balkan Trail, 1906; The Passing of
Morocco, 1908; The Chaos in Europe, 1919.
Address: Cosmos Club, Washington, D. C.

NOV 5 1931

FILED

FE/DEW 793.94/2514

DIVISION OF
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 26 1931

Department of State
7 WEST WASHINGTON STREET
NEW YORK

NOV 5 1931

Oct 21 '31

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Dear Mr. Thompson: Out of 20 years intimate experience with the Japanese may I offer you this suggestion in dealing with them:— Appeal to their sense of honor and show your confidence in them. By that means you can get anything that is right, and something more besides from them.

Although, to successive Secretaries of State our successive interferences in Manchurian affairs seem but natural or proper acts, they have come to mean nagging to the Japanese, while our long record of sympathy for China has done the latter harm rather than good.

Since 1905 our government has been irritating the Japanese (intermittently) and the accumulated

to 6. 535

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Huntzger NARS, Date 12-18-75

*OCR
index*

In reply refer to
 FE

November 4 1931.

Mr. Frederick Moore,
 The Century Association,
 7 West Forty-third Street,
 New York, New York.

Sir:

The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of
 October 21, 1931, addressed to the Secretary of State,
 containing observations on Japanese character and on
 relations between the United States and Japan.

Your courtesy in sending these observations is
 appreciated and I wish to assure you that the Depart-
 ment is continuing to give the present dispute between
 China and Japan its careful and solicitous attention.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:


W. R. Castle, Jr.

Under Secretary

793.94/2514

CH
 Oct. 20, 1931
 NOV 4 1931.
 FE:MMH:REK
 10/28/31

RAM
 FE



effect is such that, if continued, the nation is likely, sooner or later, to "break loose", just as the army did recently.

Before your term of office comes to an end you have the opportunity to win the Japanese to a new feeling towards us and the American people to a new understanding of them, and you seem to be on the road to that now.

I write only in the most friendly way, as a great admirer of the excellent work you have accomplished for the U.S. and the world since you entered office in the S.D. Sincerely yours

Frederick Moore

Honorable,
Henry L. Thompson, Esq.

183

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-128
 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR
 Charge to
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Department of State

This cable was sent in code.
 It should be carefully protected so outside
 being communicated to anyone.

Washington,

November 16, 1931.

AMEMBASSY,

PARIS (France).

551

CONFIDENTIAL FOR GENERAL DAWES.

793.94/2515
 The Japanese Ambassador here brought to my attention/
 some time ago Articles three and ten of QUOTE Protocols/
 attached to the Sino-Japanese Treaty relating to Manchuria,
 December 22, 1905 UNQUOTE. It is possible that some mention
 of these Articles will be made to you. In anticipation,
 I feel moved to inform you that it is my understanding that
 the Chinese have long claimed that these QUOTE Protocols/
 UNQUOTE were not adopted by the negotiators in 1905 as a
 part of the treaty agreement concluded.

In case the Japanese should bring them to your atten-
 tion, I suggest that you refrain from any comment.
~~pressed, you might ask what is the Japanese Government's~~
~~feeling with regard to Article fourteen.~~ The proper time
 for discussion, if and when, of the character and interpreta-
 tion of these Protocols will be in the negotiations which
 we all hope will be ultimately carried on for settlement of
 the long outstanding issues between Japan and China, rather
 than now.

FE:SKH/ZMF

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Enciphered by SKHSent by operator M., 1931

Index Bu.—No. 60.

Nov. 16, 1931.

793.94/2515

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RECEIVED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
NOV 4 1931

SECRETARY OF STATE
NOV 3 1931

AFRIC SEC
NOV 9 1931

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR
October 28, 1931.

*not photostated in
7/24/31*

The Ambassador left with me the attached papers. He said that his Government was very unhappy over the final decision of the League of Nations, primarily, because they felt themselves unable to accept dictation as to the withdrawal of their troops before the 16th of November, and, secondly, because their fifth point was an essential part of the whole picture. The Ambassador brought out the fact that in giving me an outline of the five points, he had spoken particularly, as the fifth point, of all arrangements concerning railroads. This had been brought up with Mr. Briand and Lord Reading, both of whom had said that it would be impossible for the League to consider any inclusion of the railroad question and that the railroads must not be specifically mentioned. The Japanese then felt that by changing the wording of the fifth point to its present wording, that is, "respect for treaty rights of Japan in Manchuria", the League would be likely to accept, as the maintenance of treaties was one of its main interests. This, however, was not accepted, and at the last minute the League

rushed

F/DEW

793.94/2515

NOV 4 1931

FILED

-2-

rushed through its resolution largely at the instance of Lord Reading.

On the first page of the memorandum given me by Mr. Debuchi, it will be noted that Sir Eric Drummond, on October 20, made a definite suggestion to Mr. Yoshizawa of certain points which might prove acceptable to the League. It is quite clear from what the Ambassador said that Mr. Yoshizawa took these points of Drummond's as completely official. He telegraphed them to his Government immediately and received an answer from his Government on October 22nd, stating that the Japanese Government would accept. Mr. Yoshizawa hurried to Lord Reading with this acceptance, but Lord Reading refused to discuss the matter and the League passed the resolution, which we know, over Japan's protest. This has led in Japan to violent outbreaks against Great Britain.

No. 2 of the memoranda left me by the Japanese Ambassador is the statement of the Japanese Government issued on October 27th, which we have already seen. The Ambassador at this point stated that Mr. Yoshizawa had made a very serious error in not clearly stating in Geneva what Japan considered as fundamental. He said
that

-3-

that there was no point whatever in making any secret of this since the news as to Japan's fifth point had already more or less leaked out. I gathered that Mr. Yoshizawa, in refusing to make this public and thereby creating a mystery was, if not actually disobeying his instructions, at least not seizing an opportunity which had been given him.

No. 3 of the papers left with me is Article 6 of a treaty concluded between China and Japan September 4, 1909. Mr. Debuchi pointed out on the map he brought just where this section of railroad continuing the Kirin-Changchun Railway to Huining was of very vital importance to Japan. He said that in spite of this article of the treaty, the Chinese have steadily refused to allow the railroad to be built.

No. 4 of the papers is part of a statement made by Mr. Hughes at the Washington Conference. The Ambassador left this with me largely in explanation of the fourth point made by Japan in the statement given out as to effective protection in Manchuria of peaceful pursuits undertaken by Japanese subjects. Mr. Debuchi explained that these pursuits included the right to lease land for building purposes, trade and manufacture, for agricultural purposes and for general business purposes.

It

-4-

It does not go beyond this. The Ambassador said that the reason point four was of importance was that the Chinese had consistently prevented wherever possible the Japanese subjects from having equal rights with others.

The question which the Ambassador brought up the other day as to ruinous competition among the railroads is covered in the first paragraph of the fifth paper attached. He said that the Chinese had built certain railroads which more or less paralleled the Japanese lines and were planning to build others contrary to the treaty, that Japan felt it essential, particularly in these days when railroads were not making money, that China should recognize these obligations and should not thus parallel the roads.

Attached paper No. 6 is a letter from Mr. Lamont, 1920, to the Japanese Banking group in the Consortium. The Ambassador pointed out to me the various railroads mentioned in the three numbered paragraphs of Mr. Lamont's letter, some of them being already built, some of them partly built. He felt that this was a recognition of Japanese rights on these various railroads in that they were specifically excluded from the operation of the Chinese Consortium. He pointed out that

Mr. Lamont

-5-

Mr. Lamont in writing the letter said that the statement had the approval of the governments of the United States, Great Britain and France.

I told the Ambassador that a letter from Mr. Lamont could hardly be put in the same class as a treaty, and added that I did not know personally whether this Government had made any statement on the matter. He stated that he wanted to leave these various papers with me in order that as far as possible we might understand the Japanese point of view. He added once more the disappointment of the Japanese Government at the refusal of the League to consider the Japanese fifth point. I told him it seemed to me that this was natural, since the demand of the League was confined to the present emergency. What the League wanted, and, of course, what we wanted also, was to see Japan live up to the agreement it made on September 30th. I told him that the information we had from many sources indicated that instead of withdrawing the Japanese were consolidating their position out of the railroad zone with the apparent intention of retaining control indefinitely, that because this was a violation of treaties, it became inevitably of grave concern to the whole world. I spoke, for example, of the

fact

-6-

fact that in one or two places the Japanese seemed to be constructing winter barracks, which at least did not look like evacuation. The Ambassador said that it was true that in one place at least they had constructed wooden barracks of the cheapest kind, because the weather was already exceedingly cold and the soldiers could not sleep under tents. The Ambassador, of course, had not very much that he could say on this subject, and I told him that I was personally very unhappy about it, because we got very conflicting reports from Japanese Government sources, for example, and military sources.

He said that he wanted to ask one indiscreet question, and that was whether the League had asked this Government to associate itself with the resolution taken by the Council a few days ago and had asked us in addition to bring pressure to bear on Japan. I told him that the League had not asked us to associate ourselves with their action, and if we felt it necessary it necessary to give advice and suggestions to the Japanese Government, it would be on our own initiative, - not at the request of the League.

U WRC:GMH



Confidential

(1)

Essential Points of the Suggestion made by
Sir Eric Drummond
October 20, 1931
(approved by Japan on October 22)

Evacuation and direct negotiations to proceed together.

1. Japan to evacuate as soon as possible.
2. China to provide SECURITY.
3. Direct negotiations for the above purposes.
4. The meeting of the Council to adjourn for three weeks (November 16).

.....

Essential Points of the Resolution approved by
the Members of the Council other than Japan.
October 24, 1931.

Evacuation before direct negotiations.

1. Japan to evacuate as soon as possible, not later than the date of the next meeting of the Council (November 16).
2. Direct negotiations, upon the completion of the evacuation, to settle all pending questions, especially the questions arising from the recent events as well as the questions relating to the railways in Manchuria.

(2)

STATEMENT OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT, ISSUED AT TOKYO,
OCTOBER 27, 1931, RELATIVE TO THE MANCHURIAN SITUATION.

1. On the 22nd of October, the Japanese representative in the Council of the League of Nations proposed certain amendments to the resolution then before the Council with regard to questions of (1) withdrawal of Japanese troops to the railway zone and (2) direct negotiations between China and Japan. However, these suggested amendments as well as the resolution itself fell through, having failed to obtain unanimous approval of the Council.

2. As has been repeatedly emphasized by the Japanese Government, the whole Manchurian affair was occasioned solely by a violent and provocative attack launched by the Chinese army on the railway zone. Certain small contingents of Japanese soldiers still remaining at a few points outside that zone are insistently demanded by the danger to which a large population of Japanese in that region are exposed in life and property. The presence of such a limited number of troops is quite incapable of being represented as a means of dictating to China Japan's terms for the settlement of the present difficulties.

Nothing is farther from the thoughts of Japan than to bring armed pressure to bear upon China in the course of these negotiations.

3. The Japanese Government have on various occasions given expression to their firm determination to suffer no abridgement or diminution of the rights and interests of Japan which are vital to her national existence and which are woven into the complex fabric of her political and economic relations with China. Unfortunately, the so-called "recovery of rights" movements in China have recently attained extravagant developments, while feelings antagonistic to Japan have been openly encouraged in text books used at various schools in China and have become deeply seated in the Chinese mind. In defiance of treaties and regardless of all history, vigorous agitation has been carried on in China with the object of undermining rights and interests of Japan, even the most vital. As things stand at present, the complete withdrawal of Japanese troops to the South Manchuria Railway zone under the mere assurance of the Chinese Government would create an intolerable situation exposing Japanese subjects to the gravest dangers. The risk of such dangers is clearly evidenced by past experience and by conditions

which actually obtain in China.

4. The Japanese Government are persuaded that in the present situation the safety of Japanese subjects in Manchuria can hardly be ensured without provision being made to remove national antipathies and suspicions existing in the mutual relations of the two Powers. With this end in view they have already expressed in the note of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of October 9th to the Chinese Minister at Tokyo their readiness to enter into negotiations with the Chinese Government on certain basic principles that should regulate normal interrelationship between the two countries. That note was communicated at the same time to the Council of the League. Convinced that this method of procedure is alone calculated to open out a way to save the situation, the Japanese Government have consistently held to their proposals in that sense throughout the recent discussions at the Council of the League. The basic principles which they have had in mind relate to:

- (1) mutual repudiation of aggressive policy and conduct,
- (2) respect for China's territorial integrity,
- (3) complete suppression of all organized

movements interfering with freedom of
trade and stirring up international
hatred,

- (4) effective protection throughout Manchuria
of all peaceful pursuits undertaken by
Japanese subjects.
- (5) respect for treaty rights of Japan in
Manchuria.

The Japanese Government believe that all these
points being in entire accord with the aims and aspira-
tions of the League of Nations and embodying the natural
basis upon which peace in the Far East must depend, will
commend themselves to the approval of public opinion of
the world. The refusal by the Japanese representative
to lay these points on the table of the Council was due
to the consideration that they should in their nature
properly form the subject of negotiations between the
parties directly involved.

5. With the future welfare of both nations in
mind the Japanese Government feel that the urgent need
at the present moment is to arrive at a solution of
the problem by cooperation of the two countries and
thus seek a path of common happiness and prosperity.
Their willingness remains unaltered and unabated to

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

open negotiations with the Chinese Government on the subject of the basic principles above formulated relating to normal relations between Japan and China and on the subject of the withdrawal of Japanese troops to the South Manchuria Railway zone.

3

Agreement relating to the Chientao region concluded
between Japan and China,
September 4, 1909.

(MacMurray - Page 797)

* * *

ART. 6. - The Government of China shall undertake to extend the Kirin-Changchun Railway to the southern boundary of Yenchi, and to connect it at Hoiryong (Huining) with a Korean railway, and such extension shall be effected upon the same terms as the Kirin-Changchun Railway. The date of commencing the work of the proposed extension shall be determined by the Government of China, considering the actual requirements of the situation, and upon consultation with the Government of Japan.

* * *

(4)

Statement made by Mr. Charles E. Hughes at the meeting
of the Committee on Pacific and Far Eastern Questions
of the Washington Conference,
February 3, 1922.

* * *

It is further to be pointed out that by Articles II, III, and IV of the treaty of May 25, 1915, with respect to South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, the Chinese Government granted to Japanese subjects the right to lease land for building purposes, for trade and manufacture, and for agricultural purposes in South Manchuria, to reside and travel in South Manchuria, and to engage in any kind of business and manufacture there, and to enter into joint undertakings with Chinese citizens in agriculture and similar industries in Eastern Inner Mongolia.

With respect to this grant, the Government of the United States will, of course, regard it as not intended to be exclusive, and, as in the past, will claim from the Chinese Government for American citizens the benefits accruing to them by virtue of the most-favored-nation clauses in the Treaties between the United States and China.

I may pause here to remark that the question of the validity of the treaties as between Japan and China is distinct from the question of the treaty rights of

the United States under its treaties with China;
these rights have been emphasized and consistently
asserted by the United States.

* * *

5

PROTOCOL ATTACHED TO SINO-JAPANESE TREATY
RELATING TO MANCHURIA,
DECEMBER 22, 1905

* * *

"3. The Chinese Government engage, for
the purpose of protecting the interest of the
South Manchurian Railway, not to construct, prior

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

It is noted that
this exhibit
does not quote
Article 14.

Sketch

of the said railway, any
vicinity of and parallel to
any line which might be
in the interest of the above-

* * *
These Plenipotentiaries de-
clare that after the withdrawal of the
Japanese troops from Manchuria, China
in virtue of her sovereign
rights will take effective measures to guarantee
peace and endeavor, by the same
means, to remove evil as well as
to order, so that the residents
Chinese and foreigners, may equal-
ize their life and occupation under

5

PROTOCOL ATTACHED TO SINO-JAPANESE TREATY
RELATING TO MANCHURIA,
DECEMBER 22, 1905

* * *

"3. The Chinese Government engage, for the purpose of protecting the interest of the South Manchurian Railway, not to construct, prior to the recovery by them of the said railway, any main line in the neighborhood of and parallel to that railway, or any branch line which might be prejudicial to the interest of the above-mentioned railway.

* * *

"10. The Chinese Plenipotentiaries declare that immediately after the withdrawal of the Japanese and Russian troops from Manchuria, China will proceed to take, in virtue of her sovereign right, full administrative measures to guarantee peace in that region and endeavor, by the same right, to promote good and remove evil as well as steadily to restore order, so that the residents of that region, natives and foreigners, may equally enjoy the security of life and occupation under

the perfect protection of the Chinese Government.
As to the means of restoring order, the Chinese
Government are to take by themselves all adequate
measures.

* * *

(6)

COPY OF THE NOTE ADDRESSED TO THE JAPANESE BANKING GROUP BY MR. T. W. LAMONT, REPRESENTATIVE OF THE AMERICAN BANKING GROUP RELATING TO CERTAIN RAILWAYS IN MANCHURIA.

Tokyo, Japan,

May 11th, 1920.

Dear Sirs:

We beg to acknowledge with thanks, the receipt of your communication of May 11th, informing us, in behalf of the Japanese Banking Group that, under the instructions of your Government, you have now withdrawn your letter dated June 18th last and have adopted, in association with the Banking Groups of America, Great Britain and France and on like terms with them, the agreement for the establishment of a new Consortium in respect to China.

We are happy to note that certain points that had hitherto been somewhat obscure to your Groups and to your Government have now been made plain, and we trust with you that the way is clear for the Consortium to undertake operations.

Inasmuch as some questions have arisen during our discussions as to the status of specific railway enterprises contemplated or actually begun in Manchuria and Mongolia, we hereby confirm that we have agreed with you as follows:

- (1) that the South Manchuria Railway and its present branches, together with the mines which are subsidiary to the railway, do not come within the scope of the Consortium;
- (2) that the projected Taonanfu-Jehol Railway and the projected railway connecting a point on the Taonanfu-Jehol Railway with a sea-port are to be included within the terms of the Consortium agreement.
- (3) that the Kirin-Huining, the Chengchiatun-Taonanfu, the Changchun-Taonanfu, the Kaiyuan-Kirin (via Hailung), the Kirin-Changchun, the Sinminfu-Mukden and the Ssuningkai-Chengchiatun Railways are outside the scope of the joint activities of the Consortium.

The foregoing letter of acknowledgment, although written in behalf of the American Banking Group, has, we are assured, the cordial approval of the British and French Banking Groups, also of the Governments of the United States, of Great Britain and of France.

Pray be good enough to present our regards to your colleagues in the Japanese Banking Group and our best wishes for the success of the joint Four-Power undertaking.

Very truly yours,
(Signed) T. W. Lamont.

RAILWAY MAP OF CHINA

UNITED STATES DEPT. OF COMMERCE
BUREAU OF FOREIGN & DOMESTIC COMMERCE


PEKING, OCT. 1918 PAUL P. WHITHAM
CONSULTING ENGINEER
TRADE COMMISSIONER

UNITED STATES DEPT OF COMMERCE
BUREAU OF FOREIGN & DOMESTIC COMMERCE
RAILWAY MAP OF CHINA
PEKING, OCT. 1918 PAUL P. WHITHAM
CONSULTING ENGINEER
TRADE COMMISSIONER
125°
L.L. PHOTER CO., N.Y.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REF



FROM

GREEN

Tokio

Dated November 7, 1931

Rec'd 1:52 a. m.



Secretary of State,
Washington.

210, November 7, noon.

Reference my telegram No. 209, November 6, 3 p. m.

In order that we may have more definite understanding of Japanese demands under Article Five I have directed Salisbury to assemble all treaties referred to and unless I hear to the contrary will endeavor to ascertain upon which ones the Japanese Government lays especial emphasis and which ones they feel are likely to be objected to by the Chinese. Will send the Department and Johnson at Peiping complete file of results.

FORBES

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F/DEW 793.94/2516

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

1-128
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Department of State

Collect
Charge Department
OR

Charge to
\$

Washington,

November 7, 1931.

793-af
AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO, (JAPAN).
2516

221 Your 210, November 7, noon.

Approve of 'your' undertaking to 'assemble treaties'
referred to 'but' prefer 'you do not' discuss 'them' with
Japanese Government at the present juncture. Inasmuch
as 'we understand that' this matter is under 'discussion'
with the League we do not desire 'that' anything be done which
might have the result 'or' be given the interpretation 'that'
we were working at cross purposes with the League.

793-af
793.94/2516

Stimson

SA ATK:MA

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-128

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

OIPHER

TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Department of State

Collect

Charge Department

OR

Charge to
\$

Washington,

November 8, 1931,
9 pm.

Amembassy,

Tokyo.

222.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY.

Referring to my 221, November 7, 7 pm., my
objection is based solely upon desire not to cross
wires with Briand's negotiation. I should welcome
information as to what treaties the Japanese chief-
ly have in mind provided you can get it without
any appearance of negotiating on our part or
giving any impression that we are in the least
degree retreating from the position taken in our
memorandum.

STIMSON

S

Initialed for:

W.T.B.

W.T.B.

T.A.

T.A.

T.A.-L.

C.-A.

D.C.

[Nothing but address and text of message to be written within the marginal lines. All stamps and numbers to be placed in space below.]

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 191

Index Bu.—No. 50.

1-513

793.94/2516

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY

NOV 8 - 1931

9 pm

Amembassy

222 Tokyo

Confidential for Ambassador from Secretary

Referring to my 221 November 7 - 7 P.M.

My objection is based solely upon desire not to cross wires with Briand's negotiation. I should welcome information as to what tactics the Japanese chiefly have in mind provided you can get it without any appearance of negotiating on our part or giving any impression that we are in the least degree retreating from the position taken in our memorandum

(S)

Stimson

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Division of
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NOV 11 1931
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REP

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RECEIVED
NOV - 7 1931
DIVISION OF

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 7, 1931

Rec'd 4:10 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

882, November 7. 9 a. m.

Following three telegrams from American Consul General
at Harbin:

"One. Reliably reported from Russian sources that
local Soviet authorities are taking advantage of difficult
situation in which Chinese officials find themselves and
are demanding removal from Chinese Government services of
"whites" according to a list presented by Soviet Consul,
that Chinese police searches of premises of certain "white"
individuals and that Soviet argument in this connection is
said to be these "whites" are pro-Japanese".

Two. "Local Chinese authorities and Japanese Consul
General now state that up until last night Tsitsihar troops
were still holding their positions near Noni River".

Three.

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REP

2- #882, from Peiping, Nov. 7, 9 a.m.

Three. "One. This Consulate General received today from the local Commissioner for Foreign Affairs a copy of a memorandum from Chairman Ma Chan Shan stating that rumors to the effect that Heilungkiang Government had engaged foreign military officers and had been supplied with foreign munitions of war were groundless.

Two. Chinese Eastern Railway manager Karao has informed me that General Ting Chao, Commander of the Chinese Eastern Railway guard troops, said that he would despatch this evening from Harbin a train of four armored cars loaded with several hundred of his troops to a place between ^{for} ~~(2)~~chingshan and Tsitsihar station on the west line of the Chinese Eastern Railway and from Sanchaoho on the southern line to some unknown destination.

Three. In Harbin there has been shown today a great lack of confidence in bank notes of Heilung-Kiang Provincial Bank".

Repeated to Shanghai.

For the Minister

ENGERT

JHR

WSE

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GRAM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 7, 1931

Rec'd 4:10 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

883, November 7, 10 a. m.

Legation's November 6, noon.

FROM MUKDEN.

"Engagement larger than at first reported. Japanese number their dead 41, wounded 100. Apparently Kirin reenforcements have arrived and are now engaged.

Referring to my despatch of October 14th, Ling Yeh Ching reported captured by bandits at his headquarters November 3rd".

Repeated to Shanghai.

JHR WSB

For the Minister
ENGERT

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

F/DEW

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FILED

NOV 10 1931

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 462.00 R 296 A/9 FOR MEMO.

FROM Secretary's Office (Stimson) DATED Nov 5, 1931.
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING:

Conversation with the German Ambassador relative to the Manchurian situation. He was informed that we were doing the our best through diplomatic channels to support the general objective which was being followed by the League. He was warned against believing the rumors that there had been any change or weakening in our policy.

b

793.94/2519

793.94

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Luitjens NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS



October 31, 1931.

NEW YORK TIMES:

Moscow despatch October 30 (Walter Duranty), states that foreign diplomats regard the relations between Russia and Japan in regard to the situation in Manchuria as "grave" but continues as follows:

"Generally speaking they do not believe the Soviet Government is planning to intervene in the Manchurian affair, as charged by the Japanese Ambassador, and they are aware that the headquarters of the Far Eastern Red army on the seaboard side of Manchuria at Khabarovsk is preparing for self defense against a possible attack by White Russian generals, with or without the support of Japanese, rather than for aggressive action in Manchuria itself.

"Soviet Russia has not forgotten that the Japanese several years ago evacuated Manchuria reluctantly under the pressure of Washington and other powers, and in no case do the diplomats here believe, as the writer has repeatedly stated, that the Soviet Government will seek intervention in Manchuria or do anything that might lead to war."

Tokyo despatch, October 30 (Hugh Byas), states as follows:

"The reply of L. M. Karakhan, Acting Soviet Foreign Commissar, to Foreign Minister Shidehara's note to Russia Tuesday still leaves some mystery as to the frontier situation in Manchuria despite the vigor of M. Karakhan's language.

He

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FILED

NOV 1931

- 2 -

"He passes over Ambassador Hirota's remark that if Russia sent troops to the Chinese Eastern Railway Japan would send forces to the Taonan-Tsitsihar Railroad, and he evades the question of whether the extension of Japanese military control toward Tsitsihar would call forth a Russian advance along the Chinese Eastern."

"The conversations at Harbin are taken as showing that Russia will not object to the appearance of a handful of soldiers near the Chinese Eastern for a limited, temporary purpose, but M. Karakhan's silences may have another meaning."

Officials blame the League action for strengthening the position of Chiang Kai-shek, who is held hostile to Japan. The Japanese press accuses Britain of backing the Chinese, thus encouraging anti-Japanese agitation in China, which is forcing Japanese residents to leave Nanking.

A group of 100 peers has adopted a resolution to the effect that no outside intervention should be tolerated in Manchuria, that the League's attitude is unjust and that the Japanese forces in Manchuria "should be maintained and increased if necessary".

Tokyo despatch, October 30 (AP), states that the outlook for an early solution of the situation in Manchuria is not hopeful and officials frankly admit that evacuation of the occupied zones by November 16 is "most improbable".

It

- 3 -

It is reported that troops remaining loyal to Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang in South Manchuria have been attacked and driven back toward the Great Wall by "independent" Chinese troops.

Shanghai despatch, October 30 (Hallett Abend), reports as follows:

"The movement to restore the Manchu dynasty seemingly is gaining strength under the leadership of Prince Kung. He and his followers are planning soon to announce the platform of a new government, the formal installation of which is scheduled for Nov. 16, the date set by the League of Nations for withdrawal of Japanese troops from Manchuria.

"While Soviet Russia officially denies Japanese charges that Soviet troops are concentrating on the Eastern and Western Manchurian borders, Japanese official sources today stoutly reiterate their allegations of Russian army concentrations, citing in particular a movement of 6,000 Soviet troops to a point near Pograditchaya.

"Japanese reports also insist that Soviet Russians are aiding Chinese Heilungkiang troops at Tsitsihar, while the Chinese charge White Russians bearing Japanese rifles are reinforcing Manchurian independence armies."

A night attack by several hundred Chinese soldiers on the walled city of Mukden was repulsed by the Japanese.

Geneva despatch, October 30, states that the League is disturbed by news from China and by the failure of the United States to indicate support of the Council's resolution calling for Japanese evacuation of Manchuria by November 16. "Observers here see in this situation

- 4 -

ill omens, not only for a settlement of the Sino-Japanese conflict, but for the achievement of any real results at the disarmament conference."

NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE:

Tokyo despatch, October 30 (AP), stated that reorganization of the Nanking Nationalist Government was delaying efforts at direct negotiations between the republic and Japan.

Mukden article, October 1 (Victor Keen), is the last of a series of four by this writer on the situation in Manchuria.

WASHINGTON POST:


Washington report, October 31 (AP) quotes Senator Hiram Johnson as calling upon the nation to repudiate at "the ballot box" the present policy of the United States toward the League of Nations and denouncing Japanese actions in Manchuria.

CBJ

FE: CEC:EJL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 5, 1931.

Digest of
Newspaper Items.

THE WASHINGTON POST:

Tokyo despatch (AP) dated November 5 states that according to a Rengo despatch from Changchun of same date the Japanese forces guarding the engineers repairing the Nonni River bridge south of Tsitsihar on the Taonan-Anganchi Railway had clashed with troops of the Chinese Amur army under Ma Chien-shan.

Tokyo despatch (UP) dated November 5 advises of excitement in Japan caused by the battle at the Nonni River bridge. The despatch states that it was believed that the clash might cause Japanese forces to move into Hailungkiang Province and also to occupy Tsitsihar with resultant complications with the Soviets.

Geneva despatch (UP) dated November 4 states that M. Briand presented a second note to Japan calling upon her to withdraw her troops from Manchuria and requesting the immediate appointment of a board made up of Chinese and Japanese officers to complete the evacuation. The note, which was delivered simultaneously to Mr. Yoshizawa, the Japanese delegate, and to all other members of the Council, pointed out that China had accepted in principle four of the five Japanese demands through her adherence to the

Council's

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NOV 7 1931

- 2 -

Council's resolution of September 30 and the fifth was covered by China's offer to settle the question under Article XIII of the Covenant of the League.

Tokyo despatch (AP) dated November 4 advises that Japan will probably send a note to Geneva "tomorrow" replying to M. Briand's views regarding Foreign Minister Shidehara's "five fundamental principles" for a basis of negotiation between Japan and China. The despatch states that the Japanese note as a first point will call for Chinese recognition of the treaty of May 25, 1915.

Editorial considers that whatever the purpose behind Japanese occupation of Manchuria, whether legitimate or imperialistic, the extension has reached the danger point. Japanese influence is working "feverishly" to set up a separate government which would throw off allegiance to the National Government and would naturally come under Japanese domination.

The United States can not possibly be a disinterested spectator should the situation reveal any infraction of the Nine-Power Treaty providing for the territorial integrity of China. It will be the duty of the United States to protest against any violation of that treaty.

The editorial goes on to say that the extension of Japanese military activities in the face of their formal assurances that they were not intent upon permanent occupation of Manchuria, were not demanding special rights with
respect

- 3 -

respect to economic or commercial development and would withdraw to the treaty zone as soon as the safety of Japanese life and property were assured, throws the burden of responsibility upon Japan for what may occur.

Mr. Harold J. T. Horan in an article on November 5 reports that Secretary Stimson remained at his office studying the situation created by the reported presence of Japanese troops near the Soviet "sphere of influence" there. Mr. Horan states that the Japanese Ambassador, Mr. Debuchi, called at the State Department yesterday to explain the purpose and duration of the Japanese occupation of territory near Tsitsihar. His article goes on to say that the State Department is perturbed over the situation. Ambassador Debuchi is said to have stated that Japanese troops were not occupying Tsitsihar proper. This statement was later confirmed by telegrams from Mr. George Hanson, American Consul General, now in that vicinity.

According to Mr. Horan's article, the purpose of the Japanese movement towards Tsitsihar is the maintenance of the exports of soya beans from North Manchuria to Japan and the rest of China. He states that Tokyo still insists on complete pledges of security for Japanese in Manchuria before troops can be withdrawn.

NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE:

Washington despatch dated November 4 from Herald
Tribune

- 4 -

Tribune Bureau states Japanese explanation of Manchurian situation to State Department minimizes danger of Japanese trouble with Russia.

NEW YORK TIMES:

Geneva despatch dated November 4 indicates that a second extraordinary session of the League of Nations Council to deal with the Manchurian problem is expected at League headquarters. The Secretariat officials consider the situation serious due to Japanese advance on Tsitsihar.

The despatch lists four important documents published at Geneva on November 4 as follows:

(1) A note sent by M. Briand to Mr. Yoshizawa, the Japanese delegate, on October 30, in which the Council again requests Japan to withdraw her troops from the occupied territory;

(2 and 3) Two communications sent to the League by Dr. Alfred Sze, the Chinese delegate, complaining of the further encroachments of the Japanese on Chinese territory and sovereignty;

(4) A note from the Japanese delegate notifying the League that Japan can not recognize validity of the resolution adopted by the Council on October 26 by a vote of 13 to 1, because Japan voted against it and no action could be taken without a unanimous vote.


Tokyo

- 5 -

Tokyo despatch dated November 4 advises that the War Office move whereby troops were sent to the Nonni River bridge caused a prolonged debate with the Foreign Office. Agreement was only reached after it was understood that troops would not go beyond Nonni.

The Washington correspondent of the ASAHI is informing that paper that the United States Government is viewing the Manchurian situation with great apprehension.

Changchun despatch from Mr. Hallett Abend states that according to Japanese general commanding at Changchun fully 10,000 Koreans have been massacred by Chinese in Kirin Province in past six weeks.



FE:AGL:EJL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 462.00 R 296 A/12 FOR Memo.

State Department
FROM Secretary's Office (Stimson) DATED Nov 5, 1931.
TO NAME 1-1157 ...

REGARDING:

Conversation between the Belgian Ambassador and the Secretary in which he was informed that there was no change in our policy in Manchuria; that we were endeavoring to support the League in the preservation of peace.

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793.94/2522

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- 5 -

influence to the region of Barga.

HARBIN TIMES, October 9, 1931.

ADVANCE OF GENERAL CHANG HAI-PENG

It has now been ascertained that General Chang Hai-peng, having gathered under his command considerable forces, is rapidly spreading the sphere of his influence to the west in the direction of Inner Mongolia and to the north where his object is to subject the whole of Tsitsihar Province to his power. In this connection he had made a written offer to the Tsitsihar authorities calling them to submission. Following a meeting, the Tsitsihar officials tried to enter into negotiations with the Taonan Commander-in-Chief, but the latter undertook active steps and ordered his troops to advance to Tsitsihar. Officially General Chang Hai-peng has been offering conjoint work with the Tsitsihar authorities, but the latter strongly believe that his true intention is to subject the whole province. Apprehension in the city is strengthened by rumors that serious differences exist among local officials which may result in sudden interior clashes.

General anxiety is urging the population to leave the city. While at the beginning of the Manchuria conflict Japanese residents were leaving the city for fear of disorders which might be caused by the approach of Japanese troops, they are now fearing possible internal clashes.

HARBIN TIMES, October 11, 1931.

CHANG HSUEH-LIANG, CHANG TSO-HSIANG AND
WAN FU-LIN WILL NOT RETURN.

Japanese military circles have decided once and for all to sever all connections with Chang Hsueh-liang.

It is learned that the Staff Headquarters of the Japanese Army had themselves offered Chang Hsueh-liang to have all of his personal property taken away from Mukden.

The Japanese officers, counsellors to Chang Hsueh-liang, have been ordered to return and quit their work with Chang.

It is contended in Japanese military circles that inasmuch as the whole of the population of Manchuria objects to the return of Chang Hsueh-liang, Chang Tso-hsiang and Wan Fu-lin and because of the fact that these persons, instead of liquidating the controversy, have been making preparations for a new campaign in Chinchow, their fate may be considered as finally determined. None of them will ever return to Manchuria.

It is authentically reported that changes will take place in a few days in the regional committees of Mukden and Kirin.

- Chinese -

793.94/2522

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793 94
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NOV 7 - 1931
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
(NOT FOR THE PRESS)
FOR DEPARTMENTAL USE ONLY
Department of State
Division of Current Information

MEMORANDUM OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE, MONDAY, NOVEMBER 2, 1931

SINO-JAPANESE DISPUTE

Queried at the press conference this morning concerning newspaper reports to the effect that the American Consul General at Harbin, Mr. George C. Hanson, was making a special tour of investigation in Northern Manchuria, Undersecretary Castle said that if Consul General Hanson is making a tour in Northern Manchuria it is not as a result of instructions from the Department of State. It may well be that Mr. Hanson has gone to various places in his consular district, especially if he thought he could obtain information that would be of interest to the Department. Any consular officer who has, for example, a protection case in his district may go to the scene of the trouble without informing the Department of State.

Asked if the Council of the League of Nations had asked Japan to withdraw her troops into the Railway Zone by November 16, the Undersecretary said he did not know whether the League had sent a note to that effect to Japan. According to newspaper reports there was a League Resolution to that effect. Asked if there was any likelihood that Japan would withdraw her troops by November 16, Mr. Castle said he could not comment on that because he did not know the exact situation in Manchuria. A correspondent asked if we had joined in the League's demand concerning the withdrawal of Japanese troops. The Undersecretary replied in the negative and added that the League's Resolution had nothing to do with the Kellogg Pact. A correspondent then asked if there is any chance that we will join with the League in that demand. In reply, Mr. Castle said that question was one for Secretary Stimson to answer.

Observing that the Secretary of State indicated last week that he was looking into the Russian aspects of the Manchurian

F/DEW 793.94/2523

1931. 6. NOV. FILED

-2-

situation quite carefully, a correspondent said that Consul General Hanson's visit to Northern Manchuria would provide the Department with some information concerning the situation in that district. He then asked if there were any other means by which we might obtain accurate information regarding the Russian phase of the problem. He was informed in reply that we have no other means of obtaining data except through a careful study of press reports. Asked then if we had any agents in Northern Manchuria other than those at the Harbin Consulate, the Undersecretary replied in the negative.

A correspondent said there appeared to be some confusion regarding the Northern Manchurian situation, according to press reports which arrived early today and which indicate that there is danger that the Russians and Chinese may line up together while previous reports were that Japan and Russia might reach an understanding along that line. In reply, Mr. Castle said he did not think he had ever seen any more confusing stories or comments than those which are coming in on that subject. The reports are often diametrically opposite. Asked if the Department had any knowledge of the movement of any Japanese troops, the Undersecretary replied in the negative. A correspondent then asked if the Japanese Embassy in Washington had any assurances about the Russo-Japanese situation. Mr. Castle replied in the negative and added that from the beginning Ambassador Debuchi had not been upset about the situation.

Asked when the notes to China and Japan under the Kellogg Pact would be made public, the Undersecretary said he had learned that the French note apparently had been given out in Japan and that he would speak to Secretary Stimson about the matter upon his return from New York.

A correspondent asked if Consul General Hanson was still acting as special observer in Manchuria. He was informed in

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

reply that Mr. Hanson had completed his work as special observer and returned to his post at Harbin.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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FROM
GRAY

RECEIVED
NOV - 7 1931
DIVISION OF

PEIPING via N. R.

Dated November 7

Rec'd. 10:45 a.m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 7 1931

Secretary of State,
Washington.

885, November 7, 6 p.m.

Following from Mukden, November 7, 11 a.m.

Engagement on Noni concluded by Japanese occupation
of Chinese positions and withdrawal of Chinese to the north,
Japanese reported to be strengthening position, forces
consisting of two thousand.

Tenney leaving for Harbin tonight".

Repeated to Shanghai.

For the Minister

ENGERT

HPD

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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TO NOISIA
FROM L - A
TELEGRAM

GRAY
FROM
PARIS

Dated November 7
Rec'd. 11 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



718, November 7, 1 p.m.

It is announced in the press that Briand has informed the Secretariat General of the League of Nations that he would prefer the next meeting of the Council on November 16 to discuss questions relating to the Manchurian situation to be held in Paris. It is understood that the reason for Briand's request is the opening of the French Parliament on November 12 and the consequent inability of Briand to be absent from Paris during the meeting of the League Council. The press generally assumes that the League will not interpose any objection to Briand's request.

On the whole the French press maintains an attitude of sympathy with the Japanese position as opposed to the Chinese but the Socialist and Communist organs attack Japan strongly and the radical Socialists refrain from expressing any opinions.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milt O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 7, 1931

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Rec'd 6:10 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

PRIORITY.

884, November 7, 3 p. m.

Following from American Consul General at Harbin:

"November 6, 1 p. m. CONFIDENTIAL.

One. Chao Chung Jen, who is Secretary of State Heilung-
kiang provincial Government, who was formerly ~~the~~ Tao Yin
at Hailar and whom I have known for many years) arrived
from Tsitsihar yesterday, called on local Japanese Consul
General last night to arrange if possible a peaceful settle-
ment of the conflict between Tsitsihar and Japanese troops
and called on me this morning for a suggestion in regard to
how to end this conflict.

Two. The following is Chao's version of their clash:

"The first line defense of the Heilungkiang troops is
along the fairly high bluff over five miles from the ~~main~~ bridge.



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2- #884, from Peiping, Nov. 7, 3 p.m.

bridge across the Nini River and to the east of the
Taoang Railway Station at Tahsing. Here about 2000 Chinese
soldiers with artillery had dug themselves in. (I myself
observed this position and these soldiers on November 1st
G. C. H.).

(END PART ONE).

For the Minister

ENGERT

~~(#) APPENDIX - CONFIDENTIAL~~

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REP

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 7, 1931

Rec'd 10:30 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

PRIORITY.

884, November 7, 3 p. m. (PART TWO AND THREE).

Moro Tah Sing is a wooden bridge, which had been slightly damaged by Heilungkiang soldiers. Further south is another wooden trestle bridge which was intact, and still farther south another which had been entirely burned by Heilungkiang troops. About a mile from this bridge is the large bridge across the Noni, one or two spans of which had been destroyed by the Heilungkiang troops. Just beyond the burned bridge was a train of one cold locomotive and two cars which were occupied by an advance guard of about 20 Heilungkiang soldiers (I saw these bridges, train and advance guard November first. G. C. H.). On November 3rd Japanese troops approached at the southern end of the main bridge. Next morning some of them crossed the river. Chinese advance guard

REP

2- #884, from Peiping, Nov. 7, 3 p.m.

guard fell back toward the front line position but three were disarmed and made prisoners by the Japanese, who claimed that the Heilungkiang troops should have moved back north 10 kilometres from the first bridge to the above, while the Chinese claim 10 kilometre limit was north from the main bridge. Several hundred Japanese soldiers advanced toward the Heilungkiang troops and ordered the latter to retire. Upon meeting a refusal

because the Heilungkiang troops were not anxious to leave their trenches to retire across open country ^{possibility} ~~post~~ office under Japanese fire, the Japanese troops attacked them with rifle and artillery fire, bombs from airplanes and the Heilungkiang troops replied. Fighting continued during all day of the 4th and 5th, stopping this morning,

Heilungkiang army has a limited supply ^{of} /ammunition and do not expect any help from Soviet Russia. Therefore, it could not expect to hold out against the Japanese army which can be endlessly supplied through Taonan. Local Japanese Consul General stated that the only solution of the problem was for General Ma who was being held responsible for

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

3- #884, from Peiping, Nov. 7, 3 p.m.

sible for the killing of Japanese troops in the last two days battle to resign, otherwise the Japanese would not cease fighting. A report of this was made to Tsitsihar last evening and another visit would be made to the Japanese Consul General this morning".

(END PARTS TWO AND THREE).

ENGERT

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

REP

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 7, 1931

Rec'd 10:40 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

PRIORITY.

884, November 7, 3 p. m. (PART FOUR).

I am inclined to believe the above is a fairly correct
report of the incident.

Alarming rumors are current to the effect that the
Chinese troops from other parts of North Manchuria including
Harbin are concentrating near Tsitsihar and that they
expect Soviet Russian support such as munitions and a
Soviet guard for the Chinese Eastern Railway.

Ohashi, the local Japanese Consul General, attempted
yesterday at lunch to impress on me and Hallet Abend
~~correspondent of the (H)~~, who is here and expects to
leave for Tsitsihar this afternoon, the existence of
Soviet support to General Ma, who without this support
or assurances of the same would not have resisted the

Japanese

REP

2- #884, from Peiping, Nov. 7, 3 p.m.

Japanese troops. He also tried to persuade Abend not to go to Tsitsihar but to Manchuria station at the present time, alleging that situation at former place is dangerous.

It is Japanese Consul General's personal opinion that the present clash in Manchuria is merely Japanese preparation for a greater clash with Soviet Russia later on.


There are persistent rumors that Japanese troops are being withdrawn from

(END PART FOUR).

ENGERT

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM GRAY

PEIPING

Dated November 7, 1931

Rec'd 6:11 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

PRIORITY


884 (PART FIVE)

Kirin City and Changchun and departed via Taonanfu to point to troops at the Noni river.

Chinese Eastern Railway district engineer Hsu stationed at Tsitsihar station of this railway has just reported to Kuo, Chinese assistant manager that 4,000 of General Chang Hai Peng's troops had crossed the Noni and are now engaged in fighting with the Heilungkiang forces, which have surrounded 2,000 of the enemy.

Reports from Tsitsihar City indicate that wealthy Chinese citizens are leaving that city, where there are four American missionaries (Mr. and Mrs. J. G. Vos, 52 Mercer Street, Princeton, New Jersey; Miss Reba Huston, Blanchard, Iowa; Miss Lillian L. McGracken, Beaver County, Pennsylvania), but conditions there are not dangerous. The missionaries have been requested by me to prepare to withdraw to Harbin in case

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM GRAY

PEIPING

Dated November 7, 1931

Rec'd 6:11 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

PRIORITY

884 (PART FIVE)

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MAN

2- #884, from Peiping, November 7,
1931

case the situation becomes dangerous. Reports on
Tsitsihar station indicate that Japanese and Koreans
in that region have practically all withdrawn and that
Chinese residents are fearful of being robbed by the
Chinese troops, which so far have behaved well. Tele-
phone report just received from Hailar states all quiet
there".

To Shanghai by mail.

(END PART FIVE END MESSAGE)

For the Minister

ENGERT

OX

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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NOV 9 1931
DIVISION OF
STATISTICS AND
MEM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
NOV 16 1931
FROM
DIVISION OF
WESTERN HOPEN AFFAIRS
GENEVA

SECRETARY OF STATE
NOV 12 1931
Noted

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone.

Dated November 7, 1931

Rec'd 1:30 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

287, November 7, 11 a.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Sugimura has been in Paris and London doing what he
can in conversations with the Japanese, British and
French to work out a solution respecting the Japanese
"demands" which Japan can accept.

His project is substantially as follows: that two
sets of negotiations between Nanking and Tokio be begun
simultaneously. The first set to comprise questions
relating to evacuation and the taking over of evacuated
territory. The second set to comprise questions re-
lating to the "five points". The first four points
refer to security and therefore come within the scope
of the September 30th resolution. There remains the
fifth point. The Japanese maintain that part of the
fifth point concerns security. That part can therefore
likewise be considered as being in conformity with the
September 30 resolution. A clarification of Japan's
view would be necessary respecting the other part of
the

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NOV 9 1931
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NOV 12 1931

MAM

2- #287, from Geneva, November 7,
1931

the fifth point which can not be held to refer to "security". The treatment of this part of the fifth point would not be begun until the evacuation is completed or practically completed.

Yoshizawa informed Sugimura that he would transmit this suggestion to Tokio although he did not (repeat not) say he would support it. It should be understood that Sugimura's conversations are being carried on solely on his personal authority. I understand however that both Paris and London are inclined to consider such a solution as offering a possibility of a way out of the present situation.

GILBERT

WSB

cjh

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

PEIPING via N.R.

FROM

Dated November 8, 1931

Rec'd. 6:40 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 9 1931

Department of State

888, November 8, 11 a.m.

Following from American Consul General at Harbin:

"Confidential, November 7, 11 a.m.

One. Secretary of Heilungkiang Provincial Government
Chao informed me late last night that joint attack of
Chang's troops of about 3000 regulars and 3000 brigands
and Japanese of about 1000 with two armored trains in-
creased strongly between ten and eleven a.m. yesterday
and that after severe fighting in which Japanese aeroplanes
participated Ma's troops retreated from first line of
defense through Tahsing to second line of defense, passing
Sanchienfang ten miles north of first line. He added that
the next line of defense is along the Chinese Eastern Rail-
way. However, while I was in Tsitsihar City, November 1st,
I was informed that the third line ran much closer to
that city.

Two. Other reliable Chinese reports indicate that
General Ma's troops at first successfully resisted
Chang's troops whose retreat was checked by Japanese
reinforcements

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Page 2 - #888 from Peiping .

reinforcements.

Three. There is no doubt in my opinion that the Japanese military leaders are determined to drive Ma from and set up a government favorable to them at Tsitsihar. To reach that City, the Japanese supported Chinese troops must cross the tracks of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Here they may meet with resistance on the part of the Chinese Eastern Railway guards, whose movements were reported in my telegram of November 6, 6 p.m. and whose Commander, Ting Chao, is determined to resist encroachments on the Chinese Eastern Railway at all costs. This might cause complications with the Soviet Union".

Repeated to Shanghai.

FOR THE MINISTER

ENGERT

HPD

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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RECEIVED
NOV 9 1931
DIVISION OF
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FROM

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

GENEVA

Dated November 7, 1931

Rec'd 1 p.m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 9 1931
Department of State

Secretary of State

Washington

286, November 7, 10 a.m.

The following are the essential (?) conversation between Drummond and Sze which took place on the afternoon of November 6th.

One. Sze stated that in view of Briand's expressed wish he would accept the proposal that the next Council session be held in Paris.

Two. Sze asked for information regarding Briand's action as to the seizure of the salt funds. Drummond replied that he understood that Briand was asking for information from the Japanese representative.

Three. Sze inquired regarding Briand's action respecting the Nonni bridge fighting. Drummond replied that an identic telegram would be sent almost immediately to Tokio and Nanking.

Four. Sze inquired whether Drummond had any information from neutral sources as to what was happening in Manchuria. Drummond replied that what he had was of a confidential nature and that he had been asked not

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NOV 11 1931

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MAM

2- #286, from Geneva, November 7,
1931

not to distribute it. Sze gave as his opinion that a
useful purpose would be served if information from
neutral sources could be made public.

GILBERT

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MAM

2- #286, from Geneva, November 7,
1931

not to distribute it. Sze gave as his opinion that a
useful purpose would be served if information from
neutral sources could be made public.

GILBERT

WSB

OJH



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PEIPING via N. R.

FROM

Dated Nov. 8, 1931

Rec'd. 11:42 p.m. Nov. 7.



Secretary of State,
Washington.

886, November 8, 9 a.m.

United Press report from Washington sixth published
today:

"Secretary of State Stimson today stated that policy
of United States toward Manchurian question remains un-
changed in all respects.

"United States Government will continue to act
independent in this matter through its usual diplomatic
channels. Reserve the right to complete independence
of judgment regarding each new development in this
critical situation and we shall move accordingly'."

At same time Stimson emphasized that it is desire
of his Government to cooperate in every way possible
with all other nations which have as their objective
restoration of peace in Manchuria."

For the Minister,

ENGERT

HPD

F/DEW 793.94/2530

FILED

NOV 10 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

File #
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
APR 11 1936
Department of State

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
RECEIVED
NOV 13 1931
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
NOV 14 1931
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS SECTION
MANCHURIA SITUATION

NA
SA
files
RE

STATES WHICH HAVE INVOKED THE KELLOGG PACT

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

Great Britain
France
Germany
Italy
Spain
Norway
Portugal
Yugoslavia
Irish Free State
United States.
Turkey.

Geneva's 264
October 28, 1931.

NOTE: These States are
members of the
Council. The
other members are
China, Japan,
Guatemala, Panama
and Peru.

Department's 200 to Tokyo
October 20.
Ankara's Nov. 1 - 12 m.

STATES WHICH ARE BELIEVED TO HAVE INVOKED THE KELLOGG PACT

Panama

Geneva's 264
October 28, 1931.

STATES WHICH ARE CONSIDERING INVOKING THE KELLOGG PACT

Hungary

Geneva's 269
October 30 - 12 m.

RFB/REK

793.94/251

FILED
APR 13 1936

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (3)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/2531

SEE 793.94/2524

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CJH

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PEIPING via N. R.

743-94
RECEIVED
NOV 9 1931
DIVISION OF

FROM

Dated November 8, 1931
Division of
Rec'd. 6:10 P.M. EASTERN AFFAIRS

Secretary of State,
Washington.

NOV 9 1931
Department of State
COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
Jmf

F/DEW
793.94/2532

887, November 8, 10 a.m.

Following from American Consul General at Mukden:

"November 7, 8 p.m.

Ma has withdrawn troops to new position fifteen kilometers south of Anganchi. Reported that two thousand Chinese troops are being sent from both sides of the Chinese Eastern Railway to Anganchi. Japanese are holding Tashing and repairing bridge. Japanese casualties are reported 36 dead and 142 wounded".

Repeated to Shanghai.

FOR THE MINISTER

ENCERT

HPD

NOV 12 1931

FILED

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

PLAIN

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 8, 1931

Rec'd 7:55 Nov 9 1931

DIVISION OF
ASIAN AFFAIRS

Secretary of State,
Washington.

896, November 9, 4 p. m.

Following is statement ^{issued} by Japanese headquarters,
Tientsin, received from Japanese Legation here:

"One. At ten p. m. on November 8th a disturbance
broke out in the native City which is in a state of con-
fusion.

Two. Japanese troops have been stationed to guard
the border of the concession for the purpose of ^{securely}
protecting the area.

Three. The Japanese army in Tientsin is assuming a
strictly neutral attitude without interfering with the
military riot which is an internal quarrel in China. When
the life, property, honor, rights and/or interests of the
Japanese authorities, peoples and/or the army are en-
croached upon however the right of self defense shall be
carried into effect irrespective of party concerned.

In view

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

F/DEW 793.94/2533

FILED
NOV 12 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2- #896, from Peiping, Nov. 9, 4 p.m.

In view of the casualties sustained by the Japanese
the headquarters of the Japanese garrison at Tientsin
requested Wang Hsu Chang to withdraw the Chinese troops
three hundred meters clear off the border of the concession
(November?)
and was agreed to carry it out by seven a. m. October the
ninth."

For the Minister

ENCERT

1907

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED

CONFIDENTIAL CODE

NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE

Collect
 Charge Department

Department of State

Charge to
 \$

Washington,

November 9, 1931.

AMLEGATION

PEIPING (China).

Your 892, November 9, 10 a.m., 893, November 9,
 3 p.m., 896, November 9, 4 p.m., and Tientsin's
 telegram to Legation, November 9, 3 p.m.

One. Please request Lockhart to collaborate with
 Colonel Taylor and report by telegraph their conclusions
 with regard to cause of fighting; who started it;
 whether American lives and property are endangered; and
 whether, in their opinion, there is any necessity for
 the establishment of the three hundred metre zone
 outside of the Japanese concession.

Two. Inform Lockhart that if Consular Body at
 Tientsin deems it advisable to make a united, impartial
 investigation, he is authorized to participate, but
 that he should not take the initiative toward organizing
 such an investigation.

Three. Instruct Lockhart to report promptly direct
 to Department, as well as to Legation, on all matters
 connected with the above.

Enciphered by FE:MMH/VDM FE

Sent by operator M.

Index Bu.—No. 80.

Stinson

Nov 9 1931

793.94/2533

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CJH

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be GENEVA
carefully paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone,

Dated November 7, 1931

FROM

Rec'd. 4:41 p.m.

NOV 9 - 1931

Secretary of State,

Washington.

285, November 7, '9 a.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY


One. Yesterday afternoon as soon as it was

decoded I conveyed to Drummond the message embodied
in your 126, November 5, 3 p.m. Sir Eric expressed
most strongly his opinion that the contents of our
memorandum to Tokyo and the terms in which it was
couched fitted most satisfactorily into the picture
of the current negotiations as he saw them and that
our demarche should prove to be an invaluable support

Two. Drummond will conform strictly to your
stipulations respecting his imparting knowledge of
our action. For the present, for his own reasons,
he will not inform all of the members of the Council
but only the members of the Committee of Five. To
the others he will merely make reference as occasion
arises to American press reports in the premises and
say that they appear to be well founded and that he
himself is giving them full credence.

Three. He then discussed something directly

associated



F/NEW
793.94/2534

NOV 12 1931

NOV 12 1931
RECEIVED

CJH, Page 2 - #285 from Geneva.

associated with the foregoing which has a bearing on your 122, October 30, and made some observations to be conveyed to you with the feeling that you would fully understand the spirit in which he was making them. He is naturally in close touch with Paris by telephone. He spoke to me of a situation in Paris which I also sensed in my contact with delegations here while the Council was last in session. There are pro-Japanese elements in France as well as in the French press; these are in part related to the sales to Japan by French munition manufacturers. This is also somewhat reflected in the French Foreign Office. Briand is far ahead of the French Foreign Office respecting the manner in which the Sino-Japanese question is being conducted by France and by the League. Massigli is wholly in support of Briand's policy. Leger supports Briand personally (inclined?) but is included to favor Japan as an element of French foreign policy. Berthelot, as I have reported before, is more or less openly pro-Japanese. Very much depends therefore on Briand being supported in his leadership. In a talk by telephone with Massigli, Drummond learned that communications from Washington to Paris through Claudel were very ^{un}satisfactory. Massigli informed Drummond that Briand was not at all clear regarding the American memorandum to Tokyo under discussion and was quite confused from what he has learned from Claudel respecting the entire American position.

CJH Page 3 - #285 from Geneva.

position. As a common understanding seems to me desirable at this time among the limited number who are directly concerned I venture to suggest in these circumstances that a procedure might be followed (similar to that of my relations with Drummond) of having information conveyed to Briand through our Embassy at Paris. As a case in point, I feel that to make available to Briand the text of our memorandum to Tokio would be of assistance at this time not only in that a clear knowledge of the position of the United States might be useful to him but in particular as he appears to have received a garbled version. Possibly also a clarifying of previous communications with Paris might likewise be of assistance. I feel it important that Briand be informed of these matters in person.

Four. As the foregoing indicates, Drummond is aware of our relations with Paris. He asked me if we were also in touch with London. I told him that I had no information on that score. He requested me to ask you to consider whether it might not be useful. There is no question but that Paris, London and Geneva, are the focal points in Europe in this entire question both respecting League policy and national policies (see my 274, November 2, 11 p.m. paragraph 8). I noted here during the session of the

Council

CJH Page 4 - #285 from Geneva.

Council that the French and British delegations frequently consulted before decisions were made and that the French often waited for a British lead or concurrence. As a recent case in point, the question of neutral observers associating themselves with the Chinese (see my 274,) Drummond stated that Paris informed him that they would conform to British policy in this particular. Thus a like classification of our position in London might be considered. I do not feel that any other capitals come into the picture at the present time.

Five. With respect to publicity on United States' relations with the League, Drummond is giving out nothing here. Press reports from Washington and Tokyo carry indications of the American position as expressed in our memorandum. They are, however, couched only in general terms with the exception of one from Tokyo which states that the United States has made no representations respecting the time limit for Japanese evacuation. The American press representatives here are greatly excited and it is difficult to say what they may telegraph to their papers at home. I feel that I can say confidentially, however, that anything which may appear in the press as coming from "a high official of the League" or employing some similar terms, is based in

no way

CJH Page 5 - #285 from Geneva.

no way on a statement of any responsible official in the League. Drummond and I, judging from the situation here, are both inclined to feel, and perhaps you will agree, that a statement that he was "satisfied" with American relations with the League might be interpreted by the press as indicating that something mysterious was on foot, probably in the nature of American commitments, which would make our relations with the press difficult. I would appreciate your comments on this last for my own general guidance. Drummond will of course gladly be the vehicle for any public statement which you might at any time desire him to make.

GILBERT

HPD

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS



November 17, 1931

Digest of
Newspaper Items

SKH
✓
FE
O.C.R.
file

793.94

F/DEW
793.94/2535

NEW YORK TIMES:

Despatches from Harbin said the Japanese had crossed the Nonni River with the intention of attacking Tsitsihar. General Honjo said in an interview yesterday that his troops might be compelled to take Tsitsihar.

In Paris the League Council began consideration of a compromise plan to bring Chinese and Japanese negotiators together. Mr. Briand tried to center the discussion on the treaty issue but the Chinese stood firm for the withdrawal of Japanese troops before negotiations.

Paris, November 16, by Lansing Warren. After a brief plenary session, the Council of the League went into secret sitting to discuss the procedure of a compromise plan. The formula is believed to have been drawn by Sir John Simon, British Foreign Secretary. The proposal is understood to provide simultaneous negotiations in Manchuria, on the one hand, over questions of evacuation, and in Europe on the other hand concerning the principles involved in the conflict.

The

- 2 -

The Manchurian negotiations should be rapid and should be held under the observation of a neutral body. This is construed as centering the controversy on the question of treaty obligations and their interpretation by China and Japan. The decision on the main issue is put into the hands of a conference to be conducted in Europe while order is being restored in Manchuria. This forces the question how far China will recognize Japan's treaty claims in order to obtain evacuation.

Paris, November 16. The tentative outline of the compromise plan is understood to be as follows:

1. Direct negotiations between Japan and China on the first four of Japan's points.
2. Completion of evacuation shall not depend on these negotiations.
3. Direct negotiations on the fifth point-- Recognition by China of the validity of existing treaties---shall begin only after evacuation has been completed.
4. All these activities shall be carried on as in pursuance of the Council's resolution, thus leaving the problem still in the hands of the League.

Mukden, November 16, by Hallett Abend. According to Count Uchida, Japan will insist upon arrangements with the various new Manchurian governments to safeguard the position of the South Manchuria Railway and sincerely hopes that

Marshal

- 3 -

Marshal Chang will never attempt to return to Mukden, for if he does, it will mean a renewal of trouble. He expressed the conviction that the whole dispute with China would be easily and equitably settled as soon as the League of Nations ceased to interfere.

Shanghai, November 16. Harbin reports serious fighting between Chinese and Japanese troops along the Nonni River, which has been crossed by two thousand Japanese with the apparent intention of attacking Tsitsihar.

Four foreigners from Mukden were captured by Chinese bandits while hunting. They have been released.

See editorial from NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE attached.

E/O

FE:EBT:MA:SS

November 17, 1931.

NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE:

At the renewed sitting of the League Council, the supreme problem before that body, which irregularly resolved three weeks ago that Japan should evacuate Chinese territory within a specified time, was not the restoration of peace in Manchuria but an evasion of the consequences of its own mistakes. The Council members are now fully aware that they had fostered Chinese hopes of the Japanese eviction which now makes it utterly impossible for Japan to withdraw until China is disillusioned. How to confess this without pleading guilty to blunders which such exalted persons simply can not make is the problem which supersedes that of peace.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 9, 1931

Rec'd 1:17 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

889, November 9, 8 a. m.



Following from Consul General at Mukden, November 8,
11 p.m.

"Local Peace Maintenance Committee issued proclamation
yesterday to the effect that it is functioning as the Pro-
vincial Government during this transitional period, that
it does not concern itself with either past or future
questions, and that it has no connection with Nanking or
Marshal Chang. All Bureaus and administrative offices
are directed to observe the laws and carry out instructions".
Repeated to Shanghai.

For the Minister

ENGERT

HPD



F/DEW

793.94/2536

NOV 12 1931

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GREEN

Geneva

Dated November 9, 1931

Rec'd 7:14 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.


288, November 9, 9 a. m.

Upon Sugimura's return to Geneva I learn that
Yoshizawa made the proposal outlined in my number 287,
November 7, 11 a. m., his own and so telegraphed it
to Tokyo. It is now being referred to as the "Yoshizawa
proposal".

GILBERT

McL

HPD



FILED

1931 NOV 11

F/DEW

793.94/2537

793.94

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GRAY

Tokio

Dated November 9, 1931

Rec'd 5:43 a. m.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

211, November 9, 2 a. m.

Military Attache reports he has received advices
it will take two weeks to repair Nonni River bridge
and that work must be done immediately owing to weather
conditions later.

FORBES

McL

HPD



F/DEW

793.94/2538

FILED

NOV 12 1931

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

REP

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 9, 1931

Rec'd 6:15 a. m.

Secretary of State,


Washington.

893, November 9, 3 p. m.

Legation's 892, November 9, 10 a. m.

Following from Consul General at Tientsin:

"November 9, 9 a. m. Heavy machine gun and rifle fire was heard in or near the Japanese concession last night at 11 o'clock and lasted until 2 a. m. There was a lull in the firing until 7 this morning and kept up until 9. There is much confusion in and near the Japanese concession and the exact cause of trouble is not yet known but rumors have been current for several days the ex-Shih Yu San soldiers in the concession, reenforced by Chinese students, have been organizing themselves into plain clothes squads for a concerted attack on the local Chang Hsueh Liang Government. In the firing this morning the detonation



F/DEW

793.94/2539

DEC 21 1931

RECD

REP

2- #893, from Peiping, Nov. 9, 3 p.m.

the detonation of small field pieces was distinctly heard. Strict martial law is being maintained in Japanese concession and in Chinese area. Conditions are quiet in French and British concessions but much uneasiness prevails as to possible repercussions. Mayor Chang has requested members of Consular Body to meet him at 10:30 this morning to discuss developments."

Repeated to Shanghai and Commander-in-Chief.

FOR THE MINISTER

ENGERT

RR

HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

NOV 9 1931

Department of State

SHANGHAI

NOV 12 1931

Dated November 9, 1931

Rec'd 2:14 a.m.

F/DEW

793.94/2540

Secretary of State,

Washington.

URGENT.

November 9, noon.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

May I communicate informally through Peak to Acting
Minister for Foreign Affairs substance of Department's
November 7, 2 p. m.? Apparently Chinese Foreign Office
have information that such a communication was made.

JOHNSON

HPD

FILED


NOV 9 1931

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
THE UNDER SECRETARY

NOV 10 1931

DEPARTMENT OF STATE



RECEIVED

NOV 10 1931

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

Mr. Castle:

I can't help feeling very decidedly that it would be to our general advantage to inform the public regarding the fundamental feature of our communication on November 5 to the Japanese Government -- particularly as set forth in the second and the last paragraphs (marked) of our telegram of November 7 ^(3 p.m. to Shanghai) (copy hereunder) to Johnson.

I see no reason why we should not tell the world that our communication was based on the idea of making it clear to the Japanese Government that our main objective and that of the Council of the League are identical and that we stressed the view that as to fundamental principles (specified) we and the League stand for the same things.

This telegram, as now drafted, forbids communication to the Chinese of anything with regard to the matter. I would urge that we make a press release along the lines of what we told Johnson in the two marked paragraphs to which I refer above, and simultaneously let Peck tell the same to the Chinese.

F.W. 793.94/2540

RECEIVED
NOV 11 1931

SECRET

793.94

SKH/ZMF

1924

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-128

TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR

Department of State

Charge to
 \$

This cable was sent in confidential Code.
 It should be paraphrased before
 being communicated to anyone.

Washington,

November 16, 1931.

AMERICAN CONSUL

SHANGHAI (CHINA).

Confidential for the Minister. Your November 9,
 noon.

One. The Department regards its action in connection with the memorandum under reference as a confidential communication from the American Government to the Japanese Government. Copies of the text have not repeat not been given to any of the foreign representatives here and the American Consul at Geneva was instructed to communicate the substance only, as outlined in the Department's telegram to you of November 7, 2 p.m., to Drummond for his confidential information and for discreet and limited communication by him to other members of the League Council. The Department is informed that for the present, for his own reasons, Drummond intends to inform not repeat not all of the members of the Council but only the members of the Committee of Five.

Two. For these reasons the Department desires that the substance of its November 7, 2 p.m., to you be not repeat not communicated to the Acting Minister for Foreign

Enciphered by

Affairs

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-128

793.94/2540

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect.

Charge Department

OR

Charge to

\$

TELEGRAM SENT

1-128

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

- 2 -

Affairs as you suggest. The Department prefers that the Chinese Government receive this information through its representative on the Council if, when and as Drummond on his own initiative may see fit to give it to that representative.

Three. You may repeat the Department's November 7, 2 a.m., to Peck for his strictly confidential information.

Stinson

Willy

OK

NOV 12 1981.

mif

RAM
FE:RSM:EJL

mmH
FE

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1960 1-128

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Shutzman NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 9, 1931

Rec'd 4:15 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



NOV 9 - 1931

TRIPLE PRIORITY

892, November 9, 10 a. m.

At one a. m. I received a message from Marshal Chang Hsueh Liang informing me that serious fighting was in progress in Tientsin between Chinese and Japanese. As his office had no details I immediately tried to telephone to the Consulate General and sent radio to Commanding Officer Fifteenth Infantry but received no reply. I telephoned to both later this morning and obtained somewhat conflicting reports except that all was quiet now. U. S. S. TULSA at Tangku replied to radio it had no information.

Wellington Koo just called and stated that he and the young Marshal felt the incidents of last night (concerning which I shall report fully when I have more details)

F/DEW

793.94/2541

DEC 21 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2- #892, from Peiping, Nov.9, 10 a.m.

details) had been instigated by the Japanese in the hope of overthrowing the local government and creating a confused situation warranting increase in Japanese forces and perhaps repetition of Mukden coup.

(END PART ONE).

ENGERT

HPD

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

REP

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 9, 1931

Rec'd 4:15 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.


892, November 9, 10 a. m. (PART TWO).

He requests me to suggest to the Department on behalf of young Marshal the advisability of having the principal consular officers in Tientsin instructed to make immediate impartial investigation of all circumstances and to make representations to the Japanese authorities to prevent recurrence of such events. In the meantime Chinese troops and police have been given strict orders not to fire on Japanese in uniform and in compliance with the Japanese demand all Chinese police have been withdrawn 300 meters from Japanese concession. Koo fears this arrangement cannot be prolonged indefinitely.

Repeated to Shanghai.

For the Minister

ENGERT



FE
WE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

rh

GRAY

FROM GENEVA

Dated November 9, 1931

Rec'd. 9.15 am

793-*ad*
SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

289, November 9, 10 am


Department's 119, October 27, 7 pm

With respect to communiques issued by the Secretary General and by the Chinese and Japanese (either independently or through the Secretariat), I am following and will continue to follow unless otherwise advised the policy of transmitting this information to the Department under the following system:

One. By telegraph (a) full texts (or summaries of essential points when the document is largely a repetition of previous statements) of all communications which fit in anyway into the network of the current negotiations, or which, in my opinion may be cited at some future time in the negotiations (b) usually full texts, occasionally summaries, of all military information from neutral sources.

Two. By mail all communications not falling under the foregoing. Examples this type of communique are recent long and highly contradictory statements on the part of the Chinese and Japanese respecting the Nank. Bridge fighting. I assume that in respect to this incident, for example, your information

direct



F/DEW

793.94/2542

FILED

NOV 11 1931

rh #2 of No. 289 from Geneva

direct from Tokyo and Peiping is much more satisfactory.

I am making the foregoing clear as I am aware that the American press representatives here are at times telegraphing to their home papers many communiques which I do not touch upon in my telegrams and I desire the Department to know under what conditions this occurs.

GILBERT

WSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Collect
Charge Department

Department of State

Charge to
\$

Washington,
November 10, 1931.
3P

793.94/2542
AMERICAN CONSUL,

GENEVA (Switzerland).

129 Your 289, November 9, 10 a. m.

Approved.

Simson
WY

793.94/2542

FE:MMH:REK

FE

Nov. 10, 1931.

This refers to policy followed by the Consul at Geneva in transmitting to the Department information on the Manchuria situation.

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1935 1-128

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REF

FROM

GREEN

Geneva

Dated November 9, 1931

Nov 9 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

290, November 9, noon.

Consulate's 279, November 5, noon.

Drummond yesterday, Sunday, handed me a copy of the following note dated November 5, addressed by Briand to the Japanese representative respecting the seizure of the salt revenues. This is being made public.

"You have certainly noted the letter and memorandum forwarded by the Chinese delegate to the Secretary General of the League of Nations on the 3rd of this month and a further note by Dr. Sze dated November 4, these various documents having been immediately communicated to all the members the Council.

The Chinese representative refers in particular to the seizure by the Japanese military authorities of part of the salt revenue of Newohwang which is said to be only the first

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 9 1931
Department of State

Office of Economic Affairs
NOV 23 1931
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
NOV 13 1931
DIVISION OF
WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS

F/DEW 793.94/2543

1931 NOV 26

REP

3- #290, from Geneva, Nov.9, noon.

the first of other operations of the same character.

Your Excellency will ^{remember} that in Paragraph Five of the Council resolution of September 30 the Japanese Government had already undertaken to "adopt all necessary measures not to extend the incident or aggravate the situation". At the meetings of the Council on October 23 and 24, moreover, Your Excellency spontaneously renewed on several occasions the formal assurance that the Japanese Government intended "to bring back its troops within the railway zone as soon as it could regard the safety of its nationals and the protection of their property as effectively assured", Japan for her part being prepared to facilitate by all means in her power the "pacification" which appeared to her to be indispensable for the fulfillment of this condition of security formulated by herself.

It is obvious that acts of the kind reported such as the seizure of the salt revenue cannot be related to the safety of Japanese nationals and the protection of their property and that they would therefore be incompatible with the undertakings entered into before the Council and
with the

REP

3- #290, from Geneva, Nov. 9, noon.

with the spontaneous assurances recorded by it.

I do not doubt that the Japanese Government conscious^o of the obligation resting upon it to take all necessary measures to prevent any aggravation of the situation will understand the need of furnishing the members of the Council with the necessary information regarding the incidents in question.

As President in office, and assuming the responsibility to my colleagues of following the execution of the undertakings recorded by the Council, it is my duty to obtain all information on this matter. I should therefore be glad if Your Excellency would be good enough to forward to me as rapidly as possible all useful information for the complete enlightenment of the members of the Council."

In commenting on this Drummond stated that there were speculations in the Secretariat to the effect that the Japanese had seized these revenues to assist in financing their operations in Manchuria, the Minister of Finance at Tokyo having put pressure on the Military leaders by limiting their funds.

GILBERT

WSB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

November 12 1931.

~~FE~~

FROM NEW YORK CITY

November 10, 1931

Rec'd. 10.10

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 9 1931
Department of State

743-44 rh
HON HENRY L STIMSON
SECRETARY OF STATE

Letter drafted
to Mr. Fay, Nov 9
1931 JMF

As a close observer of Sino-Japanese relations, mindful of Japan's record of scrupulous fulfillment of her international obligations, permit me respectfully to urge that the Department of State refrain from participation in the plan proposed in certain European quarters for general withdrawal of Diplomatic representation at Tokyo. The impression grows that in the Secretariat of the League of Nations there are influences over-friendly in Nanking, and I should view with profound regret and disappointment any action on the part of our Government tending to question the good faith of the Japanese Government or to undermine the historic friendship between the two nations. I firmly believe in Japan's sincerity.

CHARLES EDEY FAY

51 WALL STREET

HPD

FILED

NOV 16 1931

F/DEW

793.94/2544

1936

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

November 12 1931.

In reply refer to
FE 793.94/2544

Mr. Charles Edey Fay,
51 Wall Street,
New York, New York.

Sir:

The receipt is acknowledged of your telegram of
November 9, 1931, in regard to certain phases of the
existing dispute between Japan and China.

The Department is appreciative of your thoughtfulness
in bringing your observations to its attention and assures
you that the many problems occasioned by the present situa-
tion are being given its careful and solicitous considera-
tion.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

W. R. Castle, Jr.


Under Secretary.

RFB
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11/10/31

m.m.h.
FE

CR
Nov. 12, 1931.

793.94/2544



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GRAY

Tientsin via N. R.

Dated November 9, 1931

Rec'd 10:15 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D. *mf*

URGENT.

November 9, 4 p. m.

Following sent to the Legation:

"November 9, 3 p. m.

My November 9, 9 a. m.

At meeting with Mayor and Provincial Chairman it has been brought out that most of the firing last night was between Chinese police and plain clothes men just outside of the Japanese concession in which area the latter had organized their (*). As soon as they reached Chinese territory firing between them and Chinese police began. Some of the plain clothes men were captured and some had in their possession the sum of \$40 in currency. Their objective was the Bureau of Public Safety, the headquarters of the Provincial Government and the electric light plant in the ex-Belgian concession and possibly the telephone



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793.94/2545

DEC 21 1931

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REP

2- from Tientsin, Nov. 9, 4 p. m.

telephone office. Evidence is very conflicting as to whether there was any considerable firing inside the Japanese concession last night but there is convincing proof that the Japanese troops used an armored car and machine guns at about 7 o'clock this morning. At 4 a. m. the Japanese authorities demanded of General Wang that he remove by 6 a. m. the Chinese police to a distance of three hundred meters from the boundaries of the concession and General Wang agreed that he would do this but contended that the time was too short and requested thirty minutes grace beyond six a. m. Apparently by 7 o'clock or thereabouts the police had not been removed to the three hundred meter limit whereupon firing took place between the Japanese and the Chinese police. It is not definitely established as to who fired first. Apparently the Japanese have not proceeded beyond the boundaries of their concession and it is evident also that no Chinese troops have been in action. Up to this point on the Chinese side only police have been employed. Casualties are not yet known but Japanese claim one petty officer and one soldier killed and Chinese claim a number have been wounded. The Chinese state that there were eleven hundred plain

HPD

3- from Tientsin, Nov. 9, 4 p. m.

plain clothes men and that on some of those captured were found rifles of Japanese manufacture of "the 38th year". There is considerable doubt that any students were involved in the trouble.

The Chinese are complaining bitterly of the enforced establishment of a zone of three hundred meters outside of the Japanese concession on the Chinese side because this creates an area which is without police protection and which can be used as a refuge by the plainclothes men.

The tension is by no means relaxed and further important developments may occur at any time..


Repeated to Department and Nanking".

LOCKHART





HPD

(*) Apparent omission

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



CONFIDENTIAL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY



MEMORANDUM OF CABINET MEETING.

presented successive the situation in Manchuria, including the reading of the Forbes cable as to the delivery of the representations and memorandum of November 4 and my views of the present situation. No adverse comment by any one present was made and later the President called me and asked me what my views were for the future. I told him of my press conference and the statement I had given with it, which he characterized as a very good statement. I told him that the next meeting of the Council was not until November 17 and that we were in a position of freedom as to our future action and that I proposed to keep it so and that I thought it would be wise to wait a little later until nearer the 17th of November before deciding what we would do in reference to that meeting.

I then took up General Dawes's answer in his note No. 429 on the subject of a monetary conference and read it through and the President said that he agreed with Dawes's conclusion. I told him that I also concurred
Third,

F/DEW

793.94/2546

551.5 11/13

NOV 21 1931
THIRD

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

-2-

462.00R 296a/7
Third, I read him cable No. 711 from Howell at Paris, giving Laval's account of his conference with von Hoesch, the German Ambassador. I also read the first two sentences of Cochran's telegram to Castle of November 5 and I pointed out to the President two ambiguities indicated therein. I pointed out that Laval was apparently ready to waive the limitations of the Young Plan so far as to include in the Committee's report, a report on the unconditional annuities as well as the conditional annuities, but I also pointed out that the Germans were seeking to include in their report, a report on the short term credits which was a wholly different question. The President at once said that he would have no objection to that Committee, when they got to work, to include in their report a report on the short term credits and I expressed myself as also acquiescing in that.

Fourth, I then read the report from Austria as to the recent emergency decree and the effect which it would have on our imports.

HLS.

S:HLS:VGN

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
CONFIDENTIAL



Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 10 1931
Department of State

FE
WFE
AON
Paris

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR,
MR. PAUL CLAUDEL, NOVEMBER 6, 1931.



F/DEW 793.94/2547

The French Ambassador came in to
memorandum which he had received from Monsieur Briand.
His translation is annexed hereto. He will send me a
formal translation later to take the place of this one.

He wanted to know what had happened to our repre-
sentations to Tokyo and I read to him the telegram No.
209 of November 6, which I had received from Forbes.
He thought that the last paragraph presented a very
serious situation. He said that hitherto he had been
hopeful that Shidehara and the peace party would keep
in control but now he feels that the military party
are following out a plan which they have had in their
minds from the beginning and that no one can tell where
it will lead. He asked me whether we were going to
send any ships, saying that the lives of foreigners might
be endangered in cities on the Yangtze and other places.
I told him that we already had an Asiatic squadron there
sufficient to deal with any trouble and in my opinion
sending

NOV 17 1931

FINED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

-2-

sending any further ships out there would only result in adding flame to the fire. He expressed fear that now that the Japanese merchants have been boycotted and they stand to lose everything, they would join with the military party to seek to get all they could by war. I told him that I thought that, while we could not see our steps in detail, the principal objective was clear, that is, that we should preserve a united front among the other nations of the world and he agreed to that. I asked him what he thought it would do to the disarmament conference. He laughed and said that he had never thought there was any show for the conference but this made it doubly impossible and he thought, as his own personal opinion and not the opinion of his Government, that the best thing to do would be to postpone it until a later date.

851,20
He then told me that he had talked with General Petain and Petain had told him that plans were on foot in France to completely change the organization of the French Army in such a way as to be more agreeable to Germany; that
their

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

-3-

their present system was both expensive and ineffective. The new plan would be to create a professional army, supplemented as in the case of America (he said) by a militia. This made it less expensive than the old system but he thought it would be more effective and more like the English system. I made no comment.

HLS.

S:HLS:VGN

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY



TRANSLATION OF FRENCH NOTE

The Chinese Government has declared itself ready to execute the resolutions of the Council of the Society of Nations under date of October 24, which provides an obligation for China to adopt in view of the territories evacuated by Japan all measures proper to maintain security and the invitation to the Chinese which will be nominated the representative.

The Chinese Government has constituted for that purpose a commission under the supervision of Mr. Wellington Koo and he made representations to the Ministers of the powers in China to hasten the nomination of their representatives provided for by Article 4 and to obtain the names of these last.

I have invited our Minister in China to answer to the Chinese Government, as my English colleague has done, that the French representatives will hold themselves ready to go when their presence will be requested and when the other powers will have indicated their respective representatives.

I have moreover made known to Mr. Koo that I have

no

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

-2-

no objection that he send to the Chinese the names of our eventual representatives at the same time that his colleagues are advised to do so.

It is important that this attitude should correspond to the actual situation of the affair which should be adopted by the other powers. I ask you to make known my point of view to the Secretary of State and to ask him to give his representative in China the necessary instructions.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AMBASSADE
DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE
AUX ÉTATS-UNIS

Washington, le

RECEIVED

NOV 7 - 1931

SECRETARY'S OFFICE



Information from Paris -

November 6th, 1931.

The Chinese Government has declared its readiness to comply with the Resolution of the Council of the League of Nations of October 24th, especially with its article 4.

The latter provides for the obligation for China, in view of taking control over the territories evacuated by the Japanese, to take the necessary steps to preserve security, representatives of other powers being duly attached to the Chinese authorities appointed for that purpose.

The Chinese Government has therefore convened a committee under the chairmanship of Mr. Wellington Koo and has indicated to the foreign ministers in China, that the appointment of the representatives, provided for in article 4, should be made and their names given as soon as possible.

The.....

The French Government has instructed the French minister in China to answer to the Chinese Government, as his British colleague has done, that the French representatives will be ready to go when their presence is required and when the other powers have appointed their respective representatives.

Furthermore, the French Government has authorized Mr. Wilden to give to the Chinese the names of its eventual representatives as soon as his colleagues are instructed to do likewise.

It is a matter of interest that this attitude which befits the present situation should be adopted by the other powers./.

74

1940

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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OR
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TELEGRAM SENT

may
1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,
November 10, 1931.
4P

AMERICAN EMBASSY,
PARIS (France)

534 CONFIDENTIAL

793-94/2547

*note
793-94/118*

With reference to the memorandum from
Monsieur Briand, presented to me on November 6
by the French Ambassador here, on the subject of
the designation of representatives to serve with
the Chinese commission appointed for the taking
over by Chinese authorities of areas which have
been temporarily occupied by Japanese forces, you
may inform Monsieur Briand that, understanding that
the British and the French Governments have taken
similar action, the American Government will be
prepared to send representatives to act as observers
in connection with the carrying out of the above
arrangements, if and when made between the Chinese
and the Japanese Governments.

793.94/2547

FE:SKH/RPB

WM

Stinson
Nov. 10. 1931
CH 10 53
SM


Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 80.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-128

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



MR. SZE'S STATEMENT TO M. BRIAND

Referring to the memorandum and principal telegram hereunder, --

There has just now been received from Peiping a telegram referring to newspaper reports from Nanking on the subject of Mr. Sze's proposal to M. Briand.

A copy is here attached.

793.9412

RECEIVED
OCT 29 1931
SECRETARY'S OFFICE

SKH/ZMF

REP

PLAIN

Peiping via N. R.

Dated October 29, 1931

Rec'd 1:23 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

839, October 29.

Newspaper reports from Nanking twenty-eighth state that Ministry of Foreign Affairs is proposing to conclude a treaty of arbitration with Japan immediately after withdrawal of Japanese troops from South Manchuria and before opening of formal negotiations.

This treaty to be along the same lines as Sino-American Arbitration Treaty and intended to insure pacific settlement of all outstanding questions between the two countries.

Alfred Sze is said to have informed Briand that China is ready to conclude such a treaty with Japan and to have communicated to him text of Chinese proposal.


For the Minister

ENGERT

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF EASTERN AFFAIRS



RECEIVED DCR
file
OCT 29 1931

MR. SZE'S STATEMENT TO M. BRIAND

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

In his note of October 24 to M. Briand, Mr. Sze
says, inter alia:

"China like every member of the League of Nations is bound by the Covenant to a 'scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations'. The Chinese Government for its part is determined loyally to fulfill all its obligations under the Covenant. It is prepared to give proofs of this intention by undertaking to settle all disputes with Japan as to treaty interpretation by arbitration or judicial settlement as provided in Article 13 of the Covenant.

"In pursuance of this purpose the Chinese Government is willing to conclude with Japan a treaty of arbitration similar to that recently concluded by the United States and China or to those concluded of recent years in increasing numbers between members of the (#) (League?)".

F/DEW 793.94/2548

FILED
NOV 9 1931

SKH/ZMF

195

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Collect
Charge Department
OR

Department of State

Charge to
\$

Washington,
November 7, 1931.

793.94

~~INTER-OFFICE~~

AMERICAN CONSUL

~~RELATIVE TO CHINA~~

SHANGHAI (CHINA).

20

Urgent. STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE MINISTER.

The American Embassy at Tokyo was instructed by the Department's No. 217, November 3, 6 p.m., to hand to the Japanese Foreign Office a memorandum setting forth the views of this Government on the Manchuria situation, with particular reference to the action taken in relation thereto by the League Council in its Resolution of September 30 and the draft resolution of October 24. This memorandum was read and delivered to the Japanese Foreign Office on November 5.

793.94/2548A

In the above memorandum, the particular objective was to make it clear to the Japanese Government that, in seeking to prevent war and to bring about a solution by peaceful means, the objective of the American Government and that of the Council of the League are identical.

RM While the memorandum indicated our endorsement of the effort and ~~action~~ ^{spirit} of the League as expressed in the Resolutions of September 30 and October 24, it deliberately refrained from mentioning the time limit mentioned in the October 24 resolution and thus avoided expression of any view either favorable

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

1954

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

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TO BE TRANSMITTED
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NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Collect
Charge Department
or
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Department of State

Washington,

- 2 -

or unfavorable with regard to that particular feature of the resolution.

The memorandum stressed the view that the settlement of long-standing issues should not be made a condition precedent to withdrawal of Japanese armed forces and that the presence of those armed forces should not be availed of by the Japanese Government as an instrumentality for bringing pressure to bear upon China in the negotiations. This we regard as fundamental and we wished it to be understood that we stand for the same fundamental principles as were adopted by the Council of the League.

Stimson

CP
NOV 7. 1961.

FE:RSM:EJL

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not
mud

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....



Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1955 1-138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP



Geneva


Dated November 9, 1931

Rec'd 11:45 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

294, November 9, 3 p. m.



Drummond handed me this morning a copy of identic telegram which he sent on November 6 to Tokyo and Nanking in the name of Briand as President of the Council concerning recent armed conflict between the Chinese and Japanese forces in Manchuria:

"The extension of incidents towards Northern Manchuria and the serious nature of information supplied regarding those incidents by the Chinese and Japanese Governments cannot but increase the anxiety of the Council and public opinion. As President of the Council I desire to remind you that the Chinese and Japanese representatives have given assurances that their governments will take all necessary steps to avoid aggravating the situation. The Council placed these solemn undertakings on record in its resolution

131 81 NOV 1931

F/DEW

793.94/2549

REP

2- #294, from Geneva, Nov. 9, 3 p.m.

resolution of September 30th. To fulfill those undertakings it now seems to me necessary for the two governments to issue instructions without delay to the officers commanding their forces in order to remove all possibility of sanguinary engagements between Chinese and Japanese troops as any further serious incidents may make it even more difficult for the Council to pursue its efforts for the maintenance of peace and the peaceful settlement of the dispute with which it is called upon to deal."

GILBERT

WSB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REF

FROM

GREEN

Geneva

Dated November 9, 1931

Reo: 12950-12 of file

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

NOV 9 1931

Department of State

793-94
Secretary of State,
Washington.

295, November 9, 4 p. m.

Drummond handed me this morning the following copy
of a telegram which he received from the Japanese Govern-
ment on November 8 concerning the recent Noni Bridge
incident.

"According to report received by Ministry of War
Japanese troops after occupying Tahsing at midday on 6th
instant, have ceased to advance northward. Reinforced
ments which had not yet rejoined them have also stopped
their northward march.

Advance of the Japanese forces towards the Noni River
is due solely to necessity of protecting work of repairing
bridge which will last about a fortnight. The Government
is firmly resolved, as it has already stated, to recall
these troops as soon as the work is terminated".

GILBERT

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NOV 12 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



No. 1174

AM. RECD
EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Lima, October 29, 1931.

DIVISION OF
LATIN AMERICAN AFFAIRS
NOV 12 1931
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 10 1931
Department of State

793.94

FOR DISTRIBUTION - CHECK Yes No

To the President

In U. S. A.

Copy in FE

FE
LA
F/DEW 793.94/2551

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

S i r:

793.94/2551

I have the honor to refer to my cable No. 347 of
October 29th, 4 p.m. regarding the Manchurian imbroglio
and to inform the Department that Señor José Galvez,
the Minister for Foreign Affairs, has taken a very special
interest in the matter on account of his personal convictions
and his warm advocacy of the cause of peace. I
believe he has also been influenced to a certain extent
by the Chinese Minister, but his own desire to see the
League of Nations retain its importance and prestige,

to

NOV 17 1931

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-2-

to have the Kellogg Pact and the Nine Power Convention respected have caused him to be unusually active in endeavoring to further the efforts being made by the League and by ourselves to bring about a peaceful solution of the Manchurian question. I have reported the important part of the Minister's action in my telegram above referred to and my previous message No. 341 of October 17th, 3 p.m.

This morning during a conversation with the Minister at the Foreign Office he indicated his continued interest and that his efforts would be constantly engaged until he goes out of office, which will be, he thinks, about the middle of December. He told me the Chinese Minister had been with him, that he was taking the matter up with the Chinese Minister tomorrow and that he was particularly interested in knowing what action our Government would take as a result of the resolution taken by the Council of the League of Nations on the 24th of October and whether our Government had named a representative in accordance with this resolution to deal with the Chinese authorities. He said he did not know the exact text of the resolution and seemed to find it rather odd that the League's representatives were to deal "with the Chinese authorities", and that nothing was said about the Japanese authorities.

After speaking with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and assuring him that I would immediately inquire and give him, if possible, the information he desired, I called upon my Chinese Colleague in connection with the Chinese situation

-3-

situation in Salvador, in which instance he had requested this Embassy's and the Department's good offices. While I was informing him of the substance of Despatch No. 623 of October 21, 1931, from our Legation in San Salvador, he brought up the question of Manchuria and showed me a lengthy telegram from Chiang Kai Check through the Wai Chiao Poo, expressing deep gratitude for the assistance of Peru at the League sessions in Geneva and for Peru's general attitude of helpfulness.

The President of China stated that the action of the League had made the Chinese cause the cause of the world and that he felt that with the continued assistance of the nations of the world, it would be possible to undertake direct negotiations with the Japanese, if only by November 16th they would withdraw their troops and restore the situation to about what it was before the present situation arose.

The Minister showed me a second telegram from the Wai Chiao Poo, asking whom the Peruvian Government would name to negotiate with the Chinese Government and Mr. Ouei told me he thought that Mr. Bailey, the Peruvian representative near both the Chinese and Japanese Governments, would be entrusted with the task. He said he was seeing the Foreign Minister again tomorrow, and this seemed to me to show why the Foreign Minister was anxious to know what we had done as a consequence of the resolution of the Council of the League of Nations of October 24th.

The

-4-

The Foreign Minister wishes to do what he does carefully, but there is no doubt in my mind that he desires to aid the Chinese, and even more to aid in finding a peaceful solution. He feels that the Japanese have been too sharp and too aggressive. He realizes that the Japanese have been a long time in Manchuria and that if they sit tight and insist upon the removal of more Chinese troops, the Chinese will have lost their situation even before the case begins to be discussed. The Minister has no illusions about the forces back of the Japanese action and does not greatly expect the Japanese to yield anything substantial, although he seems to feel that some formula may possibly be found which will save the face both of the Chinese and of the League, and blunt the sharp point of suspicion and resentment now characterizing the attitude of most nations toward the somewhat too aggressive actions of the Japanese. Indeed, the Minister rather feels that population pressure in Japan and economic causes will make the Japanese extremely tenacious in holding anything they have gained and that they have almost consolidated their status in Manchuria already, and that the only thing which will disturb them very much will be some eventual powerful action by the Russians either alone or in conjunction with the Chinese to push them back or limit their advance in the Manchurian region.

A day or two ago my Chinese Colleague spoke to me quite frankly about the Manchurian question and he also sees clearly that the camel's head is already in the
window

-5-

7

• window and that his neck and forequarters are just about to enter also. He says he frankly does not see any solution for the difficulty. He paid his Japanese Colleague here, with whom he has always been quite friendly, the compliment of saying that if all Japanese were like Mr. Kurusu, there would be no difficulty and no question. He says that the ^{Japanese} War Party backed up by the people, who are suffering from too much jingoism, has simply proven too strong both for the Foreign Office and for the Government. On the other hand, he says, he does not see how the Chinese Government can accept Japanese demands or fail to do something, as that would mean the immediate ousting of Chiang Kai Check and the Nanking Government and uproar and chaos of all kinds in China. He seems to feel, therefore, that conflict is more or less inevitable. He stated that the Japanese were sending in more troops instead of retiring or withdrawing any and that for the Chinese to accept the proposal that they should withdraw any more of their troops would be to give the Japanese without a fight exactly the objective they were after.

Today Mr. Ouei was just a shade more hopeful. He told me that he and his Japanese Colleague had taken measures to prevent any clash of Japanese and Chinese here.


Two solutions for the question have been mentioned here. One a direct negotiation followed by arbitration between the two Governments; but Mr. Kurusu says that this is merely an idea of Mr. Alfred Sze and that he doubts

-6-

doubts that it will be adopted by the Chinese Government. The other solution suggested is to lay the matter before the Permanent Court at The Hague. I do not know why this suggestion has not received more comment here. I first heard it by radio several days ago from Paris, when the Paris station was reporting the action of the League on a certain set of propositions made to the Japanese, the categorical reply of the Japanese and finally, according to the announcer, a recognition by the Japanese that two of their points, one especially, concerning responsibilities, were too vague and that it was futile to expect definite replies to them from the Chinese. It was then suggested, if I understood the announcer correctly, that the best solution was to lay the whole matter before the Permanent Court at The Hague.

In view of the Foreign Minister's interest in this case, his desire to aid the cause of peace and to uphold the Kellogg Pact and the Nine Power Agreement, I shall appreciate any information the Department may care to give the Embassy for transmission to the Minister.

Respectfully yours,



Fred Morris Dearing.

FMD-hkl

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


No. 793.94
893.10

AMERICAN CONSULATE.

GENERAL,
Mukden, China, October 16, 1931.

NOV 7 31

SUBJECT: Peace Preservation Committee.



COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

WASHINGTON.

SIR

AC/c
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

NOV 21 1931

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of
my despatch No. 464, to the Legation, Peiping, China,
dated October 16, 1931, on the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 464.

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793.94/2552

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NOV 30 1931

No. 464

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, China.

October 16, 1931.

SUBJECT: Peace Preservation Committee.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping, China.

Sir:

1/ I have the honor to enclose herewith a translation of a letter from the Peace Preservation Committee, at Mukden, dated October 6, 1931, announcing the organization of the committee and forwarding a copy of the regulations governing it, a translation of which is also enclosed. This body started functioning on September 25th, as already reported. Its object, as stated in the letter, is the maintenance of peace and order, currency and trade of the locality during the present emergency.

As of possible interest, it may be pointed out that the formation of the Chinese police force and the opening of the Chinese banks are the outstanding problems which the Committee has helped to solve since its formation. It also has taken a prominent part in the relief

work

- 2 -

work which has been necessitated by the abrupt closing down of such government enterprises, as the arsenals, government cotton mill, etc. Essentially the committee is the unofficial spokesman of the Chinese in dealings with the Japanese authorities in regard to local questions. It is this group that the Japanese have been pressing to assume the functions of government. Brief biographical sketches of its members were given in my despatch No. 451, of September 30, 1931. 793.94/2347

Similar committees have been formed at Fushun, Newchwang, Tiehling, Changchun and Saupingkai. Also, according to a private report, one has been very recently established at Lishu, north of Saupingkai.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers.
American Consul General.

1/ Enclosure: Copy of letter from Peace Preservation Committee dated October 6, 1931.

Original and one copy to Legation.
Five copies to Department.

MSM:AAB
800.

Enclosure No. 444 to despatch of M. S. Myers, American
Consul General at Mukden, China, dated October 16, 1931,
on the subject "Peace Preservation Committee."

TRANSLATION.

Lee Ya-fa.

Letter (No. 31) from the Local Peace
Preservation Committee to Mr. M. S.
Myers, American Consul General, Mukden.

Dated: October 6, 1931.
Received: October 7, 1931.

Sir;

We have the honor to inform you that in view of
present conditions in Mukden we have drawn up a set
of regulations for the organization of a committee
for maintaining peace and order in the local district,
as required by the circumstances of the moment.
Its object is to take measures for maintaining
peace and order, currency and trade of the district,
which measures shall effectively be carried out. The
committee started work on the 25th day of the 9th month
of the 20th year of the Republic of China (September 25th),
in the former premises of the Bureau of Industry on
T'ung T'ien Street, Mukden. A seal was made for the
committee with these characters "Ti Yang wei Ch'ih wei
Yuan Hui" which was put in use on the same day.

Apart

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Apart from informing others, a copy of the regulations is enclosed herewith with the request that you will please take note.

Chairman;	Yuan Chia-kai
Vice Chairman;	Yu Ch'ung-hua
" "	K'an Chao-hui.

	Li Yu-lan
	Ting Chien-hsin
	Jung Tzu-chang
Committee;	Chang Cheng-shi
	Chin-liang
	Tung Chao-yuan.

Committee for Preservation of
 the Local District.

(S E A L)

Enclosure:
 1 copy of regulations.

**Regulations of the Local Peace Preservation
Committee;**

1. The name of the committee shall be known as the Local Peace Preservation Committee.
2. This committee shall maintain peace and order in the district and the currency on the market.
3. The office of the committee is established on T'ung T'ien street in Mukden city.
4. Membership of the committee shall comprise qualified gentry and members of appropriate public bodies.
5. This committee shall consist of nine members from whom one chairman and two vice chairmen shall be elected.
6. Membership on this committee is an honorable office.
7. The work of this committee shall be divided into sections. The regulations governing their organization shall be drawn up separately.
8. This committee is a provisional organization and as soon as military movement ceases, the committee will be dissolved.
9. In regard to matters not covered by these regulations, amendments may be made as required.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REC'D


No. _____

AMERICAN CONSULATE.

GENERAL,

Mukden, China, October 16, 1931.

SUBJECT: Anting Customs



THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of
my despatch No. 465, to the Legation, Peiping, China,
dated October 16, 1931 on the above subject.



Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers
M. S. Myers
American Consul General.

Enclosure;

Copy of despatch No. 465.

MSM:HTW
800



DEC 3 1931

No. 445

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Mukden, China, October 18, 1931.

SUBJECT: Antung Customs.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping, China.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose herewith a self-explanatory statement from the Commissioner of Customs at Antung, dated October 16, 1931, which was handed to me today by the local Commissioner. Mr. Peel, it may be stated, has just handed over charge of the Customs House at Antung to his successor, Mr. R. Talbot, an American citizen, and is now en route to Shanghai.

For the information of the Legation it may be said that the Antung end of the Yalu bridge is in the Japanese Railway Settlement, an area policed and protected by Japanese guards, and accordingly justification for the steps of the Japanese military authorities on the ground of the protection of the bridge is not apparent. The closing of the Customs station at the bridgehead and the demolition of the two huts (the property of the South

Manchuria

-2-

Manchuria Railway) by order of the military authorities is indicative of a state of war which the Japanese Government assert does not exist. The Commissioner of Customs points out that due to the unfettered access to the Settlement which the Korean public have the loss to the revenue is assuming alarming proportions.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

Statement regarding Antung Customs.

Original and one copy to Legation.
Five copies to Department.

MEM:HTW
800

Enclosure to despatch No. 445, of M. S. Myers, American Consul General at Mukden, China, dated October 18, 1931 on the subject "Antung Customs".

Antung Customs.

The Customs have exercised control over the Antung end of the Yalu Bridge since its construction in 1911. On the 31st September the Japanese military authorities ordered the Customs Staff to withdraw from the Bridge and the S. M. R. authorities suggested that Customs control should be established on the two main roads leading from the Bridge into the Japanese Settlement. The military, however, refuse to permit Customs Officers to approach the embankment on either side of the bridge and the Korean public consequently have unfettered access to the Settlement. The Koreans are taking full advantage of the situation and every description of cargo including contraband is now streaming into Antung. The Customs are only able to collect duty on steamer and rail-borne cargo. The loss to the revenue has already been great and is assuming alarming proportions.

On the 8th October the military authorities instructed the S. M. R. authorities to demolish the two huts (property of the S. M. R.), which served to house the Customs Staff, and the general opinion is that this has been done with a view to prevent the Customs from regaining control of the Bridge in the future.

The loss of the Bridge Head Station is serious. Smuggling by sampans has ceased as it is no longer necessary the Koreans now merely having to walk across the Bridge.

I have protested officially to Mr. Yanagawa the ^{he} Consul and has replied that he has no authority vis a vis the Military.

(Signed) L. Peel
Commissioner of Customs,
Antung, Oct. 18th, 1931.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 125 Sh 22/75 FOR Telegram 127, 4pm.

~~FROM~~ Geneva () DATED November 7, 1931
TO NAME 1-1127

REGARDING:

Assignment of G. Howland Shaw as Counselor at Paris in connection with meeting of Council of League of Nations and instructions to arrange meeting confidentially with Greene relative to obtention data on Manchurian question.

M.

793.94/2554

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 5262

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL
HARBIN CHINA
NOV 7 1931
U.S. COM. & REC.

October 13/1931

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 9 1931
Department of State

NOV - 7 31

SUBJECT: JAPANESE OCCUPATION OF SOUTH
AND CENTRAL MANCHURIA.

793.94
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
A.C./C
NOV 21 1931
SIR:

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

1/ I have the honor to enclose, for the information of the
Department, a copy of my despatch No. 2278, of even date, with
sub-enclosures, reporting to the Legation on the Japanese
occupation of South and Central Manchuria.

Respectfully yours,

(In the absence of the Consul General)

Paul M. Dutko
Paul M. Dutko
American Vice Consul.

Enclosure:

Despatch No. 2278, with sub-enclosures.

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TH/th

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NOV 80 1931

NO. 2270

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

HARBIN CHINA, October 12, 1931.

SUBJECT: JAPANESE OCCUPATION OF SOUTH
AND CENTRAL MANCHURIA.

The Honorable

Wilson Trevelyan Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping, China.

Sir,

- 1/ I have the honor to enclose translations of several news items which appeared during the course of the last ten days in THE HARBIN TIMES (Japanese) and which perhaps may serve to expose the political intentions of the Japanese military to capture the political intentions of the Japanese military in North Manchuria, as well as translations of articles from the HENS PAO, an influential daily, on the recent bombing of Chinchow by Japanese military aeroplanes.
- 2/

Immediately after news spread to Harbin of the Japanese occupation of Jiamen, Kirin and other important centers in Manchuria, the officials and public became extremely alarmed lest the Japanese might dispatch troops to points north of Changchun. The general feeling of anxiety allayed somewhat after the Japanese withdrew their troops from Jiamen, but regular visits of a Japanese aeroplane to Harbin were taken as

-thru-

- 2 -

threats that Japanese soldiers might even occupy this city. If it seemed at the outset that the situation might be localized, and if the Chinese here were nonplussed at the manner and rapidity with which things were developing, it is now believed that it is assuming proportions far greater than could be thought possible in this day of international relations, and that the Chinese, although very deeply stirred, are placing great hopes on outside powers to stop Japanese military encroachment upon Manchuria.

If Japan stood aloof during the Sino-Soviet conflict of 1939, the Soviets evidently are seizing this occasion to reciprocate in kind for they are seemingly strictly following Moscow's instruction to keep mum, both in word and by action. They are not apparently thereby engendering China's ill feeling towards themselves, while perhaps gaining the good-will of Japan. Some Chinese, however, blame the Soviets for present Japanese military activities and seem to think that they are in agreement on Japan's occupation of North and Central Manchuria, but it is more probable that the Soviets being realists find it more advantageous and more politic to follow a strictly neutral policy.

Although the responsible Chinese officials gave explicit assurance that they had the situation here well in hand and were fully prepared to assume complete responsibility for the lives and property of all residents, the general public continued in a state of nervous tension and of apprehension lest the Japanese might occupy important centers in North Manchuria, or the Soviets bring in their troops to guard the Chinese Eastern railway or that brigandage might become rampant. The steady fall of the local dollar due to heavy selling by certain Chinese banks and by wealthy Chinese, and the mushroom-like appearance of several

-2000-

- 3 -

news sheets which issued extra editions daily contributed a good deal to the public's apprehensions. Among these sheets is THE HARBIN TIMES, Japanese, published in the Russian and said to be registered at the Japanese Consulate General at Harbin.

In bold print, this Japanese news-sheet has been proclaiming the organization of a new government for Manchuria to be headed either by Yuan Chin-kai or Prince Hsuan Tung, and others; the formation of an autonomous Mongolia with its own independent army, as well as an overthrow of the present authorities in Heilungshiang Province. Reports in this newspaper concerning a supposed change in Heilungshiang Province persisted until on October 10th, it carried a Tokyo despatch of the 9th to the effect that Tsitsihar had surrendered to General Chang Hsi-peng, of Tsuchumfu, and that the province is on the verge of declaring itself autonomous. In contradiction of reports of uprisings in Barga and Heilungshiang, this Consul General has been receiving fairly regularly first-hand and direct information that conditions at Hailar and Tsitsihar are quiet and that the old authorities remain firmly in power. Apparently, there is a movement on foot to oust the Tsitsihar authorities, but the belief prevails here that they are strong enough to maintain themselves in power which is likewise the opinion of the Soviet Consul here. High Chinese officials have informed me that General Chang Hsi-peng, of Tsuchumfu, whom the Japanese have been mentioning as heading an attack on Tsitsihar, has no desire or intention of undertaking a hostile expedition against that city and that he has very recently been promoted to a higher post by Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang. I was told by an official of the Office of the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs that a telegram had been received by the local Chinese civil

-and-

- 4 -

and military authorities from General Chang Tso-hsiang instructing them to carry on their duties and to disregard orders of the new Kirin Government.

I learned this morning from the Japanese Consulate General that the families of the Japanese Consul and staff of the Japanese Consulate at Taitsihar arrived at Harbin this morning and that the wives and children of other Japanese are gradually leaving that district owing to persisting rumors that trouble is expected there. I was likewise told that for the time being all is quiet at Taitsihar and that no trouble is anticipated there, but it has been deemed wise to evacuate the women and children because of the tenseness of the situation in general. I may mention here that during the past week or more the Japanese of North Manchuria have been evacuating their families to points south of Harbin, while the number of Japanese men entering this city with each train has been much larger than usual.

The Chinese government banks at Changshun and Kirin now being under Japanese control, financial support has ceased for the Chinese troops which have been withdrawn from these cities and from points along the Chinese controlled railways in South Manchuria. As a result, retreating Chinese soldiers subsist by preying upon the farmers in the interior. There is a grave danger of these troops turning brigands for whatever support the poor Chinese farmers can afford at present will soon be exhausted. A local banker has informed me that he does not think that Chinese governmental banks have been issuing new notes to purchase the continued support of these troops. He attributes the present unusual decline in the local dollar (September 19th - bank's selling rate against gold dollars, US\$1.00 equal to local \$8.70;

- October -

- 5 -

October 1st US\$1.00 equal to local \$5.09; October 12th US\$1.00 equal to local \$8.00) to heavy selling by a few Chinese banks, wealthy merchants, and a panicky public.

At the official reception held by the Civil Administrator on October 10th (Chinese Republic Day), several of the high Chinese officials present expressed great interest in the action of the Department of State in instructing Consul General Hanson and Secretary of Embassy Salisbury to investigate conditions on the spot which move is very deeply appreciated, and stated to me that they feel certain our Government will have first-hand and correct information of what is actually transpiring in Manchuria to-day. They interpret the fact of Messrs. Hanson and Salisbury's mission in Manchuria at this critical moment as a further and singular proof of America's most friendly concern for China. I may add here that the Chinese officials have been very obliging to this office of late. Representative Japanese also were present in a body to offer felicitations to Chinese officials at a Reception where the general topic of conversation was the bomb attack by Japanese military aeroplanes on Chinchow only the day before.

Respectfully yours,

(In the absence of the Consul General)

Paul M. Dutko
American Vice Consul.

800
RMD/ah

Enclosures:

1. News items from THE HARBIN TIMES;
2. " " " " KUNG PAO.

Original to the Legation;
5 copies to the Department of State;
1 copy to the Embassy at Tokyo;
1 copy to the Consulate General at Mukden.

A True Copy of
the original
filed

Translation

HARBIN TIMES, October 2, 1931.

New Manchuria Government

It is reported that the separatist movement in Manchuria is strengthening. Autonomous governments have already been formed in Kirin, Tsitsihar and in a number of other provincial towns of Manchuria. Similar autonomous governments will probably be formed soon in Jehol and in the other districts of the North Eastern Region. In Mukden Yuan Chin-kai and other most popular officials have formed a "Regional Committee for the Maintenance of Peace and Order" which, after complete organization, will very likely take over power from Colonel Doihara, present Mayor of the City, and will become the higher administrative organ of Liaoning Province. The return of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang is generally deemed impossible. Due to economic and geographical conditions, the present autonomous governments will finally have to unite and form an autonomous state with a democratic system of government which will be free of the former representatives of military cliques.

October 5, 1931.

Armed Mongol Uprising.

A large and well-armed Mongol detachment of more than 100 horse-men rather unexpectedly attacked the Chinese guard troops in the region of Irekto and Umr (western line of the Chinese Eastern Railway).

We are informed that the Mongol detachment unobserved approached the railroad in the said region and opened fire suddenly upon the Chinese soldiers. The Chinese forces returned fire and the shooting lasted for a considerable time. The casualties of the Chinese were one officer and one private wounded, while those of the Mongols are unknown, but it is reported that there were wounded among the Mongols as well. The Chinese guard took several Russians as prisoners, however, local residents maintain that the captured Russians were not attached to the detachment. The object of the attack is unknown.

The day before another armed Mongol detachment made an appearance at the 507th kilometer of the Chinese Eastern Railway (western line), not far from Mientuho station. Although the detachment displayed hostility towards the guard troops, no attacks were made. An urgent report was sent to the HARBIN TIMES to the effect that there are numerous armed Mongol detachments in various parts of Barga. During the past few days armed Mongols have been walking about freely in Hailar, a thing which has not happened before.

- The -

- 2 -

The Mongols say that they wish to form their own independent Barga Government. In this connection, peaceful Russian and Chinese residents seem to be very much disturbed. Alarming rumors of the movements of the Mongols, Soviet preparations on the frontier and events in South Manchuria are afloat in Hailar, Manchouli and other places. Many Russian merchants, as well as employees, residents of Hailar have recently been removing in haste for Harbin. Refugees have already arrived at Harbin yesterday and the day before yesterday. They aver that people living along the railway line are constantly anticipating new events. Among the refugees are several well-known Hailar merchants, including one C-off.

Unidentified Detachment in the Hingan Mountains.

An urgent report has been received that an unknown armed detachment comprising a few score men recently appeared in the Hingan region not far from the Verontsoff Brothers' concession. The composition of this body of men is unknown. No attacks have been made by it, nor is anyone allowed to approach it. It is presumed that the detachment is composed of Mongols.

Nature of Mongol Movement.

THE HARBIN TIMES interviewed authoritative and well-informed persons in connection with the developing events in the Barga and Inner Mongolia districts. These stated that according to data at hand the movements of the Mongols are of a political nature and that their alleged object is to form an autonomous Mongol Government and an independent Mongol army. The Mongols simultaneously are opposed to any alliance or understanding with the Soviet representatives. The leaders of the movement utter their readiness to work conjointly with the Mukden government.

HARBIN TIMES, Oct. 7, 1931.

New Government in Tsitsihar.

According to an urgent report from Tsitsihar, General Chang Hai-peng, Commander-in-Chief of the troops at Taonan, has declared of having assumed power in Heilongjiang Province. Though persons previously in power are trying to retain power in their hands, it is believed that the new government of Chang Hai-peng will take charge of the administration of that province.

The General has under his command a division of his own troops, three special detachments, guard forces of the Taonan Railway and all the forces of the Hingan colonisation region which were previously under the command of General Chew Tso-hua, now abroad on a business journey.

-These-

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

These troops are entirely sufficient for the support of the new government.

HARBIN TIMES, Oct. 7, 1931.

IMPORTANT DECLARATION OF GENERAL HONJO
 (Resume)

General Honjo, Commander-in-Chief of the troops of the Kwantung Military District, just issued a declaration the gist of which is as follows: The Seventh Infantry Brigade of the North Eastern Army commanded by General Wang Yi-che, which was considered the most disciplined military unit of Mukden, after being defeated by the Japanese troops on September 18th, committed during its retreat a number of hideous crimes of rape, looting and murder. Its acts of violence were especially fierce in the region of Tai Tung-tse where there were killed about 100 peaceful Korean peasants. If such crimes are committed by such a "highly-disciplined" unit, what may one expect of the other Mukden troops? Can the old Government of the North Eastern Provinces to whom these bands belonged, speak of international justice, place itself on an even footing with the governments of other countries and enter into diplomatic negotiations therewith? At the present time new governments are being formed in the most important regions of Manchuria. The whole of the population of this country welcomes the presence of the troops of the Japanese Imperial Army and does not wish in the least the return of its former rulers. The Japanese Army only wishes to maintain order and will not interfere in political affairs. It will help China to unite and will use all of its efforts to establish friendly neighborly relations, which will lead to eternal peace in the Far East and will meet the wish of international circles.

HARBIN TIMES, October 7, 1931.

MONGOLS NEAR TAOMAN

It is learned from Chinese sources that a large detachment of armed Mongols appeared near Taoman. It is presumed that this detachment numbers 2-3 thousand men. These Mongols have not yet started any activities and seem to be busy with organization work.

HARBIN TIMES, October 8, 1931.

GOVERNMENT IN TAOMAN

General Chang Kai-peng who assumed power in the region to the north and south of Taoman is rapidly spreading his influence and strengthening his forces.

-In-

- 4 -

In addition to his former troops, he now has at his disposal two of the three brigades of the Selun region and his present forces amount to some 10,000 men.

His influence is considerably strengthened by his popularity among the population and his good connections with General Tang Yu-lin now ruling in Jehol Province and with the Mongol circles of Inner Mongolia.

For a long time friendly bonds have been existing between General ~~Shiang-Tai-shan~~ Chang Hai-peng and Tang Yu-lin. Moreover, these two leaders had long ago established close connection with the Mongol princes and can rely on their support.

Much importance is ascribed to the movement in this region, since its development will unavoidably lead to rupture of connection between Mukden and Tientsin and place the District of Chinchew in a dangerous position.

HARBIN NEWS, October 9, 1931.

ALARM IN TSITSIHAR.

Evacuation of Japanese Residents.

Yesterday general alarm was created at Tsitsihar by news to the effect that General Chang Hai-peng who calls himself Chief of the troops for the maintenance of order in the frontier regions, had undertaken decisive steps for the occupation of Tsitsihar, having ordered two of his best brigades from Taonan northward, which brigades are rapidly advancing towards the capital of the Province.

This news caused serious anxiety among all the classes of the population. All Japanese residents and some Russians and Chinese are making preparations for an immediate departure from the city, fearing that they might suffer in case of clashes between the troops or attempts at a turnover.

Forty Japanese left Tsitsihar yesterday, with the evening train. Quarters have been procured for them in Harbin by the local Japanese colony.

HARBIN NEWS, October 9, 1931.

MONGOL MOVEMENT

It is reported from Hailar that the movement developed by the young Mongol circles, notwithstanding the small number of their forces, is drawing general attention. Rumors have it that the Soviet circles are interested in this movement which takes place in a region so closely situated to Outer Mongolia governed by them and that they have taken certain steps for the purpose of establishing connection with the Barga movement and spreading their

-influence-

(Translation)
KUNG PAO, Oct. 12, 1931.
(Hart's semi-official organ)

VIEWPOINT OF CHINESE CIRCLES ON JAPANESE REPLY (Resume)

Having given space in this issue to the tendentious telegram of the "Hango" Agency reflecting the viewpoint of the leading Japanese circles on the bombardment of Chinshew by Japanese aeroplanes, and taking into consideration the fact that the same viewpoint was expressed in the reply given by Japan to the League of Nations in this connection, we feel it our duty to give below the viewpoint of the Chinese circles on this new incident.

According to the mentioned reply, as reported by telegrams, the Japanese aeroplanes during a reconnaissance flight were fired at by Chinese troops and were thus compelled to bombard the Chinese town.

Naturally, such a reply may be satisfactory to none but the Japanese, while the Chinese circles consider it nothing but naive.

International law quite definitely prohibits any flights over alien territory, regardless of the purposes for which such flights are made.

Though the Japanese leading spheres contend that there is no element of war in the activities of the Japanese troops, they state themselves in their reply that they had sent their aeroplanes for purposes of reconnaissance, which are in themselves of a purely military character. It is clear to everybody that reconnaissance in an alien country is nothing but an act of a hostile nature and a violation of the sovereign rights of this country and of International Law.

Therefore, if the Chinese troops situated in Chinshew had actually opened fire at the uninvited airplanes, such an act would have meant nothing but justified self-defense called forth by necessity.

As to the behavior of the Japanese aeroplanes it can be looked upon only as an attack.....

How would Japan have reacted if a whole squadron of alien aeroplanes had flown over her territory for scouting purposes?

The incident which happened not long ago to pilots Herndon and Pangborn, conquerors of the Pacific, who flew over Japan with the intention of overreaching Pest and Gatti and by doing so nearly brought about a serious diplomatic conflict, gives an answer to this question.

They were accused of espionage and were put to endless trouble only because they had failed to comply with certain formalities.

In the present case, however, it was not one aeroplane, but a whole squadron of Japanese aeroplanes which, neglecting all formalities and for clearly military purposes, undertook a flight over a town situated beyond the limits of that zone where Japan enjoys certain privileges pursuant to a concessionary treaty.

Therefore, the Japanese reply can by no means be considered satisfactory, even from the public viewpoint of Japan.

The strange reply of Japan in connection with the Chinshew incident will be discussed at the League of Nations tomorrow. The resolution to be passed by the League of Nations with regard to this matter is of extreme interest.

- 6 -

Chinese public circles are not satisfied with the activities of Mr. Yuan Chin-kai and General Hsi. It is suspected that some of the responsible members of these regional committees maintain secret connection with Chang Hsueh-liang and Chang Tso-hsiang.

Chinese public circles wish to see at the responsible posts stronger men who would conduct their activities independently and in a firm manner. Chinese monarchists are becoming extremely active.

Prince Toshin has already left Dairen for Mukden. He stated that the supporters of the Manchukuo dynasty were now willing to work conjointly with the regional committee.

HARBIN TIMES, Oct. 12, 1931.

CHANG HAI-PENG GAINING POWER.

General Chang Hai-peng is energetically working at the establishment of his control over Heilungchiang Province.

This work is conducted in two directions.

General Chang Hai-peng is gradually strengthening his forces thanks to the voluntary subjection of the commanders of separate detachments of the Tsitsihar army.

For instance, General Chang Hai-peng is now conducting negotiations regarding the subjection to him of the garrison troops quartered at Manchouli.

At the same time, by means of negotiations, he is bringing to his side acceptable and prominent civil, political and military officials of Tsitsihar.

As a result his influence in Heilungchiang Province is uninterruptedly extending and strengthening.

He is coordinating his activities with the new Mukden political center.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Translation

KUNG PAO, Oct. 13, 1931.

TRUTH re THE RAID ON CHINCHOW IN THE LIGHT OF ONE OF ITS
 PARTICIPANTS - MAJOR HIRATA. (Resumé)

In the issue of the pairen paper "Manchu Nippo" of October 11th there was published an interview with Major Hirata, Chief of the airplane squadron which flew over Chinchow. This interview could have taken place with the correspondent of that paper not later than October 10th, while the telegrams of the "Rengo" Agency reporting Japan's reply to the League of Nations were dated October 11th. This means that Major Hirata made his statements before Japanese leading circles could have given an account of the activities of the Japanese airplanes in Chinchow.

Major Hirata depicts the raid on Chinchow as follows:

"By order of Mukden, four airplanes hopped off from Changchun to Mukden on October 8th, at 8:30 a.m.

"None of us knew the object of our journey and we presumed that we would remain in Mukden.

"Another eight airplanes joined us in Mukden, thus forming an air squadron.

"Then we were divided into four detachments which comprised seven scouting and five battle airplanes.

"At the same time we were given instructions as to the places where bombs should be thrown. These places were: the office of General Chang Tso-hsiang, the building of the faculty and two barracks.

"On October 9th, at noon, we reached Chinchow where we threw 80 bombs.

"I threw the last bomb which struck the roof of the office of General Chang Tso-hsiang.

"All of the 80 bombs were thrown in 10-15 minutes."

Major Hirata's further statements are contradictory to the statement made by the Japanese leading circles who announced that the Chinese troops had opened military activities against the squadron of alien airplanes and that this had compelled them, for the purpose of self-defence, to throw bombs at the peaceful town and to cause the damage which had resulted therefrom.

From Major Hirata's interview it will be seen that prior to having started their flight and having been fired at by the Chinese (if even one should presume that such firing had actually taken place), the airplanes ~~mentioned~~ had already received definite military instructions, which were subsequently carried out by them.

To-day this question will be discussed by the League of Nations, and if only Major Hirata's statements have been reported by telegraph to the League, they will have a great bearing on the resolution which will be passed by the League.

As regards the damage done by the bombardment, it has not yet been completely determined, but, according to data obtainable from Chinese circles it amounts to 16 killed, 10 wounded and many buildings completely destroyed.

All this was done, according to Major Hirata's statements contradicting the official government version, in compliance with a military plan which had been drawn up beforehand.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. -----

AMERICAN CONSULATE.

GENERAL

Mukden, China, October 16, 1931.

NOV 7 31

SUBJECT: Political Situation in South Manchuria.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
A.C./C.

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy
my despatch No. 463, to the Legation, Peiping, dated
October 14, 1931, on the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 463
to the Legation, Peiping.

800
MSM:HTW

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NOV 30 1931

No. 463

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, China.

October 14, 1931.

SUBJECT: Political Situation in South Manchuria.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping, China.

Sir:

Referring to my confidential despatch No. 458 of October 10, 1931, under the above subject in which the bombing of Chihnsien (Chinchow) by Japanese aeroplanes was reported, I have the honor to submit supplementary information giving further details regarding this incident. According to my informant, a foreigner who visited Chihnsien shortly after the bombing, the aeroplanes not only dropped bombs but fired with machine guns on the Communications University building in which was located the offices of the Acting Chairman of the province, the Treasurer, Chief of Police and another official. The railway hospital and railway station were damaged by the bombing and eight bombs fell in the compound of the University. Besides property damage, including one engine and one car at the railway station,

there

- 2 -

there were 19 people killed (one soldier only) and several injured. According to the information obtained by my informant, the Chinese did not fire on the planes at any time and the Chinese authorities at Chinghsien regard the raid as an attempt to disorganize and terrorize their government which has been organized with a view to the restoration of civil order.

Although of only academic interest, it has been definitely learned that leaflets were dropped by Japanese aeroplanes over Chinghsien, a copy of one having been shown to a member of the staff of this office. A translation
1/ of this leaflet is enclosed herewith.

It has been reliably reported that Japanese aeroplanes flying in the neighborhood of Koupangtze were fired upon yesterday by a Chinese troop train and that the aeroplanes responded by the dropping of some bombs - four as reported by the Japanese. As far as is known, little damage was done.

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2/ As of interest for reference purposes, there is enclosed herewith a statement, prepared by Lieutenant C. C. Brown, showing the distribution of Japanese forces as of 12 noon on October 8, 1931. It is understood that no substantial change in the distribution of these forces has occurred since then. Last evening I was informed by my Japanese Colleague that outside the railway area and occupied adjacent Chinese cities Japanese troops are found only at Kirin, Liaoyuan (Chengchiatun) and Chüliuho (near Hsinmin).

The

- 3 -

The Japanese military authorities have repeatedly sent detachments into the interior for the purpose of dispersing bandits or so-called "bandit troops" who allegedly were threatening the railway or the lives and property of Japanese subjects. After accomplishing their missions these detachments returned to their stations. On the morning of the 13th one company of infantry and a squadron of cavalry were despatched from Mukden against bandits operating south of the Peking-Mukden line in the Tamintun area and it was reported today that the Japanese have suffered a few casualties in an encounter yesterday.

The most formidable expedition of this kind so far despatched was sent out from Mukden early this morning. Four trains with armored cars carrying, according to official reports, two battalions of infantry, one battalion of artillery, and one squadron of cavalry were sent to Hsinglungtien, a station of the Peking-Mukden Railway east of the Liao river at Chuliuh["]o, for the purpose of dispersing 5000 "bandit soldiers" about twenty miles to the northeast of that point. One squadron of aeroplanes was sent with this force. In view of the fact that some six inch howitzers were seen on the train it was thought that the expedition was destined for points west of the Liao river, but reliable information secured this afternoon corroborated Japanese statements in regard to the objective of the expedition. It is officially reported that these troops will return to Mukden as soon as their object is accomplished.

- 4 -

A news item, dated Tokyo October 12, is published in The Manchuria Daily News (October 14, 1931) purporting to give the Japanese army returns showing the numbers of Japanese and Koreans that have been "assaulted, kidnapped and massacred in South Manchuria by Chinese soldiers" between September 22 and October 5, 1931. The returns are as follows:

" About September 23, 11 butchered near Paiyintala.	11
September 28, at Changhsiahtun (west of Mukden) 4 kidnapped and their whereabouts unknown.	4
About September 29, in Taolu Prefecture about 100 massacred.	100
September 29, east of Tiehling 2 butchered.	2
September 30, 3 seriously wounded at Tungyuanpu (on the Mukden-Antung Line).	3
In Kaiyuan Prefecture 7 butchered.	7
Up to October 2, 28 massacred; 30 more at Tatientzu; 30 at Pachiatzu; 25 at Kuehlatzu; 14 at Chikuanshan.	127
October 2, at Tienchuangtai above Yingkou, about 18 kidnapped, 7 of whom released.	11
Up to October 5, about Chaopitun and Lichiatai about 350 butchered."	350 415

It may be of interest to note that the former magistrate of this district (Shenyang), Mr. Li Yi, who disappeared at the time of the Japanese occupation, has been back at his post since the early part of October. From a reliable source, it has been learned that his office is shared with a Japanese gendarmerie officer who examines all papers. The Japanese military authorities at first objected to Li Yi's resumption of his post because of his alleged anti-Japanese attitude, but at the instance of Yuan Chin-k'ai, head of the Peace Preservation Com-

mittee

- 5 -

mittee, their objection was withdrawn. The city of Mukden, it may be added, has a separate administration, at the head of which there is a Japanese at present.

Brief mention may be made of the altered complexion of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce at Mukden. Prior to the Japanese occupation, the President of the Chamber and a number of others prominent in its affairs, were members of the Foreign Relations Supporting Association which was extremely anti-Japanese. All persons prominently associated with this association have disappeared (probably have left Mukden) and a more conservative class of merchants is now conducting the affairs of the Chamber.

The opening of through traffic on the Shenyang (Mukden)-Hailung railway is scheduled to take place tomorrow, October 15. Since September 24th trains have been operating irregularly on this line between Yingp'an, a station north of Fushun, and Chaoyanshen, its northern terminus and junction point with the Kirin-Hailung railway, which has also been operating trains more or less irregularly. It is reported that the private shareholders and others interested have approached the municipal government for the resumption of traffic and that their petition has been granted. Ting Chien-hsiu, a member of the Peace Preservation Committee at Mukden, has been elected as the Chief of Railway Operations. Press reports state that Major Doihara, Mayor of Mukden, is the President of the Railway Maintenance Committee which was organized for the purpose of restoring normal traffic on the line.

Respectfully


- 6 -

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers.
American Consul General.

- 1/ Enclosure: Translation of Chinhsien leaflet.
2/ " : Troops distribution on October 8, 1931.

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800.



Enclosure No. 1, to despatch No. 463, of M. S. Myers,
American Consul General, Mukden, China, dated October
14, 1931, to the Legation, Peiping, on the subject
"Political Situation in South Manchuria."

YOUR ATTENTION

The old imperialists of the northeast who are the personification of unrestrained ambition and whose hearts are filled with avarice and lust are now in secret hiding in Chinchow. They are emboldened to make malicious designs against districts where peace and order are maintained by us. They also send plain clothes troops to coerce the gentry and to incite the bandits. Owing to their action in creating disturbances Chinese, as well as Japanese, in the northeast are greatly perturbed.

Moreover, lately troops are being concentrated at Chinchow and at the same time defeated troops from all sides are congregating in districts east and west of the South Manchuria Railway with the intention of joining together for the purpose of destroying our army, a plan which may be likened to a mantis trying to stop a cart. Our army, therefore, is compelled to take self-defensive steps and clear away the root of the trouble. Our army has given special attention to getting rid of the cruel and tranquilizing the good and will not harm or endanger good people. We wish that you, people of the municipality, will appreciate this which is important.

The 10th month of the 6th year of Chao Ho.

Enclosure No. 2, to despatch No. 463, of M. S. Myers,
American Consul General, Mukden, China, dated October
14, 1931, to the Legation, Peiping, on the subject
"Political Situation in South Manchuria."

DISTRIBUTION OF JAPANESE FORCES AS OF NOON, OCTOBER 8, 1931.

2nd DIVISION AREA.

Changchun. 2nd Division Headquarters.

- 1 Brigade Infantry
- 2 Batteries Field Artillery
- 2 Squadrons Cavalry
- 1 Squadron Pursuit planes
- 1 Squadron Observation planes

Kirin.

- 1 Brigade Infantry
- 1 Battery Field Artillery

Saupingkaï.

Headquarters of Independent Railway guards under
General Mori

Liaoyuan.

- 2 Companies Infantry
- 1 Battery Field Artillery

Tiehling.

3 independent battalions of railway guards
are distributed between Tiehling and Chang-
chun and one between Tiehling and Mukden.

CHOSEN BRIGADE AREA.

Mukden. Kwantung Army Headquarters.

- 1 Mixed Brigade (Chosen)
- 1 Squadron Pursuit planes

Hairmin. (Chulinho)

- 2 Companies Infantry
- 1 Section Field Artillery

Hewehwang. (Yingkou)

- 1 Company Infantry
- 1 Section Artillery


Antung.

- 1 Battalion Railway Guards.

There are two battalions of railway guards south of
Mukden, one along the Mukden-Antung line and one along the
main line.

NOTE: Altogether there are six battalions of these
guards.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75



RECEIVED

NOV 17 1931

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

The attached paper is from

American Embassy, Tokyo.

It is submitted as of interest to the Secretary
by the Division of Far Eastern Affairs

SECRETARY OF STATE

NOV 21 1931

(Initials) SKH

Subject: Mr. Salisbury's Report on Situation
in Manchuria.

~~Concise resume of contents:~~

Here is Mr. Salisbury's report, giving an account
of his observations, together with his conclusions,
rendered after his return to Tokyo, under date Octo-
ber 24.

Mr. Salisbury is a Foreign Service officer, a
"Japan" language officer, who has had eleven years of
service -- in Japan. He was in both the British and
the American Armies, with overseas service, during the
war. I regard him as one of the ablest of our junior
officers. He is thirty-seven years old.

I think that you will wish to read this report
in its entirety.

I feel that Salisbury should be given the protec-
tion of silence on our part with regard to the fact
that we have from him such a report: the report is
adversely critical of the action of the Japanese mili-
tary.


Recommendation of action:

No action called for.

Secretary's instruction:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 14, 1931



~~SECRET~~

(Reference despatch from Embassy, Tokyo, No. 374, October 24, 1931). This interesting summary report by Salisbury of his (and Hanson's) recent "observations" in Manchuria should be read in its entirety.


Most of the essential facts we have already had by telegraph. The comment in the following sections is especially interesting:

- II. Causes of the Action of the Japanese Military.--p. 2.
- III. Aims of the Japanese Military.--p. 3.
- VI. The Opportune Time Chosen for Attack.--pp. 11-12.
- VII. The Plan of the Japanese Military.--pp. 12-16.
- VIII. Treaty Infractions.--p. 17.
- X. Japanese Control of Occupied Cities and Railways.--pp. 19-22.
- XII. Japanese Withdrawal.--pp. 23-26.

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RSM: EJJ

SKA




EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Tokyo, Japan, October 24, 1931.

No. 374

NOV - 9 31



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793.94/2558



December 7 1931. *Instruction drafted to Tokyo, Nov. 28, 1931 Emt*

*793-94
note
123 Jan 3*

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that Mr. Salisbury left Tokyo, in accordance with the Department's telegram No. 177 of September 29th, 6 P. M., on the morning of October 2nd. He arrived at Changchun at 1 P. M., October 4th, where he met Mr. Hanson. The rest of that day and the one following they spent in investigating conditions at Changchun and the nearby places of Nanling and Kuanchengtze. On the morning of October 7th they went to Kirin and the following afternoon proceeded to Tunhua, arriving again at

Kirin

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- 2 -

Kirin on the afternoon of October 9th. On the morning of October 10th they again went to Changchun and the rest of that day and most of the eleventh was spent in further work there. At 4:30 in the afternoon of the 11th they started for Taonanfu, reaching there early in the morning of the 12th. They left Taonanfu that night for Mukden, where they arrived early in the afternoon of the 13th, having spent four hours at Ssuningkai on the way. On the afternoon of the 14th they proceeded to Newchwang (Yinkou) and spent that evening and most of the following day studying the situation there. They arrived again at Mukden at 8:00 P. M., on the 15th, and left there three hours later for Antung, where they spent October 16th, returning by the night train to Mukden. The 17th, 18th, and 19th were spent at Mukden investigating conditions there and preparing a final telegraphic report covering the entire trip. On the 20th each officer started for his respective post, Mr. Salisbury arriving at Tokyo on the morning of October 23rd.

1/. There is enclosed a copy of Mr. Salisbury's report of his investigation.

Respectfully yours,



Edwin L. Neville

Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

Enclosure:
Copy of Report.

Copy to Peiping.

Embassy's File No. 800.

LES/AA

Copy to Harbin.

1. Brief Outline of Japanese Military Action from
September 18th.

Between ten and ten-thirty on the night of September 18th, according to the Japanese military, some Chinese set off an explosive on the tracks of the South Manchuria Railway just north of Mukden. This precipitated a clash that resulted in an attack by the Japanese on the Chinese North Barracks. During the remainder of that night and the following day, the Japanese military occupied the cities of Mukden, Changchun, Antung, and Newchwang (Yinkou). On September 21st the Japanese military occupied the city of Kirin and on the 22nd Chengchiatun, thereby making ineffective for use by the Chinese those Chinese railways that parallel the South Manchuria Railway on the east and the west. Between September 22nd and 25th troops occupied Tungliao, Tunhua, and Taonanfu, cities located on the Chinese parallel lines, but withdrew from them by October 5th. Following the occupation of these cities, the most important action by the Japanese military was the bombing of Chinchow where Generals Chang Hsueh-liang and Chang Tso-hsiang were attempting to reestablish the Government that had existed at Mukden prior to the Japanese military activities. Other military action by the Japanese has continued sporadically to the present time to quell the activities of bandits whose number had been augmented by the Chinese troops that had fled before the approach of the Japanese or had been dispersed.

II. Causes

-2-

II. Causes of the Action of the Japanese Military.

A clash in Manchuria between Japanese and Chinese forces was inevitable. The Japanese had long been aggravated by Chinese intransigence. The Chinese would not - wilfully would not, from the Japanese point of view - come to a conclusion with the Japanese in negotiations over problems that affected legitimate Japanese economic development in Manchuria. Among the problems which the Japanese were anxious to have solved were those of taxation, land rights, Koreans in Manchuria, the boycott of Japanese goods, and the construction of railways by the Chinese allegedly in contravention of existing agreements. In addition to these more fundamental problems, there had been during the months preceding September 18th an increasing number of occurrences, such as the murder of Captain Nakamura and his two companions, which had added to Japanese dissatisfaction.

The Japanese military had further reasons for discontent. They believed that the conciliatory policy Office of the Japanese Foreign/with respect to Manchuria was mistaken and they felt that their prestige had been lowered through it.

Mr. Hayashi, Japanese Consul General at Mukden, stated that in July of this year he informed Baron Shidehara, the Japanese Foreign Minister, that, although the conciliatory policy should be adhered to, a clash was inevitable. He patently regretted, however, that the pretext seized upon - or manufactured - by the military was unconvincing and trivial.

III. Aims

- 3 -

III. Aims of the Japanese Military.

The only frank Japanese avowal of the immediate aim of the Japanese military was that of Lieutenant-Colonel Iwata, commander of the Japanese troops at Tashihchiao and at Newchwang (Yinkou). He told us that Newchwang had been occupied by the Japanese, not to protect the Japanese residents, as they had not been in danger, but to disperse Chang Hsueh-liang's troops - of which there had been 500 at Newchwang - and to destroy his power. He added that these were also the reasons for the taking of Changchun, a very different but more credible explanation than the one we had heard at the latter city.

There seems to be no question that the Japanese military believed that Chang Hsueh-liang's power was inimical to a favorable solution of a number of outstanding questions. They decided to destroy this power in the interest of the Japanese. Both Chinese and Japanese in Manchuria agree on this point, and the bombing of Chinchow can be adequately explained only by the fact that Chang Hsueh-liang had set up his government there. The military probably felt, too, that only by some such action could they restore their prestige which they thought had been impaired. How much further the ambition of the Japanese military may have extended will be discussed subsequently in this report.

IV. Japanese Excuse for Military Action.

With the exception of the military commander at

Newchwang

- 4 -

Newchwang already quoted, all Japanese military and civil officers with whom we talked claimed that the extended military action was necessary to safeguard Japanese lives. They insisted that once news of the clash in Mukden was received the Chinese troops would have attacked Japanese residents had they not been forestalled by the Japanese military.

V. Validity of the Japanese Excuse.

In no place did we find the Japanese excuse convincing. In places outside of Mukden, the Chinese attitude invariably was: "Why did the Japanese come here? This is a Mukden affair and should have been settled at Mukden." Wherever they were not surprised and fired upon by the Japanese without warning, the Chinese troops either fled or surrendered their arms without resistance. We were told by many Chinese that orders had sometime previously been issued to all Chinese troops not to resist in case of Japanese aggression, and the truth of this report seems to have been borne out wherever the Chinese troops had a chance to act in this sense. If such an order had been issued, it would seem that a command as efficient as the Japanese command probably knew of it. Every place which Japanese troops occupied had strategic value and such a place as Harbin, with 4,000 Japanese residents, received no military protection while Tunhua with 18 Japanese residents and Taonanfu with 5 were occupied. Of all the Japanese we asked with regard to the reasons for the

non-occupation

- 6 -

non-occupation of Harbin, although the Japanese residents there were so uneasy that many left the city, only the commander of the Japanese troops at Newchwang had a definite answer. He said that occupation of Harbin would have created complications with the Russians. To convince us of the danger to the Japanese, both at Changchun and Newchwang, we were told of trenches the Chinese troops had recently dug. At Changchun these trenches were very close to the Kuanchengtze barracks and could have been used only in defence (though they were not so used in the recent clash). As the trenches at Newchwang afforded no protection from approach of an enemy by railway (the natural way for Japanese to approach), they were undoubtedly built for protection against bandits, the number of which has increased considerably in that vicinity during the past year.

a. At Mukden.

The accounts of the Japanese military of what occurred near Mukden on the night of September 18th are so very contradictory and their protestations of Chinese culpability so elaborate that it seemed to us not only were the initial events of that night not as the Japanese military explained them but that the Japanese attack on the North Barracks came as an almost complete surprise to the 10,000 Chinese soldiers occupying them. (As the Consulate General at Mukden has already reported the initial incident, it seems unnecessary for me to give reasons for disbelief.) Admitting,

however,

- 7 -

however, that the Japanese version is correct, military action could have been stopped following the death of the three Chinese, who were alleged to have caused the explosion, without dishonor to the Japanese and without danger either to Japanese troops or civilians. Colonel Shimamoto, who commanded the Japanese troops in their attack on the barracks, told us that after a Japanese lieutenant and six soldiers had pursued the alleged perpetrators of the explosion, two or three companies of Chinese troops came out of the barracks to aid their countrymen, only to retreat into the barracks before the approach of a Japanese company. Until this time there had been no Japanese casualties. When Colonel Shimamoto was asked why the Japanese did not allow hostilities to stop at this point, he said that once the retreating Chinese company had informed the remaining 10,000 fellow soldiers of the affair they would have poured out and annihilated the Japanese. Considering that the 10,000 Chinese were apparently unprepared to resist the subsequent attack by 800 Japanese, during which 300 Chinese were killed and only 2 Japanese, it would seem that they had had no intention of leaving their barracks to attack the Japanese.

b. At Changchun.

In the vicinity of Changchun, the only place besides Mukden where there was fighting, there would have been no clash if the Chinese had not been attacked while they were

- 8 -

were asleep. Both Japanese and Chinese informants stated that the Chinese troops were asleep. The Japanese also admit that no attempt was made beforehand to effect the surrender of the Chinese troops, the Japanese again claiming that military tactics demanded an "offensive defensive".

There were four separate "battles" in the vicinity of Changchun: two at Nanling, three miles south of Changchun, one at Kuanchengtze, three kilometres north of Changchun, and one at the barracks of the Chinese railway guards at the Changchun station of the Kirin-Changchun Railway.

Major Hosoki, our military guide there, told us that news of the fighting at Mukden was received at Changchun at 12:15 and that at 1:30 A. M. all the troops at Changchun were ordered to go to Mukden to assist. (As the departure of these troops, numbering 1,000, would have left only 100 railway guards to protect the Japanese residents of Changchun, according to the Japanese consul there, it would seem to show that there was no especial concern regarding their safety.) At 3:50 or 3:55 A. M. word came from Mukden that the assistance of these troops was not necessary. 200 troops were then sent against the artillery barracks at Nanling, while 200 other troops were despatched against the infantry barracks at Kuanchengtze.

According to the Japanese military: the troops sent against the artillery barracks at Nanling reached there about 5:00 A. M., where there were approximately 500 Chinese soldiers. By 8:00 A. M., the 36 cannon

and

- 9 -

and the barracks had been destroyed and the Chinese had fled. The Japanese then retired to a nearby village to rest and dress their wounds. At 10:00 A. M., 200 Japanese reinforcements having arrived from Kungchuling, south of Changchun on the South Manchuria Railway, an attack was made on the infantry barracks at Nanling, where there were from 1,500 to 1,800 Chinese troops.*

The curious point about this battle at the Chinese infantry barracks at Nanling is that, although these barracks are only two or three hundred feet from the artillery barracks, the infantry did not come to the support of the artillery but waited quietly in their barracks until ten o'clock when the Japanese attacked them and, after fighting until 2 P. M., put them to flight.

Both at Mukden and at Changchun one felt distinctly that the Japanese wished to make it appear that the resistance of the Chinese had been very strong and that only severe fighting had quelled them. One Chinese told us that the infantry had fled, as soon as the artillery was attacked, as the Chinese cavalry in contiguous barracks had fled. Remembering the behavior of Chinese troops elsewhere, it is difficult to believe that the Chinese infantry waited in their barracks until 10:00 A. M. while the artillery was fighting and when they knew that probably they would be attacked. Before this

ten

* When figures in this report differ from figures in the telegrams we sent, it is usually because later we received what seemed to be more accurate information.

- 10 -

ten o'clock battle, if it occurred, no effort was made by the Japanese, according to Major Hosoki, to have them surrender. The indications of severe fighting at the infantry barracks cannot be taken as proof that severe fighting actually did occur since the Japanese military are not above the suspicion of having manufactured evidence, as it is alleged, with some reason, they did at the railway tracks at Mukden.

At the barracks at Kuanchengtze there seems to have been really strong resistance, which can be explained by the fact that, not only was it a surprise attack, but the building in which the 500 to 600 Chinese infantry were housed was a much stronger building for purposes of defence than the other barracks where fighting occurred. Also, here they were under fire from at least three sides and the chance of escape was lessened. The total number of dead, according to Japanese figures, in the fighting at Nanling and Kuanchengtze was: Japanese, 68; Chinese, 216. Of the Chinese, 180 were killed at Kuanchengtze.

I cannot but believe that, had the Chinese at Nanling and Kuanchengtze been given warning, they would either have fled or submitted peacefully.

The attack by Japanese troops on the barracks of the Chinese railway guards at the Changohun Station of the Kirin-Changohun Railway was certainly not to protect Japanese residents but to gain control of the telegraph office of that station. Here fighting lasted for only a very few minutes and there were no casualties on the

Japanese

- 11 -

Japanese side. Whether there were or not on the Chinese side, we were unable to learn.

c. At Other Places.

The 7,000 Chinese troops at Kirin retreated from the city the day before the arrival of the 200 Japanese troops. The withdrawal of the 1,000 Japanese residents would have been less expensive, it would seem, and would have had less serious effects on the ultimate maintenance of order than occupation of the city by Japanese troops.

At Antung there were no Chinese troops, only 600 Chinese policemen. These permitted themselves to be disarmed without offering resistance. The nearest troops (several hundred at Fenghuangchien) were disarmed without disorder and sent to Mukden.

At Newchwang about 300 Chinese troops and 800 Chinese policemen were disarmed peacefully. The remaining 200 Chinese soldiers of that city fled, having been outside of Newchwang hunting bandits at the time of the arrival of 300 Japanese troops.

VI. The Opportune Time Chosen for Attack.

The time chosen by the Japanese military for widespread action was very opportune for its success. How much thought was given to the points that follow below it is, of course, impossible to say.

(a) The strongest Chinese officials of Manchuria were absent. Generals Chang Hsueh-liang, Chang Tso-hsiang of Kirin, and Wan Fu-lin of Tsitsihar were all in Peking.

There

- 12 -

There was no official of their power or influence left in Manchuria. Their absence rendered organized resistance difficult, continuance of effective government impossible and the formation of any new government improbable unless with the support or acquiescence of the Japanese.

(b) It seems credible, as already stated, that the Chinese troops in Manchuria had received orders that in case of Japanese aggression they should not resist.

(c) The Nakamura case was on the verge of a satisfactory settlement, which would have lessened public sympathy for the action of the Japanese military if undertaken subsequently.

(d) The Japanese military may believe that this recent action, coming before the meeting of the Disarmament Conference, will make less likely any serious scaling down of the strength of the Japanese army.

(e) Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang's increasing intimacy with Peking and Nanking was tending to orient Manchuria politically toward China south of the Wall, a tendency definitely destroyed to all practical intents by the action of the Japanese military.

(f) The other Powers were seriously occupied in combatting depression.

(h) The Japanese people were growing restive under the large expenditures for the military; this restiveness may very possibly decrease before the people's pride in the efficiency of their army.

VII. The Plan of the Japanese Military.

It is apparent that the Japanese had ready a well-
worked

- 13 -

✓ worked-out plan of action in Manchuria, as any efficient army in the world probably has plans prepared for almost any contingency. That such a plan existed is indicated by the rapid, unified, and strategic action that followed the Mukden clash. It would seem to an observer that the plan consisted of four distinct steps, the first two of which were worked out fully, the third initiated but for some reason abandoned, while the fourth, apparently, is now in progress.

(a) The first part of the plan began with the alleged explosion on the tracks near Mukden and ended the following day when the Japanese military had gained control of the strategic cities of the South Manchuria Railway area, namely, Changchun, Mukden, Antung, and Newchwang. With these cities in control the Japanese army was reasonably free from any fear of attack in the South Manchuria Railway area and was in a position to administer it as they wished. ✓ All action in this area was initiated by the Japanese military before dawn on September 19th.

(b) When the control of the South Manchuria Railway area was consolidated, the second part of the plan was initiated; namely, the seizure of control of the Chinese railways that parallel the South Manchuria Railway on the east and the west. On September 21st, they took the city of Kirin, along with the Kirin-Changchun Railway. Possession of Kirin, with Mukden already occupied, gave the Japanese military the control of the Kirin-Hailung-Mukden Railway (Shen-Hai and Kai-Ki Railways), which parallels the South Manchuria Railway on the east and is a line built by the Chinese under strong Japanese protest. The following day (September 22nd) Chengchiatun was taken, thereby giving the Japanese control of
Ssapingkai-

- 14 -

Ssuningkai-Chengchiatun Railway. This made it impossible for the Chinese to use effectively the Chinese railway lines that parallel the South Manchuria Railway on the west, namely, the Tahushan-Chengchiatun and Chengchiatun-Taonanfu Railways. (The same day the Japanese troops advanced also to Tungliao, south of Chengchiatun on the Tahushan-Chengchiatun Railway, but withdrew on the 23rd, the day following.) That these occupations were for strategic control becomes apparent when one realizes that at Kirin there are only 1,000 Japanese residents and at Chengchiatun only about 150 Japanese residents; while between Ssuningkai and Chengchiatun the only town with Japanese residents is Pamiencheng, and they number about 20.

(c) The third part of the plan is difficult to understand, for apparently it was abandoned almost as soon as initiated. From Kirin and Chengchiatun, through control of which the Japanese had rendered the parallel lines practically useless to the Chinese, Japanese troops were moved along Chinese lines. Mention of the advance south to Tungliao on the 22nd, followed by withdrawal on the 23rd, has already been made. On September 23rd, 200 Japanese troops advanced from Kirin to Tunhua, occupying that city and the line connecting it with Kirin. On September 25th Japanese troops were moved up to Taonanfu from Chengchiatun, whence they were withdrawn on the 26th. The troops at Tunhua were withdrawn to Kirin on October 5th. With regard to these movements, one can only be certain that they were not made for the protection of Japanese residents, as at Tunhua there were only 18, and at Taonanfu 5 at this time. Both places are of strategic importance

- 15 -

importance, Tunhua being the point from which the Japanese have long desired to construct a railway line across to Kainei on the Korean border. (There was no evidence that such construction had been begun at Tunhua during the several days of Japanese occupancy.) From Taonanfu control of Tsitsihar, the capital of Heilungkiang, could be obtained with comparative ease, if desired and if the Russians would not object. Such far-flung control by Japanese troops would, however, weaken Japanese strength, since apparently the Japanese action has been carried on without increasing the number of troops permitted in Manchuria under treaty with China. Further advance by the military, it is also believed, was opposed by the Tokyo Government.

(d) The fourth step of this plan appears to be the setting up of political administrations independent of infra-mural China and of the former rulers of Manchuria. This was done at Kirin, where Hsi Ch'ia, formerly Chief of Staff of General Chang Tso-hsiang, formed an independent government either at the request of the Japanese or at their command. At Mukden the Japanese several times requested Mr. Yuan Chin-kai to form a government, but he consistently refused. On October 18th and 19th there were reports that General Chang Hai-peng, Garrison Commander at Taonanfu, was marching on Tsitsihar and would, if he gained control there, be amenable to the Japanese. (General Chang Hai-peng told us, however, when we visited Taonanfu that he was independent of the Japanese.) Local governing bodies were set up by the Japanese at such places as Mukden and Kaiyuan, but as this information was obtained from the American Consul General at Mukden and as he has already reported regarding it, discussion of this phase is not

-16-

not included here. In the cities which we visited that were occupied by the Japanese, local governments had not been set up, governmental establishments being carried on by Chinese officials under Japanese supervision or control. This situation will be discussed more in detail, however, in a subsequent part of this report.

On October 18th we were told by Mr. Yuan Chin-kai that he expected that the ex-emperor of China would be set up at Kirin within thirty days under the aegis of the Japanese. Kirin will be chosen because it has now a government independent of the rest of China. He went on to say that Heilungkiang will subsequently give allegiance, for General Chang Hai-peng of Taonanfu will by that time be in power at Tsitsihar, and later Fengtien will become a part of the restored Emperor's "empire". Mr. Yuan apparently felt that this would be a satisfactory solution of the present situation and did not believe that the new state would go the way of Korea. As I could obtain no definite information with regard to this alleged plan of the Japanese military and as Consul General Myers informed me that he is reporting to the Department regarding this development, I shall not discuss the matter further here.

In short, however, it is apparent that the fourth part of the plan of the Japanese military is to see that Manchuria will be governed independently of the rest of China by Chinese who will be amenable to Japanese suggestion.

VIII. Treaty

- 17 -

VIII. Treaty Infractions.

The number of troops employed by the Japanese in Manchuria since September 18th has apparently not exceeded the number permitted under Article II of the Additional Articles of the Treaty of Peking of 1905. All important military actions of the Japanese since September 18th, however, have been outside of rights conceded to the Japanese in existing treaties and agreements. From all that we learned, it would seem that the tactics used by the Japanese military were those that would be employed, subsequent to a declaration of war, against an enemy capable of competent strategy and action. There would seem to be no other explanation for the surprise attacks of the Japanese against the Chinese troops at Nanling, Kuanchengtze, and possibly at Mukden, the surprise entries into Newchwang and Antung, the seizure of strategic points on the Chinese parallel railways, the bombing of Chinchow, the taking over of control of Chinese telegraph and telephone wherever possible, and, in some instances, censorship of the posts.

IX. Behavior of the Japanese Military.

At no place which we visited did we hear of "atrocities" on the part of the Japanese. Although the attacks at Nanling, Kuanchengtze, and Mukden were unnecessary, they were apparently governed by recognized rules of warfare, with the exception that no ultimatum

had

- 18 -

had been sent nor a declaration of war made. Everywhere the Japanese military seemed desirous of making a favorable impression on Chinese civilians. Statements included in the proclamations posted by the Japanese military in the occupied cities support this view. In one of them was the declaration that "a benevolent government" would be instituted, in another that the Japanese troops had come to protect both Japanese and Chinese residents, and in a third that Japanese gendarmes had assumed responsibility for peace and order. At Antung, it is true, four Chinese were killed, but rather through misunderstanding than intention. The Chinese who told us of this incident seemed to bear no resentment. A Chinese policeman, having had his rifle returned to him by the Japanese, shot it three times at nothing in particular. The sound of the shots, however, created a panic among some Chinese. They rushed into a courtyard of a silk mill and there armed themselves with whatever happened to be at hand, thinking that they were about to be attacked. Japanese troops, intending to keep order, broke into the courtyard and apparently being attacked by the frightened Chinese - or believing that they were about to be attacked - fired and killed four. At Nanling the destruction of the artillery barracks appeared to have been more extensive than necessary. The military officer who accompanied us there explained that, as Chinese soldiers were fleeing with bundles of their belongings slung over their backs, Japanese soldiers set fire to the bundles. These burning bundles

- 18 -

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- 19 -

C bundles.---These burning bundles ignited the buildings. At Kuanchengtze we were told that a wounded Chinese policeman (or railway guard) cursed at the Japanese and was then killed by one of them. The dropping of two low explosive bombs at Taonanfu, without other reason than to frighten the inhabitants, might have resulted in unnecessary death if someone had been at that time in the toilet of the railway station. The bombing of Chinchow would seem to be a nearer approach to an atrocity on the part of the Japanese than any other acts in Manchuria since September 18th.

X. Japanese Control of Occupied Cities and Railways.

In the cities we visited that were still occupied by the Japanese, we found that practically all principal offices were under the control or the supervision of the Japanese military and were practically cut off from free communication with other parts of China, including Manchuria. At Changchun one could telephone only in the Japanese language. At Antung the Chinese telegraph office had been closed and messages could be sent only through the Japanese telegraph office. At Mukden and Antung there was a censorship of mail, at Mukden since October 4th or 5th and at Antung since October 12th or 13th. Delivery of newspapers from Shanghai or Tientsin was not permitted and letters addressed to Chinese officials were liable to censorship. Chinese radio, in any of these cities where it had been established, was not in operation. The local press at Mukden was under Japanese control and of the two local Chinese papers at Antung one had

-20-

had suspended publication following the Japanese occupation and the other had become entirely innocuous. New airfields at Changchun and at Kirin were under construction by the Japanese. We were told that one was also being made at Tashihohiao, the junction of the main line of the South Manchuria Railway and the branch to Newchwang, but we were unable to investigate this personally. In each city the Chinese police and railway guards were under Japanese control or supervision. In some places there had been a partial or complete return to them of their arms; in other places they were still unarmed, as, for instance, the Chinese railway guards along the Kirin-Changchun Line.

At Kirin, we were informed, banks were permitted to be open for a few hours each day but the Governor was not allowed to draw funds with which to pay the disbanded soldiers outside the city. At Mukden the banks were at first closed; subsequently several Chinese banks resumed business, but we were told that Chinese government funds were kept sealed.

Officials were under close supervision. The magistrate at Newchwang had been under "house arrest" for 22 days from September 19th, his papers having been thoroughly investigated and ransacked during that time. Japanese gendarmes were occupying a part of the offices of the magistrate at Antung. The new governor of Kirin, having been put into office by the Japanese, was obviously under close Japanese surveillance. The new magistrate and mayor at Changchun were appointees

of

- 21 -

of this Japanese-controlled government at Kirin. We learned also of a number of arrests of Chinese officials with whom the Japanese were displeased. The Chinese postmaster at Kirin was arrested within a few hours after having called on us, but was released a day or two later. At Mukden we were told that the Civil Governor, the Commissioner of Education, and the Commissioner of Industry had been arrested and were still under arrest. In this connection, it may be of interest that Mr. Lung Hou, former official of the Kirin Government, fled secretly from Kirin within two or three hours after his conversation with Mr. Hanson. He had said that he expected to leave in a few days, and much of his baggage was already packed. Apparently, he thought it would be wiser to leave immediately. Chinese of Kirin believed that he would not escape because the trains were watched, but subsequently we learned that he had reached Harbin safely.

The Kirin-Changchun and Tsupingkai-Chengchiatun lines were under Japanese control, with Japanese military at the larger stations, over some of which - on the former line - the Japanese flag was flying. The Mukden-Hailung-Kirin Railway was, when we left Mukden, being run by Chinese under Japanese financial supervision. This line cannot connect, as formerly, with the Mukden-Peiping line, for the tracks where the latter runs under the South Manchuria Railway have been torn up for a distance of perhaps two or three hundred feet - "to prevent the entry into Mukden of Chinese troops", we were told. The

Newchwang

- 22 -

Newchwang terminus of the Chinese Kaopangtze-Newchwang line was in the hands of the Japanese military and trenches had been dug at the end of the station facing toward Kowpangtze. We were told on what seemed to be fairly reliable Chinese information that the tracks of the Tahushan-Chengohiatun Railway had been destroyed by Japanese just south of Tungliao, but we were unable to get this report confirmed at Mukden. In short, most of the railways of South Manchuria are now under Japanese control or supervision, or, if not, at least practically useless as far as the Chinese are concerned.

XI. The Chinese Attitude toward the Japanese.

All of the Chinese with whom we talked were very much opposed to the Japanese occupation. Some were bitter and all seemed resentful. We frequently heard expressions of astonishment that the Japanese military action had extended beyond Mukden, since, they said, the affair concerned Mukden only and should have been settled there. We were told by those with whom we spoke that the only Chinese who might be satisfied with the new situation were some who would gain financially, while the uneducated classes were, not unnaturally, indifferent. It seemed that the great majority of the thinking classes of Chinese would prefer their own inadequate government to capable Japanese administration.

It did not seem that the resentment of the Chinese extended to the civilian Japanese residents, or, if it did, that they would dare attack them. For example, at Taonanfu, when we were there, there were only ten Japanese, employees of the South Manchuria Railway, in
the

-23-

the city and no Japanese military. These Japanese cut the telephone wires that connect Taonanfu with the south and ran them into their office building so that they only could telephone south of Taonanfu. Although the Chinese expressed dissatisfaction, they did not even attempt to cut the wires a second time so that at least these ten Japanese would also be unable to use the telephone.

Japanese consistently said that withdrawal of the Japanese troops would endanger Japanese residents. Particularly at Kirin did such expressions seem sincere.

When it is recalled that at Harbin and other places in China, where there are large groups of Japanese residents without Japanese military protection, no harm has come to the Japanese, it seems improbable that the Japanese civilians in the now occupied places would receive injury at the hands of the Chinese residents should occupation be abandoned. In the places which we visited, one did not feel that the resentment of the Chinese would subsequently take the form of attacks upon the Japanese civilians.

XII. Japanese Withdrawal.

Until October 19th, when we left Mukden for our respective posts, we could see no indications of intention on the part of the Japanese to withdraw effectively. It is true that two of the three companies that had occupied Newchwang had been withdrawn and that from Antung the Japanese troops had returned across the Yalu River to Shingishu. These withdrawals, however, were without significance, for it was apparent that in either place
a platoon

- 24 -

a platoon could continue to maintain as complete control as a battalion. It would appear that the Japanese military do not intend to abandon its present control until after a settlement of the principal problems that affect the Japanese in respect to Manchuria or until the formation of a government or governments amenable to Japanese wishes. Mr. Hayashi, Japanese Consul General at Mukden, said, on October 18th, that he believed that the Foreign Office at Tokyo was getting control of the situation, that the military were beginning to realize the true condition of affairs and the fact that there is such a thing as international relations, and that it intends to straighten out matters. I saw very little, if anything, that would seem to support this view.

The few Japanese gendarmes at Antung could be withdrawn immediately. There are no bandits operating in its vicinity as few, if any, disbanded soldiers have moved in its direction. The proximity of the railway guards at Antung and of Japanese troops at Shingishu would hold in check any recalcitrant Chinese. The Japanese military that are now in Changchun and its environs could also be withdrawn to the railway zone without danger to the lives of Japanese or Chinese residents. There is a total of from 50 to 70 Japanese military in the Chinese city of Kirin, Nanling, and Kuanchengtze. This force is not sufficient for protection, and in case of trouble troops from the railway zone could reach the scene of disturbance in a very few minutes. The airfield under construction at Changchun can scarcely be regarded as vital to the safety of the residents.

Changchun

At

- 25 -

At Kirin, Chengchiatun, and Newchwang, however, the situation is different. The presence of bandits and of disbanded soldiers ready for participation in banditry would jeopardize the lives and property of both Japanese and Chinese residents were the Japanese troops to be withdrawn before adequate means of protection by the Chinese military had been instituted. At Kirin since September 19th, 800 men have been formed into a bodyguard for the new governor. This bodyguard, composed principally of new recruits, together with the few hundred Chinese police, would be scarcely adequate protection against the large numbers of bandits and ex-soldiers that are said to be in the neighboring hills. At Kirin, as well as at the other places mentioned, some sort of a competent Chinese defence organization would have to be formed before the withdrawal of Japanese troops could be made with safety. We did not feel that the Japanese residents would be in danger of attack by Chinese residents if the Japanese military withdrew. At Newchwang we were told by Chinese officials that many of the ex-soldiers would return immediately to their posts upon the evacuation of the Japanese troops. This seemed to us to be a reasonable view of the situation.

In the places which we visited it seemed that the local officials would begin to function as competently as usual after withdrawal of Japanese control, provided adequate Chinese military protection were assured. This may prove difficult to provide in many places. The problem seems to be a police rather than a military one.


Manchuria

- 26 -

C
Manchuria has long been notorious as a bandit center. At present the dividing line between a soldier and a bandit seems not to be clearly drawn. The Chinese "armies" in Manchuria appear to be ex-bandits or potential bandits hired by the larger cities or districts for protection. Outlying small places may be attacked, or may pay bandits not to attack them. This situation could probably be taken care of by an adequate police or constabulary force. The provision of such force presents a political problem that is outside the scope of this report. I feel, however, that the question of adequate protection by Chinese will prove to be one of the great difficulties of Sino-Japanese negotiations.


Tokyo, Japan, October 24, 1931.

Laurence E. Salisbury
Second Secretary of Embassy.



No. 572.

NOV 9 31



F/DEW 793.94/2557

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

1/ As of possible interest to the Department, I have the honor to transmit herewith three copies of a circular which is being distributed through the mails by the Chinese Consulate General at Ottawa. The circular consists of an editorial, dated September 30, 1931, from "The Chinese Nation", Shanghai, relative to the present situation in Manchuria and is obviously intended as propaganda to rally public opinion in support of China and to discredit Japan.

Under the heading "Its Bearing on Peace Pacts", the editorial freely criticizes the United States

Government

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
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Government for its failure to invoke the Nine Power Treaty of 1922, although it did not hesitate to do so in 1929 against Russia.

I am informed that copies of the circular were received by the Consulate General at Halifax, the office of the British High Commissioner at Ottawa and the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, so I assume that it has been widely distributed, at least among government officials and representatives of foreign countries in Canada.

Respectfully yours,


Sanford MacNider.

Enclosure:

1. Circular (3 copies)
as indicated.

820.02

JCHB/EMS

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch
No. 572 of November 6, 1931,
from the Legation at Ottawa.

COPY OF AN EDITORIAL FROM

"The Chinese Nation" SHANGHAI

Volume II

DATED, SEPTEMBER 30, 1931

Number 16

Japanese Occupation of Manchuria

Its Political Significance

IT is scarcely necessary to say that the recent unfortunate events in Manchuria have rudely awakened the world to the full realization of what many observers of Far Eastern affairs have referred to as ominous potentialities of a new Balkan. The rumblings and ugly rumours which accompanied the Wanpaoshan incident and the Korean massacres have now proved themselves to be true foretokens of the dramatic events which subsequently culminated in the swift and complete occupation of South Manchuria by the Japanese troops already stationed in the neighbourhood and those despatched from Korea.

That this well-timed stroke of arms betrayed premeditation and careful staff work on the part of the Japanese military has now become a well-established fact, the various pretexts which they furnished having been found to be ridiculous enough to earn rejection even by the Japanese themselves. We have had several occasions to point out in these columns the designs of the Japanese military clique both in regard to Manchuria and to its own future in Japan. Numerous press reports from Japan have indicated the trend of political developments in that country. The independent actions and utterances of high Japanese military authorities have clearly demonstrated their intention in respect of China. Their arrogance embarrassed the Japanese Foreign Office; their rashness actually tied the hands of the Japanese Government which had later to recognize the state of affairs as created by their military operations. It was evident during the first few days that the Japanese Government was not prepared to meet the situation for which they had to find some sort of justification. They could not and they had to admit that the Japanese Army had gone beyond their control. With all the means of communication in Manchuria in their control, the Japanese authorities failed to provide the world with adequate information and it was not until they had been repeatedly pressed by the officials of the League of Nations, to which China appealed with the case, that a statement was issued from Tokyo although giving nothing beyond the traditional excuse of "self-defense" and a conditional promise to withdraw their troops.

But even this was evidently done with the utmost reluctance on the part of the military leaders who professed to be at a loss to understand "why the League of Nations (should have) taken the Manchurian situation so seriously." They contended that the League of Nations had no business to interfere with their military action in what they claim to be a local issue, and General Minami, the Japanese War Minister, was later heard to declare that in case the League should insist upon its right to intervene, the Imperial Japanese Government would not hesitate to withdraw its membership. However, under the pressure of the League whose stand was supported by the United States and the public opinion of the world, they had to reconcile themselves with the statement which the Japanese Foreign Office issued at the request of the League. This meant the suspension of the preconceived plan which the Japanese military had every intention to carry out in Manchuria. Their reluctance is therefore readily understandable, but so too has attitude become clear to the world.

Incidentally, this latest tiff between the civil administration and the military party reveals the historic rivalry between the liberal and feudal ele-

ments that now govern the country. Owing to the peculiar constitution of the Japanese Government, the military clique with the support of the oligarchic House of Peers, has always been the strongest party. Responsible to the Emperor alone and beyond the control of the Diet, it has taken every opportunity to act on its own irrespective of foreign or domestic affairs, hence the phenomenon of dual diplomacy of which the history of Japanese foreign relations contains abundant instances. With the growth of liberal and democratic ideas among such people as are sometimes represented on the administration of the Japanese Government, this old rivalry has become increasingly acute. But unfortunately owing to its intricate ramifications with the capitalist class, its position remains deeply entrenched in the political machinery of the Japanese Empire. Feudalistic militarism therefore goes hand in hand with capitalism in Japan and this combination invariably results in imperialism with all its sinister possibilities. While the soundness and ultimate political value of imperialism has been amply discussed and disproved by many students of international relations, the form that it is now assuming in this quarter of the globe has become sufficiently disquieting to compel the attention of the world Powers.

Used as an instrument of internal politics in the form of slogans such as "strong" or "positive" policy to cast opprobrium upon the "weak-kneed" policy of an opposition party it might yet be of some service in Japan because there are still people befuddled enough to believe in it, but to have it thrust upon the world in the form of an overt act requires all the cupidity of a pampered and feudalistic general staff. The Japanese military have manifestly under-estimated China and the world for they have not only roused the ire of the Chinese people but also called down the universal condemnation of the civilized world. Granted that Japan, in the words of General Minami, her militant War Minister, has picked the "most ideal opportunity" for the realization of her pet dreams in Manchuria and Mongolia, she has overlooked the drift of modern civilization. In a world which is still labouring under the ruinous legacy of a past folly and which is seeking protection by means of various clumsy peace instruments from the repetition of similar blunders, the action of Japan has struck up a fearfully discordant and an amazingly barbarous note which portends ominously of trouble that may threaten the welfare of entire mankind. And yet, it is to be regretted, the response elicited by the solicitation of China in the interests of world peace has left much to be desired. With the outstanding exception of Soviet Russia, the signatories of the League Covenant, the Washington Treaty and the Paris Pact have shown little enthusiasm for the cause of right and justice, in spite of their professions for the same. The feelings of the Chinese people have already been aroused to a dangerous pitch and Russia alone seems to have appreciated the real peril that now threatens the peace of the Far East. The fate of China is in the balance. She will not be victimized by an imperialistic nation, but lacking support from quarters in which she has reposed her confidence, she might be compelled to turn to her nearest sympathizer or she might muster every ounce of her strength to put up a desperate stand against her aggressor, though neither of the alternatives bode any good for the world. Such then is the crux of the situation as precipitated by the military occupation of South Manchuria by Japan.

We are aware, of course, of the pretexts with which the Japanese Government have been trying to justify her military incursions in Manchuria, but such hackneyed expressions as "self-defense," "vested interests" or "special interests" are not really fool-proof. In themselves they offer no insurmountable obstacles to peaceable dealings, especially between parties who are signatories to the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Washington Treaty of 1921-2. The former calls upon the Members "to respect and preserve as against external appression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League," while the latter which was "designed to stabilize conditions in the Far East, to safeguard the rights and interests of China and to promote intercourse between China and the other Powers upon the basis of equality of opportunity," stipulates that the Powers "respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China," and "refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges" It must be obvious, therefore that if Japan were sincere in her solemn professions, she would not allow her vested or special interests in Manchuria, to compromise the sovereignty or violate the territorial integrity of China. Now she has actually occupied Manchuria by force in the name of those special interests whose very legality were contested at Washington, and yet we still hear of Mr. Yoshizawa exclaiming dramatically at a public meeting of the League Council at Geneva that "the honour of Japan is engaged." We wonder where it could be! She would trample upon her own undertakings and withal mock the entire world. She has turned down the good offices of the League and would not countenance the mediation or intervention of a third party. She insists on dealing with China directly because she knows China hasn't got a fighting chance with her. Inexorably these circumstances direct us to conclude that force, might, now implemented with beguiling instruments of peace, has become more than ever strongly implanted in the place of right and justice. No doubt the 4,550,000 millions of Chinese will be properly impressed and so will be the entire population of the world. For the future of world politics which the League has striven to place on an open and honourable basis, we can only record our gravest misgivings.

The Story of the Invasion

IN the name of self-defense, Japan has shown the world how cities and territories of another country may be occupied by force. And how effectively it may be done without previous intimations being given any other nation of her intention, and how conveniently any excuse may be forwarded to the world after the act of aggression has become a *fait accompli*. And the most astounding of all is the seeming ease with which a strong aggressor may with impunity disregard the profound anger of the offended nation which is impotent from the military standpoint.

Briefly the story runs thus. Alleging that the Chinese troops had destroyed a part of the South Manchurian Railway, Japanese soldiers were mobilized and with lightning speed launched an attack on the Chinese troops stationed at the Peitaiying camp. Bombardment on the Chinese camp started at 10 o'clock on the evening of September 18 which was soon followed by Japanese occupation as the Chinese troops withdrew without offering resistance. At the same time the Mukden arsenal was also occupied by the Japanese troops. Subsequently, the Peitaiying camp was reduced to ashes and the arsenal was dismantled.

Shenyang fell into the hands of Japanese troops at 6.30 a.m. after the police and the garrison troops were disarmed who likewise were without orders to resist. True to the form of effective military occupation all communications were either seized or severed. Chinese officials were summarily arrested and made prisoners.

The protest of the Liaoning Provincial Government lodged with the Japanese Consul-General at Shenyang was disregarded on the plea that he was not in a position to advise the movement of the

Japanese troops. In the meantime the march of the Japanese on the other Chinese cities continued. Without delay the Japanese occupied Changchun, Antung, Yinkow, Kowpangtze, Haicheng, Tashih-chiao, Liaoyang, Kungchulin, Ssuping kai, Kaiyuan, Changtu on the South Manchurian Railway and Pingchihu, Tsaohokow, Chikuanshan, Fenghuang cheng on the Antung-Fengtien Railway. Meanwhile, Japanese soldiers were moving towards Shanhaikwan. That was on September 19.

With the occupation of Kirin, the provincial capital of Kirin, on September 21, the entire Kirin-Changchun Railway went under the control of the Japanese troops. Five other lines, the Taonan-Angangchi, Tahushan-Tungliao-Liaoyuan (Cheng-chiateng), Taonan-Sulan, Shenyang-Hailun Railways were also seized by the Japanese.

Latest indications are such that despite the promise of the Japanese delegation at Geneva to withdraw troops from the Three Eastern Provinces of China, a concentration of the Japanese forces is visible at Kungchuling, 34 miles north-east of Ssuping kai and 38 miles south of Changchun (Kuan-chentze) which are in readiness to proceed northward. Again, it is freely circulated that a march into Heilungkiang from Taonan and the Liaoning-Heilungkian border is being contemplated by the Japanese forces.

Pending the withdrawal of the Japanese troops and an official investigation the exact loss of property and lives sustained by the Chinese cannot be ascertained. But it requires no stretch of imagination to grasp that a military occupation of a territory which involve both Liaoning and Kirin provinces must entail Chinese losses in property and lives little short of enormous, the absence of military resistance from the Chinese troops notwithstanding.

The animosity aroused among the Chinese, if expected by Japan, has perhaps upset the equanimity of the Japanese War Office by the serious proportions it has assumed. In the history of Japanese imperialistic enterprise in China there is hardly an instance that had attracted more attention and awakened more hostility than her present brazen occupation of Manchuria. Not even the presentation of Twenty-One Demands in 1915 could vie with the notoriety of the present performance.

More disquieting still to the Japanese militarists is the dissatisfaction that has been unreservedly expressed by parties other than China, over their distasteful manoeuvre in the Three Eastern Provinces of China.

Antecedents and Pretexts

IN connection with the Japanese atrocity in Manchuria a review of the number of conflicts that Japan and China have recently had are not without significance. It may be remembered that the policy of the present Japanese Government towards China has been consistently denounced by the military clique in Japan as "weak-kneed," and for the substitute of which a so-called positive policy in Manchuria has been championed.

Following closely upon the heels of the Wanpaoshan incident came the massacre of Chinese residents in Korea, which brutality was suffered to proceed by the agents of the Japanese Government in Korea. It was revealed later that the Japanese press with its fabricated stories of Chinese cruelty to Koreans in Manchuria was mainly responsible for manipulating the popular sentiments of the Koreans at home against the Chinese. The deliberate indifference of the Japanese gendarmes was unmistakable and the cause for such nonchalance obvious. But on top of all that the Japanese Government disowned all responsibility and on the contrary called the Chinese authors of their own misfortune. The Korean affair is very far from being settled, however.

While the eyes of the Chinese people were still focussed on the possible outcome of the Korean affair, they were suddenly informed by the Japanese authorities in Manchuria that a Japanese officer had been seized and killed by the irresponsible Chinese soldiers without provocation. Whether the allegation was a mere fabrication by the Japanese official investigations have not revealed anything substantial. But in Japan the alleged incident was well capitalized

she feel greatly inclined to interpret the act as taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly States, although Soviet Russia feels deeply involved.

It naturally follows that the United States could not see her way to admitting that the Kellogg Pact has been actively repudiated. Japan has pleaded self-defense and as that the United States is seemingly convinced that occupation was not resorted to by Japan "as an instrument of national policy." But even that does not rule out the previous phrase in Article 1 of the Pact which says: "the High Contracting Parties (of which Japan is one) solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies. . . ." How military occupation of the cities of another country is dissociated from the category of war is not yet explained. An international controversy, according to the Japanese allegation, naturally existed.

In 1929, the Pact was freely invoked by the United States in regard with the Sino-Russian conflict over the C. E. R. But the invocation met only with a Soviet snub. The reluctance of the same country to invoke it this time, in the light of past experiences, is intelligible. To deny the offender the benefits furnished by the Treaty is a vague threat that cannot be counted upon to inspire awe. The reluctance of the United States to invoke on a signatory, however, does not conceal the fact that the impotency of the Pact is patent. And it should be credited the Japanese military authorities of their adequate conception of the Pact of Paris and its significance. Without a new "set of teeth," the Pact will for long remain what it is.

The Role of Japanese Militarists

VIEWED apart from the international organisations of peace and their instruments, the unsuppressed dominance of the military clique of Japan, the Choshu and Satsuma clans and their modern counterparts, will always be the cause of discord in the Far East and hence of the world. Every student of Japanese Government realizes the influence the Japan General Staff Board and the Naval Staff Board wield in Japanese politics. Liberalism has grown in Japan in recent years to be sure, but militarists are very far from retired. Nor is it their inclination to do so. Because of their free access and the responsibility to the throne, their wealth and their wide industrial and business attachments, to force them into retirement would require much more than what the present civil ministers of Japan are able to exert. As long as they remain in the Japanese Cabinet as military representatives of the Japanese Emperor, dual diplomacy towards China will not cease. And nor will there be an end to the embarrassments periodically caused the Japanese Government. How the Japanese Government was thoroughly embarrassed at the signing of the Briand-Kellogg Pact and the more recent London Naval Conference is not unknown to other countries.

In Japan the control of the civil ministers over the military is almost non-existent. Traditionally the latter class look upon China as a natural country for unconcealed exploitation. Their influence in parts of Manchuria and in Korea are formidable. It is significant that Mr. Hayashi, the Japanese Consul-General at Shenyang, admitted that he could not advise the movements of the militarists. In Japan, the Foreign Minister did not hesitate to heap blames on the hot-headed young military officials. But in this instance, the embarrassment of the Japanese Government caused by the imperialists is again complete.

To summarize briefly, the occupation of Manchuria by Japanese forces is premeditated and without provocation. The attitude of both the League and the United States toward occupation as an act of self-defense, and the sway held by the Japanese military party in the Japanese Government will determine the future of the Far East, and to a significant extent, that of the world. If the present insult to the sovereignty of China should be allowed to go with impunity, her alienation with the international peace organisations and her reliance on force to forge

a destiny for her people would in both cases be probably complete.

Its Motives and Historical Background

THERE is no belying the fact that back of the roar of Japanese cannons in the present Manchurian impasse there hides the demand for a settlement of the conflicting claims of the two countries centering upon the railway issue in that portion of China's sovereign territory. Indeed, it is not too much to say that one of the real causes, as distinguished from ready-made pretexts, for Japan's sudden military action has been the matter of railway construction in the Three Eastern Provinces. In that connection, Japan allegedly has a grievance against this nation based upon treaty rights which the latter has found ample grounds to contest. It may be recalled that not many months ago a railway conference was proposed upon the initiative of Japan, but owing to Japan's insistence to deal directly with the local authorities instead of with the Central Government at Nanking and Japan's premature broadcasting of demands that China must recognize rights based upon treaties of a shady origin, the conference came to naught. The attempt to legalize claims arising out of treaties of a dubious character having thus failed, Japan next sought to enforce them by a resort to force of arms. If such an interpretation of the motive behind Japan's late invasion carries any weight of conviction at all, as we believe it does, then no more argument is needed to prove the unwarranted and illegitimate nature of those memorable agreements wrung from China under ignoble circumstances. Two successive attempts to legalize or enforce rights secured under a doubtful international instrument cannot but imply a self admission of the invalidity of that instrument.

In the light of history many reasons may be advanced in explanation of Japan's recent *coup* in Manchuria. The swift turn of events in the last week has served to convince that the one fundamental reason for her precipitate military move in that area is Japan's ambition to further increase and consolidate her influence and control over Manchuria, which has been an underlying element in her national policy ever since the Russo-Japanese War or even earlier, whenever an opportunity for such course of action is presented without unduly involving herself in international complications. Previous to this, the golden opportunity was offered in 1915 when the world was too much occupied with the catastrophic struggle raging in Europe to mind affairs in the Far East and when China herself was too weak and divided to put up a strong resistance. The opportunity was quickly seized upon by Japan. With reference to Manchuria she got practically what she wanted out of her Twenty-one Demands, the imposition of which upon China was accomplished at the point of the bayonet. But whatever rights and interests ill-obtained by Japan in 1915 were contested and in a large measure refuted under the terms of the Washington Treaties of 1922. That Conference was a severe blow to Japan's ambitions in Manchuria in particular and on the mainland of Asia in general. Throughout the last decade Japan has been looking forward to a time when her aims on the Asian continent may be realized. And in September, 1931, she saw the one opportunity of a lifetime. China is as usual weak and divided and the nations of the world are having grave financial and political problems of their own. On top of these, the country on whom Japan intends to prey is barely struggling to overcome the worst national calamity in her history. If alert Japan does not strike at this moment the ever-growing strength of Chinese nationalism exemplified by the adoption of a centralized foreign policy towards the conflicting claims in this quarter of the globe may never permit such a step in the future. But, in spite of careful premeditation, Japan has miscalculated the consequences of her drastic action. Instead of gaining for her what she really desired in Manchuria, it may eventually prove to be her undoing. One thing is certain: it has served to bring the ranks in China to stand on one battle-line. Overwhelming Chinese reactions point to the increasing difficulties of Japan's obtaining satisfaction out of the present mess.

We are aware, of course, of the pretexts with which the Japanese Government have been trying to justify her military incursions in Manchuria, but such hackneyed expressions as "self-defense," "vested interests" or "special interests" are not really fool-proof. In themselves they offer no insurmountable obstacles to peaceable dealings, especially between parties who are signatories to the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Washington Treaty of 1921-2. The former calls upon the Members "to respect and preserve as against external appression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League," while the latter which was "designed to stabilize conditions in the Far East, to safeguard the rights and interests of China and to promote intercourse between China and the other Powers upon the basis of equality of opportunity," stipulates that the Powers "respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China," and "refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges" It must be obvious, therefore that if Japan were sincere in her solemn professions, she would not allow her vested or special interests in Manchuria, to compromise the sovereignty or violate the territorial integrity of China. Now she has actually occupied Manchuria by force in the name of those special interests whose very legality were contested at Washington, and yet we still hear of Mr. Yoshizawa exclaiming dramatically at a public meeting of the League Council at Geneva that "the honour of Japan is engaged." We wonder where it could be! She would trample upon her own undertakings and withal mock the entire world. She has turned down the good offices of the League and would not countenance the mediation or intervention of a third party. She insists on dealing with China directly because she knows China hasn't got a fighting chance with her. Inexorably these circumstances direct us to conclude that force, might, now implemented with beguiling instruments of peace, has become more than ever strongly implanted in the place of right and justice. No doubt the 4,550,000 millions of Chinese will be properly impressed and so will be the entire population of the world. For the future of world politics which the League has striven to place on an open and honourable basis, we can only record our gravest misgivings.

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by the Japanese militarists to urge the substitute of a strong policy in Manchuria as different from the one the Japanese Government has been pursuing. Huge quantities of pamphlets were distributed for the purpose, and generally the people of Japan were worked up to a high pitch. With the exception of the enlightened liberals in Japan, the scheming militarists succeeded admirably in enlisting the Japanese public opinion in denouncing the outrage allegedly carried out by Chinese soldiers on the respected person of Captain Nakamura.

And on the evening of September 18 the world was served with the ruse, too elementary to be effective and too crude to be convincing, that because of a section of the South Manchurian Railway had, with no approximation even of a motive, been torn up by the Chinese soldiers, the immediate necessity was seen to have arisen that Japanese troops should be mobilized and operations should at once begin with not the inclination to annex territory but with the only laudable incentive for self-defense. Such the Japanese invaders would have the world accept as their noble cause for action: a veritable insult to the intelligence of the civilized world! To demonstrate to the world their unmixed desire to acquire the maximum of security for Japanese on Chinese soil, city after city was occupied, the arsenal was seized, communications cut, and barracks of the Chinese soldiers burned. Not being quite satisfied with what they had already achieved a more noble desire was heard to urge the Japanese forces to seize all the railways that could be found in the most remote vicinities of Japanese concerns so that transportation might not be further jeopardised. It was only physical inability that prevented the Japanese crusaders from making safe the whole of China for the vested interests of Japan!

Reactions at Geneva

FULLY aware of the Japanese intention to create more excuses for further aggression the Chinese Government strictly ordered its troops to avoid all conflicts with the invaders. As a Member of the League of Nations she appealed to Geneva for redress. Fortunately the League was in regular session and no difficulty or delay was experienced by the Chinese delegation to bring the matter to the attention of the Members of the League Council, to which China was only recently elected as a non-permanent Member.

When the matter of Japanese atrocity was first brought before the Council of the League the embarrassment caused the Japanese delegation was apparent. For days Mr. Yoshizawa had to tell the Council that he had not received the official version of Japan's grievances in Manchuria, when the reality was that the Tokyo Government was straining its wits to invent a justification for the bold display of barbarism the military members of its Cabinet had sponsored. But the best brains of Japan in this instance only gave birth to a clumsy pretext: that of "self-defense." In addition the War Minister with professional skill attempted to tell the world that he was surprised by the seriousness the excitable world attached to the small incident in Manchuria. He strongly advised the world that the incident was purely local and should be settled directly by the parties concerned. The League was not to bother itself with the matter, the real situation, he was certain, the other countries could not even pretend to understand. But the bigoted world has refused to be hoodwinked.

The strong stand made by the Chinese delegate Dr. Sze and the public opinion that has gradually rallied behind the Chinese contention quickly reduced the Japanese War Office to the unpleasant necessity of removing its ill-worn mask. When the Chinese delegation firmly demanded an enquiry by the Council and the latter was equally inclined to appoint an international commission to investigate the Manchurian situation on the spot, the Japanese delegation was no longer heard to mince words. In plain language the Japanese War Minister told the League Council indirectly that the matter was not within its competence, and what was more, he would not tolerate the intervention of a third party. To

add force to his candid statement he further intimated that the Japanese Imperial Government would not hesitate to withdraw from the League were the Council to force itself on Japan in the settlement of the Manchurian issue.

In the face of that threat the Council very unfortunately yielded ground, or at least it seemed to, if it did not actually so behave. But the fact is such that upon the insistence of Japan the Council appeared definitely to have abandoned the proposal of an international commission for investigation. Instead, the Council was satisfied with the Japanese assurance to withdraw troops and that on the condition that circumstances would permit. In the absence of a judge of circumstances named by the Council it is to be presumed that Japan would have the free use of its discretion. Naturally one would be sorely tempted to question the justice of such a decision.

Again, one is always reminded by the callousness of the Japanese military authorities. Perhaps the World Powers have not altogether relegated to the limbo of oblivion the part played by the Japanese in the joint occupation of Siberia in the year 1917. How for a promised contingent of 7,500 the Japanese military authorities sent 70,000; and how the same authorities refused to withdraw after the object of occupation had been achieved despite the decision of the civilian Ministers, are some of the most potent reminders to the Chinese Government. It is obvious that the advance of years has not changed the unchallenged dominance of the military party in the Cabinet of the Japanese Government. In the absence of League supervision in the matter of evacuation from the sites of occupation, what assurance would the Chinese Government have for a quick and thorough fulfilment of the Japanese promise?

To sacrifice the sovereignty of China for fear of alienating Japan from the League will convince the world once for all that the League has outgrown its usefulness and defeated the very purpose of its existence. A settlement dictated by a powerful Member to the dissatisfaction of a less powerful Member made under the wings of the League will lend itself to the frequent charge that the League exists for the sole benefit of the major Powers.

It is true that at the moment of our writing no final decision has been rendered by the Council to settle the Japanese military occupation of the Three Eastern Provinces of China, but it is hoped that none of the two contingencies will arise. Indeed, in the last twelve years the League has successfully settled many disputes. But it would be tragic if the non-resistance of China in this instance should be interpreted to detract the seriousness of the situation as brought on by the active occupation of the Japanese troops. Indiscriminate occupation of foreign cities as an act of self-defense is an innovation not yet incorporated in the statutes of international law. Military occupation, in all seriousness, is an act of war.

The case is clearly such that Japan, as much a Member of the League as China, thought fit to attack and occupy Chinese cities without the least desire to first submit the alleged dispute to the organisation she has pledged to support, and its covenants, to uphold. To put it tersely, the reputation and the prestige of the League, more particularly in the Far East, will be determined by the course it champions in the settlement of the present Japanese atrocity in Manchuria. It is in the power of the League to discomfit the Soviet and German prognosticators saying that the League, as usual, will disappoint.

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PONDERING a moment on the Briand-Kellogg Pact, the far-fetched stand adopted by the United States in the present instance has been a source of unadulterated wonder. As a sponsor to the Washington Treaty she has amazingly demonstrated less anxiety than what was generally expected. Strangely enough she has chosen to share the view of the League that the Japanese occupation of Manchuria does not constitute a violation of the agreement entered into at Washington to respect the sovereignty and independence of China. Nor does

she feel greatly inclined to interpret the act as taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly States, although Soviet Russia feels deeply involved.

It naturally follows that the United States could not see her way to admitting that the Kellogg Pact has been actively repudiated. Japan has pleaded self-defense and as that the United States is seemingly convinced that occupation was not resorted to by Japan "as an instrument of national policy." But even that does not rule out the previous phrase in Article 1 of the Pact which says: "the High Contracting Parties (of which Japan is one) solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies. . . ." How military occupation of the cities of another country is dissociated from the category of war is not yet explained. An international controversy, according to the Japanese allegation, naturally existed.

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The Role of Japanese Militarists

VIEWED apart from the international organisations of peace and their instruments, the unsuppressed dominance of the military clique of Japan, the Choshu and Satsuma clans and their modern counterparts, will always be the cause of discord in the Far East and hence of the world. Every student of Japanese Government realizes the influence the Japan General Staff Board and the Naval Staff Board wield in Japanese politics. Liberalism has grown in Japan in recent years to be sure, but militarists are very far from retired. Nor is it their inclination to do so. Because of their free access and the responsibility to the throne, their wealth and their wide industrial and business attachments, to force them into retirement would require much more than what the present civil ministers of Japan are able to exert. As long as they remain in the Japanese Cabinet as military representatives of the Japanese Emperor, dual diplomacy towards China will not cease. And nor will there be an end to the embarrassments periodically caused the Japanese Government. How the Japanese Government was thoroughly embarrassed at the signing of the Briand-Kellogg Pact and the more recent London Naval Conference is not unknown to other countries.

In Japan the control of the civil ministers over the military is almost non-existent. Traditionally the latter class look upon China as a natural country for unconcealed exploitation. Their influence in parts of Manchuria and in Korea are formidable. It is significant that Mr. Hayashi, the Japanese Consul-General at Shenyang, admitted that he could not advise the movements of the militarists. In Japan, the Foreign Minister did not hesitate to heap blames on the hot-headed young military officials. But in this instance, the embarrassment of the Japanese Government caused by the imperialists is again complete.

To summarize briefly, the occupation of Manchuria by Japanese forces is premeditated and without provocation. The attitude of both the League and the United States toward occupation as an act of self-defense, and the sway held by the Japanese military party in the Japanese Government will determine the future of the Far East, and to a significant extent, that of the world. If the present insult to the sovereignty of China should be allowed to go with impunity, her alienation with the international peace organisations and her reliance on force to forge

a destiny for her people would in both cases be probably complete.

Its Motives and Historical Background

THERE is no belying the fact that back of the roar of Japanese cannons in the present Manchurian impasse there hides the demand for a settlement of the conflicting claims of the two countries centering upon the railway issue in that portion of China's sovereign territory. Indeed, it is not too much to say that one of the real causes, as distinguished from ready-made pretexts, for Japan's sudden military action has been the matter of railway construction in the Three Eastern Provinces. In that connection, Japan allegedly has a grievance against this nation based upon treaty rights which the latter has found ample grounds to contest. It may be recalled that not many months ago a railway conference was proposed upon the initiative of Japan, but owing to Japan's insistence to deal directly with the local authorities instead of with the Central Government at Nanking and Japan's premature broadcasting of demands that China must recognize rights based upon treaties of a shady origin, the conference came to naught. The attempt to legalize claims arising out of treaties of a dubious character having thus failed, Japan next sought to enforce them by a resort to force of arms. If such an interpretation of the motive behind Japan's late invasion carries any weight of conviction at all, as we believe it does, then no more argument is needed to prove the unwarranted and illegitimate nature of those memorable agreements wrung from China under ignoble circumstances. Two successive attempts to legalize or enforce rights secured under a doubtful international instrument cannot but imply a self admission of the invalidity of that instrument.

In the light of history many reasons may be advanced in explanation of Japan's recent *coup* in Manchuria. The swift turn of events in the last week has served to convince that the one fundamental reason for her precipitate military move in that area is Japan's ambition to further increase and consolidate her influence and control over Manchuria, which has been an underlying element in her national policy ever since the Russo-Japanese War or even earlier, whenever an opportunity for such course of action is presented without unduly involving herself in international complications. Previous to this, the golden opportunity was offered in 1915 when the world was too much occupied with the catastrophic struggle raging in Europe to mind affairs in the Far East and when China herself was too weak and divided to put up a strong resistance. The opportunity was quickly seized upon by Japan. With reference to Manchuria she got practically what she wanted out of her Twenty-one Demands, the imposition of which upon China was accomplished at the point of the bayonet. But whatever rights and interests ill-obtained by Japan in 1915 were contested and in a large measure refuted under the terms of the Washington Treaties of 1922. That Conference was a severe blow to Japan's ambitions in Manchuria in particular and on the mainland of Asia in general. Throughout the last decade Japan has been looking forward to a time when her aims on the Asian continent may be realized. And in September, 1931, she saw the one opportunity of a lifetime. China is as usual weak and divided and the nations of the world are having grave financial and political problems of their own. On top of these, the country on whom Japan intends to prey is barely struggling to overcome the worst national calamity in her history. If alert Japan does not strike at this moment the ever-growing strength of Chinese nationalism exemplified by the adoption of a centralized foreign policy towards the conflicting claims in this quarter of the globe may never permit such a step in the future. But, in spite of careful premeditation, Japan has miscalculated the consequences of her drastic action. Instead of gaining for her what she really desired in Manchuria, it may eventually prove to be her undoing. One thing is certain: it has served to bring the ranks in China to stand on one battle-line. Overwhelming Chinese reactions point to the increasing difficulties of Japan's obtaining satisfaction out of the present mess.

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch
No. 572 of November 6, 1931
from the Legation at Ottawa

COPY OF AN EDITORIAL FROM

"The Chinese Nation" SHANGHAI

Volume II

DATED, SEPTEMBER 30, 1931

Number 16

Japanese Occupation of Manchuria

Its Political Significance

IT is scarcely necessary to say that the recent unfortunate events in Manchuria have rudely awakened the world to the full realization of what many observers of Far Eastern affairs have referred to as ominous potentialities of a new Balkan. The rumblings and ugly rumours which accompanied the Wanpaoshan incident and the Korean massacres have now proved themselves to be true foretokens of the dramatic events which subsequently culminated in the swift and complete occupation of South Manchuria by the Japanese troops already stationed in the neighbourhood and those despatched from Korea.

That this well-timed stroke of arms betrayed premeditation and careful staff work on the part of the Japanese military has now become a well-established fact, the various pretexts which they furnished having been found to be ridiculous enough to earn rejection even by the Japanese themselves. We have had several occasions to point out in these columns the designs of the Japanese military clique both in regard to Manchuria and to its own future in Japan. Numerous press reports from Japan have indicated the trend of political developments in that country. The independent actions and utterances of high Japanese military authorities have clearly demonstrated their intention in respect of China. Their arrogance embarrassed the Japanese Foreign Office; their rashness actually tied the hands of the Japanese Government which had later to recognize the state of affairs as created by their military operations. It was evident during the first few days that the Japanese Government was not prepared to meet the situation for which they had to find some sort of justification. They could not and they had to admit that the Japanese Army had gone beyond their control. With all the means of communication in Manchuria in their control, the Japanese authorities failed to provide the world with adequate information and it was not until they had been repeatedly pressed by the officials of the League of Nations, to which China appealed with the case, that a statement was issued from Tokyo although giving nothing beyond the traditional excuse of "self-defense" and a conditional promise to withdraw their troops.

But even this was evidently done with the utmost reluctance on the part of the military leaders who professed to be at a loss to understand "why the League of Nations (should have) taken the Manchurian situation so seriously." They contended that the League of Nations had no business to interfere with their military action in what they claim to be a local issue, and General Minami, the Japanese War Minister, was later heard to declare that in case the League should insist upon its right to intervene, the Imperial Japanese Government would not hesitate to withdraw its membership. However, under the pressure of the League whose stand was supported by the United States and the public opinion of the world, they had to reconcile themselves with the statement which the Japanese Foreign Office issued at the request of the League. This meant the suspension of the preconceived plan which the Japanese military had every intention to carry out in Manchuria. Their reluctance is therefore readily understandable, but so too has attitude become clear to the world.

Incidentally, this latest tiff between the civil administration and the military party reveals the historic rivalry between the liberal and feudal ele-

ments that now govern the country. Owing to the peculiar constitution of the Japanese Government, the military clique with the support of the oligarchic House of Peers, has always been the strongest party. Responsible to the Emperor alone and beyond the control of the Diet, it has taken every opportunity to act on its own irrespective of foreign or domestic affairs, hence the phenomenon of dual diplomacy of which the history of Japanese foreign relations contains abundant instances. With the growth of liberal and democratic ideas among such people as are sometimes represented on the administration of the Japanese Government, this old rivalry has become increasingly acute. But unfortunately owing to its intricate ramifications with the capitalist class, its position remains deeply entrenched in the political machinery of the Japanese Empire. Feudalistic militarism therefore goes hand in hand with capitalism in Japan and this combination invariably results in imperialism with all its sinister possibilities. While the soundness and ultimate political value of imperialism has been amply discussed and disproved by many students of international relations, the form that it is now assuming in this quarter of the globe has become sufficiently disquieting to compel the attention of the world Powers.

Used as an instrument of internal politics in the form of slogans such as "strong" or "positive" policy to cast opprobrium upon the "weak-kneed" policy of an opposition party it might yet be of some service in Japan because there are still people befuddled enough to believe in it, but to have it thrust upon the world in the form of an overt act requires all the cupidity of a pampered and feudalistic general staff. The Japanese military have manifestly under-estimated China and the world for they have not only roused the ire of the Chinese people but also called down the universal condemnation of the civilized world. Granted that Japan, in the words of General Minami, her militant War Minister, has picked the "most ideal opportunity" for the realization of her pet dreams in Manchuria and Mongolia, she has overlooked the drift of modern civilization. In a world which is still labouring under the ruinous legacy of a past folly and which is seeking protection by means of various clumsy peace instruments from the repetition of similar blunders, the action of Japan has struck up a fearfully discordant and an amazingly barbarous note which portends ominously of trouble that may threaten the welfare of entire mankind. And yet, it is to be regretted, the response elicited by the solicitation of China in the interests of world peace has left much to be desired. With the outstanding exception of Soviet Russia, the signatories of the League Covenant, the Washington Treaty and the Paris Pact have shown little enthusiasm for the cause of right and justice, in spite of their professions for the same. The feelings of the Chinese people have already been aroused to a dangerous pitch and Russia alone seems to have appreciated the real peril that now threatens the peace of the Far East. The fate of China is in the balance. She will not be victimized by an imperialistic nation, but lacking support from quarters in which she has reposed her confidence, she might be compelled to turn to her nearest sympathizer or she might muster every ounce of her strength to put up a desperate stand against her aggressor, though neither of the alternatives bode any good for the world. Such then is the crux of the situation as precipitated by the military occupation of South Manchuria by Japan.

We are aware, of course, of the pretexts with which the Japanese Government have been trying to justify her military incursions in Manchuria, but such hackneyed expressions as "self-defense," "vested interests" or "special interests" are not really fool-proof. In themselves they offer no insurmountable obstacles to peaceable dealings, especially between parties who are signatories to the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Washington Treaty of 1921-2. The former calls upon the Members "to respect and preserve as against external appression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League," while the latter which was "designed to stabilize conditions in the Far East, to safeguard the rights and interests of China and to promote intercourse between China and the other Powers upon the basis of equality of opportunity," stipulates that the Powers "respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China," and "refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges" It must be obvious, therefore that if Japan were sincere in her solemn professions, she would not allow her vested or special interests in Manchuria, to compromise the sovereignty or violate the territorial integrity of China. Now she has actually occupied Manchuria by force in the name of those special interests whose very legality were contested at Washington, and yet we still hear of Mr. Yoshizawa exclaiming dramatically at a public meeting of the League Council at Geneva that "the honour of Japan is engaged." We wonder where it could be! She would trample upon her own undertakings and withal mock the entire world. She has turned down the good offices of the League and would not countenance the mediation or intervention of a third party. She insists on dealing with China directly because she knows China hasn't got a fighting chance with her. Inexorably these circumstances direct us to conclude that force, might, now implemented with beguiling instruments of peace, has become more than ever strongly implanted in the place of right and justice. No doubt the 4,550,000 millions of Chinese will be properly impressed and so will be the entire population of the world. For the future of world politics which the League has striven to place on an open and honourable basis, we can only record our gravest misgivings.

The Story of the Invasion

IN the name of self-defense, Japan has shown the world how cities and territories of another country may be occupied by force. And how effectively it may be done without previous intimations being given any other nation of her intention, and how conveniently any excuse may be forwarded to the world after the act of aggression has become a *fait accompli*. And the most astounding of all is the seeming ease with which a strong aggressor may with impunity disregard the profound anger of the offended nation which is impotent from the military standpoint.

Briefly the story runs thus. Alleging that the Chinese troops had destroyed a part of the South Manchurian Railway, Japanese soldiers were mobilized and with lightning speed launched an attack on the Chinese troops stationed at the Peitaiying camp. Bombardment on the Chinese camp started at 10 o'clock on the evening of September 18 which was soon followed by Japanese occupation as the Chinese troops withdrew without offering resistance. At the same time the Mukden arsenal was also occupied by the Japanese troops. Subsequently, the Peitaiying camp was reduced to ashes and the arsenal was dismantled.

Shenyang fell into the hands of Japanese troops at 6.30 a.m. after the police and the garrison troops were disarmed who likewise were without orders to resist. True to the form of effective military occupation all communications were either seized or severed. Chinese officials were summarily arrested and made prisoners.

The protest of the Liaoning Provincial Government lodged with the Japanese Consul-General at Shenyang was disregarded on the plea that he was not in a position to advise the movement of the

Japanese troops. In the meantime the march of the Japanese on the other Chinese cities continued. Without delay the Japanese occupied Changchun, Antung, Yinkow, Kowpangtze, Haicheng, Tashih-chiao, Liaoyang, Kungchulin, Ssuningkai, Kaiyuan, Changtu on the South Manchurian Railway and Pingchihu, Tsaohokow, Chikuanshan, Fenghuang-cheng on the Antung-Fengtien Railway. Meanwhile, Japanese soldiers were moving towards Shanhaikwan. That was on September 19.

With the occupation of Kirin, the provincial capital of Kirin, on September 21, the entire Kirin-Changchun Railway went under the control of the Japanese troops. Five other lines, the Taonan-Angangchi, Tahushan-Tungliao-Liaoyuan (Cheng-chiateng), Taonan-Sulan, Shenyang-Hailun Railways were also seized by the Japanese.

Latest indications are such that despite the promise of the Japanese delegation at Geneva to withdraw troops from the Three Eastern Provinces of China, a concentration of the Japanese forces is visible at Kungchuling, 34 miles north-east of Ssuningkai and 38 miles south of Changchun (Kuan-chentze) which are in readiness to proceed northward. Again, it is freely circulated that a march into Heilungkiang from Taonan and the Liaoning-Heilungkian border is being contemplated by the Japanese forces.

Pending the withdrawal of the Japanese troops and an official investigation the exact loss of property and lives sustained by the Chinese cannot be ascertained. But it requires no stretch of imagination to grasp that a military occupation of a territory which involve both Liaoning and Kirin provinces must entail Chinese losses in property and lives little short of enormous, the absence of military resistance from the Chinese troops notwithstanding.

The animosity aroused among the Chinese, if expected by Japan, has perhaps upset the equanimity of the Japanese War Office by the serious proportions it has assumed. In the history of Japanese imperialistic enterprise in China there is hardly an instance that had attracted more attention and awakened more hostility than her present brazen occupation of Manchuria. Not even the presentation of Twenty-One Demands in 1915 could vie with the notoriety of the present performance.

More disquieting still to the Japanese militarists is the dissatisfaction that has been unreservedly expressed by parties other than China, over their distasteful manoeuvre in the Three Eastern Provinces of China.

Antecedents and Pretexts

IN connection with the Japanese atrocity in Manchuria a review of the number of conflicts that Japan and China have recently had are not without significance. It may be remembered that the policy of the present Japanese Government towards China has been consistently denounced by the military clique in Japan as "weak-kneed," and for the substitute of which a so-called positive policy in Manchuria has been championed.

Following closely upon the heels of the Wanpaoshan incident came the massacre of Chinese residents in Korea, which brutality was suffered to proceed by the agents of the Japanese Government in Korea. It was revealed later that the Japanese press with its fabricated stories of Chinese cruelty to Koreans in Manchuria was mainly responsible for manipulating the popular sentiments of the Koreans at home against the Chinese. The deliberate indifference of the Japanese gendarmes was unmistakable and the cause for such nonchalance obvious. But on top of all that the Japanese Government disowned all responsibility and on the contrary called the Chinese authors of their own misfortune. The Korean affair is very far from being settled, however.

While the eyes of the Chinese people were still focussed on the possible outcome of the Korean affair, they were suddenly informed by the Japanese authorities in Manchuria that a Japanese officer had been seized and killed by the irresponsible Chinese soldiers without provocation. Whether the allegation was a mere fabrication by the Japanese official investigations have not revealed anything substantial. But in Japan the alleged incident was well capitalized

by the Japanese militarists to urge the substitute of a strong policy in Manchuria as different from the one the Japanese Government has been pursuing. Huge quantities of pamphlets were distributed for the purpose, and generally the people of Japan were worked up to a high pitch. With the exception of the enlightened liberals in Japan, the scheming militarists succeeded admirably in enlisting the Japanese public opinion in denouncing the outrage allegedly carried out by Chinese soldiers on the respected person of Captain Nakamura.

And on the evening of September 18 the world was served with the ruse, too elementary to be effective and too crude to be convincing, that because of a section of the South Manchurian Railway had, with no approximation even of a motive, been torn up by the Chinese soldiers, the immediate necessity was seen to have arisen that Japanese troops should be mobilized and operations should at once begin with not the inclination to annex territory but with the only laudable incentive for self-defense. Such the Japanese invaders would have the world accept as their noble cause for action: a veritable insult to the intelligence of the civilized world! To demonstrate to the world their unmixed desire to acquire the maximum of security for Japanese on Chinese soil, city after city was occupied, the arsenal was seized, communications cut, and barracks of the Chinese soldiers burned. Not being quite satisfied with what they had already achieved a more noble desire was heard to urge the Japanese forces to seize all the railways that could be found in the most remote vicinities of Japanese concerns so that transportation might not be further jeopardised. It was only physical inability that prevented the Japanese crusaders from making safe the whole of China for the vested interests of Japan!

Reactions at Geneva

FULLY aware of the Japanese intention to create more excuses for further aggression the Chinese Government strictly ordered its troops to avoid all conflicts with the invaders. As a Member of the League of Nations she appealed to Geneva for redress. Fortunately the League was in regular session and no difficulty or delay was experienced by the Chinese delegation to bring the matter to the attention of the Members of the League Council, to which China was only recently elected as a non-permanent Member.

When the matter of Japanese atrocity was first brought before the Council of the League the embarrassment caused the Japanese delegation was apparent. For days Mr. Yoshizawa had to tell the Council that he had not received the official version of Japan's grievances in Manchuria, when the reality was that the Tokyo Government was straining its wits to invent a justification for the bold display of barbarism the military members of its Cabinet had sponsored. But the best brains of Japan in this instance only gave birth to a clumsy pretext: that of "self-defense." In addition the War Minister with professional skill attempted to tell the world that he was surprised by the seriousness the excitable world attached to the small incident in Manchuria. He strongly advised the world that the incident was purely local and should be settled directly by the parties concerned. The League was not to bother itself with the matter, the real situation, he was certain, the other countries could not even pretend to understand. But the bigoted world has refused to be hoodwinked.

The strong stand made by the Chinese delegate Dr. Sze and the public opinion that has gradually rallied behind the Chinese contention quickly reduced the Japanese War Office to the unpleasant necessity of removing its ill-worn mask. When the Chinese delegation firmly demanded an enquiry by the Council and the latter was equally inclined to appoint an international commission to investigate the Manchurian situation on the spot, the Japanese delegation was no longer heard to mince words. In plain language the Japanese War Minister told the League Council indirectly that the matter was not within its competence, and what was more, he would not tolerate the intervention of a third party. To

add force to his candid statement he further intimated that the Japanese Imperial Government would not hesitate to withdraw from the League were the Council to force itself on Japan in the settlement of the Manchurian issue.

In the face of that threat the Council very unfortunately yielded ground, or at least it seemed to, if it did not actually so behave. But the fact is such that upon the insistence of Japan the Council appeared definitely to have abandoned the proposal of an international commission for investigation. Instead, the Council was satisfied with the Japanese assurance to withdraw troops and that on the condition that circumstances would permit. In the absence of a judge of circumstances named by the Council it is to be presumed that Japan would have the free use of its discretion. Naturally one would be sorely tempted to question the justice of such a decision.

Again, one is always reminded by the callousness of the Japanese military authorities. Perhaps the World Powers have not altogether relegated to the limbo of oblivion the part played by the Japanese in the joint occupation of Siberia in the year 1917. How for a promised contingent of 7,500 the Japanese military authorities sent 70,000; and how the same authorities refused to withdraw after the object of occupation had been achieved despite the decision of the civilian Ministers, are some of the most potent reminders to the Chinese Government. It is obvious that the advance of years has not changed the unchallenged dominance of the military party in the Cabinet of the Japanese Government. In the absence of League supervision in the matter of evacuation from the sites of occupation, what assurance would the Chinese Government have for a quick and thorough fulfilment of the Japanese promise?

To sacrifice the sovereignty of China for fear of alienating Japan from the League will convince the world once for all that the League has outgrown its usefulness and defeated the very purpose of its existence. A settlement dictated by a powerful Member to the dissatisfaction of a less powerful Member made under the wings of the League will lend itself to the frequent charge that the League exists for the sole benefit of the major Powers.

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The case is clearly such that Japan, as much a Member of the League as China, thought fit to attack and occupy Chinese cities without the least desire to first submit the alleged dispute to the organisation she has pledged to support, and its covenants, to uphold. To put it tersely, the reputation and the prestige of the League, more particularly in the Far East, will be determined by the course it champions in the settlement of the present Japanese atrocity in Manchuria. It is in the power of the League to discomfit the Soviet and German prognosticators saying that the League, as usual, will disappoint.

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she feel greatly inclined to interpret the act as taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly States, although Soviet Russia feels deeply involved.

It naturally follows that the United States could not see her way to admitting that the Kellogg Pact has been actively repudiated. Japan has pleaded self-defense and as that the United States is seemingly convinced that occupation was not resorted to by Japan "as an instrument of national policy." But even that does not rule out the previous phrase in Article 1 of the Pact which says: "the High Contracting Parties (of which Japan is one) solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies. . . ." How military occupation of the cities of another country is dissociated from the category of war is not yet explained. An international controversy, according to the Japanese allegation, naturally existed.

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The Role of Japanese Militarists

VIEWED apart from the international organisations of peace and their instruments, the unexpressed dominance of the military clique of Japan, the Choshu and Satsuma clans and their modern counterparts, will always be the cause of discord in the Far East and hence of the world. Every student of Japanese Government realizes the influence the Japan General Staff Board and the Naval Staff Board wield in Japanese politics. Liberalism has grown in Japan in recent years to be sure, but militarists are very far from retired. Nor is it their inclination to do so. Because of their free access and the responsibility to the throne, their wealth and their wide industrial and business attachments, to force them into retirement would require much more than what the present civil ministers of Japan are able to exert. As long as they remain in the Japanese Cabinet as military representatives of the Japanese Emperor, dual diplomacy towards China will not cease. And nor will there be an end to the embarrassments periodically caused the Japanese Government. How the Japanese Government was thoroughly embarrassed at the signing of the Briand-Kellogg Pact and the more recent London Naval Conference is not unknown to other countries.

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a destiny for her people would in both cases be probably complete.

Its Motives and Historical Background

THERE is no belying the fact that back of the roar of Japanese cannons in the present Manchurian impasse there hides the demand for a settlement of the conflicting claims of the two countries centering upon the railway issue in that portion of China's sovereign territory. Indeed, it is not too much to say that one of the real causes, as distinguished from ready-made pretexts, for Japan's sudden military action has been the matter of railway construction in the Three Eastern Provinces. In that connection, Japan allegedly has a grievance against this nation based upon treaty rights which the latter has found ample grounds to contest. It may be recalled that not many months ago a railway conference was proposed upon the initiative of Japan, but owing to Japan's insistence to deal directly with the local authorities instead of with the Central Government at Nanking and Japan's premature broadcasting of demands that China must recognize rights based upon treaties of a shady origin, the conference came to naught. The attempt to legalize claims arising out of treaties of a dubious character having thus failed, Japan next sought to enforce them by a resort to force of arms. If such an interpretation of the motive behind Japan's late invasion carries any weight of conviction at all, as we believe it does, then no more argument is needed to prove the unwarranted and illegitimate nature of those memorable agreements wrung from China under ignoble circumstances. Two successive attempts to legalize or enforce rights secured under a doubtful international instrument cannot but imply a self admission of the invalidity of that instrument.

In the light of history many reasons may be advanced in explanation of Japan's recent *coup* in Manchuria. The swift turn of events in the last week has served to convince that the one fundamental reason for her precipitate military move in that area is Japan's ambition to further increase and consolidate her influence and control over Manchuria, which has been an underlying element in her national policy ever since the Russo-Japanese War or even earlier, whenever an opportunity for such course of action is presented without unduly involving herself in international complications. Previous to this, the golden opportunity was offered in 1915 when the world was too much occupied with the catastrophic struggle raging in Europe to mind affairs in the Far East and when China herself was too weak and divided to put up a strong resistance. The opportunity was quickly seized upon by Japan. With reference to Manchuria she got practically what she wanted out of her Twenty-one Demands, the imposition of which upon China was accomplished at the point of the bayonet. But whatever rights and interests ill-obtained by Japan in 1915 were contested and in a large measure refuted under the terms of the Washington Treaties of 1922. That Conference was a severe blow to Japan's ambitions in Manchuria in particular and on the mainland of Asia in general. Throughout the last decade Japan has been looking forward to a time when her aims on the Asian continent may be realized. And in September, 1931, she saw the one opportunity of a lifetime. China is as usual weak and divided and the nations of the world are having grave financial and political problems of their own. On top of these, the country on whom Japan intends to prey is barely struggling to overcome the worst national calamity in her history. If alert Japan does not strike at this moment the ever-growing strength of Chinese nationalism exemplified by the adoption of a centralized foreign policy towards the conflicting claims in this quarter of the globe may never permit such a step in the future. But, in spite of careful premeditation, Japan has miscalculated the consequences of her drastic action. Instead of gaining for her what she really desired in Manchuria, it may eventually prove to be her undoing. One thing is certain: it has served to bring the ranks in China to stand on one battle-line. Overwhelming Chinese reactions point to the increasing difficulties of Japan's obtaining satisfaction out of the present mess.

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch
No. 572 of November 6, 1931,
from the Legation at Ottawa.

COPY OF AN EDITORIAL FROM

"The Chinese Nation" SHANGHAI

Volume II

DATED, SEPTEMBER 30, 1931

Number 16

Japanese Occupation of Manchuria

Its Political Significance

IT is scarcely necessary to say that the recent unfortunate events in Manchuria have rudely awakened the world to the full realization of what many observers of Far Eastern affairs have referred to as ominous potentialities of a new Balkan. The rumblings and ugly rumours which accompanied the Wanpaoshan incident and the Korean massacres have now proved themselves to be true foretokens of the dramatic events which subsequently culminated in the swift and complete occupation of South Manchuria by the Japanese troops already stationed in the neighbourhood and those despatched from Korea.

That this well-timed stroke of arms betrayed premeditation and careful staff work on the part of the Japanese military has now become a well-established fact, the various pretexts which they furnished having been found to be ridiculous enough to earn rejection even by the Japanese themselves. We have had several occasions to point out in these columns the designs of the Japanese military clique both in regard to Manchuria and to its own future in Japan. Numerous press reports from Japan have indicated the trend of political developments in that country. The independent actions and utterances of high Japanese military authorities have clearly demonstrated their intention in respect of China. Their arrogance embarrassed the Japanese Foreign Office; their rashness actually tied the hands of the Japanese Government which had later to recognize the state of affairs as created by their military operations. It was evident during the first few days that the Japanese Government was not prepared to meet the situation for which they had to find some sort of justification. They could not and they had to admit that the Japanese Army had gone beyond their control. With all the means of communication in Manchuria in their control, the Japanese authorities failed to provide the world with adequate information and it was not until they had been repeatedly pressed by the officials of the League of Nations, to which China appealed with the case, that a statement was issued from Tokyo although giving nothing beyond the traditional excuse of "self-defense" and a conditional promise to withdraw their troops.

But even this was evidently done with the utmost reluctance on the part of the military leaders who professed to be at a loss to understand "why the League of Nations (should have) taken the Manchurian situation so seriously." They contended that the League of Nations had no business to interfere with their military action in what they claim to be a local issue, and General Minami, the Japanese War Minister, was later heard to declare that in case the League should insist upon its right to intervene, the Imperial Japanese Government would not hesitate to withdraw its membership. However, under the pressure of the League whose stand was supported by the United States and the public opinion of the world, they had to reconcile themselves with the statement which the Japanese Foreign Office issued at the request of the League. This meant the suspension of the preconceived plan which the Japanese military had every intention to carry out in Manchuria. Their reluctance is therefore readily understandable, but so too has attitude become clear to the world.

Incidentally, this latest tiff between the civil administration and the military party reveals the historic rivalry between the liberal and feudal ele-

ments that now govern the country. Owing to the peculiar constitution of the Japanese Government, the military clique with the support of the oligarchic House of Peers, has always been the strongest party. Responsible to the Emperor alone and beyond the control of the Diet, it has taken every opportunity to act on its own irrespective of foreign or domestic affairs, hence the phenomenon of dual diplomacy of which the history of Japanese foreign relations contains abundant instances. With the growth of liberal and democratic ideas among such people as are sometimes represented on the administration of the Japanese Government, this old rivalry has become increasingly acute. But unfortunately owing to its intricate ramifications with the capitalist class, its position remains deeply entrenched in the political machinery of the Japanese Empire. Feudalistic militarism therefore goes hand in hand with capitalism in Japan and this combination invariably results in imperialism with all its sinister possibilities. While the soundness and ultimate political value of imperialism has been amply discussed and disproved by many students of international relations, the form that it is now assuming in this quarter of the globe has become sufficiently disquieting to compel the attention of the world Powers.

Used as an instrument of internal politics in the form of slogans such as "strong" or "positive" policy to cast opprobrium upon the "weak-kneed" policy of an opposition party it might yet be of some service in Japan because there are still people befuddled enough to believe in it, but to have it thrust upon the world in the form of an overt act requires all the cupidity of a pampered and feudalistic general staff. The Japanese military have manifestly under-estimated China and the world for they have not only roused the ire of the Chinese people but also called down the universal condemnation of the civilized world. Granted that Japan, in the words of General Minami, her militant War Minister, has picked the "most ideal opportunity" for the realization of her pet dreams in Manchuria and Mongolia, she has overlooked the drift of modern civilization. In a world which is still labouring under the ruinous legacy of a past folly and which is seeking protection by means of various clumsy peace instruments from the repetition of similar blunders, the action of Japan has struck up a fearfully discordant and an amazingly barbarous note which portends ominously of trouble that may threaten the welfare of entire mankind. And yet, it is to be regretted, the response elicited by the solicitation of China in the interests of world peace has left much to be desired. With the outstanding exception of Soviet Russia, the signatories of the League Covenant, the Washington Treaty and the Paris Pact have shown little enthusiasm for the cause of right and justice, in spite of their professions for the same. The feelings of the Chinese people have already been aroused to a dangerous pitch and Russia alone seems to have appreciated the real peril that now threatens the peace of the Far East. The fate of China is in the balance. She will not be victimized by an imperialistic nation, but lacking support from quarters in which she has reposed her confidence, she might be compelled to turn to her nearest sympathizer or she might muster every ounce of her strength to put up a desperate stand against her aggressor, though neither of the alternatives bode any good for the world. Such then is the crux of the situation as precipitated by the military occupation of South Manchuria by Japan.

We are aware, of course, of the pretexts with which the Japanese Government have been trying to justify her military incursions in Manchuria, but such hackneyed expressions as "self-defense," "vested interests" or "special interests" are not really fool-proof. In themselves they offer no insurmountable obstacles to peaceable dealings, especially between parties who are signatories to the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Washington Treaty of 1921-2. The former calls upon the Members "to respect and preserve as against external appression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League," while the latter which was "designed to stabilize conditions in the Far East, to safeguard the rights and interests of China and to promote intercourse between China and the other Powers upon the basis of equality of opportunity," stipulates that the Powers "respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China," and "refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges" It must be obvious, therefore that if Japan were sincere in her solemn professions, she would not allow her vested or special interests in Manchuria, to compromise the sovereignty or violate the territorial integrity of China. Now she has actually occupied Manchuria by force in the name of those special interests whose very legality were contested at Washington, and yet we still hear of Mr. Yoshizawa exclaiming dramatically at a public meeting of the League Council at Geneva that "the honour of Japan is engaged." We wonder where it could be! She would trample upon her own undertakings and withal mock the entire world. She has turned down the good offices of the League and would not countenance the mediation or intervention of a third party. She insists on dealing with China directly because she knows China hasn't got a fighting chance with her. Inexorably these circumstances direct us to conclude that force, might, now implemented with beguiling instruments of peace, has become more than ever strongly implanted in the place of right and justice. No doubt the 4,550,000 millions of Chinese will be properly impressed and so will be the entire population of the world. For the future of world politics which the League has striven to place on an open and honourable basis, we can only record our gravest misgivings.

The Story of the Invasion

IN the name of self-defense, Japan has shown the world how cities and territories of another country may be occupied by force. And how effectively it may be done without previous intimations being given any other nation of her intention, and how conveniently any excuse may be forwarded to the world after the act of aggression has become a *fait accompli*. And the most astounding of all is the seeming ease with which a strong aggressor may with impunity disregard the profound anger of the offended nation which is impotent from the military standpoint.

Briefly the story runs thus. Alleging that the Chinese troops had destroyed a part of the South Manchurian Railway, Japanese soldiers were mobilized and with lightning speed launched an attack on the Chinese troops stationed at the Peitaiying camp. Bombardment on the Chinese camp started at 10 o'clock on the evening of September 18 which was soon followed by Japanese occupation as the Chinese troops withdrew without offering resistance. At the same time the Mukden arsenal was also occupied by the Japanese troops. Subsequently, the Peitaiying camp was reduced to ashes and the arsenal was dismantled.

Shenyang fell into the hands of Japanese troops at 6.30 a.m. after the police and the garrison troops were disarmed who likewise were without orders to resist. True to the form of effective military occupation all communications were either seized or severed. Chinese officials were summarily arrested and made prisoners.

The protest of the Liaoning Provincial Government lodged with the Japanese Consul-General at Shenyang was disregarded on the plea that he was not in a position to advise the movement of the

Japanese troops. In the meantime the march of the Japanese on the other Chinese cities continued. Without delay the Japanese occupied Changchun, Antung, Yinkow, Kowpangtze, Haicheng, Tashih-chiao, Liaoyang, Kungchulin, Ssuping kai, Kaiyuan, Changtu on the South Manchurian Railway and Pingchihu, Tsaohokow, Chikuanshan, Fenghuang cheng on the Antung-Fengtien Railway. Meanwhile, Japanese soldiers were moving towards Shanhaikwan. That was on September 19.

With the occupation of Kirin, the provincial capital of Kirin, on September 21, the entire Kirin-Changchun Railway went under the control of the Japanese troops. Five other lines, the Taonan-Angangchi, Tahushan-Tungliao-Liaoyuan (Cheng-chiateng), Taonan-Sulan, Shenyang-Hailun Railways were also seized by the Japanese.

Latest indications are such that despite the promise of the Japanese delegation at Geneva to withdraw troops from the Three Eastern Provinces of China, a concentration of the Japanese forces is visible at Kungchuling, 34 miles north-east of Ssuping kai and 38 miles south of Changchun (Kuan-chentze) which are in readiness to proceed northward. Again, it is freely circulated that a march into Heilungkiang from Taonan and the Liaoning-Heilungkian border is being contemplated by the Japanese forces.

Pending the withdrawal of the Japanese troops and an official investigation the exact loss of property and lives sustained by the Chinese cannot be ascertained. But it requires no stretch of imagination to grasp that a military occupation of a territory which involve both Liaoning and Kirin provinces must entail Chinese losses in property and lives little short of enormous, the absence of military resistance from the Chinese troops notwithstanding.

The animosity aroused among the Chinese, if expected by Japan, has perhaps upset the equanimity of the Japanese War Office by the serious proportions it has assumed. In the history of Japanese imperialistic enterprise in China there is hardly an instance that had attracted more attention and awakened more hostility than her present brazen occupation of Manchuria. Not even the presentation of Twenty-One Demands in 1915 could vie with the notoriety of the present performance.

More disquieting still to the Japanese militarists is the dissatisfaction that has been unreservedly expressed by parties other than China, over their distasteful manoeuvre in the Three Eastern Provinces of China.

Antecedents and Pretexts

IN connection with the Japanese atrocity in Manchuria a review of the number of conflicts that Japan and China have recently had are not without significance. It may be remembered that the policy of the present Japanese Government towards China has been consistently denounced by the military clique in Japan as "weak-kneed," and for the substitute of which a so-called positive policy in Manchuria has been championed.

Following closely upon the heels of the Wanpaoshan incident came the massacre of Chinese residents in Korea, which brutality was suffered to proceed by the agents of the Japanese Government in Korea. It was revealed later that the Japanese press with its fabricated stories of Chinese cruelty to Koreans in Manchuria was mainly responsible for manipulating the popular sentiments of the Koreans at home against the Chinese. The deliberate indifference of the Japanese gendarmes was unmistakable and the cause for such nonchalance obvious. But on top of all that the Japanese Government disowned all responsibility and on the contrary called the Chinese authors of their own misfortune. The Korean affair is very far from being settled, however.

While the eyes of the Chinese people were still focussed on the possible outcome of the Korean affair, they were suddenly informed by the Japanese authorities in Manchuria that a Japanese officer had been seized and killed by the irresponsible Chinese soldiers without provocation. Whether the allegation was a mere fabrication by the Japanese official investigations have not revealed anything substantial. But in Japan the alleged incident was well capitalized

by the Japanese militarists to urge the substitute of a strong policy in Manchuria as different from the one the Japanese Government has been pursuing. Huge quantities of pamphlets were distributed for the purpose, and generally the people of Japan were worked up to a high pitch. With the exception of the enlightened liberals in Japan, the scheming militarists succeeded admirably in enlisting the Japanese public opinion in denouncing the outrage allegedly carried out by Chinese soldiers on the respected person of Captain Nakamura.

And on the evening of September 18 the world was served with the ruse, too elementary to be effective and too crude to be convincing, that because of a section of the South Manchurian Railway had, with no approximation even of a motive, been torn up by the Chinese soldiers, the immediate necessity was seen to have arisen that Japanese troops should be mobilized and operations should at once begin with not the inclination to annex territory but with the only laudable incentive for self-defense. Such the Japanese invaders would have the world accept as their noble cause for action: a veritable insult to the intelligence of the civilized world! To demonstrate to the world their unmixed desire to acquire the maximum of security for Japanese on Chinese soil, city after city was occupied, the arsenal was seized, communications cut, and barracks of the Chinese soldiers burned. Not being quite satisfied with what they had already achieved a more noble desire was heard to urge the Japanese forces to seize all the railways that could be found in the most remote vicinities of Japanese concerns so that transportation might not be further jeopardised. It was only physical inability that prevented the Japanese crusaders from making safe the whole of China for the vested interests of Japan!

Reactions at Geneva

FULLY aware of the Japanese intention to create more excuses for further aggression the Chinese Government strictly ordered its troops to avoid all conflicts with the invaders. As a Member of the League of Nations she appealed to Geneva for redress. Fortunately the League was in regular session and no difficulty or delay was experienced by the Chinese delegation to bring the matter to the attention of the Members of the League Council, to which China was only recently elected as a non-permanent Member.

When the matter of Japanese atrocity was first brought before the Council of the League the embarrassment caused the Japanese delegation was apparent. For days Mr. Yoshizawa had to tell the Council that he had not received the official version of Japan's grievances in Manchuria, when the reality was that the Tokyo Government was straining its wits to invent a justification for the bold display of barbarism the military members of its Cabinet had sponsored. But the best brains of Japan in this instance only gave birth to a clumsy pretext: that of "self-defense." In addition the War Minister with professional skill attempted to tell the world that he was surprised by the seriousness the excitable world attached to the small incident in Manchuria. He strongly advised the world that the incident was purely local and should be settled directly by the parties concerned. The League was not to bother itself with the matter, the real situation, he was certain, the other countries could not even pretend to understand. But the bigoted world has refused to be hoodwinked.

The strong stand made by the Chinese delegate Dr. Sze and the public opinion that has gradually rallied behind the Chinese contention quickly reduced the Japanese War Office to the unpleasant necessity of removing its ill-worn mask. When the Chinese delegation firmly demanded an enquiry by the Council and the latter was equally inclined to appoint an international commission to investigate the Manchurian situation on the spot, the Japanese delegation was no longer heard to mince words. In plain language the Japanese War Minister told the League Council indirectly that the matter was not within its competence, and what was more, he would not tolerate the intervention of a third party. To

add force to his candid statement he further intimated that the Japanese Imperial Government would not hesitate to withdraw from the League were the Council to force itself on Japan in the settlement of the Manchurian issue.

In the face of that threat the Council very unfortunately yielded ground, or at least it seemed to, if it did not actually so behave. But the fact is such that upon the insistence of Japan the Council appeared definitely to have abandoned the proposal of an international commission for investigation. Instead, the Council was satisfied with the Japanese assurance to withdraw troops and that on the condition that circumstances would permit. In the absence of a judge of circumstances named by the Council it is to be presumed that Japan would have the free use of its discretion. Naturally one would be sorely tempted to question the justice of such a decision.

Again, one is always reminded by the callousness of the Japanese military authorities. Perhaps the World Powers have not altogether relegated to the limbo of oblivion the part played by the Japanese in the joint occupation of Siberia in the year 1917. How for a promised contingent of 7,500 the Japanese military authorities sent 70,000; and how the same authorities refused to withdraw after the object of occupation had been achieved despite the decision of the civilian Ministers, are some of the most potent reminders to the Chinese Government. It is obvious that the advance of years has not changed the unchallenged dominance of the military party in the Cabinet of the Japanese Government. In the absence of League supervision in the matter of evacuation from the sites of occupation, what assurance would the Chinese Government have for a quick and thorough fulfilment of the Japanese promise?

To sacrifice the sovereignty of China for fear of alienating Japan from the League will convince the world once for all that the League has outgrown its usefulness and defeated the very purpose of its existence. A settlement dictated by a powerful Member to the dissatisfaction of a less powerful Member made under the wings of the League will lend itself to the frequent charge that the League exists for the sole benefit of the major Powers.

It is true that at the moment of our writing no final decision has been rendered by the Council to settle the Japanese military occupation of the Three Eastern Provinces of China, but it is hoped that none of the two contingencies will arise. Indeed, in the last twelve years the League has successfully settled many disputes. But it would be tragic if the non-resistance of China in this instance should be interpreted to detract the seriousness of the situation as brought on by the active occupation of the Japanese troops. Indiscriminate occupation of foreign cities as an act of self-defense is an innovation not yet incorporated in the statutes of international law. Military occupation, in all seriousness, is an act of war.

The case is clearly such that Japan, as much a Member of the League as China, thought fit to attack and occupy Chinese cities without the least desire to first submit the alleged dispute to the organisation she has pledged to support, and its covenants, to uphold. To put it tersely, the reputation and the prestige of the League, more particularly in the Far East, will be determined by the course it champions in the settlement of the present Japanese atrocity in Manchuria. It is in the power of the League to discomfit the Soviet and German prognosticators saying that the League, as usual, will disappoint.

Its Bearing on Peace Pacts

PONDERING a moment on the Briand-Kellogg Pact, the far-fetched stand adopted by the United States in the present instance has been a source of unadulterated wonder. As a sponsor to the Washington Treaty she has amazingly demonstrated less anxiety than what was generally expected. Strangely enough she has chosen to share the view of the League that the Japanese occupation of Manchuria does not constitute a violation of the agreement entered into at Washington to respect the sovereignty and independence of China. Nor does

she feel greatly inclined to interpret the act as taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly States, although Soviet Russia feels deeply involved.

It naturally follows that the United States could not see her way to admitting that the Kellogg Pact has been actively repudiated. Japan has pleaded self-defense and as that the United States is seemingly convinced that occupation was not resorted to by Japan "as an instrument of national policy." But even that does not rule out the previous phrase in Article 1 of the Pact which says: "the High Contracting Parties (of which Japan is one) solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies. . . ." How military occupation of the cities of another country is dissociated from the category of war is not yet explained. An international controversy, according to the Japanese allegation, naturally existed.

In 1929, the Pact was freely invoked by the United States in regard with the Sino-Russian conflict over the C. E. R. But the invocation met only with a Soviet snub. The reluctance of the same country to invoke it this time, in the light of past experiences, is intelligible. To deny the offender the benefits furnished by the Treaty is a vague threat that cannot be counted upon to inspire awe. The reluctance of the United States to invoke on a signatory, however, does not conceal the fact that the impotency of the Pact is patent. And it should be credited the Japanese military authorities of their adequate conception of the Pact of Paris and its significance. Without a new "set of teeth," the Pact will for long remain what it is.

The Role of Japanese Militarists

VIEWED apart from the international organisations of peace and their instruments, the unsuppressed dominance of the military clique of Japan, the Choshu and Satsuma clans and their modern counterparts, will always be the cause of discord in the Far East and hence of the world. Every student of Japanese Government realizes the influence the Japan General Staff Board and the Naval Staff Board wield in Japanese politics. Liberalism has grown in Japan in recent years to be sure, but militarists are very far from retired. Nor is it their inclination to do so. Because of their free access and the responsibility to the throne, their wealth and their wide industrial and business attachments, to force them into retirement would require much more than what the present civil ministers of Japan are able to exert. As long as they remain in the Japanese Cabinet as military representatives of the Japanese Emperor, dual diplomacy towards China will not cease. And nor will there be an end to the embarrassments periodically caused the Japanese Government. How the Japanese Government was thoroughly embarrassed at the signing of the Briand-Kellogg Pact and the more recent London Naval Conference is not unknown to other countries.

In Japan the control of the civil ministers over the military is almost non-existent. Traditionally the latter class look upon China as a natural country for unconcealed exploitation. Their influence in parts of Manchuria and in Korea are formidable. It is significant that Mr. Hayashi, the Japanese Consul-General at Shenyang, admitted that he could not advise the movements of the militarists. In Japan, the Foreign Minister did not hesitate to heap blames on the hot-headed young military officials. But in this instance, the embarrassment of the Japanese Government caused by the imperialists is again complete.

To summarize briefly, the occupation of Manchuria by Japanese forces is premeditated and without provocation. The attitude of both the League and the United States toward occupation as an act of self-defense, and the sway held by the Japanese military party in the Japanese Government will determine the future of the Far East, and to a significant extent, that of the world. If the present insult to the sovereignty of China should be allowed to go with impunity, her alienation with the international peace organisations and her reliance on force to forge

a destiny for her people would in both cases be probably complete.

Its Motives and Historical Background

THERE is no belying the fact that back of the roar of Japanese cannons in the present Manchurian impasse there hides the demand for a settlement of the conflicting claims of the two countries centering upon the railway issue in that portion of China's sovereign territory. Indeed, it is not too much to say that one of the real causes, as distinguished from ready-made pretexts, for Japan's sudden military action has been the matter of railway construction in the Three Eastern Provinces. In that connection, Japan allegedly has a grievance against this nation based upon treaty rights which the latter has found ample grounds to contest. It may be recalled that not many months ago a railway conference was proposed upon the initiative of Japan, but owing to Japan's insistence to deal directly with the local authorities instead of with the Central Government at Nanking and Japan's premature broadcasting of demands that China must recognize rights based upon treaties of a shady origin, the conference came to naught. The attempt to legalize claims arising out of treaties of a dubious character having thus failed, Japan next sought to enforce them by a resort to force of arms. If such an interpretation of the motive behind Japan's late invasion carries any weight of conviction at all, as we believe it does, then no more argument is needed to prove the unwarranted and illegitimate nature of those memorable agreements wrung from China under ignoble circumstances. Two successive attempts to legalize or enforce rights secured under a doubtful international instrument cannot but imply a self admission of the invalidity of that instrument.

In the light of history many reasons may be advanced in explanation of Japan's recent *coup* in Manchuria. The swift turn of events in the last week has served to convince that the one fundamental reason for her precipitate military move in that area is Japan's ambition to further increase and consolidate her influence and control over Manchuria, which has been an underlying element in her national policy ever since the Russo-Japanese War or even earlier, whenever an opportunity for such course of action is presented without unduly involving herself in international complications. Previous to this, the golden opportunity was offered in 1915 when the world was too much occupied with the catastrophic struggle raging in Europe to mind affairs in the Far East and when China herself was too weak and divided to put up a strong resistance. The opportunity was quickly seized upon by Japan. With reference to Manchuria she got practically what she wanted out of her Twenty-one Demands, the imposition of which upon China was accomplished at the point of the bayonet. But whatever rights and interests ill-obtained by Japan in 1915 were contested and in a large measure refuted under the terms of the Washington Treaties of 1922. That Conference was a severe blow to Japan's ambitions in Manchuria in particular and on the mainland of Asia in general. Throughout the last decade Japan has been looking forward to a time when her aims on the Asian continent may be realized. And in September, 1931, she saw the one opportunity of a lifetime. China is as usual weak and divided and the nations of the world are having grave financial and political problems of their own. On top of these, the country on whom Japan intends to prey is barely struggling to overcome the worst national calamity in her history. If alert Japan does not strike at this moment the ever-growing strength of Chinese nationalism exemplified by the adoption of a centralized foreign policy towards the conflicting claims in this quarter of the globe may never permit such a step in the future. But, in spite of careful premeditation, Japan has miscalculated the consequences of her drastic action. Instead of gaining for her what she really desired in Manchuria, it may eventually prove to be her undoing. One thing is certain: it has served to bring the ranks in China to stand on one battle-line. Overwhelming Chinese reactions point to the increasing difficulties of Japan's obtaining satisfaction out of the present mess.


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 47.

AM DECD

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Seoul, Chosen, October 20, 1931



NOV 3 31

SUBJECT: Reactions in Chosen to the
Sino-Japanese Crisis in Manchuria.

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that, subsequent to the initial excitement attending the movement of troops to the Manchurian border, there have been few outwardly visible effects in Chosen of the Sino-Japanese clash in Manchuria.

There were, during the first few days, heavy troop movements northward from the division stationed at Seoul and from the regiments at Taikyu and Heijo, as well as from the division stationed at Ranan. The movements included both tanks and airplanes but the exact numbers have not been announced. Further, the number of men who have actually been moved over the border is guarded with great secrecy. In general, however, it is evident that the major strength of the Japanese garrison troops in Chosen has been mobilized and put on such a footing and in such a position that it can be thrown with great rapidity to support the South Manchuria Railway garrison troops in

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Manchuria.

Upon the receipt of news of the first clash there occurred a mild panic among the Chinese residents in those centers which had been most adversely affected during the anti-Chinese riots of July, and a considerable exodus to Shantung took place within a few days time. However, the reassurances given by the authorities and the absence of any cases of molestation of Chinese persons or property either by Koreans or Japanese, proved reassuring and the Chinese communities soon settled back into their regular routine.

As it became evident that the tension would probably be of long duration and as the reaction of resentment and fear in China proper filtered back to Chosen, there commenced a less hysterical but steady exodus of Chinese from Chosen. Exact figures are unobtainable, but it is believed that up to the time of writing several thousand have gone back to Shantung. On October 1, 1931, it was reported in a Japanese newspaper published in Seoul that 1,600 had that day sailed from Jinsen (Chemulpo) for Chefoo. In the city of Seoul at least two Chinese firms considerably patronized by American residents have decided to remove to China. Thus, although Chinese life in Chosen outwardly appears to be carried on much as it was prior to the July anti-Chinese riots, it is evident that the combination of the riots and the fear engendered by the present situation is resulting in an appreciable diminution of the number of Chinese residents in the peninsula.

According to the leading Korean language daily newspaper

the

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

the increased persecution of Koreans by Chinese in Manchuria since the commencement of the Sino-Japanese imbroglio has resulted in the large scale return of Korean immigrants to Chosen and up to October 3, 1931, approximately 10,000 had crossed the Yalu river.

It is noteworthy that in spite of the high feeling in Japan and the constant reports in the Japanese and Korean press of alleged atrocities perpetrated upon Japanese and Koreans in Manchuria and in China proper not a single instance has come to the notice of this office of mistreatment of or discrimination against Chinese or their merchandise in Chosen. On the contrary Chinese are daily seen mingled in the crowds which gather around the bulletin boards of the newspapers on which are posted the reports of developments in Manchuria, and are encountered on trains and in various towns and villages throughout Chosen. It is clear, therefore, that the Japanese authorities are taking care that Chinese are given full protection and that no embarrassing incidents shall occur here.

Inquiries have been made in casual conversation with several of the more conservative and reliable American missionaries as to the Korean reaction to present developments in Manchuria. From their several replies it appears that in general there is no excitement on the part of the Koreans and no strong animus either for or against China as such, but that there is a strong hope that somehow events may so develop that Soviet Russia may come to the assistance of China and that as a result Japan may become involved in such difficulties that the present proletarian unrest in Japan proper may burst into revolution and bring about the overthrow of the Empire; also that out of

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
the ensuing confusion Chosen may emerge as one of the soviet republics in the Russian union of soviet republics. It is of course true that the Koreans who hold this hope have virtually no conception of what communism really is or of what the actual status of Chosen would be under the dominance of Moscow; it is merely a case of a desire to exchange a situation which is unacceptable for one which, although not fully comprehended, it is hoped might prove more desirable. There is seemingly no indication of any intention to regard the present as a suitable time to revive agitation or plots for independence.

In general among the Japanese in Chosen the adoption of a stronger attitude in Manchuria is heartily welcomed and the steps taken there are given full popular approval. However, one British business man informs me that some of his Japanese business friends have expressed to him grave anxiety as to the effect of the military activity in Manchuria upon Japanese trade.

In general, therefore, the several reactions in Chosen to the recent and present happenings in Manchuria are what would naturally be expected and are accordingly normal under the circumstances; also there is apparently no reason to anticipate any radical change from this situation in the near future.

Respectfully yours,

4-2-77
Respectfully yours,



John K. Davis
American Consul General

800
JKD-re

To the Department in quintuplicate.
Copy to the American Embassy, Tokyo.
Copy to the American Legation, Peiping.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM RECD

No. 7917

Confidential.

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE.

American Consulate General,
Shanghai, China, October 20, 1931.

Subject: Local Sino-Japanese Situation.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose a copy of a self-
1/ explanatory despatch No. 7039 of this date, with
enclosures, to the American Legation at Peiping,
in regard to the subject above mentioned.

Respectfully yours,

Edwin S. Cunningham
Edwin S. Cunningham,
American Consul General.

✓
Enclosure:

1/- Copy of Shanghai Consulate General
despatch No. 7039, with enclosures.

ESC MB
800

In Quintuplicate.

4 Carbon Copies

Received *[Signature]*

no FE
11/17/31 R4

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GFC



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F/DEW 793.94/2560

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No. 7039

CONFIDENTIAL.

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE.

American Consulate General,
Shanghai, China, October 20, 1931.

Subject: Local Sino-Japanese Situation.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping.

Sir:

1/4/

I have the honor to supplement my telegram of October 12, 3 p.m., to the Legation regarding local Sino-Japanese conditions by transmitting herewith copies of several memoranda of interviews, believing them to be of possible interest as indicating the unofficial suggestions given by this Consulate General to various officials responsible for the maintenance locally of law and order during this tense period - more tense than in 1925 because of its greater international importance. The overt activities of the anti-Japanese "Shanghai Municipality National Salvation Committee to Resist Japan" occur less frequently than they did a week ago, but the anti-Japanese feeling among Chinese is of increasing intensity and minor conflicts in the International Settlement are of frequent occurrence. Certainly the outstanding act of arbitrary

barbarity

-2-

barbarity, and one which has not a vestige of law to support it, is the confining in the Temple of Heaven of persons arrested by the National Salvation Association for the handling of Japanese goods. Fortunately the prisoners are Chinese citizens and therefore their detention does not concern the foreigner materially, except for the fact that the Temple of Heaven is located within the International Settlement, but without the control of the Settlement authorities. There is a possibility, however, that the International police authorities have responsibilities which, had they been exercised, would have prevented the police officials of the National Salvation Association from functioning within the Settlement (because they must function within the Settlement in order to convey prisoners to the Temple of Heaven). A more drastic action has never occurred in Shanghai than that of this Association in detaining prisoners who are purveyors of Japanese goods. By their detention the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce is connected with the National Salvation Association, since the Chamber of Commerce is the sole custodian of the Temple of Heaven; and it also, less definitely, associates the officials of the Bureau of Public Safety, under the control of which the Chinese police authorities function, with the acts of the Association.

The Japanese officials have endeavored faithfully to carry out the views expressed in the memorandum of conversation between Mr. Fessenden and myself (enclosure No. 4). They have responded when called upon by their nationals for protection, but whenever the Shanghai

municipal

-3-

municipal police appeared and were adequate to maintain order, they have withdrawn and turned the entire situation over to the Settlement police, thus recognizing that the first and primary responsibility for maintaining order within the Settlement rests with the Shanghai municipal police. There has not been so much military demonstration within the Settlement or on extra-Settlement roads since the 16th instant as was noted previously. It is true that armored cars appear on the streets more frequently than is desirable but they are less conspicuous than they were some days ago, and it is realized that transportation is necessary from ships to barracks and therefore they cannot be entirely eliminated. But one must give the Japanese credit for reducing their display of military force and probably endeavoring to keep faith with the International Settlement authorities.

Conditions are held somewhat under greater control than they were some days ago, though admittedly they still remain very difficult to handle. A contributing factor toward the preservation of peace and order is General Cheng Chun, Mayor of the Municipality of Shanghai (Chinese administered area). General Chang is Japanese educated and so far as it is possible to do so he understands the Japanese character. He has taken recently a personal interest in maintaining order within his jurisdiction and, being a strong man, is to a great extent using his influence with the various departments of the Chinese administered municipality to that end. Much remains to be done but it is believed General Cheng Chun will be instrumental in maintaining this order and his understand-

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ing of the Japanese character will assist him materially in this work.

Another contributing factor toward ameliorating the difficulties is the presence in Shanghai of delegates to the conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, which was to have convened tomorrow at Hangchow but owing to the Sino-Japanese situation is convening in Shanghai. The meetings of the conference will be held in the International Recreation Club, situated on Bubbling Well Road in the International Settlement. There are many of these delegates here and I really believe they have exercised a great deal of influence, both with the Chinese and the Japanese. It was noticeable at a reception given by General Chang Chun on October 18th that a number of Japanese delegates and officials were present. It is claimed by the delegates of other nationalities that the attendance of the Japanese was brought about by the delegates themselves, the idea being that if they participate in social events they may be led to discussions of more serious matters, and thus effect a betterment of conditions and understanding between the two peoples.

Respectfully yours,

Edwin S. Cunningham,
American Consul General.

Enclosures:

- 1/- Memorandum of Conversation between
Consul General Cunningham and
Secretary General Fessenden, dated
October 9, 1951.

2/-

-5-

- 2/- Memorandum of conversation between
Consul General Cunningham and Yu
Hung-chang, Secretary General of
Shanghai Municipality, October 12, 1931.
- 3/- Memorandum of Conversation between
Consul General Cunningham and Mr.
Fessenden, dated October 13, 1931.
- 4/- Memorandum of Conversation between
Consul General Cunningham and Mr.
Fessenden, dated October 14, 1931.

EST 11/2
800 ^{11/2} Any copy of
the signed ori-
ginal.

In Duplicate.

In Quintuplicate to Department.

Copy to Minister at Nanking.

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 7039 of Edwin S. Cunningham,
American Consul General at Shanghai, China, dated October
20, 1931, on the subject: "Local Sino-Japanese Situation."

COPY

Confidential

Memorandum of Conversation.

October 9, 1931.

Consul General Cunningham
Secretary General Fessenden.

Subject: Local Sino-Japanese Relations.

Mr. Fessenden stated that he had been spending most of his time during the last week in conferences with Japanese and Chinese individuals and committees; that the municipality was finding difficulty in maintaining peace and order in the Settlement, due to the strained relations between the Chinese and Japanese; that the persistent action of the Chinese in displaying posters in every possible position which depict the Japanese in a very undesirable manner was particularly objectionable to the Japanese and the display of force by the Japanese incites the Chinese to do unlawful acts and was particularly displeasing to them.

He said that the policy of the Shanghai Municipal Council was to destroy all posters of the character indicated which are on the streets or on public properties but they had found it impossible to deal with posters located within Chinese shops; that he had endeavored to adjust the Japanese mind to the limitations of the Council in dealing with this question; on the other hand, the Chinese complaint against the display of force is a matter which seems reasonable and which might be remedied without in any way losing prestige (by the Japanese). He said he had promised representative Chinese that he would take up the matter with the Senior Consul and request the Senior Consul to broach the Japanese Consul General to the end that there might be as little display of force as possible on the streets of Shanghai.

Mr. Fessenden was informed that it was a very difficult position; that I was in sympathy with the object of the request, namely, that there should be no particular display of Japanese force during the period when relations between the two nations are so seriously strained, but I would not agree at the moment to undertake the responsibility of discussing the question with the Japanese Consul General. Upon further dealing with the matter I informed Mr. Fessenden that I would take the matter under advisement until tomorrow when I would advise him personally as to what I proposed to do. I told him that the only possible way in which I felt I could broach the matter would be to invite the British Consul General and the Commander of the British forces, the Japanese Consul General and the Commander of the Japanese forces,

and

-2-

and Colonel Hooker, Commander of the American forces, to discuss with me the preservation of law and order in the Settlement, at which time an opportunity might arise for discreetly bringing to the attention of the Japanese Consul General the danger that is imminent from the increased display of military force in Shanghai at this time. I repeated that I would take the matter under advisement until tomorrow and then let him know what I could do.

I suggested to Mr. Fessenden that he could, with complete propriety broach the Japanese on this subject, as he is the head administrative officer in the International Settlement, and the Japanese could take no exception to it; he thought this would be possible and if I declined to act in the capacity above indicated he said he would take up the matter with the Japanese.

It was pointed out to Mr. Fessenden that the attitude of the Chinese, while admirable and more conciliatory at this time than I had known it to be before, of non-intercourse with the Japanese was more disturbing and more extensive and threatened the existence of the Japanese in China more than a war would, and therefore I felt that there was something the Chinese could do that they had not done. I instanced the fact that on yesterday a prominent Japanese banker paid a commission of \$600 for the purpose of securing \$75,000 which he needed. He was prepared to pay the commission to a concern rather than to admit to one of the big banks that he was in such an embarrassing position, as an attempt to secure such an amount would clearly indicate to the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation or the National City Bank of New York.

I told Mr. Fessenden that there was nothing the Municipal Council could do to remedy the objectionable attitude of nonintercourse, but on the other hand I felt the Japanese reply, bringing this point to the attention of anyone who might discuss it with them, would be exceedingly well taken.

Edwin S. Cunningham.

Copied by MB *B*
Compared with NHH *WA*

Enclosure No. 2 to despatch No. 7089 of Edwin S. Cunningham,
American Consul General at Shanghai, China, dated October
20, 1931, on the subject: "Local Sino-Japanese Situation."

COPY

Confidential.

Memorandum of Conversation

October 12, 1931.

Consul General Cunningham
Yu Hung-chung (O.K. Yu),
Secretary General and Senior
Counselor of the City Government
of Greater Shanghai.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Situation.

Mr. Yu stated that he had called under instructions from the Mayor of Shanghai, who desired him to present a true statement of conditions as they exist in Shanghai today in reference to the Japanese. He said that conditions are exceedingly serious and he termed them as being a cargo of dynamite that a spark might ignite at any moment; that the Mayor desired me to know of this so that I could accurately inform the American Government, and that he was doing everything he could to maintain peace and order here and prevent an outbreak or the ignition of the dynamite. Mr. Yu said he was of the opinion, and so I formed the Japanese, that the Manchurian question was one which concerns the National Government, while he was only interested in the administration of the area assigned to him and the preservation of law and order within that district. His preamble was very extensive and included many incidents most of which were familiar to me. The important things he desired to impress upon me were that only the local issue concerned the Mayor; that he was doing his utmost to restrict the posters to districts where the Japanese were not numerous; to maintain an intelligent police force in the entire district to prevent the activities of the Resisting Japanese and Saving Country Association in patriotic demonstrations, to inform the association that they should not in any way interfere with existing contracts, and that their activities should be limited to acts well within the law. Mr. Yu further stated that if the Chinese were forced to take action that they would not do so, as did Chiang Kueih-liang, by passive resistance but that they would actively resist any attempts on the part of the Japanese to occupy their territory. He was requested to explain his meaning in reference to passive resistance and he illustrated by saying that should the Japanese attempt to occupy the arsenal that force would be used to prevent them from doing so. This would create a most unhappy condition in Shanghai.

Mr.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

Mr. Yu stated that before conditions became acute there were four Japanese destroyers stationed here; that a few days ago two of these were despatched to interior places and that two new ones took their places yesterday. He said there was no increase in the naval forces in Shanghai by the Japanese but there had been an increase on yesterday of 200 men added to the marine forces stationed here. He admitted the right of the Japanese to bring whatever forces they believed necessary to protect their nationals - a rather important admission on his part - and he was not critical to any great degree of the presence in Shanghai of the present military and naval forces.

He asked me whether I considered these precautionary measures as being all that the Mayor could do and I took the liberty of pointing out to him that it would be highly desirable if posters of a challenging character were not displayed in the Chinese shops within the Settlement, that these are liable to incite disturbances, and it was very much desired that disturbances should not be created, as they would affect not only the Chinese and Japanese but the entire population of the International Settlement. Mr. Yu was not able to say that they could do more than attempt to prevent the Chinese from displaying these posters in districts where there is a large number of Japanese residents. I suggested also that the policy of nonintercourse, such as preventing the Chinese from carrying out existing contracts and preventing foreigners as well as Chinese from carrying on the usual course of trade with the Japanese, was making conditions as serious as if war actually existed. He assured me that existing contracts would be observed if the Mayor could induce the Chinese to observe them; that the policy of the Mayor was to do nothing to prevent the people from carrying on their business under contracts, though he could not force the Chinese to buy Japanese goods.

Mr. Yu stated that this afternoon at the International Recreation Club on Bubbling Well Road, at four o'clock the Mayor had invited the leading merchants and bankers to meet him, when the policy of the National Government would be made known to them and they would be urged to assist in maintaining that policy; that the policy was as stated above, and he particularly emphasized that the Resisting Japanese and Saving Country Association would be urged not to go beyond the points of law and the business men would be requested to do their utmost to prevent them in their demonstrations of national feeling from breaking the laws.

Edwin S. Cunningham

Copied by MB *B*
Compared with KKH *44*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 3 to despatch No. 7039 of Edwin S. Cunningham,
American Consul General at Shanghai, China, dated October
20, 1931, on the subject: "Local Sino-Japanese Situation."

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Confidential.

Memorandum of Conversation.

October 13, 1931.

Consul General Cunningham
Secretary General Fessenden.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Situation.

Mr. Fessenden called and stated that he had consulted with the police and found they are capable of handling the situation and that there is no necessity for calling upon the Japanese to assist in maintaining order in the northern district, where most of the Japanese reside. He said, however, that the police had very little to complain of concerning the attitude of the Japanese in that district; that the marines had not been attempting to function except in the same manner as the special guard of British and American marines; in other words, they were out for the purpose of seeing that the Japanese marines did not disturb the peace. He stated that after a conversation with the Chairman of the Municipal Council he considered it desirable, in view of the persistence of the Japanese marines in displaying armored cars and an occasional body of armed marines, that the Chairman and he should call upon the Japanese Consul General and express the hope that in the future the Japanese military force would not be in evidence to the extent that it is now. He asked if I saw any objections to their taking this step. I replied that it seemed to me to be perfectly proper for the Chairman and himself to call upon the Japanese Consul General and express the view that there should be no unnecessary display of military force at the present time; that my opinion, which was unofficial, was based upon the fact that the preservation of law and order in the Settlement and on extra-Settlement roads rested first and primarily upon the administration of the International Settlement, particularly upon the police department of the Settlement; that the police department is the local agency of protection of the entire population of the International Settlement, and until it breaks down or proves to be manifestly inadequate to give this protection, the Japanese or any other reserve or emergency force should not be called into play, and until they are requested to function it is manifestly to the best advantage of all concerned that they refrain from a display of force. Holding this view, it would be regarded as but natural for the Municipal Council officials to keep in close touch with the representatives of the reserve military forces and to make suggestions which are in keeping with the maintenance of law and order in the Settlement.

Mr.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

Mr. Fessenden, in commenting on the present situation, expressed it as his opinion, based upon interviews with various Chinese, that the present economic nonintercourse with the Japanese is deep seated and requires no organization or propaganda to maintain it; he said that in his opinion the feeling of the Chinese since the 18th of last month is more tense and more unanimously directed against the Japanese than it was against the foreigners in 1925; that at that time the anti-foreign feeling was intense but not deep seated; it was local then, whereas today it extends over the entire nation. He said also that it was his opinion that Japan would not recover from this racial antagonism for a great many years and that her commerce must necessarily suffer. He admitted, when I pointed it out to him, that the nonintercourse is being pressed by the Kuomintang and other Chinese agencies and said that it was more detrimental to Japan than a bombardment of one of her principal ports would be.

Mr. Fessenden's statement that the feeling of the Chinese against the Japanese is more deep seated than was the anti-foreign feeling in 1925 is most interesting but it corresponds with my own views on this point.

Lewin S. Cunningham.

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