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Microfilm Publication M976

RECORDS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RELATING TO POLITICAL RELATIONS
BETWEEN CHINA AND JAPAN, 1930-1944

Roll 4

1930-39

793.94/2561-2770
Oct.-Nov. 1931



THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

WASHINGTON: 1975

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

INTRODUCTION

On the 96 rolls of this microfilm publication are reproduced the records from the decimal file of the Department of State, 1930-44, that relate to political relations between China and Japan. The records are mostly instructions to and despatches from diplomatic and consular officials; the despatches are often accompanied by enclosures. Also included in these records are notes between the Department of State and foreign diplomatic representatives in the United States, memorandums prepared by officials of the Department, and correspondence with officials of other Government departments and with private firms and persons. The State Department divided the decimal file into chronological segments to retire inactive records. This division has been maintained in this microfilm publication. The records for the period 1930-39 are filmed on rolls 1-88 and those for 1940-44 on rolls 89-96.

The Lists of Documents or "purport lists" filmed on rolls 345 and 346 (1930-39), roll 532 (1940-June 1944), and roll 628 (July-Dec. 1944) of M973 give brief abstracts of the documents reproduced in this microfilm publication and serve as a finding aid to the documents themselves. The arrangement of the entries on these lists generally corresponds to the arrangement of the documents in the file.

From 1910 to 1963 the State Department used a decimal system for its central files, assembling and arranging individual documents according to subject and assigning decimal file numbers. The decimal file consists of nine primary classes numbered 0 through 8, each covering a broad subject area. The records reproduced in this microfilm publication are in Class 7, political relations of states. Each country had been assigned a two-digit number. The country numbers assigned to China and to Japan, for example, are 93 and 94, respectively. Thus, documents bearing the file number 793.94 concern political relations between China and Japan.

When one or more digits follow the second country number, they represent a specific subject. This number, in turn, may be followed by a slant mark (/). In such cases the numbers after the slant mark were assigned to individual documents as they were accumulated on a specific subject. For example, a decimal file number taken from a document reproduced in this microfilm publication is 793.943/5. The number 3 following the country number for Japan (94) signifies that the subject is extraterritoriality, and the number after the slant mark indicates the number of documents on this subject.

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The documents under one subject classification are generally in chronological order, coinciding with the assigned document number, which follows the slant mark. There are instances, however, when a document file number was not assigned until a date considerably later than the one on which the document was received.

In July 1944 the number after the slant mark began to reflect the date of the document instead of the number of documents; for example, a document dated November 20, 1944, would be numbered /11-2044. Documents dated as early as 1939 but not indexed until after July 1, 1944, also have been assigned date numbers.

Cross-reference sheets referring to related records under other subject classifications in the decimal file have been reproduced as they occur, and appropriate cross-reference notations appear in the Lists of Documents.

The file contains documents that were security classified by the State Department, as well as those received from and classified by foreign governments and other Federal agencies. Documents that have not been declassified are not available as part of this microfilm publication. The National Archives and Records Service (NARS) does not have authority to make reproductions of such documents available to searchers. Documents that remain classified have been removed from the file and replaced by a withdrawal notice that identifies the document and indicates the reason for its removal.

The records reproduced in this microfilm publication are part of General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, and are a continuation of the records concerning political relations between China and other states, 1910-29, which have been microfilmed as NARS M341.

In the same record group are several diplomatic correspondence series containing documents on relations between China and the United States. They are copies of instructions from the State Department to U.S. Ministers to China, 1843-1906 (rolls 38-43 of M77); notes to the Chinese Legation in the United States from the Department, 1868-1906 (rolls 13 and 14 of M99); despatches from U.S. Ministers to China to the Department, 1843-1906 (M92); and notes from the Chinese Legation in the United States to the Department, 1868-1906 (M98). Also related to matters concerning China are communications to special agents of the United States from the Department, 1852-86 (roll 154 of M77).

Several series of volumes contain material on relations between Japan and the United States. There are copies of instructions from the State Department to U.S. Ministers to

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Japan, 1855-1906 (rolls 104-108 of M77); despatches from U.S. Ministers to Japan to the Department, 1855-1906 (M133); notes to the Japanese Legation in the United States from the Department, 1860-1906 (rolls 66 and 67 of M99); and notes from the Japanese Legation in the United States to the Department, 1858-1906 (M163). Also related to matters concerning Japan are communications to special agents of the United States from the Department, 1823-86 (rolls 152 and 154 of M77); and despatches from special agents to the Department, 1794-1837 (roll 10 of M37).

Despatches from U.S. consular officials in China and Japan before 1906 are available as separate microfilm publications for each post. Complementary to the despatches from consuls are instructions to consuls.

The method of arranging the diplomatic and consular series cited above was discontinued in 1906, when the State Department adopted the practice of filing incoming and outgoing correspondence, memorandums, and other documents by subject in a single numerical series. Information on documents relating to China and Japan for the 1906-10 period may be found through the use of card indexes and Lists of Documents in the National Archives of the United States. The Numerical File is available as microfilm publication M862.

Several series in the State Department decimal file, 1910-29, that relate to Chinese and Japanese affairs are available as microfilm publications. In Class 7 there are two series regarding Chinese affairs: one concerning political relations between the United States and China (M339) and the other concerning political relations between China and other states (including Japan) (M341); and two series regarding Japanese affairs: one concerning political relations between the United States and Japan (M423) and the other concerning political relations between Japan and other states (M424). Class 8, internal affairs of states, has records concerning internal affairs of China (M329) and internal affairs of Japan (M422). Additional documents are in the remaining classes of the State Department decimal file:

- Class 0. General. Miscellaneous.
- Class 1. Administration, Government of the United States.
- Class 2. Extradition.
- Class 3. Protection of Interests.
- Class 4. Claims.
- Class 5. International Congresses and Conferences. Multi-lateral Treaties. League of Nations.
- Class 6. Commerce. Customs Administration. Commercial Relations, Treaties and Conventions. Commercial and Trade Agreements.



LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Peiping, October 15, 1931.

No. 1216

NOV - 31



F/DEW 793.94/2561

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

Referring to the Legation's despatch No. 1205
of October 2, 1931, transmitting editorials from the
PEKING LEADER on the occupation of Southern Manchuria
by Japanese forces, I have the honor to transmit here-
1/6 with six additional editorials from this same paper
also dealing with the Manchurian incident. News items
and additional editorials from other newspapers are be-
ing transmitted to the Department with the press clip-
pings in to-day's pouch.

Respectfully yours,

For the Minister:

C. Van H. Engert
C. Van H. Engert,
First Secretary of Legation

Enclosures:

- 1: Editorial of October 6, 1931.
- 2: Editorial of October 7, 1931.
- 3: Editorial of October 8, 1931.
- 4: Editorial of October 9, 1931.
- 5: Editorial of October 13, 1931.
- 6: Editorial of October 14, 1931.

800.
RLB/js.

1-6
Enclosure No. 1-216
Serial No. 1-216

THE LEADER, Tuesday, October 6, 1931

MANCHURIA A SECOND KOREA

Since the illegal occupation and invasion of South Manchuria by unrestrained war-mad Japanese troops, the following questions occurred to the minds of those who are closely watching the situation:

1. By what means must Japan be made to withdraw her troops?

2. If Japan fails to withdraw her troops in spite of all efforts on the part of the United States and the League of Nations, must China resort to war alone to defend her rights?

3. Suppose Japan withdraws her troops, will she be content merely with presenting a set of demands over certain railways rights, or will she also exert a complete financial stranglehold over Manchuria.

4. Will Japan be content with the mere protection of her so-called vested interests in Manchuria, or will she annex outright the whole of Manchuria?

5. Will Japan confine her annexation plans to south Manchuria or will she attempt to fasten her poisonous tentacles on North Manchuria?

That Japan will not be content merely with making demands for safeguarding the South Manchuria Railway and its subsidiary interests from Chinese competition, is fully demonstrated by her plans to set up puppet governments in Kirin and Mukden. Following the illegal entry of Japanese soldiers into Chinese territory, the disarming of Chinese troops, the forcible taking over of all government offices, and the cold-blooded murder of Chinese police and innocent civilians, Japanese mayors were appointed to take charge of affairs in various cities in the occupied territory together with a committee "for peace preservation." Reports have it that the instigators of the independence movement are designing a "national" flag for the Japanese-Controlled "independent Government". Further reports say that sons of Nippon have been intriguing among the Mongols and the Manchurians to declare their independence from China Proper.

So thus, Japanese designs and ulterior motives are laid naked to the world! The very tactics which she used to annex Korea are now being followed with the object of eventually annexing the whole of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. The independence of Korea as a sovereign state was proclaimed by Japan in the Korean-Japanese Treaty of 1876, the Shimonoseki Treaty of 1895, the Russo-Japanese Treaty of 1898, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902, and the Korean-Japanese Treaty of 1904, but all these agreements and promises meant only "scraps of paper" to the Japanese military plunderbund. The recognition of the independence of Korea was only a pretext for Japan to land troops in Korea and "help in the internal administration" by presenting a set of demands to the Korean

throne—and the solemn pledge made by Japan at the Washington Conference “to respect the sovereignty, the independence, the territorial and administrative integrity of China” meant only an illegal invasion of Manchuria. Japan’s great regard for the welfare and independence of Korea was only a stepping stone for complete annexation—just as the independence movement under Japanese auspices in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia is only a ruse to bring this vast expanse of territory under the oppressive rule of the Japanese Empire. After the assassination of the Queen of Korea in 1895 by Japan’s assassins Japanese troops were landed and the King of Korea was forced to sign documents giving away important rights and privileges to Japan—just as the bombing of the late Chang Tso-lin under the South Manchuria Railway viaduct between Huangkutun and Mukden City in 1928 was designed to bring chaos and the seizure of important cities by Japanese troops, but fortunately for China and unfortunately for Japan, no untoward event occurred and the Japanese militarists were not provided with an excuse for their aggressive designs. Japan’s demand to Korea in 1904 to engage only Japanese subjects as financial and diplomatic advisers was merely a preparation for the formal annexation of Korea—just as Japan had planned the annexation of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia when she demanded with the mouth of the cannon in 1915 that China must employ only Japanese political, military, financial and police advisers in Manchuria. The surrender of the postal, telegraph and telephone services to Japan by Korea in 1905 provided Japan with her claim for “paramount political, military and economic interests in Korea” as preliminary to her formal annexation of that ill-fated country—just as the unrecognized extension of the lease of Port Arthur and Dairen from twenty-five to ninety-nine years and the date for the restoration to China of the South Manchurian Railway from 1923 to 2002 provided a flimsy excuse for Japan to land troops and commit unspeakable atrocities on inoffensive hard-working Chinese. The Korean officials were forced to sign away their birthright under threat of death—just as the Japanese are unsuccessfully doing to-day in Manchuria to force Chinese officials to declare that China provoked the Japanese invasion. Japan’s attempt in 1915 to bring about the complete strangulation of China by means of the odious Twenty-One Demands shows that she will not rest content until she swallows up the whole of China.

At this juncture, while the whole nation is rising up in indignation against the Japanese spoliation of China’s sovereign rights, certain renegade Chinese rascals are still willing to act as the “yes” puppets of their Japanese masters, although even Chang Tsung-chang, Sun Chuan-fang and ex-Emperor Pu Yi were said to have flatly rejected all Japanese

enticements to place them at the helm. It is comparatively easy for the unscrupulous Japanese militarists or their puppets to issue all kinds of declarations on behalf of the people of the Three Eastern Provinces without the consent either of the people or the knowledge of the proper Chinese authorities, since the invaders are in possession of all the seals and documents. The thousands of Chinese refugees daily fleeing from the invaded areas shows that the population are terror-stricken with the unspeakable brutalities suffered at the hands of the Japanese military brutes, and are leaving as soon as possible as a protest against the Japanese occupation. To terrify and keep the Chinese inhabitants in Manchuria so as to provide as excuse to the outside world of Chinese prosperity under the rule of the Land of the Rising Sun, the Japanese military criminals are resorting to bombing passenger trains on the Peiping-Mukden line and using machine-guns on innocent refugees.

Some doubt is still expressed as to the reliability of Japanese reports that Heilungkiang and Harbin have declared "independence," but it does not seem at all possible since the Japanese checked their advance on Harbin as a result of Russia's protest to the Japanese Ambassador at Moscow.

The invasion of Manchuria and the insidious intrigue of Japan to foster an independence movement among the Mongolians and Manchurians, preliminary to complete annexation, notwithstanding Japanese officials' denials, should be a warning to the people in all parts of China that if they are not prepared to resist the invaders, rapacious Japan will attempt to follow the same policy in China Proper. The Chinese Government has made a wise move by refusing to acknowledge the existence of illegal bodies in Manchuria under Japanese auspices and calling the attention of the world to that fact. The only logical way to deal with the situation is to compel the Japanese troops to withdraw from Chinese territory IMMEDIATELY, and when that is done the puppet governments should be at once dissolved as illegal organizations contrary to the interests of the state, and full Chinese control should be reestablished. The question now comes up as to how that can be done, with the Powers still standing aloof and Japan possessing the most vindictive of all arguments—force and brutality.

E.B.-S.L.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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THE LEADER. Wednesday, October 7, 1931.

THE FATE OF KOREA—A WARNING

Japan's move to establish "independent" governments in Kirin and Liaoning, and her intrigues to bring in Heilungkiang and Inner Mongolia, lead to only one object—and that is final annexation. With the establishment of the so-called "independent" governments Japan will use this as an excuse to deal direct with their puppets parading as local authorities, and after the attention of the world has been diverted from the Manchurian situation, and after things have quieted down a bit, the formal annexation will be announced in order to "help in the internal administration"—just as in the case of poor Korea. That is Japanese military psychology at the moment! It now behooves the Powers to uphold their oft-repeated assertions "to respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China" and cooperate with the government and people of China to drive out the Japanese invaders so as to preserve China for the Chinese and "make the world safe for democracy."

The sad fate of Korea is a warning to the Chinese people that if they do not take steps now to avert the calamity they may yet have to suffer the lashes of Japanese imperialism in its ugliest forms. Japanese imperialism in Korea has produced no other "benefits" except the following:

1. Intellectual strangulation of Koreans.
2. Financial strangulation of Koreans by means of Japanese stewardships in wealthy Korean households.
3. Industrial strangulation of Koreans because of preferential treatment to Japanese nationals.
4. Political strangulation of Koreans.
5. Military strangulation of Korea.
6. Complete strangulation of the Korean press.
7. Killing of Korean literature.
8. Poisoning of the people by the encouragement of the cocaine and heroin traffic.
9. No freedom of speech, assembly or thought.
10. Wholesale massacres of Koreans for no other crime except calling out *Mansei* (Long Live Korea).

The Governor-General of Korea holds in his hands dictatorial powers of the mailed fist type, and in practice the lawgiver, the chief executive, the commander-in-chief of the army and navy, and the highest tribunal—taking orders only from the Japanese Emperor. When Marquis Ito was governor-general he adopted a lenient policy of assimilation, but this policy was dropped by General Seiki Terauchi who used coercion and force to mold Koreans into Japanese—and the Japanese tyrants are still using the mailed fist to suppress all signs of nationalism. If a Korean incurs the displeasure of the Japanese authorities for harboring "dangerous thoughts" he may be made to "disappear," and in that eventuality he seldom reappears.

Korean officials were swept aside, to make way for Japanese, who now fill the responsible positions. If by chance a Korean happens to be left in a high position he must listen to his Japanese "adviser" or be promptly removed. The following account of the Korean civil service issued by the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America in 1919 gives an illuminating account of conditions:

"It was fondly hoped by Koreans that as the years went by and their stronger men acquired more experience and were educated under the Japanese administration, the higher official positions would be thrown open to them. The opposite has been the policy and practice of the Japanese. In 1910 six out of the thirteen provincial governors were Korean, now there are only three. At that time all district magistracies were held by Koreans, now at least one-seventh of the largest districts are governed by Japanese magistrates, and even in some places the village provostship has been transferred to Japanese hands. The number of judgeships that have gone to the Koreans is very small, and all school principals are Japanese. The story is the same in every public department. But it is not only in the filling of offices that the discrimination appears, but also in the dignity and remuneration attaching thereto. The Japanese officials of the same rank receive forty per cent higher salaries than the Koreans, and in addition, allowances for colonial service."

Owing to the extraordinary powers given to the Japanese police in Korea, especially when they are recruited from men of low caliber, many indignities of the worst sort have been committed by the police upon their Korean victims who could have no recourse to redress. The Japanese Government report on "The Annual Report on Reforms and Progress in Chosen" gives an idea of the dictatorial powers given to the Japanese police:

"The police authorities sometimes have to participate in judicial affairs; to act as public bailiffs in distraining property and often to serve as procurators in district courts.

"The police authorities can inspect the residence of any private individual wherever there is a suspicion of the concealment of firearms or gunpowder, or *when they deem it necessary*."

Since the police are empowered to search a home *when they deem it necessary* there is certain nothing the Korean people can do to prevent serious abuses and persecution on the part of the police.

All "dangerous thoughts" regarding the independence of Korea are rigidly suppressed by means of newspaper strangulation, mail censorship, tortures, imprisonment, and even capital punishment. A missionary in Korea writes to the effect that at a church where a pastor, four elders and other churchmen were stopping, "one of the elders, in preaching, spoke of the Korean nation as a 'suffering people.' The next day the whole congregation was arrested, taken to the country jail, kept there three days, and each flogged to impress it upon them that they were not a suffering people." (Japan Advertiser, October 14, 1920).

(To Be Continued)

THE LEADER, Thursday, October 8, 1931.

THE FATE OF KOREA—A WARNING

(Continued from Yesterday)

The intellectual strangulation of the Koreans is accomplished by leaving out the Korean language in the curriculum of the government schools. Japanese history and Japan's part as the traditional protector of Korea is clubbed into the heads of the Korean children, who are being kept quite ignorant of what is going on in other parts of the world. The principals of all schools, except missionary institutions, are invariably Japanese, and Korean teachers are further discriminated against by receiving lower pay than their Japanese colleagues. Nor is this all, for "while eleven years are provided for the Japanese youths for primary and secondary education, only eight years are allowed the Korean youths; and the law says that they may still be lowered to fully seven years, while no extension whatsoever can lawfully be made under any circumstances." (See Hugh H. Cynn, "The Rebirth of Korea," Chap. V). In order to keep the Korean people as ignorant as possible only a limited number of Korean schools are provided by their Japanese oppressors, and statistics show that "for a Korean population of 17,500,000 the Government has provided no more than 447 schools, capable of receiving no more than 67,629 students, or about one three-hundredth of the population. Compared with this there has been provided for the 300,000 Japanese residents 324 schools, capable of receiving 34,100 students, or one-ninth of the population. This does not mean that the Koreans are unwilling to educate their boys.... Not only do the Japanese boys and girls in Korea get a higher standard of education than the native Korean, but more ample provision is made for their numbers..... Surely this leaves the administration open to the charge of discrimination and to the further charge of refusing the Koreans the benefits of higher education." (U.S. Congressional Record, Vol. 58, No. 47, p. 2863). To-day, the Japanese tyrants continue to make slaves out of the Korean people. Nathaniel Peffer, a well-known authority on the Far East, writes in *The Truth About Korea*, "Korean history is not allowed to be taught as such. Immediately after annexation all books giving Korean history were confiscated and destroyed. Houses were systematically searched; any literature telling of Korea's development was burned, and frequently the man in whose possession it was found was jailed. It is to-day a crime to own a Korean history. I have talked to Koreans who have been beaten and sentenced to imprisonment of from fifteen to thirty days for committing the crime of reading about their own country."

Every Korean of means must have a Japanese steward to supervise his personal accounts and "advise" him how to spend and how not to spend his money. Woe betide the Korean man of means who spends huge sums of money without the sanction of his Japanese steward, for the Government can always resort to confiscation. "No rich Korean is permitted to spend his money except on the permission of the Japanese authorities. The Japanese Government has placed in the household of every rich Korean a Japanese officer in the capacity of a butler and a cashier, who has the entire run of the house,

passing on all the expenses, and no Korean can spend his money without the O.K. of this Japanese butler. I state this on the authority of the American consul here at Seoul, who told me that an American firm here has been trying to sell automobiles to rich Koreans, who want to buy them, but that the Japanese officials will not permit such purchases to be made. I afterwards confirmed this from the American firm located here." (Sidney Greenbie, *Asia*, September, 1919.)

In order to keep the Koreans in permanent subjugation, all political thinking is dubbed "dangerous thoughts", and the suppression of "dangerous thoughts" with the mailed fist is indeed thorough, as the following can testify:

"Freedom of speech? No meeting of Koreans can be held for any purpose without official permit. No meeting can be held, even with permit, without spies. There is never a pastor's conference, there is never a church service without its spies. Freedom of speech? A Korean methodist pastor delivered a sermon on the Kingdom of God—the case is a classic in Korea. He was arrested immediately after the service. He was severely reprimanded and threatened with dire consequences if the offense were repeated. There is only one Kingdom, he was told—the Kingdom of Japan.

"In the graduation exercises of a high school in Pyeng Yang a boy once chanced to mention Julius Caesar. His notebooks and textbooks were seized by the police: the whole faculty was examined and the principal was reprimanded for allowing dangerous ideas to be propagated in his schools." (Nathaniel Peffer, *The Truth About Korea*, page 20).

Owing to the existence of an elaborate Japanese spying system in Korea, which is gradually being extended into China, every man of promise is closely watched. Every Korean must be registered and given a number by the police. Every time a Korean leaves a village or town he must register at the police station and reveal the nature of his business and his destination, and if the police finds out that the truth is not given he is subject to arrest and maltreatment. In other words, all Koreans are treated like criminals. The movements of any Korean who shows any ability or qualities of leadership are closely watched by spies, and the periodicals which he reads are censored by the post office for "dangerous thoughts." It is indeed a very good system of crushing any display of nationalism, for Koreans possessing sufficient intelligence or force of character to liberate their own countrymen from the shackles of Japanese domination are either in prison or driven into exile.

(To Be Continued)

THE LEADER, Friday, October 9. 1931.

THE FATE OF KOREA—A WARNING

(Continued from Yesterday)

The lashes of the Japanese imperialists have sunk deep into the flesh of their Korean slaves, but even the most down-trodden worm must turn some day. The death of the Emperor of Korea in 1919 provided an occasion for Koreans to form a huge procession shouting *Mansei* (Long Live Korea). This independence movement which was put down with fire and sword and unspeakable brutalities on the part of the Japanese police is described by a writer who is not unfriendly to Japan:

"On March 3rd the program for the funeral was carried out in all points according to arrangement. Seven thousand Japanese lined the streets... and there was a continuous line along the two miles from palace to the place of burial..... Chiefly in the capital, but in every considerable town, and even in villages, Koreans met together, sometimes with banners or the flag of the old regime, and formed processions, shouting *Mansei*..... Many women and children joined in these processions, which were never armed.... Perhaps it is too much to say that if these processions had been left alone there would have been no violence..... Processions were fired into as soon as they uttered their slogan, the fire brigades were called out and chased the fugitives with their bill-hooks. Swords and bayonets were as freely used, and in Seoul public safety was secured with machine-guns. The advent of the troops only made it worse, and in some cases there were massacres. One of the worst cases was at a village in the Suwon district, where the local Christians were surrounded in their church, shot down, and the church burnt over them.... The severities were not confined to the dispersing of the processions. Thousands were arrested and imprisoned, not only for demonstrating, but taken from their homes on suspicion. The methods of interrogation were mediaeval, and so were the punishments." (A. Morgan Young, *Japan Under Taisho Tenno*, pp. 156-157.)

The Japanese soldiers not only ruthlessly killed the innocent defenseless Korean people, but burnt whole villages and destroyed the grain supply. According to statistics of the massacre in Chiento during October to November, 1920, Korean inhabitants numbering 3,128 were murdered, 2,404 homes, 31 schools, 10 churches and 818,620 bushels of grain were burned. (*New York Tribune*, February 7, 1921)

The following is an account of a massacre of Koreans in Northern Korea by the Japanese gendarmes:

"During the first part of March, after the people at this place had shouted for independence, fifty-six people were asked by the gendarmes to come to the gendarme station, which they did. When they were all inside the gendarmerie compound, the gates were closed, gendarmes climbed up on the wall and shot all the people down. Then they went in among them and bayoneted all who lived. Of the fifty-six, fifty-three were killed, and three were able later to crawl out of the heap of dead." (*The Korean Situation*, pamphlet issued by the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America in 1919).

Many of the Japanese soldiers who have been massacring innocent defenseless civilians and killing non-resisting Chinese soldiers without mercy in Manchuria were transferred from Korea where they have been spending their time browbeating the submissive Korean inhabitants and committing all kinds of unspeakable atrocities. It is quite credible that savages in Japanese uniform who feel no remorse in committing brutalities on poor unarmed Koreans can have no compunction in massacring unarmed non-resisting Chinese in the Three Eastern Provinces. The Japanese savages still continue to bomb defenseless cities without provocation, killing unsuspecting Chinese civilians contrary to the law of nations.

Most atrocious of all are the recent Japanese allegations that Chinese in Manchuria have been attacking and killing Korean peasants. Everyone who knows anything of Japan's history in Korea, and of the relations between Chinese and Koreans, must understand the black dishonesty of such a charge. In spite of the most intense provocation, at the time of the murders of Chinese in Korea three months ago, there were no attacks upon Koreans in China. The Chinese people understood that these butcheries were not the act of the Korean people, but of a few criminals and renegades working for the Japanese military plunderbund.

The sad fate of Korea is a severe warning to the Chinese people. It cannot be denied by anyone that this cruel inhuman subjugation of the Korean people stands out as a black chapter in the history of a country claiming to be a civilized Power, and shows up Japan in her true colours—the imperialist of imperialists. The Japanese instigated "independence" movement in Manchuria is designed to turn that vast expanse of territory into a second Korea and the people of the Three Eastern Provinces into slaves. If the Chinese people do not wake up to the seriousness of the situation, then all hope is lost.

E.B.-S.L.

THE **LEADER** Tuesday, October 13 1931

WILL THE LEAGUE ACT OR RESIGN?

The League of Nations Council is called together for tomorrow, in view of Japan's violation of her pledge of withdrawal, and her deliberate and premeditated acts of war in China. The League is faced with a problem which permits of no two answers: Will it act in accordance with its Covenant?

For the occupation of Mukden and other points three weeks ago Japan had an explanation. It was merely a pretext, and every honest observer recognizes it as such. But it helped to "save face" before the League of Nations, and made the actual origin of the invasion a matter of dispute. And upon Japan's word that the occupying troops were being already withdrawn, and that the process would be completed shortly, the League Council adjourned for two weeks.

Not only have the Japanese troops not been withdrawn, but the Japanese now definitely state that they are not withdrawing these troops. Japan's Note presented to the League of Nations September 25 stated that "Japan has withdrawn the greater part of its forces to the railway zone and only a few troops.... are quartered.... at certain.... points, to be withdrawn as the situation improves." Japan's Note presented to the League Council October 12 stated that "the military authorities have been compelled to forego their decision to withdraw troops." Can there be any doubt, in view of the second statement, that the first statement that "Japan has withdrawn" was a deliberate lie, that the Japanese Government lied when it made the statement, and knew it lied? Can there be any further doubt that the Japanese Government is a thing without honor or principle, whose word is not worth the breath it takes? Neither honor nor decency, just murder and outrage and despicable lies!

There is no doubt today, anywhere in the world, that Japan has not only violated her pledge to withdraw troops, but that she has committed new acts of war utterly without any pretext. She has, in defiance of the Chinese Government and of the League of which China is a member, set up administrations of her own in the occupied territory. She has occupied new Chinese territory east of the South Manchurian railway. She has declared, in justification of her seizure of Chinese planes in Mukden, that a state of war existed. Her war planes have flown over Chinese territory day after day, without any permission whatsoever from the Chinese Government. These planes have bombarded and killed passengers on passenger trains in Chinese territory. These planes have bombarded the capital of the province of Liaoning, which was removed to Chinchow killing sixteen or more persons (including a foreigner). Supplementing this, Japan has dispatched warships to various ports in China.

These are acts of war. There is now no quibbling, no question of explanations or of technicalities. More than a thousand Chinese have been killed, and the cities threatened by Japanese warships are in a state of panic. But in spite of this panic, the Chinese have committed no overt act against Japan. In all the vast expanse of territory under the rule of the Chinese

Government no Japanese subject has been killed. The declaration of war which Japan apparently wishes to provoke from China has not been forthcoming. The Chinese Government continues, in accordance with the Covenant of the League of Nations of which both China and Japan are members, to refrain from violence, to submit the dispute "to enquiry by the Council," and insist that the matter be decided either by "arbitration or judicial settlement," as per Article 12. As a member of the League, it has refused Japan's demand that the matter be settled by direct negotiations.

Will the League act against Japan the outlaw? Or will it cease to exist as the body created by its Covenant? There is no third way. The League has no army, but it has other punitive powers. Article 16 of the Covenant provides:

1. Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles 12, 13 or 15, it shall *ipso facto* be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not.

2. It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the several Governments concerned what effective military, naval or air force the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League.

3. The Members of the League agree, further, that they will mutually support one another in the financial and economic measures which are taken under this Article, in order to minimise the loss and inconvenience resulting from the above measures, and that they will mutually support one another in resisting any special measures aimed at one of their number by the covenant-breaking State, and that they will take the necessary steps to afford passage through their territory to the forces of any of the Members of the League which are co-operating to protect the covenants of the League.

4. Any Member of the League which has violated any covenant of the League may be declared to be no longer a Member of the League by a vote of the Council concurred in by the Representatives of all the other Members of the League represented thereon.

The position is clear. Will the League of Nations join China in a complete boycott of Japan the outlaw? Or will it ignore its own fundamental basis and thereby cease to exist as a body for the achievement of international peace and security? There is no middle ground.

F. G.

THE LEADER, Wednesday, October 14 1931.

JAPANESE TROOPS VERSUS TREATY RIGHTS

No matter what excuses are brought up by Dai Nippon, it is an unalterable fact that the presence of Japanese troops in Manchuria is a contravention of her treaties with China, while the unprovoked invasion is a gross violation of the Kellogg Pact, the League Covenant, the Nine Power Treaty and the Hague Convention. In other words, the Land of the Rising Sun has no treaty right to station soldiers in China except the Legation guards in Peiping and a few points along the Peiping-Mukden Railway.

In a statement given out sometime ago, the Japanese Foreign Office argues that the Japanese Empire has a right to station 16,000 troops in south Manchuria in accordance with the Treaty of Portsmouth of 1905. The Japanese contention is based upon Article I of the Additional Articles to the Russo-Japanese Treaty of Peace, which reads as follows:

"The High Contracting Parties reserve to themselves the right to maintain guards to protect their respective railway lines in Manchuria. The number of such guards shall not exceed fifteen per kilometre and within that maximum number, the commanders of the Japanese and Russian armies shall, by common accord, fix the number of such guards to be employed, as small as possible having in view the actual requirements."

Let us analyze this provision. According to the above clause, fifteen railway guards are supposed to be allowed per kilometre, which works out to about 16,000 guards. The Japanese Government, whose word of honour has become a laughing stock, claims that 16,000 soldiers are now stationed in Manchuria in accordance with the Portsmouth Treaty, while the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs was of the opinion that Japan has around 50,000 troops in the occupied territory. Leaving that aside, we must realize that the Portsmouth Treaty was imposed by a victorious Japan upon a defeated foe that was then ready to come to any terms. Since the Treaty ignored the wishes of China—and it dealt with Manchuria, a huge piece of territory acknowledged officially by both Japan and Russia as an integral part of China—the people and government of this country can never give it recognition. It is preposterous to imagine two strangers making an agreement over what to do with a magnificent house without the knowledge and signature of the owner and expect it to be binding; and yet Czarist Russia and feudalistic Japan insist that the Chinese Government recognize concessions and agreements concerning this country which were made without the authority and signature of China. Suppose, by any chance, China had made an agreement, say, with Russia to the effect that both countries agree to station 16,000 troops in the Island Empire in various strategic points and along the railways: will Japan recognize these provisions? And yet, the Russo-Japanese Portsmouth Treaty states that "the High Contracting Parties reserve to themselves the right to maintain guards to protect their respective railway lines in Manchuria."

To make Japan's claim for stationing troops in Manchuria absolutely without foundation, Articles 2 and 3 of the Additional Agreement to the Sino-Japanese Treaty of December 22, 1903 relating to Manchuria declares that Japan was ready to withdraw her troops from Manchuria as soon as Russia takes this step. The Articles in question are worded as follows:

"In view of the earnest desire expressed by the Imperial Chinese Government to have the Japanese and Russian troops and railway guards in Manchuria withdrawn as soon as possible, and in order to meet this desire, the Imperial Japanese Government, in the event of Russia agreeing to the withdrawal of her railway guards, or in case other proper measures are agreed to between China and Russia, consent to take similar steps accordingly. When tranquility shall have been re-established in Manchuria and China shall have become herself capable of affording full protection to the lives and property of foreigners, Japan will withdraw her railway guards simultaneously with Russia.

"The Imperial Japanese Government immediately upon the withdrawal of their troops from any regions in Manchuria, shall notify the Imperial Chinese Government of the regions thus evacuated, and even within the period stipulated for the withdrawal of troops in the Additional Articles of the Treaty of Peace between Japan and Russia, the Chinese Government may send necessary troops to the evacuated regions of which they have been already notified as above mentioned, for the purpose of maintaining order and tranquility in those regions. If, in the regions from which Japanese troops have not yet been withdrawn, any villages are disturbed or damaged by native bandits, the Chinese local authorities may also dispatch a suitable military force for the purpose of capturing or dispersing those bandits. Such troops, however, shall not proceed within twenty Chinese *li* from the boundary of the territory where Japanese troops are stationed."

It must be remembered that at the Versailles Peace Conference China brought up the question of foreign troops stationed in China, and the Powers, including Japan, finally agreed to the following resolution at the Washington Conference:

"Whereas The Powers have from time to time stationed armed forces, including police and railway guards, in China to protect the lives and property of foreigners lawfully in China;

"And Whereas It appears that certain of these armed forces are maintained in China without the authority of any treaty or agreement;

"And Whereas The Powers have declared their intention to withdraw their armed forces now on duty in China without the authority of any treaty or agreement, whenever China can assure the protection of the lives and property of foreigners in China."

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(F) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

The Russians have withdrawn their forces from China and yet militaristic Japan did not "withdraw her railway guards simultaneously with Russia" in accordance with her pledge when she signed the Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1905. On the strength of her pledge and the resolution made at the Washington Conference, Japan has no right to maintain one single guard on the South Manchuria Railway or any part of Manchuria. But of course, the Island Empire's pledge to withdraw her troops simultaneously with the withdrawal of Russian troops and the 1922 resolution to withdraw foreign forces from Chinese soil was worded in such a way as to provide many loopholes. The fact must not be lost sight of that instead of withdrawing her troops Japan has invaded a vast expanse of Chinese territory in direct violation of the Kellogg Pact, the League Covenant, the Nine Power Treaty and the Hague Convention. Instead of withdrawing her troops she has now come forth with the note that she cannot withdraw her troops by the 14th, which shows that the statement made unblushingly by Japan's delegate on September 24 that "Japan has withdrawn the greater part of its forces to the railway zone and only a few troops.....are quartered...at certain points, to be withdrawn as the situation improves" was a deliberate lie designed to deceive—to the Japanese mind—an unsophisticated world.

China is now faced with one of the most difficult and critical external situations in her history and the next few days will decide whether the League of Nations will have enough courage to punish a powerful permanent member of the Council or whether China will have to repel the invader herself for her own self-preservation, even though she fully realizes the odds arrayed against her. The next few days, or perhaps even the next twenty-four hours, may decide whether the peace of the Far East and of the world can be effectively maintained.

E.B.-S.!

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PM RECD

No. 80



Copies for the Department

Canton, China, October 12, 1931.

NOV - 9 31

SUBJECT: Canton Riots of October 10, 1931.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.E.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping.

Sir:

793.94 / 2035



F/DEW

793.94/2562

I have the honor to refer to my telegram of October 11, 8 p.m. regarding the rioting which occurred in Canton on the previous evening and to submit the following supplementary report upon the situation.

There is a great divergence in the published accounts of the incident which gave rise to the riots. It appears, however, that on the evening of the 10th a soldier entered a shop on Wing Hon Road and took it upon himself to demand that the shop burn certain Japanese goods which the shopkeeper had exposed for sale. The soldier and some students who were with him attempted to intimidate the shopkeeper because of his refusal to comply, and the latter called in the police who took the soldier into custody and dispersed the students. The students subsequently rallied, wrecked the shop and attacked the police, who fired into the mob killing over ten and wounding a score of others. The Wing Hon Precinct Police Station was badly damaged by the rioters.

On the following morning the TAI CHUNG-HWA PAO, a vernacular daily, published an extra of a very sensational character

1931 83 NOV

- 2 -

character, placing the casualties at over 100 and reproducing the photograph of the Commissioner of Public Safety who, it was declared, was responsible for spilling the blood of patriotic students.

In the meantime the students held a meeting in which it was resolved to appeal to the Government to demand the resignation of the Commissioner of Public Safety and capital punishment for the precinct chief and the policemen responsible. The police authorities then conferred with representatives of the students and offered to have the precinct chief make a public apology and submit his resignation to the Government for its consideration.

I am reliably informed that after this conference the Commissioner of Public Safety betook himself to a hospital where he still remains.

Shortly after the riot hand-bills were circulated by communists denouncing the National Government and calling for its overthrow. Consequently a very tense situation developed on the 11th. The Mechanics' Union, which includes in its membership all bus drivers and employees in the Electric Light Plant and the Water works and which is reputed to be strongly tinged with communism, threatened trouble, and caused the suspension at 5 p.m. of all bus lines operating in the city. Members of the Union undertook also to interfere with the operation of other motor vehicles. The city is still confronted with the possibility of the supply of electric current and water being cut off during the night.

The

- 3 -

The police were unusually active during the day, and even public vehicles were stopped in their search for suspected communists. A representative of the Commissioner of Public Safety visited the foreign consuls to apprise them of the situation. He stated that the police had no doubt of their ability to control the situation effectively, but that martial law would be enforced at 9 p.m., and that extra police had been assigned to the region opposite Shameen in order to guard against the possibility of attempts by the communists to create any incident which might embroil the Government with the British and French Governments. He urged that foreign residents be warned not to go out into the city at night for a few days.

The British Consul General informed me that he had taken every precaution against any sudden mob raid on Shameen. In addition to the possibility of action by communists there was also envisaged attempts by Chinese to get at the Japanese residents of Shameen, and I gather from the Chief of Police of the British Municipality that it was proposed to evacuate the Japanese residents to Hongkong in case of necessity.

I kept in constant touch with the Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. HPLMA, who had everything in readiness to act in case of imminent danger to American lives. Nothing however developed during the night, and today the situation was quieter, although there are crowds of people assembled in front of the Municipal Building as well as a large body of police to keep order. It is believed that the authorities are still taking a serious view of the situation, as they feel

that

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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that the trouble with the students and the Mechanics'
Union is not yet settled.


Respectfully yours,

J. W. Ballantine,
American Consul General.


Copies sent:
5 to Department
1 to Legation
1 to Nanking

800

JWB:COV



PM RECD
No. 81



Canton, China, October 15, 1931.

NOV 15 1931
SUBJECT: The Student Riots, the Anti-Japanese
Agitation and the Peace Movement.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

The Honorable
Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping.



Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my despatch No. 80
of October 12, 1931, to my telegram of October 14, 6 p.m.
and to previous despatches and telegrams, regarding the
present tension in Canton growing out of the incident of
October 10th involving the killing by the police of a
number of students, and to submit the following report
upon subsequent developments in the situation.

Summary.

Although there have been no disturbances since October
10th, most schools in Canton are closed and students declare
they will not resume their studies until their demands are
acceded to for the punishment of the police concerned. The
police, on the other hand, have announced that if any of
their number are punished the entire force will declare
strike. In the meantime the Wing Hon Road Police Precinct
Chief has "escaped", and no progress has been made in connec-
tion with the trial of the police, as promised by the
authorities. The authorities aver that while demonstrations
of popular feeling are spontaneous, radical elements and

agents

F/DEM 793.94/2868

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agents of Chiang Kai-shek have instigated the carrying of matters to extreme lengths and have taken advantage of the situation thus created to engage in subversive activities. Since the Mechanics' Union and other labor organizations threatened to call a general strike in sympathy with the students, the Government was forced to take drastic measures to maintain order, and one division of troops was brought into the city to be ready for emergencies. It is now claimed by the authorities that they have the situation well in hand and that there is no longer any danger of disturbances. No settlement has yet been reached with the students and labor unions. Martial law is still in force at night, no one being allowed on the streets, but the tension has been relieved, although special precautions are being taken against incendiary fires and against the possibility of electric current and water being turned off.

Attitude of Police.

As has been previously reported, a number of divergent versions have been circulated of the details of the Wing Hon Road Affair, but it is believed that the one already submitted to the Legation sums up correctly the essential facts. The police have posted widely over the city a statement presenting certain aspects of the affair and announcing their intention to resign in a body if the Government, disregarding the justice of their position, decides to punish the police involved. It is said that this statement has made a strong appeal in Government

circles

- 3 -

circles and among the more moderate elements, including the larger merchants and intelligentsia. Summarized translation is worth reproducing:

Since it is the duty of the police to maintain order they must deal with any movement likely to disturb order. The Wing Hon Precinct Police were discharging this duty in interfering with evildoers who were attempting to loot while an inspection of 'enemy' goods was being conducted in the premises of the Sun Sai Lai Wine Shop. It is not believed that when a soldier responsible for the looting was taken to the station, the public mistook him for a student, but that it was at the instigation of radical agents that they proceeded to attack the Precinct Station. During the interval between 7 p.m. and midnight the crowd increased to over 2,000, some of whom were armed with grenades. Two grenades were thrown into the office and a fire was started near the back door. Being assailed on all sides, the police were constrained in self-defense to open fire, which resulted in deaths and injuries. If the police had failed to take action, the peace of the city would have been affected to the dissatisfaction of the public and the authority of the police would have been set aside by the radical elements, a result which would surely be attended by deplorable consequences. We ask that the public approve our action and we appeal to the National Government to treat us fairly. If it is deemed that we acted properly, To Huan Tai, the Chief of the Police Precinct concerned, should be absolved from guilt, but if it is considered that what the mob at the instigation of a few agitators did was right, we shall all resign in a body, as it is intolerable that this fine city of Canton should again fall into a state of disorder.

Alleged Instigation of Students.

While there is no reason to question the basis for the opinion, which the authorities profess to hold, that the riots were partly instigated by communists and agents of Chiang Kai-sih, the suggestion has been advanced by some observers that the students had become impatient at the apparent dilatoriness of the Government in coming to terms with Nanking

as

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as a means of enabling the nation to present a united front to Japan, and also at the Government's failure to adopt any anti-Japanese measures. The charge has been made that the Wing Hon Road Precinct Police Chief was financially interested in the shop which was the scene of the riot and that under his protection Japanese goods were being sold in defiance of public opinion. This is held by some to be the reason why the students went to such lengths in the matter. Radical elements might well have been responsible for such a charge having been given currency.

Attitude of Cantonese Government to Japan.

Nor would it be difficult in the atmosphere now prevailing in Canton to implant in the mind of the credulous suspicion of the pro-Japanese character of the policy of the Canton Government. Sun Yat-sen himself had consistently advocated a rapprochement with Japan; Wang Ching-wei last July had echoed a similar statement; Eugene Chen recently visited Japan; Chan-Kin-wan, the Commissioner of Public Safety, who has now resigned, was Japanese on his mother's side; the Government has a Japanese political adviser; and a number of Cantonese officials were educated in Japan.

In spite of all this, the view that the Canton Government is pro-Japanese is clearly untenable. It is reliably reported that the Hongkong authorities have obtained indisputable evidence through a mail censorship that the riots there were directly instigated by Canton party leaders. At a reception given by the Mayor to the foreign consuls and other representative members of the foreign community he made an address in which he referred most bitterly to the situation in Manchuria. Although he did not mention

Japan

- 5 -

Japan by name his implications of Japanese aggression could not be misunderstood. Other persons in high authority in private conversations have also brought up the question in a manner which reveals their profound concern over the situation.

As has previously been reported, the Cantonese Government has consistently made the elimination of Chiang Kai-shih their main objective, to which every other objective has been subordinated. If they have discouraged anti-Japanese boycotts and the molestation of Japanese citizens, it is not because they resent Japan any less than other Chinese, but it is because they feel that in allowing the people free rein to engage in such activities the public will lose sight of the Government's first objective, the elimination of Chiang, which is officially represented as providing the only hope of bringing about a satisfactory and permanent solution of the Manchurian question.

In keeping with this policy the Provincial Government has sent a circular order around to all the schools lauding the patriotism of the students, but at the same time urging restraint and pointing out that nothing can be accomplished by violence.

Attitude of Canton Government towards reconciliation with Nanking.

With regard to the feeling said to prevail that the authorities here lack sincerity in the matter of reconciliation with Nanking, it is difficult to understand the basis for this feeling. From the first the Cantonese have

insisted

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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insisted upon the retirement of Chiang Kai-shih as a condition essential to unification, and they have also demanded the release of Ku Han-min. As a precaution for the safety of the Cantonese leaders who may go back to Nanking they have also demanded that the Nineteenth Route Army under the command of Chen Min-chu be transferred for the garrisoning of Nanking and Shanghai. At first the Cantonese proposed that a simultaneous declaration be made on October 5th by Chiang of his resignation and by the "National Government" at Canton of its absorption into the Nanking Government, but upon Chiang's refusal they were willing to have this postponed until the opening of the reunification conference. Apparently Chiang has now acceded to the Cantonese proposals, and reunification of the country within a few weeks seems assured.

Respectfully yours,

J. W. Ballantine,
 American Consul General.

Copies sent:
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 1 to Swatow.

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SOURCES

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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SOURCES OF INFORMATION.


The information contained in the foregoing report was obtained through conversations with Chinese and foreign officials, American and other residents, and from the local press.

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



PM RECD



No. 1217

NOV - 9 31



FE

F/DEW 793.94/2664

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

Referring to the Legation's telegram No. 774

of October 15, 9 a.m., I have the honor to transmit
1/ herewith a report on the bombing of Chinchow by Japanese planes on October 8, 1931.

This report was prepared by Lieutenant Colonel Nelson E. Margetts, the Military Attaché of this Legation, who proceeded to Chinchow on the night of October 12th and who returned to Peiping early this morning. (See also the Legation's telegrams No. 748, October 12, 8 p.m., and No. 767, October 14, 9 a.m.)

The principal conclusions reached by the Military Attaché, as already summarized in the Legation's telegram first above mentioned, are that the raid took place without any previous warning, that

the

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

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
the planes had not been fired at from the ground before the bombing began, and that, while the main objectives appear to have been the buildings occupied by the Provincial Government, the military camp and the wireless station, the dropping of bombs on the populated area between the wireless station and the railroad station cannot be explained.

Certain photographs which Colonel Margetts collected at Chinchow - mostly of killed and wounded civilians - are being forwarded by him to the War Department and will be made accessible to the Department of State if desired, as no duplicate set was available.

In this connection I also have the honor to
2/ transmit a copy of an item which was taken from the Japanese Telegraph Service, an information sheet issued by the Japanese military authorities. Under the date line "Mukden, October 11th" there appeared a somewhat crude attempt to justify the bombing of Chinchow by stating that bombs had "solely been dropped on those military camps which had provoked this retaliation by incessantly firing on our aeroplanes".

Respectfully yours,

For the Minister:


C. VAN H. FUGERS,
First Secretary of Legation.

✓
Enclosures:

1. Report by Military Attaché,
dated October 13, 1931.
2. Copy of information sheet
from Japanese Telegraph
Service, dated October
11, 1931.

CVHE:EA

COPY

1
Reference No. _____
Serial No. 12 17

October 15, 1931

Subject: Report of Bombing of Chinchow, October 8, 1931. .
To: The American Minister, American Legation, Peiping, China.

1. In accordance with your verbal instructions I left Peiping on the 8:10 train, October 12th, accompanied by Lieutenant Wyman. We arrived at Chinchow at 1:00 p.m. October 13th, where we were met by a representative of the Provincial Chairman and other high officials. We were taken at once to the University of Communications, where the Provincial Headquarters is now located. Upon arrival I stated to the officials present my mission and proceeded at once to interview eye witnesses of the bombardment. The names of witnesses are given herewith:

Mr. P'an Chi-ch'un, of the Ministry of Construction of the old Mukden Government.
Mr. Huang, Ex-Chief of Mukden Police.
General Jung Chen, Chief of Staff to the Provisional Chairman
General Nin Yuan-fen, commander of the local garrison.
Major Yuan Tso-tang, representative of General Jung during his absence.
Mr. Ku Chin-sheng, Mayor of the city.
Dr. T. C. Fulton, of the Irish Presbyterian Mission.
Père Prosper Gordon, of the French Catholic Mission.

Dr. Fulton and Père Gordon were the only two foreigners (except Russians) in the city during the bombardment.

In addition to the above, many subordinate officials and civilians were questioned at random.

All these witnesses gave practically the same testimony, a resume of which is given below.

The Incident.

At about 2:00 p.m. October 8, 1931, without any previous warning, twelve Japanese airplanes appeared from the east and flew over the city of Chinchow at an altitude estimated to be about 2,000 ft. The planes were flying in formation of flights of 3-3-3-2-1. They circled the city once and then headed for the radio station where they began dropping bombs. The flight continued over the northeast suburbs and bombs were dropped in the vicinity of the Irish Presbyterian Mission compound and the French Catholic Mission. Bombing was very promiscuous in the northeast city. The flight then continued toward the railroad station and the University of Communications. This area seemed to be the main objective of the bombers. The bombing continued for one-half hour when the planes withdrew. During this time between thirty and thirty-six bombs had exploded.

At the time of the raid there were in and about the city 2,000 infantry troops and one regiment of field artillery. There was no anti-aircraft artillery located in the vicinity. All witnesses were emphatic in stating that no fire of any kind was directed against the airplanes.

The casualties resulting from the bombardment were 16 killed, 12 seriously wounded and an unknown number, estimated at about 30, slightly wounded. Of the seriously wounded three have since died, including among them a Russian, Mr. V. V. Golubtzov, who was a professor employed in the University of Communications. Of the total casualties there was only one soldier killed and two wounded.

Property loss was slight, consisting only of broken windows and scarred walls.

Dr. Fulton stated that a number of Japanese residing in Chinchow left for Mukden several days before the bombardment. When asked whether or not the report that Chinese troops were terrorizing the countryside was true, he replied, "Well, that is always so".

At about noon on the 11th of October, one Japanese plane appeared over the city, apparently reconnoitering, after which two more planes appeared. These planes dropped proclamations into the city, a copy of which is enclosed herewith.

It might be of interest to note that while we were interviewing the witnesses at 2:25 p.m., a telephone message came in stating that five Japanese planes had just passed over Kaopangtzu and were headed toward Chinchow. This might have been false information specially prepared for our benefit. However, the officials present showed considerable nervousness. They sent our horse transportation away to find cover and showed considerable diffidence about leaving the building until the destination of the planes could be determined. At 3:15 p.m. another message came stating that the planes had dropped two bombs at Han Ta Ying, just south of Kaopangtzu and had then flown northward.

Following the interview with the eye witnesses of the "incident", additional evidence in the form of photographs taken after the bombardment were presented. Accompanied by Lieut. Wyman, I then went to the places at which these pictures had been taken in order to verify their accuracy. The photographs attached, marked X, have been identified as having been taken at the scene of the explosion and they are believed to be correct. The photographs marked XX were not verified but there is no reason to believe that they are false evidence.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

We visited points where twenty bombs had fallen. The crater in no case was more than one and one-half feet deep or more than five feet in diameter, which would indicate that instantaneous fuses were used. From fragments examined it is believed the bombs were of forty or fifty pounds weight. A very powerful explosive charge was used which was indicated by the deep penetration of fragments at distances of from thirty to forty yards from the point of burst.

No bombs were dropped within the walls of the Chinese city. The attack was centered about the railroad station and the University of Communications, which are within 500 yards of each other. The fact that the Provincial Government Headquarters is in the University buildings causes one to believe that this was the principal objective of the attack. This Headquarters was in the center of a circle about one-half mile in radius in which we saw fourteen bomb craters.

A second objective was probably the military camp, Tung Ta Ying, which is located about three miles from the center of town. Here twelve bombs had found their mark but the bursts had caused little damage as the troops were not in camp in large numbers.

It was surprising to note how little actual property damage had been accomplished. The havoc wrought by the detonating bombs blazed a trail that could easily be followed from the radio station southeast of the town, past the barracks of the garrison, through the northeast suburbs outside the wall, past the railroad hospital, over the railroad station and on to the University, all north of the town, then back to the camp at Tung Ta Ying.

Either by the grace of God or due to the poor aim of the Japanese fliers the bombs in the majority of cases landed in open plots of ground where the possibility of damage was greatly

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

lessened. There were only six instances of direct hits being made on residences. These resulted in the death of eleven people, one family suffering especially in that a father, son and son's son were all killed by the same bomb. The material damage to these dwelling places was not as great as would be expected because complete and immediate fragmentation occurred at the moment of detonation.

A few bombs landed in the streets where four people were killed, including an old woman. One landed in a wheat field where another old woman was killed.

We visited the railroad hospital and saw five men wounded during the raid. Of these wounded, four of them had amputated legs. We asked only a few questions of those capable of talking and the replies were sufficient to give us a lasting impression of the ghastliness of an air raid on a civilian population. The Chinese doctor in charge of the hospital stated that he had treated thirty slightly injured people.

Though the raiders may have had a military mission it was evident that little attention had been given to the modern conventions of ordinary humanity or to the protection of personal property. It was through no fault of the fliers that the two foreign missions and the railroad hospital which flew two red cross flags were not hit directly by the bombs. As it was, bursts were so close to these places that fragments were found in all three of the compounds and only good fortune saved the inmates from harm.

From the testimony of eye witnesses to the bombardment, from evidence in the form of photographs taken where the bombs exploded, from evidence produced in the shape of bomb fragments,

from actual visits to points where twenty bombs exploded, and from a visit to the hospital where victims of the bombing are being cared for, it is found:

- 1) That at 2:00 p.m., October 8, 1931, twelve Japanese planes flew over Chinchow and during a period of one-half hour dropped thirty bombs more or less;
- 2) That as a result of the bombing the casualties number: killed, 16; seriously wounded, 12. The number of the slightly wounded can only be estimated but of the badly wounded three have since died including a Russian professor;
- 3) That the killed and wounded included civilians - men, women and children;
- 4) That the Chinese city inside the wall was not bombed;
- 5) That the objectives of the bombers as determined by the track and number of bombs dropped were:
 - a. The buildings of the University of Communications which were occupied by the Provincial Government, and the railroad station.
 - b. The military camp located three miles north-east of the city.
 - c. The wireless station located in the south-eastern suburbs of the city.
- 6) That property damage was slight, this fact being due to bombs not landing on valuable property;
- 7) That from evidence available it is not believed fire was directed from the ground against the planes;
- 8) That on October 11, 1931, three more planes flew over Chinchow, one observing while two dropped proclamations, a copy of which attached hereto;

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
9) That there appears no explanation for the dropping of bombs on the populated area between the wireless station and the railroad station, which resulted in the killing of one woman and three men.

(Signed) NELSON E. MARGLITS

Lieutenant-Colonel, Field Artillery
Military Attache

encls. as stated.

Copy



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 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY

(Reprinted Handbills distributed by Japanese planes)

NOTICE

Those ambitious and selfish men who are very anxious to dictate military powers in the Northeast are now hidden in Chinchow. They are taking treacherous and injurious plots against us within our jurisdictions. Further, they dispatch plainclothes men to embarrass gentries and people and to agitate outlaws. With these disturbances, it creates a great panic among Japanese and Chinese. Recently they are concentrating a number of troops at Chinchow and are gathering remnants, who are coming to join them from different directions, with a view to attack our troops in the east and west of the Manchurian Railway. In order to eradicate this evil, our army is adopting a self-defense action. The public are hereby notified that this army is expelling the oppressors and pacifying the people and in not endangering innocent persons.

October, 6th year.

103F

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 2
Dispatch No. 1217

COPY

JAPANESE TELEGRAPH SERVICE

(Translated & compiled from Official Sources by
special permission)

MUKDEN, October 11th


Some private Japanese took the risk to go and personally see developments at Chinchow and happened to be on the spot just after the so called Japanese air raid. They found the Railway Station crowded with people who told wild stories about bombs having been thrown by a Japanese air squadron, the number of these bombs increasing with the repeated telling of this story. The number of killed and wounded was stated at 16 killed and 20 wounded, but likewise increased when the stories were retold by others. One fact however could not be denied and that was that NO bombs whatsoever had been dropped at the Station, because it was only too evident that the Station and its surroundings were entirely intact and undamaged, same as the city of Chinchow had in NO WAY WHATSOEVER been the object of the raid, bombs having solely been dropped on those Military Camps which had provoked this retaliation by incessantly firing on our aeroplanes.--The people at Chinchow are bitterly denouncing Chang Hsueh Liang who keeps aloof of everything, shouldering no responsibilities whatsoever and leaving the people to a fate caused by his own neglect. In the meantime the Gendarmerie of Chen Hsin Yah keeps good order in the city. The troops stationed outside of Chinchow throw up defences and strongly entrench for a

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defence of the place. Yet many of the wild soldiers of Wang Ih Chou have run away from their units and are ripe for further mischief. Clad in civilian clothes they mix between the civilian population, who view this situation with ever growing distrust and fear. Most of the Officials at Chinchow have as usual, run away, leaving military guards at the doors of their buildings and many of these buildings are now flying the British flag as a protection, especially in case of air raids.

mm

PM RECD
No. 82



Canton, China, October 15, 1931.

NOV 8 ST: Canton's Communication to the League of Nations regarding Manchuria.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my telegram of October 15, 1931, regarding a communication addressed by Mr. Eugene Chen, Minister for Foreign Affairs at Canton, to the Council of the League of Nations concerning the Manchurian situation, and to enclose 1/- a clipping from the CANTON GAZETTE of today containing the full text of the message.

Respectfully yours,

J. W. Ballantine,
American Consul General.

In quintuplet.

Enclosure:

1/- Clipping from the CANTON GAZETTE
dated October 15, 1931.

800

JWB:CCW

F/DEW

793.94/2565

NOV 13 1931

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The Canton Gazette Oct. 15, 1931.

Minister Eugene Chen Despatches Illuminating Telegram To League Of Nations Now In Session At Geneva

REFUTES JAPAN'S ALLEGATION THAT ANTI-JAPANESE
MOVEMENT IN CHINA IS INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL
POLICY UNDER DIRECTION OF NATIONALIST PARTY

POINTS OUT THAT JAPANESE MILITARY DRAG THIS POINT
TO FOREFRONT TO FRUSTRATE LEAGUE'S DEMAND FOR
EVACUATION OF NIPPON TROOPS FROM MANCHURIA

To the Council of the League of Nations now in session at Geneva Mr. Eugene Chen, Minister for Foreign Affairs, despatched on October 13 the following telegram:

1. The Council of the League of Nations is already seized of the facts of the situation resulting from the acts of war committed by the armed forces of Japan in Manchuria

2. League intervention appears to assume the existence of a Government in Japan that commands the implicit obedience of the Japanese Military. This is notoriously not the case; and in the present instance the Japanese Military, in order to frustrate the League demand for evacuation of Japanese troops from the invaded areas in Manchuria, plan to confront the Council of the League:—

(a) With a new situation in Manchuria by instigating a so-called movement of Manchurian independence, and

(b) With an enlargement of the existing issue by raising the question of the anti-Japanese movement throughout China in the form of the veiled ultimatum which the Japanese Government, at the instance of the Military, spectacularly delivered to the Nanking Authorities on the Chinese National Day, October 10.

3. It is, surely, not only a misuse of words but a travesty of the facts

of contemporary history in the Far East to suggest (as the Japanese note does) that the anti-Japanese movement in China is "an instrument of national policy under the direction of the Nationalist Party."

The movement, in reality, may be said to be the work of the Japanese themselves and is undoubtedly sustained by the insults and humiliation and acts of flagrant aggression which their feudal minded Military are continually inflicting on China.

4. For this reason, it is beyond the power and competence of any Chinese Government to suppress—as the Japanese note demands—the anti-Japanese movement in China which, indeed, is the inevitable expression of the mind and feeling of the Chinese People and a spontaneous mobilisation of their moral force against unexampled acts of alien aggression. The movement can only be ended by Japan—through the supersession of brute force in Manchuria which is gravely compromising the prestige and honour of Japan as a modern civilized Power, by a policy based on the frank and honest recognition of that great region as a real and integral part of China and the consequent adjustment of the rights and interests claimed by Japan to this fundamental Chinese reality.

EUGENE CHEN.

Minister for Foreign Affairs of
The National Government, Canton.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

D-119

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE


American Consulate General,
Nanking, China.

October 13, 1931

Subject: Sino-Japanese Controversy -
Rise of War Spirit in China.

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



Sir:

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of
my despatch of October 13, 1931, to the American
Minister, transmitting a memorandum of a conversation
between an officer of this Consulate General and an
officer of the Chinese army.

Respectfully yours,

Willys R. Peck.

Willys R. Peck.
American Consul General.

Enclosure: As described.

Five copies to the Department.

800

WRP:ECH

F/DEW

793.94/2566

FILED

NOV 10 1931

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AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE
American Consulate General,
Nanking, China.

October 13, 1931

Subject: Sino-Japanese Controversy -
Rise of War Spirit in China.

The Honorable Nelson Trusler Johnson
American Minister,
Peking.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose herewith a confidential memorandum dated October 1, 1931, recounting a conversation between Vice Consul Reynolds of this Consulate General and an officer connected with a military department of the Chinese Government.

The remarks made by the Chinese informant, an intelligent young officer, show the eagerness to fight Japan which has animated many Chinese, following the military measures taken by the Japanese army in Manchuria beginning with September 18, 1931.

Respectfully yours,

Willva R. Peck.
American Consul General.

Enclosure: Report, as described.

Two copies to the Legation.
Five copies to the Department.

800

WRP:ECB

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

October 1, 1931.

Subject: Japanese situation in Manchuria
and resultant Re-action in Hanking.

... Connected with a Military Department of the
National Government.
Vice Consul L. O. Reynolds.

Hanking's Preparations for Possible Mobilization.

Mr. ... told Mr. Reynolds this evening that as a
result of an all day battle fought at Chinchow
(on the Peiping Mukden line) on September 29 between
Chinese and Japanese troops, resulting in the driving
of the Japanese troops from that city, considerable
confidence is felt by the heads of the various military
departments of the Hanking Government.

On the morning of September 30 at a Council of War,
attended by all the heads of Hanking's military depart-
ments and by the Chief of the Mukden Division Bureau,
President Chiang Kai-shek announced that he was prepared
to resign all positions now held by him, in order to re-
unite Canton and Hanking. President Chiang Kai-shek
despatched a telegram to that effect to the Canton Govern-
ment and received a reply from the Canton Government late
the same evening, stating that Canton would willingly re-
join the Hanking Government to offer armed resistance to
the Japanese troops now in Manchuria, provided President
Chiang Kai-shek would publish a statement in the newspapers
stating that he had relinquished all positions in the

National

National Government now held by himself. Mr. X. stated that although President Chiang Kai-shek had not yet made a statement in regard to Canton's request, it is the opinion of the leaders of the military departments in Hanking that he will comply with Canton's request in the very near future.

A request was sent by the leaders of Hanking's military departments to the young Marshal in Seiping to come to Hanking for the purpose of drawing up plans for mobilization. The young Marshal's plane arrived in Hanking at 1:30 p.m. today, containing his Chief of Staff and Mr. Wellington Koo, who it is understood will act for the young Marshal who was unable to come to Hanking himself because of ill health and urgent activities in Seiping.

Japanese Activities in Manchuria.

Mr. X. stated that as soon as news of the Japanese invasion reached the Hanking and Canton factions fighting in Hunan, an immediate truce was declared. Even the Reds in that section of the country withdrew and ceased to offer further resistance to Hanking's troops. This Mr. X. pointed out is only one of a number of indications of the favorable and united attitude now being taken by the people of China.

As further proof of the new patriotism created by the Japanese invasion, Mr. X. cited the case of the four Young brothers of Chungking who, upon learning of the Japanese invasion, donated their entire fortune of about Silver 21,000,000 toward flood relief, leaving to themselves only

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\$2.00 a piece. They then came to Hanking and joined the army, pledging themselves to death unless some move were made to avenge the disgrace brought upon China by the Japanese.

Mr. . stated that the general attitude of the soldiers and petty officers of Hanking's forces, being extremely bitter toward the Japanese, will make it necessary for the senior officers to decide upon some action against the Japanese in the very near future.

Mr. . stated that the National Government has received a number of communications from the Young Marshal advocating armed action immediately.

According to Mr. ., General Chang Ping-hang, Director of the Aviation Bureau, and other senior officers of the National Government have recently asserted their willingness to assume a lower rank in order to permit officers now in Canton to assume their former positions in Hanking's military organization.

During the Council of War held on September 30, President Chiang Kai-shek again pointed out the absolute necessity of reunion between Canton and Hanking in order that a concerted move may be made, "fatal though it may be", to restore China's national honor.

Mr. . stated that the troops which may be sent in action against Japan, a foreign invader, will be far more courageous than those heretofore engaged in internal

signature.

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warfare. The morale of Hanking's troops has increased 100 fold as a result of their general hatred of the Japanese. This feeling, combined with additional hatred which will be created by propaganda will, according to Mr. ., result in the most blood-thirsty fighting corps ever mobilized in China.

Mr. Reynolds called to Mr. 's attention the danger of "communist", "Red" and rebellious uprisings in the country which might be brought about if all troops were to be sent North to fight the Japanese. Mr. . stated that this matter was brought up before the "Council of War" on September 30, and that it was the unanimous opinion of all present that the people within the country will remain orderly. . . . stated that for the first time in several centuries the general population of China is showing unusual patriotism as a result of the present crisis. Mr. . stated that the heads of the various military departments in Hanking are greatly surprised at the entirely new mental attitude now evolving among the general population. This, Mr. . stated, will be one, if only one, good outcome from the present trouble.

Mr. . said that if China declares war against Japan, the Japanese gunboats will undoubtedly immediately bombard Hanking and other river ports. The heads of the military departments in Hanking expect Hanking to receive the first serious attack which will be delivered in China Proper in case China declares war. According

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to present plans the Nanking Government will assemble its entire air force at Nanking prior to distributing it to various strategic points. The Japanese, realizing that their greatest danger from the Chinese will be from the air, will according to Mr. ., attempt to put out of commission as many of Nanking's planes as possible. Mr. . pointed out that the Japanese have already evacuated their women and children from the river ports. Mr. . stated, however, that the Japanese ("manning militarists") might possibly spread a rumor to the effect that they plan an attack on river ports in order to distract the attention of the Chinese from other points which will actually be attacked.

Mr. . said that China can mobilize within three months an army of almost 1,000,000, as the Young Marshal has under arms at the present time almost 1,000,000 fully equipped and well trained men.

The National Government will have for its use in case of war between 15 and 20 serviceable airplanes. According to Mr. ., most of these machines are superior to those now being used by the Japanese air force. Mr. . stated that the Chinese Government is now in possession of a full report on Japan's air forces. This report, Mr. . stated, was prepared by three Chinese air students who have recently returned from Japan after having completed a Government flying course there. Mr. . stated that China's air force is not only fully equipped in regard

to

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to airplanes but also has a large quantity of "good American Browning machine gun ammunition".

Mr. E. stated that General Zhang Ping-hang is now in Shanghai mobilizing that section of the Aviation Bureau's staff and equipment for transfer to Hanking in a very short time should the emergency arise.

Naval and Military Equipment Available to Chinese Government.

Mr. E. stated that the military department in Hanking has received word that only 300 Japanese troops were actually engaged in the attack on Mukden and that they could easily have been repulsed by the large Chinese force which was stationed there at that time. Orders had been issued to the Chinese troops there, however, to refrain from armed resistance. This Mr. E. stated was done as a precautionary measure for the purpose of saving lives and to establish proof without doubt that the Japanese were the sole aggressors. Mr. E. stated that this evidence will undoubtedly be of great value during the negotiations between the Chinese and Japanese at the close of the war.

Upon the capture of Mukden, Japanese troops destroyed approximately 60 unserviceable planes and took over 40 serviceable planes for their own use. These, Mr. E. stated, are mainly old model French "Bieuport" planes and would not be very effective in aerial combat. The Japanese troops also destroyed the machinery in the arsenal at Mukden. Prior to its destruction, this according to Mr. E., was the finest arsenal in the Orient.

United

- 7 -

United States and League of Nations.

Mr. ... stated that most of the heads of the military departments in Hanking understand and sympathized fully with the United States for its policy of nonintervention in the present difficulty. These men realize, according to Mr. ..., that the United States might easily involve itself in serious international complications and possibly even war should it attempt to intervene at the present time.

Contrary to any unfavorable impression which the various student groups in China may have created recently toward the United States as a result of its nonintervention up to the present time, most of the heads of the military departments in Hanking cite the policy of the United States Government in regard to its nonissuance of permits for the exportation of airplanes to Canton (then a body in rebellion against the National Government) as proof of the United States' policy of "justice and fair-play".


According to Mr. ..., the majority of the Government officials in Hanking believe that the League of Nations has refrained from making any definite move toward stopping the Japanese invasion, knowing that any true statement they would make would necessarily have to be uncomplimentary to the Japanese. Such a statement would, according to Mr. ..., make it necessary for Japan to withdraw from the League of Nations, thus defeating the purpose for which the League was organized.

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By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75


No.D-117

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,
Nanking, China.

NOV 9 1931 October 9, 1931.



Subject: Sino-Japanese Controversy in
Manchuria - Foreign Office
News Releases.



F/DEW

793.94/2567

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my confidential despatch No. D-114, of October 1, 1931, on the same subject as the present despatch, with which I transmitted translations of news releases made by the Chinese Foreign Office.

There are enclosed herewith translations of four releases made on September 22, 1931, and four made on September 23, 1931. As I intimated in my former communication, these releases are of some interest as showing the character of the news dissemination of which the Foreign Office believes may be of advantage to the Government. The present assortment relates to the crisis in Manchuria.

As a sample of student propaganda, there is enclosed a translation of a leaflet distributed in Nanking on

September 29,

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-2-

September 29, 1931, and there is attached, also, the translation of a statement, obviously apocryphal, attributed to the American Minister to China.

Respectfully yours,



Willys R. Peck,
American Consul General.

Enclosures:

- 1/ 8 translations of unofficial releases issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on September 22 and 23, 1931.
- 2/ Translation of leaflet distributed in Nanking, September 29, 1931.
- 3/ Translation of statement attributed to the American Minister to China.

In quintuplicate to the Department
In duplicate to the Legation at Peiping.

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WRP:MCL

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch to the Department No.D-117
of Willys R. Peck, American Consul General at Nanking, China,
dated October 9, 1931, entitled "Sino-Japanese Controversy in
Manchuria - Foreign Office News Releases".

Press Release issued by the Chinese Ministry

of Foreign Affairs.

Unofficial

(Translation)

Sept.22,1931.

AMERICA SURPRISED AT JAPAN'S ACTIVITIES IN MANCHURIA

News from a certain reliable source is to the effect
that the American Government was surprised at and concerned
about the Japanese activities in Manchuria, and would pay
close attention to the movement of Japanese troops in
Manchuria.

Enclosure

2

Press Release issued by the Chinese Ministry
of Foreign Affairs

Unofficial

(Translation)

Sept. 22, 1931.

GREAT BRITAIN PROPOSING THE LEAGUE'S
INTERFERENCE IN MANCHURIAN AFFAIRS.

Considering action as threatening interests
of other nations in China.

London.- September 21, An Editorial in the Manchester Herald suggested the interference of the League of Nations in the Manchurian affair. It briefly stated that the rapidity with which Japan had invaded Manchuria, showed her activities as being carefully organized and planned. The Japanese military authorities have conceived the idea for a long time and spread such enthusiastic propaganda as would be helpful to their activities. Japan's action seriously affects the interests of various powers in China and furthermore, violates the spirit of the Kellogg Pact, and should receive serious consideration from the other signatory countries.

Enclosure

3

Press Release issued by the Chinese Ministry
of Foreign Affairs.

Unofficial

(Translation)

Sept. 22, 1931.

Dr. HU SHIH AND OTHER EMINENT CHINESE ASKING
AMERICA TO UPHOLD JUSTICE

Japan's action clearly violates the Kellogg Pact.

On account of the Japanese invasion in Manchuria, Dr. Hu Shih and some twenty other eminent Chinese jointly sent a telegram to the American Government and the American citizens the other day, charging that Japan purposely destroyed the world peace and requesting that other friendly nations should uphold justice. The original telegram may be briefly translated as follows:

"For the sake of maintaining world peace, we are requesting the Government and citizens of the United States to pay attention to Japan's open breach of the Kellogg Pact. Without any reason being given to China, the Japanese troops took Shenyang (Mukden) on September 18, and then continued to invade west Liaoning so as to reach the Korean boundary. They massacred the Chinese people and ruined Chinese property, the losses of which are yet unknown and may never be known, for they have severed all communications between Manchuria and the outside world. At first, the reason for which they, as they said, attacked the Chinese troops, was the tearing up of a track on the South Manchurian Railway by the

Chinese;

-2-

Chinese; later, they changed the reason from tearing up a track to bombing a bridge; and most recently, telegraphic reports from Tokyo gave the reason of the incident as the unauthorized activities of certain Japanese lower-ranked military officials who were dissatisfied with their government for its "weak" policy toward China. But we do believe that Japan's action at present is similar in nature to that of 1915. At that time, Japan, taking advantage of the European War, pressed China to accept the famous Twenty-One Demands, while now Japan utilizes the opportunity when the western nations are struggling with their economic hardships and China is suffering from floods and communism. That the Japanese army has pre-determined plans of military aggression is evident. As to the cause of the Japanese action, they have changed it three times within two days; obviously, it is incredible. The fact is that they attacked China without any reason, thus constituting a breach of the Kellogg Pact. If that Pact cannot prevent the strong from invading the weak, and if the effective maintenance of the world peace extends no further than this, the human beings in the world will always have war until they all perish. The Kellogg Pact has been signed by most nations of the world. And the intentional violation of the Pact in letter and spirit means contempt of the credit of all nations. We hope that the American Government and its citizens who can do much in enforcing the Pact, will uphold justice for the sake of world peace."

Signed by: Hu Shih, Wellington Koo, W.W.Yen, K.P.Chen, Peter W.Kuo, David Z.T.Yui, Chang Po-ling, Liu Chan-en, Yen Yang-chu, Shih Liang-chai, Chang Chu-ping, Hollington K. Tong, Liu Hung-sen, Hsia Chen-ling, Kuo Teh-hwa, and others.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure

4 !

Press Release issued by the Chinese Ministry
of Foreign Affairs

Unofficial

(Translation)

Sept. 22, 1931.

JAPAN PLANS TO OCCUPY ENTIRE MANCHURIA

Japanese military authorities desiring general
mobilization.

According to news from Nagasaki, the Japanese military
authorities wished to have official mobilization to Man-
churia, but met with the objection of the Minister of
Foreign Affairs and the consequent disapproval thereof
by the Cabinet. Actually the Japanese troops in Korea
are being dispatched to Kirin and Mukden, with the
apparent purpose of occupying entire Manchuria.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure

5

Press Release issued by the Chinese
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Unofficial

(Translation)

Sept. 23, 1931.

JAPAN ALSO AFRAID OF WORLD'S OPINION?

Cancels appointment of Too-Fai-Yuan (Japanese)
as mayor of Shenyang (Mukden)

Tokyo.-- The Japanese Cabinet met again on the 22nd. Among the cabinet members, the Minister of Foreign Affairs disputed with the Minister of Army, saying that if the Japanese army wished to swallow the Chinese Three Eastern Provinces, it was just like swallowing a bomb and that Japan would invite international accusations and follow the footsteps of Germany. Therefore, it was decided that Japan's diplomacy would protect her occupation in China.

It is also rumored that the Minister of Army has telegraphed the cancellation of the appointment of Too-Fai-yuan (Japanese) as mayor of Shenyang.

Enclosure

6

Press Release issued by the Chinese Ministry
of Foreign Affairs.

Unofficial

(Translation)

Setp. 23, 1931.

JAPANESE TROOPS CREATE FALSE EVIDENCE
AGAINST CHINESE SOLDIERS

Japanese planes flying to Hsinmin to throw bombs

A certain organization at Nanking has received telegraphic reports from Tientsin, giving the information that the Japanese troops have not reached Hsinmin yet. But on the morning of the 22nd, Japanese planes flew to Hsinmin to throw bombs. Damage is unknown. The rolling stock captured at Ssupingkai by the Japanese troops was all being sent in the direction of Tungliao and Liaoning. At the time of sending this telegram, there have arrived at Chengchiatun two armored cars with three cannon and a body of more than two hundred soldiers.

On the evening of the 18th when the Japanese were ready for Shenyang (Mukden), they first bombarded the Liuho Bridge of the South Manchuria Railway. Later, they moved numerous dead Chinese soldiers to a certain place near the bridge, as evidence that the tracks had been destroyed by the Chinese. They had already provided another track near the damaged bridge for the maintenance of transportation. Ordinarily there were Japanese soldiers (policemen) in the tower over the bridge to guard the bridge very carefully. It is evident that such false evidence will only expose Japan's plot to the world.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure

7

Press Release issued by the Chinese Ministry
of Foreign Affairs.

Unofficial

(Translation)

Sept. 23, 1931.

CHINA DENIES PROPOSAL OF ORGANIZING
A SINO-JAPANESE JOINT INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE

Waichiaopu.--That the Chinese Government, as reported in the Tokyo associated press (?), proposed to organize a Sino-Japanese joint investigation committee and that some high officials of China, as stated by the Japanese Ambassador at the League of Nations, suggested holding direct negotiations with Japan, are entirely unreliable. The Chinese Government never made such proposals. The question has been brought to the League of Nations, before which it should receive fair treatment.

Enclosure

8

Press Release issued by the Chinese Ministry
of Foreign Affairs.

Unofficial

(Translation)

Sept. 23, 1931.

WAICHIAOPU'S THIRD PROTEST AGAINST JAPAN

Since the Manchurian incident, the Waichiaopu has lodged two strong protests against Japan. Nevertheless, the Japanese troops are continuing to invade. Changchun, Yingkow, (Newchwang), Kwanchengtze, Kirin, the Kirin-Changchun Railway, and other places have all fallen into their hands. They are still ruthlessly slaughtering the Chinese people and destroying property. Therefore, the Waichiaopu has lodged a third protest, strongly charging that it is Japan's intention to extend the trouble. Her responsibility of violating international law, as well as international agreements, and of breaking peace in the Far East should be increased thereby. The protest also demands the immediate withdrawal of the Japanese troops and the return of the various territories seized.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 2 to despatch to the Department No.D-117
of Willys R. Peck, American Consul General at Nanking, China,
dated October 9, 1931, entitled "Sino-Japanese Controversy in
Manchuria - Foreign Office News Releases".

Leaflet distributed on the streets

Nanking, September 29, 1931.

(Translation)

To Countrymen

Fellow Countrymen:

Does every one of us know that China is now nearing extinction? Since the 18th instant, Japanese troops occupied our Shenyang, Changchun, Yingkow, Tientsin, and Tsingtao. They are so irresistible that they seem to have the intention of taking possession of China wholly in one blow. Recently, many Japanese gunboats have arrived at Tsinan, Amoy, Hankow and other places in the Yangtze Valley. There are cannons on board of these gunboats and these cannons look very fierce. All countrymen have been made very angry and are eager to fight. Our Government, however, always prefers peace and is waiting for the judgment of the League of Nations. The ambition of Japan develops day by day, and the attempts of the League to uphold justice become finally unsuccessful. Fellow Countrymen, dangers of extinction are ahead of us. How dangerous and important the present situation is?

Fellow countrymen, with one another we live and die, we must rise immediately. An amicable settlement is hopeless and is absolutely impossible. We must die for our country. We save her by armed force. What we have are blood and iron. Fear not the dwarf slaves (i.e. Japanese). We would rather sacrifice our lives

in

-2-

in fighting than yield ourselves to become homeless slaves. Those who lose their lives for their country are far more glorious than others who still live but who are traitors. So fellow-countrymen, expand your patriotism and support the Government; clench your hands and use them as your weapons. Rise at once, unite as one man, and fight for the preservation of our country on the first front.

Only in fighting or in severe engagements can we talk about principles of equity. Fellow-countrymen, four hundred million fellow-countrymen, we must concentrate under the Anti-Japanese flags, and concentrate immediately.

By blood and iron we shall win the final victory.

Anti-Japanese Association,
May Thirtieth Middle School,
Nanking.

Sept. 27

We have the following pass-words to be shouted loudly:

All countrymen in the country uniformly arm and declare war against Japanese imperialists,

Unite ourselves under the Anti-Japanese flags and devote our energies to save the country,

Fight a decisive battle with Japan,

Fight until we capture Tokyo, and wipe away our national disgrace.

Enclosure No. 3 to despatch to the Department No.D-117
of Willys R. Peck, American Consul General at Hanking, China,
dated October 9, 1931, entitled "Sino-Japanese Controversy in
Manchuria - Foreign Office News Releases".

Important Statement Made by the
American Minister

(Translation from Hsin Ching Jih Pao
September 22, 1931, Nanking)

Peiping, September 21, 8:00 p.m. - American
Minister, in a conversation with somebody, stated the
following:

"The Pact for the renunciation of war must
not be violated. The fact that Japan did not
accept China's note of protest, and sub-
sequently had the appearance of opening hosti-
lities, is a strange state of affairs unprecedented
in international relations. Later, since Chinese
troops offered no resistance, Japan supported her
arguments by stating that nothing in the form of
war had taken place, thus rendering it difficult
for the signatory nations to intervene. She is
really cunning.

"However, if Japanese troops continue to
occupy Chinese territory, and to translate
their ambitions into realities, the equilibrium
of privileges of the various Powers in the Far
East will be affected. The Powers may not be
able to put up with it and may give some in-
dications of their attitude. Nevertheless, this
depends mostly upon how shall China cope with the
situation."

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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AM 1000

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE



American Consulate General,
 Nanking, China.

October 13, 1931

Subject: Sino-Japanese Controversy, Proposed
 Method of Frustrating the Policy of
 the Japanese Military Party.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
 Washington.



I have the honor to enclose herewith a Memorandum

of an interview held by me with Mr. Tai Chi-tao, President
 of the Examination Yuan, on October 4, 1931, regarding the
 Sino-Japanese controversy in Manchuria.

It will be observed that Mr. Tai expressed the opinion
 that the recent military activities of the Japanese armed
 forces in Manchuria could be opposed effectively if the
 policy of the Japanese military party in Japan were strongly
 denounced by foreign nations, thus discrediting the policy
 in the eyes of the Japanese public and depriving it of
 popular support.

Respectfully yours,

Willys R. Peck

Willys R. Peck.
 American Consul General.

Enclosure: Memorandum, as described.

In quintuplicate to the Department.
 In duplicate to the Legation.

800

WRP:ELCH

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793.94/2568

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NOV 30 1931

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW

October 4, 1931

Subject: Present Sino-Japanese Crisis and
Japanese Policy toward China.

Mr. Tai Chi-tao, President of the Examination Yuan,
Chairman of the Special Diplomatic Commission,
Dr. Frank W. Lee, Vice Minister in Charge of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Mr. Peck, Counselor of Legation.
Mr. Huang, of the Foreign Office.
President Yu Yu-jen, of the Control Yuan, (present
during part of the interview).

With a view to obtaining for the American Minister a complete account of the attitude of the Chinese Government toward the Sino-Japanese Controversy in Manchuria, Mr. Peck on October 3 asked Dr. Lee whether he could arrange an interview for Mr. Peck with Mr. Tai Chi-tao. The interview was arranged and Dr. Lee accompanied Mr. Peck to Mr. Tai's house at 10 a.m. October 4. Mr. Huang, who speaks both English and Japanese, accompanied them, since Mr. Tai also speaks Japanese and Mr. Huang might be of use in interpreting either from Chinese or from Japanese and in giving explanations.

Mr. Peck said to Mr. Tai that he desired to give the American Minister as complete a picture as possible of the Sino-Japanese Controversy as viewed by the Chinese Government. He stated and reiterated that he had no instructions to ask for an interview with Mr. Tai and that he had no instructions to convey any message to Mr. Tai, but that he would be interested in hearing Mr. Tai's comments. Mr. Tai said he understood Mr. Peck's position perfectly and that in their conversation they would completely put aside their respective official positions and talk freely as individuals.

With

- 2 -

With this understanding Mr. Tai asked Mr. Peck what solution he thought would be possible to terminate the present controversy. Mr. Peck said that he had not ventured to have any opinion on this subject, but that it would appear that the most obvious way would be for China and Japan to find some way of exchanging views.

Mr. Tai appeared to take this tentative suggestion as the theme of his remarks. From then on he discoursed steadily for about two hours, giving an outline of the structure of the Japanese Government, the part taken by different divisions of the Government in the formulation of foreign policies, the growth of and changes in the policy of Japan toward China and a description of the present crisis viewed in its historical setting. The conversation was in Chinese. Mr. Tai spoke rapidly but clearly and now and then when a point was not quite clear to Mr. Peck, Mr. Huang assisted with an explanation.

In order to follow intelligently Mr. Tai's description of the Japanese Government and the manner in which foreign policies are evolved and enforced, it would have been necessary for Mr. Peck to have studied rather intensively the development of the present system of Government in Japan, beginning with the early days of Meiji Era and ending with the latest expansion of the suffrage. In outline Mr. Peck gathered that the Cabinet and the Lower House of the Japanese Department have little to do with the formulating of domestic or foreign policies, the real custodians of these policies being the Privy Council and House of Peers. Mr. Peck was not quite sure that he has identified correctly from the Chinese terminology the

institutions

- 3 -

institutions referred to but he gathered that the Privy Council is composed of members appointed for life and that only a small portion of the House of Peers is in any sense elective. He gathered, also, that there are various high officials, such as the Minister of the Imperial Household, the Lord of the Privy Seal, the General Staff, and others, who have direct access to the Emperor and are able to frustrate any attempt on the part of the Cabinet and the Lower House to change governmental policies. From this explanation and a great deal more in addition Mr. Peck was lead to infer that the foreign policy of Japan toward China had never undergone any considerable change from the beginning to the present time. In brief, this policy seemed to be based on the mainland, in China, especially in Manchuria and Eastern Mongolia. The only factors which have undergone changes from time to time, he gathered, have been the means, whether economic, political, or military, adopted to achieve the end in view.

Mr. Tai said, as well as Mr. Peck could comprehend with his very limited knowledge of the historical background of which Mr. Tai was speaking, that after the Restoration, power was centralized in the hands of the Satsuma Clan and that later the authority of the members of this Clan was eliminated in the army by the Choshu Clan, and was confined to the navy. Mr. Tai said that the struggle for power between these Clans resulted in actual physical fighting. However, be that as it may, the power to determine the policy of Japan towards China has always been confined to a limited number of leaders and only lately has popular sentiment had anything to do with the forming and execution of this policy. Mr. Tai discussed

at

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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at length the rise to position and the present political milieu of Foreign Minister Shidehara. He said that about 1924 a young man holding the minor post of a Bureau Chief in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs determined that an aggressive Japanese policy toward China was a mistake and would not lead to desirable results. He rallied to his support several other relatively minor officials among them Komura, a man of noble family, and Shidehara, and laid their ideas before Marquis Saionji, the last of the Elder Statesmen. Saionji was convinced of the soundness of the ideas of the initiator of this movement, who was no other than Saburi, who a few years later, came to a tragic end. Mr. Tai said that Komura, likewise came to a sudden death. This group selected Shidehara as their representative and Shidehara was made Foreign Minister. In this position he tried to swing the policy of Japan toward China from one of coercion to one of amicable cooperation.

Mr. Tai said that the new movement provided for the abandonment of what has been called in Japan the "scorpion" policy. This policy envisages Japan as a scorpion with its two claws terminating in the Liaotung Peninsula and the Shantung Promontory, respectively, the idea being completely to encircle Peiping, which was formerly, as the Capital of China, the one place where political coercion could be most effectively applied. Mr. Tai said that the body of the scorpion extended down through the Japanese Islands and Formosa to Manila, which was destined to become

the

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 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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the sting of the insect, whence final political pressure would be exerted for the complete subjugation of China. This grandiose plan the military party of Japan never abandoned and the history of the years from 1924 to the present time has been an account of the struggle between Saburis' idea and the plan of the military party.

Mr. Tai had asked, at the very beginning of the interview, a question which at the time seemed to Mr. Peck irrelevant. This question was "is the present aggressive action of Japan in Manchuria a sign of superabundant power, or has it arisen from a sense of weakness?" Mr. Tai said that the military party in Japan had staked its entire position on the carrying out of its plan of aggrandisement in China. With the growth in Japan of popular sentiment favorable to a more friendly policy toward China and with the abandonment of the scheme of military penetration, the military party saw its power diminishing. The military party recognizes, however, that under present conditions it could never hope to impose its policy on the Government, unless it had a unanimous popular sentiment behind it. Consequently it^{has} devoted itself to arousing popular sentiment in support of an aggressive policy in China and to bringing about instances which would offer a plausible pretext for military action and would enflame the people of Japan against China. Mr. Tai said that indications of these activities on the part of the military party had been observable for a long time. He said that he had clearly foreseen the inevitability of what had recently taken place.

Briefly

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Briefly summarized, the recent spectacular coup in Manchuria had been a desperate, final bid by the military party for the continuance of its own existence and power.

Mr. Tai made a historical allusion to a Chinese hero who wore the robes of a civil official over the armour of a warrior, and he said that the paraphernalia of constitutional Government in Japan had always been silken robes over the armour of the military party. It was this which had made the task of Saburi, Komura, Shidehara and their associates, even with the powerful assistance of Saionji, so difficult. The Cabinet and the Foreign Office have existed only as the instrument through which the military party, with its direct access to the Throne through the institutions referred to, carried out its historical policy.

Mr. Tai then reverted to the question of discussions between China and Japan to settle the present crisis in Manchuria. He said that apparently the military party had created popular enthusiasm in Japan for the recent military aggressions. The desperate character of this last bid for power by the military party arose from the fact that if it succeeded, it would receive popular approval and acclaim, while, if it failed, the military party would be deprived of influence and power. The military party at the present moment seems to have the entire people and Government of Japan behind it. As Mr. Tai explained it, Japan is now a Samurai warrior who has issued his orders to defenseless China. The only attitude on the part of China which he will accept is one of complete subservience. Mr. Tai pointed out the utter impossibility of China's discussing with Japan the Manchurian question, or any other question, with Japan in this arrogant mood.

Mr. Tai

- 7 -

Mr. Tai then disclosed what seemed to be the objective of his exposition. He said that the military party in Japan, as the result of the extension of the suffrage in a few years from 3,000,000 to more than 10,000,000 and of the increase in power of popular opinion, could never hope to succeed in its aggressive policy toward China unless it had behind it the unanimous support of the people of Japan. If the policy of the military party could be in some way discredited in the eyes of the Japanese people, the military party, rendered powerless at home, would be obliged to abandon its thrust on the mainland. Mr. Tai said that China had earnestly hoped that the League of Nations would uphold the justice of China's cause and would display to the world the military coup of Japan in Manchuria in its true light. The League of Nations had taken certain steps and had adjourned its Council on September 30., in order to give two weeks time to Japan to reverse its policy and withdraw its troops to the South Manchurian Railway from the invaded territories. Mr. Tai pointed out the hopelessness of expecting that Japan in its present mood of a Samurai warrior would reverse its policy, and emphasized the futility of any discussion or negotiations to which China might consent during the brief period of ten days remaining before the time granted to Japan should expire.

Mr. Tai said that the League of Nations was not the only agency through which light could be thrown on the Japanese measures in Manchuria, or of bringing the

Japanese

- 8 -

Japanese people to a realization of their true character. He said that it seemed to him that some other Nation, or Nations, should issue a statement upholding the justice of China's position and condemning Japan's measures as internationally unjust and violative of China's rights. If this were done the atmosphere in Japan essential to the success of this plan which had been initiated and executed by the military party, would be destroyed. Mr. Tai said that the nation best situated to issue such a statement was the United States. Its qualifications rested, he said, partly on its prestige among nations and partly on its wealth and the vital economic importance to Japan of Japanese-American commercial relations. He said that the nation next in order of qualifications for this task was Great Britain and what he most desired was a joint statement by the United States and Great Britain.

Mr. Tai observed that for several decades Occidental nations had not intervened in international politics in the Far East in a practical and effective manner, that is, not since Russia, Germany and France had intervened to prevent the retention of the Liaotung Peninsula by Japan after the China-Japanese war. Since then there had been paper declarations, but no effective intervention. He said that in the controversy between China and Japan the Chinese people would be sure to look to some third party to offer a mode of settlement. If this third party were not to be found in the League of Nations or in other powers, the result was sure to be that a large section of the Chinese

people,

- 9 -

people, especially the young educated class, would look more and more to Soviet Russia. This would certainly conduce to the increased influence in China of the Soviet Government and of the Third International.

Mr. Tai said that it was futile to expect that in the next ten days conditions would come about under which China and Japan could meet to settle the Manchurian crisis. He urged that Mr. Peck report the situation as he had described it to the American Minister, in the hope that the American Government either alone or in conjunction with Great Britain, might issue a statement calculated to bring to the Japanese people a realization of the situation in its true light.

Mr. Tai said that historically in China every great natural calamity, such as China's present floods, had been followed by periods of chaos. He said that no Government in China could survive popular displeasure if it should consent to discuss the Manchuria situation with Japan alone, without the presence of an impartial outsider to uphold justice. He also said that the present disastrous flood would greatly increase the difficulties of the Chinese Government and that if the present Government should be swept away it would be hopeless to expect another Government to take its place under the chaotic conditions which would follow.

Mr. Peck said that he would make a detailed statement of what Mr. Tai had said and would report the substance of his remarks to the American Legation at once.

NOTE:

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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NOTE: Mr. Tai's exposition was very elaborate, specific in its allusions, and logical. The account given above cannot pretend to be more than a rough summary. There is attached to this report a diagram summarizing some of the statements made by Mr. Tai. This diagram was sent to Mr. Peck by Mr. Huang after the interview.

EMPEROR

:

1. Elder Statemen

- | | |
|--|---------------------------------------|
| 2. Lord of the Privy Seal | 3. Minister of the Imperial Household |
| 4. Council of Marshalls & Fleet Admirals | 5. War Council |
| 6. General Staff Office | 7. Naval General Staff Office |

Above mentioned are only responsible to the Emperor

- | | |
|---------------------------|----------------------|
| 1. House of Peers | 2. the Privy Council |
| 3. House of Commons | 4. the Cabinet |

3 & 4 are responsible to the people

SHIDEHARA DIPLOMATIC PARTY

Mr. Shidehara, the present Foreign Minister as figure head.

1. Prince Konoye, Member of House of Peers
2. Mr. Saburi, ex-Minister to China, who committed suicide at 1929
as active head
3. Mr. R. Nagai, ex-Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs
4. Prince Komura, ex-director of the Bureau of Publicity and Intelligence, who died at 1929
5. Mr. Shigemitsu, the present Minister to China

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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No. -----

AMERICAN CONSULATE,
GENERAL,
Mukden, China, October 17, 1931.

copy to FE
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 10 1931
Department of State

793.94

SUBJECT: Some Aspects of the Situation.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE.
WASHINGTON.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

F/DEW 793.94/2569

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of
my despatch No. 466, to the Legation, Peiping, China,
dated October 17, 1931, on the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers
M. S. Myers
American Consul General.

FILED
NOV 30 1931

Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 466 to
Legation, Peiping.

MSM:HTW
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No. 466

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Mukden, China, October 17, 1931.

SUBJECT: Some Aspects of the Situation.

CONFIDENTIAL

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping, China,

Sir:

I have the honor to state that the Chinese Post Office is the only Chinese government administration at Mukden which has neither been closed nor placed under Japanese control. However, confidential information has been received that the Japanese military authorities are planning to close it should the situation be further aggravated. Although it is impossible to foretell how the situation, in view of the widespread disorder, may develop, there is little reason to believe at this time that events will occur in Manchuria justifying such a step. It is believed that the Japanese military authorities fear complications arising from developments in China proper, in which event they may extend their military occupation in South Manchuria and close the Chinese postal administration.

Banditry which is extremely serious, particularly in districts west of the Liao river, is a constant source

of

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of danger to the status quo and may at any time be used by the Japanese as a pretext for further military action. The Peking-Mukden Railway between Hsinmin and Tahushan is practically unprotected but for the 60 or 70 guards carried by each train - Chinese troops are not stationed farther north than Tahushan. The placing of Chinese guards on these trains was arranged by the foreign representative of the Peking-Mukden Railway with the Japanese authorities with considerable difficulty and their agreement was conditioned upon Japanese guards being carried on the trains between Hsinmin and Huangkutun (Mukden station west of Japanese railway tracks). However, no arrangement for the adequate policing of that bandit infested area has been made, or even attempted as far as is known. It is probable that the Japanese would not entertain a proposal from the Chinese for the policing of this area for military reasons but at least the Chinese should oblige them to declare themselves on this point. As bearing on this question, it has been learned that the foreign representative of the Peking-Mukden Railway has repeatedly been offered, by the Japanese military authorities, Japanese guards for the trains west of Hsinmin which offer has been refused.

As previously reported, the Peking-Mukden trains are carrying Japanese guards between Huangkutun and Hsinmin. Some days ago the Japanese soldiers started examining passengers on the platform of the Huangkutun station against the strong protests of the railway

company's

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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company's representative. A member of the staff of this office can testify to the undue harshness of the examination, the soldiers making free use of the bayonet in searching for concealed weapons on passengers - they are freely prodded with the point of the bayonet.


The Japanese detachment which occupies the left bank of the Iiso river at Chuliuho is now preparing quarters for winter. Buildings under construction have been seen by passengers on the trains and a few days ago a train-load of building materials was sent there. It is apparent that the Japanese military authorities anticipate the prolonged occupation of this point.

Respectfully yours,


M. E. Myers
 American Consul General.

Original and one copy to legation.
 Five copies to Department.
 One copy to Embassy, Tokyo.

MEM:HTW
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Peking, October 10, 1931.

No. 1220

NOV 9 31



F/DEW - 793.94/2570

793.94
note
500.C/112
711.0012-Anti-War

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

Referring to the Legation's telegram No. 697, of
1/ October 4, 8 a.m., I have the honor to transmit herewith
the text of the note from the Chinese Government, dated
October 3, 1931, which the Acting Minister for Foreign
Affairs telegraphed to the Legation in English, and
which the Legation telegraphically transmitted to the
Department in its telegram above referred to.

The Department will recall that this communication
from the Chinese Foreign Office contains, in substance,
an appeal addressed to the Governments members of the
Council of the League of Nations, and to the United States
as a signatory of the Treaty for the Renunciation of War,

to send

NOV 6 1931
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to send representatives to Manchuria for the purpose of collecting information regarding the progress of the withdrawal of Japanese troops to the railway zone, which the Japanese Government is said to have promised to accomplish before October 14th.

2/ The English texts of this note, both the one already telegraphed to the Department and the one enclosed herewith, are identical. But the Chinese text, a copy of which is likewise attached, does not appear to contain the last paragraph of the English translation. As paragraph five is the only one which was worded differently because it was addressed to the United States and not to a member of the Council of the League, the omission is doubtless due to an oversight.

The Department's reply to the Chinese note of October 3rd was received here on October 6th and was on the same day telegraphed to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in Nanking.

Respectfully yours,

For the Minister:


C. Van H. Engert
First Secretary of Legation.

Enclosures:

- 1/ English text of note from Chinese Government, dated October 3, 1931, No. L362;
- 2/ Chinese text of above.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1
Despatch No. 1220

L-362

Translation of a formal note addressed by His
Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of China to the Honorable Nelson
T. Johnson, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister
Plenipotentiary of the United States of America
to China.

(Trans. FO)

(Dated: October 3, 1931.)

(Recd.: October 9, 1931.)

Sir:

1. The Chinese Government has the honor to
inform Your Excellency that in its view events of
the next twelve days during which the Japanese
Government is expected by the Council of the League
of Nations to complete the withdrawal of its troops
to the railway zone in terms of the Council's resolution
of September 30th, will have the most far reaching
consequences for the effective maintenance of peace
and the present status in the Far East.

2. On its part the Chinese Government has
undertaken before the League's Council to assume
responsibility for the safety of the lives and property
of Japanese nationals outside the railway zone during
the process of withdrawal of Japanese troops and the
reestablishment of Chinese local authorities and
police forces.

3.

The Honorable

Nelson T. Johnson,

Envoy Extraordinary and
Minister Plenipotentiary of
the United States of America
to China.

-2-

3. The difficulties of this task are immeasurably increased by the situation created by the Japanese action which has violently disturbed the machinery of central control in Manchuria. Every day brings fresh incidents such as aerial attacks on trains, disarming of isolated Chinese units, imposing of Japanese military authority on various localities, et cetera.

4. Your Excellency is aware that the Council of the League resolved in the absence of any unforeseen occurrences which might render an immediate meeting essential, to convene at Geneva on Wednesday, October 14th, in order to consider the situation as it then stands, and that information with regard to the developments of the situation is awaited not only from the Chinese and Japanese Governments but also from other members of the Council.

5. Under all the circumstances as stated, the Chinese Government has requested the diplomatic representatives in this country of those Powers which are members of the Council of the League to send individual representatives to Manchuria to collect information on the progress of evacuation and all relevant circumstances for the information of the Council. In view of the fact that the United States of America is one of the signatories of the Treaty for the Renunciation of War signed at Paris in 1928 and is as deeply interested as the other Powers in the effective maintenance of peace in the Far East, I have the honor to request that you take immediate steps to be likewise represented and that information collected by your representatives on the movements of Japanese troops in Manchuria be transmitted to your Government and the general public by telegraph.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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I have the honor, Mr. Minister, to address this
formal note for your information and action.

For the Minister:

(Signed) Li Chin-lun,

-SEAL OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS-

Note--English translation of this document has been
transmitted to you by telegraph today.

October 3, 1931.

FO:T

Translator's Note:--The last paragraph of the
English translation does not appear in
the Chinese text.

FJC

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照抄外交部照會一件 第三百六十二號
 大中華民國外交部長

照會事

- (一) 中國政府以為今後十二日內之發展對於切實維持遠東和平及現狀一事實具有極遠到之結果在此十二日內國際聯合會行政院希望日本政府依照該院九月三十日之決議完成撤退其軍隊於鐵路區域以內
- (二) 中國政府方面曾對國際聯合會行政院保證在日軍進行撤退中國地方官吏及警察恢復之時所有鐵路區域以外日本僑民生命財產之安全中國政府負責維持
- (三) 此種職責因日方行動所釀成之局勢其困難之增加殊難限量日方行動曾激烈破壞東省中央統治之機關無日不見有新發生之事變如對於列車空中之擊射解除星散各處中國軍隊之武裝並於各地方強樹日本之軍權等等
- (四) 貴公使已悉聯合會行政院議決若無任何意外之事變必須立即召集會議者則於十月十四日星期三在日內瓦重行開會以考量屆時之時局且不但靜待來自中日兩國政府方面關於時局發展之消息且靜待來自行政院其他各會員方面關於時局發展之消息
- (五) 在上述情形之下中國政府已請求國聯行政院會員國之駐華外交代表各派代表前往東省搜

為

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Quistrom NARS, Date 12-18-75

集關於軍隊撤退程度及一切關連情形之消息以供給於行政院本部長鑒於美國係一九二
 八年在巴黎簽字非戰公約之二份子且對於切實維持遠東和平與其他各國具同等深切之
 關心茲特請求

貴公使取迅速之步驟同樣照派代表並將

貴方代表所探得關於日軍在東省行動之消息轉電
 貴國政府及公眾

相應照會

貴公使查照辦理為荷須至照會者
 右照會

大美國特命駐華全權公使詹

會

李錦綸代

(附注)此件英文譯文已於本日先行電達

中華民國二十年十月三日

SPECIAL MANCHURIA NUMBER



Contributors To This Issue

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MR. SHUMEI OKAWA has devoted many years of his life to effecting a real improvement in the relations of Japan and China fully conscious that the two countries are destined to hang together or to hang separately.

MR. IPPEI FUKUDA is a prolific writer on various topics, specializing in Sino-Japanese relations.

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Japan Earnestly Desires Close Co-operation By All Countries And All Nations In Asia

By SHUMEI OKAWA

Toward the close of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th Asia stood on the verge of destruction because of the aggressive policies of the white race. About this time the Japanese people, who had just begun to know themselves better, came to realize either by force of environmental influences or by fate that their true mission lay in saving Asia. Ever since then, we the Japanese people have earnestly prayed for the reconstruction of Asia by actively and closely cooperating with all the other peoples of Asia, not only with those of the neighboring countries, but also with others inhabiting this continent including the Anamese, Siamese, and the Indians.

In spite of our good neighbors, the Chinese, since the establishment of the Republic have cast away the virtues of the Oriental race jealously reserved for several centuries and have become infected with Western ideas, in particular those ideas which tend excessively toward materialism and which unduly insist on the rights of the individual. The Chinese have turned their backs upon us, have opposed and attacked us on every occasion, and have rejected our sincere offers for cooperation. Furthermore, they have evaded as much as possible our attempts to discuss with them various Sino-Japanese problems with an open heart; instead, they have tried to exert pressure upon us by seeking the aid and courting the favours of Europeans and Americans, an example of the base trick of controlling one alien power with the aid of another. Their attitude on their part has not been changed.

It may not be amiss to point out in this connection that the Japanese people are not the whole brave in show, but are extremely tender-hearted. When one appeals to the sense of ethical principles, the Japanese will not attempt to carry out their will by force or coercion against reason. From past experiences we have rather been misunderstood because we have insisted too strongly upon our rights. In brief, we are too good-natured. If, therefore, the Chinese, understanding our nature, come to us with the spirit of cooperation, the various pending issues could be solved comparatively readily. But on the contrary, they have constantly attempted to oppress us with help from Europe or America, which has compelled us to take the relations between the two peoples have only become all the more complicated.

Yet in spite of all that, we have exercised the utmost reasonableness in believing that some day the Chinese would be able to understand us. Unfortunately, we failed to understand the Japanese attitude and, on our part, just as have the Westerners. They seemed to have come to the conclusion that we had yielded completely, and have consequently exerted greater pressure upon us. Of course, we will remain patient as much as we can, but when our national dignity is trampled down, we are forced to rise resolutely and even prepared to meet the worst.

Take, for instance, the recent Manchurian incident. If the Chinese had exercised self-control just a little earlier and had refrained from acting such acts of violence, I am confident that the incident would never have taken place. That incident is the result of the clash of the two divergent traits—the egoism and selfish nature of the Chinese and the psychology of the Japanese, consisting of patience and modesty with the expectation that the other party will one day reflect over its actions. If both sides were modest or if both sides were insistent upon their respective rights, the clash might not have been so serious; and the settlement thereof could be effected easily. The national traits of the two being diametrically opposed to each other, the matter has thus become serious.

Moreover, we must not forget to mention the fact that great evil and harm are being done to the peace and smooth relationship between China and Japan because of the indiscreet speech and actions on the part of the Westerners for the purpose of tormenting Japan. Without comprehending fully the conditions obtaining in the Far East or the characteristics and morality of the Chinese and the Japanese, being merely carried away by the clever propaganda by Chinese and their agents, including certain Westerners.

Recently the League of Nations requested Japan to withdraw her troops completely to their original posts and to negotiate under better conditions. Such a request obviously fails to take into account the peculiarities of Chinese diplomatic tactics; or perhaps the request was made intentionally with the knowledge of the Chinese diplomatic policies for the object of embarrassing this nation. We should like to ask the League or any other body to give us concrete cases to prove that issues with China have been satisfactorily and justly solved with the aid of the League under peaceful conditions.

For nearly two decades we have negotiated directly with China in Manchuria under conditions of mutual equality and peace, exercising the utmost tolerance, but not once have we succeeded in settling our pending issues to our mutual satisfaction. We believe that the member nations of the League, too, have not been equally better. It is at any rate, it is entirely a mistake to face and deal with China without, first of all, studying the complex conditions in the Far East and to treat China like the nations of Europe or America which faithfully observe all treaty obligations. The Japanese people are not behind

the Europeans or the Americans in extending their sympathy to China and in relieving her distress. In fact, blood is thicker than water, as the saying goes, and our sentiments toward our brother race are most probably deeper. We do not by any means desire to see China collapse with ruin. But it should be borne in mind that to show too much cheap sympathy to a young China, who lacks self-control, and thereby fan their conceit unnecessarily would only aggravate relations between the two nations. From the standpoint of peace in the Far East, and for the mutual peace of the whole world, such favouritism actions, though done without bad intentions, should to our mind be avoided as much as possible.

Our people take it as an affront to their nation when a third power intervenes in our dealings with China on questions that affect our very existence, especially when such intervention is in the name of a study of the whole matter and only with a superficial knowledge of the affair that appear on the surface. We can state unhesitatingly that the Japanese nation stands for righteousness and does not intend under any circumstances to invade the territories of other nations and to squeeze the life-blood of their peoples and thereby secure the means with which we may live in extravagance. We are not such a cowardly and debased race. For that reason, it is unnecessary for us to listen to such unwarranted criticisms that we are aggressive or imperialistic.

By fate we are in position to look upon ourselves as being the best neighbours of the Chinese. For the deep and lofty cultures of the Orient, which China possesses, we have the highest respect and admiration. We can say that the criticisms that we have just made are not directed against the Chinese people in general but against the small band of militarists and politicians who today rule China. By nature the Chinese people are industrious and peace-loving, possessing qualities that invite our friendship. This fact we have experienced through our actual contact with the people while travelling in interior regions or at the homes of the Chinese citizens. On that account, we do not believe that the present rulers of China are typically representative Chinese.

A Much-Overlooked Facet of Sino-Japanese Relations

By ALFRED E. PIERES,

Tokyo Correspondent,
The North China Daily News (Shanghai)
The Detroit News and Other Publications

There is no desire in this article to deal with the rights and wrongs of the deplorable situation that has brought Sino-Japanese relations to a head in Manchuria. This article is intended to examine the attitude that Japan has been following toward China for the past ten years or so.

During this period Japan has studiously and sedulously endeavored to make friends with China. Its stances are numerous, but, unfortunately, China did not care to reciprocate and, instead, yavied away with offensive hauteur the hand of friendship that Japan held out. It used to be the fashion to characterize Japan as militaristic. Japan is far from that. An intense patriotism permeates her, but of late the Japanese have understood that with other civilized nations and individuals, that patriotism is not necessarily great because it is rich, mighty or acquisitive. The acquisitive nature of Occidental civilization is one of its weakest points. It is, in fact, the Achilles' heel of Western civilization, and the West has been slow to perceive this. In Europe and America, it is being realized more and more that the test of a country's greatness is its service to the world and only that. Japan, too, is fully conscious of this. Many an opportunity, of an extraordinarily tempting nature, presented itself for Japan to act in a manner that has brought her equal to the level of Western powers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. But she did not yield, largely because of the consciousness that patriotism of the Jingo sort, the patriotism that seeks loot, is not a criterion of greatness.

Japan today correctly states that China has been very rude, even boorish, in her acts towards this country. Let us roll back the pages of time a few years. There was the Hankow episode when the Chinese turned on their friends and attacked British, Americans, and Japanese. The Japanese suffered more than anyone else there, as they were in much greater numbers. Terrible things happened to the Japanese, worse than to the British at Hankow or to the Americans at Nanking. Britain turned the other cheek, knowing that these things were perpetrated by the scum of which the better Chinese Nationalists are deadly ashamed, but whom they have not had the sense to ostracize or the power to disarm. The Japanese also turned the other cheek—till the Tsinan-fu massacre. Westerners should never forget that Japan's economic life is wrapped up in and bound up with China and when the latter talks of severing economic relations with Japan and having nothing to do with her, China is making a threat that is tantamount to a desire to destroy Japan, something that no nation will accept with impunity. The world today is knit too close for any one country to say that she will not try to live on terms of amity with her neighbors. Unimportant bickerings of former years are now a vital concern of everyone; that is why the Manchurian troubles are regarded in far-off lands as though they were

family matters of their own; that is why the echoes of that unfortunate incident have reverberated far and wide. The world is too inter-dependent; the body politic of the world is today involved even in quarrels amongst the most remote and the least breeds beyond the law."

Respected China's Susceptibilities
Now Japan has never intended to be extra hard on China. China has forced Japan to make a sort of apology that could not be very much longer postponed. Japan has the deepest sympathy for China's pitiful condition, after years of turmoil and misery; and the Shidehara diplomacy, which the Japanese backed until China forced them to re-consider matters, was nothing else than a desire to reach an understanding with the Chinese susceptibility. "This is obvious in Japan's dealings with China in the past ten years. China, however, misconstrued all this. Frightened and where thought that it would come to a fight between a sword-fish and a whale and that the whale would, in the end, "swallow" the smaller fish. And China proceeded on a series of calculated insults, indignities and humiliations that have frayed and worn down the patience of Japan. In China, especially in Manchuria, the attitude of Japan and her policy has been that of the Biblical: "I am amongst you as he that serveth." But China adopted an unbecomingly hostile and unbending hostility, an attitude that is often the psychological outcome of one who knows he deserves retribution.

One may say that China's mentality is not normal after her many distresses. But even granting this, it is impossible to ignore the fact that China has been, over a period of several years, persistently refusing to let the dead past bury its dead, and, in co-operation with Japan, consent to a policy that clearly spells co-prosperity and peace and development. China cannot think that she has a right to do as she pleases with herself. No nation has a right to do this in this modern age and no nation can be permitted that extravagant and preposterous privilege.

Verbal Smoke-Screens
As usual, China is busy putting up verbal smoke screens in Geneva and Washington, at Berlin and London; while that other arch-enemy of peace and order, who will do its utmost to fish in troubled waters, is not wanting in indulging in the vilest of slanders against the "bourgeoisie" of the world. But China forgets the many acts of benevolence on the part of Japan and here "Japan" means the human being, as distinct from the political machine.

When the terrible Yangtze floods flooded Japan, Japan hurried Japan's medical supplies to the affected areas. She filled a ship full of food and clothing and sent it to Shanghai. And what does China do? Arrogantly refuses it, and because of the wooden-headedness of a coterie of howling demagogues. Goodness only knows what misadventures in the Yangtze Valley must suffer, are perhaps dead. Then, in South Manchuria, the Japanese have done yeoman

PLANS OF NANKING RESULT IN FIASCO

Well-Conceived Plot of Nationalist Government Proves A Boomerang

By IPPEI FUKUDA

No correct appraisal of the Manchurian fiasco is possible without taking stock of China's home politics.

There are at present three major regimes in that country, namely that of the Nationalists, the Communists, and the Manchurian Nationalists. No doubt the strongest of the trio, that of Canton, a newly-hatched government but yet not negligible in point of power, and that under General Chang Hsueh-liang of Mukden. These factors are seen now hugging one another with a profession of warm regard for one another after plotting to destroy one another. To define the intricate relations existing between them is to throw much light on the sensational drama being enacted in Manchuria.

Outwardly, General Chiang Kai-shek of Nanking stands on the best of terms with the ruler of Manchuria who has vowed allegiance to the former. In spite of this fact, however, General Chang Hsueh-liang happens to have under his command a number of well-trained men superior in every aspect to the army available to Nanking. In a country where guns speak louder than words, it would be idle to think that the Manchurian ally really meant what he told the head of the Nanking regime. Before the Sino-Japanese conflict broke out along the South Manchuria Railway line a month ago, the Canton government had nothing but hatred for the Nanking leaders who had, for that matter, felt the same way for the upstart government in South China.

The situation could not have been otherwise, as the former had come into existence after the revolt of its leaders against the rest of the Nationalist politicians in China. At the meantime the Chinese Communists have renewed their activities in provinces beyond easy reach of the Nationalist expedition of the Nationalist troops. Placed in this extremely embarrassing position, the sway of General Chiang Kai-shek obviously suffered. People in the provinces ruled by him are still their mistrust of his political fortune by binging down the price of government bonds which soon fell below par. The Canton government, on the other hand, issued bonds of the Flood Relief Bonds came on the market, it attracted practically no attention of the investing public. The Nationalist Treasury has been in dire straits for lack of funds. It is also easy to see that General Chiang Kai-shek is in a desperate mood to seek to salvage what remained of his prestige by some desperate move.

The Final Move
The eleventh-hour move took the form of a foreign complication. In other words, he chose to deal with Japan for the purpose of breaking the impasse under his nose. His emissaries got busy in Manchuria as a result. They were sent to face the flames of anti-Japanese among the Manchurians so as to invite a conflict between China and Japan. The subtle wirepuller at Nanking had in view the resultant losses of the Mukden troops in case of hostilities. The eventuality of course would do away, to a large extent, with an element of fear he had in the army led by his half-hearted ally, Chang Hsueh-liang. On the other hand, the march to extinction of the Government under Chiang's dictatorship could be checked by an appeal to the whole nation to unite against Japan. It was in line with the postulates of the imaginative mind of Chiang that the Chinese soldiers led Manchuria into the present disturbance by wrecking a military expedition of the S.M.R. leaders certainly scored a tactical success. Nothing could have stung this country to this country more than an attack on the S.M.R. that had planned cut, the direct consequence of the conflict fell heavily on the shoulders of the S.M.R. whose power has been so crippled since the outbreak that he has been reduced to a ruler without a kingdom. It has been the hope of Chiang Hsueh-liang to return to his capital, Mukden. He chose Peiping as a temporary haven for his exile and is said to be in the process of negotiating with Japan so that his downfall might be prevented at the last minute.

Sought New Tool
So far, therefore, the program drawn up at Nanking reaped its desired advances. The next problem, as far as Chiang Kai-shek is concerned, is to formulate a satisfactory grand finale to the drama of his creation before further development will have over-reached the objectives in view. True to his conception of statesmanship, he would not avert personally to bring the incident to a happy ending; he is trying to let others solve the big problem. The tool he set his eyes on is the League of Nations. He approached it with a view to settling the Sino-Japanese dispute to his advantage. As the matter stands to-day the League is unlikely to play that role.

Now that the failure of his attempt to decoy the Geneva Institution became a certainty, Chiang Kai-shek is in a desperate predicament. He is trying to solve the big problem. The tool he set his eyes on is the League of Nations. He approached it with a view to settling the Sino-Japanese dispute to his advantage. As the matter stands to-day the League is unlikely to play that role.

service in stamping out plague. Hospitals, where attendance and treatment is free, have been opened. Clinics have been established and Japan has plunged headlong into a Herculean fight against dirt, disease, ignorance and vermin. It is not the spirit of service, what is?

These are some of the many things that the more level-headed and sensible Chinese are reflecting upon. These are the acts that live, the spirit that rises superior to all else.

Let Right Be Might

By YOSHIHIRO YAMAKAWA

Scrupulous observance of the code of international morality and the jealous maintenance of the honor of places and covenant endorse the saying that "Right is Might." Modern nations are united in conformity upon this principle, and peace and order of the present age are preserved through a mutual sense of responsibility and respect. In the absence of this universal conception to regulate the behavior of nations the League of Nations must use its footling and the world will move backward.

This simple sense of mutual trust and responsibility seems lacking in China's foreign relations. The words and acts of China in her foreign relations are invariably in variance, never in conformity, nor accompanied with honor—promises easily forgotten and pledges ignored, all to her own ends. China looks at the world peace through the sanctity of international treaties and covenants.

Japan has on file some 300 or more items of difference with China which are considered by us as flagrant infringements of our treaty rights and with her. We have long endured with China but she merely takes advantage of our calmness and resignation. Instead of appreciating our peaceful attitude, China looks at us with contempt and an overbearing disregard. She believes us an easy prey to her deception and double dealing. Japan's loan of billions of yen to China to open her undeveloped resources and build roads is being used to jeopardize our vested rights in Manchuria—which vast territory she restored to China, from the strong clutches of the Russian bear, only at an enormous sacrifice of lives and money on our part.

China cannot put her own house in order, nor is there any immediate

she set about patting his political victim of Manchuria on the back, being aware of the resentment of the latter. Another enemy to be soled at the present juncture is the Nationalist Government in South China. The Nationalist Government's response to the call for unity seems to be not exactly what Chiang expected. Canton contends that, since the outbreak occurred as the result of the poor statesmanship of Chiang, he should resign as an apology for the fiasco. It would take more time and show of sincerity on the part of the Nationalist Government before a complete rapprochement could be reached with Canton. Isolated, deposed and desperate he is known to have made up his mind to defy Japan to the bitter end. That appears to be the only remaining stroke under the circumstances. Disorders, anarchy and an assault on the part of the Nationalist Government in South China, engaged. As the apex of the Nationalist Government's movement or movements to declare Manchuria independent both from Chang Hsueh-liang and Chiang Kai-shek.

prospect for unification. Warlords and politicians only know how to squeeze the already impoverished people while soldiers and bandits are synonymous in China. Thus, the seeming millions of ignorant people are left uncared for and suffer the utmost misery and distress.

Instead of self-contemplation, leaders of China want to find an outside party upon whom they may heap all blame for their faults and to seek a benevolent people to aid and sympathize with her—a distant nation that may easily bite her false bait. Such tactics have been used by the Chinese from time immemorial—when China was divided into so many independent feudal domains. The best tactics were thought to be to make enemies of neighbors while making friends with distant foes. Playing one against another is China's traditional diplomacy.

In her destitute condition, harassing her nearest neighbor Japan and embittering the feeling of her own countrymen against Japan is believed to act as the strongest incentive for the unification of her people while distant nations are expected to offer her the necessary aid and sympathy. Chinese politicians know how to play with the jealousies of the powers. They have made such good use of their cunning art and diplomacy in the past that even benevolent nations hesitate today to come to her aid at her beckoning.

Japan knows her old neighbor well, but she followed the trend of the time and was content with the long, tedious, patient and peaceful policy of Baron Shidehara to settle numerous vexing questions confronting Japan in China, especially in Manchuria. If China were willing to meet us half way and reciprocated our friendly and compromising attitude, it is unimaginable that Japan would have united against China as she has today.

The Japanese public believes that the Shidehara policy of conciliation with China was but eating pearls at a banquet. We all believe that Baron Shidehara trusted cunning and mischievous China with the same faith and friendliness that may be very proper with the other more advanced nations whose policy is based on an enlightened sense of justice and fair-play. "He met a beggar and handed him a Bible instead of a copper," so goes a saying on the street.

"Liberty" the youthful Chinese call, but all they mean is "License." Where can one find law and order preserved in China? Property plundered, life imperilled, and travelling made dangerous—mobs, boycotts, murders and plunders—and yet they have the audacity to cry for the abolition of extraterritoriality and to claim equal rights and treatment with the most enlightened nations? Chinese enjoy the same privileges outside of China; within their own country they are denied them, simply because they are unfit to govern themselves and to accord foreigners the same privileges which Chinese enjoy in other countries.

China's potentiality is indeed great. She could become one of the

greatest nations if only she would learn to adjust her own affairs wisely and well. It took many patient years before Japan thought herself fit to be admitted into the comity of nations. We started with placing our own house in order and making friends with other powers. Security of life and property, freedom of trade and commerce with the rest of the world, equal rights and treatment and a strict observance of international treaties and agreements—all these, step by step—although not without many difficulties, were assured to the other members of the great family of nations before Japan was admitted into its comity. China today is hitching the horse behind the cart by adopting an opposite course and claiming her right before she can fulfill her obligations.

The Chinese is individually a lovable friend with high culture and good qualities, but he as a composite of a nation, is misled by a few high hat pretenders who try to cheat their own countrymen with the highest imaginable aspirations, and who "blame" foreign peoples with their would-be wonderful accomplishments. Their government, however, is in fact a machine to amass a fortune for themselves and their patriotism is a camouflage for their own selfishness.

Apart from political disturbances and irritations from foreign relations, China is a peaceful country with vast resources and Chinese are the most peaceful and law-abiding people on earth. All the present troubles of China are brewed at the hands of a few selfish politicians who place their own advancement of position and possession above those of their own country. These men who neglect to introspect the very real condition prevailing in their own country or who know very little of the historical background of their nation are misleading the masses into a very dangerous path. Their nation is nearly torn up in destitution, a large portion of the populace have turned Red and the remainder are becoming entirely licentious dreaming of the captivating modern slogans, the full meaning of which remains incomprehensible to those who cry "Down with imperialism" or "Self-determination" or "Equal treatment," etc., which all have no meaning to a people who cannot govern themselves, nor understand that responsibility must always accompany rights.

Baron Shidehara's otherwise enlightened policy of patience, endurance, and peaceful relations with other powers, supported by all advanced nations, has failed to bring about the expected amicable solution to all pending questions between China and Japan. Boycotting, infringements upon our vested rights, denunciation of the Empire and even recent utterances for declaration of war against Japan are piled upon our head, all of which we Japanese consider most preposterous and entirely absurd in view of our long endurance and resignation in the face of deliberate negligence and slight by China.

Indignity has its limit, and when a hot-headed Chinese Commander attempted the destruction of the S.M.R. track it acted as a spark to ignite a powerful explosive but which was used by the Japanese army to limit the sphere of warfare—as dynamites are used for the destruction of a few

JAPAN ENSURES A PEACEFUL MUKDEN

Municipal Administration of Principal Manchuria City Functions Smoothly

The municipal administration of the city of Mukden has been carried out with increasing efficiency, with the arrival of more Chinese officials well versed in municipal administration from other cities in Manchuria. A financial expert of the Kwantung Government-General has been engaged by the Chinese authorities in order to deal with the problems of banking and finance. Through the courtesies of the officials of the South Manchuria Railway, Mr. Sudo, one of the directors of the S.M.R., and who is well versed in financial matters has arrived at Mukden in order to assist the municipal officials to assist the financial problems now confronting them.

Progress has been also smoothly made in the work of maintaining peace and order within the walled city. The number of Chinese police officials has reached 1,000 while private civilians are also cooperating with them. In consequence, all shops and stores have opened and the prices of commodities are practically the same as before the conflict. Japanese authorities are assisting Chinese to prepare for handing over the work of administration to whoever come to assume the task of government in the city.

The municipal administration in other cities excepting the work of maintaining order is being carried out by the Chinese officials the same before the conflict.

However, the villages and to in other districts have been rava by the Chinese soldiers who have been routed by the Japanese troops. Even in Mukden, its industrial area was attacked by Chinese bandits; soldiers who, however, were repul by the Japanese soldiers. All makes the withdrawal of the Japanese troops from the railway zone extremely difficult.

houses to limit the extent of a flagration.

Even now we are sincerely hope that China and Japan will be good friends and all the pending questions be settled amicably. We believe the Japanese people are one in the hope to dismiss all the past trouble with her nearest neighbor peacefully if we can; but, at the same time, we are determined to defend the national dignity even forcibly, if must. The present Manchurian question is one on which our destiny hangs, and Japan, too, do a right, not hesitate to enter into a death struggle to uphold her right and dignity.

K. TOMODA & CO.

HONCHO, TOKYO



Exporters & Importers of
Chemicals, Drugs, Glass Wares & Pharmaceutical Apparatus

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By MIA/O. Shigenaga
NARS, Date 12-18-75

1087

OUR STATUS IN MANCHURIA UNASSAILABLE

JAPAN'S position, in the Manchuria issue, is unassailable. We have shown the greatest patience towards China over a period of several years, but we have only received in return derision and scorn when we have called the attention of China to the accumulation of unredressed grievances suffered by our nationals at Chinese hands. It would be doing no one any service to belittle these provocations which have finally compelled us to act. China has always mobilized all the arts of evasion to delay or obstruct the conduct of diplomatic business, and the machinery of semi-official publicity has often been perverted to propagate gross inaccuracies. Sympathy is all very well, but it is altogether out of place if it encourages wilful blindness to salient facts. It is Japan that has made Manchuria the prosperous province it is today. Japan encouraged from Shantung Chinese immigration, Japan has been the means whereby millions of Chinese have found peace and prosperity. Japan has invested much money in Manchuria, and the Chinese have not even paid all of the interests on these loans that were made for the purpose of developing this area.

On the contrary, China has tried to obstruct Japan on every hand. There is the obstruction offered to linking up the Manchurian and Korean railway systems. There is the constant attempt to build parallel lines to the S.M.R. in direct defiance of existing treaties. There is the project to develop Hulutao as a rival to Dairen. Numerous are our other unredressed grievances and when we have made representations, these have been treated in a cavalierly manner. All we have asked China to do is to co-operate with us for the mutual benefit and prosperity of each other, for our mutual co-existence. But China refuses and, instead, declares her intention of plunging us into a vortex of financial and economic ruin, after which she has threatened to use physical pressure. Any disinterested third party, when it considers everything without prejudice or bias, ought to see clearly that our stand is correct and unassailable.

Let us, in justification of our present stand, recount categorically some of the many incidents in the relations between China and Japan which culminated in the Manchurian incident:

1. The murder of Captain Nakamura is not the actual reason for the Japanese taking the action they did in Manchuria. This was only the climax of a series of over 300 anti-Japanese incidents that have intensified Japanese indignation.

2. Chinese school text books are rampant with grave slanders and abuse against Japan, the object being to poison the plastic minds of the young against Japan.

3. If the anti-Japanese posters that China dots the country with be placed one over the other they would make mountains. This deliberate fanning of anti-Japanese sentiment can hardly be regarded as other than unfriendly.

4. The Chinese have boasted that the boycott against Japan and things Japanese is intended to break Japan economically and financially. This is tantamount to a form of war, in that it aims to deliver a mortal blow at a very vulnerable spot of Japan—namely her trade and commerce.

5. Although there are some 300 outstanding matters to be settled, China has coolly ignored these and when her attention has been respectfully called, has treated Japanese representations in a dilatory and frivolous manner.

6. Responsible Chinese statesmen have been indulging in virulent ebullitions and diatribes against Japan, the object of which was to inflame Chinese sentiment against Japan.

7. Mr. Sun Fo, son of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, pointed out that General Chiang Kai-shek had even gone the length of declaring that he would defeat Japan with ten divisions. No self-respecting nation will put up with this sort of bombast.

8. These ebullitions, downright lies and fantasies, plus the boycott which is intended to ruin Japan economically have incited the younger Chinese against Japan and emboldened them to act in a high-handed manner which reached its

apotheosis when a section of a public highway, the South Manchuria Railway, was crippled by hot-headed Chinese soldiers.

9. In Japan, there is not the slightest manifestation of any military spirit; instead, Japan is trying her best to make friends with China and, despite her well-founded indignation, has yet raised big funds for the relief of the Chinese sufferers from the recent floods. Officials here have even contributed to this from their salaries, thus showing the actual feeling of the rank and file of the Japanese nation towards the Chinese people.

10. The Manchuria Incident is merely a local trouble, and the action taken by Japan was in consonance with treaties and in legitimate protection of her vested rights. The situation is not inconsistent with international obligations entered into by Japan at Geneva or elsewhere.

11. The quick action the Japanese took and the lightning speed with which they occupied vital centers in Manchuria and disarmed the Chinese scared the world, which thought that this was territorial aggression, but such action is fully justified; otherwise there might have been actual war. It must be borne in mind that Japan's troops in Manchuria constitute a fraction of that of China's and such action, therefore, was absolutely necessary in order not to expand the sphere of hostilities.

12. Japan is determined to withdraw as soon as she is assured that China will fulfil her obligations and live up to the treaties she has signed. This has been announced solemnly by the Japanese Government and already Japanese troops are evacuating occupied districts and have returned to the railway zone.

13. The military discipline as well as the conceptions of the international code of morality of China and Japan must not be confused.

14. Japan is highly jealous of her national honor and of her standing in the comity of the nations of the world. She cannot be expected to tolerate the outrageous manner in which China has slapped her again and again.

(Continued on Page 3)

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (F)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By M. A. O. Smith
NAHS, Date 12-18-75

1083

China Has, Over a Long Period, Purposely Challenged Japan By Conniving at Illegal Movements

A series of significant events, in the form of anti-Japanese agitations and other contemptuous acts on the part of the Chinese officials and people, in increasing numbers and on growing scale, preceded the clash of the Chinese and the Japanese troops at the Mukden northern barracks on the night of September 18. This clash, in fact, is nothing but the culmination of the ever-aggravating atmosphere that had been fostered among the Chinese until then.

A band of Chinese regular soldiers belonging to the Mukden army destroyed the tracks of the South Manchurian Railway line just north of Mukden, and attacked the Japanese railway garrisons who were patrolling in the vicinity. The Chinese soldiers thus had actually invaded the Japanese railway zone, over which Japan, by virtue of treaty rights, exercises administrative and police powers.

To defend the railway zone so that this important artery of international traffic might be kept free and open for smooth and peaceful operation, as well as for the protection of Japanese nationals within the zone, the railway garrisons were compelled to respond to the Chinese attack, and thus fighting ensued. Subsequently, the Chinese troops in the vicinity were disarmed, as were those in a vicinity, Cheng, Yingkou, and other places. At Changchun, the northern terminus of the S.M.R. trunk line, the Japanese took possession of the important area after 10 hours of severe fighting.

Not only was it necessary for the Japanese troops to act and move quickly before the Chinese forces, which were overwhelmingly superior in number (against about 10,000 soldiers plus 16 artillery guns that compose the Kwantung garrison force, spread over a distance of 1,100 kilometres the Chinese troops numbered about 14,000 plus 40 artillery guns in and around Mukden alone), the total of Mukden troops in Manchuria reaches well over 200,000) could totally invade the railway zone, but it was also important that the strategic points along the S.M.R. lines, even outside the railway zone, be cleared of the Chinese troops, for from such points the Chinese troops could attack the S.M.R. trains or otherwise place the railway zone and Japanese residents in serious danger. By so doing was the situation checked from becoming worse. As later emphasized in the Japanese Government's statement, the temporary occupation of these few

places outside the railway zone was not an expression of Japan's intention to hold these districts permanently—Japan has no territorial ambitions in Manchuria.

Objective Attained
For this purpose, the Kwantung garrison troops were concentrated in and around Mukden, and the headquarters of the garrisons, ordinarily located in Port Arthur, was removed to Mukden. Quick action on the part of the Japanese troops saved the situation and the one essential object of these troop movements, namely, the protection of Japan's legitimate rights and interests and that of Japanese lives and property, was fulfilled.

Let us, however, examine some of the developments that had preceded this incident developments that had deliberately staged by the Chinese to annoy and give trouble to the Japanese.

At a large Chinese banquet in Mukden on the night of August 23 this year, a certain prominent Chinese citizen boldly stated:

"A number of our youths nowadays urge us to declare war upon Japan, and thereby drive the Japanese completely out of Manchuria. It is almost impossible to suppress such ideas held by our youths."

A high military officer then, spoke in the same vein:

"While the Japanese soldiers today have experience in actual fighting, our own troops have been through one war after another in the course of a number of civil strife which we have witnessed. For that reason, the younger officers of our Chinese army are irresistibly high-spirited," intimating that the Chinese officers are confident that they can whip the Japanese in case the two nations become engaged in war.

Such provocative and challenging statements by responsible Chinese only got to show how the Chinese have been looking down upon the Japanese of late. The one important mental training given to the Chinese soldiers today is to instill into their minds a deep hatred for the Japanese and a keen determination to wreak vengeance upon the Japanese for certain supposed wrongs. Numerous instances are on record during the last several years, in particular during the last several months, which reveal the fact that the Chinese, both officials and people, have persistently and methodically carried on a series of agitations designed to make the different Sino-Japanese treaties and agreements mere scraps of paper. Indeed, such treaties and agreements have come to be openly violated or disregarded by the Chinese; insults have been heaped upon the Japanese garrison troops and upon Japanese residents, not only in Manchuria but also in other parts of China; while persecution of Japanese and Koreans in Manchuria on various pretexts has been increasing in number.

Numerous Provocations

One of the most serious of such provocations and insults was the murder by Chinese soldiers in eastern Mongolia in June of Captain Shintaro Nakamura and ex-Sergeant Major Entaro Isugi, who were travelling with Chinese official permits and protection-certificates. Aside from this affair, there were the following anti-Japanese acts perpetrated by the Chinese since July this year:

(1) July 6—Chinese officials in the vicinity of Taolashan, a point along the southern branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway line, ordered the Korean peasants to leave the place, for no definite reason.

(2) July 7—About 15 Korean school children in Harbin were attacked by Chinese students.

(3) July 12—One Japanese gendarme (sergeant) was severely struck by Chinese students in Changchun, when the former was listening to the anti-Japanese speeches which the students were giving in Changchun native city.

(4) July 14—At Huangkutun, Mukden, one Japanese police officer was surrounded by about 50 Chinese police men and later taken to the police station for no plausible reason.

(5) August 5—A railway garrison soldier at Haicheng station was shot at by a Chinese with a revolver and severely wounded.

(6) August 8—A Japanese garrison soldier of Penchifu mine district was attacked by Chinese in the neighborhood of Shihchuangtau.

(7) August 14—The Chinese tried to interfere with or stop the manoeuvres conducted by the troops belonging to the 19th Japanese engineering battalion at Liutao.

(8) August 17—The Chinese commenced refusing to sell vegetables to the 4th Japanese infantry regiment stationed in Changchun.

(9) August 21—When the Japanese

tried to repair the building of a school in Takantzu, in the Chientao district, the Chinese stepped in and stopped the work.

(10) September 4—Eighty Chinese bandits attacked the train carrying the Governor of the South Manchuria Railway (Count Uchida) and his party, while travelling between Kirin and Tunhua.

(11) September 9—Chinese attacked the S.M.R. railway coaches near Fushihai station, north of Mukden.

(12) September 14—Some 20 Chinese bandits attacked five railway guards just north of Saupingai, killing one of the Japanese guards.

Chinese Provocation
Negotiations for the settlement of the Captain Nakamura murder affair had been dragging on, due chiefly to the dilly-dallying policy of the Chinese, when the recent affair in Mukden broke out suddenly. The Japanese consul-general in Mukden, Mr. Kyujiro Hayashi, acting upon instructions from the Tokyo Foreign Office, had fled a protest with the Chinese authorities of the Mukden government against the murder of Captain Nakamura and Sergeant Major Isugi. The Chinese at first promised to reply to the Japanese note of protest following an investigation of the matter on the spot.

The first investigation party sent by the Chinese officials returned without any evidence to prove that the Japanese had been killed by Chinese regular soldiers, according to the Chinese, who accordingly, said that they could not hold themselves accountable for the murder. One of the Chinese officials even went so far as to say that the report of the murder was entirely false, being a fabrication on the part of the Japanese.

Consul-General Hayashi pressed for a more responsible reply from the Chinese. Then a second investigation party was despatched to the spot where the murder was believed to have taken place. This party had almost finished its investigation and clash took place in Mukden between the Japanese and Chinese troops. In the meantime, feelings had been aroused in Japan over the murder affair, especially because the Chinese officials, including Tsang Shih-chi, chief civil administrator of Mukden, were intentionally refusing to shoulder the blame for the murder.

Wins At Geneva
Following the outbreak of the clash, the Chinese have been bent upon circulating false reports concerning the activities of the Japanese troops, both at home and abroad. Such absurd reports as that the Japanese troops massacred 3,000 foreigners in Mukden, or that the Japanese were in control of the Peiping-Mukden railway line between Mukden and Shihchuangtau, or that two entire divisions from Korea were sent to Manchuria (actually only about 4000, forming a mixed brigade, were temporarily placed under the command of the Kwantung garrison commander, etc.) have been spread by

the Chinese and even some of the English language papers in China have taken the pains to print such lies. Some wild reports even said that the Japanese had rushed troops to Tsingtao and Harbin.

China appealed to the League of Nations Council, asking the latter to form a neutral investigation committee to study the matter on the spot. The Chinese delegate at Geneva did everything in his power to paint the Japanese in the blackest of colors, but the League's Council, after listening to the reports of both sides, decided not to organize such a committee. The chairman of the Council stated that the Council was satisfied with the Japanese Government's statement (wherein Japan clearly stated that she had no territorial designs in Manchuria, that the troops had been used only for safeguarding Japan's legitimate rights and interests and Japanese nationals, and that the troops would be withdrawn to their original posts as soon as the state of peace and order of the district warranted it), as well as with the explanations furnished by the Council by the Japanese delegate, Mr. Kenkichi Yoshizawa. Thus Japan won a complete victory at the League of Nations Council. Japan, as announced in her statement, is desirous of settling the matter through direct negotiations between China and Japan, without the intervention of, or mediation by, a third party.

CHINESE FORGET JAPAN POSSESSES TREATY PRIVILEGES

(Continued From Page 4)


In Mukden province, the authorities told the village chiefs that they must rise to expel Japan from Manchuria. However, the Chinese are nothing but the slaves of the Japanese in this region."

6. On February 21st 1931, a Chinese school teacher in Fushun, South Manchuria, in a public speech, boldly stated that although Fushun and other places were actually Chinese territory, the Japanese have invaded these districts and are persecuting the Chinese economically and otherwise.

7. All the school textbooks and courses of study used in China, from the elementary schools up to the universities, are filled with subjects that actively stir antagonism against Japan and the Japanese, which fact is bound to produce tremendously serious consequences.

8. Anti-Japanese reports and articles appear in the daily press all over China and Manchuria. Clever is the use of words, the Chinese took great pains to publish exaggerated accounts of supposed Japanese aggressions, divided by the Chinese into three fields, military, economic, and cultural.

9. The police authorities and



The port of Dairen, one of the most up-to-date in the Far East, and which has contributed vastly to the prosperity of Manchuria.

other officials who ostensibly try to stop anti-Japanese riots carried on by students and others, actually work in close harmony with these agitators. Chang Hsueh-liang, chief of Manchuria, is surrounded by intensely anti-Japanese youths who act as his advisers and close followers.

Japan's Rights and Interests

Anti-Japanese movements in Manchuria naturally are concentrated upon attacking Japanese rights and interests legally acquired by treaties and agreements. Of these, the South Manchuria Railway lines form an important bulwark, and it is against this that various forms of oppression have recently been exerted. To pick up a few cases at random, we may mention the following concrete instances:

1. The Chinese in Manchuria have actively engaged in the construction of a network of railway lines which, when completed, will entirely surround the S.M.R. lines and thereby drive out all business which hitherto has been done over the S.M.R. lines.

2. Attempts are made to keep all the Chinese lines in the closest connection with one another so that they all can be operated smoothly and systematically, but to place the S.M.R. lines out of connection as much as possible.

3. Local taxes on goods are imposed upon freight passing over the S.M.R. tracks, but are exempted in case the goods are transported over Chinese lines.

4. Through the cooperation of officials and merchants, goods are carried by Chinese lines as much as possible.

5. Efforts are made to restrict the rights of Japanese who are employed by some Chinese lines by treaty agreements.

6. The principals and interests on Japanese loans, borrowed for building new Chinese lines, have not been paid on various pretexts.

7. Endeavour is made to block a smooth connection of traffic between one Chinese line and a Japanese line.

8. As for the Kirin-Hailung railway line, the treaty provisions have not yet been carried out, although the treaty itself was signed in the 42nd year of Meiji, 1909, and again approved in 1918.

9. The Kirin-Hailung line, which was to have been built with the aid of the Japanese in accordance with an agreement between China and Japan in 1913, has not yet been built. But the Chinese have gone ahead and laid another line, parallel to this, to the originally planned line, in spite of several Japanese protests.

10. The Changchun-Taonan railway line, which again was to have threat, naturalization of the Koreans.

been laid in accordance with agreement of 1918, has not yet been built.

These and other acts of violation on the part of the Chinese have met with vigorous Japanese protests, but the Chinese have ignored these solemnly-concluded treaties and have turned deaf ears to us. In addition, they have done everything possible to place the S.M.R. lines in economic difficulties by devising all sorts of means to attract products of North Manchuria to Chinese lines.

In addition to these various persecutions and oppressive acts, we may list the following, each of which can be explained in detail with concrete facts to substantiate them:

1. Imprisonment of Koreans without Japanese consent, a violation of the stipulations of consular jurisdiction.

2. Illegal confiscation of Japanese property and goods.

3. Illegal entry of Chinese police officials into the S.M.R. zone and the Kwantung Leased Territory.

4. Illegal oppression upon Japanese and Koreans' rights to residence and unlawful persecution of Korean peasants.

5. Failure to allow Japanese to lease land in the interior, in spite of a general agreement signed between the two nations.

6. Undue and unlawful persecution of Korean peasants.

7. Demanding, under force of arms, the naturalization of the Koreans.

Mitsui Bussan Kaisha, Limited

(In Europe and America: Mitsui & Co., Limited)

Its Various Enterprises---Its Sale Net Covering All Principal Points In the World

As early as 1876 the Mitsui family saw the importance of taking up Japan's foreign trade by the Japanese themselves, and established a trading firm which is today known as Mitsui Bussan Kaisha, Limited.

Based on a firm financial foundation and following an efficient business policy, the firm has been able to serve its clients for over half a century, leading the vanguard in the expansion of Japan's trade. It has now a capital of 100 million yen fully paid up with a reserve fund of over 60 millions.

It is occupied not only in home and foreign trade of Japan, but also in trade between different countries outside of Japan. It carries on freight services extensively and transacts agency business of various kinds. In addition to these, it is operating saw-mills and a shipbuilding yard.

The head office is located in Tokyo, under the

presidency of Mr. Morinosuke Mitsui. The branch offices are found in principal places in Japan, China, India and other countries of Asia. There are also numerous branches in Europe, Australia, Africa and North and South America. These offices number in the aggregate about 130, in fact, the company has extended its ramifications throughout the chief centres of business in the world.

The firm also controls several subsidiary companies and occupies a position of remarkable importance in the world's trade.

Business Policy

With its prosperous career behind it extending over many years, and equipped with experienced and intelligent office forces, a vast amount of capital and efficient organization, Mitsui Bussan Kaisha, Limited is ever striving to give its customers best services that they can render with its extraordinary equipment,

Not only has the firm successfully tackled the difficulties of the existing world wide economic depression, but has also made a positive expansion of its business activities far more than could be anticipated.

That there is nothing more valuable in business than combined force of capital, confidence and experience, goes without saying. It is only too natural then that Mitsui Bussan Kaisha, Limited should have succeeded to the extent it has actually done, and an ever-increasing prosperity awaits the firm's future.

Activities in Korea and Manchuria.

The firm has branch offices in the following points in Manchuria: Dairen, Changchun, Newchwang, Mukden, Antung, Harbin; the following points in Korea: Keijo, Fusan, Jinsen, Heijo, Seishin, Gunzan, Kankyo.

The firm deals in the following products: Soyab

beans, bean oil, bean cakes, wheat flour, miscellaneous cereals, fertilizers, coal, cement, gunny bags, machineries, ginseng, raw silk, silk piece goods, sugar, metals, salt, rubber material, rayon textiles, leaf tobacco, etc. The total amount of the products transacted reaches a stupendous sum.

Investment has also been made in such industries as coal-mining, bean oil mill, silk spinning, etc.

The branches co-operating with each other has pushed their business activities into almost every corner of the far flung interior regions by means of the firm's superior method and facilities, and thereby has accelerated the greater distribution of merchandise throughout these territories to which economic development and social welfare has greatly contributed through the firm's sound and intelligent business policy.


The firms is promised to enjoy still further success in these vast territories in the future.

Balance Sheet, 30th April, 1931

LIABILITIES	
	Yen Sen
Capital	100,000,000.00
Reserves	57,910,359.49
Super-annuation Fund	6,127,387.63
Customers Accounts	62,114,940.75
Short term Loans and Export Account.....	18,048,410.88
Bills Receivable Discounted.....	7,451,970.08
Bills Payable	73,092,457.04
Bills of Exchange en route.....	14,178,604.41
Sundry Creditors	19,565,301.92
Balance brought forward from last term.....	873,331.72
Net Profit	6,593,660.32

Yen 365,956,424.14

HEAD OFFICE



MITSUI BUSSAN KAISHA, LTD.

(Mitsui & Co., Ltd.)

No. 1 Honcho Nichome, Nihonbashi-ku, Tokyo

Balance Sheet, 30th April, 1931

ASSETS	
	Yen Sen
Wharves, Docks, Yards, Warehouses, etc.....	19,685,071.66
Business Premises	4,887,317.38
Steamers, Motorships, Steam Launches, Lighters, etc.	14,320,899.02
Bonds and Shares	59,341,002.74
Merchandise	46,376,762.58
Customers Accounts	99,513,110.16
Bills Receivable	33,851,309.85
Bills of Exchange en route, as per contra.....	14,178,604.41
Sundry Debtors	13,357,937.78
Cash on hand and with Bankers.....	60,444,408.56

Yen 365,956,424.14

While Appealing To The League

The following are the anti-Japanese movements carried on by the Chinese since China appealed to the League of Nations Council to intervene in the Manchurian affair:

Sept. 23.—Mr. T. V. Soong, Finance Minister of the Nationalist Government and chairman of Flood Relief Committee of the Nationalist Government, declined to accept relief articles amounting to \$200,000 a cash contribution of \$100,000 collected by the Japanese flood sympathy committee in Tokyo for the comfort of the flood sufferers in the Yangtze Valley. The relief articles were brought by Baron Ryutaro Fukui, chief delegate of the China Flood Relief Committee in Tokyo, to Shanghai aboard the Amagi Maru. (Rengo).

Chinese mobs raided more than 10 Japanese shops in Hongkong at about 8 p.m. (Rengo)

Sept. 25.—The offices of the Japanese Residents' Association and the rooms of the Cultural Association at Harbin were bombed about 7:30 p.m. by Chinese communists. The damage was small. (Dentsu)

Many Japanese residents in Hongkong were attacked by Chinese mobs in broad daylight on the streets. A number of British policemen and marines who rushed to the rescue of the Japanese also were placed under a rain of kicks and blows. The incident is reported to have caused many casualties. (Asahi)

More than a dozen American blue-jackets fought a Chinese mob of about 3000 when the latter attacked the Japanese quarters after returning from a demonstration meeting. (Asahi)

Torayemon Koyama, a private belonging to the 78th Infantry Regiment was killed by one of the defeated Chinese troops near Mukden. (Asahi)

The telegraph and telephone wires between Chengchiantun and Tunziao-hsien were destroyed by a group of about 100 Chinese troops. (Asahi)

Sept. 26.—Two foreign men were murdered and more than 60 passengers including one Portuguese and one Spanish woman injured when a mob of several hundred defeated Chinese troops raided a passenger-train, which was derailed and upset by them in the vicinity of Jaoyang. The train left Huanankutun at 1:40 p.m. for Peiping. Moreover all

effects of the passengers were looted by the bandit troops. (Asahi and Nichi-Nichi)

Two Japanese nationals were attacked and five Chinese shops dealing in Japanese goods stormed by Chinese mobs, who attended an anti-Japanese mass meeting at Chinatown, Shanghai.

Thirty-three Japanese were attacked by Chinese mobs on the streets in Hongkong from September 23 until 26. The number of Japanese shops in Hongkong stormed by the Chinese mobs during the same period reached 27, according to the Japanese Consulate-General there. (Rengo)

As regards the anti-Japanese movements, Dr. C. T. Wang, the Foreign Minister of the National Government declared that its suppression was impossible under the present state of affairs, thus to all intents and purposes turning down Japan's request. The request was made to the Nanjing Government by Consul Kamimura. Dr. Wang opened and censured by the Chinese

postal authorities. Consul Kamimura lodged a strong protest with the Foreign Office of the National Government in this connection. (Asahi)

Sept. 28.—Three registered letters addressed to the Japanese Consulate, Chengchow, were seized by the Provincial Nationalist Party in Shanzhai. It was also found that all mails to the Japanese Consulate at Chengchow since the occurrence of the incident were seized by the Chinese authorities. (Nichi-Nichi)

Many Japanese school children at Singapore were attacked by Chinese mobs. (Asahi)

A picketing party of Chinese students seized 20,000 bags of wheat of the Mitsui Bussan Kaisha at 5 p.m. while the goods were being taken into sampans inside the settlement. But as the Japanese marines, who were called out, arrived there, the students were forced to abandon the seized goods and fled in confusion. (Rengo)

About 300 defeated Chinese troops appeared in the neighborhood of Hsuhshai on the S.M.R. line about 6 p.m. and attempted to destroy the railway track. (Hochi)

Sept. 29.—More than 300 Korean residents at Pakuoshu, a village situated between Tieling and Kaiyuan, were slaughtered by Chinese demobilized troops (Rengo and Dentsu).

The number of Japanese children attacked by Chinese mobs in Shanghai until September 30 reached 348. (Dentsu)

Two Japanese privates were killed by bullets fired by Chinese bandits in Mukden at 10 a.m.

Remnants of General Wang I-Chu's troops numbering 1,000, which destroyed the S.M.R. track and precipitated the clash between the Japanese and Chinese troops, killed a Japanese woman at Sian-hsien on the Mukden-Kirin line. (Dentsu).

Sept. 30.—Two Japanese seamen were attacked by Chinese mobs at the

French settlement about 1 p.m. (Rengo).

Consul Tanaka and seven Japanese residents at Chengchow took refuge in Hankow in view of the fact that the anti-Japanese agitation there was growing worse. Consul Tanaka stated that Chinese mobs fired at the Japanese flag hoisted on the Japanese Consulate there several days ago. (Hochi).

Oct. 2.—About 800 Chinese troops and bandits set fire to shops and residences in Newchang. The Japanese Consulate and police offices were stormed by the mobs. (Rengo)

The house of Saichiro Takai, a Japanese resident in Canton, was raided by Chinese mobs yesterday. (Rengo)

Kikujiro Takahashi, a private of the Japanese garrison at Saupingshal, was shot to death about 1 a.m. (Hochi)

Oct. 4.—About 150 Chinese troops looted and burned a village a short distance southwest of Tieling. (Asahi)

About 1,000 Chinese troops slaughtered a large number of Chinese at Niuchishan in the vicinity of Fushun. (Nichi-Nichi).

Two Japanese women, both instructors of a textile factory of the Shanghai Cotton Spinning Company, were attacked and seriously injured by a body of anti-Japanese demonstrators. (Rengo).

Oct. 5.—One Satoru Osaka, from Tokushima Prefecture, and his wife were brutally murdered by a group of Chinese near Saian, near Kaiyuan. (Asahi dispatch from Mukden).

CHICAGO.—Change your diet and conquer the city's noisest

That, according to Dr. Donald A. Laird, is the best remedy for city workers, who complain of the incessant clanging of street cars, honking of automobiles and the rumbling of trains. Dr. Laird, director of the College University psychological laboratory, is endeavoring to solve the noise problem of "g cities."

"Building up resistance can best be done through care of the stomach and diet," Dr. Laird said today. "Constant noise produces fatigue and makes the muscles tense. Therefore, to battle train and street car and other noises the city worker would do well to eat plenty of foods like spaghetti and white bread and drink lots of malted milk."

OUR STATUS IN MANCHURIA UNASSAILABLE

(Continued from Page 3)

15. The world has been flooded with Chinese propaganda and to this is due several of the misconceptions in the press of Occidental countries and by the League of Nations.

16. China is disunited, and whatever the young diplomats may say on the Geneva stage, China is, in fact, unable to deliver the goods.

17. It is absurd to regard China in the right of an Occidental nation. An entirely different yardstick is necessary to measure China.

18. Those in or near China and those in contact with Chinese affairs know the real conditions in China and are in sympathy with Japan, simply because they are fully aware of the actual facts and are not misled by the extravagant and Quixotic torrents of words that issue from the lips of Chinese diplomats.

19. The initial attitude of the League of Nations ignored the existing conditions in China and the real status of Chinese leaders and its apprehension seems to have been founded on an illusion.

20. The League, by its action, has shown that it is ignorant of conditions in China. It thinks China is an advanced nation that lives up to its obligations. The Chinese are very clever in making fine speeches, but their rhetoric is not

based on actual facts.

21. Japan has never yet failed to honor a treaty or to redeem her pledged word. She has declared that she will move out of the occupied zones as soon as China shows that she can and will live up to her obligations, and this she will certainly do.

22. In criticizing Japan's action, the League is really acting under a misapprehension, the fallacy of its vision being due to the fantastic utterances of young Chinese diplomats who pay no heed to the stern facts of the situation.

23. None of the Chinese leaders are in a position to substantiate what they are talking about, and mere words, which lack responsibility, are worse than useless.

24. If merely Utopian views are entertained and stern realities are not faced, China will always remain in the same condition as at present, a fertile source of constant irritation and a menace to the rest of the world.

25. Since the presentation of the Japanese side of the case, the League of Nations, hitherto ignorant of the full facts, has adopted a praiseworthy stand by declaring that the issue is one that should be solved by direct negotiations of the two countries directly interested.



1093 MITSUBISHI SHOJI KAISHA, LIMITED

[Mitsubishi Trading Co., Ltd.]

Importers & Exporters, Manufacturers, Commission Merchants, Brokers, & Shipowners

HEAD OFFICE: MARUNOUCHI, TOKYO

Management Leads All Branches of Industry with Gigantic Financial Power Its Various Enterprises Crowned with Continued Success.

The genesis of this Trading Company may be traced back to the Mitsubishi Mail Steamship Company which was founded as early as 1875 and was the biggest marine transport concern in those days. The firm gradually developed new fields of commerce besides transportation. Ten years later, by the amalgamation of the firm with its rival company, the world famous Nippon Yusen Kaisha came into existence, and the firm's all the marine transport business was transferred to the new combination. Then the Mitsubishi turned its attention to other enterprises upon which it had embarked under the title of the Mitsubishi Company, which was afterwards reorganized and formed into a limited partnership under the present name of the Mitsubishi Goshi Kaisha.

Kaisha in later years detached various Departments which had formed its important units and established ten auxiliary concerns one after another. As the fountain-head of the Mitsubishi enterprises, it has a capital of 120 million yen and superintends these auxiliaries, all of which bearing the name of "Mitsubishi" are capitalized for 355 million yen in the aggregate. The fields of their activities cover such enterprises as shipbuilding, iron manufacture, mining, electrical engineering, aircraft manufacture, warehousing, banking, insurances, trust business, and commerce.

As one of these ten auxiliary concerns, the Mitsubishi Shoji Kaisha saw the first light in 1918, taking over the trading interests, which had been under the charge of the Trading Department.

Since its foundation, this Trading Company is pursuing a steady and progressive policy inherited from its parent concern,

and with the Mitsubishi's long established credit and vast financial resources at its back, it is enjoying ever increasing prosperity, and its activities in the world market have been crowned with continued success. It is now exercising mighty influence over Japan's business and industrial circles and at the same time occupies a place of considerable importance in the world's trade.

The Company is engaged in the sale of various commodities, wholesale business, transportation business, agency business and contracting business, with the network of its sales organizations in the principal centres of business throughout the world.

Its Activities in Korea and Manchuria

The Company has branch offices in the important points in Korea and Manchuria as appearing below and also has two

large and most up-to-date oil crushing mills in Dairen, which are operated by its own patented process.

The principal products exported by the Company from these vast territories are soya beans, bean oil, bean cake and meal, bone meal, oil seeds and cake, kaoliang and other cereals, sardine guano and meal, sulphate of ammonia, other fertilizers, coal, shale oil cake, benzol, pig iron, graphite, etc., etc., and those for import are rice, wheat flour, sugar, canned goods, machinery, rails and accessories, miscellaneous steel products, cast iron pipes, and other metal products, coal, coke, kerosene, lubricating oils, rubber material, cement, timber, woollen yarn, rayon textiles, raw silk, silk piece goods, chemicals, nitrate of soda and other fertilizers, etc., etc. These products transacted amount to an enormous sum. The Company has amply shared in the development of the trade and industry in these territories, and its business is steadily expanding in all directions.

Branches and Representatives in Korea and Manchuria:

DAIREN:
No. 165 Yamagata-dori,
Dairen

HARBIN:
No. 35, Vodoprovodnaya,
Harbin


MUKDEN:
No. 5 Yodomachi,
Mukden

KEIJO (Seoul):
No. 1 Nandaimon-dori Nichome,
Seoul


FUSAN:
No. 8 Honmachi-dori, Sanchoe,
Fusan

KUNSAN:
No. 20 Honmachi-dori,
Kunsan

SEISHIN:
No. 20, Hokuetsicho,
Seishin



Mitsubishi Headquarters—Tokyo



Dairen Branch Office

OTHER BRANCH OFFICES:

HOME: Kobe, Kur, Keelung, Moji, Nagasaki, Nagoya, Osaka, Otaru, Sasebo, Taihoku, Takao, Yokohama, etc.
OVERSEAS: Hankow, Chinwangtao, Hongkong, London, Manila, New York, San Francisco, Seattle, Shanghai, Singapore, Soerabaya, Sydney, Tientsin, Tsingtao, Etc.

AGENCIES IN EUROPEAN CONTINENT:

PARIS & LYONS: Societe Anonyme Francaise Mitsubishi,
BERLIN: Mitsubishi Shoji Kaisha, G.m.b.H.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(e) and 5(d) or (E)
Department of State Letter, August 10, 1972
By M.L.A. O. Duffin
NARS, Date 12-18-75

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 5263



HARBIN CHINA,

October 14, 1931.

Division of

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

NOV 10 1931

Department of State

NOV 9 31

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: POLITICAL CONDITIONS IN NORTH MANCHURIA.

1861

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

SIR:

1/ I have the honor to enclose herewith, for the information of the Department, a copy of my despatch No. 2279, of even date, sent to the Legation relative to political conditions in North Manchuria.

Respectfully yours,

(In the absence of the Consul General)

Paul M. Dutko
American Vice Consul.

800
TH/th

Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 2279 to the Legation.

F/DEW

793.94/2571

1861 88. AON

FILED

No. 2379

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

HARBIN CHINA, October 14, 1931.

SUBJECT: ATTEMPTS AT FORMATION OF PROVISIONAL
KIRIN PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT AT HARBIN
AND REPORTED HOSTILE ATTITUDE OF
GENERAL CHANG HAI PENG TOWARDS TSITSIHAR.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping, China.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that this Consulate General has been informed by a responsible official of the Office of the Special Commissioner for Foreign Affairs at Harbin that the local authorities and some of the high officials who fled from Kirin following Japanese occupation of that city, among them the Kirin Chief of Police, Finance Commissioner, and some of General Chang Tso-hsiang's military followers were considering the formation in the native city of Harbin of a provisional provincial government to continue the work of the government dispersed by the Japanese military with the Harbin Commissioner for Foreign Affairs at its head. It now appears that this move has been dropped for it was feared that were this plan consummated the native city might suffer the fate of Chinchow.

THE HARBIN TIMES, a Japanese daily sheet, to-day reported that General Chang Hai-peng has armed and equipped 15,000 men

-for-

- 2 -

for an advance on Tsitsihar; that Japanese scouting aeroplanes had observed over 100 railway cars between the stations of Taonan and Tsoan being loaded with munitions of war and that General Chang has started his advance in the direction of Tsitsihar.

The local authorities are of the opinion that, while General Chang Hai-peng of Taonan has not so far shown open hostility towards Tsitsihar, he has been receiving Japanese support in the form of funds and munitions of war. They see in this move of the Japanese military an effort to stir up trouble in North Manchuria as well through Chinese puppet generals. Daanash as Wan Kuo-pin, son of General Wan Fu-lin, governor of Heilungshiang Province, who has been left in charge during the absence of his father, is said to be inexperienced in military affairs, the Defense Commissioner of Tabeiho has been appointed Chairman of the Provincial Government at Tsitsihar in the interim in the hope that he may be able successfully to repulse any attacks coming from the direction of Taonan. It is believed here that the Defense Commissioner of Tabeiho has already reached Tsitsihar.

The situation in North Manchuria continues to be quiet.

Respectfully yours,

(In the absence of the Consul General)

Paul M. Dutko
American Vice Consul.

800
RMD/th

Original to the Legation;
5 copies to the Department of State;
1 copy to the Embassy at Tokyo;
1 copy to the Consulate General at Mukden.


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM 1000

American Consulate.

Swatow, China, October 14th, 1931.

Subject: Anti-Japanese movement in Swatow



The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson.

Secretary of State, American Minister.

Beiping.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose a copy in translation of a news article which appeared in the "Wingtung Min Kuo Kih Pao" of October 13th, 1931, regarding relations between the local Chinese and the Japanese.

Since the beginning of the trouble in Manchuria the local Chinese authorities have quite apparently made strenuous attempts to prevent all violent action on the part of the Chinese against the Japanese. Both the police and the military have been most vigilant and watchful in this regard and thus far there has been no anti-Japanese action except for a most peaceful, but nevertheless thorough-going, boycott of the Japanese and their products and the distribution of anti-Japanese posters and handbills.

One Japanese destroyer has been in port for some time. This destroyer carries an extra complement of about fifty men for landing parties in emergency. All Japanese business has stopped although the larger offices such as the Bank of Taiwan and the Osaka Shosen Kaisha remain open.

An anti-Japanese

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

An anti-Japanese parade and demonstration is scheduled to take place in Swatow on October 18th, 1931.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

David C. Berger,
American Consul.

✓
enclosure:

As stated.

Five copies to the Department of State.
One copy to the Consulate General, Shanghai.
" " " " " Canton.
" " " " " Hankow.
" " " " Consulate, Nanking.
" " " " " Amoy.
" " " " Commander of U.S.S. "Simpson".

800.
DCB:L

[Handwritten signature]


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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lutz NARS, Date 12-18-75

SHANGHAI KIN KUN YEH PAO. October 18th, 1931.

JAPANESE CONSUL'S FOUR UNREASONABLE DEMANDS.

Since the Swatow populace took positive anti-Japanese measures to save China, the Japanese Consul has repeatedly approached the Municipal Government and made innumerable unreasonable demands. Yesterday the same savage Japanese Consul again made four unreasonable demands to the Municipal Government. (1) He demanded that all the anti-Japanese posters on the walls of the various streets and lanes be torn away. (2) He demanded that police should be dispatched to protect his honest "running dogs". (Chinese workers). (3) He demanded that Chinese merchants should sell edibles to Japanese. (4) He demanded that Japanese sailors should be allowed to come ashore. Unreasonable to the extreme, and detestable to the utmost. It is reported that the Municipal Government has decided to adopt appropriate measures toward him.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Tokyo, October 22, 1931.

No. 366.

NOV - 9 31



F/DEW

793.94/2573

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

1/. I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy
of the Special Manchuria Number of the Japan Times
of October 13, 1931, containing contributed articles
dealing with the Manchurian question.

Respectfully yours,

Edwin L. Neville,
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

Enclosure:

1. As stated.
Embassy File No. 800-Manchuria
WTT/hln

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WP

FROM

A portion of this telegram
must be closely paraphrased
before being communicated
to anyone.

Peiping

Dated November 10, 1931

Rec'd 12:19 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

897, November 10, 8 a. m.

Confidential. The British Minister told me last
night that he is accompanying Wellington Koo to Nanking
tomorrow by plane instead of leaving here on the fifteenth
as originally planned. He feels the Chinese Government is
very nervous and that his presence may have a reassuring
effect.

Repeated to Shanghai.

For the Minister.

ENGERT

JS

F/DEW

793.94/2574

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 10 1931

Department of State

1 110

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(F) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter. August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS. Date 12-18-75

THE UNDER SECRETARY

NOV 10 1931

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 10, 1931.

Mr. Castle:

✓ It is my feeling that we should send Gilbert to Paris as a sort of "technical adviser" to Dawes. He has both the knowledge and the "feel" of what has transpired and would be able to give information with greater celerity and accuracy than would be possible for anyone else. Also, if he is left out of the matter entirely, it will mean that we unnecessarily subject our Consul at Geneva to a lot of loss of "face". (The implication would be that we are dissatisfied with his functioning up to date.)

However that may be, this telegram calls for consideration of an even more important and difficult question: The question of our relationship to the Council in the forthcoming meeting at Paris. You will of course read Gilbert's report of Drummond's observations in its entirety.

I feel that it would be useless for me to attempt to draft a reply until I am given an instruction in regard to what we may wish to say.

Start

SKH/ZMF

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAM

This telegram must be **FROM GENEVA**
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone.

Dated November 9, 1931

Secretary of State
Washington



293, November 9, 8 p.m.

One. In a conversation with Drummond this morn-
ing he informed me that, having received the ac-
quiescence of the other members of the Council, the
meeting of the Council set for November 16 will be
held in Paris.

Two. As you are aware this meeting is of the
status of an adjourned session and not a new session
of the Council. Thus technically American represen-
tation still would continue (unless changed) under
the terms of the letter of invitation and the ac-
ceptance of the invitation further amplified by the
statements of American representative at the Coun-
cil meeting of October 16.

Three. Drummond has expressed to me and asked
me to convey to you his most earnest hope that there
will be no change in the character of American repre-
sentation at the Paris meeting. He wished me to add
that in this he is joined by the British and French
who

R/DEW

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NOV 17 1931

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2- #293, from Geneva, November 9,
1931

who were the only members of the Council aware that a change in such representation was at any time contemplated. Any knowledge of this matter has been kept from other Council members.

He bases his desire as expressed above on certain points of policy each of which he regards as most important:

(A) An aspect of solidarity in this instance of being opposed to the use of armed force in any form would "carry through" to the approaching Arms Conference, bringing about its convening under psychologically favorable auspices and enhancing its chances of success.

(B) With respect to the negotiations with Japan and China an outward aspect of the same solidarity would be extremely desirable. Any "physical" change in the position of the American representative, although having no bearing on the actual relations of America and the League in this matter, might be made much of by the Japanese press to stiffen the Japanese public in support of the present Japanese position and would give the Japanese extremists a new lease of life so to speak which might materially affect the negotiations. The world press
moreover

MAM

3- #223, from Geneva, November 9,
1931

moreover is beginning to regard American relation to the League including American position on the Council as no longer "news". Any change would probably give rise to a species of speculation on the part of the press perhaps much of it unfortunate and harmful. This is particularly possible because of the present policy of the United States to conduct its relations with the Chinese and Japanese privately through its own diplomatic channels. Drummond, as you are aware, is fully in accord with this policy on the part of the American Government and feels that that particular strategy is the best possible under the circumstances and is of incalculable value. But, inasmuch as for this reason American policy vis a vis Japan remains in the background, it would be exceedingly difficult for anything to replace the outward symbol of solidarity and of mutual confidence achieved by America's position at the Council table which it is most desirable to maintain.

(C) When the American withdrawal from the table was previously contemplated Drummond recalls Briand's almost insurmountable difficulty of formulating a statement at that time which could explain any such change in a manner which would be satisfactory or convincing

MAM

4- #293, from Geneva, November 9,
1931

convincing or even be believed.

(D) The members of the Council and the League States in general never conceived of the American objective in associating itself with the Council as more important than confined to the invocation of the Pact of Paris. This was regarded as simply affording a means for such cooperation. They have envisaged this association as an expression of a desire on the part of the American Government to take the steps which seemed wisest under the circumstances to attain an objective held in common with other powers in endeavoring to bring about a satisfactory settlement of the Manchurian situation within the terms of modern world sentiment and machinery for a peaceful solution of disputes and to lend continuing moral support to such endeavors. The departure from customary League procedure in associating the United States with the Council for this purpose was not agreed to without a certain sacrifice on the part of League members as there was a question in the minds of the Council members whether by setting such a precedent the integrity of the League might not in some way be threatened. In this they also felt a responsibility to other League States not represented in the Council.
They

MAM

5- »293, from Geneva, November 9,
1931

They were led to extend an invitation to the United States by the great powers on the Council who felt that in any trouble with Japan they would have to bear the burden but also most of all they acquiesced in the invitation because they felt it to be responsive to the desire of the Government of the United States. For this reason a withdrawal of the United States would be misunderstood by them and would undoubtedly wound their sensibilities.

(E) The position of the representative of the United States as an "auditor" albeit a deeply interested one, is clearly understood; and Drummond does not see, viewing the situation from here, how anything could possibly arise while this technical position was firmly maintained which could prejudice the general position of the United States.

Four. It is scarcely necessary for me to say with respect to the foregoing, Drummond in his conversation with me in no wise created an impression of seeking to dictate or even to suggest the policy which the United States might desire to follow. He was merely giving you through me in a frank manner his thought on this subject as he has on other questions pertaining to America.


CSB

GILBERT

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE UNDERSECRETARY

November 13, 1931.




Mr. Hornbeck:

This question of Gilbert going to Paris will undoubtedly be decided by Dawes on the spot.

It is obvious that Gilbert ought not to go until after the first meeting of the Council anyway.

I have great confidence in Howland Shaw's judgment and I am sure they will send for him if they need him.



F.W. 793.94/2575

WLG

U WRC:GMH

NOV 17 1931

PM-101

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAM

GRAY

PEIPING VIA NR

FROM Dated November 9, 1931

Rec'd 6:50 p.m.

793.94
Secretary of State
Washington

890, November 9, 9 a.m.

Following from Consul General at Harbin, November
7, 7 p.m.:

"Secret agent Chao has informed me that at two
p.m., today General Ma telephoned from Tsitsihar City
that he is holding Sanchienfang, although three Japa-
nese aeroplanes and a small body of Japanese cavalry
are near, that the Japanese and Chang's troops are
at former Heilungkiang first defense line and that
the latter had made no offensive this morning".

Repeated to Shanghai.

For the Minister

CSB

ENCLOSURE

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 10 1931
Department of State

F/DEW

793.94/2576

FILED

1931.11.10

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE UNDER SECRETARY
NOV 11 1931
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 10, 1931.

Mr. Castle:

When I wrote the memorandum this morning expressing my view that it would be advantageous to make public something with regard to the character of our memorandum to Tokyo on November 5, I had not seen the telegram hereunder from Geneva. (29 Nov 1931)

Having seen this, I feel moved again to express the view that it would strengthen us, both in relations with Japan and China and in relations with the League (and also with our own public), if we would make a statement with regard to the emphasis laid in the memorandum on our agreement with the League in relation to fundamentals.

SKH/ZMF

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED UNDER SECRETARY

NOV 11 1931

MAM .

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. Dated November 9, 1931

Rec'd 5:30 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

222, November 9, 1 p.m.

(GREEN) I had a long conversation with Drummond yesterday Sunday at noon regarding the statement presented by the Japanese reply to Briand's letter of October 29 (Consulate's 270, October 31, 9 a.m.). The text of the Japanese reply dated November 7 is as follows:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's note of October 29 in which you were so good as to make certain observations on declaration of Japanese Government of October 26 in connection with Manchurian incident. Having referred to Tokyo your communication under acknowledgement I am now charged to assure you that my government have submitted it to their most serious consideration and that they highly appreciate your sympathetic concern in the present situation in the interest of international peace and good will and understanding.

I am further instructed to express entire concurrence of my government in Your Excellency's remark

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 10 1931

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

NOV 10 1931

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

F/BEW

793.94/2577

FILED

NOV 17 1931

13.94
580.0112

MAN

2- #292, from Geneva, November 9,
1931

remark that resolution adopted by Council of the League of Nations on September ³⁰ ~~29~~ remains in full force. Japanese Government are determined to carry it out in letter and in spirit and they reaffirm their earnest desire to proceed to withdrawal of Japanese troops to railway zone with minimum of delay.

Three. But resolution of September 30 consecrates principle that effective security must at the same time be assured for lives and property of Japanese subjects and in state of tension which at present unfortunately exists it is impossible to hope that withdrawal of Japanese forces would immediately give place to regime of settled peace and order under Chinese auspices. Japan and China would simply be exposed to speedy recurrence of untoward incidents. There can be no security for foreign residents where hostile agitation against them is allowed to proceed, where efficient protection to them in their peaceful pursuits is denied local authorities or where their treaty rights are systematically ignored. Having regard to actual conditions in Manchuria the Japanese Government have regretfully been brought to conclusion that dangers involved in precipitate recall of Japanese troops could not be averted by measures

LAM

3- #292, from Geneva, November 9,
1931

measures of supervision such as are recommended in
of ~~the~~ opposed resolution of October 24th referred to in
Your Excellency's note under review.

Four. It is pointed out in your note that first
four points of five fundamental principles mentioned
in Japanese declaration of October 26th are virtually
embodied in proposition of October 24th.

Your Excellency, however, will no doubt perceive
that terms of proposition are not sufficiently ex-
plicit or comprehensive to cover all implications of
four points in question. As regards final point, viz.,
guarantee of respect for Japanese treaty rights in
Manchuria, terms of letter addressed to you on Octo-
ber 24th by Chinese representative seem to give rise
to doubt whether it is in contemplation of Chinese
Government to call in question validity of some of
treaties constituting basic embodiment of relations
between Japan and China. It may be needless to state
that Japanese Government could not for a moment en-
tertain such contention. Nothing can be more destruc-
tive of established order of the whole world than to
permit any power to challenge binding force of treaties
concluded with all solemnity of international usages.
Japanese Government trusts that they have made it clear
that

MAN

4- #292, from Geneva, November 9,
1931

that five fundamental principles mentioned in Japanese declaration of October 26 are no more than those that are commonly observed in intercourse of ordered communities with one another. Unless and until arrangement is reached between Japan and China on bases of those principles no measure of security for lives and property of Japanese subjects sufficient to enable withdrawal of Japanese forces to railway zone can possibly be assured. Japanese Government believe that course of procedure now indicated is in entire agreement with resolution of Council of September 30. It is far from their thoughts to insist on final adjustment of whole series of pending questions between Japan and China as condition precedent to withdrawal of troops. All that they urge upon China for the present is frank recognition by direct negotiations between the two countries of fundamental principles that should govern normal relations between any two nations. Such accord will be a long step toward replacing present tension by sense of stability between peoples of two countries whose interest is to be on best of terms".

The following are the essential points of Drummond's views respecting the foregoing and the situation now presented. (END GREEN)

(A)

MAM

5- #292, from Geneva, November 9,
1931

(A) Despite the Japanese protestations to that effect the Japanese position set forth in this note is not within the scope of the September 30th resolution.

~~(B)~~ Apart from the repeated Japanese contentions that their activities in Manchuria do not constitute acts of war they have nevertheless broken the spirit of and the terms of the Pact of Paris (particularly article 2), the Covenant of the League particularly article 10 and above all the Nine Power Treaty.

(C) In response to an inquiry from Drummond as to whether he contemplated making a reply to the Japanese note Briand stated that as things were at present he would make no reply. He did not see what could be done other than to let the situation rest as it is until November 16.

(D) Drummond asked Briand whether the latter would inquire of the Japanese what were the treaties to which the note refers. Briand replied that he thought that it will not be wise to do so at present. In discussing this with me Drummond said that he was not at all sure that Briand was right in not addressing such an inquiry to the Japanese at this time but that

MAM

6- #292, from Geneva, November 9,
1931

that he had let this decision rest with Briand.

(E) Drummond asked me what I thought of the possible usefulness in view of the changes in the situation brought about by this development in the Japanese position of Washington's making public the American memorandum to Tokyo dated November 5. He said that it was possible that public opinion in Japan did not realize the seriousness of the situation and that it might be awakened by such action. I told him that without question we were being kept well informed of this as well as of other angles of the situation through our sources in Tokyo and that we were of course giving consideration to all aspects of the question. I said, however, that I would transmit his observations to you.

GILBERT

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) "
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE UNDER SECRETARY
NOV 10 1931
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

November 10, 1931.

U
M
FE
JCR
file

SKH:

Reference Geneva's No. 292, November 9, 1 p.m.:

793.94/2577
Do you think M. Briand is quite justified in taking the position (see page 5(C)) that "he did not see what could be done other than to let the situation rest as it is until November 16"?

(a) We have brought to his attention a number of times (the latest being in our instruction to Paris No. 530 of yesterday) the suggestion of negotiations in the presence of neutral observers; (b) we are informed that a "Yoshizawa proposal" of a basis of negotiation has been made, is receiving serious consideration at Geneva, Paris and London, has been referred by Yoshizawa to Tokyo and is considered hopeful; (c) the reply of the Japanese Government to Briand, and more particularly Japan's reply to us, do not seem to close the door to an attempt to bring the two parties together in "informal conversations" if not in "direct negotiations".

Can it be that M. Briand has so much in mind the juridical aspects of the question, and the upholding of the authority of the League, that he is content "to let the situation rest as it is until November 16" without making any effort along any of the above lines?

RSM:EJL


F.W. 793.94/2577

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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
FROM



Geneva

Dated November 9, 1931

RECEIVED 7:08 a. m. 10th



Secretary of State,
Washington.

297, November 9, 10 p. m.

Drummond has handed me the following text of a communication from the Japanese delegation dated November 6th which is being circulated to the Council:

"During the last few days about half Japanese army stationed at Chuliho and more than half that stationed in the locality of Kirin have been withdrawn, thus reducing of Japanese troops in these two localities (including railway guards Kirin Chang Chunn) to fewer than thousand men. I should be very grateful if you would bring the foregoing to the knowledge of the members of the Council. Sawada".

GILBERT

RR

WSB

F/DEW

793.94/2578

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NOV 13 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED



FE

REP

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 10, 1931

Rec'd 5:05 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

mt

898 November 10, 9 a. m.

Following from Consul at Chefoo:

"November 9, 9 p. m. CONFIDENTIAL. Presumably on account of Tientsin situation General Liu Chen Nien this evening issued orders for all his forces to stand by and be prepared to shift to Tsinanfu en route to Tientsin. All motor lorries in port commandeered and foreign motor car agencies are hopeful of also selling their stock lorries to Liu. Apparently Liu after seeing Admiral Shen Hung Lieh yesterday is now cooperating with the young Marshal but only at Nanking's request because it is *(?) known Res* he has refused to have anything to do with Chang Tsung Chang who is also allied with Chang Hsueh Liang. General Liu presumably now definitely allied with Chang Kai Shih but not with the young Marshal or Han Fu Chu the latter whom he has here openly criticised and refused to be under".


For the Minister
ENGERT

F/DEW 793.94/2579

793-94

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED



REP

FROM

GRAY

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
mt

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 10, 1931

Rec'd 9:25 a. m.

F/DEW

793.94/2580

Secretary of State,
Washington,

901, November 10, 4 p. m.

Military Attache requests you make essential information
regarding Tientsin incident available to War Department.

For the Minister

ENGERT

WSB

793.94

DEC 21 1931

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO
C.I.L. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

PLAIN

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 10, 1931

793.94
Secretary of State,
Washington.

THE UNDER SECRETARY
NOV 10 1931
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Rec'd 9:35 a. m.
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 10 1931
FILE
Department of State

F/DEW

793.94/2581

902, November 10.

Marshal Chang Hsueh Liang issued yesterday telegraphic circular to National and Provincial and Municipal Governments, party headquarters, newspapers, et cetera, of which following is substance in translation:

"At ten thirty p. m. November 8th, over two thousand armed plain clothes Chinese were massed at Haikuangsu in Japanese concession Tientsin. Persons arrested after incident stated they been had/given rifles, revolvers, pistols and hand grenades also forty dollars each under supervision of several Japanese.

Between eleven and twelve o'clock over one hundred persons coming from Haikuangsu Street attacked police station in Chinese area. At same time considerable number of plain clothes men rushed out of Japanese concession and attempted to seize officers of Provincial and Municipal Government's and Bureau of Public Safety. Chinese police and gendarmes put up stiff resistance.

At 1 a. m.

FILED

NOV 11 1931

REP

2- #902, from Peiping, Nov. 10, 1931.

At 1 a. m.. Provincial Chairman Wang Shu Chang informed foreign consuls of facts and demanded that Japanese Consul assume responsibility for plain clothes men operating from Japanese concession.

At 4 o'clock, Commander of Japanese forces Tientsin telephoned Provincial Chairman demanding all Chinese soldiers, gendarmes and police be withdrawn three hundred meters from Japanese concessions by 6 a. m. Wang asked for reasons for such demand and stated demand was unreasonable as there were no Chinese soldiers within three hundred meters of Japanese concession, only gendarmes and police to maintain law and order who were now trying to stop rioters.

At half past five, Japanese again urged Chairman to issue immediate order for withdrawal. As by that time Chinese police had succeeded in partially repelling plain clothes men and in order to prevent conflict between police and Japanese Chairman Wang issued order for withdrawal before six o'clock.

At half past six the situation was quiet. Over thirty shells suddenly fell into Chinese city and market. From examination of direction they came from Japanese garden and Japanese barracks Haikuangsu".

WSB

For the Minister
ENGERT

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

PLAIN

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 10, 1931

Rec'd 9:30 a. m.

7a3-94
Secretary of State,
Washington.

900, November 10.


Your 408, November 5. /2406

Correspondent International News Service states message was
mailed to you from New York.

For the Minister

ENGERT

WSB



F/DEW

793.94/2582

FILED

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COPY:REK

By Edward Hunter
International News Service Staff Correspondent
Copyright, 1931, by International News Service

Shanghai, Oct. 31...(I.N.S.)...Alleged evidence of Japanese intentions to cripple non-Japanese commercial enterprises in Manchuria was brought here today by an American traveller on his arrival from Mukden.

Preferring NOT to have his name used, the American said that during his tour of Mukden he was followed by an automobile containing Japanese spies. He said he doubled around the same block to test whether the spies were following him, and that the Japanese always remained right on his trail.

The traveler said Japanese activity was directed particularly against foreign-owned wireless stations and plants in Manchuria. He declared he saw Japanese soldiers digging trenches in front of the enormous American-built radio station outside of Mukden, which is surrounded by a barbed wire fence while a Japanese flag flies from its roof.

He said that Willi Friese, German chief engineer of the National Government Radio Administration in Manchuria, told him many important tubes had been taken from the receiving and transmitting stations in the Radio Corporation of America's plant, obviously to prevent communication between Manchuria and Europe. Repairs to restore the plant to its full efficiency will take many months, he said.

Rec'd from CI on Nov. 10 1972

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

MA
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 10, 1931.

Mr. Secretary:

This is the latest report on the incident at Tientsin. This comes from Consul General Lockhart who is on the spot.

You might care to say something to Ambassador Debuchi about this (without mentioning Lockhart).

SKH/VDM

SKH

noted
HVS

112F
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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NOV 10 1931

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

REP

GRAY

FROM

Tientsin via N. R.

Dated November 10, 1931

793-94
with
843.102T
Secretary of State,
Washington.

November 10, 3 p. m.

Following sent to the Legation today.

"November 10, 11 a. m. While there was intermittent rifle fire in the Chinese city practically throughout yesterday, last night passed quietly in that area and in the concession due to the strictest measures of control.


Chinese staff of this Consulate General were not able to reach Consulate General yesterday or today because of strict martial law in Chinese city and Japanese concession. Chinese staff of many foreign firms similarly affected.

The electric light plant referred to in my November 9, 3 p. m., is in the Chinese city and not in ex-Belgian concession.

Practically all business is suspended in the Japanese concession and in a wide area in the Chinese city.

Chinese claim that in the firing yesterday morning at 7 o'clock the Japanese directed trench mortar shells towards the

Bureau of



NOV 10 1931
Noted
HLS

F/DEW

793.94/2583

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DEC 21 1931

793-94/2583
REP

CORRECTED PAGE

2- from Tientsin, Nov. 10, 3 p. m.

Bureau of Public Safety and that two of the shells fell in the river directly in front of the Bureau.

The number of Chinese casualties is still not known but it is generally believed that there were quite a few.

American, British, French and Italian commandants, all of whom are maintaining complete neutrality in the affair, as are all members of the Consular Body, conferred with Japanese Commander yesterday afternoon for the purpose of obtaining information. Japanese Commander gave to the press a statement in the afternoon stating trouble was ^{due} to internal Chinese politics in "native city quite unexpectedly" and that orders were issued by him to protect the ~~Chinese~~ ^{Japanese} concession. Since the statement is available in the press despatch, text will not be telegraphed. The Chinese claim that about 80 plain clothes men were captured. An American missionary report that two in attempting to evade the Chinese police threw their rifles into the American Methodist Episcopal Mission compound in Chinese city. Rifles bear the mark of the northeast army and one of them appeared to be entirely new. The rifles were turned over to the Chinese authorities.

Quite a number of stray bullets fell in the French and British concession on Sunday night and yesterday without damage.

Repeated to the Department and Nanking."

WSB JHR

LOCKHART

FE

FW 793-94/2583

1128

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 7, 1931.

Digest of Newspaper
Items.

THE WASHINGTON POST

Mukden despatch (A. P.) dated November 6, reports that the Japanese troops at the Nonni River bridge drove the Chinese northward after a brisk battle leaving the Japanese in control of the railroad line along the River. The estimated killed up to, but not including, the Japanese attack mentioned above are given as 200 Chinese and 130 Japanese.

Moscow despatch (A.P.) dated November 6, states that the Executive Committee of the International issued an appeal to the "workers and oppressed people all over the capitalistic world" to give active support to the "Chinese proletariat" in their struggle against Japan in Manchuria.

Geneva despatch (A.P.) dated November 6 announces that League of Nations leaders are considering the withdrawal of diplomatic representative from Tokyo in the event Japan continues to reject measures of arbitration.

Article XV

F/DEW
793.94/2584

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-2-

Article XV of the League Covenant which deals with sanctions of a military and economic nature to be invoked against an aggressor nation is being studied by the legal section of the Secretariat. The despatch states, however, that first a supreme effort will be made to induce Japan to adopt a conciliatory attitude toward China and to restore the status quo in Manchuria. According to this report the League is counting on the United States to support it in the steps which may be taken.

An effort is being made by M. Briand to persuade Japan to return the salt tax revenues allegedly seized in Manchuria.

Washington (A.P.) report credits Ambassador Debuchi of Japan with having informed newspaper men yesterday that it was the "present intention of Japan to withdraw her troops southward as soon as repairs to the bridges at the Nonni River had been completed. A week or ten days was given as the time required. The bridges are important, according to Japanese reports, because they are arteries in the movement of the soya bean crop.

Diplomatic and State Department officials minimize the danger of Soviet Russia becoming involved in the Manchuria affair.

Mr. Harold J. T. Horan in his daily article credits "Japanese stubbornness in reinforcing instead of receding from its military positions in Manchuria" with threatening

seriously

- 3 -

seriously to compromise both the League of Nations and Secretary Stimson's peace-making efforts.

Japan, according to Mr. Horan, has utilized the full quota of about 15,000 troops allowed her by treaty in Manchuria. Ambassador Debuchi told correspondents that, in addition, 4,000 troops had been ordered to Manchuria as a supplementary force. Mr. Horan quotes Ambassador Debuchi as follows:

"Of course, these are young soldiers. They are supposed to take the places of veteran troops who were rushed into Manchuria from Korea, but, as frequently happens with inexperienced troops, they have to be trained. For this reason there may be some duplication of troops before the veterans can be evacuated and returned to their home garrisons."

The article then quotes the Secretary of State in a statement in which the Secretary yesterday reiterated the United States policy of acting independently through diplomatic channels in its cooperation with other nations in their efforts to bring about peace in Manchuria. Mr. Horan classifies the Secretary's statement as a "red herring" drawn across the trail to allay the suspicions of senatorial and other foes of the League of Nations.

The article states that no decision has been made with regard to the presence of Mr. Prentiss Gilbert at the forthcoming meeting of the League Council at Paris.

NEW YORK TIMES

Tokyo despatch (Hugh Byas) dated November 7 advises that aided by reinforcements from Taonan the Japanese counter-attacked strongly at the Nonni River bridge and broke the Chinese

- 4 -

Chinese lines after several hours of fighting. The Chinese fled in disorder.

Tokyo despatch (Hugh Byas) dated November 6 states that Japan has no desire to take Tsitsihar or permanently to occupy it. He advances the possibility of their sending a guard to Anganchi where the Taonan-Tsitsihar line passes under the Chinese Eastern Railway. Tokyo cable November 6 points out that Japan has now taken over all the railroads for the building of which she advanced money.

This cable also gives Japanese reply to Dr. Alfred Sze's charges relative to the Salt Tax seizures by the Japanese. The Japanese authorities state that on October 22 the Mukden Peace Preservation Committee, a Chinese organization said to be functioning as an interim government, requested the Salt Tax Office at Newchwang to send the surplus revenues as before. The tax office, also a Chinese organization, complied with this request and the Japanese Army saw no reason to interfere.

The message states that according to a RENGO NEWS AGENCY despatch a new government of ^{PF} Ningtien Province entirely independent of General Chang Hsueh-liang has been established. Yuan Chin-kai was reported as the head of the new government.

Washington report, November 6, indicates that the United States Government while recognizing the situation as delicate will continue to apply diplomatic pressure on Japan to bring about peace in Manchuria in spite of Tokyo intimations that further pressure may be misunderstood by the public.
The

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -

The same despatch reports that it has been learned through the Department of Commerce that boycott activities in the Yangtze Valley and in South China are increasing. Business in Manchuria is, of course, paralyzed.

AGL

FE:AGL:REK

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Collect
Charge Department

Department of State

Charge to
\$

OR
This cable was sent in Confidential Code.
It should be carefully handled by all
copy communicated to agents.

Washington,

November 9, 1931.

AMEMBASSY,

PARIS (France).

530

CONFIDENTIAL.

Department is informed through roundabout channels that Briand has not a clear understanding regarding the memorandum communicated by the American Ambassador, Tokyo, on behalf of this Government to the Japanese Foreign Office on November 5.

For your information and for use in an informal conversation with Foreign Office: I have regarded this communication to the Japanese as a matter essentially between the American and the Japanese Governments and therefore have not made the text available. I read the text and made extended comment upon it to the French Ambassador here and he was to inform Briand. I have no reason to believe that Claudel has not adequately reported, but I do not wish to have any lack of clear understanding, from whatever cause, by Briand of my position and action. In connection with the memorandum under reference, it was my particular objective to make it clear to the Japanese Government that, in seeking to prevent war and to bring about a solution by peaceful

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

793.94/A
if possible writ Briand personally

793.94/2510

793.94/2584A

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

Department of State

- 2 -

Washington,

means, the objective of the American Government and that of the Council of the League are identical. In the memorandum I indicated my endorsement of effort and action of the League as expressed in the Resolutions of September 30 and October 24, but ~~that~~, in regard to the October 24 Resolution, while invoking the spirit thereof, I deliberately refrained from mentioning the time limit and thus avoided expression of any view either favorable or unfavorable with regard to that particular feature of the Resolution. I stressed the view that the settlement of long-standing issues should not repeat not be made a condition precedent to withdrawal of Japanese armed forces and that the presence of those armed forces should not be availed of by the Japanese Government as an instrumentality for bringing pressure to bear upon China in the negotiations. I regard this as fundamental and I feel that it is imperative that it should be understood that ~~we~~ ^{this Government and the Council} stand for the same fundamental principles.

I feel that I have made it very clear to the Japanese Government that my views correspond in general with those of the Council and that I endorse the effort which the Council and particularly M. Briand are making to prevent war and to bring about a peaceful settlement.

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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OR
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TELEGRAM SENT

1-138
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NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

- 3 -

I asked the French Ambassador to bring to the attention of Briand my thought, in line with a thought which I understand to have been already in the minds of both the Japanese and the Chinese Governments, as well as of Briand, that the impasse might be resolved by resort on the part of the two Governments to the method of direct negotiations in the presence of neutral observers, as was done in connection with the Shantung question. I do not wish that this be put forward as a proposal or a suggestion emanating from the American Government; but I believe that it would be useful to attempt to elicit from the Japanese Government the formulation of a proposal on that line.

Stimson

NOV 9 1931

FE:SKH/ZMF

Enciphered by


Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1925 1-128

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CHARLES R. CRANE
522 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK



November 10th, 1931.

Hon. Henry L. Stimson,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

RECEIVED

NOV 11 1931

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

My dear Mr. Stimson:

Please let me trouble you with a little story.

When President Taft was your predecessor as Governor of the Philippines he meditated much on the problem of the Pacific and on his way to his post one time made a profound and impressive speech at Shanghai revealing an inspired understanding of our relationship to the people in that part of the world and our responsibility to them. As I myself had been concerned with problems of the Pacific for many years it was the Shanghai speech that made me active in President Taft's campaign. I felt that the occasion had arisen for a serious study of a new politic of the Pacific and that President Taft was the one to work it out. It was undoubtedly the best dream that he had.

After the campaign he invited me to take the post of Minister to China - not to occupy myself entirely with Chinese affairs but to move around very much, see many people in the various states of the East, keep in active communication with him, with the hope that before his term expired his fine dream might be worked out. However, the State Department hadn't any kind of sympathy with this program and I was forced to resign and President Taft to abandon any efforts in this direction.

The problem is still there and while Governor of the Philippines such a vision must have come over you and now by the actual drive of events you must realize how vitally important it is to formulate a doctrine for the conduct of the United States in that part of the world for perhaps a hundred years. A Stimson Doctrine of the Pacific is what we hope to see evolve before you leave office. Probably the best hope for a revival of prosperity will come from the peaceful development of the Pacific Ocean States. Everything was going along wonderfully well there from one end of the Pacific Ocean to the other, until two months ago. Manchuria must not become a second Balkans, and I am sure that you will see that not a patched-up peace is made there but that new conditions revealed necessary by the present experiences will be so solidly founded that no irresponsible soldiers can set the place aflame again.

Sincerely yours,

Charles R. Crane

CRC/FC

793.94 / 2584 1/2
Please to handle it

1 1 3 7

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

November 12, 1931

Dear Mr. Crane:

Thank you for your very interesting letter of November tenth. When such a situation of danger and violence as now exists in Manchuria breaks out in the world, usually the only principle upon which we can get all nations to unite is the same principle with which we deal with a prairie fire, namely, to first put out the fire without stopping to appraise causes, and then afterwards when there is time for careful deliberation, try to take preventive measures against another fire.

But it is very refreshing to get any suggestion in these times which is based upon broad knowledge and a broad viewpoint. I am trying to get Mr. Taft's speech in order to read it and try to get the orientation which you mention.

I am very grateful indeed that you should have taken the trouble to write me.

Very sincerely yours,


Honorable Charles R. Crane,
522 Fifth Avenue,
New York City

HENRY L. STIMSON

F W 793.94 / 2584 1/2

A true copy of
the signed original

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



Handed to the Secretary of State by the Japanese Ambassador November 9, 1931

793-94

793-94/3465A
2513

The Japanese Government welcome the views of the American Government so thoughtfully expressed in the memorandum of the American Embassy of November 5 on the subject of the Manchurian incident.

In that memorandum, the attention of the Japanese Government is invited to the fact that "a situation has been created in Manchuria which gives Japan substantial control of Southern Manchuria and has temporarily, at least, destroyed the administrative integrity of China in that region."

It is evident that shortly after the military action taken by the Japanese railway guards along the South Manchuria Railway to defend themselves as well as to protect the railway and the lives and property of Japanese subjects against attacks of the Chinese armed forces, the Chinese authorities in the affected districts have practically ceased to function. In consequence, the Japanese military authorities were obliged to undertake for some time the duty of maintaining peace and order in such districts.

Recently, however, local committees for the preservation of peace have been set up in various places by resident Chinese, and have organized a police force for that purpose. In the city of Mukden, for instance, the Chinese committee has under its direction and control 4,000 police officers and men. Those local bodies for the maintenance of public order serve to lighten the police functions of the Japanese troops, and are, as such, favorably received by the Japanese Government. Should they prove themselves effective to assure a reasonable degree of security in the

793.94/2585

FILED
NOV 10 1931

respective districts, and to afford adequate protection to foreign residents, the Japanese troops will be ready at any time to withdraw to the Railway Zone.

The state of things now prevailing in Manchuria is certainly abnormal. But it is only temporary. Similar conditions occurred in Tsinan in 1928-9, when the Japanese forces were in occupation of that district, in order to protect Japanese residents against ravages of the Chinese troops. In no case have such military measures been inspired by any thought of bringing about any territorial or administrative dismemberment of China. It will be recalled that soon after the close of the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-5, a policy looking to the eventual "partition of China" appeared to be gaining ground in some quarters of the world. In the denunciation of such a policy, the United States, Japan and Great Britain were in complete accord, and their determination to respect the territorial and administrative integrity of China was affirmed in many of the diplomatic instruments signed by those Powers. The Japanese Government remain unchanged in their stand against the partition of China.

In the memorandum of the American Embassy under review, it is pointed out that there are two distinct points to be considered: first, the peaceful solution of the present situation, and, second, a solution through negotiation of the various matters at issue between Japan and China, arising from misunderstanding as to the respective treaty rights of the two nations. The memorandum then proceeds to conclude that a settlement of the various broader issues of the second point can not appropriately be reached until the first has been disposed of.

The Japanese Government feel that their position is

virtually in harmony with that conclusion of the American Government. They have no intention of insisting on the final adjustment of the whole series of their controversies with China, as a condition precedent to the withdrawal of Japanese troops to the Railway Zone. Their efforts for the present are primarily directed towards the peaceful solution of the present situation. It is not, however, possible to hope, as things stand at this moment, that the recall of the Japanese troops now operating outside the Railway Zone would solve the existing situation. With the replacement of the Japanese troops by the Chinese, violent hostile agitation against Japan under the auspices, overt or covert, of the Chinese authorities would be set to work in Manchuria as in other parts of China. Japanese and Koreans carrying on peaceful pursuits in that region would once more be subjected to persecution and outrage as they have been for several years. All the treaty rights of Japan would be challenged and ignored, and the security of Japanese subjects would at once be menaced.

Such dangers would inevitably be involved in any premature withdrawal of the Japanese troops. In order to provide against those dangers, the Japanese Government have been brought to the conclusion that candid recognition, by an arrangement between Japan and China, of certain fundamental principles, the substance of which has already been communicated to the American Government, is of supreme importance. The principles which they have thus formulated are no more than those that are generally observed in practice in dealings of organized peoples with one another. In seeking agreement on terms of such a nature, Japan can not justly be accused of any intention of exerting military pressure on China. The Japanese Government trust that an

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

arrangement between Japan and China on those fundamental principles, affording as it will a measure of security for the lives and property of Japanese subjects, will pave the way for an early withdrawal of the troops to the Railway Zone.

They believe that the arrangement now indicated can not be regarded as solution of the various matters of the second point mentioned in the memorandum of the American Embassy, but that it is simply a process for the settlement of the first point. The whole Manchurian incident is an outcome of manifold and complicated events with historical background extending over more than thirty years. The Japanese Government hope that it will be appreciated that time and patience are needed for an adjustment of the problem.

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NOTE

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE JAPANESE INVASION OF MANCHURIA

793.94
The first news of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria aroused much excitement in this city, coming as it did out of an almost clear sky. Having in mind the occupation of Tsinan by the Japanese just three years ago, the people feared that Japanese forces might return here to inflict upon them similar sufferings to what they had previously endured. Neither were their fears lessened by the rumors which first became current of the landing of Japanese troops at Tsingtao, Chefoo and Lungkou. According to a newspaper report from Nanking, giving Peiping as the source of the news, there were Japanese plots to use Japanese agents disguised in Chinese military uniforms for the purpose of staging anti-Japanese riots, communists hired at Shanghai being employed for the purpose. Of course no basis has been discovered for such wild rumors.

The fact that there are no editorials published in the Tsinan newspapers, makes it a little difficult to say what the public opinion is, when important events are transpiring. However, the attitude of the government became clear almost immediately, when General Han

Fu Chu ...

- 3 -

Fu Chu declared that, while the people should unite in support of the National Government during this crisis, violence must on no account be resorted to, so as to avoid giving the Japanese an excuse for military action in this province. He remarked that the Japanese occupation in Mukden was not a mere Sino-Japanese incident, but one that would have far-reaching effects on the peace of the Far East. He said that he had already telegraphed Vice-Commander-in-Chief Chang Hsueh Liang counselling patience, and reminding him that in the end justice will prevail. He expressed confidence in the League of Nations protecting China from the rapacity of a stronger neighbor. General Han also telegraphed to the Tsingtao and Chefoo authorities, advising them to pay special attention to the maintenance of peace and order in those ports.

September 2nd was observed as a Special Humiliation Day on account of the Japanese occupation of Mukden, and again special precautions were taken to avoid letting the situation get out of hand. Flags were flown at half mast from government, school and shop buildings but there were no parades or other demonstrations against the Japanese.

Two days later the Tsinan Municipal Tang Pu, called a meeting in the Provincial Party Headquarters, with representatives from the several local organizations in attendance. The meeting decided to send out circular telegrams urging the whole country to stop its internal strife, to support General Chiang Kai Shek and to effect unification so as to be able to resist the foreign invaders as a united country. It was also resolved to telegraph the Central Government urging the adoption

of...

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

of a Constitution which provides for the military training of the people, and to telegraph the public bodies in the several districts of the province to make preparations for war against Japan! It was also decided that a volunteer corps should be formed at Tsinan.

At the Monday Memorial Service held in the Provincial Party Headquarters on the 28th ultimo, the Chairman, Chang Wei Ts'un, sensibly addressed the gathering as follows:

"Today we should impress it upon our brains that the Japanese occupation of the Northeastern provinces is inhuman and unjust. Japan has occupied our land and killed our people without reason. We are driven into a corner from which we cannot get out. Our country has always respected justice and loved peace, so we have taken the case to the League of Nations for adjudication. This method should be adopted by civilized countries for the settlement of their disputes. However, it is questionable whether or not the League can settle the matter justly. We know very well that it was Japan's intention to act aggressively, but we were much surprised that she should seize the present opportunity when communist troubles and floods have brought disaster upon us. Since anyone with a human mind will not act thus, we have made no preparations beforehand to forestall the occupation of our territory which Japanese soldiers have openly and suddenly encroached upon. On this account we are greatly pained.

"Since the Great War every country in the world has been tired of war and all have been working together to maintain peace. Now Japan is the one which first breaks the peace. In the event that the League of Nations and those countries which signed the anti-war pact could not stop Japan's aggression, how can the former continue to exist? No matter how cruel Japan is, if the hearts of the Chinese people do not die, if we maintain our ancient civilization, if we adhere to peace and justice, and if we use our national spirit in dealing with Japan, I believe that we can obtain the final victory. Under the circumstances we should be patient temporarily. We should renew our determination to perform our duty, step by step. Then in a few years our former glory will be restored to us".

The Chinese ...

- 5 -

The Chinese students in this province have committed no rash acts to show their hatred against the Japanese. A few posters, written by hand, have appeared on the walls outside of government schools, but even those have been less fiery than might be expected, Japanese trade has suffered to some extent and there probably will be a greater inclination for the people to avoid buying Japanese goods, but there has been no so-called "Boycott Association" or "National Goods Promotion Society" actively at work in this part of the country. Consequently there have been no thefts, investigations or seizures of an unlawful nature made with the idea of putting a stop to all commercial relations with the Japanese. For one reason or another some shipments of Japanese goods ordered by merchants in outlying towns have been returned to the Japanese sellers or their agents, I have been informed by the Japanese Consul General, but this situation has not yet developed into one of major proportions.

1 1 4

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Nanking/44 FOR Despatch #

FROM Nanking (Peck) DATED Oct. 12, 1931.

-----TO-----

NAME

1-1127 ***

REGARDING:

Crisis in Manchuria: Gives a full report on --,
according to reports received at Nanking.
(Copy attached)

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793.94/2587

71394

5. CRISIS IN MANCHURIA

According to a stream of messages received on September 19 by the Government authorities in Nanking, the Japanese troops, without provocation or warrant, opened fire on the Chinese troops stationed at the Peitaiying camp at ten o'clock on the evening of September 18, and the latter withdrew without offering any resistance. During the following 12 days, as stated by subsequent reports from the North, the Japanese troops occupied many points of strategic importance in the provinces of Liaoning and Kirin, including Shenyang (Mukden) and Kirin, capital cities of the two provinces. Great numbers of Chinese soldiers, policemen, railway guards, cadets and members of volunteer corps were disarmed. These reports were to the effect that all political offices were searched, many banks seized, educational institutions occupied, and private homes looted. Countless structures were bombarded and burnt. Many soldiers, policemen and railway guards as well as common people were killed, and their corpses were either burnt or removed. General Jung Chen (榮臻), Chief of Staff of the Vice Commander-in-Chief, and Wang Shih-yi (城式毅), Chairman of the Liaoning Provincial Government, disguised themselves in civilian dress and fled to Peiping. Several other military

-5-

military leaders were put under surveillance and attempts were made to force them to sign an affidavit admitting that Chinese troops had attempted to destroy a section of the South Manchuria Railway, thereby precipitating the trouble. But the report was that none of them would do so and that consequently they were killed. The arsenal at Shenyang was occupied and emptied. Communication facilities between Manchuria and China Proper were cut off and no exact report was available during the month concerning casualties and loss of property suffered by China in the Three Eastern Provinces.

It was reported that a few days before the crisis, the Japanese troops had maneuvers at Peitoying and environs. Upon receipt of a telegraphic report that Japanese troops had started firing upon Chinese soldiers on the evening of September 18, Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang circulated an urgent telegram ordering Chinese soldiers in Manchuria to put their arms in the arsenals and not to retaliate against the action taken by the Japanese. The vernacular press reported that during the month, all Chinese soldiers laid down their arms and offered no resistance to the Japanese troops of occupation.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs lodged during the month two strong protests with M. Shigemitsu, the Japanese Minister to China, demanding immediate cessation of hostile action on the part of the Japanese troops and their immediate withdrawal to their original posts. The Ministry also ordered that similar protests be presented to the Japanese Government. Simultaneously, Dr. Sao-ke Alfred Lee, Chief of the Chinese Delegation at Geneva and Chinese Minister at London,

END

-6-

was instructed to lay the Japanese attack on Manchuria before the Council of the League of Nations. After a series of meetings, the Council of the League advised Japan to withdraw her troops to the railway (South Manchuria Railway) zone. Up to the end of the month, however, neither the protests nor the advice of the League succeeded in bringing about a cessation of action by Japanese troops in Manchuria.

Indignation over the Japanese military aggressions in Manchuria increased rapidly during September. The action taken by different classes of people in regard to the matter was, according to reports, briefly as follows:

(1) Government Organs

- (a) National Government -arnings were issued to the masses instructing them to remain calm and friendly toward Japanese civilians resident in China.
- (b) Executive Yuan - An instruction was circulated to cancel festivities on the coming National Holiday, October 10.
- (c) Examination Yuan - Several Japanese advisors were relieved.
- (d) Legislative and Control Yuan - Several joint meetings were held to formulate measures to cope with the situation.

(2) Staffs of Government Organs - The staffs of many government organs organized volunteer corps.

(3) Kuomintang - Numerous telegrams from Party Headquarters of all grades to the Government requesting immediate declaration of war against Japan were published in press.

(4) Military Commanders - Numbers of Division Generals sent urgent telegrams to the Commander-in-Chief stating that they would lead their troops to the fronts to fight for the preservation of the country.

(5) Students - Numberless Anti-Japanese associations were organized in government and private schools in China. In many of them, students were enrolled as military cadets.

(6) Merchants

-7-



- (6) Merchants - In conjunction with the Anti-Japanese Associations, there were attached to the Chambers of Commerce at various important trade centers new organs called "Japanese Goods Examination Departments". In the same manner as the Anti-Japanese Associations, these Departments instructed the merchants to register their Japanese goods in stock. Those who were found to have either smuggled or openly imported fresh supplies of Japanese goods were, according to the regulations, subject to punishment.
- (7) Laborers - Thousands of laborers who were formerly employees of Japanese factories or firms voluntarily resigned.
- (8) Chinese Overseas - Chinese who were Merchants, laborers or students abroad separately sent telegrams to the National Government indicating their desire to back up the Government by making contributions for the purchase of military supplies and, when necessary, to come back to serve in the ranks.

Popular indignation reached a pitch equalled only by that prevailing at the time of the Twenty-One Demands in 1915. Apparently, the Chinese people, especially members of the Kuomintang, although they were aware of their military inferiority as compared with Japan, and although they did not lose sight of the fact that the Chinese nation was afflicted with floods and was making a tremendous effort in connection with the suppression of Communist-banditry, felt it absolutely necessary to oppose the foreign invasion by armed force, even though they were sure to suffer an overwhelming defeat.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE UNDERSECRETARY



MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR.
November 6, 1931.

The Japanese Ambassador came in to tell me that he had had a telegram from Baron Shidehara about the fighting at Nonni River. The Ambassador says that when the Japanese determined to repair the bridges and to send troops to protect the construction gangs and engineers, the Japanese Consul in Tsitsihar requested General Ma to instruct his troops in the vicinity not to interfere with the Japanese troops. This General Ma agreed to do. Apparently his instructions did not reach the troops at the front, which attacked the Japanese quite suddenly with machine guns and field artillery. There were fifteen Japanese casualties. Baron Shidehara very deeply regrets this incident. He reiterated the definite intention of the Japanese Government, however, to withdraw all the troops as soon as the construction work was done. It is estimated that this will not take at a maximum more than ten days and it is hoped that it may be completed within a week.

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NOV 11 1931
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-2-

The Ambassador says that there is no intention of sending troops to Tsitsihar. This would probably be provocative to the Russians and Japan has no desire to get in a conflict with the Soviet.

The Ambassador says that unfortunately, the fact that there had been written communication to the Japanese leaked out both in Tokyo and here. I think that he felt that Mr. Byers^{as} probably got the information from Mr. Forbes, and in this I am inclined to agree. The Ambassador said that in speaking to the press he would say that he knew instructions had been sent to Mr. Forbes and that it was perfectly possible that Mr. Forbes had left a memorandum of his conversation, although he had not delivered an official note from this Government.

W. R. Castle, Jr.

U WRC:GMH

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton C. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 218

The Honorable

W. Cameron Forbes,
American Ambassador,
Tokyo.

Sir:

*note
12/3/31*

The Department has received the Embassy's despatch No. 374 of October 24, 1931, enclosing a copy of the report submitted, under date October 24, 1931, by Second Secretary Laurence E. Salisbury, on the subject of his recent trip to Manchuria and his investigation of conditions there.

The writer appears to have performed satisfactorily the difficult mission on which he was sent. His report was prepared promptly and it reached the Department in time to be useful. It was well prepared both with regard to substance and to form, and it has been read with care and interest.

In view of these facts I have pleasure in stating that the Department desires that Mr. Salisbury be commended for the satisfactory performance of his mission and the excellence of his report.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

WILBUR J. CARR

793.94/2558

Noted on Liaison Agency records

W. J. Carr
Dec 4 1931 PW
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12/2/31

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

793.94
note
893.51 - Salt Revenue

FROM

GREEN

Geneva

Dated November 9, 1931

Rec'd 10th, 12:15 p. m.



Secretary of State,
Washington.

298, November 9, 11 p. m.

Consulate's 290, November 9, noon.

In a letter dated November 5 Yoshizawa denies Chinese allegations concerning seizure of salt revenues at Newchang and encloses the following text of a telegram ^{from} / Tokyo.

"As regards the salt revenue of Newchwang the total annual revenue is about \$30,000,000. There remains annually a net balance of over \$20,000,000, after deducting the expenditure and sums assigned for the service of the foreign loans secured by the tax. This balance had previously been placed at the disposal of General Chang Shue Liang who used it for his military expenditure, et cetera.

On October 22nd last the Chinese Committee for the Maintenance of Order at Mukden (see communication from the Japanese delegation dated October 14 document C 715 M 320 1931 Roman 7, page three) asked the Newchwang salt revenue office to hand over the balance of

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NOV 10 1931

RFP

2- #298, from Geneva, Nov. 9, 11 p.m.

the balance of the tax receipts. The latter office agreed to send the said balance which is at present in its possession together with the net balance of the tax to be collected. Thus the allegation that the Japanese military authorities have forcibly seized the revenue from the salt tax is entirely unfounded. The Japanese military authorities have entirely refrained from interfering in purely Chinese affairs, assuming that there was no reason to object to the Mukden-Chinese Committee for the Maintenance of Order, which discharges these duties in the place of General Chang Shue Liang receiving the balance in question from the Newchwang salt revenue office which is also a Chinese organ.

It should be noted that although it handed over the balance in question to the above mentioned Committee the Newchwang salt revenue office continued and continues to send regularly to the Nanking Government the necessary amount for the service of foreign loans. Furthermore as is well known the salt revenue administration in contrast to that of the maritime customs has become an exclusively Chinese service since the national Government at the end of 1928 reformed this administration without paying any heed to the protests of the interested powers."

GILBERT

WSB

115
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

743.94
with
843.516
Salt Revenues

FROM

GREEN

Geneva

Dated November 10, 1931

Rec'd 1:35 p. m.



Secretary of State,
Washington.

299, November 10, noon.

The Chinese representative addressed a letter to the Secretary General dated November 9 in which he discusses the seizure of the salt revenues and quotes a report on this subject by Dr. Frederick A. Cleveland, Associate Chief Inspector of Salt Revenues. The text of Dr. Cleveland's report is as follows:

"We have received from our representatives at Changchung a telegram dated November 6:

Today all the funds of the Bank of China and of the Bank of Communications, Changchung, amounting to \$2,600,000 were forcibly removed to the Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces Changchung by a transportation officer authorized by the Japanese military authorities. We protested in vain. The transportation officer formally notified us today that he cannot recognize the salt inspectorate. Therefore not only is Japanese denial of not having seized the salt revenue of Newchwang in correct but the Japanese

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NOV 10 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2- #299, from Geneva, Nov.10, noon.

Japanese military authorities continue to seize the salt revenues elsewhere through agents created, directed and completely controlled by the Japanese military authorities themselves."

GILBERT

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WSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 033.6511 Grandi, Dino /43 ^{Consider the} FOR Memorandum

FROM State Department (Stimson) DATED November 9, 1931.
TO Secretary NAME 1-1172

REGARDING: Manchurian Situation. In conversation with Italian Ambassador, the Secretary remarked that - was serious, and that the United States was attempting to back up the other nations in their attitude towards -, and waging conflict between Japan and China over the -.

P.

793.94 /2591

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

November 11, 1931

Dr. Hornbeck:

Upon inquiry of the Telegraph Section,
I find that in an effort to place the
Far Eastern telegrams, of which there
were a great many this morning, before
the officers of the Department, two clerks
were assigned to comparing who had no
experience on code work and whose services
could not be utilized otherwise. I
suppose the stress of the moment is to
blame for this bit of carelessness on their
part. Sorry!

We are issuing another corrected
copy.

D.G.S.

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 10, 1931

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Received
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 10 1931
Department of State

903, November 10, 2 p. m.

Following from American Consul General at Harbin received today:

"November 7, 3 p. m. CONFIDENTIAL.

One. Secretary Chao has just informed me that General Ma at Tsitsihar telephoned local Foreign Affairs Commissioner this morning at about 11 that his troops had been driven back by the Japanese soldiers to Sanchienfang last evening, that the left and right wings of his force had fallen back to Anganghsu station last night to dig trenches there, that he could hold Sanchienfang for one day, that the defenses at Anganghsu were weak and that the Japanese were preparing for an attack but had not yet attacked this morning that if Sanchienfang is lost, the way to Tsitsihar city will be opened to the Japanese and that conditions in the city were at present not much disturbed.

Two. Ohashi, the local Japanese Consul General, informed me an hour ago that he had received news to the effect that arrival of

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793.94/2592

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2- #903, from Peiping, Nov. 10, 2 p.m.

arrival of Japanese reinforcements from Changchun via Taonanfu
had enabled the Japanese forces, which had suffered severely in
attempting to storm

(END PART ONE).

ENGERT

WSB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 10, 1931

Rec'd 11:40 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

903,
November 10, 2 p. m. (PART TWO).

the first defense line of the Heilungkiang troops, that after a fierce attack under an artillery barrage ~~Jap. troops~~ getting on an advantageous position in the first line, whereupon their Chinese opponents were forced to retreat, that the defeated troops were retreating toward Tsitsihar in disorder and that he had no information in regard to how far the Japanese troops had advanced.

Three. From a fairly reliable Russian source at Tsitsihar Station on the Chinese Eastern Railway I received this morning a report on the situation late last night to the effect that wounded Chinese soldiers were arriving at that place in an uninterrupted stream, that Japanese troops were 18 kilometres south of the Chinese Eastern Railway and were expected to reach Tsitsihar Station and city on November 7th, that on the 6th three Japanese airplanes flew over Tsitsihar Station and threw bombs at Chinese

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2- from Peiping, (Part Two), Nov. 10
2 p. m.

at Chinese troops and a Taoang Railway train just outside of
this station and that a tremendous panic prevails amongst Chinese
and Russian refugees at Tsitsihar Station.

Four. Secretary Chao,

(END PART TWO).

ENGERT

WSB

1165

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RED

CORRECTED COPY
TELEGRAM RECEIVED GRAY


FE

793-94/2592

FROM

Peiping via N. R.,
Dated November 10, 1931
Rec'd 1:50 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



FW

793-94/2592

903, November 10, 2 p. m. (PART THREE).

who is Ma's representative here, has failed in negotiating a peaceful settlement of what he terms a misunderstanding between the Japanese and Heilungkiang troops, as China and Japan are not at war, with the local Japanese consular and military representatives, who insist that the Heilungkiang troops hoist the white flag and that Ma resign as acting chairman of the Heilungkiang Government. Chao is attempting to have the local consuls come here to arrange a cessation of hostilities.

Five. The local Japanese controlled press and military representatives openly admit that large forces of Japanese troops perhaps several consisting of infantry and cavalry, supported by artillery, and airplanes, have been brought to the Nonni River front. It is reliably reported that Major General Tamon, who forced Hsi Chia Jin to form an independent government and who commanded the troops at Changchun, has arrived at the south side of the bridges and is directing the operations of the Japanese forces.
(END PART THREE).

WSB CSB

ENGERT

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM

SECOND CORRECTED COPY

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

RECEIVED
NOV 12 1931
FROM
DIVISION OF

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 10, 1931

Rec'd 1:50 p.m.



Secretary of State,
Washington.

903, November 10, 2 p.m. (PART THREE).

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(END PART THREE).
WSB CSB

ENGERT

793.94/2592

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 10, 1931

Rec'd 2:45 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

903, November 10, 2 p. m. (PART FOUR).

Six. In my opinion, this combined Japanese-Chang Hai Pen attack against the Heilungkiang forces and ensuing three days' battle is by far the most serious military engagement since September 18th. This is actual warfare. From what I learned at Tsitsihar on November 7 and 8, I can only conclude that the Chinese engineers connected with the Taoang Railway were well able to repair the bridges, although there was an indication that they were against finishing the repairs until after November 16th, the date of the meeting of the Council of the League of Nations. The Japanese military objective was Tsitsihar and that repairing of the bridge and the defense of the South Manchurian Railway workers thereon were but pretexts used to start a clash with the Heilungkiang troops. I believe the Japanese military leaders were surprised at the Chinese resistance

REP

(Part Four)
2- #903, from Peiping, /Nov. 10, 2 p.m.

resistance which was unexpected. I have reason to believe that the Chinese military leaders in North Manchuria had come to the conclusion that by not fighting the Japanese they lose their influence, so they decided to resist the Japanese in order to bring about interference of the outside powers or possibly of Soviet Russia."

Minister informed.

(END MESSAGE).

For the Minister

ENGERT

WSB

1 1 6 9

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Collect
Charge Department
OR

Department of State

Washington,

November 10, 1931.

793-94
Amembassy,
Paris, (France).

592
VERY URGENT.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR HOWELL.

My 5/31, November 10, 11 a.m.

General Dawes will be in Paris during the Council meeting. He will direct any work involved by our relation to the Manchurian question and is relying upon Shaw to bring with him all the written records from Geneva and to furnish him with full assistance and information.

Shaw has been informed.

Stinson

793.94/2592A

(826)

M
11-10-31
WE:PLB:AMW

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1936 1-138

File

November 10, 1931.
9:30 a.m.

TRANSATLANTIC TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY
STIMSON AND AMBASSADOR DAWES AT LONDON.

SECRETARY: This is Secretary Stimson. Is this General Dawes?

DAWES: Yes, Mr. Secretary.

SECRETARY: I have an important message for you. The President and I have an important job for you to do, - a really he-man's job - and that is to go over to Paris next week or the end of this week and to be there during the special conference of the Council of the League of Nations on the subject of Manchuria. The situation, as you must know from the press, is extremely critical, and yet from the messages I get I am hopeful - very hopeful - that it will be possible with some of the astute good sense I know you to have, to have a settlement finally worked out that would vindicate the peace treaties and save peace in Manchuria. I am sending you by cable today a resumé of the situation to help you. You see at present the Paris Embassy is stripped. Edge is over here. Norman Armour is on leave, and Marriner is here. So I am sending Howland Shaw from Turkey. He is one of the best men in Europe.

DAWES: I do not get that name.

SECRETARY: Howland Shaw. He is to be Attaché and he is stopping (this is confidential) at Geneva on the way up to confer with Gilbert. I can if necessary have Gilbert go up too but that might make a little excitement in the press here. The point is that we want to be represented by you because we require the necessary personality to give effect to our views in conferences which will be held with

793.94/2592 1/2

12 1932

Confidential File

- 2 -

with people like Briand. We do not want anybody to sit on the Council. We do not want you or anybody else to actually sit in the meetings of the Council but we want them to come to you.

DAWES: Yes.

SECRETARY: And confer with you and you to confer with them on matters which this country is interested in. Our position in general has been to endorse the position of the League so far as possible, that is to endorse its general objective, which is the preservation of peace in Manchuria. We have actually cooperated in the discussions only when they concerned the Kellogg-Briand Pact, but we have conferred independently through the diplomatic channels on the general situation. The Kellogg Pact business is practically over so far as making representations under that is concerned but the general work of trying to get those two countries together in actual negotiations is the hard part. We have been giving a great deal of attention to that. The difficulty has been that the League we think has gone off a little bit too rapidly.

DAWES: The November 16th date, for instance.

SECRETARY: We have never agreed with that and we think that was a mistake so far as we can see from here, but we have never said so and we have simply reserved our independence of action and judgment in respect to that and in respect to all matters. The vital point, General, is this. Both parties, both China and Japan, are anxious to negotiate but China will not negotiate so long as Japan is occupying the new territory. And Japan will not evacuate until China negotiates

- 3 -

negotiates about some long standing disputes they have had from the past. Do you see?

DAWES: Yes.

SECRETARY: On that last point we think Japan is wrong because it is using the pressure of military force to compel the settlement of certain political and national questions which long antedate this trouble. We have told Japan and we think she is beginning to hedge a little. We have received an answer which on its face would meet our wishes, but I think they will probably try to renew their old demands in spite of that. The thing to do is to work out on the one hand - I should expect you to keep your hand on the shoulder or coat collar of Briand and not let him go too fast, and on the other hand, it would be fine if your acquaintance with Matsudaira - who I hope will go over.

DAWES: You don't know whether he is going over or not?

SECRETARY: I do not know, but it would be a great thing if he would. I do not like to suggest it because then it might keep him away, but if there is any way of putting it into his head it would be a very good plan.

DAWES: Do you suppose I could talk personally with Matsudaira about going?

SECRETARY: In view of your relations with him I think you could.

DAWES: I think I could.

SECRETARY: Yes, because the thing is a tragedy, General. I have been going over the negotiations carefully since Sunday and they indicate that the parties are close enough together

- 4 -

together to get together, but they have been kept apart by mistakes on both sides.

DAWES: Is it a fact that if the Japanese should withdraw their troops from some points outside of the Railway Zone that the Japanese nationals there would be in danger of assault?

SECRETARY: To the best of my information, in some of those places that would be true. As to some places, the original action of the Japanese has resulted in overthrowing the only law and order they have.

DAWES: Would it be a constructive step or a step in advance if Japan could be induced to indicate what her intentions were as to the controversy to withdraw her troops from those places where they can do so without endangering the lives of Japanese nationals, even if they did stay in some other places.

SECRETARY: That would be a great constructive step. The underlying trouble is that the Japanese Government - that is with our old friends Wakatsuki and Shidehara do not entirely control the situation.

DAWES: That is what Matsudaira tells me.

SECRETARY: The army has gotten out of hand and has several times got away from them.

DAWES: It is the domestic situation in their own country which makes it difficult.

SECRETARY: I have been really afraid that almost any day the army would succeed in putting the Cabinet out of office and so you have to proceed very delicately. But I do feel that Shidehara is very anxious to hold this down so far as he can and is very anxious to make a settlement, and our policy has been to try to reinforce his hand without

inflaming

- 5 -

inflaming the national sentiment. He is in a very ticklish position. In other words, the whole situation is one which requires the utmost patience, and yet it requires also absolute firmness on the ultimate point which is that these negotiations so far as they go into long standing matters - old matters - must be free from the pressure of military occupation. Here is a good slogan for you. We have not used it yet but in talking with the President yesterday he suggested it and I think it is a very good one. The negotiations which we believe in and want to have done must be carried on in the spirit of the Kellogg Pact and not in the spirit of military occupation. If you read the terms again of the Kellogg Pact, you will remember that the different countries agreed they would settle all their disputes by pacific means. Let me say one thing more. The situation in Manchuria in some ways resembles a situation that we have had to confront on the borders of Mexico and in Central America. Japan has undoubtedly suffered great aggravation in the past, but in making this attack in September she went far beyond, to the best of our information, any proper intervention in behalf of lives and property. Of course she does not admit that, but reports which I have had from independent investigations show that and I will send them to you as quickly as possible.

DAWES: I would like to ask this. It occurs to me that of course any settlement that Japan is willing to make must be one so worded as to cause the least domestic opposition as possible.

SECRETARY: That is her side of it, and on our side it must

- 6 -

must vindicate the peace treaties.

DAWES: Isn't it just possible that some formula could be devised by which Japan, while really making proper concessions, could create the impression in Japan in some way that concessions have been made to her. I do not know whether anything of that sort could be done but the way Matsudaira talked, I think that they would be glad to do anything that they could which would not overthrow them at home. It might be possible that in some way you could get some sort of a settlement made which would indicate that at home there were some concessions to their principle. For instance that they would be allowed to keep their troops where nationals were in danger.

SECRETARY: So far as we are concerned we would not object to that. To the best of our belief, it would require time to effect an evacuation and they must be given that time. It is very largely their fault that this is so because they have disrupted the original governments there which were maintaining the peace. Now we are confronted with the fact, and we do not want to be the cause of producing anarchy in Manchuria. We do not want that. Let me give you a suggestion that has already been conveyed to Briand. It is based on a historic example. At the time when Japan made the twenty-one demands - you remember in 1915 - which included the occupation of Shantung which she had taken from the Germans, this same situation arose - in fact some of the existing disputes which they want to settle now arose out of that same transaction. But when the Washington Conference in 1922 came up, Japan and China had been wrangling over the occupation of Shantung for several years without being able to get together and settle

- 7 -

settle it or to persuade Japan to withdraw her troops. Then during the Conference at Washington, it was suggested that Mr. Hughes and Mr. Balfour sit as impartial observers in the negotiations and after some demurring on the part of Japan, that was done and the trouble was settled in very quick order.

DAWES: Who did you say besides Balfour?

SECRETARY: Judge Hughes. Secretary Hughes. Charles E. Hughes.

DAWES: A Japanese?

SECRETARY: No. Hughes, our present Chief Justice of the United States.

DAWES: Oh, yes.

SECRETARY: He was the President of the Conference here - the Washington Conference - which was going on at that time. The Japanese and Chinese were finally persuaded to get into direct negotiations at the same time as that Conference was going on and Mr. Hughes and Mr. Balfour were nominally the neutral observers who sat with the Japanese and with the Chinese in the negotiations and the presence of these outside observers reassured China that they would not be overawed by Japan and at the same time they were able to straighten out several difficulties. That is a very striking case in a similar situation to the present one and it has occurred to us here in the Department that we might possibly be able to get them together in that way. The one thing we must avoid is trying to suggest ourselves as a government any solution of these longstanding problems in Manchuria.

DAWES: That

- 8 -

DAWES: That would be very dangerous.

SECRETARY: Very dangerous indeed - they can only be settled by the parties concerned.

DAWES: What is that?

SECRETARY: That can only be settled by the parties concerned.

DAWES: The more we are in the background so far as Japan is concerned the better it would be.

SECRETARY: Our interest in the situation is to preserve peace under the terms of treaties to which we are parties. Our only interest in Manchuria is to prevent war.

DAWES: That is right.

SECRETARY: We do not care what solution is reached between China and Japan so long as it is done by pacific means.

DAWES: That is very good summing up. Mr. Secretary, when I go there are you going to make an announcement of that so that it won't be necessary for me to say anything.

SECRETARY: We will announce it from here. In the meantime I should like to have it kept confidential. I think it might be a good thing if you went over a couple of days earlier.

DAWES: So far as any announcement is concerned, you will do that there.

SECRETARY: I will do that here and I will give the text of our position.

DAWES: You will give the text of our position.

SECRETARY: Yes, exactly. I will explain that. I was thinking that you might go over a day earlier to see Briand and he would give you a talk on that subject.

DAWES: When do you want me to go?

SECRETARY: I want you to go in time, if possible, to have a conference with Briand before the meeting.

DAWES: When is the meeting?

SECRETARY: The

- 9 -

SECRETARY: The meeting is set for Monday, the 16th, I think. But I do not know the hour.

DAWES: All I am to do is to wait until I get a telegram from you?

SECRETARY: You will get a lot of information. I do not want to announce it for several days.

DAWES: I had better not say anything then to Matsudaira in the meantime.

SECRETARY: I think it might be a little dangerous until it is finally announced.

DAWES: All right, Mr. Secretary.

SECRETARY: I feel greatly relieved and I know the President will be greatly relieved to know that you will be willing to go.

DAWES: I appreciate your confidence.

SECRETARY: What we want is your personality and good horse sense.

DAWES: I will keep you advised so that you can advise me along the way.

SECRETARY: All right. Yes, we will be glad to help you all we can, but we recognize that a great deal will depend on your own good sense and judgment right on the ground. I shall try to give you all our background as far as possible beforehand.

DAWES: Mr. Secretary, I will advise you before any decision, so you will know exactly what would be in my mind to do.

SECRETARY: When the original step was taken at the last meeting in Geneva to let Gilbert confer with the members of the Council, the League complicated the matter by staging up a ceremony and a lot of formality that scared

- 10 -

a lot of people over here which might not have been scared at all.

DAWES: I feel I can handle that part of it.

SECRETARY: Yes.

DAWES: I will lay low. I feel that any part we take should be very quiet.

SECRETARY: Extremely quiet.

DAWES: The less publicity about the thing the better and I will know from what you say about what to take my cue from.

SECRETARY: All right.

DAWES: You describe there the innocuous -

SECRETARY: No it is the plain common sense of the situation. It is not innocuous. You are being sent there because you are the most important man we can send.

DAWES: I mean to say that it would not be best to have too much publicity attached to it.

SECRETARY: Here is the situation. To us this is not so much a League matter as it is a conference of the nations of the world over a situation which affects everybody irrespective of the League.

DAWES: It is a matter of treaty rights.

SECRETARY: It affects the United States directly by reason of the fact that the United States is a member of the Kellogg-Briand Pact and it also is a signatory of the Nine Power Pact.

DAWES: Exactly so.

SECRETARY: In which we guaranteed the integrity of China, of which Manchuria is a part, and consequently it would be a good plan for you to read those two treaties and you will have them fresh in your mind and what our stand is.

The situation which I want to get to this country is
that

- 11 -

that here are the nations of the World concerned with this dangerous situation in Manchuria all met together in Paris and you are representing this country. Irrespective of any League matter, it would be highly foolish if we were not represented there and represented by the best man we could get.

DAWES: Thank you, I will do the best I can. I can go there one day earlier.

SECRETARY: That I will leave to you. I should try to find out what time Briand could see you beforehand and I think it would be a good plan to talk with him.

DAWES: I will go a day ahead - the Council meeting is on the 16th.

SECRETARY: Shaw will be there on the 14th. Shaw is stopping at Geneva on the way - he will be there on the 14th - Saturday. He will have all of that information and if you could get over there then you could spend two days getting the background and in seeing Briand.

DAWES: When will I get the telegram from you?

SECRETARY: I will send a message just as soon as we get the thing straightened out here and I have seen the President. I have to consult with him about the announcement.

DAWES: Sometime before Saturday?

SECRETARY: Yes, it will be before Saturday - as early as we can.

DAWES: That is Saturday of this week?

SECRETARY: Yes, I have a memorandum here. I think you will find that Atherton knows a good deal of the background of this situation.

DAWES: Who?

SECRETARY: Ray Atherton, your Counselor.

DAWES: Atherton

1 8 1

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 12 -

DAWES: Atherton is in Paris now, I think. I will talk with him about it.

SECRETARY: You have in your Embassy a man by the name of Dooman. I am told he knows about it.

DAWES: All right. Much obliged.

SECRETARY: Good luck to you. Goodbye.

S HHR VGN

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CJH

GRAY
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
PEIPING via N. R.

Dated November 10, 1931

Received 3:30 p.m.

DIVISION OF
EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS.

NOV 13 1931

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

NOV 11 1931

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

793.94
Secretary of State,
Washington.

904, November 10, 3 p.m.

Following two telegrams from American Consul

Harbin:

"November 9, 10 a.m.

One. Yesterday passed quietly near Tsitsihar and the Japanese consider that their position along the former Chinese front defense line through Tahsing and Ma's troops still held and second defense line through Sanchienfang.

Two. CONFIDENTIAL. On November 7th Secretary Chao caused to be sent to each of the consuls here except the Japanese a request which he inspired, in regard to the ^{issue} of which he probably only consulted General Ma by telephone and which purported to come from the Chinese commercial, agricultural and labor societies of Tsitsihar requesting the consuls to attempt to stop hostilities. The British Consul has informed me that he would refer this matter to his Legation. I look upon it as a measure adopted by Chao, who is very willing, to help General Ma keep his job. As far as I can perceive little can be done

F/DEW

793.94/2593

FILED

NOV 18 1931

CJH

Page 2 - #904 from Peiping.

be done by the Consular body of which the Japanese
Consul General is the senior consul, but I request
the instructions of the Legation in the premises.
(END PART ONE).

ENGERT

CSB

1184

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

NAME

GRAY

PEIPING

FROM

Dated November 10, 1931

Rec'd 4:45 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

904, November 10, 3 p.m. (PART TWO)

Three. CONFIDENTIAL. Late last evening Secretary Chao informed me that at 1 p.m. yesterday General Ma told him by telephone that Colonel Hayashi (in Chinese Liu) at Tsitsihar had sent to Ma a copy of a telegram dated November 8th received from Commander Honjo and which read as follows:

"This is to notify Chairman Ma that the only way to keep the Japanese troops from entering Tsitsihar is for him to declare his sincerity immediately. A reply to this telegram is urgently required and must be sent not later than 12 midnight of the 8th".

According to direction to Chao, Ma sent ^{*Diplomatist*} ~~to~~ Yu to Colonel Hayashi to ask what was meant by the word sincerity in that telegram. Yu was informed by Hayashi "that to prevent hostilities and to maintain local peace

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MAM

2- #904, section two, from Peiping
November 10, 1931

peace and order required that Chairman Ma resign his
position and peacefully hand over charge of the Tsi-
tsihar Government to Chang Hai Pen and that there was
no other way to attain peace".

(END PART TWO)

ENGERT

WSB

1 1 8 F
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CJH

GRAY
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PEIPING via N. R.

Dated November 10, 3 p.m.

FROM
Received 6:10 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

904, November 10, 3 p.m. (PART THREE).

Four. November 7th was celebrated on a grand scale by the local Soviet institutions, officials and citizens. Speeches against imperialism were made. At the highly decorated Soviet Consulate General and Chinese Eastern Railway Club were displayed mottos such as "We do not wish one inch of foreign soil nor shall we part with one inch of our soil". "The League of Nations provokes war".

Five. Secretary Chao has just informed me that General Ma replied last night to Honjo's alleged ultimatum of the 8th by stating "that Chang Hai Pen would not come to Tsitsihar because he had not been ordered by the Chinese Central Government to come,"

Six. Captain Tenny arrived at Harbin yesterday morning".

"Message No. 2. November 9, 1 p.m. Confidential.

One. Referring to my telegram of November 4, 10 a.m., paragraph No. 3, Hallett Abend informed me
that Ohashi

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CJH

Page 2 - #904 dated Nov. 10,
3 p.m.

that Ohashi, the local Japanese Consul General, stated to him this morning that he Ohashi had knowledge that such an official had been sent to General Ma by the Japanese Military.

Two. The local commissioner of Foreign Affairs has informed me that more Japanese soldiers have crossed the Monni and that further expedition was expected today. I have not yet been able to confirm this statement".

Minister informed. (End message).

FOR THE MINISTER

ENGERT

WSB

1188

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAM

FROM

PLAIN

PEIPING VIA NR

Dated November 10, 1931

Rec'd 5:03 p.m.



Secretary of State

Washington

906, November 10, 8 p.m.

Japanese Legation has today issued statement

dated seventh giving official version of recent clash

between Chinese and Japanese forces in Heilungkiang.

If it has not reached Department through Japanese

sources or press Legation will telegraph it.

For the Minister

ENGERT

OX

F/DEW

793.94/2594

FILED

NOV 11 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CJH

TELEGRAM RECEIVED PLAIN

BEIPING via N. R.

Dated November 11, 4 a.m.

FROM

Rec'd. Nov. 10, 7:06 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY #909.

My 908 November eleven four a.m.

Consulate General Tientsin and Fifteenth

Infantry report in reply to Legation's inquiry
that there has been firing in Tientsin since
two o'clock but could give no details. Apparent-
ly confined to Chinese City.

For the Minister

ENGERT

OX

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FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

NOV 11 1931

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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

F/DEW 793.94/2595

DEC 21 1931

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-12-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CJH


PLAIN

FROM PEIPING via N. R.

Dated November 11, 4 a.m. 1931

Rec'd. Nov. 10, 5:43 p.m.

793-ay
Secretary of State,
Washington.



F/DEW

793.94/2596

TRIPLE PRIORITY #908 November eleven, four a.m.

I have just been informed by Marshal Chang Hsueh
Liang's office that there has been more fighting in
Tientsin. Nankai University near the Japanese con-
cession is said to have been stormed by Chinese rioters.

/ Am trying to get Fifteenth Infantry by radio.

For the Minister,

ENGERT

OX

DEC 21 1931

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CJH

PLAIN

PEIPING via N. R.

FROM

Dated November 10th, 1931

Rec'd. 5 p.m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

NOV 11 1931

Department of State

COPIES SENT TO
ONE AIR MAIL

Secretary of State,
Washington.

#907, November 10th.

Reuter today reports that Japanese troops have withdrawn seven miles south of Nonni River railway bridge where reinforcements are said to be massing and planning a fresh advance the objective of which is believed to be Tsitsihar.

For the Minister

ENGERT

CX

F/DEW 793.94/2597

FILED

NOV 13 1931

CJH

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PEIPING via N. R.
Dated Nov. 10, 1931
FROM
Rec'd. 5:52 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

905, November 10, 7 p.m.
FOLLOWING FROM MUKDEN.

793-94
note
593.01


"November 11, 12 noon. Referring to
my telegram of November 8, 11 p.m., the Peace
Preservation Committee moved into the
Provincial Government yesterday and according
to the statement of one of the members a committee
will be reorganized as provincial government
during the week.

Japanese Army headquarters reports increase
of bandit activity in regions adjacent to South
Manchurian Railway due to the withdrawal of
Japanese forces to Nonni River area. Clashes
have occurred in the vicinity of Haicheng, Tich-
ling, Hsinmintun and Sspingkai. It is reported
that traffic on the Liac-Yuan, Tung-Liao branch
of the ^{S-2} ~~Li~~tao Railway was resumed on November 8.

FOR THE MINISTER

ENGERT

WSB



F/DEW

793.94/2598

FILED

1931 NOV 11

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 500. A 15 A 4/541 FOR Despatch # 357.

FROM Japan (Neville) DATED October 15, 1931.
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING:

Peculiar situation existing in Manchuria
affecting Japan's rights which will very
likely be a chief reason for her refusal
to agree to a reduction in armaments at
the coming Disarmament Conference.

hs

793.94/2599

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM


COPIES SENT TO
O.N.E. AND M.I.D.

GRAY

Tientsin via N. R.

Dated November 11, 1931

793 at
Secretary of State,
Washington.



November 11, 10 a. m.

Following telegram has been sent to the Legation today:

"November 11, 9 a. m.

Firing was resumed in Chinese city at 11 o'clock last night for a short period and again at 4 o'clock lasting until daylight. Chinese police and plain clothes men only were concerned, the Japanese apparently taking no part. Some firing took place near Nankai middle School and Methodist Mission. Quiet at Nankai University. Very severe martial law still maintained in Japanese concession, Chinese city and ex-German dock. Repeated to Department and Nanking."

LOCKHART

F/DEW

793.94/2600

DEC 21 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

NOV 13 1931
DIVISION OF FOREIGN
SERVICE ADMINISTRATION

DIVISION OF
EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
NOV 18 1931
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FROM

DIVISION OF FOREIGN SERVICE ADMINISTRATION
NOV 17 1931
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 11, 1931

Rec'd 12:42 p.m.

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 11 1931
Department of State

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Secretary of State

Washington.

912, November 11, 10 a. m.

Tenney left Harbin yesterday for Tsitsihar.

aut. mil. att.

For the Minister

ENGERT

HPD

FILED

NOV 18 1931

F/DEW

793.94/2601

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PLAIN

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 11, 1931

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
C.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Rec'd 8:30 AM
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 11 1931
FILE 94
Department of State

PRIORITY.

915, November 11, 3 p. m.

Following has just been received from Chinese Chamber
of Commerce and others in Tientsin:

"Urgent, Tientsin.

Million civilian population exposed rifle gunfire
originating contiguous Japanese concession serving also
base thousand ruffians endeavoring capture Chinese city.
So far Government soldiers, police, succeeded repulsing
attacks but in view Japanese demand Chinese defense line
withdraw three hundred meters thus favouring attackers
earnestly request you on grounds humanity, international
justice, authorize international military contingent
occupy neutral zone watch proceedings. Situation extremely
critical, panic serious general international trade, local
communications dislocated, urgent action necessary.

Signed

F/DEW

793.94/2602

FILED

DEC 21 1931

793.94
mtb
893.102T

1 9
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2- #915, from Peiping, Nov. 11, 3 p.m.

Signed Chinese Chamber of Commerce, Bankers Association, and other business organizations".

Reply has been made by Legation.

For the Minister

ENGERT

HPD

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

FROM

Shanghai via N. R.

Dated November 11, 1931

Secretary of State,
Washington.

PRIORITY.

November 11, 10 a. m.

One. I have just received the following telegram from

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

"His Excellency Nelson Trusler Johnson, American Minister.

I have the honor to request Your Excellency to appoint representatives to proceed to Tientsin at once to investigate the serious occurrences there during the last two days. I further request Your Excellency to advise the American Government of the real facts that may be found by your representatives Ching Lun, Frank W. Lee, November 10th."

Two. Does the Department authorize me to send Military Attache to Tientsin to make suggested investigation?

Three. Please reply Nanking. I am leaving for Nanking tomorrow night, arriving Friday morning.

JOHNSON

WSB

Rec'd 5:30 a. m.
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 11 1931
Department of State

Telegram drafted
to Nanking, Nov. 12
1931

EX

793.94/2603

NOV 11 1931

1238634

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
X CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Collect
Charge Department

Charge to
\$

OR

Department of State

Washington,

November 12, 1931.

AMERICAN CONSUL

NANKING (CHINA).

109
FOR THE MINISTER.

Your November 11, 10 a.m., from Shanghai.

One. Department's telegram No. 411, November 9, 4 p.m., to Peiping, directed that Legation ask Lockhart to collaborate with Colonel Taylor in investigating and to report by telegraph their conclusions with regard to occurrences at Tientsin; also that Legation inform Lockhart that if Consular Body at Tientsin deems it advisable to make a united, impartial investigation, he is authorized to participate, but that he should not take the initiative toward organizing such an investigation.

Two. In view of the above, Department perceives no special need to send Military Attaché to Tientsin. Has Acting Minister ^{for Foreign Affairs} similarly addressed representatives of other Governments? If so, report their attitude and nature of their replies. Do you consider advisable any amendment of Department's instruction as outlined in paragraph one above?

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-128

FK 793.94/72603

note
121.5493

W.H.H.

1 1203

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR

Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

1-128

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

- 2 -

Three. You may at your discretion reply to telegram
from Acting Minister ~~for Foreign Affairs~~ stating that,
prior to receipt of his telegram, the American Government
had already made arrangements to obtain from its
representatives at Tientsin a report on the ~~occurrences~~ ^{occurrences}
there. mmh
sky

Stinson
Sick

FE:MMH:LM FE

mmh

25
NOV 12 1951 10

mm

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1955 1-128

1201

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CJH

PLAIN

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PEIPING via N. R.

Dated November 11, 1931

Rec'd. 9:50 a.m.

FROM


743.94
Secretary of State,
Washington.

PRIORITY.

926, November 11, 5 p.m.

Following is official Japanese version of
Tientsin incidents last night furnished me by
Japanese Legation.

"During day time on the tenth desultory fire
was heard in native city but when darkness fell
shooting grew more frequent and increased as night
advanced. By 2 a.m. on the 11th, fierce rifle
firing developed all along south city and in
direction of San Pu Kwanerh, piece of land adjoining
Japanese Concession where low class Chinese and
vagabonds keep their dens, firing being intermixed
with three or four shots of a gun. Fighting which
lasted about one hour was caused by a collision
between Chinese soldiers and a band of Tufei (local
outlaws), who pressed upon the native city advancing
from lower course of Haiho by making a detour of
outskirts of British and French concessions and passing
through Palitai. Raiders were said to have been re-
pulsed generally with result that shooting became
weaker



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FK 793.94/2604

DEC 21 1931

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CJH

Page 2 - #916 from Peiping.

weaker by degrees.

Nevertheless firing on places guarded by the Japanese side especially northern half of boundary line of Japanese concession grew fiercer. Contrary to agreement about keeping distance of three hundred meters Chinese soldiers came within close range from fifty to two hundred meters at some places and deliberately opened fire in direction of Japanese area. Accordingly bullets came flying into the concession during the night. Water tank situated at southwestern end of Fukushima Road was hit by scores of bullets, and has started to leak."

Repeated to Shanghai and Commander in Chief.

For the Minister,

ENGERT

HPD

1 203

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CJH


TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GREEN

FROM GENEVA

Dated November 11, 1931

Rec'd. 9:10 a.m.



Secretary of State,

Washington.

301, November 11, noon.


Department's 128, November 10, 2 p.m.

The draft resolution of October 20 (see Consulate's 242, October 22, 6 p.m.) was presented in a public meeting of the Council on October 22 and voted on in a public meeting on October 24 (Consulate's 250, October 24). Its publicity was immediate as the text was circulated to the press on October 22.

GILBERT

JHR

WSB



FK 793.94/2605

NOV 13 1931

FILED

1204

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department

OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Washington,

November 10, 1931

29

793.94

AMERICAN CONSUL

GENEVA (SWITZERLAND)

128

Please report whether League Resolution of October 24
has been made public. The press here has not carried the
text.

Stinson
SKH

793.94/2605A

CI:WAF:MHC

m3p

FE

5149

MVO

15.1931.

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

1205

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone.

FROM

PARIS

Dated November 11, 1931

Rec'd 9:20 a. m.

793.24
Secretary of State,
Washington.

721, November 11, noon.

CONFIDENTIAL. Your 530, November 9, 4 p. m.


By informal conversation yesterday afternoon I conveyed
to de la Boulaye at the Foreign Office the substance of your
telegram under reference. I expect to see M. Briand in regard
to it late this afternoon.

HOWELL

RR

HPD

Chinese situation.



FK 793.94/2606

NOV 13 1931

1205


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



No. 1908

AM 1100
EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Paris, October 30, 1931.



The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

In compliance with the Department's instruction No. 293 of August 19, 1930, I have the honor to transmit herewith clippings from the French press, on the subject of the Sino-Japanese conflict, covering the period from October 24 to October 29, 1931, inclusive.

Respectfully yours,

Williamson S. Howell, Jr.,
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

Enclosures.....

F/DEW 793.94/2607

FILED

1931 21 NOV

- 2 -

✓
Enclosures: (single copy)

Clippings from the following newspapers:

October 24, 1931.

No. 1 - FIGARO
2 - LE JOURNAL
3 - LE MATIN
4 - LE PETIT PARISIEN
5 - LE POPULAIRE
6 - LE QUOTIDIEN

October 25, 1931.

No. 7 - L'ECHO DE PARIS
8 - L'ERE NOUVELLE
9 - EXCELSIOR
10 - FIGARO
11 - LE JOURNAL
12 - LE MATIN
13 - LE PETIT PARISIEN
14 - LE POPULAIRE
15 - LA REPUBLIQUE
16 - LE TEMPS

October 26, 1931.

No. 17 - L'AVENIR
18 - L'ECHO DE PARIS
19 - LE JOURNAL
20 - JOURNAL DES DEBATS
21 - LE MATIN
22 - LE TEMPS

October 29, 1931.

No. 23 - ACTUALITES
24 - FIGARO
25 - L'INTRANSIGEANT
26 - LE MATIN
27 - LE PETIT PARISIEN

In quintuplicate.

710.

RS/jdk

Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 1908
of October 30, 1931.

From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from FIGARO, October 24, 1931.

Le Conflit sino-japonais

Le Conseil de la Société des Nations a tenu hier une nouvelle séance. On espérait que ce serait la dernière, mais le débat n'étant pas épuisé, on se réunira de nouveau aujourd'hui.

Le fait important est l'acceptation par la Chine et le refus par le Japon du projet de résolution élaboré par le Conseil, dont nous avons publié le texte.

Le gouvernement de Nankin se déclare prêt à garantir en Mandchourie la sécurité des ressortissants nippons. Il accepte que des neutres contrôlent cette protection. Il insiste pour que l'évacuation des troupes japonaises soit effectuée avant le 16 novembre, date de la prochaine réunion du Conseil. Le gouvernement de Tokio consent à évacuer progressivement ses troupes, mais il subordonne cette évacuation à une entente entre la Chine et le Japon sur un certain nombre de « principes fondamentaux » devant assurer la sécurité effective de ses ressortissants. Il ne peut donc s'engager à retirer ses troupes avant le 16 novembre si, à cette date, un accord n'a pu intervenir entre les deux parties. Le représentant du Japon à Genève a soumis dans ce sens au Conseil un contre-projet de résolution qui a été repoussé par le représentant de la Chine. Aussi habile que soit notre inamovible ministre des affaires étrangères à « noyer le poisson », on ne voit pas comment il pourra parvenir à faire accepter par la Chine et le Japon un projet de résolution si anodin soit-il.

Les dépêches qui nous parviennent de Genève témoignent de la désillusion que le Conseil éprouve à constater son impuissance. « L'avis général, peut-on lire dans un télégramme officieux, est que les événements de Genève constituent une démonstration sans égale des progrès qui restent à accomplir dans l'organisation de la paix. » C'est encore le représentant de la Chine, M. le Dr Szé, qui s'est exprimé avec le plus de bon sens, lorsqu'il a déclaré hier, en séance du Conseil, qu'il existait « une paille dans les rouages de la paix ». La Société des Nations commence à s'en apercevoir. Ce n'est pas trop tôt. Mieux vaut vivre sur terre que dans les nuages. On ne risque pas de tomber de si haut.

En attendant, de nouveaux incidents se produisent : un train se dirigeant sur Pékin a été attaqué par 500 bandits à la station de Paimiaotze (sur la ligne de Pékin-Moukden).

Plusieurs voyageurs ont été tués ou blessés.

Deux mille soldats chinois qui se livraient au pillage à Louan-Chin-Chan ont été repoussés par les gardes ferroviaires japonais.

Au cours du récent engagement qui s'est produit près de Tieh-Ling entre des forces japonaises et des soldats chinois, ces derniers auraient perdu cinquante hommes.

Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 1908
of October 30, 1931.

From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE JOURNAL, October 24, 1931.

La resolution de la S.D.N. sur le conflit mandchou

M. Briand constate que la Chine
et le Japon sont d'accord
sur l'évacuation et la sécurité
mais différent sur leurs modalités

GENÈVE, 23 octobre. — La séance du conseil de la Société des nations, prévue pour cinq heures, a été ajournée d'une heure environ, afin de permettre à MM. Briand et Yoshizawa un long entretien préliminaire relatif aux contre-propositions du Japon au projet de résolution adopté par le conseil.

Disons tout de suite que le représentant de la Chine est venu déclarer que, ce projet du conseil, son gouvernement l'accepte sans réserve.

Il en va tout autrement quant à l'attitude du gouvernement de Tokio qui, après avoir rendu hommage à la longue patience de M. Briand, a jugé cependant ne pouvoir se dispenser d'apporter un nouveau texte à l'examen du conseil. Ce nouveau texte, M. Yoshizawa en explique l'esprit par les considérations suivantes :

— Le gouvernement japonais, dit-il, dans la mesure où les circonstances le permettent, a déjà commencé le retrait de ses troupes. Cependant, vu l'état actuel des esprits, vu l'état de désordre où se trouve actuellement la Mandchourie, vu l'impuissance manifeste des autorités chinoises à réprimer ces désordres dans les régions qu'elles contrôlent, vu surtout le danger que pourrait présenter, dans l'état de surexcitation actuelle, la présence, à proximité des troupes japonaises, de forces chinoises, le gouvernement japonais n'estime pas possible de fixer une date précise pour déterminer le moment où le dernier de ses hommes sera ramené dans la zone. Cela ne veut aucunement dire qu'il n'a pas la ferme intention de les ramener, ni qu'il désire les laisser là où ils sont pour obtenir de la Chine de nouvelles concessions ou privilèges spéciaux, quels qu'ils soient. C'est une situation de fait qui impose au gouvernement japonais cette hésitation.

» Quant aux négociations directes au sujet de questions pendantes entre les deux pays, le gouvernement japonais n'a aucune objection à ce qu'elles soient entamées au moment où le désirera le gouvernement chinois. Il sera toujours prêt à répondre aux suggestions faites par lui à ce sujet. Il estime que les modalités des négociations à venir pourront être facilement réglées.

» Enfin le gouvernement japonais prévoit que le conseil sera tenu au courant du développement des pourparlers, et, par là, il désire écarter tout soupçon que, par une prolongation indue des pourparlers il voudrait retarder, ne fût-ce que d'un jour, le retrait de ses troupes.

Le délégué chinois déclare qu'il ne peut pas se rallier aux amendements que suggère le Japon.

M. Briand relève alors que les deux parties sont d'accord sur la liaison des deux termes : évacuation et sécurité. En revanche, il y a désaccord sur les points qui feront plus tard l'objet des conversations directes, la Chine subordonnant ces conversations à l'évacuation préalable. Il y a avantage à élucider, à ce propos, ce que le Japon entend précisément par les mots « principes fondamentaux » qui doivent être, selon lui, à la base de la reprise des relations normales.

On reprendra cet examen demain matin mais M. Briand tient à dire, avant de lever la séance, que, jusqu'à présent, la preuve au moins a été faite que la Société des nations rend les moyens plus difficiles de faire la guerre. Et ce n'est pas rien. — Tony Roche.

Enclosure No. 3 to Despatch No. 1908
of October 30, 1931.

From the Embassy at Paris,

Extract from LE MATIN, October 24, 1931.

LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS

LA CHINE ACCEPTE LES PROPOSITIONS DU CONSEIL DE LA S.D.N.

**Le Japon persiste à déclarer
qu'il ne peut fixer la date précise
pour l'évacuation totale
de ses troupes de Mandchourie**

[DE NOTRE ENVOYÉ SPÉCIAL]

GENÈVE, 23 octobre. — Par téléphone.
— Le conseil de la Société des nations
s'est réuni de nouveau, cet après-midi, à
18 heures, en séance publique.

Tout de suite, M. Briand demande
aux représentants de la Chine et du Ja-
pon s'ils ont reçu de leurs gouverne-
ments respectifs les instructions leur
permettant de se prononcer sur le pro-
jet de résolution adopté par le conseil.

Les représentants de Tokio et de Nan-
kin ayant répondu affirmativement la
discussion s'engage aussitôt.

La parole est d'abord donnée au doc-
teur Sze. Le délégué chinois déclare no-
tamment qu'il se rallie aux suggestions
de M. Briand et de ses collègues.

— Le projet de résolution du conseil,
ajoute-t-il, constitue pour nous, Chinois,
un minimum, mais nous l'acceptons fi-
nalement ne serait-ce que pour bien
montrer notre désir de confier entière-
ment notre sort à la Société des nations.

Alors M. Briand intervient et s'adres-
sant à ses collègues :

— A 15 heures, cet après-midi, dit-il,
le délégué du Japon m'a remis un con-
tre-projet que je vais vous communi-
quer. Je ne crois pas utile de lire les
trois premiers articles de la note de M.
Yoshizawa, car ils ne font que repro-
duire les trois premiers paragraphes
de la résolution du conseil.

» C'est à partir de l'article 4 que les
deux textes diffèrent. Voici donc l'a-
mendement à l'article 4 du projet de
résolution présenté par la délégation
japonaise :

ARTICLE 4. — Le conseil prend note,
à nouveau, de la déclaration du repré-
sentant du Japon faite le 13 octobre,
selon laquelle le gouvernement du Ja-
pon procédera au retrait, dans la zone
du chemin de fer, de ses troupes se
trouvant encore dans quelques localités
en dehors de ladite zone, avec l'apai-
sement des esprits et la détente de la
situation par la réalisation d'une en-
tente préalable entre les gouvernements
chinois et japonais, sur les principes
fondamentaux régissant les relations
normales, c'est-à-dire permettant d'avoir
l'assurance de la sécurité de la vie des
ressortissants japonais et de la protec-
tion des biens leur appartenant.

Et le président du conseil de rappeler
ensuite lester mes de l'article 4 tel
qu'il est élaboré dans le projet de ré-
solution du conseil :

ARTICLE 4. — a) Le conseil demande au
gouvernement japonais de commencer
immédiatement et de poursuivre pro-
gressivement le retrait de ses troupes
à l'intérieur de la zone du chemin de
fer, afin que le retrait complet puisse
être effectué avant la prochaine réunion
du conseil (16 novembre).

On voit ainsi toutes les nuances qui
séparent les deux textes.

La parole est à M. Yoshizawa. Nous
citerons, d'après le compte rendu de la
séance, les passages essentiels du dis-
cours du délégué japonais.

— Le Japon, affirme M. Yoshizawa,
n'a aucune visée territoriale en Mand-
chourie et il a la ferme intention de
retirer ses troupes, dès que les circons-
tances permettront de le faire sans
danger. Ce retrait, il l'a déjà commen-
cé. Plus de la moitié des troupes en-
voyées, au début, au dehors de la zone
ont été ramenées à proximité et il ne
reste plus qu'environ 2.250 hommes. Ces
derniers effectifs, le Japon espère mé-
me pouvoir les ramener dans la zone
dans un bref délai, si la Chine veut
collaborer avec lui à une amélioration
de la tension actuelle.

En ce qui concerne l'article 4, le
gouvernement de Tokio, vu la tension
actuelle des esprits, n'estime pas possi-
ble de fixer une date précise pour dé-
terminer le moment où le dernier de
ces hommes sera ramené dans la zone.
Ceci ne veut aucunement dire qu'il
n'ait la ferme intention de les rame-
ner, ni qu'il désire les laisser où ils
sont pour obtenir de la Chine de nou-
velles concessions ou privilèges spé-
ciaux quels qu'ils soient.

Répondant à une question de Lord
Cecil, le délégué japonais déclare qu'il
ne s'oppose nullement à la date du 16
novembre pour la prochaine convoca-
tion du conseil.

Une intervention de M. Briand

M. Briand prend alors la parole.

— Toute la question, dit-il, c'est de
savoir ce que M. Yoshizawa veut dire
quand il parle d'une entente préalable
à l'évacuation sur les principes fonda-
mentaux ayant trait à la sécurité. Quel
sens donne-t-il au mot sécurité ? S'il
s'agit seulement de mesures de police à
prendre par les autorités chinoises pour
garantir effectivement la vie et les biens
des ressortissants japonais en Mand-
chourie après le retrait des troupes nip-
pones, aucun obstacle ne nous divise.
Mais, si sous le couvert du mot secu-
rité, le délégué du Japon se propose de
faire entrer, dans l'article 4, des ques-
tions de fond sur lesquelles pendant
des mois, des années, la Chine et le
Japon ont entamé de vains pourparlers,
évidemment, le délai que le conseil a
fixé pour la fin de l'évacuation est in-
suffisant. Voilà le nœud crucial du pro-
blème, car le conseil n'admettra pas que
de telles questions soient discutées avant
la fin de l'évacuation.

M. Yoshizawa ne répliquant pas, M.
Briand lève la séance et donne un nou-
veau rendez-vous au conseil pour de-
main matin onze heures.

L'attitude de Tokio

[SERVICE SPÉCIAL DU « NEW YORK TIMES »]

TOKIO, 23 octobre. — Par câble. —
Les dernières instructions envoyées
à M. Yoshizawa, après approbation
du cabinet, font des concessions im-
portantes concernant l'évacuation.
Le Japon accepte que le conseil
de la S. D. N. se réunisse le 16 no-
vembre pour prendre connaissance
du résultat des négociations concer-
nant l'évacuation.

Les nouvelles instructions tout en
se refusant à une évacuation sans
condition, dans trois semaines, dé-
clarent néanmoins que le Japon
commencera le retrait de ses trou-
pes immédiatement et s'efforcera de
l'avoir terminé avant la prochaine
réunion du conseil de la S. D. N.

Le Japon reste ferme sur un seul
point : celui du respect des traités
par la Chine, lequel entraîne la ces-
sation de toute propagande antija-
ponaise.

Enclosure No. 4 to Despatch No. 1908
of October 30, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE PETIT PARISIEN, October 24, 1931.

LE CONFLIT SINO-NIPPON

Le conseil de la S.D.N. espère enregistrer l'accord final dans sa séance d'aujourd'hui

Genève, 23 octobre (dép. Petit Paris.)

Après deux semaines de laborieuses négociations, le conseil de la S. D. N. touche enfin au but et, à moins d'un coup de théâtre très improbable, il enregistrera demain à l'unanimité un texte de résolution garantissant le règlement pacifique des incidents de Mandchourie.

A l'ouverture de la séance, ce soir, M. Briand fit d'abord donner lecture de la réponse du Japon à la démarche collective des puissances signataires du pacte de Paris. Comme celui de Nankin, le gouvernement de Tokio proteste de sa ferme volonté de paix, mais il accuse en même temps les autorités chinoises d'avoir contrevenu les premières à la lettre et à l'esprit dudit pacte en se livrant à l'égard du Japon à une propagande nettement délictueuse.

Après cette lecture, M. Briand demanda aux deux parties de se prononcer sur le projet de résolution qu'il leur avait soumis hier et qui a reçu l'approbation de tous les autres membres du conseil. Dans une déclaration très habile, le représentant de la Chine, M. Sze, accepta la formule proposée en ajoutant qu'elle constituait pour lui un minimum.

— La Chine, dit-il, a mis tout son espoir et toute sa confiance dans la Société des nations. Cependant, il est attristant de constater qu'après cinq semaines les efforts conjugués du conseil et des Etats-Unis n'ont pas rendu de meilleurs résultats. L'échec de cette collaboration aurait des conséquences déplorables pour le désarmement. Y aurait-il un défaut caché dans l'organisation de la paix ? En laissant passer les jours, on joue avec le feu.

Non seulement la Chine accepte le projet de résolution, mais, pour dissiper les appréhensions du délégué du Japon, elle est prête à examiner toutes les suggestions émanant de la capitale nipponne et même l'extension du système de contrôle prévu par la résolution du conseil.

Elle se refuse absolument à négocier sous la pression d'une occupation militaire, mais, l'évacuation une fois terminée, son unique désir sera de régler sans retard et dans l'esprit le plus amical toutes les questions litigieuses.

Le représentant de la Chine se retranchant ainsi derrière la Société des nations et les Etats-Unis, M. Yoshizawa se trouva complètement isolé. Malgré cela, le représentant du Japon fit bonne contenance.

Après avoir affirmé de nouveau que son pays n'avait aucune visée territoriale sur la Mandchourie, il soumit au conseil un contre-projet de résolution qui concorde dans son préambule avec le texte officiel.

Mais, dans l'énumération des mesures à prendre, M. Yoshizawa escamotait la question de l'échéance de l'évacuation — qui est prévue, comme on sait, pour le 16 novembre — insistait sur le principe des négociations directes et liait le retrait des troupes à la « réalisation d'une entente préalable entre les gouvernements chinois et japonais sur les principes fondamentaux régissant les relations normales, c'est-à-dire permettant d'avoir l'assurance de la sécurité de la vie des ressortissants japonais et de la protection des biens leur appartenant ».

Le vicomte Cecil l'ayant pressé de s'expliquer, M. Yoshizawa a donné à entendre qu'il ne s'opposerait pas à l'adoption d'une formule diplomatique concernant la date à laquelle l'évacuation devrait être terminée et qui resterait implicitement fixée au 16 novembre.

Il éluda, par contre, les précisions qu'on lui demandait touchant les « principes fondamentaux » auxquels il faisait allusion dans son contre-projet et qui se rapportent, évidemment, aux « cinq points » dont on a tant parlé au cours de ces derniers jours.

Or c'est là, comme le montra M. Briand, le « point crucial » de la discussion. En invoquant la « protection des biens », le gouvernement de Tokio peut être tenté de soulever tout le problème du contrôle du chemin de fer mandchou.

Par un détour habile, il lierait de la sorte les opérations de l'évacuation au règlement de questions de fond et à l'application de traités antérieurs. Or c'est justement ce que le conseil ne veut pas.

— Il y a deux façons, déclara M. Briand, de concevoir les choses : ou ces « principes fondamentaux » s'appliquent uniquement à la sécurité, et alors les deux parties sont d'accord et il s'agit simplement de s'entendre sur les mesures administratives policières ou même militaires ; ou ils s'appliquent à des objets plus lointains sur lesquels les gouvernements de Tokio et de Nankin négocient vainement depuis des mois et des années, et alors le désaccord est complet et la Chine ne peut accepter de discuter sous la pression de l'occupation étrangère. Ainsi nous touchons au fond des choses.

Je comprends l'impatience du délégué chinois qui a le droit d'être un peu plus sensible que nous. Cependant, en ma qualité de président du conseil, j'ai le devoir de défendre la Société des nations.

En se saisissant de cette affaire, elle a fait preuve d'un beau courage. L'unanimité, quel moyen fragile !

Mais, malgré les faibles moyens dont elle dispose, la S. D. N. a déjà réussi en quelques semaines à contenir un conflit qui allait en s'aggravant sans cesse depuis des années, et c'est là déjà un important résultat !

Après cette mise au point, qu'on peut sans exagérer taxer de chirurgicale, M. Briand leva aussitôt la séance.

Les dernières heures de la soirée seront employées à convaincre M. Yoshizawa. Si, comme on l'espère fermement, celui-ci se rallie à la définition restrictive donnée par M. Briand de ce qu'il appelle lui-même les « principes fondamentaux », il ne sera pas très difficile d'amalgamer le contre-projet japonais dans la résolution adoptée hier, et l'accord final serait donc enregistré à l'unanimité au cours de la dernière séance que le conseil tiendra demain matin à 10 heures.

Paul Du BOCHET.

UN QUASI-CONTRAT SINO-JAPONAIS QUI EXPLIQUE BIEN DES DIFFICULTÉS

Changhai, 23 octobre

DE NOTRE CORRESPONDANT PARTICULIER

Une haute personnalité, dont on comprendra que je taise le nom, m'a fait aujourd'hui une déclaration des plus importantes, expliquant les raisons de l'impossibilité momentanée où l'on est de régler le conflit sino-nippon.

La S. D. N. et, en général, l'opinion européenne, m'a-t-on dit, ne font pas assez la différence entre les Etats européens et ceux d'Extrême-Orient, et s'illusionnent à croire que le conflit sino-japonais ressemble au conflit gréco-bulgare ou au différend germano-polonais. Les puissances attendent de la Chine, pays immense, où la plupart des provinces sont en fait indépendantes du gouvernement central, ce qu'elles attendraient d'un gouvernement fortement centralisé, tandis que le Japon manœuvre de façon à tirer parti des faiblesses admises de bonne foi par la S. D. N. sans perdre rien des réalités qu'il convoite.

Pour comprendre l'attitude actuelle de Tokio, il faut savoir qu'il y a une dizaine de mois, alors que la Chine venait de subir une longue guerre civile ruineuse, le gouvernement de Nankin pensa regagner son prestige en obtenant des puissances qu'elles renonceraient à leurs droits d'exterritorialité.

On se rappelle la campagne acharnée du ministre des Affaires étrangères Wang sur ce point et les résistances des principales puissances intéressées.

Une monnaie d'échange entre Tokio et Nankin

Or le Japon, sachant que Nankin désirait absolument un succès sur ce point, consentit à envisager l'abandon de son droit d'exterritorialité à la condition que Nankin s'engagerait à reconnaître tous ses droits et avantages spéciaux en Mandchourie, et les choses furent poussées très loin dans ce sens. Quand éclata le conflit du 18 septembre dernier, le ministre des Affaires étrangères Wang et Tchang Kai Chek n'osèrent pas traiter directement avec le Japon en raison des anciennes conditions acceptées en principe par eux il y a dix mois et que le Japon ne manquerait pas de leur rappeler. Ils se retranchèrent donc derrière la S. D. N., s'en remettant entièrement à elle de façon à éviter un tête-à-tête redoutable avec le Japon.

Tokio, de son côté, a fondé tous ses espoirs sur le développement des entreprises économiques japonaises en Mandchourie.

N'ayant pu coloniser les campagnes mandchouriennes en raison du bon marché inouï de la main-d'œuvre chinoise, les Japonais veulent, grâce à leurs chemins de fer, écouler en Mandchourie leur production industrielle. Ils sont d'ailleurs seuls capables d'empêcher les Russes de mettre la main sur ce pays. A la suite de l'incident du 18 septembre, ils tiennent un gage et sont absolument résolus à ne pas le lâcher sans avoir obtenu satisfaction sur la question des droits spéciaux et du chemin de fer.

Le poids d'anciennes promesses

Or, si Nankin, embarrassé par ses anciennes promesses, n'ose pas traiter

— Surtout! Regardez votre peloton qu'il ne s'agit pas d'assister à l'officier une telle hantise d'héroïsme Marmont vit dans les yeux du jeune d'oreille commandement. ple, monsieur le maréchal, de me ren- pour faire mon devoir, et je vous sup- — Je me sens très fort, au contraire, état de vous battre. — Vous ne me paraissez pas guère en viens me mettre à vos ordres! — Oui, monsieur le maréchal, je répliquai d'une voix ferme: blessure à peine cicatrisée, Hubert Très pâle, et souffrant encore de sa — Ah! c'est vous, lieutenant? sévère: s'écrit d'un ton mi-bienveillant, mi- maréchal. Celui-ci, le reconnaissant, rès, où il pensait bien rencontrer le son uniforme et vite couru aux Tuil- la rue de la République, avait endossé s'était précipité à son tourne-bride de les supplications de sa maîtresse, que l'émue était déchaînée, malgré de Chazeau qui, dès qu'il avait ap- rant le salut militaire. C'était Hubert fait, joignant les talons et lui adres- cter de chapeaux qui, à sa vue, s'arrê- voyait s'avancer vers lui un jeune offi- même si ses ordres étaient exécutés, il

emmenant un butin de 200.000 dollars. Les soldats chinois n'arrivèrent qu'a- près leur départ.

A la suite de la décision prise hier par le conseil de la S. D. N. et que critiquent violemment les journaux nippons, le gouvernement japonais annonce qu'en vue de se montrer conciliant il consent à faire une nouvelle concession sur laquelle il garde le se- cret. Cependant, les milieux officiels laissent entendre que Tokio va promet- tre de commencer immédiatement l'éva- cuation, mais sans s'engager à la ter- miner dans un délai fixé quelconque.

Georges MORESTHE.

UNE RESOLUTION DE LA LIGUE PANJAPONAISE DES PROFESSEURS

Tokio, 23 octobre (dép. Havas.)

La Ligue panjaponaise des profes- seurs, convoquée hier d'urgence, a voté une résolution demandant à M. Briand que le conseil de la Société des nations considère l'affaire de la Mandchourie sous son vrai jour et intervienne seule- ment dans les limites de ses attribu- tions.

Cette ligue est composée de 200 pro- fesseurs d'université.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

La résolution de la S. D. N. concernant l'évacuation telle qu'elle a été câblée ici est inacceptable pour le Japon. Le point auquel il est fait objection avec le plus d'énergie est celui proposant l'évacuation avant l'ouverture des négociations au lieu de relier les deux choses entre elles.

La seule question qui reste à régler est de savoir si le gouvernement de Nankin est maintenant prêt à s'engager formellement à respecter les traités, le Japon ayant déclaré sans ambage qu'aucune évacuation ne pourrait être envisagée sans qu'il ait au préalable obtenu satisfaction.

On ne signale aucun nouveau bombardement. Ceux qui se sont produits dernièrement sont considérés ici comme très regrettables, car ils ont pu apparaître aux membres du conseil de Genève comme ayant été ordonnés pour empêcher leurs efforts d'aboutir. (Copyright.)

La paix est conclue entre Nankin et Canton

TOKIO, 23 octobre. — (Dep. Havas). — On mande de Nankin à l'Agence Ren-
do :

Selon une information émanant du parti national, il a été décidé, aux termes de la paix conclue entre Nankin et Canton, que M. Tang Chao Yi présiderait le gouvernement national dans lequel le portefeuille des affaires étrangères serait attribué à M. Eugène Chen.

Chang Kai Shek sera commandant en chef des forces militaires, navales et aériennes. L'aide de la Société des nations et des Etats-Unis sera recherchée; une alliance sera conclue sous une forme ou sous une autre avec les soviets en vue de régler les questions mandchouriennes.

Enclosure No. 5 to Despatch No. 1908
of October 30, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE POPULAIRE, October 24, 1931.

La Chine a accepté le texte de la résolution élaborée par le Conseil de la Société des Nations. Elle accepte de donner les garanties demandées pour la sauvegarde des biens et des vies des ressortissants japonais. Elle est allée encore plus loin. Elle demande aux grandes puissances d'accepter l'invitation qu'elle leur adressera incessamment « tendant à désigner des représentants neutres » qui surveilleraient l'évacuation.

La Chine se déclare prête à discuter avec le Japon toutes les questions litigieuses, mais sur un pied d'égalité, hors de toute contrainte.

Par contre, le Japon a repoussé la suggestion du Conseil de la S. D. N. Son délégué au Conseil a présenté des amendements qui modifient complètement le texte primitif de la résolution. L'évacuation est subordonnée à « l'apaisement » et à la « détente » qui doivent résulter d'une « entente préalable entre les gouvernements chinois et japonais sur les principes fondamentaux régissant les relations normales ». Par conséquent, plus de délai pour l'achèvement de l'évacuation. Pas de participation des « neutres » aux négociations sino-japonaises. Tout au plus les parties devront-elles tenir le Conseil au courant des pourparlers.

On voit la manœuvre japonaise. Le gouvernement de Tokio veut obtenir de la Chine une nouvelle reconnaissance des traités existants, les fameux traités inégaux que la Chine nouvelle ne supportera pas, qu'elle supprimera tôt ou tard. Le Japon veut que le gouvernement chinois renonce à toute idée de révision de ces traités qui avaient été imposés à la Chine par la violence.

Que fera le Conseil de la S.D.N. ? Comme si le mot « sécurité » exerçait sur M. Briand une sorte de fascination, le président du Conseil, en

l'entendant prononcer par les délégués des deux pays, s'est empressé de déclarer que sur ce point les parties étaient d'accord. Ne voit-il donc pas que, pour la Chine, « sécurité » veut dire : protection des biens et des vies des Japonais en Chine, et que, pour le Japon, « sécurité » signifie : reconnaissance par la Chine des privilèges que les Japonais se sont réservés par les traités inégaux, peut-être même l'élargissement de ces privilèges.

Mais c'est ici que nous touchons au problème capital et qui explique la ^{carence} la faiblesse, les hésitations du Conseil de la S. D. N. Il n'ose pas prendre une attitude énergique contre l'agresseur, il ne veut pas mobiliser contre lui l'opinion publique, il veut, non pas régler « l'incident », mais plutôt l'étouffer, parce que toutes les grandes puissances représentées à la S. D. N. possèdent, elles aussi, des « droits » sur la Chine en vertu des traités impérialistes.

Le Conseil voudrait empêcher la guerre. Mais il a peur de porter atteinte aux « traités inégaux ». Et quand le Japon fait comprendre à ses confrères en impérialisme que son action militaire en Mandchourie a pour but de sauvegarder et de consolider leurs « droits » coloniaux, les membres du Conseil se sentent de cœur avec lui. Seulement, ils craignent de heurter l'opinion publique. C'est pourquoi ils ne sont pas contents de l'attitude du Japon, qui les met dans une situation délicate.

Nous verrons aujourd'hui quelles préoccupations l'emporteront : la crainte de l'opinion publique ou le souci de défendre les droits impérialistes.

C'est un dilemme redoutable pour la S. D. N., dans sa composition actuelle.

O. ROSENFELD.

Enclosure No. 6 to Despatch No. 1908
of October 30, 1931.

From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE QUOTIDIEN, October 24, 1931.

Le Japon oppose un contre-projet à la proposition du Conseil de la S.D.N. acceptée par Nankin

Il veut négocier avec la Chine avant de retirer ses troupes

La journée d'hier à Genève devait, en raison de la résolution présentée jeudi soir par le Conseil, être décisive.

Or, la question est passée, à vrai dire, par diverses phases émouvantes et un peu contradictoires, du moins en ce qui concerne l'attitude japonaise.

M. Yoshizawa a rendu visite à M. Briand.

Dans la matinée on apprenait que Tokio prévenait son représentant, M. Yoshizawa, qu'un effort allait être fait en vue de retirer les troupes des points occupés en Mandchourie avant le 16 novembre, à condition que Nankin eût fait, à cette date, le nécessaire pour garantir les personnes et les biens des ressortissants japonais.

Mais à la séance du Conseil, dans l'après-midi, ce fut une nouvelle inattendue : le Japon présentait un contre-projet subordonnant l'évacuation de ses troupes à une entente préalable entre Nankin et Tokio, sur un certain nombre de « principes essentiels » susceptibles d'assurer la sécurité des ressortissants japonais. En outre, le Japon se réserve sur la date précise du retrait de ses troupes.

Quant à la Chine, elle a accepté, dès avant la séance, le projet de résolution du Conseil.

Lord Cecil, qui remplace M. Reading, a posé à M. Yoshizawa diverses questions auxquelles le délégué japonais ne semble pas avoir fait des réponses entièrement précises ni aptes à éclaircir la situation.

Le Conseil se réunira demain.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 7 to Despatch No. 1908
of October 30, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ECHO DE PARIS, October 25, 1931.

L'intervention de la S.D.N. dans le conflit mandchou aboutit à un échec

**Le Conseil s'ajourne au 16 novembre,
le Japon ayant voté contre le projet
de résolution proposé**

(De notre correspondant particulier.)

Genève, 24 octobre. — L'ultime effort de conciliation et de médiation fait par le Conseil de la Société des Nations et par son président, s'est brisé contre le mur de l'intransigeance japonaise.

Au cours de la séance de ce matin, où la discussion fut longue et âpre, M. Yoshizawa, malgré les instances de ses collègues, a maintenu son refus d'accepter la résolution proposée par le Conseil. En fait, le Japon ne consent pas à évacuer la Mandchourie tant que ne seront pas acquis les « points fondamentaux » considérés par le gouvernement de Tokio comme indispensables. Pressé de donner quelque clarté sur ces « points fondamentaux », M. Yoshizawa a répondu qu'il ne pouvait parler, son gouvernement ne l'y ayant pas autorisé.

L'impossibilité pour le conseil de donner satisfaction aux Japonais apparut alors : comment introduire dans une résolution la promesse de satisfaire à des « points fondamentaux » qui demeuraient mystérieux ? La discussion aboutissant à une impasse, la séance fut levée et renvoyée à l'après-midi.

C'est à 17 heures que le conseil s'est réuni pour la dernière fois. Après quelques paroles prononcées par MM. Briand et Yoshizawa, on passe au vote.

Deux résolutions sont en présence : celle que propose la délégation japonaise et celle du conseil.

On vote d'abord sur le texte japo-

nais, qui est repoussé à l'unanimité moins la voix du Japon. La résolution du conseil est ensuite adoptée à l'unanimité moins la voix du Japon ; on sait que cette résolution comporte l'ajournement du conseil au 16 novembre.

C'est donc l'échec.

M. Briand n'a plus qu'à prononcer le discours de clôture :

« Nous nous ajournons, dit-il, au 16 novembre. Le projet de résolution que nous avons voté est sur la table du Conseil et dans les mains du gouvernement japonais ; il est placé sous le bénéfice des déclarations du délégué du Japon.

« Sentant le poids de ses responsabilités, le représentant du Japon a répété à plusieurs reprises que, dans cette affaire, son gouvernement ne recherche aucun moyen de s'agrandir, qu'il ne nourrit aucune arrière-pensée et qu'il ne fera pas dégénérer le conflit. Ces déclarations sont importantes. Je suis convaincu que d'ici le 16 novembre, le Japon montrera par ses actes que sa bonne volonté est orientée vers la fin du conflit et que nous pourrons enregistrer alors la liquidation de ce dernier ».

Les représentants des différents Etats prennent ensuite la parole tour à tour ; puis M. Briand a déclaré la session ajournée jusqu'au 16 novembre.

Le sentiment de gêne et de préoccupation qui a dominé la clôture de la session s'est aggravé lorsque l'observateur américain sembla laisser comprendre par la concision de sa déclaration finale qu'il pourrait ne pas assister à la prochaine réunion.

On affirme ce soir que M. Stimson ferait demain une déclaration complète sur la portée de la collaboration des Etats-Unis à la Société des Nations.

Les membres du Conseil qui s'en vont ce soir ou demain matin, comme M. Briand, sont consolés par le seul résultat de la limitation du conflit sino-japonais.

M. Yoshizawa s'est longuement entretenu ce soir avec M. Prentiss Gilbert, l'observateur américain.

Enclosure No. 8 to Despatch No. 1908
of October 30, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ERE NOUVELLE, October 25, 1931.

L'obstination du Japon réunit contre lui l'unanimité du Conseil de la Société des Nations

***M. Briand exprime l'espoir
que lors de la prochaine réunion du 16 Novembre
le conflit mandchou sera résolu***

Genève, 24 octobre. — Le conseil de la Société des Nations a tenu ce matin une longue séance publique. Dans son contre-projet déposé hier, la délégation japonaise a introduit la notion « des principes fondamentaux » qu'il aurait voulu voir admettre par la Chine avant de procéder à l'évacuation de ses troupes. Toute la discussion d'aujourd'hui a tendu à obtenir de la délégation japonaise des précisions sur ces principes fondamentaux, mais M. Yoshizawa s'est dérobé.

La séance a commencé par une brève déclaration de M. Yoshizawa qui constatait que ces principes fondamentaux, dont il ne précise d'ailleurs pas le sens même général, avaient pour objet d'amener un apaisement dans la situation et de faciliter le rétablissement des relations normales entre son pays et la Chine.

Le Japon refuse de s'expliquer

Le vicomte Cecil, se référant aux cinq points japonais de principe publiés dans la presse, a alors demandé à M. Yoshizawa s'il s'agissait essentiellement pour la délégation japonaise d'une reconnaissance par la Chine des traités existants.

Le représentant du Japon a répondu que son gouvernement ne l'autorise pas à renseigner officiellement le conseil.

— Il est naturel, a-t-il dit, que mon pays désire entrer en pourparlers avec la Chine en vue d'arriver à une entente sur un certain nombre de questions touchant la sécurité de la vie et des biens des ressortissants japonais en Mandchourie.

« Le désir du gouvernement japonais est que cet accord de principe précède l'évacuation des troupes japonaises, car mon gouvernement est convaincu que nos ressortissants courent un danger grave aussi tôt que nos troupes seront retirées. »

L'Espagne demande l'évacuation immédiate

Le représentant de l'Espagne, M. de Madariaga, parle du devoir du conseil : empêcher que le conflit de Mandchourie ne tourne en une véritable guerre et sauvegarder l'avenir de la Société des Nations. Il esquisse les données générales de ce que l'on considère communément comme la sécurité nationale d'un pays. Il voit un danger à ce qu'il soit soutenu devant le conseil qu'un territoire peut demeurer envahi par des troupes étrangères, et cela pour des raisons de sécurité. L'argument lui semble insoutenable. Il pense donc, en terminant, que le bon sens voudrait que l'évacuation eût lieu et il propose que les deux parties prennent devant le conseil l'engagement solennel d'entamer des pourparlers directs pour régler le fond de leur

facilement qu'une occupation militaire puisse être entendue comme un moyen pacifique de régler un conflit quelconque.

M. Briand constate ensuite que la Société des Nations a déjà joué son rôle essentiel en empêchant la guerre. Il demande à la délégation du Japon un effort de conciliation. Et M. Briand de démontrer que les deux parties, aujourd'hui, ne sont pas loin de s'entendre.

— Le gouvernement japonais, dit-il, accepte que, pour les grands problèmes qui se posent devant lui et la Chine, des négociations s'engagent après l'évacuation. M. Yoshizawa a précisé que les principes fondamentaux dont il a parlé restaient dans le domaine de la sécurité ; et cependant des préoccupations demeurent.

« Dans ces conditions, il nous faut un texte clair. La Chine accepte d'engager des pourparlers sur l'organisation de la sécurité dans des territoires que le Japon déclare n'avoir occupés que pour protéger la sécurité de ses nationaux. En quelques jours, sinon en quelques heures, l'accord peut être fait ; puisque le gouvernement japonais, comme il l'annonçait le 30 septembre, a commencé d'évacuer, c'est qu'il pouvait le faire. Il y a seulement une question de plus ou de moins, et surtout une question de lieux.

« Le représentant du Japon a déclaré qu'il ne voulait pas, notamment en ce qui concerne le délai, prendre un engagement qu'il ne fût pas certain de pouvoir tenir. Mais le gouvernement japonais pourrait formuler une réserve précisant que l'évacuation aurait lieu à condition que la bonne volonté de la Chine s'affirme et qu'elle prenne les précautions prévues. »

M. Briand souligne ensuite combien il est convaincu que lorsqu'on saura qu'une pression militaire a cessé, les difficultés s'aplaniront et cela à l'avantage des deux pays comme de l'humanité entière. Car, actuellement, il ne faut pas jouer avec la tension des nerfs.

Refus du Japon

Mais le représentant du Japon se borne à déclarer brièvement qu'à son grand regret il ne peut accepter le projet de résolution du président, car ce projet ne constitue pas une garantie suffisante pour la protection de la vie et des biens des ressortissants japonais.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 8 to Despatch No. 1908
of October 30, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ERE NOUVELLE, October 25, 1931.

L'obstination du Japon réunit contre lui l'unanimité du Conseil de la Société des Nations

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L'intervention de lord Cecil

A ce moment, lord Cecil revint à la charge, se basant sur un télégramme Reuter, disant que, d'après les milieux officiels de Tokio, le gouvernement japonais est déçu de voir que la Société des Nations se refuse à consacrer « la sainteté des traités existants ».

Le délégué britannique fait remarquer qu'il n'existe pas de demande de la délégation japonaise au conseil sur ce point. Il n'est nullement question pour le conseil de passer outre à la validité des traités. Un problème de cet ordre devrait être porté devant la Cour permanente de justice internationale.

— Les traités, dit le représentant de la Grande-Bretagne, sont sacrés, mais discuter des détails, avant d'évacuer un territoire étranger indûment occupé, c'est renverser l'ordre naturel des choses.

Il faut, selon lord Cecil, évacuer d'abord et discuter ensuite.

M. Yoshizawa, après quelques mots de réponse de M. de Madariaga, reste inébranlable quant à son point de vue ; il ne répond même pas à la question directe de lord Cecil, se bornant à répéter que son pays est d'avis que les troupes japonaises ne pourront pas être retirées avant que la sécurité des ressortissants japonais soit nettement garantie.

Déclarations de M. Briand

M. Briand intervient à son tour et tente un suprême effort de conciliation. Il montre que le projet de résolution du conseil a pour lui la clarté, alors que le contre-projet japonais donne lieu à des interprétations que la discussion d'aujourd'hui n'a pas réussi à dissiper. Il lui semble impossible de terminer les graves débats du conseil sur un texte obscur, et il rappelle les termes d'une déclaration de M. Yoshizawa constatant, le 30 septembre dernier, que l'évacuation des troupes avait commencé.

— Nous sommes, dit M. Briand, en présence d'une question essentielle qui met en cause la dignité et l'honneur de la Société des Nations, dont le pacte, dans son article 10, de même d'ailleurs que le Pacte de Paris de renonciation à la guerre, garantissent l'intégrité territoriale des Etats membres. Par tous ces actes internationaux, les nations se sont obligées à régler leurs différends par des moyens pacifiques. Or, l'opinion publique admettrait dif-

M. Briand souligne ensuite combien il est convaincu que lorsqu'on saura qu'une pression militaire a cessé, les difficultés s'aplaniront et cela à l'avantage des deux pays comme de l'humanité entière. Car, actuellement, il ne faut pas jouer avec la tension des nerfs.

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Mais le représentant du Japon se borne à déclarer brièvement qu'à son grand regret il ne peut accepter le projet de résolution du président, car ce projet ne constitue pas une garantie suffisante pour la protection de la vie et des biens des ressortissants japonais.

— Le gouvernement japonais, ajoute-t-il, n'a pas l'intention de régler son différend par des moyens de force. Il veut seulement assurer la sécurité d'une manière efficace.

Un amendement

Le conseil entend M. de Madariaga, qui propose un amendement destiné à rapprocher la délégation japonaise de l'unanimité des membres du conseil. Il se déclare déçu de l'attitude du Japon en ce qui touche l'engagement d'agir au grand jour. Il demande à M. Yoshizawa s'il retirerait son projet et s'il accepterait la résolution du président au cas où celle-ci serait amendée par l'insertion d'un engagement des parties de commencer dès la fin de l'évacuation des négociations sur tous les points en litige.

Le délégué du Japon ne répond pas à cette suggestion, mais il déclare que les principes fondamentaux dont il a parlé ne concernent que son pays et la Chine. Il ne peut retirer son contre-projet.

Ce qui est impossible

M. Briand propose alors au conseil de remettre la suite de la discussion à 16 heures. Se tournant vers son collègue japonais, il signale à M. Yoshizawa qu'il serait impossible d'introduire dans la résolution du conseil, même par esprit de conciliation, des principes fondamentaux sans les connaître et sans avoir le droit de les discuter et formuler.

— Demander à une assemblée un tel esprit de sacrifices, c'est, dit M. Briand, aller au delà du possible. Le représentant du Japon comprendra lui-même, combien il est difficile d'envisager une pareille éventualité.

La séance de l'après-midi, fixée à 16 heures, fut consacrée au vote de la résolution proposée par M. Briand. On continuait d'espérer que la délégation japonaise se rallierait à la suggestion précise que M. Briand lui a faite le matin et qui consisterait, pour la délégation japonaise, à faire une réserve sur l'exécution par la Chine de ses engagements, en vue d'assurer la sécurité des Japonais en Mandchourie.

Le contre-projet japonais est repoussé à l'unanimité moins une voix

Le conseil de la Société des Nations s'est réuni, hier après-midi, à 17 heures au lieu de 16.

Après avoir entendu M. Yoshizawa, qui a de nouveau commenté son contre-projet en ce qui concerne le règlement du conflit sino-japonais, il a été procédé à un vote.

Le contre-projet japonais a été repoussé à l'unanimité, sauf le Japon.

La résolution présentée jeudi par le conseil a été adoptée à l'unanimité moins le Japon, par appel nominal.

M. Briand remercie les Etats-Unis

A la suite de ces décisions, M. Briand a pris la parole. Il a remercié les Etats-Unis de leur collaboration et il a fait remarquer que la résolution adoptée par le conseil, le 30 septembre dernier, invitant ses membres à fournir des renseignements sur les événements qui se déroulent en Mandchourie, conservait toute sa valeur.

M. Briand a ensuite parlé de la paix. Il a dit qu'il espérait qu'à cette époque, il pourra dire : « C'est fini, il n'y a plus de conflit. »

M. Scialoja a ensuite remercié M. Briand et a fait l'éloge de son activité.

Comment s'est produit le vote

Genève, 24 octobre. — Au début de la séance du conseil de cet après-midi, le président, M. Briand, a annoncé que des conversations nouvelles avaient eu lieu afin de trouver une solution.

Il a déclaré qu'il avait espéré longtemps que les points de vue se rapprocheraient suffisamment, mais il ne peut présenter un projet de résolution qui soit assuré de recueillir l'unanimité.

Cependant, la situation ne s'est nullement empirée ; au contraire, un désir nouveau s'est manifesté du côté japonais de se rallier aux propositions des délégations, mais le représentant du Japon, loin de son pays, n'a pu interpréter de façon plus conciliante qu'il l'a fait les instructions qu'il avait reçues. En conséquence, le conseil reste saisi des deux projets de résolutions : celui du conseil et celui du Japon.

M. Yoshizawa a déclaré que la délégation japonaise avait joint ses efforts à ceux du conseil pour trouver une solution satisfaisante ; mais, malheureusement, il existe encore une divergence de vues entre l'opinion du conseil et celle du gouvernement japonais.

Il a déclaré, une fois de plus, que le Japon ne veut nullement faire la guerre à la Chine. Le Japon n'a pas de visées territoriales sur la Mandchourie. Il ramènera ses troupes dans la zone du chemin de fer dès que la sécurité de ses ressortissants et de leurs biens sera assurée.

C'est alors que le président a mis aux voix le contre-projet japonais qui, ainsi que nous l'avons annoncé, a été repoussé à l'unanimité moins le suffrage du représentant du Japon.

Le président a mis ensuite aux voix le projet de résolution présenté par le conseil.

Ont voté pour : la Chine, l'Allemagne, l'Espagne, l'Irlande, la France, la Grande-Bretagne, le Guatemala, l'Italie, la Norvège, le Panama, le Pérou, la Pologne et la Yougoslavie.

A voté contre : le représentant du Japon.

Le président a constaté que le projet de résolution était adopté à l'unanimité moins la voix du représentant du Japon.

— Le fait, a-t-il dit, que le conflit ne constitue plus une menace de guerre est un résultat que le conseil doit mettre à son actif. Le conseil est touché du concours que, dans cette affaire délicate, les Etats-Unis lui ont apporté.

« Cette collaboration, bien que limitée, a produit un effet moral qui, certainement, n'a pas été sans faciliter l'apaisement du conflit. Le conseil peut maintenant s'ajourner au 16 novembre. »

M. Briand ne désespère pas de voir, d'ici à cette date, le Japon poursuivre son œuvre d'évacuation déjà commencée. Il souhaite qu'à la prochaine réunion du conseil, il lui soit possible de dire : « Le cauchemar est dispersé »

Les remerciements à M. Briand

C'est alors que M. Scialoja (Italie) a ensuite exprimé le sentiment de tous ses collègues en disant à M. Briand toute leur reconnaissance pour l'œuvre si grande et si pleine d'intelligence et d'expérience qu'il a faite.

— Peu d'hommes auraient pu guider le navire dans l'obscurité rencontrée.

Lord Cecil, M. Van Mutius, M. Yoshizawa, Bradland (Norvège), Szé (Chine), de Madariaga (Espagne) se sont associés à ces paroles.

Le représentant de la Chine a déclaré qu'à son avis l'ajournement au 16 novembre constituait un délai trop long. La Chine se réserve le droit de demander la convocation du conseil à une date antérieure si l'évacuation n'a pas lieu conformément aux espoirs du président.

Le conseil s'ajourne au 16 novembre

M. Briand a encore remercié ses collègues annonçant qu'il persévérera jusqu'à son dernier souffle dans son action pour la paix.

Le représentant des Etats-Unis, M. Prentiss Gilbert, a remercié le président et le représentant de la Norvège, des paroles qu'ils ont bien voulu lui adresser et qu'il ne manquera pas de transmettre à son gouvernement.

La Chine s'est déclarée heureuse de la collaboration des Etats-Unis, puis le conseil s'est ajourné au 16 novembre.

Une escarmouche aux environs de Moukden

Londres, 24 octobre. — Des télégrammes de Moukden annoncent que des avions japonais coopérant avec des troupes nippones ont dispersé, aujourd'hui, à huit kilomètres au sud de Moukden, environ deux cents cavaliers chinois faisant partie de l'armée du maréchal Tchang Hsue Liang, gouverneur militaire de la Mandchourie.

Enclosure No. 9 to Despatch No. 1908
of October 30, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from EXCELSIOR, October 25, 1931.

Le conflit sino-japonais

MALGRÉ LES SOLLICITATIONS PRESSANTES DU CONSEIL DE LA S. D. N., LE DÉLÉGUÉ JAPONAIS A PERSISTÉ HIER DANS SON REFUS D'ADHÉRER AU PROJET DE M. BRIAND

Le conseil s'est donc séparé jusqu'au 16 novembre, date à laquelle il espère que par des négociations directes, le différend pourra être réglé.

ET A L'UNANIMITÉ MOINS UNE VOIX
— CELLE DU JAPON — IL A ADOPTÉ
LE PROJET DE RÉSOLUTION ÉLABORÉ

[DE NOTRE ENVOYÉ SPÉCIAL]

GENÈVE, 24 octobre. — Jusqu'à la dernière minute, ce soir, on avait l'impression que la persuasion de M. Briand et l'unanimité des membres du conseil parviendraient à faire fléchir la délégation japonaise. On pensait se séparer avec la certitude que dès demain les troupes nippones commenceraient l'évacuation en revenant dans la zone du chemin de fer mandchourien. Il n'en fut rien. Et vers 18 heures, ce soir, M. Briand dut mettre aux voix le contre-projet que maintenait la délégation japonaise. On vit M. Yoshizawa être le seul à lever la main. La contre-épreuve était inutile. Le délégué du Japon était isolé.

On procéda ensuite par appel nominal au scrutin sur la résolution du conseil. Une fois de plus, M. Yoshizawa fut le seul de son opinion et par 13 voix contre une la résolution était adoptée.

Elle avait été votée par tous les autres membres du conseil représentant la France, la Grande-Bretagne, l'Allemagne, l'Italie, l'Espagne, l'Etat Libre d'Irlande, la Norvège, la Yougoslavie et la Pologne, de même que par les représentants de l'Amérique Latine qui, cette année, sont au conseil : le Guatemala, le Panama, le Pérou et, bien entendu, par la Chine.

Le représentant des Etats-Unis, tout en ayant auparavant informé le président du conseil que son gouvernement approuvait la résolution, ne prit pas part au vote, n'ayant qu'une voix délibérative.

Et maintenant, que va-t-il se passer ? Le Japon a pris l'engagement d'honneur de ne pas faire la guerre à la Chine et de n'avoir aucune visée territoriale sur la Mandchourie. Avant la prochaine séance du conseil, qui se tiendra le 16 novembre, vraisemblablement à Paris, l'affaire pourrait donc être réglée, et ceci d'autant plus — ainsi que le fit remarquer le président du conseil — que la résolution du 30 septembre subsiste.

De plus, on assure que déjà au Japon le parti gouvernemental commence à estimer que les puissantes organisations militaires ont agi par trop rapidement. Le gouvernement de Tokio a trop le souci de ses obligations internationales pour ne pas se soumettre, en définitive, à la résolution du conseil.

Il n'en reste pas moins qu'à la veille de la conférence du désarmement son geste aura pour premier résultat de rallier à la thèse française, qui subordonne le désarmement à la sécurité, de nombreuses nations.

Le délégué chinois, de son côté, laissa entrevoir la possibilité de demander une convocation du conseil plus rapide, et n'attendrait pas le 16 novembre pour faire, une fois de plus, appel à son jugement.

Invoquera-t-il cette fois l'article 15 du pacte et ce qui en découle et qui prévoit qu'au cas où les méthodes de conciliation ont échoué, le conseil, de médiateur, devient juge et peut prendre toutes décisions utiles, allant même jusqu'au blocus, hors la présence des parties en cause ?

La séance du matin avait été, à certains points de vue, pénible. D'un côté, douze membres du conseil et l'observateur américain, fermement résolus à appuyer l'action de leur président ; de l'autre, s'efforçant d'être calme et pondéré, M. Yoshizawa cachait difficilement sa nervosité, faisait face à l'orage, mais n'attendait que le moment où enfin il allait être libéré.

Ce fut, tour à tour, lord Cecil qui, en « débattre » parlementaire avisé, essayait de lui faire spécifier quelles étaient les visées réelles du Japon. Que signifiait la vague formule des principes fondamentaux ? Puis le délégué de la Grande-Bretagne, lisant le texte d'un télégramme d'agence, s'étonna qu'à Tokio on parle de mettre la Chine en demeure de faire face à ses engagements contenus dans les fameux traités de 1915 — dont certains d'ailleurs n'ont jamais été ratifiés, et dont on n'a jamais encore parlé au cours des longues conversations de Genève. Enfin, M. Yoshizawa entendait-il, avant l'évacuation, traiter avec la Chine des questions politiques relatives à la Mandchourie. Si c'était le cas, il fallait le dire ouvertement.

Ce fut ensuite M. de Madariaga, ancien directeur de la section du désarmement à la Société des nations, aujourd'hui ambassadeur à Washington et délégué de l'Espagne, qui, sur un ton peut-être un peu trop agressif, rappela aux Japonais leurs obligations internationales et s'efforça de leur faire comprendre que la Société des nations ne pouvait que condamner une entreprise militaire ayant pour but de s'appropriier le territoire d'autrui. Il cita les textes, fit appel à la sagesse du délégué japonais et lut même une partie du préambule du pacte de la Société des nations qui s'applique particulièrement à ce cas. Rien n'y fit ; M. Yoshizawa demeura sur ses positions. Une seule chose pour lui est importante : pas d'évacuation avant d'avoir obtenu de la Chine toutes les garanties de sécurité. Il se refusa à dévoiler les vues de son gouvernement sans y être autorisé, et il ne l'était pas. et s'attira cette verte réplique de M. Briand qui lui fit remarquer que le conseil ne pouvait accepter les principes fondamentaux qu'il ne connaissait pas et qu'on refusait de lui développer.

— C'est demander à une assemblée, dit M. Briand, un trop gros effort de sacrifice, c'est aller au delà du possible. Aucun des membres du conseil n'accepterait d'insérer dans un projet de résolution ce qu'on appelle un principe fondamental sans savoir ce que cela veut dire exactement et le délégué du Japon doit comprendre lui-même combien il est difficile d'envisager une pareille éventualité.

Rien n'y fit, et l'on se sépara jusqu'à 17 heures.

Les ultimes négociations

Dès après le déjeuner, la délégation japonaise eut, à l'hôtel des Bergues, une nouvelle entrevue avec M. Briand, mais aucune entente ne fut possible. Le conseil siégea de nouveau. C'était sa dernière séance.

Ce fut tout d'abord la déclaration japonaise réitérant sa position, puis le vote que nous avons signalé plus haut, et enfin une magnifique manifestation de sympathie pour celui qui, depuis deux semaines, avait donné une si admirable leçon d'énergie, de confiance et de foi dans l'œuvre de la Société des nations.

Enclosure No. 10 to Despatch No. 1908
of October 30, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from FIGARO, October 25, 1931.

LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS

L'échec de la S.D.N.

La journée d'hier, à Genève, peut être qualifiée d'historique, car elle a marqué l'échec complet de la Société des Nations dans sa tentative de régler un différend. Le Conseil s'est, en effet, ajourné, après de longs efforts, sans parvenir à mettre la Chine et le Japon d'accord dans le conflit qui les divise. Le projet de résolution élaboré par le Conseil n'a pas été accepté par le représentant japonais. La situation demeure donc exactement ce qu'elle était au premier jour. Les incidents continuent à se produire en Mandchourie. Ils peuvent, demain, dégénérer en guerre. Le Conseil n'a pu que décider de se réunir de nouveau le 16 novembre. Mais, d'ici là, que se sera-t-il passé ? Et quelles mesures pourra prendre la Société des nations ?...

« Séance pénible », déclare une dépêche officielle, au sujet de la réunion d'hier. Combien pénible ! La Société des Nations, qui doit veiller au respect des pactes et à l'intégrité territoriale des Etats, s'est révélée impuissante dans l'œuvre qui lui est assignée. Le Japon demandait avec insistance que le Conseil décidât la Chine à reconnaître officiellement la valeur des conventions signées par elle : la Chine s'y est refusée. Le gouvernement de Nankin demandait que le Japon retirât ses troupes des territoires occupés : le gouvernement de Tokio s'y est opposé, avant d'avoir la certitude que la vie et les biens de ses ressortissants en Mandchourie seront respectés.

La Société des Nations a inscrit dans son pacte que toute diplomatie secrète était condamnée. On attendait désormais des puissances qu'elles fissent preuve de franchise. Or, il y a quelques mois, l'Allemagne et l'Autriche signaient secrètement un accord tendant à réaliser entre elles une union douanière. Et, hier, le Conseil de la Société des Nations s'est en vain efforcé d'obtenir du Japon des précisions sur les « points fondamentaux » qu'il désire régler avec la Chine avant de retirer ses troupes de Mandchourie. De quoi s'agit-il ? Personne ne le sait au juste. On a suggéré au représentant de Tokio de soumettre l'affaire à la Cour permanente de justice internationale. Mais le récent avis émis par la Cour au sujet du projet de *Zollverein* austro-allemand n'est pas précisément de nature à lui inspirer confiance. Il entend négocier directement avec la Chine. C'est son droit.

L'échec de la Société des Nations est d'autant plus grave qu'il s'agissait de régler un différend survenu entre deux membres du Conseil. Loin d'être aplani, le conflit s'est étendu. Il s'est étendu en ce sens que le Japon garde rancune à diverses puissances de l'attitude qu'elles ont adoptée. On ne par-

donnera pas de si tôt à M. Briand d'avoir fait siéger au Conseil un délégué des Etats-Unis. On ne lui pardonnera pas d'avoir fait voter une résolution qui n'a pas reçu l'agrément des autorités japonaises. D'autre part, des dépêches de Tokio s'élèvent contre l'attitude de lord Robert Cecil, qui a essayé d'arracher à M. Yoshisawa des précisions qu'il ne voulait pas donner. Le Japon, absolument irrité, menace de se retirer de l'institution de Genève !

Il faut donc une dose d'optimisme peu commune pour prétendre, comme l'a fait hier soir M. Briand, que le but essentiel des efforts du Conseil a été réalisé. La vérité est tout autre. Le Conseil a montré qu'il était incapable d'assurer la paix. Rien ne sert de le taire. Mieux vaut, au contraire, le souligner, pour ne point laisser perdre la leçon.

Enclosure No. 11 to Despatch No. 1908
of October 30, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE JOURNAL, October 25, 1931.

LE CONSEIL DE LA S. D. N. s'est ajourné

Le Japon refuse de s'associer
à la résolution du Conseil
que M. Aristide Briand laisse
entre les mains de M. Yoshizawa

GENÈVE, 24 octobre. — La discussion de ce matin au conseil de la Société des nations, n'a pas éclairci définitivement la situation, mais elle a permis au conseil de faire préciser par le représentant du Japon la position de ce dernier.

Lord Robert Cecil s'est ému que, dans la contre-résolution japonaise en réponse à la résolution du conseil, il fût question de « points fondamentaux » obscurs.

Et après que M. Yoshizawa eut redit que son gouvernement entendait par là « ce qui a trait aux assurances de sécurité », le représentant de la Grande-Bretagne a cru devoir presser celui du Japon de dire si, oui ou non, la « question des traités » faisait implicitement partie de ces points fondamentaux.

M. Yoshizawa a marqué quelque embarras dans sa réponse. Il ne peut, évidemment, aller au delà de l'interprétation stricte des instructions qu'il a reçues de Tokio et il lui en faudrait de nouvelles pour satisfaire lord Cecil.

Après intervention de M. de Mada-riaga, M. Briand démontre que la résolution présentée par le conseil et la contre-résolution du Japon sont animées du même esprit. Et il conclut en proposant de laisser les parties à leurs réflexions qui, espère-t-il, seront de nature à les conduire à apporter leur adhésion au texte définitif de la résolution du conseil. Puis la séance est reportée à 18 heures.

La séance de cet après-midi a été très émouvante. C'est dans un silence religieux que sont tombées les paroles définitives du représentant du Japon qu'il n'était pas possible au gouvernement de Tokio de se rallier à la résolution du conseil. Il ne restait plus dès lors qu'à passer au vote. La contre-résolution du Japon ne recueillit que la voix de son auteur. Puis tous les Etats représentés au conseil répondirent à l'appel nominal du président. Cette fois,

la résolution du conseil fut adoptée par toutes les voix, moins celle du Japon.

M. Aristide Briand résuma alors la situation. Il releva que l'on avait atteint pour l'instant au but essentiel que propose à son effort la Société des nations : le maintien de la paix. Un conflit grave n'a pas dégénéré en guerre. On a pu le contenir dans les limites des difficultés actuelles, qui sont déjà de trop, mais le résultat est appréciable tout de même.

M. Briand a dit le remerciement du conseil au représentant des Etats-Unis qui, par leur association à l'effort de l'organisme de Genève, ont produit dans le monde un effet moral qui n'est pas peu de chose.

Il a enfin défini la situation que crée le vote émis ce soir. Le conseil s'ajourne au 16 novembre ; il laisse le projet de résolution « sur la table, aux mains de notre cher collègue, le représentant du Japon ».

M. Briand ne doute pas que le gouvernement du Japon montrera par ses actes qu'il entend donner suite à ses déclarations pacifiques et qu'à la prochaine réunion du conseil, l'espoir de celui-ci dans le rétablissement des relations normales entre les deux pays aura reçu le commencement de réalisation auquel se sont engagées les parties.

On a entendu alors successivement M. Scialoja (Italie) ; lord Robert Cecil (Grande-Bretagne) ; von Mutius (Allemagne) ; Yoshizawa (Japon) ; Szé (Chine) rendre un hommage éloquent à l'habileté, à la patience, à la foi pacifique et agissante de M. Briand.

Mais le porte-parole de la Chine a déclaré qu'il ne croyait pas qu'il fût vraisemblable que la situation s'améliorerait en Mandchourie d'ici le 16 novembre, puisque le Japon s'est tenu à son obstination à ne pas vouloir que l'évacuation totale précède les conversations à engager entre les gouvernements de Tokio et de Nankin. « Dans ces conditions, a-t-il dit, la Chine se réserve d'en appeler de nouveau au conseil avant cette date si elle le juge utile. Cela laisse d'ailleurs intact, ajoute M. Szé, le mérite de M. Briand, dont le nom est l'une des colonnes de la Société des nations ».

En remerciant tous les orateurs, M. Briand a dit qu'il retiendrait de ces débats la partie constructive possible, qu'il entendait persévérer jusqu'à son dernier souffle dans l'achèvement d'une œuvre comme celle-là et qu'il comptait sur l'esprit de sagesse des parties pour que rien ne fût envenimé. — Tony Roche.

Enclosure No. 12 to Despatch No. 1908
of October 30, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE MATIN, October 25, 1931.

Le conflit sino-japonais

**LE JAPON
RESTE INTRANSIGEANT**

**Le conseil de la S.D.N. a dû clôturer
sa session sans avoir réglé le dif-
férend entre Tokio et Nankin**

[DE NOTRE ENVOYÉ SPÉCIAL]

GENÈVE, 24 octobre. — Par téléphone.
— A l'unanimité moins une voix, celle
du représentant du Japon, les mem-
bres du conseil de la Société des na-
tions y compris naturellement cette fois
le docteur Sze (Chine) ont donc rejeté
les amendements à leur projet de réso-
lution présentés par la délégation ja-
ponaise. Puis, la situation se trouvant
totalement renversée, le conseil, à l'una-
nimité, moins une voix, toujours celle
de M. Yoshizawa, a adopté le projet de
résolution qu'il avait dès hier élaboré.

Rappelons les points de divergence
essentiels qui séparaient les deux textes :
celui des délégués japonais et celui par
conséquent de M. Briand et de ses col-
lègues.

Le Japon faisait dépendre la fin de
l'occupation en Mandchourie d'une en-
tente préalable avec la Chine sur des
questions fondamentales.

Par contre, le conseil se refusant à
lier les opérations d'évacuation aux
résultats hypothétiques de négociations
préliminaires, avait cru devoir fixer
au 16 novembre prochain, date de sa
nouvelle session, le retour définitif et
complet au *statu quo ante*.

Toute la discussion d'aujourd'hui, au
cours des deux séances publiques que
le conseil a successivement tenues, a
été vainement consacrée à un laborieux
essai de définition exacte des mysté-
rieux points fondamentaux invoqués
pour les besoins de sa thèse par l'en-
voyé du mikado.

En fait Lord Cecil, M. de Madaria-
ga, M. Briand et tous leurs collègues
savaient pertinemment de quoi il s'a-
gissait : les points fondamentaux — ce
leitmotiv de la journée que le délé-
gué japonais n'a pas osé énumérer en
séance publique — sont au nombre de
quatre.

Trois d'entre eux (cessation du boy-
cottage, garantie pour les biens, pro-
tection des ressortissants japonais
après le retrait des troupes) sont in-
diqués dans la résolution du conseil
elle-même. Le quatrième, celui dont
tout le monde parle en petit comité
a trait au contrôle du Sud-mandchou-
rien.

Selon les événements et le jeu de bas-
cule de la politique, le Japon, tantôt
battu en brèche par la Russie des so-
viets, tantôt inquiété par la Chine, sou-
haiterait de renforcer ou, du moins,
de confirmer son influence sur l'explo-
itation de la ligne de chemin de fer.

Mais ce vœu, le conseil n'est pas en
mesure d'y donner suite, l'interprétation
des contrats existants ne relevant pas
de sa compétence et ne pouvant être
discutée que dans des négociations di-
rectes et ultérieures.

Voyons maintenant quelle est la posi-
tion juridique du conseil vis-à-vis du
conflit que, sur la demande de la Chine,
il avait à régler.

Le conseil a donc échoué dans ses
efforts de conciliation entrepris sous les
auspices de l'article 11 du covenant et
de l'article 2 du pacte de Paris.

Ces deux articles prescrivaient au
conseil de mettre au point, puis de sou-
mettre aux deux parties en cause des
recommandations formulées dans un
projet de résolution.

Pour avoir toute la portée requise, ce
projet aurait dû être voté par tous les
membres du conseil ainsi que par les

représentants des deux parties en cause.
Il n'en a pas été ainsi.

Toutefois, le conseil n'en continuera
pas moins de surveiller étroitement un
conflit qu'il a, d'ores et déjà, délimité
et apaisé. Et, le 16 novembre prochain
— au rendez-vous accepté d'ailleurs par
M. Yoshizawa — M. Briand et ses col-
lègues, à l'appel de l'un des intéressés,
auront toute liberté, le cas échéant,
pour amorcer une nouvelle procédure.

Cette éventualité ne se produira vrai-
semblablement pas, car les déclarations
modérées du représentant du Japon, les
engagements qu'il a pris devant le con-
seil font bien augurer de l'avenir.

L'OPINION A TOKIO

[SERVICE SPÉCIAL DU « NEW YORK TIMES »]

TOKIO, 24 octobre. — Par câble. —
L'espoir de voir Genève trouver une
formule convenable pour régler le
conflit sino-japonais est abandonné
ce soir. Tous les efforts entrepris
n'ont réussi qu'à ramener l'affaire
au même point mort, étant donné
que les positions restent les mêmes :
la Chine refusant de respecter les
traités et le Japon refusant d'éva-
cuer les points occupés si la Chine
ne reconnaît pas formellement les-
dits traités. On estime que Sir Eric
Drummond a fait preuve d'une
grande ingéniosité pour tourner la
difficulté en suggérant que les deux
parties respectent « les traités mu-
tuellement reconnus », mais que
cette formule assez adroite est bien
loin de donner au Japon les assu-
rances qu'il désire. Le Japon, en
effet, semble estimer que l'expres-
sion de Sir Eric permet de dire que
certains traités sont contestables.

Les derniers télégrammes mon-
trent bien qu'une certaine confusion
s'est produite au sujet des traités
dont il est question. Il s'agit, surtout,
disent les milieux officiels japonais,
du traité de 1915. Celui-ci implique
l'occupation de Dairen et de Port-
Arthur, et toute formule qui met-
trait en doute les droits japonais
d'après ce traité est d'une applica-
tion impossible.

L'isolement dans lequel le Japon
s'est trouvé à Genève a profondé-
ment irrité l'opinion du pays. Cette
irritation s'est traduite par une cam-
pagne antibritannique dans la
presse. La France est également cri-
tiquée pour son attitude en ce qui
concerne l'évacuation et l'on affecte
de rapprocher les événements ac-
tuels de ceux qui amenèrent l'occu-
pation de la Ruhr. (Copyright.)

**Une note énergique des Soviets
au général Chang Hai Peng
au sujet de l'Est-chinois**

[SERVICE SPÉCIAL DU « NEW YORK TIMES »]

CHANGHAI, 24 octobre. — Par câ-
ble. — Pour la première fois de-
puis qu'éclata le conflit, la Russie
des soviets vient de prendre une ini-
tiative qui peut laisser supposer
qu'elle interviendrait dans certaines
conditions. Le consul des soviets à
Tsitsihar vient, en effet, de noti-
fier au général Chang Hai Peng,
chef de la faction de « l'Indépen-
dance », qui se trouve précisément
dans les environs de cette ville, que
si ses troupes menaçaient d'une ma-
nière ou d'une autre le trafic de
l'Est chinois, les soviets se verraient
contraints de faire agir les quelque
cinq mille hommes qu'ils ont con-
centrés pour protéger la ligne.

La tension s'est accrue cette nuit
dans le sud de la Mandchourie et
dans la région de Kirin. (Copyright.)

Enclosure No. 13 to Despatch No. 1908
of October 30, 1931.

From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE PETIT PARISIEN, October 25, 1931.

LE CONFLIT SINO-NIPPON A GENEVE

Les membres du Conseil sauf M. Yoshizawa ont adopté le projet de résolution

LA NOUVELLE SESSION AURA LIEU LE 16 NOVEMBRE

Les délégués ont été unanimes à exprimer leur gratitude à M. Briand pour la maîtrise avec laquelle il a dirigé ces difficiles débats

Genève, 24 octobre (dép. Petit Paris.)

On espérait hier convaincre le délégué japonais d'accepter le projet de résolution du conseil de la S. D. N. Cet optimisme était prématuré.

Dans une nouvelle séance que le conseil a tenue ce matin et qui aurait pu être la dernière, M. Yoshizawa s'est montré, en effet, plus intransigeant que jamais. Malgré les efforts déployés par le vicomte Cecil et par le délégué de l'Espagne, malgré les amicales remontrances de M. Briand qui sut allier à un degré très rare l'impartialité à la fermeté, il se refusa à donner la moindre précision sur les « points fondamentaux » qu'il voudrait voir régler en principe entre la Chine et le Japon avant le retrait des dernières troupes d'occupation.

Tout ce qu'il consentit à dire, c'est que ces garanties préalables rentrent dans le cadre des mesures de sécurité exposées par le représentant de la France. Mais ces assurances parurent insuffisantes au conseil, qui a de plus en plus l'impression que le gouvernement de Tokio s'apprête à soulever ainsi, sous prétexte de sécurité, tout le problème du contrôle des chemins de fer mandchous, problème à la solution duquel il lierait, en fait, le retrait de ses troupes.

D'autre part, le conseil estime, avec M. Briand, qu'il ne peut accorder un blanc-seing à l'un de ses membres, comme l'exige M. Yoshizawa, car il créerait, de la sorte, un précédent très dangereux.

Après avoir piétiné sur place pendant deux heures, le conseil s'est ajourné à cet après-midi, à 16 heures.

Mais après une tentative de conciliation dont la délégation française avait pris l'initiative et devant l'attitude intransigente du Japon, le conseil de la S. D. N. n'a pu qu'enregistrer ce soir l'échec partiel de sa médiation dans l'affaire de Mandchourie.

En ouvrant la séance, M. Briand a annoncé qu'en dépit de la bonne volonté générale et malgré une détente indéniable, l'accord n'avait pu se faire. Le représentant du Japon ne pouvant outrepasser ses instructions antérieures et, vu la difficulté des communications, était dans l'impossibilité de se concerter avec son gouvernement.

Dans une déclaration empreinte de l'esprit le plus conciliant, M. Yoshizawa a exposé ensuite, une fois de plus, les raisons pour lesquelles il ne peut prendre d'engagements formels concernant l'évacuation tant qu'il n'aura pas obtenu de sérieuses garanties de sécurité de la part de la Chine. Il a promis cependant de la façon la plus formelle que les dernières troupes japonaises seront retirées dans la zone concédée par les traités aussitôt que la protection des ressortissants nippons et de leurs biens sera assurée.

Cette déclaration a produit sur l'assistance entière une excellente impression et c'est dans une atmosphère d'apaisement que le conseil, après avoir rejeté le contre-projet japonais, a adopté alors définitivement le texte de la résolution officielle présentée avant-hier par M. Briand.

Par suite de l'opposition du Japon, cette résolution prend le caractère d'une simple recommandation adressée aux deux parties. Mais, comme l'a montré M. Briand, elle n'en représente pas moins un sérieux pas en avant, et avec l'appui des Etats-Unis, auquel le représentant de la France a exprimé ses remerciements les plus chaleureux, le conflit est en effet contenu dans ses limites actuelles et tout danger de guerre est désormais écarté.

Déclaration de M. Briand

— Notre projet de résolution, a déclaré en outre M. Briand, reste sur la table et aux mains de notre cher collègue du Japon, qui vient de nous donner des assurances très apaisantes. Dans ces minutes solennelles et sous le poids de ses responsabilités, M. Yoshizawa n'a pu joindre sa voix aux nôtres. Cependant, il nous a confirmé que son gouvernement n'avait pas la moindre arrière-pensée de porter la plus petite atteinte à l'intégrité nationale de la Chine et est vraiment résolu à ne pas laisser s'élargir le différend. La déclaration d'un pays comme le Japon a un grand prix pour la paix.

Je ne désespère pas, pour notre prochaine réunion, de voir son représentant s'avancer et nous dire : Le cauchemar est dissipé. Tout est fini !

Nous arrivons aujourd'hui au terme d'un long voyage qui nous a conduits dans une contrée lointaine et par des chemins sinueux. Mais nous avons accumulé soigneusement des matériaux pour construire l'édifice que nous avons en vue.

Bien que j'espère fermement recevoir d'ici là de bonnes nouvelles après lesquelles la session convoquée pour le 16 novembre paraîtra peut-être superflue, mon égoïsme me poussera à vous réunir tout de même à cette date pour vous faire part du dénouement qui sera intervenu.

1 1225

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Cette déclaration finale n'appelait pas de commentaires, mais les représentants de l'Italie, de la Grande-Bretagne, de l'Allemagne, de la Norvège, et de l'Espagne, comme ceux de la Chine et du Japon, ne voulurent pas laisser passer la fin de la session sans exprimer à M. Briand leur gratitude et leur admiration pour la dignité, la patience, l'intelligence, la haute expérience, la sagesse et la haute impartialité — ce sont leurs propres expressions — dont il a fait preuve au cours de ce débat.

Tout le monde est, en effet, unanime à reconnaître que c'est M. Briand et



M. Eugène Chen

lui seul qui a sauvé dans cette affaire le prestige du conseil.

Quoique ses efforts n'aient pas été couronnés d'un succès complet, il est arrivé à son but en ce sens que la solution adoptée ce soir ne laissera nulle part ni mauvais souvenir ni amertume. Etant donné l'atmosphère de suspicion et d'intrigues qui régnait à Genève, c'est là déjà, pour la Société des Nations elle-même, une victoire tout à fait inespérée.

Paul DU BOCHET.

Enclosure No. 14 to Despatch No. 1908
of October 30, 1931.

From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE POPULAIRE, October 25, 1931.

L'ECHEC DE GENÈVE

Le Conseil de la Société des Nations a tenu hier deux séances, après quoi, il s'est ajourné au 16 novembre. On lira plus loin les comptes rendus. Je les donne tels que l'Agence Havas nous les a transmis. Les lecteurs m'excuseront de leur longueur. Mais, les débats de Genève peuvent avoir des répercussions très graves. Il y va de la paix dans l'Extrême-Orient. Il y va du prestige de la S. D. N. Il y va peut-être encore de l'existence même de cette première ébauche d'organisation internationale.

Le Japon a maintenu intégralement son point de vue. Il peut se résumer ainsi: le retrait des troupes nipponnes ne peut se faire qu'après entente avec la Chine sur les « points fondamentaux » ; mais ceux-ci ne regardent que le Japon et la Chine, et le délégué du gouvernement de Tokio n'est pas autorisé à les faire connaître au Conseil ; néanmoins, le Japon demande que le Conseil adopte les amendements présentés par M. Yoshizawa et qui subordonnent l'évacuation à l'entente sur les « points fondamentaux » que le Conseil ignore. Autrement dit, le Japon a poussé le cynisme jusqu'à demander au Conseil de la S. D. N. d'approuver d'avance et sans les connaître, les conditions que l'Empire du Soleil Levant imposerait à la Chine sous la menace des baïonnettes.

Je ne sais pas si l'Agence Havas a rendu exactement compte des discours prononcés par les membres du Conseil. Mais de sa relation, il ne résulte pas que ceux-ci s'expliquèrent au délégué du Japon avec la force et l'indignation qui s'imposaient. On a l'impression que, contrairement à M. Yoshizawa, qui savait bien ce qu'il disait et où il voulait en venir, les représentants des grandes puissances étaient gênés et désorientés. Lord Cecil a même cru devoir protester de l'attachement du Conseil de la S. D. N. à la « sainteté des traités » et cela pour amadouer le représentant du pays qui occupe militairement une région qui ne lui appartient pas et qui viole ouvertement les « traités existants », le Covenant et le pacte Kellogg.

La gêne du Conseil s'explique, ainsi que je l'ai dit hier, par le fait que les intérêts impérialistes des Etats représentés à Genève sont identiques à ceux du Japon. La Chine est pour eux tous une colonie. Ils possèdent tous des « droits » basés sur la violence. Ils ont tous peur de la « révision des traités » si inégaux et si révoltants qu'ils soient. En réalité, ce n'est pas l'agression contre la Chine qui les trouble, mais l'expansion japonaise au préjudice des autres puissances capitalistes. C'est moins le maintien de la paix dans l'Extrême-Orient qui les intéresse, que le maintien de l'équilibre de leurs influences respectives en Chine.

Mais, hier, en plus de la gêne, il y avait du désarroi. C'est que, d'après la règle de l'unanimité, le Conseil se

trouvait dans l'impossibilité juridique de prendre une décision.

Qu'importe qu'il y ait agression caractérisée ? Qu'importe que le Japon se moque ouvertement du Conseil au sein duquel il est représenté ! Qu'importe que les traités, le Covenant le pacte de Paris soient violés ! La lettre de la loi constitutive de la S. D. N. exige l'unanimité. Et comme l'agresseur vote naturellement contre, le Conseil n'a pas le droit de prendre une décision.

Est-ce que le conflit sino-japonais, où pour la première fois l'absurdité de la règle de l'unanimité saute aux yeux, ne provoquera pas dans l'opinion publique un courant irrésistible en faveur de son abrogation ? Sinon qu'on prenne garde. La S. D. N. en mourra !

Et une autre question se pose. Le représentant de la Chine, d'abord, M. Briand ensuite, ont rappelé qu'il était dangereux de jouer avec le feu. Or, on est en présence d'un gouvernement qui délibérément, joue avec le feu. Que faut-il faire, pour empêcher l'incendie de se propager ?

Le Conseil est paralysé par la règle de l'unanimité. Il ne peut pas prendre de décision obligatoire pour tous les membres de la S. D. N. Mais quand la guerre n'a pas encore commencé, ou quand elle est encore localisée, la mesure la plus efficace pour l'empêcher ou pour l'arrêter, n'est pas telle ou telle action militaire, économique ou financière, mais la mobilisation générale de l'opinion publique contre l'agresseur, la création d'un état d'esprit de réprobation générale contre celui qui trouble la paix. Aucun gouvernement si omnipotent ou dictatorial qu'il soit, ne pourra déclencher une guerre si l'opinion publique du monde entier la réprouve, car son propre peuple se révolterait.

Et cela, le Conseil de la S. D. N. n'a pas voulu le faire.

Aussi les déclarations pacifistes de M. Briand et de ses collègues, à la séance d'hier, sonnent faux. Par les méthodes employées depuis le commencement du conflit, ils ont fait tout pour aboutir à un échec.

Et même, hier, quand le Japon refusa avec arrogance d'accepter la résolution — pourtant si timide — du Conseil, celui-ci n'osa pas adresser à l'opinion publique un appel qui l'aurait secouée d'indignation. C'eût été peut-être contraire à la lettre du Covenant. Mais cet acte eût été bien conforme à l'esprit qui a présidé à la création de la S. D. N. Il eût répondu aux aspirations des peuples qui, eux, veulent la paix.

...Les représentants des puissances capitalistes sont en train de tuer la S. D. N.

Il appartient aux travailleurs de la sauver en conquérant le pouvoir dans les principaux pays.

O. ROSENFELD.

Enclosure No. 15 to Despatch No. 1908
of October 30, 1931.

From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LA REPUBLIQUE, October 25, 1931.

Qui a tort ? Et qui a raison ?

On sait que le Conseil de la S. D. N. ne parvient pas à résoudre le conflit sino-japonais et s'est ajourné au 16 novembre. Senatus, qui n'a pas sa plume dans sa poche, fait à ce propos remarquer que Moukden après tout n'a été occupée par le Japon que le 19 septembre. En admettant donc que le Conseil réussisse à mettre les adversaires d'accord le 16 novembre, il se sera passé deux mois entre le début du conflit et son règlement. Un mauvais esprit pourrait trouver que c'est beaucoup.

Nous avons à plusieurs reprises insisté ici sur les raisons de cette désastreuse lenteur. En premier lieu, sir Eric Drummond, autrement dit le Bureau de la S. D. N., en second lieu, M. Alexandre Lerroux, qui n'y connaissait rien, et le vicomte Cecil qui élargit le conflit jusqu'à faire apparaître le problème du Pacifique. Voilà les auteurs responsables du retard. M. Briand arrivant en septembre, tout pouvait s'arranger. M. Briand arrivant en octobre ne pouvait que chausser les bottes de sir Eric Drummond et tout était perdu.

Espérons que d'ici le 16 novembre, la S. D. N. et son Bureau sauront former un dossier asiatique, ce dossier asiatique qui leur manque, et comprendront que la guerre, la guerre générale, peut sortir de la fusillade de Moukden comme de la bombe de Serajevo.

En attendant, notons deux points : L'attitude des Soviets n'a pas été sans étonner beaucoup de gens. Eux qui ont des intérêts en Mandchourie, qui l'année dernière faisaient la guerre à la Chine pour sauvegarder ces intérêts, n'ont pas bougé et, semble-t-il, ont favorisé le Japon. Là-dessus *Figaro* fait remarquer que lorsque Tchang Kaï Chek, le dictateur chinois, était en passe d'écraser le communisme en Chine, il y a deux ans, le Japon brusquement intervint contre le dictateur, barrant la route à ses armées, qui déjà marchaient sur Moukden.

Par ailleurs, des voix polonaises s'élèvent et se félicitent de l'immense effort accompli par les Soviets pour se rapprocher de la Chine, pour peupler et pour organiser la Sibérie. Plus les Russes, dit-on à Varsovie, se trouveront attirés vers les

choses chinoises, plus notre frontière sera tranquille.

Ainsi la tranquillité de l'Europe et en tout cas l'amélioration des relations polono-russes et donc roumano-russes, et aussi balto-russes, pourraient être dues au plan quinquennal, au Turksib, à l'effort russe en Asie, au mot de Staline : *Je suis un Asiate*, mot qui traduit une politique, enfin à l'intérêt extrêmement vif que les Soviets portent à la Mandchourie et au-delà à la Chine.

Troisième point : M. Jacques Bainville mène grande campagne à l'*Action Française* et à la *Liberté* sur ce point ; félicitons-nous de ne pas avoir eu le conflit à juger dans le courant de septembre. Il apparaît clairement que la Chine a provoqué le Japon, qu'elle a roulé le Conseil et qu'elle ne voulait que *faire condamner le Japon et avec lui « les traités inégaux » par quelques-unes des puissances qui sont pour leur part bénéficiaires de semblables traités.* Et notre confrère tire de là les conclusions que l'on devine.

Mais on peut en tirer d'autres conclusions, à savoir que les *traités inégaux* sont une chose détestable, que nous sommes bien sots d'en porter le poids, que la Turquie a jadis dénoncé ceux dont elle souffrait sans souci de ce que pouvait penser l'Europe, que la plupart de nos concessions en Chine ont déjà été évacuées, et qu'il faut bien s'attendre, lorsque la Chine aura des fusils et des canons, à ce que les *traités inégaux* aient vécu.

Pierre DOMINIQUE.

Enclosure No. 16 to Despatch No. 1908
of October 30, 1931.

From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE TEMPS, October 25, 1931.

LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS

A LA SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS

SÉANCE PUBLIQUE DU CONSEIL

(Par téléphone, de notre correspondant particulier)

Genève, 24 octobre.

Le conseil de la Société des nations a tenu ce matin une longue séance publique. Dans son contre-projet déposé hier, la délégation japonaise a introduit la notion « des principes fondamentaux » qu'il aurait voulu voir admettre par la Chine avant de procéder à l'évacuation de ses troupes. Toute la discussion d'aujourd'hui a tendu à obtenir de la délégation japonaise des précisions sur ces principes fondamentaux, mais M. Yoshizawa s'est dérobé. Dès qu'un membre du conseil essayait de serrer le problème de plus près, le représentant du Japon refusait de s'expliquer nettement.

La séance a commencé par une brève déclaration de *M. Yoshizawa* qui constatait que ces principes fondamentaux, dont il ne précise d'ailleurs pas le sens même général, avaient pour objet d'amener un apaisement dans la situation et de faciliter le rétablissement des relations normales entre son pays et la Chine.

Le *vicomte Cecil*, se référant aux cinq points japonais de principe publiés dans la presse, a alors demandé à M. Yoshizawa s'il s'agissait essentiellement pour la délégation japonaise d'une reconnaissance par la Chine des traités existants. Le représentant du Japon a répondu que son gouvernement ne l'autorise pas à renseigner officiellement le conseil.

Il est naturel, a-t-il dit, que mon pays désire entrer en pourparlers avec la Chine en vue d'arriver à une entente sur un certain nombre de questions touchant la sécurité de la vie et des biens des ressortissants japonais en Mandchourie. Le désir du gouvernement japonais est que cet accord de principe précède l'évacuation des troupes japonaises, car mon gouvernement est convaincu que nos ressortissants courront un danger grave aussitôt que nos troupes seront retirées.

Le représentant de l'Espagne, *M. de Madariaga*, parle du devoir du conseil : empêcher que le conflit de Mandchourie ne tourne en une véritable guerre et sauvegarder l'avenir de la Société des nations. Il esquisse les données générales de ce que l'on considère communément comme la sécurité nationale d'un pays. Il voit un danger à ce qu'il soit soutenu devant le conseil qu'un territoire peut demeurer envahi par des troupes étrangères, et cela pour des raisons de sécurité. L'argument lui semble insoutenable. Il pense donc, en terminant, que le bon sens voudrait que l'évacuation eût lieu et il propose que les deux parties prennent devant le conseil l'engagement solennel d'entamer des pourparlers directs pour régler le fond de leur différend le jour même.

A ce moment, *lord Cecil* revient à la charge, se basant sur un télégramme Reuter, disant que, d'après les milieux officiels de Tokio, le gouvernement japonais est déçu de voir que la Société des nations se refuse à consacrer « la sainteté des traités existants ». Le délégué britannique fait remarquer qu'il n'existe pas de demande de la délégation japonaise au conseil sur ce point. Il n'est nullement question pour le conseil de passer outre à la validité des traités. Un problème de cet ordre devrait être porté devant la Cour permanente de justice internationale.

Les traités, dit le représentant de la Grande-Bretagne, sont sacrés, mais discuter des détails, avant d'évacuer un territoire étranger indûment occupé, c'est renverser l'ordre naturel des choses.

Il faut, selon lord Cecil, évacuer d'abord et discuter ensuite.

Le prix des bœs exotiques (40 à 65 francs suivant qualité et provenance) augmente du droit de douane de 80 francs et des frais donne un prix de revient sensiblement inférieur au prix moyen des bœs indigènes. Aussi le gouvernement n'autorise-t-il que l'importation de 10 0/0 de bœs exotiques dans la mouline. L'écart des prix a provoqué des fraudes, comme nous l'avons déjà signalé à plusieurs reprises, et le ministère de l'Agriculture est intervenu énergiquement.

France. — Bîes d'hiver et bîes de printemps : la récolte est également défectueuse, et la qualité est médiocre. Elle semble devoir donner environ 70 millions de quintaux avec un poids spécifique moyen d'environ 72 kilos à l'hectolitre. On peut envisager une importation d'environ 15 à 17 millions de quintaux, dont 3 à 4 seront fournis par l'Afrique du nord.

La France, l'Italie et l'Allemagne continuent à limiter les importations par des droits élevés et des restrictions de pourcentage.

Days Importations

Hongrie. — La Hongrie poursuit normalement l'exportation de ses blés de nouvelle récolte, mais il semble qu'elle ne soit pas encore débarrassée de la totalité de ses vieux stocks.

superieures.

vend aux prix du jour, tout en maintenant, par son intervention à l'intérieur, des parités sensiblement

Baigante. — Cette superieure a celle de l'annee
derniere, en quantite et en qualite. L'exportation
est entre les mains d'un organisme d'Etat qui

Res. récolte d'orge peu importante : l'exportation s'en ressent.

ainsi, ce projet ne constitue pas une garantie
suffisante pour la protection de la vie et des biens
des ressortissants japonais.

Le gouvernement japonais, ajoute-t-il, n'a pas l'intention de régler son différend par des moyens de force. Il veut seulement assurer la sécurité d'une manière efficace.

Le conseil entend *M. de Madariaga*, qui propose un amendement destiné à rapprocher la délégation japonaise de l'unanimité des membres du conseil. Il se déclare déçu de l'attitude du Japon en ce qui touche l'engagement d'agir au grand jour. Il demande à *M. Yoshizawa* s'il retirerait son projet et s'il accepterait la résolution du président au cas où celle-ci serait amendée par l'insertion d'un engagement des parties de commencer dès la fin de l'évacuation des négociations sur tous les points en litige.

Le délégué du Japon ne répond pas à cette suggestion, mais il déclare que les principes fondamentaux dont il a parlé ne concernent que son pays et la Chine. Il ne peut retirer son contre-projet.

M. Briand propose alors au conseil de remettre à suite de la discussion à 16 heures. Se tournant vers son collègue japonais, il signale à M. Yoshikawa qu'il serait impossible d'introduire dans la résolution du conseil, même par esprit de conciliation, des principes fondamentaux sans les connaître et sans avoir le droit de les discuter et formuler.

Demander à une assemblée un tel esprit de sacrifices, c'est, dit M. Briand, aller au delà du possible. Le représentant du Japon comprendra lui-même, combien il est difficile d'envisager une pareille éventualité.

La séance de l'après-midi, fixée à 16 heures, sera consacrée au vote de la résolution proposée par M. Briand. On continue d'espérer que la délégation japonaise se ralliera à la suggestion préconisée que M. Briand lui a faite ce matin et qui consisterait, pour la délégation japonaise, à faire une réserve sur l'exécution par la Chine de ses engagements, en vue d'assurer la sécurité des Japonais en Mandchourie.

L'attitude du gouvernement chinois

Nankin, 24 octobre.

Le gouvernement chinois a envoyé à M. Alfred
Dreux, son représentant à Genève, de nouvelles ins-
tructions aux termes desquelles il lui enjoint de
se tenir strictement au texte original de la réso-
lution élaborée en premier lieu par la Société des
Nations et de repousser toute modification éven-
tuelle de cette proposition.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 16 to De
of October 30, 1931.
From the Embassy

Extract from LE TEMPS,

LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS

A LA SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS

SÉANCE PUBLIQUE DU CONSEIL

[Par téléphone, de notre correspondant particulier]
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La séance a commencé par une brève déclaration de M. Yoshizawa qui constatait que ces principes fondamentaux, dont il ne précise d'ailleurs pas le sens même général, avaient pour objet d'amener un apaisement dans la situation et de faciliter le rétablissement des relations normales entre son pays et la Chine.

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Il est naturel, a-t-il dit, que mon pays désire entrer en pourparlers avec la Chine en vue d'arriver à une entente sur un certain nombre de questions touchant la sécurité de la vie et des biens des ressortissants japonais en Mandchourie. Le désir du gouvernement japonais est que cet accord de principe précède l'évacuation des troupes japonaises, car mon gouvernement est convaincu que nos ressortissants courent un danger grave aussitôt que nos troupes seront retirées.

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A ce moment, lord Cecil revient à la charge, se basant sur un télégramme Reuter, disant que, d'après les milieux officiels de Tokio, le gouvernement japonais est déçu de voir que la Société des nations se refuse à consacrer « la sainteté des traités existants ». Le délégué britannique fait remarquer qu'il n'existe pas de demande de la délégation japonaise au conseil sur ce point. Il n'est nullement question pour le conseil de passer outre à la validité des traités. Un problème de cet ordre devrait être porté devant la Cour permanente de justice internationale.

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Il faut, selon lord Cecil, évacuer d'abord et discuter ensuite.

M. Yoshizawa, après quelques mots de réponse à M. de Madariaga, reste inébranlable quant à son point de vue; il ne répond même pas à la question directe de lord Cecil, se bornant à répéter que son pays est d'avis que les troupes japonaises ne pourront pas être retirées avant que la sécurité des ressortissants japonais soit nettement garantie.

DÉCLARATIONS DE M. ARISTIDE BRIAND

M. Briand intervient à son tour et tente un suprême effort de conciliation. Il montre que le projet de résolution du conseil a pour lui la clarté, alors que le contre-projet japonais donne lieu à des interprétations que la discussion d'aujourd'hui n'a pas réussi à dissiper. Il lui semble impossible de terminer les graves débats du conseil sur un texte obscur, et il rappelle les termes d'une déclaration de M. Yoshizawa constatant, le 30 septembre dernier, que l'évacuation des troupes avait commencé.

Nous sommes, dit M. Briand, en présence d'une question essentielle qui met en cause la dignité et l'honneur de la Société des nations, dont le pacte, dans son article 10, de même d'ailleurs que le pacte de Paris de renonciation à la guerre, garantissent l'intégrité territoriale des Etats membres. Par tous ces actes internationaux, les nations se sont obligées à régler leurs différends par des moyens pacifiques. Or, l'opinion publique admettrait difficilement qu'une occupation militaire puisse être entendue comme un moyen pacifique de régler un conflit quelconque.

M. Briand constate ensuite que la Société des nations a déjà joué son rôle essentiel en empêchant la guerre. Il demande à la délégation du Japon un effort de conciliation. Et M. Briand de démontrer que les deux parties, aujourd'hui, ne sont pas loin de s'entendre.

Le gouvernement japonais, dit-il, accepte que, pour les grands problèmes qui se posent devant lui et la Chine, des négociations s'engagent après l'évacuation. M. Yoshizawa a précisé que les principes fondamentaux dont il a parlé restaient dans le domaine de la sécurité; et cependant des préoccupations demeurent.

Dans ces conditions, il nous faut un texte clair. La Chine accepte d'engager des pourparlers sur l'organisation de la sécurité dans des territoires que le Japon déclare n'avoir occupés que pour protéger la sécurité de ses nationaux. En quelques jours, sinon en quelques heures, l'accord peut être fait; puisque le gouvernement japonais, comme il l'annonçait le 30 septembre, a commencé d'évacuer, c'est qu'il pouvait le faire. Il y a seulement une question de plus ou de moins, et surtout une question de lieux.

Le représentant du Japon a déclaré qu'il ne voulait pas, notamment en ce qui concerne le délai, prendre un engagement qu'il ne fût pas certain de pouvoir tenir. Mais, ajoute M. Briand, le gouvernement japonais pourrait formuler une réserve précisant que l'évacuation aurait lieu à condition que la bonne volonté de la Chine s'affirme et qu'elle prenne les précautions prévues.

M. Briand souligne ensuite combien il est convaincu que lorsqu'on saura qu'une pression militaire a cessé, les difficultés s'aplaniront et cela à l'avantage des deux pays comme de l'humanité entière. Car, actuellement, il ne faut pas jouer avec la tension des nerfs.

Mais le représentant du Japon se borne à déclarer brièvement qu'à son grand regret il ne peut accepter le projet de résolution du président, car ce projet ne constitue pas une garantie suffisante pour la protection de la vie et des biens des ressortissants japonais.

Le gouvernement japonais, ajoute-t-il, n'a pas l'intention de régler son différend par des moyens de force, il veut seulement assurer la sécurité d'une manière efficace.

Le conseil entend M. de Madariaga, qui propose un amendement destiné à rapprocher la délégation japonaise de l'unanimité des membres du conseil. Il se déclare déçu de l'attitude du Japon en ce qui touche l'engagement d'agir au grand jour. Il demande à M. Yoshizawa s'il retirerait son projet et s'il accepterait la résolution du président au cas où celle-ci serait amendée par l'insertion d'un engagement des parties de commencer dès la fin de l'évacuation des négociations sur tous les points en litige.

Le délégué du Japon ne répond pas à cette suggestion, mais il déclare que les principes fondamentaux dont il a parlé ne concernent que son pays et la Chine. Il ne peut retirer son contre-projet.

M. Briand propose alors au conseil de remettre la suite de la discussion à 16 heures. Se tournant vers son collègue japonais, il signale à M. Yoshizawa qu'il serait impossible d'introduire dans la résolution du conseil, même par esprit de conciliation, des principes fondamentaux sans les connaître et sans avoir le droit de les discuter et formuler.

Demander à une assemblée un tel esprit de sacrifices, c'est, dit M. Briand, aller au delà du possible. Le représentant du Japon comprendra lui-même, combien il est difficile d'envisager une pareille éventualité.

La séance de l'après-midi, fixée à 16 heures, sera consacrée au vote de la résolution proposée par M. Briand. On continue d'espérer que la délégation japonaise se ralliera à la suggestion précise que M. Briand lui a faite ce matin et qui consisterait, pour la délégation japonaise, à faire une réserve sur l'exécution par la Chine de ses engagements, en vue d'assurer la sécurité des Japonais en Mandchourie.

L'attitude du gouvernement chinois

Nankin, 24 octobre.

Le gouvernement chinois a envoyé à M. Alfred Sze, son représentant à Genève, de nouvelles instructions aux termes desquelles il lui enjoint de s'en tenir strictement au texte original de la résolution élaborée en premier lieu par la Société des nations et de repousser toute modification éventuelle de cette proposition.

Enclosure No. 17 to Despatch No. 1908
of October 30, 1931.

From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'AVENIR, October 26, 1931.

A GENÈVE

Le Conseil de la S. D. N. s'est ajourné au 16 novembre sans avoir pu régler le différend sino-japonais

A la suite du bombardement de la ville mandchourienne de Kin-Tchéou, le 9 octobre, par des avions japonais, en représailles, déclara le gouvernement japonais, d'attaques dirigées contre ses garde-voies par des réguliers chinois, le gouvernement chinois avait demandé et obtenu une convocation spéciale du conseil de la S.D.N. afin de leur soumettre le différend né de cet incident.

Le conseil s'est en effet réuni et a tenté sans y parvenir de trouver un terrain d'accord entre les deux parties, mais il a dû reconnaître, à regret, que tout compromis était rendu impossible par le parti pris des deux gouvernements, de ne rien abandonner ni l'un ni l'autre de leurs griefs ou de leurs revendications.

Il faut rendre cette justice au conseil qu'il a été fidèle jusqu'au bout à son mandat et qu'il n'a pas laissé porter atteinte aux principes de justice et de paix dont il avait la garde en la circonstance.

Mais les débats en étant arrivés à un point mort, le conseil s'est ajourné au 16 novembre après avoir adressé aux deux parties un appel à la conciliation directe.

Cette motion ne possède pas de valeur juridique, elle ne lie ni les parties ni le conseil, mais sa valeur morale est considérable.

Le document demeure. Il sera sur la table du conseil demain comme aujourd'hui, rappelant les parties au respect de leurs obligations.

En résumé, le conseil de la Société des Nations a fait tout son devoir, il a pris courageusement ses responsabilités.

Ce n'est ni de sa faute, ni de celle de la S. D. N. si, dans les circonstances présentes, l'organisation de la paix et les garanties de sécurité sont telles que des accidents puissent encore se produire ici ou là.

Le Japon ferait bientôt une nouvelle déclaration

Londres, 25 octobre. — On mande de Tokyo à l'Agence Reuter :

Tout le pays se montre déçu du refus du Conseil de la S. D. N. d'accepter la contre-proposition japonaise.

La conviction que le résultat du conflit sino-japonais constitue une question de vie ou de mort pour le Japon est très profonde dans les milieux officiels et l'on estime que l'attitude japonaise ne peut absolument pas être modifiée, même si le Japon doit tenir tête au monde entier.

Pour éviter toute fausse interprétation, le gouvernement prépare une déclaration qui sera probablement publiée demain soir, dans laquelle il énumérera explicitement, croit-on, les cinq points et rendra claire la position du Japon.

La déclaration réitérera en outre les assurances des Japonais : que le retrait des troupes sera effectué aussitôt que les circonstances le permettront; qu'il ne sera pas fait recours à la guerre et qu'aucun territoire ne sera annexé.

Le boycottage en Chine des produits japonais

Pékin, 25 octobre. — Vingt mille étudiants ont inspecté aujourd'hui tous les magasins de Pékin, faisant l'inventaire des produits japonais, mettant ceux-ci sous scellés et interdisant leur vente sous peine d'amende et de désignation publique des marchands.

La police est intervenue.

Il n'y a pas eu d'incident.

M. Briand rentre à Paris

Genève, 25 octobre. — M. Briand a quitté ce matin Genève par la route, rentrant à Paris.

Il est accompagné de M. Alexis Léger, directeur des affaires politiques au Quai d'Orsay.

Enclosure No. 18 to Despatch No. 1908
of October 30, 1931.

From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ECHO DE PARIS, October 26, 1931.

APRES L'ECHEC DE GENEVE

Une déclaration japonaise ferait connaître aujourd'hui les "points fondamentaux"

Tokio, 25 octobre. — L'agence *Rengo* annonce que le gouvernement est en train d'élaborer une déclaration qui, croit-on, sera publiée demain matin.

Les cercles autorisés se montrent en effet, assez embarrassés du fait qu'il a été impossible à M. Yoshizawa d'exposer clairement la genèse des cinq points du gouvernement de Tokio, lorsqu'il lui a été demandé d'expliquer clairement la signification des « principes fondamentaux ». On se rend compte que son refus d'explications portera probablement préjudice à la cause japonaise et suscitera des doutes quant aux intentions réelles du Japon.

Pour éviter toute fausse interprétation, le gouvernement prépare donc une déclaration dans laquelle il énumérera explicitement, croit-on, les cinq points et rendra claire la position du Japon.

Le Japon, dira ce document, estime nécessaire d'assurer des relations normales entre les deux pays sans perte de temps et de proposer cinq points fondamentaux qui n'impliqueront rien d'illégal, à savoir :

Garantie mutuelle par les deux pays de leur inviolabilité ; interdiction par le gouvernement chinois du mouvement antijaponais ; reconnaissance par le gouvernement chinois des droits du Japon en matière d'établissements de commerce et d'agriculture en Mandchourie ; respect par le Japon de l'intégrité territoriale de la Chine ; respect par le gouvernement chinois de l'existence de tous les traités concernant la Mandchourie. (Havas.)

Le vote de Genève exaspère le nationalisme et l'anglophobie du Japon

(Service spécial de l'Ech de Paris)

Tokio, 25 octobre. — L'ajournement du conseil de la Ligue des Nations rend de nouveau possible des négociations directes entre le Japon et la Chine. Mais si elles échouent, le Japon cherchera à tirer prétexte du nouveau facteur créé par la situation pour s'attirer les bons offices des divers gouvernements locaux mandchouriens, qui sont tous opposés fortement à Nankin.

Tandis que le gouvernement de Nankin compte absolument sur la Ligue pour le sauver de ses difficultés, la résolution du conseil a, au contraire, déterminé plus que jamais le Japon à chercher une solution en dehors de la Ligue des Nations, et il n'y a pas la moindre chance que le Japon accepte le conseil de la Ligue qui n'a fait, au contraire que renforcer le gouvernement et la classe militaire dans leur intention de ne pas se retirer de Mandchourie jusqu'à ce que la Chine ait fourni des garanties.

La plupart des grands journaux attaquent vigoureusement l'attitude de l'Angleterre et notent ce qu'ils interprètent comme le déclin de son prestige en Orient. Ils lui reprochent de n'avoir pas su sympathiser avec le Japon dans ses difficultés avec la Chine. L'Angleterre, disent-ils, devrait pourtant bien comprendre puisque en 1927, à Shanghai, elle a eu des difficultés analogues.

La presse japonaise est particulièrement sévère pour le marquis de Reading dans son rôle à Genève et pour l'attitude du ministre d'Angleterre en Chine, sir Miles Lampson. Quant à la possibilité pour le Japon de se retirer de la Ligue, on en discute de nouveau, même dans les milieux officiels. On se plaint plus que jamais que les droits du Japon en vertu des traités aient été méconnus. (Daily Telegraph.)

Enclosure No. 19 to Despatch No. 1908
of October 30, 1931.

From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE JOURNAL, October 26, 1931.

LA MEDIATION DE LA S. D. N. entre la Chine et le Japon

Si elle laisse en suspens
la solution définitive du conflit
on ne peut pas dire qu'elle n'a pas
conjuré de plus graves périls

Le conseil de la Société des nations s'est séparé samedi soir sans avoir pu mettre d'accord les Chinois et les Japonais. C'est un résultat brutal qu'on peut déplorer, mais qu'il faut cependant s'abstenir de dramatiser.

Les membres du conseil n'avaient pas la prétention de régler l'ensemble des difficultés qui divisent actuellement la Chine et le Japon. Il a toujours été entendu que ces difficultés devaient faire l'objet de négociations directes entre Tokio et Nankin. Saisi par la Chine, en vertu de l'article 11 du covenant, le conseil se proposait seulement d'arrêter, d'accord avec les deux parties, les conditions dans lesquelles les Japonais pourraient ramener leurs troupes dans la zone du chemin de fer sud-mandchourien. Le seul fait qu'il n'a pu y parvenir, malgré les longs efforts de M. Briand et la bonne volonté réciproque de M. Yoshizawa et le docteur Sze, démontre qu'il s'est trouvé devant un cas dont la complexité échappe présentement à la rigueur des lois écrites.

Le conflit sino-japonais diffère totalement des conflits prévus aussi bien par le pacte de la S.D.N. que par le pacte Briand-Kellogg, parce que, d'une part, il met aux prises un gouvernement régulier et un pays en pleine anarchie, et, d'autre part, parce que le Japon, s'appuyant sur les droits qu'il tient du traité de Portsmouth, et faisant valoir le préjudice que cause à ses intérêts, dans une région où il a investi près de quarante milliards, le boycottage antijaponais, argue que les opérations militaires qu'on lui reproche sont de simples mesures de police.

Voilà pourquoi il serait profondément injuste de conclure du particulier au général et d'aller proclamer la faillite de l'institution genevoise. Demandons-nous plutôt ce qui serait advenu si la Société des nations n'avait pas existé ?

Ah ! certes, nous sommes encore loin du temps où l'autorité et les moyens d'action de la ligue, ainsi que le jeu efficace des pactes, suffiraient à prévenir tous les conflits et à assurer la paix du monde. C'est pourquoi nous réclamons le droit de prendre toutes les mesures qui garantissent notre sécurité. Mais gardons-nous d'étouffer la petite flamme vacillante vers laquelle tous les peuples tourmentés des yeux remplis d'espérance.

Enclosure No. 20 to Despatch No. 1908
of October 30, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from JOURNAL DES DEBATS, October 26, 1931.

LE JAPON A REPOUSSE LA RESOLUTION DU CONSEIL

L'impuissance de la Ligue

Le Conseil de la S. D. N. s'est séparé hier après-midi, s'ajournant au 16 novembre, après avoir voté un projet de résolution que le Japon a repoussé. Le texte adopté est sans valeur juridique, ce n'est qu'un simple vœu, l'unanimité étant nécessaire dans un cas semblable lorsque l'article 11 du Pacte a été invoqué. Néanmoins tous les membres du Conseil, à l'exception des représentants des deux puissances en conflit, ont échangé des compliments au sujet de leur magnifique action et ont couvert de fleurs M. Briand, qui a répondu qu'il voyait là une compensation pour les déboires et les amertumes de la vie politique. Le meilleur compte rendu de cette petite comédie larmoyante a été donné par le correspondant de la *Chicago Tribune* à Genève : « Le Conseil, télégraphie-t-il, s'est livré à une débauche de tendresse (*love feast*), louant les qualités de M. Briand comme président, jetant de généreux bouquets aux Etats-Unis pour leur coopération et affirmant que la Ligue a gagné en crédit du fait que les événements de Mandchourie n'ont pas abouti à une guerre véritable pendant les délibérations du Conseil. Ensuite celui-ci s'est ajourné, laissant les affaires de Mandchourie se débrouiller toutes seules. »

Nous n'examinerons pas aujourd'hui le fond du différend, ce qui exigerait une étude détaillée. La question est trop complexe pour qu'on puisse la trancher d'une façon simpliste comme le font tant de nos confrères, qui prennent parti soit pour la Chine, soit pour le Japon. Tant du côté chinois que du côté japonais, la politique poursuivie est très subtile, comme toujours en Extrême-Orient. Le Japon a été certainement brutal, et, sous l'influence du clan qui veut une mainmise complète sur la Mandchourie, il a eu recours à des moyens qu'il n'est pas possible d'approuver les yeux fermés. La Chine, d'autre part, cherche certainement, d'une façon qui n'est pas toujours droite, à se libérer d'engagements qui la lient; en outre, les garanties qu'elle peut offrir sont sujettes à caution. Voilà ce qu'on peut constater pour le moment en toute impartialité.

La tâche du Conseil était donc très délicate, nous le reconnaissons bien volontiers. Personne ne lui reprocherait d'avoir échoué, s'il avait loyalement son impuissance. Ce qu'il y a de mauvais dans le cas de la S. D. N., c'est que ceux qui parlent en son nom ne veulent jamais enregistrer un fiasco; il doit être entendu, selon eux, qu'elle est toujours à la hauteur de sa mission et que son mécanisme suffit à assurer la paix. Comme ils se préoccupent en général surtout de sauver la face, ils commettent des erreurs qui ne font souvent que compliquer les choses. En septembre, alors que si l'on voulait intervenir il fallait agir vite, le Conseil a jugé bon de ne rien faire et de laisser les événements se développer. En octobre il a cru frapper un grand coup en invitant un représentant des Etats-Unis à siéger à sa table, initiative très contestable qui pourrait être invoquée un jour, comme un précédent, par les Soviétiques. Enfin, ne sachant que faire, il a voté une résolution qui est pratiquement inefficace et dont la valeur morale elle-même est très faible dans les circonstances où elle a été adoptée.

Au lieu de dire, comme le télégramme officieux de Genève, que la S. D. N. « a

fait tout son devoir et a pris courageusement ses responsabilités », il convient d'affirmer qu'elle n'est pas capable d'empêcher un conflit international sérieux. Ce serait bien pis s'il s'agissait d'une affaire mettant aux prises des grandes puissances européennes : les lenteurs du Conseil empêcheraient toute action utile; l'âme à la Ponce-Pilate de certains de ses membres se révélerait alors dans toute sa beauté. Quant à la coopération américaine dont on a fait si grand état, on a pu voir qu'elle était toute verbale et platonique. On n'a pas le droit de dire que les Etats-Unis pourront bientôt entrer dans la Ligue et leur collaboration extérieure, si l'on peut dire, est plutôt gênante. M. Borah a déclaré hier que « le peuple américain est plus opposé aujourd'hui à son entrée dans la S. D. N. qu'en 1920 ». Il l'est, dans tous les cas, presque autant. Si les prétendus amis de la S. D. N. continuent à crier qu'elle est en mesure de garantir la sécurité et de maintenir la paix, ils prépareront sa faillite. Il faut dire la vérité. Cela vaudra mieux pour tout le monde et pour la S. D. N. elle-même.

PIERRE BERNIS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(F) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS. Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 21 to despatch No. 1908
of October 30, 1931.

From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE MATIN, October 26, 1931.

LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS

**M. Yoshizawa continuera à Paris
ses pourparlers avec M. Briand**
[DE NOTRE CORRESPONDANT PARTICULIER]

GENÈVE 25 octobre. — *Par téléphone.*
— En compagnie de M. Leger, chef de son cabinet, M. Aristide Briand, ministre des affaires étrangères, a quitté Genève, ce matin, à 7 h. 30, en automobile, pour se rendre chez un de ses amis, près de Tonnerre, où il s'arrêtera un jour avant de rentrer à Paris. Il compte être de retour lundi soir dans la capitale.

M. Yoshizawa, représentant du Japon au conseil de la Société des nations, qui a pris le train de 14 h. 15, cet après-midi, pour rentrer à Paris, a déclaré, sur le quai de la gare, que la journée d'hier fut la plus tragique de sa vie.

M. Yoshizawa compte pouvoir continuer à Paris avec M. Briand, président en exercice du conseil, les négociations au sujet des événements de Mandchourie.

**Le Japon affirme son désir de négocier
avec la Chine**

TOKIO (via Londres). — 25 octobre. — *Téléph. Matin.* — Le cabinet japonais a décidé aujourd'hui, à l'issue d'un conseil qui a duré quatre heures, de publier un communiqué officiel pour affirmer une fois de plus sa volonté d'entrer en négociations avec le gouvernement de Pékin ainsi qu'avec les divers gouvernements locaux de Mandchourie afin d'arriver à une solution rapide du différend actuel.

**L'opinion nippone se plaint que la S.D.N.
a sous-estimé la responsabilité chinoise**

[SERVICE SPECIAL DU « NEW YORK TIMES »]

TOKIO, 25 octobre. — *Par câble.* — Le gouvernement est fort désappointé du tour qu'ont pris les débats de Genève. On déplore la résolution du Conseil, et on fait ressortir qu'elle semble rendre le Japon responsable de l'impasse où l'on est arrivé, alors que la Chine porte sa part de responsabilité en refusant de reconnaître les traités existants.

Le Japon ne veut pas, actuellement, rompre avec la Société des nations, ni changer son attitude, mais il est évident que la situation devient de plus en plus dangereuse.

Les milieux politiques estiment que la Société des nations semble approuver la Chine au moment où celle-ci répudie les obligations qui lui incombent d'après les traités ; ils pensent aussi que Nankin a été encouragé dans la voie qui consiste à contester au Japon son droit de collaboration dans le développement de la Mandchourie.

Or, d'après ces mêmes milieux, la Mandchourie n'est restée chinoise qu'à la suite de la guerre russo-japonaise de 1905. Ce fait est un des points qui font que les Japonais persistent à maintenir leur position dans le conflit.

Enfin, il est certain pour l'opinion publique que les efforts de la S.D.N. en vue de régler la question au lieu d'aboutir à un relâchement de l'emprise japonaise en Mandchourie n'ont fait que renforcer l'influence de ceux qui pensent que la Chine ne respecte que la force et ne s'incline que devant elle.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 22 to Despatch No. 1908
of October 30, 1931.

From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE TEMPS, October 26, 1931.

Le conseil de la Société des nations s'est ajourné au 16 novembre sans avoir pu régler définitivement le différend sino-japonais. En effet, le Japon n'ayant pas voté la résolution telle qu'elle a été adoptée par tous les autres membres du conseil, celle-ci reste à l'état de simple recommandation. On doit le regretter,

parce que l'unanimité s'affirmant en cette circonstance eût grandement servi l'autorité morale de la Société des nations, mais il était malheureusement à craindre que le gouvernement de Tokio ne cédât pas sur la nature des garanties qu'il réclame avant de retirer ses forces des dernières localités chinoises occupées. En réalité, le Japon entend obtenir de la Chine la reconnaissance et la confirmation formelle des droits qu'il tient des traités, et c'est parce que le conseil ne pouvait s'engager dans cette voie, la question étant indépendante de celle dont il était saisi, que l'accord n'a pu se faire.

Il n'en reste pas moins que toute menace de guerre en Extrême-Orient est écartée, que le Japon a donné l'assurance qu'il n'a pas de visées territoriales en Mandchourie et qu'il ramènera ses troupes dans la zone du chemin de fer aussi vite que possible. L'action du conseil de Genève a donc pratiquement donné des résultats, et il est incontestable que c'est à l'habileté de M. Briand qu'on le doit. Aussi les éloges adressés, à la séance d'hier, au représentant de la France sont-ils pleinement justifiés par le courage politique avec lequel M. Briand a assumé une tâche particulièrement délicate dans les circonstances actuelles.

Enclosure No. 23 to Despatch No. 1908
of October 30, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from ACTUALITES, October 29, 1931.

Le conflit sino-japonais et la Société des Nations

Par M. A. LE PAGE

Le Conseil de la Société des Nations a dû s'ajourner au 16 novembre, sans avoir pu faire l'unanimité de ses membres sur le projet de résolution, préparé par M. Briand, fixant les conditions à remplir par les deux parties, en vue de mettre fin au conflit. Ce projet de résolution comportait, dans ses grandes lignes, l'obligation, pour les Japonais de retirer leurs troupes des localités chinoises encore occupées dans un délai de trois semaines. La Chine, de son côté, était invitée à garantir, dans les localités évacuées, la vie et les biens des ressortissants japonais, après le retrait des troupes et à admettre le contrôle d'observateurs neutres, chargés de suivre cette opération pour le compte de la Société des Nations.

La Chine a accepté ce projet; mais le Gouvernement de Tokio s'y est refusé et c'est la voix de son délégué à Genève, M. Yoshizawa, qui a manqué pour faire l'unanimité, faute de laquelle, la résolution du Conseil reste à l'état de simple recommandation.

M. Yoshizawa avait présenté, au nom de son gouvernement, un contre-projet qui, tout en reprenant certains points du texte préparé par le Conseil, subordonnait l'accord du Gouvernement japonais à la reconnaissance préalable, par la Chine, de cinq points fondamentaux que le délégué de Tokio avait fait connaître confidentiellement à M. Briand, à Sir Eric Drummond, secrétaire général de la S. D. N., et à M. Stimson, mais qu'il s'est refusé à préciser en séance publique du Conseil.

Le Gouvernement japonais a publié, depuis, une déclaration officielle exposant clairement ces cinq points fondamentaux qui seraient les suivants :

1° Le Japon et la Chine se donneront une promesse mutuelle de non-agression comme garantie de l'intégrité de leurs territoires réciproques;

2° Toutes les manifestations de sentiments antijaponais, y compris les boycottages, seront définitivement réprimées;

3° Des assurances seront données concernant la sécurité des vies et des biens japonais;

4° Un versement sera effectué pour le payement des chemins de fer construits avec des fonds japonais et les accords existants pour la construction d'un chemin de fer en Mandchourie seront reconnus;

5° Les droits existants, en vertu des traités, y compris la question des terres affermées par les Japonais en Mandchourie, seront reconnus.

La déclaration réitère également les assurances données par le Japon de retirer ses troupes en deçà la zone du chemin de fer Sud-Mandchourien, aussitôt que les circonstances le permettront, de n'avoir pas recours à la guerre et de ne pas an-

pas en Mandchourie, qu'il est absolument décidé à ne pas faire la guerre, que son intervention a été déterminée par les attaques de bandes chinoises dans la région du chemin de fer Sud-Mandchourien, qu'il n'a jamais eu de visées territoriales et, qu'au surplus, il n'a fait qu'user des droits que lui donnent des traités signés par la Chine.

Sa thèse n'a pas été admise finalement par le Conseil de la Société des Nations et le délégué de Tokio s'est trouvé complètement isolé au moment du vote, le délégué britannique, lui-même, ayant pris nettement position contre lui. Il n'est pas sans intérêt de rappeler que c'est le deuxième refus opposé par le Conseil aux demandes du Japon, le premier s'étant produit lorsque l'admission aux discussions, du délégué des Etats-Unis, fut décidée malgré les objections de Tokio.

Il serait, sans doute, exagéré de dire que l'action du Conseil de la Société des Nations s'est trouvée complètement inopérante pour amener un règlement du conflit. Ainsi que l'a fait observer M. Briand avant la clôture de la dernière séance, le Conseil peut mettre à son actif le fait que le différend ne constitue pas, de l'avis du délégué du Japon, une menace de guerre. Certains ne manqueront pas de juger que ce résultat est assez maigre et qu'il était, au surplus, acquis d'avance, le Japon ayant, dès la première heure, annoncé sa décision de ne pas faire la guerre à la Chine.

M. Briand a, en outre, exprimé l'espoir que, d'ici au 16 novembre, le Japon montrera, par ses actes, que sa bonne volonté est orientée vers la fin du conflit et que le différend pourra être, enfin, définitivement liquidé. Ce n'est pas absolument certain. L'opinion publique japonaise s'est vivement émue de l'attitude prise par le Conseil à l'égard de Tokio et s'étonne de voir que tout semble s'être passé à Genève comme si, dans l'affaire, le Japon était seul coupable. On va jusqu'à dire que le Japon devrait se retirer de la Société des Nations qui s'est refusée à admettre des droits reconnus, pourtant, par des traités internationaux.

Il faut espérer que le Gouvernement de Tokio ne mettra pas à exécution, dans un accès de mauvaise humeur, un projet, sans doute dangereux pour l'autorité de la Société des Nations, mais qui irait aussi contre ses propres intérêts. Le grief fait au Conseil d'avoir méconnu le caractère de certaines obligations acceptées par la Chine n'en est pas moins fort grave en lui-même. La Chine se défend en disant que ces traités datent de 1915 et ont été imposés " par contrainte ". C'est également ce que disent les Allemands du " Diktat " de Versailles.

Le Conseil de la Société des Nations a beau prétendre que l'article II du Pacte invoqué par la Chine

Enclosure No. 25 to Despatch No. 1908
of October 30, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from ACTUALITES, October 29, 1931.

Le conflit sino-japonais et la Société des Nations

Par M. A. LE PAGE

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Ainsi le Japon se maintient solidement sur la position qu'il a prise, dès le début, devant la Société des Nations et que le Conseil s'est finalement refusé à admettre.

La Chine, au contraire, fidèle à sa tactique de plaignante et demanderesse à Genève, s'est constamment conformée aux désirs exprimés par le Conseil et est même allée, peut-être pour se concilier encore un peu plus les sympathies des délégués chargés de régler le conflit, jusqu'à une tentative de conciliation, plus ou moins sincère, entre les Gouvernements de Canton et de Nankin. La dualité de gouvernement ne pouvait, en effet, si elle s'était maintenue, qu'accentuer l'impression de désordre dont le Gouvernement japonais faisait état, pour expliquer la nécessité où il s'était trouvé d'intervenir, et faire ressortir les dangers d'une évacuation alors que le chaos chinois ne permettait pas de garantir les vies et les biens des sujets japonais après le retrait des troupes.

Il faut reconnaître que le Japon, s'il a fermement maintenu son attitude, s'est toujours efforcé de démontrer au Conseil de la Société des Nations que l'état de guerre n'existe

pas en Mandchourie, qu'il est absolument décidé à ne pas faire la guerre, que son intervention a été déterminée par les attaques de bandes chinoises dans la région du chemin de fer Sud-Mandchourien, qu'il n'a jamais eu de visées territoriales et, qu'au surplus, il n'a fait qu'user des droits que lui donnent des traités signés par la Chine.

Sa thèse n'a pas été admise finalement par le Conseil de la Société des Nations et le délégué de Tokio s'est trouvé complètement isolé au moment du vote, le délégué britannique, lui-même, ayant pris nettement position contre lui. Il n'est pas sans intérêt de rappeler que c'est le deuxième refus opposé par le Conseil aux demandes du Japon, le premier s'étant produit lorsque l'admission aux discussions, du délégué des Etats-Unis, fut décidée malgré les objections de Tokio.

Il serait, sans doute, exagéré de dire que l'action du Conseil de la Société des Nations s'est trouvée complètement inopérante pour amener un règlement du conflit. Ainsi que l'a fait observer M. Briand avant la clôture de la dernière séance, le Conseil peut mettre à son actif le fait que le différend ne constitue pas, de l'avis du délégué du Japon, une menace de guerre. Certains ne manqueront pas de juger que ce résultat est assez maigre et qu'il était, au surplus, acquis d'avance, le Japon ayant, dès la première heure, annoncé sa décision de ne pas faire la guerre à la Chine.

Le Conseil de la Société des Nations a beau prétendre que l'article II du Pacte, invoqué par la Chine pour réclamer son intervention, ne lui permettait pas d'examiner la demande du Japon en ce qui concerne la reconnaissance, qu'il exigeait de la Chine, des traités existants, sa position est assez difficile à soutenir et cette décision n'est pas faite pour augmenter, dans l'avenir l'autorité de la S. D. N.

Il reste, en résumé, que le Conseil n'a pu faire l'unanimité sur son projet de résolution et que le Japon sort de Genève peu satisfait de ce qu'il considère comme une injustice.

Il n'est pas exagéré de penser, même si le conflit actuel s'apaise avant le 16 novembre, qu'il y a là un point sensible de la carte diplomatique sur lequel la France se doit, dès maintenant, d'avoir les yeux ouverts.

« Actualités. », 10/29 A. Le Page.

Enclosure No. 24 to Despatch No. 1908
of October 30, 1931.

From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from FIGARO, October 29, 1931.

LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS

De prochaines protestations de Tokio

Tokio, 28 octobre. — Dans les milieux officiels, on exprime l'intention de rejeter la suggestion faite au Japon par sir Eric Drummond, le 26 courant, aux termes de laquelle le Japon retirerait ses troupes moyennant l'assurance donnée par la Chine de respecter ses obligations découlant des traités.

On affirme de nouveau que l'affaire de Mandchourie est précisément la conséquence des violations de traités dont la Chine est coutumière ; c'est pourquoi des assurances et des déclarations vagues sont des bases trop fragiles pour qu'on puisse y faire reposer la garantie de la sécurité et des intérêts des Japonais en Mandchourie.

Le Japon a décidé de soumettre, aussitôt qu'il sera possible, au conseil de la Société des Nations une liste des traités que la Chine n'a pas observés.

On croit savoir que ce geste sera la réponse à la lettre que le docteur Sze a adressée à M. Briand et dans laquelle il déclare que son pays se reconnaît obligé, en vertu du covenant de la S. D. N., de respecter les conventions internationales.

Entre temps, le ministère des affaires étrangères n'a pu entendre qu'il ne peut étudier la suggestion tendant à soumettre la question des traités au tribunal de La Haye, étant donné que leur validité n'est pas contestée et qu'il ne s'agit pas de difficultés d'interprétation. De plus, le ministère des affaires étrangères japonais se demande ce que deviendraient les intérêts japonais en Mandchourie en attendant la décision de la Cour internationale de justice, qui pourrait ne pas être prise avant des années.

Les hostilités continuent

Tokio, 28 octobre. — Des soldats chinois ont attaqué un détachement japonais qui avait été envoyé contre des bandits. Au cours de la lutte, un capitaine et deux soldats japonais ont été tués et trois soldats blessés. Des renforts ont été expédiés de Chang Chia Toun.

Suivant une information de source japonaise de Kharbine, Junj Ghin, chef d'état-major du maréchal Chang Hsueh Liang, aurait, selon les instructions de ce dernier, organisé trois bandes de la mort, composées chacune d'un millier d'hommes ne portant pas l'uniforme militaire, qui vont être envoyées sur divers points de la Mandchourie du Sud.

Le Japon craint une attaque des Soviets en Mandchourie

Tokio, 28 octobre. — Craignant que de sérieux événements ne se produisent, M. Shidehara, ministre des affaires étrangères du Japon, a chargé l'ambassadeur japonais à Moscou d'exprimer au gouvernement des Soviets l'inquiétude que causent au Japon les informations annonçant des mouvements de troupes soviétiques à la frontière mandchoue. Il l'a chargé également de prier le gouvernement de Moscou de s'abstenir de toute activité susceptible d'inquiéter les troupes japonaises.

Les négociations entre Canton et Nankin

CHANGHAI, 28 octobre. — La conférence entre les délégués de Canton et de Nankin continue. Bien que le secret soit gardé sur les résultats des délibérations, on croit savoir que trois résolutions ont été prises : 1° le pouvoir central sera attribué au Kuomintang ; 2° la politique étrangère de Nankin sera continuée ; 3° la requête des membres de l'association antijaponaise, qui demandaient à participer aux conversations, a été écartée.

1 1235

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 25 to Despatch No. 1908
of October 30, 1931.

From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'INTRANSIGEANT, October 29, 1931.

LE CONFLIT D'EXTREME-ORIENT

**Une démarche
intern 10/29
japonaise
auprès des Soviets**

**Au sujet des mouvements de
troupes russes à la frontière
mandchoue**

Tokio, 28 octobre. — Craignant que de sérieux événements ne se produisent, M. Shidehara, ministre des Affaires étrangères du Japon, a chargé l'ambassadeur japonais à Moscou d'exprimer au gouvernement des Soviets l'inquiétude que causent au Japon les informations annonçant des mouvements de troupes soviétiques à la frontière mandchoue.

Il l'a chargé également de prier le gouvernement de Moscou de s'abstenir de toute activité susceptible d'inquiéter les troupes japonaises.

**Le Japon prépare une nouvelle
note à la S.D.N.**

Tokio, 28 octobre. — Le Japon a décidé de soumettre dès que possible au Conseil de la Société des Nations une liste des traités que, d'après lui, la Chine n'a pas observés.

On croit savoir que ce geste sera la réponse à la lettre que le docteur Sze a adressée à M. Briand et dans laquelle il déclare que son pays se reconnaît obligé, en vertu du covenant de la S.D.N., de respecter les conventions internationales.

Entre temps, le ministère des Affaires étrangères laisse entendre qu'il ne peut étudier la suggestion tendant à soumettre la question des traités au tribunal de La Haye, étant donné que leur validité n'est pas contestée et qu'il ne s'agit pas de difficultés d'interprétation.

De plus, le ministère des Affaires étrangères japonais se demande ce que deviendraient les intérêts japonais en Mandchourie en attendant la décision de la Cour internationale de justice qui pourrait ne pas être prise avant des années.

Enclosure No. 26 to Despatch No. 1908
of October 30, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE MATIN, October 29, 1931.

RUSSES ET JAPONAIS S'OBSERVENT EN MANDCHOURIE

Matin — *1931*
Une communication
de M. Shidehara à M. Karakhan

[SERVICE SPÉCIAL DU « NEW YORK TIMES »]

TOKIO, 28 octobre. — (Par câble).
— Les Japonais et les Russes s'observent mutuellement et avec la plus grande attention dans le nord de la Mandchourie où les désordres menacent leurs intérêts économiques respectifs. Les Soviets démentent que des trains militaires aient été amenés par eux à pied d'œuvre à la frontière mandchoue. Mais, cependant, il est certain que le baron Shidehara, ministre des affaires étrangères, a fait tenir à M. Karakhan, commissaire adjoint aux affaires étrangères de Moscou, une communication dans laquelle il exprime l'espoir que les Soviets éviteront toute action qui pourrait être mal interprétée par les autorités japonaises.

L'état-major japonais aurait, dit-on, délégué un de ses représentants près de l'attaché militaire soviétique de Tokio, avec lequel il aurait eu une longue conversation.

On fait ressortir dans les milieux politiques que les Japonais sont obligés de protéger leurs biens et propriétés partout où on les attaque, et que cela les a conduits à envoyer des détachements bien au delà de la zone du chemin de fer sud-mandchourien, dans les régions où les intérêts russes sont dominants.

Il est bien évident que les Russes entendent également protéger leurs propres intérêts, mais, en dépit de rumeurs sensationnelles venant de Kharbina, il n'y a pas de raison pour que les Soviets interviennent d'une manière tout à fait directe dans le conflit sino-japonais, ou bien entrent eux-mêmes en conflit avec le Japon. Le fait que les Soviets et le Japon ont eu tous deux à se plaindre de l'action des autorités mandchoues semble suffisant pour écarter la seconde hypothèse. (Copyright.)

Un détachement japonais se porte vers la rivière Nonni

[SERVICE SPÉCIAL DU « NEW YORK TIMES »]

TOKIO, 28 octobre. — (Par câble).
— On mande de Moukden qu'un détachement d'infanterie japonaise a été dirigé vers la rivière Nonni au sud du Tsitsikar, afin d'y escorter des troupes du génie chargées de réparer trois viaducs détruits par les Chinois lors d'un engagement entre les soldats d'un des généraux fidèles à Chang Hsu Liang, gouverneur de la Mandchourie, et les troupes du général Chang Hai Feng. (Copyright.)

1 1241

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 27 to Despatch No. 1908
of October 30, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE PETIT PARISIEN, October 29, 1931.

7.7. Tokio s'emeut des mouvements de troupes de l'U. R. S. S. aux confins de Mandchourie

Changhai, 28 octobre

DE NOTRE CORRESPONDANT PARTICULIER

Tokio semble s'émouvoir des mouvements de troupes soviétiques à la frontière de Sibérie et de la Mandchourie et prétend que les Russes ont fourni des armements et des munitions aux troupes mandchoues de la province de Meulungkiang, qui ont pu ainsi repousser le général indépendant Tchang Hai Peng lorsqu'il tenta de prendre Tsitsikar.

Le baron Shidehara a ordonné à l'ambassadeur japonais à Moscou de prier les Soviets d'éviter de se livrer à une trop grande activité militaire, qui cause des appréhensions au Japon, d'autant plus que le Japon n'a aucune intention d'envoyer des troupes au nord de Tchang-Thoun et qu'il ne veut pas aller dans l'ouest au delà de Taonan.

Le ministère des Affaires étrangères japonais déclare qu'il ne portera pas l'affaire sino-nippone à la Haye, attendu que les traités dont il réclame l'application par la Chine ne sont ni désuets ni difficiles à interpréter et qu'il n'a pas de temps à perdre dans un long procès. Tokio ajoute que, quand le conseil de la S. D. N. se réunira, le Japon lui présentera la liste des traités relatifs à la Mandchourie que la Chine n'a pas respectés.

Les relations Canton-Nankin

Un revirement semble se produire à Nankin. Tchang Kai Chek paraît mieux disposé à négocier avec les Cantonais. Il a ordonné aux généraux, ses partisans, de cesser leurs manifestations en faveur du maintien du gouvernement actuel.


La conférence d'union nationale a tenu une séance au cours de laquelle elle a émis le vœu que le président du gouvernement soit choisi parmi les vieux chefs civils du Kuomintang et que le poste de généralissime soit supprimé et remplacé par un conseil militaire.

Georges MORESTHE,


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE



DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS



November 7, 1931.


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Mr. Castle:

The First Secretary of the Japanese Embassy called and stated that the Japanese Ambassador wished to inform you, in continuance of his conversation of November 6, that a report, dated November 7, to the Japanese military authorities stated that the town of Tashing, shown on the map below which the first Secretary left with me, was taken by the Japanese soldiers on November 6. Upon the taking of this town Japanese reenforcements en route to the Nonni River Bridge were stopped.

F/DEW

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Area of the Manchurian Battle Between the Chinese and Japanese for the Control of the Nonni Bridge.

NOV 11 1931

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MMH/REK

W.H.W.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED
CORRECTED COPY

COPIES SENT TO
CAN. LAND & I.D.

FROM

GRAY

PEIPING via N. R.

Dated November 11, 1931

Rec'd 5:30 a. m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
NOV 12 1931
DIVISION OF

Secretary of State,
Washington.

910, November 11, 8 a. m.

One. Department's 410, November 5, 7 p. m., has been
repeated to Mukden.

Two. In despatch No. 477, November 3, Myers states that
Japanese have made no move to restore Chinese control over
radio station even nominally under Japanese advisers as has
been done in case of other public utilities and that it is
evident they intend to operate station if it is to be operated
at all, under exclusive Japanese management. Japanese radio
experts are effecting necessary repairs to the short wave
station.

Three. On November 2 Consul Vincent with a German engineer
employed by the Chinese authorities as adviser on radio matters
inspected radio station with a view to substantiating Japanese
claim

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 13 1931
Department of State

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DEC 13 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2- #910, from Peiping, Nov.11, 8 a. m.

claim that station was ready to resume service. Japanese soldiers but no technical men found in occupation. Engineer estimated that skilled radio engineer could put receiving station into operating condition in a few days. In the transmitting station German equipment used primarily for communication with Berlin ASIA TIMES with San Francisco would not require long time to restore. American equipment in this transmitting station was in good condition but Japanese guards refused to permit inspection of the control rooms. German engineer considered it possible but not probable that at an early date Japanese would be able to resume service two or three hours per day with Seal of the Consulate General.

For the Minister

ENGERT

WSB

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

CJH


TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CJH

Page 2 - #910 from Peiping.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Mr. Arwal:
Please file with
the reports on the
transfer of Chang's
from Mukden to Liao-ten.

1 1248

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE - November 1, 1931.

CHANG'S FAMILY LOSES FORTY CHESTS OF GOLD

PEIPING, Oct. 9 (by mail)—The family of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang is the largest single loser in the Japanese occupation of Mukden. It is reported in Fengtien circles here that when Japanese troops occupied Mukden on September 19 the first thing they did was to search the residence of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang for cash and valuables. Forty chests of gold bars were removed from the family vault to the headquarters of the Japanese army. These bars were left by the late Marshal Chang Tso-lin, who paid an insurance fee of \$150,000 Mex. to a Japanese company in Mukden in the winter of 1924, when he feared defeat in the face of a steady advance of the rebel leader, General Kuo Sung-ling.

All members of the Chang family deposited their savings in the Fengtien Provincial Government Bank, which was seized by the Japanese occupation army on September 19. The fifth concubine of the late Marshal Chang, it is said, alone had \$2,000,000 in that bank. It is considered doubtful whether she will be able to recover this money.

Losses to the state are beyond calculation. According to independent foreign reports from Mukden, the Japanese army has been looting all Chinese military establishments in that city for valuables. Among the 200 or so airplanes seized have been a number bought from Britain, France and Czechoslovakia.

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
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note re Chang Hsueh-liang
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11-10-31

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NOV 1 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

SHERWOOD EDDY
347 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK CITY



Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

NOV 11 1931

Department of State
Tientsin, China
October 7, 1931

President Herbert Hoover
White House
Washington, D. C.

My dear President Hoover:

We have been living through stirring times during the last few weeks. I was present at the capture of Moukden on September 18 and 19, and after two weeks in Korea returned to find the Japanese setting up an "independence" movement to sever the rich provinces of Manchuria from China. All in Korea believe that the policy of Japan will seek to follow the three steps by which she took over Korea: first to declare her "independence" of China, second to announce a protectorate under Japan, and third, annexation and absorption.

When Moukden was captured and all meetings were forbidden by the Japanese, we flew to Seoul, Korea, and began meetings there. The visit gave us a good chance to study the methods and effects of Japanese occupation. Twenty years after annexation there is unmistakable evidence of the brilliant material advance under Japanese rule. The trade of Korea has increased in greater proportion and to a greater total than that in the Philippines under the United States in two decades. The progress in organization, law and order, in building, industry and agriculture has been noteworthy in a country previously corrupt and misgoverned. The stern discipline of Japanese rule is remaking Korea and the Koreans.

But this alien, unsympathetic and psychologically blind, military rule has failed to win the people, and instead has driven them into almost unanimous, sullen hostility. Their three indictments of Japanese rule are: 1. the policy of Japanization or absorption, not allowing them to be Koreans but crushing out their dearest traditions in the effort to make them Japanese; 2. a harsh, militaristic, autocratic rule that monopolizes all higher offices for the Japanese at a time when the principle of autonomy is so far advanced in the Philippines and in India, which has occasioned the majority of leading Koreans at one time or another serving terms in prison; and 3. a policy of economic discrimination where so many poor Korean farmers are losing their lands. Finally, there is the apparent policy of the Japanese rule to foment strife between the Chinese and Koreans. A false report was sent to Seoul that the Chinese in Manchuria were killing Koreans there. The next day Korean mobs killed over two hundred Chinese. The news of these massacres is used to turn the Chinese against the Koreans in Manchuria, and then of course the Japanese military must protect their "citizens" there. This almost furnished Japan an excuse for intervention in Manchuria, but the Chinese were well aware of the move and did not rise to the Japanese agitation, so that another excuse had to be found for the sudden capture of all strategic centers in Manchuria within a few hours.

The result of this policy of the Japanese is driving both the Koreans and Chinese toward Communism. The Japanese in Korea informed me that Communism is increasing in northern Korea, not only brought over the border from Siberia, but more especially by Korean students returning from Japan. Both Koreans and Chinese imagine that they can use this Russian influence and organization as a convenient

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NOV 11 1931

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

President Hoover - 2

10/7/31

tool or weapon for their nationalist aims of liberty, not realizing that it is like a powerful, destructive bomb which has nothing to do with nationalism or liberty. Such was the bitter experience of Dr. Sun Yat Sen and General Feng when they tried to use Communism as a tool, only to find it sweeping the masses of ignorant peasants and workers toward a bloody revolution that is passing utterly out of control and cannot now be suppressed.

Returning to Moukden after two weeks in Korea, we noted the development of the Japanese occupation. The Japanese now exhibit the spot where on the night of September 18 a small bomb was exploded at the most convenient time and place. The bodies of four Chinese soldiers are there. But no one interviewed, whether foreigner or Chinese, has seen the slightest evidence of any Chinese attack but rather of a premeditated, carefully prepared offensive plan of the Japanese army.

Within a few hours of this alleged attack the Japanese had taken five strategic cities and occupied an area greater than that of England. They had refused investigation or arbitration by any third or neutral party. They demanded direct negotiations with the Chinese alone. But in their propaganda sheet, the "Manchuria Daily News" of October 5, they state that Japan "is not going to deal with such an anomaly of government as the present Nanking Government." She declares she will treat it as a "local" issue and "must have someone who is entitled to represent the wishes of the Chinese people of the Northeastern (Manchurian) provinces" - probably of her own choosing.. Already northern Kirin has proclaimed its "independence" under a puppet Manchu leader as Japan's tool. I interviewed leading Chinese in Moukden who themselves had been repeatedly approached by the Japanese and urged to declare their independence of China and form a government under Japanese protection. The Japanese had said to them: "We would not deprive you of your freedom, as in the case of Korea. Some day we may have to fight the United States or Soviet Russia, and we would want China's friendship."

With the Chinese army of some 200,000 now withdrawn or driven out, many unpaid soldiers have become bandits, some thousands have been deprived of employment and have turned to robbery. The Roman Catholic cathedral, sheltering rich refugees, was attacked by bandits the night we were in Moukden, every night there was shooting and robberies were increasing. This will doubtless furnish a further excuse for Japan's not withdrawing her troops. We are reading the daily promises of Japan to withdraw her troops and her false statements that she is making no effort to set up an independent government in Manchuria, while at the same time we have been interviewing Chinese whom they are seeking to induce to lead an "independent" government.

Already over 100,000 refugees have fled in terror from the Japanese occupation. Our ship is loaded with them as we are proceeding to Tientsin. In the meantime, Manchuria presents a problem to Japan, to China and the world. The boycott of Japanese goods all over China is vitally affecting Japan's trade and aggravating her economic problem at home. These rich Northeastern provinces of Manchuria, with their vast resources and rapidly increasing thirty millions of population, have been misgoverned by the Chinese themselves. The old corrupt and degenerate Manchu dynasty forfeited its right to rule, and it will be a shortsighted move if Japan tries to place the boy Manchu ex-emperor as her puppet ruler over these provinces now. The late ex-bandit Chang Tso-lin as governor fleeced the people and when he refused to obey or keep his promises to Japan was blown up at the Japanese bridge outside Moukden. His son, the Young Marshal, is a lovable and well-intentioned young man, but his bad habits and the number of the officials and officers under him, with their "squeeze," graft, gambling and dissipation, their almost worthless paper money, and the sufferings of the poor at their hands have been such that they too have forfeited the right to further exploit these long-suffering provinces.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

President Hoover - 3

10/7/31

China herself is threatened with chaos from civil war, banditry, unemployment, flood, famine and the spread of Communism. Either the continued misrule of these provinces by the Chinese themselves, or a Japanese military regime under puppet "independence" will drive Southern Manchuria toward Communism, as the northern province and Mongolia are already passing under Soviet domination. Japan seems to have timed her move, like her twenty-one demands, at a moment when all the rest of the world is unable effectively to act. Will the League of Nations, America and the signatories of the Kellogg Pact be hoodwinked or outmaneuvered and fail to function in this crisis? The League and the Pact are on trial as well as Japan and China.

Very sincerely yours,

Sherwood Eddy

SE:P

1 1252

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

November 27 1931

In reply refer to
FE 793.94/2611

Mr. Sherwood Eddy,
347 Madison Avenue,
New York, New York.

Sir:

The receipt is acknowledged, by reference from The
White House, of your letter of October 7, 1931, from
Tientsin, China, in regard to the existing dispute between
China and Japan.

That dispute is continuing to receive the Department's
careful attention.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:


Maxwell M. Hamilton,
Assistant Chief,
Division of Far Eastern Affairs.

CR
Nov 27 1931.

107
FE:RFB:REK
11/24/31

FE

M.H.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

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TO BE TRANSMITTED
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1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
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Department of State

Washington, November 10, 1931

AMEMBASSY,

LONDON (England).

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE AMBASSADOR.

Referring to our telephone conversation this morning, I desire that you be in Paris during the next few days in order that you be available for conference with Monsieur Briand and perhaps the representatives of other nations who are assembling for the adjourned meeting of the Council of the League of Nations on November 16 in connection with the problem which has arisen out of the developments in and in connection with Manchuria. ~~You will not sit as a member of the Council of the League nor is it anticipated that you will find it necessary to attend its meetings~~ but in view of the fact that the developments in Manchuria and the discussions which will take place in Paris will presumably involve matters which affect treaty rights and general interests of the United States, it is desired that you be available for conference on matters pertinent thereto.

I assume that you have a general knowledge of what has occurred in Manchuria and of the discussion which has taken place at Geneva and the action taken by the Council and action taken by the American Government.

As your Government sees it, Japanese armed forces have for practical purposes taken control of the railway lines and all important cities, the telegraph, radio and telephone

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Washington,

systems, and some other public utilities in South Manchuria,
 and have destroyed or seriously disrupted Chinese administra-
 tive machinery there.

The Japanese Government contends that all measures taken
 have been necessary in order to protect the South Manchuria
 Railway and the lives and property of Japanese subjects.

and Confidential

^

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1968 1-128

1 1255

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Washington,

(Gustafson)
The Council of the League was in session when this trouble began and China immediately appealed to it. Both China and Japan are represented on the Council. On September 30, the Council unanimously adopted a resolution in which it was affirmed that Japan had no territorial designs on Manchuria; that Japan would withdraw its troops as rapidly as possible into the Railway Zone, in proportion as the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals was effectively assured; and that the Chinese Government would assume responsibility for the safety of Japanese lives and property as the withdrawal continued. The Council then adjourned, to meet on October 14.

When the Council met again on October 14, no progress had been made in the matter of withdrawal. The Japanese military had somewhat extended its activities. It appeared that the question of invoking the Kellogg Pact must be dealt with. We authorized Gilbert to accept an invitation of the Council to sit with the Council as an observer, to take part in the discussions in so far as they might relate to the Kellogg Pact, but to participate in no discussions which did not relate to the Pact. He of course had no vote. The first result was a request by several governments represented on the Council to

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19 _____

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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1955 1-128

1 1256

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Washington,

signatories of the Kellogg Pact to call attention to that treaty. The governments thus acting immediately sent notes to Japan and to China invoking that treaty, and several other governments, including the American, soon did likewise.

The Council continued in session and Briand, Reading, Grandi and others endeavored to persuade Japan and China to agree to a new resolution intended to hasten the resolving of the military situation and a solution by peaceful means. It became apparent, however, that, among other matters, Japan was now insisting as a condition precedent to withdrawal that China expressly confirm certain old treaties and treaty obligations which had been in dispute over a number of years. When it finally appeared that Japan insisted absolutely on that point, the Council drew up a resolution, which was voted upon affirmatively by all the representatives except the Japanese on October 24. This resolution, in view of the fact that the vote was not unanimous, lacks legal force. Its essential features were as follows: The points made in the September 30 resolution were reiterated. Japan was called upon to withdraw its forces before the next meeting of the Council on November 16. China was called upon to make arrangements for taking over the territory evacuated and to associate with her authorities designated for that purpose representatives of other powers to

Enciphered by ~~follow~~ execution of these arrangements. *It was recommended that*
Sent by operator M., 19

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China

1 1257

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Washington,

and Japan appoint representatives to meet and arrange details of evacuation and taking over. It was recommended that as soon as the evacuation was complete China and Japan should begin direct negotiations and, if necessary, set up a committee of conciliation. The Council was to adjourn until November 16.

At the last meeting, the Japanese made a counter-proposal, which was not accepted. Examination of this and of subsequent statements of the Japanese Government indicate that the real issue is as follows: The Japanese insist that before releasing the military grip which they have gained, matters of long-standing dispute between them and the Chinese shall be settled. These matters appear to include questions of validity of treaties which China disputes and details of interpretation of treaties which China does not dispute. The Chinese have stated in a formal note to the League that they regard themselves as bound by the League Covenant to a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations and they have offered to submit to arbitration or judicial settlement. They have not denied that they dispute the validity of certain treaties. It appears that at one point the Japanese stated that they would give the Council a list of the treaties for which they demand respect; but we are not informed that they have sub-

Enciphered by ~~mitted such a list.~~ *Begin Confidential. (Enc. 10/1)*

Sent by operator M., 19

1 1258

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Washington,

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It has seemed to us that it is not warrantable for Japan to insist on settlement of all these matters as a condition precedent to withdrawal and that such insistence would amount to exertion of military pressure to effect a settlement. Also, we have from the outset taken the position that we would endeavor to reenforce action taken by the League in so far as we might properly do so, but acting independently. We therefore had Forbes see Shidehara and leave with him a memorandum, on November 5, stating that we would deprecate use of military pressure to influence negotiations and that we shared the view of the Council as indicated in its resolutions that settlement of long-standing issues should not be made a condition precedent to withdrawal of military forces. We said nothing about the date set in the resolution for evacuation, as we did not choose to express an opinion, favorable or unfavorable, with regard to the wisdom or otherwise of the strategy of the Council in specifying a date.

All these efforts seem to have had so far no repeat no very conclusive effect. Technically, war has so far been avoided. From the outset we have realized that there was in

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

1 1259

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Washington,

Japan an internal conflict with regard to policy, and we have purposely tried to avoid measures which might aid the military element there to gain an undisputed ascendancy. There has also been an internal conflict in China, and we have hoped that the Chinese themselves would take a more realistic view of the requirements of the situation than they seem as yet to have done.

It still seems to us that it should be possible to find a method for settling this dispute by peaceful means. The *such as the Kellogg Briand Pact and the Nine Powers Treaty* integrity of various multilateral treaties is of primary importance; and respect both by China and by Japan for treaty rights as between themselves, together with the treaty rights of other powers, requires solicitous consideration.

It is imperative that both the Chinese and the Japanese be made to realize that the American Government does not intend to take sides as between the disputants; also, that we feel that our objective and that of the Council of the League, both seeking to prevent war and to bring about peaceful settlement, are identical, and we do not intend to allow a line of cleavage between us to be created. We cannot ally ourselves with the League, but we do associate ourselves

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

1 1250

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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with its efforts on behalf of peace. It is obvious that the whole world desires that peace be maintained. This fact must be impressed upon both disputants.

For these reasons, I wish to add force to my efforts here along the lines indicated by sending you to Paris and placing you in close contact with the leading members of the Council. I desire that, leaving it to Briand to lead, you use your discretion in contributing ^{by your advice & counsel} toward the finding of ways and means whereby China and Japan may be brought to agree upon a method which will achieve this end. I do not repeat not desire that the American Government be put in the position of instigator or initiator of League action; nor do I desire that we shall either push or lead in reference to this whole matter. What I want is that we add our efforts to those of the principal members of the Council and that we confer with them with regard to a difficult problem which is of common concern. S. G.

I suggest that you cautiously feel your way and I wish that you keep me fully informed not only with regard to actual developments but with regard to possibilities which you envisage in anticipation.

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M.,, 19.....

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1 1261

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Department of State

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I shall follow this with a telegram indicating certain possibilities which I have in mind.

Stinson

W4

Enciphered by FE:SKH/ZMF

FE

CR ✓
Nov. 10, 1961. pm

Sent by operator M., *SKH*
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY

Mr. Carlisle

Here is the telegram
of instructions. ~~Below~~
~~that~~ The changes
referred to by the
Secretary have been
incorporated
Klotz

telephone conversation this
you be in Paris during the
that you be available for
r Briand and perhaps the
r nations who are assembling
ng of the Council of the League
16 in connection with the
out of the developments in

and in connection with Manchuria. You will not sit
as a member of the Council of the League nor is it
anticipated that you will find it necessary to attend
its meetings, but in view of the fact that the
developments in Manchuria and the discussions which
will take place in Paris ^{will presumably} involve matters which affect
^{and general interests} treaty rights of the United States, it is desired that
you be ~~present~~ available for conference on matters
pertinent thereto.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RIDER

Referring to our telephone conversation this morning I desire that you be in Paris during the next few days in order that you be available for conference with Monsieur Briand and perhaps the representatives of other nations who are assembling for the adjourned meeting of the Council of the League of Nations on November 16 in connection with the problem which has arisen out of the developments in and in connection with Manchuria. You will not sit as a member of the Council of the League nor is it anticipated that you will find it necessary to attend its meetings, but in view of the fact that the developments in Manchuria and the discussions which will take place in Paris ^{will presumably} involve matters which affect ^{and general interest} treaty rights of the United States, it is desired that you be ~~present and~~ available for conference on matters pertinent thereto.

1 1264

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Department of State

Washington,

November 10, 1931.

AMEMBASSY,

LONDON (England).

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE AMBASSADOR.

Referring to our telephone conversation of this morning, I desire that you be in Paris during the next few days as a liaison between your Government and M. Briand and perhaps other members of the Council of the League in connection with the problem which has arisen out of developments in and in connection with Manchuria.

I assume that you have a general knowledge of what has occurred in Manchuria and of the discussion which has taken place at Geneva and the action taken by the Council and action taken by the American Government.

As your Government sees it, Japanese armed forces have for practical purposes taken control of the railway lines and all important cities, the telegraph, radio and telephone systems, and some other public utilities in South Manchuria, and have destroyed or seriously disrupted Chinese administrative machinery there.

The Japanese Government contends that all measures taken have been necessary in order to protect the South Manchuria Railway and the lives and property of Japanese subjects.

ed by _____

operator _____ M., _____, 19 _____

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Washington,

signatories of the Kellogg Pact to call attention to that treaty. The governments thus acting immediately sent notes to Japan and to China invoking that treaty, and several other governments, including the American, soon did likewise.

The Council continued in session and Briand, Reading, Grandi and others endeavored to persuade Japan and China to agree to a new resolution intended to hasten the resolving of the military situation and a solution by peaceful means. It became apparent, however, that, among other matters, Japan was now insisting as a condition precedent to withdrawal that China expressly confirm certain old treaties and treaty obligations which had been in dispute over a number of years. When it finally appeared that Japan insisted absolutely on that point, the Council drew up a resolution, which was voted upon affirmatively by all the representatives except the Japanese on October 24. This resolution, in view of the fact that the vote was not unanimous, lacks legal force. Its essential features were as follows: The points made in the September 30 resolution were reiterated. Japan was called upon to withdraw its forces before the next meeting of the Council on Novem-

ber 16. China was called upon to make arrangements for taking over the territory evacuated. It was recommended that China

ed by _____

operator _____ M., _____, 19 _____

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*of other powers to follow
 execution of these arrangements*

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

November 10, 1931.

793-94 B
320
AMERICAN EMBASSY

LONDON (ENGLAND).

Confidential for the Ambassador.

One. There is quoted below for your confidential information the text of the memorandum which Ambassador Forbes read and delivered to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs on November 5. The Department regards its action in connection with the memorandum under reference as a confidential communication from the American Government to the Japanese Government. Copies of the text have not repeat not been given to any of the foreign representatives here and the American Consul at Geneva was instructed to communicate the substance only ~~as outlined in the Department's telegram to you of November 5, 1931~~, to Drummond for his confidential information and for discreet and limited communication by him to other members of the League Council. The Department is informed that for the present, for his own reasons, Drummond intends to inform not repeat not all of the members of the Council but only the members of the Committee of Five. Text follows:

Enciphered by

QUOTE

Sent by operator M., 19.....

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793.94/2611B

1 0267

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Department of State

Washington,

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QUOTE

793.94/2465A

UNQUOTE

(Telegraph Room, repeat text of memorandum as
 given in Department's 217 of November 3, 6 p.m.,
 to American Embassy, Tokyo, copy attached.)

Two. On the evening of November 9 the Japanese
 Ambassador brought to the attention of the Secretary of
 State a memorandum in reply to the above, the text of
 which reads as follows:

QUOTE

793.94/2585

UNQUOTE

(Telegraph Room, quote text of memorandum handed
 to the Secretary of State by the Japanese
 Ambassador, November 9, 1951, copy attached.)

*I shall comment on the Japanese reply in
 a later telegram.*

Curtis
10/6

FE:RSM:EJL

FE

704

Nov. 10. 1951. PM

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM SENT

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated
 to anyone.

November 10, 1931

5 p.m.

AMERICAN EMBASSY

LONDON (ENGLAND)

323

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE AMBASSADOR

One. There is quoted below for your confidential information the text of the memorandum which Ambassador Forbes read and delivered to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs on November 5. The Department regards its action in connection with the memorandum under reference as a confidential communication from the American Government to the Japanese Government. Copies of the text have not repeat not been given to any of the foreign representatives here and the American Consul at Geneva was instructed to communicate the substance only to Drummond for his confidential information and for discreet and limited communication by him to other members of the League Council. The Department is informed that for the present, for his own reasons, Drummond intends to inform not repeat not all of the mem-
 bers

MAI

2- #323, to London, November 10,
1931

members of the Council but only the members of the Committee of Five. Text follows:

QUOTE (Here insert memorandum quoted in Department's November 3, 6 p.m., to Tokyo) UNQUOTE

Two. On the evening of November 9 the Japanese Ambassador brought to the attention of the Secretary of State a memorandum in reply to the above, the text of which reads as follows:

QUOTE The Japanese Government welcome the views of the American Government so thoughtfully expressed in the memorandum of the American Embassy of November 5 on the subject of the Manchurian incident.

In that memorandum, the attention of the Japanese Government is invited to the fact that "a situation has been created in Manchuria which gives Japan substantial control of Southern Manchuria and has temporarily, at least, destroyed the administrative integrity of China in that region."

It is evident that shortly after the military action taken by the Japanese railway guards along the South Manchuria Railway to defend themselves as well as to

MAIL

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1931

to protect the railway and the lives and property of Japanese subjects against attacks of the Chinese armed forces, the Chinese authorities in the affected districts have practically ceased to function. In consequence, the Japanese military authorities were obliged to undertake for some time the duty of maintaining peace and order in such districts.

Recently, however, local committees for the preservation of peace have been set up in various places by resident Chinese, and have organized a police force for that purpose. In the city of Mukden, for instance, the Chinese committee has under its direction and control 4,000 police officers and men. Those local bodies for the maintenance of public order serve to lighten the police functions of the Japanese troops, and are, as such, favorably received by the Japanese Government. Should they prove themselves effective to assure a reasonable degree of security in the respective districts, and to afford adequate protection to foreign residents, the Japanese troops will be ready at any time to withdraw to the Railway Zone.

The state

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lutz NARS, Date 12-18-75

3½ #323, to London, November 10,
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The state of things now prevailing in Manchuria is certainly abnormal. But it is only temporary. Similar conditions occurred in Tsinan in 1928-29, when the Japanese forces were in occupation of that district, in order to protect Japanese residents against ravages of the Chinese troops. In no case have such military measures been inspired by any thought of bringing about any territorial or administrative dismemberment of China. It will be recalled that soon after the close of the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-5, a policy looking to the eventual "partition of China" appeared to be gaining ground in some quarters of the world. In the denunciation of such a policy, the United States, Japan and Great Britain were in complete accord, and their determination to respect the territorial and administrative integrity of China was affirmed in many of the diplomatic instruments signed by those Powers. The Japanese Government remain unchanged in their stand against the partition of China.

In the memorandum of the American Embassy-under review, it is pointed out that there are two distinct points to be considered: first, the peaceful solution of the present situation, and, second, a solution through negotiation of the various matters at issue between Japan and

4 #323, to London, November 10,
1931.

China, arising from misunderstanding as to the respective treaty rights of the two nations. The memorandum then proceeds to conclude that a settlement of the various broader issues of the second point can not appropriately be reached until the first has been disposed of.

The Japanese Government feel that their position is virtually in harmony with that conclusion of the American Government. They have no intention of insisting on the final adjustment of the whole series of their controversies with China, as a condition precedent to the withdrawal of Japanese troops to the Railway Zone. Their efforts for the present are primarily directed towards the peaceful solution of the present situation. It is not, however, possible to hope, as things stand at this moment, that the recall of the Japanese troops now operating outside the Railway Zone would solve the existing situation. With the replacement of the Japanese troops by the Chinese, violent hostile agitation against Japan under the auspices, ~~overt~~ or ~~covert~~, of the Chinese authorities would be set to work in Manchuria as in other parts of China. Japanese and
Koreans

5 #323, to London, November 10,
1931.

Koreans carrying on peaceful pursuits in that region would once more be subjected to persecution and outrage as they have been for several years. All the treaty rights of Japan would be challenged and ignored, and the security of Japanese subjects would at once be menaced.

Such dangers would inevitably be involved in any premature withdrawal of the Japanese troops. In order to provide against these dangers, the Japanese Government have been brought to the conclusion that candid recognition, by an arrangement between Japan and China, of certain fundamental principles, the substance of which has already been communicated to the American Government, is of supreme importance. The principles which they have thus formulated are no more than those that are generally observed in practice in dealings of organized peoples with one another. In seeking agreement on terms of such a nature, Japan can not justly be accused of any intention of exerting military pressure on China. The Japanese Government trust that an agreement between Japan and China on those fundamental principles, affording as it will a measure of security for the lives and property of Japanese subjects, will pave the way for an early withdrawal of the troops to the Railway Zone.

They

1 1274
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

6 #323, To London, November 10,
1931.

They believe that the arrangement now indicated can not be regarded as solution of the various matters of the second point mentioned in the memorandum of the American Embassy, but that it is simply a process for the settlement of the first point. The whole Manchurian incident is an outcome of manifold and complicated events with historical background extending over more than thirty years. The Japanese Government hope that it will be appreciated that time and patience are needed for an adjustment of the problem. END QUOTE.

I shall comment on the Japanese reply in a later telegram.

STIMSON

FE:REM:EJL FE

1 1275

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-122
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

Gray
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Collect
Charge Department

Department of State

Charge to
\$

Washington,

November 10, 1931.
bp

793.94
AMEMBASSY,

LONDON (England).

324
Regarding Manchuria problem, the following important documents have been published and you can probably find them at once in the files of the LONDON TIMES:

- One. League resolution of September 30.
 - Two. League resolution of October 24.
 - Three. Japan's statement of October 26 in reply to League resolution.
 - Four. Briand's note to Japan dated October 29.
 - Five. Japan's reply to Briand's note dated November 7.
 - Six. Briand's note to Japan regarding salt revenues, dated November 5.
 - Seven. Briand's note to Japan dated November 6.
- 793.94/2611C*

Strinson
WJ

CR ✓

Nov. 10, 1931. pz

FE:SKH/ZMF

FE

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-122

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY



November 10, 1931.

London
FE # *Regarding Manchuria problem*
Doctor Hornbeck:

~~You might include in your cable to General Dawes a~~
~~mention of the fact that~~ the following important documents
have been published and ~~he~~ *you* can probably ~~get~~ *find* them at once
~~from~~ the files of the LONDON TIMES:

1. League resolution of September 30.
2. League resolution of October 24.
3. Japan's statement of October 26 in reply to
League resolution.
4. Briand's note to Japan dated October 29.
5. Japan's reply to Briand's note dated November 7.
- ⑦ 7. Briand's note to Japan, dated November 6.
- ⑥ 6. Briand's note to Japan re salt revenues, dated
November 5.

~~These documents together with the two you are cabling~~
~~today will give him at once a very clear picture of the issues~~
~~without making it necessary for him to wait until he sees Shaw.~~

A.T.K.
g

1 1277

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department

Charge to
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TELEGRAM SENT

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE ☒
PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

November 10, 1931.

793 96
Amembassy,

London, (England).

322
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CONFIDENTIAL.

FOR THE AMBASSADOR.

123072
You may take Dooman with you to Paris if you deem it advisable. Shaw will reach Paris on the 14th - 15th. *He is being directed to telephone you from Bern.* with full Geneva records on this subject. He is, of course, going to Paris on ~~routine~~ ^{normal} temporary assignment as Chargé d'Affaires and Counselor during the absence of Norman Armour. It has been arranged that he is to be entirely free to assist you on this matter during your stay in Paris and with this in mind he has been directed to spend two days with Gilbert in Berne on the way to Paris. This last will not be given to the press. It has been deemed inadvisable to send Gilbert to Paris at this time lest his presence at the time of the opening of the Council raise the question of whether or not he would continue to sit with the Council. However, if upon consultation with Shaw, you deem it advisable to have him in Paris, *for my personal information of keeping you informed* I see no objection to his going there without attendant.

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

793.942611D

1 1278
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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Charge Department
OR

Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

- 2 -

attendant' publicity' provided/ he does not/ arrive/ in Paris/
until the/ day after/ the first/ Council/ meeting/) The/ Council/
would/ thus/ have/ met/ without him/ for its/ opening/ session/
and his/ presence/ in Paris/ without/ official/ status/ should
not/ raise/ question./

Repeat to/ American Consul/ Geneva. ✓

Strinson
WJ

WE:PLB:AMW

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____, _____

Index Bu.—No. 60.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1960 1-138

1 1279

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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Charge Department
OR
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TELEGRAM SENT

1-128
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

November 10, 1931.

793.94
AMERICAN EMBASSY

LONDON (ENGLAND).

325
Confidential for the Ambassador. Reference
Department's telegram No. 323 of November 10 in which
was transmitted to you the text of the memorandum
delivered to the Japanese Foreign Office on November 5.
by Ambassador Faby

On November 9 the American Embassy at Paris was
instructed, for its confidential information and for
use in an informal conversation with the Foreign Office
if possible with Briand personally, that in connection
with the memorandum under reference, it was my
particular objective to make it clear to the Japanese
Government that, in seeking to prevent war and to bring
about a solution by peaceful means, the objective of
the American Government and that of the Council of the
League are identical. In the memorandum I indicated my
endorsement of effort and action of the League as
expressed in the Resolutions of September 30 and
October 24, but, in regard to the October 24 Resolution,
while invoking the spirit thereof, I deliberately
refrained from mentioning the time limit and thus
avoided expression of any view either favorable or

Enciphered by

unfavorable

Sent by operator M.,, 19.....

793.94/2611E

1 1281

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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Charge Department
OR

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TELEGRAM SENT

1-128
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

- 2 -

unfavorable with regard to that particular feature of the Resolution. I stressed the view that the settlement of long-standing issue should not repeat not be made a condition precedent to withdrawal of Japanese armed forces and that the presence of those armed forces should not be availed of by the Japanese Government as an instrumentality for bringing pressure to bear upon China in the negotiations. I regard this as fundamental and I feel that it is imperative that it should be understood that this Government and the Council stand for the same fundamental principles.

I feel that I have made it very clear to the Japanese Government that my views correspond in general with those of the Council and that I endorse the effort which the Council and particularly M. Briand are making to prevent war and to bring about a peaceful settlement.

Simon
WJ

FE:RSM:EJL

FE

CR ✓

Enciphered by

Nov. 10 1931. p.m.

Sent by operator M., 19.....

1 1281

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
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OR
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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Washington, *Plain*

November 11, 1931.

10 am

793.94
AMEMBASSY,

LONDON, (ENGLAND).

327
~~CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE AMBASSADOR.~~ *(215)*

Ency.
I am announcing this morning at eleven o'clock
that you will go to Paris. The announcement is in the
following form:

QUOTE. I have asked General Dawes, the Ambassador
in London, to go to Paris during the coming meeting
of the statesmen who compose the Council of the
League of Nations. Inasmuch as this meeting
will consider the present situation in Manchuria
and questions may arise which will affect the
interests or treaty obligations of the United
States, I desire to have at hand in Paris a man
of General Dawes' standing, particularly as the
American Ambassador to Paris is at home on leave.
It is not anticipated that General Dawes will
find it necessary to take part in the meetings
of the League Council, but he will be in a
position to confer with the representatives

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

793.94/2611F

1 1282

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

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TO BE TRANSMITTED
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NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

Department of State

Washington,

- 2 -

of the other nations present in Paris in case
such conference should seem desirable. UNQUOTE.

Stimson
STIMSON.

WJ

NOV 11 1981.
me

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....,

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

743.94

FROM

PLAIN

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 11, 1931

Rec'd 1:45 p. m.


Secretary of State,
 Washington.

917, November 11, 6 p. m.

Legation's 814, October 23, 11 a. m.

Following are excerpts from striking editorial in
 PEIPING AND TIENTSIN TIMES today:

"Fundamental factor of present situation is that world
 opinion has been drawn farther and farther away from real dispute
 and its respective merits in Manchuria and has become almost
 wholly question of methods. For this Japan must take the blame.
 Trouble originated in Oriental diplomacy at a time when Govern-
 ments of Western world had developed habit of putting in black
 and white their positions in any given dispute. There has been
 tremendous advance in this respect since the war. Governments
 follow up direct exchanges of views with adequate publicity in
 press. Method of indirection is obsolete and is hardly under-
 stood at all in the West where tradition is to tell truth. That
 is not



F/DEW 793.94/2612

FILED
 NOV 16 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2- #917, from Peiping, Nov. 11, 6 p.m.

is not habit of Chinese and it is disconcertingly apparent from course of events in present crisis that Japan has not yet emancipated herself from old traditions. She permitted world to judge fundamentals from the transient and trivial and the very beginning of present clash is typical. There was no attempt to explain that action was due not to unimportant incident on railways line but to long series of frustration, affronts and pin pricks in Manchuria symptomatic of determinant attack on Japan position by Nanking Government, local authorities and C. T. Wang. Pretext was an unmitigated blunder and from one pretext to another Japan continued to move to her own and others embarrassment. She kept real card and real reason for her actions up her sleeve till very last minute and then threw it in as last desperate throw by a gambler when foresight and statesmanship demanded its production outset. Events have been permitted to educate world opinion on Japan's real objects through an ever increasing maze of suspicions and spectacular events whereas plain statement at outset would have caused far less shock and much more sympathy. Technique of this business belongs old oriental order and Japan's extraordinarily isolated position is due almost wholly not

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

3- #917, from Peiping, Nov. 11, 6 p.m.

not to natural antagonism in the West but to blundering and
disingenuous methods she has used. League of Nations has no doubt
taken everything much too literally for it is dominated by more
direct and plainspoken methods of Western traditions. But it
is still not too late to take League into Japan's confidence."

For the Minister

ENGERT

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REF

TELEGRAM RECEIVED GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 11, 1931

5:30 a. m.

FROM DIVISION OF
 EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
 NOV 13 1931
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 NOV 11 1931

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

914, November 11, noon. ~~(PART ONE)~~

Following from Consul General at Harbin:

"November 10, 11 a. m. CONFIDENTIAL.

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

One. Late last night Kuo Chung Hsi, Assistant Manager of the Chinese Eastern Railway, informed me that he had received a telephone message from engineer Hsu of the Railway at Tsitsihar Station to the effect that a large body of Chinese cavalry led by four Japanese had appeared yesterday near station Hurhura on the Railway, 23 kilometres northwest of Tsitsihar Station, evidently with the intention of swinging to the north and attacking General Ma's forces in the rear. Otherwise conditions unchanged yesterday near Nonni River Bridge.

Two. C. S. Fussy, who was former British tutor to the Czarevitch, who has been ~~(?)~~ ^{and is} now employee of the Chinese Maritime Customs, who previously had been stationed at Manchuria Station

and who

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Department of State

COPIES SENT TO

O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2- #914, from Peiping, Nov. 11, noon.

and who speaks Russian language, returned from home leave to Harbin last night via Siberia and Manchuria station. He informed me that in travels through Russia and Siberia he received the impression that the Soviet officials did not desire any clash with Japan because this would be fatal to the success of the five years plan and that there was slightly increased military activity in Siberia, but that as his train passed through the principal centers at night he was unable to judge of the movements or concentration of troops of Soviet forces.

Three. The local Commissioner of Foreign Affairs this morning informed me that he received a telegram last night from General Ma to the effect that there are about 4,000 Japanese troops with 40 cannons and 8 airplanes on the south side and a few hundred on the north side of the Nonni River and that Chang Hai Pen's forces number about 6,000. These figures may be exaggerated but there appears to be little doubt that the Japanese forces are being augmented."

For the Minister


ENGERT

WSB

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE



DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

NOV 18 1931

November 12, 1931.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Attention is called to telegram No. 295, November 9,

4 p. m., from Geneva, quoting the text of a telegram received by the Secretary General of the League from the Japanese Government with regard to the recent Noni Bridge incident. This telegram states that: "Advance of the Japanese forces towards the Noni River is due solely to necessity of protecting work of repairing bridge which will last about a fortnight. The Government is firmly resolved, as it has already stated, to remove these troops as soon as the work is terminated".


Telegram No. 914, November 11, noon, from Peiping, quotes a telegram of November 10, 11 a. m., from Consul General Hanson at Harbin, which concludes with the statement that "there appears to be little doubt that the Japanese forces are being augmented." It is suggested that you may care to tell the Japanese Ambassador orally that we are disturbed by reports that the Japanese forces in the Noni River area are being augmented and that we sincerely hope that this does not indicate that the Japanese are preparing for further hostilities. At the same time attention might be called to the Japanese Government's statement that the Japanese troops in the Noni River area would be withdrawn in about two weeks from November 8.

MMH/REK

FK 793.94/2613

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS



November 9, 1931.

Digest of
Newspaper Items.

NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE:

Peiping despatch, November 9 (UP). Rioting by armed civilian Chinese and disbanded soldiery broke out in Tientsin early November 9. About 1,000 Chinese attacked the police station, the railway station and the governor's house around midnight. Chinese troops were called out to quell the disturbances and troops of the foreign garrisons, including men of the 15th United States Infantry, patrolled the concessions and defense areas. At 7 a.m. Japanese troops in the Japanese concession opened fire with small guns on adjacent Chinese territory in a strong effort to compel the rioters to cease their activities. According to the despatch, the Japanese commander had given the Chinese until 5 a.m. to cease fighting within a zone of 300 yards of the concession. He did not open fire until 7 a.m.

Chinese reports claim the disturbance to have been instigated by the Japanese to provide an excuse for the complete occupation of Tientsin by Japanese forces.

Upon receipt of the news of trouble in Tientsin General Chang Hsueh-liang left Peiping for Tientsin by armored car.

Mukden

F/DEW 793.94/2614

- 2 -

Mukden despatch (UP), November 9, announces proclamation by the Government of Mukden, under one Yuan ^{Shin-kai}, of complete independence from Peiping and Nanking, Kirin and other cities prepared to follow Mukden's example. The independence movement was announced with the full approval of the Japanese.

Peiping despatch, November 9 (AP), states that Hsuan ^TLung, the deposed boy-emperor of China, escaped assassination in Tientsin when a Chinese hotel messenger delivered to him a basket of fruit containing a bomb which failed to explode.

Tokyo despatch, November 8 (Wilfred Fleisher), reports that official quarters in Japan regarded the news that League powers and the United States were considering the severance of diplomatic relations with Japan as intimidation. Japan wants a new treaty with China embodying the five fundamental principles already announced by Japan.

Japanese officials openly accuse the League of Nations of partiality towards China.

Geneva despatch, November 8 (John T. Whitaker):

"Japan informed the League of Nations today that its forces had ceased to advance northward in the Russian sphere of Manchuria but that Japanese troops would remain for a fortnight at the Nonni River, so that they will be occupying that area when the League Council meets at Paris a week from tomorrow."

Washington, November 8 (AP). State and War Department officials were of the opinion Sunday that the Tientsin situation

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

situation had not, as yet, gotten out of hand. The participation of American troops was not deemed likely unless trouble reached much greater proportions than at present.

WASHINGTON POST:

Mr. Harold J. T. Horan, in an article on November 9, states that according to the Japanese Embassy "last night" no alarming reports had been received from Tokyo in the last 24 hours. Japanese Embassy officials also announced the receipt of M. Briand's third note to Japan which has not yet been made public, but, according to Mr. Horan, it is declared to be the most forceful and pointed of the communications so far transmitted.

The article states that the Japanese attitude remains unchanged in the face of the American and League notes.

It is the intention of the Japanese Government to assume the maintenance of Japanese prestige in Manchuria by setting up several autonomous governments with Chinese heads but under Japanese protection. Mr. Horan does not believe that the United States would recognize any of these local governments and cites the non-recognition of the Governments of Marshal Chang Tso-lin and General Chang Hsueh-liang as precedents.

At the meeting of the League of Nations Council on November 17, unless there are definite indications of a settlement of the Manchuria situation, the delegates to
the

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) *
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

the Council, including Mr. Prentiss Gilbert, may be asked to consider the grave step of withdrawal of diplomatic relations with Japan. Mr. Horan does not believe that Japanese military influence with the emperor, however strong, could prevail against such a situation.

NEW YORK TIMES:

Tokyo despatch, November 8 (Hugh Byas), states that Japanese replied to M. Briand's warning note against permitting the continuance of hostilities in Manchuria by a justification of the Japanese Army's move into North Manchuria and to the Nonni River.

Mr. Byas states that the outstanding feature of the November 8 press conference was Japanese expression of dissatisfaction with the methods of the League Secretariat which they accuse of accepting unverified statements of Dr. Alfred Sze even to the point of using them as a basis for action by the President of the Council.

M. Briand's note relative to the salt funds at Newchwang has apparently caused considerable resentment. The note seems to assume, say the Japanese, on the strength of statements of Dr. Alfred Sze that the Japanese Army has appropriated funds for its own use. Officials maintain that the army has not taken a cent of Chinese money.

Dr. Louis W. Rajchman of the League Health Service, now at Nanking, has been complained of by Japan who maintains

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lutz NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -

tains that he has acted as a medium of communication between Geneva and Nanking, as if the League were a superstate.

Moscow despatch, November 8 (Walter Duranty) states that Moscow is becoming increasingly disturbed by reports from Japanese sources that Russians are backing the Chinese or are trying to provoke a conflict with Japan. Mr. Duranty states that there is hardly a foreign diplomat in Moscow who does not believe that Russia would do almost anything to avoid war. The Russians say:

"These reports, though baseless in fact, have a foundation in purpose. They are intended to serve as an excuse not merely for Japanese troops to remain in Manchuria but for further Japanese advances northwest and northeast."

The despatch states that the regime desired by the Japanese with a system of puppet governments necessitates the control by Japan of certain railroads in North as well as in South Manchuria. This is given as an explanation of the Japanese advance to the Nenmi River and projected action against bandits on the other side of Harbin.

Harbin despatch, November 7, tells of emergency measures planned by Japanese authorities for protection of 4,000 Japanese in Harbin in case of attack. News was received from confidential sources to the effect that Japanese population was to be massacred if Tsitsihar was taken by Japanese.



FE:AGL:EJL

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 500. A 15 Naval Holiday/117 FOR Tel. # 300, 11 am

FROM Geneva (Gilbert) DATED Nov. 11, 1931.
TO NAME 1-1172 ***

REGARDING: Communication from Sze to Drummond in which
he stated that in the view of the Chinese
Government the fate of the arms truce depends
upon the issue of the present Manchurian conflict.

hs

793.94/2615

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CJH

GREEN

GENEVA

Dated November 11, 1931

Rec'd. 8:20 a.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

300, November 11th, 11 a.m.

The following is the text of a communication from Sze to Drummond dated November 7 concerning arms truce which Drummond handed me this morning on account of its obvious and important relation to the Sino-Japanese conflict.

"I beg to inform you that the Chinese Government is prepared to accede to the Assembly's proposal for a truce in armaments as a preliminary to and corollary of the Disarmament Conference. But in the view of the Chinese Government the fate of this proposal and of the Disarmament Conference itself depends upon the issue of the present Manchurian conflict before the League. Should the Covenant and the Pact of Paris prove to be bulwarks of peace and international justice on which the law-abiding nations can rely for their safety, the armaments truce and the Disarmament Conference will mark a long step forward in the organization of peace. If by some unhappy mischance these bulwarks should

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CJH

Page 2 - #300 from Geneva.

should crumble the Chinese Government and people
(above)
would be regretfully compelled to put about all
other national tasks the building up of a national
defense strong enough to secure respect, and preserve
against external aggression, the territorial integrity
and political independence of China".

This text has been circulated to the press by the
Secretariat.


GILBERT

HPD

1297

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE



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NOV 9 - 1931
SECRETARY'S OFFICE

Of special interest in the papers this morning are the
despatches from Tokyo -- from Hugh Byas for the NEW YORK TIMES
and from Wilfrid Fleisher for the HERALD-TRIBUNE.

Mr. Byas reports that Ambassador Forbes has returned to
his post and within a few hours communicated "a note just
cabled from Washington containing a momentous announcement
that the United States Administration had associated itself
with the League of Nations resolution regarding Manchuria".

In Mr. Byas' opinion, this communication will give Japa-
nese officials grave concern but it is expected that the
immediate effect will harden Japanese public opinion behind
the action which Japan has taken and that "its first effect
will be to make the Japanese dig in their heels".

Mr. Byas states that, in Japan, the League's handling
of this matter is considered as combining "a noble regard
for the highest principles of international comity with
striking ignorance of actual conditions". Mr. Byas suggests
that:

"The most urgent need was to get the two
parties to talk out their respective grievances
with the League and the United States standing
by to see that the treaties regarding China's
territorial integrity were not infringed. The
League, instead, stood on strict legality";

and

NOV 11 1931
RECEIVED

F/DEW 793.94/2616

- 2 -

and that

"a practical approach to the problem would have been for the League to insist on direct negotiations on evacuation and Japan's fundamentals, beginning simultaneously. Japan would have accepted this."

(In this connection, Peiping's 874, November 5, 4 p.m. is of interest, in which First Secretary Engert reports that he got the impression from his interview with Wellington Koo "that Nanking had perhaps become more reconciled to the possibility of negotiating with Japan if not prior to at least simultaneously with a gradual withdrawal of Japanese forces to the Railway Zone".)

Mr. Fleisher, in the HERALD-TRIBUNE, reports that, in the meanwhile, the military authorities have decided to send as replacements for Japanese troops now in Manchuria a brigade of four thousand men from Korea and other fresh troops which would bring the number of Japanese effectives in the occupied territory during the replacement period to about twenty thousand. Mr. Fleisher reports continued conflicts between the military and civil authorities with military authorities apparently having the upper hand. Also, that a party of members of the House of Peers returning from Manchuria have issued a statement saying that Japan should not withdraw her troops "until her treaty rights are respected".

The HERALD-TRIBUNE, in its editorial of today, says that:

"... under M. Aristide Briand's generalship the Council of the League of Nations has definitely abandoned the functions of arbitration and is acting as China's advocate against

Japan

- 3 -

Japan and as a loud speaker for Alfred Sze's propaganda.

".

"M. Briand abets China's demand for evacuation before discussing Japan's demand for guarantees of security and treaty observance, while Chang Hsueh-liang's military subordinates in the field promote conflicts and draw Japanese armed forces deeper and deeper into Chinese territory".

The editorial continues with the statement that China's business is now to avoid direct negotiations with Japan and to keep the Japanese military involved in a succession of encounters until Japan brings to the League Council the treaties which China denounces; and that in these maneuvers M. Briand is giving China every encouragement.

The editorial continues with the statement that at the next meeting of the Council Japan will insist upon her rights in Manchuria, as set forth in treaties, which she proposes to hold and safeguard, whatever China or the League thinks of them.

FE:RSM/ZMF

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

NOV 11 1931

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND

793.94
Secretary of State,

Washington.

November 11, 10 p. m.

telegram

Following/has been sent to the Legation:

November 11, 6 p. m.

Your November 10, 10 a. m., my telegrams of November 9, 9 a. m., November 9, 3 p. m., and November 10, 11 a. m. seem to answer at least partially some of the inquiries of the Department as to how the trouble started. Reliable American has informed me that he saw plain clothes men in considerable numbers with white bands on their sleeves congregating in the vicinity of the Chung Yuen Department Store in the Japanese concession on Sunday night about 10:30 at which time some firing outside the concession was taking place. He left the scene but returned about thirty minutes later at which time more intensive firing was taking place immediately outside the Japanese concession between plain clothes men and the Chinese police. There is at least one other foreign eye

witness of

TIENTSIN

Dated November 11, 1931

Rec'd 3:10 p. m.
Division of

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

NOV 11 1931

Department of State

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

F/DEW
793.94/2617

DEC 21 1931

FILED

REP

2- from Tientsin, Nov. 11, 10 p. m.

witness of the presence of plain clothes men with white bands
aforementioned on sleeves in the Japanese concession Sunday
night. The Chinese through one of their number who was paid
one hundred dollars by them to join the plotters and ascertain
their plans had reported that the plain clothes men would
start trouble Saturday or Sunday night. It seems unreasonable
to suppose that the Japanese with their intelligence service
could be without prior knowledge of a movement of this kind
in which approximately one thousand persons were involved.
Linking these facts and those previously reported it is
believed to be reasonably certain that the trouble was
started by men who assembled in the Japanese concession but
whether with the knowledge and acquiescence of Japanese
authorities is not definitely established.

While this need for, and establishment of, the 300 meter
zone is not evident it does seem to have prevented further
clashes between the Chinese police and the Japanese soldiers.
It makes it impossible however for the Chinese police to
clear out the plain clothes men who are hiding therein.

British and French troops are guarding, beginning this
afternoon,

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

3- from Tientsin, Nov. 11, 10 p. m.
afternoon, the boundaries of their concessions. Squads
from the 15th Infantry will also do guard duty in its
defense area in cooperation with the Chinese police of the
first special area.


Colonel Taylor with whom I am in frequent consultation
concur in this telegram.

LOCKHART

HPD


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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 678




AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE
 American Consulate
 Tsingtao, China, October 15, 1931.

NOV 11 1931



COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND A.I.D.



SUBJECT: Supplementary Political Report-
 Tsingtao and Sino-Japanese
 Developments.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
 WASHINGTON, D. C.

SIR:

1/-

I have the honor to transmit herewith, copy
 of the Consulate's despatch to the Legation at Pei-
 ping, China, No. 495, dated October 14, entitled
 as above.

Respectfully yours,

A. S. Chase

A. S. Chase,
 American Consul.

Enclosure

1/- as stated.

Original and four copies to Department.

800.
 ASC/FP

F/DEW

793.94/2618

FILED

NOV 30 1931

No. 495

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE
American Consulate
Tsingtao, China, October 14, 1931.

SUBJECT: Supplementary Political Report-
Tsingtao and Sino-Japanese Developments.

Honorable Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping, China.

Sir:

I have the honor to submit the following outline of the political situation in Tsingtao as it has developed from the beginning of October to date.

General.

The life of the port has continued practically undisturbed on the surface and anti-Japanese feeling has not manifested itself to any serious extent. The municipal authorities appear alive to the possibilities of the situation and have been extremely vigilant in their efforts to prevent any incident which might be used as an excuse for landing of Japanese troops.

Restlessness among the students has increased, however, and the authorities are finding it increasingly difficult to dissuade them from open demonstration against Japan.

Public display of an anti-Japanese poster came close to precipitating serious trouble.

The.....

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

The arrival of three Japanese destroyers on October 12th gave rise to numerous rumors, which are believed groundless.

According to confidential information from a leading official of the Municipality, the Canton Government has sent secret agents to Tsingtao to work for the creation of disturbances which would lead to the landing of Japanese forces and the further weakening of Chiang Kai-shek's position.

It appears very probable that, unless events take an unexpected turn and Mukden regains its tottering prestige, the near future will witness a change in the make up of the Tsingtao Municipal Administration, the probability being that Han Fu-chu will seek to control the city through his appointees. Related to this eventuality will be the problem as to the future fate of the North East Squadron, the pay of whose personnel is already well in arrears.

Precarious State of Public Feeling towards Japan.

All the Municipal authorities have cooperated in strenuous efforts to maintain order in Tsingtao and to prevent any open demonstration of anti-Japanese feeling. Even the Kuomintang, though conducting its propaganda in customary style, appears sincerely convinced of the desirability of avoiding any local incident that might be used as an excuse for the landing of Japanese troops.

The chief danger zone is thought to be among the students of the middle schools. As regards the laborers and other classes, the Municipality feels that it will probably.....

- 3 -

probably be able to handle possible situations by the judicial use of force. With the students, however, the use of force is considered impracticable, and the authorities are relying entirely on a policy of constant vigilance and ceaseless efforts at oral persuasion. In following this policy, the authorities have been successful to date. They admit, however, that restlessness among the students has been growing considerably and that the prevention of trouble depends entirely on constant vigilance, quick action and good luck. Particular apprehension is felt as the time limit mentioned by the League of Nations for hoped for date of evacuation of Manchuria by Japanese forces approaches.

Display of Anti-Japanese Posters.

Several anti-Japanese posters have been displayed in one of the public parks. One of these, said to depict Japanese soldiers in the act of raiding Chinchow, was the cause of a near break in the tranquility of the port. On October 9th, a Japanese civilian, attempting to tear this poster down in broad daylight, was prevented from doing so and placed under arrest by the Chinese police. He was almost immediately released and the matter fairly well hushed up with an invented explanation that the man was intoxicated. The incident was followed by an immediate protest regarding the poster by the Japanese Consulate General. The poster in question has been removed, but others of similar nature are still to be seen.

Arrival.....

- 4 -

Arrival of Additional Japanese Naval Force.

The Japanese Destroyers, ASAGAO, FUYO and KARUKAYA arrived at Tsingtao on the morning of October 12th, joining the Cruiser, KUMA, which was then the only Japanese warship in port. Numerous rumors regarding impending action in the area by Japan were immediately started. Upon approaching the Japanese Consular authorities for information in the matter, I was told that the three destroyers had called according to schedule prepared some months ago for the purpose of a farewell assembly of Admiral Tsuda's squadron prior to the regular autumnal transfer of commanding officers, and that the ships were due to leave on the 16th.

The Japanese Consul further stated that the Japanese were well satisfied with what the Chinese had done to handle the local situation to date.

Canton's Hand in Tsingtao.

According to confidential information given directly to the undersigned by a leading member of the administration, a group of five secret agents of the Canton faction were discovered in Tsingtao on October 11th. My informant stated that they have been working in Tsingtao to create disturbances which might lead to Japanese occupation of the port and thus the further weakening of Chiang Kai-shek's position.

End of Mukden in Tsingtao.

It is rumored here- and seems a very reasonable supposition- that the collapsing prestige of the Mukden faction in Manchuria will, unless unexpectedly restored, result....

- 5 -

result in a change of municipal administration at Tsingtao. It is stated by several sources that Mayor Hu Jo-yu (胡若愚) is to be replaced by Ke Kuang-ting, (葛光庭), the present chairman of the Kiao-chow-Tsinan Railway. The latter, while also a Mukden supporter, is understood to be on good terms with Han Fu-chu, and it seems probable that his regime would be merely temporary pending appointment of some permanent choice of Han's.

Incident to the collapse of Mukden is the question as to the future fate of the North East Squadron. The pay of the Squadron's personnel is in arrears at least three months. It is reported that Ke, if appointed Mayor, would endeavor to provide funds wherewith to retain the loyalty of the Squadron, but that they would voluntarily submit to Han's permanent control seems doubtful.

Banditry and Its Possible Consequences.

A member of the local staff of the Standard Oil Company of New York reports that while proceeding from Haichow to Sincpuen, Kiangsu, his boat was fired on by bandits.

More serious from the local point of view is the sudden activity of bandits in the Jihchao region. This is causing concern to the local authorities. It appears that this apprehension is not only due to their anxiety regarding the possibility of Japan's utilizing banditry as an excuse for action, but also to a fear lest the trouble might result in Han's moving a large force towards....

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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wards the coast and thus forcing Japan to anticipate
eventualities and land her forces. It is even hinted
that Han might prefer Japanese occupation in order to
hasten the complete downfall of Mukden.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

A. S. Chase,
American Consul.

Original and one copy to Legation,
Five copies to Department of State,
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo,
Copy to Consulate, Tainan,
Copy to Consulate, Chefoo.

800.
ASC/FP


A true copy of
the signed original.
FP

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

BUREAU OF FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC COMMERCE

WASHINGTON



November 9, 1931



Hon. Wilbur J. Carr,
Assistant Secretary of State,
Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

*Letter airtel
to Mr. Margulies,
Nov. 19, 1931*

Attention: A-C/C.

November 21 23 1931.

My dear Mr. Carr:

At Dr. Klein's request, I am forwarding herewith
a letter received by him in which certain suggestions
are made re the situation in Manchuria.

We will appreciate having the letter given appro-
priate consideration.

Very truly yours,

Robert J. Phillips,
Liaison Officer.

Inclosure #6175.

FILED

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131

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

INCLOSURE 6175

FROM
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
BUREAU OF FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC COMMERCE

Form 8 11-3855

73/101-1-21
Pennsylvania 7430

498 Seventh Ave.

New York

NOV 7 1931 6 23 20 12

Secretary of Commerce
Washington, D. C.

Dear Dr, Klein.

Not knowing the proper channels through which to submit the following suggestion, may I impose on your good nature to forward this letter to the proper authority for any consideration it may deserve.

Since it appears to the average citizen that the Japanese situation in Manchuria depends on Japan receiving security for its Nationals, and the Chinese Government or the Manchurian Government are not in a position to guaranty such impartial security, may it not be suggested that the parties to The Hague and Kellogg pacts should provide a neutral body of authority composing an International Police Body, to maintain order and law in the disputed area, to permit both contenders to proceed to arbitration, thereby providing to the Japanese Government the opportunity to withdraw their armed forces, which obstacle appears to hold up the operation of the Kellogg Pact.

The signatories to the both above mentioned Pacts could provide an efficient force with authority, and the size of the force to be contributed proportionately by the various subscribing signatories.

Thanking you for your consideration to my request, allow me to remain, with kindest personal regards,

Sincerely yours,

Samuel Margulies

Nov. 4, 1931

793.94/2619

P


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Larry J. Margulies Inc.

Reorganization-Consultation Service

498 Seventh Ave.
****~~RECEIVED~~****
New York

The Hon. Julius Klein
Secretary of Commerce
Washington, D. C.



Dear Dr. Klein.

Not knowing the proper channels through which to submit the following suggestion, may I impose on your good nature to forward this letter to the proper authority for any consideration it may deserve.

Since it appears to the average citizen that the Japanese situation in Manchuria depends on Japan receiving security for its Nationals, and the Chinese Government or the Manchurian Government are not in a position to guaranty such impartial security, may it not be suggested that the parties to The Hague and Kellogg pacts should provide a neutral body of authority composing an International Police Body, to maintain order and law in the disputed area, to permit both contenders to proceed to arbitration, thereby providing to the Japanese Government the opportunity to withdraw their armed forces, which obstacle appears to hold up the operation of the Kellogg Pact.

The signatories to the both above mentioned Pacts could provide an efficient force with authority, and the size of the force to be contributed proportionately by the various subscribing signatories.

Thanking you for your consideration to my request, allow me to remain, with kindest personal regards,

Sincerely yours,

Larry J. Margulies

Nov. 4, 1931

P

1313

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

In reply refer to
FE 793.94 -/2619

November 21 1951.

Mr. Larry J. Margulies,
498 Seventh Avenue,
New York, New York.

Sir:

The receipt is acknowledged, by reference from the
Department of Commerce, of your letter of November 4,
1931, addressed to Dr. Julius Klein of that Department,
in regard to the existing dispute between China and
Japan.

The suggestions made by you have been noted. The
many problems arising from the dispute between China
and Japan are continuing to receive the careful and
solicitous attention of this Department.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

M. H.
Maxwell M. Hamilton,
Assistant Chief,
Division of Far Eastern Affairs.

CR ✓
Nov 23 1951.

FE:MMH/VDM FE
11/19/31 *MMH*

A-9/C
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True copy of
the original
D

1314
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WP

FROM

This telegram must be Paris
closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.
RECEIVED
NOV 12 1931
DIVISION OF
Dated November 11, 1931
Rec'd 3:28 Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 12 1931
Department of State
NOV 13 1931
DIVISION OF
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

793-34
Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

724, November 11, 10 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Your 530, November 9, 4 p. m., and my 721, November 11, noon.

In talking this afternoon with Monseieur Briand I carefully conveyed to him the substance of your telegram under reference. He said that he would endeavor to have the plan described in paragraph two of your telegram proposed at next week's conference.

HOWELL

FW

NOV 13 1931

F/DEW
793.34/2620

1315

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department

OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-128

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Washington,

November 12, 1931.

793-94
541
AMERICAN EMBASSY

PARIS (FRANCE).

URGENT.

Inform General Dawes of your telegram 724 of
November 11, 10 p.m., and the Department's 530 of
November 9, 4 p.m., therein referred to.

6 pm
13620
2584A

793.94/2620

Stinson
SKA

DMM
FE:RSM:EJL

FE

SKIT

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 80.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-128

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone.

PEIPING

Dated November 12, 1931

Rec'd 7:07 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

920, November 12, 2 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Donald, the young Marshal's adviser, has just told
me that he understands Japanese in Tientsin have received
peremptory orders from Tokio to avoid further clashes with
the Chinese. As a result Chinese police have received
permission to enter Japanese concession to look for rioters
and other legitimate purposes. Donald believes if the
Japanese military carry out their instructions there will
be no more disturbances.


Repeated Tientsin and Shanghai.

For the Minister

ENGERT

JHR

HPD



F/DEW 793.94/2621

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WP

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone.

London

FROM Dated November

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

434, November 11, 7 p. m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

In accordance with your 326, November 10, 8 p. m.,
that I keep you informed not only with regard to actual
developments but with regard to envisaged possibilities,
I have to report that this afternoon I have conferred
both with Matsudaira and Sir John Simon. In both the
judgment of Simon and myself it is most ^{important} (*) that
Matsudaira be in Paris at the time the Council meets and
Matsudaira rather expects that his government may ask him
to go. Matsudaira seems to feel that broadly speaking
there are no differences between the purposes and plans
of the League and the Japanese Government which cannot be
amiably resolved if the matter is handled wisely and
with due regard to the prestige both of the League and
of Japan. Upon inquiry he stated to me that he felt
that

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

NOV 13 1931

DIVISION OF

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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NOV 12 1931

DIVISION OF

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 12 1931

Department of State

F/DEW

793.94/2622


REP

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y

2- #434, from London

that if the League would remove the time limit set for evacuation Japan could probably make in return some helpful gesture tending to bring about the cessation of hostilities. He felt with us that the immediate objective now was the cessation of hostilities under an armistice, pending the discussion of the best agencies and methods for final settlement.

In my talk with Simon he said that while the League might have the better juridical argument, Japan notwithstanding probably had the argument in its favor as to the necessary location of troops. He told me that he was inclined to think that the League had best propose a cessation of hostilities without suggesting any change in the status quo of the troop locations of Japan at present, pending an ^{agreement} ~~argument~~ upon the agencies and methods of securing final settlement. In other words, that the immediate objective should be an armistice. This, he said, seemed to be the Prime Minister's view of the matter in the short talk he had with him. When I told him that Matsudaira had expressed practically the same opinion he asked me to arrange a meeting tomorrow between



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- 3 - No. 434 from London

between the three of us to talk the matter over. It is significant that Simon instinctively recognized, as you did, the unwisdom of the time limit clause in the League proposition. He thought that it should be withdrawn and that its withdrawal was practicable. Simon thought that somewhere in the effort use might be made of the procedure by which Hughes and Balfour appointed observers in the Japanese-Chinese conference concerning which you telephoned me. Simon, Matsudaira and I talked only in tentative terms. I carefully explained to them both, using your words, that it was our desire neither to push or lead in reference to this overstepping matter, and that the objective of the Council of the League and our own objective in seeking to prevent war and bring about peaceful settlement were the same; and that my presence in Paris was simply to confer individually with members of the Council in a matter of common concern and mutual treaty interests and duties. It is very necessary for me as you say to proceed cautiously and if I may add, also humbly. The phrase in your press statement "it is not anticipated that

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) *
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 - No. 434 from London

that General Dawes will find it necessary to take part in the meetings of the League Council but he will be in a position to confer with the representatives of the other nations present in Paris in case such conference would seem desirable" was a great relief and help to me. As a matter of fact I did not intend under any circumstances, short of a positive instruction from you, to attend any meeting of the Council. But your phrase makes this easy without offending League susceptibilities or requiring explanation from me.

DAWES

FW-OX

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 - No. 434 from London

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*See correction
 Copying of this
 page*

*F.W.
 743 94/2622*

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
NOV 11 1931
DIVISION OF
EXTERIOR AFFAIRS
NOVEMBER 10 1931

FE
NE

743.94/2623

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON
AND THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR, SIR RONALD LINDSAY, FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

NOV 12 1931
Department of State

Manchuria.

The British Ambassador dined with me at
Woodley. I told him that I was going to send General
Dawes to Paris during the meetings of the Council of
the League there, and I gave the Ambassador my reasons
for doing so and a summary of our position.

HLS.

F/DEW 793.94/2623

S HLS:HHR

no FE
11/13/31 RH

NOV 24 1931
RECD

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WP

FROM GRAY
Tokyo

Dated November 12, 1931

Rec'd 1:49 a.m. Division of

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

213, November 12, 10 a. m.

General Staff informs Military Attache that one
brigade will be sent from Japan next week to relieve a
brigade in Manchuria. This will probably be followed
by other relief as the term of service of the men in
Manchuria runs out.

The General Staff has also invited the Military
Attaches now in attendance at the general maneuvers in
Kyushu
Kyushu to visit Manchuria. I perceive no objection
to our Military Attache accepting this invitation.

Yesterday's news carried a report of a clash
between the Japanese contingent at Tientsin and Chinese
troops. The General Staff informed the Military Attache's
office that the report appears greatly exaggerated, as
the Japanese military contingent there has a radio but
the General Staff has received no report.

The

COPIES DESTROYED
JAN 19 1964

NOV 12 1931
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
Department of State

Telegram drafted to
Tokyo 10 Paris
Nov 11, 1931 Juk

F/DEW

793.94/2624

- 2 - No. 213 from Tokyo

The General Staff also stated that there had been no confirmation of the news report that General Ma at Tsitsihar had declared war on Japan. The Minister for Foreign Affairs indicated to me in person that conditions in Tientsin were not serious.

FORBES

JS

1 1325

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-128
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Collect

Charge Department *2*

OR

Charge to
\$

Department of State

Washington,

November 12, 1931.

743.94/2624
AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (Japan).

224 Your 213, November 12, 10 a. m.

Provided that invitation to visit Manchuria is
accepted by Military Attachés of leading powers, Depart-
ment perceives no objection to our Military Attaché
likewise accepting.

Inform Peiping of action taken.

793.94/2624

*not
121.5494*
Handwritten signature
FE:MMH:REK

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12 1931. pr

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-128

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

November 13, 1931.

TO BE TRANSMITTED
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PLAIN

747
AMERICAN CONSUL,

NANKING (China).

111
FOR THE MINISTER.

One. Department has received a telegram dated November 12, 10 a. m., from the Embassy at Tokyo reading, in part as follows: QUOTE General Staff informs Military Attache that one brigade will be sent from Japan next week to relieve a brigade in Manchuria. This will probably be followed by other relief as the term of service of the men in Manchuria runs out.

The General Staff has also invited the Military Attaches now in attendance at the general maneuvers in Kyushu to visit Manchuria. I perceive no objection to our Military Attache accepting this invitation UNQUOTE.

Two. Department is replying that provided that invitation to visit Manchuria is accepted by Military Attaches or leading powers, department perceives no objection to our Military Attache likewise accepting.

FE:MMH:REK

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19

Index Bu.—No. 60.

FE

5743A

Simon

Wky

CHV

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-128

793.94/2624

1327

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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TO BE TRANSMITTED
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Collect
 Charge Department
 OR
 Charge to
 \$

Department of State

Washington,
 November 18, 1931.

AMEMBASSY

NOV 18 1931

PARIS (France)

567 FOR AMBASSADOR DAWES.

For your information.

One. Under date November 12, the American Ambassador at Tokyo telegraphed that the Japanese General Staff had invited military attachés to visit Manchuria. The Department, after consultation with the War Department, replied that our Military Attaché should accept provided the attachés of at least two other leading powers accept and that this Department believed that our Military Attaché should consider his mission non, repeat non, political.

Two. Under date November 18, our Military Attaché telegraphed the War Department that so far the British, French, Polish and American Attachés have accepted the invitation to visit Manchuria and that they would leave soon.

793.94/2624

Enciphered by FE:MMH/VDM

FE

Sent by operator M., 1931

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 12 1931
Department of State
Tokyo
NOV 13 1931

Dated November 12, 1931

Rec'd 7:25 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

NOV 13 1931

215, November 12, 1 p. m. (GRAY).

In sending a copy of his memorandum to you of November 10th Baron Shidehara suggested that I call on him. And in the informal discussion which (*) he made the important explanation that upon the satisfaction of either of two conditions Japan was prepared to withdraw troops in Manchuria to the railway zone:

- One. The creation of satisfactory police conditions.
- Two. Acceptance of the five points.

Speaking of the first, he said the organization of the local police under defense committees is now progressing and it has reached the point in Mukden where, according to him, nearly all Japanese troops have been withdrawn. Asked how the Japanese were exercising the attributes of sovereignty

F/DEW

793.94/2625

FILED
NOV 13 1931

REP

2- #215, from Tokio, Nov. 12, 1 p.m.

sovereignty in South Manchuria, he replied that their only intervention was in the matter of police protection to Japanese and Korean citizens; that they were exercising no control over the administration, including taxation, financial expenditures, justice as between Chinese citizens, or other activities of Government outside of police work. Asked how the so-called private police were paid, he said a portion of the salt tax was voted by the Chinese authorities for that purpose and that Nanking was receiving the same proportion of this tax it had before. In regard to the degree of control exercised by the Japanese over these defense committees, he said the Chinese citizens openly hostile to Japan were not recognized and that the committees were not in the pay of Japan nor under the control of Japan in their operations. (END GRAY).

This looks like a conciliatory offer on the part of Japan to open up a new and feasible avenue of escape from the present difficult situation. The United States and the League of Nations might now express approval of this project and facilitate the creation of this adequate police force so that the Japanese withdrawal of troops could take place at the earliest possible time.

FORBES

HPD
(*) Apparent Omission.

1 3 3 1

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Collect
Charge Department

Department of State

OR
Charge to
\$

This cable was sent in code. It should be sent in plain text.

Washington,
November 12, 1931.
110m

793.94/2625

AMEMBASSY,

PARIS (France).

545

Confidential for General Dawes.

The Department has received the following telegram/
from Ambassador Forbes at Tokyo under date of
November 12/

QUOTE/

UNQUOTE

(Telegraph Room, quote text of
Tokyo Embassy's No. 215,
November 12, 1 p.m., hereto
attached.)

2625

I do not ~~concur~~ concur in the view which Forbes
expresses (reparations) that we QUOTE might now express approval of
this project UNQUOTE. It has within it the possi-
bilities of a Japanese de facto control of administration
in Manchuria, and support by the Powers at this time
of such a proposal would give the Chinese the impression
that the Powers are ready to assent to Japan's dominance
there. According to our estimates, these Chinese
QUOTE defense committees UNQUOTE are a creation of
the Japanese military authorities and we should for
the present at least avoid either the fact or the

Enciphered by _____

appearance

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19 _____

793.94/2625

1 3 3 1

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
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PLAIN

• Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

Department of State

Washington,

- 2 -

appearance (of approving any move made by those authorities.
We may find it necessary ultimately to acquiesce, but
we should not in any respect currently associate
ourselves with or give countenance to projects which
those authorities formulate or put into operation!

If Japan's representatives bring up such a
proposal at Paris, you should assume a non-committal
attitude.

Stinson

Ally

FE:SKH/VDM

Rum m. m. H.
FE

SKH
OK

Nov 13, 1981.

Enciphered by *MVA*

Sent by operator *M.*, 19

Index Bu.—No. 80.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1980 1-138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138

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1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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Charge Department

OR

Charge to
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Department of State

This telegram is to be sent by the following route:
To show: Washington
By air mail radio teletype other

Washington,
November 12, 1931.

11am

AMERICAN EMBASSY

TOKYO (JAPAN).

Strictly Confidential for the Ambassador.

Your 215, November 12, 1 p.m.

You should be very careful to say nothing to the Japanese that would imply approval of either of these proposals either by you or by your Government.

I am sending General Dawes to Paris to be present during the meetings of the Council of the League. I am communicating to him what you are reporting to me.

Stimson

RAM
FE: RSM: EJJ

FE

8/16/44

Nov 13 1931.

01.6

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

793.94/2625

793.94/2625

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

793 24
REP

FROM

DEPT OF STATE
RECEIVED
NOV 13 1931
DIVISION OF

GREEN

General

Dated November 12, 1931

Rec'd

7 a. m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 12 1931
Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

302, November 12, 9 a. m.

Drummond has handed me the following text of a telegram / Briand which he despatched yesterday at latter's request to Nanking and Tokio.

"Request you to thank Chinese and Japanese Governments for replies they have made to telegram I sent them through you on November 6. After carefully studying these replies and the latest communications received I feel I must insist once more on undertaking entered into by both Governments to make every effort to avoid any aggravation of situation. I also urge that commanders of opposing forces should receive strictest orders to refrain from initiating any fresh action. Lastly, I consider it extremely important that facilities should be given to the observers whom the members of the Council may send to the scene, particularly neighborhood

F/DEW
793.94/2626

FILED

NOV 18 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2- #302, from Geneva, Nov. 13, 9 a.m.

neighborhood of Nonni Bridge and Angangchi, to collect
information referred to in resolution of September 30."

GILBERT

JHR

WSB

1335

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

FROM

BERNE

Dated November 12, 1931

Reo'd 6:47 a. m.

793-af
Secretary of State,
Washington.

RECEIVED
NOV 12 1931
DIVISION OF

191, November 12, 10 a. m. (GRAY)..

Reuter despatch dated Washington, November 11th, appears in local press this morning stating that Ambassador Dawes "has been instructed to proceed to Paris to participate" in League Council meeting. Similar announcement by the Swiss Broadcasting Circuit last evening. (END GRAY).

CONFIDENTIAL. Shaw and Gilbert expected here shortly after noon today.

GREENE

HPD

F/DEM

793.94/2627

NOV 12 1931
RECEIVED

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

793-94
REP


FROM

GRAY

Tientsin via N. R.

Dated November 12, 1931

Rec'd 8:40 a. m.



F/DEW 793.94/2528

Secretary of State,

Washington.

November 12, 2 p. m.

The following telegram has been sent to the Legation:

"There was intermittent rifle and machine firing throughout last night largely confined to the area in the Chinese city southwest of the Japanese concession. From four to six o'clock this morning firing was rather heavy in the neighborhood of the Nankai middle school. ~~the~~ *all* the American staff of this school have come into the foreign concessions on the request of this office and others are coming in today. Japanese state that they did no firing during last night or this morning."

Japanese destroyer KARUKAYAC passed Hsinho bound up river at six o'clock this morning but Chinese authorities ^{report that} vessel has been forced to stop at a point 20 miles below Tientsin because of shallow water.

Discussions

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.
mf

NOV 21 1931

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2- from Tientsin,.Nov. 12, 2 p. m.

Discussions between the Japanese Consul and Mayor Chang took place yesterday with a view to finding some solution of the present difficulty. It is understood that these discussions will be resumed today.

The Chinese Chamber of Commerce have suggested a neutral control of the 300 meter zone outside of the Japanese concession and I believe the Chinese authorities are sympathetic with the suggestion. Local consuls and foreign military commandants however would probably not look with favor on any such suggestion if it were to be officially brought up for discussion.

Foreign troops are still on duty in their respective defense areas".

LOCKHART

WSB

1338

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) *
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated
 to anyone.

SHANGHAI

Dated November 12, 1931

Rec'd 9:03 a. m.

793-94
 Secretary of State,
 Washington.


November 12, 7 p. m.

The following telegram has been received from the
 Legation:

"November 12, 2 p. m. CONFIDENTIAL. Donald the
 young Marshal's adviser has just told me that he under-
 stands Japanese at Tientsin have received peremptory
 orders from Tokyo to avoid further clashes with the
 Chinese. As a result Chinese police have received per-
 mission to enter Japanese concession to look for rioters
 and other legitimate purposes. Donald believes if the
 Japanese military carry out their instructions there will
 be no more disturbances".

JOHNSON

WSB



F/DEW

793.94/2629

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

793-af

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
NOV 12 1931
DIVISION OF

FROM

PLAIN

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 12, 1931

Rec'd 5:55 a. m.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

919, November 12, 10 a. m.

Reuter report from Nanking eleventh:

"Foreign Minister addressed protest to Japan today, animadverting upon Japan's failure to estimate occupied areas in Manchuria in conformity with resolution of League and saying that on the contrary Japan has not only evinced no intention of evacuating them but has continued to extend her unlawful activities.

Note reviews Japanese actions at Nonni River Bridge, including alleged bombing Hsitchao on Chinese Eastern Railway and Japanese demand that Acting Governor of Heilungkiang should resign and hand over administration to General Chang Hai Peng, and therefore it is established beyond doubt that the Japanese troops are bent upon employing Chinese rebels to occupy the capital of Heilungkiang to create an administration in that Province similar to those in

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 12 1931
Department of State

F/DEW

793.94/2630

FILED

NOV 16 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REF

2- #919, from Peiping, Nov.12,10 a.m.

those in Fengtien and Kirin.

Note then declares that determined, aggressive activities of Japanese troops are violating international law, agreement, and the resolution of League of Nations. Japanese Government is therefore requested to put an immediate stop to unlawful activities of its troops and to fulfill its obligations speedily under above mentioned resolutions of League. In conclusion, note states that Chinese Government will hold Japanese Government responsible for full compensation for damage and losses sustained.


Recent developments at Nonni River and at Tientsin are arousing intense anti-Japanese sentiment throughout China. Thousands of boy and girl students are arriving at Nanking from other principal cities and today many of them marched in pouring rain to urge Nationalist Government to declare war on Japan and sever economic relations with her. Students volunteer corps in military uniforms paraded streets carrying banners and shouting anti-Japanese slogans".

For the Minister
ENGERT

HPD

1 3 4 1

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE:

Tokyo despatch of November 9 (Wilfred Fleisher) states that according to an unconfirmed despatch in the TOKYO NICHU-NICHU General Ma Chen-shan, Acting Governor of Heilungkiang, has declared war on Japan. General Ma commanded the Chinese forces which took part in the recent fighting at the Nonni River.

Much importance is attached in Tokyo to the conversations which have taken place between M. Briand and Mr. Yoshizawa, the Japanese delegate to the League Council. The despatch indicates that Japanese officials believe the conversations have led to a better understanding of the Japanese point of view. This does not signify, say officials, that Japan is weakening in her present attitude.

Associated Press despatch mentions General Ma Chen-shan as a leader of Chinese Nationalists in Manchuria, and acting Governor of Hailungkiang. While General Ma's declaration of war does not commit the National Government in any way, the National Government is responsible for his acts in Manchuria.

Geneva despatch dated November 9 advises that the
United

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793.94/2636

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) *
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

United States and the members of the League Council were formally notified on that date of the Council meeting to be held in Paris November 16 where, the despatch states, "a supreme effort will be made to end the Manchurian 'war'".

(Cleveland)
Shanghai despatch of November 10 announces the issuance of a statement by Chinese Salt Administration officials in reply to General Honjo's denial of Chinese charges that Japanese military had interfered with the salt revenues in Manchuria. The statement charges that Japanese troops forcibly took possession of the accounts from the District Inspector's office at Newchwang and also of the bank where salt funds were deposited. The Japanese since the seizure, it was charged, have exercised control over all salt revenue transactions.

THE NEW YORK TIMES.

The New York Times today announces a sharp drop in Japanese bonds. The article is quoted herewith:

"All Japanese bonds, including government, utility and industrial issues, receded sharply on the local bond market yesterday as the news from the Far East continued to intensify the seriousness of the Sino-Japanese differences in Manchuria.

"Japan's 6-1/2s and 5-1/2s were sharply lower, while thirty-day sellers were quoted several points under current transactions. The 6-1/2s lost 2-1/2 points in the day's trading and the 5-1/2s lost 3 points. Tokyo City 5-1/2s lost half a point."

- 3 -

Manchurian Developments.

"The Sino-Japanese dispute appeared yesterday to be developing to a more critical stage, following the week-end outbreak at Tientsin and reports in Tokyo that fighting had been resumed on the Nonni River front.

"In Washington, President Hoover and Secretary Stimson conferred on the new situation, and it was forecast that a renewed effort would be made, in conjunction with the League of Nations, to prevent open warfare.

"Tientsin was reported quiet last night, though further outbreaks were feared. Official advices to Washington yesterday intimated that the Japanese had fomented the rioting in Tientsin.

"Tokyo has forwarded a reply to Secretary Stimson's note of last week, but it has not yet been delivered in Washington. It is intimated that the note will reveal Japan declining to alter her present attitude."

Harbin despatch November 9 (Hallett Abend):

General Ma Chen-shan, Chinese commander at Tsitsihar has refused to meet terms of twelve hour ultimatum from General Honjo demanding that he resign. The ultimatum was delivered at noon November 8 by a Colonel Hayashi attached to the Japanese Consulate at Tsitsihar.

Mr. Abend terms it an "extraordinary procedure" the fact of which is admitted by both Chinese and Japanese official sources.

Tokyo despatch (A.P.) of November 9 announces that official circles feel scant hope for peace from Yoshizawa-Briand conversations. The Foreign Office announced that its reply to the American note was nearly complete.

Tokyo

- 4 -

Tokyo despatch November 9 states that Minister of War Minami favors the formation of an international army at Tientsin to preserve order in case of further trouble there. American infantrymen would be included in this army.

Tokyo despatch dated November 9 (Hugh Byas) announces the transmission of the Japanese reply to the American note. The note, it is understood, will repeat Japanese demands for recognition of the treaties.

Mr. Byas believes Japan willing to make public the note and feels that it will be impossible to separate the fundamentals of the recognition by China of Japan's treaty position from the question of withdrawal of Japanese troops in Manchuria. The article holds the Japanese attitude to have become stiffer on this score.

With reference to the activities of Dr. Rajchman of the League Health Service mentioned in yesterday's press reports, Mr. Byas writes as follows:

"During the recent events, it is alleged, Dr. Rajchman, T. V. Soong, Nanking, Finance Minister, and an Englishman named Watson, formerly one of the League Secretariat and now employed in Shanghai, moved their beds to the offices of the European-Asiatic Wireless Company, which operates a radio communicating direct with Berlin. These three were busily engaged in sending messages to Geneva during the crisis."

Washington despatch November 9 states that all information at Washington indicates that neither Japan nor

Russia

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -

Russia desires war, but that two eventualities might force them into it. The first would be continued civil war among Chinese factions in Manchuria; the other would be movements by Japanese troops in fighting the Chinese which would put them astride the Chinese Eastern Railway.

Moscow despatch November 9 (Walter Duranty) indicates a feeling in Moscow that Japan desires to make Soviet Russia "the goat" in the Manchuria affair. Moscow believes that Japan intends to keep Manchuria and, if possible, will stir up "White Russian" agitation against the Reds in Harbin which will require the pacifying hand of Japan.

EDITORIAL November 9

Snap judgments and violent partisanship are held to be distinctly out of place in the present controversy between Japan and China. Accurate reports are almost impossible to obtain. The editorial takes up the possibility of economic sanctions under Article XV of the League being called into effect and states as follows:


"But if any action of this sort is really undertaken, the United States cannot be expected to have a part in it. Such efforts as our Government may make to compose the quarrel between Japan and China, will be based in general upon our demonstrated friendship for both of them, and specifically upon the agreement which both have made, as signatories to the Briand-Kellogg treaty, not only to refrain from war as an instrument of national policy, but to seek in every way a peaceful settlement of any controversy that may arise."

FE:AGL:EMU

AGL

1346

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



November 6, 1931.

Digest of
Newspaper Items.

THE WASHINGTON POST:

According to an AP despatch (origin not given)
China delivered a note yesterday to the League of Nations
charging that Japanese troops and airplanes had killed
120 Chinese soldiers near the Nonni river in two days
and asking the League to induce Tokyo to cease her
"incendiary activities." A special session of the League
Council was called by M. Briand to meet in Paris
November 17 to take further steps for peace in Manchuria.

Mr. Harold J. T. Horan in an article of November 6
states that the United States will continue to cooperate
with the Council of the League of Nations and other
signatories of the Kellogg Pact for Peace in Manchuria.
It will not abandon, however, the reservations for
independent action made when Mr. Gilbert was named as
American observer at Geneva.

Mr. Horan points out that, although the Japanese
promised the League Council to evacuate their troops
as rapidly as possible and although the terms of

Article XVI

F/DEW 793.94/2635

FK
DCR
file

- 2 -

Article XVI of the League Covenant provision is made for the establishment of an economic blockade in the case of a country that refused to be bound by arbitral and conciliatory mediation of the League, no sanctions or penalties have even tentatively been discussed.

The article tells of reports of travellers returned from the Orient regarding the paralyzation of Japanese commerce due to her relations with China. Due to the fact that Chinese influence in Oriental trade transcends the limits of China the Chinese boycott has caused immeasurable damage, Mr. Horan apparently believes that the protests of Japanese merchants will eventually prevail over the recommendations of the jingoists.

Tokyo despatch (AP) dated November 6, announces that Ambassador Forbes delivered the American Government's note regarding the renewal of hostilities in Manchuria to Foreign Minister Shidihara on that date. The contents of the note were kept secret but Japan considered the note a "friendly representation".

Geneva despatch (UP) dated November 5 announces the renewal of hostilities in Manchuria in the Nonni River territory as learned from Doctor Alfred Sze, Chinese delegate to the League. League circles are reported

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

reported to consider the situation extremely grave.

The despatch points out that this is the first time the League has ever been called upon to end actual hostilities in which actual battles with heavy loss of life have taken place.

Geneva despatch (UP) dated November 5, reports that the Soviet Commissar of War, M. Voroshilov, has given assurance that the Soviet Government will maintain strict neutrality in the Sino Soviet dispute. The Minister's statement is reported as a great relief to many League officials.

NEW YORK TIMES:

Tokyo despatch to the NEW YORK TIMES dated November 5 announcing the return to Tokyo of Ambassador Forbes states that the Ambassador declined to comment on the Manchurian crisis. He informed the correspondent that "his greatest wish in this time of difficulty was to preserve the fundamental good relationship between Japan and the United States."

Paris despatch (AP) dated November 5 announces that M. Briand will call a special meeting of the League of Nations Council in Paris on November 17 to discuss the Manchurian situation.

Tokyo

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

Tokyo despatch from Mr. Hugh Byas dated November 5 advises that Ambassador Forbes within a few hours of his arrival communicated to Foreign Minister Shidahara the American Government's note in which the United States Government associates itself with the League of Nations' resolution regarding Manchuria.

Mr. Byas speaks of the note as "momentous" and believes that the gravity of the American move will be realized by the whole Japanese nation. In his opinion, however, its first effect will be to make the Japanese more determined in their present attitude in Manchuria. The Japanese nation, Mr. Byas states, feel that they have exercised much restraint with China's disorder and that they have been treated in too casual a manner by the League. In Japanese opinion the League has shown a high regard for "the highest principles of international comity with striking ignorance of actual conditions, with the result that the League has been inept."

• Shanghai despatch (AP) dated November 5 gives Chinese version of fight at Nonni River Bridge when 15 Japanese soldiers were killed. General Ma Chien-Shan refused to withdraw his troops to a point six miles
from the

- 5 -

from the bridge. Some 50 Japanese troops crossed the river and captured three Chinese prisoners. After this Japanese Consul at Tsitsihar and Chinese authorities conferred with a view to avoiding a clash, but, according to the Chinese version, this became impossible when the Japanese commander's verbal ultimatum that Chinese forces withdraw before noon was not complied with. Two hundred Japanese troops then crossed the river but were repulsed.

Geneva despatch dated November 5 to the NEW YORK TIMES reports Doctor Alfred Sze as saying that at 2 p.m. on November 4, airplanes bombed the Chinese camp at the Nonni River Bridge killing and wounding some 20 Chinese officers and men. He states that in the past few days six Japanese troop trains have arrived at the bridgehead of the Nonni River.

Washington despatch dated November 5 reports that Washington regards the fighting at the Nonni River with deep anxiety but that there was no change in the State Department policy to confine its peace efforts to diplomatic measures.

AGL

FR:AGL:KC

1351

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

PLAIN


Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 12, 1931

Rec'd 1:20 p. M.

793.94
Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



PRIORITY.

922, November 12, 6 p. m.

Following is text of official Japanese bulletin
regarding situation in Tientsin this afternoon, furnished
me by Japanese Legation:

"One. At one forty p. m., on twelfth, over twenty
Chinese belonging to Paonuti (Public Safety Corps) were
seen approaching to a point about three hundred meters
away from the Japanese defense line at Nankwan Tachiep
Road leading to the south gate by flying a large red cross
flag and suddenly opened fire on the Japanese side. So
far the Japanese side when fired upon had been in doubt
of what directions fire came from. But by above incident
it has become clear that firing has been made right along
by Chinese soldiers.

Two. At one fifteen p. m. today, the remains of

Chinese

F/DEW 793.94/2634

FILED

NOV 21 1931

135

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

PLAIN


Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 12, 1931

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NOV 21 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2- #922, from Peiping, Nov. 12, 6 p.m

Chinese killed on Tungmalu in the native city were seen to have been carried to a spot two hundred meters away from Japanese defense line where their pictures were taken. It is understood that photograph. was taken in order to manufacture propaganda material to accuse Japanese army with their today Japanese staff officers Miura having had meeting at native city with a Chinese Committee was returned to Japanese concession. No sooner had he left native city party was fired upon furiously from behind by Chinese soldiers. This took place at one thirty in afternoon."

Repeated to Shanghai and Commander in Chief.

For the Minister

ENGERT

HPD

CSB

1354

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Huntzger NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE
DCR

TELEGRAM RECEIVED
CORRECTED FROM CONFIRMATION

REP

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
APR 1 1932
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

PLAIN

FROM

Peiping via N.R.

Dated November 12, 1931

Rec'd 1:20 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

PRIORITY.

922, November 12, 6 p.m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
APR 1 1932
Department of State

F/DEW

793.94/2634

Following is text of official Japanese bulletin regarding situation in Tientsin this afternoon, furnished me by Japanese Legation:

"One. At one forty p.m., on twelfth, over twenty Chinese belonging to Paoantui (Public Safety Corps) were seen approaching to a point about three hundred meters away from the Japanese defense line at Nankwan Tachieh Road leading to the south gate by flying a large red cross flag and suddenly opened fierce fire on the Japanese side. So far the Japanese side when fired upon had been in doubt of what directions bullets came from. But by above incident it has become clear that firing has been made right along by Chinese soldiers.

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Chinese

FILED
APR 8 - 1932

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

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6 p.m.

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Three. Today Japanese staff officer Miura having had meeting at native city with a Chinese Committee was returned to Japanese concession. No sooner had he left native city party was fired upon furiously from behind by Chinese soldiers. This took place at one thirty in afternoon."

Repeated to Shanghai and Commander-in-Chief.

For the Minister,

ENGERT

HPD

CSB

1356

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
• PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

Plain

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Department of State

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
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Washington,

13
November 12, 1931.

nom

AMLEGATION,

PEIPING (China).

417 Your 922, November 12, 6 p. m. 12634
You should also inform Tientsin.

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Stinson
Sick

FK 793.94/2634

Willy

FE:MMH:REK

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Nov. 12, 1931.

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____.

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

135

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

H
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 12, 1931

Rec'd 10:55 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

PRIORITY.

923, November 12, 7 p. m.


743.44
Since sending my 920/2621 November 12, 3 p. m., I learn
that the proposed arrangement has not materialized and I
feel that Japanese bulletin quoted in Legation's 922,
November 12, 6 p. m., would seem to be intended to
prepare the public for future trouble.

For the Minister

ENGERT

HPD

Avoid clashes with Chinese



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793.94/2633

REC 21 1931

1358

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

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CORRECTED COPY
FROM


GRAY

Tientsin via N. R.

Dated November 12, 1931

Rec'd 9:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



November 12, 2 p. m.

The Japanese and Chinese have come to an agreement whereby the ~~people~~ ^{police} of the latter will patrol and search the 300 meter zone for plain clothes men.

There are persistent but unconfirmed rumors that the local government may resign and be succeeded by government headed by Tuan Chi Jin and Yen Huai Shan. This report is transmitted for what it may be worth.

The strictest martial law yet in force in the Chinese areas began shortly after noon today. Repeated to the Department, Nanking and Shanghai.

LOCKHART

FILED

DEC 21 1931

793.94/2632

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

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LOCKHART



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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

FILED

DEC 21 1931

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793.94/2632

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843.00-martial law

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

RECEIVED
NOV 12 1931
DIVISION OF
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

PLAIN

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 12, 1931

Rec'd 7:55 a. m.

F/DEW 793.94/2631

Secretary of State,

Washington.

921, November 12.

Reuter report from Washington, eleventh:

"Peaceful settlement of Manchuria without resort to pressure, diplomatic ostracism or an economic boycott is the firm hope of officials, following laconic announcement that Colonel Stimson has received a very conciliatory note from Japan through Ambassador Debuchi.

Colonel Stimson is declining to issue text of it feeling that publication might embarrass the nations and serve to obstruct peaceful solution of the problem".

For the Minister

ENGERT

NOV 13 1931

FILED

793.94

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 11, 1931.

REH:

Gilbert in his 274, November 2, reporting a talk with Drummond, reports the latter as stating that:

(a) The important part of the September 30th resolution is that which envisages a speedy withdrawal of Japanese troops to within the railway zone and the effective assurance of the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals incident to evacuation.

(b) Briand's note to Yoshizawa expressed the view that the best method of effecting the proposal contained in point 5 of the October 24th resolution (the appointment by China and Japan of representatives to supervise the evacuation) be adopted by the Japanese Government.

(c) The question at present of paramount importance is to obtain Japan's acceptance to representatives being appointed immediately and to the early beginning of direct conversations on points relating to evacuation.

In Peiping's 874 of November 5 Engert, in reporting an informal interview with Wellington Koo, states that he

Got the impression that Koo implied that the commission may ultimately be called upon to deal with more serious problems than those for which it was created and that Nanking had perhaps become more reconciled to the possibility of negotiating with Japan, if not prior to, at least simultaneously with a gradual withdrawal of Japanese forces to the railway zone.

Geneva's 287 of November 7 reports a project which had been discussed by Sugimura in Paris and London in conversations with the Japanese, British and French, which was substantially

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fine

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

substantially that

Two sets of negotiations between Nanking and Tokyo be begun simultaneously. The first set to comprise questions relating to evacuation and the taking over of evacuated territory. The second set to comprise questions relating to the "five points".

The first four points of the second set refer to security and therefore come within the scope of the September 30th resolution and a part of the fifth point also is considered to concern security. This part also can therefore be considered as being in conformity with the September 30th resolution.

The treatment of that part of the fifth point which can not be held to refer to security would not be begun until the evacuation is completed or practically completed.

Gilbert in his 288 of November 9 reports that this proposal had been adopted by Yoshizawa as his own and had been telegraphed by him to Tokyo.

May not this proposal be ~~the~~ key to the solution of the situation and afford a basis for direct conversations? It is so nearly in accord with Briand's proposal and so in line with what Engert gathers is in the mind of the Chinese that it seems quite possible that some bridge over the differences might be found. It would seem that at least
 *
 Yoshizawa and Sze might be brought together in informal conversations, under the wing of M. Briand, to discuss the possibilities of reconciling the differences between the Briand proposal and the "Yoshizawa proposal" and of finding a formula which would be acceptable to all three as a basis

of

* Better name other Japanese
 SKH

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

of further informal conversations concerning the substance and the methods of carrying out these proposals.

Might some such suggestion be made to Mr. Dawes and perhaps to our Embassy at Paris (see Department's 530, of November 9, section two)?

RSM
RSM: EJJ

1364

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 500. C 1/80 FOR Despatch # 769.

FROM Rumania (Wilson) DATED Oct. 24, 1931.
TO NAME 1-1172

REGARDING:

American observer being seated with the League recently has greatly strengthened the hands of the League and has made the solution of the Chinese-Japanese dispute much easier and more probable.

793.94/2638

hs

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Bucharest, October 24, 1931.

No. 759.

The Honorable,
 The Secretary of State,
 Washington.

Sir:

In the Legation's despatch No. 747, of September 24, 1931, I had the honor to report concerning a certain dissatisfaction on the part of Rumania with the League of Nations and, largely, to that organization's apparent inability and unwillingness to take steps to take energetic measures in the dispute between China and Japan in Manchuria. It was felt that the time had come to test the real value of the League and that it had been found wanting. A translation of an article from the PROGRES ROUMAINE of the 17th instant enclosed herewith shows clearly this attitude.

Since then the development of the Chinese-Japanese dispute

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

dispute has been followed with great interest, not that the public or press were much interested or had much knowledge of the history or causes of the dispute itself, as far as China and Japan are affected, but they were deeply interested as to its effect on the League of Nations and concerned in regard to the maintenance of peace.

The point in this whole question, however, which has aroused the greatest interest and caused the greatest amount of favorable comment has been the friendly spirit of cooperation between the League and the United States, culminating in an American observer being seated with the Council of the League. This cooperation, it is felt, has greatly strengthened the hands of the League and has made the solution of the Chinese-Japanese dispute much easier and more probable. This action of the United States is quite generally hailed as the preliminary, within a longer or shorter period, of the entry of that country as a full member of the League and as a complete reversal of its previous alleged hostile attitude toward the League. It is also taken as a welcome indication that the policy of isolation and holding aloof from European affairs by the United States has come to an end. A further supposed indication of the changed policy of the United States and of its decision to cooperate more closely with Europe in the settlement of many serious questions is seen in the visit of the French Prime Minister to the United States. The press has been filled with suppositions concerning the various subjects which will be discussed by President Hoover and Mr. Laval, as is shown by the enclosed translation of an article from the ABEVEGUL of the 22nd instant, and great, and probably exaggerated, hopes are entertained by

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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by many as to immediate and definite results. Most of the serious papers, however, warn the public against too great optimism and point out that within the short period of Mr. Laval's visit it will be impossible to reach definite solutions of the many important problems which confront the two nations. The hope is generally expressed, however, that an atmosphere may be created which will make the solution of these questions easier.

Respectfully yours,

Charles E. Wilson.

Enclosures:


1. Translation of article appearing in the INDEPENDANCE ROUMAINE of October 17, 1931.
2. Translation of article appearing in the ADEVERUL of October 22, 1931.

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ca.

Three copies to E.I.C. Paris.

CS4/LHH



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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

In translation from the
 INDEPENDANCE ROMAINE
 of October 17, 1931.

American Legation,
 Bucharest, Rumania.
 Despatch No. 769
 Enclosure No.

THE TEST OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

The conflict between the yellow races can be viewed from two aspects: that of the complicated equilibrium of forces in the Pacific involving so many intrigues which we cannot understand from a distance--and that of the role of the League of Nations. It is with the latter that we intend to concern ourselves, for it is of primary interest to us. The League now finds itself, for the first time, in a position to play its essential role, which is not to protect women or whales, but to preserve peace. For some time, by means of propaganda which appears to be well-intentioned but which could become criminal, an effort has been made to convince the world that the ensemble of pacts: the Covenant, the Kellogg Pact, the pacts of non-aggression, are enough to prevent war and that, consequently, it is time to disarm. In vain have reasonable people observed that an obligation without sanctions can have no value and that just as long as the articles of the Covenant are not reinforced in the sense of the famous protocol of 1924, anyone could provoke war with impunity if he were sufficiently clever not to appear to be too openly the aggressor.

It must be recognized that the League of Nations has already had the opportunity to intervene in several minor conflicts and that it did so with success: the complications between Italy and Greece, between Bulgaria and Greece and between Poland and Lithuania. A close analysis reveals that in these three cases no one really wanted to fight

2-

fight and that the League offered an honorable way out which satisfied the pride of the parties involved.

Such is not the case in the present conflict between China and Japan. What is actually going on in distant Manchuria? Is it the Chinese who began? or is it Japan which is following shady designs? What is the role of Soviet intrigues in this affair? The member of the Council of the League of Nations who could reply to these questions would be indeed shrewd.

The first problem consists in finding an equitable solution. The second problem would be to impose it upon the two parties involved, if it is supposed that Japan truly wishes to take over Manchuria as appears at first glance.

The two tasks appear to be beyond the power of the League. Unless there is an improbable capitulation on the part of Japan, the affair is destined to turn into a failure for Geneva. And this is the more profoundly regrettable since we find ourselves on the eve of the Disarmament Conference. War in the Far East could ruin all the hopes of European pacifists.

1371

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

In translation from the
APPENDIX of October 22,

American Legation,
Bucharest, Rumania.
Despatch No. 789.
Enclosure No. 2.

FOR DISSEMINATION.

The unofficial telegrams which we have received from the transatlantic liner which is bearing the French Prime Minister to the United States bring us the joyful news that amongst the problems which will be discussed with Mr. Hoover, an extension of the Briand-Mellongg Pact will be included with the object of being able to apply international sanctions against any country which may disturb the peace.

The United States will insist that France reduce its military budget and renounce a part of its armament. The French Government has made it understood, however, that it can renounce its program of national defense only in case conditions of security are created which are sufficient in scope to protect it from all unexpected aggression.

Consequently, the interview in Washington between the French Prime Minister and the President of the United States may result in a happy solution of the two following questions: the United States might adhere to the transformation of the Briand-Mellongg Pact into an instrument which would act as a guarantee of peace by prescribing international coercive measures against a possible aggressor; in return, the French Government might consent to reduce its armaments.

If this understanding could be brought about, a great step would have been achieved in the direction of assuring the success of the International Disarmament Conference which will assemble in Geneva at the beginning of 1958.


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased before
being communicated
to anyone.

FROM



Dated November 12, 1931

Rec'd. 2:20 p. m.

NOV 13 1931
RECEIVED
DIVISION OF
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 12 1931
Department of State

793.94
with
11/13/31
Secretary of State,
Washington.

436, November 12, 4 p. m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

Have had conference with Simon and Matsudaira, where
whole situation was confidentially discussed. In the course
of the meeting I presented the suggestions made by you in
your 328, October 11, 5 p. m., included in paragraphs 4,
5 and 6, and they were thoroughly discussed. Both Simon
and Matsudaira agree upon their value and I think I may say
that Simon has adopted them as a guide in his approach to
the situation at Paris where he will attend the meeting
of the League. I explained to them your feeling that these
suggestions as to methods might be more effective if their
origin appeared to be from Japan and China. I expressed the
opinion, with which they fully agreed, that these constructive
suggestions should be so used that, if found contributory to
a final

F/DEW

793.94/2639

yes WE
11/17/31 R14

REP

2- #436, from London, Nov. 12, 4 p.m.

a final settlement, they would contribute also to the
prestige of the League. I informed them that you had
already brought the precedent of the method used in the
Shantung
~~Settlement~~ Settlement to the attention of Briand.

While of course I did not so express myself I agree
with you that the solution will be more difficult to achieve
than on the surface it would now appear. The state of public
sentiment in Japan is perhaps the most difficult factor to
be dealt with just now.

It is understood between Simon, Matsudaira and myself
that our conversation is strictly confidential. The fact
that there is no divergence in purpose and understanding
among us enables us to discuss all pertinent situations
without embarrassment or reserve. I am furnishing Simon
with a copy of the text of the memorandum which Forbes
delivered to Japan November 5th and the Japanese reply
thereto. This had not been furnished Sir John by the League
authorities.

I have discussed at length the historical introduction
to the present situation with Atherton and Dooman, most

~~becoming~~

beneficially

137

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM

3-#436, from London, Nov. 12, 4 p.m.

23077
beneficially
becoming to myself. I have made telephone appointment
(?) Sze at Paris when he arrives from Geneva. I am
taking Dooman to Paris. Shaw has telephoned me from
Berne and will meet me at Paris Saturday morning so
that I can interview him before seeing Briand, Saturday
noon. Shaw suggests that I call Gilbert to Paris. I
told him, however, that I did not want to decide this
matter until I had fully visualized the situation
there after the League has met. Personally I am desirous,
as I am sure you are, that we so conduct ourselves at
Paris as to afford as little basis for demagogic attack
as possible, consistent with making every contact
essential to the exercise of our full influence in
properly supporting League leadership and fulfilling
our own obligations under the Kellogg Pact. I want to
carefully consider the possible domestic repercussions
of having Gilbert present, remembering that it is im-
possible to have him come without general publicity and
comment relative to the nature of association between
the United States and the League. This latter subject
is a pet animal in the United States of some extremely
well trained showmen.

DAVES

WSB

CSB

1374

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REF

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated
 to anyone.

FROM

TIENTSIN

Dated November 13, 1931

Rec'd 8:03 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

November 13, 6 p. m.

The following telegram has been sent to the Legation:

"November 13, 4 p. m.

Vernacular newspapers state that young Emperor Pu Yi
 has been taken to Dairen by Japanese vessel under escort
 Japanese guards.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. Cantonese Secretary of Pu Yi
 has informed a high ranking British army officer that Pu Yi
 has been taken to Mukden. Japanese Consul General, in response
 to inquiry by me, was non-committal".

Repeated to Nanking.

LOCKHART

END



FK 793.94/2642

793.94
 with
 893-0011

1
 10/16/31

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 2 -

personal opinion. But I reminded him that in my recent note to Japan I had sought to support the principal position of the League, namely, that the solution of the longstanding treaties should not be made a condition precedent to evacuation. He asked me whether he should tell Briand that my advice was to make it easy for Japan. I said that I should put it that my advice was to be firm on essentials and very patient. The Ambassador asked me what I thought of the outcome. I told him I was very hopeful by reason of the very conciliatory character of the note which Japan had given me yesterday. He seemed to be much interested in that. I told him that this note on its face accepted our position so far as our objection to making the settlement of these old treaty issues a condition precedent to evacuation was concerned.

HLS.


S HLS:HHR

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
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



CONFIDENTIAL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY



November 10, 1931



MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON
AND THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR, MR. PAUL CLAUDEL, 4:15 P.M.

193.94
Manchuria.

I summoned the French Ambassador in order to tell him that I was sending General Dawes to Paris to be present during the week of the conference of the Council of the League. I said I did not anticipate that it would be necessary for General Dawes to sit in the meetings of the conference at all, and I told the Ambassador frankly that my position had been made a little difficult by the way in which at the previous meetings Mr. Gilbert's entrance had been dramatized. But I told him that my purpose in sending General Dawes was to make M. Briand's work easier in the face of the difficult situation which he was confronted with in Manchuria and to make a peaceful solution more possible to be worked out. He said he understood my position perfectly. In discussing the situation before the Council, I told him frankly that I had thought the setting of a time limit for November 16th was a mistake. He said frankly that that was his personal

FK 793.94/26415

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 2 -


personal opinion. But I reminded him that in my recent note to Japan I had sought to support the principal position of the League, namely, that the solution of the longstanding treaties should not be made a condition precedent to evacuation. He asked me whether he should tell Briand that my advice was to make it easy for Japan. I said that I should put it that my advice was to be firm on essentials and very patient. The Ambassador asked me what I thought of the outcome. I told him I was very hopeful by reason of the very conciliatory character of the note which Japan had given me yesterday. He seemed to be much interested in that. I told him that this note on its face accepted our position so far as our objection to making the settlement of these old treaty issues a condition precedent to evacuation was concerned.

HLS.

S HLS:HHR

1378

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




CONFIDENTIAL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY



November 10, 1931. DCR

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON
AND THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR, MR. KATSUJI DEBUCHI.

Manchuria.



743.94

The Japanese Ambassador called and began by telling me that the Japanese Government was substituting 4000 new troops for 4,000 troops now in Manchuria. He said that originally, at the beginning of the trouble in September, there were 10,400 troops there; that subsequently 4,000 were added to these and now 4,000 of the total are being replaced by 4,000 new troops. (2) He told me that the Japanese memorandum which he handed me yesterday has been withheld from publication by the Japanese Government but has been confidentially communicated to Sir Eric Drummond. (3) He told me that at present the bridgehead on the Nonni River remains in the possession of the Japanese who, however, will not proceed northward; that the situation has improved; that a part of the Japanese contingent at the bridge have returned to South Manchuria, but a portion remains; and that the Japanese do not take seriously the declaration of war by General Ma, who has only a very small force of men with him at Tsitsihar, and whose declaration of war has already been disavowed by Nanking.

(4)

FK 793.94/2640

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 2 -

(4) In Tientsin he said he is satisfied with the reports which have been made by our Consul General Lockhart as reported in the press, namely, that the Japanese did not cross the boundary of their own reservation.

He asked me about the report that the League had requested us to send an observer to Paris. I said that that was not so, but I then told him I was about to send General Dawes to Paris ~~tomorrow~~ so that he would be there to confer with the representatives of the other nations including the Japanese and Chinese if that should become desirable. I explained to him the reasons for sending General Dawes, winding up by saying that it was not a gesture hostile to Japan but quite the reverse, and he said he understood perfectly. ✓

The Ambassador then brought up the question of the "fundamental principles" mentioned in his memorandum and reverted to the Treaty of 1915, in regard to the lease of the South Manchurian Railroad, telling me how important it was to Japan because otherwise the twenty-five year lease to Russia would have expired in 1923. He said the terms of the Russian lease were known to be purely fictitious in order to save China's face and that the
Russians

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 3 -

Russians had gone ahead and made improvements contemplating a long stay. I told the Ambassador I had no objection to Japan claiming title to her rights in Manchuria either by negotiation, or arbitration, or conciliation, or in any pacific way; that our only objection was to her trying to base or improve those rights by the present warlike move in Manchuria. He argued at length on the Washington matter to prove that the United States had given up its reserved objections to the 1915 Treaty, but I produced Willoughby's book and read him Mr. Hughes' statements in which those objections were reserved in 1922. He then said that I was evidently a good lawyer. In the course of the discussion about Shantung, I reminded him that China and Japan had not been able to make any progress there until they had laid aside all juridical claims and had based their discussions on factual claims, and I asked him why they did not do so now. He said that was very interesting.

HLS.

S HLS:HHR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PLAIN

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 13, 1931

Rec'd 8:40 a. m.

793.94
 Secretary of State,
 Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
 G.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

NOV 13 1931

Department of State

929, November 13.

Following is an official statement dated today furnished
 me by Japanese Legation:

"The Chosen brigade now stationed in Manchuria, having
 its own work to perform and not being permitted to be left
 there for a long time, a decision has been reached to the
 effect that said detachment shall be sent back to Korea by
 middle of November, being relieved by an almost similar
 number of troops to be detached from Japan.

Prevailing state of affairs in Manchuria makes protec-
 tion of life and property of Japanese residents and mainte-
 nance of peace in the territory very difficult but in spite
 of the difficulties it was decided not to proceed any
 further than carrying out the aforementioned relief. Need-
 less to say the above are measures justified to be taken by
 Japanese within the scope of treaty provisions."

Repeated to Nanking.

For the Minister
 ENGERT

HPD

FK 793.94/2643

FILED

NOV 13 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793-94
 REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PLAIN

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 13, 1931

Rec'd 8:55 a. m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

930, November 13.


Reuter report from Washington 12th:

"Tremendous interest has been aroused by official hint
 that compromise plan will be advanced at meeting of League
 Council in Paris. Under Secretary of State Castle expresses
 optimism that plan will be acceptable to both China and
 Japan but he refused to disclose details."

For the Minister

ENGERT

HPD



FK 793.94/2644

NOV 23 1931

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

~~FE~~

REP TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be _____
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone.

FROM

PEIPING

Dated November 13, 1931

Rec'd 6:18 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

925, November 13, noon.

Following from Mukden:

"November 12, 2 p. m. STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

One. There are persistent rumors here of an imminent attempt to make Pu Yi Emperor at Mukden. Local manufacture of imperial dragon flags and Japanese consular confirmation of Pu Yi's departure from Tientsin lend credence to the reports. Japanese Consul General informed this office that his Government disapproves the movement and is certain that even though it may be temporarily successful it is doomed to fail.

Two. Japanese Consul General made a definite statement that Japanese troops would not be withdrawn by November 16th. With reference to League of Nations action he informed Vincent in strict confidence that he had urged his Government to request the League to send investigators to Manchuria.

Three.



FK 793.94/2645

793.94
with
893.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2- #925, from Peiping, Nov.13, noon.

Three. Japanese Consul General stated that his Government had instructed Japanese troops at the Nonni River not to advance further north. He admitted danger of irresponsible elements causing renewal of conflict with opposing forces facing each other and stated that the Japanese Consul at Tsitsihar had requested Ma to remove his line of defense to the north side of the bridge. Mail report follows".

Repeated to Nanking.

For the Minister

ENGERT

WGB

1385

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GRAY

Tientsin via N. R.

Dated November 13, 1931

Rec'd 9:10 a. m.

793.94
 Secretary of State,
 Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



November 13, 4 p. m.

The following telegram has been sent to the Legation
 today:

"November 13, 3 p. m.

The tension which has existed since Sunday night is somewhat relaxed today due to the arrangement entered into between the Japanese and the Chinese by which the latter will send police into the 300 meter zone to search for plain clothes men. There was some hitch, however, in carrying out this arrangement but the Japanese Consul General has informed me that an amicable adjustment has been made. There was intermittent rifle and machine gun firing again last night but of greatly reduced intensity. Eight or ten bullets struck the buildings of the Methodist Episcopal Mission yesterday morning during the firing but no damage was inflicted.

There

FK 793.94/2646

FILED

NOV 21 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2- from Tientsin, Nov. 13, 4 p. m.

There has been absolutely no information available today to confirm the report in the second paragraph of my November 12, 6 p. m.

There are two Japanese destroyers at Tangku but they cannot proceed to Tientsin because of shallow water depth of Haiho.

Foreign troops are still on duty in their respective defense areas".

LOCKHART

HPD

WSB

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 13, 1931

Rec'd 6:42 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

924, November 13, 11 a. m.

Following from Harbin:

"November 12, 5 p. m. CONFIDENTIAL.

One. Second officer Chao has informed me that General Ma telephoned at 2 p. m. today that Major Hayashi delivered to him this morning a message from Honjo demanding that Ma resign, that the Tsitsihar troops withdraw from that city, that no objection be made to the Japanese troops proceeding as far as Angang Hsi Station on the Taoanew Railway in order that they might be enabled to maintain order along this line and that a reply to these suggestions be made before midnight on November 12th.

Two. A portion of the local Chinese press has branded Chao a traitor who is connected with the peace party which is anxious to quit resisting the Japanese. However, I believe that he

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DIVISION OF
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 13 1931
Department of State

FK 793.94/2647

NOV 13 1931

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2- #924, from Peiping, Nov.13,11 a. m.

that he personally is anxious to save his skin, but that he feels safe enough here to maintain his contact with General Ma, who entrusted him with the matter of negotiating the Nonni bridge question with the Japanese side. No doubt the Japanese are using pressure upon the Chinese officials, who believe that Ma cannot hold out indefinitely against the wishes of the Japanese military, to enlist their aid in the Japanese efforts to eliminate Ma."

Repeated to Nanking.

For the Minister

ENGERT

RR

WSB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 13, 1931

Rec'd 8:30 a. m.


793. 94
Secretary of State,
Washington.

926, November 13, 1 p. m.

Following from Harbin:

"November 12, 11 a. m. One. The facts are fully established that two Japanese airplanes dropped on November 10th a score or more bombs on Ma's positions at Sanchienfang and killed several Chinese soldiers and that some of General Chang's troops commanded by Peng Fei, who is alleged to be secretly anti-Japanese, have reached Chinghsing, 20 miles south of Fuliaerti on the Chinese Eastern Railway. Ma who has been recently appointed by Chang Hsueh Liang as acting vice commander of the Northeastern Army has sent troops against them to prevent their crossing the Chinese Eastern Railway line. The Chinese military claim that Japanese are with Peng's troops. November eleventh passed quietly in the region near the bridges and the panic in Tsitsihar city subsided somewhat.

Two.



FK 793.94/2643

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NOV 18 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2- #926, from Peiping, Nov. 13, 1 p.m.

Two. Tenny telegraphed last evening from Tsitsihar Station that the American ^{missionaries} ~~mission~~ at Tsitsihar city are safe and well and that he was departing last evening for Manchuria Station.

Three. There are rumors regarding so-called international troops composed of Buriats, Chinese and Koreans crossing from Siberia near Manchuria Station and Taheiho and arriving at Nonni front to aid Ma. Ohashi mention^{ed} ~~ing~~ these to me and asked if I had a check on them. The Chinese officials deny the truth of these reports and I am inclined to believe they are fabrications. Travel over the road from Taheiho to Tsitsihar is very difficult at this time and will be until the country is frozen over".

Repeated to Nanking.

For the Minister
ENGERT

WSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Peiping via N. R.

FROM

Dated November 13, 1931

Secretary of State,

Washington.

927, November 13, 5 p. m.

Department's 410, November 5, 7 p. m.

Following is Mukden's reply:

"November 11, 4 p. m. It is clear that the Japanese expect to obtain the information from the Radio Corporation through this Consulate General. However, this Consulate General is of the opinion that the Japanese properly should look to the Chinese owners of the radio station for the information. It is extremely doubtful that the Chinese will divulge the information but their very unwillingness to do so seems to indicate that neither this office nor the Radio Corporation should be the agency through which the Japanese are furnished the information. The radio station is still held by the Japanese army and no steps are being taken to place it under Chinese control."

The Legation concurs in the views of Consul General Myers.

RR WSB

Control of Mukden radio station.

Rec'd 10:10 a. m.

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 NOV 13 1931

TREATY DIVISION
 NOV 19 1931
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FK 793.94/2649

1361-61-ACM

For the Minister
 ENGERT

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR

Charge to
\$

Department of State

Washington,
November 18, 1931.

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

AMLEGATION

NOV 18 31

PEIPING (China).

425 Your 927, November 13, 5 p.m. 12649

The Department is of the opinion that the Japanese, if they seek the information in question, properly should look to the organization ^{that was} in control of the station when ^{they took it} ~~it was taken~~ over; also that the Consulate General at Mukden should not repeat ^{or channel} not be the agency through which such information is furnished to the Japanese. In case the Radio Corporation should manifest a desire to furnish this information to the Japanese, the Department ^{would} ~~does~~ not desire to interfere with such action as the Radio Corporation may consider it advisable to take to protect its interests but the Department suggests that, as a matter of protection, the Radio Corporation ^{should} first advise and/or consult the organization with which it concluded the traffic agreement.

793.94/2649

FE:MMH/VDM

RM
FE

Enciphered by MMH

Sent by operator M., 19

NOV 18 1931

139


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 7, 1931.

The First Secretary of
the Japanese Embassy just
left with me the
attached copy of the
Japanese Government's
reply to M. Briand's
note of October 29.




M. Hamilton

See 793.94

2413
2421
2492

1394

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



793.94/2413

FCR

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's Note of October 29, in which you were so good as to make certain observations on the Declaration of the Japanese Government of October 26 in connection with the Manchurian incident. Having referred to Tokyo your communication under acknowledgment, I am now charged to assure you that my Government have submitted it to their most serious consideration, and that they highly appreciate your sympathetic concern in the present situation in the interest of international peace and good understanding.

2) I am further instructed to express the entire concurrence of my Government in your Excellency's remark that the resolution adopted by the Council of the League of Nations on September 30 remains in full force and effect. The Japanese Government are determined to carry it out in the letter and in the spirit, and they re-affirm their earnest desire to proceed to the withdrawal of the Japanese troops to the Railway Zone with the minimum of delay.

3) But the Resolution of September 30 consecrates the principle that effective security must at the same time be assured for the lives and property of Japanese subjects; and in the state of tension which at present unfortunately exists, it is not possible to hope that the withdrawal of the Japanese forces would immediately give place to a regime of settled peace and order under Chinese auspices. Japan and China would simply be exposed to a speedy recurrence of untoward incidents. There can

FK 793.94/2650

FILED

be no security for foreign residents, where hostile agitation against them is allowed to proceed, where efficient protection to them in their peaceful pursuits is denied by the local authorities, or where their treaty rights are systematically ignored.

Having regard to the actual conditions in Manchuria, the Japanese Government have regretfully been brought to the conclusion that the dangers involved in the precipitate recall of the Japanese troops could not be averted by measures of supervision, such as are recommended in the proposed Resolution of October 24 referred to in Your Excellency's Note under review.

4) It is pointed out in your Note that the first four points of the five fundamental principles mentioned in the Japanese declaration of October 26 are virtually embodied in the proposition of October 24. Your Excellency, however, will no doubt perceive that the terms of that proposition are not sufficiently explicit or comprehensive to cover the full implications of the four points in question. As regards the fifth point, viz, the guarantee of respect for Japanese treaty rights in Manchuria, the terms of the letter addressed to you on October 24 by the Chinese representative seem to give rise to a doubt whether it is in the contemplation of the Chinese Government to call in question the validity of some of the treaties constituting the basic embodiment of the relations between Japan and China. It may be needless to state that the Japanese Government could not for a moment entertain such a contention. Nothing can be more destructive of the established order of the whole world than to permit any power to challenge


the binding force of treaties concluded with all the solemnity of international usages.

5) The Japanese Government trust that they have made it clear that the five fundamental principles mentioned in the Japanese Declaration of October 26 are no more than those that are commonly observed in the intercourse of ordered communities with one another. Unless and until an arrangement is reached between Japan and China on the basis of those principles no measure of security for the lives and property of Japanese subjects, sufficient to enable the withdrawal of the Japanese troops to the Railway Zone can possibly be assured. The Japanese Government believe that the course of procedure now indicated is in entire agreement with the resolution of the council of September 30. It is far from their thoughts to insist on the final adjustment of the whole series of pending questions between Japan and China. As a condition precedent to the withdrawal of the troops, all that they urge upon China for the present is a frank recognition, by direct negotiations between the two parties, of the fundamental principles that should govern normal relations between any two nations. Such an accord will be a long step toward replacing the existing tension by a sense of stability between the peoples of the two nations, whose interest is to be on the best of terms.

See
793.94/2413
2421
2492

1397

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75



REP

GREEN

Geneva

Dated October 31, 1931

Rec'd 9:10 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

793.94/2413

URGENT.

270, October 31, 9 a. m.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Drummond has handed me a copy of a note from Briand as President of the Council to Yoshizawa, in reply to the Japanese declaration dated October 26 (Consulate's 263, October 28, 11 a. m.). I understand that Briand handed this to Yoshizawa on the evening of October 29. It is being circulated to the members of the Council. The text of the note is as follows:

"As President of the Council of the League of Nations, I have examined most carefully the Japanese Government's declaration dated October 26, which Your Excellency was good enough to communicate by telegram to me and to the other members of the Council through the Secretary General.

I feel I must submit to you certain observations on
this communication.

1338
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2- #270, from Geneva, Oct.31, 9 a.m.

this communication.

Since the last meeting of the Council, when the draft resolution on which my colleagues had asked me to report secured the approval of all the members of the Council except the Japanese representative, the position in regard to the question submitted to us for consideration has become clear. It may be stated as follows:

Independently of the vote taken at the last Council meeting, which retains its full moral force, we still have before us, from the juridical standpoint, a valid resolution, namely, that which was unanimously adopted on September 30th, and which retains its full executory force.

In that resolution the Council noted the statement made by the Japanese representative that the Japanese Government will continue as rapidly as possible the withdrawal of its troops which has already been begun, into the railway zone in proportion as the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals is effectively assured and that it hopes to carry out this intention in full as speedily as may be. No indication whatever was given at that time

REP

3- #270, from Geneva, Oct. 31, 9 a. m.

that time by the Japanese representative that matters such as an agreement as to the treaty rights of Japan in Manchuria were in any way connected with the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals.

It is further to be noted that in the two draft resolutions submitted to the Council on the 24th October the first three paragraphs are exactly the same, Your Excellency having withdrawn the amendment to Paragraph Three which you had submitted. It may therefore be assumed that these paragraphs express the will of the two parties. In their declaration of October 26th the Japanese Government further stated that, when it referred to certain fundamental principles it had in mind the following:

One. Mutual repudiation of aggressive policy and conduct - Paragraph Two of the two drafts submitted on October 24 states that the two countries 'are bound not to resort to any aggressive policy or action'.

Two. Respect for China's territorial integrity. Paragraph Three of the two drafts records an undertaking to that effect.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

4- #270, from Geneva, Oct. 31, 9 a.m.

to that effect.

Three. Complete suppression of all organized movements interfering with freedom of trade and stirring up international hatred. Paragraph Two of the two drafts declares that the two Governments are bound to take measures to suppress hostile agitation.

Four. Effective protection throughout Manchuria in order to allow Japanese nationals to engage there in any peaceful pursuits. Paragraph One of both drafts declares that the Chinese Government are pledged to the effective protection of Japanese subjects residing in Manchuria.

The fact that on the one hand the Chinese representative accepted the terms of the resolution which I proposed on behalf of my colleagues and that on the other hand the counter-draft of the Japanese representative contained the three paragraphs to which I have referred show that the two Governments are in complete agreement on these four points.

There remains only the last point: "Respect for treaty rights of Japan in Manchuria".

With regard to that point I would call Your Excellency's
attention

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REF

6- #270, from Geneva, Oct. 31, 9a.m.

of the resolution of September 30th and which, moreover it repeatedly confirmed by its declarations during the last session of the Council, at the meetings of October 22, 23 and 24, will continue as rapidly as possible the withdrawal of its troops into the railway zone and that it will thus be able to carry out that intention to the full in the shortest possible time.

In view of the extreme importance which your Government attaches to the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals in the territories evacuated by its troops, I venture to call Your Excellency's attention to Paragraph Five of the resolution submitted to the Council on October 24, which recommends the two Governments "to appoint immediately representatives to settle the details relating to the carrying out of the evacuation and to the taking over of the evacuated territories, in order that these operations may be carried out in a regular manner and without delay".

It is requested that this note be regarded as confidential until Monday, November 2nd when it will be made public.

GILBERT

OSB

140
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

McL
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone.

Geneva.

Dated November 2, 1931.

Received 6.38 A. M.

Secretary of State,
Washington.


272, November 2, 9 A. M.

Briand's note to Yoshizawa, transmitted in
Consulates 270, October 31, 9 A.M., (see final para-
graph of telegram) will not be made public today.

At the request of Yoshizawa publicity will be
withheld until Japanese have submitted a reply and si-
multaneous publicity can be given to the two notes.

GILBERT.

McL
WSE



793.94/2421

140
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



REP

GREEN

Genova

Dated November 5, 1931

Rec'd 2:15 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

743.94 / 2492

280, November 5, 6 p. m.

Consulate's 272, November 2, 6 p. m.

The Secretariat has given publicity to Briand's note to Yoshizawa. It is believed that Briand took this (*) with regard to publicity because he did not wish to wait longer for a Japanese reply which, according to information from the Secretariat, has not been received up to date.

GILBERT

HPD

(*) Apparent omission.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 165 Political.

AM 1100
AMERICAN CONSULATE,

Geneva, Switzerland, November 2, 1931.

793-94
note 843
TELEGRAPHIC SECTION
NOV 23 1931
DEPT. OF STATE
SUBJECT: HISTORICAL ADVISER
1-1065 GPO

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

As being possibly of interest to the Department, I
1/ have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of the map being
used by the Secretariat of the League of Nations in its
study of the situation in Manchuria in connection with the
Sino-Japanese conflict.

Respectfully yours,

Prentiss B. Gilbert
Prentiss B. Gilbert,
American Consul.

✓
Enclosure: ✓
No. 1: Map of Manchuria.


Original and 5 copies to the Department of State.
1 copy to the American Legation, Berne.

793.94/2651

FILED

NOV 25 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



THIS DOCUMENT MUST REMAIN IN THE
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

743 44

FROM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
NOV 14 1931
GREEN DIVISION OF
Geneva
Dated November 13, 1931

Rec'd 11:40 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 13 1931
Department of State

303, November 13, 10 a. m.

Drummond has handed me the following letter dated November 12 from the Chinese representative concerning the plans of the Chinese Government for taking over the occupied areas in Manchuria. This letter is being circulated to the Council.

"In pursuance of the resolution of October 24 of the Council of the League of Nations, the Chinese Government has taken necessary steps for taking over different places in Manchuria now under the occupation of Japanese troops as well as for making such arrangements as will ensure the safety of the lives and property of Japanese subjects in the evacuated territory.

On November 1 the Chinese Government announced the appointment of a commission for the reoccupation of evacuated territory

FK 793.94/2652

NOV 23 1931

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2- #303, from Geneva, Nov. 13, 10 a.m.

territory in the North East Provinces which is composed of seven members, namely, Dr. Wellington Koo, chairman, General Chang Tso Hsiang, Mr. Chang Chun, Mr. Wu Tieh Chen, Dr. Lo Wen Kan, Mr. Tang Er Ho and Mr. Lin Chih. This Commission will be intrusted with the work of arranging with the representatives to be designated by Japan, necessary details regarding the evacuation and reoccupation as well as the actual taking over and rehabilitation of evacuated places.

In executing their task the members of the Commission will request the representatives appointed by the different powers to associate with them as closely as possible. It is expected that these representatives will observe the workings of the Commission in relation to reoccupation, accompany its members to the places for actual reoccupation and remain in such places until they are sure that peace and order are effectively maintained. All necessary facilities will be accorded to these foreign representatives and all information regarding evacuation and taking over of the evacuated territory will be given to them without delay.

The best disciplined soldiers, gendarmes and police will be, upon selection by the Commission, despatched by the Chinese

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

3- #303, from Geneva, Nov.13,10 a. m.

Chinese Government to places to be actually taken over. For the effective maintenance of peace and order after evacuation and reoccupation of each place the Chinese Government will authorize the reoccupation Commission to proclaim martial law when it is deemed expedient and enforce it for a short time, during which any disturbance of peace or any act of violence against the life and property of residents will be severely dealt with according to martial law.

Special precautions will be taken for insuring the safety of Japanese nationals. In view, however, of the many dangerous acts, incompatible with the maintenance of peace, recently committed by Japanese subjects in various parts of China, especially in Manchuria, the Japanese Government is expected to warn Japanese subjects in evacuated territory against taking any undesirable course of action so as to insure the successful execution of measures of protection by the Chinese Government."

GILBERT


CSB
WSB

1406
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

793.94
REP

FROM



Geneva

Dated November 13, 1931

Secretary of State,
Washington.

304, November 13, 11 a. m.

Drummond has handed me the following letter dated
November 12th from the Chinese representative which is being
circulated to the Council:

"I beg you to be good enough to request the President
of the Council to intervene without delay with the Japanese
Government in view of the very serious developments threatened
by the following information, which has just been received
from Tistsihar.

At noon today November 12th the Heilungkiang Provincial
Government received an ultimatum from General Honjo requesting
General Ma, the Chairman of the Provincial Government, to
resign and evacuate Tistsihar immediately. Japanese troops
will take Tistsihar along the Taonan-Angangchi Railway.
The Chinese troops have retreated to Sanchienfangsze, which
is 17 miles from Tahsin Station. The latter is now in the
hands

FK 793.94/2655

FILED
NOV 23 1931

REP

2- #304, from Geneva, Nov. 13, 11 a. m.

hands of the Japanese. If the latter carry out their announced intention, which is a flagrant violation of the promises but just made by the Japanese Government to the Council, it is probable that there will be serious fighting at any moment."

GILBERT

WSB

HPD

1411
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 12, 1931.


Mr. Castle:

Whatever we may think of
Mr. Eddy's activities, the incoming letter hereunder contains a lot of interesting statements of fact and some statements of opinion that are worth considering.

SKH

SKH/ZMF

SHERWOOD EDDY
347 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK CITY



2481
2611
2110
file
FE
November 13 1931
Tientsin, China
October 7, 1931

Honorable Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

NOV 6 - 1931
SECRETARY'S OFFICE



My dear Secretary Stimson:

We have been living through stirring times during the last few weeks. I was present at the capture of Moukden on September 18 and 19, and after two weeks in Korea returned to find the Japanese setting up an "independence" movement to sever the rich provinces of Manchuria from China. All in Korea believe that the policy of Japan will seek to follow the three steps by which she took over Korea: first to declare her "independence of China, second to announce a protectorate under Japan, and third, annexation and absorption.

When Moukden was captured and all meetings were forbidden by the Japanese, we flew to Seoul, Korea, and began meetings there. The visit gave us a good chance to study the methods and effects of Japanese occupation. Twenty years after annexation there is unmistakable evidence of the brilliant material advance under Japanese rule. The trade of Korea has increased in greater proportion and to a greater total than that in the Philippines under the United States in two decades. The progress in organization, law and order, in building, industry and agriculture has been noteworthy in a country previously corrupt and misgoverned. The stern discipline of Japanese rule is remaking Korea and the Koreans.

But this alien, unsympathetic and psychologically blind, military rule has failed to win the people, and instead has driven them into almost unanimous, sullen hostility. Their three indictments of Japanese rule are: 1. the policy of Japanization or absorption, not allowing them to be Koreans but crushing out their dearest traditions in the effort to make them Japanese; 2. a harsh, militaristic, autocratic rule that monopolizes all higher offices for the Japanese at a time when the principle of autonomy is so far advanced in the Philippines and in India which has occasioned the majority of leading Koreans at one time or another serving terms in prison; and 3. a policy of economic discrimination where so many poor Korean farmers are losing their lands. Finally, there is the apparent policy of the Japanese rule to foment strife between the Chinese and Koreans. A false report was sent to Seoul that the Chinese in Manchuria were killing Koreans there. The next day Korean mobs killed over two hundred Chinese. The news of these massacres is used to turn the Chinese against the Koreans in Manchuria, and then of course the Japanese military must protect their "citizens" there. This almost furnished Japan an excuse for intervention in Manchuria, but the Chinese were well aware of the move and did not rise to the Japanese agitation, so that another excuse had to be found for the sudden capture of all strategic centers in Manchuria within a few hours.

The result of this policy of the Japanese is driving both the Koreans and Chinese toward Communism. The Japanese in Korea informed me that Communism is increasing in northern Korea, not only brought over the border from Siberia, but more especially by Korean students returning from Japan. Both Koreans and Chinese imagine that they can use this Russian influence and organization as a convenient

750.94/2504

Secretary Stimson - 2

10/7/31

tool or weapon for their nationalist aims of liberty, not realizing that it is like a powerful, destructive bomb which has nothing to do with nationalism or liberty. Such was the bitter experience of Dr. Sun Yat Sen and General Feng when they tried to use Communism as a tool, only to find it sweeping the masses of ignorant peasants and workers toward a bloody revolution that is passing utterly out of control and cannot now be suppressed.

Returning to Moukden after two weeks in Korea, we noted the development of the Japanese occupation. The Japanese now exhibit the spot where on the night of September 18 a small bomb was exploded at the most convenient time and place. The bodies of four Chinese soldiers are there. But no one interviewed, whether foreigner or Chinese, has seen the slightest evidence of any Chinese attack but rather of a premeditated, carefully prepared offensive plan of the Japanese army.

Within a few hours of this alleged attack the Japanese had taken five strategic cities and occupied an area greater than that of England. They had refused investigation or arbitration by any third or neutral party. They demanded direct negotiations with the Chinese alone. But in their propaganda sheet, the "Manchuria Daily News" of October 5, they state that Japan "is not going to deal with such an anomaly of government as the present Nanking Government." She declares she will treat it as a "local" issue and "must have someone who is entitled to represent the wishes of the Chinese people of the Northeastern (Manchurian) provinces" - probably of her own choosing. Already northern Kirin has proclaimed its "independence" under a puppet Manchu leader as Japan's tool. I interviewed leading Chinese in Moukden who themselves had been repeatedly approached by the Japanese and urged to declare their independence of China and form a government under Japanese protection. The Japanese had said to them: "We would not deprive you of your freedom, as in the case of Korea. Some day we may have to fight the United States or Soviet Russia, and we would want China's friendship."

With the Chinese army of some 200,000 now withdrawn or driven out, many unpaid soldiers have become bandits, some thousands have been deprived of employment and have turned to robbery. The Roman Catholic cathedral, sheltering rich refugees, was attacked by bandits the night we were in Moukden, every night there was shooting and robberies were increasing. This will doubtless furnish a further excuse for Japan's not withdrawing her troops. We are reading the daily promises of Japan to withdraw her troops and her false statements that she is making no effort to set up an independent government in Manchuria, while at the same time we have been interviewing Chinese whom they are seeking to induce to lead an "independent" government.


Already over 100,000 refugees have fled in terror from the Japanese occupation. Our ship is loaded with them as we are proceeding to Tientsin. In the meantime, Manchuria presents a problem to Japan, to China and the world. The boycott of Japanese goods all over China is vitally affecting Japan's trade and aggravating her economic problem at home. These rich Northeastern provinces of Manchuria, with their vast resources and rapidly increasing thirty millions of population, have been misgoverned by the Chinese themselves. The old corrupt and degenerate Manchu dynasty forfeited its right to rule, and it will be a shortsighted move if Japan tries to place the boy Manchu ex-emperor as her puppet ruler over these provinces now. The late ex-bandit Chang Tso-lin as governor fleeced the people and when he refused to obey or keep his promises to Japan was blown up at the Japanese bridge outside Moukden. His son, the Young Marshal, is a lovable and well-intentioned young man, but his bad habits and the number of the officials and officers under him, with their "squeeze," graft, gambling and dissipation, their almost worthless paper money, and the sufferings of the poor at their hands have been such that they too have forfeited the right to further exploit these long-suffering provinces.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

SHERWOOD EDDY

347 MADISON AVENUE

NEW YORK CITY



2481
2611
2110
file
FE
November 13 1931
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 6 1931
Department of State

Honorable Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

My dear Secretary Stimson:

We have been living through stirring times during the last few weeks. I was present at the capture of Moukden on September 18 and 19, and after two weeks in Korea returned to find the Japanese setting up an "independence" movement to sever the rich provinces of Manchuria from China. All in Korea believe that the policy of Japan will seek to follow the three steps by which she took over Korea: first to declare her "independence of China, second to announce a protectorate under Japan, and third, annexation and absorption.

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But this alien, unsympathetic and psychologically blind, military rule has failed to win the people, and instead has driven them into almost unanimous, sullen hostility. Their three indictments of Japanese rule are: 1. the policy of Japanization or absorption, not allowing them to be Koreans but crushing out their dearest traditions in the effort to make them Japanese; 2. a harsh, militaristic, autocratic rule that monopolizes all higher offices for the Japanese at a time when the principle of autonomy is so far advanced in the Philippines and in India which has occasioned the majority of leading Koreans at one time or another serving terms in prison; and 3. a policy of economic discrimination where so many poor Korean farmers are losing their lands. Finally, there is the apparent policy of the Japanese rule to foment strife between the Chinese and Koreans. A false report was sent to Seoul that the Chinese in Manchuria were killing Koreans there. The next day Korean mobs killed over two hundred Chinese. The news of these massacres is used to turn the Chinese against the Koreans in Manchuria, and then of course the Japanese military must protect their "citizens" there. This almost furnished Japan an excuse for intervention in Manchuria, but the Chinese were well aware of the move and did not rise to the Japanese agitation, so that another excuse had to be found for the sudden capture of all strategic centers in Manchuria within a few hours.

The result of this policy of the Japanese is driving both the Koreans and Chinese toward Communism. The Japanese in Korea informed me that Communism is increasing in northern Korea, not only brought over the border from Siberia, but more especially by Korean students returning from Japan. Both Koreans and Chinese imagine that they can use this Russian influence and organization as a convenient

750.54/2554

Secretary Stimson - 2

10/7/31

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4

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)*
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Secretary Stimson - 3

10/7/31

China herself is threatened with chaos from civil war, banditry, unemployment, flood, famine and the spread of Communism. Either the continued misrule of these provinces by the Chinese themselves, or a Japanese military regime under puppet "independence" will drive Southern Manchuria toward Communism, as the northern province and Mongolia are already passing under Soviet domination. Japan seems to have timed her move, like her twenty-one demands, at a moment when all the rest of the world is unable effectively to act. Will the League of Nations, America and the signatories of the Kellogg Pact be hoodwinked or outmaneuvered and fail to function in this crisis? The League and the Pact are on trial as well as Japan and China.

Very sincerely yours,

Sherwood Eddy

1 415
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

November 13 1931.

In reply refer to
FE

Mr. Sherwood Eddy,
347 Madison Avenue,
New York, New York.

Sir:

The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of
October 7, 1931, from Tientsin, China, containing certain
observations on developments in Manchuria.

The Department is appreciative of your thoughtfulness
in bringing these observations to its attention and assures
you that the situation in Manchuria is continuing to receive
its careful and solicitous consideration.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

SKH

Stanley K. Hornbeck,
Chief,
Division of Far Eastern Affairs.

12
WJ
NOV. 13 1931

RRB
RR: RPB: REK

WJH
FE

11/11/31

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 10, 1931.

Mr. Castle:

The letter hereunder, from Admiral Taylor, Commander-in-Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet, to Admiral Pratt, is interesting though not profound.


I note with interest his mention twice of "Japanese marines". Ambassador Debuchi told the Secretary one day that Japan has no "marines". What's in a name?

SKH/VDM

1417
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

In reply refer to initials
and No.

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON



My dear Hornbeck:

Admiral Pratt has desired me to send you, as a matter of possible interest in connection with the present situation in China, the inclosed copy of a letter which he has just received in which the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, paints a picture of the present situation in Shanghai.

With best regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

Incl. (1).

H. M. Lammers
H. M. Lammers.

Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck,
Room 380, State Department,
Washington, D. C.

793.94 2655
463
FILED

NOV 17 1931

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By JK NARS Date 3/19/73

C O P Y

UNITED STATES ASIATIC FLEET
U.S.S. HOUSTON (Flagship)

Shanghai, China.
12 October, 1931.

Dear Pratt:

Shanghai presents today an extraordinary picture, one hard to visualize. The background is a foreign settlement containing 36,000 foreigners, one-half of whom are Japanese, and 970,000 Chinese. Adjoining is the French Concession with 13,000 foreigners and 420,000 Chinese. Surrounding the whole is the Chinese city with 1,700,000 people.

The International Settlement is governed by the Municipal Council under a set of rules dating back to 1866 which get their strength as much on long custom and acceptance as anything else. The land on which the settlements are built is Chinese land, never having been alienated. The police force is composed of a few whites and Japanese and a number of Sikhs and Chinese. Standing by to protect their nationals are U. S. Marines, two battalions of British and a number of Japanese marines. The French keep to themselves and on the first sign of trouble run up barbed wire keeping everybody out. If that does not spell potential trouble I miss my guess.

Now the Manchurian trouble has acted to intensify the boycott started after the Wan po shan affair. The Nanking Government has turned thumbs down on the boycott, but is helpless. Committees of Chinese have been formed under such high sounding titles as "Society for the Salvation of China from the Japanese" and are busily engaged in creating anti-Japanese feeling and enforcing the boycott against Japanese goods. Their measures are strenuous. They send "committees" out to seize Japanese goods, threaten Chinese in Japanese employ, try to prevent clearance of Japanese bank checks by other banks and the acceptance of such checks by merchants. They arrest Chinese merchants found dealing in Japanese goods, lock them up in their headquarters (the Temple of the Moon) release them after payment of a fine of several thousand dollars, expose them in cages or march them through the streets with placards stating their offense. All this without any legal right or reference to the authorities and with little protest from the authorities. Seizures in the Settlement have been unsuccessfully attempted but such efforts were soon stopped by the police. There have been a few cases of assault against individual Japanese, but a marked absence of such throughout the country, except in Hong Kong.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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The Japanese retaliate by re-capture of the seized property by patrols and by patrols of armed cars, truckloads of fully armed men, etc. They have just brought in 240 additional marines and the TOKIWA is added to the ships here. Since the trouble the forces in the Yangtze and Shanghai have been increased by three cruisers and four destroyers with more ready to come.

Now the foreign troops are here for defense of their nationals and only become active when the Municipality says it is unable to handle the situation, when, under an agreement each force takes over a pre-determined district and acts according to its best lights. Just now no foreigners are in trouble except the Japs. To call out troops would only be in defense of them and Lord knows what the effect would be in other parts of this queer country. As a result the Japanese are parading all over the Settlement, they have just established a post near our compound.

I am rather in hopes that it will die down, Chinese enthusiasm being something like a straw fire, a lot of flame and smoke but in need of constant stoking. The stoking in this case is being done by the students who are having a lively time orating and distributing anti-Japanese posters which are silly; as but about 2% of the people can read they have pictures. The Japanese dignify these by tearing them down, quite a job as they are everywhere, on trucks, blank walls, fences, automobiles, etc.

It is a dangerous situation and an embarrassing one. It may die down and it may result in a serious complication. If we were to call out the troops we would be blamed by the Chinese for siding with the Japanese, if we don't it will be the reverse. From information here and at Peiping I believe the Japanese would like to get us involved. Things being as they are, and knowing we will be black-guarded by one side or the other, the only thing is to remain neutral until our own people are in trouble then go to it.

The AVOCET was towed in the other day with a broken shaft, the S-38 is in with only one engine, the CANOPUS is running on reduced power until she gets new furnaces and the BEAVER has one boiler out due to distorted furnaces. I will be glad when they get to Manila.

I had a queer experience with a Japanese Captain who called on me the other day. I asked him how long he expected to be in port and how many Japanese citizens were ashore. He got quite excited, said he was there to stay during the present disturbance, that he must protect his people, that he would not let them suffer and all at once as though he thought he had said too much he shot out of the cabin, as though catapulted, and Fletcher and I only caught up with him at the gangway. Some of my officers have had similar experiences, they seem jumpy.

The air is full rumors, Nanking is to be captured and the Chinese aerodrome is moved back five miles. The Arsenal here is to be captured, and great turmoil and a lot of Chinese flock into the Settlement only to move back next day. One thing it has done is to unify China more than anything in recent history.

Admiral W. V. Pratt, U.S.N.,
Navy Department,
Washington, D. C.

Yours,
(Signed) Taylor.

November 10, 1931.

Dear Commander Lammers:


I have your letter of November 9,
enclosing, at the instance of Admiral Pratt,
a copy of a letter from Admiral Taylor to
Admiral Pratt.

Please convey to Admiral Pratt expres-
sion of my appreciation of his courtesy and
tell him that I have found the letter inter-
esting and instructive.

Yours cordially,

SKH

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114
Commander Howard M. Lammers,
Office of Naval Intelligence,
Navy Department,
Washington, D. C.



SKH/VDM

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Nov. 11, 1931.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

SUBJECT OR FILE NO.		DATE DUE	
79-394/2656		3-27-53	
DATE OF DOC.	DOC. NO.	SECURITY CLASS.	DATE CHARGED
10-19-31			1-27-23
TO/FROM		ENCLOSURES	
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Form DS-933a (9-1-51)		DEPARTMENT OF STATE	

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

SUBJECT OR FILE NO.		DATE DUE	
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DATE OF DOC.	DOC.	SECURITY CLASS	DATE CHARGED
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TO/FROM		ENCLOSURES	
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 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

OCT 23 1931

OCTOBER 19, 1931.

OCT 21 1931

Mr. Secretary:

Mr. Robert E. Lewis, mentioned in the two telegrams hereunder handed in by Mr. Yung Kwai this afternoon, has for some twenty years been the General Secretary of the Y.M.C.A. at Cleveland, Ohio.

He was also for a number of years Secretary in China of the International Committee of the Y.M.C.A., New York City.

It was recently reported in the press that Mr. Lewis had been appointed as an adviser to the Nanking Government and had sailed toward the end of September to take up his duties as such at Nanking. He was evidently diverted en route to make this investigation and report.

RSM:EJL

OCT 23 1931

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*Handed by Mr. Guy Kwei
to Mr. Miller October 19, 1931.*

TELEGRAM FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AT NANKING
DATED OCTOBER 19, 1931.

OCT 21 1931

The following telegram is received from Robert E. Lewis:

"I have proof that on Friday night September 18th, the Japanese army sent from Korea into Manchuria through Antung seven army railway trains fully loaded with soldiers. On Saturday night September 19th, the Japanese army sent four additional trains loaded with soldiers into Manchuria at the same point. On Sunday, September 20th, the Japanese army sent eight additional troop trains through the same point into Manchuria fully loaded with men. These nineteen trains are part of the occupying force in Manchuria.

"Antung is 161 miles from Mukden on the Korean border. The Japanese occupied every public office in Antung excepting the custom house which has Europeans in it and also placed guards over the Chinese customs superintendent to prevent his free action. Chinese banks have been seized by the Japanese and are now operated by them. The superintendent of schools has been arrested and forbidden to teach the principles of Sun Yat-sen.

"The Japanese army has occupied Kirin, seventy-nine miles east of the South Manchuria Railway zone. On September 19th they seized and held the telegraph office, the telephone office, the wireless stations, the provincial arsenal, the water works, the water work plants, the Bank of China, the

Kirin

FK 79-94/2656

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Kirin Provincial Bank, the police headquarters, the subdivisions of the Kuomintang party headquarters and all other public offices. Search and seizure were conducted by the non-military population. Chinese troops and military cadets were disarmed, when captured, and the arms and munitions in the Chinese arsenal were removed by the Japanese including modern rifles, field guns, heavy guns and military motor trucks. The Japanese are building a large flying field at Kirin. The Japanese have impressed certain Chinese and dictated the formation of a civil government independent of the Chinese provincial and national authorities. The provincial treasury has been taken over by the Japanese army.

"The Japanese have advanced eastward from Kirin to Tunhua, 130 miles, and seized Tunhua with its hinterland. In this part of Manchuria alone, the Japanese army has advanced into Chinese territory 239 miles outside the South Manchuria Railway zone, to which the Japanese troops have not withdrawn.

Robert E. Lewis"

Chinese Legation,

Washington, October 19, 1931.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Handed by Mr. James Kwai
to Mr. Miller October 19, 1931

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Adm

TELEGRAM FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AT NANKING
DATED OCTOBER 19, 1931.


OCT 21 1931

The following telegram is received from Robert E. Lewis,
dated October 18, 1931:

"From personal observation in Manchuria up to October
16th, supplemented by conferences with neutrals and other
informed persons in various parts of Manchuria, the follow-
ing is a true statement of the situation.

"The Japanese army is feverishly consolidating its
hold on all principal towns in Manchuria outside the Railway
zones northward, including Kirin and Taonan, and from Korea
on the east to Mongolia on the west. The Japanese army is
trying to induce the Mongolian princes to sign away their
rights and to set up an independent government under Japan-
ese protection. The Japanese army is rooting out the non-
resisting Chinese civil government at all centers. The
Japanese army is insisting that unwilling Chinese individuals
shall organize puppet independent governments in all the
major areas. The Japanese openly refuse to recognize the
national Chinese civil authority in Manchuria. The Japanese
have seized and impounded the major Chinese bank reserves,
deposits, corporation records and industrial as well as
military supplies of large proportions. The Japanese are
feverishly extending their telegraph and power plants and are
cutting out the Chinese services. The Japanese have seized

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the Chinese short-wave and other radio plants, the Chinese telegraph and telephone systems and are now opening the mails in the Chinese Government Post Office and private

European letters. The Japanese censor all press despatches and we have proved cases where the censor changed the meaning to the exact opposite intended by neutral pressmen.

The Japanese moved four heavily loaded trains of soldiers out of Mukden on the night of October 13 westward seizing the Chinese Peking-Mukden Railway and now control that line in Manchuria. All other Chinese railways in Manchuria have been seized by the Japanese. The local police in all the major towns have been reorganized and controlled by the Japanese army. On October 14 the Japanese army seized the Chinese mining administration throwing 15,000 out of employment. The Japanese army has steadily pressed its seizures and commandeered Chinese property and civil organizations while negotiations in Geneva have been in progress, including private residences of high Chinese officials.

"I inspected Chinchow and had conferences with all responsible officials and without provocation twelve Japanese army airplanes dropped forty-eight bombs and fired machine guns at the offices of the Governor and other officials, the buildings of the University of Communications, the railway stations and the hospital flying the Red Cross flag. The Chinese did not fire at these twelve Japanese planes. Neutral opinion in Manchuria is astonished at the Japanese aggression and excuses made for the same. The rape of Manchuria is

nearly

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nearly completed by the Japanese army. Previous to the aggression of the Japanese army China was maintaining a satisfactory Government in Manchuria and great strides at modernization and industrialization were in progress. China is now prepared in a few hours' time to send in competent officials and well organized troops to take over and to maintain public order from the Japanese.

Robert Lewis"

Chinese Legation,

Washington, October 19, 1931.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 841.00 P. R./203 FOR Despatch #2340

FROM Great Britain (Atherton) DATED Oct. 25, 1931
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: Manchurian controversy. Latest developments in, -
Attitude of leading English journals.

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Manchuria.

Momentous though developments at Geneva during the past week have been, they largely lie outside the scope of the present report. In view, however, of the painful impressions they have created in Japan, the efforts of Lord Reading, who left for London on October 22nd, and of Lord Cecil, who then reoccupied Great Britain's seat in the Council of the League, to induce the Japanese representative to adopt a more conciliatory attitude, should not be overlooked. At the meeting on October 23rd, when Mr. Yoshizawa submitted his amendment to the draft resolution calling for the immediate withdrawal of Japanese troops to the South Manchuria Railway Zone, Lord Cecil appears

to/

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to have embarrassed Mr. Yoshizawa by asking him to disclose the nature of the principles which Japan considered necessary for the governance of normal relations between Japan and China, and to give Japan's consent to the sending of a League Commission to investigate the situation in Manchuria - both of which demands Mr. Yoshizawa had previously refused. Again, during the debate on the following day, Lord Cecil apparently contested Mr. Yoshizawa's claim that the validity of treaties between Japan and China entered into the issue then before the Council. It is unlikely that Japan would expect the other Powers represented on the Council to hesitate in a choice between maintaining the prestige of the League and supporting Japan in claims so hotly disputed by China, but to find Great Britain indifferent to its former ally has been a shock, the extent of which it is difficult from this distance to measure.

The protraction of the dispute between China and Japan has served to instruct the English press in its underlying causes, with the result that the attitudes of the leading journals are more clearly defined. The MANCHESTER GUARDIAN, which is representative of one group, expresses its gratification over the courage of the League in calling upon Japan to evacuate Chinese territory, and hopes that if Japan does not comply the League will find some method

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of forcing compliance, as the League cannot ignore the "incalculable consequences" which a war between Japan and China would have upon the cause of peace and disarmament. However, the DAILY TELEGRAPH, which admits that the Council's resolution is perhaps the best that could be formulated in the circumstances, ascribes the dilemma in which the League found itself to its "misguided insistence upon treating China as a national entity." China, it observes, is unable to protect Japan's legitimate interests, and Japan may therefore stand upon the recognized principle of protecting itself against anarchy by refusing to assume that China is able to fulfil its duty. The London TIMES takes a middle position between the two extremes. It feels that the League has acted with credit in having reconciled the claims of peace with those of justice. The issue, as it sees it, is not whether the legitimate interests of Japan in Manchuria have been prejudiced by China, but whether a nation can today employ diplomacy "by ultimatum" without first exhausting arbitration and other methods designed to yield amicable settlements.

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

TELEGRAM RECEIVED November 14, 1931

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

STATE DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON

My dear Mr. Secretary

I repeat to you a message which I send today to the
President as follows: November 21 1931. *Letter drafted to Mrs. Blair, Nov 21, 1931*

"I hesitate to advise from a distance and from
slight knowledge and yet I find it impossible not to
express my feeling on the World issues of the moment.

There must not be another war among civilized
peoples.

The Great War brought an agency which can work toward
this end.

We helped to create it.

We then turned away owing to a group of our people
misguided as I believe.

Now the world is in the threat of a storm,

It must not break.

The League of Nations is struggling manfully without
us.

We shall be chargeable with the results of desertion
if it cannot save the situation.

But whose



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rh #2 of Nov. 14 from Chicago

But whose fault it is, is the least of the question.

The World might be saved from the threatened outbreak.

The question I ask is how far can our enlightened government go in this emergency toward upholding and strengthening and cooperating with the only World machinery for settling international questions without resort to war.

And toward some police power over unbridled lying ruffianism.

I believe that the measures that are in the powers of the League of Nations should be used with full force and at the same time it should be loudly proclaimed that all questions between Japan and China ought to be fully discussed before a World congress including the question of relief for Japanese crowded island-bound population.

I believe that strong appeal to Japan and condemnation of her barbarism and the clear understanding of ~~forceful~~ measures other than war that would be used at need and holding out hope of justice from a world opinion ought all to be used.

And if we do not use them all how can they be fully used.

The world

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By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

rh #3 of Nov. 14 from Chicago

The world demands that we be courageous today.

I am thankful for the courage of our cooperation so far and I hope that it may be wholly continued and enlarged and that you may be upheld in this course.

I am sending a copy of this message to the Secretary of State and Ambassador Dawes that it may be before them for any comments you might be pleased to bestow upon it.

I shall be grateful to you and to them for receiving it.

I am with respect,

Sincerely yours,

ANITA MCCORMICK BLAINE

JS

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

November 21 1931.

In reply refer to
FE 793.94/2660

My dear Mrs. Blaine:

I have received your telegram of November 14, 1931, in reference to the existing dispute between China and Japan and problems related thereto.

Your message has been read with solicitous interest and I wish to assure you that the Administration is giving constant thought and its best effort to ways and means for bringing about settlement by pacific means in accordance with the requirements of the treaties to which the United States is a party.

Sincerely yours,

HENRY L. STIMSON

Mrs. Anita McCormick Blaine,
101 East Erie Street,
Chicago, Illinois.

FE:RFB/VDM FE 11/21/31

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Nov 21 1931

743 ad
(NOT FOR THE PRESS)
(FOR DEPARTMENTAL USE ONLY)
Department of State
DIVISION Division of Current Information

MEMORANDUM FOR PRESS CONFERENCE, WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 4, 1931

At the press conference this afternoon, Undersecretary Castle announced the release of a story concerning a bell in Italy erected in honor of those who fell during the war.

CHINA

Referring to a press release issued yesterday concerning the capture of the Reverend J. W. Vinson by bandits, the Undersecretary said that the Provincial Government had received a request from the Chinese National Government to endeavor to effect the release of Mr. Vinson and to capture the bandits.

SINO-JAPANESE DISPUTE

The Undersecretary said that the Department had received a report from Consul General George C. Hanson to the effect that he spent the week-end in Tsitsihar and made a general investigation at that place. Consul General Hanson is a good officer and he evidently meant to be on the spot to see what was going on. His telegram is not all in, however, and up to the present it has not contained any information which the Department had not already received through press reports. Mr. Hanson, in his telegram, does not speak of the Russian angle of the situation at all. Not for quotation but for BACK-GROUND purposes only, the Undersecretary said he did not know whether all the correspondents realized what the situation near

Tsitsihar is. There are various reports current concerning the construction of bridges near that place. Those bridges were destroyed in the course of military operations or projected military operations between the two contending factions of Chinese troops. The bridges cross the Nonni River about twenty-one miles south of Tsitsihar. As we understand it, the Japanese are very anxious to have those bridges repaired in order that the Soya bean crop may be moved down from Northern

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Manchuria. Of course, to bring down the bean crop is to the advantage of the South Manchurian Railroad and it is also to the advantage of the Chinese farmers in Northern Manchuria. It is probably true that Japanese troops have been sent not to Tsitsihar, but to the River where the bridges are to be repaired to assist in the work and to see that the people who are doing it are not disturbed. It is quite obvious that the repairs to the bridges are chiefly for the sake of the bean crop and not for the transportation of troops because in a very few days the Nonni River will be entirely frozen over. We have no information beyond that that any Japanese troops have gone into Northern Manchuria and we have no confirmation of the press reports that they have entered Tsitsihar. Consul General Hanson said he had no intention of going to Manchuli or any other places in North Manchuria. Asked if this rather factual and not very dynamic information might be attributed to the State Department, the Undersecretary replied in the negative and said that he received the data from the Japanese Ambassador this morning and that he desired, therefore, not to have it attributed. Ambassador Debuchi brought a map to the Department showing the location of the bridges, et cetera. Asked if he thought those bridges were strategic in so far as Russian troops are concerned, the Undersecretary replied in the negative. Referring to the reconstruction of the bridges and to the statement that they would help the South Manchurian Railroad, a correspondent said he understood that the Japanese had objected to the competition offered by that line. Mr. Castle said that was quite true but that the main reason for repairing the bridges is apparently to save the Soya bean crop rather than to help the South Manchurian Railway. He added, however, that he understood that most of the beans shipped to foreign countries were exported from the port of Dairen. Asked if there was any connection between the rather complacent attitude with which

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 By Milton O. Quirk NARS, Date 12-18-75

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this Government appears to regard the northward movement of Japanese troops in Manchuria with the promptness with which Japan accepted the recent one-year arms truce, the Undersecretary said there was no connection whatever. Asked if the Japanese Ambassador had given any indication whether his Government would withdraw its troops into the railroad zone by November 16, the Undersecretary replied in the negative. A correspondent then asked if the Undersecretary expected that the Japanese troops would be out of the recently occupied zone by November 16. In reply, Mr. Castle merely remarked that the correspondent had asked a very leading question. A correspondent said that a report was published about three days ago to the effect that the reason the United States had adopted such a waiting policy in regard to Manchuria was that we had an agreement during the London Naval Conference that, in return for Japan's adherence to the London Naval Treaty, we would maintain a hands-off policy concerning Manchuria. In reply, the Undersecretary said that the report may have been published but there was absolutely no truth in it. Such a proposition was not discussed in any way either in London or in Tokyo. Observing that the Chinese appear to be putting their trust in the League of Nations rather than in the United States Government, a correspondent asked if the Undersecretary had conferred recently with Mr. Yung Kwai, the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires in Washington. Mr. Castle, in reply, remarked that Mr. Yung Kwai often visits the Department to see Doctor Hornbeck, Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs. A correspondent asked if, in view of the Soya bean explanation, there was a tendency on the part of this Government to regard the Japanese advance northward as not particularly a cause for concern. Mr. Castle, in reply, said that we do not know enough about this so-called advance northward to know whether it is serious or not. If the explanation given for the repair of the bridges should prove to be correct, this work should not complicate the situation with Russia. A correspondent asked if it

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
was not true that the Department was somewhat inclined to give Ambassador Debuchi and the Shidehara Government in Japan credit for acting in good faith. The correspondent said that he thought the Soya bean explanation was rather vague and that frankly he did not believe it to be the true explanation. In reply, Mr. Castle said he merely gave that explanation FOR BACKGROUND as it had been given to him and that he made no comment as to what he thought about it. Asked if he had any assurance that the Japanese troops would be withdrawn as soon as the bridges are repaired, the Undersecretary said, NOT FOR ATTRIBUTION, that Ambassador Debuchi informed him that it was the understanding that they would be withdrawn instantly after the bridges had been repaired. A correspondent then asked how long it would take to move the bean crop and if the Japanese would remain there to guard the bridges to save the beans. Mr. Castle, in reply, said that if the troops are to be withdrawn the moment the repair work is completed, which would probably not take more than a week or ten days, they would have nothing to do with the moving of the beans. A correspondent said that, as he understood it, the Japanese and the French took exception to the Grandi arms holiday proposal and indicated that they would oppose it. Then the matter was rather lost sight of until after the Manchurian situation arose. Japan then hastened to submit her acceptance of the arms truce. The Undersecretary replied that he did not remember that Japan, even at the beginning, said it would not accept the arms holiday. There were reports in the newspapers about the opposition of the French, but we have had no word pertaining thereto from either Tokyo or Paris. Asked if there were any serious efforts under way to get the Chinese and Japanese into direct negotiation, the Undersecretary said he did not know what M. Briand was doing about the matter. A correspondent said that, regardless of any past commitments, which he did not believe the United States had ever

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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entered into, he would like to know why we are maintaining a rather slow or hands-off policy regarding that section of the world in which we have played an important part in the past. He was informed, in reply, that we are watching the situation with the utmost care but that as to what we may decide to do about it is a matter for the Secretary to discuss. Asked if he could sense any change in our traditional policy toward the Orient because of this new situation, Mr. Castle replied in the negative. A correspondent asked if any decision had yet been reached regarding the publication of our notes to China and Japan under the Kellogg Pact. The Undersecretary, in reply, said he did not know what the Secretary desired to do about the matter.

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



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Department of State
Division of Current Information

MEMORANDUM OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE OF FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 6, 1931

At the press conference this afternoon, Secretary Stimson announced the release of telegrams exchanged with General Pe-tain, upon the latter's departure from the United States.

A letter from a member of the Presbyterian mission at Haichow, China, to the American Consul General at Nanjing, describing the capture of the Reverend J. W. Vinson, was also released to the press.

SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT

A correspondent said that, according to press despatches from Tokyo, Ambassador Forbes delivered a note to the Japanese Foreign Office yesterday in which we declare our association with the League of Nations in the Manchurian crisis. The despatches also intimate that when this becomes known to the Japanese public it will have a very adverse effect. The Secretary replied that the press despatch was incorrect in so far as it alludes to a note having been sent. FOR BACKGROUND, Mr. Forbes has made representations to the Japanese Foreign Office, but the contents thereof have not yet been properly described. A correspondent then asked if the Department distinguished between a note and an aide memoire. He was informed that not only the Department but all people acquainted with diplomatic intercourse distinguish between a note, which is an official communication from one government to another, and an aide memoire, which is a resume of a verbal communication. The latter are commonly given in important cases.

Observing that press despatches this morning indicate that Russia may be represented on the Council of the League, in a manner somewhat similar to our own, a correspondent asked if that would affect our relations with the Council. The Secretary, in reply, said he preferred to cross that bridge after coming to it. Asked if, apart from the verbal representations made by

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Ambassador Forbes, we are associating ourselves with the League in the matter of its resolution which demands the evacuation of Japanese troops by November 16, Mr. Stimson replied that he did not wish to discuss the matter, but that the correspondents might quote the following statement:

"The policy of the government remains unchanged, namely, by acting independently through the diplomatic channels and reserving complete independence of judgment as to each step, to co-operate with and support the other nations of the world in their objective of peace in Manchuria."

Asked if it was his understanding that Russia maintains military guards on the Chinese Eastern Railway, the Secretary said CONFIDENTIALLY (the Secretary said that he did not want to speak even for BACKGROUND, as he was speaking from memory only and his statements might be incorrect) that he thought the Chinese Eastern Railway was run by a Board of Directors, half of whom are Chinese, and the other half being Russians. It has a Chinese President and a Russian General Manager. The latter is the technical man who practically runs the railroad. Mr. Stimson added that he did not know whether there were any Russian guards.

A correspondent asked if the Secretary had seen a story which was recently printed in the Moscow PRAVDA concerning a statement alleged to have been made in 1927 by Baron Tanaka, then Premier of Japan, to the effect that Japan must crush the United States before she could dominate the Orient. The Secretary, in reply, said that he had heard something about such a statement, but that he preferred not to comment on it.

Taking a broad view of the conflict, a correspondent asked if the Manchurian situation had improved any during the past few days. In reply, Mr. Stimson said that he would be glad to give the correspondents a general estimate of the situation, but that it would be in STRICT CONFIDENCE AND NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN ANY WAY, EITHER FOR ATTRIBUTION OR NON-ATTRIBUTION (At this point the Secretary was interrupted by a correspondent

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who said that he did not care to hear the explanation in confidence, as it might prevent him from publishing information already in his possession. The correspondent agreed to leave the room, if the Secretary had no objections thereto.) Mr. Stimson then said that it would probably be better if he made no CONFIDENTIAL STATEMENT, as he had no desire to tie up those correspondents who already had certain information bearing on the subject. FOR BACKGROUND, however, the Secretary said that, in view of certain reports of a rather inflammatory nature which had only recently been received from Moscow, he had studied the question rather thoroughly, but that Mr. Hanson's reports had not confirmed any of those reports from Russia. Consul General Hanson reported that he saw no evidence of Russian mobilization and could discover no details of aid which the Russians were supposed to have given to the Chinese General. Mr. Hanson visited Tsitsihar only, but his reports cover events and conditions farther on toward the Sino-Russian frontier.

A correspondent asked if efforts were still being made to get the Chinese and the Japanese into direct negotiations and what the immediate steps would likely be. The Secretary, in reply, said he thought everything of importance on that subject, including the reports of M. Briand's activities, had been published.

GERMANY

Observing that press reports from Berlin this morning said Chancellor Bruening was expected to visit the United States at the end of this month, a correspondent asked if any preparations or plans of any kind were being made. Mr. Stimson replied that there were no plans for such a visit and that he had not even heard of the newspaper report in question. The correspondent then asked if the German Ambassador, who called at the Department yesterday, had entered into any conversations concerning the debt discussions now going on in Europe. Mr. Stimson,

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in reply, said that he preferred not to discuss his conversation with the German Ambassador under the general rule that he never discusses his talks with ambassadors.

ARMAMENTS

Asked if the General Disarmament Conference was still scheduled to convene on February 2, 1931, the Secretary said he had no information contrary thereto. Queried concerning the delegates, Mr. Stimson said the selection of the delegates and other personnel had been under consideration for some time, but that he had no announcements yet to make concerning them.

M. J. McDermott.

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Department of State
Division of Current Information

MEMORANDUM OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE OF MONDAY, NOVEMBER 9, 1931

At the press conference this morning Secretary Stimson announced the release of the remarks which will be made today by the new Mexican Ambassador to the United States when he presents his credentials to President Hoover. The Secretary also announced the receipt of a telegram from Consul General Hanson at Harbin, Manchuria, who reported the situation was quiet in Tsitsihar and Hailar.

SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT

A correspondent said there was a flurry of press rumors this morning, one of which was that China had declared war on Japan. Mr. Stimson replied that the newspaper rumors which had just reached him were to the effect that Japan had declared war on China. Admitting the fact that war in Manchuria does not exist technically, a correspondent asked if the Department felt that war was actually in progress. The Secretary replied that the question came within the zone of those topics which he did not desire to discuss. Mr. Stimson then said he was afraid that the conference this morning would be disappointing to the correspondents as he did not desire to discuss the situation in Manchuria. CONFIDENTIALLY, the Secretary said he did not think the situation was as bad as some of the correspondents may think; at least, it is not bad enough for the Secretary to throw up his hands. Asked if there had been any recent correspondence between Japan and the United States concerning the situation, the Secretary replied in the negative. A correspondent said that the Japanese Foreign Office announced either last night or this morning that they had received a communication from the State Department but that they were unwilling to make it public as that was a matter to be decided by the State Department at Washington. The Secretary in reply said he had not heard the

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report. Asked if the Department had received any information regarding the trouble in Tientsin yesterday and last night, the Secretary replied in the negative and added, CONFIDENTIALLY, that in Tientsin there is a very large important city constituting the Japanese concession and that in that concession there has been living for a number of years the young Chinese Emperor, who was deposed some years ago. The trouble in Tientsin seems to have been an attack by a Chinese mob upon the Chinese police guarding the outskirts of that concession. It is believed there are not many Chinese troops there and that practically all of the troops are foreign. Mr. Stimson here remarked that he was making no inferences or statements concerning that situation. A correspondent asked if the reports indicated that the American troops were under fire. The Secretary replied that the only information in his possession concerning the rioting was obtained from the press. Asked if there was any thought being given to the sending of further American forces to China, the Secretary replied in the negative. IN CONFIDENCE, Mr. Stimson observed that we have a squadron of the fleet in Asiatic waters and two battalions of a regiment at Tientsin. The Secretary emphasized the fact that the squadron of the Asiatic fleet is in Far Eastern waters but is not at Tientsin. Asked if the matter of additional forces at Tientsin rests within the discretion of the Commander of the Philippine Department, the Secretary said the Commander would not send additional forces without consulting the State Department. The Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic fleet has general discretion, as a Commander away from home, to protect life and property of American citizens and he would act very carefully. A correspondent said that the Navy Department insists that the Commander of the Asiatic fleet may use his discretion very broadly and that he might report immediately or later what had

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been done. The Secretary replied that the Governor General of the Philippines, the Ambassador at Tokyo, the Minister to China and the Commander of the Asiatic fleet very properly have to use a great deal of discretion as they are a long way from home.

A correspondent asked if the Secretary would say whether his visit to the White House this morning concerned the situation in Manchuria. The Secretary replied that the last time he was seen leaving the White House, which was Saturday morning, he indulged in a friendly talk with a correspondent, which talk led to headlines in every newspaper. Mr. Stimson then added that he had been at the White House this morning as he had been many times during the past two and one-half years and that he did not think that comment on the visit would help the correspondents. Asked if he had had an opportunity to study the Japanese reply to M. Briand's note, Mr. Stimson said he had studied all of the documents very carefully but that he did not desire to comment on them publicly. A correspondent said that if the Secretary obtained any information on the Manchurian situation later in the day he would appreciate having it. Mr. Stimson replied that he saw the correspondents' difficulties and that he hoped they appreciated some of his difficulties. He added, furthermore, that if any point should arise concerning which he could help the correspondents IN CONFIDENCE, he would do so. The Secretary then said the correspondents had been very good all through the present crisis and that he hoped they would remain patient. The situation is a very delicate one and one in which the Secretary must go for a little while by himself.

CANADA

Asked if he had heard from Mr. Herridge, the Canadian Minister, who has just returned from Ottawa, the Secretary replied in the negative.

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RUMANIA

A correspondent asked if the Secretary would say anything about his conversation this morning, on the transatlantic telephone, with the Rumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Secretary replied in the affirmative and observed that the correspondent had asked a question about a subject that he could talk about. The conversation this morning was the first occasion on which we used the new telephone and the connection, which is the longest one that has ever been made in Eastern Europe, was the clearest the Secretary ever heard on a transatlantic connection. Asked what language he used during the conversation, the Secretary said that he spoke in English and that Prince Ghika also spoke in very good English. When the Vice President of the American Telephone Company opened the conversation by saying "Good morning" to the President of the Rumanian Company, the latter responded by saying "Good afternoon". The text of the remarks of the Secretary and Prince Ghika will be released to the press today.

ARMAMENTS

Asked if he could say when the American delegates to the General Disarmament Conference in Geneva would be selected, the Secretary said he had no idea but that the President would probably make the announcement.

ITALY

Observing that there was a suggestion in the Sunday newspapers that Signor Grandi might not be taken into New York City after landing, the Secretary said he had no announcement to make concerning the matter.

M. J. McDERMOTT

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 123 Sh 22/80 FOR Tel.#192-4 pm

FROM Switzerland (Greene) DATED Nov. 12, 1961
TO NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Shaw will arrive in Paris Saturday morning to confer with
Ambassador Dawes regarding Japanese-Chinese situation

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Department of State

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CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
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Washington,

November 12, 1931.

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AMEMBASSY,

PARIS (France).

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FOR GENERAL DAWES.

One. Department has received a telegram dated November 12, 10 a. m., from the Embassy at Tokyo reading in part as follows: QUOTE General Staff informs Military Attaché that one brigade will be sent from Japan next week to relieve a brigade in Manchuria. This will probably be followed by other relief as the term of service of the men in Manchuria runs out.

The General Staff has also invited the Military Attachés now in attendance at the general maneuvers in Kyushu to visit Manchuria. I perceive no objection to our Military Attaché accepting this invitation UNQUOTE.

Two. Department is replying that provided that invitation to visit Manchuria is accepted by Military Attachés of leading powers, Department perceives no objection to our Military Attaché likewise accepting.

Approved by
M. C. Cate
FE:MMH:REK
mm/s.

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Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Nov. 12, 1931. pm

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

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By Milton O. Justifson NARS, Date 12-18-75



AM RECD
LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Riga, Latvia.

October 30, 1931.

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No. 8179

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that the three leading political newspapers of Moscow continue to return to the conflict between Japan and China about once a week. They thresh the same straw in very similar fashion, attempting to put the United States and the League of Nations in the most disadvantageous light, and languidly suggesting a revolutionary or a proletarian

interest

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1/ interest in the Manchurian events, but taking good care not to bring the Soviet Union into the discussion. Excepting a rare miniature sketch map to illustrate the possible direction of the Japanese push, there is little in the Soviet press to indicate a greater interest in the controversy at Harbin or Vladivostok than might reasonably be shown at Sydney or Buenos Aires. The latest of these sketch maps, attached in one copy only, appeared in the Moscow IZVESTIA No. 291, of October 21, 1931, and, like the PRAVDA map which has been forwarded with a previous despatch, carries Japanese thrusts against Hailar. It must be added, however, that this map is plentifully provided with unexplained dotted lines, pointing also toward Blagoveshchensk and Habarovsk.

That the Soviet Union is too engrossed in business at this time to take an active part in international political affairs has been shown too plainly during the last six months to admit of denial. Whether it is also willing to take present profit from the Japanese action while continuing military preparations for future eventualities, must be left to speculation. The geography of Manchuria speaks for itself. A buffer between Mukden and Nanking is also a buffer between Harbin and Nanking.

Moscow PRAVDA No. 290, of October 20, 1931, on page 4 found place for a brief communiqué, through the Official Telegram Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS), which, in translation,

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translation, read as follows:

On October 18, the French Chargé d'Affaires in Moscow, M. Conti, instructed by M. Briand, informed the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the text of the telegram that has been sent simultaneously to the Chinese and the Japanese Governments by all participants in the Kellogg Pact, represented at the session of the Council of the League of Nations in Geneva.

For whatever interest they may have, there are annexed two versions of a news item, said to be of London origin, which have appeared in Riga newspapers.

The Riga Jewish daily FRIMORGN of October 18, 1931 (Sunday), carried a news despatch, dated "London, October 17," as follows:

It is reported from Tokyo that the question has been raised in Japanese political spheres of inviting Soviet Russia to participate in the sessions of the Council of the League of Nations which deal with the Japanese-Chinese conflict. It is pointed out that Soviet Russia, as a state signatory to the Kellogg Pact, has the same right to participate in the League of Nations Council as America.

The Riga Lettish daily JAUNAKAS ZINAS of October 19, 1931, carried a news despatch dated "London, October 19, by radio," as follows:

The Japanese Government has again raised the question of inviting Soviet Russia to participate in the deliberations of the League of Nations. Soviet Russia, as a state signatory to the Kellogg Pact, has an even greater claim [literally: rights] than America [i.e., to do so] ...

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The character of the Moscow leading articles probably has been sufficiently indicated.

Respectfully yours,

Felix Cole

Felix Cole,
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

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Enclosures:

1. A sketch map in the Moscow IZVESTIA No. 291,
of October 21, 1931.
(In one copy only.)
2. The United States Attempts to Get up an
Anti-Japanese Bloc.
(Moscow PRAVDA, No. 283, October 13, 1931.)
3. A New Chapter in the World Crisis.
(Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, No. 275, October 13,
1931.)
4. The Occupation of Manchuria, and the Imperial-
istic Powers.
(Moscow IZVESTIA, No. 288, October 18, 1931.)
5. The Struggle for the Manchurian Booty.
(Moscow PRAVDA, No. 288, October 18, 1931.)
6. The Knot in the Pacific is Tightening.
(Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, No. 280, October 19,
1931.)

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(In triplicate).

Copy to E.I.C.Paris.

Copy to E.I.C.Paris for Peiping.

Copy to American Cōnsul, Harbin, via Department.

Copy to American Embassy, Tokyo, via Department.

Copy to American Embassy, London, direct.

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 8175 of OCT 30 1931
from the Legation at Riga, Latvia.

SOURCE: Moscow IZVESTIA,
No. 291,
October 21, 1931.



ENCLOSURE NO. 2 TO DESPATCH NO. 0179 OF OCT 30 1931
FROM THE LEGATION AT RIGA, LATVIA.

SOURCE: Moscow PRAVDA,
No. 283, p.1,
October 13, 1931.

THE UNITED STATES ATTEMPTS TO GET UP AN ANTI-
JAPANESE BLOC.

...

A trial balloon of the Washington diplomats.

(Translation of editorial comment
on telegraphic information on the
above subjects).

The struggle of the imperialistic Powers for the Chinese markets, which had become more complicated by the activities of Japanese imperialism in Manchuria, is entering now upon the next consecutive stage. The more active resistance which American imperialism begins to show to its Japanese rivals who have gained a foothold in Manchuria, is the essence of this new stage.

It is no mere accident that the activization of the policy of American imperialism has taken the outward shape of an address of the Government of the United States to the League of Nations. It is a well-known fact that just Geneva gave its blessings to the Japanese occupation of Manchurian territory, which was supported by part of the imperialistic Powers. The United States now attempts to use the same weapon against Japanese imperialism and its protectors. In this connection, American imperialism utilizes first of all the apprehensions of the European imperialistic Powers, part
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of which are alarmed by the excessively broad plans of the Japanese invaders. Secondly, American imperialism takes advantage of the fear of the anti-imperialistic movement in China, which latter has grown stronger, since the occupation of Manchuria, and lastly and thirdly, the imperialism of the United States, in pressing its preferential right to rob China, uses all the means of pressure which it has at its disposal in respect of the European capitalistic Powers.

The League of Nations has been selected by the Washington Government as a screen for the first step of American imperialism. The address to Geneva is, so to speak, a trial balloon of American diplomacy. According to what results will be achieved by that trial balloon, the dollar diplomacy will eventually use other and more effective means. At Washington they are not over-impressed with the authority of the League of Nations. The latter will have to stand another blow, for no interference whatsoever on the part of the League of Nations will be able to stop Japanese imperialism.

The above explains why alarm and confusion reigns at the League of Nations, as well as among the imperialistic Powers which support the claims of Japanese imperialism. On the scene has come the United States which wants to proceed in robbing China according to its own plans, but not in accordance with the plans of Japanese imperialism.

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ENCLOSURE NO. 3 TO DESPATCH NO. 8175 OF OCT 30 1931
FROM THE LEGATION AT RIGA, LATVIA.

SOURCE: Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA,
No. 275, p.1,
October 13, 1931.

A NEW CHAPTER IN THE WORLD CRISIS.

(Translation of excerpts
from leading editorial).

The new phase of the world crisis sharpens the
conflict of interests between the imperialists. ...

At the same time the new phase of the crisis,
and its irregular development, bring a change into
the battle array of the world imperialistic factors.
...

The new chapter of the crisis of the capitalist-
ic system, which has just begun, causes new changes
also in the internal political grouping of the bour-
geoisie of the capitalistic countries, and creates
instability in their camp. ...

In its efforts to find a way out of the crisis,
the bourgeoisie with ever-increasing persistency is
bent upon intensifying the exploitation of the masses
of toilers, and upon increasing its aggressiveness
against

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against the U.S.S.R. The representatives of English industry, for instance, try to take advantage of the acuteness of the crisis for demanding new retrenchments and economies at the expense of the toilers, and for the immediate introduction of protective tariffs in respect of all foreign merchandise. The autumn session of the association of British Boards of Trade, which assembled on September 24, sent the following telegram to the Prime Minister, MacDonald, to Baldwin, and to Samuel:

The representatives of the Boards of Trade in all parts of England, who have assembled in Lincoln have this day instructed me to inform you that in their opinion the only way of increasing production, of reducing unemployment, and improving the national balance of trade, is the introduction of a tariff on imported goods. The huge quantity of goods imported into England every day constitutes a serious national danger, and calls for immediate action.

The same session of the Boards of Trade adopted a resolution which necessarily contained a sally against the U.S.S.R. The session directed attention to "the balance of trade with the U.S.S.R., unfavorable for England," and asked that measures against Soviet imports be adopted.

The tendency of the imperialists to finding a way out of the crisis at the expense of the masses of toilers in the capitalistic countries, and at the expense of the U.S.S.R., has been voiced very candidly also by the German fascists at their recent congress in Braunschweig Province. There cannot be a doubt that all the imperialists have the same tendency.

In

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In connection with all this, the changes which on the grounds of the crisis are taking place in the capitalistic world deserve our serious attention and study. These changes also urge that the labor class, the collective farm members, and the peasant toilers in the U.S.S.R., should unswervingly continue their socialistic construction work, and fortify the socialistic economic system in the U.S.S.R. And lastly, these changes urge that the Red Army of the Soviet Union should untiringly increase its fighting efficiency and its political training.

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ENCLOSURE NO. 4 TO DESPATCH NO. 8175 OF OCT 30 1931
FROM THE LEGATION AT RIGA, LATVIA.

SOURCE: Moscow IZVESTIA,
No. 288,
October 18, 1931.
Page 1.

THE OCCUPATION OF MANCHURIA, AND THE IMPERIALISTIC
POWERS.

(Translation of leading editorial.)

On September 29 the acting chairman of the Council of the League of Nations, the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Leroux, expressed his deep conviction that Japan will submit to the finding of the Council of the League, and that it will evacuate its troops from Manchuria, and that China in its turn will do nothing that might trammel the pacific settlement of the conflict. Since that time, a fortnight has passed, in the course of which Japan has extended and fortified the area of its occupation. Japanese army flyers during the same time have bombarded the town of Chin-chow, explaining that this was not an act of warfare, but only a measure to protect themselves against the fire of the Chinese army, which latter did not recognize the right of the Japanese military aeroplanes to fly over Chinese territory. Apart from this, by means of "self-generation" in various parts of Manchuria, which "happened to coincide" with the occupied zone, "independent" Manchurian Governments have sprung up, that are brimful of hate for Chang Hsueh-liang, and just as brimful of love for Japan.

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The Nanking Government in its turn has done nothing that might have retarded the pacific settlement of the conflict, and Chiang Kai-shek has confined himself to compiling notes, the style of which resembles the writings of Chinese lyrical poets more than the stern proclamations usually issued by that militarist. The Chinese military clique, of course, explained ~~their~~ love of peace by their profound esteem for the elder brethren in the League of Nations, but in reality their love of peace is due to the fact that the armed bands of Chiang Kai-shek are quite able to rob the civilian population, and to shoot thousands of workmen and peasants, but unable to stand up for the defense of the independence of the country.

The League of Nations too probably would have calmly looked on, in spite of the clamoring of the Chinese Government, were it not that the United States of America had considered it necessary to stimulate the League's activities by means of a special note.

The fact of the Japanese occupying Manchuria has certainly caused no little alarm in the United States. Ever since the time of the Portsmouth peace, American imperialism is opposed to the seizure of Chinese territory by Japan. Of course, this is not for the love of China, but it is done on the basis of the principle that it is much better to exploit economically the whole of China rather than a China with some bits cut off. In 1910, on the basis of the same viewpoint the United States propagated the idea of international-

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izing the Manchurian railways. When Japan forced upon China its 21 conditions that gave that great country over into the hands of Japanese imperialism, the United States utilized its power, which had grown up in war, to wrench part of the booty from Japanese imperialism. Of course, this did not prevent the American capitalists from financing Japanese expansion in Manchuria. But now that Japan, having fortified its position in Southern Manchuria in an economic and in a military sense, attempts to extend the economic and the political radius of its sphere of influence, and to pocket the whole of Manchuria, American imperialism tries to hamper its rival.

However, American imperialism is afraid to let things go as far as a duel between America and Japan. American imperialism wants to pursue its anti-Japanese policy under an international flag, and that is why it pushes the League of Nations into the foreground. By its note of October 11, the Government of the United States achieved that the question of Manchuria was broached once more at the session of the League of Nations. It goes without saying that neither England nor France show any particular desire to exercise pressure upon Japan. If England even after the Washington conference, at which the United States compelled England to withdraw from her alliance with Japan, was bent upon keeping up close relations with Japan, it will be much less inclined to quarrel with Japan now that the weight of the British foreign policy

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policy has considerably diminished. In the course of all the post-war period, France has been trying to create particularly friendly relations with Japanese imperialism, having for its support of the Japanese policy received Japan's support of her [i.e., France's] anti-German policy. France has remained true to this tradition even during the time of the Manchurian crisis. A few days before the session of the Council of the League of Nations, under the chairmanship of the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, Briand, the semi-official press organ of the French Government, the TEMPS, asked in its leading editorial of October 12, how it was possible to adopt any real measures, if it were borne in mind that now in the conditions of the crisis not a single Power — and especially the United States — can think seriously of an interference that would inevitably be bound to develop into a dangerous undertaking. On this basis, the French newspaper stated that, "perhaps now, when the Chinese will convince themselves that they can get nothing further out of the League of Nations, they will consent to settling the conflict through direct negotiations with Japan."

That is why the fact of the representative of the United States having been invited to attend the session of the Council of the League of Nations in the capacity of observer does certainly not foreshadow the adoption of any heroic measures on the part of the honorable imperialistic Powers. Japan's sharp protest against

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the admission of the American representative no doubt has been caused not so much by fear of joint activities on the part of the European and American imperialists, as by apprehensions that a conspicuous isolation of the Japanese Government might produce an impression not favorable to Japan, in the masses of the Chinese and Japanese peoples.

As regards the European imperialistic Powers and the United States, every one of those Powers will try to avoid drastic diplomatic measures against the invaders. The most powerful weapon to which the United States will resort will be to organize an ebbing-away of gold from Japan. In view of the acute tension experienced by Japanese currency during the two years of the crisis (Japan has lost 373 million yen, and owns now a gold reserve of only 700 millions), the ebbing-away of gold is likely to accelerate the progress of events in Manchuria.

The aims which Japanese militarism pursues in Manchuria are clear, and it can scarcely be expected that these aims will be waived. Some haggling there will be about what part of the its program Japan will want to have executed at all costs at the given stage, and also about what compensations, at the expense of China, the other imperialistic Powers are to receive.

Only the masses of the people of Japan and of China can change the situation that has been brought about.

js/hs

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) *
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ENCLOSURE NO. 5 TO DESPATCH NO. 5179 OF OCT 30 1931
FROM THE LEGATION AT RIGA, LATVIA.

SOURCE: Moscow PRAVDA,
No. 288, p.1,
October 18, 1931.

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE MANCHURIAN BOOTY.

(Translation of leading editorial)

A month has passed since the occupation of Manchuria by Japanese troops. From the very first days it was perfectly clear that Manchuria is becoming the center of new conflicts of interest between the imperialistic Powers, of conflicts that contain the germ of a new clash between the imperialists striving to get possession of that huge market, and that object of colonial exploitation and enrichment, which China constitutes.

In Geneva, at the latest session of the Council of the League of Nations, this became particularly clear. Within the walls of the Geneva "Palace of Peace", the imperialists concluded the transaction concerning the dividing-up of China. The League of Nations has always been used by the European imperialists, and at present more especially by the French imperialists, for their struggle against their rivals over the seas. The League of Nations stands on guard over the intactness and the integrity of the predatory Versailles system. The League of Nations which is a tool and organizing agency for war against colonial and semi-colonial peoples, has arranged an alliance between Japanese imperialism and some of the European Powers for the purpose of robbing China, and it has
legalized,

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)^a
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

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legalized, and given its blessings for, the war which the Japanese bourgeoisie is conducting against the Chinese people. The Social-Fascist Second International may now celebrate the victory of the League, that "instrument of peace":

The desire to divide up China in some form or another characterizes at present the policies of the imperialists in the Far East. The military occupation of Manchuria, where neither French nor English imperialistic interests on a large scale are involved, means the beginning of the definite and final dividing up of China, and it means at the same time a concession to Japanese imperialism, by which the imperialists are trying to add strength to their agreement.

The recent "extraordinary" session of the Council of the League of Nations, under the chairmanship of Briand "himself", turned out to be a more than candid bargaining over the 450 millions of the Chinese nation.

Before the eyes of the whole world, Japanese imperialism has attacked Manchuria. Japanese imperialism bombards cities, occupies foreign territory, and uses freely all the well-tried means of imperialistic diplomacy — lies, forgeries, and all sorts of provocation, in order to extend the zone of occupation. In the capitalistic world and in the League of Nations all this is considered "legal" and "just". And the slightest attempt to impede this broad-daylight robbery is immediately declared to be "illegal" and "an infringement of the treaties," etc., by the Tokyo Government, with the complete concurrence of the League of Nations. Out-

rage

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rage upon the Chinese nation — that is law in the eyes of the capitalistic diplomacy and the League of Nations! And struggle against the imperialistic bullies is in their "opinion" illegal!

That is how history is made at Geneva.

It is just owing to the support by the League of Nations that Japanese imperialism was able so confidently to continue the military occupation of Manchuria, begun on September 18. It is just owing to the support of the League of Nations that Japanese imperialism was able within a comparatively brief space of time to carry out the carefully elaborated plan of the seizure of Manchuria.

The principal economic commanding heights which already previously had been occupied by Japanese capitalism, the principal towns, the strategical points, and the Chinese railways found themselves in the hands of Japan. Japan comports itself in Manchuria as in a conquered colony, as in Korea, or on the island of Formosa. Japan's plans of conquest pursue more distant aims — Inner Mongolia, where dummies of Japanese imperialism have already created a so-called "independent" government. On the money of Japanese imperialism, and under the menace of its bayonets, a "movement for independence" has been organized throughout the whole of Manchuria.

The Japanese bourgeoisie has secured the fullest support of French imperialism. It suffices to observe the French bourgeois press, and the comportment of the Paris diplomats, more especially of Briand at the recent session

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session of the Council of the League of Nations, to be perfectly clear on this point. Japan has also secured a certain support on the part of English imperialism. But the United States, which has large interests in Manchuria, cannot and will not acquiesce in that the position of its Japanese rival in China shall be rendered stronger. That is why this struggle for Manchuria has by no means come to an end. As a matter of fact, we can note today that it has undoubtedly grown sharper.

This is just what induces Japanese imperialism to make greatest haste in its efforts to render secure the acquisitions made in Manchuria in the course of the last month. By cutting up Manchuria into dozens of "independent" states, Japanese imperialism has practically already separated Manchuria from China. Japanese imperialism is building with feverish haste railroads, more particularly it pushes the completion of the Kirin-Hoiren railway which latter is to become a second southern-Manchurian railway, with the difference that it does not go from south to north, but that it passes through the newly occupied districts from east to west. The Kirin-Hoiren railway is a new stronghold of Japanese imperialism in Manchuria. Within its sphere of action there are some of the most important districts of Manchuria, and more especially the valley of the Tsungari river, which is of tremendous strategical importance.

Manchuria has been selected by Japanese imperialism as a most important economic base, and as an abundant source of colonial wealth. Through furiously exploiting Manchuria, Japanese capitalism hopes to alle-

viate

-5-

viate the crisis that strangles it. And lastly, Manchuria is a most important strategical place d'armes. The fact of Japan's gaining a foothold on that place d'armes complicates and sharpens the struggle which the imperialists conduct between themselves for supremacy in the Pacific, and for the principal market of the Pacific, namely, China.

American imperialism has formulated its attitude to this event: at Washington it has been intimated that the Government of the United States takes a negative view of this matter. But at Washington they have at the same time taken into consideration the unmistakable fact that Japanese imperialism has already gained a foothold in Manchuria, and that therefore to oust it from there would in the prevailing circumstances not be easy. The struggle for Manchuria, which is going on for more than 30 years, assumes now a chronic character. Apart from this, if it is borne in mind that there are several points of difference within the American bourgeoisie in regard to the attitude to be taken towards Japan, that, further, there are internal political difficulties of American imperialism, that the question of relations with France is not quite clear, and that an Anglo-Japanese rapprochement is to be apprehended — it becomes perfectly clear why American diplomacy observes a certain restraint and a certain circumspection in regard to the counter-measures which it is adopting against the military occupation of Manchuria.

This line of conduct is on the whole adhered to by American diplomacy even now. This can be gathered from

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from the fact that the Government of the United States considers it necessary to adopt its second set of measures under the cover of the League of Nations, to reckon with which Washington had formerly never shown any inclination.

What, then, is the meaning of the Government of the United States applying to the League of Nations? The meaning of it is, first of all, that the imperialism of the United States endeavors to split that imperialistic bloc which was created at the previous session of the Council of the League. For this purpose, the United States attempts to take advantage, first of all, of the fact that Japanese imperialism, not confining itself to the seizure of Manchuria, endeavors to extend the zone of occupation to interior China. This interferes with the interests of the original imperialistic Powers. Secondly, the United States endeavors to take advantage of the fear of the imperialists that the anti-Japanese movement may convert itself into an anti-imperialistic movement in a general way. The Government of the United States puts its stake on the sharpening of the conflicts of interests between Japan, and the imperialistic powers supporting it.

It is no mere coincidence that the application of the United States to the League of Nations has taken place just now on the eve of the visit of the French Prime Minister, Laval, to Washington, and of the attempts of the English capitalists to stabilize their financial system with the aid of new loans -- American loans principally.

The

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 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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The attempts at recovering the financial position of Great Britain, and the attainment of the political aims of French imperialism in Europe, are directly bound up with what will be the outcome of the Franco-American negotiations. In the light of that step taken by the United States, and its "victory" at the Geneva session — to wit, the invitation, extended to America, to participate in the discussion of the Manchurian problem, notwithstanding Japan's resistance — acquires the character of a far-reaching political maneuver. The French and the English imperialists have very well understood that it is not in their interest to create difficulties in the way of the impending negotiations with Washington, even before they have ever begun.

The invitation extended to the United States has not brought any changes into the array of the imperialistic forces which mapped out itself in the first days of the occupation of Manchuria. The finding of the Council only bears testimony to the sharpening of the imperialistic conflict of interests, which inevitably leads to the result that the Japanese-Chinese conflict will become a Japanese-American conflict. The finding of the council of the League of Nations further means that world imperialism at the same time nevertheless attempts, under the pressure of circumstances, to concord the division of China with the interests of American imperialism, but not in accordance with the latter's plan.

In connection with the latest events, the American press begins to use a more definite language.

The

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The SHANGHAI EVENING POST, which is the mouth-piece of the views of the American imperialism, expresses itself to the effect that "America not only recognizes its responsibility for the fulfilment of the obligation which it has taken upon itself by this agreement (the agreement between Japan and the United States, in 1908, concerning the territorial "integrity" of China, is meant here. Editorial note.), but it must also take into consideration the necessity of protecting American commercial interests in Manchuria. On the ground of the above-mentioned agreement, as well as for the sake of its own commercial tasks, America cannot but take an interest in the events in Manchuria."

The New York EVENING POST uses language still more to the point: "Are we ready for the struggle?", asks this newspaper.

When American imperialists speak of the territorial "integrity" of China, they mean the sole rule of American capital in China. This is the gist of the attitude of the United States in the Manchurian question.

Whatsoever disguise American imperialism may choose, whatsoever pretext and evasive explanations it may use for hiding its aims, the undoubted fact remains that the imperialists, including the American ones, are making furious preparations for a new struggle for the redivision of the world, in which redivision Manchuria constitutes only one of many other objects.

The Kuomintang renders what aid it can to the imperialists. Its "struggle against imperialism"

takes

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takes solely the shape of opening fire at anti-Japanese demonstrations, of dispersing anti-Japanese meetings, and of attempts at strangling the anti-militaristic movement. The diplomat, Shek, from the ranks of the Kuomintang, has made haste to extol these "heroic deeds" of Chiang Kai-shek as a specimen of the "conscientious attitude" of the Kuomintang to the interests of the imperialists. In the League of Nations the Kuomintang also serves the aims of the imperialists. The Nanking Government has already stated that it is prepared to accept any decision on the part of the League of Nations, so long as it guarantees the rule of the bourgeois-and-squire counter-revolutionary clique in the Kuomintang.

The Canton Government which only quite recently has drowned in blood an anti-Japanese demonstration in China, rivals with Nanking in the struggle against the anti-militaristic and anti-feudal Soviet revolution; the generals' groups in the north and the Kuomintang are in terrible fear of an action on the part of the masses of toilers against the imperialistic oppressors. Chiang-Kai-shek & Co. know perfectly well that the struggle against Japanese imperialism and against colonial exploitation will first of all be turned against the Kuomintang. Only the Chinese Communist Party carries on persistent and relentless struggle against the imperialists and their agents impersonated by the Kuomintang and the generals' cliques.

The Manchurian knot tightens. The imperialistic conflicts of interest become ever sharper. The struggle in China is the forerunner of still more sinister events.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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events. But whatsoever the outcome of the dispute between the imperialists over the Manchurian booty may be, there can be no doubt that it will be an important stage in the preparations for a new imperialistic war, for the purpose of a re-partitioning of the world.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

ENCLOSURE NO. 6 TO DESPATCH NO. 0178 OF OCT 30 1931
FROM THE LEGATION AT RIGA, LATVIA.

SOURCE: Moscow KRASNAIA ZVEZDA,
No. 280,
October 19, 1931.
Page 1.

THE KNOT IN THE PACIFIC IS TIGHTENING.

(Translation of leading
editorial.)

The aggressive activities of Japanese imperialism in Southern Manchuria cannot be regarded without reference to the attitude of the other great imperialistic Powers. In this respect the Geneva negotiations are very instructive since, in the first place, they have disclosed the apprehension and the fear with which the European imperialists view the strengthening of the Japanese positions, and secondly, because they show the jealous attitude of the United States toward the events in Manchuria. American imperialism (and this is proved by such facts as Stimson's step, the memorandum to the League of Nations, the despatch of an "observing" commission to Manchuria, and lastly, the invitation to the United States to participate in the discussion of the Japanese-Chinese conflict at the League of Nations) attempts to take advantage of the Japanese policies to stimulate its own policies into greater activity.

American imperialism does not mean to permit its old rival in the Pacific to strengthen his position there. If Japanese imperialism regards China as its natural economic base ("the geographical and historical mission

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mission of Japan is to spread [literally: develop] on the Asiatic continent at any cost whatsoever." Kairo Sato), and as a territory that is the first to be colonized by Japan, American imperialism in its turn regards China as the most important market for American commercial expansion, and for American capital investment.

It is well known that after activizing its policy in respect of Nanking, the United States began to extend its tentacles towards the north. Japanese imperialism watched with alarm the negotiations which Chang Hsueh-lian carried on with America for the grant of a loan of 30 million dollars for the construction of a sea-port in Huludao (this port is situated on the Gulf of Liao-Tung, and is connected with the whole railway network of Manchuria.) The construction of the port at Huludao threatened to undermine the importance of Dairen as a sea-port through which all the goods traffic of Southern Manchuria is passing, and, with the transport conditions in the Tientsin district growing worse, the same would be the case also in the North of China.* Following this, there were attempts on the part of the United States to obtain a number of concessions in Manchuria for the production of gold. A certain unrest was caused in Japan also by the position taken by the United States at the time of the conflict on the Chinese Eastern Railway. The American proposals concerning

* This seems to be the meaning of this passage which is not very comprehensible in the Russian text. Translator's note.

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cerning the "internationalization" of the said railway were regarded by the ruling circles in Japan as threatening with a still deeper penetration of America into the markets of Northern Manchuria. That is why Japanese imperialism regarded its principal rival in the Far East with apprehension. Under the blows of the economic crisis, the economic conflicts of interest between Japan and the United States were laid bare to the fullest extent. Japan came out of the exceedingly sharp economic crisis in 1928/29 above all, and chiefly, thanks to the tremendous American investments. The world economic crisis which started in the United States, rendered the situation still more acute. The abolition of the embargo on gold, and the return of the Yen to the gold standard, caused an increased fall in prices, and proved a severe shock to the leading industrial branches. The diminishing of production in the United States could not but come as a blow to Japan which latter exports to the United States raw materials and half-finished articles; 95 per cent of the raw silk production, which constitutes 50 per cent of the total of the Japanese exports, goes to the United States. In its turn, Japan cannot do without America, which latter supplies Japan with coal, iron, and oil. The fact that it so much depends on American imperialism, has proved one of the principal incentives for Japan to attempt to extend its positions in the Chinese markets.

It is very characteristic that after the United States had taken diplomatic action, Japanese imperial-

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ism set to carrying out naval maneuvers at the naval base in Iokosuka. The purpose of the maneuvers - "to beat off an aerial attack upon the naval base from the direction of the Hawaii and the Philippine Islands" - shows that the Japanese ruling circles had the intention of demonstrating their readiness for action just in the line of the principal American strategical direction. The Philippines and the Hawaiian Islands are the fortified bases not only of the Pacific fleet of the United States, but also of its air forces.

The Japanese-American conflicts of interest in the Far East are entangled with the interests of other imperialistic powers. English imperialism too has interests of its own in the Far East, and pursues a policy that aims at securing English supremacy in the Chinese markets. While America is fortifying the Philippines and Hawaiian Islands, England is carrying on grandiose construction work at the Singapore naval base, and increases at the same time the military power of Hongkong. Hence the irreconcilable conflict of interests between all three imperialistic powers in the Pacific - Japan, the United States, and England. That is why the sharpening of the Japanese-American conflict of interests is bound to affect also England, the conflict of interest between England and the United States remaining the principal conflict in the camp of international imperialism.

Japanese

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Japanese imperialism is decidedly opposed to America's interference in the conflict. Japan "cannot approve the fact that the United State has been invited because it [the invitation?] is limited only to participation in the discussion of questions concerning the Far East."* The Japanese representatives in the Council of the League of Nations, Iosi-zava (in conformity with instructions received from Tokyo) objected categorically to the United States being invited. In Japan there has been published an interview with the representative of the Ministry for War, in which it is stated:

The United States is going too far in trying, jointly with the Council of the League of Nations, to interfere in the Manchurian problem. As soon as the United States will touch upon the Chin-chow question, we shall in answer refer to the action of the United States in Nicaragua. The point of view of the Japanese authorities is inflexible: no third party is to interfere in the Manchurian question.

An analogous statement was made also by the Minister for War, Minami, himself. The Japanese press reacts nervously to the Geneva decisions.

Thus, Japanese imperialism does not want to let go the prey once seized. For Japanese imperialism Manchuria is not only a source of raw materials, but also a most important strategical place d'armes. American imperialism in its turn, in view of the aggravation of the economic crisis and the strenuous efforts to find ways and means for "saving European capitalism," makes

* The Russian text of this passage is not quite comprehensible. Translator's note.

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 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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makes an appearance at Geneva, first, in order to use for its own ends the conflicts of interest between the European imperialists; secondly, in order to shift the burden of kicking Japan out of China, and curbing her appetites, on to the shoulders of the other imperialists; and thirdly, in order to have its hands free in view of the impending negotiations with French imperialism about the new plan of "financial sanitation."

By way of accompaniment to this action, American imperialism is busy pumping gold out of Japan, and speculating upon the fears of the European imperialists of a further intensification of the anti-Japanese movement in China. The European imperialists are afraid lest the broad national mass movement against Japan's predatory actions develop into a general anti-imperialistic movement.

The Pacific knot tightens more and more. The conflicts of interest in the camp of international imperialism are disclosed more and more. The struggle for the Manchurian booty is not only the beginning of the definite and final dividing-up of China, but it is also the rehearsal of the new grapple over the repartitioning of the world. The Pacific problem continues to remain one of the permanent sources of the menace of a new war.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Lima, November 1, 1931.

No. 1188

NOV 13 31

DIVISION OF
 LATIN AMERICAN AFFAIRS
 NOV 16 1931
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 NOV 14 1931
 Department of State

DISTRIBUTION - CHECK Yes No

To the Field ☐

In U. S. ☐

The Honorable
 The Secretary of State,
 Washington.

S i r:

I have the honor to refer to the Department's telegraphic instructions No. 60 of October 31st, 4 p.m., regarding the Manchurian situation and an inquiry from the Peruvian Minister for Foreign Affairs as to what action our Government would take in consequence of the Resolution of the Council of the League of Nations of October 24th. I beg also to refer to my despatch No. 1174 of October 29th.

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FK 793.94/2666

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
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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I thank the Department for the instructions it has
given me and I have given the substance thereof
confidentially to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Respectfully yours,



Fred Morris Dearing.

FMD-hkl

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




EMBASSY OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Lima, November 2, 1931.

No. 1191

NOV 13 31



793-24

X

DISTRIBUTION - CHECK Yes No
 To the President ☐
 In U. S. A. ☐

FK 793.94/2667

The Honorable
 The Secretary of State,
 Washington.

S i r:

I have the honor to refer the Department to my despatch No. 1188 of November 1, 1931, regarding the Manchurian situation, and beg to enclose here-
 1/ with a clipping from EL COMERCIO of October 31, containing the communiqué issued by the Chinese Legation.

The communiqué states that the Chinese Government has sent a statement, the summary of which is as follows:

The League

NOV 17 1931

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- 2 -

The League of Nations rejected the Japanese proposals, ratifying the first proposal of the Council, notwithstanding Japan's tenacious opposition. Such an attitude proves China's thesis of justice requesting that Japan withdraw its troops from Chinese territory and reveals the firmness of other nations to take up the cudgels for just and noble causes. In the above mentioned communiqué the following proposals are made:

That Japanese troops should be retired prior to November 16, 1931;

There should be appointed an investigating committee or a similar provisional Chinese-Japanese committee.

China trusts that these measures be carried out as early as possible and is certain that the League will continue to lend its aid. The Chinese people await justice and the maintenance of its rights. The Government of China anticipates Japanese compliance with respect for world opinion and the decisions of the League, withdrawing its troops from Chinese territory prior to November 16th and thereby making it easier to re-establish friendly relations between the people of China and Japan. Only by these means can a permanent and effective peace be established in the Far East.

Respectfully yours,


Fred Morris Dearing

AAG/ald
Enclosure:

1/ Clipping from
EL COMERCIO, Oct. 31, 1931.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure #1 to Embassy's Despatch No. 1191, Nov. 2, 1931.

American Embassy
Lima, Peru
October 31, 1931.

From EL COMERCIO (Lima), October 31, 1931.

Subject: The Manchurian situation.

Official communiqué from the Chinese Legation
regarding the action taken by the League of Nations
in the Manchurian situation. (See Embassy's Despatch
No. 1174, October 29, 1931.)

Comunicado oficial de la legación china

La legación china ha recibido de su gobierno la siguiente declaración:

«El consejo de la Liga de Naciones resolvió el 24 del presente rechazar las propuestas del Japón, ratificando al mismo tiempo la propuesta original del consejo. Aunque el Japón se opuso tenazmente, la misma fue aprobada por los demás miembros del consejo, esto es por representantes de Inglaterra, Francia, Alemania, Italia, Perú, Irlanda, Guatemala, Yugoslavia, Noruega, Panamá, Polonia, y España. Doce naciones que junto con la China han apoyado unánimemente la resolución original del consejo.

Esta actitud de la Liga demuestra incontrovertiblemente, no sólo el hecho de que la tesis China, en el sentido de que el Japón debe retirar sus tropas de su territorio, está de acuerdo con los más altos principios de justicia y derechos internacionales, sino que revela la serenidad y firmeza con que las naciones del mundo se banderizan con las causas justas y nobles.

De acuerdo con la resolución del consejo de la Liga, las tropas japonesas deben ser retiradas antes del 16 de noviembre. Esto demuestra claramente que la Liga se opone, a que cualquier país trate de resolver disputas internacionales por medio de la fuerza.

La misma resolución propuso también que, después del retiro de las tropas japonesas, se formara una comisión investigadora, o una organización similar transitoria chino-japonesa. Todo esto evidencia que la Liga está efectivamente empeñada en mantener la paz mundial.


El gobierno nacional chino, sinceramente confía que la resolución adoptada por la Liga se lleve a la práctica a la brevedad posible; y está seguro, asimismo, de que la Liga continuará en su vigoroso empeño hasta conseguir la realización de sus altos propósitos.

El pueblo chino, pacientemente y dentro de la ley, ha esperado y espera que se le haga justicia y que sus derechos no sean conculcados.

El gobierno nacional chino, por su parte, abriga la seguridad de que el Japón no podrá menos que respetar la opinión del mundo y las decisiones de la Liga, retirando por lo mismo sus tropas de nuestro territorio, antes del 16 de noviembre, facilitando de este modo la solución de los problemas que tienden a restablecer las relaciones amistosas entre los pueblos de la China y el Japón. Sólo así podrán establecerse las bases de una paz permanente y efectiva en el Lejano Oriente.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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China, November 2, 1931.

No. 1191

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INFORMATION COPY

C.C. 793.94/2667

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer the Department to my despatch No. 1168 of November 1, 1931, regarding the Manchurian situation, and beg to enclose herewith a clipping from EL COMERCIO of October 31, containing the communiqué issued by the Chinese Legation.

The communiqué states that the Chinese Government has sent a statement, the summary of which is as follows:

The League

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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The League of Nations rejected the Japanese proposals, ratifying the first proposal of the Council, notwithstanding Japan's tenacious opposition. Such an attitude proves China's thesis of justice requesting that Japan withdraw its troops from Chinese territory and reveals the firmness of other nations to take up the cudgels for just and noble causes. In the above mentioned communiqué the following proposals are made:

That Japanese troops should be retired prior to November 16, 1931;

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Respectfully yours,

Fred Morris Learning

LMG/ald
 Enclosure:

1/ Clipping from
 EL 10000010, Oct. 31, 1931.

A true copy of
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 inal *all*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75





LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Ottawa, Canada.

November 10, 1931.

No. 577.

NOV 13 31



FK 795.94/2668

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

Sir:

1/

With reference to the situation in Manchuria,
I have the honor to transmit herewith the text, as
reported in the press, of an official statement issued
last evening by Mr. I. Tokugawa, Japanese Minister at
Ottawa.

The statement is intended to prove that the Chinese
are entirely responsible for the recent clashes between
Chinese and Japanese troops in Northern Manchuria.

Respectfully yours,

Harford MacNider
Harford MacNider.

Enclosure:

1. From Ottawa JOURNAL,
Nov. 10, 1931.

820.02
JCHB/EMS

FILED

NOV 18 1931

1 491

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

OTTAWA JOURNAL Tuesday, November 10th. 1931.

Enclosure No. 1 to
despatch No. 577 of
November 10, 1931, from
the Legation at Ottawa.

Says Japanese Did Everything Avoid Encounter

Hon. I. Tokugawa Issues
Statement From Lega-
tion Here on Latest
Manchurian Develop-
ments.

Claiming that the Japanese army had done everything in its power to avoid a clash with the Chinese forces under General Mah in Manchuria, and placing responsibility for hostilities on the shoulders of the Chinese provincial army, Hon. Iyemasa Tokugawa, Japanese Minister to Canada, last night issued an official statement from the Japanese Legation here.

The position of the Japanese Government is, according to the document, that the Chinese violated their agreement to withdraw their troops from the destroyed bridge over the Nonni river on November 4, and when railway company engineers arrived, under the protection of a Japanese force, to make repairs to this structure, they were fired on by the Chinese soldiers. This act precipitated the opening engagement.

Official Statement.

Hon. Mr. Tokugawa's statement follows:

"Conflicting reports are current with regard to the recent actions of Japanese troops in North Manchuria.

"In the middle of October, the army of the province of Heilungkiang destroyed a bridge over the Nonni river of the Taonan Angangchi railway (a tributary line for the South Manchuria railway, originally constructed by the South Manchuria Railway Company by contract). The report that the Japanese army had destroyed the bridge with bombs is without foundation.

"At that time a party of engineers of the Taonan-Angangchi Railway was despatched with the consent of the Heilungkiang Government, but was fired upon by the Provincial Army and was prevented from repairing the bridge.

"This would deprive the Taonan-Angangchi Railway of the traffic for seasonal marketing of local produce and would entail a considerable loss to the South Manchuria Railway. On that ground, the Japanese consul at Tsitsihar repeatedly asked the Heilungkiang authorities for the repair of the bridge. The Heilungkiang authorities assumed an evasive attitude and no progress was in sight.

"Thereupon, the Taonan-Angangchi Railway authorities having decided to take the repairs of the bridge in hand, with the aid of the South Manchuria Railway, and to commence the work on November 4, requested the Japanese army for protection.

"The request of Japanese army headquarters and the Japanese consul at Tsitsihar to cause the Chinese troops stationed along the north bank of the Nonni river to retire to a line of 10 kilometres from the river was agreed to by the Heilungkiang authorities.

Surprise Attack.

"When, however, a small Japanese detachment arrived on the scene on November 4, not only had the Chinese troops remained on the bank of the river, but attacked the Japanese detachment by surprise. The latter was forced to open fire, and with small reinforcements drove the Chinese troops northward on November 6.

"From the above, it will be seen that the Japanese army had done everything in its power to avoid encounter, and that its action that followed was caused entirely by the conduct of the local Chinese troops. The commander of the Japanese army in Manchuria received instructions on November 6 to avoid further development, and the troops which were in readiness for reinforcement are at a standstill on their way."

1 492
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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Charge Department
OR

Charge to

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793-94
AMEMBASSY

London (England)

328 URGENT

Confidential. To Dawes from Stimson.

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

November 11, 1931.

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

It should be noted that this communication is being communicated to you.

1. The new memorandum from Tokyo, copy of which was cabled in my 323 of November 10, 5 p.m. arrived after the preparation of my 326 of November 10 and seems to me to materially affect and modify the situation as outlined to you in that cable. On its face it is a substantial compliance with the position which this Government has hitherto taken. The Japanese now say expressly that they have no intention of insisting on the final adjustment of the whole series of their controversies with China as a condition precedent to the withdrawal of their troops to the railway zone. They further say that the "fundamental principles" which they desire to discuss with China prior to withdrawal are *unquote* "no more than those that are generally observed in practice in dealings of organized peoples with one another", *unquote* and they describe them in a way which seems effectually to exclude an attempt on their part to force a settlement of issues not germane to withdrawal, such as the long standing issues of the treaties of 1915 and other old treaties. If the statements of this memorandum can be applied to the settlement of this situation next week in

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

FK
793.94/2668A

1 1493

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

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NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Washington,

-2-

the plain sense which the language of the memorandum means,
we should be perfectly satisfied and our position under the
peace treaties will be ~~limited~~ ^{vindicated}. *Nos*

2. I do not believe, however, that the solution will be so
easy, because Yoshizawa took a different position at Geneva.
There he produced five points, which he said were insisted upon
by Japan as preliminary to the withdrawal of her troops. They
were as follows:

Quote "One. Mutual repudiation of aggressive policy and conduct.

Two. Respect for China's territorial integrity.

Two Three. Complete suppression of all organized movements
interfering with freedom of trade and stirring up international
hatred.

Four. Effective protection throughout Manchuria of all
peaceful pursuits undertaken by Japanese subjects.

Five. Respect for treaty rights of Japan in Manchuria." *Unquote*

In the long discussions before the Council, it was agreed that
the first four points were germane to withdrawal, and no ob-
jection was made by Briand or the others, but when pressed as
to the fifth point, Japan insisted that it included a ratifica-
tion of the old treaties, and our position in the memorandum of
November 5 was taken in accordance with the issue thus presented

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)⁴
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
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1-128
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 PLAIN

Department of State

- 3 -

Washington,

793.94/351A
 351B
 at Geneva. I fear that in spite of the plain language of her memorandum to me, you will find Japan renewing this contention in some form or other at Paris. China has protested ever since 1915 that these treaties were obtained by duress and must be canceled. Japan has on the contrary contended that these treaties, having been formally executed, could not be so invalidated. The United States in 1915 went on formal record to both the Japanese and the Chinese Governments to the effect that it could not recognize any treaties if and in so far as they impaired rights under the Open Door and the integrity of China principles, and this reservation was renewed in 1922 at the Washington Conference by Secretary Hughes. (See MacMurray's TREATIES, page 1236.)

3. Historically, Japan was forced by the public opinion of the world in 1922 to recede from the 1915 treaties so far as they affected Shantung and to evacuate that province. She is now faced with a far better organized world opinion against her on this same issue as to the recent occupations in Manchuria. The Pact of Paris and the Nine Power Pact, had they then been in effect, would have stood probably as barriers to such conduct as that on the part of Japan in 1915 which secured the 1915 treaties. In addition to this, they are actual barriers to a present day

Enciphered by attempt to validate those treaties by force. The problem now is to find a method of restoring peace and of securing the protection of Japan's equitable rights in Manchuria without on the one hand

Index Bu.—No. 60.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1955

1 1495

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
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Department of State

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1-138
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-4-

recognizing and validating a claim which the conscience of the world has rejected hitherto, and in the second place sanctioning a present violation of the Kellogg Pact and Nine Power Pact. The complexities of this position make it evident that a solution can only be found by a direct ~~negotiation~~ ^{peaceful pacific} negotiation and agreement between the two powers involved. H-5

4. In 1922 at the Washington Conference the world faced a very similar ^{practical} problem respecting the evacuation of Shantung. After prolonged difficulties for several years, China and Japan were induced to negotiate and settle the Shantung incident by the use of the following devices. First, it was agreed to discuss the situation solely from the point of view of the de facto situation and equity rather than the point of view of strict interpretation of legal rights. Second, Mr. Hughes and Mr. Balfour, or their representatives, were invited to sit as neutral observers during the negotiations. I have already suggested this precedent to Briand, stating that I did not wish the suggestion, however, to appear to emanate from the American Government. I think you should have this precedent very much in mind. Dooman and/or Atherton can probably give you a full history. H-5
793.94/2049

5. Apart from these old troublesome questions arising out
Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____.

1496

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) *
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

- 5 -

of the coup of 1915, I feel that we can well afford to be patient and sympathetic to Japan's desire for a settlement which will protect her legitimate interests and nationals in Manchuria. We feel that she has unquestionably been subjected to much harassment and her nationals to much annoyance in Manchuria and that almost any fair solution which will on the one hand preserve the guarantees of the Open Door, the Nine Power Treaty and law and order in that locality, and on the other hand vindicate the peace treaties, should be welcome.

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.-No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1959 1-126

1 1497

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Washington,

- 6 -

6. I believe it would be a definite step in advance if Japan and China could at once be brought into negotiations of some character with or without the presence of neutral observers. Japan from the beginning has urged direct negotiations. China has consented to negotiations relating to the safety of Japanese lives and property during evacuation and has already appointed Chinese negotiators. It seems to us that negotiations might be at once begun, the purpose of which would be specifically to arrange for the safety of Japanese lives and property during evacuation and thereafter, but that it should be left for the negotiators to decide what subjects were pertinent to this object^{IVE.} If during the course of these negotiations Japan should claim that the recognition by China of any particular treaty provision was essential to this immediate object of assuring safety of Japanese lives and property, it could then be decided by the negotiators whether or not this was so, and in case China objected to any such provision as not germane to the object of that negotiation, that provision might be referred to another set of negotiators whose determination should not

a7.R

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) *
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NAHS, Date 12-18-75

793.94
 November 13 1931.

To the American Consul,
 Geneva, Switzerland.

The Secretary of State transmits herewith
 for the information of the Consulate, a copy of
 an instruction to Paris ^{793.94/2668C} enclosing a summary of
 information in regard to conditions in Manchuria.
 This information is being sent to Paris in order
 that it may be made available to Sir Eric Drummond,
 who, it is presumed, will be there during the forth-
 coming session of the Council.

793.94/2668B

Enclosures:
 Copy of Department's
 instruction to Paris,
 with enclosure thereto.

793.94/

WE:SR:MLD
 11-12-31.

CR
 Nov. 17, 1931.



WRCjr.

WCV
 PM

FE
 SKT

1 1495
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)*
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

November 13, 1931.

CONFIDENTIAL - STAFF USE ONLY.

793.94
No. 829.

Williamson S. Howell, Jr., Esquire,
American Chargé d'Affaires ad interim,
Paris.

Sir:

There is enclosed herewith a summary of information in regard to conditions in Manchuria, based on reports coming from China. The Department desires that you make this information available to Sir Eric Drummond for discreet and confidential use without disclosure of source. Heretofore similar information has been sent to the American Consul at Geneva for communication to Sir Eric.

Should Sir Eric have left Paris when this instruction is received, the information summary should be forwarded to Geneva for delivery to him. A copy of this instruction is being sent to the Consul in Geneva.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

W. R. Castle, Jr.

Enclosure:
Summary in duplicate.

793.94/

FE:JEJ:EMU
WE:SR:MLO
11-12/31

Nov. 13, 1931.

FK 793.94/26630



SUMMARY OF INFORMATION IN REGARD TO
CONDITIONS IN MANCHURIA.

1. On October 31, 1931, the Chinese electric light plant at Antung remained closed for military reasons, according to the Japanese military authorities. On November 2, 1931, the Japanese military closed the Chinese electric light plant at Changchun.

2. The Nonni River bridge affair began on or about October 15 when General Chang Hai-peng of Taonanfu, with supplies furnished by the Japanese military, started his cavalry force of about 5000 northward toward Tsitsihar. The troops under the control of the Chinese authorities at Tsitsihar retreated along the railway toward that place, destroying the small bridges approaching the main bridge across the Nonni River, and one span of that bridge. On October 19, General Ma Chang-shan, reported to have been appointed Acting Chairman of Heilungkiang Province by the Nanking Government and by Chang Hsueh-liang, assumed charge of the Chinese troops at Tsitsihar, whereupon the troops of General Chang Hai-peng ceased their march northward and encamped on the Taonanfu side of the Nonni River with General Ma's troops on the other side. This was the situation on November 2, 1931 when General Honjo issued an ultimatum to both sides to withdraw ten kilometers from the Nonni River to prevent interference with Japanese repair gangs who were to start work on the following day to repair the bridges. Refusal to comply with this ultimatum was to be considered as a hostile act which would result in the use of Japanese troops.

On

- 2 -

On November 3 and November 4, Japanese troops crossed the Nonni River, and an engagement ensued, Japanese airplanes participating, between these troops and those of General Ma Chang-shan which resulted in casualties on both sides. By November 5, the Japanese forces withdrew on the Taoanfu side of the Nonni River, while the forces of General Ma withdrew some distance further from that river toward Tsitsihar.

On the evening of November 6, the troops of General Ma Chang-shan were attacked by the troops of General Chang Hai-peng from Taoanfu and forced to retreat to another line of defense which is near the Chinese Eastern Railway, where his troops were still reported on November 7 to be entrenched. Japanese contingents were reported to be acting in concert with General Chang's troops.

According to reports, the engagement between the Japanese and Chinese troops resulted from a misunderstanding in regard to the ten kilometer zone, the Japanese alleging that the zone began from the first bridge beyond the main bridge, while the Chinese thought it began from the main bridge itself.

On November 8 the Japanese were reported to be repairing the bridges, which work will require about two weeks time.

3. On November 8, 1931, the Local Peace Maintenance Committee at Mukden issued a proclamation to the effect that it was functioning as the provincial government during this transitional period; that it does not concern itself with either past or future questions; and that it has no connection with the Nanking Government or Chang Hsueh-liang.

November 10, 1931.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



(NOT FOR THE PRESS)
(FOR DEPARTMENTAL USE ONLY)

Department of State
Division of Current Information

MEMORANDUM OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE, THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 5, 1931

793.94/2669
At the press conference this morning Secretary Stimson announced the release of a speech which will be delivered by Dr. McClure, Assistant Chief of the Treaty Division, on Friday, on the "Promotion of International Trade Through Treaties."

The Secretary also announced the release of an unconfirmed report that the Reverend J. W. Vinson was killed by Chinese bandits in the Province of Kiangsu.

SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT

Asked if any reports had been received concerning the fighting around the Nonni River bridge in Manchuria, the Secretary said that the press reports had not been confirmed by official despatches. A correspondent observed that the press reports appeared to be unanimous on the fight and in complete agreement as to the details and asked if that made the Manchurian situation more serious. Mr. Stimson replied that he did not desire to discuss the Manchurian situation today for publication. FOR BACKGROUND, he said the correspondents should know that our policy toward the conflict is unchanged. Asked what our policy is, the Secretary said it had been stated publicly many times and that he would not repeat it today. Our policy was made public a few weeks ago and it is to support consistently through diplomatic channels the other nations who are trying to achieve the objective of preventing war and supporting peace in Manchuria. In view of the increasingly serious situation, a correspondent asked if we are contemplating or have made the remotest change in our policy. Mr. Stimson replied that this question comes within

793.94/2669

-2-

his statement that he did not desire to discuss the Manchurian situation today for publication. A correspondent observed that M. Briand appears to be taking a slightly different position from the one he previously assumed and asked if we are sympathetic with that move. He was informed in reply that we have received no notice that he was assuming a different position. Asked then if M. Briand had called the attention of the Japanese to the fact that the Chinese are carrying out their part of the agreement, the Secretary again repeated that he did not desire to talk about the Manchurian situation today for publication. A correspondent asked if the Department had received any information from Consul General George C. Hanson, or any other observer in Manchuria about the alleged movements of Russian troops. In reply, the Secretary said that since yesterday's press conference he had received confirmation from Mr. Hanson that there were no Japanese troops in Tsitsihar. Asked if Mr. Hanson left Tsitsihar on Sunday, the Secretary said he did not know exactly when he left. A correspondent asked if Mr. Hanson had furnished any further information regarding the alleged massing of Russian troops at the border. Mr. Stimson replied in the negative. Referring to a recent statement that the Department was investigating into the Russian aspect of the situation, a correspondent asked if that investigation had gone any further. The Secretary replied in the negative. A correspondent observed that in one of the newspapers this morning there is a letter from a Mr. Fisher in Moscow, in which that gentleman stated with a great deal of assurance that the Soviet Government would like very much to cooperate with the United States but that they felt rather timid about doing so on account of the lack of enthusiasm which they claim to have found in Washington. Mr. Stimson, in

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone.

TOKIO

Dated November 14, 1931

FROM

Rec'd 4:29 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1111
DIVISION OF



217, November 14, 11 a. m.

Your 286, November 13, 11 a. m.

I have been careful not to make any statement that
could be construed as indicating an expression of my
attitude or that of my Government in regard to
new Japanese position.

FORBES

GW

HPD

EK 793.94/2670

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NOV 23 1931

793.94

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 14, 1931

Rec'd 11:58 a. m.

743 47
Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 14 1931
Department of State

DOUBLE PRIORITY.

936, November 14, 2 p. m.

Marshall Chang Hsueh Liang has just received a telegram from General Ma to the effect that yesterday afternoon General Honjo amended his ultimatum of the previous day and now demands to occupy the railway station of Tsitsihar itself. Ma replied that there must be some mistake and that in any event he had to refer the matter to his superiors. The young Marshal has sent the message to Nanking for immediate communication to the League of Nations and requests me to inform the Department.

Repeated to Nanking.

FOR THE MINISTER

ENGERT

RR

HPD

FK 793.94/2671

FILED
NOV 15 1931

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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FROM

PLAIN

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 14, 1931

793-44
Secretary of State,
Washington.

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Rec'd 11:58 a.m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

NOV 14 1931

Department of State

932, November 14, 8 a. m.

Reuter reports from Harbin, thirteenth:

"According to Chinese reports here Japanese have
(concentrated?)
received information and have ~~concentrated~~ eight kilometers
south of Nonni River. It is expected here that general
advance on their part will commence as soon as instruc-
tions received from Tokio.

It is understood that Japanese are anxious to ascertain
what would be Soviet reaction if they should occupy
Tsitsihar. It is alleged that Japanese have received
information that if Russians should cross frontier they
would come via Mongolia and Khailar where three hundred
box cars and one hundred flat wagons are said to have been
assembled to transport them eastwards.

Japanese troops stated here to be continuing to make
encircling

FK 793.94/2672

FILED

NOV 19 1931

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

2- #932, from Peiping, Nov. 14, 8 a. m. .

encircling movements northwest of Tsitsihar while further detachments are reported making for certain points to check possible war materials from Russia being sent to General Ma Chang Shan.

It is rumored that Japanese not only intend take Tsitsihar but are doing so to advance to Harbin so as to protect Japanese nationals and their property from retreating Chinese soldiers and mobs."

For the Minister

ENGERT

HPD

1508

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FE

REP

FROM

PLAIN

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 14, 1931

743
ad
Secretary of State,
Washington.

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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Rec'd 6:42 a. m.

Division of
AFR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 14 1931
Department of State

FK 793.94/2673

935, November 14.

Reuter report from Tientsin, thirteenth:

"It appears that clearing up of neutral zone of three hundred metres just outside Japanese concession has been abandoned and that negotiations have been broken off.

There was unusual activity in Japanese concession this afternoon and evacuation of women and children from danger area has been much increased.

Very
~~Even~~ strongly rumored that part of defenders of the native city are unruly and are demanding an immediate attack on the Japanese.

DEC 1 1931

FILED

Defenses of the foreign concessions have been strengthened and British volunteers have been called out. While port is seething with alarmist rumors attitude of foreign population

REP

2- #935, from Peiping, Nov. 14, 1931

population is on the whole very confident principal
concern being shortage of servants who have mostly been
detained in native city since outbreak. Difficulty is
also felt in obtaining food, principally meat.

It is reliably learned that young ex-Emperor left here
for Dairen on Wednesday."

For the Minister

ENGERT

HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

~~FF~~

743.94

REP

FROM

GRAY & GREEN

TOKIO

Dated November 13, 1931

Rec'd 14th, 5:30 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 14 1931
Department of State

F/

793.94/2674

216, November 13, 5 p. m.

Embassy's telegram 213, November 12, 10 a. m.

The General Staff informs the Military Attache's office that one reinforced brigade of the 8th Division will be sent to Manchuria, November 14th, reaching Mukden on the 19th or 20th, under Major General Yoshimichi Suzuki to relieve the 39th Brigade. It is on a peace time footing, numbering 4000 men, and consists of four infantry battalions, one battalion each from the 5th, 17th, 31st and 32nd Infantry; two battalions from the 8th Field Artillery; one squadron of the 8th Cavalry; one company from the 8th Engineers Battalion. The date of the return to Korea of the reinforced 39th Brigade, consisting of parts of the 77th and 78th Infantry Regiments, the 26th Field Artillery and the 28th Cavalry has not yet been decided.

NOV 14 1931

PTL:ED

The General

REP

2- #216, from Tokio, Nov.13, 5 p.m.

The General Staff states that the conditions on the Nonni River are quiet; that there are only 2000 Japanese troops at the Nonni River in Taonan and Chungch^aun while the Tsitsihar general has between 15000 and 20000 troops with the number steadily increasing; that Chinese cavalry is approaching the west rear of the Japanese troops and General Chang Hai army. The General Peng's/Staff states that it cannot give out information regarding the distribution of the Japanese troops in Manchuria as certain points have been weakened to strengthen this area.

FORBES

HPD

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

GRAY

Tientsin via N. R.

Dated November 14, 1931

Rec'd 6:42 P.M.
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 14 1931
FILE 92
Department of State

Secretary of State,
Washington.

November 14, 1 p. m.

The following telegram has been sent to the Legation
today:

"November 14, noon. The arrangement arrived at between
the Chinese and Japanese by which Chinese police search for
plain clothes men in the 300 meter zone came into force this
morning and has worked so far without friction. Plan contem-
plates clearing out two sections of area today and the
remainder tomorrow and next day. Consular Body considered
this morning a proposal made by the Consuls that neutral
observers representing the Body be sent to the zone to
watch the proceedings. In view of fact that inspection under
plan now in force seemed working smoothly today and further
fact that Japanese Consul was not in position to agree to
presence of neutral observers in zone without first consulting
with his

F/p
793.94/2675

FILED

DEC 21 1931

793.94

REP

2- from Tientsin, Nov. 14, 1 p. m.,
with his military authorities and submitting matter to
Tokyo for instructions, Consular Body deferred action pending
outcome of plan now in force. Japanese Consul General let
it be known that he felt the matter could be and was being
amicably adjusted between the Japanese and Chinese authorities.
The situation is much improved today and if no untoward
incident occurs during the clearing out process, the Chinese
police will be in complete reoccupation of the 300 meter
zone in a few days and in some parts of the zone before
nightfall. Much of the trouble in getting the agreement
down to a working basis has been due to distrust on both
sides. Repeated to the Department and Nanking".

LOCKHART

RR

OSB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 14, 1931

Rec'd 2:04 a. m.

293.94
Secretary of State,
Washington.

Telegram to Peiping
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 14 1931
FILE
Department of State

NOV 14 1931
NO

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

PRIORITY.

'933, November 14, 9 a. m.

I heard late last night, and had it confirmed this morning, that the Japanese have officially demanded that all Chinese troops be withdrawn twenty li, namely about six and two-thirds miles, from Tientsin under provisional note of July 15, 1902 (see MacMurray's treaties volume one, page 317). Donald states has no knowledge young Marshal has promised to comply but will increase Tientsin police force. Young claims only about two regiments of Chinese troops were within radius mentioned.

Repeated Tientsin, Nanking and Commander in Chief.

For the Minister

ENGERT

HPD

793.94/2676

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

November 14, 1931.

AMLEGATION

PEIPING (CHINA)

Your 933, November 14, 9 a. m.

One. You should have in mind, as should Tientsin, that the American Government was not a party to the note of July 15, 1902 addressed to the Chinese Government by the representatives of the five powers maintaining at that time the provisional government at Tientsin.

Two. Are there any instances on record in which the Legation or the American consular authorities at Tientsin have joined with others in invoking that paragraph of the note in question which provides that the Chinese Government shall undertake not to station or march any troops within twenty Chinese li of the city or of the troops stationed at Tientsin?

FE:JED:EMU

FE

SECRET

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1924 1-124

793.94/2676

793.94/2676

4P

Stinson
WY

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

PLAIN

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 14, 1931

Rec'd 9:10 a. m.

743.94
RECEIVED
DIVISION OF
Secretary of State,
Washington.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 14 1931
Department of State
file
6/2

937, November 14, 3 p. m.

Your 417, November 13, noon. /2634

Consulate General Tientsin received these bulletins
direct.

For the Minister

ENGERT

ARL

NOV 18 1931

FILED

793.94/2677

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 14, 1931

793.94

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

934, November 14, noon.

Following from American Consul General at Mukden.

"November 13, 8 p. m.

Kuangtung Army headquarters report that the situation on the Nonni is becoming increasingly dangerous and they are apprehensive of a renewal of hostilities. Headquarters further state that a large number of Chinese cavalry is threatening Japanese right; that Chinese troops at Nungan have been ordered to cut the Taoang Railway between the Japanese lines; and that Ma's troops are being augmented and are strengthening their present positions. Headquarters also reports alarming increase of banditry, particularly to the north of Hsinmin.

Hunter, American correspondent International News Service returned last night from an inspection of the Japanese position on the Nonni. Estimates Japanese forces entrenched north of Tahsing at 2500 and those encamped along railway south of

793.94/2678

FILED

NOV 18 1931

REP

2- #934, from Peiping, Nov. 14, noon.

south of Nonni at same figure. Japanese first line is ten kilometres north of Tahsing. Large concentration of field artillery south of Nonni apparently waiting restoration of bridge to be carried north. Work on main bridge night and day; expect to complete repairs in a week. Saw recently Chang Hai Pen's army. Understand it was encamped some distance from the railway. Hasebe, Commanding General, conducted Hunter on tour of inspection. Japanese troops are resentful against the Russians because of the suspected assistance to a Chinese army. Hunter stated that the attitude of the Japanese troops and general activity gave the impression of an army preparing for warfare rather than of a guard defending repair gangs."

Repeated to Nanking.

For the Minister

ENGERT

OSB

1516
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

rh
This telegram must be closely
paraphrased before being
communicated.

PARIS

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Dated Nov. 14, 1931

Rec'd. 9.58 pm

793.94
SECRETARY OF STATE

FROM

WASHINGTON

740, November 14, 6 pm

FROM GENERAL DAWES


I just had conference with Briand.

So far as matter of League procedure and substance of
Manchurian question is concerned, his present personal
attitude may be epitomized as follows.

One. He recognizes that facts and conditions as well
as Japanese public opinion seem to necessitate, for the
time being, no League recommendation as to immediate
change in troop location, or any reference to troop move-
ments, as thereby indicating a general policy of Japan is
other than the protection of Japanese life and property.

Two. He recognizes fully the necessity of the
recognition of the fact that any pronouncement of the
League must take into consideration the importance of
preserving Japanese prestige for its effect upon Japanese
public opinion, and the power of the Japanese Government
in its domestic situation.

Three.



rh #2 of No. 740 from Paris

Three. He seems confident of the sincerity and good intent of the Japanese Government,

Four. His attitude seems to be one of ^{prior} ~~(#) consisting~~ ^{proprietaryship} of League ~~declaration~~ of the idea of the possibility of the Shantung procedure but indicated decided appreciation of your suggestion of an initial committee concerned simply with the question of the protection of Japanese personnel and property and troop evacuation, which ~~could be~~ committee, by delegation to another committee of the consideration of the difficult fifth point of Japan if it was raised, could prevent that question from interfering with the continuance of troop evacuation.

Five. He then brought up the subject which was evidently uppermost in his mind for the time being, and that was the question of my attendance at the meetings of the Council. This subject, like Banquo's ghost, has confronted me on every street corner as well as in the halls of the mighty.

I more than ever appreciate the wisdom of your phrasing of the announcement of my mission here. Briand said that if I did not attend the meetings, it would be considered

rh #3 of No. 740 from Paris

considered generally as an indication of an attitude on the part of the United States of less cooperation than before, with the purposes of the League in this situation and a decided injury to its prestige and influence.

My reply to this was that if I did attend the Council meetings it would be attacked before the American public as an advance from an association of the United States with the League in its purpose in the present Manchurian situation to one of a continuing alliance with it. His reiterated insistence upon the embarrassment to the League and the injury to its prestige from my non-attendance were such that I finally told him as a strictly confidential matter between ourselves I would consider without commitment the following procedure which I now submit to you for comment. In the event that you do not comment upon it, I will consider it left to my further judgment.

I said that after the League had, say, two or three meetings, M. Briand, as chairman, might write me stating that the League was discussing matters involving American treaty rights, and its cooperation in the Kellogg Pact in the interests of peace and for that reason desired my

presence

rh #4 of No. 740 from Paris

presence. An invitation of this kind would answer in advance a demagogic attack which is sure to be made on my acceptance of a general invitation which does not state that my appearance is desired specifically because the interests of the United States are being discussed.

I have been careful to make no commitment but in my talk with Briand this morning, I realized that if I had not discussed the matter with him the League would have invited me to the sessions as a matter of course. To recapitulate, in view of the importance of the present critical situation in Manchuria, my unexplained declination of a general invitation would certainly greatly embarrass the administration among the home friends of peace. Any acceptance again would arouse at home unreasonable and demagogic attacks upon our League association, unless the invitation itself answered them in advance by stating the reason for acceptance.

Another method of procedure might be this: for you to make a statement of the circumstances under which, if they arose, you would desire me to attend the Council meetings, this statement to be made public now or later.

I am

2
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

rh #5 of #6. 740 from Paris

I am putting up the situation as it confronts me.
I want you and the President not to be deterred by the
thought of any embarrassment to me personally of any
decision you may make in this situation, and shall await
your comment and instructions, if any.

You can reach me by telephone if desired at Hotel
Ritz.

SHAW

HPD

(#) ~~Apparent omission~~

1524

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

FROM

Tientsin via N. R.

Dated November 14, 1931

Rec'd 6:14 Division of

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

NOV 15 1931

Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

November 14, 11 a. m. /2600

My November 11, 10 p. m.; November 12, 2 p. m. /2628

and November 13, 4 p. m. /2646

My November 11, 6 p. m., November 12, 11 a.m and November 13, 3 p. m., all addressed to Legation, were repeated to Nanking and the foregoing to Nanking and Shanghai.

LOCKHART

RR

OSB

NOV 23 1931

FILED

793.94/2680

1524

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

rh
A portion of this telegram
must be closely paraphrased
before being communicated
to anyone.

743 af

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

309, November 14, 2 pm


(GREEN) One. Drummond and that portion of the
Secretariat staff having to do with the Sino-Japanese
question move to Paris this evening. They will occupy
quarters in the Quai D'Orsey.

Two. Beginning this afternoon no further
communiques on this subject will be issued in Geneva.
They will be issued in Paris beginning the morning of
November 16.

Three. I have just had a talk with Drummond, the
essential points of which are as follows. (END GREEN)

A. He himself sees no change in the Japanese
position and notes only optimistic press statements under
Washington, London and Paris date lines which he hopes

mean



rh #2 of No. 309 from Geneva

mean an improvement.

B. The Chinese are still very much depressed by the situation.

C. He feels that while perhaps the term immediate security is too restrictive, nevertheless to advocate direct negotiations on points not having a close bearing on immediate security while the Japanese are still in occupation of Chinese territory, would be a backward step of a stultifying nature, which would have a serious effect upon the world political situation, and on projects for disarmament particularly, as disarmament is, in the policies of many states, closely allied with security. He also believes that such an arrangement would not be accepted by the Chinese.

(GREEN) D. No matter what the results may be of the meeting in Paris, the question will undoubtedly be continued in Geneva after that meeting. If the results in Paris are unsatisfactory, it will continue under Article eleven or under some other article of the covenant. If the Paris meeting results in a project for Japanese evacuation and other measures agreed to by the powers
and by

152
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

rh #3 of No. 309 from Geneva

and by the disputants, Geneva will unquestionably play
an important part in the implementing of such a project.

Four. I am repeating this telegram by mail, together
with all other pertinent telegrams to date to Paris.

GILBERT

JS

OSB

CJH

GRAY

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RECEIVED VIA N. R.

Dated November 14, 1931

FROM

Received 9:40 a.m.

Division of

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

NOV 15 1931

Department of State

Secretary of State,
Washington.

939, November 14, 5 p.m.

Following from Mukden.

"November 14, 8 a.m.

One. Kuangtung army headquarters report minor clash
on Nonni Anganchi front between Japanese outpost and
Chinese cavalry. Four Japanese killed and one captured.

Two. General Honjo yesterday informed Bess of the
United Press that he intends to open railway through to
Tsitsihar and keep it open. Described Nonni situation
as regional station and said that continuation of outside
reinforcements and assistance, presumably Soviet, could
not but aggravate the situation. Declared that Auganchi
situation and prevalence of banditry made withdrawal of
troops an impossibility and stated that the Japanese were
determined to make Manchuria law abiding. Accomplishment of
this might take weeks or months and Japanese will not quit
the task until it is completed. Considered the League (?)
of an international police force for Manchuria highly
impracticable". Repeated Nanking.

For the Minister.

ENGERT

CSB

RR

CH

793.94/2682

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-12-75

rh

GRAY

PEIPING VIA NR

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Dated Nov. 15, 1931

SECRETARY OF STATE

FROM

WASHINGTON

942. November 15, 7 pm

Following from Harbin

November 15, 1 pm


One. Local press this morning confirms report of
 clash mentioned in my telegram November 14, 9 pm.

Two. Ohashi, who returned from Mukden this morning,
 confirms press reports that Japanese military finished
 repairs on bridge across the Nonni on November 14th. He
 also said that Ma's left wing plentifully supplied with
 machine guns received from Manchuria Station is now
 advancing in threatening manner against the Japanese forces.

Three. This may be Japanese excuse for delivering an
 expected attack against Chinese troops.

Four. ~~Commander~~ Chinese who returned yesterday
 from front states that Ma has concentrated about 15000

troops



F/ 793.94/2683

NOV 23 1931

FILED

rh #2 of No. 942 from Peiping

troops and the Japanese 4000 at Nenmi. I believe first figure correct and the last probably exaggerated somewhat.

Five. Local Japanese press this morning published Rengo Tokyo November 13 despatch to the effect that Mina Mi Minister of War has ordered Honjo to inform Ma that Japanese military operations in north Manchuria would cease if Tsitsihar troops evacuate Tsitsihar City within a period of ten days from today."

Repeated to Nanking.

For the Minister

ENGERT

CSB

1531

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

CJH

TELEGRAM RECEIVED
CORRECTED COPY

GREEN

FROM

GENEVA

Dated November 14, 1931

Rec'd 2:07 p.m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

NOV 15 1931

Department of State

NOV 13 1931
RECEIVED
DIVISION OF STATE

793.94/2684

793.94/2684
SECRETARY OF STATE,

Washington.

308, November 14, 1 p.m.

The following is an excerpt of possible interest
from a communication from Shidehara to Briand, received
November 12.

"The Japanese Government has made a point from the
outset of present events of granting widest facilities
in its power to officials of governments represented on
the Council who have come to Manchuria to gain an idea of
the situation and no change has occurred in its attitude
in this respect."

GILBERT

NOV 20 1931

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

rh

GREEN

GENEVA

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Dated Nov. 14, 1931

Division of

Rept. to ASIA AFFAIRS

NOV 16 1931

Department of State

SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

308, November 14, 1 pm

The following is an excerpt of possible interest from
 a communication from Shidehara to Briand, received
 November 12.

"The Japanese Government has made a point from the
 outset of present events of granting evident facilities in
 its power to officials of governments represented on the
 Council who have come to Manchuria to gain an idea of
 the situation and no change has occurred in its attitude
 in this respect."

GILBERT

CIB

JS

NOV 17 1931

FILED

793.94/2684

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 BY Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

rh

GRAY

PEIPING VIA NR

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Dated Nov. 14, 1931

NOV 15 1931

DIVISION OF

FROM

Receives Division of

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

NOV 16 1931

Department of State

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

940, November 14, 8 pm

Following from Harbin:

"November 14, noon.

One. Ma has refused to comply with the terms of the ultimatum mentioned in my telegram of November 12, 5 pm, on the grounds that he cannot unless he receives orders to do so from the Central Government at Nanking. He is striving to hold his position at least until November 16th, when he hopes that League of Nations will in some way aid him against ~~Japanese~~ inspired attacks. Press reports that more air-planes are coming from Japan to Manchuria and Secretary Chao informed me that the Chinese fear that a large number of air planes will be sent to the Nonni to conduct a bombing raid which will shatter Ma's forces and make him quit before November 16th. Chao further confirmed press rumors that General Chang Haipen had personally withdrawn from the fray and was located at Taonanfu, and added that

he was

F/ 793.94/2685

FILED

NOV 23 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

rh #2 of No. 940 from Peiping

he was responsible (which I doubt very much) for securing Chang's elimination as a Japanese candidate for the governorship at Tsitsihar during his negotiations with two of General Honjo's local Japanese agents who are insisting upon the resignation of Ma.

Two. Chinese and Japanese official sources state that there were no conflicts near the bridge and that quiet reigns at Tsitsihar City and ~~foreign~~ reports that all was quiet at Hailar and Manchuria Station yesterday.

Three. Frederik Kuhlman of the United Press, who has just arrived at Harbin from Berlin via Siberia, informed me yesterday that he saw no evidence of any movements or concentration of troops in Siberia and received the impression that the Soviet officials would do nothing but protest against the violation of any Soviet rights on the Chinese Eastern Railway by the Japanese.

Four. The situation at Harbin is quiet, although there is an increasing number of brigands in the near vicinity. The Japanese press is printing alarming reports that these brigands may at any time attack the city, but as long as General Ting Chao, in command of the Chinese Eastern Railway

guard

1534
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-7.

rh #3 of No. 940 from Weiping

guard troops, which are paid by this railway, keeps a
sufficient force here, there appears to be little danger
of such an attack at present."

Repeated to Nanking.

For the Minister

ENGERT

HB

153F

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

FROM

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 NOV 16 1931
 Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 GENEVA NOV 16 1931
 Dated November 14, 1931

Rec'd 11:55 a.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

307, November 14, 11 a. m. (GREEN).

The following is the text of a letter dated November 13th from Sze to Drummond which the latter handed to Everett late yesterday evening:

"The situation at Tientsin remains grave and threatens the most serious complication at any moment, as shown by the following telegram just received from my Government 'firing resumed Tientsin 6:30 morning; rioters attacking near Sanpeikwan; simultaneously Chinese police machine gunned near Tingkungsu from direction of Japanese concession; shell dropping before Chinese barriers; assailants unknown. Tientsin authorities formally requested Consular corps arrange four national garrisons organizations three hundred meter observation, if possible international patrol. President urging American, British and French Ministers, today issue requisite instructions'. I should be grateful if you could urgently convey this information to

F 793.94/2686

NOV 23 1931

FILED

MAM

2- #307, from Geneva, November 14,
1931

to the President of the Council, to the British members of the Council and to the American representative, with the request that they be good enough to secure prompt action by their governments in the sense desired, in order to avoid the shedding of more blood". (END GREEN)

In handing Everett this letter Drummond discussed with him his conversation with Sze at the time the latter handed him the letter. The substance is as follows:

One. Referring to the telegram quoted in Sze's letter Drummond pointed out that since an appeal had already been made to the British and American Ministers those governments were certainly fully informed and, therefore, he did not believe that much more could be done from Geneva.

Two. Sze then inquired whether Drummond had any news concerning various proposals which it was rumored were likely to be put forward at the next Council meeting. To this Drummond replied that he had seen a press report to the effect that there was an American proposal but he had no knowledge of what it was or whether in fact any such proposal was being contemplated.

Sze

MAM

3- #307, from Geneva, November 14,
1931

Sze remarked that the proposal to which he referred was an alleged British proposal to the effect that direct negotiations on the five points should begin simultaneously with those relating to evacuation. He added that there was some alarm at Nanking in regard to this since the Chinese Government, having acquiesced in the draft resolution of October 24, would find it difficult to make any further concessions.

Drummond replied that he had likewise no knowledge of any suggestions of this nature on the part of the British. Sze then inquired whether he had any personal views.

Drummond replied that as far as he was concerned he considered it perfectly legitimate that direct negotiations on evacuation and security begin simultaneously since in fact these were the two cardinal points in the September 30 resolution of which the provisions were still in force. Beyond this he could say nothing.

Three. Everett remarked to Drummond that the proposal referred to above as the British proposal was very similar to the Sugimura project reported in the Consulate's telegram 287, November 7, 11 a.m. Drummond agreed and
intimated

MAM

4- #307, from Geneva, November 14,
1931

intimated that he was inclined to believe that a solution would probably have to be sought along similar lines, the essence of the proposal being to satisfy the Japanese demands in regard to security but without sacrificing the principle of the September 30th resolution that the evacuation should take place as soon as possible, meaning by this a reasonable length of time in view of the circumstances. Of course he knew the Chinese would offer resistance to direct negotiations being engaged in simultaneously on the two sets of questions but, in his opinion, they could in the end be induced to accept such a solution.

GILBERT

CSB

HPD

154
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CJH

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PEIPING via N. R.

FROM Dated November 15, 1931

DIVISION OF RECORDS. Nov. 14, 9:30 a.m.

EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

NOV 18 1931

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
NOV 15 1931

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 15 1931

Secretary of State,

Washington.

938, November 15, 4 p.m.

Following from Harbin:

"November 13, 11 a.m.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

One. Referring to paragraph one of my November 2, 5 p.m.
the sending of this ultimatum to Ma has been confirmed by
his wire of November 12th to the Chinese Government, head
of the local Chinese Communications Administration and
Commissioner of Foreign Affairs. The last report has no
information in regard to whether or not Ma complied with
these demands. In his telegram Ma requested that the local
consuls be informed in regard to contents thereof.

Two. General Ma forwarded the following two telegrams
to the local Commissioner of Foreign Affairs:

"November 2, 4 p.m. It has now been reliably reported
that the Japanese have recently brought up to the river
bridge two companies of heavy artillery and are busily
repairing the bridges previous to launching an attack on
Tsitsihar. End part one.

ENGERT

GW

CSB

F/ 793.94/2687

1931.61.AON

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

RECEIVED

NOV 15 1931

FROM

GRAY

PEIPING VIA NR

Dated November 15, 1931

Secretary of State

Rec'd 1:10 p.m.

November 14, 1931

Washington

938, November 15, 4 p.m. (PART TWO)

Please inform the various consuls to this effect. November 12, 6 p.m. General Wu of the cavalry has just reported back from the front that at twelve noon today the Japanese cavalry and artillery launched a ferocious attack against Tsitsihar troops and that fighting is still continuing. The Japanese military have openly declared their desire to attack Tsingpoo. Please immediately submit a report to the League of Nations with the request that the Japanese attack be stopped."

Three. Only the KUNGPAO (now Soviet controlled) and the HARBIN TIMES (Japanese controlled) reported today in regard to this battle. Other local newspapers which are poorly informed reported all quiet at the Monni yesterday. The Japanese Consulate General (Ohashi departed for a temporary visit to Mukden on November 11th)

(END PART TWO)

ENGERT

CSB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAK

GRAY

FROM

PEIPING

Dated November 15, 1931

Rec'd 12:50 p.m.
November 14, 1931

Secretary of State

Washington

938, November 15, 4 p.m. (PART THREE)

informed this office this morning that it had no official information regarding the situation at the bridge yesterday, but had heard that skirmishes had been taking place continually and that Japanese engineers under strong Japanese military guard were continuing to repair the bridge. I am inclined to believe that sorties by small parties of cavalry, air planes and bomb dropping have been resorted to by the Japanese military in order to protect the workers on this bridge, to undermine the morale of the Chinese troops and to exert pressure on the Chinese officials so that they will urge Ma to yield to the Japanese ultimatum of November 12th.

Four. It is rumored in Chinese Eastern Manchuria circles that Yuan Chin Kai of the new Mukden Government requested Li Shao (?),

(END PART THREE)

CSB

ENGERT

0 5 4 3

12-18-75

—PRINCE,

1:00 p.m.

958, ... (Part Four)

He had a receipt of my check. I never called,
I never telephoned, I never wrote him, and
he never told me I was on his railway books.
I was named among first approved by him. I thought
he was bragging that he had received my money.
Then I saw, in the publication mentioned above,
his name with my name and my money.

[illegible]

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

GREEN

FROM

Nanking via N. R.

Dated November 14, 1931

Rec'd 4:58 a. m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 16 1931
Department of State

793.94
note 793.94/118
Secretary of State,
Washington.

108, November 14, noon.

Enclosed with a note dated November 11th, Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent, one, plans for the taking over occupied places in Manchuria, two, regulations governing the organization of commission for the reoccupation of the evacuated territory of the northeast, and three, a list of the members of the commission.

The plans include the inviting of the representatives of the different powers to cooperate. It is expected that these representatives will observe the working of the commission and remain in reoccupied places until they are sure that peace and order are effectively maintained. The best disciplined soldiers gendarmes and police will be despatched by the Government to places to be taken over. Martial law is to be resorted to by the commission whenever necessary to protect life and property.
(END OF PART ONE).

For the Consul General
MEYER

HPD

F/19
793.94/2688

NOV. 23 1931

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REF

TELEGRAM RECEIVED GREEN

Nanking via N. R.

FROM

Dated November 14, 1931

Rec'd 6:42 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

108, November 14, midnight. (PART TWO).

Special precautions are to be taken to ensure the safety of all Japanese nationals but the Japanese Government is expected to warn its nationals in the evacuated territory against taking any undesirable course of action. The regulations are for seventeen articles. Under these regulations, and instructions from the national government, the Commission will arrange details in connection with the reoccupation and rehabilitation of the places in Manchuria now occupied by the Japanese. The commission is to be subdivided into the following sections:

One. Political, in charge of the taking over of the civil, financial, and industrial affairs of the evacuated places;
(END PART TWO).

For the Consul General

MEYER

HPD

1.

LAS

GREEN

TELEGRAM RECEIVED BANKING VIA N.R.

DATED Nov. 14, 1931

REC'D. 2:43 AM Nov 15th

FROM
Secretary of State,
Washington.

108 Nov. 14, 1931 noon.

Part three.

2. External affairs, in charge of consultations with the representatives appointed by the governments of the different countries, the arrangement of the details/taking over of the evacuated places, and other matters related thereto;

3. Safety, in charge of the assignment and supervision of soldiers, gendarmes and police, and the maintenance of peace in the evacuated places; and,

4. Communications, in charge of railways, public roads, electrical communications and all other facilities for communication. Chinese and foreign technical experts may be engaged to assist and make plans. In connection with the execution by the Commission of the recommendations contained in the resolution of the League of Nations, the Chairman of the Commission.

End part three.

For the Consul General

MEYER

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GREEN

Nanking

Dated November 14, 1931

Rec'd 7:07 a. m.

TO NO FROM

1931 11

SECRET

Secretary of State,

Washington.

108, November 14, noon. (PART FOUR).

Requests invite the representatives appointed by the governments of the different countries to observe such execution. All facilities will be accorded to the representatives appointed by the governments of the different countries. The Commission will record the proceedings of reoccupation and communicate for reference records of such proceedings to the representatives appointed by the governments of the different countries.

The regulations were promulgated by the National Government on November 7th, 1931.

Members of the Commission same as listed in Nanking's telegram November 3, 12, noon, to the American Minister at Shanghai and subsequently repeated by him to the Department.

(END PART FOUR, END MESSAGE)

For the Consul General
MEYER

HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

GRAY

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Nanking via N. R.

Dated November 14, 1931

FROM

Rec'd 9:25 AM Division of

FOR EASTERN AFFAIRS

NOV 15 1931

Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

November 14, 9 a. m. (PART ONE).

One. I returned to Nanking yesterday and in the afternoon was requested to visit the President where I found my British and French colleagues. After the interview we agreed upon the following text of an identic telegram to our respective countries.

Two. "The President summoned me and my British and French colleagues on November 13 and communicated to us telegrams received from Chang Hsueh Liang concerning situations at Tientsin and Tsitsihar. I understand that substance has been telegraphed to Geneva. As regards Tientsin, it was alleged that, in spite of agreement reached between Chinese and Japanese, firing was resumed from direction of Japanese concession in early morning of November 13th. Chinese authorities at Tientsin, acting at the instance of Chinese ^{Chamber of Commerce} ~~Chamber~~, had approached Foreign Consuls with request that they arrange for foreign troops to organize some form of observation over the three hundred meters neutral zone.

HW

JOHNSON

F / 793.94/2689

FILED

NOV 23 1931

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MEM

GRAM

FROM

NANKING

Dated November 14, 1931

Rec'd 9:50 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

November 14, 9 a.m. (PART TWO)

Local Chinese authorities reported situation to be again serious. Suspicions of Chinese Government ^{in regard to} ~~the~~ Japanese intentions at Tientsin had been increased by receipt on November 12 of strongly worded note from Japanese Minister calling upon Chinese to withdraw all troops from twenty li zone round Tientsin in accordance with 1901 protocol, and adding that if this has not been done Japanese would take necessary measures. President appealed to us most earnestly to investigate origin of trouble at Tientsin with a view to fixing responsibility and to take some action in interests of peace and security of other concessions to prevent further disturbances; and he urged us to accede to Chinese request for international forces to take charge neutral zone. I pointed out delicate position in which such troops might be placed if fired upon and danger of our thus being dragged into the conflict. I could not authorize

(END PART TWO)

JOHNSON

CSB

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

FROM

Nanking

Dated November 14, 1931

Rec'd 8:10 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

November 14, 9 a. m. (PART THREE),

such steps without instructions of my Government. But I undertook to telegraph at once to the Consulate General at Tientsin for a report on actual situation and his recommendations as to what if any thing could be done to minimize danger of further disturbances and at the same time to report urgently to you by telegraph the President's wish. My colleagues took similar line. As regards Tsitsihar, report stated that Japanese agent professing to represent General Honjo had demanded of General Ma that he withdraw from Tsitsihar before midnight November 12th. Before expiration of ultimatum Japanese troops had attacked and fighting was proceeding. President begged that we would instruct our representatives on the spot to furnish on the situation for the information of the League before November 16, with special reference to responsibility

REP

(PART THREE).

2- from Nanking/ Nov. 14, 9 a. m.

responsibility for resumption of hostilities. He assured us that General Ma had remained strictly on the defensive. We said that we were receiving reports all the time and transmitting them to our Government. His Excellency urged that we should arrange for a joint investigation and report which we pointed out would be difficult unless so instructed by our Governments. Chang Hsueh Liang's telegrams also reported that ex-Emperor Pu Yi had arrived at Dairen en route for Mukden."

(END PART THREE AND MESSAGE).

JOHNSON

OSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Collect
Charge Department

Charge to
\$

Department of State

Washington,

November 17, 1931.

AMERICAN CONSUL

NANKING (CHINA).

This message is sent in confidence.
It should be carefully paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone.

113

For the Minister.

Your November 14, 9 a.m.

One. With regard to ~~the~~ President ^{Chiang's} request that the United States participate in an investigation of the origin of trouble at Tientsin, Department will await further word from you upon basis of the telegraphic report you have requested from Lockhart. In this connection refer to the Department's telegram to Nanking No. 109 November 12, 11 a.m., paragraph two, inquiring whether you considered advisable any amendment of Department's instruction to Lockhart in regard to investigation.

Two. In regard to ~~the~~ President ^{Chiang's} desire that the United States participate in a joint investigation of the situation at Tsitsihar, Department approves reply made by you that American governmental representatives in Manchuria were sending to the American Government current reports on developments. The Department prefers to make

793.94/2689

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

1 55

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) *
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Washington,

- 2 -

no further statement in that connection at this
time. Hanson, through Legation, is report-
ing daily on that situation and Department
is relaying portions to Daves.

FE:MMH:LM

MMH

FE

SKS

Stinson

SKS

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____


Index Bu.—No. 50.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

FROM




Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

742, November 15, 9 p.m.

FROM AMBASSADER DAWES

Matsudaira came from the train this evening to tell me of the increasing dangerous state of public sentiment in Japan. He has cabled the Japanese Government seeking to secure moderation of the Japanese position as formerly presented to the League by Yoshizawa. Tonight he reports to me that because of the state of things in Japan he feared that his recommendations might not be favored by his Government. He also expressed a fear that if a favorable answer to his despatch to the Japanese Government had not been received by that time Yoshizawa, at tomorrow's meeting of the Council, might restate the old Japanese position if any general discussion was engaged in. He came to inform me of this critical situation before he saw Yoshizawa and is conferring with Yoshizawa at this time.

Realizing the dangers tomorrow of a League discussion
at the



F
793.94/2690

NOV 23 1931
FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) *
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM

2-#742, from Paris, November 15, 1933,
 9 p.m.

at the first meeting with the attitude of the Japanese Government still unsettled, with Matsudaira's concurrence and cooperation, I am placing this specific situation before those who should be able to control the nature of the first session. I have already talked over the telephone with Sir John Simon who has just arrived. He immediately realized the critical situation and will see Briand as soon as the latter reaches his office from the country tomorrow. He will urge him to make the first meeting for tomorrow afternoon purely perfunctory and short without discussion. I also arranged for Matsudaira to meet Simon in the morning. Massigli who is working with and represents Briand had arranged to call again this evening at ten thirty to hear what Matsudaira reported. I will thus be enabled through Massigli to be additionally sure Briand will be apprised fully of the situation before the meeting. I think therefore that the immediate danger which Matsudaira fears can for the present be obviated.

My feeling now is that the Council will be unwise if it has a meeting for any real discussion of the situation for several days. Upon the prior settlement
 of this

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM

3-#742, from Paris, Nov. 15, 1931, 9 p.m.

of this new Japanese situation as developed tonight may
depend the success or failure of the Conference.

Matsudaira will probably report tonight as to his
interview with Yoshizawa.

SHAW

WSB

FE
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

FROM

TOKIO

793-94
note
756 ad
759.94
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone.

Dated November 16, 1931

Rec'd 6:48 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.



219, November 16, 11 a.m.

The Dutch and Norwegian Ministers have both called
and advised me they have cabled their people recommending
strongly against the exercise of further pressure upon
Japan at Geneva. That seems to be the practically
unanimous judgment of foreign diplomats of all countries
resident here.

FORBES

McL

F/P
793.94/2691

FILED

NOV 18 1931

1558

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Guttfson NARS, Date 12-18-75

XI-16

~~22~~
This could be
made, the reference
for the tely. to
Forbes.

From In this case
the Embassy gives
no comment or
exposition of reason
why.

SRK 4

12 91 AGH

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Washington,
1931.

/2691

her information
ay/have prompted
Ministers' at

'have' already
'available' full
local developments
sently being made
atches' received
'capitals.

793.94/2691

FE:RSM:EJL

FE

NOV 16 1981 P.M.

Enciphered by

Sent by operator

Index Bu.—No. 80.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1968 1-138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Collect
Charge Department

Department of State

Charge: No. cable was sent in confidential Code.
It should be carefully reviewed before
being communicated to the press.

Washington,

November 16, 1931.

793-94/2691
AMERICAN EMBASSY

TOKYO (JAPAN).

230 Your No. 219, November 16, 11 a.m. /2691

The Department would welcome further information concerning any special reasons which may have prompted this action by the Dutch and Norwegian Ministers at this time, together with your comments.

Now that the conferences at Paris have already begun, the Department would like to have available full information from you concerning important political developments in Japan, references to which are frequently being made in press reports from Japan and in despatches received by the Department from various European capitals.

793.94/2691

RECEIVED

FE: RSM: EJJ

FE

Enciphered by

NOV 16 1931 P.M.

Sent by operator

M.

19

Index Bu.-No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)*
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

GRAY

FROM

Tientsin


November 15, 1931

Secretary of State,
 Washington, D. C.

November 15, 9 p.m.

The following telegram has been sent to the Legation:

"November 15, 4 p.m." The joint search of the 300
 meter zone went along smoothly in one area yesterday but
 in the area adjacent to the river four or five Chinese
 armed police were discovered as well as electrified
 barbed wire, barricade and other defenses alleged by the
 Japanese to have been constructed in violation of the
 Hague Conference to keep the zone free of military
 activities or warlike preparations. On discovering the
 police and the paraphernalia described the Japanese became
 indignant, charged the Chinese with bad faith and declined
 to proceed further with the search notifying the Chinese
 that in view of these discoveries and the failure to find
 any plain clothes men in the two areas searched they
 believed the Chinese police had been doing ~~the (i) any~~ *duty and if any*
 more firing was directed toward the Japanese concession
 they would take whatever measures seemed necessary. The
 Japanese



F /
 793.94/2692

FILED
 DEC 21 1931

793.94

AM

2- from Tienstin, Nov. 15, 1931, 9 p.m.

Japanese thereupon restored their barricades and guards at the points abutting the territory that had been searched. I have reason to believe that the entire matter has now been taken out of the hands of the Japanese Consul General by the military who may at any time employ drastic measures. Many refugees from the Chinese city have been coming into the foreign areas today. I do not believe the situation is as good today as it was yesterday. An extremely critical situation has now prevailed for a week and normal processes looking to the settlement of the trouble are distinctly not being employed.

Chairman of Provincial Government has notified Japanese authorities that Chinese troops will be removed 20 li from Tientsin pursuant to request referred to in the Legation's 933 to the Department.

Repeated to Department and Nanking."

LOCKHART

~~(#) apparent omission~~

WSB

CJH

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

TIENTSIN via N. R.

FROM

Dated November 16, 1931

Rec'd. 5 a.m.

Secretary of State
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



November 16, noon.

Following has been sent to the Legation:

"November 16, 11 a.m. Provisional-Chairman

Shu Chang in pursuance of a suggestion, or demand, by
the commandant of the Japanese, called on the commandant
last night and made apologies for and explanation of
presence of armed Chinese police and military pre-
parations in the 300 meter zone as described in my
November 15, 4 p.m. Conference lasted about two hours
and a representative of the chairman has informed me
that further conference would be held today and that
the prospect of an amicable adjustment has been im-
proved by reason of the visit and conference.

There was some rifle firing in the Chinese city
(whether in the 300 meter zone or outside is not
definitely established) last night at seven thirty
and again

F/8 793.94/2693

DEC 21 1931

FILED

793.94
note
893 5011

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) *
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CJH

Page 2 - from Tientsin
dated Nov. 16, 5 a.m.

and again at ten o'clock. There was no firing on part
of Japanese.

Japanese consulate has issued statement that boy
Emperor left his residence in Japanese concession shortly
after outbreak of trouble on ^{the} night of November 8th but
somehow his present whereabouts or destination not known.
Repeated to Department and Nanking".

LOCKHART

WSB

893-0011

1564

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED NOV 18 1931

DIVISION OF
EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AM

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 16, 1931

Rec'd 9:20 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

946, November 16, 5 p.m.

Following from Harbin:

"November 16, 10 a.m. Captain Tenny returned to Harbin this morning. He stated that there were no signs of Soviet activities in area near Manchuli and Hailar."

Repeated to Nanking.

For the Minister

ENGERT

WSB

FILED

1381.61.AON

F/ 793.94/2694

793-94
note
121.5-493
761.94

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 16 1931
Department of State

1565

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) *
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CJH

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

FROM

PEIPING VIA N. R.

Dated November 16, 1931
Rec'd. 4 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

943, November 16, a.m.

Following from Mukden.

"November 15, 8 p.m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 16 1931
Department of State
COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

793-94

A large patriotic demonstration of Japanese population of Mukden today. A band of demonstrators carrying flags and banners paraded Japanese and Chinese settlements, shouting prepared slogans opposing withdrawal of troops and demanding their increase and singing songs.

After reporting quiet on Nonni front during the last few days broken only by minor outpost engagements, Japanese headquarters today was forced by newspaper correspondents, who had seen Tsitsihar despatches to the contrary, to admit Japanese attacks with heavy artillery since November 12th." Repeated to Nanking.

FOR THE MINISTER

ENGERT

F/ 793.94/2695

NOV 23 1931

FILED

CJH

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be
carefully paraphrased be-
fore being communicated to
anyone. FROM

PARIS

Dated November 15, 1931

Rec'd. 9:35 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

741, November 15, 5 p.m.

FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES.

At noon today Sze called. After a short time I

induced him to forego the recounting of national grievances
and discuss the essence of the situation as you see it and
with which I agree, which is: Can the settlement of the
question of the protection of Japanese Nationals and
troop evacuation be solved without the interjection in
that continuing process of delay due to the fifth treaty
point in the former Japanese proposal? Sze said in effect

that he would agree to anything we propose but very much
wants to be allowed to refer to it as emanating from us
I submitted to him verbally as I had to Briand, Simon,
and Matsudaira your proposal and repeated the remark in
your 328 that you believed any suggestion we made would
be much more effective if its origin was not labeled as
American but appeared to come from the disputant nations
themselves.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

NOV 16 1931

DEPT. OF STATE

NOV 17 1931

RECEIVED
F/

793.94/2696

FILED

NOV 23 1931

CJH

Page 2 - #741 from Paris.

themselves. I spoke strongly on this matter to Sze pointing out that what he thought would help him in public sentiment in China might be just that which would have an adverse repercussion on public sentiment in Japan or in other quarters which we cannot foresee. He has promised faithfully that he would regard the matter as confidential and only as a helpful suggestion to both the Chinese and Japanese in the situation.

The importance in the minds of everybody here of any position of the United States and, if I may say so, their respect for the opinions of our State Department is such as to make it difficult to make confidential suggestions to several parties without creating some impression of an initiative which, in accordance with your request, I am endeavoring to avoid.

The penalty of wisdom especially when associated with power is ^{repetition} ~~that~~. However I think no harm has been done yet. Parenthetically Briand told me yesterday that Sir John Simon had wired him suggesting the same thing which I was then conveying to him as coming from you which was natural enough as his message was sent

after the

OJH

Page 3 - #741 from Paris.

after the interview between Simon, Matsudaira and myself
at London.

After Sze had gone Massigli called. He agrees
fully in this matter.

Matsudaira wired me from London that he will
arrive here this evening and I hope to report again
after I have seen him.

SHAW

HPD

1560

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793-94

AM

CORRECTED COPY
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GREEN

Peiping via N. R.

FROM

Dated November 16, 1931

Rec'd 11:08 a.m.
Division of

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

NOV 17 1931

Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington, D.C.

944, November 16, 11 a.m.

Following has been received from the Minister at
Nanking for transmission to the Department:

"November 15, 3 p.m. Please send following to
Department:

'One. I find no evidence in any of the reports
reaching me from Tientsin, Mukden, Harbin or Tsitsihar,
of any intention on the part of the Japanese to with-
draw from the stand which they have taken in Manchuria.

Two. On the contrary, all information reaching
me up to the present indicates that the Japanese are
continuing their efforts, evidently studied, completely
to destroy the prestige of Chang Hsueh Liang (and this
means that the Nanking Government with which he has
closely cooperated) in Manchuria. These efforts now
extend to the ousting of representatives of his control
in Tsitsihar and Tientsin.

Three. So thorough has this effort of the Japanese
been that I am convinced that it would be impossible
for Chang

793.94/2697

NOV 23 1931

FILED

CJH

2 - #944 from Peiping.

for Chang Hsueh Liang to reestablish his control of Manchuria either by himself or with outside aid. This applies equally to the establishment of the authority of the Nanking Government for it has no one to put in Chang's place.

Four. All of which lends color to the growing belief that Japan intends to create a situation in Manchuria which will make it possible for the setting up of a puppet government, nominally independent but actually under and subservient to Japanese control similar to that which Soviet Russia has established in Mongolia.

Five. Chinese people looked upon Manchuria as part of China. Even C. C. Wu and Eugene Chen, with whom I talked in Shanghai, and who expressed themselves as believing that direct negotiations and a settlement with Japan were possible, insisted vehemently that China could never concede Manchuria to Japan nor could a Chinese Government ever consider the validity of the 1915 treaties.

Six. It is therefore difficult here to see how League can find a settlement of the issues between China and Japan that will be a settlement and at the same time satisfactory to both.

Seven. I find an increasing feeling of pessimism
over the

CJH

3 - #944 from Peiping.

over the situation here.

Eight. China has placed all of her reliance upon League action. What will happen when the League fails to provide a solution of the problem satisfactory to the Chinese is a matter for pessimistic speculation. It is generally felt here that the authorities cannot much longer hold the people in check. The prestige of the Government is suffering and it is generally believed that when it is realized that the League can do nothing to stop Japanese aggression the people will take matters into their own hands. I am convinced that this will result in chaotical conditions throughout the whole country.

Nine. I assume that there is no way of bringing home to the Japanese Government a sense of their responsibility for such a ^{situation} so fraught with danger to the interests of every one."

Repeated to Commander-in-Chief.

ENGERT

WSB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

GREEN

Peiping via N. R.

FROM Dated November 16, 1931

Rec'd 4:00 a.m.

Secretary of State, *Telegram to.*
Washington, D. C. *Paris m.m.H.*

944, November 16, 11 a.m.

Following has been received from the Minister at
Nanking for transmission to the Department:


"November 15, 3 p.m. Please send following
to Department:

'One. I find no evidence in any of the reports
reaching me from Tientsin, Mukden, Harbin or Tsitsihar,
of any intention on the part of the Japanese to with-
draw from the stand which they have taken in Manchuria..

Two. On the contrary, all information reaching
me up to the present indicates that the Japanese are
continuing their efforts, evidently studied, completely
to destroy the prestige of Chang Hsueh Liang (and this
means that the Nanking Government with which he has
closely cooperated) in Manchuria. These efforts now
extend to the ousting of representatives of his control
in Tsitsihar and Tientsin.

Three. So thorough has this effort of the Japanese
been that I am convinced that it would be impossible

for Chang



F/
793.94/2697

NOV 23 1931

FILED

AM

2-#944, From Peiping, Nov. 16, 1931
11 a.m.

for Chang Hsueh Liang to reestablish his control of Manchuria either by himself or with outside aid. This applies equally to the establishment of the authority of the Nanking Government for it has no one to put in Chang's place.

Four. All of which lends color to the growing belief that Japan intends to create a situation in Manchuria which will make it possible for the setting up of a puppet government, nominally independent but actually under and subservient to Japanese control similar to that which Soviet Russia has established in Mongolia.

Five. Chinese people looked upon Manchuria as part of China. Even C. C. Wu and Eugene Chen, with whom I talked in Shanghai, and who expressed themselves as believing that direct negotiations and a settlement with Japan were possible, insisted vehemently that China could never ^{cede} (~~#~~) Manchuria to Japan nor could ^{the Chinese} (?) Government ever ^{Consent to} ~~could~~ ~~never~~ the validity of the 1915 treaties.

Consent to
accept?

Six. It is therefore difficult here to see how League can find a settlement of the issues between China and Japan that will be a settlement and at the same time satisfactory to both.

Seven. I find an increasing feeling of pessimism
over the

AM

3-#944, from Peiping, November 16,
1931, 11 a.m.

over the situation here.

Eight. China has placed all of her reliance upon League action. What will happen when the League fails to provide a solution of the problem satisfactory to the Chinese is a matter for pessimistic speculation. It is generally felt here that the authorities cannot much longer hold the people in check. The prestige of the Government is suffering and it is generally believed that it is recognized that ⁽⁴⁾ the League can do nothing to stop ^(the Chinese) Japanese people will take matters into their own hands. I am convinced that this will result in chaotical conditions throughout the whole country.

Nine. I assume that there is no way of bringing home to the Japanese Government a sense of their responsibility for such a way so fraught with danger to the interests of every one."

Repeated to Commander-in-Chief.

ENCERT

(#) apparent omission

WSB

1 1575

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department

OR

Charge to
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TELEGRAM SENT *Green*

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED

CONFIDENTIAL CODE

NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE

PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

November 16, 1931.

793.94/2697
AMERICAN EMBASSY

PARIS (FRANCE).

554 For the information of General Dawes. The Department has received from Minister ~~Johnson~~ *the American* at Nanking the following telegram dated November 15 in which ~~the Minister~~ *Johnson* gives his views concerning the situation in Manchuria and the attitude of the Chinese Government.)

QUOTE

UNQUOTE

(Telegraph Room, quote text of Minister Johnson's November 15 as contained in Peiping's No. 944, November 16, 11 a.m., attached.)

RSM
FE:RSM:EJL FE

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-128



793.94/2697

Stinson

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-13-75



Mr. Secretary:

The internal political situation in China must also be taken into account -- as well as that in Japan.

Minister Johnson reports: (on 1.3):

"China has placed all of her reliance upon League action. What will happen when the League fails to provide a solution of the problem satisfactory to the Chinese is a matter for pessimistic speculation. It is generally felt here that the authorities cannot much longer hold the people in check. The prestige of the Government is suffering and it is generally believed that it is recognized that (if) the League can do nothing to stop (the) Japanese, (the Chinese) people will take matters into their own hands. I am convinced that this will result in chaotical conditions throughout the whole country."

Reference Beijing: No 944
Nov. 16, 11 am

2697

SECRET

793.94/2697

SKH/ZMF

WHA

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

PEIPING, via N.R.

Dated November 15, 1931

FROM

Rec'd. 4:35 A.M.

Secretary of State

Washington.

941, November 15, 10 A.M.

Following from Harbin.


"November 14, 9 P.M.

One. Secretary Chao informed me at 7 P.M. today that he had received the following telegrams from General Ma, the first at 11 P.M. on the 13th, and the second at 10 A.M. on the 14th.

'At 8 P.M. on the 13th, Major Hayashi quoted to Ma a telegram from Honjo to the effect that the third clause of his ultimatum of the 12th to Ma reading in part 'Japanese troops should occupy Taoang Railway to Anganghsu' should have read 'Japanese troops should occupy Taoang Railway to the main Heilungkiang Station in Tsitsihar City'. Ma replied that the latter station is a station of the Tsike line and not of the Taoang line and asked if Honjo had not made a mistake in mentioning this station'. (End part one).

HPD

ENGERT



F/ 793.94/2698

NOV 23 1931

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793.94

WHL

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PEIPING, via N.R.

Dated November 15, 1931.

FROM

Rec'd. 4:35 A.M.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

941, November 15, 10 A.M. (Part Two).

"at three P.M. on November thirteenth a mixed force of about five hundred Japanese infantry, cavalry and artillery attacked a force of Heilungkiang troops at Tang Chih and Wu Lin No - Erh near San Chien Fang and after a struggle lasting three hours, owing to superior equipment, killed many and forced the remainder of the Chinese troops to fall back".

Two. I am inclined to believe authenticity of these telegrams as Chao read them to me from the original Chinese telegram.

Three. Chao is certain this attack is preliminary to violent Japanese attacks tomorrow and the day after" (End message).

For the Minister

ENGERT

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

November 16, 1931.

AMEMBASSY,

PARIS (FRANCE).

For Ambassador/Dawps,

For your information, The American Consul General,

at Harbin reports under date of November 14 that Chinese official (at Harbin) has shown him telegrams from General Ma of November 13 and 14 in which Ma states that QUOTE at three P.M. on November thirteenth a mixed force of about five hundred Japanese infantry, cavalry and artillery attacked a force of Heilungkiang troops at Tang Chih and Wu Lin No - Erh near San Chien Fang and after a struggle lasting three hours, owing to superior equipment, killed many and forced the remainder of the Chinese troops to fall back UNQUOTE. *END (HAY)*

was Hanson is inclined to *regard the telegram as* accept this report as authentic. His Chinese informant believed the attack reported to be preliminary to violent Japanese attacks intended for the next and succeeding days.)

FE:SKH:LM

FE

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____ 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

This cable was sent *CONFIDENTIAL CODE*.
It should be carefully paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone.

555

793.94/2698

158

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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AM

PLAIN

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

RECEIVED

NOV 1 1931

DIVISION OF
EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Dated November 16, 1931

NOV 18 1931

Received 6:35 a.m.
DIVISION OF
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

NOV 16 1931

Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

949, November 16.

Do you wish me to telegraph occasional important

Reuter and other news reports from Moscow regarding
Sino-Japanese conflict or do you get them from other
sources?

For the Minister

ENGERT

F/ 793.94/2699

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
1581

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) *
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793-94

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 13, 1931.



Digest of
Newspaper Items.

NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE:

"Three-hour battle occurred in Nonni River area, with Japanese suffering casualties, and Chinese reported to have Russian ammunition and "international Communist" soldiers at their command; Japanese ordered Chinese to evacuate Tsitsihar, latter complained at Geneva.

"Briand again called on China and Japan to end aggression, proposing that League observers investigate Manchurian situation; Washington indicated that its hope lies in agreement at Paris on Monday on a plan for direct negotiation.

"American Methodist hospital at Tientsin was fired on and Americans were ordered to a safer zone; the rioting was reported to be a screen for Japanese attempt to put Henry Pu-yi, "Boy Emperor" of China, on Manchu throne in Mukden."

NEW YORK TIMES:

Tsitsihar despatch dated November 12 (Hallett Abend).

General Ma Chen-shan, whose army of 12,000 is intrenched south of Tsitsihar, has sent a detail of men to confront General Chang Hai-peng, independence leader, whose troops have crossed the C.E.R. tracks at Genghis Khan station and other points west of Angangchi.

The countryside within a radius of 50 miles of Tsitsihar and Angangchi is reported picked bare by Ma's troops.

Tokyo

F/DEW 793.94/2700

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Tokyo despatch dated November 12 (Hugh Byas).

Headlines state Tokyo to be losing hope of averting a clash in the vicinity of the Nonni River bridge. The danger of a double attack on Japanese forces by Ma Chen-shan in the north and the troops of Chang Hsueh-liang in the south is feared. Telegraphic messages are reported to have been intercepted indicating this to be the plan.

Japanese headquarters in Manchuria announces that a force of 2,000 partizans made up of Chinese, Koreans and Soviet Russians has arrived at Tsitsihar from Heiho. Headquarters also states that 16 freight cars with munitions arrived at Tsitsihar from Soviet territory.

The voice of Geneva and even Tokyo are only faintly heard in Manchurian camps, writes Mr. Byas, and, although the War Office has expressed confidence that the Nonni River area will remain peaceful, the Foreign Office is anxious over the situation.

The fact that Japanese reenforcements for the Nonni River area were countermanded upon the cessation of hostilities is strong evidence that no large operations in that area were planned by the Japanese. There are no more than 1,500 Japanese troops between Taonan and the Nonni River.

The new brigade 4,000 strong will leave Hiroasaki on the 13th. It consists of two infantry, one artillery and one cavalry regiment.

Foreign

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)*
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

Foreign military attachés are to leave for Manchuria upon the completion of the grand manoeuvres.

Japan recognizes that the State Department is "making strong efforts to create a favorable atmosphere for Paris to destroy the impression of Japan against the world, which Geneva left".

Baron Shidehara "agrees with Mr. Stimson" that the delicate documents exchanged between the two governments should not be published. Mr. Stimson's description of the Japanese message as "conciliatory in tone" is reciprocated by tributes to the friendly language in the American communication.

Great Britain continues to be attacked in the press for supporting China to her own economic advantage in spite of Ambassador Lindley's denials.

Tokyo despatch dated November 12 (AP). A new battle was reported at Kungchuling north of Mukden. Fifty Chinese killed and 300 reported wounded.

Shanghai despatch dated November 12. Chinese are reported to be blocked by Japanese when hunting rebels near the Japanese concession. A sino-Japanese joint patrol has been organized, however, and conditions are approaching normal.

The Japanese have invoked the agreement of 1902 by which China agreed not to station troops within seven miles of the foreign troops in Tientsin. The note demands the immediate

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

immediate withdrawal of Chinese troops to the stipulated distance or "my Government will take the necessary measures to protect the Japanese concession".

Manchester, England, November 12 (AP). British trade has improved with Chinese boycott against Japan. Cotton sales have jumped 100 per cent and 40,000 idle have been given mill jobs. Other factors have, of course, contributed to this improvement.

Washington despatch, November 12. The United States Government centers its hopes for peace in Manchuria on the meeting of the League Council in Paris on Monday. Both countries will be urged to agree to a basis for direct negotiations, with an arrangement for Japanese evacuation, probably under neutral observers.

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FE:AGL:EJL

1585

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) *
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

NOV 10 1931

DIVISION OF

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 12, 1931.

Digest of
Newspaper Items.

NEW YORK TIMES:

"Manchurian Developments. -- While Japan was ordering fresh troops into Manchuria yesterday, the other world powers were making preparations for the League Council meeting in Paris on Monday.

"Washington announced Ambassador Dawes will act for us in a consultative capacity. London is sending Sir John Simon and Lord Cecil. Tokyo, on its part, started a campaign to win the good-will of the other nations.

"In Tientsin 200 Chinese rebels seized Nankai University, and two schools were abandoned because of shelling by the Japanese.

"Martial law was declared in Peiping, Shanghai and Hankow, because of disturbances and fears of revolt."

Geneva despatch of November 11 (AP) reports China to have informed the League of a new Japanese offensive in the Nonni River Bridge area.

Tokyo despatch of November 11 (AP) announces that four destroyers and one cruiser have been despatched to Port Arthur.

Tokyo despatch of November 11 (Hugh Byas) announces the recall of the mixed brigade sent from Korea to Manchuria and the replacement of this "fatigued" force by a similar force formed from the eighth division at Aomori. A War Office statement gives a number of precedents for

sending

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793.94/2701

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

sending troops among which are included the sending of British troops to Shanghai and U. S. Marines to Nicaragua. Care will be taken, it is said, not to exceed the treaty strength. The Japanese statement puts their casualties in Manchuria to date as 129 killed, 302 wounded and 6 missing.

According to Mr. Byas, a Foreign Office spokesman stated that a list of treaty violations were being prepared and instructions being sent to Japanese representatives in various countries to counteract the impression that Japan will compromise. "Japan will make no concessions", said the spokesman. Mr. Byas does not believe Japan to be bluffing.

Paris press despatches indicate Mr. Yoshizawa to be considering a system whereby the negotiations will be divided into two sections - Mr. Yoshizawa, Mr. Matsudaira and Dr. Alfred Sze to discuss Japan's five points while local negotiations will discuss evacuation in Manchuria.

Mukden despatch of November 11 (AP) states that repairs on the Nonni River Bridge are steadily going forward behind a screen of Japanese infantry. Chinese continue to concentrate troops and prepare the defenses of Tsitsihar.

Washington despatch of November 11 announces the storming of Nankai University by 200 "armed rebels" at 2 a.m. of that date. American and Chinese schools outside of the concessions were abandoned for fear of renewed fighting.

Washington

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Huston NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

Washington despatch of November 11 states the willingness of China to engage in direct negotiation with China to be open to debate. A strong effort to get the disputants together, however, is to be made.

London despatch of November 11 (Charles A. Selden) states that Mr. Dawes began conferences on that date with the British Foreign Secretary, Sir John Simon, and the French Ambassador.

This article states that the British Government is particularly anxious to preserve the appearance of absolute impartiality. The apparent bias of Viscount Cecil at Geneva created a feeling in Tokyo that Britain was championing China. There is a growing feeling in Great Britain, Mr. Selden writes, in favor of Japan.

Paris despatch of November 11 quotes Ambassador Yoshizawa as saying that Japan must insist on her treaty rights but both the Government and the people desire that relations with China be brought back to a normal state.

Special article by Colonel Frederick Palmer holds war for Manchuria still remote though struggle with Russia will come at some future date.

Article in the NEW YORK TIMES gives a letter to President Hoover signed by 161 prominent men and women of the United States commending the President for supporting the League of Nations in the Manchurian controversy.

Moscow

- 4 -

Moscow despatch of November 11 (Walter Duranty)
credits Soviet Government with feeling that Japan is
trying to bluff Geneva and Washington into believing in a
"Red" menace. She resents this strongly but she does not
believe Japan wants war with Russia..

Geneva despatch of November 11 (AP) reports League
officials to be heartened by brief reports of Mr. Hoover's
Armistice Speech. Observers interpreted the President's
statement that peace "cannot be had by resolution and
injunction alone" to mean that the United States is pre-
pared to take a more strong position even than the League
Council in mediating the Sino-Japanese dispute. Consider-
able speculation is reported to exist in Geneva as to
exact meaning of this part of the speech.

AGL
FEVAGL:EJL

158c

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 11, 1931.

Digest of
Newspaper Items.

NEW YORK TIMES:

"Developments in Manchuria. -- While Chinese troops continued massing in Northern Manchuria yesterday, threatening open warfare against the Japanese, Tokyo again refused to modify her present policy or recall her troops.

"In a reply to the representations made to our envoy in Tokyo last week the Japanese Foreign Minister told Secretary Stimson Japan could not alter her demand for security in Manchuria.

"More evidences of extensive Soviet support of the Chinese Manchurian army were reported from Tsitsihar yesterday."

Tokyo despatch of November 10 (Hugh Byas) indicates that Japan, having taken her stand, has no intention of receding therefrom. A strong resolution was passed November 10 by the Seiyukai members of Parliament recommending Japan to withdraw from the League rather than accede to the League demands that she withdraw her troops. The resolution indicates that in case of a change of government the next cabinet will prove equally determined on the Manchuria question.

Rumors of Soviet military activity pour in from Harbin and Mukden but are disregarded by the Tokyo Government which relies upon the Soviet Foreign Minister's statements.

Bandit

F/DEW 793.94/2702

- 2 -

Bandit activities are greatly on the increase in districts not actually controlled by Japanese troops.

The Japanese press reproduces any articles from British Conservative papers supporting the Japanese stand. Some papers even issue extras containing favorable cabled comment. The papers have not grasped, according to Mr. Byas, the League's point that "negotiation under military occupation is contrary to the new diplomacy." Virtually all Japan feels the action of the League to be interference on the wrong side of a question which is not within its sphere.

It has now become known that Japan will object to the restoration of Chang Hsueh-liang's military government and the question, therefore, now becomes important to all nations interested in the maintenance of China's territorial integrity.

Canton, writes Mr. Abend, has proposed that a government under a civilian high commissioner subject to the central Chinese Government be set up in Manchuria. Mr. Tang Shao-yi was mentioned as a possibility for the office. The Japanese Foreign Office apparently views the suggestion with some favor as the special position of Japan in Manchuria would be recognized.

Tokyo despatch, November 10 (AP), indicates despatches have been received by the War Office from Mukden to the effect that General Chang Hsueh-liang is planning

to

- 3 -

to attack the South Manchuria Railway. The despatch quotes the official report as follows:

"General Ma Chen-shan's troops concentrated in the region around Anganchi number about 12,000, with thirty-one field guns. This force is planning to assume the offensive against the Japanese.

"In North Manchuria, especially at Harbin, anti-Japanese sentiment is growing rife again, causing uneasiness to Japanese residents at various points.

"General Chang Hsueh-liang on Nov. 7 ordered General Jangchin, who is at Chinchow in command of 17,000 troops, to communicate with General Ma to plan an offensive. (General Jangchin is General Chang's Chief of Staff.)

"It is obvious that General Chang is planning to disturb the peace by inciting bandits along the South Manchuria Railway."

Tsitsihar despatch of November 10 (Hallett Abend) states that contrary to the numerous rumors that Russians are serving in the forces of General Ma Chen-shan no such persons have been seen among his troops. Mr. Abend states the Chinese and Japanese trenches to be six miles apart.

Geneva despatch dated November 10 reports Dr. Alfred Sze as having informed the League of Nations that unless the United States and the League succeed in settling the Manchurian dispute the Chinese Government will be compelled to obtain respect through the building up of powerful armaments and will not be able to comply with the one-year armament truce proposal made by the last League assembly. Thus the Geneva Conference on

disarmament

- 4 -

disarmament will necessarily be a failure.

Washington report of November 10 states \$30,000,000 in gold will be shipped by the Yokohama Specie Bank to the United States during the coming week despite the bad financial situation in Japan. The report was received from the American Commercial Attaché at Tokyo. Two reasons advanced for this shipment were Japan's efforts to remain on a gold basis and her unfavorable balance of trade during a period which usually shows a favorable trade balance.

A report from Mr. Arnold, Commercial Attaché at Shanghai, states that the boycott of Japanese goods is gaining momentum in North China. Decline in Japanese trade at Shanghai is estimated at 75%.

Washington despatch of November 10 reports Japan to be holding firmly to the five points enunciated on October 26 and quotes Ambassador Debuchi as saying:

"Mutual repudiation of aggressive policy and conduct; respect for China's territorial integrity; complete suppression of all organized movements interfering with freedom of trade and stirring up international hatred; effective protection throughout Manchuria of all peaceful pursuits undertaken by Japanese subjects, and respect for treaty rights of Japanese in Manchuria."

Diplomatic observers are reported to feel that the situation is not insoluble provided events in the Far East do not render all diplomatic efforts futile.

No reports of new moves by the United States have had official confirmation. One rumor which to quote the

despatch

- 5 -

despatch "had some official authority" was that the United States had made representations under the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922. This was later authoritatively denied.

Chicago despatch of November 10 quotes Senator Walsh of Montana as denouncing the critics of the President both on his naval policy and his attitude in the Manchuria troubles. Senator Walsh is reported to have said that while it would be possible for the United States to become involved in the quarrel while playing the role of peace maker, it was no greater than that of our being drawn in should we let the fight get under way.

A-92

FE:AGL:EJL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PM RECD

NOV 16 1931 Political.



AMERICAN CONSULATE,

Geneva, Switzerland, October 30, 1931.

NOV 14 31

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.



793.94

SUBJECT: Memorandum on the Negotiations in the Sino-Japanese Conflict from October 18 to October 24, 1931.

OR DISTRIBUTION


	Yes	No
CHECK	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

WASHINGTON.

SIR:



I have the honor to enclose a memorandum prepared by Sir Eric Drummond indicating the various stages of the Council's negotiations in the Sino-Japanese Conflict since Sunday, October 18, which led up to the drafting and presenting of the final resolution approved on Saturday, October 24, by all the members of the Council with the exception of the Japanese representative.

In transmitting this memorandum Sir Eric explained that, in view of the many rumors which have been circulating in regard to the negotiations, he thought it might be useful for me to have on file a brief factual summary of the stages of the negotiations as they actually took place. He is sending this paper also to the members of the Committee of Five.

Although

F/DEW

793.94/2703

- 2 -

Although the Consulate has reported fully on the successive steps of the negotiations as they occurred, the Department may find this summary helpful for ready reference in any analysis which may be made of the events which took place at Geneva during that period. The proposals contained in annexes "E" and "F", although referred to in the Consulate's telegrams, were not quoted, as the texts were not then available, since they formed a part of the last minute negotiations of a rather informal and personal nature between Briand and the Japanese on Saturday afternoon, October 24, just before the last meeting of the Council. Annex "B" is the "Interim Resolution" referred to in several telegrams, particularly No. 240, dated October 22, 9.A.M., which formed the basis of negotiations for only one day, October 21, and of which at that time only a draft French text had been drawn up.

Respectfully yours,

Prentiss B. Gilbert

Prentiss B. Gilbert.
American Consul.

✓ 5
JM
Enclosure:

Memorandum by Sir Eric Drummond, dated
October 28, 1931, with Annexes A, B, C,
D, E, and F.

Original and Five Copies to Department of State.
One Copy to American Legation, Berne, Switzerland.

159F

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1
with No 164 Pol. 61
Oct. 30 1931.

M E M O R A N D U M

On the 18th October, the Council, minus the two Parties, approved a resolution (Annex A), which was to form the basis of negotiations between the President, M. Briand, and the two Parties. The President, in his discussions with the Japanese Delegation, found that they were very insistent on security being linked up with evacuation. M. Briand stated that if the security point desired by the Japanese could be confined solely to security for their residents in Manchuria, and particularly in the evacuated districts, he would be prepared to recommend to the Council that direct negotiations on these points should be begun between the Chinese and Japanese Governments. The Japanese Delegation seemed to consider that such a proposal was not outside the bounds of possibility, and they promised to consult their Government. So favorable did their attitude appear that the President had drafted an amended resolution on these lines (Annex B), and submitted it to the Committee of Five for approval.

The Committee of Five agreed to the terms on the morning of Wednesday, the 21st October. On Wednesday afternoon, however, the Japanese Delegation informed M. Briand that they must insist on the inclusion of an "undertaking by the Chinese Government to fulfil the obligations which China owes to Japan under the existing treaties between those two countries relating to railways in Manchuria", as one of the security conditions. M. Briand said that unhappily he could not agree

1597

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1
with No 164 Pol. CI
Oct. 30 1931.

M E M O R A N D U M

On the 18th October, the Council, minus the two Parties, approved a resolution (Annex A), which was to form the basis of negotiations between the President, M. Briand, and the two Parties. The President, in his discussions with the Japanese Delegation, found that they were very insistent on security being linked up with evacuation. M. Briand stated that if the security point desired by the Japanese could be confined solely to security for their residents in Manchuria, and particularly in the evacuated districts, he would be prepared to recommend to the Council that direct negotiations on these points should be begun between the Chinese and Japanese Governments. The Japanese Delegation seemed to consider that such a proposal was not outside the bounds of possibility, and they promised to consult their Government. So favorable did their attitude appear that the President had drafted an amended resolution on these lines (Annex B), and submitted it to the Committee of Five for approval.

The Committee of Five agreed to the terms on the morning of Wednesday, the 21st October. On Wednesday afternoon, however, the Japanese Delegation informed M. Briand that they must insist on the inclusion of an "undertaking by the Chinese Government to fulfil the obligations which China owes to Japan under the existing treaties between those two countries relating to railways in Manchuria", as one of the security conditions. M. Briand said that unhappily he could not agree

- 2 -

agree that this fell directly within the domain of security, and therefore he felt that the Japanese Government had rejected his proposal. (It should be noted that M. Briand's proposal was exactly the same as what has been called my proposal. There was no difference between the two, and with M. Briand's proposal my proposal, equally, lapsed.)

When the President learned of the definite rejection of his suggestion, he asked that a new draft should be made of the Sunday resolution, making it more concise and clear. This was done, and on Thursday morning, the 22nd October, that draft was submitted to the Committee of Five, and later to all the Members of the Council, with the exception of the two Parties. It was communicated, however, about lunch time to the two Parties, (Annex C), and was submitted by the President to a Public Meeting of the Council in the late afternoon.

M. Yoshizawa put forward in the Council a counter-proposal (Annex D). There were, thus, two proposals before the Council. On Saturday afternoon, the 24th October, when M. Yoshizawa had found that his counter-proposal was not likely to command any support, he sent M. Ito to see the French Delegation, and to suggest an addition to the counter-proposal (Annex E). M. Briand regretted that he found that addition unacceptable, and the French Delegation suggested, purely personally, a modified form of Articles 4 and 5 of the Council resolution (Annex F). The Japanese Delegation seemed very much interested in this proposal, and asked that the Council Meeting might be adjourned for an hour to give

them

- 3 -

them time to consider it. But ultimately they stated that they could only agree to it if, in the first part of paragraph 4, after the words "les arrangements nécessaires" were added "sur les points fondamentaux". The French Delegation stated that they felt convinced that the Council could not accept this proposal, and the amendment then dropped, with the ultimate result that the resolution of the Council was adopted by 13 votes to one, Japanese opposition preventing the necessary unanimity from being acquired.

28th October 1931.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No 2
with No 164 P.H. of
Oct. 30 1931.

ANNEX A

CONFIDENTIAL.

DRAFT RESOLUTION.

The Council, in pursuance of the resolution passed
on the 30th September,

(1) Having requested the parties to do all in their
power to hasten the restoration of normal relations
between them, trusts that henceforward neither party
will resort to aggressive policy or action and that the
two Governments will take every possible measure for
the suppression of hostile agitation, and notes the
assurances already given on this point;

(2) Having noted the statement of the Japanese
representative that the Japanese Government would con-
tinue as rapidly as possible the withdrawal of its troops
into the railway zone in proportion as the safety of the
lives and property of Japanese nationals is effectively
assured, and the statement of the Chinese representative
that his Government will assume the responsibility for
the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nation-
als outside that zone, assumes that the pledge of the
Chinese Government includes the extension of efficient
protection to Japanese subjects residing in Manchuria;

(3) Having recognized the importance of the
Japanese statement that Japan has no territorial designs
in Manchuria, notes that this statement is in accordance
with the terms of the Covenant of the League of Nations
and

Enclosure No. 2
with No 164 Pol. of
Att. 30 19 31.

ANNEX A

CONFIDENTIAL.

DRAFT RESOLUTION.

The Council, in pursuance of the resolution passed
on the 30th September,

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power to hasten the restoration of normal relations
between them, trusts that henceforward neither party
will resort to aggressive policy or action and that the
two Governments will take every possible measure for
the suppression of hostile agitation, and notes the
assurances already given on this point;

(2) Having noted the statement of the Japanese
representative that the Japanese Government would con-
tinue as rapidly as possible the withdrawal of its troops
into the railway zone in proportion as the safety of the
lives and property of Japanese nationals is effectively
assured, and the statement of the Chinese representative
that his Government will assume the responsibility for
the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nation-
als outside that zone, assumes that the pledge of the
Chinese Government includes the extension of efficient
protection to Japanese subjects residing in Manchuria;

(3) Having recognized the importance of the
Japanese statement that Japan has no territorial designs
in Manchuria, notes that this statement is in accordance
with the terms of the Covenant of the League of Nations
and

- 2 -

and of the Nine-Power Treaty, the signatories of which are pledged "to respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China";

(4) Considers that these engagements and the agreements of the Chinese and Japanese representatives to the interpretation placed upon them by the Council are of a nature to facilitate the restitution of normal relations between the two parties, but that the establishment of such relations cannot be secured until the decisions taken by the Council in its resolution of the 30th September are fully executed;

(5) Calls upon the Japanese Government to begin immediately and to proceed progressively with the withdrawal of its troops into the railway zone so that the total withdrawal can be effected within a maximum period of three weeks from the date of the present resolution;

(6) Calls upon the Chinese Government to make such arrangements for taking over the territory thus evacuated as will ensure the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals there, and further requests the Chinese Government to associate with the Chinese authorities designated for the above purpose representatives of other Powers in order that such representatives may follow the execution of the arrangements;

(7) Recommends that the Chinese ^{and} Japanese Governments should immediately appoint representatives to arrange the details of the execution of all points relating

to

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) *
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

to the evacuation and the taking over of the evacuated territory so that they may proceed smoothly and without delay;

(8) Notes the formal engagement of China and Japan that on the day on which evacuation is completed direct negotiations will begin between the two Governments on questions outstanding between them, including those raised by the occupation of the territory, as well as existing difficulties arising out of the railway situation in Manchuria, a practical solution of which should be sought by means of arrangements between the Chinese and Japanese railway administrations.

* * *

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No 3

with No 164901 of
Oct. 30 1931.

ANNEX B.

CONFIDENTIAL.

DRAFT RESOLUTION

October 21, 1931.

The Council, in pursuance of the resolution passed on the 30th September, and noting that the Governments Members of the Council have invoked the 2nd article of the Pact of Paris :

(1) Having requested the parties to do all in their power to hasten the restoration of normal relations between them, trusts that henceforward neither party will resort to aggressive policy or action, and that the two Governments will take every possible measure for the suppression of hostile agitation, and notes the assurances already given on this point;

(2) Having noted the statement of the Japanese Representative that the Japanese Government would continue as rapidly as possible the withdrawal of its troops into the railway zone in proportion as the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals is effectively assured, and the statement of the Chinese Representative that his Government will assume the responsibility for the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals outside that zone, assumes that the pledge of the Chinese Government includes the extension of efficient protection to Japanese subjects residing in Manchuria;

(3)

- 2 -

(3) Having recognized the importance of the Japanese statement that Japan has no territorial designs in Manchuria, notes that this statement is in accordance with the terms of the Covenant of the League of Nations and of the Nine Power Treaty, the signatories of which are pledged "to respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China";

(4) Considers that these engagements and the agreement of the Chinese and Japanese Representatives to the interpretation placed upon them by the Council are of a nature to facilitate the restoration of normal relations between the two parties, but that the establishment of such relations cannot be secured until the decisions taken by the Council in its resolution of the 30th September are finally executed;

(5) Recognizes to its regret that the fulfilment of the pledges given to the Council has not yet been effected, owing to the exceptional conditions of the case;

(6) Notes the undertaking given on behalf of the Chinese and Japanese Governments that, in order to give full effect to the resolution of the 30th September, they will immediately appoint representatives to seek common agreement for the purpose of ensuring that arrangements are made both with regard to the withdrawal of the troops and to the assurance of the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals which will allow the completion of the evacuation with the minimum of delay;

(7)

- 3 -

(7) Decides, in order to allow sufficient time for such agreement and the consequential complete evacuation, to adjourn till the 12th November, but authorizes its President to convoke a meeting at any earlier date should it in his opinion be desirable to do so;

(8) Requests the two parties to furnish the Council through the Secretary General with full information as to the progress of the negotiations and of the evacuation, and asks the Members of the Council to continue to supply all possible information bearing on the development of the situation, and asks the two Governments to continue to give facilities to the representatives of Members of the Council for this purpose.

The Council having adopted the preceding resolution in the performance of the duty laid upon it by Article 11 of the Covenant to take with the unanimous consent of its Members any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations, earnestly calls the attention of the Chinese and Japanese Governments to the desirability of creating some machinery, such as a Permanent Conciliation Commission, whereby any further questions arising out of the present incident, and all other questions at issue between them, may be speedily and amicably settled, after the complete evacuation has taken place.

* * *

Annex C

Enclosure No 4
with No 164 Pol. of
Oct. 30 1931

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the
Council.

C.746.1931.VII.
Geneva,

October 22nd, 1931.

APPEAL BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11
OF THE COVENANT.

DRAFT RESOLUTION.

The Council, in pursuance of the resolution passed on September 30th, and noting that in addition to the invocation by the Government of China, of Article 11 of the Covenant, Article 2 of the Pact of Paris has also been invoked by a number of Governments,

(1) Recalls the undertakings given to the Council by the Governments of China and Japan in that resolution, and in particular the statement of the Japanese Representative that the Japanese Government would continue as rapidly as possible the withdrawal of its troops into the railway zone in proportion as the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals is effectively assured, and the statement of the Chinese Representative that his Government will assume the responsibility for the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals outside that zone - a pledge which implies the effective protection of Japanese subjects residing in Manchuria;

(2) Recalls further that both Governments have given the assurance that they would refrain from any measures which might aggravate the existing situation, and are therefore bound not to resort to any aggressive policy or action and to take measures to suppress hostile agitation;

(3) Recalls the Japanese statement that Japan has no territorial designs in Manchuria, and notes that this statement is in accordance with the terms of the Covenant of the League of Nations and of the Nine Power Treaty, the signatories of which are pledged "to respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China";

(4) Being convinced that the fulfilment of these assurances and undertakings is essential for the restoration of normal relations between the two parties;

a) Calls upon the Japanese Government to begin immediately and to proceed progressively with the withdrawal of its troops into the railway zone, so that the total withdrawal may be effected before the date fixed for the next meeting of the Council.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

(b) Calls upon the Chinese Government, in execution of its general pledge to assume the responsibility for the safety and lives of all Japanese subjects resident in Manchuria, to make such arrangements for taking over the territory thus evacuated as will ensure the safety of the lives and property of Japanese subjects there, and requests the Chinese Government to associate with the Chinese authorities designated for the above purpose representatives of other Powers in order that such representatives may follow the execution of the arrangements;

(5) Recommends that the Chinese and Japanese Governments should immediately appoint representatives to arrange the details of the execution of all points relating to the evacuation and the taking over of the evacuated territory so that they may proceed smoothly and without delay;

(6) Recommends the Chinese and Japanese Governments as soon as the evacuation is completed, to begin direct negotiations on questions outstanding between them, and in particular those arising out of recent incidents as well as those relating to existing difficulties due to the railway situation in Manchuria. For this purpose the Council suggests that the two parties should set up a conciliation committee or some such permanent machinery.

(7) Decides to adjourn till November 16th, at which date it will again examine the situation, but authorises its President to convoke a meeting at any earlier date should it in his opinion be desirable.

Enclosure No 5
with No 164981 of
Oct. 30 1931

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

C.753.1931.VII.

Geneva,

October 23rd, 1931.

Communicated to
the Council.

APPEAL BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11
OF THE COVENANT.

Amendment to the draft Resolution submitted
by the Japanese Delegation.

(*C.746.1931.VII).

*The Council, in pursuance of the resolution passed on September 30th, and noting that in addition to the invocation by the Government of China, of Article 11 of the Covenant, Article 2 of the Pact of Paris has also been invoked by a number of Governments,

(1) Recalls the undertakings given to the Council by the Governments of China and Japan in that resolution, and in particular the statement of the Japanese Representative that the Japanese Government would continue as rapidly as possible the withdrawal of its troops into the railway zone in proportion as the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals is effectively assured, and the statement of the Chinese Representative that his Government will assume the responsibility for the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals outside that zone - a pledge which implies the effective protection of Japanese subjects residing in Manchuria;

(2) Recalls further that both Governments have given the assurance that they would refrain from any measures which might aggravate the existing situation, and are therefore bound not to resort to any aggressive policy or action and to take measures to suppress hostile agitation;

(3) Recalls the statement of the Japanese Representative that Japan has no territorial designs in Manchuria, and notes that this statement is in accordance with the terms of the Covenant of the League of Nations and of the Nine Power Treaty, the signatories of which are pledged "to respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China";

(4) Again notes the statement by the Representative of Japan made on October 13th to the effect that the Japanese Government would withdraw those of its troops still remaining in a few localities outside the said zone as the present atmosphere of tension clears and the situation improves, by the achievement of a previous understanding between the Chinese and Japanese Governments as regards the fundamental principles

* The first three paragraphs of this text correspond to the first three paragraphs of document C.746.1931.VII.

Enclosure No 5
with No 164981.01
Oct. 30 1931

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

C.753.1931.VII.

Geneva,

October 23rd, 1931.

Communicated to
the Council.

APPEAL BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11
OF THE COVENANT.

*
Amendment to the draft Resolution submitted
by the Japanese Delegation.

(*C.746.1931.VII).

*The Council, in pursuance of the resolution passed on September 30th, and noting that in addition to the invocation by the Government of China, of Article 11 of the Covenant, Article 2 of the Pact of Paris has also been invoked by a number of Governments,

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(2) Recalls further that both Governments have given the assurance that they would refrain from any measures which might aggravate the existing situation, and are therefore bound not to resort to any aggressive policy or action and to take measures to suppress hostile agitation;

(3) Recalls the statement of the Japanese Representative that Japan has no territorial designs in Manchuria, and notes that this statement is in accordance with the terms of the Covenant of the League of Nations and of the Nine Power Treaty, the signatories of which are pledged "to respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China";

(4) Again notes the statement by the Representative of Japan made on October 13th to the effect that the Japanese Government would withdraw those of its troops still remaining in a few localities outside the said zone as the present atmosphere of tension clears and the situation improves, by the achievement of a previous understanding between the Chinese and Japanese Governments as regards the fundamental principles

* The first three paragraphs of this text correspond to the first three paragraphs of document C.746.1931.VII.

- 2 -

0
governing normal relations, that is to say, affording an assurance for the safety of the lives of Japanese nationals and for the protection of their property;

(5) Recommends the Chinese and Japanese Governments to confer together at once with a view to arriving at the understanding mentioned in paragraph 4;

(6) Recommends the Chinese and Japanese Governments to appoint representatives to arrange the details of execution of the evacuation and of taking over the districts evacuated;

(7) Asks the Chinese and Japanese Governments to be so good as to keep the Council informed of the progress of the negotiations between them and the position as regards the execution of the present resolution;

(8) Authorizes its President to take, after examination of the above communications, all such measures as he may think necessary to ensure the carrying out of the present resolution, and to convene the Council at any time with a view to a fresh examination of the position.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Council.

C.753.1931.VII. Erratum.

Geneva,

October 24th, 1931.

APPEAL BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Amendments to the draft Resolution (C.746.1931.VII.)

submitted by the Japanese Delegation.

Paragraph 3 This paragraph should read as follows:

"Recalls the statement of the Japanese Representative that Japan has no territorial designs in Manchuria, and notes that this statement is in accordance with the spirit of the Covenant of the League of Nations....."

The footnote at the bottom of page 1 of C.753.1931.VII. should therefore be suppressed.

Communiqué au Conseil.

C.753.1931.VII. Erratum.

APPEL DU GOUVERNEMENT CHINOIS EN VERTU DE L'ARTICLE 11 DU PACTE.

Amendements au projet de Résolution (C.746.1931.VII.)

présentés par la Délégation japonaise.

Le texte français est juste, mais la note en bas de la première page du document C.753.1931.VII devrait être supprimée.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 12958, Sec. 3(A) and 3(D) or (E)
 Department of State Letter, August 18, 1972
 by Milton O. Gustafson NARS. Date: 12-18-75

6
 164 104
 104 304
 ANNEX E.

CONFIDENTIAL.

I T O P R O P O S A L

October 21, 1931.

(5) Notes the statement by the Representative of China to the effect that the immediate withdrawal of the Japanese troops is essential and that his Government is prepared to appoint representatives to enter into negotiations with the Japanese Government regarding the details of the evacuation and the taking over of the localities evacuated;

(6) Recommends that the Chinese and Japanese Governments appoint qualified representatives immediately to enter simultaneously into negotiations with regard to the preliminary agreement desired by the Japanese Government, and with regard to the withdrawal of the Japanese troops and the taking over of the evacuated localities desired by the Chinese Government.

* * *

1614

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 4
with No 164 of
Vol. 30 1931.

ANNEX F

CONFIDENTIAL.

COUNTER PROPOSAL OF FRENCH DELEGATION
OF OCTOBER 24.

(4) Being convinced that the fulfilment of these assurances and undertakings is essential for the restoration of normal relations between the two Parties, invites the Chinese and Japanese Governments to appoint immediately representatives to conclude the necessary arrangements for ensuring the practical execution of all operations of evacuation and re-occupation before the next meeting of the Council, involving

(a) For the Chinese Government, in execution of its general pledge in regard to the protection of the lives and property of Japanese subjects in Manchuria, the obligation to adopt immediately with a view to the taking over of the territory evacuated such arrangements as will ensure the safety of the lives of Japanese subjects residing there and the protection of their property;

(b) For the Japanese Government, the obligation to begin and to proceed progressively with the withdrawal of its troops within the railway zone, keeping pace with the steps taken by the Chinese Government to ensure effectively the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals in the territory evacuated.

(5)

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
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)*
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gutzman NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -


(5) Requests the Chinese Government to associate with the Chinese authorities designated for the above purpose representatives of other Powers in order that such representatives may follow the execution of the arrangements.

* * *

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



November 16, 1931.



NOV 16 31

*Letter drafted
to Interior, November 24, 1931
Smt*

My dear Mr. Secretary:

Upon my return to the city, I found another cable-gram from David Z. T. Yui, copy of which is attached, and which is self-explanatory.

Sincerely yours,

Rogers

Hon. Henry L. Stimson,
Secretary of State.

Inclosure. ✓

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COPY

Postal Telegraph

Shanghai, 1150 A Nov. 12, 1931.

LCO Wilbur

Interior Washington

JAPANESE MILITARY AGGRESSION AND UNSCRUPULOUS INTRIGUES INCREASE
FROM HOUR TO HOUR JAPAN CONTINUES TO VIOLATE TREATY AGREEMENTS AND
STUBBORNLY TO DEFY LEAGUE MEDIATION DEADLOCK EXCEEDINGLY DANGEROUS
IN ORDER TO STRENGTHEN KELLOGG PACT NINE POWER TREATY TO SAVE ALL
INSTRUMENTALITIES FOR PACIFIC SETTLEMENT INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES CON-
FLICTS AND TO ASSURE CHINA AND JAPAN JUST PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT WE
APPEAL THROUGH YOU TO AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE IN CONSULTATION
WITH LEAGUE EARLY TO CONVENE SECOND WASHINGTON CONFERENCE PLEASE FORWARD
MESSAGE TO HOOVER STIMSON HORNBECK ALEXANDER MOTT SHOTWELL CHINESE
CHAMBER COMMERCE HEARTILY SUPPORTS THIS APPEAL.

DAVID YUI.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BUREAU OF INDEXES AND ARCHIVES

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR

WASHINGTON
November 16, 1931

1931 November 16, 1931.

DIVISION OF

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

NOV 19 1931

Department of State

*Letter drafted
to Secy of Interior
Nov. 21, 1931*

Dear Mr. Hornbeck:

I am inclosing copy of a cablegram which was received in my absence from David Z. T. Yui, which is self-explanatory. I have communicated with the Secretary of State.

Very sincerely yours,

Rafael M. Helmer

Hon. Stanley K. Hornbeck,
Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

Inclosure.

FILED

NOV 27 1931


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1621
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY

Postal Telegraph

Shanghai, 1180 A Nov. 12, 1931.



LCO Wilbur

Interior Washington

JAPANESE MILITARY AGGRESSION AND UNSCRUPULOUS INTRIGUES INCREASE
FROM HOUR TO HOUR JAPAN CONTINUES TO VIOLATE TREATY AGREEMENTS AND
STUBBORNLY TO DEFY LEAGUE MEDIATION DEADLOCK EXCEEDINGLY DANGEROUS
IN ORDER TO STRENGTHEN KELLOGG PACT NINE POWER TREATY TO SAVE ALL
INSTRUMENTALITIES FOR PACIFIC SETTLEMENT INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES CON-
FLICTS AND TO ASSURE CHINA AND JAPAN JUST PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT WE
APPEAL THROUGH YOU TO AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE IN CONSULTATION
WITH LEAGUE EARLY TO CONVENE SECOND WASHINGTON CONFERENCE PLEASE FORWARD
MESSAGE TO HOOVER STIMSON HORNBECK ALEXANDER MOTT SHOTWELL CHINESE
CHAMBER COMMERCE HEARTILY SUPPORTS THIS APPEAL.

DAVID YUI.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

November 25 1931.

In reply refer to
FE

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I have received your letter of November 16, 1931,
enclosing a copy of a telegram dated November 12, 1931,
which was sent you by Mr. David Z. T. Yui. I have noted
Mr. Yui's reference to the desirability of calling a
second Washington conference and wish to thank you for
having brought it to my attention.

Sincerely yours,



The Honorable

Ray Lyman Wilbur,


Secretary of the Interior.

793.94/2704

10-23-1931

FE:RFB:REK
11/21/31

FE



1622

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) "
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lutz NARS, Date 12-18-75

November 24 1931.

In reply refer to
FE

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I wish to acknowledge, with thanks, your letter of November 16, 1931, enclosing a copy of a telegram, dated November 12, 1931, received by you from Mr. David Z. T. Yui. I have noted with interest Mr. Yui's reference to the desirability of calling a second Washington conference in connection with the present dispute between China and Japan.

Sincerely yours,

H. L. STIMSON

793.94/2704

The Honorable

Ray Lyman Wilbur,

Secretary of the Interior.

FE: RPB:REK

11/21/31


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Nov. 23. 1931.7

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 167 Political.

AMERICAN CONSULATE,
 Geneva, Switzerland, November 3, 1931.



SUBJECT: Replies of Chinese and Japanese Governments with
 Reference to the Invocation of Article 2 of the
 Pact of Paris.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
 WASHINGTON.

SIR:


As of possible interest, in case the Department has not
 already received them directly from Tokio and Nanking, I
 1/ have the honor to enclose herewith the texts of the Japanese
 2/ and Chinese replies to the identical telegram sent by the
 British, French and Italian governments on October 17th, 10
 p.m., calling the attention of the two disputants to the prov-
 isions of Article 2 of the Pact of Paris. It is believed
 that there is nothing of unusual significance in these
 replies, which seem to be in each case along the lines which
 might be expected in the circumstances. The Chinese govern-
 ment expresses its thanks for the concern shown in the dev-
 elopment of events in Manchuria, while the Japanese govern-
 ment reiterates its position that it has no intention of
 having recourse to war for the solution of differences

between

F/DEW 793.94/2705

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1621
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

between China and Japan.

Respectfully yours,

Prentiss B. Gilbert
Prentiss B. Gilbert,
American Consul.

✓
Enclosures:

No.1: Copy of Japanese reply.
No.2: Copy of Chinese reply.

Original and 5 copies to Department of State.
1 copy to American Legation, Berne.

COPY.

Enclosure No 1
with No 167 Pd. of
Nov. 3 # 31

ANSWER OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT TO THE IDENTICAL
TELEGRAM SENT BY THE SIGNATORIES OF THE BRIAND-KELLOGG PACT
TO JAPAN AND CHINA.

1. The Japanese Government realise as fully as any other signatories of the Pact of Paris of 1928 the responsibility incurred under the provisions of that solemn Pact. They have made it clear on various occasions that the Japanese Railway guards in taking military measures in Manchuria since the night of September 18th last have been actuated solely by the necessity of defending themselves as well as protecting the South Manchuria Railway and the lives and property of Japanese subjects against wanton attacks by Chinese troops and armed bands. Nothing is farther from the thought of the Japanese Government than to have recourse to war for the solution of their outstanding differences with China.

2. It is their settled aim to compose those differences by all pacific means. In the note of the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Chinese Minister at Tokyo dated October 9th the Japanese Government have already declared their readiness to enter into negotiations with the responsible representatives of China for an adjustment of the present difficulties. They still hold the same view. So far as they are concerned they have no intention whatever of proceeding to any steps that might hamper any efforts intended to assure the pacific settlement of the conflict between Japan and China.

3. On the other hand they have repeatedly called the attention of the Chinese Government to the organised hostile agitation against Japan now in progress in various parts of China. The suspension of all commercial intercourse with Japanese at present practised in China is in no sense a spontaneous act of individual Chinese. It is enforced by the Anti-Japanese organisation that have taken the law into their own hands and are heavily penalising even with the threat of capital punishment any Chinese who may be found disobeying their arbitrary decrees. Acts of violence levelled against Japanese residents also continue unabated in many places under the jurisdiction of the Government of Nanking. It will be manifest to all fair observers of the actual situation that those activities of the Anti-Japanese organisations are acquiesced in by the Chinese Government as a means to attain the national ends of China. The Japanese Government desire to point out that such acquiescence by the Chinese Government in the lawless proceedings of their own nationals cannot be regarded as being in harmony with the letter or the spirit of the stipulations contained in Article 2 of the Pact of Paris.

1625
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY.

Enclosure No 2
with No 167 Pol of
Nov. 3 1931

PERMANENT OFFICE
OF THE CHINESE DELEGATION TO
THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

41, Quai Wilson,
Geneva.

October 21st, 1931.

Your Excellency,

In accordance with instructions received from the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, I have the honour to deliver to you from him the following message:

"The Chinese Government has received from the French Government the communication in which the French Government invites the attention of the Chinese Government to the provisions of the Treaty for the Renunciation of War of August 27th, 1928, and expresses the hope that both the Chinese and Japanese Governments will refrain from taking any steps that might endanger the success of the efforts already in progress to secure a peaceful settlement of the present situation in China.

"The Chinese Government feels thankful to the French Government for the deep concern shown in the development of events in the North Eastern Provinces of China since September 18th, when Japanese troops, in defiance of international law, the Treaty for the Renunciation of War

Son Excellence
Monsieur Aristide Briand,
Etc., etc., etc.

162

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY.

Enclosure No 2
with No 167 Pol of
Nov. 3 1931

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OF THE CHINESE DELEGATION TO
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Son Excellence
Monsieur Aristide Briand,
Etc., etc., etc.

- 2 -

and other international agreements, began their unprovoked attack on Shenyang (Mukden) and other cities. Being desirous of strictly adhering to the undertakings assumed under international treaties, particularly the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Treaty for the Renunciation of War, China has judiciously refrained from employing force to meet the military aggressions of Japan and has been seeking, from the very beginning, a just and adequate settlement by pacific means. We have therefore entrusted our case unreservedly to the League of Nations. We absolutely rely on the solemn engagements contained in the Treaty for the Renunciation of War, the Covenant of the League of Nations and other international agreements designed for the maintenance of peace, in the belief that Japan will be awakened to her legal as well as moral duty to human civilization.

"The Chinese Government sincerely hopes that the active efforts now in progress in Geneva to arrive at a settlement of the present case in the interests of justice and peace, will soon be crowned with success which will be conducive to the well-being not only of China but of the whole world. The Chinese Government will persist in its own efforts to seek the settlement of all questions of whatever nature by peaceful means, and will give the Council of the League of Nations every assistance in devising a permanent system ensuring the effective observance of this policy in the future in the Far East."

I beg leave also to state that a copy of the above message has been handed to M. Wilden by my Government.

Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurance of my highest consideration,

(S) Sao-Ke Alfred SZE

1629

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

1-128
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

November 12, 1931.

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AMERICAN CONSUL
NANKING (CHINA).

110

For the Minister.

For your information. General Dawes has been asked to go to Paris to be present during the meetings of the Council of the League. It is not anticipated that he will find it necessary to take part in the meetings of the Council but he will be in a position to confer with representatives of the other nations present in Paris in case such conference should seem desirable.

Repeat to ~~legation at~~ Peiping. ✓ as Dept 410 SKH

Stinson
SKH

FK 793.94/2705A

FE: RSM: EJJ
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1931

Enciphered by _____
Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

163

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)*
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75


NO. 166 Political.

AMERICAN CONSULATE,

Geneva, Switzerland, November 3, 1931.



Pamphlet on the Chinese-Japanese Conflict Prepared
by the Geneva Research Information Committee.





THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON,
DEPT. OF STATE

SIR:



- 1/ I have the honor to transmit herewith 4 copies of a pamphlet prepared by the Geneva Research Information Committee, entitled "The League and Manchuria - the first phase of the Chinese-Japanese conflict, September 18 to 30, 1931". The Geneva Research Information Committee is a private organization working in close collaboration with the League Secretariat and the Geneva branch of the United States League of Nations Association, and its activities are devoted to the preparation of studies on various questions treated by the League.

Although the enclosed pamphlet is not an official publication, I have found on making inquiry at the Secretariat that it is considered by the members of the Information Section as being a fair general statement of the first phase of the Sino-Japanese conflict before the League. The

Secretariat

1631
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) *
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Secretariat of course does not assume responsibility for
any of the opinions expressed therein.

Respectrully yours,

Prentiss B. Gilbert
Prentiss B. Gilbert,
American Consul.

Enclosures:

No.1: 4 copies of pamphlet, as above.

Original and 3 copies to Department of State.
1 copy to American Legation, Berne.
2 copies to E.I.C., Paris.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No 1
with No 166 Pd. of
Nov. 3 1937

THE LEAGUE AND MANCHURIA

THE FIRST PHASE OF THE CHINESE-JAPANESE CONFLICT
SEPTEMBER 18-30, 1931

GENEVA SPECIAL STUDIES
Vol. II. — No. 10
OCTOBER 1931

Price: One Swiss Franc or Twenty-five Cents

GENEVA RESEARCH INFORMATION COMMITTEE
4, Rue de Monthoux, Geneva

THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE RETURNED TO THE
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

793.94/3706

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NOTE

The gravity of the dispute between China and Japan over Manchuria, both in itself and as a test of the world's system for maintaining peace and of the nations' will to support it, led to a decision to prepare this day-by-day analysis of events and of League action in dealing with them, from the outbreak of trouble to the close of the Assembly and Council sessions in September.

A second Study is in preparation for the next phase of the problem from September 30 to the close of the Extraordinary Council session which opened on October 13.

THE LEAGUE AND MANCHURIA

The First Phase of the Chinese-Japanese Conflict.

September 18-30, 1931.

Prepared under the supervision of the Geneva Research Information Committee.

THE most dangerous conflict which has ever confronted the League of Nations broke out in Manchuria on Saturday, September 19, like a flash of lightning from a clear sky. Just at the moment when the Twelfth Assembly was drawing to a close and the leading statesmen were beginning to leave Geneva, came an incident which challenged the world's whole new and laboriously constructed mechanism for preserving peace and raised the great question as to what attitude the United States and Soviet Russia as non-Members of the League would take in a dispute vitally affecting their interests.

Press despatches brought word of the bombardment of Mukden, the advance of Japanese troops into Manchuria, the seizure of strategic points, all the ominous portents which in the past have been the prelude to open hostilities. The first fragments of news which reached Geneva from the Far East were passed about excitedly from person to person; the corridors of the League building began immediately to fill. In a twinkling the whole atmosphere was electrified; the lethargy and depression which had set in as a result of three weeks of endeavor recognised as sadly insufficient to meet the world's economic crisis, gave way to an alertness, a tension, even an alarm such as Geneva had never before experienced.

For ten long days the Council was in constant, strained negotiation, with the Assembly watching anxiously in the immediate foreground at Geneva, and beyond, world public opinion equally anxiously awaiting developments. Events moved so kaleidoscopically that the

sharpest way of portraying the situation and of reestablishing in fair perspective the main lines of action of unquestionably the most difficult public negotiation ever held would be to follow the thread day by day through the ten-day period from the first shots at Mukden on September 18th to the completion of the initial phase of the Council's action on September 30th and its two weeks' adjournment till October 14th as a provisional date.

SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 19th, 1931.

The first news to reach Geneva was a laconic Peking press despatch as follows:

"After having bombarded the arsenal Japanese troops occupied Mukden Saturday morning at 6 o'clock. Japanese police are assuring order in the city. The Japanese Army is now attacking the arsenal. . . . The two Japanese divisions composing the garrison of Korea have received 'urgent orders' in view of the gravity of the situation."

Geneva's first reaction was stupefaction, utter disbelief. No shadow of crisis had been cast before, no warning or indication that the peace of the East was in danger. The Assembly meetings had gone somewhat heavily on their course for three weeks, during which time, en route, as it were, China had been unanimously elected to the Council by the largest vote ever given a candidate-state; what little solace was possible had been offered for her staggering

- 4 -

flood disaster and loss of unnumbered millions of lives; the Emperor of Japan himself was known to have made a generous contribution in aid. The Far East, when thought of at all, was thought of only as a vast territory stunned by one of the most appalling natural calamities in history.

Japan Acts.

Now, suddenly, without warning, there came out of the East one of those events which every so often in history have caused a shudder to run around the world. Whatever the reason, whatever the justification, a Great Power had taken military action on its own responsibility; had occupied a neighbour's territory; had made no move towards arbitration or conciliation. The very things which the Covenant had been created to make unnecessary seemed to have occurred; the old measures of military coercion and punitive action were in full swing. The cables were not long in bringing confirmation of the first despatch. Tokio sent a report from Mukden that Japanese artillery had destroyed the village of Peitajing with considerable losses. Peking followed with a report that two Japanese battalions had arrived at New-Chwang. Tokio again announced a conflict between Chinese and Japanese troops on the outskirts of Mukden. The same source reported a Cabinet meeting to circumscribe the conflict and reduce it to a purely local affair.

Irrespective, however, of the actual details, information from various sides on this first day was sufficiently precise to leave beyond doubt that suddenly, in circumstances almost cruel, the League had come to a supreme test. Here, once again, as in the Corfu crisis, was the dreaded question feared by friends, and adversely answered in advance by enemies, of the League: What would, or could, the League do, if a Great Power took action on its own? The League would be quite satisfactory, even its enemies admitted, for small disputes of big States or big disputes of small States; it would be quite helpless and hopeless, however, if a Great Power were involved in a great issue. Suddenly, dramatically, everyone in Geneva realised that that issue had been drawn.

A World Unprepared.

A worse moment, or a worse situation, could scarcely have been imagined. First, in Geneva itself, the League meetings, Assembly, Council, European Commission and Financial Committee, had been grappling unsuccessfully for three weeks with a world economic crisis which seemed to pass the comprehension of statesmen. Despondency and depression had set in at the prospect of non-success. Adjournment was close at hand without a solution having been found. The individual nations were strangely incapacitated. Great Britain was almost demobilised by concentration on her own internal crisis and the approach to the abandonment of the gold standard. France and Germany were preoccupied with the forthcoming first visit to Berlin since Napoleon of the head of the French Government. The other nations, except for an Italian Armaments Truce proposal of uncertain future, seemed planless. The Assembly was slowing down to a perfunctory finish and the principal statesmen were either gone or going at just the moment when the gravest problem presented to the League burst upon it.

Second, the situation in Manchuria was equally difficult. Manchuria is a confused land, with Chinese sovereignty limited by Japanese control of the vital South Manchurian railroad. Until a half-century ago a rich and sparsely populated grazing ground, this vast territory has since become the crossroads of empires, the meeting ground of civilisations vastly different. At the end of the last century, imperialistic Russia had pushed her way downward to warm water and paid the price of a disastrous war with Japan in 1904. The Island Empire had succeeded to, and later prolonged until 2002, the Russian railroad concession; her soldiers, to a total allowed by treaty up to 16,000, had taken their places to safeguard the long 1200 kilometres of railroad through Manchuria. Emigrants had poured in, about a million and a half Japanese and Koreans and some twenty times that number of Chinese. Competition had become keen, administration complicated, for, in effect, two very different civilisations were interposed one on the other.

— 5 —

The sharp frontier demarcations which exist between other countries do not exist there; Japan has treaty rights and powers within Chinese sovereignty. Accordingly, events in Manchuria can hardly be judged by the same standards as elsewhere.

The United States and the Soviets.

Third, any possible League action was complicated by still another difficulty. The two other greatest Far Eastern Powers, the United States and Soviet Russia, are not Members of the League. Soviet Russia, though cooperating in League work such as Disarmament or the European Commission, is openly distrustful or hostile, regarding the League as the final expression of capitalism. The United States, while cooperating frequently and in general entirely friendly to the League as an agency of collaboration and peace, is nevertheless outside, at the very least uncertain in its reaction to a request for cooperation in a political issue. Indeed, the gravest question in the development of League jurisprudence and in its efforts to make war impossible has been this very doubt as to what the United States would do in the case of an emergency: whether she would act independently irrespective of the League, whether she would be inactive, or whether she would cooperate. Here, then, was an issue which without warning forced both these questions: on the one hand, a hostile Soviet with memories of the lost war of 1904, and on the other, the United States with an unpredictable policy of action.

Small wonder that Geneva was stirred as never before. Like a flash the world diplomats assembled there at the end of a discouraged session suddenly saw three great conflicts develop: in Manchuria between local Chinese and Japanese for the control of a vast territory; in Tokio between the civil and the military elements of the Government for control of Japanese foreign policy; in Geneva between the old diplomacy of single-handed punitive measures and the new diplomacy of organized conciliation. Huge questions stood out in everyone's mind. What did Japan really

intend; what would she do; which party would dominate her policy? And China; how would she reply; could she, even if she wished, restrain her people and prevent a collision? Would Russia move Eastward as she had before? Would the United States remain inactive?

The Forces at Issue

One fortunate coincidence in this dangerous chain was that the League was at the time in full session. Representatives of 52 Member States were present for the Assembly, and, during the following week, representatives of five other States non-Members of the League, including the United States, were to arrive in Geneva for the Disarmament discussions. A forum for world consultation and debate was therefore available, such as had only once before been available in a previous dispute, and then in less degree, when, in 1923, the Corfu crisis also developed in the midst of the full Assembly. What permanent organized machinery for peaceful settlement the world has been able to create since the Great War was, therefore, actually functioning.

Due to the fact of the Assembly, also, both Chinese and Japanese were represented in Geneva by large Delegations headed respectively by Dr. Alfred Sze, Minister in London, and M. Yoshizawa, Ambassador in Paris, and including experts in all the main branches of work on the Assembly agenda. These two countries, as the President of the Council later expressed it, are two of the most highly respected members of the family of nations; both had been original Members of the League.

Japan, one of the Principal Allied Powers in the World War, had seen her claim to the highest international equality confirmed in the Covenant by the granting to her of a permanent seat on the Council. As Lord Cecil observed, throughout all the years she had been a very sincere Member of the League, taking an active part in all its questions, whether of immediate concern to her or not, and aiding in many complicated questions such, particularly, as the minorities disputes between Germany and Poland or in the general development of international cooperation. Her mem-

— 6 —

bership in the League had not been perfunctory or formal. She had definitely taken her share of world responsibility and had received many deserved honours. Her people had been greatly interested in the League; her unofficial League of Nations Society was said by Lord Cecil to be the largest in the world next to the British; her public is the third largest purchaser, next to the United States and Great Britain, of League publications.

China, too, had been a Member of the League from the outset. She was not a permanent member of the Council, though she had been elected to it as a non-permanent Member from 1921-1923, from 1926-1928, and now from 1931 to 1934. At times her interest had not been very active; last winter, however, following certain very successful cooperation with the League in matters of health, President Chiang Kai Shek had telegraphed the Council requesting the most far-reaching technical cooperation in health, finance, economics, transit and education. As a result the Directors of the Health Section, Dr. Rajchman, of the Economic and Financial Section, Sir Arthur Salter, and of the Transit Section, M. Robert Haas, had each visited China, making suggestions for a unified medical service, a Nationalist Economic Council, the improvement of the Hwai and other rivers, and for harbor development at Shanghai. An Educational Commission, consisting of German, French, British and Polish experts, was en route to China, and the Medical Director, Dr. Rajchman, and the Assistant to the Secretary-General, Mr. Frank Walters, were in China, when the present incident broke out. At the present Assembly, China had again presented her candidature for the Council, which the two previous years had fallen just short of success, and had been the first state to be unanimously elected.

The Council Meets.

It was in these circumstances that the utterly unexpected news of the clash between Japanese and Chinese in Manchuria broke over Geneva. That very afternoon, as it happened, the 65th

Session of the newly-elected Council was to hold its first meeting. Would either party, or any other state, raise the question? Was it conceivable that the Council would pass the matter in silence? Throughout the day friends and foes debated this question; diplomats and officials were ceaselessly active; an historical moment clearly was at hand. For the Council to take up the problem meant the most serious consequences; to shirk it meant abdication, or, as many said, the moral death of the League and the collapse of its laboriously planned mechanism for peace. Even the Disarmament Conference was felt endangered, the *Journal de Genève* saying that, unless this affair were solved, it "would be quite useless to open the Conference on February 2", and a Washington dispatch to the *London Times* saying the incident would "reinforce the arguments of nations which consider armaments as essential guarantees of security".

Long before the Council came together at five o'clock, the corridors of the Secretariat were jammed. Assembly Delegates not usually on hand were present in large numbers; journalists were anxiously searching for advance indications; all that considerable group in Geneva who follow League work were present. As the Council Members came in, not a seat was vacant; the diplomatic section was crowded with observers, including the Minister of the United States; some 300 journalists were waiting to flash the smallest details around the world.

China Takes her Place.

The brief private meeting to approve the agenda opened with an odd coincidence, one of those accidents which often so deeply affect history. China, just elected to the Council without anyone for a moment suspecting the importance her election was so soon to have, was officially welcomed to her seat. Even had she not been a Member of the Council, she could, of course, have sat on the Council temporarily, under Article 4 of the Covenant, in a dispute affecting her interests; as a full Member, however, she undoubtedly was in a stronger position.

— 7 —

Japan Speaks.

The public session then began. An impressive silence reigned in the large room as M. Yoshizawa, most slowly and carefully, resolved the great question in everyone's mind by himself putting the matter before the Council. Obviously, the diplomatic work which had been going on behind the scenes had borne fruit; Japan herself, in accordance, moreover, with a desire expressed by the President of the Council, was ready to explain in Geneva what had happened in Manchuria.

An incident, M. Yoshizawa said, was reported to have occurred in Manchuria; he was anxious to communicate the first details he had received that morning. Unfortunately they were few; he had cabled for more. His Government had taken all possible measures to prevent this local incident from leading to undesirable complications; he was sure it would do everything possible to deal with the situation.

Mr. Sze, in his turn, said he would not conceal his great disturbance at the news from Manchuria. His information indicated that the incident had not been occasioned by any act of the Chinese. He would not fail to keep the Council informed of any news he might receive. Thereupon the President expressed the Council's satisfaction that Japan would take the necessary measures and their most sincere hope for a prompt settlement.

That was all. But it was immensely significant. It meant that the very day that a military clash had occurred in distant Manchuria, the Council of the League of Nations on the other side of the world was officially informed by both parties and the incident put before an international tribunal, in public session, with fourteen states at the table, another 43 in the immediate foreground, and 300 journalists waiting to flash the news to the world. The first question, then, had been answered affirmatively. The Council would take up the affair. Many people in Geneva asked, even if no one could answer: What might the existence of this mechanism of conference, consultation and world opinion have meant if it had been in operation when

a single revolver shot was fired at Sarajevo in the quiet summer months of 1914?

SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 20th.

The second day was, fortunately, a Sunday. No meetings were scheduled, no Assembly, Council or committees, none of the ordinary current work to occupy attention. There was, then, free time for consideration and concentration on this vital question which had so unexpectedly cut across the face of world life.

First, of course, was the actual news. Diplomats and press alike anxiously awaited the dispatches. Would the second day's developments fulfil the fears caused by the first? Would the Japanese attacks be local or general? Would the Chinese resist and precipitate a general clash?

Tokio announced the occupation of Kwang Cheng Tse, the complete control of the arsenal and aerodrome at Mukden, and the taking of 450 prisoners, casualties of 30 dead and 90 wounded at Chang-Chun, and the despatch to Mukden of a group of aeroplanes to establish liaison between the Japanese armies in Kwang Tung and Korea.

Nanking reported a demand for immediate suspension of hostilities and the retreat of Japanese troops. Washington entered cautiously on the scene with the impression that the conflict was with Chinese irregulars and not a violation of the Kellogg Pact. The fundamental contradiction as to responsibilities which always arises in such crises was clearly shown in the following despatches from Peking and Tokio respectively:

PEKING, September 19
(Special Correspondent
of the London Times):
A squad of Japanese
soldiers approached . . .
about 10 o'clock last night
and opened fire on the
camp, the arsenal, and the
city from the Japanese
Concession . . . one
shell falling every 10 minutes.

TOKIO, September 19:
The War Ministry states
that three or four companies
of Chinese troops
bombed and destroyed a
section of the South Manchuria
line, north of Mukden,
about 10.30 last night
and attacked the railway
guards. The guards replied.

— 8 —

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 21st.

Division in Tokio.

One slight rift, however, appeared in the clouds. The question had at once arisen: Was this action due to the military commanders alone or did it represent a determined policy of the Government? If the former, it could be localised and terminated; if the latter, the consequences were unforeseeable. Almost from the outset, however, came indications that the Government was not behind the move, that it was indeed greatly taken aback by it. From Peking on the very first day the London *Times* correspondent reported that "the Japanese Consular authorities (in Mukden) were reported to be unable to induce the military to cease firing". From Peking also, on the 20th, came a despatch to the *Temps* "that a number of Japanese soldiers out of control of all authority had first opened fire on the arsenal at Mukden". From Tokio on the 19th came a despatch to the *Journal de Genève* that "the Minister of War states that, the situation being better in Manchuria, it has been decided not to send there the Japanese troops from Korea" which only the day before in the first despatch announcing the bombardment, had been said to have been given "urgent orders". Even more striking, however, was the London *Times* correspondent's despatch on September 20, that "it is scarcely an exaggeration to say that the Japanese Foreign Office was stunned by the news".

Thus, the lines began to be drawn. The advance was evidently a serious and widespread one; the Chinese were for the moment unresisting; the Japanese seemed divided between their military and civil parties. Geneva was pre-occupied not only by the gravity of the situation itself, but also by the extremely delicate question as to what course of action would be the most helpful. This was no moment for heroics or demonstrations; whatever was done had to be done with the most extreme caution, with the sole thought not of immediate appearances but of final result. Fortunately, the Council could be above questions of prestige.

On the third day of the dispute, less than 48 hours after the first news had reached Geneva, China officially brought the situation before the League under Article 11 of the Covenant, requesting an immediate meeting of the Council to "take such action as it may deem wise and effectual so that the peace of nations may be safeguarded." Dr. Sze, in a letter to the Secretary General immediately circulated to the Council, stated that since Saturday's meeting the situation had become even graver and the military occupation gone even further. China, therefore, requested the Council to take immediate steps "to prevent the further development of a situation endangering the peace of nations", to re-establish the *status quo ante*, and "to determine the amounts and character of such reparations as may be found due to China." China, he concluded, "is fully prepared to act in conformity with whatever recommendations it may receive from the Council and to abide by whatever decisions the League may adopt in the premises." This document is so clear a statement of the Chinese viewpoint and so basic to the situation, that it is given in full:

"I am instructed by the National Government of China to bring to your attention the facts stated below, and to request that, in virtue of Article Eleven of the Covenant of the League of Nations, you forthwith summon a meeting of the Council of the League in order that it may take such action as it may deem wise and effectual so that the peace of nations may be safeguarded.

"Through statements made to it at its meeting on September nineteenth, by the representatives of China and Japan, the Council was advised of the fact that a serious situation had been created in Manchuria. In his statement at that meeting the representative of China declared that the information which he then had, indicated that the situation had been created through no fault upon the part of the Chinese. Since September nineteenth, the undersigned has received from his Government information which discloses a situation of greater gravity than had appeared by the first report, and which

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revealed that, beginning from ten o'clock of the night of September eighteenth, regular troops of Japanese soldiers, without provocation of any kind, opened rifle and artillery fire upon Chinese soldiers at or near the city of Mukden, bombarded the arsenal and barracks of the Chinese soldiers, set fire to the ammunition depot, disarmed the Chinese troops in Changchun, Kwanchengtse, and other places, and later took military occupation of the cities of Mukden and Antung and other places and of public buildings therein, and are now in such occupation. Lines of communication have also been seized by Japanese troops.

"To these acts of violence the Chinese soldiers and populace, acting under instructions from the Chinese Government, have made no resistance, and have refrained from conduct which might in any way aggravate the situation.

"In view of the foregoing facts, the Republic of China, a Member of the League of Nations, asserts that a situation has arisen which calls for action under the terms of Article Eleven of the Covenant. I am, therefore, instructed by my Government to request that, in pursuance of authority given to it by Article Eleven of the Covenant, the Council take immediate steps: to prevent the further development of a situation endangering the peace of nations; to re-establish the *status quo ante*; and to determine the amounts and character of such reparations as may be found due to the Republic of China.

"I will add that the Government of China is fully prepared to act in conformity with whatever recommendations it may receive from the Council, and to abide by whatever decisions the League of Nations may adopt in the premises."

"The Heart of the Covenant"

Article 11 thus invoked by China is the great mediatory Article of the Covenant. Indeed, as Mr. Conwell-Evans states in his excellent study of the methods employed by the Council to prevent war, it "has come to be regarded as the corner-stone of the Covenant and the bulwark of the world's peace." Even those

closest to the League have little appreciation of how often in the relatively few years since 1920 this Article has been called into play. Mr. Conwell-Evans records no less than twenty cases up to 1927: In eight hostilities or a resort to arms had, in fact, occurred, in four¹ of which one of the parties itself had appealed under Article 11, in the others² a party neutral to the dispute or the Council itself. Twelve other appeals not involving hostilities had also been made, four³ by one of the parties immediately concerned, two⁴ by Great Britain as an interested state, four⁵ by the Conference of Ambassadors representing Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan, and one⁶ by the Supreme Council. Since this enumeration a number of other cases have occurred, two during the last month, China-Japan over Manchuria, and Great Britain-Finland over the seizure of Finnish ships in the War.

Indeed, Article 11 would seem to provide exactly that machinery of consultation and mediation which it is now generally recognised is the great lack of the Kellogg Pact, threatening to make that document a general declaration of international policy rather than a living force in international life. So important is Article 11 both in the powers it gave the Council in the Sino-Japanese affair under review and in its establishment of a new type of international jurisprudence where States, whether parties to a dispute or not, are free to bring it before an international tribunal without as heretofore being charged with unfriendly action, that it is worth quoting in full:

"Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and

¹ Persia-Soviet Russia, 1920; Poland-Lithuania, 1920; Yugoslavia-Albania, 1921; Greece-Bulgaria, 1925.

² Costa Rica-Panama, 1921; Yugoslavia-Albania, 1921; Bolivia-Paraguay, 1928.

³ Finland-Soviet Russia (E. Carelia), 1923; Bulgaria and neighbouring States, 1922; Hungary-Rumania, 1923; Great Britain-Turkey, 1924.

⁴ Aaland Islands (Finland and Sweden); Yugoslavia and Albania;

⁵ Hungary and Yugoslavia, 1923; Hungary-Czechoslovakia, 1923; Poland and Czechoslovakia, 1923; Memel.

⁶ Upper Silesia.

See "The League Council in Action", by T. P. Conwell-Evans.

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the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. In case any such emergency should arise the Secretary-General shall on the request of any Member of the League forthwith summon a meeting of the Council.

"It is also declared to be the friendly right of each Member of the League to bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstance whatever affecting international relations which threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends."

As these events were taking place in Geneva, despatches from various sides indicated an increasing diplomatic tension throughout the world.

While London despatches stated that "news from different Chinese and Japanese sources indicate that, after the occupation of Mukden and different strategic points, there was a cessation of the hostilities that broke out so dramatically", the diplomatic front was growing ever wider. A Tokio report announced a vigorous note of protest from China accusing Japan of ignoring the Kellogg Pact and demanding the immediate withdrawal of troops. A Nanking despatch stated that Foreign Minister Wang, in addition to direct protests to Japan, intended to notify the League of Nations and the Signatories of the Kellogg Pact of the situation. In Moscow M. Karakhan, Assistant Commissar of Foreign Affairs, was interviewing Mr. Hiroto, the Japanese Ambassador. Peking reported to London the rumour of an arrangement between Russia and Japan for the division of Manchuria. From Geneva, the Executive Committee in Europe of the Kwomintang issued a sweeping summary of the situation.

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 22nd.

One of the most dramatic and extraordinary international debates ever held occupied the whole morning of the fourth day of the Manchurian incident, when Mr. Sze and Mr. Yoshizawa, representing China and Japan respectively, faced each other for nearly three hours

across the Council table in the presence of a group of diplomats, officials and journalists which filled the large Glass Room to overcrowding. The atmosphere was extremely tense and highstrung as the delegates of the two great Oriental nations began to elaborate their views and positions. Practically nobody had any idea what course the discussions might take or what dangers might lie ahead.

Mr. Sze entered straightway into the heart of the matter by reading two cables just received from Nanking giving details of the occupation of various centres in Manchuria, the cutting of communications, the seizure of materials and especially the bombardment and conflagration in Changchun, with 600 casualties and 1,000 prisoners. Speaking tensely and dramatically, he stated that these places covered an area as extensive as the whole United Kingdom of Great Britain, Northern Ireland and the Irish Free State. The situation was becoming ever graver; it had become a serious question whether Articles other than Article 11 of the Covenant might not be required¹. In any case, he reiterated his request for immediate action to prevent the further development of a situation endangering the peace of nations and to re-establish the *status quo ante*.

Japan Explains.

Mr. Yoshizawa, speaking extremely slowly and carefully and betraying his tension only by pulling on his cigar, said he was the first to deplore the unfortunate incidents that had occurred. He would reply to the Chinese Representative's statements after he had received instructions from his Government. Meanwhile, however, he would like to clear up the problem somewhat. Manchuria is a vast territory where Japan has enormous interests and rights guaranteed by treaties. She also has some hundreds of thousands of nationals there but only some 10,000 soldiers as against 220,000 Chinese. The present incident had been caused by the destruction by Chinese troops of part of the Japanese railway near

¹ This was understood to mean Article 15 which would have given the Council greater powers.

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Mukden; the small Japanese force had been obliged to take up arms to prevent further destruction and to protect the railway and nationals in the district. It was not accurate that the Chinese had offered no resistance; the dead and wounded amongst the Japanese in Changchun alone numbered over 150. The incident, however, was not an isolated event; for years Chinese activities have imperilled Japanese interests and rights, while deplorable events, like the murder of Staff-Captain Nakamura, have created a feeling of tension which led to the present explosion. Any Chinese claim for reparations is unintelligible; the *status quo ante* can be settled only by considering the factors in each locality. Japan, however, has taken steps to prevent the troubles from spreading and has no intention of provoking further collisions, least of all of making war on China. A proposal, he said, had been made in China for direct negotiations and Japan had welcomed it. Premature intervention would only needlessly excite Japanese opinion and impede pacific settlement. Mr. Yoshizawa promised to acquaint the Council with his Government's views as soon as he had received instructions, and in the circumstances requested adjournment.

China Requests Inquiry.

Mr. Sze immediately retorted that, as to the question of the accuracy of his statements, he was prepared to agree to an enquiry being carried out by a Commission appointed by the League and to leave the matter in its hands. As regards the Nakamura and other cases, he urged that such references were quite irrelevant, that the Covenant provided other means—diplomatic, judicial, or appeal to the Council. Similarly, defensive measures could not be pleaded, as the Council itself, including the Representative of Japan, had declared on previous occasions. China could not agree to direct negotiations with a country holding a large part of its territory in military occupation and having resorted to means other than diplomatic negotiation. Mr. Sze appreciated the assurance that Japan had no idea of war but could not, however, disguise his impression

"that we are very close to war and that immediate steps are imperatively necessary". In any case, he repeated, China will abide by whatever decisions the League may take.

Mr. Yoshizawa disagreed that reports from Manchuria were meagre; the first news had come from Peking and telegrams were appearing daily in the press. He then reiterated that one of the highest officials in the National Government at Nanking had proposed direct negotiations. That to him seemed the best course. He did not say that the question did not fall within the competence of the Council; he only asked adjournment until he had instructions.

Mr. Sze, suggesting there might have been a misunderstanding owing to the fact that they were not using their own language, pointed out that there were no direct negotiations in progress and that no one could make statements for his Government unless authorised. To this, Mr. Yoshizawa replied that the Chinese official in question held one of the most important portfolios in the Chinese Government and there was no reason why the Japanese Minister should regard his statement of policy as of no official importance. The Japanese Government still agreed with the suggestions made by this very responsible person.

The League Jurisprudence.

The British Representative, Viscount Cecil, at this moment at the end of the morning, cut across the debate to express the views of one of the chief authors of the Covenant itself. The matter was grave, he said, all the more so because of the present condition of the world. There are, however, some encouraging aspects. Japan has always been one of the great pillars of the League and pre-eminent amongst the nations in her adherence to international obligations. China similarly has taken great interest in the League, and had been only a few days ago unanimously elected to the Council. At the moment no question of the merits of the dispute arises. The necessary facts are not available; accounts of the two interested parties naturally disagree. There are, however, certain preliminary steps which

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the Council may take, and which indeed it has taken in previous clashes of arms. The Council now has what may be considered a settled procedure: first, an appeal through its President to both sides not to do anything to aggravate the position and to avoid further fighting; and second, where the troops of either party have entered the territory of the other, an appeal to both sides to withdraw and to avoid anything which might lead to a clash. Beyond this, however, a definite jurisprudence has been developed which was expressed in M. Briand's statement before the Council in Paris in October 1925 (in the Greek-Bulgar dispute), which was approved by Sir Austen Chamberlain on behalf of the British Empire, Viscount Ishii, speaking for Japan, Mr. Scialoja speaking for Italy, and a number of others. This statement read:

"... He had understood the representative of Greece to indicate that all these incidents would not have arisen if his country had not been called upon to take rapid steps for its legitimate defence and protection. It was essential that such ideas should not take root in the minds of nations which were Members of the League and become a kind of jurisprudence, for it would be extremely dangerous. Under the pretext of legitimate defence, disputes might arise which, though limited in extent, were extremely unfortunate owing to the damage they entailed. These disputes, once they had broken out, might assume such proportions that the Government which started them, under a feeling of legitimate defence, would be no longer able to control them.

"The League of Nations, through its Council, and through all the methods of conciliation which were at its disposal, offered the nations a means of avoiding such deplorable events. The nations had only to appeal to the Council. It had been shown that the criticisms which had been brought against the League of Nations to the effect that its machinery was cumbersome and that it found it difficult to take action in circumstances which required an urgent solution, were unjustified. It had been proved that a nation which appealed to the League when it felt that its existence was threatened, could be sure that the Council would be at its post ready to undertake its work of conciliation."

The United States Informed.

Finally, Viscount Cecil drew attention to certain international instruments beyond the League which affect this dispute, the Pact of Paris and the so-called Nine-Power Treaty. In both, the United States of America are closely interested; the Council would do well, therefore, to communicate to that Government a statement of all its proceedings and of all the discussions which have taken place within it. The United States would then be fully informed of what the Council was doing and able to take any action it might think might in connection with the matter.

At this moment, at the end of a long morning session, with preliminary statements having been made by both parties and a general pronouncement of League policy by Viscount Cecil, the President proposed that, as it was hardly possible for the Council to adopt a resolution at once, he would ask time to prepare a draft. This was agreed to and the first great public debate on the question brought to an end.

Up to this point, public and press, even those hostile to the League, seemed satisfied. The matter had come before the Council; Japan and China had faced each other squarely across the table; Viscount Cecil had laid down League jurisprudence in no uncertain terms; the clash which humanity seems to like, curiously thoughtless of its dangers, had taken place. Those on the outside waited eagerly, even hungrily, for more, irrespective of the dire possibilities; those on the inside strove ceaselessly to find a way which, regardless of method or theatrics, would avert one of the gravest dangers since the World War and reestablish peace in one of the key-centres of international life.

The afternoon session opened in an atmosphere fully as tense as the morning's, for, now that each party had made declarations, the Council was face to face with the question of what action it would take. Speculation was rife, running all the way from the "strong action" which many people unthoughtful of the consequences urged, to complete inaction which certain enemies and sceptics loudly predicted.

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The Debate Resumed.

At the outset, Mr. Yoshizawa fully endorsed Viscount Cecil's sentiments and expressed Japan's loyal adherence to various agreements, such as the League Covenant and the Briand-Kellogg Pact, and her determination to observe their stipulations in all respects. He wanted, however, to explain the conditions in Manchuria where Japan has enormous interests: apart from the railroad, more than a million Japanese nationals, and investments estimated at two thousand million yen. Unfortunately, there were hundreds of outstanding questions between the two governments; tension existed locally; relations between the two peoples had become acute. Despite regrettable incidents, Japan was doing its utmost for the friendliest possible settlement; the present incident must be viewed from that angle.

Mr. Sze recalled that the Chinese soldiers and populace had obeyed the government's instructions not to make any resistance to the acts of violence committed. Telegrams just received showed the situation was becoming worse and worse every minute; it required immediate attention; not a moment must be wasted. Many Chinese women and children had been killed; some of the details were of the most revolting character. If the Council agreed to the Japanese suggestion of adjournment, it should be only until tomorrow. China desired nothing more than that all outstanding questions with Japan or any other nation be settled amicably; if there were such questions with Japan, methods for settlement were provided in the Covenant in more than one Article and in more than one way. The immediate question, however, was the invasion of Chinese territory; no other question could be discussed at the moment. He again requested a committee of enquiry, despatches showing that the area of Chinese territory under occupation was being extended. That must be stopped immediately and the troops withdrawn.

The President of the Council intervened at this point. The parties had said all they could; it was now for the Council to express its view. Mr. Lerroux read a brief statement suggesting that the Council authorize him:

"(1) To make an urgent appeal to the Chinese and Japanese Governments to refrain from any action which might aggravate the situation or prejudice the peaceful settlement of the problem;

"(2) To endeavour, in consultation with the Chinese and Japanese representatives, to find adequate means of enabling the two countries to withdraw their troops immediately, without the lives of their nationals and the safety of their property being endangered."

He also asked that all minutes and documents on the subject be forwarded to the United States for its information, and suggested that the two parties be asked to meet immediately after the Council together with certain Members of the Council.

Various Members of the Council supported this resolution in turn. Dr. Curtius, German Foreign Minister, expressed his hope of unanimity including the parties. This action would be a first step, at a moment when world political and economic conditions were extremely difficult, but the Council should not rest content with a merely provisional measure; it should go further and take steps for a final settlement. It was of the greatest importance to show the whole world that such conflicts could be amicably settled by the Council.

Mr. Massigli of France associated himself with this statement. The steps proposed were only the first, indeed the very first. It was the Council's duty to exert all its authority to secure as expeditiously as possible a provisional settlement in order to permit a final solution in an atmosphere of confidence and calm. Time, however, was essential, distance great, communications difficult. It was essential the next meeting be held soon if the Council were not to find itself in an infinitely more delicate situation.

Mr. Braadland of Norway expressed keen anxiety at this incident between two Members of the League and his hope of early satisfactory communications from the two governments. Mr. Grandi, Foreign Minister of Italy, appealed to the parties for a solution which would not merely satisfy them both but would also be of the highest importance to the whole world. Mr. Sokal of Poland hoped that, with the good-

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will of both governments, the Council would be able to find a solution with all possible speed.

Mr. Sze then spoke again. He emphasized that all speakers had urged that time was essential and that this was only the first of a series of steps. He also understood that in the consultations before the next meeting the work would be within the Council; there was no question of direct negotiation. He accepted the proposal as good as far as it went, even though it did not provide for immediate steps to reestablish the *status quo ante* which would not only prevent further loss of life and property but would also pave the way for an impartial examination under the auspices of the League to determine the responsibility and damages. He hoped and expected such further action as might be necessary and trusted the Council would resume its discussion on the following day.

Mr. Yoshizawa highly appreciated the sentiments of his colleagues and expressed his sincere thanks for the attention the Council had given the matter. As to the next meeting, he was making every effort to supply fuller information to enable the Council to discuss the matter in detail; he could not at the moment say whether he would be in a position to ask the President to convene another meeting on the following day.

Viscount Cecil accepted the President's proposal as a first step. As to the next meeting, it would be useless to come together unless the Council could take some action; if the Chinese information was correct, however, very grave incidents were still taking place in Manchuria and there must be no avoidable delay. He appealed to his Japanese colleague to hasten the necessary instructions as much as possible.

Mr. Yoshizawa replied that he was making every possible effort to obtain fuller information and would not fail to submit a comprehensive report at the earliest possible moment. As to Lord Cecil's statement, he understood that if the Chinese report of the slaughter of hundreds of men, women and children were true, the Council could not hesitate to meet as soon as possible: he hoped the interpretation was incorrect. Viscount Cecil explained that the

matter was extremely urgent and that he hoped the instructions from Tokio would arrive at the earliest possible moment.

Mr. Lerroux, speaking both as President and as representative of Spain, associated himself with his colleagues, assuring them that the question would be investigated with the utmost diligence. Finally, Mr. Garay of Panama said the American countries represented on the Council could not but view with concern a question which affected the peace of the world and that it was the Council's duty to take all necessary steps in conformity with the Covenant and other treaties to secure the immediate cessation of hostilities, to prevent any resumption of the fighting by either party and to bring about a restoration of peace in those countries which at the moment deserved every sympathy on account of the deplorable calamities they had recently suffered.

A Decision without Delay.

Thereupon the Council unanimously, including the parties, authorised the action proposed. That night, the very day after the Chinese appeal to the League, the following cable was formally sent by the President of the Council to Tokio and Nanking:

"I have the honour to inform you that at its meeting to-day devoted to the Chinese Government's appeal under Article 11 of the Covenant in connection with the situation in Manchuria, the Council of the League of Nations unanimously authorised me: (1) to address an urgent appeal to the Governments of China and Japan to refrain from any act which might aggravate the situation or prejudice the peaceful settlement of the problem; (2) to endeavour in consultation with the Chinese and Japanese representatives to find adequate means of enabling the two countries to withdraw their troops forthwith without the safety of their nationals and their property being endangered; (3) the Council further decided to forward the minutes of all the meetings of the Council and documents relating to this question to the Government of the United States of America for its information. I am firmly convinced that in response to the appeal which the Council has authorised me to make to you your Government will take all possible

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steps to prevent the commission of any act which might aggravate the situation or prejudice the peaceful settlement of the problem. I am about to begin the consultations contemplated with the Japanese and Chinese representatives with a view to the execution of paragraph (2). For these consultations I have obtained the assistance of the representatives of Germany, Great Britain, France and Italy. The decision referred to under (3) has been carried out."

This cable, it should be noted, gave information as to the creation of a special group within the Council to keep in touch with the Manchurian affair. It was to be composed of the President, together with the representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy and Germany, and was to become known as "The Committee of Five". Some "discontent", as the *Journal de Genève* put it, was expressed, especially amongst the smaller States, that the League practice of including one or more small Powers in such mediatory action was not followed, and there was even suggestion of action to prevent this becoming a precedent for future cases. Whether or not such criticism was justified, the composition of the Committee left little doubt as to the seriousness with which the Council regarded the situation.

America Approaches.

Meanwhile, a new element dramatically appeared in the situation. The Council, it will be recalled, had decided to send all its material to the United States Government: little short of a sensation, however, was created when the American Minister to Switzerland, Mr. Hugh R. Wilson, who only the day before had been commissioned to represent the United States for the first time in the Assembly Committee discussions on the Armaments Truce, suddenly left that meeting to go upstairs to visit the Secretary-General. While Washington despatches this same day said that there seemed to be no violation of the Kellogg Pact and the Government did not at the moment intend to take position, it became very clear at Geneva that America's relationship to League action in Manchuria was not to be confined to the

receipt of documents. On the contrary, from almost the first moment, Mr. Wilson was seen frequently to go up the stairs to the Secretary-General's office to receive the latest information.

Tuesday, then, seemed to end satisfactorily in Geneva, though badly in the East. At the Geneva end the two parties had had a close debate, though the Japanese Delegate was handicapped by lack of instructions; the Council had unanimously agreed on an appeal to both Governments, an approach to collaboration with the United States, and the establishment of informal discussions amongst the Great Power representatives, while the United States Government itself was in close touch with Council proceedings.

The Military Speak.

From Tokio, however, the *London Times* brought news that the Japanese Cabinet had sat for seven hours in deadlock over the sending of reinforcements to Manchuria, Baron Shidehara, Foreign Minister, and Baron Inouye, Finance Minister, leading the opposition. Half an hour afterwards, however, General Minami, War Minister, was stated to have reported that the Korean Commander had sent a mixed brigade to Mukden. At the same time, General Honji, Japanese Commander-in-Chief in South Manchuria, was reported from Peking to have issued the following proclamation, important as illustrating the attitude of those responsible in the field:

"The violence perpetrated by the Chinese side at this time is no spasmodic outburst of feeling, but a premeditated action of the Chinese authorities, who have been accustomed to insult Japan. Were this left unchallenged, Japan's acquired rights and interests in Manchuria would most certainly be overthrown.

"The people of China are innocent, and ambitious militarists alone are responsible for the incident. In view of the heavy responsibility of protecting the South Manchuria Railway, I adopted determined steps. It being my object to chastise the authorities and not the people, the populace should carry on its occupations in peace."

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WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 23d.

Press despatches, which in the first days had been the most important source of news, tended by midweek to give way to official communications. Both Japan and China inaugurated a system of written statements to the League producing a constant flow of information.

On Wednesday, Japan transmitted her first official statement of what had happened in Manchuria, and China added thirteen more messages to the two sent the first day. Never before had there been such a continuous and up-to-the minute distribution of news by two parties engaged in a dispute.

The Japanese statement ascribed the incident to the blowing up by a detachment of some 350 Chinese of part of the main line of the South Manchurian railroad north of Mukden. The Japanese intervened, a battle ensued, Japanese headquarters took the steps necessitated by the gravity of the situation and the disproportion of forces, and occupied the Chinese barracks, the open town, the official buildings, and the arsenal. Concentration took place at Mukden; the Kwantung staff proceeded there; Changchun was occupied with 60 Japanese killed and 96 wounded as well as various strategic points and Kirin, where Japanese citizens were in danger. In these places order is being maintained in cooperation with the Chinese; outside the railroad zone Japanese consuls have applied to the local authorities to protect their nationals; so far foreigners in the occupied sections are safe. In view, however, of the disquieting situation caused by undisciplined bands, the attitude of the population, and the insufficiency of the Japanese forces to protect the railroad line and Japanese and foreign lives, the 39th army corps of 4000 men had been sent to Manchuria from Korea.

China's new cables gave added information on both the political and the military aspects of the situation. Number 3 stated that Mr. T. V. Soong, while considering a mixed Chino-Japanese commission when the affair seemed purely local, rejected it when it appeared to be warlike measures on a large scale. Number 4 described a tense situation in Harbin.

Number 5 gave details of further occupations, airplane demonstrations, and the death of over 100 Chinese police in Peitaying. Number 6 contained the text of President Chiang Kai Shek's proclamation to the nation that "an hour of unprecedented gravity" had struck and that China had entrusted her case to the League and her Army received the strictest orders to avoid any possible clash. Number 7 reported Chang Hsueh Liang as ordering Manchurian troops to barracks. Number 8 gave details of Kirin and other places, estimating seizures at Mukden at \$100,000,000. Number 9 reported the death of Brigadier Commander Fu and family. Number 10 disclaimed any attack on the railroad. Number 11 reported Kirin burning, with the 56th Chinese regiment exterminated and 60 Japanese casualties. Number 12 said that the National Government categorically repudiated direct negotiations with the matter now in the hands of the League. Number 13 reported the famine sufferers in Hankow and Wuchang as "too proud to accept relief from a country whose militarists have been permitted to slaughter our brethren in Manchuria and invade our territory when 16 of our provinces are suffering from the disastrous floods." Number 14 gave the text of a similar message to the Chairman of the Japan Flood Relief Commission. Number 15 cited a Tokio report of 65 soldiers killed and 93 wounded and 3 officers killed and 7 wounded.

Meanwhile, diplomatic negotiations seemed to be continuing on a wide scale. In Moscow Mr. Litvinoff had again seen the Japanese Ambassador; alarm was expressed there at the events, and surprise at Russia's not having been informed. In Washington both Japanese and Chinese representatives were reported conferring with State Department officials.

The Assembly Watches.

In Geneva itself, the Assembly was somewhat restive. As in the Corfu affair years before, the larger League body felt a certain uneasiness and hesitation lest the Council be too conservative and diplomatic. Many of its delegates, particularly the more active leaders from the smaller states, wished to make its voice heard

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in order both to sustain the Council in the action which it had already taken and to urge it on against any possible temptation to draw back. The Council, on its part, was glad to have the moral support of the Assembly, even though it shrank from a general debate in so large a gathering.

The Assembly Approves.

In response to this very legitimate interest on the part of League Members not represented on the Council, the President of the latter body asked to appear before the Assembly to make a communication on behalf of the Council. The dispute between Japan and China, he said, is now under consideration by the Council. Consultations are taking place; the Council hopes they will lead to a satisfactory conclusion. The Council also hopes to make a statement to the Assembly as soon as possible. Meanwhile it wishes to assure the Assembly that it is devoting to the question all the time and attention required in the interests of peace and the respect the Council owes to both parties.

The President of the Assembly, Mr. Titulesco of Rumania, made a reply which he hoped would obviate an immediate discussion. The dispute, he said, had not been brought before the Assembly; the Council is competent in the matter. In circumstances like these, however, it is before all else necessary that the League be able to rely on the approval and help of public opinion in all countries. It is, therefore, not enough for the Council to sit permanently as much as possible in public session until peace is assured. The Assembly must also not finish its labours without having an opportunity of showing the interest which all the members of the League feel for the success of so vital an action. The Assembly hopes, therefore, that, before it ends, the Council will make a new communication so that it may express its opinion.

With this view the Assembly concurred. There was no further action or speech; those who had felt that the Assembly should manifest its interest and concern were satisfied for the moment with the fact that the President of the Council had come before them to promise a

further communication and that the President of their own body had reiterated its necessity. The Chinese-Japanese affair, while, therefore, not under negotiation by the Assembly, had nevertheless been presented to it in recognition of the importance it might have to every State Member of the League and of the value which the moral support of the League's largest and most authoritative organ would certainly afford.

Meanwhile the Council was keeping steadily at its task. The President conferred, separately in the morning, with both Mr. Yoshizawa and Mr. Sze. At 3 o'clock the Committee of Five met for a short time and at 5 o'clock again. A full public session of the Council was summoned for 6.45. A large attendance was on hand; several members of the Council were already at the table, including Dr. Sze, when at 7 the latter was suddenly called upstairs to a meeting of the Five and the public session adjourned without explanation.

For two hours the private meeting continued. Nothing was given our officially; it was fairly clearly understood, however, that the question at issue was the Chinese demand for a commission of enquiry. Here there was the greatest divergence of viewpoint.

The Chinese cited the precedent established in the Greek-Bulgar case when the Military Attachés of the Great Powers had been sent to the area of hostilities within a few hours of their outbreak. Japan, however, had an earlier precedent to recall in that no such action had been taken in the Corfu crisis between Italy and Greece. Moreover, Tokio despatches that same day brought further details of her proposal for direct negotiations through a committee of three Japanese and three Chinese and her unalterable opposition to an international commission as implying doubt of her good faith. Finally, the report began to get around that Washington, while approving the principle of League intervention in the matter, questioned the wisdom of pressing at the moment for an international commission.

Geneva and Washington Talk by Telephone.

At this moment another bit of startling news found its way through the crowded

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corridors. It was reported that the American Minister, Mr. Wilson, who had been in constant touch with the Secretary-General, had also been in telephonic conversation with the Secretary of State in Washington. This had never happened before; the telephone had never been used for a communication from an American diplomat at the League to his chiefs in the State Department. Extreme rumours followed one another to the effect that the United States had already been formally invited to sit on the Council, that Mr. Wilson had actually sat there in private, that the United States had refused to sit, etc., etc. Any doubt, however, of America's intense interest both in the conflict itself and in the Council's relation to it was by now more than dispelled.

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 24th.

Early Thursday morning came one of the most far-reaching communications yet received by the League of Nations. Hardly had the Secretary-General reached his office when the American Minister handed him a communication from Secretary of State Stimson to the President of the Council to the effect that the United States not only was "in whole-hearted sympathy" with the Council's action but would itself take similar action. Washington's response to the Council decision to keep it informed of developments in Geneva was more complete and more friendly than even the most optimistic had dared to hope. The American Government took no middle course; the Secretary of State said:

"I have received from the American Minister at Berne the copy of the resolution of the Council of the League of Nations which you transmitted to him. I have noted the two parts of this resolution and the fact that they have been embodied in a note which you have addressed to the Governments of Japan and China.

"I assure you that the Government of the United States is in whole-hearted sympathy with the attitude of the League of Nations as expressed in the Council's resolution and will despatch to Japan and China notes along similar lines.

"I have already urged cessation of hosti-

lities and a withdrawal from the present situation of danger and will continue earnestly to work for the restoration of peace."

America Arrives.

By this single short message the greatest gap in the mechanism for peace was dramatically closed. Not only did America not object to League action; not only was she not indifferent to it; on the contrary, she approved and supported it in the most positive terms. The two principal agencies working for peaceful settlement were, therefore, united, not divided; they would work together rather than apart.

This news, spreading rapidly through the Assembly, which was just coming together, was greeted with the utmost gratification. On all sides it was given an immense significance both for the particular case in question and for the future. For the first time the United States was cooperating with the Council in an effort to prevent war. Once before, in the Bolivia-Paraguay case, the Council had put to the United States the question of what action it would suggest in case war actually broke out, as seemed likely; the necessity of a reply, however, was obviated by an unexpectedly quick settlement of the dispute. In the Manchuria case, however, the United States had taken position firmly and positively; no doubt was left but that the American Government was with Council in fact if not in form.

What this may mean for the future organisation of world peace is difficult to imagine. Delegates there were in Geneva who felt the precedent thus established was one of the most important in League development. No longer was America isolated, unattainable; clearly she had shown that, in case of world crisis, the Council might hope for her friendly collaboration. "This", as the London *Times* correspondent that day telegraphed, "brought the United States into closer co-operation with the League than at any other time".

Echoes

It may not here be inappropriate to set back the clock of history for twelve years to a

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dramatic scene in the White House at Washington. On August 19, 1919, President Wilson had returned from Paris for a brief visit to secure Senate support for the League of Nations and the Peace Treaties then under negotiation. He was facing an almost openly hostile Foreign Affairs Committee from that body, some of whose members were obviously seeking to put embarrassing questions. After Senator Johnson of California had asked about the Japanese situation in Shantung, the following exchange took place:

Senator Knox: Mr. President, the economic privileges that the Japanese originally acquired in Korea, and subsequently in inner and outer Mongolia, and in northern and southern Manchuria, have almost developed into a complete sovereignty over those countries, have they not?

The President: Yes, Senator, in the absence of a League of Nations, they have.

Senator Knox: You think the League of Nations would have prevented that, do you?

The President: I am confident it would.

China Accepts.

On the same day that the United States signified its endorsement of League action, the Chinese Delegation transmitted to the Council China's complete acceptance of the suggestions contained in the Council's telegram to both parties of three days before. This was less than a week since the first shot at Mukden. The incident had started late on a Friday night; the news had reached Geneva Saturday morning; China had appealed to the League Monday; the Council had telegraphed to both parties Tuesday night; and on Thursday came China's reply. Whether the League will always succeed in averting hostilities is a hypothetical question which cannot be categorically answered; what its new method of international conference and consultation may mean for the mobilization of world opinion and moral pressure may be clearly seen, however, against the chaos and disorganization which existed before the League and which made it possible for the World War to break out without even an exchange of views.

China, as the appealing party, fully accepted the Council's recommendations. She regarded them, however, as only a first and preliminary step leading to a final settlement and complete satisfaction to the aggrieved nation. She agreed to abstain from any action likely to aggravate the situation and cited her President's proclamation that, as the case had been entrusted to the League, the National Army had the strictest orders to avoid all possibility of clash. She particularly welcomed the decision that troops on both sides should return immediately to their original positions, though China had taken no measures contrary to this view. She was gratified that the Council was seeking the most effective means of ensuring the immediate withdrawal of the Japanese troops; the situation was growing in gravity every hour and brooked absolutely no delay. China will assume full responsibility for the protection of life and property as soon as she regains control of the areas evacuated by Japanese troops. Finally, she noted with satisfaction the decision to forward all data to the United States Government.

More Chinese Telegrams.

On Thursday, also, the Chinese delegation had circulated to the Council 7 more telegrams covering six long typed pages and making a total to date of 22. Number 16 gave dangerous details regarding Kirin and Harbin. Number 17 brought disquieting news of unrest in Shantung, and Number 18 further details from Manchuria. Number 19 explained more fully the Chinese rejection of direct negotiations. Number 20 quoted Senator Johnson's declaration in San Francisco that Japan was waging war on China. Number 21 reported the occupation of Taonanfu, and Number 22 alleged further attacks in Kirin with 200 Chinese killed and total casualties in Mukden of over 5000.

Japan Counters.

The Japanese delegation also circulated further telegrams just received. The first, from Tokio, categorically denied the occupation

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of Tsingtao or Chefoo or the landing of marines in China proper. As, however, the Chinese nationalist party and others were organizing a strong anti-Japanese campaign, arrangements had been made to move Japanese women and children from Nanking to Shanghai in case of need. The second denied sensational reports that Japanese troops had occupied nearly all towns in Manchuria. On the contrary there had been no advance north of Changchun, and Kirin had been left with guards only. At Mukden the control of the municipality was temporary, the Chinese officials having fled. Elsewhere Chinese authorities were at their posts working in concert with the Japanese; nowhere had a military government been established.

Conflicting Press News.

Meanwhile, press despatches were pouring into Geneva from all sides. The League action seemed to be viewed differently in the two Eastern capitals. A Tokio despatch to the Times said it was regarded in Japan as well-meant but, in view of the actual facts, pointless: a Nanking message said it had been "warmly received there and has somewhat calmed anti-Japanese feelings". Nanking reported a third note to Tokio: Tokio reported a note from the United States, a Cabinet meeting to consider a reply to the League, and the drafting by Baron Shidehara of a declaration promising withdrawal of troops on condition of safety of Japanese lives and property.

In a military sense, the reports were very conflicting. Shanghai stated that Japan had renounced her intention to occupy Harbin: a Tokio despatch again said that the army at Kirin had refused to obey the Central Government: a further Tokio despatch said that, in view of the fact that the military had achieved their aims, Japanese troops had been withdrawn except at Mukden, Changchun and Kirin. Mukden reported that the Japanese had taken twelve leading citizens as hostages: Nanking forwarded a telegram from Chang Hsueh Liang that Soviet troops were moving on the frontier: Shanghai sent details of the first day of national grief and mourning, with a monster mass

meeting and proposals for a general strike and boycott.

The Council Replies.

At five o'clock that afternoon the Committee of Five, and immediately after at seven the full Council, met privately to approve a reply to the United States. The Council endeavoured to express its appreciation in the warmest possible terms and opened the door still wider for further co-operation. Some question there had been of an open invitation but this was abandoned, partly because, if a declination were deemed necessary in Washington, it would be unfortunate for all sides and militate against the chances of a peaceful settlement. The reply to the United States was as follows:

"The Council of the League of Nations has requested me to express to the Secretary of State its appreciation of the friendly answer which he was good enough to make in regard to the situation which has unhappily arisen between two highly respected Members of the family of nations, China and Japan. The Council is gratified to note that the Government of the United States is in whole-hearted sympathy with the attitude of the League of Nations as expressed in the Council resolution, and that it will despatch to Japan and China, in addition to previous communications, notes on lines similar to those followed by the Council.

"The Council has no preconceived method for solving the difficulties which have arisen; no procedure or formula to which it is irrevocably bound other than its obligation to 'take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations'.

"To this end, the Council will gladly continue to keep the Government of the United States informed of any action it may take or any information it may secure, and ventures to hope that that Government will also be disposed to communicate with it. The Council feels confident that, irrespective of any individual effort which any Government may deem it desirable to make, it is by the continuance of common endeavour that a successful result is most likely to be achieved. The efforts which are now being made here will be continued by the Council in such form as circumstances may require."

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FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 25th.

Just as the first week following the outbreak at Mukden was closing came Japan's acceptance of the Council's recommendation to both parties. The text is so clear and so brief that it is worth quoting in full:

" Acting on instructions received from my Government, I have the honour to acquaint Your Excellency with the reply of my Government to the telegram of September 22nd which Your Excellency was good enough to forward to it.

" 1. As regards the first point mentioned in the message, the Japanese troops, since the beginning of the present events, have been careful to act only within the limits necessary to ensure their own safety, the protection of the Railway and the safety of Japanese nationals. The Japanese Government has firmly pursued the object of preventing an extension of the incident and the aggravation of the situation; it is profoundly desirous of ensuring the peaceful settlement of this problem as rapidly as possible by negotiations between the two countries, and it has the firm intention not to depart from this line of conduct.

" 2. As regards the second point in the message, the Japanese Government desires to state that it has withdrawn the greater part of its forces to the Railway zone and that they are concentrated there. Outside that zone, only a few troops are, as a precautionary measure, quartered in the town of Mukden and at Kirin, and a small number of soldiers have been placed at certain points, these measures not constituting any military occupation.

" The Japanese forces are being withdrawn to the fullest extent which is at present allowed by the maintenance of the safety of Japanese nationals and the protection of the Railway. The Japanese Government, which intends to withdraw its troops to the Railway zone in proportion as the situation improves, feels confident that the Council will, in this matter, trust the sincerity of its attitude."

At the same time, the Japanese Delegation also forwarded a declaration made by the government in Tokio the day before. Despite Japan's constant efforts to foster friendly relations with China, it stated, the conduct of Chinese officials and individuals, particularly

in Manchuria, had been such that Japanese national sentiment was frequently irritated and the Japanese people brought to doubt whether its sentiments were reciprocated. It was in this atmosphere that a detachment of Chinese troops destroyed the railroad near Mukden and created a dangerous situation. Only 10,400 Japanese soldiers were on the ground against 220,000 Chinese, with hundreds of thousands of Japanese residents in danger. To forestall an imminent disaster the Japanese Army had to act promptly, disarming nearby Chinese garrisons and entrusting order to local Chinese under Japanese supervision. The troops were then mostly withdrawn. Nowhere does military occupation as such exist, nor have Japanese troops seized customs or the control of railroads or passed north of Changchun. The special Cabinet meeting of September 19th sent instructions to make all possible efforts to avoid an aggravation of the situation. Japan has no territorial designs in Manchuria; she seeks only the opportunity of participating safely in the development of that territory; she is prepared to cooperate with China to prevent the present incident developing into a disastrous situation and to work out "such constructive plans as will once for all eradicate causes for future friction."

Tokio Reactions.

Just what influence League action had had in Tokio was reported in different ways in despatches reaching Geneva. A despatch to the London *Times* of September 25 said that "the press displays irritation at the action of the League, but the Foreign Office says the League is not open to censure". A further despatch said that it was certain that the mediation of Geneva had contributed to the more conciliatory attitude adopted at Tokio. On the other hand, Viscount Ishii, President of the Japanese League of Nations Association was stated in the *Times* of the 26th to "have complained bitterly of the League's suspicions of Japan. "The whole structure of the disarmament plan", he said, "might be wrecked by a probably unintentional but inconsiderate act of suspicion which casts doubt on the accuracy

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of the solemn statement made by the Japanese Government". "In any case", the same despatch stated, "a sense of relaxing tension pervaded the Government offices today".

America Acts Again.

This same day the United States Minister transmitted to the President of the Council, under instructions from the Secretary of State, the text of the Identic Note addressed to China and Japan in Washington. The text was as follows:

"The Government and people of the United States observed with regret and with concern events of the past few days in Manchuria. In view of the sincere desire of the people of this country that principles and methods of peace shall prevail in international relations, and of the existence of treaties, to several of which the United States is a party, the provisions of which are intended to regulate the adjustment of controversies between nations without resort to use of force, the American Government feels warranted in expressing to the Chinese and the Japanese Governments its hope that they will cause their military forces to refrain from any further hostilities, will so dispose respectively of their armed forces as to satisfy the requirements of international law and international agreements, and will refrain from activities which may prejudice the attainment by amicable methods of an adjustment of their differences."

Satisfactory though this and the previous communication from Washington had been, there were still not a few observers in Geneva who feared lest, if cooperation were limited to written communications after the fact, a gap might quite easily develop in which divergent policies might arise. A far greater certainty of the pursuit of similar action by both parties would undoubtedly exist if a method of consultation in advance could be arrived at. League authorities were naturally anxious to know what action the United States was contemplating; similarly, they frequently mentioned the possibility of having an American representative present to advise with them before their own action was taken.

Another Council Session.

That afternoon the Council came together for another public session. The President noted the replies of the two Governments to the Council's telegrams; expressed its appreciation for the promptness with which they had responded to its appeal; and expressed the view that the Council had every reason to be satisfied with the Japanese Government's statement that it had withdrawn the greater part of its forces to the railroad zone and that they were concentrated there. That improvement in the situation should be noted.

Mr. Yoshizawa then asked that, in view of the importance of the two documents, his Government's reply to the Council's telegram and its statement on the situation in Manchuria above mentioned be read. He said he felt that these statements had cleared the atmosphere, which up to then had been obscured by alarming and exaggerated reports, added that he must enter "an indignant protest against the abominable accusations" concerning the Japanese troops, and asserted his belief that the situation had now been reduced to its proper proportions where it could be examined in calm. He again summarised the situation in Manchuria, pointing out that protective measures had to be fairly far-reaching in scope if they were to be effective. He similarly reaffirmed Japan's pacific intentions, her previous withdrawal of most of her troops, and her intention of withdrawing the rest. The improvement in the situation seemed to him to militate in favour of the direct negotiation originally proposed by China. As to the Council, its essential mission was to bring about pacific settlement. The method might vary according to circumstances but must respect the wishes of the parties. If one of them clearly expressed its views as to the choice of procedure, it seemed to him the duty and the practice of the Council to respect these desires. In the present case the Council would do well not to intervene prematurely, as thereby it might risk adversely affecting the situation which already showed signs of improvement.

Mr. Sze then had the Chinese reply read. He thereupon added that China had placed herself unreservedly in the hands of the League and

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agreed to accept any recommendations the Council might make. Already she had ordered her military and civilians not to resist, and was ready to assume full responsibility for the protection of life and property. He reiterated, however, that the Council's action was considered as but a first and preliminary step and that the next and immediate step should be to secure the complete withdrawal of troops and the re-establishment of the *status quo ante*. In accordance with precedent, China would like a commission of neutral members to observe the modes and times of such withdrawal. Also, he desired the Council to point out to Japan that, unless this withdrawal should take place, she would place herself in opposition to the categorical obligation assumed by her in Article 15 to submit to the Council disputes likely to lead to a rupture. If this Article should be brought into operation, the procedure would no longer be a matter of discretion but is definitely outlined. Should Japan claim that her citizens and property would not be safe, China had already given an assurance to this effect which was all the more valid because, despite intense indignation throughout China, Japanese living there had not been molested. Mr. Sze then commented on certain statements made by Mr. Yoshizawa, noting the admission that there was still a considerable occupation of Chinese territory — including Mukden and Kirin, very important cities, both capitals of provinces of Manchuria. Mr. Sze would ask what "a small number of men" and a "few other places" might mean. As regards defensive measures, Lord Cecil had already read an extract on that subject; it was a dangerous principle to assert that troops might occupy so many places, destroy so much property, and kill so many people. As regards direct negotiations, Mr. Sze read cable No. 19 previously submitted, the last sentence of which "that the invasion made any direct negotiations absolutely impossible" still held good.

Mr. Yoshizawa thereupon simply added that he had already replied in a previous statement to the accusations brought by the Chinese representative against Japan.

Defining the Position.

Viscount Cecil stated his understanding of the actual position of the Council. Its duty under Article 11 was "to take any action that might be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations". It had not to settle the dispute or pass any judgment on the action of the parties. It was only when peace had been safeguarded that any question as to the settlement of the actual dispute could arise. Lord Cecil agreed with his Japanese colleague that the question of the dispute itself was for the parties and not for the Council to deal with unless it came before the Council under Article 15 or some other contractual agreement. But at the present stage the business of the Council was to safeguard the peace of nations. It was with the greatest pleasure that he had learned that, even before receiving the Council's communications, the Japanese troops were being withdrawn. The Council would desire, and Japan too, he hoped, that the remaining troops be withdrawn as rapidly as possible. Both sides admitted the withdrawal was in progress; there was every reason to hope that the duty of the Council to safeguard the peace of nations might in a short time be regarded as fully accomplished. If the Council had any doubt on the question, it would have to consider its duty in these circumstances.

The President then made a brief statement. The Japanese forces were being withdrawn; and, if both sides made efforts to alleviate the situation, the Council might hope for a satisfactory settlement. It must rely first and foremost on the loyalty of the two parties. On the one hand it would wish to appeal to Japan to withdraw its troops as rapidly as possible; on the other, it would note China's assumption of responsibility, as and when the Japanese troops withdrew, for the safety of Japanese lives and property. The Council would, no doubt, wish to be kept informed of the measures taken; in the meantime, in view of the importance of the statements made, he would propose postponing the discussion to allow their study.

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Geneva Doubts.

This session created the gravest difference of opinion and interpretation amongst both official and private observers. As the *New York Times* correspondent that night wrote, opinions were divided into two radically opposed schools of thought. The majority, he said, felt that the Council, and especially Lord Cecil, had lost face in trying to save the face of the Council, or Japan, or both. This group held that Japan had successfully defied both the League and the United States, and compared her promise to withdraw troops as rapidly as possible with that of Gladstone when the British occupied Egypt 50 years ago. The other school of thought, he continued, and especially that of League officials, was that the League had attained a victory. This group held that the principal object was to bring about the retreat of troops without attaching too much importance to the method, and that the best way of assuring the continuation of this retreat was that of Lord Cecil which, in effect, made Japan's promise more solemn. If in several days Japan did not keep its promises, the Council could employ more energetic measures. Japan's reply might be considered a rebuff to the League but in view of Japan's psychology it was, in effect, a great concession. In any case, he concluded, the Council definitely followed the policy which Washington was urging as the most wise.

A Wise Policy ?

The Council, at the moment, was banking everything on persuasion, mediation, and confidence. Constant reports of the division in Japan between the civil government and the military, constant urgings not to take any action which might weaken the former, especially Baron Shidehara, and develop a wave of ultra-patriotic reaction, as well as the now well-known judgment of the American government against immediately forcing the situation, fitted in with the personal desires of the members of the Council and of all their countries, preoccupied with acute

internal problems, to recommend a policy of friendliness and caution in the hope that, somehow, matters would right themselves and the world be spared further movement along the road to calamity. There were the strongest of reasons for this policy, not only in the difficulties of the various countries nor even in the fact that the League's chief purpose is to prevent rather than to stimulate sharp actions, but also in the faith and confidence which the Council felt it could place in both parties to the dispute. Whether or not this view was justified, whether or not those were right who pressed for action without perhaps sufficiently estimating possible eventualities, the rumor was not long in getting around that the Japanese delegation in Geneva had responded most generously to this method and had cabled urgently to Tokio that Japan must make very effort to reciprocate the goodwill and confidence shown by the League. If that were indeed the case, as seemed well established, the policy which led to it, and the temporary misunderstanding in China, would seem to have been justified. Certainly no effort could be spared or no opportunity left untried to secure peaceful settlement by persuasion and mediation.

SATURDAY AND SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 26th AND 27th.

Saturday and Sunday were relatively quiet, waiting days. Both parties had pledged themselves to follow the Council's recommendations; obviously a short delay was inevitable before the actual results would be clear. On the whole, however, the situation was distinctly better. Geneva was relieved, though anxious. Tokio reported a lessening of the tension and a belief that the military action was ended and the troops really in withdrawal. Nanking, however, was disturbed; the League's action was not understood; an impression prevailed that it had abandoned the affair.

What news there was, was calmer. The Chinese sent in but three telegrams over the week-end, numbers 23 to 25, without, however, startling new facts. The Geneva press pictured

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the two parties as resting on their positions, China proposing but Japan refusing a Commission of Inquiry, and Japan proposing but China refusing direct negotiations. The situation seemed to come down to the question whether the Japanese would actually withdraw before another dangerous incident threw it into jeopardy again. In this connection disturbing reports came from Peking of the derailing of a train near Mukden by bandits, with the death of 30 people; from Hong-Kong of hostile demonstrations against the Japanese; and from various sources of incipient military republics in Manchuria and Mongolia.

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 28th.

Monday morning's dispatches brought news of an attack on Foreign Minister C. T. Wang in Nanking by students dissatisfied with his supposed failure to persuade the League of Nations to continue to support China. When the Council took up the Chinese-Japanese affair at its afternoon meeting, the President said that the Council had learned of this with deep emotion and expressed the unanimous desire of his colleagues to transmit their warmest sympathies to Dr. Wang. He then recalled a resolution submitted by his delegation to the present Assembly concerning the grave disturbance to international relations which might be caused by false news and made a fraternal appeal to the press to cooperate with the Council in its particularly delicate task by giving world public opinion accurate information. Mr. Yoshizawa expressed his deep emotion at the attack on Dr. Wang, a personal friend for many years. Mr. Sze thanked the Council, and particularly Mr. Yoshizawa, whose esteem Dr. Wang reciprocated.

The Secretary-General asked the Council's authority to send to the League offices in Tokio and Nanking a short resumé of the proceedings. This was agreed to by the Council, particularly the Japanese and Chinese delegates, and drew attention to a little appreciated fact that the League, as part of its new system of cooperation and liason, had, during the past years, built

up a chain of correspondents in many countries to keep it informed of developments and to serve in case of need. In Tokio, for instance, there has been for many years a very effective and valuable bureau for expediting collaboration between Japan and the League and for answering queries in a country possessing one of the largest League societies and purchasing the third largest amount of League publications. In Nanking, following the recent increase in collaboration with China, a correspondent similarly had been appointed.

Mr. Yoshizawa then expressed the view that the unfortunate situation was happily improving. He reiterated Japan's intention to withdraw her troops as and when the return to peaceful conditions should make such withdrawal possible without danger to her nationals, but drew attention to the fact that, despite China's assumption of responsibility for Japanese lives and property, unfortunate experiences compelled her to recognize that China's goodwill had not always been able to make itself heard in the provinces. The Powers had often been compelled to land and maintain troops in China or to send war vessels there. The situation in Manchuria was particularly difficult and could not be compared with that between countries with separate populations divided by a well defined frontier. Japan must, therefore, be careful before withdrawing her troops. Despite pressing appeals for protection, no more troops had been sent and the withdrawal was continuing. Japan had made every effort to supply the Council with accurate information; it had no object in concealing the facts; indeed, at the very moment, every facility was being given in Manchuria for foreign officers, for instance, Colonel Thornhill, British Military Attaché in Peking, and for newspaper correspondents. Any further measures, then, appeared unnecessary. Mr. Yoshizawa concluded with reaffirming that Japan had no territorial designs on Manchuria, that she intended to withdraw her troops as soon as her nationals and property could be safeguarded, and that it was his earnest hope that this would be "within the shortest possible time."

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A New Method.

Then developed a long and very intricate debate between the Japanese and Chinese representatives, with two interventions by Lord Cecil, which was remarkable both for the diplomatic subtlety with which it was conducted and for the fact that two nations in the midst of a most dangerous dispute could thus negotiate publicly back and forth across the Council table in the presence of representatives of twelve other states and some 300 journalists representing the press of the world. No debate of this type had ever taken place before, nor, indeed, had the mechanism which alone made it possible existed before the establishment of the League. If there be value in open diplomacy, if there be such an element as world moral opinion, if, indeed, there is any hope of supplanting the old methods of force and disorganization with new methods of common world responsibility, the demonstration of world consultation and conference already so dramatically made in the present incident would seem to show, whatever the eventual result and even in case it should not finally succeed, that the world has entered into a new phase of international relationships.

Little enough was this appreciated at the time, even in Geneva, where many, especially those not responsible, pressed for sharp measures; much less did it seem to be appreciated outside, where the debates were too often regarded as mere talk. Vital lines were being laid, however, both for the particular case in question and for cases that may come in the future.

Mr. Sze began the debate with satisfaction at the continued withdrawal of Japanese troops, though he would have been happier if they had all been withdrawn, or at least a date set therefor. He then wished to ask some questions. Could the Japanese representative give the Council any information on Japanese airplane attacks on trains on the Peking-Mukden railroad, of which he understood there were four on Thursday and Friday, the trains carrying ordinary passengers, with no Chinese soldiers nearby, and the planes flying low and using machine-guns? Also he would like to

know if, in the places evacuated, the *status quo ante* had been reestablished, that is, persons arrested released and property restored. As regards Japanese in China, no report had been received that any had been attacked, despite high feelings; China was as anxious as Japan to live on friendly terms with all peoples, including Japan, as shown by her recent inauguration of a very active collaboration with the League. But the most important element in such a matter is goodwill and mutual appreciation. In regard to Mr. Yoshizawa's mention of two posts, Hsinmintung and Chengshiatung, as still occupied, he would like to ask if there were no others?

Mr. Yoshizawa interrupted to add Kirin and Mukden.

China Offers a Compromise.

Mr. Sze then asked Japan's intentions regarding these places and how soon the troops would be withdrawn. Everyone agreed on a speedy completion of the withdrawal; the question remained as to the method. China's desire for a neutral commission was well-known, but, in order to be conciliatory and meet the Japanese representative more than half-way, he would propose that the Council help the parties reach an agreement as to arrangements on the spot, which would make it possible to fix an early date for the completion of withdrawal and render it unnecessary for the Council to send a commission of enquiry from Geneva. Finally, as regards reports that the Japanese had disarmed Chinese railway guards on the Peking-Mukden line, he hoped also for information from the Japanese representative.

Mr. Yoshizawa replied that the most important points raised seemed to be immediate withdrawal and the commission of observers. He was convinced he had already explained, that day and Friday, why Japan was unable to agree to those suggestions. As to the statement that Chinese women and children had been massacred by the Japanese army, he had already denied that in the most formal manner.

Other accusations were beyond the practice of the Japanese army. As soon as he had any information, however, he would inform

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not only the Chinese representative but the Council.

Mr. Sze then said he understood the Japanese could not agree to immediate evacuation: he protested in the strongest possible terms against longer occupation. He reiterated his preference for a commission of neutral observers, but, to be conciliatory, repeated his suggestion that the Council aid the parties to come to an agreement on the spot. The telegrams to which the Japanese representative had taken exception and the differences in the statements of the two parties proved conclusively the need for the early dispatch of such a commission to ascertain the true facts.

Approach ?

Mr. Yoshizawa observed that he had already replied to the suggestion that a date for the completion of the evacuation be fixed. He was, however, prepared to telegraph at once to Tokio Mr. Sze's suggestion for the organization of a Sino-Japanese commission on the spot to facilitate evacuation.

Mr. Sze wanted to be sure about this commission. He said that, as China had entrusted her case to the Council, he expected the commission would report to the Council in order that the latter might be informed of the speedy and complete withdrawal. Also, he would venture to ask if the Japanese representative could answer his other questions as to the release of Chinese officials and civilians and restoration of property. As regards the reasons given by Mr. Yoshizawa for the maintenance of Japanese troops, he would point out that Japanese in China far from Japanese soldiers were unmolested and that it was the presence of Japanese soldiers which created the tension against which Japan claimed it necessary to provide military protection. A vicious circle was thus created.

Mr. Yoshizawa said he would have to ask for information on these points. He would like to ask Mr. Sze, however, whether he had in mind a commission of Japanese and Chinese only, or one including other nationalities.

Mr. Sze replied that, as the Japanese representative had frequently denied the accuracy

of reports and there were matters on which the representatives of the two countries did not agree, it was possible the same thing might happen again regarding the withdrawal. Hence, as the Council was assisting the two parties, it should appoint a neutral representative or representatives to help settle differences or remove misunderstanding. In connection with this withdrawal, the statement that several hundreds of Japanese police had been left at Chientao had been made; their presence, however, was liable to aggravate the situation. He requested that arrangements be made to replace them with Chinese.

Mr. Yoshizawa responded that he had already explained his government's views on evacuation and a commission of observers. He had said that all other measures than those he had mentioned were unnecessary. He could not agree, therefore, to a commission constituted on the lines just indicated by Mr. Sze.

Mr. Sze replied that he had not used the words "commission of observers". He had not suggested a commission to proceed from Geneva, as there were neutrals on the spot. As the Japanese delegate had said his country was anxious to live on the most friendly terms with China, he would most certainly welcome someone to help remove any possible misunderstanding.

An Attempt at Mediation.

Viscount Cecil here intervened to attempt to bring some kind of agreement out of a debate which seemed to have gone as far as it could wisely go. He thought the Chinese suggestion an interesting one and hoped his Japanese colleague would be able to give it further consideration. As he understood it, there should be some kind of committee or meeting in Manchuria, consisting chiefly of Chinese and Japanese. The Chinese representative had also suggested that the League might do something to help the two parties to come to an agreement. If Mr. Yoshizawa agreed, the Council might begin by bringing the two parties together to see if they could arrive at an agreement. The chief business of the League was to promote an agreement between the two parties after they had

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succeeded, if they did succeed, in avoiding all danger of the dispute developing into a war. The League was intensely interested in an agreement being reached between the parties; but in all previous experience, it had always been left for the parties to come to an agreement if they could. He hoped his Japanese colleague would carefully consider whether a meeting of Chinese and Japanese might not be of service; if that meeting should prove fruitless, the Council would have to consider whether anything else could be done to bring about agreement. Meanwhile, in order to avoid misunderstanding, he hoped Mr. Sze would put his proposal in writing.

Mr. Sze gladly assented. He added, however, that he had said the Council could help the parties come to an agreement by arrangements on the spot. He had not said that China or Japan alone could arrange matters, but that the Council could arrange them and that the Council might see fit to select its representatives.

Waning Hope.

Viscount Cecil that that in that case the Council would be unable to carry the matter further at the present stage.

Mr. Yoshizawa repeated that he was quite ready to submit Lord Cecil's suggestion to his government, but, if it were supplemented by the further suggestion of the Chinese representative, he could not do so. He appreciated Lord Cecil's motives; Japan had no intention of making war on China. He interpreted Lord Cecil's suggestion to mean that the Chinese and Japanese would endeavor to come to an arrangement without help from outsiders. If that were correct, he would not fail to transmit the suggestion to his government.

Mr. Sze said there seemed to be a misapprehension; he had made a proposal which Lord Cecil had sought to restate in his own words, and this restatement Mr. Sze had corrected.

Viscount Cecil regretted any misunderstanding. He had thought the Chinese proposal applied to the questions of method, time, etc. of the evacuation and nothing else. It was true that Mr. Sze had thought the League could help the parties to come to an agreement. The only

difference was that it was now suggested that the Chinese and Japanese should meet and try to come to an agreement. If they failed, the Council would be no worse off; it could then say what further steps could be taken. Lord Cecil was referring solely to the question of evacuation; he was not dealing with other matters. However, it would be very difficult to carry the matter further at the moment.

The President of the Council agreed. The statements made would need to be carefully studied. He would summon another meeting shortly but, as the Assembly was closing the following day, the Council would doubtless agree that he should explain the situation to it. He proposed to ask the Assembly's permission to give an impartial report on the question and on how the Council had so far carried out its duties under Article 11.

Thus ended a long and tortuous debate which had held a large attendance in complete silence throughout. At times it had looked as though appreciable progress were to be made, but each time efforts just failed. The Chinese delegate had pressed a number of difficult questions as to Japanese actions or policy in Manchuria, to which the Japanese representative had replied either by reference to previous declarations or by saying he would have to ask Tokio for further information. The Chinese representative had also offered a compromise on the subject of an agency on the spot to arrange evacuation, which at first it seemed the Japanese delegate would cable to Tokio. When precision was sought, however, it was found that, despite Lord Cecil's attempts for a still finer compromise, the two parties stood practically where they had been standing throughout, the Japanese for direct negotiations without any participants from outside, and the Chinese for negotiations initiated through the Council, with neutral assistance, and reporting to the Council. The hope for a bridge over this gulf, which at one moment was strong, faded decidedly at the end.

The Point at Issue.

The Japanese, indeed, from the very outset, had taken strong position against any kind of outside participation in the affair. The inci-

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dent, they felt, was purely a local one between the two countries. Not only was there no need for neutral observers or assistants but their presence would imply distrust of Japan's word. Mr. Yoshizawa had made this clear in Geneva; the Japanese Government had repeatedly stated it in Tokio; Viscount Ishii, devoted friend of the League and President of the Japanese Society for the League, was quoted as rather bitterly affirming it.

America's Share.

Whatever the Council's views might have been in a field where it was free to act entirely on its own judgment, there can be but little doubt but that in this case its policy was deeply influenced by that of the United States. From the first, it had become known that its government, while most warmly supporting the League's effort for peace in principle, felt the method of a neutral commission, for the moment at least, to be unwise. A Tokio dispatch printed in the London *Times* of September 26 said: "Officials express appreciation of the refusal of the United States to join the League's proposal for a military commission of inquiry in Manchuria." The leading article in the same issue commented:

"The Council's appeal has thus borne fruit already in the improvement of the local situation and in the encouragement which it has given to the moderate elements in Japan. And the prompt and efficacious assistance of the United States has contributed in no small measure to this initial success. It is no exaggeration to say that the American government, though not a member of the League, has been in closer collaboration with it during the last few days than at any previous time. In one respect, indeed, it has handled a difficult and obscure situation more skilfully than the Council was at first disposed to do. The manner of Mr. Stimson's intervention was as tactful as was the text of his communication to the Japanese and Chinese governments. His refusal to support the proposal mooted at a meeting of the League Council for the dispatch of a Military Commission of Inquiry to Manchuria showed a sagacious appreciation of the dangers inseparable from such a step. Any action which gave the proud and

sensitive islanders the impression, however unfounded, that their government was regarded with distrust by other Powers must have increased the embarrassments at Tokio and might have defeated the good intentions of Geneva."

This view, however, was far from universal. There were very bitter critics who felt that the League, in not taking steps on its own to find out exactly what was happening, was in effect abdicating its duty. And it was said that, in almost any case except one involving a Great Power, it would at once have taken this action. The United States naturally came in for its share of criticism from these quarters. Whichever view be correct, the decision was an extremely difficult one, with strong arguments to be advanced on both sides. It well illustrated the difficulties of the new diplomacy, the transition period, as it were, between past methods and future.

The News.

Meanwhile, information reaching Geneva on Monday was a shade less disturbing than theretofore, though still bad. It seemed to indicate a moment of waiting, from which, however, a sudden catastrophe might at any time develop. Press reports indicated a growing public unrest throughout China and Manchuria, with the possibility of anti-Japanese outbreaks on the one hand or the establishment of military governments on the other. Tokio dispatches gave details of independent republics in Manchuria and Mongolia, on which, however, the Japanese government was said to frown. Nanking reported demonstrations of students dissatisfied with the League's decision; Hong-Kong reported martial law, patrols in the streets, and mobilization of British volunteers; Canton announced the suspension of all circulation for three minutes, a period of silence, and mourning armbands for the period of the occupation.

The delegations in Geneva also communicated information to the Council. The Japanese transmitted the declaration of General Shimamoto, commanding the protective forces at Mukden, on the origin of the affair. The Chinese dele-

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gation circulated ten more telegrams, making a total of 35, together with two unofficial telegrams from Chinese in Singapore and Germany. These messages gave further details of the Japanese occupation and military movements; reported all China as "seething with indignation", with the government hard put to quiet the population; claimed that the attack was premeditated and intended to cover annexation; and concluded that, "While Government fully recognizes earnest endeavour Council to maintain peace, the fact that neutral commission yet undispached Manchuria and continued Japanese air attacks on Peking-Mukden railway, Japanese semi-official statement that Kwantung army should remain present positions pending completion negotiations, settlement present dispute, reported movement Japanese warships producing most unfavorable impression public opinion. Government most earnestly trust Council will exert its full authority before too late."

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 29th.

This was the closing day of the Twelfth Assembly. The President of the Council, at a previous meeting on September 23, had promised a full statement on behalf of his colleagues before the representatives of the 52 nations in the Assembly, including the 38 not in the Council, dispersed to their homes. Interest was high as Mr. Lerroux mounted the rostrum before the world's largest organized body. What would he say, what interpretation would he give, what assurance would he hold out to those who had so anxiously followed the development of the affair? And what, too would the Chinese do? Would they seize the occasion to precipitate another general debate, or would they let the matter rest as it was?

The Council Reports.

On the first point the Assembly was given as full satisfaction as was possible in the incomplete stage of the proceedings. In recognition of the high authority which the annual meeting of all League States has attained, the President

of the Council gave a full account of the development of the affair, how it had come before the Council, the action of that body, the replies from the two parties, the cooperation of the United States, the beginning of evacuation, and the developing hope of agreement. He then summarized the present situation and the plans and hopes for the future. He concluded;

"I only wish to allude to several essential points: Firstly, the affirmation by the Japanese Government and by its Representative that it never had or will have any intention of occupying Manchuria militarily; Secondly, the fact that the Japanese Government has on several occasions insisted before the Council on its intention to withdraw as soon as possible the Japanese forces to within the railroad zone gradually as the safety of its nationals and their property is effectively guaranteed; Thirdly, the fact that this intention, has, according to the declaration made yesterday to the Council by the Japanese Representative, been, during the last two days, translated into definite action and that outside the railroad zone Japanese troops are only stationed in a few localities.

"The Council has noted these reassuring statements by the Japanese Government. It feels certain that, in this very difficult affair as in other affairs which have been laid before it, the goodwill of the parties and their loyalty to international engagements constitutes the best guarantee for the peace of the world. Having had the matter laid before it on the basis of Article 11 of the Covenant, the Council will, after the Assembly's session, continue its efforts with the representatives of the two parties to aid them to obtain by such measures as both deem acceptable, a satisfactory settlement of the situation which has deeply affected the relations between two great nations and at one time even seemed likely, before the progress achieved in the last few days, to constitute a threat to international peace."

This statement was accepted as clear, impartial, and objective—open diplomacy, indeed, to the highest degree. Whatever had been the hesitation in certain quarters, whatever the doubts as to whether the Council's action had been sharp and determined enough, the Assembly was, on the whole, gratified. The President of the Assembly then expressed the appreciation of the Assembly and the view that, as the

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statement was wholly objective, there was no need for the parties, nor for other members of the Assembly, to open a discussion upon it. He hoped the Council would continue its pacific mission and expressed the firm conviction of the Assembly that its efforts would rapidly be crowned with complete success. Thereupon the work of the Twelfth Assembly was brought to an end and the delegates went off to their homes after nearly a month of intense and at times alarming conference. As they left, they had a definite hope, but by no means a feeling of certainty, that the most serious dispute yet brought before the League, which had arisen so suddenly and unexpectedly, would be solved shortly and satisfactorily.

The Council Carries On.

If the Assembly concluded its labors that noon, the Council was destined to continue in session to complete its work resulting from the Assembly decisions and to consider what course of action to follow in the Chinese-Japanese affair. While the latter did not figure on the agenda of the Tuesday session, aspects of the general Chinese situation came before the Council in connection with relief measures and epidemic disease in the flooded areas. This is worth mentioning in that it shows the all-inclusive nature of the League's interest and the fact that its members are often bound to it not only in political crises but in the general development of their social life. On this occasion, the Irish representative, recalling the Assembly appeal to all states to cooperate in this relief, stated that two distinct problems faced the Council. As regards the first, that of relief, he reported that China had asked the Secretary-General to recommend a League expert in relief work, preferably one with experience in the Near East, to act as general director of the headquarters of the National Flood Relief Commission. The Council authorized this appointment and further requested all states to take every possible measure for the relief of the flood victims. As regards the second question, that of epidemic disease control, the Council pointed out the danger to

all nations, recalled the League's coordination of national actions in the typhus scourge in Eastern Europe in 1921, mentioned the fortunate fact of the presence in China of League health officials who were already cooperating in the work, urged all governments to give effect to appeals for aid, drew the attention of governments and public to the need for money as well, and instructed the Secretary-General to transmit the resolutions to all states.

In this same connection a cable was received from the League Medical Director, who happened to be in Nanking, that Colonel Lindbergh had taken Dr. Borcic of the League Health Section to Hankow by air, in order to get assistance to the stricken area in the quickest possible way. The interdependence of all these matters is again illustrated by the fact that several years ago, when the League was creating a committee to consider the question of international civil aviation, Colonel Lindbergh was one of the famous world flyers to respond to the League's request for his views as to what should be done.

In addition, a letter was read from the Delegate of Paraguay recalling that the Twelfth Assembly had invited the Nansen International Office for Refugees to devote particular attention to the precarious situation of more than 100,000 Russian refugees living in China and the possibility of finding employment for them in other countries. In response to this humanitarian appeal, Paraguay was prepared to receive 1000 refugees of German origin (Mennonites and Lutherans) who appeared to be particularly well adapted for colonisation in the Chaco, where flourishing Mennonite settlements already exist. This was conditional, of course, on the cost of transport and establishment being met out of special funds which might be provided in part by numerous charitable and religious organisations. In response to this suggestion, Mr. Sze said that, while China welcomed all refugees who sought her hospitality, she found that differences of language and customs made it difficult for them to earn their livelihood; he, therefore, supported the suggestion. As the refugees involved were German, Count Bernstorff also expressed his gratitude and the

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matter was referred to the Refugee Office for action.

The final event of Tuesday was a session of the Committee of Five to consider what course of action to recommend to the Council at its session the following day. At that time a program was agreed upon to be submitted to the parties and the Council. Otherwise there were no developments. Press news was scarce: the Chinese delegation circulated but one more telegram, the 36th, giving a few more details of Japanese movements. A moment at least of pause, if not, as all hoped, of final settlement, seemed at hand as trains in all directions were taking the Assembly delegates out of Geneva.

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 30th.

This was to be the last day of the steady sessions and conferences which the Council had held on the Chinese-Japanese affair since it first took it up on September 19. The news was distinctly more calm and encouraging, both that reported in the Press and that sent in by the delegations. The latter, indeed, comprised but two brief telegrams from the Chinese delegation, making a total of 37 which that delegation had had distributed to the Council and the public since the outbreak of the affair.

Moreover, the Chinese compromise proposal for a Commission of Enquiry on the spot had been put in writing as requested and circulated to the Council. The text was as follows:

"Whereas the Chinese Government still believes that the best method that may be devised by the Council for securing the prompt and complete withdrawal of the Japanese troops and police and the full reestablishment of the *status quo ante*, is the sending of a neutral commission to Manchuria; and

"Whereas the Chinese Representative is desirous of being as conciliatory as possible and of meeting half-way the wishes of the Japanese Government;

"Therefore, the following proposal is made:

"That the Council shall help the parties to an agreement as to arrangements on the spot which will make it possible to fix an

early date for the completion of the withdrawal of all troops, police and aerial forces, thereby making it unnecessary to send a Commission of Enquiry in connection with the complete restoration of the *status quo ante*.

"That the Council in making the arrangements referred to shall appoint neutral persons on the spot to represent it, who shall participate in all arrangements made and report currently to the Council."

On Wednesday afternoon, after the Council had concluded all its other work, the Chinese-Japanese matter came before it for final discussion. The President pointed out that the Council, in view of its duty "to take such action as may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations", had singled out one object as of immediate and paramount importance, namely, the withdrawal of troops to the railway zone. Nevertheless, it could not but admit that, in the special circumstances, a certain amount of time, which the Council together with the parties wished to be as short as possible, had to be allowed to ensure the safety of life and property. He felt, therefore, that the best course would be for the Council to adjourn its discussions for a short time, holding itself always in readiness to render any assistance possible. He then proposed the following resolution, summarising the situation as it stood at the moment, including the pledges of both Governments, and suggesting adjournment till October 14th:

The Council

1. Notes the replies of the Chinese and Japanese Governments to the urgent appeal addressed to them by its President and the steps that have already been taken in response to that appeal;

2. Recognises the importance of the Japanese Government's statement that it has no territorial designs in Manchuria;

3. Notes the Japanese Representative's statement that his Government will continue as rapidly as possible the withdrawal of its troops which has already been begun, into the railway zone in proportion as the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals is effectively assured and that it hopes to carry out this intention in full as speedily as may be;

4. Notes the Chinese Representative's

— 32 —

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4. Notes the Chinese Representative's

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statement that his Government will assume responsibility for the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals outside that zone as the withdrawal of the Japanese troops continues and the Chinese local authorities and police forces are reestablished;

5. Being convinced that both Governments are anxious to avoid taking any action which might disturb the peace and good understanding between the two nations, notes that the Chinese and Japanese representatives have given assurances that their respective Governments will take all necessary steps to prevent any extension of the scope of the incident or any aggravation of the situation;

6. Requests both Parties to do all in their power to hasten the restoration of normal relations between them and for that purpose to continue and speedily complete the execution of the above mentioned undertakings;

7. Requests both Parties to furnish the Council at frequent intervals with full information as to the development of the situation;

8. Decides, in the absence of any unforeseen occurrence which might render an immediate meeting essential, to meet again at Geneva on Wednesday, October 14th 1931, to consider the situation as it then stands;

9. Authorises its President to cancel the meeting of the Council fixed for October 14th should he decide after consulting his colleagues, and more particularly the representatives of the two Parties, that in view of such information as he may have received from the Parties or from other members of the Council as to the development of the situation, the meeting is no longer necessary.

The procedure thus suggested had been carefully worked out. It reaffirmed the commitments made by both Japan and China, provided for the continuance of information, and made possible a short breathing spell in which Japan would have the opportunity to withdraw her troops. A time-limit was not fixed, though there was some such connotation in the proposal for reconvening fourteen days later. There was little doubt but that the Council wished to evince complete confidence that within this period Japan would have been able to complete the withdrawal already begun.

Japan Suggests Information.

Mr. Yoshizawa accepted the President's resolution. With regard to information to be obtained on the spot, Japan felt it would be quite useless to take special measures, particularly as there were a great many people in Manchuria from whom the Council could obtain information. However, in order to facilitate this task, he suggested that each Member of the Council send the Secretary-General any information his government might have received on the spot which he thought useful and desirable to communicate to his colleagues.

Mr. Sze noted that the Japanese Representative now recognised that neutral information was required by the Council in order to facilitate its task. He further noted the Council's request that it be given complete and frequent information as to the progress of events and assured the Council of his government's willingness to comply therewith. Thereby he hoped that as a first step towards the restoration of normal relations the present unfortunate situation would speedily come to an end. He noted with satisfaction the Council's recognition of its responsibility for helping both parties to secure the complete and prompt withdrawal of Japanese forces and the full reestablishment of the *status quo ante*, and that it would remain in session until that responsibility had been fully discharged. If by October 14th, the complete withdrawal and reestablishment of the *status quo ante* had been effected, present measures would have proved adequate; if, however, contrary to everyone's hope, this happy result were not achieved by that date, the Council would have to examine what other measures might be required. Mr. Sze recalled his two suggestions: first, a Committee of Enquiry; and second, local arrangements, though he fervently hoped that when the Council met on October 14th no such action would prove necessary. He also emphasised that this withdrawal of troops and reestablishment of the *status quo ante*, while a distinct and separate matter, constituted but a single and preliminary step in the adjustment of the controversy which China had submitted to the Council. He, therefore, deemed it proper to say that, when

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the *status quo ante* had been reestablished, China reserved all its rights under the Covenant and would continue to look to the Council for aid in determining the responsibilities of the two parties and in the fixing of damages.

Mr. Yoshizawa was unable to accept this interpretation. He only accepted the draft resolution as it stood.

The President then noted that the Council approved the resolution unanimously. There was, he thought, no need to go into matters of interpretation at the moment. The rights of both parties obviously remained intact. Either would be entitled, if necessary, to submit his point of view to the Council later.

The Council Adjourns.

Such, then, was the first phase of the Chinese-Japanese dispute in Manchuria. Events had gone rapidly indeed. Late in the evening of September 18 an incident had occurred near Mukden; on the morning of the 19th the news had reached Geneva; that afternoon the Japanese Representative, after consultation with the President of the Council, had reported it to that body; on September 20th China had appealed to the League under Article 11 of the Covenant; that afternoon the Council had met, and heard statements from both parties; the next day it had decided on a policy, and that night cables had gone to Tokio and Nanking urging measures to preserve peace and to withdraw troops, and to Washington to inform the United States; for the next ten days the

Council was in almost steady session or consultation; on Thursday the United States had given its "whole-hearted" support to the League's action; on the same day China, and on Friday Japan, accepted the Council's recommendations; on two occasions the Council reported to the Assembly; and on Wednesday, the 30th, with the withdrawal of troops already begun and its completion promised, the Council adjourned for a two weeks' period to allow the necessary time.

Never before in any dispute in world history had there been such immediate and public action. Both Assembly and Council happened to be in session when the incident broke out; both Japan and China, as well as other countries, had large delegations in Geneva, while an American delegation had arrived for the first time for an Assembly Disarmament discussion; over 300 journalists were on hand to send news broadcast throughout the world. In ten days of negotiations both sides had accepted solemn pledges for peace; Japan had denied any aggressive intentions or territorial aims; China had accepted responsibility for Japanese lives and property; and a beginning had been made for fuller information and future mediatory action.

Adjournment took place in circumstances undoubtedly serious but nevertheless encouraging. The two parties were given the full confidence of the Council to carry out their pledges; there seemed good reason to hope that, despite all the dangers of incidents, a satisfactory completion of this first phase of the dispute would be reached before the Council was scheduled to reconvene.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



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
LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Ottawa, Canada.

November 12, 1931.

No. 579.

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The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to the Legation's
despatch No. ²⁶⁶⁸ 577 of November 10, 1931, transmitting
copies of a statement issued by the Japanese Minister
at Ottawa in regard to the Manchurian situation and to
report that Dr. Li Chuin, Chinese Consul General here,
has made public his reply. Copies of the statement,
which merely attempts to refute Mr. Tokugawa's arguments,
are enclosed herewith.

Respectfully yours,

For the Minister:

James C. H. Bonbright
James C. H. Bonbright,
Third Secretary of Legation.

✓
Enclosure:
1. Statement of
Dr. Li Chuin.

820.02
JCHB/EMS

FILED
1931 81 NOV

OTTAWA JOURNAL Thursday, November 12th. 1931.

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch
No. 579 of November 12, 1931,
from the Legation at Ottawa.

Says Provocative Attitude of Japan Cause of Trouble

Dr. Li Chuin, Chinese Consul General Here, Replies to Japanese Legation Statement.

Charging the Japanese with provocative activity in Manchuria, Dr. Li Chuin, Chinese Consul General, last night issued a statement in response to that given out two nights ago by Hon. Iyemasa Tokugawa, Japanese Minister here. Dr. Li Chuin's statement follows:

"The Chinese Consulate General feels that it is his duty to make the following communique after having had knowledge of the statement issued from Ottawa and published in some of newspapers of today's date with regard to the recent military developments in the Heilungkiang province.

Can Hardly Be Blamed.

"With due consideration to the origin and intention of the said statement, this Consulate General, however, can hardly conceive that the Chinese troops should be blamed for the breach of peace in the region of the Nonni river in general and for the destruction of the Nonni bridge in particular. The cable news heretofore emanated both from Tokyo and the Japanese controlled City of Mukden and gave the impression that the bridge was damaged by Japanese bombing planes because they were fired at by Chinese soldiers.

A long lapse of time passed during the negotiations for the repair of the bridge between the Japanese and Chinese local military authorities with the consequence and development known to all. The Chinese military authority might, for strategical reasons, not have consented to the immediate repair of the Chinese-owned railway bridge, especially when it realized the danger of the advance of the rebel troops of Chan Hai Peng backed by the Japanese.

Provocating Attitude.

"The provocative attitude of the Japanese soldiery in the Chinese three eastern provinces and in some of the treaty ports does not help in bringing a solution to the present controversy and as long as the Japanese troops do not leave Chinese soil and as long as the Japanese militarists do not change their aggressive policy towards China, the anti-Japanese feeling and the indignation of the Chinese people are bound to be growing tense."

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

OTTAWA JOURNAL Thursday, November 12th. 1931.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAM

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone.

PARIS

Dated November 16, 1931

Rec'd 6 p.m. Division of

Secretary of State

Washington



744, November 16, 3 p.m.

FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES

My first caller this morning was Sir Eric Drummond.

Since last night the prepared speeches which Sze and
Yoshizawa had expected to make this afternoon had been
furnished to Drummond and are now in the hands of
Briand. As a strictly confidential matter of informa-
tion to you, not available to others here, the speech
of Yoshizawa was prepared at Tokyo by the Japanese Gov-
ernment and wired to him here. Matsudaira received
copy of it last night and brought it to me this morn-
ing and I shall comment on it later in this despatch.
The speech of Sze which he has sent to me is a re-
counting chiefly of Chinese grievances.

To have no speeches at this time except Briand's
opening speech followed by an adjournment subject to
the call of the Chairman, Drummond, after reading the
speeches of Sze and Yoshizawa, still thought was the
wise procedure. As these speeches however are not in-
tended



F/DEW

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MAM

2-#744, from Paris, November 16,
1931

intended to close discussion of vital points or to present ultimatums Briand may decide to let them be read.

For the moment nothing can stop the military operations of the Japanese and Chinese which because of the superior discipline and equipment of the Japanese troops are liable to reach a position of stabilization favorable to the Japanese troops in perhaps two or three days. This successful military stabilization of Japan's temporary troop locations should for the moment satisfy the extreme military element in Japan thus making it easier as regards public sentiment in Japan for the Japanese Government to endeavor to meet the suggestions of the League for proper and eventual settlement. In this event they would probably go further in conciliation than they do in the speech they have prepared for Yoshizawa to be delivered this afternoon.

Drummond said that in general up to this time the Council subject to change of conditions feel that their eventual recommendation should include a suggestion that the Chinese and Japanese agree on two separate committees one of them considering the question of the safety of the Japanese and the evacuation of the troops and the other ^{the} five Japanese points and also the suggestion that the decision of the treaty committee should not

MAIL

3- #744, from Paris, November 16,
1931

not be a necessary precedent to the settlement of the
personnel and evacuation question.

While dictating this I received a telephone call
from Simons asking me if I could see him at the British
Embassy at three o'clock. I shall endeavor to keep
you advised up to the minute as matters progress.

What follows from here is a paraphrase of the most
important portion of the speech prepared by Tokyo for
Yoshizawa. Matsudaira listened and approved of the fol-
lowing paraphrase which I dictated, but did not wish
me to cable the exact words of the speech. The follow-
ing is the paraphrase:

"The idea of Japan is that she is willing to re-
call her forces if satisfied that the five fundamental
principles advanced by her are substantially observed
in practice in the districts where those forces are at
present stationed. Japan feels that the efforts of
the local committees appointed to preserve the peace,
which were mentioned in Forbes' despatch and were or-
ganized by resident Chinese, indicate that this is a
proper method for securing the result which Japan de-
sires in the way of troop withdrawal. Japan feels that
because she has acted from necessity for the protection
of Japanese life in Manchuria no one should feel that
her

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MAM

4- 744, from Paris, November 16,
1931

her constant desire for sincere friendship between
China and Japan has weakened. Japan desires 'not one
foot of Chinese territory' and realizes sympathetically
the difficulties which confront China. The safety of
their fellow countrymen and the preservation of what
they consider their just and agreed upon rights Japan
looks upon an object of duty (END OF PARAPHRASE AND
QUOTE).

SHAW

OX

FW

File
November 16, 1931.
11:00 a.m.

TRANSATLANTIC TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY
STIMSON AND AMBASSADOR DAWES AND G. HOWLAND SHAW IN
PARIS.

Manchuria.

SECRETARY: General Dawes, I called you to tell you I received your cable about future sessions of the Council and the proposal of Briand that you should sit at them. I wanted to say that I approve of your proposed course. I have talked with the President about it and he approves of it. He suggests that you let as many meetings go by without your going there as possible before you have to go.

DAWES: Do you think I will have to go? I do not think it will be necessary at all because I will tell you what has happened. Drummond came over this morning and Massigli came last night with the argument that I should go. Then this morning Drummond wanted me to write some letter at this time telling that in the future conferences.....

I would not write anything at all. I said I was not going to say anything at all and I was going to keep perfectly free and not make any decision about this. Japan wants... a wise and necessary course. I said that they were approaching from the standpoint of... between us..... little inferiority complex. But I said that we wanted to support the policy of the League in every way but we must decide in what way it was best to support the League. That they could be perfectly sure that my action here would be such in the future as to show the cooperation that the United

793.94/2703 1/2

11. 12 1932

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Confidential File

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17

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States furnishes the League at this time. I had to be a little firm on that. Just before the meeting here and not over twenty minutes ago Briand sent over here what he proposed to say in opening the League meeting this afternoon. He asked me to make any changes in it which I thought were best, and I changed it a great deal. He goes on to explain that the situation differs from what it was in Geneva and that the United States had an official observer there and all that sort of thing and recognizes the change in the conditions. He then went on to say that they had sent me here and he copied my statement which I had prepared very carefully - and that I had come here to confer individually with the members of the Council on those matters in which the United States had treaty rights and in the general effort for peace. I scratched out the part that I might find it necessary to sit and then assured him of close cooperation in the League purpose.

SECRETARY: The general objective of the League in Manchuria -

DAWES: Peace in Manchuria. I scratched out any reference to the sitting. As time goes on and I have a chance I will talk with you first. The whole thing is over now with Briand's speech. I will read to you a copy of a telegram which is already on its way to you telling you what the present situation is.

SECRETARY: Before you do that let me repeat to you our position here. I feel that you have stated your position exactly right.

DAWES: Thank you.

SECRETARY: Briand has rather overstated what we did at Geneva. He has overstated it. What I really intended to do at Geneva is exactly what you have done here but they took

Gilbert

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

Gilbert and ran him in and made a regular ceremony of it and tried to make it look as if he were sitting there.

DAWES: That is what they tried to do with me.

SECRETARY: You were right in keeping out of it. The point is to go ahead the way you have been. If it should be necessary for you to go in in order to confer about some matter in which we are deeply interested, particularly a treaty, you have authority in your discretion to do it, but I would like to know first so that I can back up your statement and the invitation by a statement here which will make it absolutely clear.

DAWES: That is exactly what was in my mind.

SECRETARY: Make sure that the invitation which comes to you from Briand is all right and that it does not overstate the position. You get hold of his invitation beforehand.

DAWES: I do not think it will be necessary.

SECRETARY: I am only talking about what may happen - so much the better if it does not happen.

DAWES: Yes.

SECRETARY: What I say is, if it should happen contrary to our present expectations, you make sure that Briand's invitation is couched in the language which we have agreed upon as being the correct situation. Your cable to me was all right.

DAWES: Make it all the better. To confer individually regarding the treaty interests of the United States and then we can decide whether or not it is necessary to sit. I do not want to sit at all unless it is absolutely necessary from our standpoint.

SECRETARY: Let them know you are doing everything you can for peace.

DAWES: Otherwise

- 4 -

DAWES: Otherwise we will open ourselves to unjustified attack by foes in the Senate. Whatever I do, I am not saying a word and I am not going to. What you see in the newspapers is not coming from me. I have not gone out of my room except to see Briand. I am going to see Sir John Simons at 6:30. He wants to see me. I am going there.

SECRETARY: What has happened - what is the news - have you anything new.

DAWES: Yes, I have. My first caller this morning was Sir Eric Drummond. Last night - prepared speech which Yoshizawa has expected to make this afternoon. It was furnished to Drummond and is now in the hands of Briand. The speech of Yoshizawa was prepared at Tokyo by the Japanese Government and wired to him here. Matsudaira received a copy of it last night and brought it to me this morning. I shall comment on it later in a despatch. The Chinese asked to have no speeches at this time except Briand's opening speech followed by an adjournment by the Chairman. Drummond after reading Yoshizawa's speech felt it was wise - speech however was not intended to present ultimatum. Briand might decide that that be done this afternoon. For the moment to stop the military operations of Chinese and Japanese. Because of the superior discipline of the Japanese troops. They are liable to reach a more stabilized position in two or three days. This successful military..... for the moment by the extreme military elements in Japan makes it wiser to arouse Japanese public sentiment. And the settlement in this event will probably go further. He says in two or three days Japan's position will stabilize the thing. Then after that it will be easier for the Japanese to withdraw from

- 5 -

from their more extreme position in the League. He thinks you had better not have that discussion between Sze and Yoshizawa this afternoon.

SECRETARY: Let me see if I understand that. Drummond's position is that if these speeches are not made now, in a few days the Japanese will have stabilized their position in such a way that it will be easier for them to withdraw their troops.

DAWES: It is easier for them to withdraw their troops under this committee arrangement and to satisfy Japanese sentiment. Just now Matsudaira is very much alarmed and was afraid the Japanese would send him a message because they had not answered his message suggesting what you suggested, and he was afraid it would be adverse.

SECRETARY: I have read that this morning. I have read that telegram. Let me ask you this - Is it possible that the Japanese mean that in the meanwhile during these two or three days their troops will be able to lick General Ma's Army and will be in a better position from their standpoint to hold the situation. Is it possible that during these two or three days the Japanese will advance and fight a successful battle against General Ma?

DAWES: Think better not to make the speech now, that it might be after two or three days because of the happenings in Japan.

SECRETARY: What they are trying to do is to get a better situation in Japan itself?

DAWES: Yes.

SECRETARY: How about Manchuria? Are they going to be able to hold it steady there?

DAWES: Matsudaira has only got the idea of the general situation

- 6 -

situation and the public sentiment in Japan. He has not got any other details.

SECRETARY: The critical situation is at the Nonni Bridge in Manchuria and I should like to know whether you have any information bearing on what the Japanese intend to do there.

DAWES: Yoshizawa is coming this evening and maybe I can get something from him.

SECRETARY: What I am concerned about is this. It looks as if the Japanese Army commanders were intending to push northward beyond the Nonni River up to the Chinese Eastern Railway, and I do not see any justification for their doing that. Have you any news on that?

DAWES: I have no information about that. I will try to get it. Drummond said that in general up to this time the Council thinks that their eventual recommendation will be this: that the Chinese and Japanese might meet on two separate committees, one considering the safety of the Japanese people and the other the five Japanese points, and also to suggest that the position of the previous committee should not be a necessary precedent to evacuation. I telephoned to Sir John Simon, asking if I could see him at 3:00 o'clock. After your call came through I told him I would see him at 6:30. I can endeavor to keep you advised up to the minute. Here is a paraphrase of the most important portion of the speech prepared by Tokyo for Yoshizawa.

SECRETARY: Have you seen that speech?

DAWES: I am just now quoting about ten sentences to give you the gist of it. Matsudaira listened to a part of the

text

- 7 -

text which I dictated but did not wish me to cable the exact words of his speech. The following is a paraphrase: "The idea of Japan is that it is willing to withdraw its forces if satisfied that the five fundamental principles are substantially observed and practiced in the districts where those forces are at present. The Japanese feel that the efforts of local committees to preserve the peace, which were organized by resident Chinese, indicate that this is a proper method to secure the results which Japan desires in the way of troop withdrawal. Japan feels that because she has acted for the protection of Japanese lives in Manchuria, no one should feel that her desire for sincere friendship between China and Japan has weakened. Japan desires not to take a foot of Chinese territory and realizes the difficulties which confront China in the safety of their fellow-countrymen. It provides for what they consider their just and due treaty rights. Japan looks upon it as a duty". That is the principal part of Yoshizawa's speech. I have got here a memorandum which Drummond sent over to me as giving his idea of what the League ought to do. I have not read it yet but if you have a stenographer there - it is confidential - I shall just have Shaw here read it to you.

SECRETARY: Have him read it to me right now. That covers everything you have? You have done first rate.

DAWES: I will not talk to the press or say a thing.

SECRETARY: Everything is all right here. Do not worry about the press.

DAWES: If I can satisfy you and Hoover and do the right thing

SECRETARY: You are doing that. We have great confidence in you.

DAWES: Thank you very much.

SECRETARY: Is

- 8 -

SECRETARY: Is this Howland Shaw?

SHAW: How are you, Mr. Secretary?

SECRETARY: I am very glad you are there, Shaw. Go right ahead with that message:

SHAW: The message is as follows:

"As I see the situation the only thing we have really to work on is the September 30 resolution. That resolution can be divided into two component parts: the first evacuation; the second security. They are mutually interdependent. There is, therefore, no reason why the Council should not recommend to the two parties that direct negotiations should at once be begun on evacuation and security. These negotiations could be separate but parallel, or else merged. But in order that the Council may make any recommendation it is necessary I think to obtain from the Japanese some definite statement as to what they mean by security. For instance, they stated in their reply to M. Briand's note that the first four points were not sufficiently covered in the resolution of October 24th. They speak of other implications of those four points. It would be most useful to know what they are.

There remains the famous fifth point. I think that we ought to ask them to define more closely their intentions on that point. Do they bring the interpretation of treaties into it and if so how is that to be reconciled with security? This seems to me to be somewhat imaginary as the American attitude up to now has been that they cannot recognize the occupation of territory as a method for securing the interpretation of treaties or of the validity of contested ones. They might also be asked whether Dr. Sze's letter about treaties does not satisfy them and if not to what treaties it referred. If they

would

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) *
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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would state what those treaties are the Chinese representative could be asked whether he accepted them and if he said no his reasons for not doing so. The Council could then say to the two parties that, as there was disagreement about the validity or interpretation of these treaties, it would be willing to ask for an advisory opinion from the Court. I think it is certain that the Japanese would refuse. Taking this for granted I think then that the Council might definitely ask the Japanese whether they would agree to negotiations being opened immediately on evacuation and security, with a solemn engagement by the Chinese representative taken before the Council, that understanding on which evacuation was complete direct negotiations on the treaty points should begin. It is true that this suggestion has already been put to the Japanese and that up to now they have agreed to it but it has never been made public and I cannot help feeling that they would be in a very difficult position if this were done.

But supposing, as may unfortunately be the case, all this fails then I feel that the Council can only say that it regrets very greatly what has happened, that it will continue its work under Article eleven of the Covenant, that it expects the resolution of September 30 to be fulfilled, and that it cannot refrain from expressing formal disapproval of the Japanese refusal to accept proposals which seems to it to be fair and equitable, and indeed, which have gone to the limit to satisfy the Japanese desires. In view of the special circumstances of the case and of all the preceding history and events, the Council does not, for the time being, desire to proceed further, but it would be glad to be informed by the Japanese Government of the steps it takes

- 10 -

takes to consider the engagements it has already entered into under the resolution of September 30th.

This may, of course, seem rather weak, but I think it is the best that can be done. To my mind it would be much worse if the Council endeavored to force the Chinese Government to accept direct negotiations on all the five points (unless the fifth was very considerably altered) as long as Chinese territory is occupied. To do so would create the most dangerous precedent for the future, and further, I do not for a moment think that the Chinese Government would agree.

The Japanese apparently would be willing now to institute direct negotiations for evacuation with the local Manchurian authorities, but this, to my mind, is equally impossible, as it would mean, and the League would recognize, that these authorities were independent of the Central Chinese Government. Ultimately I think the Japanese will have to come to terms with that Government, because the continued boycotting is beginning to affect them very severely, and Japan would certainly like the League's help in trying to put a stop to this, but if we give them that help they must be ready to give us something in return and at present they show no sign of doing so."

SECRETARY: Thank you very much. The memorandum simply suggests to me that the League and its representations are of course quite naturally tied up in the formal and detailed steps which they are already in. I am rather concerned to see what can be done to stop the fighting at Tsitsihar, because unless that is done I think there is likely to be serious trouble all through there.

SHAW: I will send the text of the memorandum at once.

S HHR:VGN

1685

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D)* or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

GREEN

FROM

PARIS

Dated November 16, 1931

Rec'd 10:40 a.m.
10th Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 17 1931

793.94
Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

751, November 16, 12 p.m.

From Ambassador Dawes

Answering your telephone request for latest news

as to fighting, Drummond gave me the following which
was communicated by the Chinese representative on the
Council:

"Apparently fighting momentarily ceased around
Monni Bridge. Ma receiving peremptory demand from
Honjo. We are most anxious (?) fighting should not be
resumed; extremely difficult for Ma to negotiate with
Honjo's representatives in view of ever conflicting
demand. Clearly therefore indispensable prevent further
fighting, that Briand arrange for immediate arrival
League representatives so that arrangements between
Ma and Japanese be made with his assistance and under
authority President League Council. Indispensable also
Briand telegraph this sense Tokyo in order to prevent
resumption fighting.

The Chinese Government received this morning from

General

F/DEW

793.94/2709

FILED

NOV 24 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM

2-#751, from Paris, November 16, 1931
 12 p.m.

General Ma, Tsitsihar, a report stating that at eight last night Major Hayashi handed communication from General Honjo who stated that owing to telegraphic error his previous message unclear. Instead of that message reading that Japanese troops should proceed to Angangchi to protect Taoang Railway it should read: 'To protect railway party of Japanese troops must be allowed to proceed to Lungchang Station'. General Ma was asked to give a clear reply by noon, 14th. Ma comments to Marshal: 'On account of continual increase of demands I have no trust in what Japanese say or ask. I hope Marshall will put this problem before League for decision. I have already replied to Japanese as follows:

'Have received your second communication. Your previous demand was that Japanese troops proceed to Angangchi. Lungchang is a station on Tsitsihar-Koshan Railway, a purely Chinese railway not on Taonan Angangchi Railway, whose terminal is Angangchi. Since your troops want to protect Taoang Railway why do you want to proceed to Lungchang. I am afraid some further mistake has been made by you.' (This interpreted here means that Japanese intend

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM

3-#751, from Paris, November 16, 1931
12 p.m.

intend to occupy Tsitsihar if possible. All quiet in
Tientsin last night, arrangements made for joint search
three hundred metre zone by Sino-Japanese police, probably
take four days)."

HFD

SHAW

"(?)" in above message indicates that communication was
received by Chinese representative in Geneva with
undecipherable group.

DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

AM

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone.

Nanking

Dated November 16, 1931.

FROM

Rec'd 10:35 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

November 16, 5 p.m.

Rumors are current in Nanking of some kind of a
 rapprochement between Japan and the United States on the
subject of Manchuria. These rumors have grown out of
the fact that the United States has decided not to
send an observer to the meeting of the Council of the
League at Paris but is sending Ambassador Dawes who is
to take no part in the meetings of the Council. It
being said that this is a concession to Japan. I
mentioned these rumors to Wellington Koo who called upon
me today and he stated that America's decision not to
send observers had caused considerable speculation in
high government circles. He also stated that it was
understood here that Japan had recently addressed a
note to the Government of the United States, which was
being kept secret, but which had been commented upon
by the State Department as offering a solution of the
Manchurian question which should be satisfactory to
both sides.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 17 1931
Department of State
NOV 17 1931

F/DEW

793.94/2710

FILED

NOV 23 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM

2--from Nanking, November 16, 1931
5 p.m.

both sides.

Koo, who is a member of the President's Foreign Policy Commission, expressed himself as believing that some solution must be found at this meeting of the Council of the League. I gathered that Chinese are prepared to begin discussions directly with the Japanese under the auspices of League or observers appointed by the League. Such a conference would naturally have to take into consideration the entire Manchurian problem. It is freely admitted by Koo that there

End Section One.

JOHNSON

RR

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CJH)

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased be-
 fore being communicated
 to anyone.

Peking

Dated November 16, 1931

FROM

Rec'd. Nov. 17, 1:20 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

(SECTION TWO)

November 16, 5 p.m.

can be no settlement of this problem entirely satisfactory to either Japan or China because of the conflict between the desires and interests of the two countries. He feels hopeful however that a temporary settlement might be found through some agreement which would place the economic development of Manchuria on such a basis as to permit participation by all countries.

The above came out casually in conversation and is of course to be treated as confidential and is not committing anyone. I report it merely to indicate the trend of thought of one responsible member of the organization now handling Chinese foreign affairs who insists that China can never concede the validity of the 1915 Treaties or the territory of Manchuria to Japan.

Can Department give me any information for use here that would allay suspicions as to course United States is pursuing

1691

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

OJH

Page 2 - Section two from
Nanking dated Nov. 16, 5 p.m.

pursuing vis a vis problem of Manchuria during forth-
coming meeting of League Council. (End Message)!

JOHNSON

WSB

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

1-128

TO BE TRANSMITTED

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Department of State

Washington,

November 17, 1931.

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1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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Charge Department
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AMEMBASSY,

PARIS (France).

556

Confidential for Ambassador Dawes. Reference
Department's telegram No. 554, November 16, 5 p. m. There
is outlined below, for your confidential information, contents
of a subsequent telegram received from Minister Johnson under
date of November 16:

QUOTE Rumors are current in Nanking of some kind of a
rapprochement between Japan and the United States on the
subject of Manchuria. These rumors have grown out of the
fact that the United States has decided not to send an
observer to the meeting of the Council of the League at Paris
but is sending Ambassador Dawes who is to take no part in the
meetings of the Council. It is being said that this is a
concession to Japan UNQUOTE.

A high Chinese official who called upon Johnson ~~stated~~
~~that America's decision not to send observers had caused~~
~~considerable speculation in high government circles. He also~~
~~stated that it was understood in Nanking that Japan had~~
~~recently addressed a note to the Government of the United~~
~~States, which was being kept secret, but which had been~~
~~commented upon by the State Department as offering a solution~~

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

of

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793.94/2710

1693

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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PREPARING OFFICE
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Department of State

Washington,

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~~of the Manchurian question which should be satisfactory to both sides.~~ ^{SKH} He expressed himself as believing that some solution must be found at this meeting of the Council of the League. Johnson gathered that Chinese are prepared to begin discussions directly with the Japanese under the auspices of League or observers appointed by the League. His interlocutor admitted that there can be no settlement of this problem entirely satisfactory to either Japan or China because of the conflict between the desires and interests of the two countries. Interlocutor felt hopeful however that a temporary settlement might be found through some agreement which would place the economic development of Manchuria on such a basis as to permit participation by all countries.

The above was to be treated as confidential and ^{as/} not committing anyone. Johnson reports it merely to indicate the trend of thought of one responsible member of the organization now handling Chinese foreign affairs who insists that China can never concede the validity of the 1915 Treaties. ~~the territory of Manchuria to Japan~~

Stimson

FE:SKH:REK

FE

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19 _____

Nov. 17, 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)*
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Washington,

November 17, 1931.

AMERICAN CONSUL

NANKING (CHINA).

112
 Confidential for the Minister. Your telegrams of
 November 15, 3 p.m., and November 16, 5 p.m., have been
 repeated in part to Ambassador Dawes at Paris for his
 confidential information.

Referring to your request for information: The
 Department has on several occasions, and in several
 quarters, referred to the method of settlement of the
 Shantung question at the Washington Conference as sug-
 gesting a possible way for handling the problem of the
 present situation. We have on each occasion expressed
 our wish that this suggestion be not referred to as
 emanating from us as we consider it desirable that the
 suggestion be advanced by one or the other of the dis-
 putants. The idea has been informally discussed on
 this basis by Ambassador Dawes with Messrs. Simon,
 Briand, Matsudaira and Sze and it has been the ground
 of our hope that some such solution of the difficulty
 might be worked out in the conferences at Paris. This,
 together with occasional references in telegrams from

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Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

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1 1695

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the Legation, such as that under reference, and from the Embassy at Tokyo, which indicate that some such proposal might ultimately receive favorable consideration by both China and Japan, has been in considerable measure the basis for the "optimism" which has been referred to in the press reports.

There has not repeat not been created any sort of a QUOTE rapprochement UNQUOTE between the United States and Japan on the subject of Manchuria, nor has any attempt been made to create such. In our note to Japan we stressed the point that settlement should be achieved by peaceful means and called attention to agencies therefor but did not discuss or suggest terms of settlement. (See Department's November 7, 2 p.m., to Shanghai for the Minister.)

Our position in sending Ambassador Dawes to Paris was explained to you in the Department's No. 110, November 12, 5 p.m.

Repeat summaries of your two telegrams under reference to Tokyo for Ambassador's confidential information.

FE:RSM:EJL

Enciphered by

Sent by operator

M.


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



November 12, 1931.

The Honorable
Henry L. Stimson,
Secretary of State.



Dear Mr. Secretary:

The President has directed
me to send you the enclosed copy of memorandum.

Yours sincerely,

Lawrence Richey
Lawrence Richey,
Secretary to the President.

LR-M.
Enclosure.

FILED

NOV 17 1931

F/DEW 793.94/2711

November 12, 1931.

Memorandum:

It seems to me that two or three more points might be put up to Mr. Dawes for consideration:

First: It is obviously impossible for the Japanese to withdraw their troops on the one hand or the Chinese to restore order on the other, unless some form of properly established civil government is set up in Manchuria. The Japanese will not have Young Marshal Chang in view of his failure to preserve order hitherto. It would seem that the solution of this end of the problem lies in the setting up of a civil government which will be recognized by the Japanese that would be responsible to the Nanking government. It would seem also that the Nanking government ought to be glad to get rid of the young marshal and establish its full and final authority over Manchuria, and that therefore if something in the nature of a viceroy of Manchuria could be appointed by the Nanking government and accepted by the Japanese the whole question of the establishing of civil government and order would fade out of the picture, as then the Japanese could proceed to withdraw as fast as he had established the situation, and the Nanking government could quite well agree to support the new viceroy in obtaining control of the troops and other agencies in Manchuria.

Mr. Dawes
293.01

- 2 -

The second point that might be emphasized to Ambassador Dawes is that if these people would be prepared to negotiate the specific provision, that the negotiation should be carried out in the spirit of the Kellogg Pact. It might do away with the necessity to have foreign observers at the negotiation. Both sides would be quick enough to appeal if there was any infraction.

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Department of State

Washington, November 14, 1931

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AMEMBASSY

PARIS (France).

547 CONFIDENTIAL STIMSON / TO / DAWES.

793.94/A
note
50 A 40
543.0144

~~NOTE~~ I / note / with interest / in press / that you / are / men-
tioning / the / Nine / Power / Treaty / of / 1922 / This / treaty / is / very /
important / It / not / only / includes / precise / and / ^{relevant} ~~relative~~ / covenants /
to which the / nine / powers / including / Japan / are / party / toward / just /
such a situation / as now / exists / in / Manchuria / but it / represents /
a / crystallization / of / traditional / American policy / toward / China /
of which / we / cannot / be / forgetful / It represents / the / final /
successful / embodiment / in / treaty / form / of / the / long / efforts / begun
by / John / Hay / to secure / the / open door / and prevent / the / dismember-
ment / of / China / We are / the / legal / custodian / of / that / treaty / and
thus / if / occasion / arose / would be / in ^{an} / appropriate / position / to /
invoke / Article / seven / thereof / I have not / thus far / thought it /
wise / to take / that / step / inasmuch as / actual / conferences / of the
same / nations / were / going on / in the form of / meetings / of the /
League / Council / But it / may be / helpful / for / you / to have / that /
treaty / especially / Article / one / clearly in mind / for use / with
the Japanese / if / they / talk / loosely / about their / QUOTE / special
rights / UNQUOTE / in / Manchuria / This / treaty / seems to me / to be / a
complete / renouncement / of / any claim / of special / political / rights
there / as distinguished from

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Sent by operator M., 19.....

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

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note
393,94

from 'economic' rights' (see also 'Articles' three 'and' four 'of
the 'Portsmouth' Treaty of '1905'). Therefore, the only ^{indisputable} ~~sound~~
legal basis of Japan's 'intervention' in its 'present' form
would seem to be ~~limited to~~ the general 'international' right
to 'protect the lives and property' of 'nationals'.

On the other side of the picture, we must remember
that in 1895-1898 China, by 'granting' to Russia the con-
cessions for the 'Chinese Eastern Railway' (a portion of which
Railway became, in 1905, the South Manchuria Railway), made
possible the construction of a 'railway' line which, in a
military sense, created a situation distinctly menacing to
Japan. Russia's use of this instrument, in pursuance of
her 'Manchuria' and 'Korea' policies, caused Japan to go to war
to destroy this menace, and in the war Japan was successful.
Under these circumstances, although it is our view that
Japan's only ^{undisputed} legal rights in Manchuria under the treaties
are essentially economic rights, Japan necessarily regards
her position there as one upon which her national security
absolutely depends.

Stimson

Enciphered by WCL

Sent by operator M., 19

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Washington,

November 16, 1931.

793.94
AMEMBASSY,

PARIS (France).

552

CONFIDENTIAL FOR DAWES.

Department's 328, November 11, 5 p.m., to you in
London, paragraph four.

For information:
You should have it clearly in mind that in the
Shantung case the choice of neutral observers was made by
China and Japan, not repeat not by the other powers.

Stimson

793.94/2711B

FE:SKH/ZMF

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NOV. 17 1931

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Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

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November 13, 1931.

AMEMBASSY,

PARIS (France).

CONFIDENTIAL FOR EAMES.

Department's 328, November 11, 5 p.m., to you in
London, paragraph four.

One. You should have it clearly in mind that in the
Shantung case the choice of neutral observers was made by
China and Japan, not repeat not by the other powers.

Two. On the basis of a suggestion which has been made
to me by the President, I feel that it would be well for
you to familiarize yourself thoroughly with the provisions
of the Nine-Powers Treaty concerning policy in reference to
China, of 1922, especially Article one. With the letter and
the spirit of that treaty well in mind, and remembering the
circumstances which lead to the calling of the Washington
Conference and the great effort which was made at that Con-
ference to arrive at satisfactory solutions of Far Eastern
problems and to provide a basis for regulation of interna-
tional relations in and with reference to that region, in
order that it might be possible to arrive at agreements
with regard to disarmament, you might find it possible and
distinctly useful to introduce and disseminate and gradually

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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insist upon the idea that action which is taken now and in the course of negotiations which we confidently expect will eventuate, the powers, particularly the two disputants, should be guided in general by the spirit of the treaties and agreements of 1922 and expressly by the applicable provisions of the Nine-Powers Treaty of that group. In this connection, I would suggest carefully avoiding much if any mention of the QUOTE Washington Conference UNQUOTE -- as the Japanese never were enthusiastic over that Conference; instead, it would be better to throw the emphasis on the QUOTE Treaties and Agreements of 1922 UNQUOTE and particularly on the QUOTE spirit and the letter of the Nine-Powers Treaty UNQUOTE.

You should work this out as your own idea and should not attribute it to the President or to me.

FE:SKH/ZMS

FE

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Department of State

Washington,

November 14, 1931.

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (JAPAN).

793.94
229
War Department has conferred with Department with regard to proposed visit of military attachés to Manchuria. The two Departments concur in the view that McIlroy should accept provided attachés of at least two other leading powers accept. As to instructions, it is Department's view that McIlroy should consider his mission non-repeat non-political, should refrain from discussing with Japanese any phase of the political questions involved in the situation and, upon return to his post, should report to Ambassador and to War Department his observations and views. Inform

McIlroy.

Stinson

Sick

FE:SKH:EMF

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

SPECIAL GREEN

PARIS

FROM

Dated November 16, 1937

Rec'd 8:50 p.m.


Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

748, November 16, 8 p.m.

FROM AMBASSADOR DAVES

Following is text of Drummond's personal and strictly confidential memorandum read to you over the telephone this afternoon.

"As I see the situation the only thing we have really to work on is the September 30 resolution. That resolution can be divided into two component parts: the first evacuation; the second security. They are mutually inter-dependent. There is, therefore, no reason why the Council should not recommend to the two parties that direct negotiations should at once be begun on evacuation and security. These negotiations could be separate but parallel, or else merged. But in order that the Council may make any recommendation it is necessary I think to obtain from the Japanese some definite statement as to what they mean by security. For instance, they stated in their reply to M. Briand's note that the first four points were not sufficiently covered in



F/DEM 793.94/2712

FILED

AM

2-#748, from Paris, Nov. 16, 1931
8 p.m.

covered in the resolution of October 24th. They speak of other implications of those four points. It would be most useful to know what they are.

There remains the famous fifth point. I think that we ought to ask them to define more closely their intentions on that point. Do they bring the interpretation of treaties into it and if so how is that to be reconciled with security? This seems to me to be somewhat imaginary as the American attitude up to now has been that they cannot recognize the occupation of territory as a method for securing the interpretation of treaties or of the validity of contested ones. They might also be asked whether Dr. Sze's letter about treaties does not satisfy them and if not to what treaties it referred. If they would state what those treaties are the Chinese representative could be asked whether he accepted them and if he said no his reasons for not doing so. The Council could then say to the two parties that, as there was disagreement about the validity or interpretation of these treaties, it would be willing to ask for an advisory opinion from the Court. I think it is certain that the Japanese would refuse. Taking this for granted

I think

AM

3-#748, from Paris, Nov. 16, 1931
2 p.m.

I think then that the Council might definitely ask the Japanese whether they would agree to negotiations being opened immediately on evacuation and security, with a solemn engagement by the Chinese representative taken before the Council, that understanding on which evacuation was complete direct negotiations on the treaty points should begin. It is true that this suggestion has already been put to the Japanese and that up to now they have agreed to it but it has never been made public and I cannot help feeling that they would be in a very difficult position if this were done.

But supposing, as may unfortunately be the case, all this fails then feel that the Council can only say that it regrets very greatly what has happened, that it will continue its work under Article eleven of the Covenant, that it expects the resolution of September 30 to be fulfilled, and that it cannot refrain from expressing formal disapproval of the Japanese refusal to accept proposals which seems to it to be fair and and equitable, and indeed, which have gone to the limit to satisfy the Japanese desires. In view of the special circumstances of the case and of all the preceding history and events, the Council does not, for the time
being

AM

4-#748, from Paris, Nov. 16, 1931
2 p.m.

being, desire to proceed further, but it would be glad to be informed by the Japanese Government of the steps it takes to consider the engagements it has already entered into under the resolution of September 30th.

This may, of course, seem rather weak, but I think it is the best that can be done. To my mind it would be much worse if the Council endeavored to force the Chinese Government to accept direct negotiations on all the five points (unless the fifth was very considerably ~~altered~~ altered) as long as Chinese territory is occupied. To do so would create the most dangerous precedent for the future, and further, I do not for a moment think that the Chinese Government would agree.

The Japanese apparently would be willing now to institute direct negotiations for evacuation with the local Manchurian authorities, but this, to my mind, is equally impossible, as it would mean, and the League would recognize, that these authorities were independent of the Central Chinese Government. Ultimately I think the Japanese will have to come to terms with that Government, because the continued boycotting is beginning to affect them very severely, and Japan would certainly like the

League's

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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5-#748, from Paris, Nov. 16, 1931
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League's help in trying to put a stop to this, but if
we give them that help they must be ready to give us
something in return and at present they show no sign
of doing so."

SHAW

HPD



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Department of State

Washington,

November 17, 1931.

AMEMBASSY,

PARIS, (FRANCE.)

CONFIDENTIAL FOR DAWES FROM STIMSON. / 2713

Your 750 November 16, 11 p.m.

The trouble with Simon's proposition is that it surrenders the central point for which both the League and the United States have been contending; namely, that Japan shall not be allowed to extort a ratification of these treaty rights by force. You hit the point exactly in your answer to him. We do not object to Japan obtaining a ratification, providing she does it by the consent of China. ~~fact I should~~ ^{Q 2 K.} ~~be rather glad if she did~~ But to allow her to get it through the pressure of her armed occupation would be to make ducks and drakes of all the peace treaties we have been laboriously building up. Is not the main thing to get these two nations into negotiations under such circumstances and with such limitations of agenda that it cannot be said that a ratification of the treaties is being wrung out by force. I still think that the presence of neutral observers offers the

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M.,, 19.....

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By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

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most likely road to settlement and that if Japan
was pressed hard enough to consent to them, she would.
If she won't, we will have to outlaw her (A.7.14)
and let her sizzle awhile under the influence of a
good Chinese boycott with all the moral pressure of
the world against her. Her army has been hard-
boiled enough to make an Easter egg and if we
finally have to state our views publicly they will
be forcible enough to crack the egg. It might help
if Matsudaira knew this.

Certain press reports are current today to the effect
that the United States is weakening in its insistence that
the settlement of these broader questions shall not be made
a condition precedent to withdrawal of troops and in our
desire to cooperate with the League on that objective.
These reports are utterly unfounded false. Our position is
entirely unchanged and I hope that you will make sure that
Matsudaira and Yoshizawa understand this.

S HLS:EHR

T-E

STIMSON.

A.7.14

Enciphered by

Sent by operator

M.

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

A portion of this telegram ^{FROM}
must be closely paraphrased
before being communicated
to anyone.


Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

750, November 16, 11 p.m.

FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES

I just returned from a conference with Sir John
Simons in leading up to the specific but tentative and
purely personal suggestion which he submitted to me
and upon which he asked an expression of opinion. He
discussed the situation from a broad standpoint. He
feels that little will come out of the welter of talk
now in process until it is recognized on the part of the
League that they must give Japan a consideration valuable
from a practical standpoint the attaining of which will
satisfy public sentiment in Japan and will comprehend an
economic as well as juridical settlement of Japan's
problem. He has not tried out this suggestion upon
Briand as yet. He has talked shortly with Matsudaira
about it but the latter was cautious in his comment. Sir
John wants us to understand that he is not familiar with
all the angles of the situation involved in the past
relations



Rec'd 17th, 7:07 a.m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 17 1931

Department of State

F/DEW

793.94/2713

FILED

NOV 27 1931

AM

2-#750, from Paris, November 16, 1931
11 p.m.

relations of Japan and China in Manchuria.

The purely personal and tentative suggestion which he handed to me is as follows:

(GREEN) One. Nanking Government to give to Japan solemn and formal assurance that Japan's treaty rights in Manchuria would be respected.

Two. China to address a note to the members of the League represented on the Council, plus the United States of America, undertaking to these powers that China would strictly observe the above undertaking.

Three. A further term of the arrangement indicated (one?) in paragraph four above would be that the Nanking Government agrees with Japan to set up at once a technical commission for the purpose of entering upon a working arrangement between the South Manchurian Railway and the Chinese railways in Manchuria so as to put an end to unfair competition.

Four. Japan to undertake to withdraw her troops within the railway zone contemporaneously with the above arrangements being entered into". (END GREEN)

As to the above he said that the Nanking Government has already stated that Japan's treaty rights in Manchuria would be respected and that he feels that the addressing by China of a note to the members of the League and the

AM

3-#750, from Paris, November 16, 1931
11 p.m.

and the United States of America undertaking to these powers that China would strictly observe this promise would justify Japan in a greater confidence that China would keep its promise. The advantage to Japan of a successful working out of the proposition in the third paragraph is self-evident.

I then pointed out to him the point you had made in your 328 that China has protested ever since 1915 that these treaties were obtained by duress and must be canceled while Japan has contended that they have been formally executed and could not be invalidated, furthermore, that the United States Government in 1915 went on record to the Japanese Government and the Chinese Government that it could not recognize any treaties if and in so far as they impaired rights under the open door and integrity of China, principles which reservation was renewed in 1922 at the Washington Conference by Secretary Hughes. I said that this statement of yours as to the position of the United States was probably the position of the other signatories except Japan of the Nine Power Pact and that utilization of his paragraph three if entered into would create a situation which would involve such an application of the stipulations of the Nine Power Pact as its Article seven envisages. I pointed out also that if this arrangement from a practical standpoint meant the eventual control of
the Chinese

1716

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CJH

* 4 - #750 from Paris,
Nov. 16, 11 p.m. 1931.

the Chinese parallel railroad by Japan it then gave Japan large powers to impose difficulties and delays in the handling of foreign imports into Manchuria as compared with shipments from Japan.

Probably there are many other objections in this connection to be taken into consideration which would suggest themselves to one more familiar with actual trade conditions and customs in Manchuria but at any rate it seemed to me that many interests of the other powers under the Nine Power Treaty must be weighed before arriving at a conclusion as to the wisdom of his proposal at this juncture. He agreed that such considerations as this must be fully thrashed out in our minds as to whether they are insurmountable obstacles. Please send us your observations on Sir John's memorandum, remembering, as he asked, that he puts it forward in a suggestive way without past familiarity with the events and agreements which have lead up through the years to the present difficulty.

Briand as I told you over the telephone, sent me a typewritten copy for my approval, of what he expected to say about my presence here. It was given to me quite a short time before the hour of the meeting and since it had to be translated into French for Briand it did not reach him in time to be included in his speech. I rather regret this for he afterwards sent word that my changes were satisfactory. With these changes as made by me the rest of what he said was largely a quotation from my

interview

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

CJH

5 - #750 from Paris dated
Nov. 16, 11 p.m. 1931.

interview given when I arrived.

Yoshizawa is calling on me at 9:30 this evening but I probably shall not cable you about it as he does not speak English well and I shall be very guarded in what I say to him. Yoshizawa is the son-in-law of the leader of the opposition in Japan.

SHAW

WSB

1 0718

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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Charge Department

OR

Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138 TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

November 19, 1931.

This cable was sent in confidential code.
It should be carefully paraphrased before
being communicated to anyone.
NOV 19 31

793 94/2713
AMEMBASSY,

PARIS (France).

574 CONFIDENTIAL FOR AMBASSADOR DAWES. /2713

Further reference to your 750, November 16, 11 p.m.

Replying in more detail to your request for observations
on Sir John Simon's memorandum:

Concerning the first paragraph: The Chinese have already
repeatedly affirmed their willingness to respect Japan's
treaty rights; and Sze has expressly pointed out that such is
one of the solemn obligations imposed by the League Covenant
and assumed by each and every member of the League. Much of
the difficulty in connection with present issues arises out
of the fact that the views of the Chinese and the Japanese
Governments respectively with regard to the character and
extent of those rights are at variance. The Japanese conten-
tion includes agreements alleged to have been entered into in
1905 as well as the whole collection of treaties and agree-
ments entered into in 1915 on the basis of the so-called
QUOTE Twenty-one Demands UNQUOTE. It is conceivable that the
Nanking Government may be induced to give a formal blanket
assurance that Japan's treaty rights in Manchuria will be

793.94/2713

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 60.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lutz NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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OR
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TELEGRAM SENT

1-128
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Department of State

- 2 -

Washington,

respected, but it is likely that they may hesitate to do that, in view of the fact that under such circumstances the stronger party is likely subsequently to insist on its own definitions and prescriptions. Might not inclusion of such an assurance in a resolution of the Council be all the formality that would be required on this point, and would not that be a measure to which the Chinese might more readily be induced to agree?

The same applies with regard to paragraph two.

With regard to paragraph three, your observations seem absolutely pertinent. The underlying issue as regards the railways involves both economic and political factors. It is highly complicated. I am inclined to believe that the railway question, in so far as it relates to the so-called QUOTE parallel UNQUOTE lines, might advisedly be left out of the discussion of the problem at the present time. If, however, it is discussed and a commission is suggested, should it not be specified that that commission would begin its work simultaneously with or after withdrawal of troops.

With regard to paragraph four, it should be noted that the provisions of paragraphs one, two and three do not cover

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

1 172

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
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Department of State

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Washington,

- 3 -

the question of effective protection of life and property,
which is an immediate problem the solution of which the
Japanese declare to be their principal objective. For that
reason, may it not be doubted whether, even if both disputants
could be brought to agree on points one, two and three, Japan
would thereupon be prepared to make and carry out the under-
taking proposed in paragraph four.

Stinson
SKA

NOV 19 1972

FE:SKH/ZMF

FE

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1969 1-138

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM


GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 17, 1931

Rec'd 9:15 a.m.



Washington, D. C.

950, November 17, noon.

Following from Harbin:

"November 16, 6 p.m.

One. Referring to ultimatum mentioned in my telegram
November 16, noon, Secretary Chao informed me this after-
noon that, acting under instructions of Ma, he informed
local military representative of Honjo that no verbal
reply could be given today at noon because it would be
necessary to hold a meeting of the Heilungkiang military
leaders before a decision could be made in regard to the
withdrawal of the Chinese troops from Tsitsihar and that
he (Chao) had already sent to Alfred Sze, in the name of
Ma, a telegram stating that the written reply due tomorrow
at noon would state that the Tsitsihar troops had been
sent to the Nonni front to protect Tsitsihar against
Chang Hai Pen and other rebels, that the right to
withdraw or not to withdraw these troops lay within
the province of the Heilungkiang authorities who would
act in

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) *
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM

2-#950, from Peiping, November 17, 1931
noon

act in self-defense, that these authorities had the right
to station their troops anywhere within Heilungkiang
Province and that as the Taoang Railway was in Heilungkiang
Province the Provincial authorities have the right to
search trains or stop them from running.

(END PART ONE)

ENGERT

CSB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CJH

FROM GRAY
PEIPING

Dated November 17, 1931

Rec'd. 9:40 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

(PART TWO) #950, November 17, noon.

Chao also added that yesterday Japanese airplanes threw bombs on Chinese troops at Sanchienfang and flew over Tsitsihar City but did not drop bombs there.

Two. The women missionaries mentioned in my telegram November 12, 11 a.m. withdrew from Tsitsihar at my request and arrived at Harbin this morning. Mr. Vos is now at Tsitsihar Station of Chinese Eastern Railway where I believe he is safe for the time being.

Three. Chashi denies that there was any serious fighting at the front on my arrival 13th as allegedly reported by American correspondents but only skirmishes between outposts. "

Repeated to Nanking. (End part two and message).

FOR THE MINISTER

ENGERT

WSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM

GRAY

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Reiping via N. R.

Dated November 17, 1931

FROM

Reid 7:33 a.m.

Division of

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

NOV 17 1931

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

745

NOV 17, noon.

Following from American Consul at Hankow: "November
16, 6 p.m.

One. There are now five Japanese destroyers and four
Japanese gunboats in Hankow as compared with three Japanese
naval vessels on October 3 and five on October 31. One of
the Japanese naval vessels in port at the beginning of
October was a cruiser and it is probable that the total
man and gun power of the forces here at present does not
greatly exceed that of the Japanese naval forces here at
the beginning of October. The light cruiser was forced
to leave on account of falling water.

Two. There are reports from private Chinese sources
claiming that the Japanese authorities are, through
Chinese agents, expending money amongst Chinese coolies
here for the purpose of inducing the latter to precipitate
anti-Japanese disturbances. It is impossible to verify
or refute the reports.

Nanking informed."

For the Minister

JHR

HPD

ENGERT

793.94/2715

FILED

NOV 23 1931

74.3.94
note
544.3393

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

November 17, 1931.

AMERICAN LEGATION

NOV 17 31

5pm

PEIPING (CHINA).

Your 949, November 16.

The Department would be glad to receive from the
Legation "occasional" and "important" news reports
from Moscow.

793.94/2715

Stinson
Sick

FE: RSM: EJJL

FE

Nov 17. 1931. P.M.

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

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172+

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)*
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM

GRAY

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 17, 1931

FROM

Rec'd 11:06 a.m.

743.94
Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.


948, November 17, 11 a.m.

Following from Mukden:

"November 16, 3 p.m.

Bess of the United Press informed Vincent in confidence of an interview this morning with Prince Kung. Gist of the interview follows: Kung states Japanese ^{Rom} ~~Rom~~ have tried to persuade him to head Manchurian monarchy which he flatly refuses to do but would like to see Manchurian Republic established. Also states that ^{Rom} ~~Rom~~ are bringing strong pressure to bear upon Pu-Yi to become Emperor; that he disapproves; but fears that Pu-Yi, being weak, may succumb to persuasion. He denies knowledge of present whereabouts of Pu-Yi or any connection with his reported departure from Tientsin. Kung is unfriendly towards ^{Rom} ~~Rom~~ intrigues but appreciates ability, resulting from Japanese action, to worship at Mukden tomb of royal ancestors for first time since establishment of the Republic."

Repeated



FK 795.94/2716

FILED

NOV 28 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM

2-#948, from Peiping, November 17, 1931
11 a.m.

Repeated to Nanking.

For the Minister

FOR THE MINISTER

ENGERT

WSB

HPD

CJH

GRAY

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PEIPING via N. R.

Dated November 17, 1931

FROM

Rec'd. 10 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

952, November 17, 5 p.m.


Following from Harbin.

"November 16, noon.

One. Japanese Consul, his staff and remainder Japanese residents, including Major Hayashi, who negotiated with General Ma regarding bridge, of Tsitsihar numbering 13 persons arrived at Harbin yesterday morning.

Two. Local press this morning reports minor clashes at Nonni River front yesterday in which Japanese driven back, some killed and some made prisoners. These reports confirmed by local Chinese officials, who are becoming proud of so called ability of Tsitsihar troops, and are aiding the latter with money gifts and clothing and with words of encouragement. This elation on the part of the Chinese will cause the Japanese military to push onward to save the "face" of the Japanese army, which have been no doubt sending reinforcements to the Nonni front.

Three. Ohashi returned to Harbin yesterday morning and confirmed



FK

793.94/2717

FILED

NOV 23 1931

CJH

Page 2 - #952 from
Peiping.

and confirmed to me ultimatum of Honjo delivered to Ma
on the 15th as mentioned in my telegram November 15,
1 p.m. (END PART ONE).

ENGERT

JHR

WSB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 17, 1931

Rec'd 9:20 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

952, November 17, 5 p.m. (Part Two)

Local Commissioner of Foreign Affairs stated that Ma has been requested to give an answer in regard to his willingness to comply with the terms of the ultimatum by noon today and that he expects fighting to take place this afternoon. American journalists who returned from Tsitsihar yesterday morning feel that General Ma is determined to resist Japanese attacks.

Four. There is unrest among Mongols of Barga and I believe that Princes Hu Lan Tai and Ku of the Young Mongol Party are being influenced by the Japanese, not by Soviet Russians, to agitate for Barga autonomy."

Repeated to Nanking.

(End part two end message)

For the Minister

HPD.
WSB

ENGERT

1731

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
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NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

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OR
Charge to
\$

Department of State

Washington,

November 17, 1931.

793.94/2717

AMERICAN EMBASSY

PARIS (FRANCE).

NOV 17 31

558

CONFIDENTIAL.

FOR AMBASSADOR DAWES.

For your information ^{and} confidential as to source.

The American Consul General at Harbin reports under date of November 16, noon, that the Japanese Consul, staff and Japanese residents of Tsitsihar arrived at Harbin on the morning of the 15th.

He further states that reports of minor clashes at Nonni River front on the 15th, in which Japanese are said to have been driven back, are confirmed by local Chinese officials who are aiding the Tsitsihar troops. He adds that QUOTE ~~this~~ elation on the part of the Chinese will cause the Japanese military to push onward to save the SINGLE QUOTE face END SINGLE QUOTE of the Japanese Army, which have been no doubt sending reinforcements to the Nonni front UNQUOTE.

Hanson further reports that the Japanese Consul at Harbin had confirmed to him that an ultimatum had been delivered by General Honjo (Japanese) to General Ma (Chinese) on the 15th. Hanson was informed by local

Enciphered by _____

Chinese

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

793.94/2717

1 1732

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
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OR

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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

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CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Washington,

- 2 -

Chinese officials that an answer to this ultimatum had been requested by noon of the 16th. He states that American journalists who have returned from Tsitsihar feel that General Ma is determined to resist Japanese attacks.

Hanson also reports unrest among Mongols of Barga and states his belief that some of the Mongol princes are being influenced by the Japanese, rather than by Soviet Russians, to agitate for Barga autonomy.

RAM
FE: RSM: EJJ

FE

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CJH

GRAY

FROM PEIPING via N. R.

Dated November 17, 1931

Rec'd. 4:03 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

947, November 17, 10 a.m.

Department's telegram No. 420 November 16, 5 p.m.

See copy of Mukden's despatch No. 78 for the Secretary
of State, November 4th to the Legation. Consul General has
been instructed to report further.

FOR THE MINISTER

ENGERT

CSB

Salt Revenue.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 17 1931
Department of State

F/DEW 793.94/2718

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NOV 23 1931

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843.51 - Salt Revenue

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

✓
Form Acknowledgment

DCR

file
M.H.W.

In reply refer to
FE 793.94 -

793.94
116.4



F/DEW

793.94/2719

The receipt is acknowledged, by reference from The White House, of your recent communication in regard to the existing dispute between China and Japan.

The many problems arising from that dispute are continuing to receive the careful and solicitous attention of this Department.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

Maxwell M. Hamilton,
Assistant Chief,
Division of Far Eastern Affairs.

NOV 17 1931

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1735
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Form "A"



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

In reply refer to
FE 793.94-

The receipt is acknowledged, by reference from The White House, of your recent communication in regard to the existing dispute between China and Japan.

Your comments have been read with interest and you are assured that the Department, mindful of this Government's engagements under treaties, is giving constant thought and its best effort to the end that the dispute may be settled by peaceful means.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

Maxwell M. Hamilton,
Assistant Chief,
Division of Far Eastern Affairs.

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FEB 10 1982

FW

793.94/27197
792.84/197
A


173F
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C.



In reply refer to
FE 793.94

Form 2A
JCH
file
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON



FW 793.94/2719

The receipt is acknowledged, by reference from
The White House, of your recent communication in regard
to the existing difficulties between China and Japan.

Your interest in this matter is appreciated and you
are assured that the many problems presented by and the
factors involved in this situation are continuing to
receive the earnest and solicitous attention of the
Department in the light of the treaties to which the
United States is a party and the responsibility of the
Government in reference to protecting American lives and
property.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

Maxwell M. Hamilton,
Assistant Chief,
Division of Far Eastern Affairs.

FEB 9 1932

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1737
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

Form 3 A

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.



In reply refer to
FE 793.94

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

793.94/2719

FW 793.94/2719

The receipt is acknowledged, by reference from
The White House, of your recent communication in regard
to the existing difficulties between China and Japan.

Your interest in this matter is appreciated and
you are assured that the many problems presented by and
the factors involved in this situation are continuing
to receive the earnest and solicitous attention of the
Department in the light of the treaties to which the
United States is a party.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

Maxwell M. Hamilton,
Assistant Chief,
Division of Far Eastern Affairs.

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FEB 12 1982

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

From E



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

In reply refer to
FE 793.94

FW 793.94/2719

The receipt is acknowledged, by reference from The White House, of your recent communication in regard to the existing difficulties between China and Japan.

Your interest in this matter is appreciated and you are assured that the many problems presented by and the factors involved in this situation are continuing to receive the earnest and solicitous attention of the Department in the light of the treaties to which the United States is a party and to the end that these difficulties may be settled by peaceful means.

Very truly yours,



For the Secretary of State:

Maxwell M. Hamilton
Assistant Chief,
Division of Far Eastern Affairs.

1736

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE



MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH M. HENRY
November 11, 1931.

43-44

M. Henry came in to read me a telegram from M. Briand in answer to the telegram sent him by M. Claudel on the subject of our memorandum delivered by Mr. Forbes to the Japanese.

M. Briand says that his attitude toward the Manchurian matter is very similar to ours. What he was hoping may be avoided are such dramatic instances as would make a solution of the whole matter more difficult. He thinks that the situation at the Nonni River looks better, but that it might in time become more serious. He points out that Nanking has asked that the various powers send observers to the Nonni River region. M. Briand adds that this might greatly irritate the Japanese, but that on the other hand full knowledge is necessary. His feeling would be, as representing his own Government, that it would be better to refuse this request of the Chinese, but on the other hand, if England and the United States feel that it should be done and intend to appoint observers definitely to go to this region, France would do the same by ordering someone from the Legation in Nanking. He feels that we ought

F/DEW

793.94/2720

NOV 14 1931

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ought all to take the same action.

I told M. Henry that speaking for myself it did not seem to me necessary to send some civilian, as M. Briand had suggested, from the Legation. I pointed out that we all had military attachés in Manchuria who were undoubtedly following the situation closely and that I could see no reason, as this is primarily a military matter, to send in anyone else at the moment. M. Henry said that this accorded he was sure with M. Briand's wishes in the matter. I told him that if the Secretary should feel differently about it, I would let him know.

WRC

U WRC:GMH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 21, 1931.

M. Carter

I am confident that, with the exception of the comparative few who have studied international law, no Oriental considers that he is under any obligation either moral or legal in relation to a pledge which he has made under duress.

With regard to the "sanctity of treaties", I believe that the vast majority of Orientals consider that the sanction of treaty obligation is physical rather than moral.

With regard to Japanese respect for her own treaty obligations, I would invoke the record of the treaties which she concluded with Korea and with other countries in regard to Korea; also the present attitude toward her obligations under the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Kellogg Pact and the Nine-Power Treaty.

As for the Chinese, the nation as a whole has never shown any respect for treaty obligations inconvenient to themselves; and incidentally, a part of the reason has been that they regard these obligations as having been imposed under duress.

The simple fact of the matter is that the conception which a few highly educated, high-minded and enlightened statesmen in an Oriental

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

- 2 -

country may have with regard to treaties,
international obligations, etc., is very
remote from and utterly different from the
conception which the rank and file possess.

SKH

SKH/ZMF


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE UNDER SECRETARY



November 13, 1931



MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH MR. YUKIO OZAKI

743.94

Mr. Ozaki came with Mr. Miller to call. He is one of the distinguished statesmen of Japan and has at various times been in the government. He is a writer of important books on Japanese constitutional law and is the leader in that country of the movement for disarmament. Although holding one of the most important positions in the Diet, he is not popular with either political party, because he has always played an entirely independent role politically, nor is he popular with the masses because he is known as the leading pacifist of Japan. It is very hard to talk with Mr. Ozaki because of his deafness.

He is naturally very unhappy over the situation in Manchuria and I think he felt the chances were that it would develop into a war involving all of China, a war which he himself would deplore. He said that as in all cases of the kind, popular feeling had been stirred up back of the military element and that the Japanese Government could not take a stand diametrically opposed to popular opinion, which is convinced that the safety of the Empire depends upon

F/DEW

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-2-

upon controlling Manchuria and that the Chinese ignoring of treaties has greatly endangered Japanese standing in Manchuria.

I asked Mr. Ozaki what he thought the nations might do to prevent this conflict. He said that he thought the leadership should be taken by this country because political feeling here would hardly permit this country to follow in the footsteps of the League. I gathered that he thought the writing of notes to Japan was more or less futile, because he said that we and the League kept insisting that Japan observe the treaties, meaning the Kellogg Pact and the treaties of 1922. He said that if we would go the other way and insist that China also observe the treaties, including those of 1915, with certain omissions which had become dead letters, his country would feel that the world was really being useful. He said that at present the Japanese Government felt that we wanted them to observe treaties, but did not care whether China observed them or not. I pointed out to him that many people felt the treaties of 1915 had been obtained under duress and were, therefore, not valid.

He said that looking at it from a commonsense point of view, it was obvious that if these treaties were invalid, the Treaty of Versailles was also a scrap of paper.

Mr. Ozaki

-3-

Mr. Ozaki said that there were many things in the treaties of 1915 which were distinctly advantageous to China, and that although he fought against them when he was in the government at the time, he now felt that they were not as bad as he feared then they would be. He added, however, that he had made a mistake in not resigning because he did not approve of the method. He emphasized the fact, however, that to the Oriental mind a treaty signed, sealed and delivered was a sacred document and and that the people in general did not distinguish between different kinds of treaties.

Wally

U WRC:GMH

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JCR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 19, 1931.

Attached is the memorandum of the Undersecretary's conversation with the Japanese Ambassador on November 14.

With reference to the Ambassador's statement that under no circumstances are the Japanese troops to get into the region north of the Chinese Eastern Railway (i. e., the Angangki-Tsitsihar area), it seems well established from this morning's press reports that Japanese troops are now in that area, although it may be doubted that they have as yet reached Tsitsihar City, which is about 35 miles north of the Nonni front, a goodly day's advance for a military force.



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74
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)*
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE



THE UNDERSECRETARY
OF STATE
EASTERN AFFAIRS



November 14, 1931.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR

The Ambassador came in primarily to inform the Department that his Government had ordered Mr. Matsudaira to go to Paris to be there during the session of the League. Mr. Matsudaira will, of course, have no connection with the League, but like Mr. Dawes will be on hand and available for conference. Mr. Debuchi says that he will be expected to "play ball with Mr. Dawes." He feels that it will be very valuable to have Mr. Matsudaira there because he not only stands well with the Foreign Office, but has a very high position in court circles.

844.002

Mr. Debuchi brought up with me the statement made in the papers this morning that a plot had been discovered against Baron Wakatsuki, Baron Shidehara and Count Makino. He said that to this list should be added Inouye. Mr. Debuchi said there was no doubt of the accuracy of this report, since he had had private advices from Tokyo that ten young army officers had been arrested during October. It is possible that more

may

ADW

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-2-

may have been arrested since. The Japanese press has been ordered to say nothing about it, and has obeyed orders. The men were arrested after an attempt was actually made on the lives of some or all of these men.

The Ambassador says that with the state of feeling in Japan with regard to Manchuria, the position of the Wakatsuki cabinet is very dangerous and that, therefore, Baron Shidehara immensely appreciates the patience which the Secretary of State has shown through all the recent trouble.

The Ambassador told me something about the situation at the bridge-head on the Nonni River. He says that the Japanese troops have orders not to proceed any further north, that under no circumstances are they to get into the region north of the Chinese Eastern Railway as shown in the attached map. He says that the rumor in the attached telegram that General Ma has been ordered to evacuate Tsitsihar is complete false, that the Chinese never stop to check up on such stories, but immediately send them to Geneva. Their principal agent for the filling of political information is said to be Racjhamin (?) who was sent out by the League to take charge of sanitary measures. The Japanese Government has appealed to the
League

74
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-


League to urge the Chinese not to permit General Ma to attack the Japanese contingent guarding the bridge building. Unless such attack is made, there is no danger of further Japanese advance. All the papers say this morning would appear to show the truth of the Ambassador's remarks.

W. R. Castle.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

WHERE NEW CLASH IS EXPECTED IN CHINA.



Arrow Shows the Nonni River Bridgehead, Held by the Japanese, Against Which the Chinese General Ma Is Marching.

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 14, 1931

Rec'd 4:58 a. m.

has just received a telegram
 that yesterday afternoon
 matum of the previous
 the railway station of
 that there must be some

mistake and that in any event he had to refer the matter
 to his superiors. The young Marshal has sent the message
 to Nanking for immediate communication to the League of
 Nations and requests me to inform the Department.

Repeated to Nanking.

FOR THE MINISTER

ENGERT

RR

HPD

REP

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 14, 1931

Rec'd 4:58 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

DOUBLE PRIORITY.

936, November 14, 2 p. m.

Marshal Chang Hsueh Liang has just received a telegram from General Ma to the effect that yesterday afternoon General Honjo amended his ultimatum of the previous day and now demands to occupy the railway station of Tsitsihar itself. Ma replied that there must be some mistake and that in any event he had to refer the matter to his superiors. The young Marshal has sent the message to Nanking for immediate communication to the League of Nations and requests me to inform the Department.

Repeated to Nanking.

FOR THE MINISTER

ENGERT

RR

HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 224.


AMERICAN CONSULATE,
St. Stephen, N. B., Canada, November 9, 1931.

793-94
SUBJECT: Local Opinion on The Chinese-Japanese Situation.

1-1055 GPO
THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON



SIR:

I have the honor to report the following concerning an address delivered this day before the local Rotary Club by Rev. A. S. Bishop, Pastor of the Baptist Church in St. Stephen, N. B.

Mr. Bishop used as his subject "In Memorium; in Expectation". His address was divided into two parts, the first part consisting of remarks concerning the experiences of Canadian soldiers and the part they were called upon to play in the World War; and the second section related to the expectations of the world as the aftermath of the war.

Mr. Bishop dwelt quite strongly on the present situation in the Far East, in fact, about one-third of his time was devoted to the present attitude of Japan and what he conceived to be the possible reaction of the world to the Japanese stand. He stressed three points. First, the probable good effect of world opinion in influencing the Japanese to discontinue operations in Manchuria. The second point was the possibilities of the world effectively exercising an economic

boycott

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
1931-83-ADN
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- 2 -

boycott on Japan. The third was the possibilities of the remainder of the world withdrawing their Diplomatic Corps from Japan as a mark of censure or disapprobation.

Having been present in, "so to speak", the back row of the audience, composed of about forty influential Canadians resident in the two adjacent towns of St. Stephen and Milltown, I feel qualified to say that the rapt attention paid Mr. Bishop, and the hearty congratulations which followed, justifies the belief that in this immediate and relatively small part of the world public opinion desires an amicable and just settlement, and very distinctly objects to war-like activities and attitudes.

Respectfully yours,



George L. Brist,
American Vice Consul.

GLB/EWF
800.

54

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 18, 1931.

Political Report from Mukden.

Reliable reports have been received that Chinese bandits are active along the Ssuningkai-Taonan Railway, traffic on the Liaoyuan-Tungliao branch having been suspended, and the main line having been cut north of Liaoyuan.

A certain revolutionist named Ling Yin-ching has recently been playing an active role. He has assumed the title of Commander of the Self-Protection Forces of the People of the Northeast, and issued circulars denouncing Kuomintang rule and calling on generals and other executive officers to join the movement for a republic on San Min principles. He is recruiting an armed force from among bandits.

There are other movements of a similar nature, particularly among the Mongols in western Liaoning Province and in Jehol Province. Japanese are actively associated with the activities of the Manchu princes for the restoration of monarchical government, and with the Self Government Societies which have been established at various places, chiefly along the S. M. Ry., for disruptive purposes. The continuation and

intensification

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PM RECD




AMERICAN CONSULATE,

GENERAL,

Mukden, China, October 24, 1931.

NOV 16 31

SUBJECT: Recent Political Developments



WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of
my despatch No. 469, to the Legation, Peiping, dated
October 24, 1931, on the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers
M. S. Myers
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 469.

MSM:HTW
800

F/DEW

793.94/2724

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NOV 30 1931

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 469

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Mukden, China, October 24, 1931.

SUBJECT: Recent Political Developments.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping, China.

Sir:

Supplementing my report of yesterday's date on the above subject, in which reference was made to the unsettled conditions along the Ssu-T'ao Railway, I have the honor to state that reliable information has been received to the effect that traffic on the Liaoyuan-Tungliao branch has been suspended and that a large body of Mongol bandits is still occupying Talinchan on that line. Some days ago the families of the staff of the railway were moved to Liaoyuan. It has also been reported that the main line of that railway has been cut between Liaoyuan and T'aonan by bandits; that the T'ao-Ang Railway is being operated between T'aonan and Tailaichi which is now occupied by Heilungkiang troops.

A new candidate for political power in Manchuria has come into the limelight owing to his revolutionary

activities

-2-

activities. He is one Ling Yin-ch'ing (凌印清) who is described in press reports as a revolutionist and an old enemy of the Chang family - he was once designated as Pacification Commissioner for the Three Eastern Provinces. On October 20, 1931, two printed circulars, in his name, were widely distributed. One, in the form of a telegram, denounces Chiang Kai-sih and Chang Hsueh-liang as enemies of their country and states that "we" oppose a monarchical government and desire to establish a real republic, based on the San Min principles, in which the party is subordinated to the Government. In the other circular which is addressed to the commanding generals, executive officers and police of the northeast, he makes an appeal that they join his camp under the five barred flag, emblem of the five races constituting the Republic. Ling has assumed the title of Commander of the Self Protection Forces of the People of the Northeast. According to reliable information Ling is about 45 years of age and is a native of this province (village of Kaototzu). He is now at Tengaopu, a large village east of the South Manchuria Railway between Liaoyang and Haicheng where he was recently seen in company with twelve Japanese and escorted by fifty men armed with new rifles. Three hundred rifles and over ten boxes of cartridges were received by him at that village where, it is expected, his headquarters will be temporarily established. He is now recruiting bandits and according to Japanese press reports he plans to march westward to attack Chinhsien.

-3-

Chinhhsien.

Movements of a similar nature are probably being fostered in other parts of Manchuria, particularly, in my opinion, among the Mongols in western Liaoning and Jehol provinces. It is well known that Japanese subjects are actively associated with the activities of the Manchu princes for the restoration of a monarchical government and with the Self Government Societies (自治會) which have been established for disruptive purposes at various places, mostly along the South Manchuria Railway lines (reference to my telegram of October 21 4 p. m.). The immediate effect of these movements in which Japanese are actively engaged is the continuation and intensification of disorder which will give a plausible pretext for the prolongation of the military occupation of South Manchuria or the reinforcement of the Japanese troops, a development that is already being discussed in the press of Japan.

As reported in my telegram of October 21 4 p. m., Self Government Societies have been formed at Fushun, Tiehling, Kaiyuan, Liaoyuan, Ssupingkai, Lishu, Changchun, Kungchuling and Chiench'ang. At Fushun the society displayed a yellow flag at the time of its inauguration (October 11) and the taking over of the duties of the magistrate by its executive committee. The inauguration of these societies called forth a warning from the Peace Maintenance Committee at Mukden which sent a delegate to visit each one of them. As the Committee is proposing to appoint new magistrates for these and some other districts, it is believed that this movement has subsided,

at

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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at least for the time being.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers
American Consul General.


Original and one copy to Legation, Peiping.
Five copies to Department.
Copy to American Embassy, Tokyo.
Copy to Consulate General, Harbin.

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HTW

A true copy of
the signed orig-
inal.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PM RECD



AMERICAN CONSULATE.
GENERAL,

Mukden, China, October 24, 1931

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.T. AND M.T.O.

NOV 16 1931

SUBJECT: Recent Political Developments

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THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

Copy mtd.
Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 18 1931
Department of State

F/DEM

793.94/2725

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of my
despatch No. 468, to the Legation, Peiping, China, dated
October 23, 1931, on the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers
M. S. Myers
American Consul General.

FEB 18 1932

FILED

Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 468.

MSM:HTW
800

No. 468

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Mukden, China, October 23, 1931.

Subject: Recent Political Developments.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping, China.

Sir:

Referring to my telegrams of October 21 11 a. m. and October 22 11 a. m. in regard to the reopening of the Bureaux of Finance and Industry of Liaoning Province and to the transfer of the Mukden Municipality to the Chinese, I have the honor to report upon recent developments in this district. Reference is also made to my despatch No. 467, of October 21, 1931, concerning the reorganization of the Bureau of Finance, with which was forwarded a copy of the provisional regulations of that bureau.

The Peace Maintenance (Preservation) Committee at Mukden has recently made the following appointments with the approval of the Japanese military authorities:

Chief Judge of Superior Court, Mukden -
Dr. Chao Hsin-po (趙 欣 伯),
a graduate of Tokyo Imperial University;

Mayor of Mukden Municipality -
Dr. Chao Hsin-po;

Chief

-2-

Chief of Bureau of Finance of Liaoning
Province -
Weng En-yu (翁恩裕),
formerly Chief of Tax Collectorate
at Liaoyang;

Chief of Bureau of Industry of Liaoning
Province -
Kao Chun-ko (高鈞閣);

Chief of Bureau of Civil Administration
of Liaoning Province -
Ping K'o-chuang (邢克莊),
formerly Taoyin and Commissioner
for Foreign Affairs at Antung.

Except for Ping K'o-chuang who has not yet accepted the appointment, the above officers have in the past few days entered upon the duties of their respective offices. The Bureau of Civil Administration has not yet been organized and the other Bureaux have not yet started to function.

Japanese advisers are attached to every Chinese office that has been organized since the Japanese occupation and according to the published provisional regulations which have been seen (those of the Bureaux of Finance or Industry and of the government banks) they have a wide degree of authority and will be able to exercise complete control whenever desired. Too, under present conditions the Japanese military authorities may interfere at any time. The Chinese offices having Japanese advisers according to a published list are the Municipal Office, Peace Maintenance Committee, Bureau of Industry, Bureau of Finance, Shenyang magistrate and the Mayor himself.

It is noted from the above that the Peace Maintenance Committee, of which Yuan Chin-k'ai is the

head,

-3-

head, is gradually assuming the prerogatives of government. Although Mr. Yuan only a short time ago publicly announced that he would have no connection with an independent government, responsible Japanese believe that it is only a matter of time until he will head a government at Mukden, a conclusion that appears reasonable in view of recent appointments. It is possible that he is following developments at Geneva closely and expects that Nanking will be obliged to recognize locally constituted governments when Sino-Japanese negotiations are opened.

The Self Protection Police (自衛警) of Mukden which are under the control of the Municipal Office now number about 3000 according to Japanese reports. Besides this force, there is the Peace Preservation Force (保安隊) directly under the control of the Peace Maintenance Committee. Its proposed strength is 1000 but at present only 300 have been recruited. The Chamber of Commerce supports a Merchants' Volunteer Corps which has now 500 rifles. Except for the police of the Shenyang magistrate, there are no other armed Chinese forces in the immediate vicinity of Mukden.

In a previous despatch, mention was made of the assurances given to the Japanese by the Commissioner of Defense at Shanch'engtzu (General Yu Ch'ih-san), south of Hailung on the Shen-Hai Railway, that the lives and property of the Japanese and Korean residents in his jurisdiction would be adequately protected. It is now reported in the press that General Yu has been elected by the people

as

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

-4-

as Peace Preservation Commander of the Eastern Frontier (東邊保安司令), that his 4000 troops have been reorganized as the peace preservation force and that he formally assumed office a few days ago. It is also reported that he will visit Mukden shortly to pay his respects to General Honjo, the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese forces. General Yu was formerly a subordinate officer under K'an Chao-hai who is a member of the Peace Maintenance Committee. It seems probable that General Yu's prospective visit to Mukden is concerned primarily with his relations with the Peace Maintenance Committee at Mukden or its reorganization as the provincial government.

Yesterday the Japanese military authorities reported that 1000 soldiers who had come from east of Kirin had crossed the South Manchuria Railway line at Tefantien (大房店) about eight miles south of Tieling. They were reported to have cut the telephone wires and to have suffered 60 casualties in an encounter with two companies of railway guards who reported no casualties. The Japanese sent a squadron of cavalry to cut off their retreat which was in the direction of the Chinese lines. From these scanty particulars it is to be inferred that the Chinese were retreating in good order, that they offered little or no resistance to the Japanese soldiers and that the Japanese military seize every opportunity of inflicting punishment on the northeastern forces no matter whether there is provocation or not. Probably too, they are anxious to show to the world that the

northeastern

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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northeastern troops are a menace to the peace and order of Manchuria and that the presence of Japanese troops are necessary for its maintenance.

Under date of October 12, 1931, the Joint Committee for the Maintenance of Peace and Order of the Mongolian Border officially announced its formation at T'aonan and the election of its officers. It was stated that the Committee is made up of members of the Peace Maintenance Committees of the ten districts and four banners constituting the circuit of T'ao-Liao. On the same day the Joint Committee announced that Chang Hsi-p'eng, the Commissioner of Defense at T'aonan, had been elected by the ten districts and four banners as Rupan of the Mongolian border. He assumed the duties of that office on October 15.

During the past two weeks Chang Hsi-p'eng has been conducting a military expedition against the Heilungkiang Government, concerning which many contradictory reports have been heard. Information from private sources received a few days ago were to the effect that Chang's expedition had been held up at Talaichi, a station on the T'ao-Ang Railway in southern Heilungkiang, and that some of his Mongol troops who had recently received arms and ammunition (presumably those supplied by Japanese mentioned in a previous report) had deserted. The bridge over the Nonni river, south of Angangohi, was destroyed by the Heilungkiang troops. At the same time the Japanese press published from day to day report of the advance of Chang's force toward Tsitsihar and even its capture. These reports,

anticipating

-6-

anticipating events that failed to transpire, seem to add weight to other reports alleging that the Japanese were assisting Chang with arms and ammunition and with airplanes.

Yesterday the Japanese military authorities announced that a Japanese scouting plane had been fired on by Heilungkiang troops on the T'ao-Ang Railway and in reply dropped several bombs which, however, did no damage. The Japanese explain that their action was taken as a measure for the protection of their vested interests in the T'ao-Ang line, of which two bridges had recently been destroyed by the Heilungkiang troops. It was also stated that the military authorities had approached the South Manchuria Railway Company with an offer to protect the line while repairs are being carried out, the proposal being advanced for humanitarian reasons in connection with the movement of the crops. In view of the reports that the forces of Ma Chan-shan, the Acting Chairman of Heilungkiang, have defeated Chang's troops and pushed them southward, other motives are generally attributed for this proposal.

Disturbances at Mukden have become less frequent as well as less serious. In the interior, however, information from reliable sources confirm in a general way Japanese press reports in regard to bandit activities in many parts of the province. East of the South Manchuria Railway main line and north of the Peking-Mukden Railway in the Liao river basin conditions are serious and reports from American firms have been received concerning the looting of their

stocks

-7-

stocks in the hands of native agents. Several towns on the Liaoyuan-Tungliao branch of the Sau-T'ao Railway (Talinshan and Chienchiatien) have been thoroughly looted by large bands of Mongols and recently it was reported that traffic on this branch might be suspended for the time being. Tungliao has been menaced several times and taken once by Mongol bandits. Japanese who were employed on a large farm operated by Okura and Company, a Japanese firm, in that vicinity were removed from danger by Japanese airplanes.


It may be mentioned that the Japanese military authorities have had the personal effects and furniture of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang boxed and shipped to him in care of the Japanese troops at Tientsin with directions to forward them to Peiping. These effects, comprising 471 packages valued at Yen 500,000, were despatched from Dairen a few days ago according to press reports.

Respectfully yours,



M. S. Myers
American Consul General.

Original and one copy to Legation, Peiping.
Five copies to Department.
Copy to American Embassy, Tokyo.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



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
AMERICAN CONSULATE,
GENERAL,

Mukden, China, October 22, 1931

NOV 16 31

SUBJECT: Reorganization of the Bureau of
Finance of Liaoning Province.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

1793.94
note
893.51

CF/DEW 793.94/2726

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of
my despatch No. 467, to the Legation, Peiping, dated
October 21, 1931, on the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers
M. S. Myers
American Consul General.

FILED
NOV 30 1931

Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 467.

MSM:HTW
800/851.2

176

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure to despatch of M. S. Myers, American Consul General
at Mukden, China, dated October 22, 1931 on the subject
"Reorganization of the Bureau of Finance of Liaoning Province."

No. 467

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,
Mukden, China, October 21, 1931.

SUBJECT: Reorganization of the Bureau of
Finance of Liaoning Province.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping, China.

Sir:

Referring to my telegram of October 21 11 A. M.
in regard to the opening of the reorganized Bureau of
Finance of Liaoning Province, I have the honor to
enclose herewith a copy of the provisional regulations
of the Bureau, as published in The Manchuria Daily News
of October 20, 1931. This translation of the regulations
has been checked against the original Chinese text^{which} appear-
ed in the local vernacular papers. These regulations
were ostensibly drawn up by the Peace Preservation
(Maintenance) Committee but the hand of the Japanese
military authorities is plainly visible. It is
apparent that the Japanese will completely dominate
the policy of the Finance Bureau. The Chief of the
Bureau is Wang En-yu (翁恩裕), who was formerly
chief of the tax collectorate at Liaoyang. The
Bureau is not yet entirely organized and the collection
of taxes has not been started.

As reported in my telegram, a Bureau of Civil

Administration

-2-

Administration and a Bureau of Industry are in the process of formation. The heads of these bureaus have not yet been selected.

Whether the Japanese are aiming at economic or political domination of this territory, the control that they are wielding over the reconstituted official banks (Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces and Frontier Bank) and of the reorganized civil government offices (Finance Bureau and Municipal Office) would seem to be equally applicable. It seems certain that the different taxes that were contrary to the treaties or were strongly objected to by the Japanese in the past will be dropped; among these there may be mentioned the consumption tax at open marts and possibly the consolidated tax on tobacco and wines.

It is well known that in the past the provincial government of this province enforced many regulations which were originated primarily for the purpose of preventing the expansion of Japanese interests in this territory. Restrictions on the purchase of land and the mortgaging of property are cases in point. There can be no doubt that the Japanese while controlling such Chinese administrations as the Mukden municipal office and, when established, the Bureau of Civil Administration will withdraw these restrictions and at the same time arrange a satisfactory settlement of Japanese cases that had been held up for years. Following the Sino-Japanese agreements of 1915, Japanese concession hunters were extremely active in Manchuria and possibly they will again avail themselves of

the

-3-

the opportunity to gain valuable concessions. This may explain the interest of the Japanese authorities in re-establishing the Bureau of Industry at this time. At the very least, the steps that the Japanese military authorities are taking to safeguard Japanese interests should greatly facilitate subsequent Sino-Japanese negotiations in regard to some of the knotty problems in their relations if these steps do not totally eliminate them.

Respectfully yours,


M. S. Myers
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

Provisional Regulations of
Finance Bureau, Mukden.

Original and one copy to Legation, Peiping.
Five Copies to Department.
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.

MSM:HTW
800/851.2



(THE MANCHURIA DAILY NEWS)
October 20, 1931.

BOARD OF FINANCE OF LIAONING
PROVINCE, REOPENED ON THE 19th
WITH JAPANESE ADVISER AND
SECRETARIES.

On the 19th instant as previously reported, the Finance Board of Liaoning Province was reopened on the provisional regulations outlined as under:-

GENERAL RULES:

Article 1. The Local Peace and Order Committee, with a view to restoring and safeguarding the public peace and order and the people's living, seeing the necessity to revive the Provincial Board of Finance, has laid down the provisional regulations for accomplishing the above object.

ORGANIZATION AND SCOPE OF AUTHORITY:

Article 2. The Director of the Board of Finance shall be selected by the Local Peace and Order Committee.

Article 3. The organization and the scope of authority of the Finance Board shall remain as before for the present, what changes are deemed necessary being confined to the minimum.

Article 4. The Local Peace and Order Committee, with the object of perfecting the working of the financial administration, shall engage a number of Japanese adviser and secretaries whose opinions to be duly respected by the Board in administering financial affairs.

FINANCIAL READJUSTMENT:

Article 5. The Local Peace and Order Committee shall organize the Financial Readjustment Committee to take up the plan of how to reorganize the taxation system, how to compile the estimates, et cetera, the new Committee comprising:

Japanese representative, the representatives of Local Peace and Order Committee, Municipal Office,

General

- 2 -

General Guild, and Agricultural Guild, Superintendents of Finance Board, and Advisers and Secretaries, although the Guilds' representatives are to take part in the meetings considering the taxation system.

Article 6. The Director of the Finance Board on consulting with the Local Peace and Order Committee shall issue such notices as are deemed necessary for the present purposes, subject to the approval of the Japanese Army, prior to giving them effect.

Article 7. The Local Peace and Order Committee, when the provisional regulations of the Board of Finance have been got up, shall apply to the Japanese Army for its consent to reopening the Board to business, and shall take steps to actually open it with despatch.

Article 8. In case of a revenue official who served the old government being guilty of remitting taxes to the hostile party, the Local Peace and Order Committee shall demand the Japanese authorities to deal with such offenders severely.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) of (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

~~SECRET~~
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 24, 1931.

Mukden's October 20, 1931, No. 412 - Opening of
local Chinese Banks under Japanese supervision.

There are enclosed copies of regulations governing the reopening of the Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces and the Frontier Bank, and of an instruction issued by General Honjo which provides for effective control by the Kuantung Army over the operation of the two banks.

The banks were kept closed for almost a month because it was feared that while conditions remained unsettled runs on the banks might take place, with disastrous consequences.

The two institutions were banks of issue, responsible for practically the entire Chinese bank note circulation in South Manchuria. They were fiscal agents of government institutions and handled most of the domestic financing of the region. In financing Manchuria's large bean and grain crops they had a decided advantage over would-be Japanese competitors.

The new regulations provide for the detention of public deposits and the payment of private deposits on a restricted basis. The prohibition placed on future loans and the order for closing out accounts with associated business organizations portends a severe curtailment of participation by the banks in industrial and commercial financing.

The

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

The embargo on the transportation of silver out of the area is being enforced.

Though some of the regulations will become inoperative when a new government is organized, those pertaining to loans and accounts with auxiliary commercial enterprises are not in the nature of temporary measures.

American business has been adversely affected, as former Chinese government and public organizations, as well as Mukden officials, have been unable to draw money to settle their accounts. Since the changes in management have not been legalized, clients are afraid to honor the signatures of newly appointed officials.

The regulations and instructions make clear that Japan is determined to exercise effective control over the banks, and to effect a complete severance of financial relations between the banks and the former Chinese Government and government officials in Mukden. The Japanese intend either to use the banks as agencies for furthering their own economic ambitions or to effect their gradual strangulation, enabling Japanese banking institutions to take over their former functions, giving Japan financial control in South Manchuria and unchallenged leadership in the exploitation of natural resources and the promotion of industrial development.

The bureaux of Finance and Industry have been reopened with Japanese advisors, all Chinese railways

in

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

3

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

in South Manchuria with the exception of the
Peiping-Liaoning line have been placed under
Japanese control, and a large number of public
utility corporations have been taken over or
closed by the Japanese.

Whatever the solution of the political issue,
it is confidently anticipated that the Japanese
will successfully insist upon retaining a large
measure of the financial, railway, and industrial
control which they are now so carefully
establishing.

EBT

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D)*or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 412

COPIES SENT TO
AMERICAN CONSULATE
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

GENERAL.

Mukden, China, October 20, 1931.

SUBJECT: Reopening of Local Chinese Banks under
Japanese Supervision and Army Control.

THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
WASHINGTON.

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honour to enclose for the Department's information translations of the regulations governing the reopening of the Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces and the Frontier Bank and of an instruction issued by General Honjo, Commander in Chief of the Kuantung Army, to Yuan Chin-kai, chief of the Local Peace Preservation Committee, which provides for effective control by the Kuantung Army over the operation of the two banks. In this connection, the Department's attention is respectfully invited to this Consulate General's telegrams of October 11, 3 p.m. and October 20, 2 p.m. to the Legation, Peiping, which, it is understood, were repeated to the Department. Reference is also made to the concluding pages of my despatch No. 454 of October 5, 1931, to the Legation, copies of which were forwarded to the Department.

The Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces and the Frontier Bank were seized and closed by the Japanese military authorities on September 19, 1931. The Japanese

gave

- 2 -

gave as their reason for seizing the banks the necessity of investigating their financial condition, which, according to reports, was believed to be unsound. There was also no attempt to conceal the fact that the Kuantung Army wished to detain, and to all appearances, retain the funds of Chang Hsueh-liang and other military and civil officials of the Northeastern Provinces, whom they described as "enemies" of the Japanese Army, and also Government and other public deposits. The banks were kept closed for almost a month under Japanese control because the military authorities feared that their reopening while conditions remained unsettled would result in a run on the banks with disastrous consequences to private depositors, holders of banknotes, and even the continued existence of the banks. Due to rumours which were spread to the effect that the silver reserves and securities of the banks were inadequate, the banknotes depreciated after the banks were closed, at one time as much as 25% below par value. However, just prior to the reopening of the banks, they recovered and were being quoted at about 5% below par.

It is interesting to note, in connection with the exchange value of the banks' notes, that prior to the seizure of the banks by the Japanese their notes exchanged freely with silver. For many months remittance fees to

Tientsin

- 3 -

Tientsin and Shanghai have been rather high, usually 3%, but locally the notes of the Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces and the Frontier Bank have been accepted at their face value since they were issued several years ago. These banknotes should not be confused with the notorious "Fengpiao" which prior to the Japanese occupation were quoted at 60 to the dollar and have been fluctuating between 70 and 80 during the past month.

The Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces was organized in 1905 as a government bank for Fengtien Province. In 1909, its scope and capital stock were enlarged and its name changed to the one it now bears. The Frontier Bank was first opened in Tientsin in 1927 by Marshal Chang Tso-lin. In 1928 it was moved to Mukden. Chang Hsueh-liang's connection with the bank is so intimate and his control over its policies so complete, that it is frequently referred to as his personal bank.

The two institutions were banks of issue and as such responsible for practically the entire Chinese banknote circulation of South Manchuria. No reliable estimate can be obtained of the amount of notes in circulation. The banks were the fiscal agents of the Manchurian government institutions. They also handled practically all of the domestic financing in South Manchuria. The foreign banks and the Bank of China and Bank of Communications participated only in a limited and indirect way in such

undertakings

- 4 -

undertakings, , their business being largely a matter of handling the financing connected with foreign trade.

One of the most important functions of the two banks was the financing of Manchuria's large bean and grain crops. Unsecured loans were made to large grain merchants for advances to the farmers during the period of planting and cultivation. At harvest time further loans were made to these merchants to finance purchase of the crops, and the beans and grain were hypothecated to the banks as security for outstanding loans. The close contact which the banks maintained with the farmers and grain merchants gave them a decided advantage in these profitable operations over would-be Japanese competitors.

The banks were heavily interested in railway, mining, navigation, harbour, and public utility enterprises. Through auxiliary organizations they engaged in flour and bean milling, lumbering, and foreign trade. The Iida Company, now closed, was the agent of the banks in conducting a large export trade in Manchurian products.

On October 15th, the Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces and the Frontier Bank were reopened. The regulations governing their opening were drawn up by a special Sino-Japanese committee. They provide for the detention of public deposits and the payment of private deposits in accordance with a system of restrictions. The prohibition placed on future loans and the order for closing

out

- 5 -

out accounts with associated business organizations portends a severe curtailment, if not cessation, of participation by the banks in industrial and commercial financing. Remittances are also subject to limitations, the most significant being that relating to transfers to sub-banks outside the South Manchuria Railway zone. In practice, the restrictions on remittances and cashing of drafts have been more stringent than provided for in the regulations. For the time being, only drafts drawn prior to the Japanese occupation are being cashed and remittances are possible only on a very unsatisfactory and unsystematic basis. In accordance with the regulations, fifty dollars silver are being paid to holders of notes but the amount paid out in any one day was at first limited to \$10,000 and has now been raised to \$60,000. The embargo on the transportation of silver out of the area is being enforced. The regulations are apparently to become inoperative when a new government is organized and takes charge of the banks. It is observed, however, that the regulations pertaining to loans and accounts with auxiliary commercial organizations are not in the nature of temporary measures.

American business was adversely affected by the closing of the banks and is now suffering from the restrictions and confusion which have attended their reopening. Former Chinese government and public organizations, as

well

- 6 -

well as former Mukden officials, which are indebted to American firms are unable to settle their accounts because of the detention of their funds in the banks. The Standard Oil Company of New York, The Texas Company, and other distributing firms are in some cases unable, and in others only partially able, to cash drafts drawn by their agents against accounts in the two banks. The banks have issued new signature cards for the recently appointed officials. Clients of the banks under their former managements cannot, without giving cause for possible future complications, honour these signatures. This is particularly true of foreign banks having debit accounts with the Chinese banks. This is due to the fact that nothing has been done to legalize the change in managements, the sequestration of government and official funds, and, since the subject is mentioned, a hundred or more other interferences with and seizures of Chinese public and private property and, in some cases, private foreign property.

The instruction issued by General Honjo was presumably handed to the Chairman of the Peace Preservation Committee prior to the opening of the banks, although it was not made public until yesterday. It was known, however, at the time the banks opened that Japanese authorities were to be employed to supervise the operation of the banks. Mr. Sudo, a director of the South Manchuria Railway, has been chosen as chief adviser to the banks and eight Japanese councillors have

been

- 7 -

been appointed. General Honjo's instruction also provides for periodic inspections of the banks by supervisors appointed by the army headquarters. The reported remittance by the Kaiyuan branch of the Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces of \$350,000 to the Chinchow government is understood to have been responsible for the sections concerning the transaction of business hostile to the Army and the restriction of branch bank reserves.

The regulations and the instruction make clear two facts. Japanese determination to exercise effective control over the banks and through this control to effect a complete severance of financial relations between the banks and the former Chinese government and government officials in Mukden. It is understood that the funds of "enemy" officials and government organizations, withdrawal of which is forbidden, will be used to increase the reserves of the banks.

The future of the banks is uncertain. The calling of outstanding public loans and the refusal to make new loans, is indicative of an intention to curtail their former activities. There are reliable reports to the effect that their commercial departments are to be closed as soon as possible. However, whether the Japanese intend to utilize the banks as agencies for furthering their economic ambitions or whether they plan to effect their

gradual

- 8 -

gradual strangulation, thereby clearing the way for Japanese banking institutions to take over their former functions, the outcome is the same: Japanese financial control in South Manchuria and through this control unchallenged leadership in the exploitation of Manchuria's resources and in the promotion of industrial development.

Statements by the Vice President of the South Manchuria Railway Company are already being published which contain extensive plans for enlarged Japanese investments in South Manchuria. It is significant that although no provincial government has yet been organized, the bureaux of Finance and Industry have been reopened with Japanese advisors attached to them. Furthermore those Chinese railways which are now operating in South Manchuria, with the exception of the Peiping-Liaoning line, have been placed under Japanese control. A large number of public utility corporations have been either taken over or closed by the Japanese. The closing of the Antung (Chinese) Electric Light Plant and the operation of the Mukden Light Plant by the Japanese are noteworthy cases in point.

Hence, while a solution of the political issue is attracting widespread attention and concern and the outcome is obscured in a complexity of immediate problems the Japanese are laying foundations for the financial and economic domination of South Manchuria. Realization of the


army

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 9 -

army's aspiration for political control is doubtful but it is confidently anticipated that the Japanese will successfully insist upon retaining a large measure of the financial, railway, and industrial control which they are now so carefully establishing.

Very respectfully yours,


M. S. Myers.
American Consul General.

✓
enclosures

Original and four copies to the Department.
In duplicate to the Legation, Peiping.
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.

JCV:WYP
800

Enclosure I to despatch No. 412 of October 20, 1931.

Provincial Regulations Governing the reopening of the
Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces and the Frontier Bank.

1. Withdrawal of Deposits.

Public Funds:

- (a) Public funds deposited in the past shall be detained for the time being.
- (b) New accounts shall be opened for public funds deposited hereafter.

Ordinary Funds:

- (a) Depositors indebted to the Bank shall have the amount of their indebtedness deducted from their deposits.
- (b) Deposits of other banks shall not be placed under this rule.
- (c) Deposits not exceeding \$5,000 shall be paid in full; on deposits above \$5,000 but not exceeding \$10,000, \$6,000 shall be paid; on each additional \$10,000 payment of \$1,000 shall be made; that is, on a \$20,000 deposit \$7,000 shall be paid and on a \$30,000 deposit \$8,000 may be withdrawn.
- (d) Depositors are permitted to withdraw funds once a week.
- (e) No restrictions are placed on the accounts of new depositors.

2. Loans.

- (a) Measures shall be taken to collect outstanding public loans.
- (b) Except in cases of extreme urgency, no new loans shall be made.
- (c) Sub-banks must obtain the approval of the head bank before making loans.
- (d) A gradual settlement and closing out of accounts with businesses associated with the banks must be effected.

3. Remittances.

- (a) Only firms and individuals, in the proper conduct of their businesses, may be permitted to make remittances.
- (b) Large remittances by sub-banks outside the South Manchuria Railway zone must be approved by the head banks.

4. Redemption of Banknotes.

- (a) A conversion office shall be established in the city. Each person is entitled to have fifty dollars converted into silver each day.
- (b) It is prohibited to take more than \$100. silver outside the district.

Persons infringing the regulations shall be liable to the punishment provided for in the past, and also to the severe Punishment to be decided upon by the Peace Preservation Committee.

The establishment of a new government and the taking over of the Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces and the Frontier Bank shall operate to cancel these regulations.

Enclosure II to Despatch No. 412 of October 20, 1931

Instruction from General Honjo, Commander in Chief of
the Japanese Forces in Manchuria, to Yuan Chin-kai,
Chairman of the Mukden Peace Preservation Committee.

Manchuria Daily News,
October 19, 1931.

- (1) The Japanese Army, in terms of Art. 43 of the Army Law, has permitted the reopening of the Northeastern Provincial Bank to render financing facility to the public.
- (2) In conduct of business, the Bank shall safeguard the interests of the Japanese Army in terms of Art. 53 of the Army Law, and also shall do everything to restore and preserve public order and people's living.
- (3) The Japanese Army, in order to accomplish the above mentioned object, shall supervise the Bank affairs by deputing a few Japanese supervisors to be engaged by the Bank as Adviser and Counsellors.
The Bank affairs may be supervised by other than those above mentioned at any time.
- (4) If deemed necessary, the Japanese Army shall suspend the whole or part of the Bank business at any time.
- (5) In case of the Local Peace and Order Committee preparing the names of the candidates for the chief officials of the Bank, the approval of the Japanese Army shall first be obtained.
- (6) The Bank shall not be permitted to do any dealing hostile to or with a hostile intention against the Japanese Army.
- (7) Concerning conduct of business by the Bank, any directions being given the Bank management by the Local Peace and Order Committee shall be made subject to the approval of the Japanese Army.
- (8) The Bank shall not permit any branch thereof to hold a large amount of cash money.
- (9) The above instructions shall also apply to the Frontier Bank.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

WP

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone.

Paris

Dated November 17, 1931

Rec'd 1:17 a.m. 18th

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

756, November 17, 7 p. m.

FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES.

793 04

Sweetser tells me that at this morning's private
meeting of the Council, minus Japanese and Chinese, it
was decided that Briand should see Japanese this after-
noon to try to find out precisely the importance they
attach to point five in connection with safety of
Japanese lives and property in Manchuria and exactly
what treaties in their judgment are pertinent to this
issue. He states Briand will also talk with Sze. Next
private meeting eleven o'clock tomorrow morning.

SHAW

JS

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 18 1931
Department of State
RMS

F/DEM

793.94/2728

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
NOV 27 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



AM REC'D
EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 1943.



Paris, November 10, 1931

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WE

793-94

FOR DISTRIBUTION - CHECK
To the Field
In U. S. A.

NOV 17 1931

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 13 1931
Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
NOV 27 1931
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

F/DEW 793.94/2729

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

In compliance with the Department's
instruction No. 293 of August 19, 1930, I
have the honor to transmit herewith clip-
pings from the French press, on the subject
of the Sino-Japanese conflict, covering the
period from November 5 to November 9, 1931,
inclusive.

Respectfully yours,

Williamson S. Howell, Jr.

Williamson S. Howell, Jr.,
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

Enclosures.....

NOV 20 1931

FILED

- 2 -

Enclosures: (single copy).

Clippings from the following newspapers:

November 5, 1931.

No. 1 - ACTUALITES

November 6, 1931.

No. 2 - L'AVENIR

3 - L'HUMANITE

4 - JOURNAL DES DEBATS

November 7, 1931.

No. 5 - L'ECHO DE PARIS

6 - FIGARO

7 - L'HUMANITE

8 - LE JOURNAL

9 - LE PETIT PARISIEN

10 - LE POPULAIRE

November 8, 1931.

No. 11 - L'ECHO DE PARIS

12 - EXCELSIOR

13 - LE JOURNAL

14 - LE TEMPS

November 9, 1931.

No. 15 - FIGARO

16 - LE POPULAIRE

16

In quintuplicate.

710.

RS/jdk

Act. 5

Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 1943
of November 10, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extrait from ACTUALITES, November 5, 1931.

Le Japon et les derniers agissements des Soviets

Actualités ——— 11/5

La situation, en Mandchourie, semble s'être encore compliquée, depuis la clôture de la session du Conseil de la Société de Nations. A ce moment, et bien que l'unanimité n'eût pas été obtenue par le projet de résolution du Conseil, les assurances données par le Japon qu'il n'avait pas de visées territoriales en Mandchourie et les négociations en cours entre Nankin et Canton, pour arriver à l'unification du gouvernement chinois, laissaient espérer qu'un jour prochain, la Chine et le Japon pourraient entrer en pourparlers directs pour le règlement du conflit.

Il semble, malheureusement, que la tentative de conciliation entre les deux gouvernements de Nankin et de Canton ne doive pas être suivie de résultat et l'on peut même se demander si elle n'a pas été amorcée, durant la session du Conseil de la S. D. N., dans le but de faire examiner les demandes chinoises avec plus de bienveillance.

D'autre part, la propagande antijaponaise ne paraît pas avoir diminué et le boycottage des produits japonais continue, puisque selon une information récente de Pékin, les douanes chinoises auraient annoncé qu'en douze jours, l'arrêt des importations japonaises a entraîné sur les droits d'entrée, une diminution de recettes de deux millions de dollars, correspondant à environ quarante millions de dollars de marchandises refusées.

Enfin, un élément nouveau est venu compliquer encore la situation. Le Japon s'est ému des mouvements de troupes soviétiques à la frontière de Mandchourie et l'ambassadeur de Tokio à Moscou a été chargé de faire une démarche à ce sujet, auprès du Commissaire du Peuple des Soviets pour les affaires étrangères. Celui-ci a naturellement protesté que son gouvernement n'avait aucune intention d'intervenir en Mandchourie. Mais certaines informations font état de l'appui donné par le gouvernement soviétique au général chinois Ma Chan Shan, à qui il aurait fourni des armes et des munitions. Or, il est symptomatique que c'est précisément le général Ma Chan Shan qui vient de recevoir du chef des troupes japonaises en Mandchourie un sévère avertissement à la suite de la destruction d'un pont sur la ligne de chemin de fer Tao-Non-Angan-Ki, pont qu'il avait promis de réparer et que les Japonais ont décidé de remettre en état par leurs propres moyens, en faisant remarquer que la ligne a été construite avec des fonds japonais pour lesquels il n'a été payé ni principal, ni intérêts.

Nul ne peut prévoir ce qui se passera d'ici au 16 novembre, date à laquelle le Conseil de la S. D. N. se réunira de nouveau pour examiner la situation. En attendant, il convient de suivre, avec une particulière attention, les agissements des Soviets en Mandchourie.

« Actualités »

Annex 6

Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 1943
of November 10, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'VNIR, November 6, 1931.

Le Japon et la Mandchourie

L'activité et la politique des Nippons, leurs buts et les résultats obtenus jusqu'ici

Quelles sont exactement les visées du Japon sur la Mandchourie ? Doit-on tenir pour véridiques les assertions du gouvernement de Tokio qui répète, chaque fois que l'occasion lui en est donnée, qu'il ne tient pas à occuper cette province, à l'annexer, mais qu'il y défend seulement ses intérêts économiques et le respect des traités ? A ces questions, un ouvrage qui vient de paraître, *La Mandchourie moderne*, de M. Henry W. Kinnery, donne une réponse pertinente. Nous en extrayons ce chapitre, qui expose en quelques pages les efforts accomplis par le Japon sur cette partie du continent asiatique et les raisons pour lesquelles il s'y maintient fermement :

La Mandchourie représente une vaste étendue capable de fournir au monde une immense quantité de produits agricoles, forestiers, miniers et autres. Par ce rapport au reste du monde, la Mandchourie est un nouveau pays. Il y a trente ans, il y avait un seul port ouvert, relativement peu important, New-Chwang, qui lui servait de débouché pour son commerce extérieur. Depuis cette époque, ce pays a été ouvert d'abord par l'activité russe, puis par celle du Japon. On a construit des chemins de fer qui ont permis d'utiliser cette étendue énorme de territoire merveilleusement fécond, mais improductif jusqu'ici. Pendant ces vingt dernières années, la population a augmenté probablement de 12 à 25 millions. Des industries modernes ont été établies sur une grande échelle là où les méthodes les plus primitives de production étaient employées, il y a quelques dizaines d'années, avec des moyens très limités. Et encore les ressources de la Mandchourie n'ont pas encore atteint la moitié de leur développement. Le progrès continue à grands pas. Des immigrants chinois arrivent à raison d'un million par an et ouvrent à l'exploitation de nouvelles terres. Les nouveaux chemins de fer introduisent des colonies dans les régions nouvelles. De nouvelles industries naissent. La production augmente et le nombre des habitants qui pourront tirer de Mandchourie leurs moyens d'existence et de prospérité, devient plus important d'une année à l'autre.

Dans cette contribution à la civilisation, la plus grande part pourra être revendiquée par le Japon, qui reprit, après le traité de Portsmouth en 1905, des entreprises russes, principalement militaires, partiellement développées en Mandchourie, et adopta une politique de développement économique, qui fit de la Mandchourie la région la plus prospère et la plus paisible de la Chine. La Compagnie du Chemin de fer Sud-Mandchourien a été le principal facteur de cette œuvre.

Pas conquête, mais développement. — L'activité et les visées des Japonais en Mandchourie ont toujours été l'objet de soupçons et de malentendus à l'étranger. Cependant on peut facilement comprendre le fond de la pensée du Japon en ce qui concerne ses intérêts et ses ambitions en Mandchourie. Il n'est nullement question de conquêtes, ni même de colonisation sur une grande échelle. Dès le début, le Japon décida de développer son avenir à l'aide, non pas de la guerre, mais de l'industrie et du commerce. Le Japon doit gagner l'argent dont il a besoin pour payer les aliments qu'il doit importer afin de nourrir ses habitants, dont le nombre augmente rapidement. Il s'applique au développement de l'industrie et du commerce. A cette époque où l'on se dispute ardemment le monde, il lui faut chercher des débouchés où il pourra jouir des avantages naturels les plus grands. Il les trouve surtout en Asie orientale, et la Mandchourie est logiquement un champ d'activité pour le Japon. Toute pensée de conquête doit être écartée pour de nombreuses raisons. D'abord ce serait en contradiction avec la politique japonaise, qui consiste à coopérer paisiblement avec les autres puissances, et le Japon en fit une démonstration significative à la Conférence de Washington. Et puis cela attirerait au Japon la haine de tout le reste de la Chine, ce qui lui ferait perdre ses débouchés les plus importants et les plus riches en promesses. A ce jeu n'en vaudrait pas la chandelle.

Enfin il a été incontestablement démontré que les Japonais, qui s'employaient comme fermiers, petits commerçants, etc., sur une petite échelle, ne pouvaient pas soutenir la concurrence des Chinois, dont le genre de vie est beaucoup plus humble et dont l'énergie, la

industries et du commerce ; cependant, ce profit est encore, en somme, très loin d'être proportionné aux capitaux placés et aux efforts déployés. Ceci dû largement au fait que le principal organe du Japon, la Compagnie du Chemin de fer Sud-Mandchourien (S.M.R.) se regarde comme une force civilisatrice beaucoup plus que comme une pure entreprise commerciale qui cherche à profiter, et consacre la grande partie de son gain aux œuvres de culture et de charité, construction et entretien de nombreuses écoles modernes, d'hôpitaux, etc., qui ne lui rapportent, ni directement ni indirectement, aucun profit. Cependant, l'importance de ces œuvres dépasse l'importance de ce qu'elles représentent intrinsèquement, car elles servent de précieuses intentions : intention d'initier les Chinois aux arts et aux méthodes de la civilisation moderne. Nous en trouvons un exemple dans ce fait que les Chinois manifestent une inclination de plus en plus prononcée à suivre les Japonais dans les progrès formidables de leurs villes, obtenus par leurs propres efforts. Si la Mandchourie continue à être tenue éloignée des guerres, comme elle l'a été, presque sans interruption depuis plus de vingt ans, il est sûr que cette région, qui fut considérée jusqu'à ces dernières années par le peuple chinois comme le pays de la sauvagerie et de la barbarie, deviendra pour les Chinois, sur une grande échelle, un exemple de ce qui peut être accompli dans les autres parties de la Chine, exemple qu'il sera bon de suivre.

SITUATION POLITIQUE

Ainsi, les visées du Japon en Mandchourie sont surtout économiques, mais les considérations stratégiques ne sont pas à négliger. Le Japon sait très bien que si jamais un danger le menaçait, ce danger se développerait le plus vraisemblablement sur le continent asiatique. Depuis des siècles le Japon est convaincu que les possibilités de danger ont leur source dans la position géographique de la Corée. C'est un poignard mis au cœur du Japon. La nécessité stratégique de tenir cette péninsule à l'abri du danger d'être occupée par des adversaires, est indiscutable. Ainsi donc, il est de l'intérêt du Japon, pour des raisons économiques autant que militaires, que la Mandchourie demeure en paix et ne soit pas troublée dans les mains des Chinois. Les mains de quels Chinois ? Cela importe peu, tant qu'elles seront assez puissantes pour maintenir la paix et l'ordre. L'opinion qui prévalut à l'étranger et d'après laquelle le Maréchal Tehang Tso-Lin est un pantin entre les mains du Japon ne peut que faire rire. Il y a cependant là quelque chose d'un peu douloureux, et pour le généralissime de Moukden et pour les Japonais. L'assistance que celui-ci a prêtée au Japon comme chef de la cavalerie irrégulière pendant la guerre russo-japonaise a été appréciée. Il a été, d'ailleurs, assez puissant pour éloigner la guerre des trois provinces de l'Est et il a ainsi fait tout ce qui était faisable pour y développer l'industrie, chose impossible dans une grande partie de la Chine proprement dite, troublée par les guerres. Cependant le Gouvernement Mandchourien n'a prêté au Japon aucune chose pour laquelle il n'ait pas été généreusement, souvent trop généreusement payé. Un esprit nationaliste, sain et louable, a été développé, qui pousse les chefs, en Mandchourie, à désirer entreprendre eux-mêmes des œuvres de progrès, partout où la chose est possible.

En fait, bien loin de « prendre les ordres » du Japon, le Gouvernement Mandchourien contrecarre souvent la réalisation des ambitions japonaises, par exemple, en refusant aux Japonais l'autorisation de louer du terrain, bien que ce privilège ait été assuré par le traité. Cependant il entre dans la politique japonaise de demeurer dans les termes d'une coopération amicale avec ceux qui gouvernent la Mandchourie, et de les assister autant que faire se peut, sans aller contre le principe de non-intervention dans les affaires intérieures de la Chine. Un gouvernement puissant et prévoyant en Mandchourie est ce qu'il y a de plus intéressant pour le Japon. La partie de la Mandchourie que le Japon contrôle actuellement — territoire concédé, 3.380 kilomètres carrés ; la zone du chemin de fer, 260 kilomètres carrés environ — est infiniment petite quand on fait comparaison avec les 993.200 kilomètres carrés environ que les trois provinces de l'Est comprennent. La force militaire japonaise en Mandchourie se réduit à quelque 7.500 hommes, tandis que le Japon a le droit,

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Ainsi donc le Japon doit chercher ses profits en Mandchourie dans l'assistance aux Chinois, aidant ceux-ci à exploiter la paix et leur montrant la voie. C'est ce que le Japon a fait et fait encore en construisant des chemins de fer, en enseignant aux Chinois les meilleures méthodes d'agriculture, en cherchant de nouveaux marchés et en augmentant par de nouveaux procédés l'utilité et la valeur des produits. En conséquence, la Mandchourie devient rapidement un grand dépôt des matières premières dont le Japon a besoin pour ses industries chez lui, en même temps qu'elle devient un grand débouché pour les marchandises fabriquées au Japon ; car la capacité d'achat en Mandchourie augmente avec la population et sa prospérité.

UNE FORCE CIVILISATRICE

A un certain degré, le Japon a profité directement des chemins de fer, des mines, des

usines, etc. Mandchourie. Ainsi donc, il est de l'intérêt du Japon, pour des raisons économiques autant que militaires, que la Mandchourie demeure en paix et ne soit pas troublée dans les mains des Chinois. Les mains de quels Chinois ? Cela impose peu, tant qu'elles seront assez puissantes pour maintenir la paix et l'ordre. L'opinion qui prévalut à l'étranger et d'après laquelle le Maréchal Tchang Tso-Lin est un pantin entre les mains du Japon ne peut que faire rire. Il y a cependant là quelque chose d'un peu douloureux, et pour le généralissime de Moukden et pour les Japonais. L'assistance que celui-ci a prêtée au Japon comme chef de la cavalerie irrégulière pendant la guerre russo-japonaise a été appréciée. Il a été, d'ailleurs, assez puissant pour éloigner la guerre des trois provinces de l'Est et il a ainsi fait tout ce qui était faisable pour y développer l'industrie, chose impossible dans une grande partie de la Chine proprement dite, troublée par les guerres. Cependant le Gouvernement Mandchourien n'a prêté au Japon aucune chose pour laquelle il n'ait pas été généreusement, souvent trop généreusement payé. Un esprit nationaliste, sain et louable, a été développé, qui pousse les chefs, en Mandchourie, à désirer entreprendre eux-mêmes des œuvres de progrès, partout où la chose est possible.

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Le développement des ressources de la Mandchourie, accompagné d'une augmentation de sa population, qui deviendra prospère en arrachant de riches produits au sol, très productifs jusqu'ici, tel est le but du Japon en Mandchourie. Cela lui donnera des matières brutes pour ses usines, et les puissantes hordes d'immigrants de Shantung et de Chilili qui s'établissent tous les ans comme pionniers en Mandchourie, s'élevant ainsi de la situation de coolies pauvres à celle de fermiers prospères, augmentent le nombre des acheteurs mondiaux, ce dont profitent, non seulement le Ja-

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75 *

mir.

pon, mais encore toutes les nations commerciales. Il y a déjà un commencement prometteur. Les commerçants de diverses nations sont au travail, et profitent des grands travaux de la civilisation qui sont en cours, travaux pour lesquels le Japon et son instrument principal, la Compagnie du Chemin de fer Sud-Mandchourien, peuvent à juste titre réclamer la plus grande mesure de crédit.

Hum. 6

Enclosure No. 3 to Despatch No. 1943
of November 10, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'HUMANITE, November 6, 1931.

Alerte pour la défense de l'U. R. S. S.

UN APPEL DU COMITÉ CENTRAL DU PARTI COMMUNISTE FRANÇAIS

Travailleurs de France,

Les dangers de guerre impérialiste s'accroissent avec une extrême rapidité. En Mandchourie, les troupes japonaises, après avoir tué des milliers de travailleurs chinois, après avoir bombardé villes et villages, se dirigent vers les positions stratégiques situées dans les régions frontalières de l'U.R.S.S.

L'U.R.S.S., la révolution chinoise et le mouvement soviétique en Chine, représentant déjà près de 100 millions de travailleurs, sont directement visés par l'impérialisme nippon à travers la conquête de la Mandchourie dont il veut s'approprier les richesses.

La Société des Nations, avec la collaboration des impérialistes américains, laisse les mains libres aux impérialistes japonais. Leurs opérations militaires sont rendues possibles et favorisées par les coupeurs de têtes du Kuomintang, valets de l'impérialisme, dont toute l'attitude consiste à créer des illusions autour de la S.D.N. en même temps qu'ils répriment avec violence le mouvement populaire chinois dirigé contre l'impérialisme japonais envahisseur.

L'impérialisme français, dont le représentant à Genève, Briand, a présidé aux manœuvres pro-japonaises de la S.D.N., appuie le gouvernement impérialiste du Japon. Sentant ses positions ébranlées en Indochine, l'impérialisme français est au premier rangs dans la lutte contre le mouvement révolutionnaire en Extrême-Orient. Il considère que « le sort du bolchevisme peut se jouer dans les plaines de la Sibérie ».

Des bateaux de guerre, des avions sont envoyés en Extrême-Orient. La menace impérialiste contre l'Union soviétique devient de plus en plus grande. Et en même temps, les calomnies contre l'U.R.S.S. se multiplient. La politique du fil de fer barbelé de Clemenceau est en train de recommencer. Le blocus économique et financier de l'Union soviétique est à l'ordre du jour dans les milieux impérialistes.

Jouant son rôle dans le concert antisoviétique, la II^e Internationale vote une résolution hypocrite. Mais, en même temps, son président, Vandervelde, justifie l'attitude du Japon ; Renaudel accuse l'Union soviétique de vouloir annexer la Mandchourie, et le Populaire, organe du parti socialiste, lance de ve-

nimeuses attaques contre le pouvoir soviétique.

Alerte ! Un monde d'ennemis entoure le pays où se construit victorieusement le socialisme. Partout la guerre se prépare contre lui.

En même temps qu'il envoie des forces militaires en Chine, l'impérialisme français prépare ses pays vassaux à l'attaque antisoviétique, vidant les poches des travailleurs, organisant des emprunts d'escroquerie pour fournir de l'argent aux gouvernements de Varsovie, de Bucarest, de Belgrade, cependant que les ouvriers sont réduits à la misère et au chômage.

Le Parti communiste dénonce la politique impérialiste du Japon et de la Société des Nations. Il accuse l'impérialisme français d'organiser l'écrasement de l'Union soviétique, patrie des travailleurs du monde entier et de la révolution chinoise. Il accuse le parti socialiste de soutenir cette politique criminelle.

Travailleurs de France,

Notre responsabilité est grande. Nous avons en face de nous l'impérialisme le plus puissant et le plus dangereux. Contre lui, mobilisons toutes nos forces.

Et vous, ouvriers socialistes qui, nombreux, avez proclamé votre volonté de défendre l'Union soviétique, vous avez le devoir de former, avec les ouvriers communistes, avec les ouvriers inorganisés, le front unique de classe, s'opposant au front unique impérialiste allant jusqu'à votre parti.

Tous ensemble, dressons-nous pour imposer le rappel de l'escadre de Chine, le rappel des marins et des soldats qui sont là-bas.

Tous ensemble dressons-nous contre l'impérialisme criminel.

Que partout des meetings, des manifestations s'organisent. Que partout la protestation ouvrière se fasse entendre contre la politique de misère et de guerre de l'impérialisme.

Permettre à nos ennemis de classe de diminuer les salaires et de laisser les chômeurs dans le dénuement, c'est leur donner davantage de moyens pour préparer la guerre impérialiste.

Debout partout pour faire reculer l'offensive impérialiste. En avant pour la défense de l'Union soviétique et de la révolution chinoise. En avant contre les dangers de guerre impérialiste et pour la paix.

Le Comité central du P. C. F.

Subato 6

Enclosure No. 4 to Despatch No. 1943
of November 10, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from JOURNAL DES DEBATS, November 6, 1931.

LA S. D. N. ET LE JAPON

Le Conseil de la S. D. N. doit se réunir le 16 novembre pour s'occuper des affaires de Mandchourie. Si la situation ne s'est pas modifiée d'ici là, son embarras sera aussi grand qu'au mois d'octobre. M. Briand, préoccupé, cela se conçoit, de cette prochaine session, a cherché à aplanir les voies en adressant au Japon une note dans laquelle il déclare que quatre des revendications que ce pays a présentées ont reçu satisfaction, grâce à des engagements pris par la Chine, « engagements qui sont, dit-il, conformes aux principes fondamentaux du Japon ». Il constate notamment que le gouvernement de Nankin a donné des assurances au sujet de la répudiation de toute politique agressive, de l'abandon de la campagne antijaponaise (entrave à la liberté du commerce et excitation à la haine) et de la sécurité des ressortissants japonais. Ainsi, affirme-t-il, le gouvernement de Tokio n'a plus de motifs légitimes de plainte et il doit retirer ses troupes.

Le Japon n'admettra probablement pas ce point de vue, qui lui semblera un peu théorique. Quelles que soient les réserves et les critiques qu'on puisse légitimement faire à propos de son action brusquée, il est équitable de reconnaître qu'il a toutes sortes de raisons très sérieuses pour justifier sa méfiance à l'égard de la Chine. Celle-ci, qui est dans un état d'anarchie permanente, peut donner toutes les assurances du monde; il est certain qu'elle est incapable de tenir ses engagements et, d'autre part, la S. D. N. l'est sans aucun doute tout autant de garantir le maintien d'un ordre, même relatif, dans une région aussi troublée.

Mais, en réalité, le véritable conflit est relatif au respect des droits que les traités, entre autres celui de 1915, ont reconnus au Japon. Si celui-ci est intervenu, c'est avant tout parce qu'il a considéré que la Chine cherchait par tous les moyens à les abolir. C'est pourquoi le cinquième des « points fondamentaux » concerne « le respect des droits concédés au Japon en Mandchourie par les traités ». M. Briand suggère l'idée d'un recours à l'arbitrage à ce sujet. Le Japon n'y consentira certainement pas. On comprend assez bien son attitude. Sur quoi porterait l'arbitrage? Probablement, en définitive, sur la validité des traités. C'est ce que désire la Chine et ce que ne veut pas le Japon. Contrairement à ce que croient beaucoup de gens, l'arbitrage n'est pas une procédure applicable dans tous les cas, car il est pratiqué dans des conditions qui sont loin d'être toujours équitables. Il y a des questions d'ordre vital qu'aucun pays ne consentira jamais à lui soumettre.

L'erreur, quand on étudie ces affaires d'Extrême-Orient, est de les traiter comme si l'on se trouvait en présence de conflits analogues à ceux qui peuvent se produire entre des Etats occidentaux. (D'ailleurs,

même pour ceux-ci, la procédure internationale n'est pas au point et est loin de fournir les garanties nécessaires.) Ce n'est pas sans motifs que les puissances européennes ont encore des troupes en Chine, à Changhaï et même à Pékin. Leur exemple peut évidemment être invoqué par le Japon, sinon juridiquement, du moins au point de vue politique.

Il est possible qu'un beau jour tout finisse par s'arranger tout à coup; ces événements se passent en Extrême-Orient, où la politique se livre à des jeux plus subtils encore qu'en Occident. Cependant le conflit peut tout aussi bien s'éterniser. Faire à ce sujet des prévisions est parfaitement vain. Mais même si aucune solution n'était trouvée dans un avenir prochain, il n'en résulterait pas nécessairement des complications graves. La possibilité d'un heurt entre les Soviets et le Japon inquiète bien des gens, et cela est fort naturel, les bolchéviks ayant repris en Extrême-Orient la politique russe traditionnelle en la compliquant par des intrigues révolutionnaires. Si, comme on le prétendait, les Japonais avaient occupé Tsitsikar, une réaction des Soviets aurait été probable, car on toucherait ainsi au chemin de fer de l'Est chinois, que les Russes contrôlent. Mais cette occupation, qui serait une grosse imprudence de la part des Japonais, est démentie. Certes les Soviets et le Japon se surveillent, mais jusqu'ici rien ne fait prévoir une lutte entre eux. Il semble pour l'instant qu'ils aient, pour des raisons diverses, intérêt à se ménager.

Il reste à envisager l'attitude des Etats-Unis, sur lesquels le Conseil de la S. D. N. avait beaucoup compté. Elle a été récemment définie par M. Castle, secrétaire d'Etat adjoint. M. Castle a déclaré que l'Amérique désapprouverait « l'occupation permanente de la Mandchourie » par le Japon, « mais qu'elle n'avait pas endossé la requête de la S. D. N. demandant au Japon d'évacuer avant le 16 novembre les positions qu'il occupe en Mandchourie ». Si donc, le 16 novembre, le Conseil de la S. D. N. croyait devoir adresser une sorte d'ultimatum au Japon, il risquerait de n'être pas suivi par les Etats-Unis. On ne voit pas très bien actuellement ce qu'il pourra faire. M. Briand et ses collègues n'en savent apparemment rien eux-mêmes. La situation dans laquelle ils se sont placés n'est pas commode.

PIERRE BERNUS.

Enclosure No. 5 to Despatch No. 1943
of November 10, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ECHO DE PARIS, November 7, 1931.

LA PACIFICATION DE LA MANDCHOURIE PAR LE JAPON

« Le Japon a su faire de la Mandchourie une oasis florissante au milieu du désert que la Chine est devenue. »

Cette phrase, citée par le *Times* et le *Daily Mail*, nous paraît résumer admirablement la situation.

C'est ce que nous chercherons à expliquer par un examen très simple, très élémentaire mais exact de la question historique et géographique.


La Mandchourie comprend trois provinces, du fleuve Amour à la Mer Jaune, qui comptent 23 millions d'habitants. Les Mandchous prirent Pékin en 1644 et y régnerent jusqu'en 1912. Aristocratie guerrière, la race mandchoue formait la garde des empereurs et, par les guerres, fut peu à peu dé-

dans leurs îles, avant fortune faite.

Ce que le Japon désire, ce sont des acheteurs qu'il recrute parmi les fermiers chinois devenus prospères, et des matières premières pour ses usines.

Il veut l'ordre, mais non la conquête. Et c'est parce qu'il veut l'ordre, que des millions de pauvres Chinois, épouvantés, ont abandonné l'autel des ancêtres, la chaumière, pour fuir loin des seigneurs et loin des bourreaux sadiques, vers le seul coin de leur patrie où l'on peut travailler honnêtement.

Dans ces plaines grisâtres et fécondes où le paysan japonais regrette ses cerisiers fleuris et ses coteaux verdoyants, la compagnie du chemin de fer sud mandchou-



Les chemins de fer japonais sont indiqués en double trait ; les chemins de fer chinois en trait simple.

timée. Les Mandchous avaient interdit jalousement aux Chinois l'entrée de leur territoire. Mais, peu à peu, cette défense, abrogée d'ailleurs en 1905, fut tournée. Aujourd'hui, 90 0/0 des habitants de la Mandchourie sont Chinois, grâce au Japon, en partie, comme nous allons le voir.

En 1894, la guerre éclata entre la Chine et le Japon. La Chine fut écrasée et le traité de Shimonoseki céda au Japon le sud de la Mandchourie entre l'embouchure du Yalu et New-Chwang. Le Japon abandonna presque aussitôt sa conquête à la suite d'une démarche amicale faite par la Russie, l'Allemagne et la France. Ce trait de prudence va se répéter plusieurs fois. C'est qu'en effet le Japon ne désire pas conquérir; il n'y a aucun intérêt : il veut administrer et commercer.

Survint en 1905 la guerre russo-japonaise. La Russie céda au Japon à Portsmouth (New-Hampshire) ses droits sur la péninsule de Liaolung et sur le chemin de fer, jusqu'à Kwangchangtsu. La Chine ratifia le traité, en étendant les droits du Japon au chemin de fer de Moukden-Antoung, construit pendant la guerre.

En 1915, un nouveau traité sino-

rien a construit une ligne allant de Dairen à Changchoune, longue de 700 kilomètres, une ligne de Moukden à Antoung, longue de 250 kilomètres, et quelques autres tronçons plus courts.

Les lignes chinoises sont celles de Ssipingkai à Taonan, de Taonan à Tsitsihar et de Kirin à Changchoune.

Au tour de son chemin de fer principal, le Japon a installé des usines d'électricité, des usines à gaz, des hôtels modernes à Dairen, Port - Arthur, Changchoune et Moukden. Village de pêcheurs il y a cinquante ans, Dairen compte 250,000 habitants aujourd'hui, dont cent mille Japonais environ, et son port manipule quinze millions de tonnes.

Quant au revenu de l'agriculture mandchourienne, il s'élevait, en 1927 à un milliard de yens.

CHARLES BONNEFON.

Inclosure No. 5 to Despatch No. 1943
of November 10, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ECHO DE PARIS, November 7, 1931.

LA PACIFICATION DE LA MANDCHOURIE PAR LE JAPON

« Le Japon a su faire de la Mandchourie une oasis florissante au milieu du désert que la Chine est devenue. »

Cette phrase, citée par le *Times* et le *Daily Mail*, nous paraît résumer admirablement la situation.

C'est ce que nous chercherons à expliquer par un examen très simple.

La Mandchourie, mais avant l'entrée de leur territoire. Mais, peu à peu, cette défense, abrogée d'ailleurs en 1905, fut tournée. Aujourd'hui, 90 0/0 des habitants de la Mandchourie sont Chinois, grâce au Japon, en partie, comme nous allons le voir.

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En 1915, un nouveau traité sino-japonais fut signé, connu sous le nom des vingt et une demandes. Le département d'Etat américain approuva, après un examen minutieux, seize de ces demandes concernant la Mandchourie du sud et même le Chantoung, que le Japon rétrocéda assez cordialement à la Chine, à la Conférence de Washington.

En 1925, à la suite d'une intervention du Japon en faveur de Tchang-Tso-Lin, le généralissime chinois, quelques concessions nouvelles économiques lui furent accordées par la Chine.

Cette modération et cette prudence japonaises s'expliquent par le fait que le Japon veut gagner de l'argent en Mandchourie mais non pas la coloniser. Il y a favorisé l'entrée de dix millions de Chinois qui font prospérer ses chemins de fer, mais dans les trois mille kilomètres carrés qu'il contrôle sur un million de kilomètres carrés et dans les 260 kilomètres carrés qui sont la zone des chemins de fer, le nombre des paysans japonais ne dépasse pas deux cent mille.

Il leur faut leur bain chaud tous les jours. C'est là une des principales raisons de leur nombre assez restreint. D'une propreté méticuleuse, ils n'ont pas le goût de lutter avec les coolies chinois qui se contentent de peu. Enfin, l'instruction de leurs enfants les préoccupe et les fait rentrer souvent

dans leurs îles, avant fortune faite.

Ce que le Japon désire, ce sont des acheteurs qu'il recrute parmi les fermiers chinois devenus prospères, et des matières premières pour ses usines.

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CHARLES BONNEFON.

Pendant des années, le Japon avait réussi à préserver de la peste universelle cette « oasis » de la Chine, en écartant tout conflit armé de la zone du chemin de fer, large de dix kilomètres. Mais, depuis quelques mois, les brigands qui ne trouvaient plus rien à piller dans la Chine épuisée, exsangue, s'étaient mis comme les poux dans la Mandchourie et la ruinaient. Comme les soldats japonais les gênaient dans leurs dévastations, ces bandits faisaient sauter leurs lignes de chemin de fer. Toute l'œuvre civilisatrice était menacée à sa base. Il n'y avait plus qu'à s'en aller ou à réprimer le désordre.

Aujourd'hui encore, deux ou trois généraux chinois se battent en Mandchourie, sous les yeux ironiques des Japonais. Mais ici, nous pateaugeons dans l'obscur. En Chine, les généraux, les brigands et les agents des Soviets sont interchangeable. C'est une question de costume.

Je n'en donnerai qu'une preuve.

Ce fameux pont de Tsitsihar qui a sauté et qui traverse en son milieu la ligne de chemin de fer *Est-Chinois*, a été construit par la Chine malgré les plus violentes protestations des Soviets.

Qui donc l'a fait sauter ? C'est facile à deviner. Les Japonais, qui sont en train de le réparer avec un bataillon de cinq cents hommes appuyé par de l'artillerie de campagne, assurent que, dès que l'opération sera terminée, ils se replieront sur Taonan.

Mais les généraux chinois Ma et Chang Hai Feng n'ont pas exécuté leur promesse de se retirer à six milles de la rivière Nonni et ont tenu sous leur feu le pont de Tsitsihar qui n'a pas pu être réparé.

Ces détails de dernière heure n'ont pas une grande importance, si on les compare aux conséquences très graves que pourraient entraîner des conflits diplomatiques de nature à encourager l'hostilité latente des communistes russes et leur action louche.

Nous ne voyons pas du tout, avec Claude Farrère, le brave sénateur Kellogg s'enrôlant, pour défendre son pacte, dans une fabrique d'obus à gaz et de nappes asphyxiantes. Mais, vraiment, un examen sérieux, posé, attentif de ces questions, nous incite à croire qu'on crée le danger en le dramatisant; que vouloir cingler l'amour-propre japonais à coups de cravache, alors que le Japon *désire* se retirer le plus tôt possible de l'aventure parce qu'il n'a aucun intérêt à la prolonger; c'est jouer un rôle de pédant dont les bévues sont coûteuses; et que l'opinion publique dont on parle tant comprend mal ces dissertations à propos d'une expédition de police, organisée en vertu des traités, ou au nom du droit des gens, par quelques milliers de gendarmes-gardes-barrières, dans un Etat qui tombe en loques chez un peuple martyrisé par ses généraux et par ses bandits et dont on ne sait même pas quel est le gouvernement légitime.

Quelle fière chandelle devrait la Chine au Japon, s'il pouvait la débarrasser de ses parasites et la ramener à la santé et à l'ordre, en respectant, comme il l'a promis, son intégrité ! Que l'on puisse, au nom de l'humanité ou d'une vague utopie, prendre la défense d'un régime féodal abject qui a coûté la mort de dix millions d'hommes, voilà qui dépasse mon entendement.

C'est tout un peuple sur la claie, et à bout de forces tout un peuple de pauvres gens déchirés par une meute et sous la coupe de soudards dégénérés, qui crie son désir d'être libéré, après vingt ans d'une torture incessante.

CHARLES BONNEFON.

FIG. 7

Enclosure No. 6 to Despatch No. 1943
of November 10, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from FIG. RO, November 7, 1931.

M. Briand à Moukden



Jusqu'ici, quand M. Briand faisait entendre son cri de paix : « Arrière les canons, les fusils, les mitrailleuses ! », l'écho se contentait de répondre : « En avant, la brigade des ovations spontanées ! » L'écho devient brutal sans cesser d'être ironique. A la dernière homélie de M. Briand, il réplique par le son du canon.

A peine la lettre adressée par notre ministre des affaires étrangères, en sa qualité de président du Conseil de la S. D. N., au Japon pour l'inviter à évacuer la Mandchourie, était-elle publiée que les télégrammes de Moukden signalent un violent combat entre troupes chinoises et japonaises, expriment la crainte que cet incident n'entraîne des complications graves, d'autant plus que les Japonais ont le sentiment que les Chinois sont soutenus financièrement par les Soviets, comme ils le sont moralement, si l'on peut dire.

En ce cas, les Soviets étant eux-mêmes soutenus financièrement par Berlin qui l'est par Londres, Washington et Paris, « le devoir de l'homme blanc », comme disait Kipling, serait oublié, ou aurait changé de sens. Il consisterait désormais à payer tribut à l'homme jaune, et à lui fournir des armes pour massacrer les Européens. Si la S. D. N., qui se réunit le 16 novembre pour s'occuper des affaires de Mandchourie, encourage dans cette voie les Puissances civilisées, elle sera fidèle à elle-même. Non seulement elle n'a rien fait ni tenté pour empêcher la contrebande des armes en Chine, mais elle y a envoyé des enquêteurs qui en sont revenus dupes ou complices du gouvernement de Nankin. La Chine n'est-elle pas une grande démocratie ? Dès lors, elle représente le bien en face du Japon qui, étant un empire, incarne le mal. La collusion de Moscou et de Nankin ne peut qu'améliorer la position de la Chine sur les bords du lac de Genève où abondent les sirènes rouges. La S. D. N. communique aussi avec la Chine dans leur égale impuissance, notamment dans leur impuissance à faire respecter les traités. La Chine est une Société des nations sans pouvoir exécutif, comme l'autre est elle-même une Chine sans autre souci que de se sauver la face.

Le zèle sinophile est donc consubstantiel à l'institut genevois. Les sinologues s'étonnent qu'il anime également M. Briand. C'est que les sinologues sont mauvais psychologues ou ignorent la psychologie de M. Briand. Il est doublement sinophile : comme genevois et comme mystagogue. Le mythe d'une grande démocratie jaune voile à ses yeux toutes les réalités de l'Extrême-Orient. Sinon, il faudrait appeler d'un autre nom la démence qui lui a inspiré l'initiative de faire intervenir les Etats-Unis dans le conflit sino-japonais.

M. Briand qui, vivant dans l'avenir et dans les espaces stellaires, se vante de ne connaître ni l'histoire ni la géographie de notre planète, ignore sans doute l'existence de l'Indochine. Il ignore que l'autorité de la France sur cette magnifique colonie ne peut se maintenir que par des moyens diplomatiques, que l'amitié du Japon est le premier de ces moyens, que nous devons être d'autant plus attentifs à la ménager qu'elle ne nous est plus assurée par l'Entente cordiale et l'ex-alliance anglo-japonaise, enfin que rien ne risque autant de nous l'aliéner que son attitude actuelle à Genève. Mais il ignore aussi que tout devait le dissuader de s'adresser aux Etats-Unis qui ne font pas partie de la S. D. N., qui sont en conflit latent avec le Japon en Extrême-Orient et qui, au surplus, ont toujours traité le Mexique comme le Japon traite la Chine.

M. Briand ignore aussi que le rapport actuel des forces dans le monde donne au Japon une importance considérable en Europe et le solidarise avec la France et avec la cause de la paix générale. Seul, en effet, le Japon est à même de neutraliser la Russie en Europe, où son programme de révolution universelle et d'agression contre la Pologne avec la complicité de Berlin constitue le plus grave risque de guerre. Le Japon est dans le dos des Soviets une ventouse qui les incite à le tourner à l'Europe et les décongestionne là où un « coup de sang » les entraînerait à faire couler le nôtre.

Une fois de plus, avec le mot de conciliation à la bouche, M. Briand a été sur le plan international, comme sur le plan national, le plus grand commun diviseur. Son œuvre est « magnifique », ainsi que le lui a télégraphié M. Kellogg. Elle est vaste : il a compromis à la fois nos intérêts continentaux et nos intérêts coloniaux, tout en affaiblissant les garanties de la paix sur toute l'étendue du globe. Sa politique est vraiment mondiale.

Les hostilités en Mandchourie

Figure ——— 11/7

Les dépêches sur la situation en Mandchourie sont des plus contradictoires, selon qu'elles viennent de Tokio ou de Moukden. Un seul fait demeure certain, c'est que les soldats chinois et japonais sont encore aux prises pour la possession du pont stratégique sur la rivière Nonni.

Du côté chinois, les pertes s'élèveraient déjà à deux cents tués, et du côté japonais on compterait cent trente morts. Le nombre des blessés est encore inconnu. Il semble que pour l'instant les forces japonaises soient débordées par les troupes chinoises, qui auraient réussi à encercler une avant-garde japonaise.

Le commandant des forces japonaises a envoyé des renforts sur les lieux, mais on ne pense pas que les effectifs japonais soient assez élevés pour soutenir les attaques répétées des contingents chinois.

On annonce, d'autre part, que Chinois et Japonais sont aux prises dans la région de Ipuchici; le combat tournerait à l'avantage des forces chinoises.

[**]

Depuis la dernière réunion du Conseil de la Société des Nations, la situation en Mandchourie n'a fait, on le voit, qu'empirer. La prochaine session reste prévue pour le 16 de ce mois. M. Briand vient de prier le secrétaire général de la Société des Nations de demander aux membres du Conseil s'ils ne verraient pas d'inconvénient à ce que la réunion eût lieu à Paris. Notre ministre des affaires étrangères déclare qu'il lui serait difficile de s'absenter au moment de la reprise des travaux parlementaires. Il est probable que la proposition de M. Briand sera acceptée.

Les Etats-Unis commencent à être fortement émus par les événements de Mandchourie et l'impuissance de la Société des Nations. Une dépêche officieuse de Washington fait connaître que le gouvernement américain ne paraît pas disposé à considérer avec indifférence la violation du pacté Briand-Kellogg de renonciation à la guerre. Que feront les Etats-Unis? Et que fera Moscou dans le cas où la situation se compliquerait? Ce sont là autant de questions auxquelles il est difficile de répondre, mais qui montrent à quel point la situation en Mandchourie est devenue inquiétante et combien vains ont été les efforts de la Société des Nations.

LA MENACE CONTRE L'U. R. S. S.

La bataille fait rage en Mandchourie aux abords de Tsitsikar

**La Pravda dénonce
les provocateurs impérialistes
de la presse française**



Le général MINAMI
ministre de la Guerre japonais

**« Bas les masques ! Provocateurs
antisoviétiques ! »**

C'est sous ce titre que la *Pravda* de jeudi publie en editorial un vigoureux acte d'accusation contre les fauteurs de guerre impérialistes.

« Le rapt impérialiste, écrit la *Pravda* se poursuit en Mandchourie d'après des plans bien préparés.

Un territoire immense a été occupé. Le trésor du fisc, les recettes et même les économies de la population ont été saisis par les conquérants japonais. Toute la vie économique de la Mandchourie est complètement désorganisée. Les conquérants ruinent les chemins de fer chinois parce qu'ils font la concurrence aux lignes japonaises. La moindre protestation des Chinois contre ces mesures coercitives est réprimée par la plus cruelle violence.

La lutte pour la Mandchourie est inséparable de la lutte des impérialistes pour l'hégémonie dans le Pacifique, et pour la préparation d'un nouveau carnage mondial. C'est ce qui explique l'intérêt de l'impérialisme français pour le Pacifique.

Les visées japonaises

Les impérialistes japonais n'aspirent pas seulement à un « Pan-Japon » mais à un « plus grand Japon » qui engloberait les Iles Philippines, l'archipel malais, les Iles de Tahiti, Samoa et toute l'Australie.

Dans le rapport de l'ancien président du conseil, baron Tanaka, cet éminent inspirateur de l'impérialisme nippon, il est dit entre autres :

« ...Les trois provinces orientales constituent politiquement une tâche incomplète en Extrême-Orient. Le Japon doit vaincre — dans l'intérêt même de son auto-défense — ses difficultés en Asie Orientale et doit réaliser sa politique par le fer et le sang. Il heurtera cependant les Etats-Unis. Si nous voulons contrôler en avenir la Chine, nous devons d'abord abattre les Etats-Unis. Et pour conquérir la Chine nous devons d'abord conquérir la Mandchourie et la Mongolie. »

C'est la tâche de la II^e Internationale de dissimuler devant le prolétariat international ce qui se passe en Extrême-Orient et surtout les intentions de l'impérialisme nippon. Si la guerre entre les impérialistes n'a pas encore commencé, c'est parce que les conditions nécessaires en première ligne, les conditions de la politique intérieure : l'asservissement du prolétariat à la manière fasciste, l'oppression du mouvement communiste, ne sont pas encore réalisées. D'autre part, parce que l'Union Soviétique poursuit une politique pacifique et démasque les impérialistes.

Mais les impérialistes japonais ont besoin d'une nouvelle « justification » pour l'extension de la zone d'occupation. Ils la trouvent dans le « péril rouge » qui les menace soi-disant du Nord. Cette version est beaucoup plus commode parce qu'elle permet à l'impérialisme nippon d'espérer le soutien et la sympathie des impérialistes de tous les pays.

L'impérialisme japonais essaye de se dresser comme « gardien de la paix et de l'ordre » en Extrême-Orient, après qu'il a créé lui-même un désordre sanglant. Il essaye de se dresser au moyen d'un mandat des « nations de l'ordre », comme l'écrivait le plume de la presse bourgeoise française, M. Pertinax. Le « Grand-Japon » joue le rôle du gendarme de l'Extrême-Orient.

Démasqués

La presse mondiale réactionnaire, en première ligne la presse française, reprend avec avidité la provocation de la presse japonaise contre l'Union Soviétique. Le rôle principal dans ce jeu revient à l'organe favorisé de l'oligarchie financière et des réactionnaires français, au *Temps* à Paris. Ce journal qui vante les militaristes français et dont les rédacteurs ont des millions de vies humaines tombées dans la guerre mondiale sur la conscience, ce journal, qui peut être considéré comme l'innombrable chenil des chiens qui aboient contre l'Union Soviétique, poursuit chaque jour une excitation furieuse contre l'U. S. et essaye de lui attribuer la faute pour ces événements provoqués par l'impérialisme japonais avec le soutien direct de l'impérialisme français et de la presse bourgeoise française.

1 1804

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Canailles

Nous ne savons pas combien coûte chaque ligne consacrée à l'excitation antisoviétique dans les éditoriaux du *Temps*, mais nous savons très bien que l'unique but que ces bandits littéraires poursuivent, c'est la création d'un réseau de provocations, guerrières autour de l'Union soviétique.

Camille Aymard, un triste personnage dont la place est en prison, rédige le plus grand journal policier parisien la *Liberté*. Il écrit ces jour-ci entre autres : « La puissance soviétique peut être facilement frappée en Sibérie. Si l'Europe comprend son devoir vis-à-vis de la civilisation, les steppes infinies de Sibérie peuvent devenir bientôt le camp de guerre où périra le bolchevisme ».

Le journal policier est secondé par la feuille social-fasciste le *Populaire*. « Sur l'attitude du gouvernement soviétique — écrit cette feuille — on ne sait rien. Il garde depuis le commencement du conflit en Mandchourie un silence mystérieux.

La II^e Internationale est devenue très affairée depuis qu'elle a flairé les provocations antisoviétiques. La presse de la II^e Internationale hurle de toutes ses forces avec les loups de la presse impérialiste contre l'Union soviétique.

Le prolétariat international doit être sur ses gardes. La campagne antisoviétique des provocateurs de guerre doit être démasquée sans merci. Bas les masques des excitateurs de guerre ! doit être notre mot d'ordre.

jour 7

Enclosure No. 8 to Despatch No. 1943
of November 10, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE JOURNAL, November 7, 1931.

Il est temps de revenir à la compréhension juste des causes du conflit

Va-t-on enfin se décider à comprendre l'affaire de Mandchourie ? Les derniers événements projettent de tragiques clartés.

Des combats sanglants se sont engagés. Pourquoi ? Parce que les Japonais ont entrepris de rétablir la libre circulation du chemin de fer, qu'ils ont voulu faire reconstruire des ponts détruits, qu'ils ont rencontré des résistances par suite, soit de l'anarchie, soit de la mauvaise volonté des autorités chinoises, soit des intrigues des Soviets et, sans doute, à cause de tous ces éléments combinés.

Il y a donc un fait indiscutable. Les traités qui reconnaissent au Japon le droit d'exploiter le chemin de fer et d'en assurer la libre circulation sont violés.

On dira peut-être que ces incidents sont la suite de l'intervention initiale des troupes japonaises. L'argument n'oublie qu'une chose, c'est que les attentats ont commencé bien avant les mesures de répression. Il n'y en a pas eu moins de 352, rien que pendant l'année 1930. Le Japon n'a eu recours aux mesures militaires qu'après avoir épuisé les moyens de conciliation pour tâcher d'obtenir l'exécution régulière des contrats.

L'erreur de la Société des nations, dès le début de son intervention, a été de s'attacher aux conséquences plus qu'aux causes mêmes du conflit. La confusion pouvait s'expliquer, à la rigueur, dans le trouble de la première heure, alors que l'on pouvait se demander si la réaction contre les attentats ne dissimulait pas des arrière-pensées impérialistes. Le doute est maintenant dissipé. Le Japon n'a aucune raison de souhaiter autre chose que le régime d'ordre et de prospérité qu'il a fait régner en Mandchourie pendant 25 ans. Après tout, il n'est que trop certain que la combinaison de l'anarchie chinoise et de la poussée nationaliste se traduit — et pas seulement en Mandchourie — par des attaques continuelles contre les accords internationaux.

Dans ces conditions, l'apaisement ne peut venir que du rétablissement de l'autorité des traités. On tourne le dos à la logique en discutant le retrait des troupes japonaises avant que la Chine se soit montrée capable de faire respecter les droits qu'elle a elle-même reconnus aux Japonais. Les déclarations de principe dont les dirigeants de Nankin sont si prodigues ne valent pas la moindre garantie. La Société des nations peut d'autant moins l'ignorer que la Chine ne tient même pas les engagements pris envers la société de Genève. Il ne manquerait plus que de mettre en accusation une puissance pour la simple raison qu'elle entend ne pas discuter des droits dont la violation est flagrante. — SAINT-BRICE.

1 1806

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

P.P. 7

Enclosure No. 9 to Despatch No. 1943
of November 10, 1931.

From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE PETIT PARISIEN, November 7, 1931.

**Le prochain conseil de la S. D. N.
se tiendra probablement à Paris**

On sait que le conseil de la S. D. N. doit se réunir le 16 de ce mois pour examiner à nouveau la question du conflit sino-japonais en Mandchourie.

Comme cette réunion coïncidera, à très peu de jours près, avec la reprise des travaux parlementaires français, M. Aristide Briand, ministre des Affaires étrangères et président en exercice du conseil de la S. D. N., a fait demander à ses collègues, par l'entremise du secrétaire général de la S. D. N., s'ils verraient un inconvénient à ce que la prochaine session du conseil ait lieu à Paris et non à Genève.

Sir Eric Drummond a fait procéder hier à une consultation des autres membres du conseil, et il y a tout lieu de penser qu'il sera donné satisfaction au désir exprimé par M. Briand.

La réunion du conseil à Paris abrégera en effet le voyage pour la plupart des membres du conseil. Le délégué japonais notamment, M. Yoshizawa, qui est ambassadeur en France, ne fera aucune opposition à ce que le conseil se réunisse ici même.

Ajoutons que cette réunion permettra à M. Briand de faire connaissance avec sir John Simon le nouveau chef du Foreign Office, et que cette prise de contact permettra, très certainement, aux deux hommes d'Etat de procéder à un échange de vues général.

Pop. 7

Enclosure No. 10 to Despatch No. 1943
of November 10, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE POPULAIRE, November 7, 1931.

L'U. R. S. S. reste muette

Dans une note que la Chine a communiquée au Conseil de la S.D.N., il est rappelé très opportunément que la ville de Tsitsikar est située à 630 kilomètres, à vol d'oiseau, au nord de Moukden. Les Japonais se trouvent déjà aux environs de cette ville. Depuis la dernière séance du Conseil de la S.D.N., qui a suggéré — très timidement et presque en s'excusant — le retrait des troupes nipponnes, celles-ci ont fait un véritable saut en avant... Vers le chemin de fer de l'Est Chinois et la zone d'influence de la Russie.

Or, le Japon — et on le verra d'après les télégrammes ci-dessous — essaye de justifier cette avance par la nécessité de réparer un pont qui n'a rien à voir, ni avec Moukden, ni avec la zone dans laquelle les Japonais ont le droit de maintenir leurs troupes en vertu des traités.

Nous ne connaissons pas encore les vraies circonstances dans lesquelles s'est livrée la bataille d'avant-hier, sur les bords du fleuve Nonni. Hier, elle a repris.

Voici la version chinoise :

« Dès le matin du 3 novembre, une partie des troupes japonaises ont traversé le pont et ont attaqué le camp du général Ma, en tirant des coups de feu et en jetant des bombes. Les troupes chinoises s'étant abstenues de riposter, les forces japonaises se retirèrent vers le Nonni. Des trains ont amené des renforts de troupes japonaises.

« Il convient, dit la note chinoise, d'interpréter à la lumière des faits exposés ci-dessus la déclaration japonaise démentant la présence de troupes quelconques au nord de la tête du pont du Nonni, de même que la communication officielle publiée à Tokio dans les premiers jours de l'occupation japonaise et démentant que les troupes japonaises eussent progressé au nord de Tchong-Tchoung.

« Leur avance se produisit immédiatement après la publication du démenti. Plus au sud, à Toungh Liao, trois trains blindés japonais sont arrivés le 31 octobre, et six avions les jours suivants.

« Un avion japonais a survolé la ville à 1 heure le 1er novembre, en décrivant des cercles, et a tiré à la mitrailleuse sur la porte septentrionale.

« Le lendemain matin, des troupes japonaises ont tiré sur la ville, et trois heures plus tard, une automobile blindée japonaise, sous la protection d'un barrage d'artillerie, s'est emparée de la gare du Nord et y a arboré le drapeau japonais.

« Au cours du bombardement, cinq obus ont atteint la gare du Midi, deux tombant sur le bureau de la police des chemins de fer, deux atteignant le mur oriental de la gare, et un la voie de raccordement entre les gares du Nord et du Midi.

« Les forces japonaises comprenaient un contingent de troupes mongoles en costume chinois.

« La voie de raccordement entre les gares du Nord et du Midi a été minée par les Japonais.

« Cinq avions japonais ont survolé Tchén Tchéou. En général une grande activité de trains blindés et d'avions a troublé les localités aussi éloignées les unes des autres que Tao Nam, Tchén Tchéou, Chang Tchí Tai, Tung Liao, Tzeetchin Chan. »

L'Agence japonaise Rengo présente les événements autrement :

Les troupes japonaises chargées de protéger les équipes d'ouvriers qui sont occupées à réparer le pont de la ligne de chemin de fer Taonan Anganchi, sur la rivière Nonni, ont été attaquées traîtreusement par l'armée du Hei Loung Kiang, que commande le général Ma Tchan Tchan.

Plus de 140 soldats japonais ont été tués ; mais les troupes de Ma Tchan Tchan ont été mises en déroute cet après-midi et battent en retraite dans la direction d'Anganchi.

Nous ne pouvons pas juger laquelle de ces deux versions est conforme à la vérité. Mais ce ne sont là que des points de détail. Le fait essentiel, c'est l'avance des troupes japonaises dans un territoire qui ne leur appartient pas, vers un chemin de fer qui est sous le contrôle d'une autre puissance.

Dans ces conditions rien, absolument rien, ne peut ni justifier, ni même expliquer l'action militaire du Japon. L'agresseur s'est désigné lui-même. Les puissances qui veulent maintenir la paix n'ont pas le droit de l'ignorer. Elles ne peuvent pas ne pas agir.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Et agir, — je le répète pour la vingtième fois — c'est empêcher le conflit de se compliquer ; c'est rendre impossible un choc entre le Japon et l'U.R.S.S. ; c'est établir autour du Japon un *blocus moral* qui l'obligerait à céder.

Dans cette action, qui ne peut être couronnée de succès que si elle est conduite d'un commun accord par l'U.R. S. S., par les Etats-Unis et par les Etats faisant partie de la S.D.N., le rôle dirigeant aurait dû appartenir au gouvernement qui se dit prolétarien, qui se réclame du socialisme et de la paix.

Or, il reste muet. Il ne manifeste aucune activité ! Il se laisse ainsi entraîner à des aventures qu'il ne désire, certes pas, mais qu'il n'a pas le courage et la clairvoyance d'empêcher.

O. ROSENFELD.

Edno 8

Enclosure No. 11 to Despatch No. 1943
of November 10, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ECHO DE PARIS, November 8, 1931.

Où nous mène la politique de M. Briand à l'égard du Japon ?

L'excellent article de notre ami Charles Bonnefon sur le rôle du Japon en Mandchourie aura-t-il ouvert les yeux sur la politique insensée de M. Briand, sur la manière folle dont il a engagé le prestige de la Société des Nations et, ce qui est plus grave, les intérêts français dans cette affaire ?

Face aux immenses multitudes bouillonnantes de l'Asie anarchique, le Japon représente à l'extrême bout du monde oriental la civilisation moderne. Partout où il a pris pied la sécurité, le travail se sont installés avec lui. La Mandchourie, jadis la plus misérable des provinces chinoises, est devenue, grâce à lui, riche et prospère, à côté des autres provinces ruinées, ravagées par la guerre civile, le soviétisme, les bandes d'aventuriers et les généraux cupides. Ce n'est pas tout. Le Japon se heurte à la Russie, dont la pensée suprême est de soulever contre l'Europe un milliard de Jaunes et d'Hindous. Ce n'est pas tout encore. Le Japon, maître des mers orientales, voisine amicalement avec le colonialisme européen, celui de la France en Indochine, celui de la petite Hollande dans les grandes îles.

Si donc il y avait en Europe un peu de bon sens, si M. Briand, qui rêve de diriger la politique européenne et de lui donner une âme, avait conscience de la situation, la Société des Nations, expression de la civilisation et de la puissance occidentales, se précipiterait au secours du Japon.

C'est le contraire qui se passe. Les peuples européens, à la remorque de M. Briand, prennent le parti du brigandage et du soviétisme. Les nations se conduisent comme ces foules stupides qui, voyant un gendarme aux prises avec des bandits, prennent fait et cause pour les bandits sans même savoir ce qui se passe.

Cette politique absurde, chimérique, scandaleuse qui se pare de l'humanitarisme le plus ignorant n'a abouti jusqu'ici qu'à dresser contre la France un grand pays qui fut pendant la guerre son allié fidèle, à discréditer les institutions genevoises (dont un seul membre a pu librement envoyer promener tous les autres), à encourager la Russie rouge et les féodaux sanguinaires de la Chine. L'Occident sabote son prestige. La vieille Europe pratique une politique de suicide. Et M. Briand, — poussé par M. Léger qui, pour avoir habité la Chine, l'a aimée comme Loti aimait la Turquie, en artiste mais en aveugle, — et M. Briand s'enfonce jusqu'au cou dans ces humiliations et ces folies.

Or, c'est le moment que choisit Mgr Beguin, évêque de Belley, pour faire à ses fidèles — chose extravagante — une obligation de se rallier à Genève et aux conceptions de notre ministre des affaires étrangères.

Décidément, tout est incohérent en notre étrange époque.

HENRI DE KERILLIS

Enc 8
Inclosure No. 12 to Despatch No. 1943
of November 10, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from EXCELSIOR, November 8, 1931.

L'INTERVENTION DE LA S. D. N. DANS LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS

En attendant la réunion du
conseil à Paris, M. Briand fait
appel à la sagesse des gouver-
nements de Tokio et de Nankin.

LES OPÉRATIONS DE GUERRE SEMBLENT POUR LE MOMENT ARRÊTÉES SUR LA NONNI

Le conseil de la Société des nations
se réunira, à Paris, le 16 novembre,
sous la présidence de M. Briand, pour
examiner la situation créée par le
conflit sino-japonais en Mandchourie,
conflit qui ne semble pas s'apaiser.

Il faut espérer que le conseil abou-
tira, non point à départager les respon-
sabilités dans une affaire infiniment
complexe, où les éléments d'apprécia-
tion font défaut et où des torts appa-
raissent des deux côtés, mais à résoudre
le différend dans le sens de la conci-
liation la plus large, de manière à ne
pas laisser subsister d'amertume et de
rancœur, préjudiciables à l'apaisement
des esprits. C'est le seul but que puisse
s'assigner la France, qui a trop d'inté-
rêts matériels et moraux en Extrême-
Orient pour pouvoir y jouer aisément
un rôle d'arbitre entre deux pays inéga-
lement évolués, mais où elle possède
d'égales sympathies.

Rappelons que, jusqu'ici, M. Briand,
en sa qualité de président en exercice
du conseil de la Société des nations, a
fait trois communications : la première,
visant l'ensemble de la négociation
pour le règlement du conflit sino-japo-
nais, et qui répondait à la note japo-
naise du 26 octobre dernier ; la se-
conde, relative à la saisie, par les trou-
pes japonaises (mais Tokio dément) —
ou chinoises rebelles, l'on ne sait pas
au juste — des recettes de la gabelle ;
la troisième, sous forme de télégramme
adressé le 6 à la Chine et au Japon,
pour les inviter à suspendre les hosti-
lités.

L'on sait que dans ses réponses,
M. Yoshizawa, représentant du Japon
au conseil de la Société des nations,
qui a été reçu hier par M. Briand, a
affirmé à diverses reprises que son gou-
vernement n'avait nulle intention d'ou-
vrir des hostilités contre la Chine ni
de poursuivre des visées territoriales
en Mandchourie. Le gouvernement japo-
nais, après avoir proposé une entente
directe avec le gouvernement chinois,
n'a pu fixer de date pour le retrait de
ses troupes hors de la zone des che-
mins de fer nippons, mais a donné l'as-
surance que ce retrait serait effectué le
plus tôt possible, compte tenu de la sé-
curité des personnes et des biens de
ressortissants japonais.

Sans doute est-il difficile à des trou-
pes de défendre une zone de chemins
de fer dans les strictes limites de cette
zone, ce qui rendrait difficile leur ravi-
taillement et rendrait précaire la sûreté
de leurs communications.

Toutefois, l'on fait observer, dans
certains cercles diplomatiques, que les
derniers combats qui ont été livrés sur
la rivière Nonni, dans la région de
Tsitsikar, intéressaient un point straté-
gique sur une voie ferrée appartenant
à une compagnie chinoise et distante
de près de 500 kilomètres de la zone
des chemins de fer contrôlés par le
Japon.

On déclare, par ailleurs, que les
Japonais auraient demandé aux auto-
rités chinoises de rétablir le pont dé-
truit par des troupes chinoises rebelles,
afin de permettre l'écoulement de la
récolte de blé indispensable au ravitail-
lement du Sud mandchourien. Il n'en
reste pas moins que l'éloignement des
avant-garde japonaises, autant qu'on
en puisse juger par les cartes géogra-
phiques, paraît mettre les états-majors
des troupes d'occupation nippones dans
une position juridique assez délicate.

L'inconvénient principal, dans un
litige portant sur des régions peu
connues des membres du conseil de la
Société des nations, est l'absence de
toute vérification possible des plaintes
formulées de part et d'autre. Raison de
plus pour rechercher, sans retard, les
solutions conciliantes permettant au
gouvernement japonais et au gouverne-
ment chinois d'ajuster leurs intérêts
respectifs sans froisser leurs suscepti-
bilités d'honneur militaire et de pres-
tige national. — M. P.

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Enclosure No. 13 to Deapatch No. 1943
of November 10, 1931.

From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE JOURNAL, November 8, 1931.

APRÈS LA BATAILLE du pont du Nonni

M. Briand a exprimé
à M. Yoshizawa
ses appréhensions
au sujet de l'attitude japonaise

L'ambassadeur du Japon est venu, hier soir, au Quai d'Orsay, voir M. Briand. L'entrevue a été longue et fort animée. Le ministre des affaires étrangères français, qui a pris la présidence du conseil de la Société des nations au mois d'octobre, alors que l'affaire sino-japonaise était déjà fort mal engagée, ne peut se dissimuler que les événements ne marchent pas dans le sens du redressement. Il s'est montré tout particulièrement ému des combats qui se sont produits sur la rivière Nonni, au moment où il venait d'adresser à Tokio une note demandant au gouvernement japonais de se contenter des assurances données par la Chine à la Société des nations et de désigner immédiatement des délégués pour régler le retrait des troupes nipponnes.

La réponse japonaise à cet appel est déjà connue. Le gouvernement de Tokio considère que le retrait des troupes ne pourra être envisagé qu'après la négociation qu'il réclame de la Chine pour régler d'abord les points fondamentaux. Ce n'est donc pas uniquement pour communiquer cette réponse que M. Yoshizawa s'est rendu au Quai d'Orsay. En réalité la cause déterminante de l'entrevue est la préoccupation provoquée chez M. Briand par les combats de la rivière Nonni.

M. Briand a fait remarquer à l'ambassadeur du Japon que ces combats se sont produits sur la ligne du chemin de fer chinois, à quelque 600 kilomètres de la voie ferrée japonaise du Sud-Mandchourien. M. Yoshizawa n'a pas manqué de répondre que le chemin de fer en question est bien chinois, mais qu'il a été construit avec des capitaux exclusivement japonais et que la Chine n'a tenu aucun des engagements prévus par le contrat d'emprunt, ni pour les intérêts, ni pour l'amortissement. Le gouvernement japonais peut-il, en plus, laisser détruire la voie, c'est-à-dire compromettre son gage ? La nécessité d'assurer le bon état de la ligne a seule inspiré l'intervention du Japon pour la reconstruction du pont détruit. Le Japon n'a pas manqué de demander à la Chine de procéder elle-même aux travaux. Ce n'est que parce que cette demande s'est heurtée à un refus obstiné que les Japonais se sont décidés à intervenir. Encore n'ont-ils envoyé qu'un détachement de protection de deux cents soldats pour surveiller le travail. Il est difficile d'admettre qu'un détachement de deux cents hommes ait pris l'initiative d'attaquer quatre mille soldats chinois. Les renforts envoyés ne dépassent pas les forces indispensables. Les troupes ont reçu l'ordre impératif de ne pas dépasser la rivière. Elles seront retirées dès que le pont aura été remis en état. On prévoit que les travaux dureront deux semaines.

M. Yoshizawa a communiqué également à M. Briand des renseignements précis sur les incidents antijaponais qui se multiplient un peu partout en Chine. Il y en a eu, notamment à Changhaï, à Soo-Chow, à Hal-Cho, à Hankéou, à Amoy. M. Briand, tout en reconnaissant que le projet du 24 octobre n'a pas la portée d'une recommandation du conseil, puisqu'il n'a pas rallié l'unanimité, a insisté sur la valeur morale de l'invitation qui a été adressée au gouvernement de Tokio. Il a appelé l'attention de l'ambassadeur sur la situation délicate qui serait créée si la prochaine réunion du conseil se trouvait en face d'une attitude absolument intransigeante du Japon. — S.-B.

TEMPS 6

Inclosure No. 14 to Despatch No. 1943
of November 10, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE TEMPS, November 3, 1931.

LA SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS ET LE DIFFÉREND SINO-JAPONAIS

La situation continue à s'aggraver en Mandchourie. Chaque jour amène de nouvelles complications entre Tokio et Nankin, sans compter le rôle extrêmement suspect que Moscou joue dans cette affaire. Ce ne sont pas les notes japonaises et chinoises adressées à Genève, et qui se multiplient singulièrement en raison même d'une situation de fait au sujet de laquelle personne ne semble posséder d'informations exactes, qui peuvent contribuer à éclaircir le débat. Elles accumulent, en effet, les arguments nouveaux en faveur des thèses de l'une ou l'autre partie et elles donnent au différend des aspects imprévus. Il faut plaindre le conseil de la Société des nations, qui ne peut s'en tenir qu'à l'esprit et à la lettre du pacte, de devoir se débattre au milieu de cet amas de faits non contrôlés et d'informations contradictoires pour essayer d'empêcher la guerre et d'amener les parties à un règlement pacifique du différend.

M. Briand, agissant comme président en exercice du conseil de la Société des nations, a proposé que ledit conseil se réunisse le 16 novembre, à Paris. C'est à cette date, en effet, qu'il avait été convenu que le conseil se réunirait à nouveau pour examiner, s'il était encore nécessaire, l'état du différend, après que les recommandations formulées par lui le 24 octobre auraient produit leur effet. Il est malheureusement à prévoir qu'aucun véritable progrès ne pourra être accompli dans l'intervalle et que le conseil se trouvera le 16 novembre devant la même situation que le 24 octobre dernier, lorsqu'il adopta la résolution qui, faute de l'assentiment d'une des parties, le Japon, n'a pas force obligatoire.

En réalité, il semble bien que le conseil de la Société des nations ait rempli sa tâche en évitant une véritable guerre sino-japonaise et en obtenant des deux parties l'engagement formel d'éviter tout conflit armé déclaré. Il lui reste à veiller à ce que ne surgisse pas une nouvelle menace, à ce que le différend, qui doit être réglé par des négociations directes entre Nankin et Tokio — et il le serait sans doute depuis longtemps si l'on ne s'était obstiné de certains côtés à attendre de l'intervention de Genève plus que celle-ci ne peut raisonnablement donner — ne dégénère pas en une crise internationale à laquelle l'attention particulière que la Russie soviétique porte à la situation en Extrême-Orient pourrait donner un caractère très grave. Le Japon a répété formellement qu'il n'a pas de visées territoriales en Mandchourie, qu'il ramènera ses troupes dans la zone du chemin de fer Sud-Mandchourien dès qu'il aura obtenu des garanties pour la sécurité de ses nationaux résidents, et il a indiqué les cinq points — dont la confirmation des droits spéciaux qu'il tient des traités — qu'il désire voir faire l'objet des négociations préliminaires. Cette prétention du Japon de soulever, à propos du différend actuel, la question de la confirmation par la Chine des traités existants peut surprendre, mais on comprend que cette préoccupation existe à Tokio en raison même de la facilité avec laquelle la Chine essaye à toute occasion de se soustraire à ses obligations et d'enfreindre les stipulations des accords. La cause profonde de la crise est là et si le Japon a évidemment outrepassé son droit en prenant des mesures militaires en dehors de la zone du chemin de fer pour défendre ses intérêts et sauvegarder les droits qu'il tient des traités, il est évident pour tout esprit impartial que les attentats répétés contre la voie ferrée placée sous son contrôle, l'agitation antijaponaise organisée dans toute la Chine, le boycottage des produits japonais expliquent dans une certaine mesure sa riposte.

Tout ce qu'on peut raisonnablement demander au Japon, c'est de hâter le retrait de ses troupes, comme il s'est engagé à le faire, sans admettre pourtant qu'une date soit fixée pour la réalisation totale de ce repli. Dans la lettre que M. Briand, agissant toujours en sa qualité de président du conseil de la Société des nations, a adressée, il y a trois jours, à M. Yoshizawa, il a insisté pour que le Japon, désireux de remplir l'engagement qu'il a contracté solennellement aux termes de la résolution du conseil du 30 septembre et qu'il a confirmé à plusieurs reprises, poursuive aussi rapidement que possible le retrait de ses troupes dans la zone du chemin de fer. Les arguments que fait valoir la lettre de M. Briand pour justifier cette recommandation sont solides en droit et en fait et, d'autre part, le gouvernement des États-Unis a appuyé la note du président du conseil de la Société des nations par une communication adressée directement à Tokio, mais qui, elle aussi, s'abstient de fixer une date pour l'évacuation totale, car on reconnaît, en Amérique, que la situation est telle en Mandchourie que le retrait pur et simple des troupes nippones pourrait donner lieu à des troubles.

Les événements de ces trois derniers jours ne sont que trop de nature à confirmer de telles craintes. Les engagements qui ont eu lieu sur la rivière Nonni, où les troupes du général chinois Ma Tchang Chan ont attaqué les soldats japonais envoyés pour réparer le pont du chemin de fer, créent une situation nouvelle. Du côté chinois on veut naturellement interpréter le fait de l'envoi de forces nippones sur la ligne Taonan-Anganki comme une tentative pour étendre l'occupation japonaise en Mandchourie. On a même prétendu que le Japon allait occuper Tsitsikar, ce qui eût entraîné des complications avec les Soviets, mais la nouvelle a été catégoriquement démentie. A Tokio on affirme, au contraire, que les forces — très limitées d'ailleurs — qui ont été envoyées pour remettre en état le pont du chemin de fer sur la rivière Nonni seront rappelées dès que leur tâche sera terminée. Seulement, l'attaque dont elles ont été l'objet de la part des troupes du général Ma Tchang Chan, lequel n'appartient pas à l'armée régulière mandchoue et opère pour son propre compte, vient compliquer les choses.

Qui fournit à Ma Tchang Chan les moyens d'agir? Moscou nie énergiquement toute collusion avec ce général chinois, mais on sait par expérience qu'on ne peut se fier aux déclarations du gouvernement soviétique. Là comme ailleurs, la politique des Soviets est pleine de réticences et d'embûches. Il y a pourtant des raisons de croire que l'Union des républiques socialistes soviétiques n'est pas plus disposée à intervenir dans le différend sino-japonais actuel que le Japon n'est intervenu dans le différend sino-russe de 1929. Les Soviets veulent évidemment être prêts, comme nous l'avons déjà indiqué, à prendre de nouveaux avantages dans le nord, si le Japon en obtient dans le sud de la Mandchourie. Cela crée de sérieuses préoccupations, mais cela ne constitue pas, à proprement parler, un danger immédiat de guerre.

Il faut souhaiter que la raison finisse par l'emporter dans une controverse diplomatique qui est sans issue si, le terrain étant définitivement déblayé, on n'en revient pas aux pourparlers directs entre le Japon et la Chine. C'est à faciliter de telles négociations que le conseil de la Société des nations, qui a déjà réussi à empêcher une véritable guerre, peut exercer utilement son influence lorsqu'il se réunira le 16 novembre. Au point où en sont les choses et en raison des positions prises respectivement à Tokio et à Nankin, sa tâche ne sera pas facile.

FIG 9

Enclosure No. 15 to Despatch No. 1043
of November 10, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from FIG RO, November 9, 1931.

En Mandchourie légère accalmie

Figaro

11/9

Selon les dernières nouvelles, la situation apparaît plus calme en Mandchourie. On avait annoncé dans la nuit de samedi à dimanche que les troupes du général chinois Ma Tchang Chan, après leur défaite sur la rivière Nonni, se concentraient à Anganchi, où arrivaient par ailleurs d'importants renforts. Les Chinois allaient-ils engager immédiatement de nouveaux combats et exécuter, en partant d'Anganchi, une contre-offensive sur la rivière Nonni ? Ces craintes se sont un peu dissipées au cours de la journée d'hier. On assure de Tokio que les aviateurs japonais n'ont reçu l'ordre de bombarder les troupes chinoises que si celles-ci tirent elles-mêmes sur les avions. Le gouvernement japonais, voulant tout faire pour éviter l'aggravation d'un conflit qui, dans cette région, risquerait d'entraîner des complications avec les Soviets, aurait donné pour instruction à ses troupes de ne pas pousser plus au nord.

Ce n'est donc que s'ils sont contraints par les circonstances que les Japonais s'avanceront, affirment-ils, sur Anganchi et Tsitsikhar. La délégation japonaise à Genève, dans un télégramme que, d'ordre de son gouvernement, elle vient de remettre hier au secrétariat général de la S. D. N., précise d'ailleurs l'attitude de l'armée japonaise et le but du mouvement des troupes du Mikado dans la région de la Nonni. On pourra lire dans notre Dernière Heure ce télégramme qui est la réponse au télégramme expédié, le 6 novembre, par M. Briand au gouvernement japonais.

Une nouvelle qui peut contribuer à calmer les esprits est le démenti de l'assassinat du consul japonais à Tsitsikhar. L'Agence Rengo vient, en effet, d'annoncer que le consul japonais à Kharbine avait reçu la dépêche suivante de M. Schimizu, représentant du Japon à Tsitsikhar : « Sommes tous saufs. Maintenant la situation est calme, bien que plusieurs Coréens aient été tués hier, aux abords du consulat. » A Tokio, le ministre des affaires étrangères a reçu un câblogramme confirmant cette nouvelle.

Dans les milieux officiels japonais, on n'ajoute pas foi aux informations de source américaine, selon lesquelles les grandes puissances auraient menacé de rappeler leurs représentants diplomatiques si le Japon n'adopte pas une attitude plus conciliante envers la Chine. En revanche, dans les mêmes milieux officiels, on se montre de plus en plus mécontent de voir le secrétariat de la S. D. N. prendre pour argent comptant les nouvelles de source chinoise et on y laisse entendre que le Japon ne manquera pas d'attirer l'attention de la S. D. N. sur ce point. Il y a même dans l'air, paraît-il, des bruits de démission.

La session du Conseil, qui se réunira à Paris, le 16 novembre, ne manquera pas d'intérêt.

Pop. 9.

Enclosure No. 16 to Despatch No. 1943
of November 10, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE POPULAIRE, November 9, 1931.

LA GUERRE EN MANDCHOURIE

La carence de la S.D.N. La faute de l'U.R.S.S.

Je ne sais pas si, pour les docteurs américains en droit, la bataille de la Nonni constitue ou non une violation du pacte Kellogg qui a mis — si nos souvenirs sont exacts — la guerre « hors la loi ». Je ne sais pas non plus si, pour les juristes du secrétariat de la Société des Nations, l'ayance des troupes japonaises en territoire chinois constitue ou non une violation du Covenant. Mais je suis certain que l'opinion publique du monde entier considère les événements de la Mandchourie comme une guerre entre le Japon et la Chine aujourd'hui, comme une menace de guerre entre le Japon et l'U.R.S.S. pour demain, comme un danger de guerre universelle pour après-demain.

Et l'opinion publique a bien raison. Elle est fondée à s'étonner de ce que le Conseil de la S.D.N. essaye de dissimuler la gravité de la situation et de voiler la vérité par tout un artifice de procédure bureaucratique.

Personne ne demande au Conseil de la S.D.N. et à son président l'impossible. Tout le monde sait qu'ils ont des moyens d'action très limités. Mais on peut exiger de cette organisation créée en vue de protéger la paix, qu'elle ne facilite pas, au moins, l'entreprise de l'agresseur.

Or, par toute son attitude depuis le commencement du conflit sino-japonais, Genève n'a fait que tromper l'opinion publique en lui faisant croire que le Japon n'a nullement des intentions bellicieuses. Au lieu de mobiliser contre le conquérant le front unique de la réprobation générale, au lieu de l'isoler moralement, dès le début, quand il était encore hésitant, le Conseil de la S.D.N. a voulu étouffer l'incident... parce que les intérêts coloniaux de tous les Etats impérialistes y sont en jeu.

Le Populaire n'a cessé de critiquer la politique de Genève dans cette affaire. Nous avons notamment répété, à maintes reprises, que, contrairement à l'opinion répandue dans les « milieux de la S.D.N. », le temps ne travaillait pas pour la paix, mais contre elle.

Va-t-on enfin se rendre à l'évidence? Se décidera-t-on enfin à envisager, conjointement avec les Etats-Unis et l'U.R.S.S., une action commune pour arrêter la guerre de Mandchourie?

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Nous avons été et nous sommes, je le reconnais, sévères à l'égard de la S.D.N. Mais nous ne le sommes pas moins à l'égard de l'U.R.S.S. Son attitude est aussi déconcertante que celle de Genève. Cependant, la Russie est la première intéressée à ce que le conflit sino-japonais soit liquidé le plus rapidement possible. Le gouvernement des Soviets comprend mieux que quiconque, que le Japon ne vise pas seulement l'annexion de la Mandchourie, mais aussi celle de la région de Vladivostok.

Malgré tout, Moscou n'a rien fait pour essayer d'éviter au moins un conflit avec le Japon. Durant des semaines, le Kremlin s'est tu. Enfin, avant-hier, le gouvernement a fait une déclaration. Nous l'avons publiée hier, en dernière heure, d'après l'agence officielle des Soviets. En voici le passage le plus important :

« La position de l'Union soviétique est claire et elle est connue du monde entier. Elle diffère radicalement de la position de la Société des Nations. Le gouvernement de l'Union observe une politique stricte de non immixtion. Il suit cette politique, parce qu'il respecte les traités internationaux conclus avec la Chine, la souveraineté et l'indépendance des autres Etats et parce qu'il estime qu'une politique d'occupation militaire est incompatible avec la politique pacifique de

draient pas l'initiative de l'U.R.S.S.? C'est à voir. Mais en tout cas, l'opinion publique la soutiendrait, elle. Et qui sait, si ce dernier appui ne serait pas de nature à obliger les chancelleries à agir en faveur de la paix.

Il est temps encore pour empêcher la guerre russo-japonaise. Mais quand le choc se produira, il sera certainement déjà trop tard.

L'isolement dans lequel se confine l'U.R.S.S. est plein de dangers pour elle-même, pour la révolution, pour la paix.

O. ROSENFELD.

Page 9

Enclosure No. 16 to Despatch No. 1945
of November 10, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE MONDE, November 9, 1931.

LA GUERRE EN MANDCHOURIE

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Qu'est-ce que cela veut dire? Que la Russie reste indifférente à la violation du territoire chinois par les troupes japonaises? Mais alors comment concilier cette attitude avec les articles des journaux soviétiques qui accusent la S.D.N. de faire cause commune avec les impérialistes japonais? Cependant, la S.D.N. a « invité » le Japon à respecter la souveraineté de la Chine, tandis que les Soviets n'ont même pas fait cela. La carence de la S.D.N. a naturellement favorisé l'entreprise du Japon. Nous l'avons dit et répété ici. Mais la carence de l'U.R.S.S. l'a favorisée dans une mesure encore plus grande.

Reste une autre question troublante. Que feront les Soviets si le Japon occupe Tsitsikar et exerce ainsi son contrôle sur le chemin de fer de l'Est chinois qui relie la Sibérie à Vladivostok? Tout fait croire que l'U.R.S.S. ne le tolérera pas. Mais alors, les dirigeants bolcheviks envisagent-ils l'éventualité de la guerre? On pourrait le croire. Mais c'est la contradiction avec les principes pacifiques que vient de proclamer Moscou.

L'U.R.S.S. veut la paix, mais elle est entraînée à la guerre. Ainsi se résument la situation. Et la Russie se trouve dans cette situation équivoque parce qu'elle n'a pas su — ou parce qu'elle n'a pas voulu — faire une politique de paix.

Et la politique de paix ne consiste pas dans l'attente de la guerre, mais dans l'action rendant impossible la guerre.

Cette action aurait dû être entreprise dès le début. Mais aujourd'hui encore elle est possible si les Soviets la veulent vraiment : qu'ils invitent tous les signataires du pacte Kellogg à faire une démarche commune auprès du gouvernement de Tokio ; qu'ils fassent appel à l'opinion publique mondiale.

Les autres puissances ne soutien

P22 9

Enclosure No. 16 to Despatch No. 1945
of November 10, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE POPULAIRE, November 9, 1931.

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
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
1-317
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75



No. 1928.

Paris, November 5, 1931.

NOV 17 1931



F/DEW 793.94/2730

NOV 20 1931

FILED

793-94
The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

In compliance with the Department's instruction No. 293 of August 19, 1930, I have the honor to transmit herewith clippings from the French press, on the subject of the Sino-Japanese conflict, covering the period from October 30 to November 5, 1931, inclusive.

Respectfully yours,

Williamson S. Howell, Jr.,
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

Enclosures.....

- 2 -

Enclosures: (single copy).

Clippings from the following newspapers:

October 30, 1931.
No. 1 - FIGARO

October 31, 1931.
No. 2 - FIGARO
3 - LE POPULAIRE
4 - LE TEMPS

November 2, 1931.
No. 5 - FIGARO

November 3, 1931.
No. 6 - L'HUMANITE
7 - LA REPUBLIQUE

November 4, 1931.
No. 8 - LE POPULAIRE

November 5, 1931.
No. 9 - L'ERE NOUVELLE
10 - FIGARO
11 - L'INTRANSIGEANT
12 - LE JOURNAL
13 - LE POPULAIRE
14 - LA REPUBLIQUE

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INFORMATIONS

Un nouveau paquebot italien

La flotte commerciale italienne ne cesse de s'enrichir de nouvelles unités. C'est ainsi que le 28 octobre au matin a été lancé à Trieste le *Conte-di-Savoia*, qui appartient à la grande Compagnie de navigation « Lloyd Sabaudo ».

Ce paquebot de 48.000 tonneaux a été salué, au moment où il pénétrait dans son élément par les ovations d'une foule de 70.000 personnes.

LL. AA. RR. le prince et la princesse de Piémont, ainsi que M. Ciano, ministre des communications, et un grand nombre de personnalités assistaient au lancement. C'est la princesse Maria de Piémont, qui baptisa le nouveau paquebot.

Jean de Paris.

S S H

Il y faut l'union et la collaboration des classes, alors que Blum est pour la lutte des classes.

Qu'on considère donc le Cartel pour ce qu'il est : une avant-garde socialiste.

Conseils

Si l'**ACTION FRANÇAISE** — M. J. B. — encourage de ses vœux la majorité nationale anglaise, c'est assurément qu'elle en a besoin (comme nos nationaux, les conservateurs ont fait souvent volontiers la besogne de leurs adversaires) :

Les conservateurs anglais auront-ils le courage et même les moyens d'arrêter le flot montant des dépenses publiques, ce qui supposerait une rupture complète non seulement avec les lois qu'ils ont votées, mais avec les lois naturelles et constitutives du régime électif ? La formule de coopération nationale ne fera pas de miracles. Elle a en outre l'inconvénient de laisser au pouvoir ou près du pouvoir M. Ramsay MacDonald lui-même, qui ne se mettra pas à son âge à gouverner, entraînant ainsi tout ce qui s'y rattache.

La Chine, depuis la proclamation de la République, sous l'autorité de Lou Kien ou dictateurs militaires, n'a été ni indépendante, ni souverainement elle-même, ni libre. La plus grande partie du territoire est contrôlée par les communistes, presque partout, et encore les armées chinoises sur dix-huit ; elle est tenue par lui, sans dans le peuple chinois ; elle est représentée en rien en 1928 par les puissances ne représentant en rien l'autorité forte et respectée. La faction reconnue officiellement central en Chine, qu'il n'existe aucune ignorance ou affecte d'ignorer qu'il n'y a pas de gouvernement véritable défini à la paix. La Société des Nations longtemps vécu en Asie, le verdict de Genève est tombé ! Celui qui sait, qui comprend pour avoir tiré le tribunal que les peuples comment leur destination du conflit sino-japonais. Et dire que c'est à stupéfiant de la légèreté, de l'incompréhension totale présentes en Extrême-Orient, la réalité nue, on est quand on connaît tous les faits de la situation

Le conflit sino-japonais et le verdict de Genève

Extract from FIGARO, October 30, 1931.

From the Embassy at Paris.

Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 1928 of November 5, 1931.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Dutz NARS, Date 12-18-75

Fig. 30

D^r A. Legendre.

à la faction de Nankin le soin de rétablir l'ordre et la sécurité en Mandchourie. Ne riez pas : ce que la S. D. N. charge de ramener la paix en ce pays. La faction qui, depuis des années, n'a su que créer le désordre, la misère, une poignante anarchie sur un immense territoire, celle-là même a toujours la confiance des augures de Genève : elle reste chargée par eux d'une tâche impossible. Mais où nous mènent donc nos bergers ? Si les peuples savaient combien mal placée est leur confiance !

D'ailleurs, ce n'est pas dans les couloirs du Parlement ou sur les tréteaux des problèmes vilains qu'il agitent le monde à l'heure présente.

Quand même, la S. D. N. ne saisit-elle pas tout ce qu'il y a d'imprudence à sommer le Japon de retirer ses troupes de zones notablement dangereuses ? Agir ainsi, n'est-ce pas préparer la guerre ?

Que nos augustes mandarins ouvrent enfin les yeux ! Leur idéologie est aussi puérile que dangereuse.

FIG.30

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Aussi, depuis l'apparition du Kouo Ming Tang, en 1911, avec ses clans de politiciens qui s'entre-dévoient depuis vingt ans, l'immense Chine a perdu toute unité politique : elle n'est plus qu'une masse confuse de fiefs vivant leur vie propre sans le moindre souci de l'intérêt général. D'où cette réalité que, en tant que nation, la Chine ne compte plus sur l'échiquier mondial. La S. D. N. peut-elle se faire des illusions à ce sujet ? La Chine ne peut rien pour la paix ; bien au contraire : elle ne peut qu'engendrer de redoutables conflits où l'Europe elle-même serait entraînée, ne serait-ce que pour défendre ses intérêts économiques. Pareils conflits sont d'autant plus à craindre que la Chine est déjà grandement contaminée de bolchevisme et branlante devant l'assaut de Moscou. Est-ce que les vrais maîtres de la Chine ne sont pas les cinq millions de reîtres et de bandits qui écument ce grand pays au bénéfice d'une poignée de politiciens ou de féodaux ? Et c'est l'envoyé d'un de ces clans politiques qui prétend parler à Genève au nom de la Chine entière, alors qu'il ne représente qu'un comité de profiteurs porté au pouvoir par Moscou en 1927 et maintenu là par de grandes nations aveugles, les Etats-Unis en tête, sous la poussée du sinophile Borah.

Rien n'a éclairé ces nations, pas même ces luttes fratricides dont souffre tant la masse chinoise, ce pauvre peuple qui compte si peu pour la faction de Nankin. Luttres de principes, diront certains dogmatiques ignorant tout de la Chine ; luttres d'appétits, faut-il dire, entre une poignée d'ambitieux qui exploitent leur pays pour des fins personnelles et réalisent, en quelques mois, d'énormes fortunes, ainsi que Tchang Kai Chek lui-même a dû le reconnaître dans une proclamation d'octobre 1930. Ils inspirent si peu de confiance, les politiciens du Kouo Ming Tang, que jamais autant de Chinois, paysans ou ouvriers, n'avaient fui leur pays, cherchant un refuge dans les colonies étrangères. C'est par millions qu'ils sont allés vivre en paix en Indochine, à Java, en Malaisie anglaise ou en Mandchourie, c'est-à-dire chez ces Européens ou Japonais, ces « impérialistes » dénoncés tant de fois par Nankin comme les pires ennemis de la Chine.

Eh bien ! aucun de ces faits si probants, pas plus que les massacres continuels d'hommes, de femmes et d'enfants, n'ont éclairé les puissances, leurs ministres responsables. Même les avanies, les pires insultes infligées à ces nations n'ont pas réussi à secouer leur torpeur, baptisée par elles « libérale », « humanitaire », tandis qu'elle nous conduit sûrement à de graves conflits.

Un Chinois averti a fait ressortir la terrible situation de son pays. Dans un article intitulé : « Les Malheurs de la Chine », il accuse nettement le gouvernement de Nankin d'en être la cause et parle de sa corruption : « Cette clique, dit-il, qui sans cesse implore l'aide du peuple pour garder le pouvoir et, pendant ce temps, vide le trésor pour s'enrichir, elle et ses amis. »

Voilà les protégés de la S. D. N., ces politiciens sans mandat du peuple qui ne se contentent pas d'affamer, de ruiner les masses, mais encore, dans leur xénophobie morbide, s'ingénient à provoquer les puissances, à détruire toutes leurs créations, telles les concessions et certains grands services publics qui, avant la venue du Kouo Ming Tang, avaient valu à la Chine une vraie renaissance économique. Ce sont ces mêmes politiciens qui, pour une question de « face », le souci de la leur se

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Mais où nous mènent donc nos bergers ? Si les peuples savaient combien mal placée est leur confiance !

D'ailleurs, ce n'est pas dans les couloirs du Parlement ou sur les tréteaux de Genève qu'on apprend les faits essentiels des problèmes vitaux qui agitent le monde à l'heure présente.

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Fig. 30

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D^r A. Legendre.

Fig. 31

Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 1928
of November 5, 1931.

From the Embassy at Paris,

Extract from FIGARO, October 31, 1931.

LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS

LES SOVIETS INTERVIENDRONT-ILS EN MANDCHOURIE ?

Figaro

10/31

La situation en Mandchourie ne semble pas s'améliorer, en dépit des conseils de la Société des Nations. Le Japon refuse toujours d'évacuer ses troupes avant d'avoir négocié avec la Chine et obtenu l'assurance que la vie et les biens de ses ressortissants seront respectés. Le gouvernement de Nankin, par l'organe de son ministre des affaires étrangères, M. Wellington Koo, faisait savoir, hier soir, qu'il avait toujours respecté les traités, que la sécurité des nationaux japonais en Chine n'était nullement menacée et qu'il attendait le retrait des troupes nippones.

Un fait nouveau, dont on pouvait se douter, vient compliquer la situation : les Soviets songeraient à intervenir en Mandchourie. L'ambassadeur du Japon à Moscou a protesté contre le rassemblement de troupes soviétiques à la frontière mandchoue. M. Karakhan, commissaire du peuple adjoint aux affaires étrangères, a répondu à l'ambassadeur en niant le fait et en donnant toutes les assurances possibles ; mais dénégations et promesses ne valent pas grand'chose lorsqu'elles sont données par le gouvernement de Moscou. On ne peut prendre au sérieux des phrases comme celle-ci, qui figure dans la réponse de M. Karakhan : « Le gouvernement soviétique observe une politique stricte de non-immixtion, parce qu'il respecte les traités internationaux conclus avec la Chine, parce qu'il respecte les droits de souveraineté et l'indépendance des autres Etats et parce qu'il estime enfin que la politique d'occupation militaire effectuée sous la forme de prétendus secours est incompatible avec la politique pacifique de l'Union soviétique et avec les intérêts de la paix universelle. » Bien loin d'être respectueux de la souveraineté des autres pays, les Soviets s'immiscent continuellement dans leur politique ; loin de vouloir la paix, ils ne cessent de fomenter la guerre civile.

Ainsi les événements de Mandchourie se compliquent. Le conseil de la Société des Nations se trouvera, le 16 novembre prochain, devant une situation encore plus difficile qu'il y a quinze jours. Que fera-t-il ? Rien encore, car il ne peut rien.

Il est vain de vouloir cacher l'échec complet de la Ligue pour régler le différend relatif à la Mandchourie. M. Kellogg lui-même ne parviendra pas à nous donner le change avec le télégramme que voici, envoyé à M. Briand : « Je vous félicite de votre magnifique action pour assurer le règlement amiable du conflit sino-japonais. Votre autorité constitue le plus grand espoir pour le maintien de la paix dans le monde. » Si la paix repose sur l'autorité de M. Briand, elle est décidément bien malade.

Pop. 31

Enclosure No. 3 to Despatch No. 1928
of November 5, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE POPULAIRE, October 31, 1931.

LA TENSION russo-japonaise

Il y a exactement huit jours que le Conseil de la Société des Nations s'est séparé sans prendre de décision en ce qui concerne le conflit sino-japonais. Et déjà « l'affaire » se complique.

Ainsi qu'on pouvait le prévoir, la situation créée en Mandchourie par l'action militaire du Japon provoque une tension entre Tokio et Moscou.

Au fond, on ne sait rien de l'attitude du gouvernement des Soviets. Depuis le début du conflit sino-japonais, il a gardé un silence énigmatique. Tandis que sa presse dénonçait — assez mollement, d'ailleurs — les visées impérialistes du Japon, le gouvernement cachait soigneusement ses intentions. Cela a fait courir les bruits les plus contradictoires. Tantôt on parlait d'un accord secret qui lierait l'U. R. S. S. et le Japon et qui aurait pour but de partager la Mandchourie en zones d'influence. Tantôt on annonçait des mouvements de troupes russes à la frontière mandchoue et même la mobilisation.

A Genève, on évitait de parler de l'U. R. S. S. On a invité les Etats-Unis, puissance « intéressée ». Mais à aucun moment on n'a envisagé la participation de la Russie, qui est cependant non moins « intéressée » aux affaires de la Mandchourie. La Chine même ne le demanda point.

Mais, chose encore plus singulière, l'U. R. S. S., ordinairement très sensible à l'attitude de la S. D. N., ne protesta pas contre son exclusion. Et sa presse ne releva pas cette situation étrange, que pour ma part je n'ai cessé de souligner ici.

Or, l'échange de « notes verbales » entre Tokio et Moscou, que le *Populaire* a annoncé hier, en dernière heure, révèle que, de ce côté aussi, tout n'est pas très clair. Le Japon accuse les Soviets de procéder à des préparatifs de guerre et d'aider les Chinois. Il menace de représailles. Les Soviets déclarent les nouvelles de source japonaise dénuées de tout fondement. Ils déclarent rester absolument « neutres » à l'égard des deux parties aux prises en Mandchourie.

Le Japon se contentera-t-il des affirmations du commissaire bolcheviste? Ces affirmations sont-elles conformes à la réalité? Le Japon ne cherche-t-il pas querelle à la Russie? L'U. R. S. S. ne cache-t-elle pas son jeu?

Dans l'état actuel des informations, il nous est impossible de répondre à ces questions. Jusqu'à plus ample informé, je ne crois pas que les Soviets commettent l'erreur de vouloir s'immiscer dans le conflit sino-japonais. Mais toute situation a sa logique. Si les Soviets se rendaient exactement compte de la gravité des événements qui se déroulent en Mandchourie et si Moscou voulait vraiment mettre fin, le plus rapidement possible, au conflit sino-japonais, les dirigeants du Kremlin auraient, de leur propre initiative, proposé une action commune de tous les signataires du pacte Kellogg.

Pour ne pas l'avoir fait, l'U. R. S. S. s'expose à présent au risque d'un conflit avec le Japon.

Pour ne pas avoir invité la Russie, la S. D. N. s'est exposée au risque de voir l'affaire de Mandchourie dégénérer en une guerre, à laquelle la Russie ne pourra pas rester longtemps étrangère.

TEMPS 31

Enclosure No. 4 to Despatch No. 1928
of November 5, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE TEMPS, October 31, 1931.

LES SOVIETS ET LE DIFFÉREND SINO-JAPONAIS

Y a-t-il lieu de craindre que lorsque le conseil de la Société des nations se réunira à nouveau, le 16 novembre, pour examiner l'état du différend sino-japonais en Mandchourie il ne se trouve en présence d'un fait nouveau dominant à la situation un aspect imprévu ? Certaines informations qui nous parviennent ce matin d'Extrême-Orient portent, au premier abord, à le faire croire. D'une part, la conciliation entre Tokio et Nankin ne fait aucun progrès depuis que le conseil de Genève a fait connaître ses dernières recommandations ; d'autre part, l'ambassadeur du Japon à Moscou a fait auprès du gouvernement des Soviets une démarche qui prouve assez combien le cabinet de Tokio est attentif à tout ce qui pourrait amorcer une intervention russe en Mandchourie.

En ce qui concerne le différend sino-japonais proprement dit, rien ne permet de prévoir un règlement prochain. L'impression de détente qui existait au lendemain de la session du conseil de la Société des nations, alors que les Nippons venaient de confirmer solennellement qu'ils n'ont pas de visées territoriales en Mandchourie et qu'ils hâteront l'évacuation des localités chinoises encore occupées en dehors de la zone du chemin de fer sud-mandchourien dès que la situation locale leur permettra de le faire sans risques pour la sécurité de leurs ressortissants, est moins nette aujourd'hui. Il est vrai que la Chine n'a rien entrepris de réellement efficace pour garantir la sécurité générale dans cette région, de telle sorte que les Japonais refusent plus énergiquement que jamais de fixer une date pour le retrait de leurs troupes. Hier encore, un télégramme de Tokio, transmis par Shanghai, annonçait que, suivant les déclarations faites par le premier ministre et le ministre des affaires étrangères au conseil privé réuni à Tokio, le Japon ne ramènera pas ses troupes dans la zone du chemin de fer tant que son différend avec la Chine n'aura pas été réglé par des négociations directes.

On sait quels sont les cinq points essentiels — dont la confirmation par la Chine des droits que le Japon tient des traités existants — que les Nippons entendent placer à la base des négociations directes. Il faudra en tout état de cause que les pourparlers entre dirigeants chinois de Canton et de Nankin aient abouti à la réorganisation du gouvernement national de la Chine pour qu'une décision ferme puisse être prise en ce qui concerne le principe même d'un règlement direct. En attendant, la situation se complique sur place, la campagne antijaponaise, qui se traduit surtout par le boycottage des produits du Japon, s'étendant aux principaux centres de la Chine et étant encouragée de toute évidence par les autorités chinoises. De source japonaise on publie à ce sujet des informations qui, si elles sont exactes, ne laissent subsister aucun doute en ce qui concerne les responsabilités encourues de ce fait par l'administration chinoise. Il en résulte une excitation de l'opinion publique au Japon dont le gouvernement impérial est bien obligé de tenir compte et qui, en tout cas, lui fournit des arguments politiques sérieux pour persister dans l'attitude qu'il a adoptée et qui n'est pas précisément de nature à donner toute l'efficacité désirable aux récentes recommandations de Genève.

Ce qui risque de compliquer davantage encore une situation déjà très délicate en soi, ce sont les inquiétudes qui se font jour à Tokio au sujet des intentions de l'Union des républiques socialistes soviétiques. A tort ou à raison, les Japonais craignent que Moscou ne veuille mettre à profit le différend sino-japonais pour s'assurer des avantages en Mandchourie. Dès les premiers jours du différend, on a signalé des concentrations de troupes soviétiques à la frontière, comme si les Soviets voulaient se préparer à agir au moment qu'ils jugeraient le plus favorable à un coup de main. La démarche que l'ambassadeur du Japon vient de faire auprès du commissaire du peuple pour les affaires étrangères précise des faits pour le moins suspects. Le représentant du Japon fait état des bruits qui circulent en Mandchourie concernant l'appui que le gouvernement soviétique aurait donné au général chinois Ma Chan Shan en mettant à la disposition de celui-ci des instructeurs militaires et des munitions et concernant la concentration d'une force russe de 30,000 hommes prête à passer en Mandchourie.

Des informations venant de Shanghai indiquent même que la compagnie de l'Est chinois aurait envoyé à la frontière de Sibirie 400 wagons destinés au transport des troupes soviétiques. On explique, il est vrai, que ces troupes seraient éventuellement destinées à assurer la garde de la voie ferrée entre Mandchouli et Pouranitchmaye, mais, ceci n'en constituerait pas moins une opération militaire d'une certaine envergure qui ne saurait laisser le Japon indifférent. Quoi qu'il en soit, l'ambassadeur de l'empire du Soleil-Levant a donné à sa communication au gouvernement de Moscou une conclusion qui a la valeur d'un avertissement : si les troupes de l'Union des républiques socialistes sont envoyées sur la ligne de l'Est chinois, le Japon enverra des troupes sur la ligne de chemin de fer de Taonan-Tsitsikar, « construite, ne manque-t-on pas d'ajouter, avec des capitaux japonais », ce qui est évidemment destiné à justifier une initiative de cette nature par la nécessité de défendre des intérêts japonais.

M. Karakhan, au nom du commissariat du peuple pour les affaires étrangères de l'Union des républiques socialistes soviétiques, n'a pu que répondre à l'ambassadeur du Japon en protestant de la pureté des intentions du gouvernement de Moscou, en déclarant sans fondement les nouvelles en question et en affirmant que l'Union des républiques socialistes soviétiques observe une politique stricte de non-intervention, « parce qu'il respecte les traités internationaux conclus avec la Chine et qu'il respecte les droits de souveraineté et l'indépendance des autres Etats et parce qu'il estime, enfin, que la politique d'occupation militaire effectuée sous la forme de prétendus secours est incompatible avec la politique pacifique de l'Union des républiques socialistes soviétiques et avec les intérêts de la paix universelle ».

Il est bien regrettable que Moscou ne se soit pas inspiré de ces principes il y a deux ans, lorsque l'armée rouge a envahi la Mandchourie avant toute négociation directe avec la Chine au sujet des incidents du chemin de fer de l'Est chinois. A Tokio on doit être fixé sur la valeur exacte de déclarations de ce genre de la part du gouvernement soviétique dont toute la politique se résume en une négation brutale et permanente de toutes les règles qui commandent les relations entre Etats civilisés et qui ose parler des intérêts de la paix universelle alors que sa raison d'être est de porter la guerre civile dans tous les pays. Mais cela ne signifie pas que le différend mandchou doive forcément provoquer des complications entre Tokio et Moscou. Aux termes du traité russo-japonais de 1925, la Russie soviétique et le Japon s'engagent en fait à ne pas se gêner mutuellement en Mandchourie. Si les Japonais prennent un avantage dans leur zone, les Russes se réservent d'en prendre un autre dans la leur et réciproquement. Toute la question, pour l'instant, est de savoir qui prendra l'initiative du premier pas à tenter dans cette voie et dont la Chine, bien entendu, ferait éventuellement les frais.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FIG. 2

Enclosure No. 5 to Despatch No. 1928
 of November 5, 1931.

From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from FIGARO, November 2, 1931.

'LE CONFLIT' DE MANDCHOURIE

Une protestation japonaise à Moscou² FIGARO

La guerre va-t-elle éclater en Mandchourie ? Il serait prématuré de l'affirmer. Mais ce qu'on peut dire, c'est que si les efforts du conseil de la Société des nations n'ont abouti à rien, depuis que les augures de Genève ont regagné leurs foyers respectifs, la situation n'a pas pris meilleure tournure.

Il n'a pas été possible de mettre d'accord Chinois et Japonais, et il paraît très difficile, maintenant, qu'ils puissent parvenir à un arrangement avant la prochaine réunion du conseil de la S.D.N., fixée au 16 de ce mois.

Ce qui menace maintenant de compliquer encore les choses et qui pourrait avoir les conséquences les plus graves, c'est l'attitude des Soviétiques.

L'Agence Reuter a annoncé que le général chinois Mac Han Chan obtiendrait l'appui des Soviétiques à Tsitsikar. Naturellement le Japon, qui se tient sur ses gardes, aurait envoyé 600 soldats de Kirin à Tchang-Tchoun. Ces soldats seraient prêts à marcher sur Taonan. Le gouvernement de Tokio, à la menace soviéto-chinoise répondrait en renforçant ses effectifs sur la ligne de chemin de fer de Taonan à Supingkai.

Il est évident que la Chine intrigue à Moscou. M. Modéti, son représentant dans la capitale des Soviétiques, a de longs et fréquents entretiens avec M. Karakhan, remplaçant de M. Litvinoff, actuellement en Turquie. Au surplus, M. Karakhan, s'il brouille les cartes en Mandchourie n'en sera pas à son coup d'essai. Sans doute les Soviétiques ne désirent pas entrer en guerre avec le Japon. Mais on peut être assuré qu'ils ne négligeront aucune occasion de troubler la Mandchourie et qu'ils n'hésiteront pas, comme ils l'ont déjà fait, à utiliser les chefs militaires chinois pour répandre leurs malféliges doctrines.

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L'astucieuse diplomatie chinoise aurait-elle cherché un succès personnel qu'elle n'aurait pas mieux réussi.

En fait, le résultat des réunions de Genève n'a satisfait personne. Les membres du conseil sont obligés de reconnaître leur échec. Le succès apparent qu'ils viennent de remporter à Genève ne laisse pas d'inquiéter les Chinois qui se retrouvent à leur point de départ. Les troupes japonaises resteront en Mandchourie tant que la vie et les propriétés des Japonais et des Coréens y seront menacées. Toute tentative d'agression sera immédiatement réprimée.

Quant aux Japonais, s'ils avaient conservé jusqu'à ce jour quelque illusion sur l'obligation d'observer les clauses d'un traité, ils doivent déchanter avec quelque mélancolie : toute la thèse japonaise repose sur l'observance des accords internationaux. Que n'ont-ils médité sur les aventures et les abandons du traité de Versailles !

Que va-t-il donc se passer en Mandchourie où les Chinois — nationalistes, soldats, brigands ou autres — continuent à perpétrer des attentats contre les Japonais car les Coréens, qui y sont au nombre de huit cent mille, sont légalement des Japonais ? Un télégramme, hier, ne signalait-il pas une nouvelle attaque de réguliers chinois contre un faubourg de Moukden ? Ou les Japonais retirent-ils leurs troupes de police et de protection : alors la vie de leurs ressortissants se trouvera menacée, et les diverses entreprises minières, industrielles et agricoles, aujourd'hui si prospères, seront

vouées à la ruine, mais le boycottage des produits japonais pourra, par contre, cesser.

Où les troupes japonaises resteront en Mandchourie pour le plus grand bien de tous les habitants de cette région, y compris — et surtout — des Chinois : alors le boycottage des marchandises japonaises continuera plus florissant.

Dilemme rendu insoluble par l'absence d'un gouvernement fort en Chine. Grave problème auquel les événements peuvent apporter une dramatique solution.

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Je lui ai donc demandé :

— Et ce conflit, comment allez-vous le résoudre, puisque Genève s'est avérée impuissante à l'apaiser ?

— Je suis un railway-man, me répondit-il en souriant. Et rien que cela ! La politique est un terrain mouvant et brûlant. Je m'y aventure le moins possible. Et d'ailleurs, les augures en politique ! Les prévisions les moins prévisibles sont souvent celles qui se réalisent. En ce qui me concerne, je suis un simple citoyen japonais, tout comme un autre. Je fais confiance, les yeux fermés, à mon gouvernement et à l'expérience des anciens. Ceux-ci décident après mûre réflexion, et je suis persuadé que leurs décisions sont synonymes de patriotisme, justice et sagesse.

— Quant à moi, si vous me le permettez, je vous parlerai « chemin de fer ». Là, je suis dans mon élément, je sais ce dont je parle. Si le public français était plus au courant de la question mandchourienne, il se rendrait compte plus exactement de la situation.

— Très certainement. Cette situation n'est-elle pas rendue plus difficile par la co-existence de plusieurs gouvernements en Chine ?

— Oui, la Chine actuelle est un chaos. Il y a le gouvernement de Nankin, celui de Canton, celui de la Mandchourie, il y aura encore demain celui de je ne sais où. Il y a surtout les chefs militaires qui s'entre-dévorent. L'autorité du gouvernement central, dit de Nankin, s'exerce en fait dans la région du Yang-Tsé, quelques dizaines de kilomètres à droite et à gauche du grand fleuve. Encore ne faut-il pas remonter le fleuve trop loin. La Chine est vaste comme l'Europe. Elle est, dans sa majeure partie, le paradis des bandes de brigands, de soldats en rupture de ban, parce que ne touchant pas leur solde — des communistes, pour qui la propriété d'autrui fait le bonheur. Tout cela vit d'actes de banditisme, à la barbe de ce fameux gouvernement central. Aussi n'est-il pas étonnant de voir que près d'un million de Chinois viennent annuellement s'établir en Mandchourie, où, grâce à la protection japonaise, ils vivent heureux et dans l'aisance. Hormis la Mandchourie, il n'est pas, à l'heure actuelle, de région prospère en Chine.

— N'est-ce pas cette prospérité, qu'il est incapable de faire fleurir, que jalouse le gouvernement central ? N'est-ce pas elle qui attire les bandes de brigands, comme le miel les mouches ?

— La Compagnie du chemin de fer est pour quelque chose dans cette prospérité. La ligne principale était à l'origine une simple voie stratégique russe, qui reliait Port-Arthur à Changchoune. Les Japonais, refirent, en la doublant, l'ancienne voie russe. Les bénéficiaires furent, du reste, les Chinois qui, disposant d'un moyen d'évacuation, n'eurent plus qu'à cultiver la terre. Cette terre mandchourienne est fertile entre toutes. Pour en citer un exemple, l'exportation de la fève de soya et de ses dérivés a atteint, en 1928, la somme considérable de 200 millions de yens. La Compagnie du chemin de fer sud-mandchourien bénéficie du transport de ces denrées et de leur acheminement vers son port de Dairen, qui est, aujourd'hui, le deuxième, par ordre d'importance, des villes maritimes chinoises.

— Si l'on devait traduire par des chiffres le développement prodigieux de la Mandchourie, grâce à l'action du Sud-Mandchourien, on peut dire que la Mandchourie a plus d'un kilomètre de rail par 5,000 habitants, alors que, dans la Chine entière (avec ses 440 millions d'habitants), il y a moins d'un kilomètre de rail par 550,000 habitants. Le tonnage transporté en 1927 a été de 90 millions de tonnes, alors que vingt années auparavant il n'était que de 6 millions.

— Les recettes s'élevaient, durant ce laps de temps, de 9.788.000 yens à près de 120.000.000 de yens. Le commerce extérieur de la Mandchourie, qui était en 1903 de 700 millions de francs, dépassait en 1929 9 milliards et demi de francs, atteignant les 35 0/0 du commerce total de la Chine, alors que, sous le rapport de la population, la Mandchourie atteint à peine le cinquième de la population totale de la Chine.

— Le Sud-Mandchourien emploie dans ses différentes entreprises plus de 40.000 ouvriers chinois. — Pour tout dire, c'est plus de 35 milliards que le Japon a investis en Mandchourie.

— Il est évident que, dans ces conditions, vous considérez un peu comme votre cette Mandchourie si riche et si prospère.

— Que non pas ! Il est dans l'intérêt du Japon, pour des raisons économiques autant que militaires, que la Mandchourie demeure en paix et qu'elle reste dans les mains des Chinois. Le Japon sait

ont leur source dans la position géographique de la Corée. C'est, comme le dit Henry K. Kinney à qui j'emprunte ces lignes : « un poignard mis au cœur du Japon ».

— La nécessité stratégique de tenir cette péninsule à l'abri du danger d'être occupée par des adversaires est indiscutable.

— La guerre sino-japonaise a été pour le Japon une guerre purement défensive, de même que la guerre russo-japonaise. Dans les deux cas, ce furent les deux envahissements de la Corée par les Chinois et les Russes qui déclenchèrent la guerre. Par le traité de Portsmouth nous héritâmes des droits des Russes sur le chemin de fer sud-mandchourien et sur la presqu'île de Liao-Tong. Ces droits, confirmés par la suite par des accords particuliers, nous tenons à ce qu'ils soient respectés.

— Nous ne demandons pas autre chose.

On ne peut d'ailleurs exprimer plus clairement les visées japonaises en Mandchourie que ne le faisait cette haute personnalité française qui écrivait, il y a douze mois : « L'originalité de l'influence japonaise en Mandchourie réside dans le fait que le Japon ne colonise pas : il n'y exerce aucun protectorat. Il détient simplement une portion de l'épine dorsale et, partant de cette base d'influence, il se borne à aider les Chinois à exploiter ce pays et leur montre la voie. »

Si l'on doit, après cela, attenter à la vie et aux propriétés des Japonais résidant en Mandchourie, sous le prétexte que la Chine est aux Chinois, ne peut-on pas trouver naturel que les Japonais se défendent ?

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
Hum 3

Enclosure No. 6 to Despatch No. 1928
of November 5, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'HUMANITE, November 3, 1931.

La menace d'agression contre l'Union soviétique se précise

L'ETAT-MAJOR JAPONAIS EST PRÊT A ATTAQUER TSITSIKAR
SUR LE CHEMIN DE FER DE L'EST-CHINOIS



« La stratégie exige l'occupation de certains points en dehors de cette zone (celle du chemin de fer sud-mandchourien)... En réalité la situation en Mandchourie est telle qu'elle peut très bien exiger le renforcement des troupes et elle exclut catégoriquement leur évacuation. »

Ce sont là les déclarations du ministre de la guerre du Japon, faites au conseil des ministres le 25 octobre. Ce sont les conclusions pratiques tirées par l'impérialisme japonais des délibérations du Conseil de la S. D. N.

Et le même jour, le 29^e régiment d'infanterie de la 2^e division japonaise, parti de Tchong-Tchoun, s'avance sur la ligne ferroviaire Sipinghai-Taouan.

Taouan est occupée par les Japonais et la pression s'accroît sur le prolongement de ce chemin de fer, Taouan-Tsitsikar (ce dernier point, sur le chemin de fer de l'Est Chinois).

La menace japonaise contre l'Union Soviétique devient de plus en plus précise. Le correspondant à Moscou du *News Chronicle* ne cache pas que l'activité de l'armée japonaise en Mandchourie fait entrevoir la possibilité de graves événements.

Après la prise de Taouan

L'occupation de Taouan fut préparée de longue main. L'envoi de tout un régiment fut décidé parce que les Japonais savent qu'ils peuvent compter sur l'aide du général chinois Tchong Kai Tchen. Mais il témoigne aussi que l'impérialisme japonais prépare de grandes opérations militaires en direction de la Mongolie intérieure et aussi — et surtout — de Tsitsikar.

Le but est d'occuper Tsitsikar. Mais les impérialistes de Tokio trouvent en face d'eux l'opposition du général Ma Tchan Tchong, qui ne s'est pas vendu et qui dirige le district de Tsitsikar.

L'agence *Tass* signale que deux officiers de l'état-major du mikado ont sommé Ma de livrer la ville à Tchong Kai Tchen. Les officiers l'ont menacé, au cas où il ne céderait pas, d'un bombardement aérien et d'une attaque des troupes nippones. Cependant Ma a refusé. L'ultimatum expire aujourd'hui.

Il y a donc lieu de s'attendre à un événement d'une importance et d'une gravité considérables. Cette insistance du Japon à pousser plus profondément l'occupation de la Mandchourie et à vouloir s'emparer de Tsitsikar est la démonstration claire des buts véritables que poursuivent les impérialistes japonais : provoquer l'U. R. S. S., provoquer un conflit qui serait le signal d'une attaque générale des impérialistes contre l'Etat ouvrier.

Et ce dessein abominable s'exécute sous la direction de l'impérialisme français dont le gouvernement fait le complice de l'odieuse cam-


Hum 3

Enclosure No. 6 to Despatch No. 1928
of November 5, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'HUMANITE, November 3, 1931.

La menace d'agression contre l'Union soviétique se précise

L'ETAT-MAJOR JAPONAIS EST PRÊT A ATTAQUER TSITSIKAR
SUR LE CHEMIN DE FER DE L'EST-CHINOIS



La situation est grave. L'Etat-major japonais est prêt à attaquer Taouan-Tsitsikar (ce dernier point, sur le chemin de fer de l'Est-Chinois).

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Et ce dessein abominable s'exécute sous la direction de l'impérialisme français dont le gouvernement se fait le complice de l'odieuse campagne antisoviétique que mène actuellement la presse de Paris qui soutient ouvertement et cyniquement les provocations japonaises, basées sur les mensonges que nous avons dénoncés ici.

Chaque jour précise le danger de guerre impérialiste contre l'U.R.S.S., chaque jour approche l'heure où les militaristes nippons peuvent se livrer à un acte de guerre contre notre patrie socialiste.

L'Union soviétique se tient prête à répondre à l'agression. Elle a la grande tâche de défendre la révolution prolétarienne triomphante sur un sixième du globe. Le gouvernement soviétique, après avoir usé tous les moyens en son pouvoir pour empêcher le mauvais coup des impérialistes, saura employer tous les moyens aussi pour conserver la paix à laquelle tous les travailleurs de l'Union sont provisoirement attachés. Si la paix est troublée une seconde fois sur sa frontière d'Extrême-Orient, par la faute des canailles impérialistes, la force de l'armée rouge devra être utilement employée à la rétablir, à arrêter toute tentative de violer l'intégrité du territoire soviétique.

Mais nous devons sans retard alerter tous les travailleurs de ce pays en les appelant à se lever pour la défense de l'U.R.S.S. menacée. Il serait criminel de s'en remettre, dans les circonstances présentes à la seule volonté de paix de l'Union, à la seule force de l'armée rouge.

Seule l'intervention énergique du prolétariat international peut parer aux dangers immenses qui s'accumulent en Extrême-Orient.

« Nous appelons toute la classe ouvrière, tous les travailleurs de la ville et de la campagne, nous appelons tous les ennemis d'un nouveau massacre mondial à élever leur voix contre les provocations de guerre des impérialistes japonais ! Il faut déchaîner une tempête de protestations de masse contre toute tentative d'attaquer le pays du socialisme !

Et pour ce faire il faut, partout, dévoiler l'activité criminelle de l'impérialisme français, notre propre impérialisme, qui dirige cette abominable préparation à la guerre contre l'Union soviétique édifiant le socialisme.

La lutte contre la guerre impérialiste et pour la défense de l'U.R.S.S., c'est la lutte de masse, au chantier, à l'atelier, aux champs contre notre impérialisme gendarme de la contre-révolution.

La lutte contre la guerre impérialiste et la défense de l'U.R.S.S., pour la paix, c'est le combat aux côtés des prolétaires de Chine, aux côtés des soviets chinois.

Camarades du Parti ! Camarades ouvriers ! Alerte !

Debout pour la défense de l'U. R. S. S. !

M. MAGNIEN.

Ref. 3

Enclosure No. 7 to Despatch No. 1928
of November 5, 1931.

From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L. REPUBLICAIN, November 3, 1931.

Les bruits de guerre s'amplifient

Hier nous disions que la S. D. N. dans l'affaire du conflit mandchou avait marqué un point. Elle l'a effectivement marqué, mais il semble que le parti militaire japonais, hier obligé de se replier, contre-attaque aujourd'hui. Oh ! tout le monde ne le soulignera pas, la presse japonaise s'étendant fort loin du Japon et se publiant en langues nombreuses, en presque toutes les langues de la terre. (Nos lecteurs ne nous en voudront pas si nous mettons en lumière ce petit point, et si nous faisons remarquer que la hauteur des Japonais de Genève à l'égard de la presse blanche, et le mépris qu'ils semblaient avoir pour elle n'étaient pas un spectacle très réjouissant.)

Quoi qu'il en soit, soutenu par un grand nombre d'organes de tout calibre et de toute nationalité, le parti militaire japonais a repris l'offensive et semble à l'heure actuelle tourner son effort contre les Soviets. Nous disons : semble le tourner, car il ne faut pas oublier que les Soviets étaient, l'année dernière, en guerre avec la Chine et qu'ils ont toujours soutenu les troupes communistes chinoises qui sont en lutte ouverte avec le gouvernement de Nankin. Si bien que Soviets et Japon semblent avoir la même politique à l'égard de Nankin, politique d'hostilité avouée, les premiers visant la soviétisation de la Chine, les autres la prise de possession de la Mandchourie.

Certains de nos confrères ont même soutenu que Soviets et Japon étaient d'accord, que les plaintes de celui-ci étaient destinées à donner le change, et que les deux gouvernements cherchaient dans les mouvements l'un de l'autre des prétextes pour envahir chacun de son côté la Mandchourie.

Le fait est que des mouvements autonomistes — probablement provoqués par le Japon — éclatent de toutes parts, et que l'anarchie qui paraît à son comble dans cette région vaste comme deux fois la France favorise les deux impérialismes, mais il est pourtant difficile de croire à l'entente entre les Soviets et le Japon.

Si nous éliminons cette hypothèse un peu machiavélique, faudrait-il donc admettre que le parti militaire japonais recommence à jouer carrément la carte de 1903 contre Moscou ?

Faudrait-il admettre qu'il devine que les Soviets vont tôt ou tard recommencer la partie perdue en 1905 par le tsarisme ?

Faudrait-il penser que l'attaque brusquée de Moukden, il y a quelques semaines, que les mouvements — tenus secrets — des troupes japonaises ces jours-ci en direction du Nord, sont la répétition du fameux torpillage sans avertissement préalable de trois navires russes dans la baie de Tchewoulpo ?

Notons au passage que le Japon s'est engagé devant le Conseil de Genève à ne rien annexer en Mandchourie, et même à retirer ses troupes dans la mesure où l'ordre serait réabli. Il est entendu d'ailleurs que l'ordre n'a pas été réabli et ne pouvait l'être, puisque encore une fois l'anarchie règne en Mandchourie comme en Chine. Mais le prétexte du désordre persistant a été trouvé par le Japon et ne sera plus lâché.

Et maintenant devons-nous conclure que la S. D. N. qui paraissait hier victorieuse des forces mauvaises du nationalisme et de l'impérialisme, est vaincue aujourd'hui ? En aucune façon. De ces réactions nationalistes, nous en verrons longtemps encore. Longtemps encore les partis militaires essaieront de troubler le monde, de mettre le feu ici ou là. On éteindra d'abord les incendies, un par un, puis on finira par mettre le pied sur les partis militaires eux-mêmes. Le Japon finira par l'apprendre à ses dépens.

Pierre DOMINIQUE.

Pop 4

Enclosure No. 8 to Despatch No. 1928
of November 5, 1931.

From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE POPULAIRE, November 4, 1931.

Vers un conflit russo-japonais

Une avalanche de nouvelles de Mandchourie. Mais elles sont suspectes et contradictoires. Elles varient selon qu'elles parviennent de source japonaise ou de source chinoise.

Les Chinois parlent de mouvements des troupes nippones et de projets d'occupation par le gouvernement de Tokio. Les Japonais essayent de créer l'impression que la Mandchourie est en proie à l'anarchie et que seul le Japon pourrait y mettre de l'ordre.

Et aucune information ne nous arrive ni de Moscou, ni même via Moscou. On dirait que l'U. R. S. S. ignore complètement les événements qui se déroulent en Mandchourie. On pourrait croire que le gouvernement des Soviets se désintéresse du conflit qui met aux prises les Japonais et les Chinois à proximité de ses frontières.

Ce silence et cette indifférence apparente sont d'autant plus suspects que le Japon ne se gêne pas pour provoquer ouvertement la Russie. Tantôt on annonce la mobilisation de troupes russes. Tantôt on parle de matériel de guerre envoyé par l'U. R. S. S. aux Chinois. Tantôt on insinue que Moscou accorderait une aide pécuniaire aux « bandits mandchous ».

Ces informations alarmantes semblent destinées à justifier d'avance l'occupation de la ville de Tientsin, qui est une gare importante du chemin de fer de l'Est Chinois. Qu'une garnison japonaise l'occupe, Tokio aura le contrôle de la voie ferrée qui relie la Sibérie à Vladivostok.

Le Japon, dont l'intention d'annexer la Mandchourie ne fait pas de doute, veut-il s'approprier également la province extrême-orientale de l'U. R. S. S. avec le grand port sur le Pacifique ?

Il suffit de se poser cette question pour comprendre toute la gravité de la situation qui se crée en Mandchourie.

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Pour expliquer l'attitude énigmatique de l'U. R. S. S., on se livre aux conjectures les plus diverses. Ainsi, dans certains milieux anglais, on prétend qu'il existe un accord secret relatif à la Mandchourie entre Tokio et Moscou.

D'autres croient, au contraire, que la Russie se prépare à intervenir très énergiquement en Mandchourie, ce qui ferait prévoir une guerre russo-japonaise imminente.

Quant à moi, je n'accepte ni l'une ni l'autre de ces hypothèses. Jusqu'à preuve du contraire, je ne crois pas à un accord entre le Japon et l'U. R. S. S. En tous cas, s'il en existait un, il ne pourrait avoir pour objet que le partage de la Mandchourie en zones d'influence. Si accord il y a, il a joué en 1929, lors du conflit sino-russe, quand le Japon — comme d'ailleurs le monde impérialiste tout entier — a approuvé et soutenu l'action soviétique en vue de maintenir les « droits » de la Russie sur le chemin de fer de l'Est Chinois.

Or, à l'heure présente, le Japon semble vouloir élargir sa zone d'influence en Mandchourie au détriment de la Russie. Son action est donc contraire à l'accord présumé.

Je ne pense pas non plus que l'U. R. S. S. envisage une guerre avec le Japon. Tout ce que je sais sur l'état d'esprit du Kremlin me fait croire, au contraire, que le gouvernement soviétique et Staline lui-même ne veulent pas la guerre. Ils se rendent, d'ailleurs, fort bien compte de l'impossibilité pour la Russie, dans son état actuel, de soutenir une guerre, surtout en Mandchourie ou en Sibérie Orientale.

Il me semble plutôt que Moscou est complètement désorientée, qu'elle a été surprise par les événements et ne sait pas comment se tirer d'une situation qu'elle avait créée elle-même.

Car, ne l'oublions pas, l'U. R. S. S., toute bolcheviste qu'elle est, n'avait pas renoncé aux droits impérialistes sur le chemin de fer de l'Est Chinois que lui avait légués le régime tsariste. Elle n'a pas su s'entendre à l'amiable avec la Chine pour lui restituer le chemin de fer établi sur le territoire mandchou, moyennant des garanties administratives et économiques qui auraient pu assurer la communication normale avec Vladivostok. En 1929, quand la Chine a voulu se débarrasser de la tutelle russe sur ce chemin de fer, Staline n'a pas hésité à recourir à la manière forte. L'armée du général Blucher a procédé à une incursion en Mandchourie... et la Chine céda.

Or, il n'était pas difficile de prévoir que, tôt ou tard, la situation changerait et que si la Chine n'arrivait pas à se libérer du joug étranger, c'est le Japon qui tenterait de se substituer à la Russie.

Nous l'avons dit ici, lors du conflit sino-russe. L'Internationale Ouvrière Socialiste avait, à l'époque, suggéré à la Russie une solution pacifique. Aveuglés par leur succès militaire et encouragés par l'approbation unanime des puissances capitalistes, les bolcheviks n'apportèrent aucune modification au statut mandchou.

On voit les conséquences. Profitant de la crise qui paralyse le monde capitaliste et de la faiblesse de la Russie, le Japon essaye d'enlever à la Chine la Mandchourie et en même temps de chasser la Russie de l'Océan Pacifique. Prudents, les Japonais voudront certainement réaliser leur programme en plusieurs étapes. Mais en tout cas, c'est déjà le commencement.

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Si les Soviets avaient compris, dès le premier jour du conflit sino-japo-

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

nais, la manœuvre du Japon, et s'ils étaient décidés à maintenir la paix coûte que coûte, ils auraient dû aussitôt chercher à se joindre aux efforts de la S. D. N. et des Etats-Unis en vue de mettre fin à l'entreprise nipponne. Que dis-je, se joindre ? Ils auraient dû prendre l'initiative de cette action pacifique.

Les bolcheviks ne l'ont pas fait. Ils ont laissé la S. D. N. s'enfoncer dans le maquis de la « procédure ». Par leur attitude incompréhensible, ils ont aidé la S. D. N. à les exclure de l'action commune pour la paix, tentative vouée à l'échec si la Russie n'y participe pas. Ils se sont laissés isoler. Ils se trouvent à présent face à face avec un adversaire redoutable qui les menace de guerre. Ils peuvent y être entraînés sans le vouloir, par la logique même des choses.

Inutile, me semble-t-il, d'insister sur les dangers que cette situation comporte, aussi bien pour la paix que pour la Révolution russe.

O. ROSENFELD.

Enc 5

Enclosure No. 9 to Despatch No. 1928
of November 5, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'OPINION NOUVELLE, November 5, 1931.

Editorial

M. Sze a, hier, au nom du gouvernement chinois, remis au secrétaire général de la Société des Nations, une note et un memorandum relatifs au conflit sino-japonais en Mandchourie.

Le gouvernement chinois y exprime son inquiétude devant l'attitude des Japonais qui, depuis l'ajournement du Conseil de Genève, le 24 octobre, n'ont pris aucune disposition permettant d'espérer un retrait prochain de leurs troupes. Et il se déclare fermement résolu à ne pas accepter de négocier sous la pression d'une occupation militaire.

On sait que le Japon, de son côté, persiste à refuser de retirer ses troupes avant d'avoir négocié un accord avec la Chine sur « certains principes fondamentaux ».

Après avoir pris cette position devant le Conseil de la S. D. N., le 23 octobre, le Japon a manifesté sa volonté de s'y maintenir, il y a quelques jours, en refusant de désigner des représentants pour discuter avec ceux de la Chine.

Deux points de vue ne semblent pouvoir être plus foncièrement opposés et si un peu de sagesse n'intervient pas de part et d'autre, toutes les menaces que comporte la situation se prolongeront avec elle.

Nous disons « de part et d'autre », car il apparaît bien, maintenant que l'on commence à voir plus clair dans l'imbroglio des informations reçues à la fois de Tokio et de Nankin, qu'il appartient à l'un et à l'autre des deux pays de prendre d'urgence un certain nombre de décisions qui prouveront leur égal désir de ne faire courir aucun risque à la paix.

La grande et valeureuse nation qu'est le Japon doit s'interdire tout acte militaire de nature à faire naître en Chine de légitimes inquiétudes.

Le peuple chinois, dont la finesse est le fruit d'une vieille et remarquable civilisation, a le devoir évident de faire cesser immédiatement les graves excès commis à l'égard des ressortissants japonais en Mandchourie, dépouillés souvent de leurs biens, molestés et même parfois menacés de mort.

On est en droit d'espérer encore que ces deux grands peuples se rendront compte que la paix, qu'ils doivent désirer autant l'un que l'autre, exige d'eux, aujourd'hui, un effort immédiat de mutuelle compréhension et de réalisation.

La S. D. N., de son côté, a le devoir de continuer à suivre attentivement les événements, et l'heure n'est peut-être pas loin où une nouvelle intervention de sa part sera nécessaire et pourra être décisive.

Le grand ouvrier de la paix, Aristide Briand, dont nous n'avons jamais manqué, en aucune circonstance, de soutenir la politique ou la personne, si injustement attaquées parfois, est parvenu en octobre, grâce au rayonnement de son autorité et à sa profonde connaissance des problèmes internationaux, à empêcher le conflit sino-japonais de s'étendre et de s'aggraver.

Il faudra, sans nul doute, une fois encore, recourir à lui pour qu'un des plus graves dangers que la paix ait connus depuis longtemps soit définitivement écarté.



Fig. 5

Enclosure No. 10 to Despatch No. 1928
of November 5, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from FIG. 10, November 5, 1931.

Le Conflit sino-japonais

Fig. 10

La Société des Nations est-elle pour la paix ?

Le 30 octobre dernier, M. Kellogg télégraphiait à M. Briand : « Je vous félicite de votre magnifique action pour assurer le règlement à l'amiable du conflit sino-japonais. Votre autorité constitue le plus grand espoir pour le maintien de la paix dans le monde. » Flatterie d'augure qui en postule une semblable, croyant ainsi se grandir. Or, qu'en faut-il penser ? Quelle est la réalité ?

Le verdict de Genève a profondément étonné, irrité le Japon. Pourquoi ? Parce qu'il est sûr de son droit, qui s'appuie sur des traités entérinés par les grandes puissances. Ce qu'il a fait en Mandchourie est simple, naturel : menacé par 200.000 reîtres chinois bien armés de mitrailleuses, de canons même, et préparant un mauvais coup contre lui, contre sa voie ferrée, le Japonais s'est défendu, a frappé aux points sensibles qu'il occupe aujourd'hui. *Il a ainsi prévenu un grave conflit.* Ce n'est qu'une riposte : il n'est pas sorti de la *défensive*, cette défensive admise par tous les pactes Kellogg et autres, j'imagine. C'est pourquoi le Japon ne comprend pas l'attitude des puissances, celle surtout de la France et de l'Angleterre. *Il voit avec raison, dans leur verdict, une grave injustice et trop de parade de « conciliation » à tout prix, sans tenir compte des réalités, des nécessités.* Le comité exécutif de la Société des nations nage, en effet, trop dans l'absolu, appliquant, dans ses décisions, une formule générale qui veut être de l'ordre magique, soit la prétention de neutraliser tous les maléfices, d'aplanir brusquement tous les antagonismes. Pareil miracle ne se réalise que dans l'imagination de certains thaumaturges de la paix.

Pourquoi avoir implicitement donné tort au Japon ? En somme, il a été le bon gendarme, le défenseur de l'ordre, de la paix en cette Mandchourie que *quette le bolchevik* et qui peut, si l'on n'y prend garde, devenir le champ clos d'une nouvelle grande mêlée où l'Europe serait fatalement entraînée.

Le Japon, si fier et si dévoué jusqu'ici à l'œuvre de la S. D. N., nous pardonnera difficilement notre insistance à couvrir les méfaits de la Jeune-Chine. Il est vindicatif comme tout Asiatique. Pour moi, qui le connais pour avoir vécu des années à côté de lui, nous sommes allés trop loin : nous l'avons *humilié* à Genève devant le toukium, le reître chinois. S'étant fait le gardien de la paix en Mandchourie, voilà que la Société des nations *charge ce même reître*, qui se confond avec le brigand, de rétablir l'ordre dans ce pays. Or, la faction de Nankin, depuis des années, n'a su que créer le désordre, la misère. Quand même, elle a toujours la confiance de la S. D. N.

On peut se demander ce que deviendraient l'Indochine, la paix dans toute l'Extrême-Asie et même dans l'Inde, si le Japon n'était là pour barrer la route à Moscou ? Que deviendrait l'Etat-tampon de Mandchourie qui couvre la Chine, si le Japon ne se dressait devant le bolchevik ? On ne paraît guère y avoir songé à Genève. D'ailleurs, parmi l'Exécutif de la S. D. N., combien ont une idée nette de la Mandchourie, de sa valeur économique et stratégique ? Que leur disent le Soungari, la Nonni, Tao nan ou Tsitsikar, et même Moukden ? Ils ignorent aussi, certainement, que la Mandchourie n'a jamais été une terre *chinoise* ; elle appartenait à l'ancienne dynastie impériale, qui en interdisait l'entrée à tous ses sujets non-mandchous. C'est seulement depuis que le Japon y a créé la sécurité que des millions de Chinois, fuyant la famine et la mort, sont venus s'y établir et prospérer.

Et, cependant, ce sont les hommes ignorant ces faits essentiels qui décident *ex cathedra*, fixent nos destinées. Le suffrage universel, cette volonté aveugle, l'a ainsi réglé.

Ils se sont d'ailleurs sentis dans un tel embarras qu'ils ont appelé l'Amérique au secours, ces Etats-Unis dont l'hostilité à l'égard du Japon ne s'est que trop affirmée, ces dernières années, pendant que toutes leurs faveurs allaient à la Jeune-Chine, à la faction de Nankin, leur « gens », leur clientèle. Le choix était d'autant plus risqué que l'Amérique fournit au Japon un précédent fâcheux, bien fait pour l'encourager dans sa résistance, ainsi que le rappelle le *Times*. En effet, en 1916, il y eut conflit entre les Etats-Unis et le Mexique, alors en pleine anarchie comme la Chine d'aujourd'hui. Des vies américaines, de gros intérêts étaient constamment menacés par un banditisme organisé. Le président Wilson perdit patience, et une armée de 50.000 hommes, sous les ordres du général Pershing, franchit la frontière. Le Mexique poussa les hauts cris, comme la Jeune-Chine, parla d'*outrage* à la paix par la violation de frontières ; mais Washington s'obstina, refusant toute médiation des Sud-Américains et déclarant que le conflit devait être réglé *directement* entre les deux parties. Il est vrai que la S. D. N. n'existait pas encore ; mais aucun doute, dit avec raison le *Times*, que les Etats-Unis, devant l'urgente nécessité d'intervenir, n'eussent pas agi autrement que le Japon, surtout en présence d'un verdict aussi dénué du sens des réalités que celui de Genève.

Qu'on se rappelle aussi l'origine de l'annexion du Texas et de la Californie par les Etats-Unis : ce fut le besoin d'assurer l'ordre, de défendre leurs colons contre l'anarchie mexicaine.

Mais, revenant à la Chine, comment la France et l'Angleterre ont-elles riposté, en 1927, à la menace contre leurs concessions ? Elles ont envoyé des troupes, des escadres. Une brigade française occupe toujours notre concession de Shanghai, une division anglaise garde celle internationale. A Tientsin, à Pékin, il existe, de même, des contingents étrangers. Vraiment ? diront les pacifistes : « Hâtez-vous alors de retirer ces troupes. » Oui ! mais les conséquences ? Un conflit immédiat certain avec les éléments chinois xénophobes, si bien dressés par Nankin à l'école de Moscou ; l'attaque des concessions et le massacre d'innocents de notre race par des mercenaires et brigands, trop bien armés par les *grandes puissances, toutes trafiquantes d'armes*, avec l'assentiment de la S. D. N., la pacificatrice.

Le Français, l'Anglais et même l'Américain sont donc de bons gendarmes en Chine, aux points vitaux, ni plus ni moins que le Japonais en Mandchourie. *C'est là la vérité, la réalité.*

D^r A. Legendre.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 11 to Despatch No. 1928
of November 5, 1931.

From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'INTRANSIGANT, November 5, 1931.

EN MANDCHOURIE

De nouvelles complications dans le conflit

Les forces du général chinois Ma ont tiré sur des patrouilles japonaises

Tokio, 4 novembre. — Les dernières informations reçues à Tokio font prévoir de nouvelles complications dans le conflit mandchou.

Bien que l'on déclare officiellement que les généraux Ma Tchang Chan et Tchang Hai Peng aient accepté de retirer leurs troupes à environ 9 kilomètres du pont endommagé de chemin de fer au-dessus du fleuve Nonni, pendant que les Japonais le réparent, des nouvelles de source japonaise émanant de Kharbine indiquent que les forces du général Ma tentent d'empêcher que ces travaux soient effectués et ont tiré hier soir sur des patrouilles japonaises.

D'autre part, une information japonaise de Tchang Tchun annonce qu'un détachement de cavalerie japonais est parti ce matin à destination de Taonan, ce qui semblerait indiquer que l'escorte accompagnant l'équipe chargée des réparations du pont va être renforcée.

Les Japonais occupent une voie ferrée

De Pao Nan à Anganchi

Londres, 4 novembre. — Le correspondant en Mandchourie du « Daily Telegraph » annonce que des troupes japonaises ont procédé hier à l'occupation de la voie ferrée Pao Nan-Anganchi, à la suite de la destruction du pont sur la rivière Nonni, par des troupes du général chinois Ma Tchan Chan.

Les troupes japonaises, comprenant de l'infanterie, de la cavalerie, de l'artillerie, du génie et des infirmiers, au total 3.000 hommes, ont été transportées près du pont en six convois précédés par un train blindé.

Le drapeau japonais flotte maintenant sur toutes les gares de la région.

Un détachement du génie japonais va reconstruire le pont détruit, dont l'importance serait très grande pour la sûreté des communications japonaises, en cas d'intervention des troupes des Soviétiques.

On assure, dans les milieux japonais, que le général chinois Ma Tchan Chan serait ravitaillé en munitions et en vivres par le gouvernement de Moscou.

Le Japon exige que la Chine reconnaisse la validité de tous les traités

Tokio, 4 novembre. — On déclare aujourd'hui, dans les milieux officiels, qu'à la prochaine conférence de Genève le Japon insistera pour que la Chine reconnaisse la validité de tous les traités, y compris celui de 1915.

Telle sera l'attitude adoptée par le Japon dans la réponse qu'il doit envoyer demain à la proposition de M. Briand portant sur un traité d'arbitrage avec la Chine.

Enclosure No. 12 to Despatch No. 1928
of November 5, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE JOURNAL, November 5, 1931.

Le Japon est invité à se contenter des assurances données par la Chine à la Société des nations

La polémique de la crise sino-japonaise s'enrichit de deux nouvelles pièces: une note chinoise et une note de M. Briand.

La note chinoise n'a qu'un intérêt documentaire. Elle ne fait que répéter de



M. ALFRED SZE, délégué de la Chine
(Croquis de KELEN.)

nouveaux griefs, inévitables aussi longtemps que la querelle continue. Or, le conflit ne peut que continuer puisque la note montre la Chine s'obstinant à refuser de régler directement avec le Japon les violations de traités qui ont été l'origine de toute l'affaire. La note chinoise indique l'intention bien arrêtée de continuer à s'abriter derrière le conseil de la Société des nations.

Par contre, la note de M. Briand est très importante, puisqu'elle fixe la doctrine du conseil de la Société des nations en réponse à l'exposé japonais du 25 octobre.

Ce qui frappe immédiatement dès le début de la note de M. Briand, c'est que le président du conseil doit se référer à l'engagement pris par le Japon le 30 septembre. Il ne peut tenir compte de la date d'évacuation du 16 novembre fixée par le projet de résolution du 24 octobre, puisque le Japon a refusé de donner son adhésion, empêchant la résolution de réaliser l'unanimité requise pour sa validité.

Ainsi l'action internationale ne peut se développer que sur le plan de l'engagement japonais du 30 septembre. Or, cet engagement comporte seulement la promesse de retirer les troupes « aussi rapidement que possible... dans la mesure où la sécurité de la vie des ressortissants japonais et la protection de leurs biens seront effectivement assurées ». La formule est très élastique; elle réserve toutes les possibilités. Elle mentionne catégoriquement la sauvegarde des biens japonais, c'est-à-dire avant tout des chemins de fer. Or, la violation des droits des chemins de fer n'est-elle pas continue, puisque les Japonais ne parviennent pas à obtenir des Chinois la reconstruction des ponts détruits?

Partant de la constatation que le conflit doit évoluer autour de l'engagement du 30 septembre, M. Briand remarque que la Chine et le Japon sont d'accord sur tous les points, sauf sur un seul: la reconnaissance des traités et la garantie du respect de ces traités. Il espère que ce désaccord peut disparaître.

Quel argument la note Briand invoque-t-elle auprès du Japon?

Je me permets d'attirer l'attention de Votre Excellence sur les termes de la lettre adressée le 24 octobre par le représentant de la Chine, dans laquelle le docteur Sze déclare: « La Chine, comme tout membre de la Société des nations, est tenue, aux termes du pacte de respecter scrupuleusement toutes les obligations des traités. »

Le gouvernement chinois, pour sa part, est déterminé à exécuter loyalement toutes les obligations que lui impose le pacte. Il est disposé à donner des preuves de cette intention, en s'engageant à régler, par voie de solution arbitrale ou judiciaire, ainsi que le stipule l'article 13 du pacte, tous différends avec le Japon relativement à l'interprétation des traités. »

M. Briand estime que ces assurances peuvent être considérées comme « des engagements conformes aux principes fondamentaux du Japon ».

Dès lors, il exprime l'espoir que le gouvernement japonais exécutera l'engagement pris le 30 septembre de retirer ses troupes aussitôt que possible. Il rappelle l'attention du Japon sur le paragraphe 5 du projet de résolution du 24 octobre, qui « recommande aux deux gouvernements de désigner immédiatement des représentants pour régler les détails d'exécution de l'évacuation et de la prise en charge des territoires évacués, afin que cette opération puisse s'accomplir de façon régulière et sans retard ».

Voilà la conclusion de la note qui, en résumé, invite le Japon à se contenter d'engagements de principes du gouvernement chinois.

Mais tout le conflit n'est-il pas né du fait que le gouvernement chinois s'est montré incapable de tenir ses engagements, qu'il en conteste même quelques-uns? La proposition d'arbitrage ne fait que souligner la gravité de l'opposition. Quel est le gouvernement, en effet, qui accepterait de soumettre à des arbitres le fait même de l'existence de traités

formels? Il ne s'agit pas du tout de divergences d'interprétation relevant de l'arbitrage mais de l'existence même des traités.

Un télégramme de Tokio annonce déjà que le gouvernement japonais s'en tiendra strictement à sa thèse et qu'il n'admettra aucun intermédiaire entre la Chine et lui pour déterminer la validité et la garantie d'exécution des traités existants.

Ce que le Japon répondra à la note Briand

Tokio, 4 novembre. — On déclare aujourd'hui dans les milieux officiels qu'à la prochaine conférence de Genève le Japon insistera pour que la Chine reconnaisse la validité de tous les traités, y compris celui de 1915.

Telle est l'attitude adoptée par le Japon dans la réponse faite à la proposition de M. Briand portant sur un traité d'arbitrage avec la Chine.

Faisant allusion à l'avis exprimé par le ministre français, à savoir que le Japon devrait avoir tous apaisements à l'égard du 5^e point de ses revendications (portant sur l'observation des traités), la Chine étant prête à soumettre la question au tribunal de La Haye, un haut fonctionnaire a déclaré que c'était précisément la non-observation des traités par la Chine qui était la seule justification des récentes mesures militaires du Japon. Il a ajouté que cette attitude de la Chine avait créé une situation qui menaçait la position du Japon en Mandchourie. En conséquence, le Japon ne peut pas revenir au *statu quo* tant que la Chine n'a pas reconnu les obligations qu'elle a contractées en vertu des traités.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

**Nouvelle note de la Chine
à la Société des nations**

GENÈVE, 4 novembre. — Le secrétaire général vient de communiquer au conseil et aux membres de la Société des nations une note et un memorandum qu'il a reçus du représentant de la Chine.

Dans cette note, le gouvernement chinois déclare qu'il est sérieusement inquiet des développements de la situation en Mandchourie depuis l'ajournement du conseil.

Le gouvernement chinois répète qu'il est fermement résolu à ne jamais accepter en aucune circonstance de négocier sous la pression de l'occupation militaire et il est assuré que les membres de la S.D.N. et les Etats-Unis d'Amérique ne souffriront pas que le pacte de la Société des nations et le pacte de Paris, ainsi que le traité des neuf puissances signé à Washington, soient foulés aux pieds.

Le memorandum contient un résumé des informations parvenues de Nankin par câblogramme durant les trois derniers jours. Il traite des moyens en vue d'assurer le retrait des troupes. — (Havas.)

**Le Japon
dément l'occupation de Tsitsikar**

TOKIO, 4 novembre. — L'agence Rengo déclare que l'information qui a été adressée au secrétariat de la Société des nations, selon laquelle les troupes japonaises auraient occupé Tsitsikar est officiellement démentie. — (Havas.)

Assurances japonaises à Washing'on

WASHINGTON, 4 novembre. — M. Debuchi, ambassadeur du Japon, a déclaré aujourd'hui au département d'Etat américain que le Japon n'envisagerait pas d'étendre son activité en Mandchourie.

Pop. 5

Enclosure No. 13 to Despatch No. 1928
of November 5, 1931.

From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE POPULAIRE, November 5, 1931.

LA SITUATION EN MANDCHOURIE

Les Japonais s'avancent vers la Sibérie

C'était hier une journée bien chargée.

Une série de notes ont été échangées entre le Japon, la Chine et la S.D.N. Des informations de plus en plus alarmantes sont parvenues de Mandchourie.

En ce qui concerne les notes, il y a d'abord une longue réponse de M. Briand, président en exercice du Conseil de la S.D.N., à la communication japonaise du 26 octobre. M. Briand essaye de persuader le Japon que la seule divergence entre le point de vue nippon et celui de la S.D.N. consiste dans les fameux « cinq points fondamentaux ». Il souligne l'attitude loyale et pacifique de la Chine. Il exprime l'espoir que le Japon poursuivra aussi rapidement que possible le retrait de ses troupes.

Un télégramme de Tokio, adressé au secrétariat de la S.D.N., annonce que le Japon refuse de désigner ses représentants pour régler les détails de l'évacuation, ainsi qu'il a été prévu dans la résolution du Conseil, en date du 24 octobre. Le gouvernement japonais rappelle qu'aucune résolution n'a été adoptée le 24, ce qui est exact, puisque l'unanimité n'a pas été obtenue. Le Japon ayant voté contre. Tokio maintient son point de vue : la Chine doit accepter d'abord les cinq points fondamentaux.

Enfin, il y a eu deux communications du gouvernement chinois. Celui-ci exprime son inquiétude au sujet de la situation en Mandchourie. Dans sa première note, il déclare que « l'armée japonaise étend et consolide fermement sa mainmise sur la Mandchourie du sud et fait, pour pénétrer dans la Mandchourie du nord, des tentatives qui causent de l'anxiété à Moscou ».

La deuxième note est plus explicite. D'après le résumé transmis par l'Agence Havas, la Chine déclare :

Il est clair maintenant que l'armée japonaise d'occupation poursuit délibérément une politique qui s'efforce de substituer à l'autorité du gouvernement chinois la domination de différents particuliers et groupements institués et maintenus par les Japonais eux-mêmes.

Dans le memorandum d'hier, une nouvelle mesure inspirée par la politique en question était annoncée comme imminente. Or la dite mesure vient d'être prise : les militaires japonais confisquent les recettes de l'impôt sur le sel, et essaient de les détourner au profit des prétendues autorités qu'ils ont instituées eux-mêmes.

Il n'est pas nécessaire d'insister sur le grave préjudice causé aux intérêts étrangers.

Il est clair d'autre part que cette politique constitue un défi catégorique aux recommandations du conseil et une violation flagrante du pacte de la S.D.N., du pacte de Paris et du traité des neuf puissances signé à Washington.

La situation, conclut la note chinoise, est d'une extrême gravité.

D'après les informations de Mandchourie, les Japonais avancent en effet dans la direction du Nord. Le bruit

court même que Tsitsikar est occupé. Or, Tsitsikar est une gare importante du chemin de fer de l'Est chinois, contrôlé par les Russes.

Le prétexte qui a servi aux Japonais pour exécuter ce mouvement en avant est le soi-disant refus du général chinois Ma-Tchan-Chan, de réparer un pont de chemin de fer qu'il avait détruit au cours de sa retraite. Le Japon affirme que les réparations effectuées, ses troupes se retireront.

On connaît la valeur des promesses japonaises. Il est clair que l'occupation de Tsitsikar, si elle se confirme, n'est pas une mesure temporaire, mais bien le commencement d'une vaste opération dirigée contre l'U.R.S.S.

Pour le moment, les Soviets ne réagissent point. Un article des *Izvestia*, organe officiel du gouvernement des Soviets, dément toute concentration de troupes russes sur la frontière de la Mandchourie. Moscou accuse même les Japonais d'avoir inventé la fable de « l'intervention de l'U.R.S.S. dans le conflit sino-japonais pour justifier le maintien des troupes japonaises en Mandchourie ».

Tout cela est fort bien, mais ce n'est pas là une *politique* de paix.

On se trouve en présence d'une action militaire du Japon qui s'approprie une province chinoise. Tôt ou tard, la guerre entre la Chine et le Japon éclatera. En outre, l'occupation militaire du Chemin de fer de l'Est chinois coupe la voie directe qui relie la Russie avec la province de Vladivostok. L'U.R.S.S., c'est certain, ne pourrait pas accepter cette situation. Mais quand elle se trouvera devant un fait accompli, il sera trop tard pour protester. Ou plutôt, à ce moment, la protestation serait le commencement de la guerre.

Ce n'est pas une *politique* de paix que de laisser les événements évoluer vers leur conclusion logique qui est la guerre. Une véritable *politique* de paix doit empêcher un conflit de se développer et de dégénérer en une guerre.

La Russie, si elle ne veut pas être acculée à la capitulation dangereuse ou à la guerre inévitable, doit donc agir. Et agir contre la guerre, c'est essayer d'opposer à l'agresseur le front unique de toutes les puissances désireuses de maintenir la paix.

Quelles que soient les hésitations et les faiblesses de la S.D.N. et des gouvernements représentés et associés au Conseil, aucun d'eux, ni la S.D.N., dans son ensemble, ne désirent favoriser l'expansion japonaise. L'U.R.S.S. le sait et doit utiliser ces dispositions favorables pour elle des puissances capitalistes.

Si le gouvernement soviétique ne le fait pas, soit par aveuglement, soit par haine contre la S.D.N., soit par méfiance à l'égard de l'ensemble des Etats, il condamnera la Russie et la Révolution aux pires aventures.

O. ROSENFELD.

Enclosure No. 14 to Despatch No. 1928
of November 5, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LA REPUBLIQUE, November 5, 1931.

On se bat toujours en Mandchourie

Mauvaises nouvelles aujourd'hui : les Japonais poursuivent leur avance vers Tsitsihar et vers Kharbine, c'est-à-dire vers les points où les lignes mandchoues nord-sud rejoignent les lignes mandchoues est-ouest, points stratégiques extrêmement importants. Cependant on parle d'éléments mongols organisés par les Soviets qui marcheraient à leur rencontre. Risque de guerre avouée qui s'accroît de jour en jour.

Précisons ici une fois de plus que la Mandchourie est mise en valeur par le capital et les techniciens japonais d'une part, la main-d'œuvre chinoise de l'autre. Dix millions de colons d'un côté, plusieurs dizaines de milliards de francs de l'autre. On ne voit comme solution du problème que l'établissement d'un condominium. La Société des Nations en demandant que nul ne parlât d'annexion et que le Japon retirât ses troupes à condition que l'ordre fût rétabli en avant jeté les bases ; on reviendra sur ces bases un jour ou l'autre ; il n'y en a pas d'autres qui puissent permettre d'édifier une paix durable.

Le Japon, disions-nous, ne saurait abandonner ses positions en Mandchourie, parce que le pays lui fournit des matières premières pour son industrie et des produits alimentaires dont il ne peut absolument point se passer. Mais on peut se demander aussi ce que la guerre contre les Soviets lui rapporterait. Or, la partie nord de l'île Sakhaline qui appartient aux Soviets est extrêmement riche en gisements de pétrole. Si riche que le Japon qui, à l'heure actuelle, est tributaire des producteurs de pétrole étrangers, et notamment américains, deviendrait, s'il possédait Sakhaline dans son entier, son maître en matière de pétrole. Et sa flotte est chauffée au mazout.

Ce n'est pas tout. Si nos conservateurs voient volontiers dans le Japon la puissance capable de rétablir l'ordre en Chine, il voient peut-être aussi en lui la puissance capable d'arrêter la marche des Soviets sur l'Asie ou même de donner un coup décisif à l'Union des Soviets. On parle dans certains milieux d'une alliance polono-japonaise. Les Japonais accrocheraient les Soviets — il faut se souvenir qu'en 1919 ils ont poussé jusqu'au lac Baïkal — et quand ceux-ci seraient dans la situation où se trouvaient les armées russes en 1905, la Pologne interviendrait.

Par ailleurs, les Soviets se flattent de pouvoir compter sur l'appui américain. Et il est bien entendu que l'Amérique ne voit pas sans une certaine crainte le Japon agrandir son emprise sur la Mandchourie. On peut pourtant parier à coup sûr pour la neutralité américaine. Le jeu serait pour l'Amérique infiniment trop dangereux. Les bases navales avancées des Etats-Unis sont très loin de leurs côtes et au cas de guerre navale, les Philippines seraient une proie facile pour le Japon. Les deux flottes sont certes dans la proportion de 66 à 100, mais la marine japonaise concentrée aux abords d'un archipel très facile à défendre est à peu près imbattable sur les côtes d'Asie.

Et la Chine ? Mais la Chine ne peut rien. La Chine n'a pas de marine, pas d'armée. L'anarchie la plus profonde règne en Chine. Tout récemment le gouvernement de Nankin a tâté les Soviets pour obtenir quelque chose comme une alliance. Les Soviets en ont profité pour annoncer que fut enfin achevée la négociation sino-russe relative au chemin de fer de Kharbine. Les Chinois ont cédé. Les droits des Soviets sur le chemin de fer sont par eux reconnus. Cela renforce la situation des Soviets en Mandchourie ; cela permet de croire que lorsque les Japonais atteindront

pon cherche à l'entraver. Nul n'a le droit de se rendre justice à soi-même ; nul n'a le droit de faire la guerre pour quelque motif que ce soit ; toute tractation doit être publique et les négociations dites directes qui facilitent les chantages doivent être interdites. Le Japon avait accepté tout cela à Genève. Mais sa diplomatie est une chose, son gouvernement une autre. Les militaires, là-bas, restent les maîtres.

Comme dit la Bible, on reconnaît l'arbre à ses fruits, un gouvernement de militaires à ce qu'il fait la guerre. Et voilà l'explication des événements de Mandchourie.

Pierre DOMINIQUE.

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Précisons ici une fois de plus que la Mandchourie est mise en valeur par le capital et les techniciens japonais d'une part, la main-d'œuvre chinoise de l'autre. Dix millions de colons d'un côté, plusieurs dizaines de milliards de francs de l'autre. On ne voit comme solution du problème que l'établissement d'un condominium. La Société des Nations en demandant que nul ne parlât d'annexion et que le Japon retirât ses troupes à condition que l'ordre fût rétabli en ayant jeté les bases ; on reviendra sur ces bases un jour ou l'autre ; il n'y en a pas d'autres qui puissent permettre d'édifier une paix durable.

Le Japon, disions-nous, ne saurait abandonner ses positions en Mandchourie, parce que le pays lui fournit des matières premières pour son industrie et des produits alimentaires dont il ne peut absolument point se passer. Mais on peut se demander aussi ce que la guerre contre les Soviets lui rapporterait. Or, la partie nord de l'île Sakhaline qui appartient aux Soviets est extrêmement riche en gisements de pétrole. Si riche que le Japon qui, à l'heure actuelle, est tributaire des producteurs de pétrole étrangers, et notamment américains, deviendrait, s'il possédait Sakhaline, ~~donc dans~~ la situation où se trouvaient les armées russes en 1905, la Pologne interviendrait.

Par ailleurs, les Soviets se flattent de pouvoir compter sur l'appui américain. Et il est bien entendu que l'Amérique ne voit pas sans une certaine crainte le Japon agrandir son emprise sur la Mandchourie. On peut pourtant parler à coup sûr pour la neutralité américaine. Le jeu serait pour l'Amérique infiniment trop dangereux. Les bases navales avancées des Etats-Unis sont très loin de leurs côtes et au cas de guerre navale, les Philippines seraient une proie facile pour le Japon. Les deux flottes sont certes dans la proportion de 66 à 100, mais la marine japonaise concentrée aux abords d'un archipel très facile à défendre est à peu près imbattable sur les côtes d'Asie.

Et la Chine ? Mais la Chine ne peut rien. La Chine n'a pas de marine, pas d'armée. L'anarchie la plus profonde règne en Chine. Tout récemment le gouvernement de Nankin a traité les Soviets pour obtenir quelque chose comme une alliance. Les Soviets en ont profité pour demander que fût enfin achevée la négociation sino-russe relative au chemin de fer de Kharbine. Les Chinois ont cédé. Les droits des Soviets sur le chemin de fer sont par eux reconnus. Cela renforce la situation des Soviets en Mandchourie ; cela permet de croire que lorsque les Japonais atteindront Tsitsihar ou Kharbine, les Soviets interviendront. Mais cela ne ramène pas la paix. Loin de là.

La paix ne peut être ramenée que par l'action de la S.D.N., mais la ja-

pon cherche à l'entraver. Nul n'a le droit de se rendre justice à soi-même ; nul n'a le droit de faire la guerre pour quelque motif que ce soit ; toute tractation doit être publique et les négociations dites directes qui facilitent les chantages doivent être interdites. Le Japon avait accepté tout cela à Genève. Mais sa diplomatie est une chose, son gouvernement une autre. Les militaires, là-bas, restent les maîtres.

Comme dit la Bible, on reconnaît l'arbre à ses fruits, un gouvernement de militaires à ce qu'il fait la guerre. Et voilà l'explication des événements de Mandchourie.


Pierre DOMINIQUE.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




No. 1931

AM 800
EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Paris, November 6, 1931.



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FOR DISTRIBUTION - CHECK
To the Field
In U. S. A.



F/DEW

793.94/2731

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

Sir:

With reference to the Embassy's telegram No. 699
of October 31, 2 p.m., I have the honor to transmit for
the information of the Department, as of special interest
in connection with the Sino-Japanese conflict in Manchuria,
copy and translation of two articles by Stéphane Lauzanne
which appeared in LE MATIN of October 31 and November 1
respectively. In these articles, written from the

United . . .


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United States, Lauzanne asserts on what he claims to be good authority that American opinion has undergone a complete change as regards the situation in the Far-East and that it is now sympathetic with the Japanese position. While these articles have not occasioned editorial comment in the French press, they cannot, on account of the prestige of the writer, help from having a considerable effect upon French opinion in general.

Respectfully yours,



Williamson S. Howell, Jr.,
Chargé d'affaires ad interim.

✓
Enclosures:

- No.1. Extract from LE MATIN
of October 31;
- No.2. Translation of Enclosure
No. 1;
- No.3. Extract from LE MATIN
of November 1;
- No.4. Translation of Enclosure
No. 3.

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710.

Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 1911

of NOV 1931

from the Embassy at Paris

Extract from LE MATIN, October 31, 1931.

LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS

Washington considère que le conseil de la S. D. N. a trop avantage la Chine

Un parallèle entre l'habileté
du délégué chinois
et l'intransigeance du délégué japonais

[DE NOTRE ENVOYÉ SPÉCIAL]

WASHINGTON, 30 octobre. — (Par câble, via Western Union). — Il est préférable, je crois, d'exposer sans ambages que la récente décision du conseil de la S. D. N. dans l'affaire de Mandchourie n'aura guère contribué à rehausser son prestige et son autorité vis-à-vis du département d'Etat et du peuple américains.

L'opinion américaine, qui n'a jamais montré de partialité exagérée à l'égard du Japon, a subi une curieuse et profonde transformation. La vérité est qu'elle est excédée du désordre et de l'anarchie qui sont l'état chronique de la Chine. Dans l'affaire de Mandchourie, le département d'Etat estime que si on chiffrait les torts des deux parties, 90 pour cent devraient être mis au compte de la Chine et 10 pour cent seulement au compte du Japon. Le rapport adressé au département d'Etat par un de ses meilleurs agents de Pékin, très pro-chinois, dit, en propres termes :

Je dois reconnaître que la seule province chinoise où règne actuellement l'ordre est la Mandchourie dans la zone occupée par les Japonais. S'il était possible d'ouvrir les cerveaux des Chinois occupant cette zone et de les photographier, on verrait qu'ils ne souhaitent rien tant que l'occupation japonaise parce que seule cette occupation assure le respect des biens et des personnes.

Evidemment, l'armée japonaise d'occupation a eu tort de contrevenir aux ordres de Tokio et de sortir de la zone fixée par les traités mais elle y fut provoquée par la série innombrable des méfaits et des crimes chinois. Il n'y a pas une armée au monde qui, malgré sa discipline, puisse résister éternellement à de continuelles provocations.

Dans ces conditions, le département d'Etat estimait que, en bonne justice, le conseil de la S. D. N. devait dire aux Japonais, comme on le leur avait dit jadis dans le cas analogue du Chantoung : « Retirez aussitôt que vous le pourrez vos troupes », et en même temps dire aux Chinois : « Négociez aussitôt que possible avec les Japonais et faites cesser les troubles dont ils se plaignent ». Il fallait, en un mot, mettre sur le même plan les négociations et le retrait des troupes. Au lieu de cela, le conseil demande le retrait des troupes avant l'ouverture des négociations, c'est-à-dire avantage la Chine au détriment du Japon. Il commet donc une erreur de justice, qui est toujours la plus grave des erreurs.

A quoi tient cette fâcheuse partialité ? A ceci, dit-on à Washington, que le porte-parole chinois à Genève fut habile, souple, déférent et multiplia les flatteries à l'égard de l'aréopage genevois, tandis que le négociateur japonais se montra raide, maladroit, cassant et peu ménager des susceptibilités des conseillers auliques. Mais, ajoutet-on, dans les grands conflits internationaux les faits doivent être examinés en eux-mêmes et selon les règles éternelles de l'équité, sans se laisser impressionner par l'habileté, les courbettes ou l'éloquence des avocats.

Comme il est probable que le Japon n'obtempère pas à la décision du conseil et n'évacue pas, à la date fixée, la zone occupée extra-légalement par ses troupes, le conseil de la S. D. N. fera bien de réfléchir à deux fois avant de rendre son deuxième verdict. S'il prétendait faire jouer l'article du covenant comportant des sévérités économiques à l'égard du Japon, les Etats-Unis certainement ne s'y associeraient pas, d'abord parce que ce ne serait pas juste, ensuite parce que ce serait absurde. Ce n'est pas au moment où le commerce est partout difficile qu'il convient de le rendre plus difficile encore.

D'une façon générale, on pourrait dire aussi, en se plaçant sur le terrain de la haute politique, que ce n'est pas au moment où partout, dans le monde, les nations d'ordre sont aux prises avec les nations de désordre qu'il convient de s'alléner les sympathies des premières. L'Amérique, en tout cas, penche pour les pays d'ordre.

Stéphane Lauzanne

1845

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 2
to despatch No. 1931
of November 6, 1931.
from the American Embassy, Paris.

Translation of article cabled from Washington,
October 30 by Stephane Lauzanne to the MATIN
published next day.

THE SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT

Washington considers that the Council of the
League of Nations has favored China too much.

A parallel between the ableness of the Chinese
delegate and the stubbornness of the Japanese
delegate.

Washington, 30 October. (By cable, via Western Union).

It is preferable, I believe, to point out, without beating
about the bush, that the recent decision of the Council of the
League of Nations in the Manchurian affair will hardly have
contributed to enhance its prestige and its authority vis-à-vis
the Department of State and the American people.

American opinion, which has never shown exaggerated partiality
with respect to Japan, has undergone a curious and profound trans-
formation. The truth is that it has wearied of the disorder and
anarchy which reigns chronically in China. In the Manchurian
affair, the Department of State feels that, if a statement were
to be drawn up of the mistakes of both parties, 90 percent should
be charged to China's account and 10 per cent only to Japan's.
The report made to the Department of State by one of its best
agents in Peiping, very pro-Chinese, stated, in fitting terms:

"I must acknowledge that the only Chinese province
where order reigns at the present time is Manchuria
in the zone occupied by the Japanese. Were it possible

to open . . .

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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to open the minds of the Chinese occupying that zone and photograph them, it would be seen that they wish nothing better than the Japanese occupation because that occupation alone assures respect of property and individuals."

Evidently, the Japanese army of occupation did wrong to disobey Tokio's orders and to penetrate beyond the zone fixed by the treaties, but it was provoked by the countless series of misdeeds and crimes on the part of the Chinese. There is not an army in the world which, despite its discipline, can eternally resist continual provocation.

Under these conditions, the Department of State felt that, in all justice, the Council of the League of Nations should have said to the Japanese, as it had done formerly in the analogous case of Chantung: "Retire your troops as quickly as you can", and at the same time should have said to the Chinese: "Negotiate with the Japanese as quickly as possible and see that the troubles of which they complain cease." In a word, the negotiations and the retreat of the troops should have been placed on the same plane. Instead, the Council demanded the retreat of the troops prior to the opening of negotiations, that is to say, favoring China to the detriment of Japan. It committed, therefore, a miscarriage of justice, which is always the gravest of errors.

On what was this regrettable partiality based? It is said in Washington that it was because the spokesman for China at Geneva was able, elastic, yielding and salved the Geneva assembly with flatteries, whereas the Japanese negotiator was inflexible, awkward, dictatorial and inconsiderate of the feelings of the Aulic counsellors. But, it is added, in all great international conflicts facts should be examined in themselves and in accordance with . . .

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with the eternal rules of equity, without the assembly allowing itself to be influenced by the ableness, fawning or eloquence of advocates.

Since it is probable that Japan will not comply with the decision of the Council and will not evacuate on the date fixed the zone occupied extra-legally by her troops, the League of Nations will do well to reflect twice before rendering its second verdict. If it pretends to evoke the article of the Covenant envisaging economic sanctions with respect to Japan, the United States certainly will not associate itself therein because (1) this would not be just, and (2) it would be absurd. This is not the time, when commercial relations everywhere are difficult, to render them even more difficult.

In a general way, it can also be said, on the ground of sound policy, that it is not advisable just now, when peaceful nations everywhere in the world are quarreling with nations in disorder, to estrange one's self from the sympathies of the former.

America, in any case, leans toward the peaceful countries.

Stéphane Lauzanne

HSB/cg.

Enclosure No. 1 to Dispatch No. 1011

of November 1, 1931

From the Embassy at Tokyo.

Extract from the Tokyo Dispatch, November 1, 1931.

LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS

L'opinion américaine est favorable au Japon qui en Asie représente la civilisation

*Les soviets fournissent aux bandes
chinoises de Mandchourie
des munitions et des vivres*

[DE NOTRE ENVOYÉ SPÉCIAL]

WASHINGTON, 31 octobre. — (Par câble, via Western Union). — Les dépêches d'Extrême-Orient reçues ici depuis quarante-huit heures s'accordent toutes pour reconnaître que, derrière la bagarre de Mandchourie, apparaît la main sinistre des gens de Moscou. Cette main jusqu'ici était demeurée cachée, mais les Japonais l'ont saisie dans le sac, sous la forme de munitions, de vivres et de



M. SHIMAZU

commissaire financier spécial du gouvernement japonais, à son départ de Tokio pour Londres où il va rejoindre son poste.

matériel fournis par les autorités soviétiques aux bandes chinoises du général Ma Chan Shan. M. Walter Duranty, correspondant du *New York Times* à Moscou, télégraphie que des notes raides sont échangées entre les soviets et l'ambassadeur du Japon. Il est néanmoins peu probable qu'un échange de coups suive l'échange de notes, car la Russie bolchevik a moins d'allant pour se battre elle-même que pour faire se battre les autres.

Naturellement le développement de la situation n'a pu que renfor-

cer l'opinion américaine dans ses dispositions favorables au Japon et désapprobatives pour le conseil de la Société des Nations.

L'opinion américaine, nous ne le répéterons jamais suffisamment, est une opinion simpliste, qui va droit au fait; elle refuse de se laisser embellir dans les controverses juridiques et les arguties de procédure. Pour elle, le conflit est avant tout un conflit entre une nation, peut-être un peu brusque dans ses gestes et hautaine dans ses attitudes, mais représentant l'ordre et la civilisation, et une nation en décadence et qui n'a gardé que l'art génial de tendre des paravents, brodés de motifs trompeurs. Entre ces deux nations, l'opinion américaine, malgré de vieux préjugés et de vieilles méfiances à l'égard des Japonais, penche d'autant plus vers le Japon que maintenant le banditisme russe apparaît derrière le brigandage chinois. L'opinion américaine va vers le Japon, non parce que Japon, mais parce que gen-darme.

Quant au département d'Etat, il maintient que l'affaire n'a rien à voir avec le pacte Briand-Kellogg et qu'il ne faut pas prendre l'habitude de transformer des rixes dans des terrains vagues en batailles de frontières.

Si le Japon est en Mandchourie, il l'est en vertu de droits à lui reconnus par le traité qui lui concède la zone de police. Qu'il ait excédé ses droits en sortant de sa zone, c'est certain, mais qu'on ait multiplié les provocations pour l'en faire sortir, c'est non moins certain. Il faut donc, selon l'avis de Washington, qu'il rentre dans sa zone, mais il faut aussi que les provocations cessent. Les deux choses vont de pair. Et le conseil de la Société des Nations, tout occupé à humer l'encens que le Chinois astucieux lui distillait sous les narines, a par trop négligé cette parité.

Par ailleurs, jusqu'à plus ample informé, le département d'Etat ne croit pas que le Japon ait envie d'envahir et d'occuper toute la Mandchourie : d'abord parce que cette occupation le rendrait territorialement limitrophe de la Russie soviétique et que nul ne tient à avoir le choléra comme voisin. Ensuite, parce que le Japon a favorisé l'émigration de milliers de Chinois en Mandchourie septentrionale et orientale, ce qui prouve qu'il ne nourrit pas d'ambitions annexionnistes.

Pour conclure, on compte ici que la France, qui représente actuellement la principale force d'ordre en Europe, fera tout pour se mettre d'accord avec le Japon, qui représente la seule force d'ordre en Asie. L'heure n'est pas au byzantinisme des basochiens, elle est au groupement des peuples d'ordre.

Stéphane Lauzanne

Enclosure No.4 to despatch No. 1931
of November 6, 1931.
from the American Embassy, Paris.

THE SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT

American opinion is favorable to Japan
which represents civilization in Asia.

The Soviets are furnishing munitions
and food to Chinese bands in Manchuria.

Washington, October 31 - (By cable, via Western Union).

Far-East despatches received here during the last 48 hours concur in recognizing that, behind the Manchurian squabble there appears the sinister hand of Moscow. That hand has up to the present remained concealed, but the Japanese have unearthed it in form of munitions, food and material furnished by the Soviet authorities to the Chinese bands of General Ma-Chen-Shen. Mr. Walter Duranty, correspondent of the NEW YORK TIMES at Moscow, telegraphs that sharp notes are being exchanged between the Soviets and the Japanese Ambassador. It is nevertheless improbable that an exchange of blows will succeed the exchange of notes, since Soviet Russia is less eager to fight herself than to cause others to fight each other.

Naturally the development in the situation has only strengthened American opinion in its attitude, favorable to Japan and unfavorable towards the Council of the League of Nations.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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American opinion, we can never sufficiently repeat, is a simplest opinion which goes straight to facts; it refuses to allow itself to become entangled in legal controversies and quibblings of procedure. As regards American opinion, the conflict is primarily a conflict between one nation, doubtless a little brusque in her actions and haughty in her attitude, but representing order and civilization, and a nation in decadence which has only preserved the genial art of mounting screens embroidered with deceptive designs. Between these two nations, American opinion, in spite of old prejudices and distrust with regard to the Japanese, leans all the more toward Japan since Russian banditry now appears behind Chinese brigandage. America leans toward Japan, not because of Japan, but because she represents order.

As for the Department of State, it maintains that the affair has no relationship with the Briand-Kellogg Pact and that it is not necessary to form the habit of transforming squirmishes in waste lands into frontier battles.

If Japan is in Manchuria, it is by virtue of the rights accorded her by the Treaty which grants her the police zone. That she has over-stepped her rights in penetrating beyond her zone, is certain, but that the provocations forcing her to leave her zone have been multiplied is no less certain. She should, therefore, according to the opinion of Washington, return within her zone, but the provocations should cease as well. The two things go hand-in-hand. The Council of the League of Nations, quite occupied in inhaling the incense

which . . .

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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which the astute Chinese distills under its nostrils, has been, indeed, too neglectful of that parity.

Moreover, according to the best information, the Department of State does not believe that Japan desires to invade and occupy the whole of Manchuria because (1) that occupation would make her territorially bordering on Soviet Russia, and (2) no one is anxious to have cholera for a neighbor. Furthermore, that Japan has favored the emigration of thousands of Chinese in Northern and Eastern Manchuria proves that she does not nourish annexationist ambitions.

In conclusion, France, which at the present time represents the principal force of order in Europe, is counted on here to do everything in her power to reach an agreement with Japan, which represents the only force of order in Asia. This is no time for the byzantinism of the Basochiens, it is for the grouping of the nations of order.

Stéphane Lauzanne.

HSB/og.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



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



LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Riga, Latvia.

November 6, 1931.

NOV 17 1931



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Mr. B. Rieker	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Mr. J. D.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
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No. 8213

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor, in supplement to my despatch
No. 8211, of this date, to report that the official
newspaper of the Soviet Government, the Moscow IZVESTIA
No. 305, of November 4, 1931, in the editorial leading
article commented with much bitterness on the acceptance
by many in Europe and America of the Japanese charges
that the Soviet Union is lending underhanded support
to

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-2-

to Chinese military forces. The readiness of imperialistic circles to spread cook-and-bull stories about a red danger in northern Manchuria, while quite aware of the foolish character of these reports of Soviet interference, indicates, the IZVESTIA declares, a general desire for the extension of occupation.

Aside from the mortification of registering the lack of credit given to Soviet official asseverations, what seems to be of most note in this editorial is the reassertion of Soviet harmlessness and the betrayal of chagrin that Russia is exposed to an unequal contest for the imperialistic legacy of Count Witte in the Far East.

Respectfully yours,

Felix Cole
Felix Cole,
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

Enclosure:

1. He That Sows The Wind Will Heap The Whirlwind.
(Moscow IZVESTIA, No. 305, November 4, 1931.)

(In triplicate.)

Copy to E.I.C.Paris.

Copy to E.I.C.Paris for Peiping.

Copy to E.I.C.Paris for Tokyo.

Copy to American Consul General, Harbin, direct.

Copy to American Embassy, London, direct.

710 R Japan - China.

DBM/hs

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 0210 of NOV 6 1931
 from the Legation at Riga, Latvia.

SOURCE: Moscow IZVESTIA,
 No. 305,
 November 4, 1931.

HE THAT SOWS THE WIND WILL REAP THE WHIRLWIND.

(Translation of excerpts from leading
 editorial.)

The Japanese military clique gives as the reason for the occupation of Manchuria the danger implied to Japanese residents and Japanese property by the various units of the disarmed and dispersed army of Chang Hsueh-liang, the dangers implied by soldiers who have turned bandits, and so forth, and so on. This argumentation was meant for justifying the occupation. But it becomes clearly insufficient even in the eyes of the League of Nations. New arguments are needed now to explain why the occupation forces are left in Manchuria. And if such an argument does not exist in nature — it has to be invented. And so the fairy-tale was invented about the red danger in Manchuria, the fairy-tale about the interference of the U.S.S.R. in the Chinese-Japanese conflict... the provocative version about the aid rendered by the Soviet power to General Mah commanding the troops at Tsitsihar ... We need not mention that Karakhan's statement leaves no doubt as to the falseness of these rumors.

And yet, in spite of the unmistakable falsehood of these rumors invented by certain circles which are displaying

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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displaying much activity on the territory of Manchuria, these rumors broadly reverberate throughout the imperialistic circles, and the imperialistic press not only of Japan, but of the whole world ... The chairman of the Military and Naval Committee of the American parliament, Britten, displayed phenomenal impertinence in declaring that, "Russia mobilizes colossal land, naval, and air forces in Manchuria, and whole world sits on a volcano, as it were, an eruption of which may take place at any moment."

The New York WORLD-TELEGRAM explains what purposes these and similar inventions are to serve. The editor of the financial section of that newspaper writes: "War, perhaps, even stimulates trade. If Russia will be drawn into war even in a small measure, she will be compelled to abandon the five-year plan which has caused so much worry to the United States." That American newspaper relishes already in advance, on the one hand, the profits to be derived from the supply of war stores to Japan and China, while on the other hand it dreams already of the failure of the five-year plan, due to the fact that the Soviet Union will have to shoot into the air the steel and the iron which otherwise might have been used for building works and factories ...

Thus we see with what readiness the imperialistic circles in a number of countries listen to, and spread, cook-and-bull tales about the red danger in Northern Manchuria. These gentlemen are of course perfectly well

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well aware of the foolishness of the rumors about Soviet interference. But what are they to do, if without such rumors it is impossible to "justify" the military occupation, and impossible to "justify" the extension of the occupation? Hence the sensation in connection with the fable about the red danger in Manchuria ...

... A new "argument" is required, an argument that might serve the occupation at least till November 16 when the League of Nations is to take up once more the subject of the Japanese-Chinese conflict. As such an argument is considered by the authors of the occupation the fable of Soviet interference, the slanderous inventions about the alleged concentration of Soviet troops on the border of Manchuria, about supplies from the U.S.S.R. to China, about Soviet military instructors, etc.

Well, let the occidental and oriental gentlemen engaged in kindling war and conflicts continue inventing absurd rumors about the U.S.S.R., to gratify the imperialists of all countries. If they do not know it yet, they will soon learn that he that soweth the wind, will reap the whirlwind.

js/hs

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



LEGATION OF THE
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Riga, Latvia.

November 6, 1931.

793.94

DIVISION OF
 EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
 JAN 8 - 1932
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 NOV 13 1931
 Department of State

HISTORICAL ADVISER

JAN 12 1932

DEPT. OF STATE

FOR DISTRIBUTION - CHECK		Yes	No
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RECEIVED

NOV 21 1931

SECRETARY'S OFFICE
 SECRETARY OF STATE
 NOV 21 1931

F/DEW

793.94/2733

No. 8211

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
 Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that the Soviet press recently has displayed growing nervousness over the development of the Japanese-Chinese conflict in Manchuria.

The departure of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs for Ankara and thence for Italy in the last ten days of October might, theoretically, have one of three or four explanations:

A

JAN 15 1932

FILED

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A satisfactory understanding had been reached with Japan, and it was expected to remain satisfactory;

The Moscow dignitaries preferred to leave Far Eastern matters to Karakhan;

They did not expect to take important resolutions about the Manchurian situation during the absence of Litvinov;

Or, if so, they attached greater importance to the maintenance or strengthening of the Soviet position in the Levant, as set forth in my despatch No. 8209, of November 6, 1931.

I shall not undertake to discover which of these alternatives is most probable.

With reference to the first, it may be added that, however satisfactory the understanding between two Powers may be, the stronger of them is necessarily in the advantage in the translation of the understanding into action. The Japanese naturally are well acquainted with the supply of the Soviet armies with foodstuffs, forage and other munitions of war, and probably expect the deficiencies of that supply, particularly of foodstuffs, and the concentration of Soviet attention upon the program of industrial extension, to tie the hands of the Soviet Union in the Far East.

1/ In the absence of Litvinov, the Japanese Minister at Moscow on October 28 in the name of his Government, and on the basis of information received by it, represented to Karakhan that there might be danger of a disturbance of the good relations between the two countries which had theretofore persisted during the progress of the Japanese-Chinese conflict. After
setting

-3-

setting forth the reports of Soviet aid and countenance to Chinese military forces, the Japanese Minister in a non-sequitur gave warning that the sending of Soviet troops to the zone of the Chinese Eastern Railway would elicit counter measures by the Japanese Government.

In view of the fact that the Japanese maintained at least the appearance of neutrality during the Soviet-Chinese conflict over the Chinese Eastern Railway, and allowed the Soviet Union to withdraw its military forces, ostensibly of its own volition, this warning needs no commentary, further than to point out that it openly measures a shifting of the balance of forces in the Far East to the advantage of Japan and the disadvantage of the Soviet Union.

The "exhaustive" answer of Karakhan was confined to denials of the reports cited by the Japanese Government, and protestations of a love of peace. The Japanese veto of possible action by the Soviet Union in defense of its interests in northern Manchuria was passed over in silence.

Whether, as indicated at Moscow and Tokyo, Japan really was satisfied with Karakhan's denials, remains to be disclosed, possibly before the resumption of the discussion of the Manchurian conflict at Geneva on November 16. That the Soviet Union has ceased altogether to give at least secret aid and comfort to Chinese military forces may be considered improbable in the light of the past and the commitments of the Soviet Union to the world

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world revolution. In any case, it may be supposed that the Japanese are well informed, and can resume the discussion, or act, whenever they like, and they may desire to present the League of Nations with further faits accomplis.

The best commentary on the Manchurian events that has been found in the Soviet press has been in the form of sketch maps, usually small and never accompanied by explanatory text, setting forth the geographical location of the Japanese action, and Soviet expectations, or fears, as to future developments. The first of these sketches, which have been forwarded to the Department, indicated a Japanese thrust strictly parallel to the Chinese Eastern Railway, from the Sea of Japan into Inner Mongolia. The latest of the series, a copy of which is thereto attached, shows possible Japanese thrusts against Soviet territory at three points, Hailar (Commanding Manchuli station), Blagoveshchensk via Tsitsihar (and possibly via Harbin as well), and Habarovsk via Ninguta and a point near the borders of the Maritime Province. There is also indicated an inland route to Peiping. This sketch map is an improvement of one that has appeared in the IZVESTIA. It betrays acute Soviet anxieties. Whether the Soviet Government has facts to support its surmises must remain to be seen.

The Moscow PRAVDA No. 303, of November 2, 1931, carried a TASS despatch, dated Paris, October 31, in which S. Lausanne was cited as cabling from Washington that

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that the United States probably would leave Japan a free hand in Manchuria and Mongolia, in the interest of the suppression of the forces of disorder in the Far East, and Communistic propaganda especially. The PRAVDA's headlines clearly indicated that it gave full credit to this report.

- 3/ Of the leading Soviet newspapers, only the IZVESTIA has had editorial comment on the Manchurian events recently, and it coupled these events with Laval's journey to the United States. It tried, in conclusion, to extract solace from the future, when the masses of the peoples will comprehend the situation, and will act. Romain Rolland, in a letter for which the IZVESTIA made room on its first page, spoke a more candid language, calling for revolution in Japan and China, Europe and America.
- 4/

The periodical KOMMUNISTICHESKY INTERNATIONAL, in Nos. 27 and 28, of September 30 and October 10, 1931, dealt with the Japanese-Chinese conflict. In No. 27 "Z. Madyar" declared that the events in Manchuria are provocation of war upon the Soviet Union and an attack on the revolutionary cause in China, Chosen and the Pacific Ocean lands in general. An unsigned article in No. 28 (pages 12-16) sharply criticised various communist publications and parties for ineffective use of this occasion for propaganda and action, but the Japanese, Korean and Chinese communists were exempted from this rebuke.

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rebuke.

Respectfully yours,

Felix Cole
Felix Cole,
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

Enclosures:

1. The Japanese-Chinese Conflict.
(Moscow IZVESTIA, No. 300, October 30, 1931.)
2. Copy of a Sketch Map.
In one copy only. (Moscow PRAVDA, No. 303, November 2, 1931.)
3. Save Yourself, Who Can.
(Moscow IZVESTIA, No. 298, October 28, 1931.)
4. Romain Rolland on the Events in Manchuria.
(Moscow IZVESTIA, No. 298, October 28, 1931.)

(In triplicate.)

Copy to E.I.C.Paris.

Copy to E.I.C.Paris for Peiping.

Copy to E.I.C.Paris for Tokyo.

Copy to American Consul General, Harbin, direct.

Copy to American Embassy, London, direct.

710 R Japan - China

DBM/hs

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-12-75

ENCLOSURE NO. 1 TO DESPATCH NO. 0211 OF NOV 6 1931
FROM THE LEGATION AT RIGA, LATVIA.

SOURCE: Moscow IZVESTIA,
No. 300,
October 30, 1931.

THE JAPANESE-CHINESE CONFLICT.

THE POLICY OF THE U.S.S.R. IS A POLICY OF
PEACE AND RESPECT FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF
OTHER STATES.

(Information of the TASS.)

(Translation.)

On October 28, the Japanese Envoy, Mr. Hirota, visited
the Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.,
Comrade L.M. Karakhan, and, as instructed by the Japanese
Government, made the following statement to him:

Mr. Hirota's Statement.

Ever since the origin of the Japanese-Chinese incident, there have been between ourselves no occurrences that might have told on our mutual relations, which must be considered very fortunate.

Only of late have sundry rumors been circulating in Manchuria concerning the mutual relations of the various generals or generals' groups. The Japanese Government, considering it useful for our mutual relations, has instructed its Envoy to give what information he has on this subject.

General Ma (of Tsitsihar), before he left for Sakhalian about October 12 or 13, had a conference with an officer of the Red Army who had come from Blagoveshtshensk.

In General Ma's army there are Soviet instructors.

General

1864

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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General Ma has stated that there is an agreement on the strength of which he receives from the Soviet Union military aeroplanes, zenith guns, and pilots.

On the western line of the Chinese Eastern Railway, in the vicinity of Tsitsihar, freight cars are being concentrated, three hundred of them near the Manchuli station.

The Chinese troops in the district of Hailungcheng, on the northern bank of the Nongho, receive artillery from the Soviet Union.

With a train which was traveling from Tsitsihar to the terminal of the Taonan-Tsitsihar railway were despatched twelve zenith guns, four field guns, and some other artillery, projectiles and munitions of war, which the Hailungcheng troops received from the U.S.S.R.

According to a statement made by General Ma, in the Soviet Union, near the station Dauria, Soviet troops are concentrating, numbering 20 or 30 thousand men; apart from this, there are about six or seven hundred freight cars. It is intended to send these troops to Manchuria.

In this connection General Ma has intimated that Chinese troops would suffice for the protection of the Chinese Eastern Railway and that he therefore requests these troops to be removed from Dauria to the interior of the country.

Apart from these rumors and reports, there is also other information concerning Chinese-Soviet relations, namely, information about the close cooperation between the U.S.S.R. and China in connection with the events in Manchuria.

Such is the talk in Shanghai, Harbin, and in other places.

So there are many rumors and reports alarming public opinion in Japan, and giving alarm also to the military authorities in Manchuria.

In the event of troops being sent from the U.S.S.R. to the Chinese Eastern Railway, this would increase the tension and aggravate the situation, and the Japanese Government would be compelled to adopt the necessary measures of defense and protection of its residents /evidently meaning citizens/, as well as for the protection of the railway line Taonan-Kokokai (Taonan-Tsitsihar railway) which has been built with Japanese money.

Thus,

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Shults NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Thus, there is much danger that the sphere of the conflict may extend.

* *
*

On October 29, Comrade Karakhan invited the Japanese Envoy, Mr. Hirota, and in conformity with instruction from the Government of the U.S.S.R., made the following statement to him:

Comrade Karakhan's statement.

The Government of the U.S.S.R. cannot but express its surprise at the statement made on October 28 of the current year by the Japanese Envoy, Mr. Hirota, on behalf of the Japanese Government, in which reference was made to absolutely unfounded and freely invented rumors emanating from irresponsible Japanese or Chinese circles which in view of the prevailing situation in Manchuria are somehow or other interested in the spreading of provocative rumors.

The Japanese Government cannot but know that there are no Soviet instructors whatsoever with the troops at Tsitsihar, nor with any other troops in any of the Manchurian provinces; further, that those troops have not been receiving, and are not receiving, any arms or munitions of war from the U.S.S.R., and that the U.S.S.R. is rendering no aid whatsoever to either of the parties engaged in the struggle in Manchuria.

The Government of the Soviet Union adheres to a policy of strict non-interference, but not for the reason that such a policy may be welcome or unwelcome to anybody. The Government of the Soviet Union adheres to a policy of non-interference because it respects the international treaties concluded with China, because it respects the sovereign rights and the independence of other states, and because it holds that the policy of military occupation, even if it is carried on under the pretext of a so-called assistance, is not compatible with the pacific policy of the U.S.S.R. and with the interests of the general peace.

The

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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
The Government of the U.S.S.R. expresses the hope that this is an exhaustive answer to the questions that were broached in the statement made by the Japanese Envoy, Mr. Hirota on October 28.

js/fk

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 2 to despatch No. 2241 of
 from the Legation at Riga, Latvia.

SOURCE: Moscow PRAVDA,
 No. 303,
 November 2, 1931.
 Copy of a Sketch Map
 of Manchuria.



- railways in operation
- projected railways
- section of Kirin-Hsiao-chow-fu zw under construction
- occupied zone
- frontier line with the U.S.S.R.
- highway along Sungari river

- JAPANESE TROOPS
- troops in Japanese pay
- CHINESE TROOPS

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ENCLOSURE NO. 3 TO DESPATCH NO. 0211 OF NOV 6 1931
FROM THE LEGATION AT RIGA, LATVIA.

SOURCE: Moscow IZVESTIA,
No. 298,
October 28, 1931,
Page 1.

SAVE YOURSELVES, WHO CAN.

(Translation of leading editorial.)

The outcome of the debates at the League of Nations in connection with the occupation of Manchuria by the Japanese, and the outcome of Laval's trip to Washington, have many analogous features. At Geneva, as well as at Washington, there was disclosed the same helplessness of the capitalistic Powers in the face of the crisis and its consequences. At Geneva, as well as at Washington, were shattered all the hopes of the democratic optimists who had thought that the weaker Powers might obtain support and assistance from the stronger ones even in the face of a threatening catastrophe.

The League of Nations went to meet Japan, not a step, but quite three quarters of the way. The League of Nations admonished China to stop even such weak attempts at pressure upon Japan, as was the boycott of Japanese merchandise. The League of Nations demanded of China that China should make concessions to the Japanese imperialistic intentions. And of Japan it only demanded the withdrawal of the troops outside the authorized

southern

-2-

southern Manchurian railway zone. But Japan most imperturbably refused the demands of the League. The negotiations with the League led to the results desired by Japan: they demonstrated to China the hopelessness of its hopes for the assistance of the Great Powers. With such an outcome of the negotiations in its pocket, the Japanese Government can now quite safely propose negotiations to Nanking. If Nanking agrees to such negotiations without having preliminarily insisted upon the withdrawal of the Japanese troops from Manchuria, it will be clear that the League of Nations cannot broach the question of evacuation before the negotiations have come to an end. But if the Chinese Government will not agree to negotiations without the preliminary evacuation of the Japanese troops, the Japanese imperialistic circles will be able to point to the alleged intransigency of China as a danger threatening Japan on the part of China. The sharpening of the crisis in the United States is a guaranty, in the opinion of Japanese politicians, that for some time to come Japan has to fear no unexpected action on the part of America.

The official communiqué about the outcome of the negotiations between the American President and the French Prime-Minister is a master-piece of diplomatic literature. The said communiqué informs that the representatives of the two states which hold in their hands 70 per cent of the world's gold reserves, have been engaged in cordial and friendly conversations, and that as a result of these negotiations they

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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they have come to the conclusion that it would be very well to stick to the gold standard, and that generally speaking the crisis ought to be combatted, everybody to do so in the measure of his strength and opportunities. Of course, bourgeois diplomacy has never considered it its duty to speak the truth about its decisions, and very often empty diplomatic communiqués have hid very important decisions. In the given case one may, on the basis of a calm review of the entire situation, and irrespective of the official communiqué, be convinced that the negotiations between Laval and Hoover have not yielded any serious political results. One may ask, why then Laval went to Washington? For to convince oneself of the hopelessness of the attempt to come to an agreement might have been possible by the ordinary diplomatic channels, through the representatives of the two countries in Paris and in Washington. It is clear that this trip was necessary to France in order to demonstrate to England and Germany the growth of French influence, while it was needful to Hoover for reassuring the depositors who are withdrawing their deposits from the banks. From this point of view, both sides have attained their ends. The English press states with great dissatisfaction that England was not invited to participate in the negotiations, while the German press notes that in regard to further postponement of payments Germany

will

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will have to deal with France directly. As to the United States, as a recompense for refraining from taking the initiative in the question of reparations, it has achieved that France leaves 250 million dollars, deposited there by French banks, in New York.

Since diplomacy is always late, it is quite possible that even this insignificant bit of an agreement will in the near future be overthrown by facts. Even the French social-fasists were compelled in the person of Mister Leon Blum to admit the sharpening of the crisis in France. While up to now the French press has been boasting of perfectly ridiculous figures of unemployment, it is now compelled to admit that there are a million unemployed, and 800,000 workmen working only 16 hours in the week. If even bourgeois statistics arrive at this conclusion on the basis of a scrutiny, conducted at random, of enterprises with more than one hundred actually employed workmen, it is clear that the actual number of the unemployed is considerably higher. The development of the crisis in France will soon disclose the actual strength of French capitalism, and then it will undoubtedly become clear that the economic base of France is not sufficient to warrant France's claim not only to world hegemony, but not even to being the Power that shapes the fate of the European continent.

This proof of the impotence of the League of Nations, this proof of the inability of the capitalist Powers to undertake some sort of concerted action, be it even only for mitigating the consequences of the crisis, will also have political sequels.

1872

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

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sequels. The masses of the people are not always sufficiently quick to draw the necessary conclusions from political and economic facts. But still they do draw them. And the facts involved here are not insignificant. The impotence of the League of Nations in the Manchurian question demonstrates its impotence in the face of the menace of war. If the League of Nations is unable to decide in the Japanese-Chinese conflict which the aggressive side is, if it is unable to protect its member-state China, what then may the masses of the peoples expect of it in the event of international conflicts in which the situation will not at all be so perfectly clear as it is in the given case. The impotence of the capitalist governments, and of the bourgeoisie in general, in the face of the growing economic crisis, is bound to place before the masses of the peoples the problem of trying to find their own way out of the situation, and with their own resources.

From the historical point of view, the diplomatic ado about the Manchurian problem, and the fruitless voyages of representatives of a number of states, as well as their sterile negotiations, cannot therefore be considered as absolutely sterile and fruitless. They will bear fruit, but not such fruit as is expected by the representatives of capitalism.

js/rk

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

ENCLOSURE NO. 4 TO DESPATCH NO. 0211 OF NOV 9 1931
 FROM THE LEGATION AT RIGA, LATVIA.

SOURCE: Moscow IZVESTIA,
 No. 298,
 October 28, 1931,
 Page 1.

ROMAIN ROLLAND ON THE EVENTS IN MANCHURIA.

(Translation.)

Below we reproduce a letter sent by the famous author in reply to the request to express himself in regard to the invasion of Manchuria by the Japanese imperialists — a request that came to him from the organizers of the Chinese meeting of protest that took place in Paris on October 23.

Dear Wang Te-wei

You know of the friendly ties between myself and young China and young Japan. In both countries I have friends that are equally dear to me, and who in an equal measure desire a union between the two fraternal nations. Needless to say that they suffer in an equal measure under the effects of nationalistic imperialism, ruling supreme in both countries.

They desire peace. I too desire it, as do all the persons that have assembled here this evening. But he who seeks an aim, seeks also means to attain it. But he is in truth ridiculous and childishly naive, he indeed risks to place himself between two chairs, who confines himself to merely appealing for peace, and to sentimental sermons.

Peace between China and Japan will always be false, faked (faux), unstable, and impossible, so long as both nations will humbly bear the pernicious and bestial yoke of the generals and their cliques, of the alliance of imperialistic and capitalistic parties that now oppose, and then unite with, the imperialists and the capitalists of Europe and America for the purpose of cruelly robbing the unfortunate peoples.

who

-2-

Who strives for peace strives also for the destruction of the principal factors of war. Who strives for international peace strives also for revolution. I appeal for revolution. I appeal to the two great nations of China and Japan to throw off their necks the great bandits that straddle them. Let the two nations achieve their liberation from domestic oppressors, who (just as with us) are employing the ruinful poison of nationalism in order to drug and enslave them. Let the two nations over the heads of their overthrown hangmen grasp each others hands, and carry into effect the fruitful alliance of the toilers of China and Japan.

And let us, in Europe and in America, follow their example.

(Signed)

ROMAIN ROLLAND.

js/fk

1875

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CJH

PLAIN

PEIPING via N. R.

FROM

Dated November 18, 1931

Rec'd. 3:30 p.m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 18 1931

Department of State

793-94
Secretary of State,
Washington.

Telegram
drafted to
Peiping, Nov 19
1931 Spt
1931
NOV

953, November 18, 9 a.m.

Reuter reports from New York Seventeenth:

"America's attitude towards Japan as set forth in
NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE in that State Department is
sending firm note to Tokyo declaring that United States
supports efforts of League of Nations to persuade Japan
to evacuate forbidden territory in Manchuria. Simultane-
ously, however, Japanese Ambassador has been privately
assured at Washington that United States will not go to the
extent of backing up her demands by force. She will not
follow the League in any economic boycott nor in the with-
drawal of diplomatic representatives from Tokyo".

Is the portion beginning "simultaneously" to the end
a quotation from the newspapers?

For the Minister

ENGERT

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NOV 23 1931

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Department of State

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
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Washington,

November 18, 1931.

AMLEGATION

PEIPING (China).

Your 953, November 18, 9 a.m.

One. The portion beginning QUOTE simultaneously UNQUOTE is not a verbatim quotation from but is evidently based upon an article carried by the NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE on November 17 under Washington date line November 16.

Two. The Department has made no repeat no statement or commitment with regard to its attitude with reference to a boycott of Japanese exports or withdrawal of diplomatic representatives from Tokyo. With regard to the withdrawal of Japanese troops, you are informed of the Department's attitude.

Three. The same article carried a sub-heading as follows:

QUOTE Utmost support pledged to Geneva disavowed by State Department in conferences with Debuchi UNQUOTE. There is no basis for this statement.

Four. ^{Inform} ~~Reply~~ to Minister and ~~to~~ Tokyo.

Enciphered by FE:MMH/VDM FE

Sent by operator MMH/M., 19

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-128

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CJH

GRAY

FROM

PEIPING via N. R.

Dated November 18, 1931

Rec'd. 9:10 a.m.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Telegram to Paris.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

959, November 18, 6 p.m.

Following from Mukden.

"November 18, noon. Kuangtung army headquarters
announced that Japanese offensive was launched on
Nonni front at dawn today."

FOR THE MINISTER

ENGERT

CSB

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 18 1931
Department of State

FK 793.94/2735

NOV 23 1931

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lutefson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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Department of State

Washington,

November 17, 1931.

1-128
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

AMEMBASSY

PARIS (France)

For Ambassador Dawes.

One. The NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE on November 17

carried an article under Washington date line, November 16,
stating that QUOTE It was learned tonight on high official
authority UNQUOTE that QUOTE At no time in the negotiations--
was the Japanese Ambassador left without confidence that
the American Government would refuse to follow the League of
Nations either in a proposed economic boycott of Japanese
exports, withdrawal of world diplomatic representatives from
Tokio or insistence upon the withdrawal of Japanese troops
from occupied Manchurian territory by today UNQUOTE.

Two. The Department has made no repeat no statement of
commitment with regard to its attitude with reference to a boycott of
Japanese exports or withdrawal of diplomatic representatives
from Tokyo. With regard to the withdrawal of Japanese troops,
you are fully informed of the Department's attitude.

Three. The same article carries a sub-heading as follows:

QUOTE Utmost support pledged to Geneva disavowed by State
Department in conferences with Debuchi UNQUOTE. As you are

Enciphered by aware. there is no basis for this statement.

Sent by operator Wich M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.-No. 80. FE:MMH:REK

FE

NOV. 17, 1931

793.94/2735A

New York Herald-Tribune

Tuesday, November 13, 1931.

U. S. Would Reject Boycott by League, Japan Is Assured

Utmost Support Pledged
to Geneva Disavowed by
State Department in Con-
ferences With Debuchi

Sharp Cable to Tokio
Contradicted Orally

American Attitude Viewed
as Fortifying Nipponese
Determination to Defy
Order to Quit Manchuria

Outstanding developments yester-
day in the Manchurian crisis follow:

High Washington authority disclosed
that Japanese Ambassador Debuchi
had been receiving private assur-
ances that United States would not
join in extreme pressure on Japan
to compel evacuation of Man-
churia, and did not support League
Council's demand for troop with-
drawal by November 16.

League of Nations Council, meeting
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U. S. Would Bar Boycott
By Harold K. Philips

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State Department was sending sharply
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territory in Manchuria, the Japanese
Ambassador was receiving private assur-
ance in Washington that the United
States would not go to the extent of
using force to back the demands, it
was learned tonight on high official
authority.

At no time in the negotiations, it
was learned, was Katsuj Debuchi, the
Japanese Ambassador, left without
confidence that the American govern-
ment would refuse to follow the League
of Nations either in a proposed
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withdrawal of world diplomatic repre-
sentatives from Tokio or insistence upon
the withdrawal of Japanese troops
from occupied Manchurian territory
by today.

Satisfactory Assurance Given

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As a result, it became clear tonight
that Japan was in no mood to com-
promise the dispute between herself
and China, but would insist to the end
that the whole question finally should
be settled through direct negotiation
between Tokio and Nanking. High of-
ficial sources took the position that until
the League of Nations accepted this
point of view the crisis would remain.

In support of this, attention was
called to the fact that the time limit
imposed by the League of Nations
ended tonight. Instead of abandoning
their narrow strip of occupied territory
along the half-Russian-owned Chinese
Eastern Railway, Japanese military au-
thorities are reinforcing their present
forces. Japanese authorities declared
the protection of the South Manchuria
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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM

GRAY

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Dated November 18, 1931

FROM

Rec'd 10:40 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

960, November 18, 7 p.m.

Following from Harbin:

"November 17, noon.

One. Chinese and Japanese authorities and local
press report quiet at Nonni front yesterday with the
exception of minor clashes.

Two. Local Commissioner of Foreign Affairs in-
formed me this morning that yesterday a Japanese air-
plane dropped six bombs near Chinese Eastern Railway
tracks at ^{Fuliarkhi} Fuliarkti, near some barracks of the Railway's
workmen and upon a warehouse; that forty Japanese
bombs were dropped on Chinese troops seven miles south
of Anganghsi; that Japanese reenforcements and more
airplanes were coming from Japan to the Nonni River
front and that he feared that fighting would occur when
they arrived. Kalina, the Assistant Manager of the
Chinese Eastern Railway, informed this office that he
had received no report of damage done by bombing to
Company's property and that he did not believe any had
been done.

Three.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.L. NOV 18 1931

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 18 1931

Department of State

793.94/2736

NOV 23 1931

FT/END

AM

2-#960, from Peiping, Nov. 18, 1931
7 p.m.

Three. Telephone report just received from a reliable source, Russian, at Hailar stated all quiet there.

Four. Ohashi called on me this morning and tried to convince me that Ma was receiving Soviet material and moral support. I told him that Captain Tenny, the American who visited Tsitsihar, and I unearthed no evidence of such support. Ohashi stated that, although he had no proof of such support, he was certain that there was such because the Heilungkiang troops, who had a poor reputation even among Chinese troops, had acted so courageously in the face of well directed Japanese artillery fire, which proved to him that they were being encouraged and directed by some agency not Chinese".

Repeated to Nanking.

For the Minister

JHR

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RR

1884

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 or
 Charge to

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138
 TO BE TRANSMITTED
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 NON-CONFIDENTIAL CODE
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Washington,

November 18, 1931.

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 AMEMBASSY,

PARIS (France).

NOV 18 31

572 FOR AMBASSADOR DAWES.

For your information and confidential as to source.

The American Consul General at Harbin reports under date November 17 that a local Chinese official informed him that on November 16 a Japanese airplane dropped six bombs near Chinese Eastern Railway tracks at Fularki, near some barracks of the Railway's workmen and upon a warehouse; and that forty Japanese bombs were dropped on Chinese troops seven miles south of Angangki. An official of the Chinese Eastern Railway has informed the Consul General that no damage to the Railway's property, due to bombing, has been reported.

A reliable telephone report from Hailar states that all was quiet there.

On November 17 the Japanese Consul General informed the American Consul General that General Ma was receiving Soviet material and moral support, citing in support of this that the Heilungkiang troops, who had a poor reputation, had acted so courageously in the face of well-directed Japanese artillery fire. The American Consul General replied that neither he nor the American Assistant Military Attaché had found any evidence of such Soviet support.

Enciphered by

Sent by operator

Index Bu.—No. 60.

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CJH

FROM GRAY

TIENTSIN via N.R.

Dated November 18, 1931

Rec'd. 9:15 a.m.

793-24
Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



November 18, 4 p.m.

Following sent to the Legation:

"November 18, 3 p.m. Conditions are greatly improved today although many refugees continue to flock into the foreign concessions from the Chinese city and Japanese concession. There was no firing during the night. Barricades and entanglements in Chinese city are being removed today under the agreement between Chinese and Japanese. When this work is completed, which should be within next few days, Chinese police armed with pistols would do duty in 300 meter zone and Japanese will remove their barricades at concession boundaries. American detachments were withdrawn from guard duty at noon today. British now withdrawing and French tomorrow.

Repeated to Department and Nanking".

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FK 793.94/2737

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This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone.

Rec'd 7:07 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

Telegram to
Paris.



222, November 18, noon.

General Staff informs Military Attache that the
despatch of an additional division to Manchuria is
under consideration. Military Attache apparently
believes it highly probable that the despatch has
already been approved. The General Staff also states
that three additional air squadrons have been sent to
Manchuria.

FORBES

HPD

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TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
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Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

793-94/2738

Department of State

Washington,
November 18, 1931.

6 pm

AMEMBASSY

PARIS (France).

568
FOR AMBASSADOR DAWES.

For your information and confidential as to source.

The American Ambassador at Tokyo reports under date
November 18 that the Japanese General Staff has
informed our Military Attaché that the despatch of
an additional division to Manchuria is under consideration;
that the Military Attaché apparently believes it highly
probable that the despatch has already been approved;
and that the General Staff states also that three
additional air squadrons have been sent to Manchuria.

793.94/2738

In a telegram dated November 18 to the War Department
our Military Attaché added that three very important General
Staff officers left for Mukden on November 17, and that
he suspected that one tank company had gone to Manchuria.

FE:MMH/VDM FE
Enciphered by MMH
Sent by operator M., 19Nov. 18, 1931.

Stinson
OK

1880

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

AM

TOKIO

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone.

Dated November 18, 1931

Rec'd 7:07 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

222, November 18, noon.

General Staff informs Military Attache that the
despatch of an additional division to Manchuria is
under consideration. Military Attache apparently
believes it highly probable that the despatch has
already been approved. The General Staff also states
that three additional air squadrons have been sent to
Manchuria.

FORBES

HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-12-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CJH

PLAIN
FROM
PEIPING via N. R.

Dated November 18, 1931

Rec'd. 5:15 a.m. Division of

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

NOV 18 1931

Department of State

COPIES SENT TO
GENERAL AND MR. LEE

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Telegram to Paris

955, November 18, 11 a.m.

By mandate of National Government issued yesterday
General Wan Fallin's resignation as Chairman of Heilungkiang
is accepted and General Ma Chan Shan is appointed in his
stead.

For the Minister

ENGERT

WSB

FK 793.94/2739

FILED

NOV 23 1931

793.94
with
793.01

1891

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
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Charge to
 \$

Washington,

November 18, 1931.

793-44/

AMERICAN EMBASSY

PARIS (FRANCE).

566

FOR AMBASSADOR DAWES.

For your information and confidential as to source.

One. In telegrams dated November 18, the American Legation at Peiping reports (a) that by Chinese Government Mandate issued November 17 General Wan Fu-Lin's resignation as Chairman of Heilungkiang Provincial Government is accepted and General Ma Chan-shan is appointed in his stead and (b) that four Japanese destroyers which arrived Tsingtao November 16 had not previously been stationed in Chinese waters.

Two. The American Consul General at Mukden ~~reports~~ ^{telegraphs} under date November 18 that the Kwantung army headquarters announced that a Japanese offensive was launched on the Nonni front at dawn on that day.

Three. The American Legation at Peiping telegraphs under date November 18, 3 p.m., as follows:

QUOTE Young Marshal's office has received telegram from General Ma that large Japanese forces with six bombing

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1930 1-138

793.94/2739

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RB

FROM

GRUY

Peiping, via N. R.

Dated November 18, 1931

Division of

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

NOV 18 1931

Department of State

Telegram to

Secretary of State, Paris

Washington, D. C.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

958, November 18, 5 p. m.

I learn that the four Japanese destroyers which
arrived Tsingtau 16th had not before been stationed in
Chinese waters.

For the Minister.

URGENT

WVC

HPD

NOV 23 1931

FILED

FK 793.94/2740

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note
804.33 93

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CORRECTED COPY
 FROM

PLAIN

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 18, 1931

Rec'd 5:15 a. m.



Secretary of State,

Washington

954, November 18, 9 a. m.

Mandate of National Government issued sixteenth
 refers to situation in Manchuria and proceeds:

"All agreements of sale or lease or those similar
 to a lease or sale concerning forests, mining property,
 barren land, fishing grounds and railways in China,
 etcetera, either owned by local Governments, public
 or private legal bodies or individuals, which have been
 made clandestinely with foreigners without authorization
 of the appropriate ministry of the Central Government,
 shall all become null and void, in order that National
 sovereignty and the peoples' livelihood may be protected

FOR THE MINISTER

ENGERT

76B

793.94/2741

FILED

NOV 24 1931

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

FROM

PLAIN

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 18, 1931

Rec'd 5 Division

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

NOV 18 1931

Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

954, November 18, 9 a.m.

Mandate of National Government issued sixteenth
first to situation in Manchuria and proceed.

"All agreements of sale or lease or those similar to a
lease or sale concerning forests, mining property, barren
land, fishing grounds and railways in China, etcetera,
either owned by local Governments, public or private legal
bodies or individuals, which have been clandestinely with
foreigners without authorization of the appropriate
ministry of the Central Government, shall all become null
and void, in order that National Sovereignty and the
peoples' livelihood may be protected".

FOR THE MINISTER

ENGERT

WSB

NOV 23 1931

FILED

FK 793.94/2741

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not
893.602
393.73
893.0/44

1895

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CJH

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be carefully paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

PARIS

Dated November 17, 1931

Rec'd. Nov. 18, 2:17 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

757, November 17, 8 p.m.


FROM AMBASSADOR

I report interviews had today in sequence.

Sze was the first caller. One has to be guarded with him in view of his evident anxiety to have us disregard the attitude of strict impartiality which we must of course maintain. He said, for instance, that if we would ask it he would insure that his Government, in order to stop the fighting, would consent that in the local organizations of Chinese for police protection of Japanese nationals in Manchurian cities these organizations could be headed and controlled by foreigners other than Japanese. I told him that any such proposition as this should be made by him to the League and not to me.

At three o'clock this afternoon Drummond called. He states that the Council is extremely anxious to get some kind of a proposition from the Japanese and the Council have urged the Japanese to make one. Simon talks freely with Drummond and we discussed somewhat

the tentative



F/DEW

793.94/2742

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CJH

Page 2 - #757 from Paris.

the tentative suggestions of Simon which I wired you yesterday (see my telegram No. 750, November 16, 11 p.m.).

At four p.m. Matsudaira brought me a memorandum of a proposition which the Japanese delegation had discussed among themselves as something which their Government might authorize and which is as follows:

"(Special green) One. The Japanese and Chinese Governments shall enter into conversations with a view to reaching an agreement to constitute the bases of security of Japanese subjects in Manchuria (five fundamental principles).

Two. The first point being admitted the nomination of a commission to be made up of X members to be sent to China (China proper and Manchuria) by the League of Nations and entrusted with the making of investigations into such questions as anti-Japanese agitations, etc., with a view to placing the Council in a position to deliberate on the basis of complete information.

Three. The Council shall be kept informed of the progress of the above mentioned negotiations" (end special green).

The above, is purely tentative. The delegation, however, has wired it to Tokio for Government comment. Matsudaira thinks that in the first paragraph it is in line with

CJH

Page 3 - #757 from Paris.

line with your suggestion of procedure which I communicated to him and Simon at London. Matsudaira will take it to Simon this evening stating to him as he does to us that it is purely tentative and has been sent to the Japanese Government for comment.

I asked Matsudaira about this idea of Simon's memorandum, a criticism of which I wired you yesterday in my telegram 750. I think I can say that Matsudaira is impressed with it for he offered no objections to it in principle. He is sending it to his Government as I have sent it to you awaiting comment.

500-A4D

The more I think of this situation the larger the nine power pact looms in it. Almost all the propositions under discussion here upon which agreement is being sought will require the consideration of each signatory as such to the Nine Power Pact. It would seem quite probable that before any permanent and really constructive settlement of this situation can be reached, and whether the League temporarily succeeds or fails in its present effort, Article 7 of the Nine Power Pact must be eventually invoked. This subject of course is unwise for me to discuss here at this time but I would welcome your comments as a guide.

SHAW

HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
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Department of State

Washington,

November 18, 1931.

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793.94
AMEMBASSY,

PARIS, FRANCE.

569 CONFIDENTIAL FOR DAWES FROM STIMSON.

Your 757, November 17th. /2742

The most important thing that you have reported today is the Matsudaira proposition. If I understand it correctly I believe it would involve a substantial surrender of our position and should be rejected for the following reasons:

One. Matsudaira wishes an agreement that China shall negotiate with Japan on the subject of the five propositions which include the much disputed fifth proposition of treaty obligations and to do so without any protection to China from the oppressive position in which she is now placed by the Japanese occupation. In plain language, ^{he asks that} China ~~must~~ agree to negotiate the validity of the disputed treaties without even the protection of neutral observers. This last was the minimum protection which we felt China could accept, assuming that the occupation was still in effect.

Two. He then wishes an investigation to be made

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M.,, 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1925 1-138

793.94/2742

Confidential File

1 - 1895

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Washington,

- 2 -

of the grievances which Japan claims to have suffered from China, both in China and Manchuria, and in this investigation he is willing to have the investigation by a neutral body. In other words, Matsudaira refuses even neutral observers where Japan is on the defensive and proposes a neutral investigation where China is on the defensive. This last seems to me to be merely disingenuous window-dressing and not to meet at all the point which we have had in mind.

Under these circumstances, unless I wholly misunderstand your report of Matsudaira's proposition, I do not think it adds anything to the efforts towards a genuine settlement and should be rejected.

In fact such a proposition coming from Matsudaira is one of the most discouraging facts which has come to me. It is tending to drive me towards the conclusion that after all a settlement which we can accept in the light of the peace treaties is getting to be more and more hopeless, and that our only recourse may be to close the negotiations by everybody, to publish the entire damning case against Japan, and rest upon the ensuing reaction of public opinion which in this country would be overwhelming against

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1952 1-138

Japan.

1 1900

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

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PLAIN

Department of State

- 3 -

Washington,

Revised
Japan. I shall greatly regret reaching that conclusion, but the trend of these latest communications seem to me to be in that direction. I shall hope for better news from you tomorrow. Inasmuch as I am making no communications to the Japanese Government for fear of interfering with your negotiations, if in your opinion Japan should know the way my thoughts are tending, you had better tell Matsudaira yourself.

I wholly agree with what you say about the importance of the Nine-Power Treaty, but the conferences which have been going on in Geneva and Paris have afforded a full opportunity to bring to Japan's attention her obligations under that Treaty and I can see nothing in her attitude which indicates that she would be any more amenable to a direct invocation of that Treaty than she has been already in the negotiations under the League Covenant.

12 8 1 AON

STIMSON

7425

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19

1901

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton E. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Paris
A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. FROM

Dated Nov. 17, 1931
Rec'd. 3:04 a.m.

Secretary of State
Washington, D.C.

758, November 17, 9 p.m.
FROM AMBASSADOR DATES.

Sir John Simon has handed me the following confidential resume of the Manchurian situation as he sees it:

(SPECIAL GREEN). "There is strong reason to fear that unless some new mode of treatment can be suggested this troublesome matter may drag on indefinitely and the prestige of the League will greatly suffer. Up to the present the Council of the League has appealed to both sides in the controversy to exercise restraint and has taken note of Japan's assurance that she will withdraw her troops as soon as circumstances permit. But as things are going at present Japan will concede that circumstances do not permit for a long time. And the fundamental condition which Japan seeks to lay down that the treaty position between herself and China in reference to Manchuria should first be cleared up gives endless opportunities for delay.

The practical

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 18 1931
DEPT. OF STATE
NOV 12 1931
DIVISION OF
WESTERN AFFAIRS

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F/DEM 793.94/2743

FILED
NOV 21 1931

-2-

From Paris, #758

The practical question is whether Japan's willingness to withdraw could be stimulated by anything which the League could do. Is there any point where she might feel it was in her own interest to withdraw because she will gain something which she has not now?

It seems to me that there is one point of which Japan is at present in a very weak position and where it might be possible to get her withdrawal in view of that position being strengthened. Her juridical position in Manchuria is weak for her troops are on Chinese soil where on League principles they have no right to be. It may be a very good practical answer that Japanese troops are where they are because Japanese lives and property in Manchuria need protection but on League principles in such a case Japanese forces should not occupy Manchuria first and argue afterwards but should rely in the first instance on an appeal to the League. Japanese policy therefore at present is exposed to the reproach that settlement by acting contrary to the principles of the League whatever may be the practical justification or the excuse which public opinion may make for her. Presumably Japan would prefer, other things being equal, to act as a faithful member of the League should. Is it possible to devise a solution which Japan might be

-3-
From Paris, #758

might be willing to embrace because she would get out of the juridical weakness of her present position?

Japan is not prepared to withdraw in return for China's undertaking to respect treaty rights because experience shows that China has sometimes been impotent to fulfill them. But suppose that China at present delivered a note giving such undertakings to the other states and to the United States of America, the result would be that if China disregarded her undertakings in the future she would be disregarding a promise made to the Council of the League and to America, and Japan would be able to point to this fact and urge that China was the wrongdoer and that all the powers to whom China had given assurances should press for compliance. Is it not worth while considering whether such a promise given to the other powers and America is possible and whether Japan would not regard it as valuable for the reason above given?

The immediate origin of the Manchurian trouble in its present critical stage was, I understand, railway competition with the South Manchurian Railway. It may be that there are other railway questions between China and Japan in Manchuria. Would it be possible to urge China, as part of the arrangement, to enter into an agreement with Japan to appoint a technical commission with, say, a neutral chairman, for the purpose of drawing

CJH

Page 4 - #758 from Paris.

drawing up a "working agreement" with a view to ending unfair competition and securing the operation of Manchurian railways as a combined system? This agreement between China and Japan might also be repeated in the note given by China to the other powers.

If undertakings and arrangements on these lines were practicable, Japan ought to be prepared to withdraw her troops when it is signed, for she would no longer be relying on China's promise. She would have gained two points of great importance:

(One.) The knowledge that if China defaulted Japan could ask the League and America to join in bringing pressure on China in view of China's promise to them and,

(Two). An agreement to reach an adjustment of the railway trouble.

Japan would be quick to note that such a solution as this puts her in a strong legal position for the future whereas she is now in a weak one. China would at any rate be able on these terms to get Japanese troops withdrawn. The League would have taken an effective part in clearing up the situation and would emerge from it without discredit. But if something of this sort is not possible it is difficult to see how, as a practical matter, Japanese can be induced to withdraw or how a severe blow to the moral authority of the League can be avoided."

SHAW

WSB

1905

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
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Department of State

Charge to
 \$

Washington,
 November 18, 1931.

This cable was sent in confidential code.
 It should be carefully paraphrased before
 being communicated to anyone.

793-94

AMEMBASSY,

PARIS (France).

565

Your 758, November 17, 9 p.m.

If China and Japan could be brought to at any time
 agree on what treaties are valid and thus clear up any
 uncertainties as to interpretation, the application of
 Simon's suggestion as additional assurance to Japan that
 China will respect her obligations might then well be
 helpful. I have always been of the opinion that Japan
 should be shown some substitute for direct action on her
 part to insure that China will respect Japan's valid rights.
 I have felt that a way should be found to convince Japan
 that the nations of the world would exert the same moral
 pressure on China to insist that she live up to her valid
 obligations as is now being exerted against Japan to insist
 that she not use military pressure for the enforcement of
 her claims. Simon's underlying thought seems to be in accord
 with this idea; but in my telegram yesterday I pointed out
 the fact that, as stated, Simon's plan seemed to fail to
 take account of the vital distinction between the treaties

793.94/2743

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____.

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-128

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
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- 2 -

Washington,

which were admitted to be valid and those which have always
been claimed by China to be invalid.

Stinson

NOV 18 1981

SA:AFK
FE:SKH/ZMF

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Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1958 1-138

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM

GRAY

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Feiping via N. R.

Dated November 18, 1931

FROM Rec'd 6:00 a.m.

COPIES SENT TO

C.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

DOUBLE PRIORITY.

956, November 18, 3 p.m.

793.94

Young Marshal's office has received telegram from General Ma that large Japanese forces with six bombing planes attacked shortly after 4 a.m. today, that Chinese were being hard-pressed and that he considered his position very serious.

My informant added that Japanese were evidently carrying out their threat to wipe out Ma's troops.

Repeated to Nanking and Commander-in-Chief.

For the Minister

ENGERT

JHR

RR

FILED

NOV 21 1931

F/DEW

793.94/2744

1908

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/2745

CANCELLED. SEE 393.1115-VOS, J.G.

1909

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 18, 1931.

NOV 20 1931

Mr. Secretary:

This is the first report by Ambassador Forbes in response to our request for information on important political developments in Japan. (223-Nov 18, 1931)

By way of comment on the possibility of a change in Cabinet,--

The Embassy does not say what might happen to the Foreign Office. We should have in mind the fact that the Foreign Office is now functioning essentially as a buffer between the faction that is now actually in control of Japan's national policy outward and the foreign powers. The removal of that buffer might conceivably enable the powers more effectively to come to grips with the people who actually dominate in determining Japan's action now than is possible while the buffer exists.

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NOV 19 1931

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

SKH/REK

1911

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CJH

A portion of this telegram must be carefully read before being communicated to anyone.

TOKIO
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
Dated November 18, 1931

FE

Rec'd. 8:55 a.m.

FROM

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Secretary of State,
Washington.

223, November 18, 6 p.m.

Your telegram No. 230, November 16, 2 p.m.

The Dutch Minister made a special call evidently for the purpose of informing me of his report to his Government. He has further developed his theme today to the effect that he is confident pressure will only consolidate public opinion in Japan and enhance the power of the military. The Norwegian Minister was very definite that in his opinion the present ^{government} (*) is most conservative and conciliatory possible to organize and should be supported because any change is likely to be toward more militant attitude. The Dutch Minister and he confirmed my observation in regard to unanimity of attitude of diplomatic corps, the Norwegian Minister noting only one minor exception.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 18 1931
Department of State
NOV 20 1931
F/DEW
793.94/2746

The air is full of rumors of an impending change in the Cabinet either within a few weeks or a few months. As yet, however, there is little that is definite. Three reasons are advanced for the possible Cabinet change, namely, weakness of Japanese diplomacy vis a vis the League of Nations, weakness of the Cabinet with respect to the Japanese military since September 18th and the financial situation.

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NOV 28 1931
ADN

Three.

CJH

Page 2 - #223 from Tokio

Three possibilities are mentioned regarding the formation of the Cabinet that will take the place of the present cabinet:

(1) - A part of the Minseito under the leadership of Mr. Adachi the present Minister for Home Affairs and a part of the Seiyukai under the leadership of Mr. Tokonami will form a "coalition cabinet". This does not seem probable without a precedent. Two men particularly the latter are politicians rather than statesmen, are opportunists and would not have the confidence of the country. The formation of a Cabinet as a result of such an intrigue would probably be opposed by such powerful personages as Prince Saionji and Count Makino who play an important part when a political change occurs..

(2) - The Seiyukai will form a Cabinet. This does not seem probable at the present time. Its reputation is still unsavory from the scandals which occurred when it was in power under Baron Tanaka. It is the minority party and it is doubtful if the personages above mentioned would find it acceptable at present.

(3) - Mr. Wakatsuki will continue as Premier and will form a coalition Cabinet of Minseito Seiyukai and independent men. If the Cabinet should fall in the near future this is regarded as the most probable of the three surmises.

There is no doubt that the situation is most tense but if given time will undoubtedly calm down in the absence of irritating developments. The press is full of rumors and every day bans

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Page 3 - #223 from Tokio.

every day bans against publication of significant items are received from the Government. For example, yesterday one ban prohibited any news of the movement of two divisions except those given out by military authorities; another, any information about proposed extension of the South-Manchuria-Railway; another, any comment on Japanese assistance in connection with the movement of former Emperor of China from Tientsin. Newspapers are very busy commenting about possible compromises and conjecturing conditions. Day before yesterday ADVERTISER published much information contained in my telegram No. 215, November 12, 1 p.m., the story of the alternative conditions of withdrawal being given out by the Foreign Office. Colonel McIlroy is back from the maneuvers preparatory to leaving by way of Manchuria. He saw numerous transports collected as for movement of a large force of troops^{troops} on their way to Mukden are being moved from the extreme north of Japan. Colonel McIlroy reports that every station is packed with children waving flags, trains full of troops moving every 30 minutes, the whole giving the appearance of organized effort to stir up war time enthusiasm.

FORBES

WSB

(*) apparent omission.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
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Department of State

Washington,

November 20, 1931.

Collect
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OR
Charge to

793 at
AMEMBASSY,

PARIS (France).

583
FOR AMBASSADOR DAWES.

In a telegram, dated November 18, the American Ambassador at Tokyo reports that the diplomatic corps at Tokyo is practically unanimousⁱⁿ believing that pressure would only consolidate public opinion in Japan and enhance the power of the military; that, while there is little definite information, there are many rumors of an impending change in the Cabinet within a few weeks or a few months; that the situation is tense but will probably quiet down in time if no irritating developments occur; and that there appears to be an organized effort to stir up war time enthusiasm.

793.94/2746

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Enciphered by _____

Nov 20 1931

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.--No. 80.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



No. 1228

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
RECEIVED

Lima, November 11, 1931.

1931 NOV - 18 - PM 1:40
1931 NOV - 15 - PM 1:40

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF STATE
COMMUNICATIONS & RECORDS

DIVISION OF
LATIN AMERICAN AFFAIRS
NOV 21 1931
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 9 1931
Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
NOV 2 1931
DIVISION OF
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

S i r:

I have the honor to refer to my cable No. 347 of
October 29th, 4 p.m. and to my despatch No. 1174 of
October 29th regarding the interest of the Foreign
Minister in the Manchurian imbroglio, and to inform
the Department that my Japanese Colleague called
upon me on the morning of November 9th and commented
inter alia upon the interest of the Foreign Minister,
Señor José Galvez, in the League and what the League
is doing to bring about a peaceful settlement in
Manchuria

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
-2-

Manchuria. Señor Kurusu said that Señor Galvez was not particularly well informed about the Manchurian situation and pointed out his personal and very direct interest in the League.

The Minister said that the League had made the mistake of putting its prestige in play and also had attempted to coerce Japan, which had only caused Japan to fight back. He paid a special tribute to our country, saying we understood the question and wished to be fair and said that he had suggested to Señor Galvez that if he wished to know about the Manchurian situation, he should instruct the Peruvian Ambassador in Washington to keep in touch with our Government and with the situation from there.

I told the Minister that of course our primary interest was in having Japan and China find peaceful means for settling their differences and that there was not much more that I could say from this faroff viewpoint. I expressed the hope that the two nations would find some peaceful method, so that the present menace to peace would be scotched.

Respectfully yours,



Fred Morris Dearing.

FMD-hkl

1916

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REC'D



Lima, November 11, 1931.

No. 1223

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CONFIRMATION COPY

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The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my cable No. 347 of October 29th, 4 p.m. and to my despatch No. 1174 of October 29th regarding the interest of the Foreign Minister in the Manchurian imbroglio, and to inform the Department that my Japanese Colleague called upon me on the morning of November 9th and commented inter alia upon the interest of the Foreign Minister, Señor José Calves, in the League and what the League is doing to bring about a peaceful settlement in

Manchuria

1917

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

Manchuria. Senator Murasu said that Senator Galvez was not particularly well informed about the Manchurian situation and pointed out his personal and very direct interest in the League.

The Minister said that the League had made the mistake of putting its prestige in play and also had attempted to coerce Japan, which had only caused Japan to fight back. He paid a special tribute to our country, saying we understood the question and wished to be fair and said that he had suggested to Senator Galvez that if he wished to know about the Manchurian situation, he should instruct the Peruvian Ambassador in Washington to keep in touch with our Government and with the situation from there.


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Respectfully yours,

Fred Morris Tearing.

WMD-hkl

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



For purposes of convenient
reference, --

Herewith a copy of the statement
made by Secretary of State Hughes, at
the Washington Conference, in regard
to the American Government's reserva-
tions in relation to the Sino-Japanese
agreements of 1915.

SKH/ZMF

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Statement Made at Washington Conference by
Secretary of State Hughes in Regard to the
American Government's Reservations to the
Sino-Japanese Agreements of 1915.

At the Sixth Plenary Session of the Conference on the
Limitation of Armament held at Washington, February 4, 1922,
the Chairman, the Honorable Charles Evans Hughes, Secretary
of State of the United States of America, made the following
statement:

"I am directed by the Committee on Pacific
and Far Eastern Questions to read, for the purpose
of having the statements formally placed upon the
records of the Conference, the following declarations
with respect to the so-called Twenty-one Demands or
the Sino-Japanese Treaties and Notes of 1915".....

"Thereupon, on behalf of the American Government,
I stated to the Committee the position of the Govern-
ment of the United States:

'The important statement made by Baron Shidehara
on behalf of the Japanese Government makes it
appropriate that I should refer to the position of
the Government of the United States as it was set
forth in identical notes addressed by that Government
to the Chinese Government and to the Japanese Govern-
ment on May 13, 1915.

'The note to the Chinese Government was as
follows:

'In view of the circumstances of
the negotiations which have taken place
and which are now pending between the
Government of China and the Government
of Japan and of the agreements which have
been reached as a result thereof, the
Government of the United States has the
honor to notify the Government of the
Chinese Republic that it cannot recognize
any agreement or undertaking which has been
entered into or which may be entered into
between the Governments of China and Japan
impairing the treaty rights of the United
States and its citizens in China, the
political or territorial integrity of the
Republic of China, or the international

policy

FK 793.94/2748

NOV 10 1922

- 2 -

policy relative to China commonly known as the open door policy.'

'An identical Note has been transmitted to the Imperial Japanese Government.'

'That statement was in accord with the historic policy of the United States in its relation to China, and its position as thus stated has been, and still is, consistently maintained.'"

(See page 324 and page 334 of the Conference on the Limitation of Armament, Washington, November 12, 1921, February 6, 1922).

NOTE: Secretary Hughes' statement in reference to the position of the United States in regard to the so-called Twenty-one Demands or the Sino-Japanese Treaties and Notes of 1915 was made at the Thirty-first Meeting of the Committee on Pacific and Far Eastern Questions on February 3, 1922.

(See page 1560 of the Conference on the Limitation of Armament, Washington, November 12, 1921, February 6, 1922).

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1921

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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NOV 13 1931
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
(NOT FOR THE PRESS)
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Department of State
Division of Current Information

MEMORANDUM OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE ON SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 7, 1931

93-44
Secretary Stimson announced this morning the issuance of press releases on the Foreign Service changes made during the past week, the Conference on Opium Smoking which will convene at Bangkok on November 9, 1931, and the installation of a new type of special telephone conference equipment especially designed for long-distance conversations. The new equipment, which will be installed in the Secretary's office, is the first of its kind to be used anywhere. It will be used for the first time on Monday, November 9, in a conversation between the Secretary and the Minister of "Foreign Affairs of Roumania."

SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT.

A correspondent said that press reports from Europe this morning say that consideration is being given to the possible withdrawal of ambassadors and ministers from Japan; that the League, when it meets on November 16, will consider that question; and that much speculation is rife in League circles whether the United States will join in such a move. The correspondent then asked if the Secretary would comment on the subject. The Secretary said he preferred not to discuss the matter. Another correspondent then asked if such a proposition was not rather absurd. Mr. Stimson, speaking CONFIDENTIALLY, said that any situation causing the withdrawal of ambassadors was serious, but that he preferred to say no more about the matter. Asked if the recall of ambassadors would be tantamount to breaking off diplomatic relations, the Secretary said that would depend on the circumstances. Mr. Stimson then asked the correspondents how many years we were without an ambassador from Argentina. The correspondents replied that Argentina had no ambassador in Washington for nearly two years, whereupon Mr. Stimson said he had nothing more to say about the matter even CONFIDENTIALLY. Asked then if there was any further information from Manchuria,

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the Secretary replied in the negative.

DEBTS AND REPARATIONS

Referring to the financial situation in Germany, with special reference to Germany's capacity to pay reparations, a correspondent asked if there were any new developments which had come to the Department's attention. The Secretary replied in the negative and added that the correspondents should read the Joint Communique again, especially that part which says that the initiative should come from Europe.

ITALY

Observing that the tentative sketch of the program covering the forthcoming visit of the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs makes no mention of special conferences at the White House, a correspondent asked if special conferences would be held as they were during the visit of M. Laval. Mr. Stimson replied that there would undoubtedly be conversations between President Hoover and Signor Grandi, as that was the main object of the visit. Asked if the agenda would be similar to that during the visit of M. Laval, Mr. Stimson said that informality would be the watchword during the conversations.

M. J. McDermott.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 9, 1931.



Digest of Special Articles by Mr. Victor Keen
to the NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE regarding the
Sino-Japanese clash in Manchuria.

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ARTICLE I - Dated September 28.

Mr. Keen's first article gives an account of the events which took place in Manchuria from 10:30 p.m., on Friday, September 18, to September 23. The Japanese and Chinese versions of the affair are both given as well as the opinion of the foreign community. As the article covers a situation thoroughly dealt with in legation and consular reports, as well as in earlier news telegrams, no attempt is made to condense the first article.

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ARTICLE II - Dated September 29.

The second article is entirely devoted to the historical aspect of the affair. The aspirations of Japan in Manchuria are traced from the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895, whereby the Liaotung Peninsula was leased by Japan from China followed by the intervention of Germany, Russia and France, through the Russo-Japanese War, Japan's era of economic expansion in Manchuria and exploitation of the soya bean down to 1915 and the 21 demands.

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Mr. Keen

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Mr. Keen then turns to the Chinese-Eastern Railway and the Soviets, describing how after the Russian Revolution in 1917 the Chinese Eastern was operated by an inter-Allied commission until 1922. China recognized the Soviet Government in 1924 when a treaty was negotiated at Peiping and later another with the Mukden Government reinstating Russia's ownership of the C.E.R. but under different conditions as to management. The railway was established under joint Chinese-Soviet operation. The article sets forth the conditions and describes the difficulties arising in 1925 at the time of the Kuo Sung-lin Rebellion against Chang Tso-lin when the Russian Manager of the railway refused to transport Chang's troops and Japan took the opportunity to declare a neutral zone around Mukden.

Mr. Keen then discusses in some detail the Sino-Soviet break of July 1929 and China's appeal to the signatories of the Kellogg Pact. The hostilities were terminated by the Habarovsk Protocol but, the article goes on to say, a conference this spring at Moscow broke down leaving as outstanding issues the railway dispute, the resumption of diplomatic relations and the conclusion of a commercial treaty.

ARTICLE III - Dated September 30.

Mr. Keen here departs abruptly from his historical vein

- 3 -

vein and starts with strong editorial comment adverse to the Japanese position in Manchuria. In his opinion, if the blowing up of the South Manchuria Railway line by Chinese troops was the casus belli for Japan's occupation of South Manchuria, there is much evidence to support the Chinese claim that the Japanese military used it as an excuse to put into effect a long prepared plan of military aggression without the sanction of the civil government. Mr. Keen points out that it is difficult to believe that a Tokyo government whose attitude up to now has been "conspicuously conciliatory" would permit the use of armed force until all other negotiations had failed. To support the theory that the civil government had no knowledge of the affair he points out that the Japanese Consulate General had not up to that time (September 28) notified the other consular representatives at Mukden of the purpose or the fact of the Japanese occupation. He states that the Japanese consular authorities were at first in ignorance of the Japanese plans. The civil authorities are now able to do nothing but attempt to justify the attitude of the military.

There can be no doubt, writes Mr. Keen, that many treaty rights and privileges claimed by Japan in Manchuria have been frequently violated by the Manchurian authorities. He then goes on to speak of the violation of railway agreements, discriminatory taxation, disturbances on the South Manchuria

- 4 -

Manchuria Railway and alleged violation of treaty stipulations affecting Koreans.

Part 1

The ~~agreement~~ ~~signed~~ by Japan and China following the Russo-Japanese War in which China, by one clause, agreed not to construct without Japanese consent lines running parallel to or competing with the South Manchuria Railway is then discussed. Mr. Keen goes into detail in the matter of the various parallel and competing lines which have been constructed and the several Japanese protests arising therefrom.

He then goes into the question of the double duty collection at Dairen, another Japanese grievance. The Korean troubles in Manchuria with regard mainly to the right to lease land and the Nakamura incident are also dealt with.

The disagreements between the War and Foreign Offices at Tokyo as shown in the Japanese press are clearly pointed out and the article is brought to a close by a final paragraph in which Mr. Keen indicates the probability of China declaring an economic boycott against Japan.

ARTICLE IV - Dated October 1.

Mr. Keen states that observers agree Japan will not attempt to annex or establish a protectorate over Manchuria because of the adverse effect this action would have on world opinion. The most probable step by which Japan might

1927

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

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as in
Korea

might obtain what she considers her rights and privileges would be through the establishment of a new Chinese administration friendly, if not amenable, to Japanese.

Business, the article states, is at a standstill and the unemployed figures are given as 100,000 out of total population of approximately 400,000. A serious economic factor has been the closing by order of the Japanese military of the Frontier Bank and the Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces, both provincial banks and semi-government institutions. All government funds had been deposited in these banks and the pay of thousands of government employees was consequently held up. The National City Bank of New York's Mukden branch has substantial silver deposits in the banks above-mentioned and the Mukden manager protested to the military authorities stating that he felt it necessary to withdraw his deposits.

The article speaks of Japanese efforts to establish a new local government and to oust the former Chinese officials including General Chan Hsueh-liang. Mr. Keen states that he has been reliably informed that representatives of the Japanese military approached members of the Chinese Preservation of Public Safety Committee with a proposal to organize an independent government headed either by General Chang Ching-hui, a Chinese commander in Harbin, or by Kan Chao-hsi, former Governor of Jehol. The committee, which was formed to help preserve order soon after

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after the occupation, refused to consider the proposal.


A new government, says Mr. Keen, would have disastrous effects upon many foreign firms should it repudiate the obligations of the former regime which has debts to foreigners running into millions of dollars.

Sum] The article is brought to a close with the mentioning of many rumors current among the Chinese as to what the Japanese propose to do. The former Emperor, now Mr. Henry Pu Yi, was rumored to have arrived in Mukden with a view to negotiating with the Japanese for the restoration of his rule in Manchuria.

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1926

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



743 at
 FOR THE PRESS

NOVEMBER 11, 1931

I have asked General Dawes, the Ambassador in London, to go to Paris during the coming meeting of the statesmen who compose the Council of the League of Nations. Inasmuch as this meeting will consider the present situation in Manchuria and questions may arise which will affect the interests or treaty obligations of the United States, I desire to have at hand in Paris a man of General Dawes' standing, particularly as the American Ambassador to Paris is at home on leave. It is not anticipated that General Dawes will find it necessary to take part in the meetings of the League Council, but he will be in a position to confer with the representatives of the other nations present in Paris in case such conference should seem desirable.



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NOV 18 1931

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE



The Minister came in to say unofficially that his Government had instructed him to tell the Department how keenly they appreciated the cooperation of this Government in trying to bring about a peaceful settlement in Manchuria. The Dutch Government is very appreciative of the willingness of this Government to cooperate in this task with the League of Nations.

The Minister told me that he had had a very interesting letter from General Pabst, the Dutch Minister in Tokyo, in which he said that he felt strongly the way to bring the Japanese to reason in the whole Manchurian matter was through persuasion - not coercion, and that any appearance of coercion would have the opposite result than that intended.

Note. General Pabst, whom I knew well in Tokyo, has lived for many years in the Far East, both in China and in Japan, and his opinion is well worth consideration.

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
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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS



November 12, 1931.

CONVERSATION WITH MR. HENRY, COUNSELOR OF THE FRENCH EMBASSY.

Mr. Henry called and said that the French Embassy had an inquiry from the French Foreign Office with regard to the memorandum which the French Ambassador had left with the Secretary on November 6 inquiring whether the American Government would be prepared, as were the British and the French Governments, to send observers to attend the taking over by Chinese authorities of areas evacuated by Japanese armed forces in Manchuria.

Mr. Hornbeck said that on November 10 the Department had telegraphed the American Embassy, ^{Paris} London, instructing that reply be made to M. Briand in the affirmative. Mr. Hornbeck said that he was of the impression that the French Ambassador had been informed of this action; that he was sure that it had been the Secretary's intention to inform him.

Mr. Henry said that doubtless the inquiry from his Government had been sent a very short time in advance of the receipt by his Government of the message which the Department had sent through our Paris Embassy. He expressed gratification that we were prepared to take the same action that the French Government was prepared to take.

NOV 15 1931

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 033.6511 Grandi, Dino /74 FOR Memorandum
FROM State Department (Stimson) DATED November 14, 1931.
TO Secretary NAME 1-1172 app

REGARDING: Manchurian dispute. Conversation with French Ambassador
in which the Secretary denied report that U.S. had
made a compromise in the --.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



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1. Period from September 10 to 18 -
Prior to the Mukden clash.

The belligerent attitude of the Japanese military faction is obvious from the press comments on the Nakamura murder case during the ten days preceeding the Sino-Japanese clash about Mukden on the night of September 18-19.

On September 10, the Japanese Chronicle with reference to that case reported under the caption 'Japan's "Last Measure" (enclosure 1), that should the Chinese "by any chance disappoint Japan's expectation, the Foreign Office is ready to resort to certain measures.'

"On the other hand the military authorities pin no hope to the diplomatic negotiations now in progress. Colonel Dohihara, head of Japan's special military staff at Mukden, is expected in Tokyo shortly. After hearing his detailed report, the military authorities will give him certain important instructions. Charged with this new mission, the Colonel is expected to return to Mukden immediately."

This officer is quoted as saying on September 8, that "the anti-Japanese sentiment in China is steadily growing."

NOV 21 1931

FK 793.94/2755

1954

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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growing. Japan's rights and interests are seriously encroached upon, and in such circumstances, Japanese residents in Manchuria are unanimous in desiring the last measure based on a strong diplomatic policy. So long as the Chinese authorities refuse to show sincerity, nothing short of recourse to the last measure will settle the affair. The Colonel said that he intends to explain these circumstances fully to the military authorities in Tokyo and return to Mukden with the necessary instructions.

"The military authorities have issued a secret order to Major Shibata, a military adviser to General Chang Hsueh Liang to come home. This officer will also receive important instructions from the Army General Staff."

The Osaka Mainichi on September 11 (enclosure 6), reported that Colonel Dohihara reached Tokyo on September 10, and states that "well-informed quarters believe that Colonel Dohihara in his report explained minutely regarding the concrete plan for a measure to be taken against China which is being upheld by the leading men of the Kuantung troops, and also the latter's hopes for the Foreign Office in its diplomatic negotiations with Mukden."

The Colonel is quoted as follows:

"Japan will have no alternative but to take the final measure if the second investigating party sent by Mukden repeats the same report as the first party."

On

1935

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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On September 11, the Mainichi further reports (enclosure 7), that "General Soroku Suzuki, former Chief of the General Staff, left for Manchuria on September 9 at the head of a party of 41 retired army officers to convey a message of appreciation of the services of the Japanese troops in Manchuria. This trip at the present moment, when the Sino-Japanese relations are strained, is attracting the attention of the public."

The further movements of this party are not reported, but as it was not due to return to Japan until September 25, it was presumably in Manchuria when the Mukden clash came.

In an editorial on September 12 (enclosure 8), the Japan Times states as follows: "Under the circumstances there are three ways open to Japan, first a continuation of the Shidehara policy of passivity towards China; secondly a military gesture with the intention of intimidating the Chinese; third, a fundamental military solution of the Manchurian situation by its occupation and the incorporation of that part of which is under the Japanese sphere of influence within the Japanese Empire.

"The third alternative is the occupation and the annexation of southern Manchuria. Once that is done, the Chinese farmer and merchant from the machinations of agitators will be as content under Japanese rule as are the Chinese in Formosa.

Japan

1936

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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"Japan has offered the hand of conciliation, of co-operation and of friendship. If China spurns it, who is responsible but China herself if Japan must summon to action her men of arms?"

In a series of articles appearing in the Japan Chronicle, Kobe, on September 12 and 13, on the Sino-Japanese-Manchurian situation, a writer named Hosono defends the Japanese position, accuses the United States of unwarranted meddling in Far Eastern affairs and urges a strong policy by Japan, (enclosures 9--12.).

On September 13, the Chronicle quotes an Asahi account (enclosure 13) of an interview with Major-General Hashimoto, of the Army General Staff, upon his return to Japan from a month's tour of inspection in the Yangtze Valley and North China. "The Major-General expressed surprise at the prevalence of anti-Japonism everywhere. Contempt of Japan fits the case better. He is glad that public opinion in Japan is aroused, and thinks that this is a unique opportunity for the past weak China policy to be discarded."

These statements express the unmistakable trend of opinion in the Japanese military party and would seem to indicate a resolve on the part of that group to press for some such action as has actually materialized.

However,

- 5 -

However, other influences appear to have been at work. The JAPAN CHRONICLE of September 15 (enclosure 18), records that General Minami, Minister of War, visited Prince Saionji on the 12th instant. Its editorial comment (enclosure 19), follows: "So striking is the change in the character of General Minami's utterances since his visit to Prince Saionji that there can be little error in supposing that the aged statesman made a considerable impression on his visitor. He said that the matter -- (i.e. the Manchurian question) -- being in the hands of the Foreign Office, the military authorities kept in the background, though they were always ready to give help if desired. Can it be possible that Prince Saionji has been reading General Minami a little lecture on the army being, constitutionally, the servant of the civil power? The Minister of War went on to inform the ASAHI reporter that it was a great mistake to suppose that the army was meddlesome and made incursions into the field of diplomacy and he disagreed with those critics who condemned the foreign policy of Baron Shidehara as weak and retrograde. This sounds very different from the General Minami of a few weeks ago."

Under date of September 16 the JAPANESE ADVERTISER quotes the JIJI (enclosure 27) as follows:

"In this connection, a section of public opinion is advocating strong steps for the solution of the Nakamura affair. We, for our part, gravely doubt if strong

action

1938

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lutz NARS, Date 12-18-75

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action by Japan will lead to a solution of the situation.

"The situation, indeed is serious, and something must be done for the safeguarding of our interests in China. But we are against the steps suggested by the militarists. To speak frankly, we are unable to understand the attitude of the military men, who talk as though Japan's rights in Manchuria and Mongolia would be lost if China were not punished in connection with the Nakamura incident. The Manchurian problem is one which cannot be solved by the military authorities. It is time the Government curbed the activities of the military leaders in connection with the Manchurian problem."

On the other hand the JAPAN ADVERTISER of September 16 (enclosure 23) reports as follows: "Because of the all-pervasive unfavorable attitude of China toward Japan, the murder of Captain Shintaro Nakamura by Chinese soldiers is of more than ordinary significance, War Minister General Jiro Minami and Chief-of-Staff General Hanzo Kanaya are said to have agreed at a special conference yesterday morning of two hours' duration of Manchurian and Mongolian questions, according to the ASAHI.

"Pending between Japan and China are more than 300 disputes. The Generals are of the opinion the present opportunity should be seized to force their settlement and to bring about a fundamental change in the Chinese attitude. They will urge Foreign Minister Baron Kijuro Shidehara to adopt

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adopt this view, it is reported, and his reaction is being awaited with great interest.

"According to the HOCHI, the conference was also attended by Colonel Kenji Doihara, special service officer of the Kwangtung Leased Territory Army, who was instructed at the last moment Monday evening to postpone his return to Dairen for another day."

The JAPAN TIMES on September 16, (enclosure 25) quotes Colonel Dohihara as follows, prior to his departure from Tokyo on September 15:

"As the result of my recent visit to Tokyo, however, my position in this affair has been made clear and now I shall be able to assist Consul-General Hayashi at Mukden with my unreserved counsel.

"Therefore, I intend to assist the negotiations both officially and unofficially hereafter. I have also ascertained that the central military authorities are desirous of a speedy settlement of the Nakamura affair and that they have a firm determination for its settlement.

"In case the Chinese should fail to show a sincere attitude to settle the dispute, it is needless to say that the issue will assume a grave importance. Measures to cope with such a development are now being considered, but I am not in a position to make public the nature of such measures."

Commenting

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Commenting upon the reported divergence of opinion between the Foreign and War Ministers, the JAPANESE ADVERTISER of September 17 (enclosure 32), stated as follows: "Observers thus see the gap between the War Ministry and the Foreign Office widening, with the Foreign Office playing a lone hand against the 'strong measure' movement. According to the NICHU-NICHU, Prince Saionji, the last of the Elder Statesmen, both houses of the Imperial Diet and a large percentage of the populace are behind the military leaders in their demands."

On September 17 (enclosure 37), the JAPAN CHRONICLE under the caption "Is War Coming? - Mainichi Predicts Clash Within a Year", quotes the MAINICHI as follows: "There is a firm belief in military circles that regardless of the settlement of the Nakamura case, the time will come before long when Japan will have recourse to armed force. The prevailing prognostication in many quarters, says the MAINICHI, is that if the military views referred to have the support of public opinion, Sino-Japanese relations may develop their worst phases within a year and a head-on collision between the two countries may be precipitated."

On September 17 (enclosure 39), the MAINICHI quotes General Kanaya, Chief of the Army Staff, as making the following statement to the War Minister: "This is the

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most ideal opportunity to settle the pending Manchurian and Mongolian issues en masse. If we lose this chance, the solution of these many unsettled subjects will never be expected. We must take a determined attitude and try to solve more than 300 problems one after another, and we want a final solution to each question. At the same time, the Chinese contempt of the Empire must be removed." It is added that "the two generals further exchanged their views as to how to persuade Foreign Minister Baron Shidehara to consent to the Army's plan regarding Manchurian and Mongolian question."

It is pointed out that the threatening comments just quoted were published within forty-eight hours of the Mukden outbreak.

However, on September 17, (enclosure 40), the MAINICHI stated that Foreign Minister Baron Shidehara still favored a peaceful policy holding the view that "while strong action might be needed in the settlement of the Nakamura case, such strong action in the settlement of the numerous other pending issues as advocated by the Army authorities is inadvisable at the present moment."

On September 18, the very day on which hostilities begun about Mukden, the JAPAN ADVERTISER (enclosure 41), stated editorially that "while Japanese army circles have been talking of a firmer attitude towards China there are

few

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
few Japanese in authoritative position who are considering armed intervention in China as a solution of the Manchurian problem. While it is generally believed that the Seiyukai, if it should come to power, would champion a stronger policy than the present Shidehara policy, Seiyukai leaders are not believed either to favor a return to the military policy of the Tanaka regime. The question which arises is how can Japan stiffen her policy so as to impress upon China that this country is in earnest and does not intend to see her interests in Manchuria placed in jeopardy, without a resort to arms?"


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2. Period from September 18 to 25, 1931 -
The Mukden Clash and Subsequent Developments.

The outbreak and development of Sino-Japanese hostilities in Manchuria appear to have been promptly reported in the Japanese press during the week following the Mukden outbreak on the night of September 18-19.

Telegraphic accounts of the hostilities from Mukden, Dairen, and other places in Manchuria and Korea were published on September 19. The JAPAN TIMES, (enclosure 43) Tokyo, of that date, carried the following reports:

"DAIREN, September 19--The walled city of Mukden fell into the hands of the Japanese troops at 3 o'clock this morning."

"MUKDEN, September 19--The entire force of Chinese troops and police within the city was disarmed by 6 o'clock this morning. Those disarmed numbered 6,000 soldiers and 5,000 policemen.

"The North-Eastern Army arsenal was captured by the Japanese troops at 5 o'clock this morning.

"Following a clash between Japanese and Chinese troops at Peitaying, 3 miles north of Mukden at 10:30 o'clock Friday evening after Chinese troops are said to have blasted a section of the South Manchuria Railway's line at Peitaying, the relations between China and Japan have become more

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more strained than at any time during the past few years.

"The clash at Peitaying immediately led to major military operations on both sides, the Chinese troops concentrating at Mukden, while the Japanese forces at Port Arthur and other localities rushed to reinforce the Japanese garrison at Mukden.

"At 4 o'clock Saturday morning, the Japanese were reported to have rushed into the walled city of Mukden. At Changchun, too, the Japanese and Chinese troops were reported threatening to clash.

"Alarmed at the serious developments in the Manchurian situation, War Minister General Minami called a conference of his subordinates at the Ministry of War at 7:30 o'clock Saturday morning. Following this conference, the War Minister called on Premier Baron Wakatsuki at 8:10 o'clock to report on the military operations in Manchuria and to consult the Premier on the measures to cope with the situation.

"Minister of War General Minami was received in audience by His Majesty the Emperor at 9:45 o'clock Saturday morning to submit a report on the military operations in Manchuria.

"Before reparing to the Imperial Palace, the War Minister held a conference with General Hanji Kanaya, chief of the General Staff, and General Nobuyoski Muto, Inspector-General of Military Education, at the General Staff headquarters at 8:30 o'clock.

All

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"All Chinese banks and other monetary establishments within the walled city of Mukden and also in the South Manchuria zone have been put under the control of the Japanese Army.

"The Chinese attack on the S. M. R. garrison troops, it is said, was found to have been premeditated, as the Chinese soldiers were commanded by high officers.

"The Japanese Second Division at Liaoyang left for Mukden by a special train at 6 a.m. The headquarters of the Japanese Kwantung Army have been moved to Mukden while the Kungchulin and Nichlin garrisons have been ordered to advance for operation.

"Lt.-General Honsho commanding some 800 infantry troops hurried to Mukden leaving Dairen by the special 4:30 a.m. train today.

"Early Saturday morning an official Chinese delegation visited the Japanese Consulate General at Mukden, petitioning the suspension of hostilities.

"Rengo reports from Changchun stated that the Japanese troops occupied Kwangchentze at 4:40 a.m. Saturday.

"About 2 o'clock Saturday morning the Japanese battalion at Lienshanshi clashed with the Chinese brigade near Fenghuangcheng. The Japanese garrison troops at Antung, under command of Captain Shigematsu, started for Fenghuangcheng at 3:40 a.m. to aid their fellow troops. The Japanese troops

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troops at Shingishu, Korea, have started preparations to maintain order in Antung, just across the Yalu River."

"The Japanese troops succeeded in occupying the walled city of Mukden at 4:30 o'clock this morning and are disarming the Chinese patrols. The bombardment of the walled city by the Japanese troops was started shortly after midnight last night and the guns are still booming.

"Severe fighting took place between the Chinese and Japanese troops at 10:30 o'clock last night at Peitaying, about 3 miles north of Mukden. The Japanese succeeded in occupying the entire district at 12:30 o'clock this morning, repulsing the Chinese troops.

"The Japanese troops immediately began bombarding the walled city of Mukden with the guns roaring throughout the night. The Nineteenth Regiment of the Japanese Army and two battalions of the railway guards were mobilized, a part being despatched to re-inforce the Japanese troops at Peitaying and another being sent to drive the Chinese troops out of the concession in Mukden."

"The Japanese troops occupied the Mukden wireless station at 5:30 o'clock this morning."

"The 77th Infantry Regiment of the Chosen Army at Heijo was ordered at 6:05 o'clock this morning to proceed to Mukden."

The speed

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The speed with which the various units were able to go into action is worthy of note. The cutting of the railway line at Peitaying apparently did not occur until 10:30 p. m. on Friday, September 18. In view of the promptness and decision with which the Japanese forces moved, the suspicion would seem to arise that such action may have been contemplated in the "important instructions" reported to have been issued by the military authorities at Tokyo, several days earlier.

Definite, specific details of the destruction of the South Manchuria Railway at Peitaying, allegedly by Chinese troops, are conspicuous by their absence, in the press reports received. This omission may be worth noting.

The JAPAN TIMES of September 19 (enclosure 47) quotes a Foreign Office spokesman as follows: "the main point of importance concerns the motive which led the Chinese to destroy a section of the trunk line of the South Manchuria Railway. We are not in a position as yet to account for the destruction of the line by the Chinese as we have not been fully informed of the whole situation.

"In my personal opinion, however, there could be no justifiable provocation to China, if there were any, to plead impunity for the serious outrage. Coming as it did at the very moment when much of the Sino-Japanese ill-feeling created by the murder of Captain Nakamura by Chinese soldiers

is about

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is about to be appeased by an amicable settlement the coincidence is more than unfortunate. In case of further aggravation of the Mukden conflict Japan may be compelled to send troops from the bases at home to the perturbed zone in Manchuria. As far as the Foreign Office is concerned every possible means would be tried to avert such consequence. My department, in common with the rest of the Government to the paramount importance of the Manchuria problems but it is our unshakable conviction that force should be used only when attempts at pacific settlement were exhausted and proved fruitless."

The JAPAN ADVERTISER of September 20 (enclosure 49) stated that the "Japanese Government officials were unanimous in their stand against any act on the part of this country which would in any way aggravate the affair. The attitude of the Japanese Government was expressed following emergency Cabinet meeting which was called at 10 o'clock yesterday morning and which lasted until 1 o'clock in the afternoon. The Premier voiced the official sentiment of the nation when he stated that so far the Government regards the clash between Japanese and Chinese troops as a purely local affair to be dealt with through the usual diplomatic and consular channels.

"The cabinet stood out firmly against the sending of any additional troops to the affected area, deeming the regular
 garrison

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garrison troops stationed there as sufficient to cope with the situation and protect Japanese lives and property. General Jiro Minami, Minister of War, was forced to cancel an order issued to troops in the Kwantung Leased Territory and over the border in Korea to move a portion of their forces in the direction of Mukden.

"The Foreign Office carried out the decision of the Cabinet to confine the affair to as small an area as possible by dealing with the Chinese through consular officials on the spot. After the Cabinet meeting, Mr. Kijuro Shidehara, Minister of Foreign Affairs sent instructions to Mr. Kyujiro Hayashi, the Japanese consul-general at Mukden, requesting Mr. Hayashi to do his utmost to prevent an aggravation of the situation and to negotiate with the local Chinese officials for an early settlement of the affair. Regret that the clash had taken place was also expressed in the Foreign Office instructions."

According to the JAPAN CHRONICLE of September 20 (enclosure 54) "General Kanaya is quoted as saying that in default of particulars, he is not in a position to forecast the future course of events in Manchuria. As for the Army General Staff, it had been prepared for some severe collision between Japanese and Chinese troops in view of the growing estrangement of Sino-Japanese feelings. It has completed

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opening negotiations for a settlement. This the militarists are determined will not take place.

"Lieutenant-General Sugiyama, Vice-Minister of War, stated on Saturday that, 'Our troops responded to the challenge of the Chinese and defended themselves. It is necessary for us to punish the violence of the Chinese soldiers if the prestige of Japan is to be maintained. Chinese soldiers have been acting in a very haughty manner toward our army officials in Manchuria of late and the action taken by our troops was therefore needed.'"

The JAPAN TIMES, of September 21 (enclosure 61) quoted Jiji as follows: "Unless the above Chinese outrages are deliberate the situation is not likely to undergo any worse development, and it was quite a relief to us that the Cabinet here agreed to take steps for the localization of the hostilities as far as possible."

"Unless China realizes the grave nature of the present situation and act accordingly, the situation will not only undergo a serious development but make it impossible for China to hope for any early recovery of the Capital of Manchuria.

". . . the most important thing to bear in mind is that the readjustment of the aftermath of military operations should be left entirely in the hand of the diplomatic authorities."

On September 22, (enclosure 62), the JAPAN CHRONICLE stated that at a cabinet meeting on September 21, War Minister General Minami, demanded that reenforcements be sent to Manchuria. On the same date an article by Mr. Hosono (enclosure 63) was published

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published in the CHRONICLE, reading in part as follows:

"Even though Japan has thus no alternative but to take up the challenge thrown down by China and accept the state of war which actually exists between the two countries, there are hypochondriac people here, as they are to be found in every country, who may fearfully ask what is to be done and what will become of Japan (1) if China chooses to make a drawn war of the proposed struggle, (2) if America and/or Russia take sides with China and stop Japan's foreign trade by cutting off communications at sea, (3) if the war between Japan and China proves the train lighted for another world war, and (4) if Japan should be defeated in the end?

"1. As for tractical operations, these may be safely left to the military experts responsible for the conduct of the war, who will no doubt see to Japan rapidly securing the mastery of the situation by their carefully laid plans.

"2. It is not easily practicable for America or Russia to co-operate with China in hostilities against Japan. Moreover, even if America joins the War on China's side, it will not be necessary for Japan to invade and take Washington.

"3. Even if the War between Japan and China develops into a general world war by any chance, it will not directly affect Japan unless the armies and navies of all the countries of the world join in invading these shores. But should another World War be precipitated by the local war, it will prove a heaven-sent boon for Japan-a fact which will be easily realised

by

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by recalling the phenomenal boons experienced in 1918 and 1919.

"4. There can be no defeat for Japan so long as she is content with guarding her own territory and the strait of Korea and the peace of Manchuria and Mongolia, instead of shipping troops across the Pacific and effecting landing in San Francisco or marching them all the way to Moscow over the Siberian plains."

The JAPAN ADVERTISER, of September 23 (enclosure 64), quoted the Japanese press as follows: ASAHI: "The Government, according to reports, has approved the action of the military in sending troops to China on the military's own initiative.

"The League of Nations, will not be of any great help to us in protecting our position in China. On the contrary, it will obstruct us when it comes to using force in the defense of our position. This point should be remembered by the military authorities, who are apt to think that they are in a position to act toward China as they please.

"There is a possibility of the situation in this territory becoming aggravated, but there is a limit to armed intervention. The Manchurian question is one which cannot be solved by soldiers."

The ADVERTISER of September 23 (enclosure 65), reports as follows: "Japanese troops in Manchuria have been withdrawn within the railway zone at all points excepting Mukden, Kirin and Changchun within the knowledge of the Foreign Office, it was stated yesterday. This action was taken, it was said, in accordance with a decision reached at the meeting of the cabinet
 on

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on Tuesday afternoon, after which instructions were sent to the Commander in Chief in Manchuria which should have been carried out by last night.

"Japanese consular officers throughout Manchuria have been instructed by the Foreign Office to report to the Government what Japanese forces are still remaining outside the railway zone, where they are allowed by treaty.

"It was said that the military municipal administration had been abolished and that it was the intention of the Japanese forces to return the administration of the city to the Chinese as soon as there were any Chinese prepared to take it over.

"With the greater part of the Japanese troops now withdrawn within the railway zone, officials said that the remainder could be taken out at very short notice and the evacuation completed within a matter of hours.

"The Japanese community had passed a resolution to the effect that it was not desirable to send Japanese troops there, and that Japanese residents were prepared to evacuate in preference in the event of danger. The Consul General requested the Government not to send troops unless he specifically asked for them.

"The statement also is expected to point out that the Japanese Government has the right to send 3,000 more soldiers to Manchuria. The right applies only to the railway zone, and if stationing troops outside the railway zone is likely to cause misunderstanding abroad, we will be ready to remove them

at

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at the first opportune moment.

"Japan will be embarrassed if the League interferes in a Sino-Japanese dispute over a local affair. Such interference is unnecessary, as the incident is a small one and does not threaten the peace of the world. Japan has no intention of waging war upon China.

"Such a proposal as the appointment of a commission to investigate the subject of withdrawal of troops, composed of military officers of the powers represented in China, is too absurd to merit consideration. The Army believes that Mr. Kenkichi Yoshizawa, Japan's representative at Geneva, should tell the League that Japan intends to settle directly the trouble between Japan and China."

The ADVERTISER on September 23 (enclosure 66) carried the following report from Harbin: "Meantime the Chinese authorities in Harbin took measures to protect the Japanese residents, while the Soviet representatives there announced that their Government would remain neutral in the present Sino-Japanese hostilities as long as Soviet residents were not molested and the operation of the Chinese Eastern Railway, which is jointly administered and owned by China and Russia, was not interfered with."

The ADVERTISER of September 23 (enclosure 67) states that "Nippon Dempo said the commander of the Chinese garrison at Harbin and Manchuli, had refused an offer from the Soviet Consul-General at Harbin of several thousand Russian troops to assist in protecting the Chinese Eastern Line."

The

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The JAPAN CHRONICLE'S version of the situation on September 23 (enclosure 79) follows: "The Premier, reported that after the Cabinet Council on the previous day, he received a report from the War Minister that in view of the arise of dangerous situation in Manchuria pressing for prompt action, the Commander of Japanese Garrison in Korea had taken steps, on his own authority, to send troops from Korea.

"As the dispatch of troops is an accomplished fact, the Cabinet had to accept it.

"The proposal from the Nationalist Government that a Sino-Japanese joint committee of inquiry should be appointed was also taken up. The consensus of the views expressed by the Ministers on the matter was in favour of the acceptance of the proposal.

"General Minami insisted that negotiations should be opened with General Chang Hueh-liang so that the matter may be settled as a local affair, but the view of Baron Shidehara that the Nationalist Government should be the party with which to negotiate prevailed."

The OSAKA MAINICHI of September 24 (enclosure 82) states that instructions to the Japanese representative at Geneva included the following: "The Empire is determined to continue its guarantee occupation in Manchuria and the maintenance of peace and order. The Empire therefore shall not accept the proposal for arbitration by any other party."

Editorially the MAINICHI on September 24 (enclosure 83) stated that "Our Foreign Office has become convinced that in

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so far as the actual situation in Manchuria is concerned, there is no room for a third party to intervene.

"The attitude of the Foreign Office, therefore, is not only correct but it definitely reflects the opinion of the Japanese people."

The JAPAN ADVERTISER of September 25 (enclosure 86) states "Japan will keep troops in Manchuria so long as the Chinese authorities are unable to protect the lives and property of Japanese residents in the territory.

"The Foreign Office has come to an accord with the military authorities regarding the measures to be adopted to meet the situation in Manchuria. The Military have hitherto been hampering the actions of the authorities of the Foreign Office. An agreement with the military will make it possible for Baron Shidehara, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to solve all pending questions between Japan and China, including the present Manchurian incident."

1958

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

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
SECRETARY OF STATE
NOV 21 1931
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY
NOV 23 1931
MR. KLOTS

As the Russians
are shown it!

SKH

1950

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THE UNDER SECRETARY
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 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

November 14, 1931.

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Digest of
 Newspaper Items.

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 NEW YORK TIMES:

Reports have been received in London that Stimson has formulated a plan for a settlement in Manchuria, which is acceptable to Britain, will satisfy Japan and not impair prestige of League. Plan permits direct negotiations between Japan and China. May be presented by Briand.

Nanking, Nov. 12 (AP). American Minister has been in conference for two hours with President Chiang Kai-shek, presumably in connection with Manchurian conflict. Also called on acting Foreign Minister Frank Lee. Chinese high officials said they had no information on a "compromise plan", but indicated they would welcome appointment of neutral investigating commission, by League.

Mukden, November 13, from Hallett Abend. General Honjo has announced that Japan is determined to carry out repair of Nonni River bridges and open Taonan-Tsitsihar Railway to normal traffic. General Ma flatly turned down suggestion of Colonel Hayashi at Tsitsihar that Chinese retire northward. This means that 20,000 Chinese are facing 2,500 Japanese at Nonni River and may renew conflict at any time. General Honjo reports that Chinese bandit gangs and disorganized soldiers are looting villages in many parts of South Manchuria and Kirin Province. These outfits number from 40 to 2,000. Chang Hsueh-liang has telegraphed General Ma, congratulating him on "killing so many Japanese."

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Japanese."

✓ Tokyo, November 13, by Hugh Byas. Movements are reported of General Ma's cavalry, in an attempt to surround the Japanese forces. Correspondents in Mukden do not seem to reckon with the presence of General Chang Hai-peng, or realize that General Ma may be attacking Marshal Chang. The Marshal's power in Heilungkiang Province will probably soon be broken, as it has been in Mukden and Kirin.

✓ Two of the three bridges over the Nonni have been repaired.

✓ Japanese officials are interested in reports of a compromise plan from Washington, and consider Under-Secretary Castle's remarks that a final settlement must be a matter of direct negotiations between Japan and China as hopeful.

✓ Japan is willing to be silent about the 1915 treaty if this will make the League's task easier; but as the treaty extending Japan's leases of Port Arthur and Dairen are basic, China must recognize them in the end.

A Japanese spokesman made the statement that evacuation does not depend solely on the acceptance by Nanking of the five points. When the local authorities are able to provide security for life and property the Japanese troops will be withdrawn. If Nanking declines direct negotiations, it may find that its authority over Manchuria has vanished.

WASHINGTON, November 13, by Frederick Moore. According to Ambassador Debuchi, Japanese opinion will not permit the submission of the question of Japan's position in Manchuria to any outside authority.

PARIS, November 13.

General Dawes in Paris.

1961

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General Dawes in Paris. ** After his arrival at Paris, General Dawes made the following statement in writing: "The Council of the League in the Manchurian situation is considering matters which presumably affect not only the treaty rights and general interests of the United States under the nine-power pact, but relate to the Kellogg pact as well. I am here, therefore, to confer with members of the Council individually with regard to a problem which is of common concern and involves mutual treaty interests."

Mr. Dawes said that he did not propose to be present at any of the plenary meetings of the Council, but was not sure whether or not Mr. Gilbert would be authorized to be present as an unofficial observer.

This is the first time that the United States has publicly asserted that her interest in her treaty rights and general rights under the Nine-Power Pacific Pact are involved in the present controversy.

NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE.

TOKYO, October 31. Plot to kill cabinet officers and set up Army Dictatorship in Japan. Information of a plot to assassinate three of the principal officials of the government and set up a military dictatorship, for which more than 100 younger officers of the army are under arrest has gradually been uncovered during the past fortnight, although publication of it has been forbidden in Japan. The plot is said to have been motivated by dissatisfaction among the younger element of the army, with which a certain younger reactionary civilian group was in sympathy, over the "weak" policy of the government in Manchuria. It would appear that only a handful of the plotters meant violence against the statesman mentioned, and that the majority were unaware of this part of the plot. The men who were marked for death are

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are Baron Reijiro Wakatsuki, Premier, Baron Shidehara, Foreign Minister, and Count Nobuaki Makino, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and close advisor of the Emperor.

A Compromise in Manchuria. Under date of November 13, Leland Stowe reports that Ambassador Dawes on arriving at Paris did not deny the possibility of a compromise proposal, American in origin, and his typed statement stressed the American Government's intention of bringing together the conflicting viewpoints of Tokyo and Nanking. On the other hand a despatch from Tokyo dated November 13 says that reports that the United States has a compromise proposal have led Japanese Foreign Office attaches to remark that there is little room for a compromise and that Japan will insist on the acceptance of Tokyo's five fundamental principles before the withdrawal of troops.

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

NAME

This telegram must be **PARIS**
closely paraphrased be- **FROM**
fore being communicated Dated November 18, 1931
to anyone.

Secretary of State
Washington

THE UNDER SECRETARY
NOV 19 1931
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RECEIVED
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 18 1931
Department of State

762, November 18, 8 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE PRESIDENT AND
SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES.

I have made perfectly clear to the Japanese, as
suggested in your 560, November 17, 11 p.m., that the
United States strongly insists that Japan shall not be
allowed to extort a ratification of treaty rights by
force and that it is emphatic in its insistence that
the settlement of these broader questions shall not be
made a condition precedent to the withdrawal of troops.
I told him also that we are cooperating with the League
on these objectives. They understand that our position
in this matter is entirely unchanged.

In your 560 you say:

"I still think that the presence of neutral ob-
servers offers the most likely road to settlement and
that if Japan was pressed hard enough to consent to
them, she would."

In my telegram 757, November 17, 8 p.m., I reported
the

F/DEM

793.94/2758

Confidential File

793.94
note

FE

1967

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

MAM

2- #762, from Paris, November 18,
 1931

the memorandum of a proposition which the Japanese delegation had discussed among themselves as something which their government might authorize, the full text which had been wired to the Japanese Government asking for authority for the delegation to present it to the Council. To this cable the delegation has not received an answer but realizing the extremely critical situation precipitated by the occurrences on the fighting front they have now wired their government asking for authority to submit the second point only to the League withdrawing point one which had been a condition to agreeing to the substance of point two. In other words the Japanese delegation now hope to get their government to allow them to propose the nomination of a commission to be made up of League members to be sent to China (China proper and Manchuria) by the League of Nations and entrusted with the making of investigations into such questions as anti-Japanese agitations, et cetera, with a view to placing the Council in a position to deliberate on the basis of complete information. While I am dictating this Yoshizawa is before the Council informing them of the sending of this second recommendation to the Japanese Government and his hope of securing authority to present it to the League.

Matsudaira

1965

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MAM

2- #762, from Paris, November 18,
 1931

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Matsudaira

1964

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MAM

3- #762, from Paris, November 18,
1931

with
544.00

Matsudaira gave me in strict confidence a most alarming statement as to the internal condition in Japan, a condition so dangerous to existing authority that he cannot allow it to become a matter of discussion. It concerns the direct control of the command at the front by those at the head of a plot against the government. I fear almost anything may happen there. Matsudaira himself considers it one of the most critical times internally in Japan's history. I have strongly advised him to tell Sir John Simon just what he has told me. He told me this after I had made a strong statement of the determined attitude of our government and what I considered the effect of today's military operations would be on public sentiment in condemnation of Japan's position. Nothing would seem to have been lacking in Matsudaira's recommendations to his government but he strongly fears that the power of determining policy is, for the time being, at least, beyond their control.

(*) apparent omission

SHAW

OX

FW

1967

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-128

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE

Collect
Charge Department
OR

Department of State

NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Charge to
\$

Washington,

This cable was sent in confidential Code.
It should be carefully paraphrased before
communicated to anyone.

November 19, 1931.

3.P

AmEmbassy,

Tokyo.

235

793.94/2758

Strictly confidential for the Ambassador.

Matsudaira has told Dawes in strict confidence in Paris that there is in Japan a very dangerous condition so far as existing authority is concerned. He intimates that it concerns direct control of the command at the front by those at the head of a plot against the Government and that this has caused one of the most critical internal conditions in the history of Japan. In other words, Matsudaira fears that the power of determining policy is, for the moment at least, beyond the control of the Government.

You must not REPEAT NOT indicate in any way the source of this information, but I hope you will be able to

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1935

1-128

793.94/2758

Confidential File

1968

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-128

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

Department of State

Washington,

AmEmbassy, Tokyo, page 2.

to check it and let me have very promptly your estimate
of the present situation.

There was recently a newspaper report of a plot
to kill Shidehara^{and others}. We have had no confirmation.
Please keep the Department closely informed on all
such matters.

Stinson

U WRC/AB

WRC

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____, _____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1965 1-128

1969

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

SPECIAL GREEN

Paris

FROM


Dated November 18, 1931

Received 19th, 12:50 a.m.

793.94
Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

763, November 18

FROM AMBASSADOR DAVES



F/UEW

793.94/2759

FIL 7D

NOV 27 1931

Sweetzer reported the private meeting of the twelve members of the council excluding the parties called this morning at eleven a.m. and lasting two hours as follows:

"Briand today presented to the Council the informal suggestions made yesterday by Yoshizawa containing three points: One, direct negotiations between Japan and China for the safety of Japanese nationals in the light of the five points; Two, the despatch of a commission named by the League to consider the whole situation between Japan and China especially in Manchuria and as regards the boycott and, Three, the keeping of the League informed of details.

Briand suggested that the best course would be to learn from the Japanese exactly what they meant by treaty rights and from the Chinese exactly what they were willing to give.

Thereupon a decided difference of approach developed amongst the various members of the Council. Briand was evidently

1971

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM

2-#763, from Paris, Nov. 18, 1931
9 p.m.

evidently groping around to find the smallest possible opportunity for starting negotiations which he hoped might gradually be built up into a general acceptance agreement. He recalled that while there were undoubtedly hostilities still war had been averted by the League and cited the fact that once before in the dispute between Poland and Lithuania, Lithuania had declared a state of war during whole years time before final solution was reached. He urged that the League exhaust every possible avenue of conciliation and then if in the end it failed he for his part was willing as he twice reiterated to go "absolutely to the limit". The other approach was stated by Simon who began "while we are sitting in private session here events are moving in Manchuria which may be stronger than words." The press speaks of "positive action" by Japan; it is well known that an ultimatum has been delivered to General Ma. While the Council is justified in taking time to get word from Yoshizawa it must envisage the possibilities of very serious consequences. He was not at all contented as to the scope of the Japanese proposals; for instance whether a commitment could be sent irrespective of agreement on the first point; nor had the Council ever been able to get from Japan a clear idea of what the fifth point meant. He stressed the fact that his Government was very

AM

3-#763, from Paris, Nov. 18, 1931
9 p.m.

was very anxious to support the League. If he had to choose on the one hand between long and uncertain negotiations which might or might not come to a result but which would give the appearance of the abandonment of the League's principles of solution and on the other going squarely and openly on the records to support the principles of the League even if unsuccessful he would for his part choose the latter. He hesitated about getting involved step by step in endless discussions which might weaken all that the League stands for.

A detailed discussion then ensued among various other members of the Council on Brainin's proposal of inviting Japan and China to come before them this afternoon to explain their views. It was arranged to see Mr. Yoshizawa at four o'clock and Dr. Sze at five."

SHAW

HPD

1 972
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 500.. A 15 A 4/557 FOR Despatch # 530.

FROM Finland (Brodie) DATED Oct. 24, 1931.
TO NAME 1-1172 ...

REGARDING:

Japanese-Chinese relations.
Satisfaction expressed by Minister Holsti
at the declarations of the U. S. re -
which have caused an altered attitude
to be adopted on the part of the Japanese
representative.

hs

793.94/2760

197
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 701.9475/2 FOR Resnatch #379

FROM Albania (Bernstein) DATED Nov. 8, 1931
TO NAME 1-1172 ...

REGARDING: Japanese attitude in Manchurian question. Newly appointed Japanese Minister to Albania stated that all Japan wants in Manchuria is to protect her nationals and vast interests there, and put a stop to anti-Japanese agitation

793.94/2761

✓

1974

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Tirana, Albania,

No. 579.

November 3, 1931.

Confidential.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that on November 3, 1931, M. Kawashima, the Japanese Minister to Greece, presented his credentials to King Zog and is now accredited also to Albania.

M. Kawashima called at the Legation yesterday and during his visit made the following remarks:

"All we want in Manchuria is to protect our nationals numbering about a million, our vast interests there, and to put a stop to the anti-Japanese agitation. The Soviets are working there most energetically. It is their intention

1975

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

intention to sovietize Manchuria, Korea and so on. We seized four strategic points in Manchuria in order to safeguard our interests, and to check these dangerous bolshevist Russo-Chinese aspirations. Now we have only 1800 soldiers at these points. But I do not believe that by the time the Council of the League meets again to discuss the Manchurian situation, Japan will have withdrawn all her troops. Although our Foreign Office is working for peace, it cannot proceed too quickly in a situation of this nature, for it must also reckon with the tense national feelings prevailing in our country.

In February the world will watch the Disarmament Conference. The conference is essential. It is twelve years since the peace treaties were signed. It is high time to examine whether the problem of disarmament can be solved. This is surely the best time to start solving the problem, because of the general economic depression. Some nations cannot afford to go on increasing their armaments even if they wanted to. I don't think the nations can disarm as yet. I don't believe most of them are willing even to reduce their armaments. It may be that the conference will succeed in getting the nations to agree to limit the maximum, and that will also be an achievement, - a good beginning. But there is one element that is bound to interfere with the success of the conference. I mean Soviet Russia. She will agree to a most sweeping reduction of armaments. In fact she may again advocate complete disarmament. But no one trusts her. Despite her promises, Soviet Russia will continue to arm. The nations near Soviet
Russia

- 3 -

Russia will be afraid to disarm. Poland and Rumania will insist on maintaining their armaments in order to check any invasion by the Soviets. We thus have a curious situation with regard to disarmament. The United States, Great Britain and Italy say: "Disarm and then mutual confidence will be restored and world peace will thus be made secure." France and her followers say: "Guarantee us security first, and there will be no more war. Then there will be no need for armaments." If the Disarmament Conference fails to bring about an agreement to reduce armaments, Germany will justly say to the other nations: "Either disarm, or permit us to arm." Japan will say: "How can we disarm, as long as we doubt the promises and question the motives of Soviet Russia?" Besides, how is the reduction of armaments to be controlled? A standing army may be reduced to the minimum, and yet a much larger number of youths may be trained for military service without actually being in the army, and in the event of need a greater army than now would be ready at short notice. And what about poisonous gases and other destructive war inventions? Who will be in position to control these?"

Referring to King Aeg, the Japanese Minister said:

"The King makes a fine impression. He strikes me as being quite democratic. It is difficult for a King to pursue the right course between the formalities of Court life and the democratic spirit which the people expect everywhere nowadays. Our own King has found this happy medium- he is both a real King and a man of the people. At present there is no harder business in the world than

the

- 4 -

the King business, for he must steer his course skillfully between the extremists on the right and the extremists on the left."

Then, apropos of nothing, the Japanese Minister referred to our immigration quota for Albania, saying:

"The United States has granted Albania a quota of 100 immigrants a year. Albania is a little country. And yet Japan would be happy if the United States were to place her in the same category in this matter, by granting her a quota, however small. We are still hoping that the United States will do it some day. At present more Japanese enter the United States than if we had a quota. All we desire is to be treated upon a basis of equality with other nations."

Respectfully yours,

Herman Bernstein.

Copies to Rome, Athens and E.I.C.

HB/sjs

A true copy of
the signed original.
KK

1978

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WAR DEPARTMENT

Nov. 14, 1931

Secretary of War
Assistant Secretary of War
Assistant Secretary of War (Air)
G-1
G-3
G-4
War Plans Division
Statistics Branch
Adjutant General's Dept.
Army Industrial College
Army War College
Air Corps (Liaison Officer)
Cavalry
Chemical Warfare Service
Coast Artillery Corps
Corps of Engineers
Command & General Staff School
Field Artillery
Finance
Infantry
Inspector General's Dept.
Insular Affairs
Judge Advocate General's Dept.
Militia Bureau
Office of Naval Intelligence
Ordnance Dept.
Quartermaster General's Dept.
Signal Corps
Surgeon General's Office

✓ State Dept.:
Eastern Europe
Western Europe
Near East
Latin America
✓ Far East
Mexican Affairs

Commerce Dept.:
Foreign & Domestic Commerce
Aeronautics


✓ For your information and file
Note and return
Note and send to

1970

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE SECRETARY OF WAR

COPY



Code
Cable

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By me NARS Date 3/19/73

RADIOGRAM


Received at the War Department.

November 14, 1931

9:30 A. M.

From

Tokyo



To The Adjutant General

WS 6

CONFIDENTIAL

Number 195

Nov. 14th

McIlroy on annual maneuvers until November 17th. Military Attache invited by General Staff to visit Manchuria, State Department approved McIlroy going if others go. British will go, McIlroy will go if others go, they are awaiting instructions. He thinks it is a political matter and requests that special instructions from State Department after consultation with War Department. Party expects to leave November 19th.

Following distribution of Japanese troops in Manchuria given by General Staff to us only, confidential for use of State Department and War Department only. Between north bank Nonni River and Chang Chiatun one battalion 4th Infantry, two battalions 16th Infantry, two battalions 29th Regiment Infantry, 28th Cavalry, two batteries 2d Field Artillery, two batteries 26th Field Artillery, one company 2d Battalion Engineers, two squadrons 6th Regiment Air Service. Between Chang Chun and Kirin one battalion 4th Infantry, two battalions 30th Regiment Infantry, two batteries 2d Field Artillery. Mukden one battalion and one company 77th Infantry, one battalion and two companies 78th Infantry, two batteries 26th Field Artillery and one company 20th Engineers battalion. Liaoyang one company 78th Infantry. Chuiliuho near Shinmin two companies 77th Infantry. Distribution of railroad guards has not been changed since October. It appears that Japanese have weakened other places and concentrated the majority of their troops at Chang Chia Tun and Taonan

F/DEW

793.94/2762

793.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE SECRETARY OF WAR

RADIOGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

- 2 -

BUREAU OF INQUIRIES AND ARCHIVES

Number 196 (continued)

Nov. 14th

to support eventualities on the west. General Staff claims all quiet except for bandits but admits possibility of more trouble in Nonni River Area as Ma's army, about 20,000 is increasing in number and his cavalry is active. Press reports considerable activity within a few days in that vicinity. Reinforced brigade from the 8th Division leaves today via Dairen consisting of one battalion each from 5th Regiment 31st Regiment Infantry 17th Regiment and 32d Regiment, two batteries 8th Regiment Field Artillery, one squadron 8th Regiment Cavalry, one company 8th Engineers battalion total about 4000 to relieve Korea brigade.

Cranford

81
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE SECRETARY OF WAR
DIRECTS ANSWERS TO

RADIOGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BUREAU OF INDEXES AND ARCHIVES

FOI

GPO

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE SECRETARY OF WAR
DIRECTS ANSWERS TO THIS
RADIO AS FOLLOWS:
ADVISE WITHIN 12 HOURS
if answer is unnecessary.
If answer is NOT SENT
WITHIN 7 DAYS REASON
MUST BE STATED.
C. H. BRIDGES.
Major General.
The Adjutant General.

Code
Cable

RADIOGRAM

Received at the War Department.

DCR
file

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
NOV 16 1931
DIVISION OF RECORDS
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

November 14, 1931

9:30

M.

To The Adjutant General

Copies furnished as noted:

CONFIDENTIAL

Number 195

Nov 14th

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Military Attache invited by General Staff to visit
Manchuria, State Department approved McIlroy going if
others go. British will go, McIlroy will go if others
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a political matter and requests that special instructions
from State Department after consultation with War
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Following distribution of Japanese troops in
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for use of State Department and War Department only.
Between north bank Nonni River and Chang Chiatun one
battalion 4th Infantry, two battalions 16th Infantry,
two battalions 29th Regiment Infantry, 28th Cavalry, two
batteries 2d Field Artillery, two batteries 26th Field
Artillery, one company 2d Battalion Engineers, two
squadrons 6th Regiment Air Service. Between Chang Chy
and Kirin one battalion 4th Infantry, two battalions
30th Regiment Infantry, two batteries 2d Field Artillery.
Mukden one battalion and one company 77th Infantry, one
battalion and two companies 78th Infantry, two batteries

G-2
TAG

X
V

F.W. 793.94/2762

FILED

NOV 16 1931

X INDICATES RADIO ROUTED FOR ACTION; / FOR INFORMATION

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE SECRETARY OF WAR
 DIRECTS ANSWERS TO THIS
 RADIO AS FOLLOWS:
 ADVISE WITHIN 12 HOURS
 if answer is unnecessary.
 If answer is NOT SENT
 WITHIN 7 DAYS REASON
 MUST BE STATED.
 C. H. BRIDGES,
 Major General,
 The Adjutant General.

Copies furnished as noted:

Sheet #2

RADIOGRAM

Received at the War Department.

From M.
 To

Number 196 (continued)

Nov 14th

26th Field Artillery and one company 20th Engineers
 battalion. Liaoyang one company 78th Infantry.
 Chuiliuho near Shinmin two companies 77th Infantry.
 Distribution of railroad guards has not been changed
 since October. It appears that Japanese have weakened
 other places and concentrated the majority of their
 troops at Chang Chia Tun and Teonan to support
 eventualities on the west. General Staff claims all
 quiet except for bandits but admits possibility of
 more trouble in Nonni River Area as Ma's army, about
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 few days in that vicinity. Reinforced brigade from the
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 one battalion each from 5th Regiment 31st Regiment
 Infantry 17th Regiment and 32d Regiment, two batteries
 8th Regiment Field Artillery, one squadron 8th Regiment
 Cavalry, one company 8th Engineers battalion total
 about 4000 to relieve Korea brigade.

Cranford

X INDICATES RADIO ROUTED FOR ACTION, / FOR INFORMATION

1984

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-126
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Collect
Charge Department
or
Charge to
\$

Department of State

Washington,

November 18, 1931.

793.94

AMERICAN CONSUL

NOV 18 31

NANKING (China).

115 FOR THE MINISTER.

The Department desires to be kept currently
informed, by mail and/or telegraph, with regard
to the anti-Japanese boycott.

Stinson
Wly

793.94/2762A

note
643/412

FE:MMH/VDM

FE

Enciphered by M.M.H.

Sent by operator M., 19

Index Bu.—No. 80.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1926 1-126

1985

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CJE

This telegram ~~must be~~ **TELEGRAM RECEIVED**
carefully paraphrased be-
fore being communicated to
anyone.

PARIS

Dated November 18, 1931

FROM

Rec'd. Nov. 19, 4:42 a.m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 19 1931
Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington.

765, November 18, 2 p.m.

FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES.

Sir John Simon leaves to attend cabinet meeting

at London early tomorrow morning but expects to return
here shortly. I had a conversation with him late tonight
over the critical situation. I told him that Matsudaira
regarded the internal situation in Japan as beyond the
control of the Japanese Government. Simon ^{commented} that he
had independent and strictly confidential intimation of
a possible coup in Japan.

Yoshizawa when he went before the Council this after-
noon instead of informing them of the sending of a second
recommendation to the Japanese Government and his hope of
securing authority to present it to the League as
Matsudaira had expected and as reported in my 762,
November 18, 8 p.m., reaffirmed with extravagant addi-
tions all the old objectional proposals of Japan (see
my 764 ~~to-night~~ containing Sweetser's report of the proceed-
ings of

F/DEW

793.94/2763

FILED

NOV 27 1931

1984

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

OJH

Page 2 - #765 from
Paris.

ings of the Council meeting in question).

The League is now acting under Article 11. It is anticipated that China will soon if not tomorrow ask that the League proceed under articles 10, 12, 15 and if necessary 16, parenthetically Dr. Sze has notified me that he will call upon me at 10:30 tomorrow morning and it may be to inform me in this connection. If China makes this request Simon feels that League should proceed to the appointment of a commission under Article 15 to report upon the general situation and should that action be ineffective then proceed under article sixteen. In other words he is inclined to think that the League should go to the limit of its powers in this situation irrespective of whether or not the probabilities be in favor of success. It would at least tend to mobilize the moral forces of the world in a strong way in a condemnatory attitude toward Japan's procedure provided always that the United States Government assumes independently and concurrently the same attitude. He queries whether in case under article 15 a commission of the League members is sent to report on the situation the United States would be inclined to appoint a member or if not a member an associate investi-

gator. He

1 093
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CJH

Page 3 - #765 dated
November 18, from Paris.

gator. He expressed a desire for a continuing exchange of ideas between his Government and ours designed, since our treaty interests and general relation to the situation are the same, to have our attitudes supplement each other in the most effective way.

SHAW

W SB

198

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CJH

Page 3 - #765 dated
November 18, from Paris.

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SHAW

W SB

1 980

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793 94 / 2764

MAIN

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GREEN AND SPECIAL GREEN

PARIS

FROM

Dated November 18, 1931

Rec'd 4:23 a.m., 19th.

Secretary of State

Washington

764, November 18, midnight

FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES

Referring Embassy's 763, November 18, 9 p.m., the Committee of Twelve met privately this afternoon questioning Yoshizawa for nearly two hours and Sze for an hour with discouraging results. Sweetzer reports proceeding as follows:

"Yoshizawa said that Japan considered points 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the October 24 resolution as quite insufficient and unprecise. The second point, for instance, of "hostile agitation" was very vague and far removed from what his Government had in mind. Similarly, Japan's request for effective protection throughout Manchuria for all peaceful occupations was not at all met. Japan attaches great importance to this, particularly agricultural exploitation by Koreans, and the failure to cover it is a cause of deep discontent. Point 4 was also insufficient, though no reason was given, while Point 5 does not give proper recognition of railroad questions.

Mr. Yoshizawa



#2, #764 from Paris, November 18,
midnight, 1931

Mr. Yoshizawa then introduced a new thought to the effect that the first four points of the October 24th resolution may be said to be only headings for the first four Japanese fundamental points and that when they are actually negotiated Japan would want to go into far greater detail. Hence, the expressions used in the resolution were wholly insufficient.

Taking up Briand's questions, he said that as regards the point wherein Dr. Sze's letter raised doubt as to whether China intended to question the validity of certain treaties, Japan could not for a minute allow treaties signed and ratified to be questioned. China had even sought to bring up at Washington the treaty embodying the 21 demands which Mr. Hughes had recognized.

As regards the second question as to whether Japan will be content with a general declaration relative to respect for treaties or would desire a declaration enumerating particular treaties, he said that she would not be content with such a general declaration even if it contained details, as China does not respect treaties, but Japan would insist on a new treaty reaffirming the old treaties.

As regards the third question as to what degree
questions

MEM

3- #764, from Paris, November 18,
1931

questions of security are implied in the treaties specially foreseen by him, he said that Japan was interested not only in the security of her people but also in the safety of property, though he did not expect many details would be here involved.

Briand then began a cross questioning of Mr. Yoshizawa to know whether evacuation would begin upon the fixing of a program of negotiation and the naming of the negotiators, or only after the negotiations had been completed and an accord reached. Mr. Yoshizawa in his first reply said that Japan intended to complete evacuation only when she had arrived at an accord with China on those points. Bitter experience had shown that fair documents might be signed but would not be fulfilled. Japan did not intend to suffer again in this way. She must have agreement first.

Briand rephrased his question three different times in an evident attempt to get the Japanese to agree on earlier evacuation. He thought, for instance, that when the program of negotiation had been settled and the mediators named it might not be necessary to wait until complete success was achieved; otherwise, the delay might be very long. Again, he pointed out that perhaps when China had shown its good will and a program of negotiations been drafted Japan's conditions might be considered fulfilled.

Mr. Yoshizawa,

4-#764, from Paris, November 18, midnight
Mr. Yoshizawa, however, remained firm; Japan did not wish to complete evacuation until she had completed the accord and had been fully assured of China's good faith. This accord, however, was one of principle, not of detail, and ought not to take long. Similarly, troops could be withdrawn from certain places where order was established. Japan did not intend to occupy Manchuria permanently but felt that security was possible only after agreement on the fundamental points.

After one more attempt by Briand, and a statement by Scraloga that these points were too difficult to handle orally across different languages, the Japanese agreed to put their understanding of this point into written form.

Dr. Sze then came before the Committee. He began with a prefatory statement that China was not willing to pay out a price for Japan's agreement to withdraw her troops. To do so would be to condone a flagrant violation of the Covenant and the Kellogg Pact. China could not be expected to pay for rights guaranteed by treaty. Briand here explained that the Council had no such idea in mind but had asked this question simply in view of the doubt raised by Japan.

Sze then repeated that China felt herself bound as
with

LAM

5- #764, from Paris, November 18,
1931

with all members of the League, to a scrupulous respect for treaties. In addition she was willing to have arbitration on any doubtful points as promptly as possible under Article 13 of the Covenant. He recalled that at Washington the parties, except for China, had agreed to file their treaty agreements. If Japan should bring up a treaty which is out of date or invalid, China thought the proper course was to arbitrate. A general discussion of treaties at this moment might take a long time; no one knew what treaties Japan had in mind. He thereupon read the text of the Washington provisions for registration of all commitments.

She laid stress upon the point that China is bound as regards Manchuria, not only to Japan but to other nations. Under the Nine Power Treaty, for instance, she has obligated herself to other states to maintain the open door and equal commercial opportunity. If there is any difference of interpretation China was prepared to arbitrate.

If, however, Japan has in mind the 21 demands China is not going to resign them to buy evacuation. Since their day, China has become bound by the Washington Treaty.

6-#764, from Paris, November 18,
midnight

Treaty. Sze pointed out that this statement contained nothing new but was simply a reaffirmation of what he had said at Washington.

The question as to treaties, he said, is not one of China respecting her obligations, but Japan. The latter, he claimed, had already violated the Covenant, the Kellogg Pact and the Nine Power Treaty. Japan had promised two months ago to withdraw; she had not done so; she was always pressing new demands; one wondered when she was going to stop. Thereupon, in reply to a question, he gave the history of the 21 demands, saying they had been presented secretly, with a 48-hour ultimatum, signed under military pressure, never ratified, and since repeatedly protested.

Sze took the occasion to inform the Council that he was constantly receiving urgent cables from China. Since Monday the Japanese troops north of the Monni had greatly increased, with artillery, tanks, aviation and cavalry. Something must be done to stop the bloodshed. If there were difficulties under Article 11 he gave notice that he would take the opportunity of the first public meeting to invoke Articles 10, 12, 15 and, if necessary, 16. He felt that the time had come to speak plainly; that Japan had not fulfilled any of her agreements as to the withdrawal

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

HAM

7- #764, from Paris, November 18,
1931

withdrawal of troops, withdrawal of bombing planes, not
penetrating north of the Nonni, and the like.

The next meeting is fixed for eleven o'clock to-
morrow morning, with the probability of having before
it Japan's written statement of her views of the rela-
tion of the evacuation to the negotiation of the accord
on the fundamental points. An atmosphere of gravity
settled over the Council at the end, with the feeling
that there was very little prospect now of settlement
by mediation. Those who have been pressing for a pub-
lic affirmation of principles, as the British and Ger-
man representatives this morning, and who have, up until
now, held back to give Briand full chance of negotiation,
are likely now to press their views vigorously."

SHAW

ARL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

SPECIAL GREEN AND GREEN

PARIS

FROM

Dated November 18, 1931

Rec'd 19th, 4:23 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.


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"Yoshizawa said that Italian authority considered points 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the October 24 Resolution as quite insufficient and unprecise. The second point, for instance, of "hostile agitation" was very vague and far removed from what his Government had in mind. Similarly, Japan's request for effective protection throughout for all peaceful occupations was not at all met. Japan attaches great importance to this particularly agricultural exploitation by Koreans and the failure to cover it is a cause of deep discontent. Point 4 was already insufficient though no reason was given, while Point 5 does not give proper recognition of railroad questions.

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F/DEW
793.94/2764

FILED
NOV 24 1931

AM

2-#764, from Paris, November 18, 1931
midnight

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As reported the second question as to whether Japan will be content with a general declaration relative to respect for treaties or would desire a declaration enumerating particular treaties he said that she would not be content with such a general declaration even if it contained details, as China does not respect treaties but Japan would insist on a new treaty reaffirming the old treaties.

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

3-#764, from Paris, Nov. 18, 1931
midnight

FROM

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4-#764, from Paris, Nov. 18, 1931
midnight

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AM

5-#764, from Paris, Nov. 18, 1931
midnight

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Sze laid stress upon the point that China is bound as regards Manchuria, not only to Japan but to other nations. Under the Nine Power Treaty, for instance, she has obligated herself to other states to maintain the open door and equal commercial opportunity. If there is any difference of interpretation China was prepared to arbitrate.

If, however, Japan has in mind the Twenty-one Demands, China is not going to resign them to buy evacuation. Since their day, China has become bound by the Washington Treaty.

6-#764, from Paris, Nov. 18, midnight

AM

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Sze took the occasion to inform the Council that he was constantly receiving urgent cables from China. Since Monday the Japanese troops north of the Nonni had greatly increased, with artillery, tanks, aviation and cavalry. Something must be done to stop the bloodshed. If there were difficulties under Article 11 he gave notice that he would take the opportunity of the first public meeting to invoke Articles 10, 12, 15 and, if necessary, 16. He felt that the time had come to speak plainly; that Japan had not fulfilled any of her agreements as to the

withdrawal of troops

AM

7-#764, from Paris, Nov. 18, midnight

of troops, withdrawal
withdrawal of bombing planes, not penetrating north of the
Nonni, and the like.

The next meeting is fixed for eleven o'clock tomorrow morning, with the probability of having before it Japan's written statement of her views of the relation of the evacuation to the negotiation of the accord on the fundamental points. An atmosphere of gravity settled over the Council at the end, with the feeling that there was very little prospect now of settlement by mediation.

Those who have been pressing for a public affirmation of principles, as the British and German representatives this morning, and who have, up until now, held back to give Briand full chance of negotiation, are likely now to press their views vigorously. "

SHAW

ARL

FW

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Collect Department of State
Charge Department Department of State
Charge to Department of State
\$ 20684

Washington, 21
November 20, 1931.
2 R

793.94/2764
AMEMBASSY

586
PARIS (France)
FOR AMBASSADOR DAWES.

Embassy's 749, November 18, midnight. 2764

With regard to Yoshizawa's statement that QUOTE China had even sought to bring up at Washington the treaty embodying the Twenty-one Demands which Secretary Hughes had recognized UNQUOTE, your attention is called to the fact that Secretary Hughes appears neither to have recognized nor to have denied the validity of the Sino-Japanese treaties of 1915. At the Washington Conference, Secretary Hughes, as stated in my No. 328 sent to you in London, November 11, reaffirmed the reservations made in 1915 by the American Government in connection with the Sino-Japanese negotiations and agreements of 1915. Secretary Hughes also stated that under the most-favored-nation clause of its treaties with China the American Government would claim for American citizens equal rights with the Japanese in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia. He then stated QUOTE I may pause here to remark that the question of the validity of treaties as between Japan and China is distinct from the question of the treaty rights of the United States under its treaties with China. UNQUOTE.

Enciphered by MMH/VDM
FE:MMH/VDM
Sent by operator M., 19

1015

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Index Bureau

RECEIVED

RB OCT 29 1931

PARIS


FROM

Dated November 19, 1931

Rec'd 10:25 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.



TRIPLE PRIORITY.

766, November 19, 12 noon.

FROM AMBASSADOR DAVES.

Please call me without fail Hotel Ritz 9:30

Washington time for important communication.

SHAW

F/DEW

793.94/2765

FILED

NOV 23 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

OJH

TELEGRAM RECEIVED GRAY

PEIPING VIA N. R.

FROM

Dated November 19, 1931

Rec'd. 4:43 a.m.

Secretary of State,


Washington.

962, November 19, 9 a.m.

Following from Harbin:

"November 18, 8 p.m. Following is translation of
the telegrams received by Foreign Commissioner here from
Ma:

November 17, 8 p.m. Today the Japanese troops have
made renewed efforts to advance. At noon a part of their
troops began to attack, but they were held back. For the
last few days four or five Japanese bombing planes have
daily attacked the Chinese troops. Reports have come in
that the Japanese troops at the Nonni Bridge have been
strengthened with several reinforcements, with their
mind made up to attack the city of Tsitsihar. The Jap-
anese Consul at Tsitsihar left for Harbin with his staff
on the twelfth. On the fifteenth Pai Wu, Honjo's re-
presentative at Harbin, delivered an ultimatum to the
Chinese authorities



F/DEW

793.94/2766

NOV 23 1931

OJH

Page 2 - #962 from
Peiping via N.R.

Chinese authorities demanding that the Chinese troops be withdrawn immediately to the north of Tsitsihar. The Chinese reply suggested that the Tsitsihar and Japanese troops be withdrawn, which reply was rejected by the Japanese. The Japanese further demanded verbally that Tsitsihar be proclaimed independent of the Central Government and that a council be established for the maintenance of peace and order, threatening to resume hostilities in case this demand should be rejected.

A telegram has been sent to Sze to this effect and it is requested that the various consuls at Harbin be informed accordingly.

For the Minister

ENGERT

GW

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

9JH

Index Bureau
RECEIVED

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAM

OCT 29 1929

TOKIO

11-11-11

FROM

Dated November 18, 1931

Rec'd. Nov. 19, 9:50
a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

224, November 18, 7 p.m.



F/DEW

793.94/2767

The Minister of Foreign Affairs informed me that all yesterday he had understood that General Ma had agreed to the proposal of the Japanese, namely, to withdraw his forces to Tsitsihar, return those drawn in from other posts and not impede the operation of the railroad which when done the Japanese would immediately withdraw. He stated their position was such that with the Chinese threatening they were unable to withdraw in safety from their present positions. General Ma had informed the authorities in Harbin that he had accepted the Japanese terms and had despatched a messenger, expected to arrive yesterday morning, with his acceptance. Contrary to expectation the message was not an acceptance. This morning the Chinese launched a heavy attack and the situation was very disturbed. The assistant chief of staff has been despatched with instructions that whatever the outcome

FILED

NOV 24 1931

of battle

QJH

Page 2 - #224 from
Tokio.

of battle the Japanese armies are immediately to withdraw
and under no circumstances to occupy Tsitsihar. He thinks
this situation will clear itself within 3 or 4 days and
stated positively that the additional division had not
yet been sent.

943.0511

He described the departure of the young emperor as
wholly on his own initiative and due to fears for the
safety of his life which has been repeatedly threatened
in Tientsin until he could not sleep. He was not assisted
by the Japanese troops or civil authorities in this move
but is now being "protected" by them at some resort in
Manchuria, one feature of the "protection" being that he
is not allowed to communicate with the various defense
committees. Baron Shidehara characterized him as weak,
inexperienced, and stated that neither the Japanese civil
or military authorities would favor his assuming the
position of Emperor. He added that in the character of
simple "Mr. Pui" he might be selected by members of the
defense committees as a sort of general chairman at some
later period. The Baron further stated that he and the
military authorities had been in entire accord.

FORBES

WSB

H

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM


CORRECTED COPY
FROM

GRAY

Nanking via N. R.

Dated November 19, 1931

Rec'd 9 a.m.



Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

November 19, 4 p.m.

Your 113, November 17, 7 p.m., to Nanking.

No further action at present appears necessary
in the matter of investigation into causes of trouble
at Tientsin.

JOHNSON

RR

Chinese political situation.

793.94/2768

1021

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY
Nanking via N. R.

Dated November 19, 1931

FROM

Rec'd 9 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

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
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JOHNSON

RR

Chinese political situation.



F/DEW

793.94/2768

FILED

DEC 21 1931

CJH

GRAY

FF

TELEGRAM RECEIVED PEIPING via N. R.

Index ~~REMOVED~~

OCT 29 1931

Dated November 19, 1931

FROM

Rec'd. 9:40 a.m.

Dept. of State

793.94
Secretary of State,

Washington.

965, November 19, 12 noon.

Following from Mukden:

"November 18, 3 p.m. Japanese headquarters released
a report this morning substantially as follows:

"Ma Chan Shan after the fighting near Tahsing
concentrated strong forces at Angangchi and in the
surrounding districts. Not only has he failed to
reply to the Japanese proposals by the 16th but has
advanced and pressed the Japanese right and rear, thus
endangering the Nonni River bridges near Kiangchow.
At the same time bandits, cooperating with Ma's troops,
from various points, attempted to destroy the Sstao
railway, the only Japanese line of communication. Clashes
between small forces in the front lines have taken place
during the last few days and Ma's troops, showing signs
of unusual activity since the 17th, finally undertook an
enveloping offensive. Under the circumstances the Jap-
anese troops, as a measure of self preservation, launched
an offensive

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
NOV 18 1931
Department of State
Telegram drafted
to Paris, 19, 1931
Smt 1891 81

793.94/2769

FILED
NOV 23 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Mita O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CJH

Page 2 - #965 from
Peiping via N. R.

an offensive early this morning.

Japanese press reports state that the replacement mixed brigade left Hirosaki on the 14th by train and the planes ordered to Manchuria left their bases on the 16th. It is believed that they have already reached the front.

Japanese reserves have been called to the colors for guard duty in the railway zone, replacing troops that have been sent to the Nonni front".

"November 18, 9 p.m. Japanese officially announced Japanese troops after sharp fighting reached the Chinese Eastern Railway at one this afternoon. No details available." Repeated to Nanking.

FOR THE MINISTER

ENGERT

WSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 10, 1931.

Forbes, in his 215, November 12, reported a conversation with Baron Shidehara in which the latter gave two conditions upon either of which Japan was prepared to withdraw troops in Manchuria.

In his 223 of November 18, Forbes reported that the ADVERTISER had published much the same information concerning these alternative conditions which had been "given out by the Foreign Office".

In his 225 of November 19, hereunder, he states that press report above referred to was not given out by the Foreign Office but had come from some other source.

RECEIVED

NOV 19 1931

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

RSM/ZMF

1025

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RB

Index B TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RECEIVED

Tokio

OCT 29 1929

Dated November 19, 1931

RECEIVED

Dept. of State

FROM

Rec'd 9:51 a. m.

Division of

NOV 19 1931

Secretary of State

SECRETARY OF STATE

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Washington.

NOV 20 1931

NOV 19 1931

Department of State

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

225, November 19, 3 p. m.

Reference Embassy's telegram 223, November 18,
6 p. m.

My statement that the story in regard to
alternative conditions was given out by the Foreign
Office was incorrect. It was given me by B. W.
Fleisher, evidently in error, as his son who secured
the information told me that it had come from some
other source.

FORBES

CSB

FK 733.94/2770

NOV 23 1931

MICROCOPY

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ROLL

4

END

