

MICROCOPY

976

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**NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS**

Microfilm Publication M976

RECORDS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RELATING TO POLITICAL RELATIONS  
BETWEEN CHINA AND JAPAN, 1930-1944

Roll 5

1930-39

793.94/2771-2940  
~~Oct.~~.-Nov. 1931



**THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES  
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE  
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**

WASHINGTON: 1975



## NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

### INTRODUCTION

On the 96 rolls of this microfilm publication are reproduced the records from the decimal file of the Department of State, 1930-44, that relate to political relations between China and Japan. The records are mostly instructions to and despatches from diplomatic and consular officials; the despatches are often accompanied by enclosures. Also included in these records are notes between the Department of State and foreign diplomatic representatives in the United States, memorandums prepared by officials of the Department, and correspondence with officials of other Government departments and with private firms and persons. The State Department divided the decimal file into chronological segments to retire inactive records. This division has been maintained in this microfilm publication. The records for the period 1930-39 are filmed on rolls 1-88 and those for 1940-44 on rolls 89-96.

The Lists of Documents or "purport lists" filmed on rolls 345 and 346 (1930-39), roll 532 (1940-June 1944), and roll 628 (July-Dec. 1944) of M973 give brief abstracts of the documents reproduced in this microfilm publication and serve as a finding aid to the documents themselves. The arrangement of the entries on these lists generally corresponds to the arrangement of the documents in the file.

From 1910 to 1963 the State Department used a decimal system for its central files, assembling and arranging individual documents according to subject and assigning decimal file numbers. The decimal file consists of nine primary classes numbered 0 through 8, each covering a broad subject area. The records reproduced in this microfilm publication are in Class 7, political relations of states. Each country had been assigned a two-digit number. The country numbers assigned to China and to Japan, for example, are 93 and 94, respectively. Thus, documents bearing the file number 793.94 concern political relations between China and Japan.

When one or more digits follow the second country number, they represent a specific subject. This number, in turn, may be followed by a slant mark (/). In such cases the numbers after the slant mark were assigned to individual documents as they were accumulated on a specific subject. For example, a decimal file number taken from a document reproduced in this microfilm publication is 793.943/5. The number 3 following the country number for Japan (94) signifies that the subject is extraterritoriality, and the number after the slant mark indicates the number of documents on this subject.

## NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

The documents under one subject classification are generally in chronological order, coinciding with the assigned document number, which follows the slant mark. There are instances, however, when a document file number was not assigned until a date considerably later than the one on which the document was received.

In July 1944 the number after the slant mark began to reflect the date of the document instead of the number of documents; for example, a document dated November 20, 1944, would be numbered /11-2044. Documents dated as early as 1939 but not indexed until after July 1, 1944, also have been assigned date numbers.

Cross-reference sheets referring to related records under other subject classifications in the decimal file have been reproduced as they occur, and appropriate cross-reference notations appear in the Lists of Documents.

The file contains documents that were security classified by the State Department, as well as those received from and classified by foreign governments and other Federal agencies. Documents that have not been declassified are not available as part of this microfilm publication. The National Archives and Records Service (NARS) does not have authority to make reproductions of such documents available to searchers. Documents that remain classified have been removed from the file and replaced by a withdrawal notice that identifies the document and indicates the reason for its removal.

The records reproduced in this microfilm publication are part of General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, and are a continuation of the records concerning political relations between China and other states, 1910-29, which have been microfilmed as NARS M341.

In the same record group are several diplomatic correspondence series containing documents on relations between China and the United States. They are copies of instructions from the State Department to U.S. Ministers to China, 1843-1906 (rolls 38-43 of M77); notes to the Chinese Legation in the United States from the Department, 1868-1906 (rolls 13 and 14 of M99); despatches from U.S. Ministers to China to the Department, 1843-1906 (M92); and notes from the Chinese Legation in the United States to the Department, 1868-1906 (M98). Also related to matters concerning China are communications to special agents of the United States from the Department, 1852-86 (roll 154 of M77).

Several series of volumes contain material on relations between Japan and the United States. There are copies of instructions from the State Department to U.S. Ministers to

## NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

Japan, 1855-1906 (rolls 104-108 of M77); despatches from U.S. Ministers to Japan to the Department, 1855-1906 (M133); notes to the Japanese Legation in the United States from the Department, 1860-1906 (rolls 66 and 67 of M99); and notes from the Japanese Legation in the United States to the Department, 1858-1906 (M163). Also related to matters concerning Japan are communications to special agents of the United States from the Department, 1823-86 (rolls 152 and 154 of M77); and despatches from special agents to the Department, 1794-1837 (roll 10 of M37).

Despatches from U.S. consular officials in China and Japan before 1906 are available as separate microfilm publications for each post. Complementary to the despatches from consuls are instructions to consuls.

The method of arranging the diplomatic and consular series cited above was discontinued in 1906, when the State Department adopted the practice of filing incoming and outgoing correspondence, memorandums, and other documents by subject in a single numerical series. Information on documents relating to China and Japan for the 1906-10 period may be found through the use of card indexes and Lists of Documents in the National Archives of the United States. The Numerical File is available as microfilm publication M862.

Several series in the State Department decimal file, 1910-29, that relate to Chinese and Japanese affairs are available as microfilm publications. In Class 7 there are two series regarding Chinese affairs: one concerning political relations between the United States and China (M339) and the other concerning political relations between China and other states (including Japan) (M341); and two series regarding Japanese affairs: one concerning political relations between the United States and Japan (M423) and the other concerning political relations between Japan and other states (M424). Class 8, internal affairs of states, has records concerning internal affairs of China (M329) and internal affairs of Japan (M422). Additional documents are in the remaining classes of the State Department decimal file:

- Class 0. General. Miscellaneous.
- Class 1. Administration, Government of the United States.
- Class 2. Extradition.
- Class 3. Protection of Interests.
- Class 4. Claims.
- Class 5. International Congresses and Conferences. Multi-lateral Treaties. League of Nations.
- Class 6. Commerce. Customs Administration. Commercial Relations, Treaties and Conventions. Commercial and Trade Agreements.

## NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

In Records of Boundary and Claims Commissions and Arbitrations, Record Group 76, there are records relating to the Claims Commissions of 1858 and 1901 between the United States and China.

In Records of International Conferences, Commissions, and Expositions, Record Group 43, are records of several conferences in which the United States and Japan participated. There are records of the Washington Conference on Limitation of Armament, 1921-22, which met to consider the limitation of armaments and certain questions relating to Pacific and Far Eastern problems. There are also records of the Commission To Represent the United States at the Grand Exhibition of Japan, 1917. The exhibition was planned for 1912 but had been postponed, and the records relate mainly to the visit of U.S. Commissioners to Japan in 1908 and to their conferences with Japanese officials. Other relevant records in Record Group 43 are those concerning the Sino-Japanese Dispute, 1930-32 (documents gathered by Gen. Frank McCoy, U.S. representative on the Lytton Commission), those of the U.S. Element, Allied Council for Japan, 1946-52, and those of the Far Eastern Commission, 1945-51.

In Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Record Group 84, are records originally kept at U.S. diplomatic and consular posts. Among these are records of the U.S. Legation (later Embassy) in China, 1843-1945, and of the U.S. Legation (later Embassy) in Japan, 1855-1936, as well as those of various consular posts in those countries.

The records reproduced in this microfilm publication were prepared for filming by Ralph E. Huss, who also wrote these introductory remarks.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Peiping via N. R.

FROM Dated November 19, 1931

Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.


968, November 19, 5 p.m.

According to fairly reliable information Japanese  
forces entered Tsitsihar City last night.

For the Minister

ENGERT

HPD



F/DEW

793.94/2771

FILED

1931.11.19  
NOV

793.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

OJH

PLAIN

PEIPING via N. R.

Dated Nov. 19, 1931

Rec'd. 10:30 a.m.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

NOV 23 1931

FROM

Secretary DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington.

COPIES SENT TO

O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

966, November 19, 3 p.m.

Reuter reports from Mukden, November 17, 7 p.m.

"Shortly after dawn this morning Japanese artillery on Nonni front thundered to signalize opening of large scale offensive against General Ma Chang Shan which may carry Japanese forces across Chinese Eastern Railway to occupation of Tsitsihar.

Japanese have been reticent regarding developments in that area recently and yesterday they suddenly suspended permission for correspondents to proceed to Nonni front via the Taonan Railway.

Yesterday also Japanese detachments which had been at Chuliuho few miles from Mukden suddenly left for unknown destination lending color to reports that Japanese have been concentrating reinforcements on Nonni front preparatory for this morning's offensive.

Questioned regarding Russian interests on Chinese

Eastern Railway,

F/DEW

793.94/2772

FILED

1381.96.100

793.94  
note

761.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

CJH

PLAIN

PEIPING via N. R.

Dated Nov. 19, 1931

Rec'd. 10:30 a.m.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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NOV 23 1931

FROM

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F/DEW

793.94/2772

FILED

1931.96.10N

793.94  
note

761.94

OJH

Page 2 - #966 from  
Peiping.

Eastern Railway, Japanese military authorities declared they will of course not infringe those rights but add significantly that momentum of Japanese action may carry their forces over railway.

It is known that Japanese consider it most undesirable that their forces should remain in exposed positions north of Nonni river all through winter this being reason for their demand on November fourteenth to General Ma Chang Shan to evacuate.

General Ma Chang Shan's uncompromising attitude and his determination to treat Japanese as foreign foes infringing on China's rights and endeavoring to establish puppet government in his province culminated in his proposals yesterday which appear to have been signal for Japanese to strike decisive blow.

Outcome is still little doubtful for the Japanese forces number over four thousand and Chinese outnumbered them fifteen to one. The Japanese have advantage in field artillery and aeroplanes but there are tremendous forces of Chinese cavalry well mounted and Chinese are more used to bitter conditions now prevailing in Manchuria.

Great interest has been aroused here by persistent reports that



1004  
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CJH

Page 3 - #966 from  
Peiping.

reports that Japanese officers are now drilling and  
training several hundred Koreans who are residents in  
Manchuria in North Barracks just outside Mukden which  
was one of first places attacked September eighteenth."

For the Minister,

ENGERT

OSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 19, 1931

FROM

Rec'd Div. 2, 7 p.m.

Secretary of State

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

NOV 19 1931

Washington, D. C.

969, November 19, 7 p.m.

The young Marshall has just sent word to me that he is ill and will be unable to see anybody for several days. From a person close to him I learn that the young Emperor is being kept in Port Arthur and is not the Japanese candidate for the restoration in Manchuria. The real candidate is more likely to be Prince Kung who is already in Mukden.

For the Minister

ENGERT

RR

CSB

F/DEW 793.94/2773

FILED

1931 88 NOV

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not  
893.0011

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON


RECEIVED

NOV 19 1931

SECRETARY'S OFFICE



November 18, 1931



Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
NOV 19 1931  
Department of State

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State  
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

Please find enclosed herewith  
reliable information which will no doubt  
interest you.

Yours faithfully,

*Harold G. Hoag*

FILED

NOV 24 1931

EXDEW

793.94/2774

1 000

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PATRONS ARE REQUESTED TO FAVOR THE COMPANY BY CRITICISM AND SUGGESTION CONCERNING ITS SERVICE

12018

CLASS OF SERVICE

This is a full-rate Telegram or Cablegram unless its deferred character is indicated by a suitable sign above or preceding the address.

# WESTERN UNION

NEWCOMB CARLTON, PRESIDENT

J. C. WILLEVER, FIRST VICE-PRESIDENT

SIGNS

DL = Day Letter  
NM = Night Message  
NL = Night Letter  
LCO = Deferred Cable  
NLT = Cable Night Letter  
WLT = Week-End Letter

The filing time as shown in the date line on full-rate telegrams and day letters, and the time of receipt at destination as shown on all messages, is STANDARD TIME.

Received at 708 14th St., N. W. Washington, D. C. ALWAYS OPEN


NA1030 35=FI NEWYORK NY 17 710P

THE PRESIDENT=

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC=

MET JAPANESE WOMAN THIS EVENING TOLD ME JAPAN ONLY TRYING  
TO SAVE FACE IN MANCHURIA TELL HER TO STOP SHE WANTS TO BUT  
THE GESTURE MUST COME FROM YOU ILL BACK YOU STOP THIS WAR=

HOMER DODGE. ✓



RECEIVED

NOV 19 1931

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

THE QUICKEST, SUREST AND SAFEST WAY TO SEND MONEY IS BY TELEGRAPH OR CABLE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

FROM

Dated November 19, 1931

Rec'd 4:43 a.m.


793.94  
Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.

963, November 19, 10 a.m.

Following from <sup>Harbin</sup> ~~Peck~~ "November 18, noon. ✓"

One. According to all reports, yesterday passed without any serious attacks by Japanese or Chinese troops on the Nonni River front.

Two. Ohashi informed me last night that Chinese representatives of General Ma had informed local representatives of Honjo that his written reply to the Japanese ultimatum of November 15th would not be delivered but that he would comply with the Japanese Consulate demands on the condition that the Japanese troops would simultaneously withdraw with the Chinese, that the Heilungkiang Provincial Authorities reserve the right to keep troops south of the Chinese Eastern Railway line in the case of bandit activities there and that in case normal traffic would be restored on the Taoang Railway, the troops of General Chang Hai Pen would not be allowed to use the zone. Ohashi reminds me that



NOV 20 1931

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NOV 24 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM

2-#963, from Peiping, Nov. 19, 10 a.m.

me that this is construed by the Japanese side to be  
a refusal to accept the terms of the ultimatum and  
added that on November 16th the Japanese war office  
gave out in Tokyo.

(End Part One)

For the Minister

ENGERT

CSB

rh

GRAY

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PEIPING VIA NR

Dated Nov. 19, 1931

FROM

Rec'd. 5.50 am

SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

963, November 19, 10 am (Part two)

a statement to the effect that it was dissatisfied with Ma's attitude and that the threatening attitude of his troops might make it necessary for the Japanese to clear them away from Tsitsihar and vicinity as a matter of safety. Local Chinese officials confirm the failure of Ma to give a written answer to the ultimatum and attentions, that civil administrator Chang (who is suspected of being pro-Japanese) and Ma could not agree until late last night upon the wording of the written reply which Chinese officials state will arrive in Harbin this morning. Japanese side becoming impatient in regard to dilatory talk of Chinese, who are playing for time.

Three. During the last few days weather has become very cold and it is expected that in a few days Nonni

river

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

rh # 2 of No. 963 from Peiping

river and swampy land near by will freeze over solid.

This would facilitate crossing the river and transport on land, but handicap fighting of soldiers of both sides, but more especially the Japanese who can only be supplied via Taonan. (End part two)

For the Minister

ENGERT

WSB

CSB



CJH

TELEGRAM RECEIVED PRAY

PEIPING via N. R.

FROM

Dated November 19, 1931

Rec'd. 10:40 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

963, (PART THREE)

November 19, 10 a.m.

Four. Local Commissioner of Foreign Affairs has confirmed to this office the press report that the provincial government for Kirin Province was established on November 11th at Pinhsien, 30 miles east of Harbin and a short distance south of the Sungari River with Cheng Jun, former chief of the Bureau of Civil Affairs at Kirin, appointed as acting chairman during the absence of Chang Tso Hsiang. All the laws and orders issued by the Central Governments and the Kirin Provincial Government before September 21st are still in force. Kirin ex-officials did not take this step formerly because they feared bombing by Japanese airplanes. Evidently Ma's resistance to Japanese has encouraged them in this step.

Five. Following is a translation of radiogram sent by General Ma at Tsitsihar to General Chiang Kai Sheik at Nanking

CJH

Page 2 - #963 from  
Peiping via N.R.

at Nanking\* handed to this Consulate General by local  
Chinese radio station:

"November 18, 10 a.m. The Japanese troops started  
general offensive at 4 o'clock today with heavy artillery  
and 6 aeroplanes dropping bombs. Fighting has been  
very serious. Please appeal to the League of Nations  
to have the hostilities stopped".

Ohashi has just informed me that he believes this  
report to be true and that situation at Nonni front is  
serious."

Repeated to Nanking. (End part three - end message).

FOR THE MINISTER

ENGERT

WSB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N. R.


Dated November 19, 1931

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Rec'd 2:40 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.



964, November 19, 11 a.m. Part One., Following  
two from Harbin "November 18, 6 p.m.

One. At three p.m. this office was informed by  
the Chinese radio station at Harbin that telegraphic  
information had been received to the effect that the  
Heilungkiang troops were retreating toward Anganghsi  
and that telephone communication with Tsitsihar was  
interrupted at 2:30 when another Japanese airplane  
flew over the city.

Two. At 4:30 assistant manager Kuo of the  
Chinese Eastern Railway informed me that he had reports  
from trustworthy sources indicating that since 2 p.m.  
the position of the Chinese troops was somewhat better,  
that Japanese airplanes had dropped leaflets, stating  
that the property of the Chinese Eastern Railway would  
not be molested, that the people would be protected  
and that Chinese military activities would be stopped,  
but did not drop bombs into Tsitsihar City, and that

the Japanese

F/DEW

793.94/2776

FILED

NOV 30 1931

793.94  
note

FE

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM

2-#964, from Peiping, November 19, 11 a.m.

the Japanese troops had retired somewhat. Ohashi (End  
Part One)

ENGERT

OSB

CJH

GRAY

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

UNDATED

PEIPING via N. R.

FROM

Rec'd. Nov. 19, 9:35  
a.m., 1931.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

964, Part Two.

When questioned regarding this ~~to~~ informed me that neither he nor the Japanese local military mission had received recently any information regarding events at the front, a statement which I doubt very much.

Three. I have advised missionary Vos, now at Anganghsu, to proceed to Harbin.

Four. American newspaper correspondents had planned to leave Harbin today at three for a visit to the front but cancelled trip upon my suggestion that they could get more news at Harbin regarding situation than they could at Anganghsu or Tsitsihar".

"November 18, 8 p.m. Assistant Manager Kuo has informed me that engineer Hsu of the Chinese Eastern Railway, stationed at Tsitsihar station, reported that he personally saw 3,000 or 4,000 Japanese soldiers cross at 3 p.m. today in the direction of Tsitsihar City, the

Chinese Eastern

393.1115-102.19

CJH

Page 2- #964, part two.

Chinese Eastern Railway tracks near the viaduct over  
which the Taoang line runs, that no damage had been done  
by the Japanese or Chinese troops. (END PART TWO)

FOR THE MINISTER

ENGERT

GW

WSB

1014

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Rb

GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Undated

Secretary of State  
Washington.

Rec'd November 19, 5:50 am

964, Part Three.

to the Chinese Eastern Railway and that General Ma  
had fled to Koshan, leaving orders behind that his  
troops should follow him to that place.

I have not been able to locate Ohashi to confirm  
this, but believe that the report is in the main, true.

Repeated to Nanking. (End message)

For the Minister.

ENCERT

GW

CSB

1 1019

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

November 19, 1931.

1-138  
TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

793.94  
AMEMBASSY

NOV 19 31

PARIS (FRANCE)

579 FOR AMBASSADOR DAWES. /2769

For your information and confidential as to source.

One. In telegrams dated November 18, the American Consul General at Mukden reports that Japanese headquarters on that day released a report to the effect that the Japanese troops, as a measure of self/preservation, launched an offensive against Ma Chan Shan early on the morning of November 18; ~~that it is believed that the replacement mixed brigade and the planes have already reached that point~~ <sup>the front</sup> that Japanese reserves have been called to the colors for guard duty in the railway zone; and that the Japanese have officially announced that Japanese troops after sharp fighting reached the Chinese Eastern Railway at one o'clock on the afternoon of November 18. /2766

Two. In a telegram dated November 18, the American Consul General at Harbin reports that telegrams received by a Chinese official at Harbin from Ma state that on November 17

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

793.94/2776



1 1020

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR

Charge to  
\$

## TELEGRAM SENT

1-128  
TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

### Department of State

Washington,

- 2 -

the Japanese troops made renewed efforts to advance; that for the last few days four or five Japanese bombing planes have daily attacked the Chinese troops; that on November 15 General Honjo's representative at Harbin delivered an ultimatum to the Chinese authorities demanding that Chinese troops be withdrawn immediately to the north of Tsitsihar; and that the Japanese further demanded orally that Tsitsihar be proclaimed independent of the central government. /2776

Three. In a telegram dated November 19, the American Legation at Peiping reports that according to <sup>fairly</sup> ~~further~~ reliable information, Japanese forces entered Tsitsihar last night. *mmh*

*Stinson*  
*SKH*

FE:MMH:EMU  
*mmh*

*RSM*  
FE

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1955 1-128

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CABLEGRAM

BFS

November 18, 1931.

From Tokio,

To The Adjutant General.

CONFIDENTIAL

Number 196. November 18th.

Situation most serious. Reinforced brigade from Hirosaki completed embarkation near Hiroshima on November 16th. On same day following air service departed for Manchuria: one pursuit squadron Heijo, one observation squadron Tachiarai, one light bombing squadron Hamamatsu. Suspect one company tank has gone from Kurume. Three very important general staff officers left yesterday for Mukden. There is a press ban on movements of 19th and 20th. General staff is considering early dispatch of another division from Japan proper. I saw at least 15 large freighters lying idle near Hiroshima. Repairs of Nonni bridge are completed but news agency to-day reports a general engagement between Japanese and General Ma beginning at 5 A.M. General Staff reports situation in Tientsin still bad. Commander Eastern Siberian Army known to be impulsive and prone to independent action. So far British, French, Polish and American Attaches have accepted invitation to Manchuria and will leave soon.

McIlroy

1:20 P.M.



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793.94/2777

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NOV 24 1931

102

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 841.00 P. R./204 FOR Despatch #2360

FROM Great Britain ( Atherton ) DATED Nov. 2, 1931  
TO NAME 1-1127 o.p.

REGARDING:

Manchurian controversy. Not much hope for fulfillment of League's request that Japanese commence evacuation of troops in Manchuria. Comment in press as to what will be next step in situation.

793.94/2718

fp

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Manchuria.

The events which have elapsed since the League of Nations requested the Japanese Government to commence the evacuation of its troops in Manchuria and which was to be completed by November 16th, have not encouraged much hope here that the League's request will be fulfilled, and this has led to considerable comment

as/

-15-

as to what its next step must be in the event that this proves to be the case. It is felt that the League of Nations provides the machinery for the collective and peaceful solution of international difficulties and that if a single break-away from its principles occurs it may have widespread and disastrous consequences, because successful defiance of its wishes might well deal a severe blow to the statesmanship of moderation, and so encourage sections of opinion everywhere which believe in force rather than methods of arbitration and conciliation.

With this thought in mind, the serious press has called on Japan to accede to the League's request, and the TIMES asks "Will not the Japanese Government understand, before November 16th, the extreme embarrassment in which it places her friends by making them choose between the maintenance of a traditional friendship in all its cordiality and the defense of principles which they have most solemnly undertaken to maintain?"

More emphatic, the MANCHESTER GUARDIAN, after reviewing the events leading up to the situation as it now stands, concludes: "The League will have a hard task in bringing this militarist conspiracy to heel. If it shirks the task it is hard to say how far Japanese aggression may go. But one thing is certain. It will be a heavy, perhaps fatal blow to the credit of the League of Nations as a guarantee of international peace and an effective agency of world peace."

1 1025

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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Charge Department  
OR

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
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TO BE TRANSMITTED  
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NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

November 18, 1931.



AMERICAN CONSUL

NANKING (China).

FOR THE MINISTER. FOR INFORMATION.

Department's 103, October 27, 5 p.m., to Nanking,  
in regard to paragraph four of resolution voted upon  
by Council on October 24.

On November 10 the Department authorized the  
Embassy at Paris to inform M. Briand that, understand-  
ing that the British and the French Governments have  
taken similar action, the American Government will be  
prepared to send representatives to act as observers in  
connection with the taking over by Chinese authorities  
of evacuated areas, if and when arrangements to that end  
are made between the Chinese and the Japanese Governments.

The Department has desired that ~~any~~ information with  
regard to the above, ~~be obtained by~~ <sup>be imparted to</sup> the Chinese ~~from~~ <sup>be imparted by</sup>  
Briand.

FE:MMH/VDM

RAM  
FE

Enciphered by M. M. H.

Sent by operator M., 19

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-128

1 1026

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
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WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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TO BE TRANSMITTED  
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NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

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Charge Department

Department of State

Charge to  
\$

Washington,  
November 18, 1931.

793.94/B  
AMEMBASSY,

NOV 18 31

PARIS (France).

571 FOR AMBASSADOR DAWES.

On November 18 I issued to the press a statement as follows: QUOTE I want to correct certain erroneous statements which have appeared lately in the press.

It is not true that this Government has changed in any way the attitude on the Manchurian situation which it has held from the first.

The American Government has not proposed any terms of settlement either to Japan or to China, has not been approached by either Government on the subject of terms which it might approve, and has made no commitments, either express or implied, to either of the disputants.

This Government has consistently urged and is continuing to urge that only peaceful means and not military pressure shall be used in the settlement of the dispute between China and Japan regarding Manchuria. It understands that this is the essence of the position taken by the nations represented on the Council of the League of Nations at Paris. This Government earnestly hopes that the negotiations now going

Enciphered by .....

on

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

793.94/2778B

1 1027

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
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# TELEGRAM SENT

## Department of State

1-138  
TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

Washington,

- 2 -

on in Paris will find a way which will lead to a settlement  
of the difficulty in accordance with these principles UNQUOTE.

~~You may release this statement to the press.~~

SKH

Stinson  
SKH.

NOTE: Telegraph room. Same message  
should go to the American Consul,  
Nanking, for the Minister, and  
to the American Embassy, Tokyo.

FE:MMH:REK  
mmh

FE

SKH

234

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_


Index Bu.-No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1960 1-138



1028

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

November 18, 1931

STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I want to correct certain erroneous statements which have appeared lately in the press.


It is not true that this Government has changed in any way the attitude on the Manchurian situation which it has held from the first.

The American Government has not proposed any terms of settlement either to Japan or to China, has not been approached by either Government on the subject of terms which it might approve, and has made no commitments, either express or implied, to either of the disputants.

This Government has consistently urged and is continuing to urge that only peaceful means and not military pressure shall be used in the settlement of the dispute between China and Japan regarding Manchuria. It understands that this is the essence of the position taken by the nations represented on the Council of the League of Nations at Paris. This Government earnestly hopes that the negotiations now going on in Paris will find a way which will lead to a settlement of the difficulty in accordance with these principles.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REC'D



JAMES F. CURTIS  
RAYMOND B. FOSDICK  
CHAUNCEY BELKNAP


FOSDICK & BELKNAP  
ATTORNEYS & COUNSELORS AT LAW  
61 BROADWAY  
NEW YORK

December 9, 1931

CABLE ADDRESS: CURTISITE

NOV 25 31

November 24, 1931



My dear Mr. Secretary:

On November tenth I wrote you enclosing a petition signed by one hundred and sixty-one citizens urging our full participation with the League of Nations in connection with the settlement of the Manchurian difficulty. A number of names came in too late to be added to the petition, and I am venturing to enclose the list herewith.

May I also take this occasion to acknowledge your courteous letter of November eighteenth relative to the receipt of the original petition.

Very respectfully yours,

*Raymond B. Fosdick*

The Honorable Henry L. Stimson  
Secretary of State  
Washington, D.C.

*Encl.*

DEC 10 1931

RECEIVED

FW 793.94/2779

*Redelink  
493.94/2779*

*Letter drafted  
to Mr. Gustafson, Dec 4, 1931*

1031

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

Additional Signers of Letter to the President

Dated November 11, 1931

Baldrige, H. C.	Former Governor of Idaho, Parma, Idaho
Black, E. R.	Governor, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Atlanta, Ga.
Bowers, Henry S.	Goldman Sachs Company, New York City
Buckingham, Edward T.	Mayor of Bridgeport, Bridgeport, Conn.
Byrd, Harry F.	Former Governor of Virginia, Winchester, Va.
Cogswell, C. C.	Master, Kansas State Grange, Pretty Prairie, Kans.
Cole, Charles H.	General, U. S. Army (retired), Boston, Mass.
Curley, James M.	Mayor of Boston, Boston, Mass.
Dennison, Henry S.	President, Dennison Mfg. Co., Framingham, Mass.
De Van, R. P.	Mayor of Charleston, Charleston, West Va.
Filene, Edward A.	President, Wm. Filene's Sons Co., Boston, Mass.
Gray, Peter F.	Mayor of Lansing, Lansing, Michigan
Hammond, John Hays	Mining Engineer, Washington, D. C.
Hay, Logan	Lawyer, Springfield, Illinois
Holt, Hamilton	President of Rollins College, Winter Park, Florida
Jenkins, Thomas	Bishop Protestant Episcopal Church for Nevada, Reno, Nevada
Jouett, Edward S.	General Counsel, L. & N. R. R., Louisville, Ky.
Lee, Ivy L.	Publicist, New York City
Lehman, Arthur	Lehman Brothers, New York City
Leigh, Robert D.	President, Bennington College, Bennington, Vermont
Mather, William G.	President, Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co., Cleveland, Ohio
Mayo, W. B.	Chief Engineer, Ford Industries, Dearborn, Mich.
McConnell, Bishop Francis J.	President, Federal Council of Churches, New York City
McCormick, Cyrus H.	Chairman, International Harvester Co., Chicago, Ill.
Monroe, Paul	Professor Teachers College, New York City
Pannington, Levi T.	President, Pacific College, Newberg, Oregon
Pennybacker, Mrs. Percy V.	Former President, General Federation of Women's Clubs, Austin, Texas
Phillips, John C.	Former Governor of Arizona, Phoenix, Arizona
Porter, John C.	Mayor of Los Angeles, Los Angeles, California
Ream, J. D.	Overseer, Nebraska State Grange, Broken Bow, Nebraska
Reinhardt, Mrs. Aurelia Henry	President, Mills College, California
Rike, Frederick H.	President of Rike Kumler Co., Dayton, Ohio
Stone, Charles A.	Chairman, Stone & Webster, New York City
Sweet, William E.	Former Governor of Colorado, Denver, Colorado
Walker, P. M.	Mayor of Pasadena, Pasadena, California
Williams, T. M.	Master, North Dakota State Grange
Shaw, Albert	Editor "Review of Reviews", New York City

1 0031

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

In reply refer to  
FE 793.94/2779

Mr. Raymond B. Fosdick,  
Attorney and Counselor at Law,  
61 Broadway,  
New York, New York.

Sir:

I acknowledge the receipt of your further letter  
of November 24, 1931, enclosing a list of American  
citizens who desire to associate themselves with the  
signers of the petition approving action taken by the  
Administration in regard to the present dispute between  
China and Japan.

Would you please be so good as to convey my  
appreciation to these additional signers of the petition?

Very truly yours,

HENRY D. SHAW

GE  
Dec 6 1931  
M. O. Gustafson  
FE:RPB/VDM FE 12/4/31  
SKH

Ym


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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

**CURTIS, FOSDICK & BELKNAP**

ATTORNEYS & COUNSELORS AT LAW  
 61 BROADWAY  
 NEW YORK


JAMES F. CURTIS  
 RAYMOND B. FOSDICK  
 CHAUNCEY BELKNAP



RESPECTFULLY REFERRED  
 FOR CONSIDERATION.

*For Mr. Packey*  
*admitted 11/27/31*

CABLE ADDRESS: CURTISITE



F/DEW

793.94/2779

My dear Mr. President:

I am venturing to enclose a copy of a  
 petition which has been signed by one hundred  
 and sixty-one citizens endorsing the policy  
 which the Administration has followed in con-  
 nection with the Manchurian problem.

Very respectfully yours,

*Rand B. Loring*

The President  
 The White House  
 Washington, D. C.

FILED  
 NOV 18 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

The President,  
 The White House,  
 Washington, D. C.

November 11, 1931.

Dear Mr. President:

The undersigned desire to express their hearty approval of the steps that you have taken to provide for the cooperation of our government with the League of Nations in its efforts toward maintaining peace in Manchuria.

We fully endorse the statement of Secretary Stimson that "The American government, acting independently through its diplomatic representatives, will endeavor to reinforce what the League does and will make clear that it has a keen interest in the matter." We trust that this policy will be followed without qualification, that the representative of the United States will sit with the Council of the League when it reconvenes November 16, and that any joint action which may be agreed upon at that meeting, looking toward the just and peaceful settlement of the Manchurian question, will receive the wholehearted support of the American government.

Furthermore, we believe that this policy of upholding the established agencies that are working for peace through joint conference and action should be followed in all future crises that may threaten the peace of the world.

Yours very respectfully,

SAMUEL B. ADAMS Lawyer, Savannah	HERIOT CLARKSON Associate Justice, Supreme Court of North Carolina, Raleigh, N. C.	PHILIP G. GOSSLER President, Columbia Gas & Electric Corp., New York	R. A. LONG Chairman, Long-Bell Lumber Corporation, Kansas City	WILLIAM COOPER PROCTER President, Procter & Gamble Company, Cincinnati	STEPHEN B. STORY City Manager, Rochester, N. Y.
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ROBERT W. BINGHAM President and Publisher, <i>The Courier-Journal</i> <i>The Louisville Times</i>	CLEVELAND E. DODGE Vice-President, Phelps-Dodge Corp., New York	ROY W. HOWARD Chairman of the Board, Scripps-Howard Newspapers	ROBERT WALTON MOORE Former Congressman, Fairfax, Va.	EDWIN R. A. SELIGMAN Economist	L. G. TOLLES *Master, Connecticut State Grange
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DESHA BRECKINRIDGE Publisher, <i>Lexington Herald</i> , Lexington, Ky.	STANLEY A. EASTON	ROBERT M. HUTCHINS President, The University of Chicago	HARVEY INGHAM Editor, <i>The Des Moines Register</i>	MRS. JOHN F. SIPPEL President, General Federation of Women's Clubs, Washington	FELIX M. WARBURG Kuhn, Loeb & Co., Bankers, New York
					PAUL M. WARBURG Chairman, Manhattan Co., New York

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

SAMUEL B. ADAMS Lawyer, Savannah	HERIOT CLARKSON Associate Justice, Supreme Court of North Carolina, Raleigh, N. C.	PHILIP G. GOSSLER President, Columbia Gas & Electric Corp., New York	R. A. LONG Chairman, Long-Bell Lumber Corporation, Kansas City	WILLIAM COOPER PROCTER President, Procter & Gamble Company, Cincinnati	STEPHEN B. STORY City Manager, Rochester, N. Y.
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NEWTON D. BAKER Former Secretary of War, Cleveland	JOSEPHUS DANIELS Former Secretary of the Navy, Raleigh, N. C.	ALANSON B. HOUGHTON Former Ambassador to Great Britain	ALBERT G. MILBANK Lawyer, New York	WALTER DILL SCOTT President, Northwestern University	GEORGE H. TERRIBERRY Lawyer, New Orleans, La.
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 16, 1931.

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note this before it goes on to  
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lutefson NARS, Date 12-18-75

November 18 1931.

In reply refer to  
FE 793.94-Fosdick

Mr. Raymond B. Fosdick,  
Curtis, Fosdick and Belknap,  
61 Broadway,  
New York, New York.

Sir:

I acknowledge the receipt of your letter of November 10, 1931, transmitting a copy of a petition which has been signed by one hundred sixty-one citizens, endorsing the policy which the Administration has followed in connection with the Manchurian problem.

I am deeply appreciative of the endorsement by so many distinguished citizens of the attitude which this Government has adopted in the face of the present dispute between China and Japan, and I wish to assure you and through you the other signers of the petition that the developments in the situation are being closely followed with a view toward seeing that the dispute is

adjusted

FW 793.94/2779

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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adjusted by pacific means in accordance with the  
requirements of the treaties to which the United States  
is a party.


Very truly yours,

MILTON O. GUSTAFSON

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Nov 16 1981  
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AM RECD



CURTIS, FOSDICK & BELKNAP  
ATTORNEYS & COUNSELORS AT LAW  
61 BROADWAY  
NEW YORK

JAMES F. CURTIS  
RAYMOND B. FOSDICK  
CHAUNCEY BELKNAP



FE

793.94

November 10, 1931

*Letter drafted  
to Mr. Fosdick  
Nov 16, 1931 Jmt*

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I am venturing to enclose a copy of a  
petition which has been signed by one hundred  
and sixty-one citizens endorsing the policy  
which the Administration has followed in con-  
nection with the Manchurian problem.

Very respectfully yours,

*Rand B. Harris*

The Honorable Henry L. Stimson  
Secretary of State  
Washington, D. C.

*✓  
Petition att.*

F/DEW  
FW793.94/2779

FILED  
NOV 19 1931

The President,  
The White House,  
Washington, D. C.

November 11, 1931.

Dear Mr. President:

The undersigned desire to express their hearty approval of the steps that you have taken to provide for the cooperation of our government with the League of Nations in its efforts toward maintaining peace in Manchuria.

We fully endorse the statement of Secretary Stimson that "The American government, acting independently through its diplomatic representatives, will endeavor to reinforce what the League does and will make clear that it has a keen interest in the matter." We trust that this policy will be followed without qualification, that the representative of the United States will sit with the Council of the League when it reconvenes November 16, and that any joint action which may be agreed upon at that meeting, looking toward the just and peaceful settlement of the Manchurian question, will receive the wholehearted support of the American government.

Furthermore, we believe that this policy of upholding the established agencies that are working for peace through joint conference and action should be followed in all future crises that may threaten the peace of the world.

Yours very respectfully,

SAMUEL B. ADAMS Lawyer, Savannah	HERIOT CLARKSON Associate Justice, Supreme Court of North Carolina, Raleigh, N. C.	PHILIP G. GOSSLER President, Columbia Gas & Electric Corp., New York	R. A. LONG Chairman, Long-Bell Lumber Corporation, Kansas City	WILLIAM COOPER PROCTER President, Procter & Gamble Company, Cincinnati	STEPHEN B. STORY City Manager, Rochester, N. Y.
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lutz NARS, Date 12-18-75

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WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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TELEGRAM SENT

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TO BE TRANSMITTED  
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PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

November 19, 1931.

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AMEMBASSY,

PARIS, (FRANCE.)

CONFIDENTIAL FOR DAWES FROM STIMSON.

According to the suggestion you made over the telephone this morning, I give you a suggested press statement which you may give out if it seems to you to be helpful. I leave the matter entirely to your discretion. It seems to both the President and me that any such statement had better come from you in Paris than from us here, for the limitation of our action with the League seems to be better understood here than it is by the members of the League themselves.

QUOTE. I have been directed to come to Paris for the purpose of discussing with the representatives of the different nations assembled here the crisis which is taking place in Manchuria. As a signatory of the Pact of Paris and of the so-called Nine-Power Treaty, the United States is deeply interested, with its fellow signatories, in seeing that the lofty purpose of those treaties is fulfilled. It has been the hope of my government that a settlement in accordance with the

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ....., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

793.94/2779A

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR

Charge to  
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

1-138  
TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

- 2 -

principles of those treaties would be arrived at through discussion and conciliation during the conferences in Paris and that the presence here of a representative of the United States would contribute to bring about a solution through this method. The United States is of course not a member of the League of Nations, and it therefore cannot take part in the discussions ~~and~~ ~~discussions~~ bearing upon the application of the machinery of the League Covenant. Since in the present crisis it may be possible that such discussions may arise, it is obvious that my presence at the meetings of the Council would not only be inappropriate but might even embarrass the efforts of the Council itself. But the position thus necessarily assumed by the United States in no way indicates that the United States is not wholly sympathetic with the efforts being made by the League to support the objective of peace in Manchuria. The United States must, however, preserve its full freedom of judgment as to its ~~future~~ course ~~in the event that~~ ~~the present efforts at the arrival of a settlement fail.~~ UNQUOTE

S HLS:HHR

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....



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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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PLAIN

- 3 -

Since preparing the above, it has occurred to me that this might be issued in the form of a joint communique by you and M. Briand. If that idea appeals to you and is subscribed to by Briand, make the necessary, but only the necessary alterations, and issue it as a joint communique. Otherwise, issue it in its present form as your own statement.

Please inform me immediately when this action is taken and give me exact text used.

*Slm*  
404

NOV 19 1961 3 40  
11:00

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1959 1-138

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAN

GRAY

BEIJING VIA NR

FROM

Dated November 19, 1931

Rec'd. 2:50 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
NOV 20 1931  
Department of State

DIVISION OF  
EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS  
NOV 21 1931  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

967, November 19, 4 p.m.

Following from Harbin:

"November 19, 1 p.m.

One. Confirmed Chinese reports received here this morning confirm the retreat of Chinese troops, the advance of Japanese troops to within a short distance of Tsitsihar City, the departure of General Ma from that city northerly direction on the Tsiko Railway and the presence in Tsitsihar of Chinese police only. (?) that no damage was done by either Chinese or Japanese troops to Chinese Eastern Railway property during the retreat and the advance. It is estimated that the Japanese forces numbered 5,000 well equipped and the Chinese 20,000 badly equipped soldiers.

Two. I have in my possession one of the leaflets which yesterday Japanese airplanes dropped into Tsitsihar City. It is a mimeographed copy of an order written in long hand in the Russian language purporting to have been signed by General Tamon, commander of the second division of the Japanese army, in which he states that the Japanese army

F/DEW

793.94/2780

NOV 25 1931

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104  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

HAH

2- #967, from Peiping, November 19,  
1931

army did not desire to fight the Heilungkiang army, which  
attacked the Japanese first, that his object is the con-  
quest of the real enemy (Chinese military or Soviets ~~(?)~~  
G C H), that he has no intention of damaging the Chinese  
Eastern Railway ~~(?)~~ he wishes to treat ~~W~~ friendly way  
the police and local authorities, with whose domestic  
government he had no intention of interfering and that  
the people should attend to their usual business.

Three. The telephone message received at 12 noon  
from Hailar stated that all was quiet in the town and  
in Manchuria station."

For the Minister

ENGERT

WSB

104

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAH

PLAIN

FROM

NANKING VIA NR

Dated November 19, 1931.

Secretary of State  
Washington

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
NOV 20 1931

Department of State

November 19, 9 a.m.

I have received the following manifesto from the  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the request that it  
was transmitted to the American Government.

"Since the forcible occupation of various places  
in the Northeastern Provinces, the Japanese military  
authority have been frequently instigating or utilizing  
bandits, rebels and other undesirable characters to dis-  
turb local peace and order as well as organized govern-  
ments usurping administrative powers under the protection  
of duress of Japanese troops.

It has been lately reported that, during the re-  
cent disturbance in Tientsin created by insurgent rioters  
who made use of the Japanese concession as their base of  
operations, the defunct emperor Pu Yi of the former Man-  
chu dynasty was kidnapped and escorted by the Japanese  
from the said concession to Shenyang for the establishment  
of a bogus government with himself proclaimed as the em-  
peror.

The

F/DEW

793.94/2781

FILED  
NOV 23 1931

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

HAM

2- from Nanking, November 9, 1931

The National Government has already declared to the League of Nations and the governments of friendly powers that the Chinese Government and people will not recognize any ~~illegitimate~~ <sup>illegitimate</sup> institution established in subversion of China's administrative integrity in those places of the Northeastern Provinces which remain under the occupation of Japanese troops. In the event that the establishment of Fu Yi's bogus government is confirmed, the National Government will regard such a government as a seditionist institution and at the same time as an auxiliary organ of the Japanese Government in disguise, while all the acts of such a government which are necessarily illegal will be repudiated by the National Government and the entire responsibility therefore will be laid on the shoulders of the Japanese Government.

Nanking November seventeenth, nineteen thirty-one".

JOHNSON

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAM

PLAIN

FROM

NANKING VIA NR

Dated November 19, 1931.

Secretary of State  
Washington

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
NOV 20 1931  
Department of State

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from the said concession to Shenyang for the establishment  
of a bogus government with himself proclaimed as the em-  
peror.

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793.94/2781

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NOV 23 1931

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JOHNSON

CSB

105

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM



FROM

GREEN

Paris

Dated November 20, 1931

Rec'd 8:50 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.

TRIPLE PRIORITY


770, November 20, 1 p.m.

FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES

Press statement contained in your 526,  
November 19, 6 p.m., given textually to press  
at 12 noon, Paris time.

SHAW

HPD



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WE  
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F/DEW 793.94/2782

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NOV 24 1931



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM GRAY  
FROM Peiping via N. R.  
Dated November 20, 1931

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Rec'd 5:20 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.

Telegram to  
Paris.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
NOV 20 1931  
Department of State

970, November 20, 9 a.m.

American Consul General at Mukden reports:

"November 19, 9 p.m.

Following is substance of news released by  
Japanese headquarters this evening:

Russians have taken no action as a result of  
Tsitsihar action. Japanese forces entered Tsitsihar  
at noon. Chinese troops are retreating in disorder  
north of Tsitsihar. Fourth Brigade of Japanese  
troops will arrive Mukden tomorrow."

For the Minister

HED ENGERT

F/DEW 793.94/2783

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NOV 24 1931

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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\$

Washington,

November 20, 1931.

AMEMBASSY,

PARIS (France).

FOR AMBASSADOR DAWES.

For your information and confidential as to source.

One. In a telegram, dated November 19, the American Consul General at Mukden states that Japanese headquarters announced that Japanese forces entered Tsitsihar at noon on November 19 and that the Fourth Brigade of Japanese troops would arrive at Mukden on November 20.

Two. In a telegram, dated November 18, the American Consul General at Harbin reports that a Chinese official has confirmed the report that on November 11 the Provincial Government for Kirin Province was established at Pihhsien, thirty miles east of Harbin, and that all the laws and orders issued by the Central Government and the Kirin Provincial Government before September 21 are still in force. The Consul General states that the Kirin ex-officials did not take this step ~~formally~~ because they feared bombing by Japanese airplanes and that evidently General Ma's resistance to the Japanese has encouraged them to take this step.

Enciphered by

FE:MMH:REK

Sent by operator

M.

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

Peiping via N. R.

FROM

Dated November 20, 1931

Rec'd 8:55 a.m.

Secretary of State  
Washington

PRIORITY.

974, November 20, 7:00 p.m.

Reuter report from Nanking, 19th:

"General Chiang Kai Shek has announced that he is proceeding immediately to Manchuria. He announced this decision at secret session of fourth National Kuomintang Congress. Speaking with emotion he declared that he must fulfill his duty and obligations and prove his loyalty to his country and to Kuomintang by proceeding immediately to North China. Upon his making this announcement the delegates rose bodily and spontaneously in silent solemn tribute to him. It is understood that an important resolution will be submitted by Foreign Affairs Commission at tomorrow's session of Congress".

Similar item has appeared in business press but it is not clear whether he said "Manchuria" or only "North China".

For the Minister

WSB

ENGERT

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
NOV 20 1931  
Department of State  
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NOV 20 1931

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*file*

TRANSATLANTIC TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON  
AND GENERAL DAWES, PARIS, NOVEMBER 19, 1931. 11:00.

SECRETARY: Hello Dawes. Yes, I can hear you all right.

I just this minute received your telegram asking me to call you.

DAWES: Did you get my telegram after I saw Sir John Simon?

SECRETARY: I got your telegrams 762 and 763 and they give me the story you got from Matsudaira and it gives me the substance of what took place in the meeting of the League Council this morning.

DAWES: I have your 569.

SECRETARY: What is that?

DAWES: I want to give you my ideas, which I think are your ideas, conveyed in part of your telegram No. 569. The situation has developed so that it seems to me absolutely essential that this Government should maintain its position along the lines of your idea in 569 and clear up this situation. It is impossible for the League to clear it up. The League is at present working on opposing views.

SECRETARY: You gave me those opposing views in your 763.

DAWES: It is perfectly evident that our Government's influence comes from that independent stand and it is to its interest to have it still maintained. Without any question it is a big help. The League people here are now very anxious to call me in over there and the situation, as it has been submitted to me, is that the League doesn't know all that I know because Sze has come to me with the position he is willing to take. The League is discussing much the same proposition but there is some difference of opinion and in some way I think that you have got to make a state-

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Confidential File

-2-

ment for them in which you outline, as you say, that this situation which Japan has created is not going to change for the better but only get worse so you are protecting yourself in the matter of the public opinion - in the matter of the United States interceding in the matter and maintaining also in the public mind, the fact that you are maintaining independence of judgment of action. If I should go over to the League in any capacity, we then will be in the position of playing up to the League and agreeing with it and the League is going to lead us nowhere. They are going to bring pressure upon me. I have an appointment to see Briand at 6:30 tonight and what he is going to do is to invite me over there. Briand does not know that Sze came to me with a proposition which they propose putting to the League regarding invoking Article 11; they propose to then start action under Article 15 and that action being proposed, they will tell the League to invite me.

SECRETARY: That is just the time you ought not to be there because that means that they are going to take up the question of sanctions.

DAWES: Yes, I agree. - would do nothing except that they would come to us for our advice.

SECRETARY: I will tell you for your confidential guidance that in case the League should take up the proposal of an embargo by the League, I have no doubt that this Government would do its best not to interfere with that embargo but I don't want to have it announced before hand. I don't want to have that announced until after the League has done its own action and I doubt whether it is advisable for the League to go on with an embargo but in case they should -

I am

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

DAWES: I am going to read you a statement. It is evident to me that for your own protection and for the protection of our independent position it is desirous for you to make some statement of the case up to this time and then say what you will about the League - about the United States support of the policies of the League and the force of public opinion so far as it is not inconsistent with our treaty rights or something of that sort. But then make it perfectly clear that your action will be taken in cooperation with the League if their action is conducive in your judgment to settlement. You are still independent to make a decision as to what extent you are willing to cooperate with the other Governments against Japan; that if I go over there the United States just falls in with the League program and that leaves the enemies of the whole situation in the United States and elsewhere to count us out in their calculations. What I want to suggest is that you make a statement - I think you should get out a statement. I think that if the request for me to come over is given, in which Briand is going to join, we should have a statement as to what our action is going to be. If we are going to make such a statement, make a statement first and if they get the statement first, then we would be looked upon more or less and yet you can make your statement so that we sustain fully the general policies of the League but do not confine ourselves to the program necessarily of the League. They are going to get into such a mess. They have got to wait for this decision which they think important and the United States can not afford to wait to have this decision applied in effect by the League. In our relations as one of the League, instead of the position that

-4-

that we will take action absolutely independent of the League but cooperating with it, seems to be reasonably conducive to the interests of the situation for peace.

SECRETARY: Let me say something to you.

DAWES: I will read you the proposition.

SECRETARY: What proposition is this?

DAWES: I am reading you the proceedings of the Council as taken in the sessions of the League held this afternoon. It was a private meeting of twelve members of the Council. Briand reported that the two parties named are exceedingly opposed and that it might be a loss of time to make further efforts. Japan believes that there could be no evacuation until there was an accord. The Chinese refuse to pay for evacuation at a high price. It seems impossible to still hope for conciliation. Should they go into the question of the time and conditions.....could they relate to one line or the other. You should make a statement of the situation. Lord Cecil is not here - he is in London. The Council was proceeding toward unanimity and no unanimity has prevailed since September 30th. There now seems absolutely..... discuss.

SECRETARY: If you lower your voice I can hear you better.

DAWES: If there was a public meeting where both sides could state their views.....world opinion had a right to be informed. Thereafter a small committee was appointed to draft a report for the next public session and bring in all that had been done under Article 11. This article is mediatory. The Council can act only with agreement of the parties. Article 11 was then exhausted. It might be best to explain the facts and to consider what steps would next be taken. General Dawes asked whether any contact had been made with him.

Who

-5-

SECRETARY: Who made this question?

DAWES: The Chairman. Briand said that General Dawes had assured him at the outset that they had thought it best, as he had said in the first public meeting, that the United States would continue its cooperation with the League for the preservation of peace. He had explained that he had no desire to take part in the meetings but that if at a given moment the Council wished him to take part, he would be glad to consider the suggestion. That up to now the meetings had been undetermined and Briand had not considered it necessary to invite him to come. Now, however, the Council believes that the moment had arrived when he could be invited before it - even today. In addition to the statement, he had seen a good deal in the press particularly the American press in connection with the nine power treaty which permits of confirmation should the Council consider this also. But in any case agreed that he might see General Dawes today. The members of the Council received the Japanese statement as to the relation between evacuation and the signing of an accord. The Council would certainly have in mind the commission but also promises the League that our efforts in invoking that article..... If the Council could get a definite promise but it was not sure that Dr. Sze would consent to this project. The situation is getting worse. He then therefore went to see General Dawes at once. Japanese reply.....and try to add to it and if he considered it, China is willing to continue under Article 11. Von Burro agreed with this viewpoint. He thought it wise that they did not take action at all - every last avenue was destroyed. The Secretary General brought out that should the American Government agree to General Dawes's presence there they should consider whether that should take place in the formal council or at  
the



-6-

the private discussions. The latter presence, however, would be less important.

I will now read you what Dr. Sze brought in here this morning. He is the Chinese member.

"Confirming my conversation with you of this morning, I beg to state that my suggestions are as follows:

"First: Increasing military activities from November 16; heavy fighting north of the Nonni River. This was understood to have been made in Washington and London and created a new situation. This situation was made clear last night when Yoshizawa told the Council that it is insisting upon.....to China and direct negotiation on military occupation. This policy is an open violation of Japan's treaty obligations and means the closing up of the Washington Nine Power Treaty and shuts the open-door in China which is a flat defiance of America's traditional policy in Japan.

"Two: Mr. Stimson's note of October 12 to the Council declares that the United States will bring forward the Nine Power Treaty and the Pact of Paris 'if the time should come when it would seem advisable.'

"Three: I am of the opinion that this time has now come. I am proposing to suggest to the Council that it appoint a committee to study the whole situation in the light of the Nine Power Treaty and the Kellogg Pact. The United States should be invited to join in this committee. In this way it would seem that the United States would be able to act effectively and concurrently with the members of the League and at the same time maintain independence of action. There seems to be some misunderstanding on the part of the members of the Council as to the attitude of the United States with the result that the Council has not

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-7-

taken.....possibility if the main purpose to these the United States would agree. This illustrates the urgent need of facilities.....

That is Sze's memorandum. He is perfectly right. The Council can not take any position at all until they know what the position of the United States is. If we go over there and join them....

SECRETARY: It strikes me that the way to meet that situation is not by an announcement by us on the line that you spoke of because I have made many such announcements. It is perfectly clear here. I have again and again said that we would follow the general objective of the League, reserving our independence of judgment of action. I can say that again but it is no more than I have said several times. I should say off-hand that the way for you to meet the problem that is now put up to you about this invitation to go and meet with the League, would be to have a conference, not with the League, but somewhere else, if necessary in your rooms, with the same gentlemen representing the different countries where you could talk just as freely. That would make the necessary stage difference between going in to their meeting of the League and in that you have got to keep separate. The thing I don't want to have played up here is that you take any part in the League action particularly now that they are reaching the point of discussing sanctions.

DAWES: That is perfectly right.

SECRETARY: It seems to me you ought to be able to reach that point of common counsel in a different way. It is merely a matter of stage setting, so to speak, something that

-8-

that will prevent the newspapers from misrepresenting you. You are in Paris for the purpose of conferring with all of these men, the representatives of the Governments. The only danger comes from misrepresenting your conferences with them as a participation in the League conferences. I should think you could arrange that. This is only a suggestion - in inviting them to confer with you.

DAWES: That is the point, whether they would consider that consistent. The first thing in their mind over here is preserving the League.

SECRETARY: We have got to preserve our own position.

DAWES: I am sure if I can't go over there as one man to meet twelve they as twelve would not come over to meet me.

SECRETARY: Then try some neutral place.

DAWES: That would create a wrong impression again.

SECRETARY: I don't want to affront their dignity but think it over and discuss informally some way of choosing a neutral place which would avoid the misunderstanding. I think you must insist on this.

DAWES: I do not think -

SECRETARY: They were the ones who made the trouble at Geneva and they must therefore not repeat it now. I should think you could find some way of conferring and even discussing it.

DAWES: They have been conferring with me. I have seen Briand a number of times. I have seen Simons. Matsudaira comes here. Cecil comes here but the trouble is that the question in their minds, which seems more important than the settlement of this dispute, is to preserve the dignity of the League and clear up over the World the indication that the United States should now come in behind the League.

SECRETARY: You are not there to do that.

I will

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-9-

DAWES: I will have to tell Briand so.

SECRETARY: I am afraid you will if they insist on it. You are there to confer with the representatives of those different nations on the situation which is now existing in Manchuria and they have got to meet us on a basis which will avoid misunderstanding.

DAWES: Now that is one thing. When the United States Government does that it means something. I think you ought to say that and say that you have instructed me. Say that I am here for a conference with the members of the League individually just as I said in my statement and that you have instructed me not to attend those meetings, in order not to have that action misconstrued as it might be and that we reserve the right of independent decisions. It could be framed in these words.

SECRETARY: I can try that if you think it will help you.

DAWES: It will be looked.....after what I said to Briand.

SECRETARY: I don't want to give it out in any given instruction to you in the form of a communication to the press. I think rather to send it as a telegram to you; then you can give it out if you want to.

DAWES: That won't help me any. I might say....put them off for they all come around and they all understand that I am not going to say anything at all. This evening I am going to see Briand. Make the words read that I construe the attitude of our Government as that - and myself decided that - the attitude of our Government was to cooperate in every possible way with the League but we reserve the right to take full rights of action independently upon our judgment

-10-

judgment as to what constitutes our own interest in the situation.

SECRETARY: I can read you a statement I gave out the last time. I can give it from memory. I am sending for it now.

DAWES: They used your words. You have said that the United States was not attending the meeting itself because the United States is not ready to decide to what extent it can give cooperation with the other powers against Japan. Those are your exact words.

SECRETARY: I don't remember that.

DAWES: What is the decision of the United States as to the extent to which it will cooperate with the other powers and that statement of yours makes it more impossible and difficult for us to go there because it is going to be said that we have made a decision and they are going to want to know what it is if we have made a decision to cooperate with the League and if I go it will put the Government in a wrong position. I haven't thought of any formal words. I think probably - just as you say - that it is better for me to make some statement and I don't want to make any statement until I have decided upon the words with you. It is a very delicate thing. We don't want to offend the sensibilities of the League, yet we don't want to say something that will destroy our present position of independence.

SECRETARY: This is what I said so far as I can recollect it. This was the shortest statement I made. It covered the general points about which you are talking. I said the attitude of this Government is unchanged; we are acting independently and reserving full independence of judgment

as to

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

-11-

as to each step to be taken. We are endeavoring to support the general objective of the League, namely, the preservation of peace in Manchuria.

DAWES: Here I have a statement the way it came over. Secretary Stimson gave an emphatic denial that the Japanese Ambassador had been given assurances that the United States is not following the League of Nations.....decided upon the economic boycott of Japan. He added that if General Dawes had given out at the Council of the League.....the reason was that the United States is not ready to make a decision as to how far it is willing to go in assisting against Japan.

SECRETARY: That is not my phrase. No, that is something somebody else has made up. I do not remember ever using that last phrase that you have just quoted "that we have not yet made up our minds". I have never said anything like that. My position has always been that the United States can not commit itself before hand to adopt a policy of the League before that policy has been adopted.

DAWES: That is right.

SECRETARY: That is what I mean when I say that we reserve our independence of judgment until the time of action takes place.

DAWES: That is right. The part I can say after my talk with Briand..... See if I can not take that myself as an instruction from the State Department and that in my judgment I would because of this conception of the attitude of the United States.

SECRETARY: I do not quite get that last.

Mr. Dawes

-12-

DAWES: Mr. Dawes said in his statement, I am to call on Briand at 6:30; that he had discussed with M. Briand the matter of his attendance at these meetings of the Council of the League. Ambassador Dawes said that he had informed M. Briand that the United States..... That it was his clear understanding that this Government reserved independence of judgment until the time of action by the League. He said that his presence here has enabled both members of the League and himself to have every opportunity for the discussion of such matters as were of mutual concern to the League and to the United States. He stated also that in order that there might be no public misconception of this position of the Government, that he had decided that it was not best for him to attend the meetings of the League.

SECRETARY: Let me call you up again in a little while. In the meantime I will try to draw up something here. I want to try a hand at something either as a statement or an instruction.

DAWES: You have a statement in mind.

SECRETARY: I have that clearly in mind. Can you wait long enough for me to ask you a question?

DAWES: Matsudaira was in here just a little while ago to say that he had a telegram from his Government suggesting that the League appoint a commission to study the status quo of the situation. He is very anxious that the League appoint a committee under Article 15. He is anxious to have his government make that recommendation.

SECRETARY: He is anxious what?

DAWES: He has got no idea at all whether his government will let him do that and I don't think there is any chance of there doing it.

Here

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

-13-

SECRETARY: Here is the situation as we see it. Beginning with September 18th there was a government in Manchuria which was not a very good government but it was the regular acknowledged government by China; namely, the government of the young Marshal Chang Hsueh-Liang. Beginning on that day the Japanese Army has deliberately set out to destroy that government and it has done so very effectually. It has attacked it wherever it had forces regardless of the railway zone or the treaty limits for the Japanese forces, and it has culminated its action by going way up into northern Manchuria and attacking Tsitsihar just for the purpose of destroying the last remaining force of Marshal Chang. All of the talk about protecting nationals has been shown to be mere bunk. So far as the army is concerned it has been an intelligent and deliberate drive to destroy the existing Chinese government of Manchuria. That can not now be effectively denied and that act amounts to a complete violation of the Kellogg-Briand Pact and a complete violation of the Nine-Power Pact. That is our view today. That is the view which we have on top of this situation. You report from Matsudaira, and what Matsudaira says is confirmed so far as it goes by what we hear from Tokyo, that the army is entirely out of hand and is running the show in Japan. That makes a situation where any results of future discussion by the League seems very hopeless. It does not look as if there was any reasonable chance of a settlement, in the near future anyhow. The only thing that has been suggested by the President, in a talk I had with him to-day, which might crystallize the issue and make it affirmative would be if China would appoint some new viceroy or governor for



-14-

for Manchuria in the place of Marshal Chang. I see many objections and impossibilities to that because I do not think they could get one and it would make a row between China and Marshal Chang, who still retains some power, but I wanted you to know that that was in the President's head as the only solution he could see for a constructive solution instead of a purely negative one. If such a thing could be done, if China could be induced to select a new ruler of Manchuria and then Japan afterwards endorse it, it might be possible to work a constructive solution out of it, but I do not myself see any chance of that.

DAWES: I do not, because Sze says that public sentiment is very greatly aroused and they can not afford to make any concessions.

SECRETARY: That being so, and going back to the original position, it is rather our opinion now that it would be worse for the world, for us to do anything which would condone what Japan has done that it is to stand off and say in some way or other and by some act or other that we disapprove of that action. This is confidential for you. We do not see how we can do anything more ourselves as a government than to announce our disapproval and to announce that we will not recognize any treaties which may be forced by Japan under the pressure of military occupation. We do not ourselves believe in the enforcement of any embargo by our own government, although we would not probably in any way allow our government to interfere through the fleet with any embargo by anyone else. We believe an embargo is a step to war and if an embargo is decided upon by the League, it would be very likely for that embargo to lead to war.

That

-15-

DAWES: That is what Sze wants to do.

SECRETARY: Yes Sze would like very much to get all of the nations of the world in war with Japan.

DAWES: Exactly.

SECRETARY: We have no sympathy with that and we do not intend to get into war with Japan.

DAWES: Simon's position was that he wants to go to the limit.

SECRETARY: We do not want to discourage them from going ahead with that if they want to, but we do not want in any way to tie ourselves up to it because our principles are entirely different. That is the line which you must follow. We will not do anything to discourage their taking action under Article 15 and 16 of the League if they want to. Confidentially, though you must not say this beforehand, I do not anticipate that this Government would allow its fleet to do anything to interfere with such an embargo if it was imposed. In other words, if that was done we would stand aside and not interfere with it and I think very likely a good many of our people would sympathize with that embargo and it would reduce the trade of Japan with this country. That would be entirely unofficial - not an act of government. So far as the Government is concerned, the only act we see we could do would be to publish the papers and the correspondence, announce our disapproval of the action of Japan, possibly calling it a violation of these treaties and then announce as we did in 1915 that we would not recognize any treaties that were created under military force.

DAWES: It is very evident that if the League proceeds

under

-16-

under Article 16 that your position is going to be a little different from the other members of the League.

SECRETARY: It will be entirely different and for that reason I do not want to have you sit in the League while they are discussing those problems.

DAWES: If I say that I have been instructed not to sit in the meetings..... If I go and sit with the League it would create the impression that we are going to follow the League all the way through. Therefore, I think that there is a better way; that I had better put this statement to Briand and to the press and so word it that it states your position freely, as you suggested, yet indicates that our ..... although you have different authority, it was the best of my judgment as to whether I should go over to the meetings and explain. But it is not necessary. It is useless anyway as compared with just what I could do outside. If I could give that impression, that will carry out the principal statement and everybody would recognize that you do not want to take these steps until you know the action of the League. There would be no harm done to the League or to anybody else if we do not go. I would like to sit down for a half hour and think over something of that sort and would like to have you write out something at the same time but the one trouble is that I have to see Briand at 6:30 and it is now 5:30.

SECRETARY: You have my statement of my position already so that if it becomes necessary for you to use it you can use it, namely, by saying that we have been trying to support the general objectives of the League while we still reserve our independence of action and of judgment.

I have

107

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-17-

DAWES: I have this statement of yours here. I believe I can have something ready in ten or fifteen minutes or so.

SECRETARY: We will try to call you back. I want to be able to try something myself.

DAWES: The only trouble is that it takes so long to put the call through and I have to see Briand at half past six.

SECRETARY: Make what arrangements you can with the telephone company. Can't you postpone your talk with Briand if necessary. We will be through in a few minutes. We will call you again as quickly as we can, but I will have to speak to the President myself. Have Shaw take the message and follow you over there if you have to go and give it to you.

DAWES: I can postpone it with Briand.

SECRETARY: Postpone it with him. That is best.

S: HHR: VGN

*file*  
TRANSATLANTIC TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY  
STIMSON AND GENERAL DAWES, PARIS, NOVEMBER 19, 1931.3:45.

SECRETARY: Hello, is that you General Dawes. General,  
I have cabled you some instructions on that subject of  
what you should do in regard to these meetings in a form  
which you can discuss with M. Briand. I have also tele-  
graphed in a separate cable a suggested press statement  
that you might give out, either alone or as a joint  
statement with Briand. That last, however, is for your  
full discretion. We are not anxious here for any press  
statement.

DAWES: You have cabled another press statement which  
either I am to give out alone or with Briand?

SECRETARY: Yes, just as you like. You need not give it  
out at all unless you want to but the instructions which  
I sent you are of a nature for you to show to Briand in  
confidence just to make clear to him exactly our position.  
They do not seem to understand it quite as well as I would  
like to have them so I have sent that to you. Let me go  
on. I have talked this matter over with the President and  
he fully concurs with everything that I said to you about  
our position. As I told you our own attitude is limited  
by the treaties to which we are parties. Those treaties  
provide for only the sanction of public opinion and not  
for any sanctions by economic or military forces and those  
will be the guide of our own Government.

DAWES: I don't get that last sentence.

SECRETARY: Those principles will guide our action as a  
government but if the others choose to go ahead under the  
League with their particular sanctions, we shall, of course,  
do nothing to oppose it or interfere with it.

793.94/2785 3/4

19 1932

Confidential File

107  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*file*  
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Confidential File

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

DAWES: That is what you are expressing in this confidential statement for Briand -

SECRETARY: I am stating it for you and you can use your discretion in letting them know what our position is. But I don't want to put that in writing. If the League goes ahead, what we shall do is to publish, of course, our notes and make our position perfectly clear after the League has acted - immediately after.

DAWES: Do I understand that you are publishing this note you are sending to me after the League has taken its action.

SECRETARY: No. No. I mean the notes between the United States and Japan.

DAWES: I understand.

SECRETARY: I mean for two months I have been keeping everything quiet in an effort to give the Japanese Government an opportunity to get the control of the Army. Our public opinion has not been educated on it at all but if there comes to be a show-down between the League and Japan, I shall make our position perfectly clear so that there will be no danger of it being misunderstood as not sympathetic with the League.

DAWES: Yes I understand. Mr. Secretary, let me understand are you cabling to me an instruction as to -

SECRETARY: Those instructions are merely as to sitting in the Council. I can read it to you if you like.

DAWES: That is what I mean. I want to know because of what has happened at this time. At 6:30 Sweetser came over from Briand's office and said that he was not feeling well; that he expected to sit up until I came and suggested that I come

at

1075

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

at 11:00 o'clock tomorrow instead of 6:30 o'clock tonight.

SECRETARY: I think that is much better because by that time you will have my cables and there is no need of me reading them to you now.

DAWES: At nine o'clock the newspaper men come up here and they get everything from the Council chamber. It is a secret meeting but they always get it and they know that the matter of my being invited was being discussed and they know too that Briand was to see me about that tonight. I don't want to tell them that I have instructions not to attend because that thing must not come until M. Briand has had a chance to talk to me and make a statement.

SECRETARY: You had better soft pedal it. The instructions are a sort of guide to you in your talk with Briand. They also are to constitute a record of our reasons in the future for history. The instructions are the record instructions; they are to make the record of this matter.

DAWES: This is what will happen with Briand as soon as he knows that I can not come to the meeting. He will probably make a statement as he did at the first meeting when he sent over a copy of what he was going to say and suggested to me that I make any changes I saw fit. What he said about what I said when I came here. He talked about representation and I talked about consultation and things like that. A Japanese statement was designed to explain to the public that this form of negotiation It stated that the invitation was extended a long time ago although the conditions were changed and that the United States Government had sent me here and that I felt that I could be on hand to talk independently with members of the League. It may be that he may want to make some sort of a statement to that effect.



-4-

SECRETARY: Let him make it, that is his business.

DAWES: I understand that I am not to make any public statement.

SECRETARY: We think here that it might be possible for you and Briand to make a joint statement which will show that there are no cross purposes between you but I leave that to you and you can use your discretion in that. I think that you will find the language of my suggested press statement very possibly useful to you. You can use that.

DAWES: You have made a suggestion as a press statement.

SECRETARY: I have sent you two cables to use in any way you like either as a press statement only or it could be modified into a joint statement between you and Briand.

DAWES: I understand that. It is a great relief.

SECRETARY: You will get two cables. One with the instructions which is not for publication but for use with Briand privately and the other is the suggested press statement which I spoke of.

DAWES: That is fine - that takes care of my troubles. When I went over to see Briand and told him I could not come - What he decided to do is to make a statement then about my attitude that he made at the beginning of the League and if invited I would be compelled to make a statement of this sort. He wants to get out that old statement. After you called me Mr. Sze called to see me. He is not going to do anything although he has talked to Briand. He has agreed to do just what I say about it and he is acting very nicely about it.

SECRETARY: That is Briand or Sze?

DAWES: Sze.

SECRETARY: Be careful with him.

-5-

DAWES: Matsudaira came in to see me an hour ago. He had received a telegram from the Japanese Government saying that they were sending a message to him about that recommendation. He doesn't have it yet but the recommendation is to the effect that Japan consents to the League's appointment of a commission to examine into the situation. In other words, the Japanese Government agreed that the same action can be taken now as the League proposed under Article 15.

**SECRETARY:** Will they stop fighting in the meanwhile?

DAWES: I don't know about that.

**SECRETARY:** That isn't much good unless they do that.

DAWES: I don't think they will stop fighting. That is Briand's idea. He will not consider the recommendation from Matsudaira but Matsudaira is very anxious. He says that if the League appoints a commission under Article 15, that his Government will                      It is not going to do any good. He said he would be fearful of what would happen. It is so unsettled. He is going to make an effort to get Matsudaira's proposal coupled with the proposition for an armistice and then carry it out. I have just had information as to the situation between Matsudaira and the League but we have nothing to do with that.

SECRETARY: I don't think anything will come of these suggestions of Matsudaira. The thing has gone too far.

DAWES: I agree with you.

SECRETARY: And what I want you to understand is that if the League goes ahead, we expect not to interfere with it in any way and so far as the marshalling of public opinion can do

to

107  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-6-

to back it up by the public opinion of this country and it is the view of the President that if the League should act and we should publish our papers, the support of our public opinion would be overwhelming.

DAWES: I don't get that.

SECRETARY: I say the President thinks that if the League should go ahead on this present situation and on the record of what the Japanese Army has done and we should publish what we know about it, the support of American public opinion would be overwhelming. Very strong.

DAWES: Yes. I am not going to tell the newspaper men anything at all. I will see them again after I have seen Briand.

SECRETARY: That is a good way.

S:HHR: VGN

1075

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

210 THIRTY SECOND STREET  
WASHINGTON, D. C.  
This cable was sent in confidential Code.  
It should be carefully paraphrased before  
being communicated to anyone.

NOV 20 1932

*True Priority*

*Amembassy  
Paris*

584

Confidential for 'Dawes' from 'Stimson'.  
Press dispatches 'to-night' report  
probable 'agreement' upon a  
neutral 'Commission' of  
investigators 'pending' an  
armistice - the whole 'plan'  
being 'agreed to' by 'both'  
China and Japan. They'

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

2718 THIRTY-SECOND STREET

WASHINGTON, D.C.

also report that presence  
of an American will  
probably be suggested.  
If these reports are true  
the objection which I  
mentioned over the telephone  
to an American member  
sitting on a commission  
which was

(23)

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

3

~~2715 THREE SECOND STREET~~  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

acting purely under  
authority of the League  
and, against the opposition  
of one of disputants, would  
not apply and both the  
President and I are  
inclined to think American  
membership might be  
very desirable - of course

108

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

4

2718 THIRTY-SECOND STREET  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

I shall want to know  
details, scope of 'communications'  
activities, terms of reference  
and any reservations that  
may be made by any  
party before making decision  
to participate.

Stinson

A-7.1K

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

## TELEGRAM SENT

1-128

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
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OR  
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## Department of State

TELEGRAM SENT

*Washington,*

November 20, 1931

9 p.m.

\$ This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to **anyone**.

Amembassy

Paris (France)

584. TRIPLE PRIORITY.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR DAWES FROM STIMSON.

Press despatches tonight report probable agreement upon a neutral commission of investigators pending an armistice, the whole plan being agreed to by both China and Japan. They also report that presence of an American will probably be suggested. If these reports are true the objection which I mentioned over the telephone to an American member sitting on a commission which was acting purely under authority of the League and against the opposition of one of disputants would not apply and both the President and I are inclined to think American membership might be very desirable. Of course I shall want to know details, scope of commission's activities, terms of reference and any reservations that may be made by any party before making decision to participate.

STIMSON  
ATK

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

S

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_.

Index Bu.—No. 60.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1930 1-128

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
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 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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Department of State

Charge to

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AMEMBASSY,

PARIS (FRANCE)

NOV 19 31

CONFIDENTIAL. FOR DAWES FROM STIMSON.

The following is a brief statement of the position of this Government in directing you to go to Paris. You can use it as an explanation of your position to Briand so far as you, in your discretion, deem advisable.

"I have directed you to go to Paris for the purpose of discussing with the representatives of the different nations meeting there the crisis which has arisen in Manchuria. But in so doing it <sup>is</sup> necessary constantly to carry clearly in mind the difference between the treaty obligations of the United States and those of the other nations meeting with you in Paris. As a signatory of the Pact of Paris and also of the so-called Nine Power Treaty, the United States is keenly interested that the present controversy in Manchuria should be settled by pacific means and that the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China, of which Manchuria is a part, should be respected.

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Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929

1-138

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
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## TELEGRAM SENT

### Department of State

Washington,

-2-

1-138  
TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
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We have hoped that at this Paris meeting a solution of these objectives might be arrived at by discussion and conciliation, in which your presence in Paris might be helpful. The other nations meeting in Paris are not only interested as signatories of these two treaties, but they are also signatories of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Under that Covenant these nations have assumed certain obligations and rights to which the United States is not a party. China and Japan have covenanted, as members of the League, that under certain circumstances the machinery provided for in various articles of that Covenant should be invoked by their fellow signatories, but the United States is not a signatory and has no right or obligation towards Japan or China in respect to the invocation of that machinery. It is quite possible that at this meeting in Paris the subject of the invocation of this machinery may become a matter of discussion or determination. The United States, while earnestly supporting the objective of the other nations, namely, of preserving peace in Manchuria, and while not desiring to in any way interfere with the discussion or action of the other nations in respect to matters forming a part of the Covenant of the League of Nations, can not take

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1939 1-138

1 1086

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
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## TELEGRAM SENT

### Department of State

Washington,

-3-

1-138  
TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

part in such discussion or determination, nor can it submit itself to the possibility of misconstruction in that respect. It must and will reserve its full freedom of judgment and of action in respect to any situation which may arise hereafter out of the conduct of the other nations which are members of the League. On account of this situation it is important that in the exercise of your duties in Paris you should not only confine your conferences to matters which come within the purview of treaty rights and obligations of the United States but that you should also carefully avoid the possibility of misconstruction and misrepresentation as to the scope of your actions. We are most earnestly interested in our mutual objective of peace. We desire to earnestly cooperate with these other nations in support of their objective and shall do so, but in view of the fundamental difference in the obligations imposed by these treaties, as well as their methods of enforcement, we must proceed by our path independently and without confusion."

S HLS:BMS

NOV 10, 1918

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator MA, 19\_\_\_\_

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1920 1-138

8  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Huston NARS, Date 12-18-75

DA ~~S~~  
FE  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 18, 1931.

Mr. Secretary:

You were inquiring about a statement made by Mr. Taft, in 1907, with regard to American Far Eastern policy.

I think that this is the statement.

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NOV 19 1931

SECRET  
SECRETARY'S OFFICE



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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS



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NOV 19 1931  
SECRETARY'S OFFICE  
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FIDEW

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Speaking at a dinner under the auspices of the  
American Association at Shanghai in October, 1907,  
Mr. Taft said:


"The policy of the Government of the  
United States has been authoritatively stated  
to be that of seeking the permanent safety and  
peace of China, the preservation of Chinese  
territorial and administrative entity, the  
protection of all rights guaranteed by her to  
friendly powers by treaty and international  
law, and, as a safeguard for the world, the  
principle of equal and impartial trade with  
all parts of the Chinese Empire. This was  
the policy which John Hay made famous as that  
of 'the open door'. By written memorandum,  
all the great Powers interested in the trade  
of China have subscribed to its wisdom and  
declared their adherence to it. The Govern-  
ment of the United States has not deviated in  
the slightest way from its attitude in this  
regard since the policy was announced in 1900."

(See 609 Numerical File 1906-1910 Cases.)

SKH:EJL

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



(NOT FOR THE PRESS)  
 (FOR DEPARTMENTAL USE ONLY)

Department of State  
 Division of Current Information

MEMORANDUM OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE, SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 1931

At the press conference this morning Secretary Stimson announced the release of the Foreign Service changes made during the past week.

The Secretary also said that he hoped to be able to give to the press later in the day the program of the visit of Signor Grandi.

SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT


A correspondent asked if the United States and Japan had been working on a plan for settling the Manchurian dispute and if the plan would be presented at the meeting of the Council of the League next week. The Secretary asked if the correspondent referred to a press clipping which he held in his hand. (The press clipping referred to contained a story that Secretary Stimson had been able to reach an agreement with the Japanese on the Manchurian problem and that the British Minister of Foreign Affairs had also agreed to the plan which might be presented at the meeting of the Council of the League on Monday as a plan evolved by M. Briand.) The correspondent replied in the affirmative. The Secretary then said that the press report was not true. Mr. Stimson observed FOR BACKGROUND that when you have a situation like the present one in Manchuria, which is probably the most thorny and difficult kind of problem that there could be in the world, where the applecart of peace might be upset at any moment by some hot head in Manchuria, it is not likely that a formula or a proposal of settlement could be made by one gentleman sitting in an armchair in one capital with another gentleman in another capital. This press despatch mentions a formula having been reached between the United States and Japan. That report is

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75



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Division of Current Information

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SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT

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-2-

not true. The Secretary said he understood there was another story to the effect that we are making a proposal to the League of Nations. This story, furthermore, is untrue. Mr. Stimson here said that the above statements were FOR BACKGROUND AND NOT FOR ATTRIBUTION.

Asked if he had heard any of the results of the conference this morning between Ambassador Dawes and M. Briand, the Secretary replied in the negative and said he understood that there was another rumor to the effect that Ambassador Dawes had called him on the telephone. That was characterized as purely rumor by the Secretary, who said that he had not heard from Ambassador Dawes and that if a cable report had been sent he had not received it. Mr. Stimson added that he was sorry to nip all these incipient buds.

The correspondent stated that the Chinese in New York City are attempting to recruit 10,000 young aviators. He added that he understood that, according to Section 10 of the Criminal Code of the United States, the recruiting of such forces on our soil is prohibited. The correspondent asked if the State Department had any information on this subject. The Secretary said that some twenty-five years ago, when he was practicing law, he was up on such question, but that he had not heard of the patriotism of the young Chinese of New York City. The correspondent then said that he and the Legal Adviser, Mr. Hackworth, looked at Section 10 of the Criminal Code yesterday and found that it provides a fine of \$1,000 and three years imprisonment. He then asked if the State Department had taken any action concerning the matter or if such action would be taken by the Department of Justice. The Secretary replied that the enforcement of those statutes is in the hands of the local United States District Attorney, wherever the offense takes place. Mr. Stimson said, furthermore, that that was his duty for four or five years in the Southern



-3-

District of New York and that he was not instructed by the State Department or anyone else. When he received information that the laws were being violated he took the necessary action. The correspondent then asked if, in the event that the Federal authorities in New York do not act, the State Department would call their attention to this matter. Mr. Stimson replied that when he acted as District Attorney he had more plausible information than that which the correspondent had just stated. He did not refer to the correspondent's authority, but to the mere suggestion that 10,000 young Chinese are learning to fly in New York to go to China. The correspondent then said that the matter was contained in a statement issued by the Chinese of New York. Mr. Stimson then asked the correspondent to remember what he said a few days ago regarding the faculties of the inhabitants of China and Japan for indulging in propaganda.

A correspondent observed that General Honjo, who is commanding the Japanese troops around the Nonni River bridge, charges that the forces of General Ma are being aided by the Russian Third Army. The correspondent then asked if our military observers had reported anything on that situation. The Secretary replied that he did not recall that any reports had been received. Asked if we have any reason for believing that Russia is actually aiding in China, the Secretary said we have only the information contained in the press.

Asked if it had yet been determined whether Ambassador Dawes would attend the meetings of the Council of the League in Paris, the Secretary said there had been no change in the situation as it was reported in the recent press release on that subject. We still do not anticipate that General Dawes will find it necessary to attend those meetings.

#### CANADA

A correspondent said he understood that the Canadian

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

-4-

Minister was to visit the Secretary this morning in regard to the St. Lawrence deep waterway project. Mr. Stimson, in reply, said he thought he had a date with the Canadian Minister today, but that he did not know what the subject of discussion would be.

M. J. McDermott.

109

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



(NOT FOR THE PRESS)  
(FOR DEPARTMENTAL USE ONLY)

Department of State  
Division of Current Information

MEMORANDUM OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE, WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 11, 1931

At the press conference this afternoon Secretary Stimson announced the release of a speech made this morning by Assistant Secretary Francis White at the inaugural meeting of the delegates of Bolivia and Paraguay, who have met at the Pan American Union to discuss a pact of non-aggression.

The Secretary also announced the release of a speech delivered today by Consul General John K. Caldwell at the Conference on Opium Smoking in the Far East, which Conference has convened at Bangkok, Siam.

SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT

A correspondent asked why, in view of the indications from Japan and from Ambassador Debuchi that there were no objections to the publication of the correspondence between Japan and the United States, the correspondence is being kept secret. The Secretary replied that the correspondence is being kept secret but that he did not desire to say why. He added, however, that a very conciliatory note was received from Japan yesterday. A correspondent then asked if the Secretary would comment on the general trend of affairs in Manchuria. The Secretary in reply said, FOR BACKGROUND, that General Dawes is going to Paris to be available to consult if he should be needed and that the situation appeared to be very good. This country, whether it wants it or not, is a country which is looked up to as very influential in this situation by Japan and China and other nations. There is a very important meeting coming on next week when the representatives of the other nations of the world will meet and we have asked General Dawes to go to Paris to be in a position where he can confer, if it is wanted, with anyone who is interested in that situation and his presence there

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-2-

will be of great help and will add to the hope of arriving at a peaceful solution of the Manchurian situation. The Secretary here recalled that he had told the correspondents the other day, FOR BACKGROUND purposes, that he could not go into the details of these negotiations. When negotiations are going on everything that is said to the public press as to the position of either one of the countries freezes into print in nine cases out of ten and it is more difficult to get away from that than it is to negotiate. For that reason, it is the part of wisdom not to publish in the press the details of what either one says, back and forth. One can never tell what details will hop up to plague one in the negotiations. A correspondent said that, recognizing the justice of what the Secretary had said, he was constrained to refer back to our first step in cooperating with the League and that, from what the Secretary had just said with reference to the influential role the United States has always taken in the Orient, it occurred to him that that had been such a well recognized fact in the past that we appeared to have abandoned our traditional policy when we cooperated with the League and that, recognizing that fact, we are coming back to it. Replying, Mr. Stimson said that he had repeated many times, and that it was a good thing to repeat over and over again, that, in regard to what we have done in the past, we have sought, acting in the independence of our own judgment and acting independently through the diplomatic channels, to support the movement toward peace in which all of the countries of the world are interested. That is our common objective and our method is the one which has been described so many times. It is a very potent method because it is the United States; and that is the influence which General Dawes is thought to be the proper man to bring to bear at Paris. A correspondent said that the implication appeared to be very

-3-

clear that Mr. Dawes actually has instructions to sit in at the meeting of the Council if it is required or desirable. The Secretary, in reply, said he preferred to let the correspondents wrestle with the language of the press release which announced that Ambassador Dawes would go to Paris to attend the meeting of the League Council on November 16th. Asked if Ambassador Dawes has any positive instructions or whether he is merely to wait until he is instructed, the Secretary said that he preferred not to go into that, except to say that Ambassador Dawes was fully informed of what had occurred in the past. A correspondent said he assumed that no definite steps, beyond the ordinary exchange of conversations, would be taken prior to the meeting at Paris on Monday. Mr. Stimson replied that he did not anticipate any particular move would be necessary before the meeting in Paris. The Secretary then added that he had told the correspondents last Monday his reasons for maintaining silence concerning the Manchurian situation and that a number of the correspondents had rushed out and said that he was silent because he was preparing a note to Japan. The Secretary then said that if the correspondents were going to do that he would have to be careful as to what he said. Silence in a situation of this kind ought to be perfectly clear and it should be a notice to the correspondents that, at least to one interested in the success of the conversations, irresponsible speculation is not going to do any good. A correspondent then observed that lack of information was largely responsible for the irresponsible speculation. The Secretary replied that the correspondents' dilemma had only two points, but a third one is responsible silence. A correspondent observed that it appeared to him that M. Briand had made public several of his notes and, while the Japanese have not made theirs public, they have told us unofficially that they have no objection to their publication. The corres-

-4-

pondent added that he recognized that the Secretary could not make public certain documents and asked if this particular case was not a departure from his previous policy. In reply, the Secretary said that he could only assure the correspondent that if the time comes, which is what the Secretary is anxious for, that is peace in Manchuria, he will make public everything there is, but just at the present time such a procedure would be dangerous. When a thing is printed and speculated on and circulated throughout the world, and when feelings run high between disputants, people who do not want a peaceful settlement have a little more ammunition to use in the course of the discussions and debates which would work in the other direction. Asked if the correspondents might quote the statement that the Japanese reply yesterday was conciliatory, the Secretary replied in the affirmative. A correspondent said that he understood yesterday, from Japanese sources, that the position which Japan took was that the troops could be withdrawn only after Japan had been assured of the protection of Japanese life and property. The correspondent asked if that was the same position which Japan has maintained all along. The correspondent said, furthermore, that he would like to know, as a matter of clarification, how that was an advance in the negotiations and why it should lead to optimism. The Secretary replied that there was an advance toward a settlement, but that the correspondent probably got an untrue impression of the Japanese position. Observing that apparently the line between independent action and cooperation with the League was so finely drawn that the question comes up whether, in the event of League sanctions on the 16th, the United States could undertake any sanctions of its own independently without the appearance of cooperating with the League, the Secretary did not reply to the question but said that he would merely repeat again that he regarded the Japanese reply

-5-

yesterday as conciliatory and that he was hopeful because of it. Asked if he anticipated the necessity for sanctions, the Secretary said he hoped not. A correspondent then asked if any thought had been given to invoking the Nine Power Pact. Mr. Stimson, in reply, said that he preferred not to go any further into the matter. A correspondent then asked if he could use, FOR BACK- GROUND, that the application of sanctions is not considered likely. The Secretary replied in the negative. The correspondent then said that the newspapers have been writing "sanctions" for about a week and that the idea appears to be uppermost in the minds of the people. The Secretary merely replied that he preferred not to comment any further on it. A correspondent then asked if it was not true as a matter of fact that to all intents and purposes the Nine Power Pact has been invoked in a private way in the conversations but without getting to the public. Mr. Stimson replied that the treaty exists but that he would not discuss it any further. Referring to the announcement that Ambassador Dawes would go to Paris to attend the meeting of the Council of the League, a correspondent asked if that would in any way affect the relations of Mr. Gilbert with the League. The Secretary replied that Mr. Gilbert is Consul at Geneva and that he had no expectations at present that he would be needed in Paris.

#### PANAMA

Asked if this Government is interested in the coming elections in Panama, the Secretary said that there is interest in the Department in the elections and that we shall follow their course quite carefully.

#### CANADA


Asked if Mr. Walsh's reply to the Secretary's recent letter regarding the St. Lawrence Waterway had been received, the Secretary replied in the negative.

M. J. McDermott.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT

A correspondent said that press despatches from Manchuria this morning appeared to be even more alarming than those of yesterday, that there was a battle around the Nonni River Bridge and that, according to some reports, seventy Japanese have already been killed. The correspondent said he assumed that, if the ratio is carried out, a far greater number of Chinese have been killed. The correspondent then asked if the Department had received any official reports on that fight. The Secretary replied in the negative and added that he had read press reports which had come in concerning this alleged battle and that he was inclined to say that the reports that seventy Japanese had been killed were considerably exaggerated. The only reports we have are two days old and came from Consul General George C.



DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

*Press Conference 11/13/31*

793.94/2788



-6-

Hanson, who is very well known to the correspondents as a responsible man. Mr. Hanson said in the reports that November 11 passed quietly in the region of the Nanni River Bridge and that the panic in Tsitsihar had subsided somewhat. Mr. Hanson had word from Mr. Tenney, our Military Attache, that the American Mission was safe and well and that he was leaving for Manchuria station. The Secretary then asked the correspondents to remember what he told them a few days ago about rumors and propaganda, and also to remember that Manchuria is in a great state of ferment and that there is bound to be a great deal of exaggeration.

A correspondent referred to Mr. Hanson's despatch to the effect that the panic in Tsitsihar subsided and said that indicated that there had been a panic and that there apparently is a likelihood of fighting in or near the city of Tsitsihar. The Secretary replied that from the press reports the correspondents could get a pretty drastic picture of the conditions there. One report this morning said that within a radius of fifty miles around Tsitsihar, the area was scooped clean. A correspondent then asked if, in view of those reports, reliable or unreliable, the Secretary was still optimistic. Mr. Stimson replied that he was more optimistic than before. The correspondent then asked if he might quote the Secretary as saying that. NOT FOR ATTRIBUTION, the Secretary replied that he had made the statement yesterday for quotation and that he did not want to be quoted as saying that all the time. The correspondent then asked if there was any reason for increased optimism. In reply, the Secretary said that every publication of expression made by him in any detail as to the course of action taken by the Government or its position is likely to make the situation more difficult. For the correspondents' CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION, however, the Secretary said that his optimism was based on the way the preparations for the negotiations have been going on.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-7-

CANADA

A correspondent asked if there was anything new on the St. Lawrence Waterway project and if the Secretary had received Mr. Walsh's letter. He was informed in reply that a courteous acknowledgment of the Secretary's letter had been received.


M. J. McDermott.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS



November 16, 1931.

S.  
Mr. Secretary:

With regard to the question of (comparative) law and order in Manchuria during recent years, the statements contained in the excerpts quoted hereunder, both from Japanese sources, are interesting and enlightening.

The first is from a book entitled "Second Report on Progress in Manchuria", published by the South Manchuria Railway Company, and printed in Dairen over date April, 1931.

It states that "enduring peace and order" have been maintained in Manchuria. It says: (793-94-Manchuria/70)

"Order in Manchuria has thus been preserved . . . . without serious interruption, despite the frequent forays of Manchurian bandits upon isolated settlements. This has been achieved partly with the aid of Japanese troops . . . . while the military authorities of the Three Eastern Provinces also played an important part in the maintenance of peaceful conditions."

The second is from a statement made in 1929 by Mr. Matsuoka, an expert on Manchuria and the South Manchuria Railway. It gave a different picture.

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DIVISION

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

"After the Russo-Japanese war, a period of tranquillity set in throughout the Far East. As regards Manchuria, enduring peace and order were maintained for almost a quarter of a century except for sporadic outbreaks, while revolutions, civil wars, or other political disturbances were unfortunately as frequent in China proper, after the establishment of the Republican régime, as at any time in the past. Indeed, Manchuria was the only region in the whole vast area of China which offered the benefits of peace and order to the calamity-stricken people of Shantung, Chihli, and Honan, who were driven out by the famine, warfare, and extortionate taxation which prevailed especially during the civil war of 1926-8, and again during the frequent civil wars of 1929-30. Order in Manchuria has thus been preserved since the Russo-Japanese war, without serious interruption, despite the frequent forays of Manchurian bandits upon isolated settlements. This has been achieved partly with the aid of the Japanese troops, which, though stationed in the limited areas of the Leased Territory and the Railway Zone, exercised a moral weight in the preservation of order in Manchuria in general, while the military authorities of the Three Eastern Provinces also played an important part in the maintenance of peaceful conditions."

(From SECOND REPORT ON PROGRESS IN MANCHURIA (S.M.R.),  
page 2.) 1931.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

"As a matter of fact, the absolute necessity of peace and order for the development and prosperity of any region, and the fact that order accompanies the railways, is demonstrated by a comparison between those parts of Manchuria which are served by railways and those which are not. Thus, one finds that in the Japanese railway zone order prevails and, as a consequence, even the Chinese find it preferable for business and residence, much in the same way as they seek shelter in the foreign settlements elsewhere in China, and even in the Chinese railway areas better order is found than where no railways exist. In fact, in the regions where no railways are found and even in the areas but little distant from the railway lines, banditry is rife in many places to such an extent that it is dangerous to travel without an escort."

(Address by Yosuke Matsuoka at Kyoto Conference, 1929.)

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

Tientsin via N. R.

Dated November 20, 1931

FROM

Rec'd 9:00 a.m.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

November 20, 2 p.m.

The following to the Legation:

"November 20, 3 p.m. there was a fresh outbreak of firing between plain clothes men and Chinese police in the area near Nankai middle school this afternoon at one o'clock. Japanese not involved. Trouble was suppressed but it resulted in restoration of strict martial law in Chinese areas.

Repeated to Department and Nanking."

LOCKHART

WSB



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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM

GRAY

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 20, 1931

FROM

Rec'd 9:15 a.m.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I. DIV. NOV 20 1931

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

972, November 20, 2 p.m.

Following from American Consul General at Harbin:

"November 19, 5 p.m.

One. Yesterday Ohashi called on acting President of the Board of Directors Li Shao Ken and General Manager Rudi of the Chinese Eastern Railway, informed them that the Japanese forces south of Anganghsi in order to protect themselves had started military activities, that these forces had received orders from Honjo to respect the interest of the Chinese Eastern Railway and to avoid clashes with the Chinese guard troops of this railway, that there was danger that the troops of General Ma might take advantage of the Chinese Eastern Railway in some way as to prolong the conflict and thus endanger the property of the railway, and that to avoid such danger the railway should advise the Tsitsihar troops not to permit

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lutz NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM

2-#972, from Peiping, Nov. 20, 2 p.m.

permit themselves to take this advantage. Ohashi stated that both agreed to issue orders to the railway guard troops to take every precaution to safeguard railway property. Ohashi called on Soviet Consul Orloff whom he assured that the Japanese troops had no intention of harming the interests of the railway and upon Ting Chao, commander of the railway guard troops, whom he urged to prevent defeated Tsitsihar soldiers from coming to Harbin."

Repeated to Nanking.

For the Minister

CSB

ENGERT

WSB



1 1 0 8

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*file*

November 20, 1931.  
12:40 o'clock.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION OVER THE TRANSATLANTIC  
TELEPHONE BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON AND AMBASSADOR DAWES. *at Paris.*

Manchuria.

SECRETARY: I called you up just to clarify one or two things and to be sure we understood each other. Of course you got my statement yesterday that we would not put any obstacles in the way of the League's full action. Did you not?

DAWES: Yes, I did, and I have talked with Briand. He is entirely satisfied.

SECRETARY: He was satisfied with that statement?

DAWES: Entirely. I did not show him the statement I made to the press, but as to the other he expressed satisfaction and complete understanding.

SECRETARY: What I want to be clear that you do understand is that if the League proceeds to go on as you suggested in your telegrams and in your telephone conversations - that it might go on under the other articles on sanctions. We will offer absolutely no obstacles to that at all.

DAWES: They are cleared away, I think by what you have done.

SECRETARY: I mean that our position is perfectly understood. I do not see personally - I always hope that they may reach some settlement, but I do not think that it looks very much as if that would be the case now, and if they do not I see no other way that the League can do than to go ahead.

DAWES: That is the idea.

SECRETARY: Did you in your telephone message to me yesterday

793.94/2791 1/2

Confidential File

November 20, 1931.  
12:40 o'clock.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION OVER THE TRANSATLANTIC  
TELEPHONE BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON AND AMBASSADOR DAWES. *at Paris.*

Manchuria.

SECRETARY: I called you up just to clarify one or two things and to be sure we understood each other. Of course you got my statement yesterday that we would not put any obstacles in the way of the League's full action. Did you not?

DAWES: Yes, I did, and I have talked with Briand. He is entirely satisfied.

SECRETARY: He was satisfied with that statement?

DAWES: Entirely. I did not show him the statement I made to the press, but as to the other he expressed satisfaction and complete understanding.

SECRETARY: What I want to be clear that you do understand is that if the League proceeds to go on as you suggested in your telegrams and in your telephone conversations - that it might go on under the other articles on sanctions. We will offer absolutely no obstacles to that at all.

DAWES: They are cleared away, I think by what you have done.

SECRETARY: I mean that our position is perfectly understood. I do not see personally - I always hope that they may reach some settlement, but I do not think that it looks very much as if that would be the case now, and if they do not I see no other way that the League can do than to go ahead.

DAWES: That is the idea.

SECRETARY: Did you in your telephone message to me yesterday

793.94/2791 1/2

Confidential File

- 2 -

yesterday say that you had discouraged Sze from invoking Article 15?

DAWES: Yes, Briand is very anxious not to have Article 15 invoked now.

SECRETARY: I do not think you ought to give any advice to him. We do not want to take the responsibility of any advice to him.

DAWES: I have not given any advice to him. I said to him that I was giving him advice not to bring us into it. I told him this morning that we had no advice whatever to offer to him.

SECRETARY: That is all I wanted to be sure of. Certainly I should not give him advice.

DAWES: I was only talking to him about what he proposed to say about us.

SECRETARY: Certainly do not discourage him from going ahead.

DAWES: No, I am not going to. Not at all. The situation is this. Matsudaira has received from his government and transmitted to Briand a proposition from the Japanese Government recommending the appointment of a commission of the League, not under Article 15, but under Article 11.

SECRETARY: That was for an investigation of China and not Japan.

DAWES: Of China in Manchuria.

SECRETARY: But it did not include an investigation of Japan in Manchuria.

DAWES: I do not know as to the wording of that. Matsudaira is coming to see me in a few minutes.

SECRETARY: There would be a very great difference between an investigation of China alone and a really full investigation  
of

- 3 -

of everything on the part of China and Japan.

DAWES: Well the proposition as I understand it is that a full investigation, that is as Briand has explained it to me, a full investigation of everything by Japan as well as China.

SECRETARY: That is very much more hopeful.

DAWES: In one of these telegrams we have got just what Matsudaira has to say. I will read it to you.

SECRETARY: Do not read it as the telephone connection is not good.

DAWES: Briand is still hopeful that they will agree with some investigation and that they will agree to a cessation of hostilities. However, I do not think Sze will agree to that. He tells me that as long as things run along this way and public sentiment in his country is getting worse all the time, he has been moving along and trying to keep it satisfied. The first thing they are going to do is overthrow his government and mobilize troops. I think it is a hopeless situation but Sze will ask for action under Article 15. I think he is going to present a proposition of his own tomorrow.

SECRETARY: Do you think that Sze would oppose a full investigation with a temporary cessation of hostilities?

DAWES: A full investigation?

SECRETARY: A full investigation of everything that Japan has done as well as China.

DAWES: I do not say that he will oppose that. He does not feel that he would oppose that but - -

SECRETARY: Would he vote against it in the Council?

DAWES: I doubt whether he would or not.

SECRETARY: I doubt if he would vote against it. There  
is

- 4 -

is a chance - I mean if Japan has come to offer a full and neutral investigation with a cessation of hostilities, that is a step further than they have ever done yet.

I say, if Japan has come to the point of offering to support an investigation by the League of everything in Manchuria both on the side of Japan and on China, that is a further step forward than I have heard of Japan doing thus far at all.

DAWES: Well that is right. Matsudaira has been waiting for that and it has come and that will go to the Council for discussion tomorrow. Sze's proposition -

SECRETARY: I think if Sze voted against that he would run the risk of putting himself in wrong.

DAWES: I do not think he is going to do that at all, and of course they are all very doubtful as to whether Japan can back up and do what it has agreed to, but Sze will allow that to be discussed, in my judgment, and put it through if he can possibly do it. Because of public sentiment, he claims his government is in danger.

SECRETARY: The important point of that will be to have a fully empowered neutral commission. It must not be a partisan commission.

DAWES: That is right and I told Briand that. Do you remember, you suggested that in one of your telegrams - about a commission. I told him that you had been talking very much about that.

SECRETARY: I never thought that Japan would allow it from the beginning, but if she has come to that point, by all means that is a long step forward.

DAWES: Briand seems satisfied with your position in all these things and the fact that you are sympathetic to

- 5 -

to any movement on their part that they think best to take and thus when it comes to the decision made on their part that you will of course consider what your responsibilities are in connection with some acts of assistance to the League policy, consistent with your ideas. We have the same situation as we have always had, except now we are relieved of the disadvantage of all this talk about whether we are coming or whether we are not coming.

SECRETARY: That is good. Have you anything more?

DAWES: Matsudaira is downstairs and don't you think I had better send down to him to see if he has any late news?

SECRETARY: I will not hold the wire, but I will tell you this -

DAWES: I can give it to you right away. In my telegram No. 757 the three Japanese points are mentioned. The Japanese withdraw the first point. They are not making the second point conditional upon the first point.

SECRETARY: The second point in that telegram as I understand it was merely an investigation of China and it did not include Japan.

DAWES: When I read it over it rather strikes me so.

SECRETARY: I will send you a telegram. All I want to get over the telephone are the things we are in a hurry about. There is one other thing. If the League should order an investigation, the investigating body should be purely a League agency. It should not include the United States.

DAWES: They will want to know about that.

SECRETARY: I am inclined to think that it is very much better not to have the United States on it, but to have a  
purely

- 6 -

purely League body. They can get plenty of impartial investigators from the other nations and it would carry great weight provided it was purely impartial. On the other hand, if we allowed one of our members to go, I am inclined to think it might make misunderstanding again here, but I will reserve - I won't say definitely on that - I will not decide definitely against it in case there should be strong reasons the other way but that is my first impression.

DAWES: Until they make it. Let them make it first, and we do not have to participate in any discussions.

SECRETARY: I would be purely a League function. It would be an investigation under Article 11 of the League and we are not a member of that. At first thought there would be danger of misunderstanding here. I should not want to cripple it by staying away. We might be able to protect ourselves in some other way, but I would prefer not to do so. I have one or two other things. It occurred to me - this is for your confidential information - you have written me about the Nine Power Pact and the question of whether there should be an investigation of that Pact and I have answered that we did not want to do so, so long as there was any danger of crossing wires with the League. Do you remember? Now so long as the League has jurisdiction of this matter I do not think we had better invoke the Nine-Power Pact.

DAWES: I think that is wise because you can decide whether to invoke it after this thing is settled one way or another.

SECRETARY: But this is for your confidential information.

Do

- 7 -

Do not tell anybody. If the League should fail - if the League should break down and should be unable to go ahead with the imposition of sanctions under Article 16 - if there should be a deadlock and it should just become futile, then I would consider very seriously for the United States to go ahead as the depository of that treaty by calling a meeting here in Washington, but I do not want anybody to know about that.

DAWES: I will keep it confidential.

SECRETARY: So long as the League is working on it, I do not think it ought to be thought of. Is it true that Chiang Kai-shek is going to Manchuria?

DAWES: I do not know. I have not heard about it.

SECRETARY: There is just one thought further - for your confidential information, we are very anxious that in case there should be a break with Japan that the issue should be perfectly clear and I think the League ought to have that in mind in whatever steps it takes. It is a very serious thing that when a breakdown occurs it should be on an issue which puts the blame squarely on Japan and they ought to think of that very carefully in whatever they do. That is what occurred to me. If Chiang Kai-shek, as the President of China, was making a peaceful visit to Manchuria, if the Japanese should not allow him to come it would be very serious for them.

DAWES: That is another occasion for your independent position. That is if they should fail to make that clear that you have the material there to make a perfectly

clear



- 7 -

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Luitjens NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 8 -

clear statement in connection with your position.

SECRETARY: I strongly hope that they will not fail  
and we are doing everything we can to help them.

S HHR VGM

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Dated November 20, 1931

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone.

Rec'd 9:40 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.



229, November 20, 6 p.m. 793.94/2758

Department's telegram No. 235, November 19, 3 p.m.

All the authentic information which the Embassy  
has been able to obtain has been forwarded to the  
Department. Besides, Shidehara, Makino,  
Wakatsuki, Ikki and Inoue have been rumored as marked  
for assassination. Embassy's telegram No. 191, October  
21, 11 a.m. and despatch No. 382 of November 7th  
contained what information was locally available in  
regard to the alleged plot and the last paragraph of  
Embassy's telegram No. 209, November 6, 3 p.m., indicated  
the present state of affairs. 793.94/2498

The Japanese Government is a very complicated  
machine and almost impossible of control by any one  
element. Political assassination is not unknown, the  
deaths of Hara and Hamaguchi being recent examples.  
Despatch No. 383 of November 7, discusses at some  
length the divided control of government agencies in

Japan

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM

2-#229, from Tokio, Nov. 20, 6 p.m.

Japan.

In time of political excitement here there are apt to be plots and attempts to assassinate prominent officials. The present plot seems to have been frustrated but there is still some public excitement and constant rumors appear to the effect that there will be a change of government. See my <sup>793.64/2146</sup> 223 of November 18, 6 p.m. I shall endeavor to obtain further information if possible and develop the situation more fully in a later telegram.

HFD

FORBES

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



(NOT FOR THE PRESS)  
(FOR DEPARTMENTAL USE ONLY)

Department of State  
Division of Current Information

MEMORANDUM OF PRESS CONFERENCE, THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 12, 1931

SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT

793.94  
At the press conference this morning a correspondent asked if we were still as optimistic as we were yesterday in the face of present reports that the military situation in the Far East had become very much worse. Under Secretary Castle, in reply, said we had received nothing to change that feeling. The correspondent then said it was difficult for him to understand why the Department would be optimistic concerning the situation in Manchuria in the face of these unfavorable reports. Mr. Castle in reply said that the only reports we have are optimistic. Asked if the Department had received any reports on the military phase of the situation since yesterday or if any reports had been received from either Ambassador Debuchi or the Chinese Charge d'Affaires, which gave rise to the optimism, Mr. Castle said that neither Ambassador Debuchi nor Mr. Yung Kwai had called at the Department since yesterday.

A correspondent said that press despatches received this morning indicate that France is perhaps not as optimistic as Great Britain and the United States on the Manchurian situation. He said, furthermore, that reports had been received from Europe that M. Briand was considering despatching further notes to China and Japan and at the same time the Foreign Office in London and the State Department at Washington are radiating great optimism. The correspondent then asked if there was some joint action on the part of Great Britain and the United States which France did not know about. The Under Secretary replied in the negative. The correspondent then asked if there was any other basis other than mere hope that the situation would improve. He was informed in reply that the Department has seen no development which would indicate

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that the situation was becoming worse. The correspondent then read the following paragraph from one of the morning newspapers:

"Japanese troops in Manchuria renewed warfare against Chinese irregulars over a wide area north of Mukden today, and dug in along the Nonni River against the long threatened attack by troops in the Heilungkaing Province."

Mr. Castle in reply said he had not read that despatch.

Continuing, a correspondent said a later story from Tokyo said that the Japanese may have to occupy Tsitsihar and some other towns in Manchuria. The correspondent said that these reports were not in the morning newspapers but that they would appear later in the day. Mr. Castle in reply said that we might possibly receive reports to enable us to check on the accuracy of these recent despatches before the evening newspapers come out. The correspondent said there was another report that 5,000 bandits were moving on Changchun. Mr. Castle in reply said that would not seem impossible.

Queried regarding the whereabouts of Consul General George C. Hanson, the Under Secretary said that Mr. Hanson was in Harbin, as far as he knew.

The report from Tokyo, a correspondent said, says that the Japanese War Office is charging that Russia has sent many car loads of ammunition to General Ma. The report, which comes from the Military Intelligence of Japan, says it has very authoritative information to that effect. In reply, Mr. Castle observed that the same report had been made over and over again in the press and elsewhere but that he did not know whether the report was true.

A correspondent said that Sir John Simon, British Foreign Secretary, in speaking yesterday with regard to reports of possible sanctions or diplomatic withdrawals from Tokyo, said that Britain certainly would not participate in any such movement and that Britain would not consider an action of that kind against a former ally. The correspondent then asked if

-3-

that indicated that the Sino-Japanese Alliance was not as dead in spirit as in body. Mr. Castle replied in the negative. Asked if the question of sanctions had been considered by the State Department, the Under Secretary said we had taken no action whatever. The question has not arisen and it is probable that Sir John Simon meant that the question had not arisen in the British Foreign Office.

Observing that the correspondents had been told something about the present Japanese attitude, a correspondent asked if the State Department knew anything about the Chinese attitude toward direct negotiations. He was informed in reply that the Department had no information on that subject except what the Chinese have said to M. Briand. The Chinese position as taken some time ago, a correspondent observed, was that negotiations would not begin until Japan had evacuated her troops back into the treaty zone. The correspondent then asked if we had any reason to believe that the Chinese attitude had changed. The Under Secretary replied in the negative.

Observing that it would be difficult to find a constituted government anywhere in China capable of controlling the situation, a correspondent asked if the Department knew of any measures the Chinese had taken to control the bandits or to restore the situation which would permit the Japanese under their theory to withdraw their troops. Mr. Castle replied in the negative.

Observing that M. Briand is sending some very strong notes to Japan, a correspondent asked if Mr. Castle had any idea whether the French Government was backing M. Briand. The Under Secretary, in reply, said he presumed that M. Briand was acting as President of the Council of the League of Nations. The correspondent asked if it was known whether the League was directing all of its energies on Japan or if it was bringing equal pres-

-4-

sure on the Chinese. In reply, Mr. Castle said that he did not know.

Observing that reports indicate that the League of Nations is sending observers to Manchuria, a correspondent asked if those observers are to watch the withdrawal of the Japanese troops or merely to study the Japanese situation. The Under Secretary, in reply, said that he had not heard the reports referred to.

A correspondent observed that there appeared to be some indication that M. Briand was thinking more of the prestige of the League of Nations than of the hope of settling the dispute. Mr. Castle in reply said he would not like to think that of M. Briand and that it appeared to him that the gentlemen on the Council of the League were doing their level best to find some way out of the situation and that they have tried from the beginning to bring about a peaceful settlement. The correspondent then asked if this Government was particularly interested in maintaining the prestige of the League and if this Government would join the League in sending observers to Manchuria. The Under Secretary in reply said he was not talking about our interest in the League and that no suggestion had been made that we send observers to Manchuria. The correspondent then said that he understood that the American Military and Naval Attaches at Peiping, and also the British Attaches, have been going into Manchuria and obtaining first hand information regarding the situation. The correspondent then asked if we had received any reports from our attaches. The Under Secretary replied in the negative and added that it was possible that they had been traveling in Manchuria as they have a very free hand and are likely to be found where there is trouble or danger of trouble. In such cases they usually report to their own Departments. No reports have been received by the



-5-

State Department from the War and Navy Departments recently. In cases where the subject matter is important the attaches report to our Minister. A correspondent said that he understood that an observer is one who goes and sees for himself, while a reporter is one who takes what somebody else gives him. The Under Secretary replied that observers endeavor to get all the information they can. It is perfectly obvious that the people with whom they talk are very much on one side or the other. Observers also use their eyes. They might send in reports saying that a Japanese or a Chinese general told them certain things and they would then add what they themselves had seen.

Asked if the Department is awaiting action by the League, Mr. Castle said he did not think the Secretary would say that we were simply sitting quietly awaiting the League's action. We feel that no action on our part will be necessary before the League meets.

Asked if the Department approved all of M. Briand's actions in the Manchurian dispute, Mr. Castle replied that M. Briand apparently is doing a lot of things which we know nothing about.

Asked if our optimism is based on the belief that China and Japan can be brought together in a sort of compromise, the Under Secretary said he hoped that would occur.

A correspondent asked if the Department's attitude had changed in any degree from that which was previously stated, CONFIDENTIALLY AND FOR BACKGROUND, which was that the only settlement which would be satisfactory from our point of view would be one voluntarily arrived at by China and Japan under conditions which would not constitute Japan's having a sword at China's throat. As the question was CONFIDENTIAL, Mr. Castle said his answer would also be CONFIDENTIAL. He then observed that the above was a very good statement.

-6-

A correspondent said that when the Manchurian situation first arose it was considered doubtful here whether the course of the Army authorities in Manchuria had the solid support of the entire Japanese Government. The correspondent then asked if the Department now feels that the military faction has the upper hand. NOT FOR ATTRIBUTION IN ANY WAY, Mr. Castle said he felt, as was indicated in the beginning, that it was a military coup and that the action of the Japanese military authorities in Manchuria appeared not to have had the backing of the Central Government. As the correspondents have been told repeatedly, and as the Secretary has said over and over again, it is much easier to get into a bad position than to get out of it. Mr. Castle added that he thought the chances were, although the Japanese Government is very sorry the trouble occurred the way it did, that it would nevertheless support the military to the extent of not insisting that they withdraw their troops instantly in cases which might endanger Japanese life and property.

Asked if the Japanese people were more or less enflamed, Mr. Castle replied that they undoubtedly were---just as we were enflamed in 1917.

#### ITALY

Referring to Signor Grandi's coming visit, a correspondent asked if the officials of the Department had turned over in their minds what they desired to talk about. Mr. Castle in reply said that Signor Grandi will be the man to present the subjects for conversation.

Asked if Signor Grandi will go through New York City, if Mr. Castle would meet him, and if the trip would be made in a closed, armored car, the Under Secretary replied that, NOT FOR QUOTATION, he expected to go to New York to meet the Italian Foreign Minister.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-7-

CANADA

A correspondent asked if the Department had received a communication from Mr. Walsh of the New York Power authority on the St. Lawrence waterway project. The Under Secretary in reply said that no communication had been received recently, as far as he knew, but that it may possibly have arrived.

M. J. McDermott.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CJH

GRAY

FROM

Nanking via N. R.

Dated November 20, 1931

Rec'd 6:44 a.m.

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note  
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893.01

Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.

PRIORITY

November 20, 9 a.m.

The following identic telegram is being sent  
to their <sup>respective</sup> governments by my British, French and  
German colleagues:

"I and my British, French and German colleagues  
received summons from Mr. T. V. Soong late on  
November 19th. He informed us on behalf of the  
President, occupied with party meetings, that he  
had a grave announcement to make. The failure to  
act on the two resolutions of the League Council  
and the failure to meet China's recent request for  
neutral observers to be sent to Manchuria to prove  
on which side the aggression lay had created a  
deplorable impression throughout the country. The  
Chinese Government still believed that the attitude  
they had hitherto adopted was correct and they had  
not lost faith in the League. But the occupation  
of Tsitsihar by Japanese had brought matters to a  
climax. The

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
NOV 20 1931  
Department of State

Telegram  
drafted to  
Paris Nov. 21,  
1931 SMF

COPIES SENT TO  
C.N.I. AND M.I.D.  
SMF

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CJH

Page 2 - from Nanking  
dated Nov. 20, 9 a.m.

climax. The Party Congress had ~~perpetually~~ <sup>that day</sup> held a secret session and passed a resolution that, in view of the dislocation of all machinery of government in Manchuria brought about by recent events, President Chiang should proceed to the North as Commander-in-Chief as soon as possible "to watch events". This was a very fateful decision; and, while the resolution had already been carefully worded, we should read between the lines and understand all its implications.

In reply to our enquiries, he furnished following. In face of national crisis all internal differences would be sunk. Nanking National Congress had at the same time reached the further decision to carry out to fullest agreement arrived at by Shanghai Unification Conference and in fact to accept all the demands of Canton. Nanking and Canton party congresses would each elect 24 members for new central executive committee. Business of Party Congress would probably <sup>until about Monday</sup> take ~~preference~~. <sup>that there was thus still</sup> Inquiry established ~~preceded at thus still~~ an interval of few days before President's departure. Peiping ~~would~~ probably be his first destination. It was realized that wavering would be madness, but if some action were not taken Government would fall and Komintang itself be so discredited that existence not only of the Government but also of the party was at stake.

Asked if there was any special message for our  
respective

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CJH

Page 3 - from Nanking dated  
Nov. 20, 9 a.m.

respective Governments, he said there was nothing to add  
to above announcement. "

Repeated to the Legation, Tokyo and Commander-in-Chief.

JOHNSON

CSB

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-126  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR

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TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

*Mar*  
Washington,

November 21, 1931.

*noon*

*793-24*  
AMEMBASSY

*585* PARIS (France).

FOR AMBASSADOR DAWES.

In a telegram dated November 20 from Nanking, Minister Johnson quotes the text of an identic telegram being sent to their respective Governments by the American, British, French and German Ministers. The identic telegram is a report of an interview on November 19 with the Chinese Minister for Finance, T. V. Soong, who stated that, while the Chinese Government had not lost faith in the League, the failure to act on the two resolutions of the League Council and the failure to meet China's recent request that neutral observers be sent to Manchuria to determine the aggressor had created a deplorable impression in China; that the Japanese occupation of Tsitsihar had brought matters to a climax; that the Party Congress in secret session had passed a resolution that President Chiang Kai-shek should proceed to the North as Commander-in-Chief QUOTE to watch events UNQUOTE; that while the resolution had been carefully worded, it should be read between the lines with a view to understanding all its implications; that in the face of the

Enciphered by .....

national

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect  
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## TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-128

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

Washington,

- 2 -

national crisis all internal differences would be sunk;  
that it was realized that wavering would be madness  
and if some action were not taken the Government would  
fall and the existence of the Kuomintang would be at  
stake.

*Stinson*  
*SKG*

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Sent by operator M., 19  

Index Bu.—No. 50.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HS

Paris

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone

Dated November 20, 1931

Rec'd 12:55 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington


771, November 20, 3 p.m.

FROM AMBASSADOR DAVES.

I have had an interview with Briand.

to him the position of the United States fully and  
satisfactorily along the lines of your 575, November 19,  
5 p.m. It was a friendly discussion and I felt quite  
enabled also to present my views on the local situation  
here. I said that he knew as well as I did that the  
present method of my conferring individually with the  
members of the Council as to matters of mutual interest  
and concern to the United States and the League was in  
fact the only useful and constructive method of confer-  
ence, for discussions of the private meetings of the Coun-  
cil were as freely available to the press as the results  
of a public meeting.

He had expressed complete approval of the general  
attitude of the United States as I outlined it to him.  
I told him that the eventual public reaction upon the  
cooperation of the League and the United States in the  
interests of peace would be based upon their respective  
and



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

HS

2-#771, from Paris, November 20, 3p.m.

coordinated acts and not upon press discussion of minor incidents. Both the League and ourselves must steer by the compass and not by the winds with which he agreed. We are now in a position to determine our cooperative course with a clear and definite statement and understanding that we retain independence of judgment and action.

I did not discuss the matter of my public statement with Briand as it seemed to me absolutely essential for the best interests of our position here as well as at home, that we clarify our position and I wished to reserve my independence of decision as to issuing a statement. I accordingly have given to the press a statement which is word for word the same as suggested in your telegram 575, November 19, 6 p.m.

SHAW

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HS

GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N.R.

Dated November 20, 1931

Received 11: 25 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

973, November 20, 6 p.m.

Following from American Consul General at Tsingtau.

"November 14, 6 p.m..

Han Fu Chu's 18th Brigade detained at Kiaochow yesterday for purpose of relieving 58th Brigade for campaign against bandits, meaning presumably Liu Hei Chu. For past week Tsingtau Municipality has been taking police precautions nearly approaching martial law, which while publicly explained as normal winter measures against thieves are obviously for a more serious purpose. It seems certain that the Municipality would have it generally believed precautions are really in anticipation of trouble by Japanese agitators. While this may be true to some extent, a more plausible immediate cause would seem to be a threat of raid reported on fairly good advice to have been <sup>to another</sup> recently to the Municipality by Liu Hei Chi. KUMA and four Japanese destroyers now in port."

Repeated to Nanking

For the Minister

ENGERT

WSE  
HNS

FEE

F/DEW

793.94/2796

FILED

NOV 30 1931

Division of  
FOR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
NOT 20 1931  
Department of State

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RECD

NO. 169 Political

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
AMERICAN CONSULATE  
Geneva, Switzerland, November 2, 1932

NOV 20 31

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
FEB 17 1933  
DIVISION OF  
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS  
Division of  
EASTERN AFFAIRS  
NOV 20 1932  
FEB 11 1933

SUBJECT: Sino-Japanese Dispute, Statement of Upton Close  
(Josef Washington Hall)

THE HONORABLE  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE,  
WASHINGTON.

FOR DISTRIBUTION - CHECK

To the Field ☒  
In U. S. A. ☐

Embassy Tokyo  
Legation Peking

SIR:

I have the honor to report on an incident which took place during the period October 13 to October 24, inclusive, when the Sino-Japanese question was before the Council of the League.

Sir Eric Drummond told me that he had received a letter from a Mr. Upton Close, apparently an American citizen, in which he offered to come to Geneva to give information in his possession respecting the situation in Manchuria. Mr. Close had given his address as the American Embassy, Berlin; and Sir Eric Drummond asked me if he was officially connected with the American Government. I replied that I knew nothing of Mr. Close, but that the fact that he had given the Embassy as his address had no particular bearing as it was a practice not unfrequently followed by Americans. I later learned that Sir Eric wrote to Mr. Close, saying that the Secretariat was not in a position to bring him to Geneva,

but

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- 2 -

but that he would be glad to have him transmit, if he so desired, any material which he might have in his possession.

A few days thereafter, Mr. Close called me by telephone from a hotel in Geneva and said that he wished to see me in connection with furnishing information respecting Manchuria to the competent authorities in Geneva. It happened that I was very much occupied at that time. I asked him, however, respecting the occasion of his coming to Geneva. He told me that it was in response to a letter from Sir Eric Drummond but that he had not yet called at the Secretariat. I suggested to him, that, inasmuch as he had such a letter, it seemed to me appropriate that he should follow whatever intimations the letter might contain with respect to calling on Sir Eric Drummond or some Secretariat official. He said that he would do so.

Some days later, I was informed that he had called at the Secretariat and that, probably due to the fact that the officials there were at that time very busy, he had not received the attention which he believed should be given him. The upshot of the matter was that he mailed a "statement" to Sir Eric, under cover of a letter. The letter was couched in the most choleric terms in which he complained of the treatment which he had received. At about that time, there also came to me in the mail, but without a covering letter, a paper which I found to be a copy of the statement which he had sent to Sir Eric. I noted from the envelope that Mr. Close had mailed it to me. I then learned that Mr. Close had left the city.

I

- 3 -

I regard it as possible that Mr. Close may feel that I likewise did not accord him sufficient consideration.

After reading the paper which I had received in the manner described, I handed it to Sir John Pratt, a Far Eastern expert of the British Foreign Office, who was present in Geneva with the British Delegation, and asked him to give me his opinion on it. When he gave it back to me, he told me that he had found it very interesting, that he regards it as a fairly accurate description of the background of the Japanese coup and of the coup itself, although of course he could not pass upon the accuracy of most of the details.

1/ I am transmitting with this despatch a copy of Mr. Close's paper. I beg to add that, as I have read it with considerable care, it would be of interest and perhaps of value to me could the Department see its way clear to furnish me with its opinion respecting it.

Respectfully yours,

*Prentiss B. Gilbert*  
Prentiss B. Gilbert,  
American Consul.

Enclosure:  
No. 1: Copy of Mr. Close's statement.

*2nd-100*

Original and 3 copies to Department of State.  
1 copy to American Legation, Berne.  
2 copies to E.I.C., Paris.

COPY.

Memorandum dictated extemporaneously by Upton Close (Josef Washington Hall) on arrival in Geneva noon, October 16, from Tokyo via Shanghai, Nanking, Peiping, Mukden, Harbin and Moscow.

(Upton Close has lived in close contact with Japanese and Chinese affairs, making a special study of inter-relations and of Japanese internal politics since 1915. He was an observer of the occupation and later retrocession of Shantung. He is the author of "Outline History of China", "Revolt of Asia", "Eminent Asians - the Lives of the Makers of the New East", and several other books. For the past six years he has been engaged chiefly in cultural relationships between America and China and Japan, being Commander of the annual Cultural Expedition of American university professors and students to Japan and China. This work is encouraged equally by the Japanese and Chinese governments, and the Supervising Director is Dr. Inazo Nitobe, leading Japanese scholar and former permanent Under Secretary of the League of Nations. He left the scene of conflict in Manchuria on October 2, 1931.)

I. A Note on Japanese "Contempt of Court."

1. The observer gathers (and hopes he will not be thought offensive) that the League of Nations (concretized in personnel) is foremostly concerned with its own prestige and is puzzled that the Japanese military action should have been taken while the League was actually in session and China even represented on the Council. The following must be considered: The action was taken by the Military in defiance of and therefore without advice of their diplomatic confreres. The Military have always regarded the League with contempt. They and the Japanese people generally feel that if Japan could have retained Shantung province in 1919 and still be admitted to the League, she can now seize Manchuria and still remain in it. Local conditions were far too fortuitous, other world conditions too favorable, the case of their own survival far too desperate, for the Japanese Military to let slip the opportunity. Their decision was: "Act, and let the diplomats smooth ruffled feathers afterward." Mr. Yoshizawa, known to

favor

-2-

favor drastic policy, was sent from China to Geneva, and this precaution having been taken, the Military put the League of Nations out of their heads. They succeeded from their angle for the Japanese populace in nationalistic madness have quite forgotten that Japan is a member of the Covenant, and regard all mention of Geneva as bald, outside interference. The Japanese refusal to let the situation as it now stands go before the League is partly fear of adverse decision, but more a revival of the intense samurai pride which is quite above the reach of reason.

2. The most important phase of the situation is that Japanese popular opinion (swayed more than elsewhere by newspapers) after several uncertain days, had, by October 2, definitely swung behind Minister of War Minami, "legitimizing" in the sense of public support the unauthorized action of the Military, and forcing the Minseito Party cabinet (Premier Baron Wakatsuki and Foreign Minister Baron Shidehara) to acknowledge and defend the coup. The reason this could come about despite the general dislike of the Military and widespread genuine sentiment for peace and liberalism in Japan is: in the Japanese mind Manchuria really belongs to Japan, who has been evilly or unfairly frustrated until now from taking her own. To further explain: The Japanese popular attitude toward Manchuria is determined by two groups: 1, Japanese financial interests established there, 2, the veterans of the war with China in 1894-5 and the war with Russia in 1904-5, both of which were fought chiefly on Manchuria soil. Following the war with China, Japan would have annexed a large portion of Manchuria with China's consent, but was forced to release it upon ultimatum from Russia, France and Germany, which action the Japanese nation considered so unjust that Premier Ito was shot in the leg by an indignant

patriot



- 3 -

patriot for yielding. The Japanese people, particularly the veterans, have considered Manchuria rightfully theirs since that time, and have felt that one self-interested Power after another or several Powers in concert have constantly and unjustly stood in the way of their claiming their own. Popular sentiment in Japan is still largely dictated by the war veterans of the Russo-Japanese war and elections are largely determined by their vote.

II. Japanese internal Politics leading up to the Present Situation.

The Japanese Constitution (promulgated 1889) drafted by Prince Ito under the advice of Prince Bismarck, and modelled after the Prussian constitution, provides for complete independence of the War and Navy Departments from party, political or cabinet control. The Ministers of War and Navy must be ranking officers in active service. The Military have frequently made the formation of party cabinets impossible by ordering high officers to refuse the War and Navy posts. The Ministers of War and Navy have frequently abstained from sitting in the Cabinet while still retaining their Cabinet offices. They are responsible only to the Privy Council as the mouth-piece of the Emperor, and consequently on equal plans with the Premier himself. This situation has frequently put Japan in a bad light before the world, as it enables the Military to proceed independently, leaving the Minister of Foreign Affairs in ignorance of their intent and actions. Usually, when the Military contemplate such action in international relations (as in the case of the "21 demands" on China, 1915) they make agents of certain individuals in the diplomatic and consular service, who thus, for the time, have more actual power than

their

- 4 -

their conventional superiors. Since the successful growth of a two-party system in Japan, it has generally been felt that there remained only the removal of this anomaly for actual popular constitutional government to exist in Japan.

The progress of such a movement for bringing the Military under Cabinet control was greatly aided by the bad odour of the last government of the Seiyukai party under Premier-General Tanaka, a disciple of Prince Yamagata, builder of the modern Japanese army. General Tanaka, both officer and politician, in himself effected alliance between the Military and the Seiyukai party. The Seiyukai is also known as representing to some extent the big five financial families of Japan, who are said to own 95% of the non-government and non-crown-owned large industry of Japan. It favors a spending policy and embargo on gold, and police suppression of radicalism. The Minseito has been more liberal, favours economic retrenchment, removed the gold embargo and is allied rather with the smaller trade and industrial interests of Japan. Following the downfall of the Seiyukai cabinet of General Tanaka and his subsequent death, as is generally understood, by suicide, to escape the onus of revealed corruption, the Minseito has exercised strong authority and taken bold steps both toward financial retrenchment and the checking of imperialistic and military tendencies. The chief figure now is Baron Shidenara, Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs. It is chiefly under his direction that Japan has become in recent years so hearty a collaborator in international enterprises of peace and disarmament.

The strong figure of the Minseito party was Hamaguchi, fondly called by the Japanese "The old Lion". His power was so inimical to the jingo group that a young fanatic, member of

- 5 -

a fascistic organisation favoured by the Military, attempted to assassinate him a year or so ago. He lingered on, still the bulwark of his party, but turning the actual premiership over to his friend, Baron Wakatsuki, who unfortunately lacks the political prescience, decision and popularity of his predecessor. The Military were afraid of Hamaguchi but not of Wakatsuki. They forced the latter to appoint to the Ministry of War their "fire-eater" General Minami, whom Hamaguchi predicted would wreck the Cabinet. General Minami at once took a strong public position against military budget reduction and further disarmament, to which principles the Minseito was pledged. General Minami and the Military throughout Japan excoriated the Foreign Minister for failing to prevent Japan's rapid loss of prestige economically and politically in Manchuria and for failing to retaliate against the new, over-drastring and very offensive application by Shanghai merchants of a boycott on Japanese goods, beginning in August.

The Military eventually went into the open against the Minseito government, and the country was treated to the spectacle of the Minister of War campaigning against his own Cabinet. Elections were due in seven critical provinces the middle of September and War Minister Minami sent military airplanes to scatter leaflets against Shidehara and his party. The Military had already pretty well won or bought over the press, which was exciting the populace with stories of foreign (particularly American) espionage, with instalments of the book "Black Chamber", etc. It is notable that some of the Press, however, took exception to the use of military places in election campaigning. (The Military were alert to every opportunity for arousing the people, and compelled the dragging out of the Pangborn-Herndon incident - the American scout flyers who descended in forbidden zone - for this purpose. At

the

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- 6 -

the same time the American Legation was entirely wrapped up in Colonel Lindbergh's visit.

The first week in September Ex-Premier Hamaguchi died of complications from the wound in his abdomen. Nasty insinuations were thrown at his physician from radical quarters - showing the high degree of suspicion existing. The doctor turned his fees into a philanthropy. Almost immediately War Minister Minami went to Osaka at the other end of the island, the commercial center of Japan chiefly concerned with Chinese trade, and held a "Little Cabinet" of his own with officers and prominent financiers and merchants. While at Osaka General Minami came into final understanding with the financiers of the South Manchurian Railway. The proceedings were kept secret but General Minami issued in the press an ultimatum that if Foreign Minister Shidehara did not promptly and favorably settle the issues with China the army would. This week Minister of Railways Egi, known as the most able member of the Minseito after Hamaguchi and an upholder of peace, resigned, further weakening the Cabinet.

During this week I interviewed several Cabinet heads and many of her prominent men. They were all in a frankly-revealed state of depression. However Baron Shidehara stated that he had sent Japan's new Minister Mr. Shigemitsu (succeeding Mr. Yoshizawa) to get into direct touch with the Chinese Government at Nanking about the Nakamura incident (see under Section VI) and thought peaceful settlement of issues still possible.

Apparently sensing the need of haste, Mr. Shigemitsu went direct to the Acting President of the National Council of China, Mr. T.V. Soong, rather than the Foreign Minister C.T. Wang, and on September 17 Mr. Shigemitsu reported to his government that he and Mr. Soong had agreed to a joint commission to settle all disputes. It is believed by some

observers

- 7 -

observers that this directly precipitated action by Japanese military, who were loath to let Baron Shidehara get the controversy entirely out of their sphere and definitely into diplomatic channels.

This observer inclines to believe that Baron Shidehara thought he had won, and that the military action of the following night came as a complete surprise to him and most members of the Japanese diplomatic and consular services. I may state positive knowledge that the Japanese Consul-General in Mukden itself, who is known as a Shidehara man, was unforwarned of the attack, but have convincing reasons to believe that certain members of the consular force in various posts in the occupied area were in touch with and at the service of the Military.

Another contributing cause to the haste on the part of the Military may have been their disappointment in the elections of mid-September. During the first part of the month it appeared as if the Seiyukai party, backed by military influence and funds, might displace the Minseito Cabinet. At the critical moment the Minseito orators revealed a still further corruption of the Seiyukai Cabinet - the selling of Imperial decorations. This blinded the veterans of the Russo-Japanese war who had risked their lives for these same medals, to all other issues, the ever effective charge in Japan of dishonoring the Emperors Sacred Name was made, and the elections went to the party in office by a landslide. The last hope of political frustration of the detested Minseito policies - cut in military budget and whole-hearted joining in the disarmament conference, was swept away.

There remained for the Military only submission to gradual starvation of their machine or desperate action on the chance of rallying nation behind them. They took the gamble and from their viewpoint have won, as the increase of a sense of national

danger

- 8 -

"danger and isolation can only increase the "risk-all-and-die",  
"brook-no-affront-to-pride" spirit of the Japanese People.

IV. Japanese International Politics after the Coup.

For two weeks the Cabinet government was paralyzed - the police, a splendidly disciplined body of men who do the actual ruling of the people, maintaining order. Most newspapers were already prepared to support the drastic act, but public opinion wavered until driven into line by the lash of pride, following the prejudiced picture given them by Military and press of the moves made by outsiders, (China and League and America) to interfere in their self-establishment in the land where "Japanese flesh and blood have joined in sacred union with the earth". The Diplomatic service, at first stalling for time, was now compelled to devote its ingenuity to finding excuses for military actions, but is constantly embarrassed by further execution of military plans about which the Military does not take the trouble of fore-advising diplomatic and consular officials.

The Military, now unquestionably in the saddle, are still continuing their attack on Baron Shidehara, and plan to keep him just long enough to make him the scape-goat of any Japanese failure to get their own way abroad. Popular respect and confidence have been removed from the unfortunate man. It is predicted by Japanese that the entire Minseito Cabinet will have to step aside for, or merge itself in, a National (military?) Cabinet.

Meanwhile there are growing evidences of panic on the part of the large industrial community that relies upon foreign markets - chiefly China and America. The Chinese market is temporarily lost, these people consider the possibility of economic measures by members of the League and Paris pact, and know that this would plunge Japan into financial panic

and

- 9 -

and bread riots (as in 1919).

Little space need be given the international and League societies in Japan. The Japanese and French are the world's true Nationalists today. Internationalism is an intellectual toy but nationalism is the breath of the Japanese soul. "Japan first and we will talk these angles after the crisis" may be taken as the response of internationalists.

One of the military charges against party government is that it coddles radicalism. I lack news, but am sure the Japanese radicals, now no negligible quantity, are feeling the iron hand as well as the Chinese. If distress follows economic boycott of Japan they will become a disturbing factor. They are receiving constant incitation from Russia. A supporter of the military policy told me that "if this fails the world may next expect Japan to be joined to the Soviet."

#### V. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE JAPANESE MILITARY.

It is popular among Japanese liberal, cultured and diplomatic circles to speak of the Military as "simple-minded fellows", who understand only direct action, and must be expected to take it if irritated unduly. The favorable prospects for the coup from their viewpoint, were first, the surprising recent rise of anti-Chinese feeling in Korea (claimed by the Chinese to be engineered - without proof) removing the usual threat of a Korean independence movement in the rear when advancing on China; secondly the high state of resentment of the English and American and French communities (particularly the first) in China against the Chinese Nationalists due to the imminent loss of extra-territorial rights by these foreigners; thirdly, an assurance that Russia would not at the moment interfere unless her borders were transgressed; fourthly the general  
preoccupation

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
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- 10 -

preoccupation of England with internal politics; fifthly the weakness of China due to the split-off of the left wing of the Kuomintang or Nationalist governing party and the preparations to open hostilities from Canton; sixthly the economic and transportation paralysis of the Nanking government due to the unprecedented flood catastrophe along the entire length of the Yangtze and Hwai river systems. It seems the Japanese have over-relied on the British and others' viewing the coup as a god-given succor in postponing the end of extraterritoriality.

The astonishing mentality of some Japanese military officers was shown this observer in a long discussion in Chinese with a man who at first pretended to be a Chinese Colonel, but whose disguise was soon evident. The Japanese army and navy, said he, were prepared if necessary to fight the United States or America, which he had been taught "was a rich nation and therefore could not really fight. A small poor nation accustomed to hard living could always defeat a rich nation". He revealed some of the strategy of such a war. When I pointed out the economic side he was nonplussed except to say that with Manchuria Japan had material enough. When I set forth the antiquated methods of the Japanese army he blustered in wrath. He seemed genuinely afraid of the Soviet, which he did not want to come in conflict with now, but America was a "straw man".

#### VI. CONDITIONS AND STATE OF FEELING IN MANCHURIA BEFORE THE COUP.

The desperate struggle of 200,000 Japanese immigrants to assume a superior standard of living and status among a Chinese population of twenty million (increasing a million a year chiefly by immigration from south of the Great Wall) must give rise to mutual hostility. Feeling between the Japanese and

Chinese



- 11 -

Chinese communities in Mukden has been growing steadily worse for several years, and particularly since the death by bomb of Marshal Chang Tso-Lin (June, 1928) in which local Japanese civilians whose enmity he had gained and local Japanese officers were admittedly implicated. The Manchurian Japanese community expected at this time that disorder would arise and their government would take all Manchuria while the Chinese Nationalist regime was just getting started south of the Wall. They were bitterly disappointed at the success of old Marshal Chang's son and officers in maintaining order and at the restraint shown by their own government - largely due to Baron Shidehara's influence. The Japanese community and garrison soldiery had come to feel that the Chinese were encouraged in insolence by the "weak attitude" of their government, and cartoons showing Shidehara frightened of the Chinese bogey were frequent. The Japanese claim some three hundred unsettled incidents of cheating, beating and killing of Japanese subjects in Manchuria; while the Chinese claim that false arrests by Japanese gendarmerie in the Japanese zone, maltreatment and arrogance became a regular condition. It was to some extent the unpleasantness of living in Mukden in these conditions that influenced Chang Hsueh-liang, the "Young Marshal", appointed by Nanking to be vice Commander of the Northeast, to remove his headquarters to Peiping a year ago. In fact nearly all important Chinese officials left Mukden, making it possible for clashes to continue there under even less restraint.

The situation was aggravated by 1, the agreement between Chang and Nanking that the latter should handle all foreign affairs; 2, the unwillingness of the Japanese who had always dealt directly with old Chang Tso-lin to deal with Nanking, which was not intimate with the circumstances and inuendoes and also was not subject to the pressures and inducements that could be

brought

- 12 -

brought on Mukden; 3, Nanking's (Minister C.T.Wang's) counter-  
ing each claim with a Chinese claim and his insistence that  
only by abolition of extraterritoriality could the situation  
be stabilized; 4, the removal of Chang Hsueh-liang from Muk-  
den, leaving no one there in authority for the Japanese "to  
get their hands on"; 5, the presence in Manchuria of several  
hundred thousand Koreans hardly distinguishable from the  
Chinese population but for whom Japan claimed extraterritorial  
rights as Japanese citizens; 6, the boycott by Chinese; 7,  
the relations between the Japanese S.M.R. and building Chinese  
railways; 8, the Nakamura incident". The latter four must  
be further dealt with.

Sensing the danger of increasing Korean population under  
Japanese control the Chinese Manchurian authorities had  
refused to register deeds of sale and rental papers made to  
Koreans by Chinese citizens. The Japanese authorities claimed  
this to be violation of the treaty giving Japanese subjects  
right to buy or lease anywhere in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia.  
The Chinese countered that this treaty was made before Korea  
came under Japanese rule and did not contemplate Koreans.  
Clashes over Koreans have occurred in Manchuria for fifteen  
years - particularly in the Chientao district on the north  
Korean border, which Japanese police and troops have repeated-  
ly occupied and where the Japanese consulate has been several  
times attacked and wrecked.

The most serious incident was at and over Wanpaoshan,  
in late July this summer, where Chinese peasants attacked  
Korean settlers who were damming up a stream to drain wet land  
A Chinese exploiter had, without authority from his own of-  
ficials, leased to them. The Korean efforts to drain the  
land in turn flooded Chinese land and the Chinese endeavored  
to get redress peacefully but the Koreans were protected by

Japanese

- 13 -

Japanese authority. Then the Chinese peasants resorted to violence, killing many Koreans. Japanese troops and Koreans in turn killed some Chinese. Next Koreans in Keijo, Heijo (Seoul, Pingyang) and other Korean cities massacred Chinese residents. Japanese authorities claim to have given all available protection and executed speedy justice. Chinese claim Japanese officers led Korean mobs into <sup>the</sup> Chinese quarters. Both these claims were officially published and handed in Mukden and Seoul respectively to members of my Fifth American Cultural Expedition to Pacific Asia, in August. The observer tends to confirm by some personal investigation, that the Japanese police in Korea acted properly after the riots had started.

The upshot was great fear of Chinese attack by Koreans in Manchuria who began an exodus to their own country. But after the Japanese occupation the Korean settlers took an arrogant and offensive attitude and Chinese living in the neighbourhood of Korean villages were terror-stricken. I asked refugees fleeing to the Great Wall if they were running from the Japanese. "No, the Koreans", was their reply.

The pretext for the renewed boycott against Japanese goods, begun at Shanghai in August, was the killing of Chinese by Koreans - in Korea. The fact is that the boycott plans had been prepared for a considerable time against a pretext to apply them, the Chinese merchants behind the boycott being interested in furthering products which they were ready to put on the home market in competition with Japanese imports. One may notice a charge that the Nanking government, particularly Foreign Minister C.T.Wang, winked at the progress of these plans in the hope that they would give him pressure for negotiating a more favorable renewal of the commercial treaty with Japan.

The

- 14 -

The railway situation: In the summer of 1931 it was made known that the South Manchurian Railway Company, Japan's "arm" on which hang all her prestige, population and possessions in Manchuria, was in the first dangerous economic crisis of its history. This was blamed chiefly on competition in bean-product hauling from new Chinese railways in Manchuria, and the Chinese-Russian Railway across North Manchuria. Also on the general attitude of Chinese business in Manchuria, which had grown to be independent of Japanese ward-ship, with its own bank and commercial accoutrement. The simple, desperate fact staring the Japanese in the face was the proof that under moderately favourable Chinese sovereignty Japanese could not only not compete with Chinese individually (long since admitted) but that they also could not compete in the large machinery of trade and finance. In other words, in the situation of "double sovereignty" instituted in Manchuria over a Chinese population, Chinese political sovereignty tended to overwhelm Japanese economic sovereignty - to the surprise of many observers and particularly the Japanese themselves.

According to treaty, railways competing with the South Manchurian Railways cannot be built in Manchuria unless with Japanese assistance - or, if without, purely with Chinese money and men. Chang Hseuh-lieng, as part of his policy to make Japanese economic power secondary in Manchuria, has vigorously encouraged construction of several lines which take revenue from the South Manchurian Railway, although opening new country which in the long run would do everybody good. Some of these lines were built by the South Manchurian Railway, on contract with the Chinese, and the Japanese consider it a special grievance that while the Chinese have defaulted in payments on construction loans, they build further competing mileage from revenue proceeds.

- 15 -

proceeds. Also they consider it violation of the spirit of agreement that the new Chinese roads should be turned into feeders for the Russo-Chinese Railroad of the north and the port of Vladivostok, rather than the South Manchurian Railway and Dairen. Further, Japanese object to the construction of the all-Chinese port of Hulutao in extreme south Manchuria with Dutch help, claiming that it is really a railway project since it is meant to be a rail outlet, and therefore subject to the "no-other-foreign-aid" proviso of the treaties.

Many of the conditions militating against the Japanese were open to correction in Japan's favour according to the letter of existing treaties, but Japanese knew that even the enforcement of these provisions would not cure their fundamental disability in Manchuria. For a once-for-all cure it was necessary to go beyond treaty guarantees and therefore useless to appeal to the League or rely on diplomatic settlement.

For this reason the financiers of the South Manchurian Railway finally endorsed the Military's viewpoint - that a coup was the only solution. The Railway management was reorganized and a Director-General, of old military affiliation, appointed. The aged Governor-General Saito of Korea was replaced in July by a retired General - reversing the recent policy of putting men of civil background in Korea. Chosen (Korea) is of course a most strategic factor both from standpoint of military operations and connecting railway. The large American investment in the Railway, threatened unless conditions became more favorable to it, was relied upon to assist in quieting any American indignation over developments.

The Nakamura Incident: While the Japanese Military were publicly attacking the Shidehara policy in Japan they brought

forward

- 16 -

forward the claim that a Japanese captain in actual service, named Nakamura, had with two Russian porters, been murdered by Chinese regulars in Inner Mongolia. The Chinese foreign-office authorities delayed in accepting responsibility on basis of lack of evidence, until considerable fire-breathing had been resorted to by the Japanese Military. Finally both Nanking and Vice Commander Chang sent committees of investigation to the scene. They were on the point of reporting when the coup of September 18-19 was executed. It was prominent among the incidents that Mr. Shigemitsu and Mr. T.V. Soong agreed to settle by joint committee, just before the coup.

The affair, while stirring the Japanese people to some extent, failed of a supreme effect, as it was evident, and admitted, that Nakamura had gone into Mongolia on a passport as an educationalist to study geology. But the Japanese army staff now claimed him as a member on active service. Since the jingo papers had been proclaiming that foreign spies in Japan should be shot on sight, the alleged fate of Captain Nakamura was robbed of its relative atrociousness. The Japanese people were cooling over the matter when the coup occurred.

#### VII. CONDITIONS IN MANCHURIA SINCE THE COUP.

Unreserved attack was made on all Chinese military and civil authority - completely paralyzing them. The banks were sealed and guarded. All business stopped. The greatest Chinese technical university, Northwestern University, with 5,000 students, was forced to disband after heroic efforts of its acting head to keep it open, due to point-blank refusal of the Japanese commander to release its money, and to lack of protection - all Chinese having been disarmed while bands of brigands and Koreans wandered about armed.

All shops closed, fearing that local money would be found worthless.

- 17 -

worthless. Wealthy and official Chinese were detained, reports are that they were made to pay money. No atrocities were committed against poor and middle class civilians but they were left without police protection or means of sustenance. Police were assaulted and disarmed at sight by Japanese soldiery. After several days those who accepted Japanese command were permitted to resume their beats, armed only with sticks, which left them helpless before armed thugs. The Japanese soldiery for days took no responsibility for order, save to assure protection of and defence to their own people. No overt injury or insult whatever was done the foreign population of Mukden (about 30,000 Russians and several hundred Americans, Britons, Germans, etc.) but they were left without police protection. Their appeal to the Japanese Commandant brought a few distressingly insolent Japanese soldiers to stand guard.

A panic took the middle-class tradesmen and workers and in ten days 100,000 refugees poured out of Mukden, mostly southward on the Chinese railway to Peiping. Japanese troops acted as bystanders only, as thousands mobbed the trains tramping over one another, paying no attention to the ticket office. Pathetic scenes are reported by Mr. Steele, British Traffic Director of the railroad and his staff of seven Britons who rushed to Mukden. Mr. Steele was put in full acting charge of the railway by the Chinese Director-General, which the Japanese soldiery greatly resented, as these Englishmen would not be frightened off and could not with impunity be assaulted as were the Chinese.

The Japanese Military openly endeavoured to disrupt Mr. Steele's management of the Chinese railway, and gain excuse to take it over in the interests of the public. They sent armoured cars as far as Hsinmin and garrisoned the railway stations further south. They disarmed (and often assaulted) all railway guards

(police,

- 18 -

(police, not military) coming into their area. A no man's land through which trains had to pass unguarded was soon created and one after another south bound trains loaded with refugees and their belongings were looted. One train was derailed by removal of spikes which could not be seen by the engineer, piling up the engine and six passenger cars, killing thirty or more. My wife and I passed the wreck, one of the most terrible I have seen, three days later. I attach two snapshots. Corpses were still protruding. Mr. Steele's staff built a temporary track around the debris and carried on. The Japanese, who had seized his main Mukden station, forcing him to set up at Huangkutun, where are the repair shops, on the southern outskirts of Mukden, now sealed his railway telegraph. They placed an ignorant soldier as censor on his telephone. As traffic manager of the railway he was unaware of the safe "getting through" of the train on which my wife and I rode, until it pulled up to his platform. We had three first class cars to ourselves with the young car-boys, who had replaced those just killed, but were very nervy and cool.

Our first sight of Japanese soldiers was at Tangku, which they have patrolled since the Boxer protocol. They were pointing bayonets at everyone's bellies - forcing them to step aside. I saw no Japanese soldier in Manchuria who was not flourishing a fixed bayonet, regardless of the absurdity of the case. However, the individual soldiers were for the most part just Japanese boys having a lark which they did not quite understand, individually good-hearted and courteous, glad to smoke a cigarette and find a stranger who could talk a little Japanese to them.

A Japanese plane had shot into a defenceless trainload of Chinese refugees, far south of the occupied area, killing two and wounding several. Two Japanese soldiers had assaulted and

seriously



- 19 -

seriously wounded the railway police on duty at the door of the round house, apparently without preliminary talk or provocation. Had retaliation been taken by the Chinese workmen the Japanese could have had pretext to occupy the roundhouse and shops, thus effectively paralyzing the railway.

Mr. Steele made official protests on all these points to the Japanese Consul-General at Mukden, Mr. Hayashi. He was finally asked to take the complaints direct to the Japanese Commandant, General Honjo, and see what redress he could obtain, the Consul-General being helpless in the situation. The Japanese offered, on October 2, to permit Chinese armed guards to escort trains up to the point of Japanese occupation, (Hsinmin), provided Mr. Steele would carry Japanese guards on his trains through the occupied area - this being tantamount to recognizing Japanese sovereignty on this portion of the railway.

En route from the Great Wall to Mukden on the night of October 1, the observer saw at Chinchow (about half way) Chinese troops, about three-fourths disarmed, reforming under command of Chang Ischiang. In all cases Chinese troops seen by the observer, although still in a state of daze from the sudden catastrophe befalling them, were in good order, whether armed or disarmed. The observer is convinced that the bandits robbing trains between Chinchow and Hsinmin are not composed particularly of either Koreans or Chinese dispersed troops, as claimed and counterclaimed, but that they are primarily the peasant-brigands of the region taking advantage of the unusual opportunity made for them by the Japanese action.

At Mukden the observer was asked by an official Japanese if General Chang Tso-hsiang, associate of the old Marshal, Chang Tso-lin, and largest Chinese figure in Manchuria, would accept rule of the three provinces under Japanese hegemony - repudiating

all

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Luitfsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 20 -

all responsibility to Chang Hsueh-liang and Nanking. This observer's negative opinion was received with some depression by the questioner, and he was then told that the alternative would be the formation of many local Chinese committees of administration, responsible to the Japanese military, who would have to remain to supervise and protect them. The observer was given the names of the Committee which has since been announced to function in Mukden; also of the new directorate (including one Japanese) that would take over the official bank of the Three Eastern Provinces. Since this time (October 9, according to despatches) Japanese airplanes have bombed General Chang Tso-hsiang's new headquarters in Chinchow. It is the policy of the Japanese Military to allow no reorganization, political or military, of Chinese authority anywhere in Manchuria, unless it first bows to and is endorsed by said Military.

Foreign interests in Mukden particularly are complaining of loss of trade and hampering, in violation of the "open door" treaties regarding Manchuria.

#### VIII. THE SITUATION IN NORTH MANCHURIA.

The observer has reasons to believe that the Military first contemplated occupation of the Chinese Eastern (joint Russo-Chinese) Railway area also, but were dissuaded by the Japanese Consul General in Harbin, Mr. Ohashi, one of the few Japanese foreign officials to whom they incline to give ear. The observer has conclusive reasons to believe that Moscow was aware of the imminence of the coup. Mr. Kharkhan, Vice Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. had told an American gentleman who arrived in Changchun on the day of the coup that he would probably be greeted by Japanese soldiery. When the observer offered this to a Japanese official he replied: "The Russians have excellent intelligence service. I think they

knew

- 21 -

knew what was going to happen."

Just preceding the coup, Mr. Chashi, Consul-General at Harbin, made a trip to Vladivostok and up the Amur River to Chita - on his own statement for the purpose of feeling out local Soviet authorities on the proposition of purchasing the Amur valley for three billion yen on ten year payment. He was at Manchuli, the Chinese border, when the coup occurred.

IX. THE RUSSIAN REACTION.

The only Russian interest overtly touched in the occupation was the station of the C.E.R. at Changchun. The Russian traffic management held up their train and officially protested. The Japanese soldiery evacuated - although an occasional patrol from the nearby Japanese barracks walks down the platform. Two Russian railway workers were injured by Japanese shots. Mr. Kalina, acting Director of the C.E.R., informed me that from the Russian angle, the incident was closed, but no infringement on the railroad, "which, it must be remembered by all, is Russia's property" would go unprotested.

In Moscow the observer deduced from talk with Mr. Karakhan that Russia would not now resort to military action should Japanese troops come even to her border, but that no infringement would be forgotten and that ultimately it would be "rectified". The feeling was that America particularly should act; that the League of Nations faced its supreme test but probably could be put down as having already failed. - That the present Chinese regime could not save its country but would likely soon be replaced by a Communist regime, to which the U.S.S.R. would be glad to lend every moral and physical (in the realm of possibility) aid.

The observer saw no evidence of Russian troop massing in  
the

- 22 -

the "Vostok". War Commissar Voroshiloff did not go east but was in Moscow October 10. It is the observer's opinion that the U.S.S.R. has no force of note east of Omsk save an air squadron at Vladivostok. This is interesting in view of the Japanese Military's dread of Russian intervention, and the military-inspired stories in Japan to the effect of massing Russian cohorts on the Manchurian border.

Although one may accept that the U.S.S.R. would not now react with military force should Japanese occupy to the Amur, the observer has reason to believe they are preparing Mongol bands to give Japanese units advancing into Mongolia a very warm reception.

The Chinese administration in Heilungkiand and along the C.E.R. is left to carry on as an entirely isolated and temporarily independent commonwealth, and both Japanese and Russians say it is making earnest efforts to keep the peace, but complain of increasing banditry. That it must soon fall under either Russian or Japanese hegemony is evident. The Chinese here dislike and distrust both Russia and Japan, pointing out the stations of the C.E.R. and business district of Monchuli destroyed by Russian planes two years ago on one hand, and Japanese action in South Manchuria on the other. But they would accept Russia in preference to Japan.

#### X. THE REACTION IN CHINA.

At first it seemed one of almost indifference - or possibly of stupefaction. On the third day after the coup the observer saw uniformed cadets of the Nationalist Military School impassionately orating on the street, to rather "dumb" audiences. By the fourth day hand-written posters (on colored Japanese paper!) had appeared on walls the length and breadth of China (apparently the work of the Dangbo, or Nationalist Party Neuclei)

demanding

- 23 -

demanding war to the death with Japan. This day the Nanking students from kindergarten to University paraded, led by their professors. Three days later Shanghai students attacked Foreign Minister C.T.Wang.

Demonstrations in Peiping, Tientsin area took place later but were more impressive in spirit. The Shanghai commercial community tend to blame President Chiang Kai-shek for the situation, saying that if he had not precipitated the split in the party Japan would not have dared such action, and virtually issuing him an ultimatum to make up with Canton. At the same time Marshal Chang in Peiping is bringing pressure to bear on Canton.

Two courses seem open to President Chiang and his cabinet: For the President of the National Council to resign this office in favor of a left-wing man, retaining the supreme military command, or to face out the general demand for conciliation from his side and risk chaos.

The Nanking Government official policy is to place the situation entirely in the hands of the League of Nations and signers of the Paris (Briand-Kellogg) pact. Its minimum stipulation is entire Japanese withdrawal from occupied territory as a preliminary to any negotiations. President of National Council Chiang Kai-shek has made several well-phrased speeches along this line. Chief burden for procedure lies on the shoulders of young T.V. Soong, Minister of Finance, Director of Flood Relief and Vice-President of the National Council. Particularly is this so since the injury to Dr. C.T.Wang. Minister Soong transmitted a personal message to Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang begging him to sacrifice if necessary all personal possessions and feelings (in possible view of Japanese overtures?) for his nation, stating that never did China have such an opportunity of getting the entire Manchurian situation settled once and for all. The British and American

advisors

- 24 -

advisers to Nanking and Marshal Chang regarded Mr. Soong's optimism and faith in international justice as naive.

In event of failure of international intervention the first step of the Chinese government would be severance of diplomatic relations and deportation of the Japanese Community, which it is felt would bring Japanese blockade and occupation of Shanghai, expected to involve the nations possessing large interests on the Yangtze.

There was general talk even among the wealthy commercial communities that "only the communists can save China" and "it is fated that China shall go Soviet after all." Of this much the observer is convinced - the present National Government must obtain redress through the League of Nations or Kellogg pact, or it must fight Japan, or it must fall. In either of the latter two events, chaos followed by communism and Soviet dominance is inevitable. The large communist nucleus in central south China is still undestroyed and if the present Nationalist regime lost heart it would occupy Nanking, Shanghai and Hankow unopposed within a few days operation.

A note here on Baron Shidehara's diplomacy toward China is in order. Even the Japanese much opposed to his policy have pointed out how much the Chinese would have been gainers had they supported his prestige by making possible some successes in their negotiations with China. Doubtless he has been, and could have continued, China's greatest friend. But his conciliation was met by a stiffer attitude on the part of Dr. C.T.Wang, Chinese Foreign Minister, the wisdom of whose diplomacy is open to question.

### XII. THE ACTUAL COUP.

The following story was told the observer by foreigners living in

- 25 -

in Mukden and well acquainted with the Japanese officer in command there. It was at least apparently admitted by the Japanese officer acting as liaison with foreign press and public in Manchuria:

In the late evening of September 18 the officer in local command in Mukden returned to the hotel from a social affair somewhat inebriate, and was handed a despatch. He promptly gave orders for execution of emergency plans. The same order went to every Japanese garrison in Manchuria, which immediately, without warning, attacked the complementary Chinese garrison. In most cases the attack consisted of shelling followed by machine-gun infantry charge. At Mukden the Chinese barracks were target for many field-guns whose existence was previously unknown, and which had been concealed, with emplacements, under sheds, etc., in the Japanese concession. Apparently they were already trained on their target.

A typical case is that of Changchun. The Chinese barracks housing 500 men under a Colonel Fu were fired into without warning from three sides. Since in all Chinese cantonments arms are locked up at night the Chinese soldiery were helpless. Colonel Fu went out in his night-dress to see what was happening - he was shot down, as were some 300 of the men before the firing stopped, despite the running up of a white flag. Finally unlocking the arms depot, the survivors desperately charged their attackers, and broke through, killing and wounding about 60. In retaliation their wounded were compelled to lie without succor for a day, and civilians coming with water, etc., fired upon, while the Chinese hospital was taken over for care of the Japanese wounded. - Where the Chinese made no effort at self-defence, as in most places, their wounded were better treated by the attackers. In this case the attacked were

unaware

- 26 -

unaware whether their attackers were Japanese or Russians until it was over.

By 3 a.m. every Chinese garrison along the S.M.R. was occupied by the Japanese - also the walled city of Mukden, the arsenal and wireless station (joint Chinese-American) and private park and homes of Chang Hsueh-liang. Kirin and other points on branch Chinese railways were taken soon after. No effort was made to hold or reorganize surrendering Chinese troops but merely to disarm, terrorize and scatter them. The effectiveness of the surprise attack is shown by the utter helplessness of 200,000 Chinese against 16,000 Japanese. Without doubt a stiff resistance would have been put up had any opportunity existed.

The Japanese surprise attack on prepared and filed plans reminds of the beginning of the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars, both of which were begun by Japanese surprise attack before conventional declaration.

Japanese state that the immediate provocation for the drastic action was a Chinese attack on their railway near Mukden. They state it was cut and immediately repaired. No trains were cancelled or delayed. Confirmation seems impossible.

Much puzzlement exists over the Chinese high command's order to its troops to retreat without defending itself. It would appear that some Japanese action without warning had for long been regarded by Chinese officers as in the realm of likelihood and that this blanket order had been issued by Marshal Chang against such a situation.

There exists the feeling in China that the order was a mistake. Had the Chinese troops normally defended themselves, after the first surprise, enough blood would have been spilled to have made the Japanese action appear more truly as an

invasion,



116  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 27 -

invasion, and to have forced more serious reaction to it at  
Geneva and elsewhere abroad, is this view.

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
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RECD

NO. 170 Political



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
SUBJECT: Sino-Japanese Dispute - Transmitting a Communication from Viscount Astor, dated October 17, 1931.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:



I have the honor to enclose, as of possible interest to the Department in its consideration of the Manchurian question, a copy of a letter, together with its enclosures, which I received from Lord Astor during the period October 13th to October 24th, inclusive, when the Sino-Japanese question was before the Council of the League.

It will be noted that the enclosures to Lord Astor's letter are two telegrams, one from Sherwood Eddy from Tientsin, delivery date October 11, 1931, and the other from "The Young Marshal, Governor of Manchuria", delivery date October 17, 1931.

Very respectfully,

*Prentiss B. Gilbert*  
Prentiss B. Gilbert,  
American Consul.

Enclosure:

No. 1: Copy of letter from Viscount Astor, Oct. 17, 1931.

Distribution:

Original and 5 copies to Department of State.  
1 copy to Legation, Berne.

F/DEW 793.94/2798

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY.

Enclosure No 1  
with No 170 Rd. of  
Nov. 6 1931

3, Elliot Terrace,  
The Hoe,  
Plymouth.

17th October, 1931.

Dear Mr. Gilbert,

I know nothing myself about Manchuria, but it might interest you to see copies of two cables which I have sent to Eric Drummond. Sherwood Eddy is a most reliable person from the U.S.A. who has been travelling in China. The other cable was sent to my son who was in China two years ago and comes from the young Marshal (Governor of Manchuria) and Donald who is his adviser.

I was thrilled to read of your taking your place at the Council table. I only wish I had been there to see it.

We are in the thick of our election campaign here.

Yours ever,

(signed) Astor.

Prentiss Gilbert Esq.,  
American Consul  
Geneva

1 1 6 7

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY.

CABLEGRAM.

Delivery.  
11th October, 1931.

Tientsin P3 210W 12 1 12 Northern.  
Mallou Toynbee Hall London.

I was present capture Moukden. Evidence of many witnesses interviewed at time and on spot points to premeditated carefully prepared offensive plan of Japanese Army without provocation of any Chinese attack producing bitter resentment when China suffering with flood disaster and world preoccupied. Japanese troops not withdrawn but all strategic points Southern Manchuria still held by Japanese and Chinchow bombed. I testify to evidence of efforts to establish puppet independence governments Manchuria under Japanese military control. I have forwarded sworn statement of interviews with Chinese leaders Manchuria who testify to repeated pressure of Japanese to induce them to head Independence Governments. Universal indignation in China taking form economic boycott which government cannot control. Efforts of Nanking government still peaceful nonresistance which imperil government if pacific settlement fails. Situation critical grave developments imminent. All Orient looking to League of Nations and Kellogg Pact signatories for action. Asia believes League and Pact are on trial as well as Japan and China. A notable turning toward Soviet Russia as an ally and Communism is developing pointing toward fall of Nanking Government and widespread Communist anarchy if League and Pact fail in this supreme crisis and menace of war.

SHERWOOD EDDY.

1 1 6 8

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY.

Copy of cablegram received by W.W.A. 17.10.31.

We solicit your services to direct attention responsible people to the intimate relation(s) of the present Manchurian situation to the 21 demands. Japanese have taken advantage of world economic chaos (,) and of the terrible floods in China to expand gains which were wrung from China when world was at war in 1915. Japan now deliberately developing chaos in Manchuria, which threatens to spread to China, her object being defeat the work of the Washington conference. Therefore it is very important that the British Government and the League should very seriously recall the circumstances and results of the 21 demands and their lasting effect on Chinese in order to estimate accurately the motives now prompting Japan, who are trying to dominate Manchuria and serious consequences other nations' trade if they are permitted to do so. Stop.

Japanese methods deceiving world. Same both of ....

Regards Many thanks from  
Marshal and Donald

1165

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 23, 1931.

The statement of the Chinese delegate at Geneva regarding the Japanese reply to the telegram from signatories of the Briand-Kellogg Pact throws no new light on the Chinese position. It is pointed out that seizing strategic points over such a wide area can hardly be pleaded as a measure of self-defense.

The statement is dispassionate in tenor, China stating its readiness to cooperate with the Japanese in working out arrangements for taking over the evacuated areas in connection with the Japanese withdrawal, so that there shall be no danger to the lives or property of Japanese subjects. While China will not consent to the discussion of other issues under military pressure, it will be not only willing but anxious to discuss all issues between the countries in the most friendly spirit when normal relations are restored.

Anti-Japanese feeling is an inevitable result of the action of the Japanese Army, and will die down when the cause is removed. China is not only determined to observe its obligations under international law and practice to protect the lives and property of all foreigners throughout China, but to do all in its power to promote good relations with Japan, and is anxious to conclude a treaty with Japan providing for conciliation and arbitration of all disputes between the countries.

EBT

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lutz NARS, Date 12-18-75

RECD

No. 171. Political.

AMERICAN CONSULATE,

Geneva, Switzerland November 7, 1931.

NOV 20 31

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS  
LEAGUE OF NATIONS SECTION

NOV 21 1931

1 COPY RETAINED

*793.94/2790*  
*note 500.0112*  
SUBJECT: Sino-Japanese Conflict.- Chinese note November 4 to Drummond commenting on Japanese reply to identic telegrams sent from Geneva by signatories of the Pact of Paris.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

With reference to the Consulate's telegram No. 284 of November 6, 5 P.M., I have the honor to transmit here-  
1/ with a copy of document C.795.M.389.1931.VII containing the text of a note dated November 4, 1931 from the Chinese representative on the League Council to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, commenting on the Japanese reply to the identic telegrams sent from Geneva on October 17 by signatories of the Pact of Paris. The text of the Japanese reply was transmitted to the Department with the Consulate's despatch No. 167 Political, of November 3, 1931. Only one copy of the enclosed document is being sent with this despatch, but the usual number of copies are being forwarded under the regular subscription to League documents.

Respectfully yours,

*Prentiss B. Gilbert*  
Prentiss B. Gilbert,  
American Consul.

Enclosure:  
copy of document C.795.M.389.

Original and Five copies to Department of State.  
One copy to American Legation, Berne, Switzerland.

793.94/2799

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1  
with No. 1 Pol. &  
Nov. 7 1931

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the  
Council and Members  
of the League.

C.795.M.389.1931.VII.

Geneva, November 4th, 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11  
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Chinese Representative.  
on the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following communication which he has received from the Chinese Representative.

Note with reference to the reply of the Japanese Government  
to the identical telegram sent by the Signatories of the  
Briand-Kellogg Pact.

November 4th, 1931.

Sir,

I have now had an opportunity of studying carefully the reply returned by the Japanese Government to the identical telegram sent by the Signatories of the Briand-Kellogg Pact to China and Japan, communicated to the Council and the Members of the League by the Secretary-General on October 23rd.

I wish to submit the following comments on this reply:

1) The Japanese Government allege that the occupation of Chinese territory over a wide area, that began on the night of September 18th and still continues, was a measure of self-defence due solely to the necessity for the Japanese railway guards to defend themselves and to protect the South Manchuria Railway and the lives and property of Japanese subjects against attacks by Chinese troops and armed bands. The Chinese Government has repeatedly denied that there was any such attack and pointed out that no Chinese soldiers are suffered by the Japanese troops to approach within miles of the railway zone, which makes the alleged attack even more difficult to believe. In any case, so long as the Japanese Government are not willing to agree to the impartial enquiry for which the Chinese Government has repeatedly pressed, and on which it still insists as the only method compatible with League principles and practice of establishing the question of responsibility, it is difficult for world opinion to accept the Japanese version.



- 2 -

In any case, seizing the chief strategic points in an area as wide as the British Isles on the plea of self-defence cannot be regarded as behaviour compatible with the Covenant. On this point it is sufficient to quote the words of M. Briand, when he presided over the special meeting of the Council in 1925:

"No had understood the representative of Greece to indicate that all these incidents would not have arisen if his country had not been called upon to take rapid steps for its legitimate defence and protection. It was essential that such ideas should not take root in the minds of nations which were Members of the League and become a kind of jurisprudence, for it would be extremely dangerous. Under the pretext of legitimate defence, disputes might arise which, though limited in extent, were extremely unfortunate owing to the damage they entailed. These disputes, once they had broken out, might assume such proportions that the Government, which started them under a feeling of legitimate defence, would be no longer able to control them....

At the same time, "Mr. Austen Chamberlain said that the declaration which the President had made as to the role which the League of Nations could play in cases such as that which had brought about the present meeting, and as to the restraint which nations concerned in unfortunate incidents of this character might be expected to exercise in view of the fact that the Council could be immediately convened and could use its good offices to reconcile disputants, was of such consequence for the position of the League of Nations and for the guidance of nations in future that he would like, on behalf of the Government, to express his complete concurrence in all that the President had said and to thank him for having so completely defined the duties of nations and the duties of the League of Nations.

Also, at the same time, "Viscount Ishii said that he entirely agreed with the statement made by the representative of the British Empire endorsing the declaration made by the President".

While feeling it necessary to make the above comments on the Japanese Government's version of events in Manchuria, the Chinese Government is happy to note that the Japanese Government are in their answer adopting the attitude laid down in the Council resolution of September 30th and repeated in the resolution proposed by all the other Members of the Council to Japan on October 22nd. If it really is the intention of the Japanese Government to make withdrawal dependent only upon securing the safety of the lives and property of its nationals in the areas evacuated by the Japanese troops agreement is in sight, for the Chinese Government has strongly emphasised its desire to give such guarantees in the fullest measure and for this purpose to accept without limit the help of the Council of the League of Nations in devising and carrying out local arrangements on the spot.

- 3 -

2) The Chinese Government is also glad to note the declaration of the Japanese Government that it is their settled aim to compose the differences between Japan and China by all pacific means, and that they have no intention whatever of proceeding to any steps that might hamper any efforts intended to assure the pacific settlement of the conflict. But the Chinese Government feels compelled to point out that Japanese troops are still occupying Chinese territory, and to quote the observations on this subject of M. Briand, the President of the Council, on the twenty-fourth of October last:

"The League, indeed, is the trustee of the obligations assumed by its Members, and it is obviously its duty to see that those obligations are honoured. Article X of the Covenant says nothing else: it states that all the members of the great family of nations agree to respect each other's territorial integrity and political independence. Again, Article II of the Pact of Paris says that 'The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement of solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be settled except by pacific means.....'

"I do not wish to dwell upon it, but I think public opinion would find it difficult to admit that military occupation could be assigned to the category of pacific means. I think that military occupation falls outside that class of measures, and therefore the prolongation of that occupation also involves the prolongation of that feeling of uneasiness which has already lasted too long."

The Chinese Government has already undertaken under the resolution proposed on October 22nd to take steps immediately to discuss with representatives of the Japanese Government the detailed arrangements for withdrawal of Japanese troops and taking over the evacuated areas by the Chinese authorities without danger to the lives and property of Japanese subjects. This, as was pointed out by M. Briand and other Members of the Council on October 23rd and 24th, is the only issue at present before the Council. Any attempt to make evacuation conditional upon the discussion of other issues would be contrary to the course laid down by the Council and constitute an attempt to extort concessions from China as to the future relations between the two countries under the pressure of military occupation. The Council has made it clear that it fully endorsed the attitude of the Chinese Government that such an attempt is a direct negation of the Covenant and the Peace Pact. The Chinese Government would draw attention once more to the declaration of its representative on the Council that "once this unhappy incident is settled and normal relations restored between China and Japan the Japanese Government will find us not only willing but anxious to discuss every issue between the two countries in the most friendly spirit".

This declaration represents the settled policy of the Chinese Government which is conscious that it is at all points in conformity with the Covenant, the Pact of Paris and the

- 4 -

recommendations of the Council in this conflict.


3) Finally, the Japanese Government contends that the boycott movement in China is contrary to Article II of the Pact of Paris. The Chinese Government is a little surprised at such an argument from such a source, for, surely, if the Pact of Paris could be held to condemn a refusal on the part of private persons in China to buy Japanese goods it must a fortiori condemn a government that keeps its armies in the territory of a fellow signatory of the Paris Pact, and thereby openly violates the letter and the spirit of Article II of that Pact. The remarks of M. Briand quoted in 2) above on this subject would seem to make it perfectly clear that the position of the Japanese Government in this matter is untenable.

The Chinese Government would add that anti-Japanese feeling in China is a direct, natural and inevitable result of the action of the Japanese army in Manchuria, and will die down rapidly as soon as the cause of hostility is removed. The Chinese Government is determined, on its part, not only scrupulously to observe all its obligations under international law and practice to protect the lives and property of Japanese subjects as of other foreigners throughout China, but to go further and do everything in its power to promote good relations with Japan. It is for this reason that the Chinese Government is anxious at the earliest possible moment to conclude a treaty with Japan providing for conciliation and arbitration of all disputes between the two countries.

Please accept, Sir, the assurance of my highest consideration.

(Signed) SAO-KU ALFRED SZE.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



note  
793.74

THE UNDER SECRETARY  
NOV 3 1931  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HORNBECK

Subject: Japanese Radio Traffic in China,  
Increase in Volume of.

1. Attached hereto is a memorandum concerning the increase of radio traffic between various stations in China and Tokyo since the beginning of the Manchurian affair on 19 September.

*W. Baggeley*  
W. Baggeley,  
Captain, U.S.N.  
Acting Director of Naval Intelligence.

F/DEW 793.94/2800

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
OSD letter, May 2, 1972  
BY pc NARS Date 3/19/73

793.94/2800

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
Office of Chief of Naval Operations  
Washington

Op-20-G

**Confidential**

29 October, 1931.

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS.

Subject: Japanese Radio Traffic in China,  
Increase in Volume of.

This office has received confidential information from a most reliable source to the effect that Japanese radio traffic to and between stations in China has undergone a marked increase beginning on 19 September 1931.

The present volume of traffic as compared to normal for various stations is conservatively estimated to be approximately as shown in the following table:

<u>Traffic between</u>	<u>Increase</u>
Tokyo - Peiping	3 times
Tokyo - Nanking	3 times
Tokyo - Mukden	10 times
Tokyo - Harbin	10 times
Peiping - Mukden	5 times
Peiping - Harbin	5 times
Nanking - Mukden	10 times
Nanking - Harbin	10 times
Mukden - Harbin	5 times

The total number of Japanese messages handled by the stations listed above in twelve days, beginning 19 September, was four times greater than the total number handled in the twelve days immediately preceding that date. The greater portion of the traffic appears to have been "urgent" or "very urgent", whereas traffic prior to that date was apparently mostly "routine."

It is interesting to note that the reported increase in traffic was coincident with, rather than preceding, the occupation of Manchuria.

W. Baggeley  
Acting.

1177

STATE

CHINA

November 9, 1931.

The American Consul General at Tientsin, Mr. Frank P. Lockhart, reported to the Department of State on November 9th to the following effect:

On the night of November 8th heavy machinegun and rifle fire was heard in the direction of the Japanese concession. The firing lasted from 11 o'clock until 2 a.m. There was a lull in the firing from 2 a.m. until 7 a.m., November 9th, when firing was apparently resumed and continued until 9 a.m. At 10 a.m. today the exact cause of the trouble was not known, but there appeared to be much confusion in and near the Japanese concession.

In the firing on the morning of November 9th the detonation of small field pieces was distinctly heard.

Strict martial law was being maintained in the Japanese concession and in the Chinese area at 10 a.m.

Conditions were reported quiet in the French and British concessions but much uneasiness seemed to prevail as to possible repercussions.

Consul General Lockhart reported as of 3 p.m., today, that most of the firing last night apparently was between Chinese police and plain clothes men just outside of the Japanese concession in which area the latter had organized their forces. Their objective apparently was the Bureau of Public Safety, the headquarters of the Provincial Government and the electric light plant in the ex-Belgian concession, and possibly the telephone office. Evidence was very conflicting as to whether there was any considerable firing inside the Japanese concession last night.

At 4 a.m., the Japanese authorities demanded of General Wang Hsu Chang that he remove by 6 a.m. the Chinese police to a distance of three hundred meters from the boundaries of the concession and General Wang agreed that he would do this but contended that the time was too short and requested thirty minutes grace beyond 6:00 a.m. Apparently by 7 a.m., or thereabouts the police had not been removed to the three hundred meter limit whereupon firing took place between the Japanese and the Chinese police.

It has not been definitely established as to who fired first. Apparently the Japanese have not proceeded beyond the boundaries of their concession and it is evident also that no Chinese troops have been in action. Up to this point on the Chinese side only police have been employed. Casualties were not known at 3 p.m. but the Japanese claimed one petty officer and one soldier killed and the Chinese claimed a number had been wounded. The Chinese claim that there were 1,100 plain clothes men involved.

Consul General Lockhart added that the tension had by no means relaxed.

American citizens and property at Tientsin

The latest figures of the Department of State, show there are at Tientsin, approximately:

Civilians - men, women and children	476
Military - wives and children of members of the 15th Infantry	122
Total	598
Military - officers and men of the 15th Infantry (as of Aug. 15)	455

The value of American property at Tientsin is approximately \$9,500,000, of which \$9,000,000 is business property, and \$500,000 missionary or philanthropic.

793.94/2301


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
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS



November 18, 1931.



Digest of  
Newspaper Items.

NEW YORK TIMES

Paris, November 17, by Lansing Warren.

The nine power treaty, guaranteeing the integrity of China, today became a major factor in the efforts of the League to find the solution in the Manchuria crisis. This Convention contains stipulations which must be observed in any settlement recommended by the Council. The introduction of this compact into the discussion was not received with enthusiasm by the Japanese. Members of the League Council held a private sitting today without the Chinese and Japanese members. It was decided to ask the Japanese delegate to give a definite statement as to precisely what treaties are referred to in the fifth of Japan's fundamental five points, demanding China's recognition of treaty obligations. Ambassador Yoshizawa agreed to transmit this to Tokyo. Doctor Sze is under pressure from Canton to shift China's appeal to Article 16 of the League Covenant.

Mukden,

793.94/2802

FILED  
NOV 21 1931

- 2 -

Mukden, November 17, by Hallett Abend.

Instead of complying with Tokyo's demand that his army withdraw to Tsitsihar by November 25, General Ma declares he will evacuate his present position provided the Japanese withdraw first. He also states that if Japan will guarantee that General Chang, Japan's Chinese ally, will not be permitted to use the Toanan-Anganchi Railway, General Ma will not hinder the railway's operation.

Movements of armed cars northward on the Peiping-Mukden Railway indicate the possibility that Marshal Chang may synchronize an attack on Mukden with an attack on the Nonni front by General Ma.

Tokyo, November 17.

Reports from the Japanese Consul at Harbin indicate that General Ma has accepted Japan's terms to evacuate the Nonni front.

Tokyo, November 17, by Hugh Byas.

The optimism reigning in Paris is not reflected in official circulars here. Little hope is placed in the League and dissatisfaction with Nanking is growing. It is believed

that if



1018  
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

that if China continues stubborn she will soon realize the disadvantages of an independent Mukden.

Washington, November 17.


Secretary Stimson personally denied today the report that he had informed the Japanese Ambassador that the United States would not participate in an economic boycott of Japan and would not withdraw its Ambassador in Tokyo, whatever the developments in the Manchuria situation.

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FE:EBT:AAR:SS

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE




SECRETARY OF STATE  
NOV 20 1931

November 19, 1931.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON  
AND THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR, MR. KATSUJI DEBUCHI.

Manchuria.



F/DEW

793.94/2803

The Ambassador said that he had come in to tell me that the Japanese forces at the Nonni River had been ordered to stand still, but having been attacked by the Chinese they had attacked in return and had driven the Chinese northward, and later that he had had a message from Mukden stating that the Japanese had occupied Tsitsihar. The Ambassador said that it was a dark day for him. I told him that I thought it was proper now to give him the whole picture in which this matter presented itself to my mind, and that it was as follows: That on September 18th the regular organized Chinese Government in Manchuria consisted of the government of the young Marshal Chang Hsueh-Liang; that this government had been recognized by the Central Chinese Government at Nanking and was the only regular government of Manchuria; that on that day and thereafter the Japanese army had attacked and destroyed the forces of Marshal Chang wherever they could find them and the only time they stopped attacking was when there were no Chinese forces

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 2 -

forces to attack; that in this last instance, when a new force had cropped up in the extreme northern part of Manchuria, many hundreds of miles from the Japanese railway zone, the Japanese had attacked and taken Tsitsihar; and that I could not but regard this as a violation by the Japanese army of the provisions of the Kellogg Pact and of the Nine-Power Treaty.

I told the Ambassador that under these circumstances I must ask him to tell Baron Shidehara that I must reserve full liberty to publish all of the papers and documents which have passed between our two governments on this subject; that I did not intend to publish them at once necessarily, but that I must retain full liberty to do so. I told Debuchi that as he knew, for two months I had been preserving these papers in confidence in the hope of a settlement, so that it might not embarrass the Japanese Government or the chance of such a settlement. I told him that I had gone so far in this hope as to urge our press not to publish anything which would inflame American sentiment against Japan, but that now in the interests of the position of my own government I must reserve full liberty of action to make public the whole matter. He said he appreciated fully my position

118  
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 3 -

position and they had no complaint to make of it.

I told him further that there had been very unfortunate rumors coming from various sources in regard to my having assured Debuchi that the American Government would not support the League in its issue against Japan. I told Debuchi that I did not attribute these rumors to him, but that they were very false and very embarrassing, and I reminded him of how I had made it very clear that on the central point of the controversy between the League and Japan we fully sympathized with the League. I told him further that I had received word from Paris that yesterday Mr. Yoshizawa, in his speech before the League, had gone back to the most extreme contentions of Japan in regard to insisting upon ratification by China of these treaties before there was any evacuation by the Japanese troops; that Yoshizawa had even gone so far as to say that it would not be sufficient even to ratify the old treaties, but there must be a new treaty ratifying them. I pointed out that this was a complete repudiation by Yoshizawa of Baron Shidehara's position taken in his last memorandum to me, in answer to my memorandum of November 5th. Debuchi said he was very much surprised at this and that he thought there must

be

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 4 -

be some misunderstanding. He asked me where I got the information. I told him that it had come direct from Paris through General Dawes and I was sure there was no misunderstanding because Yoshizawa had been cross-examined very carefully by Mr. Briand about his meaning. Debuchi was very much troubled. In closing, however, he said that he wanted me to know that whatever happened in the future, he knew that from the beginning my position had been perfectly fair and even friendly towards his government and that that was appreciated by Baron Shidehara; that Baron Shidehara's views had reflected themselves of late in the Japanese press, so that no matter what happened the record between him, Debuchi and me was clear. I told him that that was so and I had no complaints or criticisms as to the way he had conducted business with me, and in all respects he had been fair and friendly and accurate with me.

HLS.

8 HLS:RHR

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

RADIOGRAM

BFS

November 17, 1931.

2:00 P.M.

From Manila

To The Adjutant General.

Manila Number 5227. November 17th.

x x x x

AG 380.3 (11-17-31)


Paragraph 2. Following from Commanding Officer, U.S.A.  
 Troops in China, November 14th repeated.

"Disorders to date have been limited to Chinese police efforts to suppress Chinese plain clothes men and occasional return fire by Japanese troops when Japanese concession is endangered by Chinese firing. All foreign military contingents are occupying their defense lines with object of preventing plain clothes men from entering their respective concessions. The situation is improving and no serious developments indicated."

x x x x

Hines

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

RADIOGRAM

BFS

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file

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
NOV 19 1931  
Department of State

November 19, 1931.

9:30 A.M.

793-94  
From Peiping,

To The Adjutant General.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
1 1931  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

CONFIDENTIAL

Number 304. November 19th.

Headquarters Chang Hsueh-liang received information by direct radio from Tsitsihar nine o'clock A.M. November 19th that general attack was launched at four o'clock A.M. November 18th by Japanese on whole line with infantry, heavy artillery and airplanes. Attack continued until three o'clock A.M. November 19th. Result Chinese troops forced back to third defensive position along Cer.

Margetts.

F/DEW

793.94/2805

NOV 21 1931

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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



FROM

Peiping via N.A.

Dated November 21, 1931

Secretary of State  
Washington



F/LS

975, November 21.

Reuter report from Paris twentieth.

"General Dawes <sup>made</sup> ~~was~~ statement to the effect that as United States was not member of League his presence at meeting of Council would not only be inappropriate but might even embarrass the Council. He added that while United States was sympathetic towards efforts which League was making in cause of peace the United States must preserve full freedom of judgment regarding its own course."

For the Minister

ENGERT

WSB

793.94/2806

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NOV 30 1931

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

HS

TELEGRAM RECEIVED GREEN

Tokio

Dated November 21, 1931

Rec'd 9:11

793.94  
Secretary of State  
Washington

FROM

COPIES SENT  
D. H. AND

Division of  
EASTERN AFFAIRS  
NOV 21 1931  
THE UNDER SECRETARY  
NOV 21 1931  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

230, November 21, Noon.

In his address of welcome to the Military Attaches who were invited to go to Manchuria, the Chief of the Japanese General Staff said that he hoped "you will make a close study of historical relations between Japan and Manchuria, that you will see what are Japan's rights and interests and how Japanese residents, including Koreans, are living there and that you will study what attitude the Chinese authorities have assumed toward our residents there in the past. Once you are thoroughly acquainted with the above points we trust that you will see how eager the Japanese people in official and private circles are in dealing with questions relating to Manchuria and Mongolia, and that a contention advanced by the Nanking Government to force Japan to withdraw her troops before the opening of direct parley between Japan and China is out of the question until the peace and order in various districts of Manchuria are restored to normal and the lives and property of our residents are fully guaranteed".

A member of my staff had occasion yesterday to see the

F/LS

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893.01

HS

2-#230, from Tokio, November 21, 1931  
9:30 a.m.

the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs. He referred to the danger that the Manchurian affair might cause the downfall of Chang Kai Shek's Government at Nanking. The Vice Minister stated that he could not say what might happen but that it was quite possible, of course. In reply to a question as to what might be expected to follow, the Vice Minister said that perhaps the Cantonese might get into office, though he said that there was nobody who seemed to have much prestige or power to take Chang Kai Shek's place. In reply to a further question, he said that a situation might arise where there would be no government in China, but while he could not speak for the Japanese Government, he did not see how it would be much different from previous situations where the Powers were in doubt as to whom credentials should be presented by ministers accredited to China.

So far as Manchuria is concerned, the Vice Minister said that some sort of government through the growth of the local defense committees (\*). A general supervisor or Governor could then be named who would hold office by appointment from the Central Chinese Government or be recognized by it.

Repeated to Nanking.

GV

FORBES

WSB

(\*) Apparent Omission.

file  
**CONFIDENTIAL**

TRANSATLANTIC TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON  
AND GENERAL DAWES, PARIS, NOVEMBER 21, 1931. 11:30.

SECRETARY: Hello is that you General. I have had no mes-  
sages from you except a very brief one telling me that Sze

had informed you that he was going to prepare a statement.

DAWES: That is all I sent because there has been no change.

SECRETARY: I would like very much to know what happened  
yesterday.

DAWES: Nothing happened yesterday.

SECRETARY: The papers reported that both Japan and China  
had agreed in principle.

DAWES: That is the newspaper's idea. They are way ahead  
of the situation. The situation has not changed to the ex-  
tent that they indicated at all. They had no reason to be-  
lieve that they knew anything at all about China's attitude.  
Some of these big fellows have been talking encouragingly  
about the situation when they do not know anything about  
China's attitude and Sze came in this morning to see what  
we proposed to say and I suggested the whole thing was  
broken up. When I am talking to them I am saying nothing.

SECRETARY: That is right.

DAWES: But in the proposition that Sze was going to make,  
it all comes back to wanting to invoke Articles 10, 12, 15  
and 16 and also to calling on the League to bring in the  
United States.

SECRETARY: What you are saying now is what China wants to  
do. This is what China wants.

DAWES: Yes that is what China wants to do this morning.  
She isn't going to do that. Sze was going to be very  
reasonable and play on with this Japanese proposition and  
make a suggestion for a non-partisan neutral commission

793.94/2807 1/2

Confidential File

-2-

like Japan coupled with troop withdrawal and it isn't going to be unconditional troop withdrawal by saying that Japan should be protected. In other words, it was something if he hadn't heard from his Government, would have put us a long way toward settlement. But he just sent word to me, not over half an hour ago, which he had sent to China had not been approved and they wired back that it was not strong enough in what he said about troop evacuation and they wanted to put in..... It doesn't break the situation at all. It is just exactly where it was when Japan made this proposal and the reason why I haven't cabled you was because I wanted to keep you exactly informed of the situation. The papers were wrong in talking about the members of a commission and all that sort of thing.

SECRETARY: I want to tell you about something else.

DAWES: They were talking from incomplete information.

SECRETARY: I want to talk a minute.

DAWES: I just want to tell you one thing more. I want to ask you a question. Matsudaira came in here about an hour or two ago and he showed me what purported to be a telegram that Tokyo had sent to you about your representations to Japan. He said that you had told the Japanese Government that you were anxious to see this thing peacefully settled but that public sentiment in the United States demanded that something ought to be done by them to indicate a willingness on their part to stand by these propositions they promised to make and that otherwise it might be necessary for you to make a statement, in which you ask them what they could do and this telegram, he said, was to the effect that they would try within the next day

or

-3-

or so to have a proposition to remove the troops at Tsitsihar and to carry that out it was....and that he very much hoped that could be done. If that is so, it would have a great effect if it could be made known to Sze - if you could make it known in some way that in holding them off.....because Japan wants to pacify public sentiment in their country. It would be very much easier if they should know that Japan would like to do that. I don't feel authorized to do it without instructions from you. If I could tell him that I had gotten that from Matsudaira. I don't want to create the impression that we are working with one more than the other. What was in my mind and what I have been thinking of was to read what I am telling you and ask if I could use it at my discretion here.

SECRETARY: I tell you this. Of course, the form of the report which Matsudaira gave you is rather exaggerated and it is hardly recognizable. Two days ago, however, when the Japanese had taken Tsitsihar, you know that city in the north, I called in the Japanese Ambassador and I told him that the situation looked to me as if in substance that the Japanese Army had run amuck and had seized all of these places and was holding them and that it was a violation of these treaties and that I looked at it as a very grave situation and I told him that I must now reserve all my rights to make public everything that had taken place between the American Government and the Japanese Government. Do you see? I have been holding in confidence the terms of my memorandum of November 5 and their reply of November 9, which you have, and I have been holding back our press. I told the Ambassador today, that it looked to me as though things

-4-

things had come to the breaking point and I couldn't promise to do it any more; that I had to look after my own public opinion. That evidently scared them and this reply this morning has come from that. The Japanese Ambassador has been in with what I suppose is the same message that Matsudaira has given you. It is not in writing but it is a verbal assurance that they are doing their utmost to conform to all of our suggestions. They are firmly determined to withdraw from the Tsitsihar region and they already have withdrawn two battalions of infantry and one company of artillery and they tell me that they are sending over the Assistant Chief of Staff to keep a hand on the coat tails of General Honjo.

DAWES: That man is probably the one that Matsudaira refers to as the Deputy Chief of Staff.

SECRETARY: Yes, they have sent him over there to put a check on General Honjo and that he (Shidehara) assured me that the policy which he outlined in his memorandum of November 9 remained the policy of the Japanese Government and that I could rely upon it no matter what Yoshizawa said in Paris. I had pointed out to them the same day that Yoshizawa's statement was entirely contradictory to Shidehara's note. Do you see? So much for that. The most important thing was that he then went on to tell me that Japan was making a proposition for a neutral commission to go to China, including Manchuria, and to investigate all matters which are in controversy between Japan and China. I examined him very closely on that and he told me that it covered everything, - all of these old questions of treaties or anything they wanted to go into.

It

-5-

It is quite comprehensive and general and it intends to cover the whole situation - the Japanese and Chinese situation.

DAWES: Does it include, if it comes before the League, an investigation into the grievances which China has against Japan as well as those which Japan has against China?

SECRETARY: Yes, it is so drawn as to cover that. I think that is quite plain. They assured me that in that respect it differs very radically from the proposition which you telegraphed me - the one as coming from Matsudaira.

DAWES: That is right, it does differ.

SECRETARY: It must differ because the other was entirely unsatisfactory. I asked him specially whether the Army had consented to this new proposal and he told me that the Army had been consulted and had consented to it. He said that.

DAWES: Do you mean Shidehara said that.

SECRETARY: No Debuchi said that as coming from Shidehara.

DAWES: Here is something for you to decide right now.

If the Chinese could know that in some way it would be a big help. If you would allow Sze to know that.

SECRETARY: I haven't any right to say that. They told me for my satisfaction and the only way you could do that would be for you to get Matsudaira to tell the others that.

DAWES: That is a sensible suggestion.

SECRETARY: Let me finish. He told me that the Japanese Government was taking steps to prepare public opinion for this step of a neutral investigation. I will say - this

is

-6-

is my own opinion that I say now - it is a very long step forward by Japan beyond anything that I have ever known Japan to do before. Hitherto it has been contrary to Oriental opinion to have any neutral or impartial investigation into their affairs when they are in controversy. They always exclude the idea of a judicial or neutral investigation and Japan has consistently taken that position, particularly in regard to Manchuria. Do you see? I told Debuchi that if this was really done - if they had really made this proposition, in my opinion it would represent a very long step forward by Japan towards accommodating itself to western opinion, the opinion of the western world. Do you get that. Then comes this further fact. Debuchi went on to say that the League had proposed an armistice but that Japan had refused because it would admit the existence of a state of war. I told him that in my opinion that was a great mistake because it would destroy the value in a large part of the investigation unless it was accompanied by a cessation of hostilities and I told him that the agreement to suspend hostilities could be easily drawn so as to avoid any admission of a state of war. He listened very attentively and went away to telegraph my opinion to Shidehara on both those points, namely, that I thought that the proposition for a general investigation I would look on very favorably but that it certainly must be accompanied, in order to make it of any value, with an agreement to suspend hostilities. DAWES: That is exactly the idea that you cabled in the note. That is the opinion over on the Continent - that it would not be any good at all unless you could get an agreement for a cessation of hostilities and Briand, when I was  
over



-7-

over there the other day and was talking about that, didn't call it an armistice exactly but a cessation of hostilities. Here is what I have in mind. Sze is being assisted here by Robert E. Olds, who used to be Under Secretary of State. I haven't known him but do you refer to him as a reliable man in every way.

SECRETARY: Yes, I have known him for many years and have regarded him as thoroughly reliable.

DAWES: I do too and he is very helpful in this thing. He is very helpful and I would trust him to be very discreet and he was the one that brought me the news of this despatch that Sze had gotten. I have just seen Sze and he read me what he proposes to do and China certainly has gone a long ways. Olds came over just about three quarters of an hour ago to tell me that when Sze put his proposition up to his Government, they said to make it stronger and to put in a time limit. I had gotten Sze to take out the time limit - the words about unconditional withdrawal - so it left the whole thing just where it was. Now if I could tell Olds and I was thinking of telling it so we could be safe against the impression of taking .....from Japan or China would indicate that we were closer to Japan than China. I did not know how to do it. I have been thinking about this since we have been talking. I had thought about telling Matsudaira to tell him. Sze and Matsudaira are good friends. I don't know whether Sze's proposition.....saying that makes certain that they are not going to do it - sort of an atmosphere. If you will let me tell Olds about the information you got - I can tell him personally and not officially and that he must not convey it to Sze in a way that comes from us and not to tell Sze at all until a day

or

-8-

or so has passed so Japan's withdrawal can come without telling him.

SECRETARY: You can avoid one part of that by having the information on which my opinion is based coming from the League because practically everything that I have heard from Shidehara is in line with what has taken place in the League.

DAWES: If that is so that is all right. I can tell Olds.

SECRETARY: If you can put it that way.

DAWES: The Japanese are going to try to remove the troops at Tsitsihar in a few days if possible and that will enable him to hold off Sze until they have that news.

SECRETARY: Yes that part.

DAWES: I would not make any other statement until I see what I can do.

SECRETARY: So far as the news about Tsitsihar is concerned, I think you can tell him that I had received that message of assurance - as I have just given it to you. Yes I think you ought to give them that message. The alternative is a break down.

DAWES: They should act quickly and the League has been very much worried. But as a matter of fact the papers do not know the whole thing and there is no foundation for it at all. I was very much surprised when I picked up the paper this morning, to find them talking about commissions.

SECRETARY: So far as the message about the Japanese Government informing me that it was firmly determined to withdraw from the Tsitsihar region as rapidly as possible, I see no harm in that message being conveyed if it will do any good.

DAWES: That is all I want.

-9-

SECRETARY: The thing I do not want you to quote me as saying is what I am saying to you about the merits of the general agreement of Japan to submit everything to a neutral commission.

DAWES: I won't say that. I am very careful about expressing any opinion from you unless I get a wire over here.

SECRETARY: I can tell you for your information so you can tell any one if it becomes advisable to use it, that the President and I both think that such an investigation by a neutral observer accompanied by an agreement for a cessation of hostilities would be a wonderful thing to have happen - a very good thing, and either of these countries, in view of present public opinion, would be a fool to refuse it.

DAWES: Yes, all right.

SECRETARY: Did you get my telegram last night about the attitude we would take toward an American on the commission?

DAWES: Yes, I did. Of course, I have not said anything about that. No, I won't do anything.

SECRETARY: Of course, we would have to know.....in which the function of the commission was exercised whether it was a voluntary commission which Japan and China agreed to and also what the scope of its powers were.

DAWES: In Sweetser's report -

SECRETARY: I do not have Sweetser's report.

DAWES: I am wiring you what took place after I had conferred with Briand and you can see from Briand's statement that he does not know how much cooperation that the League could expect.

-10-

SECRETARY: I should use Matsudaira, if I were you, as far as possible to communicate with Sze or Olds either one. Or he could tell Drummond and let Drummond tell Sze but I see no harm as far as the Tsitsihar information is concerned. I don't see any harm in telling that.

DAWES: That is all that is necessary. We do not need anything more.

SECRETARY: I can not guarantee that the promise will be kept but the promise has been made.

DAWES: That will keep Sze from trying to press the thing under pressure from the Chinese Government. They are protecting him in trying to work this thing out.

SECRETARY: You can use the information that they have represented to me that they are firmly determined to withdraw from Tsitsihar and that already two battalions of infantry and one company of artillery have gone over the railroad.

DAWES: That is all we need. That is what Sze.....that is all that would be of help.

SECRETARY: I do not guarantee the accuracy of the information.

DAWES: All right. Mr. Secretary, as long as you do not hear anything from me, there is no change in the status quo. There is no change - it rests on talk of the newspaper fellows. They say whatever they please.

SECRETARY: My advise to you is to let Matsudaira understand very fully our opinion so far as that general investigation is concerned. I sent you a very strong message that the previous proposition of Matsudaira was highly unsatisfactory. I see no harm in your telling him that we regard this as an entirely different solution if they

-11-

they are willing to investigate the whole matter through a satisfactory neutral commission but that to make it at all valuable, it must be accompanied by a cessation of hostilities.

DAWES: Suppose it goes ahead - suppose they decide on a commission. I think if the committee is appointed that will make it possible for the United States if it goes on..... That is what is in my mind. We do not want to fall in this thing. ....make it a concession that we come over there and sit with them. Isn't it perfectly possible to get a committee that would not be a league committee - a neutral, non-partisan committee which had full powers in itself to be independent of the League.

SECRETARY: That might make it a little.....but I would not turn it down for that reason alone.

DAWES: I understand Mr. Secretary, but I think they want to do everything they can to make good their position that way because I have been told that they do not think we are easy marks in the League by any means.

SECRETARY: On the other hand General, I am not at all adverse to having the League get all the prestige it can out of this thing.

DAWES: I know you wanted them to have it.

SECRETARY: I want them to have it. I am very anxious to have them get success out of this thing.

DAWES: That is right and I am assuming that. Another thing.....came over to see me and I told them that I thought the League had done right and that as a result of the methods they had followed, they had gotten the thing pretty well where it could be adjusted. Remember that is what you said. Even if the League fails, it has

had

-12-

had a great opportunity in the opinion of the world to do a great service. In our case we should make a clear statement of just what the issue was and it should be prepared in the proper way. Don't you remember you said that. I told.....that I didn't want that as coming from me but he is going to say it. I have to be careful.

SECRETARY: I think you have done very well; I have no criticisms, nothing but praise. The main thing is if we can settle this think peacefully, I think it will be a great thing and if we can suspend hostilities and get an impartial investigation, it lays the foundation for the future of broadening Japan's attitude towards western methods of investigation which I had been very disparing of before. It brings Japan much more into alignment with the methods of our peace treaties.

DAWES: When you do not hear from me, you know that there is no change in the status quo.

SECRETARY: When is the next meeting of the League. There are no more meetings of the League today?

DAWES: Yes, they are meeting now. I do not know what the outcome of it is and the Japanese have put in their proposition which they showed me but Sze is not putting his in because his government told him it was not strong enough - his present statement.

SECRETARY: I think that the vital thing now is to get word in some way to the Chinese not to make a fool of themselves. I leave that to your judgment.

DAWES: Sze is a good fellow and he has a very level head.

SECRETARY: You can say it any way you see fit but try not to bring us into it too far. It is the opinion of this section of the world that China had better not make a fool of herself.

120

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-13-

DAWES: That is right. I don't think she is going to.

She won't if he can help it.

SECRETARY: If anything dramatic happens - anything very important - at this meeting, you had better send it to me by telephone within the next four hours because I am thinking of going over to Baltimore for the night - just for the night. I shall not leave here until five and shall come back tomorrow morning. I will leave my telephone address so you can reach me.

DAWES: I don't think it will be necessary to telephone you because what is going to result is just what we have been going over.

SECRETARY: All right. Goodbye.

S VGN BMS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.



PARIS

Dated November 21, 1931

Rec'd 11:20 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

774, November 21, 4 p.m.

FROM GENERAL DAWES

Sze informs me confidentially that he will propose at this afternoon's meeting of the Council a non-partisan and neutral commission. He has endeavored to frame his proposition so as not to cause any immediate break.

With reference to Sweetser's report of yesterday's meeting (see my 773, November 21, 3 p.m.) I have made no commitments regarding American membership on any commission to be appointed saying that America would make a decision as to this when the occasion required.

SHAW

F/DEW 793.94/2803

NOV 30 1931

FILED



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM

GRAY

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Receiving via N. R.

Dated November 21, 1931

Rec'd 6:40 a.m.

FROM

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

NOV 21 1931

Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

976, November 21, 10 a.m.

Following two from Harbin:

One. "November 20, 11 a.m.

One. Japanese troops now in control of Tsitsihar City and Ma was last reported by Chinese officials as being at Taianchen on the Tsike Railway about 27 miles from Koshan, where he hopes to collect some of his scattered forces and await action of the League of Nations and the Nanking Government. He is cut off from the outside world except through Taheiho and Blagoveshensk and cannot receive support unless from or through Soviet sources. It would appear that he must leave Manchuria or come to terms with the Japanese.

Two. Confidential. Chang Ching Hui who is Civil Administrator of the Chinese Eastern Railway special area, who is pro-Japanese and who tried to persuade Ma to give in to the Japanese demands, has been ~~secretly~~ urged by the Japanese Government officials and allegedly publicly requested by (End Part One)

HFD

WSB

(\*) ~~apparent omission~~

ENGERT

F/DEW  
793.94/2809

FILED

NOV 30 1931

1205

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

### TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 21, 1931

Rec'd 6:40 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

976, November 21, 10 a.m. (PART TWO)

the "people" of Tsitsihar to take over the duties of Provincial Governor there in addition to his duties as Civil Administrator here. I have reason to believe that he will depart for Tsitsihar in the near future, although local responsible Chinese leaders have asked him to remain here.

Three. I believe that at Harbin there will be a peaceful turning over of provincial and town positions from anti-Japanese to pro-Japanese -Chinese officers, who would recognize Chia's government at Kirin and that the local authorities can maintain peace and order so that there will be no opposition real or pretended ~~for Japanese~~ <sup>to come here</sup> following ~~(?)~~ troops ~~(?)~~. There may be some changes in the Chinese personnel of the Chinese Eastern Railway.

Four. The Japanese military now control either directly or indirectly through pro-Japanese Chinese officials the whole of Manchuria. The Province of Charhar is of insignificant importance politically and economically.

1206

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM

2-976, from Peiping, Nov. 21, 10 a.m.

economically.

Five. If this taking over the control of Manchuria is not a move aimed at Soviet Russia, with whom some responsible Japanese believe Japan must eventually go to war, then the Japanese authorities might perhaps consider a proposal to place all the railways in Manchuria under the control of a single company in which international capital, including Japanese and Chinese, could be invested. This would be a solution aimed at the elimination of useless non-profitable branches and competing lines, and at the development of a communications system on a sound economic basis. I believe that, although the Japanese now flushed with victory might not wish at present to relinquish their control over the railways, except the Chinese Eastern Railway, of Manchuria, the Chinese would welcome such international participation and the Soviet Government does not appear to be as strongly interested in the Chinese Eastern Railway as formerly."

Two. "November 20, 4 p.m.

Local Chinese Communication's Administration has informed this office that there are 2000 Japanese troops at present in the City of Tsitsihar, that the radio station there is out of commission, but that the telegraph, telephone still work. The local Japanese Consulate General informed me, however, that only a small party of Japanese troops entered Tsitsihar City last evening at 6 p.m., that

Radio  
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM

3-#976, from Peiping, Nov. 21, 10 a.m.

that main body is several miles from the city and that  
Shimidzu, Japanese Consul, left Harbin for his post in  
Tsitsihar today at 3 p.m."

(END PART TWO. END MESSAGE)


For the Minister

ENGERT

WSB

HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75



# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

FROM

Riga

Dated November 21, 1931

Rec'd 11:25 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

52, November 21, 4 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Voluntary comments on the Manchurian situation made privately to members of the staff of this Legation by the Rumanian and Polish charges and the French Military Attache here reveal a recrudescence of old and vague hopes of possible intervention in Russia based on what the foreign diplomats mentioned regard as an inevitable Japanese-Russian armed conflict leading to the defeat of the latter. Their anticipation is that the resulting weakness of Russia could be utilized forcibly to end the Communist regime. These views are shared only in certain very limited Latvian circles.

WSB

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
F/DEW

793.94/2810

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NOV 27 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

Riga

Dated November 21, 1931

Rec'd 11:25 a.m.

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Secretary of State  
Washington


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COLE



F/DEW

793.94/2810

FILED

NOV-27 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PC

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased before being communicated  
to anyone.

PARIS

Dated November 22, 1931

Rec'd. 3:00 P.M.

Secretary of State

Washington

778. November 22, 4 p.m.

FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES.

NOV 24 1931

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Sze outlines condition of public sentiment in  
China which may soon eventuate in positive instructions  
from his government to prepare a further statement of  
position before the League which will break up present  
negotiations. Sze in order to prevent too precipitate  
action of this kind may be compelled to make some  
public statement emphasizing that China is not going  
along with League program until satisfied with evac-  
uation conditions. Sze feels that the League's pro-  
gram, which involves a present discussion of details of  
the commission without concurrently providing for evac-  
uation, creates unjustified public anticipation of a  
satisfactory settlement. This, he thinks, compels him  
to make such a statement here as will indicate clearly  
to his government that he has not changed his position  
in any regard.

F/DEW

793.94/2811

-2- #778, Nov. 22, 4 p.m. from PARIS

in any regard.

He thinks this action on his part is necessary to enable him to hold off an immediate persona non grata with the League thus giving Japan an opportunity to commence the voluntary withdrawal of troops of which Debuchi informed you. It should be understood that China in the general interest is for the moment refraining from invoking all its rights and remedies under the Covenant, especially Article X but she is beginning to feel that present actions of the League may drive her into a corner and force her to act. Sze is unable at this juncture even to discuss with League matter of commission.

SHAW

WSB



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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPA NT

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAM  
MUNICA 10

A portion of this telegram  
must be closely paraphrased  
before being communicated to  
anyone.

PARIS

Dated November 21, 1931

Secretary of State  
Washington

773, November 21, 3 p.m.


FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES

Sweetser reports as follows concerning yesterday's  
private session of the 12 members of the Council exclud-  
ing the parties:

(GREEN) "Briand gave a report of the discussion  
he had had at the request of the other members with  
Yoshizawa, Sze and General Dawes.

The latter he said had expressed the desire of the  
United States to continue its collaboration and support  
of the League but its belief that it should not change  
the present basis thereof. If, however, at any time it  
could make any gesture which would help in the present  
difficult position it would be glad to consider it. In  
the special case of the commission the American attitude  
seemed to be entirely favorable.

Mr. Yoshizawa, as the other members knew, had sub-  
mitted the detailed explanation the Council had requested  
as to the relation of evacuation to security while Dr. Sze  
had



F/DEW

793.94/2812

DEC 1 1931

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NAM

2- #773, from Paris, November 21,  
 1931

had taken a stiff line as to any discussion before evacuation, or any price to be paid for evacuation. He was optimistic, however, that the parties could be brought to the acceptance of the commission idea which represented to him a decidedly constructive step.

Cecil drew attention to the Japanese statement as to a cessation of hostilities pending the report of the Commission. This unfortunately had been promised ever since September 18 but had not eventuated. It was impossible to say finally who was responsible; the fact that the breaches of the peace took place on Chinese soil however left the inference that it was the Japanese. Should the Council not then have some measure of control? Should not some regular system of information on such points be a part of the settlement? Unless some such precaution were taken it would be impossible either to prevent further breaches or to know who was responsible. Another point also he would like to mention. Mr. Yoshizawa stated that the original conditions of evacuation are still valid but since their promulgation the Council had received very great amplifications bringing in in fact all the various treaties. The Chinese, however, hotly declined to accept such conditions which would mean the occupation would become permanent. He had searched  
 the

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MAM

3- #773, from Paris, November 21,  
1931

the record and could find no such conditions suggested  
before September 30 which in effect meant that entirely  
new terms have been brought forward. In the circumstances  
he felt it essential to have a public meeting tomorrow;  
it can not be postponed any longer.

(END SECTION ONE)

SHAW

WSB

1 215

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED



GREEN

PARIS

FROM

Dated November 21, 1931

Rec'd 3:38 p.m.

Secretary of State  
Washington

773, November 21, 3 p.m. (Section Two)

Briand agreed to this last suggestion fixing the afternoon as allowing the parties more time to receive instructions. He also agreed that some kind of control was highly desirable also a more solemn engagement on both sides against aggravating the situation. He would then call a public meeting at four when Yoshizawa could make his statement including the proposal for a commission. Sze could reply and the Council then name a rapporteur to bring the material together in the form of a resolution which should also include control.

Cecil again stressed that the matter of evacuation still disturbed him. The new Japanese statements first four paragraphs called for very far-reaching agreements which would require long discussion. The last paragraph however foresaw the possibility of some earlier evacuation which might mean that the Japanese were prepared to evacuate if the Chinese showed a real intention of carrying out the conditions even if an agreement were not finally drafted. Perhaps it would be worth trying to get a precision

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MAN

2- #773, from Paris, November 21,  
1931

a precision on this point.

Scialoja strongly supported the commission idea. This would allow time and the possibility of the parties coming to an agreement. Belligerent sentiments would have chance to cool.

Madariaga replacing Leroux while agreeing to the commission was preoccupied with the fact that this was a conflict between a weak and a strong power and that the public might think the Council's action was a surrender to force. He was sure no member of the Council had ever thought in September when security was first mentioned that it went so far as the Japanese now said. The Council owed it to itself to state that when it spoke of security it meant security in the immediate sense; it must stop somewhere; otherwise it would be astronomic. If the resolution to be adopted spoke of an armistice on the present basis it must also stress the need of immediate evacuation. If there is to be a commission it will take time to form it; could the Council not make an immediate start on it from out of the local elements on the spot? The commission might be a starting point around which to build a system but it must be able to be buttressed in many ways. As regards the United States that Government seemed rather strong

121

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MEM

3- #773, from Paris, November 21,  
1931

strong as regards article 11 of the Kellogg Pact; as Mr.  
Briand had said she is willing to go along a good way  
with the League, there is some reason to fear that the  
League is behind public sentiment in the United States.

SHAW

WSB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED



FROM

GREEN

PARIS

Dated November 21, 1931

Rec'd 4:53 p.m.

Secretary of State  
Washington

773, November 21, 3 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

Briand took up this point to say that the members of the Council should not have too great expectations regarding the United States. That Government was not ready to go beyond the Pact of Paris. It contemplated no sanctions. If the Council went too far it might disassociate itself from the United States. The Council therefore must go slowly. Already it had done a great deal; it was only necessary to think what would have been the case if it had not been there. He had the feeling that there were many in Japan who were keenly anxious to resume normal relations with China; the Commission might form a rallying point. The Japanese did not want it to interfere with direct negotiations or the movement of troops; still its field was so vast it must be limited in order not to become atmospheric. Also the Council could recall the various promises made, especially that evacuation was to continue; the Commission could not work at all if the situation continues as at present. By it however  
he

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

1AM

2- #775, section three, from Paris,  
November 21, 1931

he hoped the Council could save the world's one single moral agency against war; the League was indeed the barrage behind which public opinion could rally in such crisis.

The Secretary General here interrupted to restate a little more clearly what he understood to be Ambassador Dawes' view. He had thought he did not say that the United States was ready to impose sanctions nor yet on the other hand did he say that it was not ready to impose them. Indeed it was for this reason that General Dawes was all the more anxious that the commission to be appointed should be under Article 11 rather than Article 15. Briand added that American membership in the commission would be of considerable importance and seemed to be assured.

Cecil then drew attention to the desirability of giving the commission power to make interim reports if necessary. The final report would obviously require a good deal of time; some constructive suggestions might be possible at an early date. He again stressed the complete change in the Japanese attitude since September 30. It was very clear then that it was only a matter of protecting Japanese lives and property; there was no suggestion of treaty rights. He was also exercised to know what should be the proper international attitude toward acts short of war. These he felt might fall into three categories



122

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

HAM

3- #773, section three, from Paris,  
November 21, 1931

categories; simple protection of lives as in the case of riot; more serious punitive action; or finally military coercion to attain a political end. The last named seemed to be the case here. It was distinguishable from war only in degree. The Council must guard itself against conniving with such action which is inconsistent with the Covenant, the Kellogg Pact and the Nine Power Treaty. Finally he would like to deny that the use of Article 15 would be an approach to Article 16; it is only a resort to war which would make the latter operative.

Von Bulow approving the commission thought the terms of reference should be large enough to keep the commission in the field for a long time and thus help induce a solution. It might indeed be a point of departure for the solution; it could have much influence on the spot. If the commission reported that order prevailed in Manchuria, for instance, Japan could hardly insist on maintaining her troops there.

The next meeting was fixed for today, Saturday, at four, in public".

(END MESSAGE)

SHAW

HFD

1221

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

Secretary of State  
Washington

776, November 21, 12 p.m.  
FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES

At this afternoon's public meeting of the Council Yoshizawa proposed that the League send a commission to make an inquiry in Manchuria and China. He stated that the nomination and ~~telegram~~ <sup>sending</sup> of this commission would in no way modify the desire of the Japanese Government to withdraw its troops as soon as possible to within the railway zone in accordance with the resolution of September 30th. He added that already, in so far as such action was warranted by the restoration of order, Japan has withdrawn a considerable number of troops and will proceed with that withdrawal under the conditions contemplated when the necessary security has been afforded.

Size declared that no disposition which fails to provide for the immediate cessation of all military operations and the withdrawal of the Japanese forces immediately set in motion and progressively executed for a period of time of the shortest possible duration can pretend to be a solution



F/DEW 793.94/2813

FILED

DEC 1 1931

793.94  
note  
793.94/118

122

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MAN

2- 776, from Paris, November 21,  
1931

solution of the problem. He said that his government could not bargain for withdrawal or consent that withdrawal be dependent on any other matter than the arrangement of details for the securing of safety of life and property in the evacuated areas.

As to the position of his government concerning the proposed commission of inquiry he said that while making no objection to it but on the contrary favoring any means of obtaining more accurate knowledge of events in Manchuria the Chinese will not for a moment agree that the creation of a commission should in any way furnish an excuse for a delay in beginning and progressively carrying out in the shortest possible time the complete withdrawal of the Japanese troops. The Chinese Government he stated will not be willing to discuss the proposal for a commission of inquiry upon any other basis.

All members of the Council endorsed the proposal for a commission as a move calculated to further a settlement of the immediate situation as well as of the underlying difficulties. A draft resolution is being elaborated.

WSB

SHAW

1 2 2

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

cib

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY  
Nanking

Dated November 22, 1931

FROM

Recd November 21, 10:30pm.

Secretary of State  
Washington.

URGENT.

November 22, 1 a.m.


Koo called on me November 21, 10:30 p.m. and informed me that his government was informed that a public session of the League Council was even then about to open at which a resolution would be introduced providing for a method of dealing with controversy in Manchuria. He said Briand had informed Sze of salient features of the proposed resolution under the following headings:

Number One. The League would send a commission to Manchuria which should not be related to evacuation but would continue for a more or less indefinite time for the purpose of investigating pending questions; during this time the resolution of September 30 would remain in force;

Number Two. The Commission would be composed of Europeans and an American to be sent at the earliest date;

Number Three. The Commission would deal with any question which might be raised by any member of the League (Briand pointed out to Sze that this would give China an opportunity to raise any point which it might desire to submit for investigation).

Number Four.



F/DEW

793.94/2814

FILED

NOV 30 1931

-2- from Nanking, November 21, 1931.

Number Four. Briand observed that even if China were to invoke Article 15 of the League Covenant a commission similar to that proposed would still have to be appointed.

Number Five. Briand expressed the opinion that the presence of this commission on the spot would quiet the situation in Manchuria and Japan would be obliged to evacuate the occupied areas in four or five months.

Number Six. Briand hoped that China would not oppose this proposal since it would establish certain principles, and details could be worked out subsequently.

Number Seven. In the resolution the Council would ask for the immediate cessation of hostilities and for speedy evacuation, but without fixing a time limit, and the Council would insist on an understanding by Japan not to extend the areas of occupation.

Number Eight. If the resolution were adopted the Council would adjourn to reassemble subject to the call of any member of the League Council.

Koo told me that Sze was led to believe that Japan had indicated its readiness to accept a resolution of this character.

Two. Koo informed me that the Chinese Government had already telegraphed to Sze that this proposal was not acceptable to

-3- from Nanking, November 21, 1931.

acceptable to China and that a counter-proposal was being worked out which would be sent to him very shortly. The Chinese Government's chief grounds of objection to the proposal were that it was vague in its terms, it provided no time limit for evacuation, and it provided no method of bringing China and Japan together for a general settlement of outstanding questions.

Three. Koo then described to me the principal features of the counter-proposal which had been drafted and accepted by important members of the Special Commission on Foreign Relations and would undoubtedly be passed by the commission November 22. These features were as follows:

Number One. It provides for the immediate cessation of hostilities.

Number Two. It stipulates for the evacuation of occupied territory within a fixed period.

Number Three. China is to give assurances for the security of Japanese life and property in Manchuria.

Number Four. The League will "arrange for" a commission of neutral observers to supervise evacuation and the taking over of evacuated territory (note: Koo pointed out that the League would "arrange for" and not "appoint" the commission, thus permitting the participation of powers not members of the League).

Number Five. China and Japan will reaffirm the principle of respect for treaty obligations [including the League Covenant]

JS \* -4- from Nanking November 21, 1931

League Covenant, the Anti-War Pact, and the Nine Power Treaty on principles.]

Number Six. It will stipulate that China and Japan shall enter into immediate discussions, in the presence of the neutral observers, on the following questions: (a) details of evacuation and re-occupation (b) measures to safeguard Japanese life and property in Manchuria

Number Seven. All questions between China and Japan relating to Manchuria will be discussed [and determined] by a conference of interested powers which will be jointly convoked by the United States and the League, with the following principles serving as the basis for discussion and settlement: (a) safeguarding peace in the Far East [ (b) the promotion of the economic development of Manchuria through international cooperation, ] (c) removing causes of misunderstanding between China and Japan.

Four. Koo remarked that on several occasions the League Council had been guided by what it understood to be the attitude of the American Government in regard to a given proposal and he said that on this account the Chinese Government was most anxious to learn at the earliest possible date whether the Chinese counter-proposal outlined above would receive the support of the government at Washington. He therefore urged that I inform the Department immediately regarding the nature of the counter-proposal and that I give this information to him when received. He stated that the Chinese Government would welcome any  
comments

1227

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-5- from Nanking, November 21, 1931.

comments or suggestions which the Department might desire to make.

Five. I suggested to Koo that Sze be instructed to communicate this information to Ambassador Dawes in Paris and Koo asked that Dawes be informed of the Department's attitude for communication to Sze.

JOHNSON.

OX



1 1228

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAM

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated **FROM**  
to anyone.

PEIPING

Dated November 22, 1931

Rec'd 9:45 a.m.

Secretary of State  
Washington

DOUBLE PRIORITY

983, November 22, 1 p.m.

Following from Minister

793.94/2815  
793.94/118  
1215-493

"November 22, 9 a.m. CONFIDENTIAL. With reference  
to my telegram of November 20, 9 a.m., I have just been  
informed by my British and French colleagues that re-  
sponsive to statement of Soong relative to our sending  
of observers to Manchuria and in view of possibility of  
developments in and about Chinchow, the French Minister  
has been instructed by Paris to send observers into Man-  
churia to watch events at Tsitsihar and Chinchow. Lamp-  
son is informed that similar instruction will be sent to  
him but he is anticipating them and is ordering Military  
Attache Titimoss to proceed to Chinchow at once to observe  
and report to him upon conditions and developments there.  
I have been informed by French Minister that Washington  
is being approached to send similar observers. Pending  
receipt of such instructions it is my desire that Military  
Attache proceed at once to Chinchow for the purpose of re-  
porting

NOV 30 1931

F/DEW

793.94/2815

FILED

1 1220  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

KAM

2- #983, from Peiping, November 22,  
1931

reporting to me upon situation there, what if any Chinese troops are concentrating there and any developments that may arise. Confidentially I infer that we may expect a movement by Japanese forces from direction of Mukden toward Chinchow and I would like to have any developments on this line watched for and reported upon."

For the Minister

ENGERT

1 1230

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect  
Charge Department

Charge to  
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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

Washington,

November 24, 1931.

7432.24/2815  
note  
793.94/118

AMEMBASSY,

NOV 25 31

PARIS (France).

594  
FOR AMBASSADOR DAWES.

Department's 585/2794 November 21, noon.

In a telegram dated November 22 from Nanking, Minister Johnson reports that he has been informed by his British and French colleagues that in response to statement of Soong in regard to sending observers to Manchuria and in view of possibility of developments in and about Chinchow, the French Minister has been instructed to send observers into Manchuria to watch events at Tsitsihar and Chinchow; and that the British Minister is anticipating similar instructions which he expects to receive by ordering the British Military Attaché to proceed to Chinchow at once. Minister Johnson infers that a movement by Japanese forces toward Chinchow may be expected.

Minister Johnson has been informed by the French Minister that the Department will be approached to send similar observers. The Department has replied to Minister Johnson that it has not yet been approached with such a request but approves his sending the Military Attaché, without reference to such request and in regular course, to Chinchow for

observation.

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_\_

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-138

793.94/2815

1 1231

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128  
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1-128  
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CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

- 2 -

observation. The Department is informed that the  
Military Attaché left for Chinchow on November 23.

*Stinson*  
*Smith*

CK ✓  
Nov 25, 1931.

*MMH*

FE: MMH: REK

*RAM*  
FE

Enciphered by MMH.

Sent by operator M., 1931

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-128

1 1232

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Mita O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
PREPARING OFFICE  
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OR

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# TELEGRAM SENT

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE ✓  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

## Department of State

Washington,

November 23, 1931.

1102  
This message was sent in Confidential Code.  
It should be carefully paraphrased before  
being communicated to anyone.

793.94  
AMERICAN LEGATION

PEIPING (CHINA).

430  
DOUBLE PRIORITY.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE MINISTER.

Your 983, November 22, 1 p.m. The Department has not as yet been approached with such a request but approves your sending the Military Attaché, without reference to such request and in regular course, to Chinchow for observation as you propose.

793.94/2815

Strinson  
Wdy

with  
12.15.493

QNM  
FE:RSM:EJI

mmH  
FE

NOV 23, 1931.

Mx

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 80.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1939 1-138

123

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LAH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
 RECEIVED  
 NOV 23 1931  
 DIVISION OF  
 COMMUNICATIONS AND  
 TRANSPORTATION

GRAY

PEIPING VIA NR

dated November 22, 1931

COPIES SENT TO  
 O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Secretary of State  
 Washington

Rec'd 5:40 p.m.  
 Division of  
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
 NOV 23 1931  
 Department of State

F/DEW 793.94/2816

793.94

980, November 22, 10 a.m.

Following from American Consul General at Mukden:

"November 21, 6 p.m. Japanese headquarters reports that three trains of Chinese troops passed Shanhaikuan moving north. Local Japanese press today devotes much space to northerly movement of Chinese troops along the Peking-Mukden Railway and reports main concentration of troops to be around Koupangetza.

Japanese replacement brigade detrained and is being held, it is believed, in readiness for offensive action against Chin <sup>Chow</sup> Heien. Several trustworthy reports indicate that this is probable objective of next Japanese attack.

Reliable information received that ex-Emperor went back to Dairen on the 18th".

Repeated to Nanking and Commander in Chief.

For the Minister.

ENGERT

GW

with 843.0011

NOV 30 1931

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quitsman NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

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PREPARING OFFICE  
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1-138  
TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

Washington,  
November 23, 1931.

NOV 23 31

AMEMBASSY,

PARIS (France).

FOR AMBASSADOR DAWES.

For your information and confidential as to source.

The American Consul General at Harbin reports under date November 20/2809 that Chang Ching Hui, pro-Japanese Civil Administrator of the Chinese Eastern Railway, has been urged by Japanese officials and allegedly publicly requested by the QUOTE people UNQUOTE of Tsitsihar to take over the duties of the Provincial Governor. The Consul General believes that at Harbin there will be a peaceful turning over of provincial and town positions from anti-Japanese to pro-Japanese Chinese officials. The Consul General states that the Japanese military now control either directly or indirectly through pro-Japanese Chinese officials the whole of Manchuria.

The American Consul General at Mukden reports under date November 21/2816 that, according to Japanese headquarters, three trains of Chinese troops passed Shanhaikuan moving north and that the Japanese press reports the main concentration of Chinese troops to be around Koupangtze, about thirty miles north of Chinchow; and that several trustworthy reports

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

indicate

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

793.94/2816

1 1235

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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## TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

Washington,

- 2 -

indicate that Chinchow is the probable objective of the next Japanese attack.

The American Ambassador at Tokyo reports under date November 21 <sup>12307</sup> that the Chief of the Japanese General Staff has stated to the Military Attachés that QUOTE a contention advanced by the Nanking Government to force Japan to withdraw her troops before the opening of direct parley between Japan and China is out of the question until the peace and order in various districts of Manchuria are restored to normal and the lives and property of our residents are fully guaranteed UNQUOTE. The Ambassador reports further that the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs mentioned to a member of the Embassy staff that the Manchurian affair might cause the downfall of Chiang Kai-shek's Government; that a situation might arise where there would be no Government in China; and that in Manchuria there <sup>might</sup> ~~would~~ be some sort of government through the growth of the local defense committees, with a general supervisor or Governor under appointment from or recognized by the Chinese Government. *mmh*

FE:MMH:REK

Enciphered by mmh

Sent by operator M., 19  

Index Bu.—No. 50.

*Stinson*  
*SKH*  
*CR*  
Nov 23, 1931 P.M.  
*mmh*

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-128



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAM

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone.

PARIS

Dated November 22, 1931

Secretary of State

Washington

777, November 22, 2 a.m.

FROM AMBASSADOR DAVES

The status quo on the Chinese position as to meas-  
ures of evacuation which should accompany the appointment  
of a commission is still the same. I have however since  
your telephone communicated to Sze the information which  
you authorized me to give with, I think, good effect.

I am confidentially informed through the Secretary  
General that the proposal for a commission of inquiry  
takes the following form at the present moment and is  
being transmitted in this form to Tokyo by Yoshizawa

(GRAY) "The Council having noted the declarations  
made and communication presented the representatives of  
China and Japan in the course of the proceedings of the  
Council in regard to the appeal of China under Article 11  
of the Covenant:

Decides to appoint a commission of ten members to  
study on the spot and to report to the Council on any  
circumstance arising out of the said declarations and  
communications

Rec'd 12-18 a.m.  
Division of

FOR EASTERN AFFAIRS

NOV 23 1931

Department of State

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F/DEW 793.94/2817

FILED

NOV 23 1931

1237

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAM

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
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PARIS

Dated November 22, 1931

Secretary of State

Washington

777, November 22, 2 a.m.

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communications

Rec'd 2:18 a.m.  
Division of

FOR EASTERN AFFAIRS

NOV 23 1931

Department of State

NOV 25 1931

F/DEW

793.94/2817

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LAM

2- #777, from Paris, November 22,  
 1931

communications affecting the relations between China and Japan which threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding between the two nations upon which peace depends.

Each Government will have the right to indicate to the Chairman of the commission any question, falling within its terms of reference as defined above, the examination of which it particularly desires". (END GRAY)

The following is Sweetser's report on the above

"The resolution has been put in this form in order to limit the commission to matters covered by declarations and communications made during the course of the present dispute. This would save the commission from having to take up every problem within the field of Chinese-Japanese relations.

Further the right would be given to each government to raise any question it desires. This would avoid a general discussion here and allow complete liberty later. The Japanese could if they desired raise the question of boycott; the Chinese could similarly raise that of compensation. Thus neither would have to argue at this time the question of what should be discussed by the commission.

The Commission would also be given a wide geographical latitude being allowed to pursue its studies "on the spot".

-3- #777, from Paris, Nov.22,1931.

spot". This is phrased in order to include Nanking, Peiping, Tokyo and Mukden.

The Japanese originally suggested a commission of five members to include an American, an Englishman, a Frenchman, a Chinese and a Japanese. It has been suggested, however, that it would be better to have the Chinese and Japanese as assessors rather than as members.

This text, elaborated after considerable discussion with the Japanese, is considered to be a great improvement on their original proposal which was limited to the internal conditions of China only and which would not have been accepted by the Chinese and probably not recommended by the other members of the Council.

If this text is approved by Tokyo and by the Chinese it would be embodied as part of the whole general resolution embracing not only the commission idea but also the September 30th resolution the cessation of hostilities and evacuation. The principal difficulty now is to find an arrangement regarding evacuation which will be satisfactory to the public sentiment of both Japan and China. The Japanese have stated however that the two ideas of commission and evacuation are separate and that evacuation could take place as the other conditions permitted and

124  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-4- #777 from Paris, Nov. 22, 1931.

and without relation to the commission.

In this connection two other suggestions have been made first that in order to bridge over the time necessary for the commission to be constituted and proceed to the spot it might be possible to begin at once the gathering of the essential materials and second that in order to obviate the long delay until the committee makes its final report the committee might be empowered to make interim reports on any specific phases of the subject which it thought it might usefully complete at an earlier date".

SHAW

124

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MAN

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

NANKING

Dated November 22, 1931

Rec'd 12:25 p.m.

793-24  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND  
Secretary of State

Washington •

URGENT

November 22, 7 p.m.

My November 22, 1 a.m. paragraph 3.

One. Koo has just called to say that Chinese draft was submitted to Foreign Affairs Commission today and was adopted with a few changes and it is now being telegraphed to Sze at Paris with instructions to furnish copy to Daves.

Two. Draft as adopted is as follows with clauses numbered as in paragraph No. three of telegram under reference:

No. 1 no change

No. 2. For evacuation fixed at 2 (repeat 2) weeks

No. 3, no change

No 4, Commission of neutral representatives to be jointly appointed by League and American to supervise evacuation and the <sup>ing</sup> take over of evacuated territory; to study situation in Manchuria and report for information of conference mentioned in clause 7.

No. 5, no change

No 6, no change.

No 7. A conference of interested powers to be jointly convoked by the League and the United States

TE

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
NOV 23 1931  
Department of State  
to Paris  
1844  
Nanking

F/DEW

793.94/2818

NOV 30 1931

FILED

rh #2 of Nov. 22 from Nanking

States to discuss and to settle all questions between China and Japan relating to Manchuria on the basis of the principles embodied in the Covenant of the League, anti-War Pact and Nine Power Treaty with a view to safeguarding peace in the Far East and to promoting economic development of Manchuria through international cooperation.

Three. Above proposal will be accompanied according to Koo by an introductory statement somewhat along following lines:

Japan in the view of China by continued hostilities extending occupation in Manchuria has violated those covenant provisions enjoining members from going to war, especially articles X, XII, XIII and XV. In view of this violation, China is of the opinion that League should apply sanctions provided for in article XVI which in effect says that if any member should go to war in violation of articles XII, XIII or XI it would be considered ipso facto to have committed

an act

124  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MAM

3- from Nanking, November 22, 1931

and act of war against other members who are forthwith to put sanctions into force. To uphold the sanctity of the Covenant and to fulfill the purpose of its existence the League should proceed at once to apply this Article, but knowing the Council's natural hesitation in pursuing this course China does not wish to insist at present upon the enforcement of this Article until every chance of a peaceful settlement has been exhausted. It is in this spirit of conciliation that China offers this counter proposal.

JOHNSON

WSB



124

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HS

FROM

PLAIN

Peiping

Dated November 23, 1931

Rec'd 7:00 a.m.

Secretary of State  
Washington

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.  
NOV 23 1931  
Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
Department of State

991, November 23.

Reuter report from Mukden, twenty-second:

"It is learned on good authority that a new Mukden Government will shortly declare control over the three Eastern Provinces, Fengtien, Kirin and Heilungkiang with a republican form of government."

For the Minister

RPT

ENGERT

F/DEW

793.94/2819

FILED

NOV 30 1931

793.94  
with  
843.01

1 1245

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated November 23, 1931

Rec'd 1:10 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
NOV 23 1931  
Department of State

PRIORITY.

986, November 23, 9 a.m.

Legation's 983, November 22, 1 p.m.

Colonel Marget<sup>t</sup>s is leaving tonight for

Chinchow. Captain Tenney returned November 21st

from Harbin. Please advise War Department.

Nanking informed.

For the Minister

ENGERT

RR

F/DEW

793.94/2820

NOV 30 1931

FILED

793.94  
not  
121.54.93

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

FROM

Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.

781, November 23, 1931  
FROM AMBASSADOR DAVES.


Doctor Sze circulated this evening the following memorandum addressed to all members of the Council other than China and Japan.

"In order to remove all possibility of misunderstanding I deem it my duty to place before you the following considerations affecting yesterday's proposals for the appointment of a Commission of Inquiry.

One. In the present emergency there can be no objection to a properly constituted Commission to investigate and report upon the existing situation in Manchuria. Indeed it is a step which might well have been taken two months ago had not Japan refused to entertain the suggestion.

Two. I beg, however, to point out that the creation at this juncture of such a Commission, however constituted and whatever the scope of its activity might be, is a purely illusory proposal unless it is

based



F/DEW  
793.94/2821

FILED

DEC 2 1931

793.94  
note  
500-0112

124

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM

2-#781, from Paris, Nov. 23, 1 p.m.

based upon a simultaneous effective disposition covering the immediate needs of a situation which brooks no further delay. To put the matter more concretely inquiry without at the same time providing for immediate cessation of hostilities and for the withdrawal of Japanese forces (such withdrawal to begin at once and proceed progressively to prompt completion) becomes a mere device to condone and perpetuate for a more or less indefinite period the unjustifiable occupation of China's territory by an aggressor who has already virtually attained his unlawful objective while these discussions have been going on.

Three. In the circumstances you will readily see that as I tried to make plain at yesterday's meeting of the Council it is quite impossible for me to consider the proposal in question or to participate in working out the details connected with it until the bases above mentioned have been adequately laid down.

China still sincerely hopes for a genuine solution of the problem at the hands of the Council but she can hardly be expected seriously to visualize proposals that ignore and evade the essential factors which lie at the very foundation of her appeal to the League of Nations".

SHAW

JHR

1 1248

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

NAM

CORRECTED COPY

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
NOV 25 1931  
DIVISION OF  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
PARIS  
Dated November 22, 1931  
Rec'd 10:22 p.m. 21st.

Secretary of State

Washington

779, November 22, 8 p.m.

FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES

793.22

Sir John Simon and Sir Eric Drummond have just called upon me. I read them 778, November 22, 4 p.m., in order to apprise them of Sze's exact attitude. I have also informed them confidentially as individuals of the importance in your mind, so far as regarded the presence of an American on the proposed commission, of the difference between a commission appointed by the League against the opposition of one of the disputants, and exclusively under the League's authority, and one which is appointed with the approval of both Japan and China. Without making any commitment for you, I stated to them that you were inclined to believe that the membership of an American might be desirable upon a neutral commission of investigators agreed to by Japan and China pending an armistice. I did this so that Simon and Drummond would realize the importance, so far as American participation was concerned

DEC 1 1931  
DEC 1 1931  
DEC 1 1931

MAIL

2- #779, from Paris, November 22,  
1931

concerned, of the commission being appointed by unanimous agreement under Article 11 instead of Article 15 by the Council, with Japan and China excluded.

Simon and Drummond without having yet submitted it to Yoshizawa or Sze, have furnished me a copy of a tentative resolution of the Council which takes the place of the draft resolution contained in my 777, November 21, 1 a.m. with which they hope by its first paragraph to somewhat appease Sze provided they can get will agree Sze's agreement to it. It is herewith submitted to you for observation. I shall quote it at the end of this textually for your information and for any comment you think appropriate.

Simon and Drummond realize the fact which is becoming increasingly evident that what most influences Japan and China is the attitude of the United States.

They understand I think that what has chiefly influenced Japan's recent effort toward moderation and what is preventing Sze from immediately, by opposition, checking further consideration of the situation by the Council under Article 11 is one and the same thing, to wit the influence of the United States. This led them to ask me whether it would be possible for you to consider suggesting to both (repeat to both) parties that they be satisfied with the substance of what is suggested in the purely tentative

MAIL

2- 779, from Paris, November 22,  
1931

concerned, of the commission being appointed by unanimous agreement under Article 11 instead of Article 15 by the Council, with Japan and China excluded.

Simon and Drummond without having yet submitted it to Yoshizawa or Sze, have furnished me a copy of a tentative resolution of the Council which takes the place of the draft resolution contained in my 777, November 21, 1 a.m. with which they hope by its first paragraph to somewhat appease Sze provided they can get will agree Sze's agreement to it. It is herewith submitted to you for observation. I shall quote it at the end of this textually for your information and for any comment you think appropriate.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MAM

3- #779, from Paris, November 22,  
 1931

tentative declaration quoted below. The reasons advanced for it from Simon's standpoint are obvious. Some of the reasons for not doing so from our standpoint seem to me equally obvious: It would constitute a recommendation on the part of the United States in favor of the application of the machinery of the League of Nations which might subject us to misunderstanding in our own country and involve us in the failure of the League's efforts the prospects of which are only too tangible. On the other hand it is becoming increasingly difficult for the Council to withstand the internal pressure of some members to do something and then get away irrespective of the consequences. Any step therefore which we can take which would help to avert an impasse between China and Japan just at present it is our duty at least carefully to consider. I, therefore, pass on Simon's suggestion and await instructions.

The early, if not immediate, Japanese withdrawal from Tsitsihar which Debuchi assures you is being attempted becomes increasingly important. If this withdrawal occurs it might make much easier the agreement of both China and Japan to the substance of the League's tentative plan of procedure.

Drummond is most apprehensive over alarming information he has received that the Japanese intend to occupy Chinchow.



MAIL

4- #779, from Paris, November 22,  
1931

Chinchow.

I told Simon and Drummond that you were much interested in knowing just what would be the scope of the proposed Commission's activities, the terms of reference, any reservations that may be made by any party and all other relevant details, and they must be submitted to you before you could make any decision about participation.

The tentative reassurance under consideration above referred to is as follows:

(GREEN) One. The Council recalls and reaffirms the resolution passed unanimously by it on September 30 by which the two parties declare that they are solemnly bound. It therefore calls upon the Chinese and Japanese Governments to take all steps necessary to assure its execution so that the withdrawal of the Japanese troops within the railway zone - a point to which the Council attaches the utmost importance - may be effected as speedily as possible.

Two. Considering that events in Manchuria have assumed an even more serious aspect since the Council meeting of October 24 calls upon the two Governments:

(a) - To give the strictest orders to the commanders of their respective forces to refrain from any initiative which may lead to further fighting and loss of life.

(b)

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

MAM

5- #779, from Paris, November 22,  
1931

(b) - To take all measures necessary to avoid any further aggravation of the situation.

Three. Invites the two parties as well as the other members of the Council to continue to keep the Council informed as to the development of the situation.

Four. Desiring on the other hand in view of the special circumstances of the case to contribute towards a definitive and fundamental solution of the questions at issue between the two Governments,

Decides to appoint a commission of three members to study on the spot and to report to the Council on any circumstances affecting international relations which threatens to disturb peace between China and Japan or the good understanding between them upon which peace depends.

The Governments of China and of Japan will each have the right to nominate one assessor to the commission. It is understood that the commission has no mandate to interfere in any negotiations which may be initiated between the two parties or to supervise the movements of the military forces of either party.

N B. The President after the adoption of the resolution will state

(a) - That each of the two Governments will have the right to indicate to the chairman of the commission any question

125

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MAM

6- #779, from Paris, November 22,  
1931

question the examination of which it particularly desires.

(b) - That the commission may should it so desire  
furnish the Council with interim reports".

SHAW

DAS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

HS

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Paris

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Dated November 22, 1937

Rec'd 10:22 p.m., 21st.

FROM

Secretary of State


Washington

779, November 22, 8 p.m.

FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES

Sir John Simon and Sir Eric Drummond have just called upon me. I read them 778, November 22, 4 p.m., in order to apprise them of Sze's (?) attitude. I have also informed (?) confidentially as individuals of the importance in your mind, so far as regarded the presence of an American on the proposed commission, of the difference between a commission appointed by the League against the opposition of one of the disputants, and exclusively under the League's authority, and one which is appointed (China?) with the approval of both Japan and China. Without making any commitment for you, I (\*) to them that you were inclined to believe that the membership of an American might be desirable upon a neutral commission of (?) agreed to by Japan and China pending an armistice. I did this so that Simon and Drummond would realize the importance, so far as American participation was concerned, of the commission being appointed by unanimous agreement under Article 11 instead of Article 15 by the Council, with Japan and China excluded.

Simon



F/DEW

793.94/2822

DEC 1 1937

FILED

793.94  
note  
500-0112  
793.94(18)

1 - 1256

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

HS

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Paris

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Dated November 22, 1931

Rec'd 10:22 p.m., 21st.

FROM

Secretary of State

Washington

779, November 22, 8 p.m.

FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES

793-94  
note  
500-0112  
793-94118

Sir John Simon and Sir Eric Drummond have just called upon me. I read them 778, November 22, 4 p.m., in order to apprise them of Sze's (?) attitude. I have also informed (?) confidentially as individuals of the importance in your mind, so far as regarded the presence of an American on the proposed commission, of the difference between a commission appointed by the League against the opposition of one of the disputants, and exclusively under the League's authority, and one which is appointed (China?) with the approval of both Japan and (China?). Without making any commitment for you, I (\*) to them that you were inclined to believe that the membership of an American might be desirable upon a neutral commission of (?) agreed to by Japan and China pending an armistice. I did this so that Simon and Drummond would realize the importance, so far as American participation was concerned, of the commission being appointed by unanimous agreement under Article 11 instead of Article 15 by the Council, with Japan and China excluded.

Simon

793.94/2822  
F/DEW  
DEC 1 1931  
FILED  
FIL

1257

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

HS

2-779, from Paris, Nov. 22, 1931,  
10:22 p.m.

Simon and Drummond without having yet submitted it to Yoshizawa or Sze, have furnished me a copy of a tentative resolution of the Council which takes the place of the draft resolution contained in my 777, November 21, 1 a.m. with which they hope by its first paragraph to somewhat appease Sze provided they can get (?) Sze's agreement to it. It is herewith submitted to you for observation. I shall quote it at the end of this textually for your information and for any comment you think appropriate.

Simon and Drummond realize the fact which is becoming increasingly evident that what most influences Japan and China is the attitude of the United States.

They understand I think that what has (?) Japan's recent effort toward moderation and what is preventing Sze from immediately by opposition checking further consideration of the situation by the Council under Article 11 is one and the same thing, to wit the influence of the United States. This led them to ask me whether it would be possible for you to consider suggesting to both (repeat to both) parties that they be satisfied with the substance of what is suggested in the purely tentative declaration quoted below. The reasons advanced for it from Simon's standpoint are obvious. Some of the reasons for not doing so from our standpoint seem to me equally obvious: It would constitute

125

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

HS

3-#779, from Paris, Nov. 22, 1931, 10:22  
p.m.

constitute a recommendation (on?) of the part of the neutral powers in favor of the application of the machinery of the League of Nations which might subject us to misunderstanding in our own country and (?) us in the failure of the League's efforts the prospects of which are only too tangible. On the other hand it is becoming increasingly difficult for the Council to withstand the internal pressure of some members to do something and then act away irrespective of the consequences. Any step therefore which we can take which would help to avert an impasse between China and Japan just at present it is our duty at least carefully to consider. I, therefore, pass on Simon's suggestion and await instructions.

The early, if not immediate, Japanese withdrawal from Tsitsihar which Debuchi assures you is being attempted becomes increasingly important. If this withdrawal occurs it might make much easier the agreement of both China and Japan to the substance of the League's tentative plan of procedure.

Drummond is most apprehensive over alarming information he has received that the Japanese intend to occupy Chinchow.

I told

1- 1254

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

HS

2-#779, from Paris, Nov. 22, 1931, 10:22  
p.m.

I told Simon and Drummond that you were much interested in knowing just what would be the scope of the proposed Commission's activities, the terms of reference, any reservations that may be made by any party and all other relevant details, and they must be submitted to you before you could make any decision about about participation.

The tentative reassurance under consideration above referred to is as follows:



MET

#779, from Paris  
November 22, 1931

(GREEN) One. The Council recalls and (?)  
a sharp the resolution passed unanimously by it  
on September 30 by which the two parties declare  
that they are solemnly bound. It therefore calls  
upon the Chinese and Japanese governments to take  
all steps necessary to assure its execution so that  
the withdrawal of the Japanese troops within the  
railway zone - a point to which the Council attaches  
the utmost importance - may be effected as speedily  
as possible.

Two. Considering that events in Manchuria  
have assumed an even more serious aspect since the  
Council meeting of October 24 calls upon the two  
governments.

(a) - To give the strictest orders to the  
commanders of their respective forces to refrain  
from any initiative which may lead to further fighting  
and loss of life.

(b) - To take all measures necessary to avoid  
any further aggravation of the situation.

Three.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

#779, from Paris  
November 22, 1931

Three. Invites the two parties as well as the other members of the Council to continue to keep the Council informed as to the development of the situation.

Four. Desiring on the other hand in view of the special circumstances of the case to contribute towards a definitive and fundamental solution of the questions at issue between the two governments,

Decides to appoint a commission of three members to study on the spot and to report to the Council on any circumstances affecting international relations which threatens to disturb peace between China and Japan or the good understanding between them upon which peace depends.

The governments of China and of Japan will each have the right to nominate one assessor to the commission. It is understood that the commission has no mandate to interfere in any negotiations which may be initiated between the two parties or to supervise the movements of the military forces of either party.

N B. The

1- 126

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

#779, From Paris  
November 22, 1931

N B. The President after the adoption of the  
resolution will state

(a) - That each of the two governments will  
have the right to indicate to the chairman of the  
commission any question the examination of which it  
particularly desires

(b) - That the commission may should it so  
the  
desire furnish/Council with interim reports".

SHAW

DAS

1 126

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

13.24  
550.002  
MET

FROM

GREEN

Paris

Dated November 22, 1931

Rec'd 10:55 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

780, November 22, midnight.

FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES.

After consultation with Briand the draft  
resolution contained in my 779, November 22, 8 p.m.,  
has been modified by adding a new paragraph numbered  
4 as follows, the words "as well as the other members  
of the Council" being omitted from paragraph numbered 3:  
"invites the other members of the Council to furnish  
the Council with information received from their  
representatives on the spot".

The old paragraph numbered 4 now becomes 5 and  
has been slightly changed to read as follows:

"desiring, on the other hand, in view of the special  
circumstances of the case, to contribute towards a  
definitive and fundamental solution of the questions

at issue

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

NOV 25 1931

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
NOV 23 1931

Department of State

F/DEW

793.94/2823

FILED  
DEC 1 1931

1 1264  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#780 from Paris,  
November 22, 1931

at issue between the two governments,

Decides to appoint a commission of 3 members to study on the spot and to report to the Council on any circumstance which, affecting international relations, threatens to disturb peace between China and Japan, or the good understanding between them, upon which peace depends.

The Governments of China and of Japan will each have the right to nominate one assessor to the commission. It is understood that should the two parties initiate any negotiations these will not fall within the scope of the terms of reference of the commission, nor will the commission supervise the movements of the military forces of either party".

SHAW

GW

1 2 6 5

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM

GRAY

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Repping via N. R.

Dated November 23, 1931

FROM

Rec'd 5:30 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

989, November 23, noon.

Legation's 947, November 17, 10 a.m. 12718

Legation has now received from chief inspectors  
of salt revenue Shanghai a letter transmitting  
mimeographed copy of their report of November 9th to  
the Minister of Finance regarding seizure of salt  
revenue in Manchuria by Japan. Substance of report  
was telegraphed by Minister of Finance to Alfred Sze  
at Geneva and it is assumed American representative  
there has been supplied with such summary. However,  
American Consul General at Shanghai has been requested  
to obtain additional copies and transmit them to the  
Department by next sailing.

For the Minister

ENGERT

RR


793.94  
note  
843.51 Salt Revenue

F/DEW

793.94/2824

FILED

NOV 30 1931



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

GRAY

MET

Peiping via N.R.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Dated November 23, 1931

d

Rec'd 7 a.m.

FROM

Secretary of State,

Washington

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
EASTERN AFFAIRS  
NOV 23 1931  
Department of State

990, November 23, 3 p.m.,

Legation's 862, November 3rd, 3 p.m., and

864, November 3rd, 5 p.m. / 2454

Consul General at Mukden in despatch No. 486  
of 16th (copy direct to the Department and Tokyo)  
reports Japanese military headquarters on October  
27th issued a statement defining policy in respect  
of seized materials in which foreign firms have  
interest. Statement briefly summarized follows:

Present situation has been occasioned by  
unlawful actions of Chang Hsueh Liang. Japanese  
army is making every effort to prevent seized  
material from coming into possession of Chang or  
other former officials of the provincial or Nationalist  
Governments or bandits. Japanese army, while sympathiz-  
ing with interested Japanese and other foreign firms,

cannot

F/DEW

793.94/2825

FILED

NOV 30 1931

793-94  
note  
393.114

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#990, Peiping via N.R.,  
November 23, 1931

cannot dispose of material until present dispute is  
settled and ownership of property is <sup>e</sup> determined. The  
matter is being handled fairly and there will be no  
discrimination (end of summary).

Two. Consul General states that the only  
American property now being held by Japanese is <sup>2454</sup>  
aeroplane referred to in Legation's 864, of November  
3rd, 5 p.m.

For the Minister,

ENGERT

RPF-GW



1 1268

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

rh

GRAY

PEIPING VIA NR

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Dated Nov. 22, 1931

Rec'd 5:40 am

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION  
SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

FROM  
COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.E. AN. M. L. K.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
NOV 23 1931  
Department of State

793-94  
984, November 22, 1 pm

Following two from American Consul General at Harbin.

One. November 21, 4 pm.

One. American correspondents, who returned to Harbin this morning, confirm the reports of presence several thousand Japanese soldiers in Tsitsihar City where they held parade yesterday and state that General Tamon has headquarters in South Manchuria Railway building at Tsitsihar City.

Two. Chinese report that General Ma, taking with him gold reserve, wireless apparatus and what few Tsitsihar Provincial Bank notes there were in treasury and bank, is on his way to Hailun, terminus of Huhai Railway, where he will set up rebel government.

Three. Despite reports that a fierce battle was waged between ~~at which~~ 5,000 Japanese and 20,000 Chinese ~~(#)~~, it is believed that the Japanese losses were insignificant and the Chinese a little larger. This is due to the fact that the latter largely fled before former came in contact with them. (End part one.)

ENGERT

GW

(#) ~~Apparent omission~~

F/DEW

793.94/2826

FILED

DEC 2 1931

1265

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CORRECTED FROM CONFIRMATION

MET

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated November 21, 1931

Rec'd 22nd, 9 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington

PART TWO

984, November 21, 1 p.m.

793.94/2826

Four. Owing to Japanese control of ~~communications~~ communi-  
cations, it is difficult for Chinese officials here to  
secure information regarding conditions in Tsitsihar.


Five. Situation at Harbin made rather tense by rivalry  
between civil administrator Chang Ching Hui, who has control  
over 2000 newly recruited Chinese police on the one hand,  
and Chief Wan, who has several thousand regular police,  
Commissioner of Education Chou and Commissioner of Communi-  
cations Hsu, the last two agents of the Kuomintang, on  
the other hand. Chang is willing to aid Japanese establish  
new government, while the others are opposed to Chang's  
attitude in this respect. I believe Japanese might attempt  
to persuade defeated General Ma to inaugurate new government.

Six. A wealthy representative Chinese merchant of good  
standing informed me personally that Heilungkiang provincial  
finances are in a mess, old Governor Wu, having milked

(END PART TWO)

GW-RPF

ENGERT



793.94/2826

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N.R.

Dated November 21, 1931

Rec'd 22nd, 9 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

PART TWO.

984, November 21, 1 p.m.

Four. Owing to Japanese control of communications and without Japanese Consulate for Chinese northwest provinces, officers hesitate to secure information regarding combat in Tsitsihar.

Five. Situation at Harbin made rather tense

by rivalry between civil administrator Chang Ching Hui, who has control over 2000 newly recruited Chinese police on the one hand, and Chief Wan, who has several thousand regular police, Commissioner of Education Chou and Commissioner of Communications Hsu, (?) two agents of the Kuomintang, on the other hand. Chang is willing (?) Japanese establish new government, while the others are opposed to Chang's attitude in this respect. I believe Japanese might attempt to persuade defeated General Ma to inaugurate new government.

Six.

1215  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#984, Peiping via N.R.  
November 21, 1931  
Rec'd 22nd, 9 a.m.  
(PART TWO)

Six. A wealthy representative Chinese merchant of  
good standing informed me personally that Heilungkiang  
provincial finances are in a mess, old Governor Wu,  
having milked a  
(END PART TWO)

ENGERT

GW-RPF

1 127

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 21, 1931

FROM

Rec'd 9 a.m. 22nd

Secretary of State.

Washington, D. C.

984, November 21, 1 p.m. (Part Three.)

~~the~~ province for the equivalent of American dollars .  
35,000,000, WanFu Lin of 10,000,000 and his son  
Wan Kuai-ping of 10,000,000. Just before the trouble  
started on the Nonni River, Young Wan sold \$11,000,000  
Tsitsihar bank notes, behind which there is no  
silver nor gold reserve on the local market for  
yen 3,000,000, which nearly caused the total collapse  
of the Harbin dollar. Tsitsihar merchants are reported  
to be petitioning Nanking and local authorities to  
arrest young Wan, who is hiding in this city, for  
embezzlement".

Two. "November 21, 7 p.m. Secretary Chao  
informed me this afternoon that Ma yesterday arrived at  
Pai Chuan and probably today at Hai Lun; that Japanese  
aircraft had pursued and bombarded one of his trains  
and that therefore Ma could not form a government  
because of certainty that Japanese aircraft would bomb  
wherever he was, if he did"

Repeated to Nanking. (END PART THREE)

For the American Minister

GW  
REF

ENGERT

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustofson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CJH

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be carefully paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Dated November 23, 1931

FROM Rec'd. 12:08 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

782, November 23, 2 p.m.


FROM AMBASSADOR DAVES.

Sweetser's comments on the League's activities of the day are the following:

"A draft resolution embracing the various points of the present conflict including cessation of hostilities, evacuation and the proposal for a commission was drafted and approved today in conferences between Drummond, Simon and <sup>finally</sup> Briand (see my telegram No. 779, November 22, 8 p.m.). It will be presented to a private meeting of the twelve members of the Council, exclusive of the parties, tomorrow morning at 10:30. Briand feels that he is not justified in immediately presenting it to the parties before his colleagues have approved it. He also feels their approval would add great weight to it and that the matter should be clinched at the earliest possible moment.

Two difficulties are foreseen as regards the Japanese. First, the phraseology as regards the cessation of hostilities and evacuation is considered to be much more precise than they would wish: in this connection, though

without



750.94/2827

DEC 1 1931

FILED

CJH

Page 2 - #782 from Paris.

without having seen this text, Yoshizawa saw Briand this afternoon. He expressed hesitation regarding any suggestion for an armistice saying that it was very difficult to know what might happen in Manchuria; that there were many brigands and armed bands throughout the territory and that there might even be another concentration such as embraces Tsitsihar. The Japanese would need to be free to take the necessary action in such contingencies.

The second difficulty foreseen with the Japanese is that their formula for the competence of the commission would seem to give the commission power to discuss almost any question of international relations in the Far East. Matsudaira explained to Simon this afternoon that he would like the commission to be able to take up any international problem. Simon, however, explained that this was quite impossible in so far as it affected British interests. Briand later expressed the same viewpoint as regards French interests. As a result the resolution <sup>to be submitted</sup> (?) tomorrow was phrased to obviate this difficulty". November 23, 2 a.m.

SHAW

WSB

CJH

Page 2 - #782 from Paris.

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SHAW

WSB



127

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- #783, November 23, 1931

the Japanese have yet seen the text of the proposed resolution. There is no reason to believe that it is satisfactory to them. I see therefore in the situation only a slight promise to hope for a successful outcome of the Council's negotiations. The Chinese will not dare without hearing from you to make the proposition to the Council in the form stated in the Nanking telegram which includes proposals involving demands of the United States. Sze assures me to this effect. The situation therefore affords you the opportunity of at least temporarily delaying the prospective impasse by taking ample and fully justified time for consideration of your reply. During this time the effort for troop withdrawal reported to you by Debuchi may materialize into something helpful to the situation. Perhaps you will consider whether the present situation does not afford you a good opportunity independently of the League and unembarrassed by prior discussion with it to express directly to Nanking your opinion as to the wise position for China to take at this juncture. Again you may deem it wise in view of the

1218  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

3-#783, November 23,  
1931

the critical situation as it is now outlined to you to make additional representations to Japan. In my judgment in the minds of these several powers the attitude of the United States is that which is of primary importance and the attitude of the League though very important is yet considered by them as secondary.

The accompanying telegrams which I am sending you tonight I think will bring you up to the moment with the situation as it exists here.

SHAW

HPD  
CSB

1270

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Paris

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone.

Dated November 23, 1931

Rec'd 2:14 a.m.

NT  
FROM

Secretary of State,

Washington

793-94  
VERY URGENT.

783, November 23, 3 a.m.

FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES

At midnight tonight Sze gave me a copy of the  
main portions of telegram from Nanking Government  
through Johnson (?). He told me that his Government  
desired that your comments upon its message should  
be communicated through me to Sze instead of following  
the usual course of communicating directly with  
Nanking through Johnson for Nanking to pass on to  
Sze. It is evident that Nanking is taking matters  
into its own hands and has severely restricted Sze's  
discretion. It also seems evident that if anything  
like this Nanking proposition goes before the Council  
it means the failure of the League negotiations which  
Sze, who seen the text of the proposed resolution of  
the Council, wired you in my number 779, November 22,  
8 p.m. (?) smiled with contempt. I do not know whether  
the

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
NOV 23 1931  
Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
NOV 25 1931  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

EX 793.94/2823

FILED

DEC 1 1931

MET

2-#783, Paris, November  
23, 1931.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
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MET

2-#783, Paris, November  
23, 1931.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

### TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

3-#783, Paris, November 23,  
1931

FROM

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The accompanying telegrams which I am sending you tonight I think will bring you up to the moment with the situation as it exists here.

SHAW

HPD

1282

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
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NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
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Collect  
Charge Department

Department of State

Charge to  
\$

Washington,

November 23, 1931.

AMCONSULATE

(NANKING) CHINA.

119 CONFIDENTIAL. FROM STIMSON FOR THE MINISTER.

I have just sent the following telegram to General Dawes:

~~Your 783, November 23, 3 a.m.~~

*Just* There follow my views upon the proposed resolution of the Council contained in your 779, November 22, 8 p.m., and upon the proposed Chinese resolution contained in <sup>a</sup> ~~your~~ cable from Peking dated November 22, 1 a.m. You may communicate these views, so far as you deem it wise in your discretion, to Dr. Sze.

The central point of the proposal of the Council is the provision for a neutral commission with broad powers to study and report upon all circumstances threatening to disturb the peace between China and Japan or the good understanding between them upon which peace depends. This <sup>central</sup> proposal in its possibilities for future good, far transcends any proposal which I have thus far seen, not only in these protracted negotiations but in any similar problem in that part of the world. It proceeds upon the principles which underlie substantially all modern treaties of conciliation executed by the nations of the western world, and if adopted <sup>in this case</sup> ~~here~~, would in my opinion, go further to align the peace methods of China and

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

793.94/2828

1 1283

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
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# TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138  
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PLAIN

-2-

Washington.

Japan with those of the rest of the world than any other step which could be taken. It seems to me to furnish the most effective means possible for reaching a general world understanding of the necessities which underlie a permanent solution of the Manchurian problem. The ultimate solution of this problem must be arrived at by negotiations between the two nations concerned. But such negotiations will be more effective in reaching a just and permanent solution when made in the light of the report of such an investigation than if made without it. The period required for the investigation will also afford a much needed opportunity for the cooling of present hostile feeling. The presence and operation of such a commission will, in my opinion, also tend to insure that these direct negotiations will not result in the imposition of unjust terms by reason of military pressure. The provision for a commission thus preserves the essential principle for which we have all been striving. The proposal also contains a repetition of the resolution of September 30 containing the covenant of a withdrawal of the Japanese troops within the railway zone as speedily as possible. It also contains a covenant providing for the abstention on the part of military commanders of any initiative which may lead to further fighting. The language in which this last proposal is worded seems

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-138



1 1284

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Department of State

1-138  
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NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

-3-

Washington,

seems to me to be an effective provision for cessation of hostilities, probably the best that can be drawn under existing circumstances.

This proposal represents the painstaking negotiations and efforts of the representatives of the nations which have been gathered at Geneva and subsequently at Paris in an earnest endeavor to secure a peaceful solution of this difficult problem. Taken all in all, it seems to this Government to represent the most hopeful road towards a solution, and we believe that it carries with it a great presumption in its favor and that serious responsibility will rest upon its rejection.

Turning now to the counter proposal from Peking. We have given this proposal also careful consideration, but we have no hesitation in saying that we do not regard this even from the standpoint of the interest of China as as effective as the proposal which has been reached by the League. In addition to this, it contains several provisions which seem to us to be entirely impracticable. *Endorse*

I think that you should communicate the substance of this message to the Chinese Government. This seems to us particularly important, since I have been approached by the Ambassador of one of the nations represented in the Council, who states that the Chinese

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

1 1285

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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PLAIN

Washington,

-4-

are taking a more intransigent position towards the League resolution and are basing their observation on the alleged fact that you have told the Chinese Government that the United States is willing to go much further than the League in support of the Chinese position. The text of the Council's resolution, to which I refer above, is being transmitted to you in a separate telegram.

*Skinner*  
*He*

S-BMS

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ....., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1955 1-138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

November 25, 1931.

NOV 25 31

DOUBLE PRIORITY.

AMERICAN CONSUL,

NANKING (CHINA)

121 Confidential from Stimson for the Minister.

Reference my No. 119 November 23, 6 p. m. In order  
that you may know how the matter under reference was pre-  
sented to the Japanese Government I have requested  
Ambassador Forbes to repeat to you expeditiously, for your  
confidential information, my two telegrams to him of  
November 23 and his reply of November 24. 2856

You may in your discretion inform Dr. Koo orally  
regarding the facts.

FE:RSM:EMU

FE

NOV 25 31

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M. \_\_\_\_\_

Index Bu.—No. 50.

PM 2000

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-138

793.94/2828

1 1287

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

November 23, 1931.

This telegram was sent in confidence.  
It should be carefully paraphrased before  
being communicated to anyone.

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
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1-138  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to

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793.94  
AMEMBASSY

(PARIS) FRANCE

589 CONFIDENTIAL. FROM STIMSON TO DAWES.

793.94/2828  
Your 783, November 23, 3 a. m.

There follow my views upon the proposed resolution of the Council contained in your 779, November 22, 8 p.m., and upon the proposed Chinese resolution contained in your cable from Peking dated November 22, 1 a.m. You may communicate these views, so far as you deem it wise in your discretion, to Dr. Sze.

The central point of the proposal of the Council is the provision for a neutral commission with broad powers to study and report upon all circumstances threatening to disturb the peace between China and Japan or the good understanding between them upon which peace depends. This proposal in its possibilities for future good, far transcends any proposal which I have thus far seen, not only in these protracted negotiations but in any similar problem in that part of the world. It proceeds upon the principles which underlie substantially all modern treaties of conciliation executed by the nations of the western world, and if adopted <sup>in this case</sup> here, would in my opinion, go further to align the peace methods of China and Japan with those of the rest of the world than any other step which

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_.

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

793.94/2828

NLS

1 0288

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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Charge Department  
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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

-2-

Washington,

1-138  
TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

could be taken. It seems to me to furnish the most effective means possible for reaching a general world understanding of the necessities which underlie a permanent solution of the Manchurian problem. The ultimate solution of this problem must be arrived at by negotiations between the two nations concerned. But such negotiations will be more effective in reaching a just and permanent solution when made in the light of the report of such an investigation than if made without it. The period required for the investigation will also afford a much needed opportunity for the cooling of present hostile feeling. The presence and operation of such a commission will, in my opinion, also tend to insure that these direct negotiations will not result in the imposition of unjust terms by reason of military pressure. The provision for a commission thus preserves the essential principle for which we have all been striving. The proposal also contains a repetition of the resolution of September 30 containing the covenant of a withdrawal of the Japanese troops within the railway zone as speedily as possible. It also contains a covenant providing for the abstention on the part of military commanders of any initiative which may lead to further fighting. The language in which this last proposal is worded seems to me to be an effective provision for cessation of hostilities, probably the best that

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

1 1289

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR

Charge to  
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

-3-

Washington,

1-138  
TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

that can be drawn under existing circumstances.

This proposal represents the painstaking negotiations and efforts of the representatives of the nations which have been gathered at Geneva and subsequently at Paris in an earnest endeavor to secure a peaceful solution of this difficult problem. Taken all in all, it seems to this Government to represent the most hopeful road towards a solution, and we believe that it carries with it a great presumption in its favor and that serious responsibility will rest upon its rejection.

Turning now to the counter proposal from Peking. We have given this proposal also careful consideration, but we have no hesitation in saying that we do not regard this even from the standpoint of the interest of China as as effective as the proposal which has been reached by the League. In addition to this, it contains several provisions which seem to us to be entirely impracticable.

After you have discussed the above with Dr. Sze and have obtained his reaction to it, you may, in your discretion, tell Mr. Briand that we have considered the proposal of the Council and that it seems to us to be satisfactory and a very hopeful advance over the proposals heretofore made. If you discuss its terms with Briand, you should emphasize to him that I would think the proposition contained therein for a cessation of hostilities is

Enciphered by

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1949 1-138

1 1291

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR

Department of State

Charge to  
\$

-4-

Washington,

an essential part of the proposition, and that the proposition  
without it would not be satisfactory.

*Stinson*

S-EMS

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1959 1-138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HS

GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

FROM

Dated November 23, 1931

Rec'd 10:40 a.m. 22nd

Secretary of State  
Washington


COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
THE UNDER SECRETARY  
NOV 24 1931  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

985, November 23, 3 p.m.

Following from American Consul General at Shanghai:

"November 21, noon. Though no condition has arisen which the Shanghai Municipal police could not handle without assistance, recent happenings in other parts of the world have rendered conditions in Shanghai even more tense and necessitate greater precautionary measures than during any recent period. The Japanese marines are renewing their conspicuous activities, insisting they are necessary. The statement has been made, and I am inclined to concur in it that the Japanese themselves are responsible for much of the anti-Japanese demonstrations. Their action would indicate that they believe an attack is the best defense, while the municipal authorities consider that an incident caused by such attack would possibly create a much worse anti-foreign demonstration. The Japanese cotton mills which employ some 60,000 workmen are curtailing their activities by finally carrying out of tentative agreement reached some days ago to close their mills sometime later because



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FK 793.94/2829

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NOV 25 1931

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

693.94/2

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HS

2-#985, from Peiping, Nov. 23, 1931  
10:40 a.m.

because of the boycott. The Shanghai Municipal Council has issued orders yesterday that Russian representative be transferred to the northern district where a marine guard of Japanese extremes reside and in future so far as possible the Japanese Police of the Shanghai Municipal Council will be in seclusion the key this is a commendable precautionary move. While the settlement authorities have succeeded remarkably well in the trying circumstances, more since the middle of September, the future is one which will require skill and tact to deal with.

The Chinese students in their enthusiasm to collect funds for General Ma break out intrench during two days disregarded the refusal of the Shanghai Municipal Council to allow them to collect contributions in the Settlement and greatly interfered with traffic as well as the order of the settlement. Last night they were informed that police would enforce its prohibition against soliciting funds in the settlement. It is hoped today will see an improvement in the present conditions. Nanking informed.

RR

FOR THE MINISTER

CSB

ENGERT

Note: Full corrected copy will be issued later.

DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MF

CORRECTED COPY ✓

GRAY

Peiping via N.R.


FROM Dated November 23, 1931

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Secretary of State,

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793.94/2829

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NOV 30 1931

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 693-9412

1 1294

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MF

CORRECTED COPY ✓

Peiping via N.R.

FROM Dated November 23, 1931

Rec'd 10:40 a.m. 22nd

793-94

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

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O.N.I. AND M.I.A.

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NOV 30 1931

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MF

2-#985, from Peiping, Nov. 23, 1931  
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FOR THE MINISTER

ENGERT

WSB


1 1294

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793-94

November 20, 1931.

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Digest of  
Newspaper Items.

NEW YORK TIMES

Mukden, November 19, by Hallett Abend.

Tonight witnessed the complete evacuation of the Anganchi-Tsitsihar area by the army of General Ma. The Japanese flag is flying over the walled city, and the entire railroad between Toanan and Tsitsihar is held by Japanese forces. Reports to General Honjo from the field state that the entire Chinese army is retreating north and northeast in utmost confusion. Japanese planes report that about 3,700 of Ma's men are retreating along the railway to Koshan. General Honjo's headquarters issued a statement today that during the last two days no positive action had been taken by Soviet Russia east or west of the Manchurian border. This military expedition of the Japanese, begun under charges of depredations in the South Manchuria railway zone, has gradually become an unmasked occupation admittedly designed to force China formally to sign a new guarantee to observe all existing treaties.

Paris,

L

F/DEW

793.94/2830

- 2 -

Paris, November 19, by Lansing Warren.

As it was shaping tonight, opinion in the Council is tending toward a return to the stand in September of expressing hope for early evacuation by the Japanese, coupled perhaps with a scheme for an international inquiry in the Far East. The Chinese are still unwilling to accept a compromise and threaten an appeal under Articles of the League Covenant, providing for sanctions. Yoshizawa gave final notice of Japan's refusal to clarify the terms she offered China for direct negotiations over treaty obligations.

Washington, November 19.

A new joint effort of the United States and the League of Nations to have Japan modify her course in Manchuria appeared definitely in prospect today when Secretary Stimson conferred with his chief advisers in the State Department. It was implied that the world powers, for the present at least, would not go beyond moral pressure through diplomatic measures.

Tokio, November 19, by Hugh Byas.

The deliberations of the Council are tending to a  
point

- 3 -

point to which the Council will ~~next~~ reaffirm its resolution of September 30 and then adjourn pending the outcome of an investigation commission's work. Rumors that Yoshizawa made demands equivalent to establishment of a Japanese economic protectorate over Manchuria are flatly denied.

It is considered that a return to the status existing before the conflict would only mean prolongation of the trouble between Japan and China. Canton is convinced the only solution for the Manchurian problem is to give civil government to Manchuria and organize relations between Japan and China on that basis. This is the demilitarization scheme mentioned by Eugene Chan which would be acceptable to Japan.

Tokio, November 19, A. P.

A friendly warning that serious complications will result if Russia sends troops into north Manchuria was despatched to Moscow today by the Japanese Government. It was stated that no damage had been done to the Chinese eastern railway.

Shanghai, November 19.

At a meeting of the Kuomintang Congress in Nanking, Chiang Kai-shek announced that in view of the serious situation

- 4 -

situation in Manchuria, he would proceed northward to  
take charge of the situation.

Tomorrow the Congress is expected to discuss important  
resolutions regarding the Sino-Japanese<sup>conflict</sup>. An increase of  
the belligerent spirit among local Chinese is unmistakable  
and students are using the capture of Tsitsihar to arouse  
greater indignation.

NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE

Editorial

In invoking the League Covenant and the Kellogg  
Pact to protest against Japanese action, the Council  
fostered the Chinese defiance of Japanese intervention  
which made an extension of it inevitable. The extension  
of military operations created a situation which the  
Japanese General in the field has apparently taken entirely  
into his own hands, with the hearty endorsement of  
Japan's public opinion. General Honjo is now launched  
upon a punitive expedition in north Manchuria.

It is impossible to escape the feeling that the  
civil government of Japan has ceased to control these  
operations and that its major function is to keep up with  
and justify them.

What militates against an adjustment of the present

situation



130

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lutz NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -

situation by negotiations in Paris is now the tremendous popularity of military action and equal resentment against the League Council in Japan.

Japan's international credit certainly depends now upon her ability to put a firm check upon military operations and this cannot be done too quickly or too clearly impressed upon her representatives. At the same time the worse than futile results of the League's last attempt to give Tokio peremptory orders in China's interest ought to dictate an approach that can be more accurately described as diplomacy.

44  
FE:EBT:KC:SS

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 24, 1931.

Peiping, October 24, 1931, No. 1229:

Conversation of Minister Johnson with President  
Chiang Kai-shek.

Important points were not seriously discussed,  
the conversation in general being limited to  
formal inquiries and diplomatic replies of a  
general nature.

Though asked twice, Mr. Johnson did not  
attempt to predict the probable developments  
which would follow the meeting of the League  
Council.

Mr. Johnson stated that he wished to be in  
Nanking in order to facilitate communications  
between the two governments.

Mr. Johnson had occasion to say that the  
American Government had openly approved what the  
Council had done and had informed the Council  
that it would support the action taken by the  
League.

Mr. Soong said that the prospects of a  
settlement of the difficulties between Nanking  
and Canton were excellent.

There was some conversation concerning the  
role

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

2

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

role of the American representative at Geneva,  
with respect to the League.

Mr. Johnson explained that Mr. Hanson and  
Mr. Salisbury had been sent by the State Depart-  
ment to Manchuria to make observations and  
reports, and that the American Military Attache  
had been sent to Chinchow for the same purpose.

*2u*  
EET

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




PM RECD

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
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Peking, October 24, 1931.



No. 1229

NOV 23 31



F/DEW

793.94/2831

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

1/ I have the honor to enclose a memorandum of a conversation the Minister had at Nanking on October 14, 1931, with President Chiang Kai-shek concerning the Sino-Japanese controversy in Manchuria.

Respectfully yours,

For the Minister:

*C. Van H. Engert*  
C. VAN H. ENGERT,  
First Secretary of Legation

Enclosure:

Memorandum of conversation  
as stated.

800.

LHE:EA

NOV 24 1931

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



PM RECD


LEGATION OF THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Peiping, October 24, 1931.

No. 1229

NOV 23 31



F/DEW

793.94/2831

DEC 3 1931

FILED

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1305

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1  
Despatch No. 1229

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW

Nanking, October 14, 1931

Subject: Sino-Japanese Controversy in Manchuria

Present: President Chiang Kai-shek  
Mr. T. V. Soong, Minister of Finance  
Dr. H. H. Kung, Minister of Industries  
Dr. Frank W. Lee, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs  
Mr. Johnson, American Minister  
Mr. Peck, Counselor of Legation

Dr. Lee conducted Mr. Johnson to the residence of President Chiang Kai-shek at 4:30 p.m., by appointment. Mr. Soong and Dr. Kung arrived during the progress of the interview. Dr. Tan Shao-hwa, Acting Counselor of the Foreign Office, and a Secretary of the President were also present.

After some conversation of a social nature President Chiang Kai-shek asked Mr. Johnson what he thought the outcome of the Council meetings resumed at Geneva on October 13 would be. The President asked this question of Mr. Johnson on two occasions, but Mr. Johnson did not attempt any prediction regarding the probable developments which would follow the meetings of the League Council.

Mr. Johnson informed President Chiang Kai-shek that he had called to announce his arrival in Nanking and to let the Chinese Government know that the American Government felt a solicitous interest in the solution

of the

1306

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

of the Sino-Japanese Controversy. He said, also, that he wished to be near the Chinese Government so that he might facilitate communications between the American and Chinese Governments.

The President asked Mr. Johnson what the attitude of the American Government was in the matter of the Controversy between China and Japan. Mr. Johnson said that following the reference of the matter by China to the League of Nations and the taking of measures by the Council of the League for the solution of the controversy, the American Government had openly announced its approval of what the Council had done and had informed the Council that it would support the action taken by the League. He said that it was the hope of the American Government that the League would be successful in its efforts to adjust the controversy.

The President inquired of Mr. T. V. Soong whether the British Minister had arrived in Nanking and Mr. Soong replied that Sir Miles Lampson had arrived in Nanking that afternoon, coming from Peiping by airplane.

Mr. Johnson inquired of Mr. Soong whether it was true, as reported, that there were excellent prospects for a friendly settlement of the difficulty between Canton and Nanking. Mr. Soong said that the prospects were very good. He said that Mr. Hu Han-min, accompanied by some of the Kuomintang leaders, had gone to Shanghai by train that morning, in order to meet delegates from Canton.

The

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- 3 -

The President asked Mr. Johnson whether the American Government was represented at the meeting of the League Council by an official observer. Mr. Johnson observed that the United States was not a member of the League of Nations and he did not think that the American Government was participating in the present meeting of the Council through the presence there of an official observer. Mr. Soong said he had noticed a reference in the press to the presence of Mr. "Parker Gilbert" as American observer. Mr. Johnson said he did not think that Mr. "Parker Gilbert" was in Geneva in the service of the American Government. (It subsequently developed that a Reuter report from Geneva dated October 12 referred to Mr. "Prentiss Gilbert" as American observer at the Council meeting.). The President inquired whether the American Government had not sent some investigators to Manchuria. Mr. Johnson said that the Department of State had sent Mr. Hanson, American Consul General at Harbin, and Mr. Salisbury, an American Diplomatic Officer in Japan to Manchuria to make observations and reports. Mr. Johnson said that he might also remark confidentially that he had on October 13 sent the American Military Attaché to Chinchow, to make a report on the situation there.

President Chiang Kai-shek asked Mr. T. V. Soong whether the attitude of the press in Great Britain and France was favorable to China. Mr. Soong replied that the

LONDON



1301

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -


LONDON TIMES was somewhat more favorable to China than  
the Paris TEMPS.

The President said he hoped to see Mr. and Mrs.  
Johnson at tea on the following day.

WRP/hp

1300

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



This despatch relates to the efforts of the Japanese military at Mukden to interfere with the National City Bank in that city, a matter which is now, I believe, being made the subject of a protest by Ambassador Forbes in Tokyo.

One particular feature of the attached is the marked paragraph at the bottom of page one of Enclosure No. 2 which shows that the Japanese authorities at Mukden dictate to the "Public Peace and Order Committee", at least in financial matters. That Committee was ordered not to issue a permit which would have permitted the National City Bank to withdraw certain silver deposited in the Provincial Bank.

attach to 793.94/

JLJ

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7 1932  
~~2882~~  
28(3)2-1

131

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RECD

No. -----



AMERICAN CONSULATE.

Mukden, China, November 3, 1931.



NOV 23 1931

SUBJECT: Japanese Threaten the National City Bank  
of New York.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.



I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy  
of my despatch No. 472, to the Legation, Peiping,  
China, dated October 31, 1931, on the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers  
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 472.

MSM:HTW  
800

F/DEW

793.94/2832

FILED

JAN 11 1932

No. 472

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, China.

October 31, 1931.

SUBJECT: Japanese Threaten the National City Bank  
of New York.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping, China.

Sir:

Referring to my telegrams of October 29, 6 p.m.,  
and October 30, 9 p.m. <sup>1372</sup> in regard to a letter received  
by the National City Bank of New York from the Chief of  
Staff of the Kuantung Army, Mukden, concerning the trans-  
fer of funds deposited with it by the late Liaoning  
Provincial government, I have the honor to enclose here-  
1/ with a copy of the despatch of this office dated October  
29, 1931, to the Japanese Consul General and a copy of  
2/ a memorandum, dated October 30, 1931, from the Manager of  
the local branch of the bank in regard to this matter.  
No reply has as yet been received from the Japanese Consul  
General.

It will be noted from the enclosed memorandum that  
Mr. Cochran believes that the letter is a threat warning  
the bank not to transfer any funds of the late Liaoning

Provincial

1312  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Provincial government to Tientsin or Peiping. He mentions that it may have been inspired by the silver purchases, referred to in the memorandum, or more probably by the existence of certain deposits of the former Provincial Bank, of the actual disposition of which the Japanese have probably no definite information. It is apparent that Mr. Cochran has not transferred any funds away from Mukden and apparently intends to hold the funds in question until it is determined which of the two parties is entitled to receive them.

In connection with this matter, it may be mentioned that the National City Bank of New York received new signature cards from the Provincial Bank when it was reopened. In acknowledging these cards, the bank stated that the new signatures would be recognized for subsequent deposits and withdrawals therefrom.

The objectionable feature of this letter is the implication that the Japanese military authorities may at any time interfere with the operations of this bank. In the regulations of the Chinese banks and in other respects the military authorities have acted, and are acting, as if a state of war exists between China and Japan, notwithstanding the repeated declarations of the Japanese government that Japan is not, and has no intention of, waging war against China.

Respectfully

1 3 1

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -


Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers.  
American Consul General.

- 1/ Enclosure: Copy of despatch to Japanese Consulate  
General dated October 29, 1931.  
2/ " : Copy of memorandum from National City  
Bank of New York dated October 30, 1931.

Original and one copy to Legation.  
Five copies to Department.  
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.

MSM:AAB  
340/800.



1314

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1, to despatch No. 472, of M. S. Myers, American Consul General, Mukden, China, to the Legation, Peiping, dated October 31, 1931, on the subject "Japanese Threaten the National City Bank of New York."

American Consulate General, Mukden, China, October 29, 1931.

Sir and dear Colleague,

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of a letter addressed to the National City Bank of New York by the Chief of Staff of the Kuantung Army. You will observe that the letter forbids the National City Bank of New York to make remittances of public funds deposited by the Liaoning Provincial Government in the American Bank, and requests an explanation of the report that a plan is under consideration for remitting the funds of the Purchasing Commission, a subordinate office of the Liaoning Government, to Peiping and Tientsin.

I beg leave to request that you secure for me at the earliest possible moment an explanation of the enclosed letter. I am not aware of any law, regulations or circumstances which give the Chief of Staff of the Kuantung Army the right to issue orders to the National City Bank of New York or in any way to interfere with the bank's business operations.

I have the honor to be,

Sir and dear Colleague,

Your obedient servant,

For the Consul General:

(SIGNED) J. C. Vincent  
American Consul.

K. Hayashi, Esquire,

Consul General for Japan,

Mukden, China.

Enclosure: Copy of letter from Chief of Staff of Kuantung Army.

JCV:HTW  
340.

A true copy of  
the signed original.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

October 28th, 1931.


The Manager,  
The National City Bank of New York,  
Moukden.

Dear Sir,

This is to inform you that the Japanese military authorities strictly forbid the remittance of public funds deposited or in your bank by the late Liaoning Provincial Government and its subordinate offices, before the outbreak of the recent hostilities, to Chang Hsueh-liang's agents in Peiping and Tientsin. Such remittances would appear to be antagonistic or actions assisting our enemies. We firmly believe that any wise foreign bank would refrain from so doing.

We recently heard that means are under consideration to have the funds of the Purchasing Commission of the Liaoning Provincial Government, which were in your bank, secretly transmitted to Peiping and Tientsin. We request your proper explanation of this matter.

(SIGNED) Chief of Staff of the Kuantung  
Army.





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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 2, to despatch No. <sup>473</sup> of M. S. Myers, American Consul General, Mukden, China, to the Legation, Peiping, dated October 31, 1931, on the subject "Japanese Threaten the National City Bank of New York."

MEMORANDUM.

REGARDING INCIDENTS AND FACTS WHICH MAY HAVE SOME BEARING  
ON THE LETTER RECEIVED BY THE NATIONAL CITY BANK OF NEW  
YORK FROM THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE KWANTUNG ARMY DATED  
OCTOBER 28th, 1931.

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It is our impression that the above letter was sent to us as a threat and warning not to remit to Tientsin or Peking any funds which we might hold in the name of Marshal Chang Hsiao Liang, or any of the old Moukden Government organizations. The above letter refers to funds deposited in the name of the Purchasing Commission, but there is no account in our books in that name.

Immediately after the occupation of Moukden by the Japanese Army we received a letter from the Army demanding information regarding the credit balances and securities held by us for Marshal Chang Hsiao Liang. In reply we stated that the Marshal's account was overdrawn with us and that the securities in cover of the overdraft are held in New York and recommended that they apply to our Head Office if they require further information.

When we withdrew our silver balances with the Frontier Bank the Japanese supervisors there endeavoured to prevent the Frontier Bank from paying us, but their Manager pointed out that they had a special arrangement with us regarding our silver deposits there and that they were obliged to pay us silver. This undoubtedly annoyed the Japanese, who were endeavouring to withhold that Bank's supplies of silver.

When we endeavoured to withdraw silver from the Provincial Bank the Japanese supervisors there definitely prohibited the Bank to pay us silver. The Bank then informed us that if we would obtain a permit from the Public Peace and Order Committee they would pay us silver. The Public Peace and Order Committee after some days of negotiations informed us that the Japanese Army would not allow them to issue the required permit. Upon receipt of the Committee's refusal to issue the permit we wrote the Bank on October 20th, pointing out that we urgently required re-payment of our

deposits

- 2 -

deposits which had already been held up for more than a month and stated that unless they were willing to pay us silver on the following day that we would purchase silver in the market and set off our balances with them against certain balances with us which we were holding as cover. The following day they requested us verbally to delay a day or two as they could not yet give us a definite decision. After waiting several days with no results, we advised them that we would have to take the steps mentioned in our letter of October 20th. Finally on October 27th we wrote them that we had covered the equivalent of \$500,000.- and that we had set off our balances with them to the extent of \$500,000.- against Yen which we were holding as cover. On the 28th October the Bank sent a messenger to us who informed us that they were willing to pay us silver and requested that we reverse our operation of the previous day, to which we replied that it was impossible for us to reverse the previous day's operation, and that unless they paid us the remaining balances in silver in the near future we would cover the total amount as we had the \$500,000.- It may be significant that the letter from the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army was written to us on the same day that the Provincial Bank protested about our action in connection with our deposits with them.

The fact that we had also a few days previously lodged a complaint through the American Consulate General regarding the action of the Japanese Army in prohibiting the Frontier Bank to pay cheques drawn by the Peking Moukden Railway in favor of the Netherlands Harbour Works and endorsed to us for the credit of their account with us, may have also had something to do with the above mentioned letter from the Chief of Staff.

Although the Japanese Military have made no reference to deposits that were formerly held by us in the name of the Provincial Bank of The Three Eastern Provinces, the disposition of these funds probably has a direct bearing on the matter. Before the Provincial Bank was opened under the supervision of the Japanese Military Authorities we received instructions from President Lu of the Provincial Bank cancelling the chops and signatures then in force and substituting others in their place. At the same time we received instructions to transfer the balance of US\$1,500,000.- then standing in the name of Provincial Bank to the credit of an account opened in the name of J. C. Elder and similar instructions were received for ¥1,000,000.00. We effected the transfer as instructed with the exception of ¥300,000.- which we placed in a special account to cover our silver balances with the Provincial Bank. We then took signed

cheques

1318

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

cheques from Mr. Elder for the amount placed to his credit and instructed him that we would be unable to release the funds in question until we were certain that there was no possibility of the Bank incurring a loss by paying out these funds.

We believe that the foregoing covers all the facts that may have any bearing on the letter under discussion and are inclined to believe that the Japanese Military Authorities have no definite information but have written their letter as a threat warning us to avoid all transactions which might be against their best interest.

(SIGNED) L. M. Cochran.  
Manager.

A true copy of  
the signed original.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*MMH*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

*[Signature]*  
November 24, 1931.

Mukden, November 3, 1931 : Political Developments.

The Japanese are continuing to urge Yuan Chin-kai to form a provincial government at Mukden. Chao Hsin-po, the Japanophile Mayor of Mukden, is using his persuasion to assist the Japanese in this.

Yuan says he has no intention of forming a government, and states he is ready to resign the Chairmanship of the Peace Maintenance Committee unless the Japanese comply with the following terms: (a) Payment of the police (the military authorities have not released government funds held in the banks), (b) Give the police more than five cartridges each, (c) Cancel the independence of various districts (those in which self government societies function with Japanese advisers, (d) Permit the undertaking of banditry suppression.

Due to the influence of Yuan, it is believed that the Japanese will make an effort to keep him at the head of the Peace Maintenance Committee.

There follows comment on reports of engagements between Heilungkiang troops and those of Chang Hai-peng, which it is believed are not of interest at this date.

The line between Liaoyuan and Tungliao, which was attacked by Chinese or Mongol bandits, is being repaired under Japanese protection. Traffic may have been interrupted by the Japanese themselves, due to the presence at Kailu of Jehol troops.

*26*  
MBT

By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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**Index**

No. 476

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, China.

November 2, 1931.

SUBJECT: Recent Political Developments.

CONFIDENTIAL.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Legation,

Peiping, China.

Sir:

Referring to my despatch No. 471 of October 30, 1931, in which mention was made of the influence being brought to bear upon Yuan Chin-k'ai to organize a provincial government at Mukden, I have the honor to state that confidential information, believed to be entirely reliable, was received this morning in regard to further efforts of the Japanese to induce Mr. Yuan to head the local government. Yesterday Mr. Yuan in company with Dr. Chao Hsin-po, the new Japanophile Chinese Mayor of Mukden, met the Japanese military authorities including, it is understood, the Vice Minister of War, at the Yamato Hotel and during the conference which followed he was strongly urged to form a provincial government. The promise was made by the Japanese military authorities, so it was stated, that they would withdraw their troops to the

railway

- 2 -

railway zone in three days' time if he organized a government. Also Dr. Chao urged Mr. Yuan to accede to the behest of the Japanese which, however, he stoutly refused to do and said that no matter what the Japanese might do he had no intention of forming a government. He further stated that he was ready to resign from the Chairmanship of the Peace Maintenance Committee and would resign unless the Japanese complied with the following terms: (a) Payment of police (Government funds are held in provincial bank and cannot be released without approval of military authorities), (b) Give the police more than five cartridges each, (c) Cancel the independence of various districts (those in which self government societies function with Japanese advisers), (d) Permit the undertaking of banditry suppression. Although it is not possible at this time to obtain confirmation of this information I am inclined to believe that full credence to it may be given. Should in the next few days information to the contrary be obtained the Legation will be promptly notified by telegraph. These alleged terms require no comment to show the extent of the influence of the Japanese.

It may be explained that Yuan Chin-k'ai is the most influential and most highly respected member of the Peace Maintenance Committee and therefore it is believed that the Japanese will make a great effort to retain him as its head. A suitable successor would be difficult to find.

A report dated October 30, 1931, has been received from Yenan, in which it was stated that during the evening of the 29th and the early morning of the 30th there was serious fighting at Tailai between Chang Hai-p'eng's

forces

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

forces and those of Ma Chan-shan, Acting Chairman of Heilungkiang. It was stated in this report that 600 Japanese soldiers were fighting with Chang's men at the front and that out of four aeroplanes, obviously Japanese, two were brought down. It was further stated that newly recruited troops at Teonan were preparing to move to the front and that it was feared by the business community that if Chang's forces were badly defeated his troops would return and loot the town. It is possible that the news regarding the fighting is hearsay as Tailai is nearly a hundred miles north of Teonan. During any engagement in China all kinds of rumors are likely to be heard. However, it is given for what it is worth, and, if true, it will be confirmed in the course of a few days.

Obviously there has been another engagement between Heilungkiang and Cheng Hai-p'eng's forces, concerning which Japanese press reports and those from military headquarters have been silent. The Japanese headquarters a few days ago reported that Japanese troops had been despatched north of Liaoyuan (Chengchiastun) along the Suu-Tao railway on October 28th in order to reestablish traffic which had been suspended since October 23. From an independent source it was learned that on that day 200 Japanese troops arrived by train with an armored car at Taipingchuan, a point nearly half way to Teonan. Traffic on this line has since been resumed and a Dairen newspaper a few days ago carried the report that the South Manchuria Railway was operating the line, which, however, is denied in official circles here. It is believed that additional Japanese are being used to operate the line at this time.



1324

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -


Report of the Japanese military headquarters of October 30 was to the effect that the Liaoyuan-Tungliao branch of the Asu-Tao Railway which had been cut on October 12 by Chinese bandit soldiers, causing 600 Japanese nationals including Koreans to suffer severe hardships, was being repaired under the protection of two companies of Japanese soldiers. From an independent source it has been learned that this line may be reopened within two or three days. As was reported in previous despatches of this office, several stations along this line were occupied by Mongol bandits about October 12 and that on October 19, or thereabouts, the railway staff of the various stations were withdrawn to Liaoyuan. It was thought by some that this line was purposely cut by the Japanese, or permitted to remain interrupted, owing to the presence at Kailu of a considerable force of Jehol troops.

Respectfully yours,

M. B. Myers.  
American Consul General.

Original and one copy to Legation.  
Five copies to Department.  
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.  
Copy to Consulate, Pairen.  
Copy to Consulate General, Harbin.



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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

## DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS



November 19, 1931.

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fileDigest of  
Newspaper Items.

## NEW YORK TIMES

Paris, November 18, by Lansing Warren.

Appearing before the Council, Mr. Yoshizawa, acting on fresh instructions from Tokyo, again declined to give satisfaction with respect to the treaty claims involved, refusing to give an exact definition of the rights claimed by Japan. He maintained that this was a matter for discussion between China and Japan. Japan's position continues to be that the Manchurian affair is a local incident, Japan's position being much the same as that of the United States in Nicaragua. Japan will negotiate directly with China and retire when she considers her nationals safe. The movement on Tsitsihar did not come before the Council for formal action.

It is evident that the Japanese offensive has had damaging results for the members of the Japanese delegation ~~and~~ holding out for moderation in military action. On receipt of the news of the fighting Ambassador Matsudaira rushed

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- 2 -

rushed to consult with Mr. Dawes.

Tokyo, November 18, by Hugh Byas.

The Japanese objectives in Heilungkiang Province are to disperse the army under General Ma and uproot the last remnant of Marshal Chang's government. By one o'clock this afternoon a Japanese armored train had entered Anganchi and immediately pushed on across the Chinese Eastern Railway. Advanced Japanese parties are reported tonight within twelve miles of Tsitsihar. The War Office has announced that it will not interfere with the Chinese retreat along the Chinese Eastern Railway.

Mukden, November 18, by Hallett Abend.

At eight o'clock tonight Japanese troops are occupying Tsitsihar Station, according to meager information from the front. Heavy casualties occurred on both sides but the Chinese were finally driven back in disorder. They outnumbered the Japanese by about ten to one. It is feared that action on the part of Soviet Russia may follow the crossing by the Japanese of the Chinese Eastern Railway.

Mukden,

- 3 -

Mukden, November 15, by Hallett Abend, (by courier to Peiping).

✓ The Chinese control the telegraph and wireless systems in North Manchuria while communications in the south are under Japanese control. Thus, news emanating from these areas is remarkable for the contrasts. Whatever merits originally were on either side are now beclouded locally by ill-advised acts of each side. Most foreigners in Mukden feel that the Japanese occupation may result in rebates and other special arrangements which will drive out foreign business from Manchuria.

NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE

Editorial.

Meaning ?  
The marked change of attitude toward the Manchurian situation in Paris is plainly traceable to a belated understanding of the fact that Japan's now drastic policy is an inevitable reaction against the Chinese policy of "treaty sabotage". That the Chinese policy is in turn eventually traceable to an American policy in the Orient inaugurated by President Wilson is going to be made clearer as the Manchurian problem becomes more a subject for serious discussion and less an occasion for impulsive action.

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1328

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

THE UNDER SECRETARY  
NOV 17 1931  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE



November 16, 1931.

Digest of  
Newspaper Items.

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NEW YORK TIMES.

Paris, November 15 (by P. J. Philip). News of fighting in Manchuria has created a tense atmosphere here on the eve of the meeting of the League. It is felt that neither China nor Japan had made a sincere effort to conform with the League's suggestions, and that the outbreak of fighting made it difficult for ~~either~~ either of these nations to move toward compromise at this time. Probably neither government can effectually control its generals in the field at this juncture, and the League is of course powerless to influence such generals directly. There is therefore the likelihood, which nobody relishes, that the League may have to face the issue of what steps it can take under the Covenant and the Briand-Kellogg pact to enforce its authority.

Several compromise proposals are reported to have been drawn up, which probably depend first on China's acceptance of some form of direct negotiations, and second on Japan's accepting a general statement of China's recognition of her treaty obligations.

Tokyo, November 15, by Hugh Byas. Messages from Harbin

state

- 2 -

state that Consul Shimizu and Major Hayashi have arrived there from Tsitsihar. It was known in Tokyo that Hayashi had been recalled, but the Foreign Office had not ordered Shimizu to leave.

The Foreign Office disclaims knowledge of the sharp note from Litvinoff to Japan, contents of which have been published by TASS.

It is reported that the C. E. R. four days ago started a direct service between Soviet territory and Manchuria. Such a new arrangement would facilitate the shipping of munitions from Russia without detection.

Mukden, November 15, by Hallett Abend. From early morning until after midnight, thousands of singing and cheering Japanese paraded the streets of Mukden in a demonstration against the withdrawal of Japanese troops from Manchuria and in denunciation of the attitude of the League. Nothing developed in the nature of a demonstration in behalf of Henry Pu Yi, who is believed to have fled to Tientsin rather than head a monarchical restoration movement. It was authoritatively announced in Mukden today that the Japanese did not intend to use the ex-Emperor in any way.

Paris, November 15, by P. J. Philip. At the last session of the League at Geneva, that body appeared <sup>primarily</sup> ~~more~~ concerned with preserving its prestige as a peace-maintaining organization. In shifting the scene to Paris, there has been an obvious intention to place the emphasis on the League's arbitration functions. There is apparently an orientation toward considering less the facts of actual violence committed in Manchuria than the prospects of inducing Japan and China to accept a compromise upon the causes which have produced it. This change creates an atmosphere more favorable to the Japanese, who were

completely

- 3 -

completely isolated during the final days at Geneva.

The fact that the personnel of the various delegations has been strengthened for the coming meeting is another hopeful sign of the determination of the governments concerned to obtain some workable compromise.

Editorial. Litvinoff's restrained communication to Tokyo confirms the belief that an informal agreement exists and has so far been observed between Japan and the Soviet Union. It reveals that Karakhan's pledge of strict non-interference was in exchange for Japan's promise not to bring harm to Russian interests in north Manchuria. It explains why General Ma has felt perfectly confident of the security of his base behind the former Russian railway, and therefore of his ability to harass the Japanese force sufficiently to keep it in the field for the edification of the League Council at its impending sitting. The danger in the situation in the Nonni district lies in the anxiety of the Japanese military to find an excuse for invading the Russian sphere.


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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE



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November 16, 1931.

Manchuria Situation  
 Subject: Chinese Salt Revenue in Manchuria.

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The Japanese Government apparently admits that the accumulated salt revenue at Newchwang has been taken by the Chinese Committee for the Maintenance of Order at Mukden (also referred to in some telegrams at the Peace Preservation Committee) from the bank in which the salt authorities deposited it, but denies the allegation that the Japanese military authorities have seized these funds. (Geneva's No. 298, November 9, 11 p. m.)

The most reliable Chinese accounts are those based on the reports of Mr. Pearson, an employee of the Ministry of Finance (apparently in connection with the collection of salt revenue) and of Mr. F. A. Cleveland (American), Associate Chief Inspector of salt revenue.

According to Mr. Pearson, General Honjo's (Japanese) headquarters informed him, sometime prior to the seizure of the funds at Newchwang, that the entire salt revenue of Manchuria must go to the Mukden Government. (Geneva's No. 276, November 3, 10 a. m.)

Mr. Cleveland's report in regard to the actual seizing of the funds, as given to the League, reads as follows:

"October



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Lutz NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

"October 31 at 10 a. m.

"Mukden District Inspectorate telegraphed to the Inspector General that the manager of the Newchwang branch of the Bank of China handed us on the 30th at 8 p. m. a letter stating that at 11 a. m. today Paymaster Iwase of the Japanese military headquarters, Adviser Tamada Shigeji of the Provincial Government Bank and Provincial Finance Bureau (newly created office) and staff officers of the Provincial Government Bank with armed men came to his bank and demanded handing over salt revenue collections. This was refused, but finally at 4 p. m. \$672,709.56 was taken away. It was only after repeated negotiations that a Provincial Finance Bureau's sealed receipt signed by Tamada was obtained. Under such circumstances we could do nothing." (Geneva's No. 279, November 5, noon.)

Subsequently, on November 9, the League was informed of another seizure, by "a transportation officer authorized by the Japanese military authorities", of accumulated salt revenue at Changchun amounting to \$2,600,000. Concerning this seizure the Department has not yet been informed of any comment of the Japanese Government. Mr. Cleveland's report to the League is as follows:

"We have received from our representatives at Changchun a telegram dated November 6 as follows:

"Today all the funds of the Bank of China and of the Bank of Communications, Changchun, amounting to \$2,600,000 were forcibly removed to the Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces, Changchun, by a transportation officer authorized by the Japanese military authorities. We protested in vain. The transportation officer formally notified us today that he cannot recognize the Salt Inspectorate. Therefore not only is Japanese denial of not having seized the salt revenue of Newchwang incorrect, but the Japanese military authorities continue to seize the salt revenues elsewhere through agents created, directed, and completely controlled by the Japanese military authorities themselves." (Geneva's No. 299, November 10, noon).

It is

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

It is believed that, on the basis of the information now available to the Department, a fairly accurate estimate of the real situation is as follows:

The accumulated salt revenues in Manchuria, as well as present collections, are being taken over by an independent Chinese Government at Mukden, called the "Peace Preservation Committee" which began to function on September 30 (League Circular C.715.M.320. 1931.VII, page 3), and which moved into the Provincial Government building at Mukden on November 10 (Peiping's No. 905, November 10, 7 p. m.).

It is difficult to say how far the activities of the Peace Preservation Committee are controlled by the Japanese military or other Japanese authorities now in Manchuria, but the Department has been informed that Japanese advisers are associated with this Committee. It is not believed, therefore, that the Committee would dare seize the funds referred to without at least the approval of the Japanese authorities in Manchuria.

In connection with the seizure of these funds, it is interesting to note that they have been redeposited in the Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces which was, so far as is known, a semi-official bank belonging to Chang Hsueh-liang and some of his official associates. It was closed by the

Japanese

- 4 -

Japanese authorities about September 19 and permitted to reopen about October 15 with Japanese advisers. (Peiping's No. 751, October 12, 11 p. m.) This bank practically had a monopoly on the bank note issue in Manchuria, which was, before the present situation arose, far in excess of the silver reserves in the bank. These reserves were further depleted by a transfer by Chang Hsueh-liang shortly after the outbreak, to either Tientsin or Peiping, of about \$2,000,000 in silver. It is not unlikely therefore, that the Japanese authorities, whose nationals hold many of the notes of the Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces, are, through the medium of the Peace Preservation Committee, attempting to use the salt revenues of Manchuria to reestablish and maintain the value of the note issue of this Bank.

With regard to the salt revenue it should also be remembered that the Ministry of Finance of the National Government at Nanking, about 1929, came to an agreement with the various independent or semi-independent factions in China, of which the Manchuria faction was one, that, provided these factions remitted to Nanking a small proportion of the collections for the service of foreign and domestic loans charged on this source of revenue, the balance might be retained by these factions. In Manchuria, it appears that the surplus collections, which amounted to about \$1,600,000 monthly, were retained by the Chinese authorities in Manchuria. The Japanese representative

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -

representative at Geneva states (Geneva's No. 298, November 9, 11 p. m.) that the Manchurian share of the salt funds, ear-marked for the retirement of foreign and domestic obligations charged thereon, is still being remitted to Nanking.

It is not believed that it is advisable for the American Government to make any representations to the Japanese Government on the subject. The League has already brought the matter to the attention of the Japanese representative at Geneva. We might, however, in order that we may have more definite details for use at a later date, instruct the Consul General at Mukden to make discreet inquiries and report on the question of the seizure and disposition of these funds.



*Telegram drafted.*

*Approved  
not*

*[Signature]*  
 JBJ:EMU

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



November 18, 1931.

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Memorandum of conversation with the British Ambassador,  
November 18.

The British Ambassador said that two or three days ago there had been printed a statement that we had assured the Japanese Ambassador that under no circumstances would the United States take part in any sanction against Japan which might be instituted by the League of Nations nor would it consider the withdrawal of ambassadors. He said that this report had been denied this morning, but that he wanted to check up on the truth of it since the first statement had been published in Tokyo and the British Ambassador there had telegraphed him.

I told him that the denial was correct, that there had been no foundation whatever for the original statement because it was perfectly obvious that no one in the Department would have been so foolish as to make any statement of the kind to the Japanese Ambassador. I said that we had always said that we reserved complete liberty for future action. The Ambassador said he had supposed  
this

793.94/2838

133

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
THE UNDERSECRETARY

2

this was the case and that he knew it would relieve the  
British Ambassador in Tokyo to be so informed.

W. R. Castle, Jr.

U WRC/AB

1338

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



PM RECD




LEGATION OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Peking, October 27, 1931.

*FE*

No. 1242

NOV 23 31



F/DEW

793.94/2839

793.94

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Sir:

1/ I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of  
a letter dated October 17, 1931 from the President  
of the University of Nanking, which he purports to  
sign on behalf of the Faculty of the said University.

This letter refers to Japan's recent invasion of  
Manchuria and expresses the hope "for prompt and  
effective action" on the part of the United States  
in order to avert a crisis. The writer believes that  
direct negotiations between China and Japan are im-  
possible unless the latter withdraws her troops and  
is "willing to conform to international law". The  
letter concludes:

"We trust that the League and the United  
States of America will settle the issue  
purely on the basis of law and justice."

The enclosed letter is interesting as an expression  
of the views largely held by educated Chinese and is  
characteristic

NOV 27 1931  
FT. 40

1330  
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

characteristic in that it emphasizes the importance  
of preventing similar "aggressive action . . . . by  
any country in the future."

Respectfully yours,

For the Minister:

  
Van H. Engert,  
First Secretary of Legation.

800. ✓

Enclosure:

Copy of letter of October 17, 1931  
from President of University of  
Nanking.

CVHE:MM



1 3 4  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1242  
Despatch No. 1242

COPY

University of Nanking,  
Nanking, China.

October 17, 1931.

The Honorable Nelson T. Johnson,  
American Minister to China,  
Nanking.

Your Excellency:

The Council of the League is now reconvening to consider the Manchurian Affair. It is a crucial test to the greatest peace machinery in the history of mankind. It is a test whether justice or force will dominate. The success or failure of the League cannot but affect vitally the other great instruments of peace existing in the world, including the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact and the Nine-Power Treaty of the Washington Conference.

The Japanese military occupation of Manchurian cities is a clear case of violation of international law and treaties. The extensive military activities of the Japanese in Kirin, Newchwang, and other places have greatly aggravated the situation in Manchuria. The continuous air bombardments by the Japanese at Chinchow and the further augmentation of their naval forces along the coast of China and in the Yangtse River have increased the tension of Sino-Japanese relations to the utmost degree.

This crisis between China and Japan must be averted in the shortest possible time. Only through law and justice can the Manchurian Affair be peacefully and satisfactorily settled. Only when the governments of the Powers stand boldly against the wrong done by an aggressive

Power

- 2 -

Power can justice and law be maintained. It is a most critical moment in which your Honor can render a significant piece of service to the peace of the world by appealing to your government for prompt and effective action.

We firmly believe that direct negotiation is impossible unless Japan immediately withdraws her troops and will be willing to conform to international law. It is reported that Japan will ask the League to postpone its action until next spring. This is merely Japanese crafty diplomacy. All civilized nations should demand the immediate withdrawal of Japanese troops in Manchuria that no such aggressive action may be contemplated by any country in the future and that the world will be made safe for humanity.


We will stand by our nation's sovereign rights at all costs and will not surrender to the dominance of Machiavellian diplomacy as existed in 1919 when the Shantung question was up for international consideration. We trust that the League and the United States of America will settle the issue purely on the basis of law and justice.

Respectfully submitted by the

Faculty of the University of Nanking

(Signed) Y. G. CHEN

The President.



1 34

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. —

AMERICAN CONSULATE,

Dairen, Manchuria, October 21, 1931.


SUBJECT: Transmission of Printed Matter.

1-1066 GPO



THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.



SIR:

793.94  
I have the honor to transmit herewith, as of possible interest to the Department, two copies of a pictorial supplement put out by the MANSU NIPPON, a Japanese daily published in Dairen, illustrating various incidents attending the recent Japanese occupation of South Manchuria.

Respectfully yours,

*Wm. R. Langdon*

Wm. R. Langdon,  
American Consul.

✓  
Enclosure:  
As stated.

800  
WRL:L

In duplicate.  
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.  
Copy to Consulate General, Tokyo.  
(No enclosure)

F/DEW

793.94/2840


FEB 9 1932

FILED



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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NAHS, Date 12-18-75

年九十三治明業創



部一の舗店服洋屋木白

候上申禮御有難展發し増に日しふ忝を顧愛御の位各

目丁三町速浪市連大

店服洋屋木白

番〇四五連大替振 番五七一五話電

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

29

# 自動時計 ロールス

いつも止らず正確な  
 ネジのない時計  
 手につけたらすぐ動く



雪崩れ込む支那兵へ奉天城内に於けるパン配給...九月二十七日




婦人救済会に満員婦人職員が街頭に出大連派遣中にて



満員婦人職員甲斐々しく婦人救済会の荷送り...本社にて

婦人にも女学生が軍隊のお手傳ひ(旅順歩上訓練で冬服に格好つけ)九月二十二日







奉天地方維持委員會委員（向つて  
右から金梁、袁金鎧、張成箕、丁  
錫修の四氏）…九月二十七日…




皇后陛下御下賜の瑞帶（拜  
受した本庄關東軍司令官  
（左）と捧持して來た眞田副  
官）十月四日




 黒吉省長官宣誓式の日（向  
 つて右から大迫吉林軍事顧問  
 新長官熙洽氏、左端加藤本社  
 特派員）…九月二十八日…



大連に於ける非常在滿邦人大會  
九月二十一日夜歌舞伎座にて…



長春の非常市民大會……九月二




西大連市民大  
會：九月二十  
日夜大正小學  
校にて：

滿洲青年聯盟代表母國訪問遊説  
九月二十八日大連埠頭の出發

[illegible]






奉天衛戍病院に負傷兵を見舞ふ森獨  
立守備隊司令官：九月二十六日

長春滿鐵醫院に收容された南嶺、寛  
城子の戦隊におけるわが負傷兵：九  
月十九日



わが名譽の戦死將校



公主嶺衛戍病  
院で懇ろに負  
傷兵を見舞ふ  
江口滿鐵副總  
裁：九月二十  
九日



長春衛戍病院に收  
容のわが負傷兵：  
九月十九日



獨立守備隊第一大隊第三中隊  
前市岡平治大尉



獨立守備隊第一大隊第三中隊  
本茂少中隊長




獨立守備隊第一大隊第三中隊  
前市岡平治大尉




長春駐留兵隊第四聯隊  
駐川松信少尉

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75







吉村軍から我軍に引渡した兵器の檢閲



吉村軍から我軍に引渡した兵器の檢閲




吉村軍から我軍に引渡した兵器の檢閲




吉村軍から我軍に引渡した兵器の檢閲

*Wafangdian, Fushun Series*

22





⇒ 瓦房店守備隊が公安隊を武装解除して没收した銃器：九月十九日





△ 撫順城を占領す：九月二十一日正午南門にて

⇒ 占領後の撫順城内公安隊：九月二十一日



△ 撫順永安橋の架橋工事：九月二十一日


⇒ 瓦房店商務總會附近を警戒のわが守備隊兵：九月十九日夜



△ 迫撃砲の彈丸 瓦房店公安隊から没收…九月十九日…










わが獨立守備隊の上田大隊  
洩南城に入る…九月二十五日…




羽山支隊郷家屯に著く…九月二十三日…





 洮南到着の獨立守備隊兵  
 …九月二十五日…




吉林省政府を警備する我が兵…九月二十三日…



貨車にまでも滿載吉林へ出動長春驛にて  
九月二十一日朝



吉林驛に著いた日本軍九月二十一日午後六時




土褒を築いて吉林日本總領事館の警備九月二十二日朝


吉林の第師團司令部名古原蔵にて九月二十一日夜




長春城内留守使公署へ武裝解除に向つたが軍九月十九日午後




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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



全  
 吉林に出動すべく松花江  
 前に集結した第二師団の  
 精鋭、九月二十一日午前  
 七時半



吉林に向け發車せんとするサモワ  
 ー、我々が軍用列車、九月二十  
 一日午前八時



列車に續き乗込む日  
 本兵、九月二十一日  
 朝






我が砲撃に焼けた支那軍馬（南陽砲兵第二旅にて）九月十日




わが負傷兵の陣中慰問手當（見城子戦線後方にて）九月十日



長春に集結したわが野砲隊九月十九日



長春驛に置かれた警備司令部九月十九日



空から見た見城子城の状況  
左方へは白城子、右方へは長春、前方は敵軍の陣地、後方には我が軍の陣地、九月二十日





昌圖紅頂山へ前進…九月二十日…



狀觀測のわが重砲隊員

日本軍司令官布告

和六年九月十九日

統道者求本固而後修其末也。北軍自對我國東部出動以來，戰也明矣。一時的熱情之請，當以用手段與組織兩端進行。神聖得行為者只觀東北軍權而知者意欲行爲光明知何如哉！不在任其豪強把持心此一揮軍權之行爲也。然職員無所歸路之重責者因爲其既得之利權確係帝國軍之威信故不可割。我軍政權應有彼更其權而已。關於國民民生休戚大職誠屬注意當特對部下已經切實指示應盡其福利愛撫其身分個人自由尊重自然無所憂苦安居萬勿出沒歧途之舉熱忱倘有我國軍行動愈加勤奮者不啻雲集有所過必出斷寸感謹此佈

大日本關東軍司令官 本庄 繁

關東軍司令官  
の布告

日本軍の鹵獲品




寛城子の戦場で捕  
虜となつた支那兵  
九月十九日



威力を示した我  
が山砲陣地：九  
月十九日



全 寛城子の戦線における  
我が歩兵隊：九  
月十九日




寛城子に設けられた  
我が衛生隊臨時出張  
所：九月十九日




前線における日本義勇軍：九  
月十九日、寛城子にて

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75







Cl. of ... page 17.




▲ 駐米大使館の義勇隊員(左側)と  
 駐米大使館員(右側)と九月十日  
 駐米大使館前にて九月十日




▲ 駐米大使館前にて九月十日  
 駐米大使館前にて九月十日  
 駐米大使館前にて九月十日



▲ 駐米大使館前にて九月十日  
 駐米大使館前にて九月十日  
 駐米大使館前にて九月十日




▲ 駐米大使館前にて九月十日  
 駐米大使館前にて九月十日  
 駐米大使館前にて九月十日



▲ 駐米大使館前にて九月十日  
 駐米大使館前にて九月十日  
 駐米大使館前にて九月十日




▲ 駐米大使館前にて九月十日  
 駐米大使館前にて九月十日  
 駐米大使館前にて九月十日



▲ 駐米大使館前にて九月十日  
 駐米大使館前にて九月十日  
 駐米大使館前にて九月十日




新しく奉天自衛警察局の看板を掲げた瀋陽縣政  
府内の公安局…十月一日…



奉天市政公所の幹部（同つて右から土肥  
原市長、鶴岡警務課長、鹿谷総務課長、富村  
秘書長、三谷財政課長、守田衛生課長、吉川  
工程課長）：九月二十日；

支那兵破壊の満鐵線現場で新聞記者  
團に狀況説明…九月二十四日朝、柳  
條溝にて…







DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

10


奉天に入つた旅  
 成旅團：九月二  
 十一日夜




我が憲兵隊が奉天城内に貼  
 り出した治安維持令を諷する  
 布告…九月十九日




我軍が拘捕した奉天  
 北会館の  
 九月十  
 朝日




奉天加茂町に頑張つた自  
 警團：九月十九日夜




奉天満鉄附屬地と商埠  
 地境界線に陣取つた自  
 警團：九月十九日夜



到着：九月十九日  
綴々わが部隊奉天に




奉天：九月十九日  
東北陸軍兵工廠と日露の日



奉天風雨  
九月十九日  
九日甲内へを断り  
断り

わが部隊奉天入城  
九月十九日




奉天満鉄附屬鐵道足城の線  
奉天警備所：九月二十日



敗走後の奉天皇宮内：九月十九日



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75



△ 避難者及人の荷物の検査  
 奉天城にて  
 九月十九日

△ 土橋を築いて奉天満鉄附属地境界防備  
 の日本兵  
 九月十九日




△ 占領した東北航空軍司令部  
 午後  
 九月十九日




△ 占領直後の奉天城内東北邊防司令部  
 長官公署  
 九月十九日

△ 前進した前進(奉天)城小西門附近の我が軍  
 九月十九日朝

△ 奉天到着の我が空軍  
 九月二十日








奉天城頭高し  
…九月十九日朝…



戦重なる夜の歩哨  
…九月十九日夜…




トラックで捕虜収容奉天兵  
工廠にて…九月十九日朝…



奉天城小東門の警備…九  
月十九日朝…

我軍の警備厳し（奉天満  
鐵附屬地境界線にて）…  
九月十九日朝…




DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
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 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




奉天城に向つて進軍中の遼陽歩兵聯隊 九月十九日




武装解除で山を爲した支那兵の銃器 九月十九日



奉天




余山 盛んに燃えつゝある北大營の遠望 九月十九日



北大營の一香港り(奉天駐留部隊の高橋中尉) 九月十九日

占領した奉天東塔飛行場 九月十九日

Table 1 - up 15 Page 11.



合 奉天城へ出動しつゝある我が装甲自動車（小東邊門にて）九月十九日拂曉




攻め入らんとする我が機關銃隊：九月十九日拂曉


關東軍司令部（奉天重振支店内）



日軍旗朝風に翻る  
（昌領直後の奉天北大營）九月十九日



Head-on view of the Eden





る繞を變事洲滿  
物人要主の國兩支日

東北邊防軍司令長官  
張學良氏



官令司軍東關  
將中榮庄本



總理大臣  
若槻禮次郎氏



駐京南  
將一介蔣



席主府政省事憲  
氏毅式威



長團師二第駐洲滿  
將中郎二門多



官令司隊備守立獨  
將中連森



陸軍大臣  
南次郎氏



長謀參軍防邊北東  
氏驥榮



表代部支盟聯際國  
氏基盛施



長謀參軍東關  
將少治光宅三



長總謀參  
將大三範谷金



外務大臣  
幣原喜重郎氏



吉林省新政府長官  
熙洽氏



氏英光重 使公支駐



國際聯盟日本代表  
芳澤謙吉氏



奉天總領事  
林久治郎氏



長團旅成混  
將少郎次速村嘉



長團旅五十第兵步  
將少郎六野天



長團旅三第兵步  
將少悟照川谷長

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

# 満洲局地圖

齊  
哈  
爾  
濱




井杉氏遺族(右から長男延壽君、次男保君、かよ子未亡人)



中村少佐未亡人幸子さんと長女幸子さん



洮安地方で東北軍興安屯警第三團兵に虐殺された中村少佐(左)と井杉延太郎氏(右)は昭和六年六月六日黒龍江立克都出發の際撮影したもの



中村氏一行虐殺事件の責任者…屯警第三團長代理關玉衡



滿鐵線爆破の際支那兵が遺棄した銃器、軍帽とレールの破片

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure in despatch of Wm. P. Langdon, American Consul at Dairen, Manchuria,  
 dated October 21, 1931, file no. 800, on the subject "Transmission of Pinked matter."

# 滿洲變事フラグ



出動命令下る

滿洲日報社發行

昭和三十一年十一月十五日第三種郵便物認可  
 昭和三十一年十一月十五日發行

滿洲日報第九千五百五十二號附錄

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

# 大連自動車株式會社



## 營業所電話

工場	南山麓案内所	露西亞町案内所	若狹町第一タクシー	星ヶ浦出張所	播磨町營業所	沙河口營業所	聖徳街營業所	加賀町營業所	山縣通營業所	日本橋營業所	晴明臺營業所	逢坂町營業所	春日町營業所	吉野町營業所	常盤橋營業所	本店
二一八八〇	四七三四	六九六四	三八四一	九二一〇	四七〇八	九五三六	九三二〇	八七三〇	八七三八	五八六二	四三五一	六五五〇	五三三八	六六三三	八三八四	二八五六

昭和十八年十月十五日第三種郵便物認可  
 昭和十六年十月二十日發行  
 滿洲日報第九千五百五十二號附錄  
 發行人 鈴木 昇  
 編輯人 橋本喜代治  
 印刷人 本村武盛  
 發行所 大連市東公園町三一  
 滿洲日報社

1123.94 / 2510



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75




PM RECD

LEGATION OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Peiping, October 27, 1931.

No. 1241

NOV 23 31



793.94

RECORDED  
X-3-31

F/DEW 793.94/2841

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Sir:

Referring to various telegrams from this Legation, repeating messages from Lieutenant C. C. Brown, of the Naval Attaché's office, whom the Legation authorized to proceed to Mukden shortly after the Japanese invasion, I have the honor to report that Lieutenant Brown returned to Peiping on October 24, 1931.

1/ There is enclosed herewith a copy of a memorandum, dated October 23, 1931, which he prepared for the Naval Attaché reporting his observations in Changchun and Kirin.

/ The impression gained from this memorandum, as well as from conversations I have had with

Lieutenant

DEC 3 1931

FILED

136

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



PM RECD




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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Lieutenant Brown since he returned, is that the Japanese have no present intention of withdrawing from the principal points which they have occupied outside the railway zone.

Respectfully yours,

For the Minister:

  
O. Van B. Engert  
First Secretary of Legation.

Enclosure: ✓

1: Copy of Memorandum  
dated October 23, 1931.

800.

CVHE/js.

COPY

Enclosure No. 1  
Despatch No. 1271

Mukden, Manchuria,

October 23, 1931.

Memorandum for the Naval Attaché:

1. I have returned from a trip to Changchun, northern terminus of the South Manchuria Railway, and Kirin City, capital of the province bearing that name. Although I was met by the Japanese consular and military officials at Kirin sufficient opportunity was presented to interview British and American residents, as well as Chinese officials and business men, without the "assistance" of the Japanese.

2. As a newspaper correspondent who made the trip remarked, "Kirin is a city of fear", and this very aptly summarized existing conditions.

3. After sensing the atmosphere of uneasiness among the population one is next impressed with the air of permanency of the Japanese military occupation, both among Chinese and Japanese alike. The mission hospital conducted by Dr. Sloan, with whom I talked, is unable to install steam heating as all available plumbers in the city have been commandeered by the Japanese in the renovation of former Chinese barracks and installation of a modern heating system therein. An aviation field more than a mile square is being constructed on the outskirts of the city by the Japanese. Obstacles such as houses, trees, etc., were arbitra-

rily

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gutzman NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

rily moved although a time limit was allowed for the voluntary removal of graves by relatives. Failing their removal upon the expiration of the time limit, "White" Russians were employed to level the graves. The Japanese headquarters at Kirin is in a set of buildings well adapted for that purpose and directly in front of the South Manchuria Railway hospital, a large modern plant, now also under military medical control. Japanese soldiers are to be seen everywhere. A detachment of field artillery is billeted in the Japanese Consulate.

4. At 2.00 p.m. on the 22nd I called on the Japanese Consul General, Mr. Nishi. Mr. Tada, who had met me at the station was also present. Both of these gentlemen had spent some time in the States and spoke English fluently. The Consul General said that Kirin was peaceful and that at the present time there was no serious trouble in the outlying districts which were thickly populated by Koreans. In his consular district which includes the greater part of the province and particularly that part towards the Korean border, the Ch'ientao district, the Korean population is very heavy. He stated that 24 Korean farmers have been murdered with a few still missing. 920 Korean refugees were presenting a problem in Kirin since they were reluctant to return to their farms and required feeding. His attitude seemed to reflect that it was quite safe for these refugees to return to their native districts. In common with the implied attitude of other Japanese consular officials in Manchuria, neither the Consul General nor Mr. Tada, were pleased to have a brigade

of

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

of Japanese soldiers quartered in the town and in control.

5. At 2.40 p.m. on the same date I called on the Brigade Commander, whose name I understood to be Hasebe. Mr. Tada kindly acted as interpreter. The General received me very courteously and volunteered to answer "any" questions I might ask. He stated that he had a peace-strength brigade of about 1800 men in the city, with attached units to bring it to about 2000. There had been no clash with the Chinese troops as they had evacuated before the arrival of the Japanese. However, they had been able to carry off their arms and plenty of ammunition and were still within a distance of from 30 to 70 kilometers from Kirin. For the most part they were split into groups of from one to five hundred. The General remarked that he kept track of their movements through daily aerial reconnaissance and felt that if his force should be withdrawn they would immediately reoccupy and loot the city. He stated that the railway line from Kirin to Tunhua had not been molested recently and that Tunhua was quiet. However, the condition of the Korean farmers was dwelt on at length and he enlarged somewhat upon the Consul General's estimates of the murdered, missing and homeless. His attitude reflected a strong desire to have the Japanese military remain in Kirin and the Chinese soldiers to stay out.

6. I later visited the "Pao An Tui" parade ground where Japanese instructors were busily engaged in drilling about 500 new recruits for this peace preservation corps. A Japanese flag was flying over the barracks there. The arsenal was of course in Japanese hands and it is reliably reported that much modern equipment, particularly

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- 4 -

tiicularly field guns and machine guns, recently purchased or manufactured by Chang Tso-hsiang, has already been shipped to Changchun. The Power Plant and other utilities were also flying the Japanese flag. In fact, from the time I arrived at the station which flew one, until the time I left I saw only Japanese flags. No other is allowed over the government buildings. Most of the higher schools, including the University are closed. Those remaining open have only a fractional attendance. Japanese soldiers visit the schools in session each day in search of propaganda and listen to the instruction. The so-called Minister of Education stated that everything must be submitted to the Japanese military for approval, including textbooks, speeches, etc. Japanese advisers are placed in every department of the government, banks, railway, etc.

7. The Japanese Consulate asked me if I wanted to interview Hsi Ch'ia, and that in case I did they would be glad to "arrange" it. Since Mr. Kline and his Chinese friends had arranged for a private interview to Mr. Hunter, who had promised me his notes, I did not offer to take advantage of their opportunity. This frankly puzzled them.

8. The governor very frankly admitted that his was an independent government, adding significantly that it was so because the Japanese had cut him off from all outside communication and that he could have no intercourse with other capitals of Manchuria or Peiping. He further stressed the point, much as has been done by Yuan Chin-kai at Mukden, that he was at-

tempting

- 5 -

tempting only to be responsible for peace and order in Kirin. He deprecated the idea of a split either with the rest of Manchuria or China proper. The governor was exceedingly ill at ease and apprehensive should the Japanese guards outside discover that he was being interviewed.

9. Some sources in Kirin reported that Hsi Ch'ia has strong Manchu contacts and that he is bound to the movement for the restoration of the Ching dynasty, which movement has made considerable headway during the past ten days in Mukden. One source reported that the Governor is a relative of the former ruler, Pu Yi. One responsible Chinese told me that the reason the Japanese had elected to use Hsi was due to the fact that he had never liked Sun Yat-sen and his teachings, nor was he particularly fond of the propaganda emanating from the Kuomintang. However, they had now discovered that he was in fact loyal to the Central Government at Nanking and not unloyal to Chang Hsueh-liang. This informant further stated that so long as Hsi Ch'ia continues to function in a peace preservation capacity he will be supported by the people but any monarchial moves will not meet with support outside of the walls of Kirin city.

10. My informant further stated that the Japanese were attempting to eliminate two groups of Chinese from Kirin, those with financial power or interests and those with any particular standing in the community who were respected by their fellow men. Foreigners confirmed these statements.

11. While practically all shops in Kirin are

forced



- 6 -

forced to remain open there is little business and all valuables are being buried or secreted. The larger business firms deal in lumber and for the most part have always had Japanese managers so there is little change.

12. Only Japanese owned and printed Chinese newspapers are allowed on sale in Kirin or to be delivered through the mails. The Chinese charge that the bundles are taken from the post office and burned. Foreigners stated that they had received no papers since the 14th of October. I personally tried to purchase Chinese papers from various newsboys and they all confirmed that only Dairen and Harbin Japanese owned papers were available.

13. It was reported that Yung Ho (?), the finance head whom Mr. Hanson interviewed, was severely "grilled" by the Japanese authorities upon Mr. Hanson's departure as to the nature of the interview. He was so scared that he fled to Harbin.

14. A foreign evangelist who had arrived from the Korean border within the past few days stated that there was no evidence of any work being done to complete the railroad connecting Tunhua and Korea. The Japanese have, however, connected the tracks of the Kirin-Hailung railway and those of the Changchun-Kirin line. While they have only been separated by a matter of a few hundred feet the two lines were never connected. At present there has been considerable shifting of rolling stock from the Ki-Hai line, which stock is mostly of modern American manufacture.

15. The railway between Changchun and Kirin is

well

- 7 -

well policed by the Japanese military with entrenchments at each station and armored trains on the line.

16. The Chinese population was aroused on the day of my visit by the shooting on the night before of two young men near the University. One of them had also been bayoneted and the presumption is that they failed to halt when challenged by Japanese patrols. Most of the Chinese believe that they were deliberately murdered. Foreigners have, almost without exception, been courteously treated by the military. They searched the Y.M.C.A. and objected to the receipt of certain circular letters by the foreigner in charge and confiscated some of his papers which were later returned. They however stated that they would conduct future searches of a similar nature.

17. The spirit of the Chinese population of Kirin, both high and low alike, has been broken by the military occupation. They anticipate that it will continue for at least a year, if not forever. Their policy seems to be no resistance and as little cooperation as possible except in the maintenance of order, and in this connection it is interesting to note that the police remained at their posts throughout the critical period of occupation and are still on duty. When asked as to their opinion of the ultimate outcome the answer is almost invariably the Chinese expression "mai yu fa tzu", or, "there is no recourse".

(Signed) C. C. BROWN

1st Lieutenant, U.S.M.C.

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the signed orig-  
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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PM RECD  
No. 1  
DEPT. OF STATE  
DIV. COM. & REC.

AMERICAN CONSULATE,

GENERAL,

Mukden, China, October 28, 1931.

NOV 23 31

SUBJECT: Recent Political Developments.

793-94  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE  
NOV 23 1931  
THE HONORABLE  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
NOV 24 1931  
Department of State

F/DEW 793.94/2842

SIR:

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of my  
despatch No. 470, to the Legation, Peiping, China,  
dated October 27, 1931 on the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

*M. S. Myers*  
M. S. Myers  
American Consul General.

FILED  
OCT 8 1931

Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 470

MSM:HTW  
800

No. 470

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, China.

October 27, 1931.

SUBJECT: Recent Political Developments.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping, China.

Sir:

Referring to my despatch No. 468 of October 23, 1931, in regard to recent political developments in which reference was made to the expedition of Chang Hai-p'eng, Tupan of the Mongolian border, against the Heilungkiang government, I have the honor to state that the report that he has been supplied with arms and ammunition by the Japanese military has been confirmed by an American who recently returned from a visit to Taonan. He stated that early in October six carloads of rifles (number given as 6000), ammunition and uniforms were shipped to Taonan by the Japanese. This equipment was said to have been taken from the arsenal at Mukden. All of Chang's soldiers at Taonan are equipped with new uniforms and new rifles. It was learned that when Chang left Taonan in charge of the Heilungkiang expedition he was accompanied by two Japanese

advisers

- 2 -

advisers dressed in Chinese clothing. As previously reported, the expedition was held up at the Nonni River because of the destruction of the railway bridge at that point by the Heilungkiang troops. At present, or at least fairly recently, Chang's troops were concentrated at Tallaichi, in southern Heilungkiang.

About ten days ago the Japanese sent a train, comprising an armored car and several coaches filled with Japanese troops, from Liaoyuan to the Nonni River for the purpose of surveying the damage done to the railway but the train was shelled by Heilungkiang artillery from the north bank of the river and had to return without accomplishing its object. The territory south of the river is under the control of Chang Hai-p'eng's forces.

The district from Liaoyuan northward is under the control of General Chang Hai-p'eng and formerly his troops were distributed at various points along the Ssu-Tao Railway for its protection and for maintaining peace and order in that area. At present, however, not a Chinese soldier is to be seen along the railway between Liaoyuan and Taonan and except for a few station police, armed with batons, there are no guardians of any kind.

Brigandage is rampant in that region. On October 21st the railway was cut at Maolin by a band of about a thousand bandits and for several days traffic was interrupted. However, on October 23rd, the bandits having permitted the repair of the destroyed track, the train dashed through Maolin

and

- 3 -

and was fired upon by the surprised bandits who expected it to stop. Until either the Chinese or Japanese drive away the bandits who are looting the towns and villages along the railway, it is not expected that trains on this line will be able to operate. It is understood that some days prior to this, traffic on the Liaooyuan-Tungliao branch of this line was suspended owing to banditry.

The Chinese throughout that region are greatly alarmed by the state of affairs and many permanent residents have already departed bag and baggage while others are preparing to leave. It is believed that unless conditions materially improve in a short time a large part of the Chinese population will have left.

Japanese official reports are to the effect that an expedition is being prepared at Liaooyuan for despatch northward. Whether its object is to drive away the bandits along the Ssu-Tao Railway or to bolster up the waning fighting spirit of Chang's force by undertaking the repair of the bridge has not been indicated. The river at that point should soon be frozen over and consequently the broken bridge should not prove an effective barrier in case Chang's troops can dislodge the Heilungkiang troops entrenched on the north bank.

There seems to be little doubt that Chang Hai-p'eng has received assistance from the Japanese military and is being used as their pawn in an attempt to establish Japanese influence in Heilungkiang. Reports are not lacking that

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

the Soviet military at Manchouli are assisting General  
Ma Chan-shan, of Heilungkiang, with arms and ammunition  
to resist this invasion. It will be interesting to watch  
how far the Japanese will go in this instance.

Respectfully yours,


M. S. Myers.  
American Consul General.

Original and one copy to Legation.  
Five copies to Department.  
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.  
Copy to Consulate General, Harbin.

MSM:AAB  
800.

A true copy of  
the signed orig-  
inal.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
Lima, November 13, 1931.

DIVISION OF  
LATIN AMERICAN AFFAIRS  
DEC 2 1931

Division of  
EASTERN AFFAIRS  
NOV 24 1931  
Department of State

F/DEW

793.94/2843

# CHILD

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Sir:

My Japanese colleague, Mr. Saburu Kurusu, has carried further with me the conversation I reported to the Department in my despatch No. 1228, November 11. He came to see me on the 10th of November and inquired quite bluntly whether I had seen the Foreign Minister since he had spoken to me the first time. I told him I had not and that the Foreign Minister had said nothing to me, and he seemed somewhat surprised. He said the Council of the League was to take some important action on the Manchurian question at the meeting on November 16th, and that his Government was naturally

naturally



- 2 -

naturally very much interested in the attitude that would be taken by the Peruvian Government as a member of the League. He said that the peace of the world and the prestige of the League was involved, and that he had just had a long conversation the day before with the Minister for Foreign Affairs. He said that Doctor Galvez' attitude was that the prestige of the League should be upheld and that he was trying to find ways of doing this, and that of course Doctor Galvez was also interested in the maintenance of peace. He said Doctor Galvez indicated that he was trying to learn the opinion of Great Britain and of France. Mr. Kurusu said that he had strongly advised the Minister that he should learn the opinion of the United States and that he should consult the United States through the Peruvian Ambassador in Washington. I said that very likely the Minister had not thought of consulting the United States because the United States is not a member of the League, and that he was approaching the question primarily from the League point of view, so far as the November 16th meeting was concerned.

Mr. Kurusu said he thought Doctor Galvez was beginning to understand the Chinese situation somewhat better, and that he had made remarks referring to the enormous size of the country and the unfitness of the Republican form of Government for a people like the Chinese. He thought that probably some special instructions might be sent to the

Peruvian

- 3 -

Peruvian representative at the League, and gave the opinion that probably the Minister would tell the Peruvian representative to follow the lead of some other nation. Nevertheless the Minister allowed it to be very clearly seen that he did not know what the attitude of the Peruvian delegate would be, and seems to have instructions from his Government to do everything he can to influence the attitude of the Peruvian Government so that its delegate at Geneva will not be too unfavorable to Japan. The Minister is collecting all the information he can. He commented very pointedly about the League, saying that it had acted too quickly, that it was uninformed, that it had threatened, and that Japan very naturally had stiffened its attitude when it was menaced with the retirement, or so it was reported, of the representatives of all the nations, members of the League, from their diplomatic posts in Tokio. He said that Japan had felt all the more coerced when there had been reports that if the retirement of the diplomatic representatives would not be sufficient to make the Japanese behave, economic sanctions would be applied.

The Minister was very keen to have me talk to the Foreign Minister and give him the Foreign Minister's attitude. I told him I did not know whether I was going to talk with the Foreign Minister or not, but that if the question came up in any conversation we might have, I would feel free to tell the Foreign Minister quite  
frankly

- 4 -

frankly about my conversation with him. I also told the Japanese Minister that unless the Foreign Minister gave his complete permission, I could not of course repeat the substance of any conversation I might have.

In my talk with the Japanese Minister I did not undertake to reflect the policy of our Government further than to say that we were of course interested in a peaceful solution and that our attitude was one of complete impartiality. The Minister again stated that he felt our nation to be the best informed and the fairest of all.

Yesterday I had a talk with Señor Galvez, the Foreign Minister. He said he had taken due note of the urgency of the Japanese Minister but that he had not felt obliged to follow his suggestion about informing himself at Washington, as he had had a number of other reports both from the Far East and from Geneva, and had his own ways of informing himself. He said he had rather expected that the delegates mentioned in the resolution of October 24th would not be named and that there would be other developments. He commented with approval upon a brief despatch in the paper saying that Secretary Stimson had announced that a very conciliatory note had been received from the Japanese Government.

The Foreign Minister evidently felt slightly crowded by the Japanese Minister, but indicated that he did not intend to be drawn. He reported a long conversation with the Chinese Minister and showed that he realized that the question is not as simple as it may seem and that all the right

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -

right is not on the Chinese side. He is conscious of the fact that if the Japanese are pushed out of Manchuria, all other foreign missions may be pushed entirely out of China and concessions come to an end. He is aware of the enormous infiltration of the Chinese into Manchuria, of the length of the occupation of Manchuria by the Japanese, of the significance of Communism in China, and of an eventual attempt by Russia to reach the waters of the Yellow Sea, and of the past history of the Chinese Eastern railway and the activity of various groups of foreign powers in attempting to finance and do construction work in China and keep various political influences in balance. I believe, therefore, that the Minister is sufficiently informed to be detached and impartial in what he does and that his efforts will be entirely in the interests of world peace and the efforts of the League to bring that about and save its prestige.

He, as well as the Japanese Minister and the Chinese Minister all feel that the League has been precipitate and that it was rather supererogatory for the League to make its prestige the first pawn in the game so early in the negotiations. The Foreign Minister feels that continuing negotiations of one kind and another will soften the atmosphere, gain time for everyone concerned, and that gradually in one way or another formulas may be found to save the face of the nations involved.

I have not seen my Japanese colleague since my talk with the Foreign Minister and shall not seek him out.


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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 6 -

If, under the circumstances, the Department should feel it necessary to give me any instructions or any reflections of its attitude, I shall appreciate having them, as I do not wish to run the risk of erring in anything I may have to say to my Japanese and Chinese colleagues and to the Foreign Minister about this extremely important matter.

Respectfully yours,



Fred Morris Dearing.

FMD:BJ

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RECU



Lima, November 13, 1931.

No. 1243

DEC 22 31

CONFIRMATION COPY

C.O. 793.94/2843

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,  
 Washington.

Sir:

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 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

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 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 6 -

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Respectfully yours,

Fred Morris Dearing.


YMD:BJ

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the signed origi.  
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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PM RECD

No. 1




AMERICAN CONSULATE.

GENERAL,

Mukden, China, October 30, 1931.

NOV 23 31

SUBJECT: Recent Political Developments.



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note  
893.94  
The HONORABLE

DEC 1 1931  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy  
of my despatch No. 471, to the Legation, Peiping, dated  
October 30, 1931, on the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

*M. S. Myers*  
M. S. Myers  
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 471.

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MSM:HTW

F/DEW

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NOV 3 1931

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 441

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, China.

October 30, 1931.

SUBJECT: Recent Political Developments.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping, China.

Sir:

In continuation of my despatch No. 469 of October 24, 1931, under the above subject, I have the honor to report upon recent developments in this district. Reference is also made to my despatch No. 470, of October 27, in which conditions along the Ssu-Tao Railway were reported.

According to a Japanese military report, the Japanese detachment at Liaoyuan (Chengchiatun) was reenforced by two companies of troops from Changchun early in the week. On October 28, as reported by the Japanese military, two contingents of Japanese troops, one from Liaoyuan and another from Saupingkai, attacked the bandits along the Liao River north of the railway and east of Liaoyuan. These troops, comprising altogether four infantry companies and one artillery battery, engaged three groups of Chinese bandits aggregating over 1500 and put them to flight leaving 180 dead on the field; the wounded, it was reported, were taken

away

- 2 -

away by the retreating bandits - possibly there were no wounded. The full Japanese casualty list has not been given; in one encounter a Captain and two privates were killed. The Japanese report that the Chinese engaged near Liaoyuan comprised mixed refugee troops, bandits and villagers and that they carried flags bearing the inscription "Public Safety, North East Self Defense Corps". The Japanese units have been withdrawn to their respective stations.

An unusual ceremony took place at Peiling (North Tomb) at noon on the 26th October. Prince Kung, one of the Manchu princes, offered sacrifice to his ancestor buried there and made the following oath, as reported in the press, before the tomb: "I have not been able to offer sacrifice for a long time. The temple is ruined and the ceremonial has long been suspended. I am greatly affected by these circumstances. Now, by the strength of the spirit of my ancestors and the righteousness of Japan the bad administration of the past twenty years has ceased. The people of this old capital, Shenyang, have elected me Chairman of the Ssu Min Wei Ch'ih Hui (Four People's Maintenance Society). I beseech the powers of heaven and seek the assistance of the people of the four provinces so that the glory of the past may be recovered and blessings and happiness may be enjoyed by the people. I will exert every effort to attain this end."

It is reported that many people (believed to be several hundred) witnessed the ceremony and that several thousand poor who were attracted by reports that the Prince would dispense gifts, were present. They were disappointed.

The

- 3 -

The head of the Four People's Maintenance Society was, when first organized, K'an Chao-hsi who is a member of the local Peace Maintenance Committee. He resigned about two weeks ago and on October 24 Prince Kung was elected as its head. This society was organized, or so it was reported, for the purpose of providing food and clothing for the needy, but there is reason to believe that it has been engaged mainly in conducting propaganda in favor of the independence movement. Japanese are said to be working with this Society, to which little importance has so far been attached.

According to information emanating from a reliable source, Yuan Chin-k'ai has been pressed again and again by Japanese to form an independent government but has refused to do so. I am inclined to believe that this is a fact as responsible Japanese within the past week have told me that it is only a matter of time until he would organize a government at Mukden. Yuan's opinion is, as far as can be ascertained, that a serious effort is being made to effect a Manchu restoration at Mukden and that the recent ceremony at the North Tomb is a significant part of it. A report has been heard that an attempt will shortly be made to bring Hsuan T'ung to Mukden. On the other hand, responsible Japanese opinion was expressed to me only a short time ago to the effect that the movement had no chance of success and that its importance in the news column was largely based on rumors circulated by interested persons, Chinese and Japanese.

The

- 4 -

The Japanese press from day to day publish reports regarding the movements or military activities of Ling Yin-ch'ing and his following. The latest report is that he is at the head of an army which is now engaging Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang's troops near Koupangtzu, the junction point of the Newchwang branch with the main line of the Peking-Mukden railway. This news seems doubtful and certainly the reports that his following numbers 80,000 is grossly exaggerated - 3,000 is a more likely number. The opinion generally prevails that he is receiving Japanese support.

According to information supplied by a responsible Chinese, Ling has lived for some years in the railway settlement at Mukden where he was engaged in the sale of opium. It is claimed also that at the time of the death of Marshal Chang Tso-lin he was arrested by the Japanese and handed over to the Chinese authorities as a Kuomintang extremist who was implicated in the bombing of the train. The Chinese, it was said, refused to accept the man. This report cannot be confirmed. My informant stated also that he is looked upon as a tool of the Japanese and that there are Japanese dressed in Chinese uniforms in his following. In this connection reference is made to my despatch of October 24, 1931, in which reliable information was reported regarding his being seen at Tengaopu in company with twelve Japanese and an escort of 50 men armed with new rifles.

Respectfully



133  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers.  
American Consul General.

Original and one copy to Legation.  
Five copies to Department.  
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.  
Copy to Consulate General, Harbin.

MSM:AAB  
800.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

WE  
FE/sk

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

~~SECRET~~ DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 24, 1931.

Tokyo, November 6, 1931, No. 378.


✓ Recent alleged acts of officials of Great Britain have aroused nation-wide resentment in Japan and have brought conviction that the League has been used by Great Britain to advance her economic ambitions in China. It is believed that ✓ Great Britain is abetted by France, who anticipates British support another time in manipulating the League to promote French interests.

✓ The three principal incidents, as given by Japanese officials, appear to be no more than a question of manners. However, according to an unconfirmed report, Shidehara ~~ix~~ expressed to the British Ambassador in no mild terms his displeasure at the "impertinent" language employed by Sir Miles Lampson to the Japanese Minister at Peking, and expressed the wish that it might be moderated. The resentment which has been aroused in Japan has united the nation on the side of the military, and will probably complete Japanese scepticism of the disinterestedness of future League actions relating to Manchuria.

✓ The tone of the press has become very anti-British, and the public will doubtless give credence to the additional allegations of chicanery which are appearing. Copies of translations of several editorials are enclosed herewith.

According

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Tokyo, Japan, November 6, 1931.


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NOV 23 31



F/DEW

743.94  
note  
741.94



793.94/2845

JAN 13 1932

FILED

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that recent alleged acts of certain officials of Great Britain have aroused nation-wide resentment in Japan and have brought conviction here that the League of Nations has been used by Great Britain to further her economic ambitions in China. Great Britain is believed to be abetted by France, the latter country anticipating support at some subsequent time in manipulation of the League to promote French interests.

Briefly, the three principal incidents - according to statements by Japanese officials - are as follows:

On

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

WE  
FE/skt

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

~~SECRET~~ DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 24, 1931.

Tokyo, November 6, 1931, No. 378.

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The three principal incidents, as given by Japanese officials, appear to be no more than a question of manners. However, according to an unconfirmed report, Shidehara ~~is~~ expressed to the British Ambassador in no mild terms his displeasure at the "impertinent" language employed by Sir Miles Lampson to the Japanese Minister at Peking, and expressed the wish that it might be moderated. The resentment which has been aroused in Japan has united the nation on the side of the military, and will probably complete Japanese scepticism of the disinterestedness of future League actions relating to Manchuria.

The tone of the press has become very anti-British, and the public will doubtless give credence to the additional allegations of chicanery which are appearing. Copies of translations of several editorials are enclosed herewith.

According

2

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

✓ According to the newspapers, the British Ambassador on November 5 presented to the Minister for Foreign Affairs a memorandum denying on behalf of the British Government the truth of the report that it is supporting China in the present Sino-Japanese trouble.


EBT

SKH:

This may have some relation to British decision not to send a note like ours to Tokyo, i.e. making up for past bad feeling.

AMS.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Tokyo, Japan, November 6, 1931.


No. 378

NOV 23 31



F/DEW

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JAN 13 1932

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The Honorable

The Secretary of State,  
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Sir:

I have the honor to report that recent alleged acts of certain officials of Great Britain have aroused nation-wide resentment in Japan and have brought conviction here that the League of Nations has been used by Great Britain to further her economic ambitions in China. Great Britain is believed to be abetted by France, the latter country anticipating support at some subsequent time in manipulation of the League to promote French interests.

Briefly, the three principal incidents - according to statements by Japanese officials - are as follows:

On

- 2 -

On October 22nd, at the meeting of the committee of the Council of the League charged with drafting a resolution on the Manchuria situation for submission to the Council, Mr. Yoshizawa requested that the committee postpone decision until the following day, pending the receipt of instructions from his Government that would make possible the drafting of a resolution acceptable to Japan as well as to China. Opposing the request successfully on the trivial ground that he wished to leave that evening for London to spend the week-end, Lord Reading induced the committee's approval of the resolution detrimental to Japan's interests. The second incident was Lord Cecil's "cross-examination" of Mr. Yoshizawa at the meeting of the Council of the League on October 24th in a manner repugnant to the Japanese. Japanese anger was increased by the report that Sir Miles Lampson had called on the Japanese Minister at Peking "to bring pressure to bear" in effecting the withdrawal of Japanese troops before the negotiations and in obtaining the restoration to power of Chang Hsueh-liang. According to a further report, which I have not yet been able to confirm, Baron Shidehara expressed to the British Ambassador at Tokyo in no mild terms his displeasure at the "impertinent" language employed by Sir Miles Lampson and expressed the wish that it might be moderated.

It may be that these three alleged incidents were actually no more than a question of manners, but the Japanese are convinced they reveal British self-interest. Not only has the resultant resentment united the nation more firmly on the side of the Japanese military, but it

will,

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

will, I believe, complete Japanese scepticism of the disinterestedness of future League action relating to Manchuria. Any tranquilizing powers of the League have been temporarily nullified in this country by the belief that Great Britain has acted high-handedly in an effort to improve her position in China at the expense of Japan.

So convinced of British self-interest do the Japanese seem to be that I should not be surprised if they give considerable credence to additional allegations of chicanery that have been appearing in the vernacular press during the past few days. Various leading papers report that the British are supporting General Chiang Kai-shek so that Japan's position in Manchuria may be made less tenable, that Sir Miles Lampson is acting as intermediary between Generals Chiang Kai-shek and Chang Hsueh-liang, that the Thornburn case was settled soon after the Mukden incident in a manner unfavorable to the British to curry Chinese favor. The tone of the press has become so anti-British that, according to the newspapers, the British Ambassador yesterday presented to the Minister for Foreign Affairs a memorandum denying on behalf of the British Government the truth of the report that it is supporting China in the present Sino-Japanese trouble.

1/. If this denial was made, it has apparently had little or no effect. The Tokyo CHUGAI SHOGYO, the leading commercial daily, commented editorially this morning with respect to it in the following vein: "the most unfriendly and insincere attitude and actions of the British Government and its agents toward this country in connection

with



- 4 -

with the Manchurian trouble are too well known to the Japanese people and will not be easily erased from the memory of every Japanese subject who cannot but be astonished at the statement of the British Ambassador

2/. which is indeed a transparent lie". The Tokyo HOCHI in its editorial this morning recapitulates briefly the questionable British activities already mentioned and says, "since the outbreak of the Manchurian affair Britain's attitude toward Japan has been anything but an endorsement of its traditional friendly relationship of the past many years".

These editorials of this morning are a reflection of comment that appeared previously. On October 23rd, for

3/. example, the Tokyo NICHU NICHU, one of the most influential newspapers, after commenting adversely on the presence of an American observer at the meetings of the Council of the League, went on to say that Lord Reading was the principal advocate of this "scheme". It then asked, "Is such an underhand measure worthy of the wisdom of such an enlightened British statesman as Lord Reading?", continuing with the statements: "the best political measures for upholding Britain's prestige and influence must be established on a broader basis than that of petty immediate gains. The interests of the Manchester manufacturer alone should not be taken into consideration". In fact, the only leading newspaper that has not published strongly anti-British comment is the Tokyo JIJI. Copies in translation of the editorials mentioned are transmitted

as of

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -

as of possible interest.

Respectfully yours,

  
W. Cameron Forbes

✓  
Enclosures:

- 1 - Copy in translation of  
the CHUGAI SHOGYO's Editorial.
- 2 - Copy in translation of the  
HOCHI's Editorial.
- 3 - Copy in translation of the  
NICHU NICHU's Editorial.

Embassy's File No. 800.

LES/AA

Enclosure No. 1  
Despatch No. 378  
From American Embassy  
Tokyo.

Translation.

Britain's Fishing in Troubled Waters

(The Tokyo CHUGAI SHOGYO, November  
5, 1931.)

In connection with the anti-British tone of Japanese Public opinion in connection with the Manchurian question, the British Ambassador, Sir Francis Lindley, called on the Vice Minister, Mr. Nagai, at the Foreign Office on Wednesday afternoon and, repudiating the press reports accusing the British Government of interference in the Manchurian trouble on behalf of China, with the apparent intention of befriending China and deriving some selfish interests as its reward, made an explanation in defence of the honest attitude of the British Government. The Ambassador handed Vice Minister Nagai a written statement denying the truth of the reports printed in several Japanese papers some time ago. The statement was apparently intended for publication in the columns of the vernacular papers. In this connection the Foreign Office authorities refrain from making any remarks, in accordance with diplomatic courtesy. The most unfriendly and insincere attitude and actions taken by the British Government and its agents toward this country in connection with the Manchurian trouble are too well known to Japanese people and will not be easily erased from the memory of every Japanese subject, who cannot but feel astonished at the British Ambassador's statement, which is indeed a transparent lie. Of all the occidental powers, Britain and the United States are the only countries which are well cognizant of the actual state of things in China and

- 2 -

and which fully understand that Japan's previously acquired rights and interests in Manchuria are most vital to the Japanese nation. Then, in the League of Nations, Great Britain is the only member who fully understands and ought to understand Japan's stand in Manchuria, the rest being quite ignorant of it and having no understanding.

The Council of the League slighted this very important question. For instance, the British representative placed Japan in a most difficult position through influencing it to be anti-Japanese by making use of China's false propaganda. He helped China in the Five Powers Committee meeting to the utmost degree, which finally submitted the worst kind of resolution to the Council of the League on October 24th. Not only this, but Sir Miles Lampson meddled publicly with the internal affairs of China by going back and forth between Nanking and Peiping for the purpose of establishing cooperation between Chiang and Chang. Furthermore, he worked against the Japanese by sending a 10,000-ton cruiser to Shanghai, by ridicule of Shigemitsu by using coercive language, and by other things that are well-known facts, all of which goes to show that Britain's policy is to help China. Britain, in accordance with the policy, solved the Thornburn case in a manner disadvantageous to Britain. All these things are undeniable facts. To be anti-Japanese or to be anti-British is the usual policy of Chinese statesmen. As the British know this, if they really desire peace in the Orient they should use this opportunity to correct China's unreasonableness. Yet, on the contrary, the present way  
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

of puffing up and encouraging China by misuse of this opportunity, is conclusive evidence of British policy. There is no excuse on the part of the authorities of the Foreign Office for listening to such an explanation and again the spinebssness of the authorities of the Foreign Office is proved. It deserves open denunciation.

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Enclosure No. 2  
Despatch No. 378  
From American Embassy  
Tokyo.

Translation.

The Unfriendly Attitude of Great Britain.

(The Tokyo HOCHI of November 5, 1931.)

Since the outbreak of the Manchurian affair Britain's attitude toward Japan has been anything but an indorsement of the traditional friendly relationship that has bound the two countries for many years past. To cite some instances, the British Minister in China, Sir Miles Lampson, is reported to be actively engaged as an intermediary between Chang Hsueh-liang at Peiping and General Chiang Kai-shek at Nanking, and carrying on secret political manoeuvres. He is even suspected of interference in the peace parley between the representatives of the Nanking and Canton Governments. These and other similar reports coming from highly trustworthy sources, substantiated by facts, tend to convince us with the undeniable truth of the alleged pro-Chinese attitude of the British Minister in China. There was something very incomprehensible in the attitude towards Japan of Chairman Drummond and the British delegate, Lord Reading, at the recent session of the Council of the League of Nations. That the British Government, which is best informed on Chinese affairs and has had many bad experiences in its dealings with China for many years past, would assume an attitude of indifference toward Japan's special rights and interests in Manchuria and Mongolia is indeed incomprehensible and, therefore, the recent attitude of the British authorities has arrested the keen attention of the Japanese Government

and

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

and nation, and, moreover, has given rise to somewhat excited feeling among publicists. Especially, the Japanese Government is paying keen attention in that direction because of possible influence on the future of the friendly relations between Japan and Britain. Apparently perturbed by this undesirable development of the situation, the British Ambassador, Sir Francis Lindley, under instructions from his home Government, called on Vice Minister, Mr. Nagai, at the Foreign Office on Wednesday afternoon, and, handing the Vice Minister a written statement denying in the name of the British Government the Japanese press reports to the effect that the British Government is supporting China in connection with the Manchurian embroglio in the hope of obtaining some reward from China for its kindly assistance, asked Mr. Nagai to give publicity in the Japanese press to the said statement, and, further, to make efforts to allay such undesirable doubts respecting the attitude of the British Government. In reply, Mr. Nagai stated that he believed it was most important for the maintenance of the friendly relationship between Japan and Britain for the British Government to prove by practice and actual facts in the sight of the Japanese nation its candid and upright attitude.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 3  
Despatch No. 372  
From American Embassy  
Tokyo.

Translation.

Britain's Far Eastern Policy

(The Tokyo NICHU NICHU of October 23, 1931.)

What is Britain's dignity and influence in the Far East at present? This question is to be best answered and explained by the Britons. The waning of British influence in the Far East may be explained in many ways according to the different angles of observation, but many agree that one of the greatest causes lies in the psychology of great statesmen who frame the policy of a country as the helmsman of the craft of state. The attitude of Lord Reading in the recent session of the Council of the League of Nations in connection with the Manchurian problem has deeply impressed us with the truth of what has just been stated. The United States of America refused to become a member of the League of Nations on the eve of its coming into existence, as everybody knows, and yet when the Manchurian problem was taken up for discussion at the recent session of the Council of the League the United States was made to participate in the session of the Council under the name of observer. There was no reason or ground whatever to justify America's participation in the Council, which irregularity could be explained only by "political convenience", this simply meaning that the United States is a great country. If it is convenient to make a country not belonging to the League of Nations participate in the Council of the League simply because of its being a great power, why did not the League make

Soviet



- 2 -

SovietRussia similarly participate in the Council? Soviet Russia is a great country and as a neighbor of Japan and China it has very complicated political and economic relations with them. In that respect the United States is no comparison. Nevertheless, they induced the United States to participate in the discussion over the Manchurian affair of the Council at the expense of Russia. This is nothing but an attempt of the League to bring pressure on Japan by borrowing the influence of the United States, and Lord Reading, the British delegate, is at least the strong advocate of the scheme. Is such an underhand measure worthy of the wisdom of an enlightened British statesman such as Lord Reading, who is eager to maintain Britain's influence and prestige in the Far East?

England has many colonial possessions and complicated economic and other interests in the Far East, which are both its advantages and weakness. The best political measures for upholding Britain's prestige and influence must be framed and established on a broader scope; it should not be formulated from the viewpoint of petty immediate gains or of mere theory. The interests of the Manchester manufacturers alone should not be taken into consideration, but the Far Eastern policy of the British Government should be formed on an imperial principle, as their great statesmen have often wished. We cannot but question whether Lord Reading had taken the trouble to consider what effect undue pressure upon Japan will bring about to Britain's interests in the Far East.

Nobody can deny that a great disturbance will occur in

the

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

the Yangtze region in the trail of the recent great floods, claimed to be the most disastrous experience for several hundred years. A second Taiping rebellion may break out in the shape of a communistic uprising in the provinces of Hunan and Hupeh, which are already a hot-bed of communism. In such an eventuality, the British alone can never escape unhurt from the inevitable. The nation that can cooperate with Japan will only be able to secure its present position. The present is the time when the British nation ought to reconsider their Far Eastern policy.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




PM RECD

LEGATION OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Beiping, October 28, 1931.

No. 1244

NOV 23 31



The Honorable

The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Sir:

1/ I have the honor to transmit herewith, as of possible interest to the Department, a copy in translation of an undated statement, addressed "To the Minister of the United States and for transmission to the Ministers of other Powers", from the Standing Committee of the Labor Union of Timber Interests in the Municipality of Nanking. This statement is in the nature of an appeal to the Powers to "uphold justice" in connection with the alleged Japanese aggression. The document contains the following significant statement which indicates the real reason for so many of the ills which afflict China today:

"China

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

"China is a country having due regard for courtesy and justice, and the only reason why the Chinese people are subject to molestation by others is that the militarists who are responsible for the incessant Civil Strife, have absolutely no idea of the fact that personal interests must be subordinated to National considerations."

Respectfully yours,

For the Minister:

  
C. Van H. Enger,  
First Secretary of Legation.

Enclosure:

Statement addressed "To the Minister of the United States and for transmission to the Ministers of other Powers."

800.

CVHE:MM

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1  
Despatch No. 1844

COPY

October ..... 1931.

To the Minister of the United States and for  
transmission to the Ministers of other Powers.

China has just suffered from serious flood disasters but, instead of thinking about the relief of the distressed and sympathizing with their neighbor, the Japanese, out of a sordid motive, have made much of the opportunity thus offered. Taking advantage of China's trying moment, they sent out troops suddenly, occupied the Three Eastern Provinces, demolished nearly all of the existing structures, seized public property as well as private possessions and killed numerous soldiers and civilians in a manner that would identify their activities with those of bandits or marauders. For the troops of a large country to avail themselves of the trouble of another to rob its possessions without notice or declaration of war and in a manner characteristic only of free-booters and highwaymen is a cowardice in the eye of every strong nation no matter to what extent the conquest may be carried. Inevitably, such a mischief would lower its perpetrators in the estimation of the world and impair the prestige of their country making the other Powers ashamed to sit with it in all international conferences. Furthermore, the outrageous, underhand and illegitimate

- 2 -

legitimate measures adopted by its military constitute virtually a violation of the Kellogg Treaty and a contempt of all other nations. We wonder how the Powers that have signed the anti-war treaty in good faith would endeavor to preserve the sanctity of agreement.

No nation on earth is always immune from bad luck or calamity; if the Japanese should take as a golden opportunity a similar mishap that befalls any country other than China and repeat there in a manner beyond control everything that they have done here, what would be the result? If, in the present instance, the Powers fail through the medium of an international tribunal to compel Japan to inflict a severe punishment upon the ringleaders of the marauding soldiery and compensate China for the losses she has suffered in their hands, then no Power which cares to obviate the possibility of such a precarious situation as it is impossible to guard against would ever have the nerve to allow a single armed Japanese to approach its frontier.

We wonder how Japan's national dignity could exist when its regular troops are so audacious and worse even than the dwarf marauders of old days. We recall the fact that a few years ago, when the Japanese suffered from a terrible earthquake, the soldiers and civilians throughout China sympathized deeply with the victims and grieved as much as they would in the case of death of their brothers. We had not the least desire to take advantage of their trouble but this savage nation was never influenced by our example. China is a country having due regard for courtesy and justice and the only reason why the Chinese people are subject  
to

- 3 -

to molestation by others is that the militarists who are responsible for the incessant civil strife have absolutely no idea of the fact that personal interests must be subordinated to national consideration. In the Korean case of Wanpaoshan and the present occupation of Chinese territory, the Japanese have manifested a total disregard for humanity by the massacre of empty-handed and innocent persons. Does international law permit one country to send troops to another in a stealthy manner? Does it tolerate the seizure of one's territory by another who takes advantage of the latter's trouble? Even in the Indian insurrection, Great Britain did not bear to inflict injury upon Ghandi or to do harm to the Indian community. No nation on earth that disregards virtue and benevolence can win the confidence of others and permanently rule by force.

We respectfully request that the Powers uphold justice while the Chinese are willing to take up arms and march in front of an army against the malicious Small Island whose days are numbered. It is our painful duty to make this declaration and appeal to you for aid in the interest of justice.

Lu Tso-fan, Standing Committee of the  
Labor Union of Timber Interest in  
the Municipality of Nanking.


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



REQD



EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Tokyo, November 7, 1931.

No. 384.


NOV 23 1931



DCR 4123

F/DEW

793.94/2847



The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit to the Department  
1/. herewith two copies of a Chronology of China, With  
Special Reference to Manchuria, reprinted from The  
Manchuria Year Book, 1931, and issued by the East  
Asiatic Economic Investigation Bureau.

Respectfully yours,

Enclosure:  
1. As stated.  
Embassy File No. 800-China  
LES/hln

*W. Cameron Forbes*

W. Cameron Forbes,  
Ambassador.

JAN 9 1932

FILED



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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CHRONOLOGY OF CHINA  
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO  
MANCHURIA

793.94/2847.

REPRINTED FROM  
THE MANCHURIA YEAR BOOK, 1931

ISSUED BY  
TOA-KEIZAI CHOSAKYOKU  
(East-Asiatic Economic Investigation Bureau)

THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE RETURNED TO THE  
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CHRONOLOGY OF CHINA  
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO  
MANCHURIA

(1925—1930)

1925

- Jan. 25—Chi Hsieh-yuan's (齊燮元) troops defeated by Mukden troops under Chang Tsung-chang (張宗昌).  
31—Shanghai occupied by Chang Tso-ling's (張作霖) troops.
- Feb. 1—Apr. 21—Reorganization Conference (善後會議) inaugurated at Peking by Tuan Chi-jui (段祺瑞) and attended by members of Peking Government and military leaders.
- Mar. 12—Death of Sun Yat-sen (孫逸仙).
- Apr. 4—Dispute arises between the Chinese and Soviet officials of the Chinese Eastern Railway about the discharge of anti-Soviet Russians from employment by the railway.  
11—Increase of the Customs Surtax at Newchwang with the approval of the Diplomatic Corps at Peking, the increased revenue to be applied to the dredging of the lower stream of the Liao River.  
12—Agreement concluded with France, settling "Gold franc controversy."  
30—Relations between Feng Yu-hsiang (馮玉祥) and Chang Tso-ling become strained. Chang arrives at Tientsin, Peking threatened.
- May 30—The demonstration in Shanghai of Chinese students in sympathy with Chinese strikers in Japanese mills. Police station in International Concession attacked. Nine Chinese killed and several wounded. (The Shanghai Incident)
- June 1—General strike declared at Shanghai. "State of Emergency" declared.  
1—General Manager Ivanoff of the Chinese Eastern Railway discharges about 600 anti-Soviet employees. The Chinese authorities protest, and relations between China and the Soviet become strained.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gutzman NARS, Date 12-18-75

320

THE MANCHURIA YEAR BOOK

- 24—Peking Government in note to Diplomatic Corps demands abrogation of the "unequal treaties."
- Aug. 5—Ratifications of the two treaties of Feb. 6, 1922 exchanged at Washington.
- 18—Peking Government invites Powers to Special Tariff Conference (to be held under Washington Treaty, within three months of the ratification of Treaty).
- 19—Chang Tso-lin proposes to construct the Huhai or Hulan (呼蘭)-Hailun (海倫) Railway as a semi-government enterprise, the construction to be started in February, 1926 at Nantuan.
- 28—The Department of Foreign Affairs of the Chinese Government submits a demand to abolish Japanese post offices in South Manchuria Railway Zone.
- Sept. 15—Preparatory Committee of the Tariff Conference meets.
- 17—United States Government convoked Extraterritoriality Commission for Dec. 18 at Peking. (Meeting subsequently postponed, owing to interruption of communications between Peking and Tientsin).
- 24—The Government of Outer Mongolia submits a demand for independence to the Bureau for Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs, Peking.
- Oct. 1—Peking Government rejects the demand of Outer Mongolia for independence.
- 16—Sun Chuan-fang (孫傳芳) issues a circular telegram announcing to start a punitive expedition against Chang Tso-lin.
- 21—Relations between Wu Pei-fu (吳佩孚) and Chang Tso-lin become strained, and Wu issues a circular telegram announcing his attitude against Chang. Mukden forces advance southward.
- 26—The first Plenary Session of the Special Conference on Chinese Customs Tariff.
- Nov. 13—Agreement reached between Chang Tso-lin and Feng Yu-hsiang for withdrawal of Chang's troops from the neighbourhood of Peking.
- 23—Kuo Sung-ling (郭松齡), a general under Chang Tso-lin, revolts.
- 23—Right wing opposition of Kuomintang meets in Peking (Hsishan conference: 西山會議); resolution to exclude communist from the party passed.
- 26—Feng Yu-hsiang's troops occupy Peking.
- Dec. 6—Kuo defeats Chang's army at Chinchow (錦州), and advances towards Mukden.
- 9—Feng attacks Tientsin.
- 15—Japanese announcement on sending immediate reinforcements to protect South Manchuria Railway.

CHRONOLOGY

321

- 15—Diplomatic Corps at Peking presents a note to the Department of Foreign Affairs insisting on restoration of free communication between Peking and Tientsin.
- Dec. 23—Summaries of the findings of three Judges regarding Shanghai Incident published.
- 24—Kuo Sung-ling defeated and captured, (executed on Dec. 27).
- 26—Japanese Ministry of War decides to withdraw additional troops from South Manchuria.
- 26—Hsu Shih-ying (許世英) appointed Prime Minister.
- 31—Hsu Cabinet formed.

1926

- Jan. 1-20—Second National Congress of Kuomintang held at Canton.
- 9—Feng Yu-hsiang retires from all official ranks and positions.
- 12—Anti-Japanese agitation opposing the despatch of Japanese troops to Manchuria starts at Amoy and Canton.
- 12—The International Commission on Extraterritoriality opened at Peking.
- 17—Disputes over the transport of Chinese railway guards cause suspension of traffic on the Chinese Eastern Railway.
- 19—Mukden forces advance within Shanhaikwan.
- 22—Chinese troops arrest General Manager Ivanoff of the Chinese Eastern Railway.
- 25—Disputes respecting the Chinese Eastern Railway solved, and Ivanoff and others set free.
- 25—Mukden forces retreat beyond the Shanhaikwan.
- Feb. 20—Prime Minister Hsu resigns.
- Mar. 4—Chia Teh-yao (賈德耀) cabinet formed.
- 9—Foreign shipping fired on by Taku (大沽) Forts.
- 18—Anti-foreign mass meeting at Peking. Collisions between students and Government troops follow, causing numerous casualties.
- 20—Coup d'état in Canton (Cruiser Chungshan: 中山艦 Incident) Chiang Kai-shek arrests Russian extremists and strikes at Canton.
- 27—Mukden forces advance southward to attack Peking, and occupy Tungchow (通州).
- 30—Chang Huan-hsiang (張煥相) Governor of Tungsheng Special District dissolves Municipal Assembly of Harbin.
- Apr. 6—Diplomatic Body protests against aerial bombardment of Peking.
- 18—Mukden forces enter Peking.
- 19—Chia cabinet resigns en bloc.
- 20—Regent Tuan (段祺瑞) resigns.

1421

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

322

THE MANCHURIA YEAR BOOK

- May 5-7—Strike of horse carriage drivers and rikisha-men of Mukden, opposing the carriage and cart tax levied by the South Manchuria Railway.
- 13—Regency Cabinet inaugurated under Yen Hui-ching (顏惠慶).
- 15-26—Special Plenary Session of Kuomintang held.
- 20—Strike at the Penhsihu Colliery and Iron Works (本溪湖煤鐵公司).
- 21—Sino-Soviet Conference to discuss the Chinese Eastern Railway problems opened at Mukden.
- 22—Fengtien-piao, or Mukden note falls to the rate of 345 yuan for 100 silver yuan. Authorities prohibit the use of Tayang silver coins and Chin-piao (Bank of Chosen note) within the walled-city of Mukden.
- 30—Fengtien-piao falls to the rate of 430 yuan for 100 silver yuan.
- June 1—Anti-foreign demonstration in Shanghai.
- 1—Opening ceremony of the construction of the Kirin (吉林)-Tunhua (敦化) Railway held at Kirin.
- 5—Decisive battle imminent at Nankow (南口) between Mukden forces and troops of Wu Pei-fu. Chang Tso-lin advances in person to Tientsin.
- 10—Customs Tariff Conference decides to adopt for the present the 5 and 2.5 percent rates of surtaxes agreed upon at the Washington Conference.
- 23—Opening ceremony of the construction of the Chinfu (金福) railway held at Chinchou.
- 23—Resignation of Prime Minister Yen.
- 28—Chang Tso-lin and Wu Pei-fu meet at Peking to discuss compromise.
- 28—Kirin Province issues regulations prohibiting shipments of cereals out of the province.
- July 3—Customs Tariff Conference discontinued.
- 6—Formation of the Tu Hsi-kuei (杜錫珪) Cabinet.
- 9—Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石), appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist Revolutionary Army, issues a declaration for subjugating the Northern provinces.
- 11—Part of the Hulan-Hailun Railway, 23 km. from Sungpu (松浦) to Hulan (呼蘭) opened to traffic.
- 15—Taonan (洮南)-Anganghsi (昂昂溪) Railway opened to traffic between Taonan and Mokuchi (模古氣).
- 28—Following a development of events unfavourable to the Mukden forces, the Fengtien-piao further falls to the rate of 600 yuan for 100 silver yuan.
- Aug. 14—Kuomin Army (國民軍) of Feng Yu-hsiang defeated at Nankow.
- 16—Occupation of Nankow by Mukden forces.
- 19—Chang Tso-lin executes five leading exchange brokers in Mukden for disturbing the currency market.

CHRONOLOGY

323

- 20—Nine more exchange brokers shot in Mukden.
- 25—Fengtien-piao quotations advance to the rate of 350 yuan for 100 silver yuan.
- 27—Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang at Canton announces that Feng Yu-hsiang is permitted to join the party.
- 30—Peking Government demands recall of Soviet Ambassador Karakhan.
- Sept. 1—Oct. 11—Siege of Wuchang (武昌).
- 2—Chinese Authorities at Harbin seize vessels belonging to C.E.R. at Harbin and dissolves the railway's Education Department.
- 5—Wanhhsien (萬縣) Incident. Clash between British Naval forces and Chinese troops.
- 10—Karakhan leaves Peking.
- 16—The last full session of the Commission on Extraterritoriality.
- 17—Feng Yu-hsiang appointed Commander-in-Chief of Allied Nationalist Forces (國民軍聯合總司令).
- 15-28—Extraordinary Congress of Central Executive Committee and Provincial Delegates of Kuomintang.
- 20—Peking Government demands revision of Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1896, which expired on Oct. 19.
- Nov. 3—Occupation of Kiukiang (九江) by the Nationalist troops.
- 15-20—Military Council of Chang Tso-lin held at Tientsin. Chang Tsung-chang (張宗昌) and Sun Chuan-fang (孫傳芳) discuss united action against the Nationalist forces.
- Dec. 1—Chang Tso-lin appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Ankuochun (安國軍) or National Defence Army.
- 18—British Memorandum concerning China communicated to the representatives of the Washington Treaty Powers.
- 27—Chang Tso-lin enters Peking.

1927

- Jan. 1—Mandate issued by the Nationalist Government to consolidate cities of Hankow, Wuchang and Hanyang (漢陽) into one city named Wuhan (武漢).
- 1—Mixed Court at Shanghai formally handed over to Chinese.
- 3—Governor of Tungsheng Special District issues order prohibiting the circulation of gold yen notes of Japanese banks.
- 4—Seizure of British Concession at Hankow.
- 7—Fengtien-piao falls to the rate of 645 yuan for 100 silver yuan.
- 12—By a Presidential Mandate actual collection of Customs surtaxes from February 1, declared. Minister Yoshizawa of Japan issues a protest against this declaration.
- 21—Negotiations to revise Sino-Japanese Treaty opened.

42

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 23—Hulan-Hailung Railway opened to traffic as far as Suihua (綏化).  
24—Despatch of British troops announced by British War Office.  
24—Nationalist Government issues a protest against British despatch of troops.  
25—A Section of the Tahushan (打虎山)-Tungliao (通遼) (Paiyintala) Railway, 64 km. in length, completed.  
27—Agitation against gold yen in North Manchuria settled by Sino-Japanese negotiations held at Mukden.  
27—U.S. Secretary of State makes official statement regarding U.S. policy in China.  
31—Peking Government dismisses Sir Francis Aglen, Inspector-General of Customs.  
31—The Department of Foreign Affairs of Peking Government issues protest against despatch of British troops.
- Feb. 1—Diplomatic Corps at Peking protests againsts the dismissal of Sir Francis Aglen.  
7—Chen Yu-jen (陳友仁)-O'Malley negotiations reopened at Hankow.  
16—Army of Sun Chuan-fang (孫傳芳) defeated by Nationalist Army at Hangchow (杭州).  
19—General Strike at Shanghai against the Northern allied forces.  
19—Agreement regarding future of British Concession at Hankow signed by the representatives of Nationalist and British Government.  
22—French Settlement at Shanghai shelled by Chinese boats.  
24—General Strike at Shanghai called off by General Labour Union.
- Mar. 1—Arrest of Mme. Borodin at Pukow (浦口).  
10-17—Plenary Session of the Kuomintang held at Hankow. Conflict between Chiang Kai-shek and Communists becomes manifest.  
15—Formal rendition of the concessions at Hankow and Kiukiang carried out.  
21—Occupation of Shanghai by the Nationalist troops.  
22—Fengtien-piao falls to the rate of 860 yuan for 100 silver yuan.  
24—Nanking occupied by the Nationalist troops. (The Nanking Incident).  
25—South Manchuria Railway Company decides to reduce railway fares for refugees from Shangtung and to carry children under 15 and aged persons above 60 free of charge.
- Apr. 1—Twentieth anniversary of the commencement of business of the South Manchuria Railway Company.  
3—Japanese concession at Hankow attacked by mob.  
5—Japanese Consul-General at Harbin protests against the declaration of the Harbin Customs Office to collect the Customs surtaxes.

- 6—Chang Tso-lin conducts a search in the rooms of the Military Attaché of the Soviet Embassy, Peking, arrests number of Chinese, including Li Ta-chao (李大釗) and Russians, and confiscates documents.  
7—Chiang Kai-shek carries out a coup d'état in Shanghai against the left wing of the Kuomintang and Communists.  
7—Fengtien-piao falls to the rate of 1,102 yuan for 100 silver yuan, and the financial condition of the Three Eastern Provinces becomes critical.  
12-13—General Labour Union at Shanghai declares general strike in opposition to Chiang Kai-shek.  
14—General Labour Union at Shanghai dissolved.  
18—Chiang Kai-shek inaugurates "moderate" Nationalist Government at Nanking.  
19—Soviet Chargé d'Affaires withdraws from Peking.  
19—Wuhan Government declares war against Chiang Kai-shek.
- Apr. 20—Tanaka Cabinet formed in Japan.  
22—Japanese Government issues an urgency Imperial Ordinance regarding moratorium (from April 22 to May 12). Associated banks and exchanges of Dairen close their doors on the 22nd and 23rd, following a similar step taken by banks in Japan proper.  
23—Moratorium also declared for Korea. It is decided to apply moratorium ordinance to the Kwantung Leased Territory and other colonies (from the 25th in the Kwantung Leased Territory and South Manchuria Railway Zone).  
28—Li Ta-chao and twenty other Communists executed at Peking.
- May 12—Raid of Arcos at London.  
13—Sino-Japanese negotiations on Treaty revision discontinued.  
15—Sun Chuan-fang retreats from Pukow.  
17—British Government orders its diplomatic representatives to leave Hankow.  
20-26—Pan-Pacific Labour Conference held at Hankow.  
27—Breach of diplomatic relations between Great Britain and Soviet Union.  
28—Japanese Government issues a statement respecting the despatch of troops to Central China.
- June 3—Yen Hsi-shan (閻錫山) hoists the Nationalist flag in Shanhsi (山西) Province.  
6—Yen Hsi-shan appointed Commander-in-Chief of Northern Forces of Nationalist Army.  
10-13—Conference at Chengchow (鄭州) between Feng Yu-hsiang and representatives of Hankow Government.  
18—Chang Tso-lin appoints himself to Grand Marshal or Generalissimo. Military Government inaugurated in Peking.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

326

## THE MANCHURIA YEAR BOOK

- 19-21—Feng Yu-hsiang and Chiang Kai-shek meet at Hsuehchow (徐州).  
 30—Nanking Government issues new tariff regulations.
- July 8—Arrival of 1,500 Japanese troops at Tsinan.  
 9—Japanese Government issues mobilization order for the second despatch of troops to Shantung.  
 15—Central Executive Committee of Wuhan Government proclaims complete breach with Communists.  
 20—Communist Party falls from power at Wuhan.  
 27—Borodin leaves Hankow.  
 29—Military Conference of Wuhan Government held at Lushan (廬山).  
 29—Ho Lung (賀龍), Yeh Ting (葉挺) and others with the remnant of the Communist Party, declare independence at Nanchang (南昌) in opposition to the Wuhan Government.
- Aug. 3—Peking Government announces that on and after August 15, a surtax of 5 percent will be levied on articles of luxury.  
 13—Resignation of Chiang Kai-shek.  
 17—Sun Chuan-fang's troops reach Pukow.  
 19—By the decision of Central Executive Committee, Wuhan Government announces to move the Capital to Nanking.  
 23—Strike at the Penhsihu Colliery and Iron Works becomes riotous. Strikers temporarily occupy the electric engineering station, and the town is plunged into complete darkness.  
 24—Japanese Minister at Peking confers with Chang Tso-lin about some questions in Manchuria.  
 30—Japanese Government orders to withdraw despatch troops from Shantung.
- Sept. 1—Sun Chuan-fang defeated, and withdraws from Pukow.  
 4—Anti-Japanese demonstrations in Manchuria culminate in disturbances at Mukden.  
 5—Evacuation of Japanese troops from Tsinanfu completed.  
 5—Construction of the Fengtien (奉天)-Hailung (海龍) Railway completed.  
 15—Kuomintang Conference opened at Nanking.  
 Reconciliation of Hankow and Nanking Governments attempted.  
 20—New Nationalist Government proclaimed at Nanking.  
 25—Oct. 3—Swatow captured by "Red" Army.  
 27—Yen Hsi-shan attacks Mukden troops at Kalgan.  
 29—Martial law proclaimed in Peking.
- Oct. 1—Chinfu (金福) Railway opened to traffic.  
 2—Chang Tso-lin issues an order to punish Yen Hsi-shan.  
 10—Shanhsi forces of Yen Hsi-shan defeated after severe fighting.  
 15—Construction of the Tahushan (打虎山)-Tungliao (通遼) Railway completed.

## CHRONOLOGY

327

- Oct. 20—Nanking Government orders expedition against Tang Sheng-chih (唐生智) at Hankow.  
 23—Chiang Kai-shek arrives in Tokyo.
- Nov. 10—Chiang Kai-shek returns to Shanghai.  
 12—Tang Sheng-chih retires.  
 17—Supreme Court formed under Nationalist Government.  
 17—Labour and communist agitation at Shanghai.  
 17—Coup d'état carried out in Canton by Chang Fa-Kuei's (張發奎) army.  
 18—Wang Ching-wei (汪精衛) and Li Tsi-chien (李濟) arrive at Shanghai to attend Kuomintang Conference.  
 29—Yang Yu-ting (楊宇霆), Chief Staff of Mukden army, protests in a press interview against proposed American loan to South Manchuria Railway Company.
- Dec. 1—By an agreement between Education Department of Tungsheng Special District and Russian staff of Chinese Eastern Railway right of administration of the educational affairs restored to Chinese authorities.  
 1—Wu Chao-shu (伍朝樞) Minister of Foreign Affairs of Nanking Government sends telegram to U. S. Secretary of State to protest against American loan to South Manchuria Railway Company.  
 2—Oppression of Koreans by the Kirin Provincial Government becomes extremely severe.  
 3—Preparatory Conference of Kuomintang opened at Shanghai.  
 3—Nanking Government dismisses Chang Fa-Kuei.  
 7—Fengtien-piao falls to the rate of 1246 yuan for 100 silver yuan.  
 10—Chiang Kai-shek again accepted post of Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist Revolutionary Forces.  
 11—Canton siezed by Communists.  
 14—Li Fu-lin (李福林) recaptures the city of Canton. Many Communists, Chinese and Russian including Soviet Vice-Consul, executed.  
 14—Nanking Government issues order to close all Soviet Consulates in its territory.  
 15—Nanking Government addresses a note of protest to Soviet Government.  
 16—Northern troops under Chang Tsung-chang defeated at Hsuehchow.  
 17—Wang Ching-wei announces his intention to retire.

1928

- Jan. 3—Tataohui (大刀會), or Big Sword Society disturbances at Tung-hua (通化), eastern district of Fengtien Province.

1424

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Huntzsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

328

THE MANCHURIA YEAR BOOK

- 9—Chiang Kai-shek issues circular telegram announcing his resumption of office as Commander-in-Chief of Nationalist Armies.
- 16—Hungchianghui (紅槍會) or Red Spear Society disturbances at Linhsi (林西), Inner-Mongolia.
- 25—Unofficial mission from Nanking Government consisting of Hu Han-min (胡漢民), Wu Chao-shu (伍朝樞) and others leave for tour of various countries to prepare ground for treaty revision and to investigate political and economic conditions abroad.
- 25-26—Military council held at Peking.
- 26—Tataohui rebels arrest and kill the District Magistrate of Huanjen (桓仁).
- 28—Tataohui surrenders at discretion to the Mukden armies.
- 31—Fengtien-piao falls to rate of 4,500 yuan for 100 silver yuan.
- Feb. 2—Strike of more than 1,200 Chinese labourers of the Tōa Tobacco Company, Yingkow, demanding the payment of wages in terms of gold.
- 2—Fengtien-piao quotation is somewhat improved, being between 3,200 and 3,300 yuan for 100 silver yuan.
- 3-7—Fourth Plenary Session of Kuomintang held at Nanking.
- 9—Strike of 600 Chinese coolies employed at the Holiensai (火連塞) coal mine on the Antung-Mukden Railway line, demanding the payment of wages in terms of gold.
- 15—Number of merchants and manufacturers in Mukden giving up their business because of the continued fall of Fengtien-piao reaches 5,089.
- 17—Revival of Tataohui disturbances in the eastern districts of Fengtien Province.
- 23—Strike of the Tōa Tobacco Company ends, wages of workers to be paid in Tayang silver coins.
- Mar. 1—Main body of the Nationalist army leaves Nanking for northern expedition.
- 3—Exclusion of Japanese currencies decided at the conference of Tao-yin (道尹), or Division Chiefs, held at Kirin.
- 5—Chang Huan-hsiang (張煥相) Governor of Special District prohibits circulation of foreign currencies in North Manchuria.
- 17—Large strikes start at various places because of the fall in the value of the Fengtien-piao.
- 19—Military Councils meet at Peking.
- 30—Notes exchanged between Nanking Government and United States of America regarding settlement of the Nanking Incident of March, 1927.
- Apr. 18—Arrangement reached between Chinese and Japanese authorities in Manchuria settling dispute over through traffic and over rolling-stocks seized by Chinese.
- 19—Marshal law proclaimed in Peking.

CHRONOLOGY

329

- 20—Japanese Government issues a statement concerning the despatch of troops to Shantung.
- 22—Nationalist army occupies Taian (泰安).
- 25—Advance guard of Japanese army reaches Tsinanfu (濟南府).
- 30—Northern army withdraws from Tsinanfu.
- May 1—Vanguards of Nationalist troops enter Tsinanfu.
- 3—Clash between Chinese and Japanese troops (The Tsinan Incident).
- 9—Chang Tso-lin issues circular telegram announcing to suspend hostilities.
- 11—League of Nations Secretariat receives telegram regarding Tsinan Incident from Nanking Government.
- 11—Japanese troops occupy whole of Tsinanfu.
- 18—Memorandum on Japanese policy in China and Manchuria handed to Peking and Nanking Governments.
- 28—Japanese note on Tsinan Incident sent to League.
- June 2—Chang Tso-lin issues circular telegram announcing his intention to withdraw into Manchuria.
- 3—Chang Tso-lin leaves Peking.
- 4—Chang Tso-lin and Wu Chun-sheng (吳俊陞), Governor of Heilungkiang Province, killed by a bomb explosion outside Mukden. Marshal law proclaimed in Mukden.
- 4—Fengtien-piao falls from the quotation of 2,360 yuan on the previous day to that of 2,700 yuan for 100 silver yuan. Exchange market suspended.
- 4—Nanking Government appoints Yen Hsi-shan Commander-in-Chief of the Peking-Tientsin Garrison.
- 6—Wang Cheng-ting (王正廷) appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs to succeed Huang Fu (黃郛).
- 16—By a mandate of Grand Marshal, Chang Hsueh-liang (張學良) becomes Governor of Fengtien Province.
- 18—Chang Hsueh-liang returns to Mukden.
- 20—Chihli (直隸) Province newly named Hopei (河北) Province; Peking given the new name of Peiping (北平).
- 20-30—National Economic Conference held at Shanghai.
- 21—Announcement of Chang Tso-lin's death.
- 25—Chang Hsueh-liang proclaims Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the Three Eastern Provinces, Wan Fu-lin (萬福麟) formerly proclaimed Governor of Heilungkiang Province.
- 25—Fengtien-piao quotation rises to the rate of 2,000 yuan, causing suspension of business.
- July 1-10—National Conference on Finance held in Nanking.
- 7—Nanking Government announces its general attitude towards "unequal treaties."

142

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

330

THE MANCHURIA YEAR BOOK

- 10—Japanese Government decides that the evacuation of Japanese troops in Tsinanfu should begin on 20 July.
- 17—Japanese Consul-General at Mukden advises Chang Hsueh-liang to reconsider proposed agreement between Manchuria and Nanking.
- 24—United States Government sends note to Nanking Government regarding its attitude toward Chinese tariff autonomy.
- 25—New Tariff Treaty between China and United States signed at Nanking.
- Aug. 7—Funeral of Chang Tso-lin. Baron Hayashi attends the ceremony representing Japanese Government.
- 8-15—Fifth Plenary Session of Kuomintang held at Nanking.
- 9—Agreement with Great Britain for settlement of the Nanking Incident of March 1927, signed at Nanking.
- 17—Independence movement of Barga (Hulunbuir) started.
- 17—Sino-German Treaty providing for reciprocity in Customs and similar matters signed at Nanking.
- 19—Marshal law in Mukden withdrawn.
- 25—Construction of Kirin-Tunhua Railway completed.
- Sept. 2—Pneumonic plague rages at Tungliao (Paiyintala).
- 7-13—Fighting between remnants of Chihli-Shantung army under Chang Tsung-chang (張宗昌) and Southern troops under Pai chung-hsi (白崇禧).
- 14—Chang Tsung-chang declares war against Mukden.
- 20—Chang Tsung-chang's army disarmed.
- Oct. 1—Surtax collection on the export duty, coast trade duty, and clearance duty begins.
- 3 & 8—Organic Law of National Government of the Republic of China promulgated.
- 9—Barga independence movement subsides.
- 10—New National Government formed on the basis of Organic Law of Oct. 8. Chiang Kai-shek formally proclaimed as head of the National Government.
- 18—Japanese Government appoints Consul-General at Shanghai as its official representative. National Government announces Wang Cheng-ting (王正廷) as its representative for Sino-Japanese negotiations for settlement of Nanking and Tsinan Incidents. (Conversations opened on Oct. 19).
- 23-28—Military Council of Three Eastern Provinces decides to adopt the brigade system instead of the divisional system, and to reduce the present military strength of 250,000 men to 130,000 men.
- Nov. 1—Central Bank of China opened for business.
- 4—Clash of a anti-Japanese demonstration and authorities at Harbin. Chang Huan-hsiang, the Governor of the Special District, resigns.

CHRONOLOGY

331

- 4—Kirin Provincial Assembly denounces the construction of Kirin-Kainei (吉林—會寧) Railway.
- 12—Peking-Mukden Railway reopens.
- 27—M. Thomas of International Labour Office, Genève, arrives at Nanking.
- Dec. 5—New Customs tariff promulgated, to come into force on Feb. 1, 1929.
- 7—Construction of the line between Suihua (綏化) and Hailun (海倫) of the Hulan-Hailun Railway completed.
- 10—Northeastern Pohai Squadron and the Kirin-Heilungkiang River Squadron combined together to form the Northeastern Squadron. Chang Hsueh-liang becomes Commander-in-Chief of the Squadron.
- 10—Sino-Japanese Exchange Bank (中華匯業銀行) announces suspension of business for one month.
- 13—Students' riot at Nanking; anti-Japanese and anti-treaty agitation; Wang Cheng-ting's house wrecked.
- 20—Anglo-Chinese treaty granting Chinese tariff autonomy signed at Nanking.
- 22—Sino-French treaty granting Chinese Tariff Autonomy signed at Nanking.
- 22—Chinese authorities declare the recovery of the telephone service conducted by the Chinese Eastern Railway.
- 23—Soviet authorities protest against the recovery by China of the telephone service.
- 25—Nanking Government demands of Chang Hsueh-liang that on and after February 1, Customs autonomy is to be enforced and the new tariff announced by the National Government adopted.
- 29—Mukden Government orders the Three Eastern Provinces to hoist the National flag.

1929

- Jan. 5-25—Disbandment Conference (裁兵會議) held at Nanking.
- 7—Chang Hsueh-liang appointed by the Nanking Government Commander-in-Chief of the Northeastern Frontier Defence Army (東北邊防軍總司令), with Chang Tso-hsiang (張作相) and Wan Fu-lin (萬福麟) as Vice-Commanders.
- 9—The Three Eastern Provinces becoming a component of the National Government, the Peace Preservation Committee of the Three Eastern Provinces is dissolved and the North-Eastern Political Committee (東北政務委員會) formed.
- 11—Yang Yu-ting (楊宇霆) and Chang Yin-huai (常蔭槐) shot at Mukden by order of Chang Hsueh-liang.



142

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

330

THE MANCHURIA YEAR BOOK

- 10—Japanese Government decides that the evacuation of Japanese troops in Tsinanfu should begin on 20 July.
- 17—Japanese Consul-General at Mukden advises Chang Hsueh-liang to reconsider proposed agreement between Manchuria and Nanking.
- 24—United States Government sends note to Nanking Government regarding its attitude toward Chinese tariff autonomy.
- 25—New Tariff Treaty between China and United States signed at Nanking.
- Aug. 7—Funeral of Chang Tso-lin. Baron Hayashi attends the ceremony representing Japanese Government.
- 8-15—Fifth Plenary Session of Kuomintang held at Nanking.
- 9—Agreement with Great Britain for settlement of the Nanking Incident of March 1927, signed at Nanking.
- 17—Independence movement of Barga (Hulunbuir) started.
- 17—Sino-German Treaty providing for reciprocity in Customs and similar matters signed at Nanking.
- 19—Marshal law in Mukden withdrawn.
- 25—Construction of Kirin-Tunhua Railway completed.
- Sept. 2—Pneumonic plague rages at Tungliao (Paiyintala).
- 7-13—Fighting between remnants of Chihli-Shantung army under Chang Tsung-chang (張宗昌) and Southern troops under Pai chung-hsi (白崇禧).
- 14—Chang Tsung-chang declares war against Mukden.
- 20—Chang Tsung-chang's army disarmed.
- Oct. 1—Surtax collection on the export duty, coast trade duty, and clearance duty begins.
- 3 & 8—Organic Law of National Government of the Republic of China promulgated.
- 9—Barga independence movement subsides.
- 10—New National Government formed on the basis of Organic Law of Oct. 8. Chiang Kai-shek formally proclaimed as head of the National Government.
- 18—Japanese Government appoints Consul-General at Shanghai as its official representative. National Government announces Wang Cheng-ting (王正廷) as its representative for Sino-Japanese negotiations for settlement of Nanking and Tsinan Incidents. (Conversations opened on Oct. 19).
- 23-28—Military Council of Three Eastern Provinces decides to adopt the brigade system instead of the divisional system, and to reduce the present military strength of 250,000 men to 130,000 men.
- Nov. 1—Central Bank of China opened for business.
- 4—Clash of a anti-Japanese demonstration and authorities at Harbin. Chang Huan-hsiang, the Governor of the Special District, resigns.

CHRONOLOGY

331

- 4—Kirin Provincial Assembly denounces the construction of Kirin-Kainei (吉林—會亭) Railway.
- 12—Peking-Mukden Railway reopens.
- 27—M. Thomas of International Labour Office, Genève, arrives at Nanking.
- Dec. 5—New Customs tariff promulgated, to come into force on Feb. 1, 1929.
- 7—Construction of the line between Suihua (綏化) and Hailun (海倫) of the Hulan-Hailun Railway completed.
- 10—Northeastern Pohai Squadron and the Kirin-Heilungkiang River Squadron combined together to form the Northeastern Squadron. Chang Hsueh-liang becomes Commander-in-Chief of the Squadron.
- 10—Sino-Japanese Exchange Bank (中華匯業銀行) announces suspension of business for one month.
- 13—Students' riot at Nanking; anti-Japanese and anti-treaty agitation; Wang Cheng-ting's house wrecked.
- 20—Anglo-Chinese treaty granting Chinese tariff autonomy signed at Nanking.
- 22—Sino-French treaty granting Chinese Tariff Autonomy signed at Nanking.
- 22—Chinese authorities declare the recovery of the telephone service conducted by the Chinese Eastern Railway.
- 23—Soviet authorities protest against the recovery by China of the telephone service.
- 25—Nanking Government demands of Chang Hsueh-liang that on and after February 1, Customs autonomy is to be enforced and the new tariff announced by the National Government adopted.
- 29—Mukden Government orders the Three Eastern Provinces to hoist the National flag.

1929

- Jan. 5-25—Disbandment Conference (裁兵會議) held at Nanking.
- 7—Chang Hsueh-liang appointed by the Nanking Government Commander-in-Chief of the Northeastern Frontier Defence Army (東北邊防軍總司令), with Chang Tso-hsiang (張作相) and Wan Fu-lin (萬福麟) as Vice-Commanders.
- 9—The Three Eastern Provinces becoming a component of the National Government, the Peace Preservation Committee of the Three Eastern Provinces is dissolved and the North-Eastern Political Committee (東北政務委員會) formed.
- 11—Yang Yu-ting (楊宇霆) and Chang Yin-huai (常蔭槐) shot at Mukden by order of Chang Hsueh-liang.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

332

## THE MANCHURIA YEAR BOOK

- 21—Inspector-General Maze of the Maritime Customs announces the application of the new customs tariff rates ranging from 7.5 to 27.5 percent from February 1, 1929.  
 23—Chang Hsueh-liang, Wan Fu-lin and others join the Kuomintang.  
 31—Sino-Japanese Treaty signed.
- Feb. 1—New provisional Customs tariff put into force.  
 1—National Government suddenly issues an order to increase the export duty, making the export surtax 2.5 percent, the coast trade surtax 1.25 percent, the export surtax on products made by western machinery 2.5 percent.  
 4—Japan protests against the increase of the export duty.  
 5—Fengtien Province changes its name to Liaoning (遼寧).  
 11—The senate of the United States of America ratifies the treaty recognizing the Customs autonomy of China.  
 19—Chang Tsung-chang (張宗昌) lands at Lungkow (龍口).
- Mar. 5—Sir A. F. Whyte appointed Political Counsellor to Nanking Government.  
 12—Feng Yu-hsiang resigns from the post of War Minister of Nanking Government.  
 14—Manifesto published by Wan Ching-wei (汪精衛) and other left wing leaders of Kuomintang denouncing the rule of Nanking Government.  
 15-28—Third National Congress of Kuomintang held at Nanking.  
 26—Despatch of punitive expedition against Kwangsi troops announced by Nanking Government.  
 26—Li Tsung-jen (李宗仁) Li Tsi-chen (李濟), and Pai Chung-hsi (白崇禧) cashiered.  
 28—Sino-Japanese Agreement in settlement of the Tsinan Incident of May 3, 1928 signed.  
 29—Chiang Kai-shek leaves for Kiukiang and assumes supreme command of Government forces operating against Kwansi troops in Wuhan district.
- Apr. 1—Kwansi troops evacuate from Canton.  
 4—Kwansi troops evacuate from Wuhan.  
 5—Chiang Kai-shek's army enters Hankow.  
 16—Japanese evacuation of Shantung postponed at the request of Chinese government.  
 16—By a resolution of the committee meeting of the Executive Yuan Nanking was made national capital.  
 20—Peking-Mukden Railway named Peining (Peiping-Liaoning) Railway.  
 26—Arms embargo agreement of May 7, 1919 cancelled.  
 26—Chang Tsung-chang defeated and retreats from Shantung to Dai-ren. Japanese authorities do not allow him to settle in the Leased Territory. Chang leaves for Japan.

## CHRONOLOGY

333

- 27—Chen Tiao-yuan (陳調元) appointed to control the whole of Shantung.  
 27—Chinese Government presents notes to Treaty Powers urging abolition of extraterritoriality.
- May 1—Memorandums on revision of treaty between China and Japan published.  
 2—Settlement reached between China and Japan regarding the settlement of the Nanking and Hankow Incidents.  
 14—Railway line between Chaoyangchen (朝陽鎮) and Kirin, the last portion of the Kirin-Hailung Railway, completed; to be opened to traffic on the 15th.  
 15—Ho Chien (何建) invades Kwangsi and occupies Kweilin (桂林), the capital of the province.  
 20—Feng Yu-hsiang denounces Nanking Government as an illegal government.  
 22—Relations between Chiang Kai-shek and Feng Yu-hsiang becoming strained, Chang Hsueh-liang declares in support of Chiang, and Yen Hsi-shan also.  
 23—Feng Yu-hsiang expelled from the Koumintang.  
 27—Soviet consulate at Harbin raided.  
 29—All, except 39 persons of the arrested staff of the Soviet Consulate-General at Harbin, released.
- June 1—State funeral of Sun Yat-sen at Nanking.  
 1—Soviet note of protest to China.  
 3—Minister Yoshizawa of Japan present credentials to Nanking Government.  
 7—Final collapse of Kwansi rebellion against Nanking.  
 7—Fengtien-piao falls to the rate of 6,470 yuan for 100 silver yuan.  
 8—Mukden authorities examine books of currency brokers within the walls of Mukden on the ground that the fall of the Fengtien-piao has rendered such action necessary.  
 10-14—Second Plenary Session of Kuomintang.  
 18—Liaoning Provincial Government issues a regulation prohibiting the shipment of Tayang silver coins out of the province in order to prevent the fall of the Fengtien-piao.  
 19—Novosti Jizni the only communist Russian newspaper in North Manchuria ordered to suspend publication.  
 24—Fengtien-piao falls to the rate of 7,520 yuan for 100 silver yuan.  
 25—Chiang Kai-shek enters Peiping.  
 26—To prevent a further fall of the Fengtien-piao, Chang Hsueh-liang announces regulations for maintaining the price and decides to instruct the Provincial Bank to exchange 60 Fengtien-piao yuan for one Tayang yuan.  
 30—Chiang Kai-shek and Yen Hsi-shan meet at Peiping Reorganization of the Northwestern Army of Feng Yu-hsiang discussed.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Luitfsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

334

THE MANCHURIA YEAR BOOK

- July 2—Tanaka Cabinet of Japan resigns en bloc. Hamaguchi ordered to form the succeeding cabinet.  
5—Punitive mandate against Feng Yu-hsiang cancelled.  
7-10—Chiang Kai-shek, Chang Hsueh-liang and Wang Cheng-ting (王正廷) confer at Peiping on diplomatic problems of the North-Eastern Provinces.  
11—Chinese authorities discharge Emshanoff, General Manager and five other section chiefs of the Chinese Eastern Railway, and appoint Yuan Chi-kuang (苑其光) as the General Manager.  
11—Chiang Kai-shek, Chang Hsueh-liang and Yen Hsi-shan discuss at Peiping the disposal of troops.  
13—The Soviet Government submits to China a proposal for peaceful settlement of the Chinese Eastern Railway problem, and asks for a reply within three days.  
17—Chinese reply sent. Soviet Government expresses dissatisfaction at the Chinese reply, and despatches a note informing China of the rupture of diplomatic relations between the two countries.  
19—United States, Great Britain, France and Japan separately notify Chinese and the Soviet Government of their wish to have the Chinese Eastern Railway problem peacefully settled.  
22—Strike of about 1,000 Russians in Harbin employed by the Chinese Eastern Railway protesting against the recovery of the railway by China other employees of the Chinese Eastern Railway also strongly inclined to join the strike.  
22—Negotiations opened at Harbin between Tsai Yun-sheng (蔡運升) and Melnikoff.  
24—Melnikoff and Chang Tso-hsiang (張作相) meet in Harbin station.  
30—Melnikoff and Tsai Yun-shen negotiate in a train at Manchouli.  
Aug. 1-6—Further Disbandment Conference held at Nanking.  
4—Tsai-Melnikoff negotiations come to a deadlock.  
13—Chinese delegates to the negotiations on the Chinese Eastern Railway disputes leave Manchouli.  
13—Hostilities opened in the neighbourhood of Jalai Nor and Suifenho  
24—Chang Hsueh-liang declines the offer of Chiang Kai-shek to reinforce with Nanking troops.  
28—Attempted assassination of Chang Kai-shek in Shanghai.  
29—Hai Lu-feng (海陸豐) and Peng-pai (澎湃) and other communists arrested and shot in Shanghai.  
31—Agreement signed for retrocession of Belgian concession at Tientsin.  
Sept. 5—Note sent by Chinese Government to United States urging immediate initiation of discussions on extraterritoriality. Similar notes addressed later to Great Britain, France and other Treaty Powers.

CHRONOLOGY

335

- 6—Chinese note to Powers proposing the opening of negotiations on Shanghai Provisional Court on Sept. 23.  
7-12—Soviet forces attack Manchouli and Pogranichnaya.  
15—Harbin branch of Dali Bank closes.  
16-17—Chang Fa-kwei (張發奎) on being ordered to move with his troops from Ichang (宜昌) to the neighbourhood of Lunghai (龍海) Railway, revolts and declares independence.  
20—Chang Fa-kwei dismissed from his position.  
25—Soviet Government protests against attacks of Chinese and White Russians.  
26—Manifesto published by Wang Ching-wei (汪精衛) and other "Reorganizationist" (改組派) leaders denouncing Third National Congress and Nanking Government.  
29—Further Soviet protest.  
29-20 cadets involved in assassination plot of Aug. 28, shot in Shanghai.  
Oct. 2-4—Manchouli again attacked.  
3—Anglo-Soviet agreement to resume normal diplomatic relations signed.  
10—German proposal for exchange of prisoners accepted by China but not by Soviet.  
10—Generals under Feng Yu-hsiang in Shansi (陝西) and Honan issue circular telegram denouncing Chiang Kai-shek and Nanking Government.  
14—Lahassasu captured by Soviet forces.  
15—The North-Eastern Provinces decide not to join the anti-Chiang movement. Yen Hsi-shan's attitude still undecided.  
17—Yen Hsi-shan and Feng Yu-hsiang meet at Wutaishan (五臺山).  
27—Nov. 8—Third Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations held at Kyoto.  
31—Agreement signed regarding rendition of British concession at Chinkiang (鎮江).  
Nov. 5—Yen Hsi-shan appointed Deputy-Commander-in-Chief of the National Forces.  
8—Chang Fa-Kuei's army enters Kwantung and threatens Canton.  
9—Note exchanged between China and Great Britain regarding the settlement of the Chinkiang Incident of March 1927.  
11—The Commission of financial experts, headed by Prof. E. W. Kemmerer presents its report on gradual introduction of a gold standard currency system in China.  
20—Feng Yu-hsiang's troops retreat beyond the line of Lunhai Railway.  
21—Manchouli occupied by Soviet forces.  
21—Japanese Government announces the removal of the gold export embargo on January 11, 1930.

142

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

336

THE MANCHURIA YEAR BOOK

- 21—Sino-Soviet negotiations reopened by Tsai Yun-sheng.  
23—Chiang Kai-shek orders Ho Chien's army to reinforce Canton.  
24—Soviet forces attack Hailar.  
27—Soviet forces occupy Hailar.  
27—Preliminary Russian terms accepted by Chang Hsueh-liang and Khavarovsk decided as the place of further negotiations.
- Dec. 1-3—Negotiations between Tsai Yun-sheng and Simanovsky at Niko-lisk, resulting in provisional agreement.  
2—United States, France Great Britain and Italy address memoranda to Soviet and Chinese Governments drawing their attention to the Pact of Paris.  
3—Soviet Government replies rejecting outside interference.  
3—Mutinies of Shih Yu-san's (石友三) troops at Pukow (浦口). Nanking threatened.  
3-18—Revolt of Tang Sheng-chin (唐生智).  
9—Negotiations on Shanghai Provisional Court opened at Nanking.  
11—Chang Fa-kwei and Kwansi armies defeated near Canton.  
12—Wan Ching-wei expelled from Kuomintang.  
16—Sino-Soviet negotiations resumed at Khabarovsk.  
16—Negotiations on Shanghai Provisional Court come to a deadlock. Representative of foreign legations leaves for Shanghai.  
19—Chinese Government objects to the appointment of Mr. Obata as Japanese Minister to China.  
20—Simanovsky and Tsai Yun-sheng sign Protocol providing for restoration of Chinese Eastern Railway to the general condition before the dispute.  
28—Chinese mandate issued declaring that as from Jan. 1, 1930, all foreign nationals in China should abide by Chinese laws.

1930

- Jan. 6—Mo Teh-hui (莫德惠) assumes the office as the President of the Chinese Eastern Railway.  
11—Gold export embargo in Japan lifted.  
13—Arrival of Justice Feetham at Shanghai.  
15—Orders by National Government given to the Customs Offices to charge import tariff in terms of gold on and after Feb. 1.  
18—Confiscated property of Dali Bank, Harbin, returned.  
22—Yen Hsi-shan assumes the office of Deputy-Commander-in-Chief of National Forces at Taiyuan (太原).  
23—Being reappointed Consul-General, Melnikoff arrives Harbin and succeeds Simanovsky.  
24—Contract regarding construction of the Hulutao (葫蘆島) Port signed at Tientsin by Peking-Mukden (Peiping) Railway Administration and Netherlands Harbour Works Co. of Amsterdam.

CHRONOLOGY

337

- Feb. 1—Collection of Customs duties on imports from abroad on a gold basis commenced.  
4—Dali Bank, Harbin, reopened.  
7—Tsai Yun-sheng (蔡運升) punished by the State Council as the person responsible for the Kharvarovsk agreement.  
8—Harbin Chamber of Commerce established by the businessmen of Great Britain, United States, Germany and France.  
10—Yen Hsi-shan requests Chiang Kai-shek's retirement.  
12—Mo Teh-hui appointed Chinese Plenipotentiary Delegate to Sino-Soviet negotiations.  
12—Chiang Kai-shek issues statement replying Yen's request.  
13—Provisional agreement about the rendition of Weihaiwei (威海衛) signed by Wang Cheng-Ting and British Minister.  
17—Agreement on reorganization of Shanghai Provisional Court signed at Nanking by the representatives of the Ministers of the interested Powers, with the exception of French delegate.  
18—Wang Lo-ping (王樂平) leader of left wing Kuomintang assassinated in Shanghai.  
26—Last telegram to Yen Hsi-shan from Chiang Kai-shek appealing for peace.  
28—Feng Yu-hsiang meets Yen Hsi-shan at Taiyuan.
- Mar. 1—Circular telegram of Chang Hsueh-liang issued announcing his neutrality.  
1-6—Third Plenary Session of Kuomintang.  
4—By a circular telegram, Yen's intention announced to retire and to depart immediately together with Feng Yu-hsiang for a trip abroad.  
4—Silver quotation for London falls to 18½ pence.  
14—Fen Yu-hsiang arrives at Tungkwan (潼關) to assume the command of Northwestern Army.  
28—Shuntienshihpao (順天時報), the only Japanese-owned Chinese paper in Peiping, suppressed by the Peiping Kuomintang branch.
- Apr. 1—Agreement regarding Shanghai Provisional Court enter into effect.  
1—Yen Hsi-shan assumes office as Commander-in-Chief of the National Forces at Taiyuan and proclaims war against Nanking.  
1—Feng Yu-hsiang and Li Tsung-jen (李宗仁) assume office as Deputy-Commander-in-Chief at Tungkwan and Kweiling (桂林) in Kwangsi respectively.  
4—Yen Hsi-shan dismissed from all his post in the Kuomintang and the National Government.  
17—Chinese Workers Union of Chinese Eastern Railway ordered to dissolve by Northeastern Political Committee on the ground of its radical tendency.  
18—Anglo-Chinese Agreement on the rendition of Weihaiwei formally signed at Nanking.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

338

THE MANCHURIA YEAR BOOK

- May 1—Mo Teh-hui, the Chinese delegate, leaves Harbin for Moscow.  
1—Hostilities between government troops and anti-Chiang allied troops opened along the Lunghai Railway line.  
6—Sino-Japanese Customs Tariff Treaty formally signed at Nanking.  
8—Chiang Kai-shek leaves Pukow for Hsuehchow (徐州).  
10—Chiang arrives at Tsinanfu.  
16—National Government bans export of Chinese gold and import of foreign silver coin.  
19—Yen Hsi-shan moves his headquarters from Taiyuan to Shihchiachuang (石家莊).  
26—Arrival of German economic mission at Mukden.  
26—Fengtien-piao falls to the rate of 9,900 yuan for 100 silver yuan, and late in the afternoon to the rate of 10,000 yuan.  
29—Silver quotation falls to 17½ pence.  
29—June 12—Mongolian Affairs Conference held under the chairmanship of Ma Fu-hsiang (馬福祥).  
30—Riots of Koreans in various places of Chientao.
- June 11—Publication of Chiangnanwanpao (江南晚報), the only Japanese-owned Chinese paper in Central China suspended by the pressure of the National Government.  
16—Yen Hsi-shan takes over the Customs at Tientsin.  
17—Neutrality proclaimed by the Political Committee of Northeastern Provinces.  
21—National Government orders to close Customs House at Tientsin.  
21—National Government appoints Chang Hsueh-liang Deputy-Commander-in-chief of National Forces.  
24—Further fall of silver quotation to 15½ pence per standard ounce.  
24—Chang Hsueh-liang declines the appointment from Nanking.  
25—Shanhsi (Yen's) troops capture Tsinan.
- July 2—Construction of Hulutao under new project commenced.  
3—Shanhsi troops occupy Taian.  
13—Conference of "Reorganizationists" and "Hsishan" factions held in Peiping.  
15—Tsinanfu recaptured by Southern army.  
20—Yen Hsi-shan arrives at Tsinanfu.  
23—Chiang Kai-shek retreats from Hsuehchow to Pangfu (蚌埠).  
23—Wang Ching-wei and several Reorganizationist leaders enter Peiping.  
27—Aug. 6—Occupation of Changsha by Communist Army.
- Aug. 3—Communist Army occupies Tayeh (大冶).  
5—Changsha recaptured by Government troops.  
8—Communists Army occupies Chingchiang (清江), the opposite side of Kiukiang (九江).  
15—Tsinanfu recaptured by National Forces.

CHRONOLOGY

339

- 30—Decision reached at Taiyuan for the organization of government at Peiping with Yen Hsi-shan as Chairman of the State Council.
- Sept. 1—Enlarged Plenary Session in Peiping announces regulations of 16 articles governing the organization of government.  
4—Ma Fu-hsiang appointed chairman of the Commission for Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs (蒙藏委員會).  
9—Yen Hsi-shan formally assumes office as the head of the Northern Government.  
14—Yen Hsi-shan issues telegram from Shihchiachuang addressed to the Enlarged Plenary Session of Peiping announcing his decision to retire.  
17—Note for the rendition of the British Concession in Amoy exchanged at Nanking.  
18—Chang Hsueh-liang issues circular telegram calling to a halt all military operations. Mukden troops at Shanhaikwan begin to march on Peiping. Yen Hsi-shan's retirement proclaimed by a circular telegram.  
19 & 22—By notes presented by the British Minister, Great Britain offers to remit all payments of the Boxer Indemnity as from Dec. 1, 1922.  
20—Enlarged Plenary Session moved to Taiyuan.  
23—Mukden forces enter Peiping and the control of the city passes peacefully to their hands.  
26—Chang Hsueh-liang decides to accept the position of Deputy-Commander-in-Chief of the National Forces.  
27—Nanking Government appoints Wang Shu-chang (王樹常) Chairman of the Hopei Provincial Government and Yu Hsueh-chung (于學忠) Garrison Commander of Peiping and Tientsin.
- Oct. 1—Exchange of ratifications of the agreements on the rendition of Weihaiwei effected, and Weihaiwei transferred to Chinese control.  
5—Yen Hsi-shan, Fen Yu-hsian and Wang Ching-wei issue telegram to Chang Hsueh-liang urging him to use his influence for the early convocation of the National Convention.  
6—Clash between Chinese and Japanese policemen at Lungtsingtsun (龍井村) in Chientao (閩島). 2 Japanese policemen shot.  
9—Chang Hsueh-liang formally assumes office as Deputy-Commander-in-Chief of National Forces.  
10—Direct train-service between Peiping and Kirin opened.  
10—National Anniversary Celebration. Chiang Kai-shek returns to Nanking.  
11—First Sino-Soviet Conference held in Moscow.  
18—Sino-Soviet Conference reaches a deadlock, conference postponed.  
20—Communists' disturbances in Chientao.
- Nov. 11—Chang Hsueh-liang and Chiang Kai-shek meet at Nanking.  
12-18—Fourth Plenary Session of Kuomintang held.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

340

THE MANCHURIA YEAR BOOK


- 15—Commission for the Readjustment of Foreign and Domestic Loans (內外債整理會議) meets at Nanking.
- 24—Direct train-service between Nanking and Mukden opened.
- Dec. 4—Sino-Soviet Conference reopened.
- 4—Chang Hsueh-liang leaves Nanking for Mukden.
- 11—Chang Hsueh-liang and Shanhsi representatives confer in Tientsin on the future of Shanhsi troops.
- 16—Sino-Soviet Conference again reaches a deadlock and is suspended.
- 16—Mandate issued to abolish Likin and all other taxes on goods in transit as well as Coast Trade and Transit Duties on Jan. 1, 1931.
- 18—Fall of gold price of silver reaches to 14½ pence per ounce in London market.
- 22—Yen Hsi-shan leaves Tientsin for Dairen.
- 29—New import tariff promulgated by the National Government.
- 30—Mo Teh-hui, the Chinese representative at the Sino-Soviet Conference in Moscow, returns to Harbin.
- 31—Sino-Japanese Telegram Conference comes to an agreement.

143

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



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
LEGATION OF THE  
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Peiping, October 29, 1931.

No. 1245

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FILED

The Honorable  
 The Secretary of State,  
 Washington.

Sir:

In continuation of the Legation's despatch  
 No. 1216 of October 15, 1931, I have the honor to  
 1/4 transmit herewith four further editorials which  
 have appeared in THE LEADER of Peiping between  
 October 21st and 27th, all relating to the events  
 in Manchuria.

Editorials from other papers, as well as  
 articles and news items, regarding the Manchurian  
 situation will be found among the press clippings  
 going forward in to-day's pouch.

Respectfully yours,

For the Minister:

*C. Van H. Engert*  
 C. VAN H. ENGERT,  
 First Secretary of Legation.

Enclosures:

- 1: Editorial of October 21, 1931.
- 2: Editorial of October 22, 1931.
- 3: Editorial of October 23, 1931.
- 4: Editorial of October 27, 1931.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Justifson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1-41

Disposition 12-45

THE LEADER, Wednesday, October 21, 1931.

### THE HORRORS OF ANOTHER WORLD WAR

The savage-minded Japanese troops are still occupying Chinese territory and refuse to budge an inch, in spite of optimistic reports from the League yesterday that Mr. Yoshizawa had given a solemn promise that the Japanese Government will limit the activities of its troops in Manchuria. The truth is that the Japanese Government has no more control over the ferocious militarists any more than Mr. Yoshizawa, who is placed in the embarrassing position of trying to prove happenings that did not take place. The unexpected invasion of Manchuria was committed by the pigheaded militarists of the Island Empire contrary to the persuasions of the Government, who later had to defend the actions of their military savages on the plea of "self-defense". In view of lies of the most misleading variety given before the League by Japan's silk-gloved oily-tongued representatives, only the most simple-minded would readily swallow this talk about Japan's intentions to withdraw immediately from the occupied territory—especially since a formal note was handed on the 18th to our fellow-Covenanters to the effect that Dai Nippon has no intention of fixing a date for the withdrawal of her military savages. It will be readily recalled that barely were the words uttered on September 24th by Mr. Yoshizawa that "Japan has withdrawn the greater part of its forces to the railway zone", when Japanese military planes fired on a passenger train running on the Peiping-Mukden Railway, killing two and wounding several innocent civilian refugees who were bent only on getting away from Japanese-occupied territory. On the very same day that the venerable Mr. Yoshizawa made his statement to the League, a Japanese armored train arrived at Hsinmintun, while four Japanese armored trains moved to Tahushan, according to a report issued by the Japanese themselves. Since then, more trains were bombed, more innocent civilians were killed, and to make the job more complete, about 36 bombs were dropped on the defenseless city of Chinchow on the plea of "self-defense". That is the way they withdrew "the greater part of their forces to the railway zone"!

The Nipponese not only have not withdrawn from any section of the occupied zone, but only a few days ago General Minami, the Minister of War, decided to take extreme measures along the Peiping-Mukden railway as far as Shanhaikuan if necessary, according to a Tokyo report issued by a Japanese news agency—which means that the Japanese militarists have no immediate intention of withdrawing from the territory of a neighbor which they forcibly occupied.

The danger of war still looms in the horizon. In case another world conflagration breaks out, it would be more terrible and more devastating than the last Great War because the nations of the world have been making greater and greater strides in the field of science since the Armistice, and with almost thirteen years to do research work the "civilization" of mankind must be greatly advanced by the invention and improvement of weapons of destruction and the discovery of chemicals which can destroy human lives with greater ease and effectiveness.



During the battle of Ypres Germany surprised the Allies by using mustard gas, but to the surprise of the scientific world France was able to produce a similar gas within a short time. Mustard gas during the Great European War contained such strong chemical qualities that it can even penetrate poorly-made gas masks, and it is not surprising if stronger death-dealing gases are now being discovered. It is not difficult to produce compressed gas bombs which can wipe out millions of people off the face of the earth when dropped on densely-populated cities since the physical and chemical dissipation of poison gas would not be able to take place as rapidly in the open spaces. The use of poison gas is prohibited by international law, but what respect have the Japanese militarists for mere "scraps of paper"? The Japanese military brigands not only bombed the defenseless city of Chinchow and other places in violation of the Hague Convention, but bombed passenger trains on the Peiping-Mukden railway and used machine-guns on unarmed civilian passengers contrary to all laws of humanity, invaded and seized important cities and towns in Manchuria in violation of the Kellogg Pact, the League Covenant and the Nine-Power Treaty. If the Japanese military criminals are capable of bombing defenseless cities and passenger trains at the same time as lying statements are made by her polished diplomats at the League that "Japan has already withdrawn her troops to the railway zone", then she is capable of using the most deadly sort of poison gas if she decides to defy the world and embark on a war of conquest, which is the great ambition of her militarists.

There can be no doubt that airplanes will play a decisive part in a future war just as they did during the Great War, but in a future war they will be able to do more damage. We now witness the spectacle of huge commercial planes making transcontinental and trans-oceanic flights and we may yet see the day in the not too distant future when mammoth warplanes, equipped with huge long-range guns instead of mere machine-guns and carrying tons of huge bombs instead of only a few, will wage war thousands and thousands of miles from their base.

By harnessing the forces of nature man has risen to the present stage of comfort and luxury but with the aid of science he is also able to destroy himself much easier and without much effort. The machinery for the prevention of the destruction of the human race lies in the effective working of the Kellogg Pact and the League of Nations Covenant, which is now put to a severe test by Japan's insolent refusal at the very beginning to allow the League to investigate the atrocities committed by her savage-minded soldiers in Manchuria, and later by her refusal to sanction the participation of the United States in the deliberations of that august and cumbersome body generally known as having a soft bark and no teeth. Japan was faced with the alternative of saying "yes" or withdrawing from the League, and it seems that the civilian elements are trying to make the military understand that it is better to say "yes" than "no", since it is a *fait accompli*.

The totally illegal and uncalled-for invasion of Manchuria and the recalcitrant attitude of feudalistic Japan stands as a challenge to the effectiveness of the League Covenant and the Anti-War Kellogg Pact as instruments for the maintenance of world peace. We can only wait for the results.

E. R. S. L.

THE LEADER, Thursday, October 22 1931.

### STRANGE DOINGS IN MANCHURIA

As proof that the Japanese military brigands have not behaved like civilized beings in their orgy of looting and bloodshed when they forcibly occupied the territory of an unoffending neighbor, *Reuter* carried a report from Mukden, which appears to-day in another section of *The Leader*, that not only did the Japanese occupy the houses of a number of prominent officials in the Three Eastern Provinces but that an uncalculable amount of valuables including curios and silver and even furniture were taken away by Japanese military criminals who invaded Manchuria for the alleged purpose of "protecting Japanese vested interests." By looting and carrying away valuables belonging to private individuals, the Japanese military thieves have violated the Rules of Land Warfare of the Hague Convention which categorically prohibits pillage of private homes. But the Japanese Foreign Office claims that there is no war because the Chinese soldiers consistently followed the policy of non-resistance and did not fire back at them in spite of extreme provocations. If there is no war, as the Japanese claim, then there is all the more reason why the army of occupation should respect private property and the inviolability of private homes. When almost two hundred planes in Mukden were seized by the invaders, the excuse was that they were taken as a war prize in accordance with section 53 of the rules of land warfare of the Hague Convention, although at the same time, the Japanese Foreign Office repeated over and over again that there was no war and that the invasion of a vast expanse of territory was a mere "local incident." We wonder what excuse the Nipponese will give for the wholesale looting of private homes and what lies these most artful of all rumor-mongers will fabricate in order to cover up their criminal looting of private homes. Will they say that this organized robbery is justified on the plea of "self defense"—just as they pleaded self-defense when twelve of their warplanes dropped tons of bombs on the defenseless city of Chinchow?

The looting of private homes is not all, for they are now, according to information from reliable sources, stealing machinery and ammunition from the Mukden Arsenal—machinery and supplies which were bought and paid for by the Chinese authorities with Chinese money. It is a well-known fact that the brigands from the Land of the Rising Sun have been removing ammunition from the Arsenal since their illegal occupation of Mukden, and now, to facilitate their outrageous thievery of huge machines and supplies, they have built tracks running from the Japanese-owned South Manchuria Railway direct to the Arsenal, while a portion of the track leading from the Arsenal to the Peiping-Mukden Railway has been torn up. Thus, countless millions of dollars worth of machinery, ammunition and arms are being gradually stolen with the connivance of the Japanese Government. We wonder how long outrages of this sort will be tolerated by the world.

Contrary to all agreements, voracious Japan closed a number of banks such as the Bank of China, the Bank of Communications, the Bank of the Three

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 Department of State Letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Eastern Provinces and the Frontier Bank when they occupied the city of Mukden by force of arms, thus creating an economic crisis. Some of these Chinese banks and the foreign banks have reopened. But now, Japan's hand is laid bare by regulations regarding the opening of the Frontier Bank and the Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces issued by the Japanese Army of occupation to the effect that these banks must be supervised by a military officer, that special investigators are to be appointed by the Japanese army from time to time, that the business of the bank may be suspended at any time by the High Command, that the employment of all bank clerks and officials must be approved by the Army of feudalistic Japan, and no business considered to be injurious to this overbearing Army will be sanctioned. What is the meaning of this financial strangulation of Manchuria? In the past, the Japanese have always been circulating Japanese money on the market in the leased territory and accept no Chinese money. By placing all kinds of restriction on Chinese banks, the unscrupulous Japanese imperialists hope to paralyze Chinese business in the occupied region so that Japanese banks and Japanese business may flourish. The fact must not be overlooked that similar restrictions are placed on Korean banks by the inhumane oppressors of the Korean people, and the application of this system to the Chinese-owned banks in South Manchuria is a sufficient indication of Japanese plans to turn this rich fertile piece of Chinese territory into a second Korea.

In the meantime, the Japanese-inspired "autonomy" movement is still going on in Manchuria. General Chang Hai-peng who seems to have swallowed the Japanese bait, hook and all, is still making frantic attempts to attack Tsitsihar, the capital of Heilungkiang, with the ultimate object of setting up a puppet government there. Reports are widely circulated that an "autonomous" government has been set up at Tiehling, and that General Kan Chou-shan has been inspired by the Nipponese to form a new province to be called the "Central Manchurian Province" with Ssupingkai as the capital. Intrigues are still going on, and it is even said that Henry Pu Yi, the former Manchu boy-Emperor, has accepted the Japanese invitation to help in the so-called "independence" movement but it has been denied by the Japanese.

In the meantime, Japan steadfastly refuses to fix a date for the withdrawal of her savage troops, although her winged-collar prevaricators at Geneva told the world on September 24th that "Japan has withdrawn the greater part of its forces to the railway zone." While Japan's diplomats are uttering fine words and soft phrases, her army of occupation is plundering and looting private as well as government property. *We wonder whether the League will take action to stop the organized robbery under official auspices which is going on in Manchuria.*

E.B.-S.L.

THE LEADER. Friday, October 23, 1931.

### FIVE POINTS AND THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS

While rapacious Japan steadfastly refuses to fix a date for the withdrawal of her troops from occupied Chinese territory, a surprising report emanated from Tokyo to the effect that Japan insists upon the recognition by China of the following five demands before the withdrawal of her troops.

- (1) A mutual pledge of non-aggression and a guarantee of territorial integrity;
- (2) The anti-Japanese agitation and the boycott to be called off permanently;
- (3) Assurances for the safety of Japanese lives and property;
- (4) Payment for railways built with Japanese money and recognition of existing agreements for railway construction in Manchuria;
- (5) "China shall recognize all obligations on treaties with Japan including the so-called Twenty-One Demands, and pledge before the League of Nations that she will act upon the letter and spirit of these treaties."

It must be noted that while *Reuter* reports the fifth demand as a "recognition of existing treaty rights, including the question of Japanese land leases in Manchuria," *Nippon Dempo* specifically mentions the odious Twenty-One Demands which was presented to China at the point of the bayonet on January 18, 1915, when the Powers were busily engaged in a death struggle among themselves. Lack of space prevents us from commenting to any extent on the obnoxious clauses of the Twenty-One Demands which were aimed at bringing China under the political, financial and military tutelage of Japan. Group Five of these Demands, which were postponed for future negotiation, were presented in the following form to Yuan Shih-kai with the most threatening backing of Japanese machine-guns and dreadnoughts:

"Article 1—The Chinese Central Government shall employ influential Japanese as advisers in political, financial and military affairs.

"Article 2—Japanese hospitals, churches and schools in the interior of China shall be granted the right of owning land.

"Article 3—Inasmuch as the Japanese Government and the Chinese Government have had many cases of dispute between Japanese and Chinese police to settle, cases which cause no little misunderstanding, it is for this reason necessary that the police departments of important places (in China) shall be jointly administered by Japanese and Chinese or that the police departments of these places shall employ numerous Japanese, so that they may at the same time help to plan for the improvement of the Chinese Police Service.

"Article 4—China shall purchase from Japan a fixed amount of munitions of war (say 50 per cent or more of what is needed by the Chinese Government) or that there shall be established in China a Sino-Japanese jointly-worked arsenal. Japanese technical experts are to be employed and Japanese material to be purchased.

"Article 5—China agrees to grant to Japan the right of constructing a railway connecting Wuchang with Kiukiang and Nanchang, another line between Nanchang and Hangchow, and another line between Nanchang and Chaochow.

"Article 6—If China needs foreign capital to work mines, build railways and construct harbour works (including dockyards) in the Province of Fukien, Japan shall be first consulted.

"Article 7—China agrees that Japanese subjects shall have the right of missionary propaganda in China."

Although Group Five, as above quoted, was referred to a later date for negotiation, the Chinese negotiators were coerced by Japanese threats of forcible occupation of the country to sign away China's rights by agreeing to Groups One, Two, Three and Four, the more important items of which are the following:

1. The extraction from China of a promise to allow Japan to hold all the rights and privileges held by Germany as well as certain rights not enjoyed by Germany. The matter was, of course, adjusted amicably at the Washington Conference.

2. The extension of the lease of Port Arthur and Dairen and the South Manchurian Railway and the Antung-Mukden Railway for a period of ninety-nine years.

3. The right of Japanese subjects to lease or own land in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia.

4. The freedom of Japanese subjects to reside, travel, do business and open manufacturing plants in South Manchuria and Inner Eastern Mongolia.

5. The consent of Japan to be obtained before permission may be granted to nationals of a third Power to build a railway or make a loan for the purpose of building a railway in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia.

6. Consultation with Japan first before the employment of political, financial or military advisers in South Manchuria or Eastern Inner Mongolia.

7. Revision of the Kirin-Changchun Railway Loan Agreement. "When in future more advantageous terms than those in existing railway loan agreements are granted to foreign financiers in connexion with railway loans, the above agreement shall again be revised in accordance with Japan's wishes."

8. Joint Control of the Hanyehping Iron Company. In a note dated May 25, 1915, Lou Tseng-hsiang declared that "if in future the Hanyehping Company and the Japanese capitalists agree upon cooperation, the Chinese Government, in view of the intimate relations subsisting between the Japanese capitalists and the said Company, will forthwith give its permission. The Chinese Government further agrees not to confiscate the said company, without the consent of the Japanese capitalists to convert it into a state enterprise, nor cause it to borrow and use foreign capital other than Japanese."

9. The right of Japanese to work mines in South Manchuria.

10. Agreement by the Chinese Government not to give their consent to any foreign nations to construct a dockyard, coaling station, naval base or any military establishment along the coast of the province of Fukien or to borrow capital for that purpose.

The fact must be noted that the United States despatched identic notes to Japan and China on May 11, 1915 informing both countries that the American Government "cannot recognize any agreement or undertaking which has been entered into between the Governments of China and Japan impairing the treaty rights of the United States and its citizens in China, the political or territorial integrity of the Republic of China, or the international policy relating to China commonly known as the open door policy."

(To Be Continued)

THE LEADER, Saturday, October 24, 1931.

## FIVE POINTS AND THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS

(Continued from Yesterday)

If Japan had really presented at Geneva the five points which were carried in messages from Tokyo, it stands to reason that no sane Chinese delegate would accept all the points in the form given out in those reports.

The first point that "Japan and China mutually pledge a non-aggression guarantee of each other's territorial integrity", is perfectly absurd. While Japan has violated China's integrity and while China has made no resistance whatsoever to such aggressions, Japan wants China to pledge non-aggression. While her troops are still occupying Chinese territory and while she refuses to fix a date for their withdrawal imperialistic Japan talks about "territorial integrity" and wants China to respect "each other's territorial integrity." The only interpretation of this unreasonable demand is that Japan wants a guarantee from China that she will not take steps to force the withdrawal of Japanese troops from Manchuria, and it looks as if the Vulture of the Land of the Rising Sun is planning to claim territorial permanency in Manchuria, especially in view of reports that more machine-guns and ammunition are being sent to Japanese-occupied territory.

The second point that "all forms of anti-Japanism, including the boycott, be called off permanently," is impossible to consider. The boycott is being carried out voluntarily by the people as a protest against the atrocities committed by the Japanese military tigers in Manchuria and the Government cannot control what is the free will of the people. The only way to stop the boycott against Japanese goods is for Japan to withdraw her troops IMMEDIATELY from Chinese territory, give reparation for damage to Chinese property, return all the planes and machinery and supplies which are being moved out of the Mukden Arsenal, cease all intrigues to turn the Three Eastern Provinces into a second Korea, stop building railways in south Manchuria which infringe upon Chinese sovereignty, stop interfering with Chinese railways in the Three Eastern Provinces, and in general, respect the integrity of China which Japan has pledged again and again in numerous treaties and agreements. That is the ONLY way to stop the boycott against Japanese goods! No amount of bomb diplomacy and intimidation will stop the anti-Japanese boycott.

The third point regarding "assurances for the safety of Japanese lives and property" is entirely superfluous. When the nervous tension of the Chinese people were brought to the highest pitch, when the anger of the Chinese people almost reached the point of explosion over the illegal invasion of Manchuria and the bombing of passenger trains and the defenseless city of Chinchow as well as a number of important cities and towns, when another country would have taken violent measures, the Chinese people remained passive and there were no reports from Japanese or other sources that a single Japanese national has been killed in territory under the control of the Chinese Government. That is the answer to the third point.

The fourth point regarding "payment for railways built with Japanese money and recognition of the existing agreements on railway construction in

Manchuria" shows that Japan is endeavoring to control all the railways in Manchuria south of the Chinese Eastern Railway at one stroke of the pen, which has been the dream of Japanese imperialists for years.

The fifth point on the recognition by China "of all obligations on treaties with Japan including the so-called Twenty-One Demands, and pledge before the League of nations that she will act upon the spirit and letter of these treaties" shows that Japan is seeking every opportunity to bring about the political, financial and military strangulation of China. The odious Twenty-One Demands were forced upon an unwilling Chinese Government with Japanese bayonets and warships, and now, the artful Japanese reason that they would be in a better position if the League helps them to enforce the Twenty-One Demands upon China in accordance with the last clause. But they are doomed to disappointment.

For the League has just passed the following resolutions:

1. That Japanese troops should withdraw into the railway zone as rapidly as possible before November 16.
2. That both governments (China and Japan) should refrain from measures that may aggravate the situation.
3. That Japan observe the Covenant of the League and the Nine-Power Treaty to respect the sovereignty, independence and administrative integrity of China.
4. That the Chinese Government make arrangements to take over the territory to be evacuated.
5. That the Chinese and Japanese Governments immediately appoint representatives to arrange details for the evacuation.
6. That the two countries should establish a conciliation committee or some permanent machinery.
7. That the Council will adjourn until November 16 and authorizes the president to convoke a meeting any time in case of necessity.

It seems upon an examination of the points raised in the League resolution, that the five points attributed to Mr. Briand by the Tokyo report was merely a preconceived expectation on the part of Japanese imperialists of what they fondly hoped would be imposed upon China, but the report from the League shows that the delegates of the Powers are fully aware of Japan's skill in spreading rumors and falsehoods and have reached these decisions only after careful deliberation.

In view of the insistence of the League that Japan should withdraw her troops before November 16 from territory which they occupied without reason or justice, it is yet to be seen whether the Vulture of the Land of the Rising Sun will abide by world opinion or defy the League and the signatories of the Kellogg Pact.

E.B.-S.L.

THE LEADER. Tuesday, October 27, 1931.

### JAPANESE LIBEL BRIAND AND THE LEAGUE

The reports received by *The Leader* through the Japanese news agency *Nippon Dempo* are used by us with the greatest care and circumspection. When a report was received October 21 about Japan's "five fundamental points," including the notorious Twenty-One Demands, we printed the report, but simply quoted indirectly from the first paragraph of same, omitting the statement that this formula had been reached between Briand and Yoshizawa, and furthermore that Briand had told the Japanese delegate that the formula "would certainly be accepted by China." We considered it almost impossible that this could be true.

Reports from reliable agencies now have since confirmed our judgment, making it clear that Briand's proposal, concurred in by every nation except Japan, was and is that Japan evacuate the occupied territory immediately, and complete the process within three weeks, regardless of any equivocation about "treaty rights," etc. We are now printing, for the benefit of our readers, the full *Nippon Dempo* report referred to, to show now circumspect it is necessary for us to be in the handling of news, and what indefatigable and conscienceless liars the Japanese propagandists are, stooping even to misrepresenting absolutely the position of the president of the League of which Japan is a member.

A further report, without specific mention of the Twenty-One Demands but otherwise similar to the *Nippon Dempo* canard, was received from *Reuter* in Tokyo. We understand that *Reuter*, which has (here) been very fair in its reports on the situation, is still represented in Japan by *Kokusai*, a Japanese news association reported to have official connections there.

*Nippon Dempo*

PEIPING, October 21.—In connection with the report that there are five fundamental points which Japan insists China should recognize before the Japanese troops withdraw to the railway zone, the Peiping Office of *Nippon Dempo* has received a Tokyo telegram to the effect that these points form the backbone of a tentative formula reached between M. Aristide Briand and ambassador Yoshizawa at the tete-a-tete conference on Monday last. M. Briand, it is reported, told Mr. Yoshizawa that this formula would certainly be accepted by China, and Mr. Yoshizawa wired it to Tokyo for approval.

#### The Twenty-One Demands

1) All forms of anti-Japanism and anti-Japanese education shall be called off permanently; 2) Japanese lives and property in China shall be perfectly protected; 3) The right of Japanese of residence and carrying out businesses in China shall be recognized and assured; 4) Japan and China shall respect and guarantee each other's territorial integrity; and 5) China shall recognize all obligations on treaties with Japan including the so-called Twenty-one demands, and pledge before the League of Nations that she will act upon the letters and spirit of these treaties.

Shidehara O.K.'s it

On receipt of Mr. Yoshizawa's message, Baron Shidehara, the Foreign Minister on conference with the Government authorities, is said to have replied to him that the formula is appreciated, and that the Tokyo Government is ready to open negotiations with China relative to the withdrawal of the Japanese army. Mr. Yoshizawa has been instructed to report to M. Briand to the above effect.



The Tokyo message further states that M. Briand is expected to open negotiations with Dr. Alfred Sze, the Chinese delegate, on the basis of the formula. The result of the negotiations is being awaited with impatient interest.—*Nippon Dempo*.

**The Fifth Point**

*Reuter*

TOKYO, October 20.—It is understood that M. Briand has expressed the belief that he will be able to persuade China to accept four of Japan's five fundamental points without much difficulty, but he is said to have advised Japan to forego the clause insisting upon Chinese recognition of Japan's railway rights in Manchuria as a preliminary to negotiations.

The five points are stated to be: (1) A mutual pledge of non-aggression and a guarantee of territorial integrity. (2) The anti-Japanese agitation and the boycott to be called off permanently. (3) Assurances for the safety of Japanese lives and property. (4) Payment for railways built with Japanese money and recognition of existing agreements for railway construction in Manchuria. (5) Recognition of existing treaty rights including land leases in Manchuria.

Not only has the position of President Briand and the League now been made fully clear, to the effect that Japan must get out of the illegally occupied territory at once, but it has been made clear furthermore that Briand would not even consider an equivocal proposal such as that from the Japanese, he stating definitely (see *Reuter's* Geneva telegram of October 24 in the news columns today) that "it was impossible to accept inclusion in the resolution of words with regard to which nothing was known."

If the agencies sending out the utterly false and mendacious reports quoted above have any explanation to make of same we shall be glad to learn of it. Unless some other explanation is made, we shall be obliged, provisionally, to assume that the object of these false reports was to arouse indignation and anger in China against the League and its members, and that it was hoped that in the present tense state of popular feeling such anger might result in violent outbreaks against friendly foreign nationals in the country, seriously compromising China's position. We are glad to say that if this was the object it failed utterly, owing to the circumspection and distrust with which these Japanese reports are deservedly treated.

*The Leader*

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



PM RECD

LEGATION OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Peking, October 26, 1931.



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The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPY TO  
ONE AND ONLY  
Dec. 3-31

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit herewith a  
1/ memorandum dated October 6, 1931, of a conversa-  
tion between Lieutenant Willard G. Wyman, of the  
Military Attache's office, and Mr. Sam Dean, an  
American missionary who recently returned from  
Kirin.

In addition to reporting on events in Kirin  
and elsewhere, many of which Mr. Dean witnessed  
himself, the memorandum contains the following  
two interesting statements which confirm views  
expressed by other observers and which are shared  
by the Legation:

"Mr. Dean said that there was an undefinable  
feeling continually present that the Japanese were  
considerably worried over the fact that no inci-  
dent arose which gave them an excuse to actually  
fight.....

"Mr.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

"Mr. Dean felt that it was interesting to note that in all his dealings with the Chinese after the occupation it seemed evident to him that the Chinese public laid the entire blame for the affair on the shoulders of Manchurian officialdom."

Respectfully yours,

For the Minister:

  
O. Van H. Engert,  
First Secretary of Legation.

✓  
Enclosure:

- 1: Copy of memorandum  
of conversation  
dated June 6, 1931.

800.

CVHE/js.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1  
 Despatch No. 1240

COPY

Peiping,  
 October 6, 1931.

**Memorandum to The Military Attache:-**

The following is a resume of a conversation between Lieutenant Wyman and Mr. Sam Dean, a missionary who recently returned from Kirin.

On the 19th of September there was no activity at Kirin that would indicate that news had been received relative to the Japanese Occupation. Mr. Dean walked to the top of Lung Tan Shan on that date and could look down into the Chinese barracks where there seemed to be no exceptional activity. The streets of Kirin seemed to be as usual.

On the morning of the 20th the Japanese civilians, residents of Kirin, appeared on the streets with arms. They wore their usual clothes and did not appear to be particularly well organized but merely wandered about the streets in small groups. They were armed very miscellaneously with pistols, shot guns, sporting rifles and clubs. Mr. Dean said that he did not see anything that looked like a military rifle. A Chinese pointed out a local Japanese barber who was standing in front of his shop with a pistol (Mr. Dean) strapped about his middle and told him that inside the shop was a Japanese machine gun. This was not verified.

Orders from "somewhere" were received that all the demands of the Japanese should be complied with. A strong Chinese police guard was thrown about the Japanese Consulate.

The 5,000 Chinese troops stationed in Kirin retired from the town and took up a very strong position on Lung Tan Shan. These troops were very boastful about what they would do to the Japanese. They would die before they would give up their arms etc.

A Japanese plane flew over the city dropping pamphlets. Mr. Dean could not read Chinese but one was interpreted to him roughly about as follows: the Japanese had suffered much at the hands of Manchurian officialdom, the blowing up of their railroad was the last incident of the kind that could occur, they were now coming into the Three Eastern provinces to pacify the country. Chinese civilians had nothing to fear at the hands of Japanese troops. However anyone bearing arms against Japan would be severely dealt with. Anyone possessing arms should give them up immediately. Mr. Dean felt that this translation was too doubtful to be quoted.

In the evening, returning to his residence from the outskirts of town, his flashlight was seen by a Chinese watchman (police) of a nearby factory. The watchman came running out to him giving every evidence of the utmost fear which subsided somewhat when it was found that the owner of the flashlight was an American rather than a Japanese. The watchman told him that Japanese troops had arrived, that anyone on the streets was in great danger and that he must not continue into town. Mr. Dean disregarded the man's advice and continued on his way. As he came to the railroad tracks he saw a group of four or five Japanese soldiers standing carelessly

beneath a very brilliant arc light. They paid no attention to him tho' he walked close to them. He felt that their carelessness either indicated that the situation at Kirin was not at all serious or that their training and discipline was very poor. This was the only indication of Japanese troops that were seen by him the night of the 20th. However, at his residence at about 10 o'clock, a great deal of noise was heard by him from the direction of the railroad station. The next day he discovered that this was the main body of Japanese troops coming to town.

On the 21st the cars that had brought the troops to Kirin were counted. There were forty of them and it was estimated that probably about 2,000 troops had arrived. On arrival the Japanese disarmed all the Chinese police without resistance and all military munitions were seized.

The troops at Lung Tan Shan were ordered by the Japanese to come in to town and give up their arms. All but 1800 of the so called Fen Tuan complied. The troops that gave up their arms were very craven about it. They were very much frightened, many of them making the farmers of the countryside give them their clothes so that they could come into town in civilian garb. The Feng Tuan moved off away from the town and were pursued by airplanes and a considerable body of cavalry mounted on large Japanese horses. The pursuit was without success other than that it separated the Chinese force into two retreating bodies. The Japanese in Kirin resorted to threats stating that if this force did not come in and lay down their arms the city would be bombarded.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Mr. Dean saw what appeared to him to be about 40 field pieces emplaced about the Japanese Consulate which were to carry out the threat. The Feng Tuan did not come in and the city was not bombarded.

For the next several days the Japanese resorted to demonstrations in the streets of the city which consisted of the practice of combat problems by small units in full field equipment. These problems were conducted in a most theatrically ferocious manner. The Chinese were driven from the streets while they were in progress but offered no resistance. The local populace were all smiles in the presence of Japanese troops but the minute they passed the smiles gave place to sullen looks and curses.

On the occupation of the city all the Korean prisoners in the municipal jail were released. The Koreans about the countryside were collected and taken into the Japanese Consulate. Mr. Dean said that he was unable to fathom the true meaning of this because the Koreans acted as tho' they were in fear of their lives. The Japanese troops threatened them and clubbed them for no apparent reason, and treated all Koreans very roughly.

Mr. Dean said that there was an undefinable feeling continually present that the Japanese were considerably worried over the fact that no incident arose which gave them an excuse to actually fight.

The money with which Mr. Dean was operating was deposited in the Bank of China which had been closed. He went to the Japanese Consulate to see if there was any way of secur-

ing funds from the bank to pay his workmen. The Consul politely told him that that would be impossible but that if through his Shanghai headquarters he would deal through the Bank of Chosen the funds could be easily taken care of. In fact he advised him to always use the Bank of Chosen because it would prove to be the most dependable.

An interesting side light relative to the comparative cost in the use of the Chinese railways as opposed to the use of the South Manchuria railways came up when Mr. Dean said that he had been making several carload shipments of goods from Peiping to Kirin. If the South Manchuria railway were to be used two transshipments of goods would be necessitated, a caretaker would have to accompany the goods and the cost of the shipment would be about \$350.00. If shipped over Chinese lines the caretaker would be eliminated, the shipment would be direct and the cost \$153.00.

On the 23rd Mr. Dean started for Peiping. Trains from Kirin were crowded with refugees bound for Harbin. Stations on the Kirin - Changchun railway were guarded by Japanese troop units, bridges, by Japanese sentries stationed at both ends. There was practically no travel on the road from Changchun south to Mukden. Only the customary train guards were being used. He saw no evidences of fighting in the vicinity of Changchun.

On the 24th he was surprised to see so many refugees crowding the station of the South Manchuria railway at Mukden endeavoring to secure passage to Dairen.

At the Mukden station of the Mukden-Peiping line tremendous crowds of refugees were gathered. Inside were only two Japanese sentries who worked together holding individuals up at the point of a pistol and requiring them to give up their money. Mr. Dean was told that this was being done to dis-




courage people from leaving Mukden. From time to time he noticed a little Russian boy pointing people out to the sentries. As this was done much excitement ensued. The sentry blew a whistle and a group of Japanese soldiers would come rushing into the station, surround the individual who had been pointed out and take him away.

Going south from Mukden, Mr. Dean did not remember where he last saw Japanese soldiers but he remembered the impression that Chinese troops were in possession of the road very shortly after the last of Japanese had been seen. He noticed several troop trains on sidings north of Kowpangtze. The soldiers belonging to these trains were very interested in asking about news from Mukden. Mr. Dean was interested to note that all troop trains had engines coupled on them with steam up and headed south.

North of Kowpangtze there had been a battle between Chinese troops and bandits. He saw working parties burying the dead as he passed by on the train. He said that it was in about this place that at a wayside station he saw the body of the Chinese passenger that had been killed by a Japanese airplane. Having seen the battleground where the bandits had been fighting with Chinese troops he felt that the Japanese excuse for that incident was quite a plausible one.

Mr. Dean felt that it was interesting to note that in all his dealings with the Chinese after the occupation it seemed evident to him that the Chinese public laid the entire blame for the affair on the shoulders of Manchurian officialdom.

Willard G. Wyman,  
1st Lieut., Cav., D.O.L.



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




PM RECD LEGATION OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Peking, October 24, 1931.

No. 1238

NOV 23 31



The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Sir:

1/2 With reference to the Legation's telegrams No. 697 of October 4, 8 a.m., and No. 707 of October 5, 6 p.m., I have the honor to transmit herewith two memoranda, both dated October 5, 1931, of a conversation Mr. Johnson had with Sir Miles Lampson, and regarding a meeting of various chiefs of mission at the British Legation in connection with the note from the Chinese Government requesting that observers be sent to Manchuria for the purpose of watching the withdrawal of Japanese forces.

3/4 In this connection, and referring to the Legation's telegram No. 721 of October 7, 4 p.m., I also transmit herewith memoranda of conversations with the British Minister and the French Minister on October 7th, in which both expressed the opinion that

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- 2 -

in view of the general international situation arising from the appeal of the Nanking Government to the League of Nations and to the United States, they felt that they should probably likewise proceed to Nanking. Both Ministers have since then left for Nanking, on October 14th.

Respectfully yours,

For the Minister:

  
Van H. Engert,  
First Secretary of Legation.

Enclosures:

1. Memorandum of conversation with British Minister, October 5th.
2. Memorandum of meeting at British Legation, October 5th.
3. Memorandum of conversation with British Minister, October 7th.
4. Memorandum of conversation with French Minister, October 7th.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1  
Despatch No. 1238

Conversation.

Peiping, October 5, 1931

Sir Miles Lampson, British Minister

Subject: Note from Chinese Foreign Office regarding  
Conditions in Manchuria

Sir Miles Lampson called this morning and in the course of conversation told me that he had received, somewhat later than the rest, a note from the Chinese Foreign Office requesting him, as the representative of a government which is a member of the Council of the League of Nations, to send representatives to Manchuria for the purpose of observing the situation. The note stated that Japan had given an undertaking to the League to withdraw her troops to their original positions in the zone of the South Manchuria Railway by the 14th October; that it was the desire of the Chinese Government that the British Minister have representatives there to observe the process of withdrawal in order that his Government might place this information before the Council of the League of Nations.

I read to Sir Miles the telegram which I had received from the Foreign Office and we found that the texts of his message and my message agreed except that mine was addressed to me as representative of a government signatory to the Kellogg Pact for the Renunciation of War and requested me to send observers for the purpose of reporting developments to the United States and to the public. I told Sir Miles that we had despatched two observers to Manchuria,

one

- 2 -

one a secretary from the Embassy at Tokyo, Mr. Salisbury, and one our Consul General at Harbin, Mr. Hanson, and that these two gentlemen were now in Changchun beginning their observations. I said that they had been sent by the Department of State with the knowledge of the Japanese Government and that I had informed the Chinese Government of their going, making it clear that the decision to send these men into Manchuria had been taken prior to the receipt of the Chinese note and that they had not been sent in response to the Chinese request.

We both agreed that there was some difficulty in complying with the Chinese request as it looked a little as though the Chinese were trying to put into effect a proposal which had been discarded by the League because of the disapproval of the Japanese.

We are to meet with other representatives of the powers representing the members of the Council of the League of Nations at the British Legation this afternoon at 4:15 to discuss this matter.

Nelson Trusler Johnson  
American Minister

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 2  
Serial No. 1238

Peiping, October 5, 1931

Memorandum of Meeting at British Legation

Subject: Appeal of Chinese Government to Powers  
to send Observers to Manchuria

There was a meeting at the British Legation this afternoon which was presided over by the Spanish Minister and was attended by the Italian Chargé, the German Minister, Mr. Trautmann, the French Minister, Mr. Wilden, the British Minister, Sir Miles Lampson, and myself. The former met as representatives of governments who are members of the Council of the League of Nations to whom the Chinese Foreign Office had addressed an appeal for observers to be sent into Manchuria for the purpose of watching the withdrawal of Japanese forces. I was present at the request of the Spanish Minister as representing the government interested in the Kellogg Pact for the Renunciation of War and as one of the governments addressed by the Chinese.

The Spanish Minister, explaining the reason for the meeting, stated that at the request of his Minister for Foreign Affairs the Spanish Consul General at Shanghai had been sent to Manchuria but he had not gone in response to the Chinese request.

The British Minister stated that his reaction was to acknowledge receipt of the Chinese note and state that he was receiving information from British consular officers in Manchuria which he was forwarding to his Government. The British Minister stated that the receipt of this mes-

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- 2 -

sage from the Chinese rather complicated matters. His own Military Attaché had now returned and with this request in his hands he could not very well send him back without giving the appearance of partisanship in a matter about which he thought we should be very careful. There was some question in his mind as to whether the Chinese Government might not by this means be attempting to put into effect a proposal which had been abandoned by the League when opposed by the Japanese.

The French Minister stated that he had also received a telegraphic appeal from the Chinese Government. Prior to its receipt, however, he had received from his Government an instruction to the effect that he was to keep Paris informed concerning (1) evacuation of Japanese troops; (2) freeing of prisoners; (3) releasing of public buildings. He said this instruction had been sent by Paris in view of the League's action and was intended to enable the French Government to keep the Council of the League informed. He said that this instruction was immediately followed, however, by a second instruction to the effect that in view of Japanese disapproval of the League proposal the instruction calling for this information would have to be complied with with the greatest care and discretion on his part.

I informed my colleagues in confidence of the despatch of Messrs. Salisbury and Hanson, Secretary of our Embassy at Tokyo and Consul General at Harbin, respectively, by the

Department

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

Department of State to South Manchuria for purposes of observation. I stated that these gentlemen had already arrived at Changchun; that they had been despatched with the knowledge of the Japanese and that I had informed the Chinese Government of their going, making it clear that they had not gone in response to its appeal.

We all agreed that nothing could be done in response to the Chinese request without instructions from our several governments. I explained that I had telegraphed the Chinese appeal in toto to my Government.

Nelson Trusler Johnson  
American Minister

NTJ/hp



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure 3  
Date 12-38

Conversation.

Peiping, Oct. 7, 1931

Sir Miles Lampson, British Minister

Subject: Sino-Japanese Relations  
Departure for Nanking

I called upon the British Minister this afternoon by arrangement and told him that I had received instructions from my Government to make reply to the appeal of the Chinese Government requesting that we send observers to Manchuria. I gave to him the substance of this reply. I then told him that I had received instructions from Washington to the effect that Washington desired that I be in Nanking for the next two or three weeks for the purpose of facilitating communication and that I had been asked to proceed at my earliest convenience to Nanking unless I knew reasons to the contrary. I told the British Minister that I was unable to think of any convincing reasons why I should not go to Nanking; that on the contrary I felt that the situation was very serious and that if it was possible to accomplish anything toward moderating the situation at Nanking by being there, my presence there was necessary. I said that I intended to inform the Department that I would leave Peiping on Monday for Nanking.

The British Minister stated that this required that he think very seriously about his own duties in the matter.

He

- 2 -

He felt that perhaps he also should go down to Nanking if I went as there was benefit in our being together to cooperate in any efforts that might be made at that place. We both agreed that the present situation was fraught with dangerous possibilities and that it was desirable that our governments do whatever might be possible to prevent the situation getting worse.

Sir Miles then read to me a telegram which he had received from his Government in reply to three that he had sent in regard to the request of the Chinese Government that observers be sent to Manchuria. This instruction was generally to the effect that the British Government felt that the Chinese request should be complied with and that the British Government had requested the French Government to instruct its Minister at Peiping to confer with the British Minister to the effect that they might send observers to Manchuria, first obtaining the approval of the Japanese. Sir Miles stated that it had been his intention to despatch Mr. Stirling to Manchuria but that if he went to Nanking he might have to change this arrangement. He was short-handed in Peiping.

Nelson Trusler Johnson  
American Minister

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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1238

Conversation.

Peiping, Oct. 7, 1931

Mr. Wilden, French Minister

Subject: Sino-Japanese Relations  
Departure for Nanking

I called upon Mr. Wilden, the French Minister, and told him that I was under instructions to proceed as soon as might be convenient to Nanking. Mr. Wilden stated that this intention on my part raised the question in his mind as to whether he also should not go down. He asked me when I intended to go. I told him that I could not leave before Monday. We agreed that the situation was fraught with dangerous possibilities and that it behooved the representatives of the powers party to the League and the Kellogg Pact for the Renunciation of War to do what might be possible to prevent the situation getting worse.

Nelson Trusler Johnson  
American Minister

NTJ/hp

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PM RECD

No. 1.

AMERICAN CONSULATE,

Amoy, China, October 20, 1931.

NOV 23 31

Subject: Bombing of Japanese Consulate at Kulangsu  
and Japanese Police Station at Amoy.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,  
American Minister,  
Peking, China.

Sir:

743 94  
702.9493

I have the honor to refer to my telegram of October 19, 10 a.m., regarding the anti-Japanese feeling at Amoy and to enclose a copy of a report, dated October 19, 1931, of the Chief of Police at Kulangsu regarding the bombing of the Japanese Consulate, October 18, 1931 (Sunday), at 7:50 p.m., and which report appears, after investigation, to be substantially correct.

When I called upon Mr. Yoshiaki Miura, the Japanese Consul, to-day, he informed me that he thought the bombing might have been instigated by a group of people of communist tendencies. His Consulate is being guarded by Japanese sailors. While the hand grenade thrown at the Japanese Consulate did not go off, Mr. Miura informed me that one thrown at the police office on the Amoy side did go off but did no damage.

The news of the throwing of these grenades did not reach my attention or the attention of any of my staff until this morning although we are not far from the

Japanese Consulate.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Japanese Consulate.

Respectfully yours,

Lynn W. Franklin,  
American Consul.

Enclosure:

Copy of report, dated October 19, 1931,  
of Chief of Police at Kulangsu.

800  
LWF/O

In duplicate to Legation, Peiping.

In quintuplicate to Department (one copy marked "For  
the Commercial Office").

A true copy of  
the original  
filed  
J. C. C.

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 1 of Lynn W. Franklin,  
American Consul at Amoy, China, dated October 20, 1931,  
on the subject "Bombing of Japanese Consulate at  
Kulangsu and Japanese Police Station at Amoy".

Copy

KULANGSU MUNICIPAL COUNCIL.

AMOY, CHINA.

-----  
Kulangsu, Amoy, 19th October, 1931.

Rough Police Report.

At about 7.50 p.m. on Sunday, 18th October, 1931, a small hand grenade was thrown by some person over the wall of the Japanese Consulate. The grenade fell on the back verandah of the Consular Residence, but failed to explode.

The policeman on duty, who had just passed around to the front of the Consulate, heard the breaking of glass and hurried back but saw nothing. He immediately reported that someone had thrown a stone; the true character of the missile being ascertained after search.

Extra police were posted around the Consulate and I spent a considerable time investigating the local situation and was satisfied that residents were not aware of the occurrence which had been the work of a person or persons from Amoy.

I subsequently visited the Japanese Consulate and was requested to assume responsibility for the protection of all Japanese lives and property within the Settlement from attacks of this nature.

As this necessitated the watching of each and every Japanese residence in the Settlement I called upon the force to do double duty during the night.

I found that the missile was a copy of a "Mills

Hand Grenade",

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Hand Grenade", very old and probably discarded military stores, or a grenade found unexploded at some former time.

I understand that simultaneously three grenades were thrown into the compound of the Japanese Police Office at Amoy. The following points are of interest and should be taken into consideration:

1. The grenades were thrown in Kulangsu and Amoy at the same time.
2. The grenades were all old and were not of similar manufacture or design, indicating that they have been collected from different sources, regardless of their efficiency.
3. That the persons who are responsible for these acts have no new or efficient grenades at their disposal.

I am of the opinion that these acts can be considered those of a small party of young men, possibly university students, who have secretly formed themselves into a band, with intent to create a difficult situation, but who are not in possession of efficient weapons.

I understand that about midnight a party of about 20 armed Japanese marines landed at Singapore Jetty and proceeded to the Japanese Consulate where they are being held for duty within the Consular Compound.

Police are being detailed to watch Japanese residences as far as can be done with the number of men at my disposal, the police have also received orders to search any suspected persons.

It should be clearly understood that to guard every Japanese house on all sides would require a force ten times in number to that available, it being impossible  
 for

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

for the police to concentrate on one or more buildings,  
leaving the others unguarded.

(Sgd.) G. R. Bass

Chief of Police,

Kulangsui Municipal Council.

A true copy of  
the signed original.  
J.O.G.



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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~~CORRECTED COPY~~  
**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated FROM  
to anyone.

Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.


784, November 23, 4 p.m.

FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES.

The following is Sweetser's report of the private  
meeting of the Council held at 10:30 to 1 p.m., today.

"M. Briand presented today to the twelve members  
of the Council, excluding Japan and China the draft  
resolution prepared yesterday in negotiations between  
himself, Simon and Drummond. He explained that it was  
based on the Japanese proposal for a commission, which  
however had been surrounded with impossible conditions  
and that the efforts of the last days had been to take  
out those conditions and add other proposals regarding  
evacuation and cessation of hostilities which would make  
it possible of acceptance by the Chinese and in accord  
with the principles which the Council was called upon to  
defend. His effort was to get unanimity, if possible;  
otherwise there would be a break if the commission could

once



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Guttfeld NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM

-2-#784, from Paris

once be established, one of two alternatives would immediately become clear: Either the two parties would have the means of agreement and conciliation on the spot or it would be evident that there would be no way out. He foresaw great difficulties, however, in getting the proposal accepted. The Japanese would not like parts of it; the Chinese had already announced in their memorandum last night that they must have satisfaction on evacuation. For the moment the best course seemed for him to present this project to the Chinese as the best that it appeared possible to secure from the Japanese and see what the Chinese would propose. The members of the Council must still hope to be able to build up an agreement step by step.

Thereupon ensued a discussion which showed that certain members of the Council had grave hesitations as to whether the draft went far enough either to secure the agreement of the Chinese or to safeguard the principles already announced by the Council. Madariaga found it very paradoxical that while at the outset the Japanese had resisted any interference whatsoever in a matter which they considered strictly between themselves and China they were now proposing a commission which should study

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
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AM

3-#784, from Paris

study every phase of the relations of the two countries except, so far as he could judge, the presence of Japanese troops on Chinese soil. He questioned the statement of limitation which seemed to exclude from its task any consideration of the military angle, and also the relegation to the President's speech of the right of either party to put any question it wished before the commission. He did not like, after three months' effort, to appear to cover up the principal question of the presence of Japanese troops in Chinese territory or to be diverted from the one immediate issue to vast wider issues beyond.

Colban, agreeing with the desirability of unanimity did not see how it would be possible to obtain it after reading the Chinese memorandum and knowing the Japanese view. If unanimity were impossible, however, the Council could not adjourn on a text giving the impression that it accepted the Japanese invasion of Chinese territory. He hoped the text would not be presented to the Japanese as definitive and thus justify them in false hopes. Unfortunately, however, he had no alternative to offer. Fotitch expressed the fear that the text might be interpreted as admitting the concurrence between the occupation and the commission and that

AM

4-#784, from Paris

that it might even legalize the former.

Simon agreed that it must be made clear that evacuation must not be postponed to the end of the commission. It must take place before and not at the end of its labors. Unless the Council made that plain there was no chance of the Chinese accepting. Evacuation must be independent of the commission. It was most important that the commission should not be taken as an excuse for delaying the evacuation. To that effect he proposed an amendment to the fifth point that "it was further understood that the deliberations of the commission should not be regarded as any ground for delaying the evacuation of the Japanese troops." Briand agreed that he would try to improve the text in this connection in order to remove the impression of his colleagues that it might be taken to legitimize the occupation.

Madariaga also raised the question as to whether the limitation as to not supervising the military movements of either party would prevent the commission from considering the military aspect of the situation. It would seem to him wrong for a League Commission to be in

Manchuria

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
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AM

5-#784, from Paris

Manchuria and possibly quite helpless while military movements were going on. This was the fourth time the Council had put the question of evacuation. It was now becoming a bit banal. He did not see how the Commission could disinterest itself from the principal question.

Briand replied that the Japanese did not want the League to send a commission to control their armed forces. Drummond added that the Commission could report on military aspects but could not give orders to the troops. The Japanese wanted the right to take measures against bandits, for instance, without having to ask the consent of the commission. Simon then asked if the Council might envisage a public meeting shortly. The draft resolution must of course be discussed first with the Japanese and the Chinese but he feared an indefinite prolongation of private meetings. The impression was growing amongst the public that while the Council was discussing the matter in private, grave events were taking place without any effective action. Should a public meeting not be held <sup>certainly</sup> (?) before the end of the week.

Briand replied that a public session had been held

on

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on Saturday just as soon as there had been something of substance to put before it. At that time the Japanese had suggested the commission idea, it was now desirable to study that idea in order to try to secure material for the next public meeting. The week ought not to end however without a decision one way or the other. There must be either an agreement or a draft resolution as last time.

Briand then explained that he would attempt to modify the draft in order to take into account the preoccupations expressed and that he would discuss it this afternoon with the Japanese and the Chinese. He would make clear, however, that it was merely a schemat not yet approved by his colleagues and consequently still open to amendment by them. He would report the results of his interview at a meeting tomorrow at eleven A.M."

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This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated FROM  
to anyone.

Paris

Dated November 23, 1931

Rec'd 7:43 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 - No. 784 from Paris

once be established, one of two alternatives would immediately become clear: Either the two parties would have the means of agreement and conciliation on the spot or it would be evident that there would be no way out. He foresaw great difficulties, however, in getting the proposal accepted. The Japanese would not like parts of it; the Chinese had already announced in their memorandum last night that they must have satisfaction on evacuation. For the moment the best course seemed for him to present this project to the Chinese as the best that it appeared possible to secure from the Japanese and see what the Chinese would propose. The members of the Council must still hope to be able to build up an agreement step by step.

Thereupon ensued a discussion which showed that certain members of the Council had grave hesitations as to whether the draft went far enough either to secure the agreement of the Chinese or to safeguard the principles already announced by the Council. Madariaga found it very paradoxical that while at the outset the Japanese had resisted any interference whatsoever in a matter which they considered strictly between themselves and China they were now proposing a commission which should study



- 3 - No. 784 from Paris

study every phase of the relations of the two countries except, so far as he could judge, the presence of Japanese troops on Chinese soil. He questioned the statement of limitation which seemed to exclude from its task any consideration of the military angle, and also the relegation to the President's speech of the right of either party to put any question it wished before the commission. He did (?), after three months' effort, to appear to cover up the principal question of the presence of Japanese troops in Chinese territory or to be diverted from the one immediate issue to vast wider issues beyond.

Colban, agreeing with the desirability of unanimity did not see how it would be possible to obtain it after reading the Chinese memorandum and knowing the Japanese view. If unanimity were impossible, however, the Council could not adjourn on a text giving the impression that it accepted the Japanese invasion of Chinese territory. He hoped the text would not be presented to the Japanese as definitive and thus justify them in false hopes. Unfortunately, however, he had no alternative to offer. Fotitch expressed the fear that the text might be interpreted as admitting the concurrence between the occupation and the commission and that

- 4 - No. 784 from Paris

that it might even legalize the former.

Simon agreed that it must be made clear that evacuation must not be postponed to the end of the commission. It must take place before and not at the end of its labors. Unless the Council made that plain there was no chance of the Chinese accepting. Evacuation must be independent of the commission. It was most important that the commission should not be taken as an excuse for delaying the evacuation. To that effect he proposed an amendment to the fifth point that "it was further understood that the deliberations of the commission should not be regarded as any ground for delaying the evacuation of the Japanese troops." Briand agreed that he would try to improve the text in this connection (?) remove the impression of his colleagues that it might be taken to legitimize the occupation.

Madariaga also raised the question as to whether the limitation as to not supervising the military movements of either party would prevent the commission from considering the military aspect of the situation. It would seem to him wrong for a League Commission to be in

Manchuria

- 5 - No. 784 from Paris

Manchuria and possibly quite helpless while military movements were going on. This was the fourth time the Council had put the question of evacuation. It was now becoming a bit banal. He did not see how the Commission could disinterest itself from the principal question.

Briand replied that the Japanese did not want the League to send a commission to control their armed forces. Drummond added that the Commission could report on military aspects but could not give orders to the troops. The Japanese wanted the party to take measures against bandits, for instance, without having to ask the consent of the commission. Simon then asked if the Council might ~~envisage~~ a public meeting shortly. The draft resolution must of course be discussed first with the Japanese and the Chinese but he feared an indefinite prolongation of private meetings. The impression was growing amongst the public that while the Council was discussing the matter in private, grave events were taking place without any effective action. Should a public meeting not be held <sup>Certainly</sup> (?) before the end of the week.

Briand replied that a public session had been held

on

- 6 - No. 784 from Paris

on Saturday just as soon as there had been something of substance to put before it. At that time the Japanese had suggested the commission idea, it was now desirable to study that idea in order to try to secure material for the next public meeting. The week ought not to end however without a decision one way or the other. There must be either an agreement or a draft resolution as last time.

Briand then explained that he would attempt to modify the draft in order to take into account that (?) expressed and that he would discuss it this afternoon with the Japanese and the Chinese. He would make clear however that it was merely a scheme not yet approved by his colleagues and consequently still open to amendment by them. He would report the results of his interview at a meeting tomorrow at eleven A. M."

SHAW

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED



FROM Paris


Dated November 23, 1931

CONFIDENTIAL CODE

Rec'd

Advance copy subject to correction.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.



784. November 23, 4 p. m.

FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES.

The following is Sweetzer's report of the private meeting of the Council held at 10:30 to 1 p. m. today.

"M. Briand presented today to the twelve members of the Council, excluding Japan and China, the Spaulding Resolution prepared yesterday in negotiations between himself, Simon and Drummond. He explained that it was based on the Japanese proposal for a commission, which however had been surrounded with impossible conditions and that the efforts ~~last~~ last days had been to take \_\_\_\_\_ those conditions and add other proposals regarding evacuation and cessation of hostilities which would make it possible of acceptance by the Chinese and in accord with the principles which the Council was called upon to defend. His efforts \_\_\_\_\_ get unanimity, if possible, otherwise there would be a break if the commission could once be established, one of two alternatives would immediately become clear: either the two parties \_\_\_\_\_ the means of agreement and conciliation on the spot or it would be evident that there would be no way out. He foresaw great difficulties however in getting the proposal accepted. The Japanese would not like

147C

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

784 from Paris -2

parts of it; the Chinese had already announced in their memorandum last night that they must have satisfaction on evacuation gave in for the moment the last course seemed for him to present earliest account of project to the Chinese as the best that it appeared possible to secure from the Japanese and see what the Chinese would propose. The members of the Council must still hope to be able to build up an agreement step by step. Thereupon ensued a discussion which showed that certain members of the Council had grave hesitations as to whether the draft went far enough either to secure the agreement of the Chinese or to safeguard the principles \_\_\_\_\_ announced by the Council. Madariaga found it very paradoxical that while at the outset the Japanese had \_\_\_\_\_ any interference whatsoever in a matter which they considered strictly between themselves and China they were now proposing a commission which should study every phase of the relations of the two countries except, so far as he could judge, the presence of Japanese troops on Chinese soil. He questioned total of \*\*\*\*\*

Above approximately one third of message now in from Paris and being decoded.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WP

GREEN & GRAY  
 FROM  
 Paris

Dated November 23, 1931

Rec'd 9:38 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

790, November 23, 2 p. m.


FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES.

Final sub paragraph under paragraph numbered five  
 of proposed resolution as transmitted in my 780, November  
 22, 12 p. m., now reads as follows:

The Governments of China and of Japan will each  
 have the right to nominate one assessor to assist the  
 Commission. It is understood that should the two parties  
 initiate any negotiations these would not fall within the  
 scope of the terms of reference of the Commission nor  
 would the Commission interfere with military measures  
 taken by either party."

The following new final sub paragraph has been  
 added to paragraph numbered 5:

"It is further understood that the appointment and  
 deliberations of the Commission are not to be regarded as  
 any ground for delaying the withdrawal by the Japanese  
 troops



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 - No. 790 from Paris

troops within the railway zone as laid down in paragraph one of this resolution".

Above amendments are result of this morning's private meeting of Council members (see my telegram 784 November 23, 4 p. m.) and the resolution so amended has been communicated by Briand to Sze who has agreed to transmit it to his Government but who expresses no hope that it will be accepted.

SHAW

CSB



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

NT

PLAIN

FROM

Peiping via N.R.

Dated November 24, 1931

Rec'd 7:35 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

996, November 24.

Peiping anti-Japanese Students' Union for  
 national salvation adopted certain resolutions which  
 according to Chinese press were yesterday afternoon  
 presented to Marshal Chang Hsueh Liang by delegates  
 of the Union. Following are the more important  
 resolutions:

One. National Government to sever diplomatic  
 relations with Japan.

Two. Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek to come  
 north and expel the Japanese.

Three. Investigation to be made of reasons  
 for policy of non-resistance.

Four. China to withdraw from League of Nations.

Five. Attention of United States to be invited  
 to Nine Power Treaty, Anti-War Pact and violent conduct


of

F/DEW

793.94/2854

FILED

NOV. 30. 1931



793.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

2-#996, From Peiping via N.R.  
November 24, 1931.

FROM

of Japanese army in China.

Six. If Japan refuses to withdraw and League fails to take any action China is to decline participation in Disarmament Conference.

Seven. Voluntary corps in various colleges be promptly armed.

Eight. Every village and town to organize a self defense corps.

Nine. Troops to be sent immediately to assist General Mah Chan Shan in Heilungkiang.

Ten. All persons connected with attempt to ~~resort~~ <sup>restore</sup> Manchu dynasty in Manchuria to be arrested and their property confiscated.

The above probably represents attitude of majority of students in Peiping.

For the Minister

ENGERT

WSB

1482

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 24, 1931.

The telegram hereunder (Tokyo Embassy's 233 of November 24, 3 p.m.) refers to interference by the Japanese military authorities in Manchuria with the business transactions of the Mukden branch of the National City Bank, which was brought to the Department's attention in a letter from the New York office of the National City Bank dated October 31, 1931 (hereto attached).

A memorandum dated November 10, 1931, dealing with this case of the National City Bank and other similar cases of interference with American interests in Manchuria is also attached for reference.

It is suggested that this matter of the National City Bank, and of the similar matters referred to in the above memorandum, might well be brought to the attention of the Japanese Ambassador as previously suggested.

WMM  
RSM:EJL  
m.m.H.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

November 24, 1931.

FE  
Dear Dr. Hornbeck:

Please note the Secretary  
instructions:

FE, please ins.

Last paragraph of the  
attached telegram he says YES.

ERM.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*EE*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

GRAY

FROM

Tokio

*Del. to Tokyo direct*

Dated November 24, 1931

Rec'd 6:10 a.m.

NOV 25 1931

Secretary of State,  
 Washington

233, November 24, 3 p.m.

Division of  
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
 NOV 24 1931  
 Department of State  
*RCM*

F/DEW

793.94/2855

Japanese military authorities in Manchuria have issued orders forbidding transfer of government funds in Chinese banks to Mukden branch of National City Bank, honoring their check for business enterprises involving British controlled Mukden-Peiping Railroad and Dutch owned Hulutao Harbor Works. The latter company owes the City Bank approximately \$200,000 for payment of which funds are on deposit but which they are not permitted to draw. I am requested in writing by Tokyo representative City Bank to protest to the Japanese Government against this interference with business of a neutral bank conducted with a neutral company. I shall see Baron Shidehara about it this week and unless I hear to the contrary I will make urgent request that the City Bank be allowed to conduct

FILED  
 NOV 28 1931

*793.94  
 note  
 811.516 93  
 843.516*

*23*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#233, Tokio, November 24,  
1931.

conduct business on normal basis and will protest  
against stoppage of collection of their claim.

Is it the desire of the Department that such  
protest be in writing?

FORBES

RR-WSB

1 488

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

November 24, 1931.

18

Collect  
Charge Department

Charge to  
\$

AMERICAN EMBASSY

TOKYO (JAPAN).

243

Your 233/ November 24, 3 p.m. Department approves  
your proposed course of action and ~~leaves the method of~~  
~~you leave with Shidehara a written memorandum~~  
~~presentation to your discretion.~~

You might in your interview with Baron Shidehara  
refer also to the cases of interference with American  
interests which the Department understands have been  
reported to you by our Consul General at Mukden.  
Similar representations will be made orally to the  
Japanese Ambassador here.

Thurson

FE: RSM: EJJ

FE

NOV 25 1931 P.M.

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-128

793.94/2855

793.94/2855  
note  
811.51693  
893.516

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL

file



TRANSATLANTIC TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY  
 STIMSON AND GENERAL DAWES, PARIS, NOVEMBER 23, 1931. 3:00.

SECRETARY: Hello, is that you General. Has anything happened that you wanted to tell me? I am sending you a telegram in respect to an answer to your question about the Chinese counterproposal and the Council proposal. I think it will be a pretty strong one in favor of the League proposal and against the Chinese proposal because I think that the Council proposal is now in very good shape. I shall also send a message to Japan cautioning them that it will be absolutely necessary to have a suspension of hostilities and warning them against an expedition to Chin Chow. That is the substance of about all I can do. I want to hear what the situation is with you.

DAWES: There is no change whatever in the situation from that which I sent you at midnight last night. Briand late this afternoon is seeing Sze and Yoshizawa to try to get them together on the proposal of the League. The reports that I get are that Sze is absolutely..... He has arranged later in the evening to see Sweetser. I will send that report of the meeting which Briand had with Yoshizawa and Sze later.

SECRETARY: I can not speak too strongly of the folly on the part of China in resisting such a proposition, it seems to me, as this one of the Council.

DAWES: Do you say that in your telegram to Sze?

SECRETARY: I will. The telegram is for you to pass on to Sze, or so much of it as you think wise in your discretion.

DAWES: Do you answer the telegram directly to Sze.

SECRETARY: No, I answer it to you for you to give as much to him as you think may be wise.

793.94/2855 1/2

FIVE

Confidential File



-2-

DAWES: Sze will send it right back to his Government.

SECRETARY: I shall also repeat it to Johnson, our Minister to China.

DAWES: Mr. Secretary, may I tell Briand or Simon what I have done.

SECRETARY: That depends on the situation that you are in over there. We intend to back you up.

DAWES: I have reported to you everything that I have said to Simon or to Drummond. You know just how far I have gone with it.

SECRETARY: I have no objection to your telling Briand that I think the Council proposal as it now lies before me, is in good shape.

DAWES: If Briand knows that he will surely use it to make an announcement. It isn't possible to keep anything of that sort confidential.

SECRETARY: Perhaps you had better not tell him until it gets to the others.

DAWES: Mr. Secretary they are trying in every way, rumors are going around one way and the other, that we have approved the Council's proposition, which of course we have not done.

SECRETARY: Who is doing that, China?

DAWES: It is going around the Council table.

SECRETARY: Who is saying it, China?

DAWES: Sze came to see me and said that some of the clerks - not Briand, nor Simons nor Drummond, but some of the employees were saying that I had approved the Council's proposition. They want to get that out; they want to have the United States..... I simply said that the proposition had been submitted to you for your information only.

-3-

SECRETARY: I don't think you had better tell Briand until it has gotten to Sze.

DAWES: I think it had better go to Sze.

SECRETARY: I would hold it back until they have it.

DAWES: It had better just go to Sze. He was up here asking me about it. I simply said that I had told them that I wanted to send it to you for your information and I can tell Sze that you sent this to me to read to him confidentially because that is where the influence is needed and where it will do good if any good can be done. Probably Sze can go ahead then.

SECRETARY: You had better wait until it gets to China first. You had better not say anything to the Council until it gets to China.

DAWES: Absolutely. Had I better say anything to them after I have communicated it to Sze.

SECRETARY: Not until you have passed it to Sze. Don't say anything to Briand until you have gotten it to Sze.

DAWES: I wouldn't do that any way. Do you want me to say something to Briand after I have given it to Sze. I can see Sze any time.

SECRETARY: I think you can afterwards.

DAWES: I think I may afterwards. I had better say that it is an important decision from Paris which will go all over the press in the morning as the words from Briand.

SECRETARY: The point is that I don't think anything had better be said until the form of the proposal is made public.

DAWES: Not until the form of the proposal is made public. That is a very wise decision.

Don't

149

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-4-

SECRETARY: Don't say anything until the proposal itself is public.

DAWES: There probably will not be another public meeting until Thursday.

SECRETARY: When will it be held?

DAWES: They are going to have another public meeting on Thursday. Mr. Secretary, I will explain the situation a little.

SECRETARY: The connection is poor I can not hear you.

DAWES: There is a little difficulty about how to handle this thing with Briand.

SECRETARY: I will try to send you this telegram tonight so you will get it tomorrow morning. Do not say anything to Briand until you have passed it on to Sze. That is understood. Then if the proposal of the Council remains in its present form as contained in your two cables to me 779 and the one that amends it, I have no objection to your telling Briand that I think it is in good shape. That in general we approve of it, but I should rather have it public before my own approval is made public. That is all I want to say.

S: HRR VGN

CJH

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be  
carefully paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone.

Tokyo


Dated November 24, 1931

FROM Rec'd. 11:45 a.m.

793.94  
Secretary of State,  
Washington.

234, November 24, 10 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE.



EE  
Tel to Paris  
Nov. 24, midnight  
Rene

See 793.94  
2950

FK

Referring to the Department's telegrams. I conveyed  
to Baron Shidehara the purport of your messages at six  
o'clock this evening. His attitude was wholly cordial  
and conciliatory. He stated that he, the <sup>Premier</sup> (\*), the  
Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff are agreed that  
there shall be no hostile operations towards Chinchow  
and orders to that effect have been issued. He agrees  
to clause in draft prohibiting of hostilities but insists  
that Japanese troops must protect their citizens against  
marauding bandits with which the country is infested.  
Situation in this respect extremely difficult as these  
men claim to be soldiers one day, in citizens clothes the  
next and are actually members of marauding bands. If  
hostilities were defined as operations between national  
armies he states there will be no objection on the part  
of Japan. I do not undertake to quote exact wording.  
He states the retention of troops at Tsitsihar has no  
political significance and is purely for the purpose of  
effecting

793.94/2856  
DEC 1 1931  
FILED

CJH

Conf. page 2 - #234 from  
Tokyo.

effecting evacuation, picking up the dead, and gathering in the wounded and frostbitten. Troops have operated with the thermometer thirty degrees centigrade below zero with great suffering over an extended area. Delay in complete evacuation is only due <sup>to</sup> the necessity for collection and caring for the sufferers - a matter of days; of which when pressed he could not give me the number but says in the policy of this evacuation he is also in complete agreement with the officers of the War Department; the fighting reported in progress today he claims is merely to drive off force of bandits not exceeding 2,000 threatening to cut South Manchuria Railway; he said not near Chinchow.

FORBES

WSB

HPD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-126  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER


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1-126

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
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PLAIN

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OR  
Charge to  
\$

Department of State



Washington,  
November 25, 1931.

DOUBLE PRIORITY.

NOV 25 31

4P

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (Japan).

244

Urgent.


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Repeat my 240 of November 23, 7 p. m., 241, November 23, 10 p. m., and your 234, November 24, 10 p. m., to the American Consul at Hanking for confidential information of the Minister. Please expedite.

*Stinson*

793.94/2856

*RAM*  
FE: RSM; REK

FE



Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

Index Bu.—No. 50.

DM RECD

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1926 1-126

1494

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

HS

PLAIN  
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

NT

Peiping via N.R.

Dated November 24, 1931

FROM

Rec'd 4:15 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

992, November 24, 8 a.m.

Following statement was issued by Japanese Delegation yesterday:

"Former Manchurian Emperor Pu Yi was living in Japanese concession Tientsin. At the period when riot broke out at Tientsin the other day, however, whether he was afraid of danger of bodily harm he apparently escaped from the city on the tenth and unexpectedly landed at Yingkow three days later. There he requested Japanese authorities for protection. Prevailing conditions then were such that actually no guarantee could be given as to his being absolutely (\*) from danger had request been turned down. So from humanitarian view-point Japanese authorities complied with the request and decided to give him desired protection by quartering him at a safe place. But as Japanese Government does not wish him drawn into a political whirlpool whilst under their protection prudent considerations are being paid for isolating him in order to prevent him from coming in contact with the outside"

For the Minister

GW  
WSB

ENGERT

793.94  
note  
1893.5011

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
NOV 24 1931  
Department of State  
rcm

FK 793.94/2857

NOV 28 1931  
FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

MP

GRAY

TELEGRAM RECEIVED


Shipping via N.R.

Dated November 24, 1931

FROM Rec'd 9:35 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



995, November 24, 4 p.m.

Following from American Consul General at Hankow.

"November 23, 4 p.m. The Japanese Consul General informed me today that all Japanese subjects, including consular officials, have evacuated Chengtu and Chungking. He said the Japanese subjects from those places have returned to Japan and that the Chengtu and Chungking Consular officials are at Hankow. The Japanese Consuls at Ichang, Shasi, Chungsha and Kinkiang are still functioning but nearly all Japanese subjects have been evacuated from these parts. The Japanese Consul General commented favorably upon the effectiveness of the measures taken by the Chinese authorities at Wuhan to prevent disturbances here.

Hankow is at present unusually quiet in all respects. Boycott of Japanese goods here is nearly one hundred per cent effective but there is a noticeable decrease in public agitation against the Japanese concession."

Nanking informed.

FOR THE MINISTER

ENGERT

RR  
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FK 793.94/2858

NOV. 30, 1931

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED


GRAY  
Peiping via N.R.

Dated November 24, 1931

FROM

Rec'd 9:20 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.



993, November 24, 11 a.m.

Following two from Harbin. November 21, 1 pm.  
General

"One./ Ma is at present at Hailun and according to a personal representative Men Ching Feng, who with secretary Chao called on me last night, he has no plan to establish a government. He has several thousand soldiers at or near Hailun. My callers stated that Japanese airplanes had flown over Lientien.

Two. Local Foreign Office informed me this morning that it believed it safe for missionaries to return to Tsitsihar, As all reports indicate city quiet and patrolled by several hundred Chinese police under Japanese military control, I have suggested to missionaries that they return. Vos is leaving today from Anganghsi and the women tomorrow from Harbin. Japanese are attempting form a new committee of public safety at Tsitsihar.

Three. Conditions at Harbin, Manchuria, Station and Hailun are quiet."

Two

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NOV. 30 1931

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793-1115-1/2

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2-#993, from Peiping, Nov.24, 1931

Two. "November 23, 5 p.m. Up country Chinese agents of Russians of New York have reported that shops are closed in Taiashhen, Kessg, Paichuan and Lintien, which are all located in a prosperous section of Heilungkiang Province and which are now surrounded by threatening armed bands, either brigands or ex-soldiers of General Ma's that the shops at Mingshui, Andachen and Andahsien are open but that banking facilities are paralyzed and that the magistrate at Mingshui has run away."

Repeated to Nanking.

FOR THE MINISTER

ENGERT

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 25, 1931.

~~S. J. P.~~  
~~S. K. H.~~

With reference to the attached telegram No. 994, November 24, 3 p.m. from the Legation in regard to the stationing of Chinese troops within a twenty li radius of Tientsin, I do not feel that any further action on our part is necessary. This is particularly true of Consul General Lockhart's statements quoted in the last paragraph of the telegram.

The references cited by the Legation in the first paragraph of the telegram would indicate that in 1911 the American Consul General at Tientsin associated himself with his colleagues in regard to the question of the twenty li zone. However, eleven years later, on January 25, 1922, the Department pointed out to the Minister at Peking, as it did in our recent telegram No. 418 of November 14, 4 p. m., that we were not a party to the note of July 15, 1902 which contains the provision in regard to the twenty li zone. The Department's instruction No. 213 of August 19, 1922 to the Legation, cited by the Legation in the telegram under reference, approves an understanding of the Consul General at Tientsin in regard to his participating with his colleagues in regard to foreign troops in certain areas referred to in the Boxer Protocol, and not to the question of the twenty li zone.

JEJ:EMU

*[Signature]*  
I concur  
*[Signature]*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated November 24, 1931

Rec'd 9:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,


Washington

994, November 24, 3 p.m.

Your 413, November 14, 4 p.m.

See Department's instructions number 66, January 25, 1922, and 213, August 19, 1922. Legation's files show, however, that in October and November 1911 the American Consul General at Tientsin appears to have associated himself with his colleagues in discussing and acting upon a request from the then Viceroy of Chinli for the temporary suspension or modification of the 20 li rule. I find (weekly) despatches to the Department on the subject but see Peiping dean circulars numbers 151 and 152 November 1st, 155 and 157 November 5th, 167, November 11th and 177, November 19, all in 1911.

Consul



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MET

2-#994, Peiping via N.R.,  
November 24, 1931

✓  
Consul General Tientsin reports as follows:

"November 17, 10 a.m. In the present situation the Japanese made the demand independently of the other powers signatory to the note of July 15th, 1902. Local American officials have in the present instance confined themselves exclusively to precautionary measures, in cooperation with the Chinese police authorities, for the protection of American lives and property by the employment of small detachments for guard duty in the general defense plans for Tientsin which have long been in force. It is not expected that there will be any need in the present circumstances to deviate from that course".

For the Minister'

ENGERT

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
OFFICE OF THE ECONOMIC ADVISER

EA  
NOV 14 1931  
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DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Dr. Hornbeck:  
Mr. Klots:

This memorandum on Chinese boy-  
cotts is neither conclusive nor ex-  
haustive but you may find an idea or  
two in it. Do you think it worth  
while to have Dr. Wallace make a more  
systematic and thorough study of the  
subject?

H Feis



I don't think so -

Q.7.12

HF:Dry

MEMORANDUM ON CHINESE BOYCOTTS

Table of Chief Chinese Boycotts.....	
Initiating and Sustaining Forces.....	
Scope of Boycotts.....	
Methods and Organization.....	
Effectiveness of Chinese Boycotts.....	
Statistical Difficulties.....	5
Gross Results.....	7
More Detailed Results.....	10
Political Effects of Boycotts.....	15



FK 793.94/2361

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# CHIEF CHINESE BOYCOTTS

<u>Initial Date</u>	<u>Country Concerned</u>	<u>Cause</u>	<u>Termination</u>
1905 <sup>(1)</sup> July 20	United States	Harsh administration of the Chinese exclusion laws.	Largely died down by the end of the year.
1908 March 20	Japan	Apology forced from China in the Tatsu Maru affair.	Indefinite. A popular writer in 1915 spoke of its continuance for eight years.
1910	Japan	Manchurian aggression.	Flourished 1910-1912.
1915	Japan	Twenty-one demands.	
1919	Japan	Shantung awarded to Japan by Peace Conference.	Flourished 1919-1922.
[1922 February	Hongkong	Shipping strike growing out of wage dispute.	Settled March 3.]
1923	Japan	Agitation against concessions of 1915.	
1925 June 1	Great Britain	May 30th incident.	Officially terminated in Canton, Oct. 10, 1926
1927	Japan	Shantung (?)	
1928 June	Japan	Japanese troops sent to Tsinan.	Governmental order for termination, August, 1929.
1931 September	Japan	Waopanshan incident and Korean massacres.	

(1) Various writers speak of this boycott as having begun in 1906. It was discussed however, by Chester Holcombe in The Outlook of December 30, 1905, as something not yet over, although consular reports indicated that its importance had greatly diminished.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By MILS O. Butts NARS, Date 12-18-75

1505



- 2 -

Chinese boycotts may originate in any political incident involving foreigners, or if the Hongkong strike of 1922 be included, the cause may be some economic dispute.

INITIATING AND SUSTAINING FORCES

A. Patriotism and anti-foreign feeling.

If unorganized, these feelings would not carry the movement very far, but every movement has been fanned by the agitation of groups of students and promoted and enforced by special organizations such as the Anti-Japanese Association and national salvation societies formed ad hoc. In the 1915 boycott a national salvation fund of Mex.\$50,000,000 was called for and half of that amount had been pledged in the first few days.

B. Self-interest of Chinese manufacturers and producers of competing goods.

Guilds of producers and of merchants handling Chinese products have been very active in promoting boycotts of foreign goods.

Even in the first boycott in 1905 the students of Tientsin included in their resolution the following paragraph:

"Every

- 3 -

"Every encouragement must be given to the improvement of Chinese manufactures so that they may compete with the excluded American goods."

From this point of view Chinese boycotts may be looked upon as specially directed and particularly virulent flarings-up of the more or less continuous agitation in favor of native goods as against foreign. The Ministry of Industries in the present Government, for instance, carries on a more or less continuous campaign for native products, and obtains reiterated orders directing officials to wear Chinese clothes and buy Chinese products. In this respect the Chinese activity is very similar to the campaign long current in Great Britain and other parts of her Empire, and by no means unknown in the United States and many other countries.

#### SCOPE OF BOYCOTTS

Sokolsky states that more than 100,000,000 Chinese may take part in a boycott. Boycotts against the Japanese seem to be ineffective in Manchuria.

The overseas Chinese number millions and control a large part of the retail trade of the Philippines, Siam, Dutch East Indies, and the Malay States. These overseas Chinese are exceedingly patriotic and join  
effectively

- 4 -

effectively in the boycott movements, at least in recent years.

METHODS AND ORGANIZATION

The methods by which boycotts are carried on vary from voluntary individual refusal of foreign goods to violence and destruction of property. The agitation is carried on by mass meetings, street speeches, parades, posters, newspaper editorials and the like. In addition to this, the anti-Japanese societies, without interference from the authorities and frequently with their concurrence, picket foreign shops, intimidating the customers or even taking from them any foreign goods purchased. They examine goods in the express offices and confiscate them. In Shanghai in 1929 goods confiscated in this or other ways were publicly advertised for auction at the local Kuomintang headquarters, the money being presumably used to support the Anti-Japanese Association and promote the boycott.

A milder method is to induce or compel owners of stocks of foreign goods to register these goods and buy no more after they are sold. Where foreign goods are more or less essential they sometimes fine the dealers instead of preventing the sales entirely. G. B. Rea states that  
such

- 5 -

such fines reach tens of millions of dollars.

Attempts are made to prevent the export of products to the offending country but since the exporters may be totally dependent upon the export markets, this is a more difficult matter and the stoppage of exports seems not to be successful. In one case at Wuhu the anti-Japanese society compromised on payment of 30 Chinese cents per picul of cereals exported to Japan.

#### THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CHINESE BOYCOTTS

For many reasons Chinese boycotts mean much less than a complete cessation of imports from the offending country. Their greatest intensities are local and temporary. The sale of essential supplies cannot be stopped. Certain products may not be recognized as the product of the country against which the boycott is directed. Great masses of the people cannot be reached. The fighting zeal of the agitators wears off.

#### STATISTICAL DIFFICULTIES

The results of boycotts on trade can be determined only roughly. Below are quoted certain figures of annual trade and also certain figures by months; but these must be taken only as general indications, to be

corrected

- 6 -

corrected in any thorough study of the subject by taking into consideration many factors such as the following:

The general tendency for Great Britain to decline, and for Japan and the United States to rise, in relative commercial importance.

The rapid growth of Manchuria compared to the rest of China and the relative ineffectiveness of boycotts there.

The continuity of boycotts against Japan, scarcely interrupted since 1908.

The effects of the World War on trade and of numerous civil wars in various parts of China.

The effects of the depressions of 1920 and 1930.

The rise of industries in China, such as the cotton spinning industry, supplying important imports of particular countries.

The accumulation of imported goods in warehouses when a boycott prevents their sale.

Increased imports in anticipation of higher tariff rates.

Figures for trade by months show much more sharply the immediate effects of boycotts, but these figures would yield accurate results only if carefully checked for seasonal changes in trade, changes in fashion, the over-buying or under-buying by local merchants, the rise and fall of silver exchange, and so on.

GROSS

- 7 -

GROSS RESULTS, FROM ANNUAL FIGURES

Table I shows the total imports into China and the imports from the four chief sources<sup>(1)</sup> for the years 1913 and 1917-1930. This table shows that the World War doubled the percentage of Chinese imports which came from Japan, but that with the conclusion of the War and the inauguration of the boycott of 1919, this percentage declined from 41.35 in 1918 to 22.55 in 1921. At this point it was still a little ahead of the 20.4 per cent in 1913. In 1925 this percentage jumped to 31, due at least in part to the boycott on British goods. Aided by the great coal strike in Great Britain in 1926, this percentage has declined only gradually though steadily, reaching 24.6 per cent in 1930.

The effect of the British boycott in 1925 is shown in the reduction of the British percentage from 12.1 per cent in 1924 to 9.6 per cent in 1925. If Great Britain and Hongkong be considered together, the decrease is from 35.6 per cent to 27.8 per cent and in 1926 to 20 per cent. Considering that the boycott of 1925 began on June 1, the reduction in direct imports from Great Britain from 191,000,000 Haikwan taels in 1924 to 143,000,000 in

1925

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(1) In certain recent years, however, India has displaced Great Britain from fourth place.

- 8 -

1925 suggests that the boycott diminished British imports by one half during seven months. The decrease in imports from Hongkong (presumably largely goods from Great Britain) was even greater, namely, from 244,000,000 to 176,000,000 Haikwan taels.

Table I

- 9 -

Table I  
IMPORTS INTO CHINA  
 in millions of Haikwan taels

Total gross imports		Imports from Japan and Formosa		Imports from Great Britain		Imports from the United States		Imports from Hongkong	
		%		%		%		%	
1913	586	119	20.4	97	16.5	35.4	6.0	172	29.3
1917	577	222	38.4	52	9.0	61	10.6	159	27.5
1918	578	239	41.35	50	8.6	59	10.2	162	28.1
1919	680	247	36.3	64	9.5	110	16.2	154	22.6
1920	800	229	28.6	132	16.5	143	17.9	159	19.9
1921	933	210	22.55	150	16.1	176	18.85	231	24.8
1922	975	231	23.7	145	14.9	169	17.3	239	24.55
1923	949	211	22.25	120	12.7	154	16.3	248	26.1
1924	1,039	235	22.6	126	12.1	191	18.4	244	23.5
1925	965	300	31.0	93	9.6	143	14.8	176	18.2
1926	1,145	337	29.4	116	10.1	188	16.4	124	10.9
1927	1,034	294	28.4	75	7.3	167	16.1	213	20.6
1928	1,210	319	26.4	114	9.4	206	17.0	226	18.7
1929	1,281	323	25.2	119	9.3	231	18.0	214	16.7
1930	1,328	327	24.6	108	8.15	232	17.5	218	16.4



- 10 -

MORE DETAILED RESULTS

Of the boycott of 1908 it is reported that the importation of the chief Japanese products fell off 20 per cent and that the loss to Japan in 1909 and 1910 was not less than 50,000,000 yen. Presumably "loss" means loss in gross value of exports to China.

The Far Eastern Republic of April, 1920, printed figures showing a decisive effect of the boycott of 1919 on Japanese shipping on the Yangtze River. It shows that in 1918 the boats of the China Merchants Steam Navigation Company averaged 264 tons of freight per trip and the boats of the Nisshin Kisen Kaisha averaged 154 tons. In the first five months of 1919 the Japanese line averaged per trip 103 tons but for the next five months the average was only 4.4 tons per trip. In these five months the average of the China Merchants line was 350 tons per trip, the number of trips increasing by 15 per cent over the same months of the previous year. The paper quotes the Herald of Asia (Japanese) as giving the following figures for China's imports from Japan:(1)

Article

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(1) Probably the figures are for Japanese exports to China.

- 11 -

<u>Article</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>Sept.</u>	<u>Decrease Sept. over May in %</u>
Cotton yarn (piculs)..	12,470	3,099	3,954	68.3
Paper (piculs).....	21,097	7,956	7,450	64.6
Cotton cloth (yards)..	867,000	356,000	167,000	80.7
Umbrellas.....	343,000	49,000	6,000	97.9
Canvas bags.....	1,378,000	474,000	456,000	66.9
Matches (gross).....	499,000	115,000	269,000	<u>46.1</u>
Average loss in percentage...				70.75

It then states, (presumably still quoting the Herald of Asia) the following figures of the decrease of the principal Japanese exports to China between June and August, 1919:

<u>Japanese goods</u>	<u>Decrease percentage</u>	<u>Japanese goods</u>	<u>Decrease percentage</u>
Toys.....	90	Hats and caps.....	30
Patent medicines....	70	Fans.....	20
Looking glasses.....	80	Cotton hosiery.....	50
Earthenware.....	60	Cotton tissues.....	30
Soap (mostly toilet)	70	Satin (silk and cotton).	40
Average percentage..... 54			

The boycott of 1923 is said to have reduced imports of Japanese goods by one-third; whereas every steamer formerly brought 17,000 pieces of grocery goods, it is now only about 5,000. The Christian Science

- 12 -

Science Monitor of August 16, 1923, states that total Japanese exports to China in May, 1922, were 30,900,000 yen but in May, 1923, only 19,000,000 yen, and that exports to **central** China had fallen off by one-half.

In regard to the boycott of 1925, Sokolsky says:

"No British goods could be sold publicly anywhere in China except perhaps Manchuria. Chinese would have no personal intercourse with individual Britons. Even servants left their posts. British trade with China dropped to a normal figure." (New York Times Magazine, November 8, 1931.)

The loss to British trade has been put at Mex.\$1,000,000 per day during the sharpest part of the boycott.

Odagiri states that the Japanese exports to China fell off by 20 per cent in June to December, 1928, as compared with the same months of the previous year (Problems of the Pacific, 1929, pages 377-379). The China Weekly Review (March 16, 1929) gives the following figures for imports into Shanghai<sup>(1)</sup> for the five months ended November 30, 1928, compared with the same period of 1927:

Imports of cotton cloth from Japan fell off 15 per cent while British cloth increased 75 per cent and imports from the United States and Germany much more, the percentages in the latter three cases being reckoned  
on

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(1) Imports into Shanghai in 1928 were 45.5 per cent of China's total imports. Imports into Tientsin were 9.3 per cent.

- 13 -

on much smaller bases. Imports of woolen, union and artificial silk goods from Japan fell 90 per cent while imports from England and Germany quadrupled. Imports of sugar decreased 97 per cent but imports from Java increased 30 per cent and from Singapore 48 per cent. Maritime products lost about 70 per cent but imports from other countries also fell by 30 per cent. Aniline dyes lost about 50 per cent and other Japanese dyes about 20 per cent, while rival products gained decisively. On the other hand, imports of Japanese printing paper increased markedly and in much greater percentage than that for the increase from other sources. In heavy chemicals, imports from Japan increased while similar goods from other sources decreased by 30 per cent.

In Tientsin imports of Japanese cotton tissues during the October-December quarter, 1928, were 40,000 pieces as compared with 62,000 pieces in the same quarter of the previous year while cotton yarn totalled only 745 pieces as compared with 14,700 pieces in the corresponding quarter for 1927.

On the other hand, when not complaining bitterly of the Chinese boycotts, the Japanese make the argument that they are totally ineffective and unimportant.

For

- 14 -

For instance, the Chinese Economic Journal of August, 1930, quotes from a Mr. Tabe the monthly figures of Japanese exports to China for 1926, 1927 and 1928. These, however are total figures including exports to Kwantung. The one striking decrease in 1928 as compared to 1927 is for June, the figures being nearly 41,000,000 yen and 33,500,000 yen. Similarly, George Bronson Rea in the Far Eastern Review for December, 1929, argues that Japan is no longer dependent upon China as an export market since Japanese exports to China have decreased from 45 per cent of her total exports in 1920 to 23 per cent of the total, and that the boycott affects only 3 per cent of Japan's total trade (presumably meaning 3 per cent of total foreign trade).

In regard to the 1931 boycott, the Consul at Shanghai has sent in a clipping from the Japanese Chronicle, October 22, 1931, which quotes the Japanese Consul General in Shanghai as saying all merchants except retailers who are patronized exclusively by Japanese residents are unable to carry on business and many small merchants have had either to reduce their business or close their shops altogether. Japanese spinning mills are still going but they are shipping about 20 per cent of their output to other markets and 80 per cent

- 15 -

cent is kept in stock. They may not be able to continue production after the end of November. Cotton yarn, cotton cloth, sugar, paper, and sundry goods shipped from Japan do not move at all. Coal and chemicals have so far not been affected much by the boycott. Wheat bran, rape seed, cotton seed cake and similar Chinese products find buyers only in Japan but threatened by the Anti-Japanese Society, suppliers are not approaching their Japanese customers. Japanese bankers and steamship companies are experiencing much inconvenience by the resignation of Chinese employees, particularly compradores. The Nisshin Kisen Kaisha has been obliged to suspend some of its regular lines owing to the sharp decrease in passengers and cargoes.

#### POLITICAL EFFECTS OF BOYCOTTS

It is evident that the Japanese complaints of Chinese boycotts, such as that by Odagiri at the Institute of Pacific Relations, report the real attitude of the Japanese toward boycotts. Japanese exporters to China are naturally alarmed by a falling off in exports to Shanghai, even though the increase of exports to Manchuria may bring the total figures for the year up to what they had been in the previous year. Even if the statement be true that the Chinese boycott affects only

- 16 -

only 3 per cent of Japanese exports, it is evident that the losers of this 3 per cent make their voices heard in Japan. The extent, however, to which Chinese boycotts have affected the policies of the countries against which they have been directed must be left for the determination of students of politics.

EA:BBW:LEW

1521

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lutz NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 17, 1931.

Mr. Secretary:

This relates to Chinese boycotts.

The principal memorandum is a study by Dr. Wallace of the Office of the Economic Adviser.

I have covered it with a short memorandum (three pages) which contains a digest of the conclusions arrived at or suggested.

NOV 21 1931

SECRETARY'S OFFICE  
SKH/REK

Office of Economic Adviser  
NOV 27 1931  
NOV 21 1931

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
NOV 18 1931

on Chinese boycotts, prepared Office.

My duty was to discover, if possible, boycotts, especially boycotts

as at or suggests conclusions

Mr. Sokolsky states that Chinese may take part in

Chinese boycotts mean much less than a complete cessation of imports from the offending country. Their greatest intensities are local and temporary.

The results of boycotts on trade can be determined only roughly.

The anti-British boycott in 1925 resulted in reducing the percentage of imports from Great Britain from 12.1% of the total in 1924 to 9.6% of the total in 1925. If Great Britain and Hong Kong be considered together, the decrease is from 35.6% to 27.8% in 1924-1925 and to 20% in 1926.

Anti-Japanese boycotts seem to be ineffective in Manchuria.


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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



Herewith a memorandum on Chinese boycotts, prepared by the Economic Adviser's Office.

The object of the study was to discover, if possible, how effective are Chinese boycotts, especially boycotts against the Japanese.

The memorandum arrives at or suggests conclusions as follows:

One experienced observer (Sokolosky) states that more than one hundred million Chinese may take part in a boycott.

Chinese boycotts mean much less than a complete cessation of imports from the offending country. Their greatest intensities are local and temporary.

The results of boycotts on trade can be determined only roughly.

The anti-British boycott in 1925 resulted in reducing the percentage of imports from Great Britain from 12.1% of the total in 1924 to 9.6% of the total in 1925. If Great Britain and Hong Kong be considered together, the decrease is from 35.6% to 27.8% in 1924-1925 and to 20% in 1926.

Anti-Japanese boycotts seem to be ineffective in Manchuria.

FK 793.94/2361

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DEC 1 1931

note  
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- 2 -

Manchuria.

The anti-Japanese boycott of 1908 caused a falling off of 20% of the importation of the chief Japanese products. The loss to Japan in 1909 and 1910 was not less than fifty million yen.

The anti-Japanese boycott of 1919 was an important cause in a decline of imports from Japan from 41.35% of the total in 1918 to 22.55% in 1921. This boycott had a decisive effect on Japanese shipping on the Yangtze River. In 1918 the boats of the China Merchants Steam Navigation Company averaged 264 tons of freight per trip and the boats of the Nisshin Kisen Kaisha averaged 154 tons. In the first five months of 1919 the Japanese line averaged per trip 103 tons, but for the next five months the average was only 4.4 tons per trip. Six of China's leading imports from Japan showed an average loss of 70.75% in the month of September as compared with the month of May.

The anti-Japanese boycott of 1923 is said to have reduced importation of Japanese goods by one-third.

The anti-Japanese boycott of 1928 is said to have resulted in Japanese exports to China falling off by 20% from June to December, 1928, as compared with the same months of the previous year.

In

- 3 -

W In regard to the 1931 anti-Japanese boycott, the Consul General at Shanghai has sent in a clipping from the Japan Chronicle, October 22, 1931, which quotes the Japanese Consul General in Shanghai as saying that Japanese(?) merchants (except retailers who are patronized exclusively by Japanese residents) are not able to carry on business and that many small merchants dealing in Japanese goods have had either to reduce their business or to close their shops altogether. Japanese spinning mills are still running but they are shipping about 20% of their output to other markets and are keeping 80% in stock. They may not be able to continue production after the end of November. Cotton yarn, cotton cloth, sugar, paper and sundry goods shipped from Japan do not move at all. Coal and chemicals have so far not been affected much by the boycott. Wheat bran, rape seed, cotton seed cake and similar Chinese products find buyers only in Japan but, threatened by the Anti-Japanese Society, suppliers are not approaching their Japanese customers. Japanese bankers and steamship companies are experiencing much inconvenience by the resignation of Chinese employees, particularly compradores. The Nisshin Kisen Kaisha has been obliged to suspend some of its regular schedules.

MMH/VDM

*mmh*

1525

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone.

FROM

Secretary of State,  
Washington.


791, November 24, 2 p.m.

FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES.

Sweetser's report on the League's activities  
yesterday afternoon is as follows:

"The draft resolution was amended this afternoon  
in the light of this morning's discussion (see my  
telegrams 784, November 23, 4 p.m., and 790 November  
23, midnight) to cover two points. First, the com-  
mission's relationship to the control of the military  
activities of the two parties was clarified with the  
thought that the Commission can report on those  
activities but could not give orders to the troops of  
either country, especially if the Japanese, for in-  
stance, thought it necessary to take action against  
bandits. Second. The amendment proposed by Simon  
on the point raised by Madariaga, Colban and Fotitch,  
as an additional paragraph making it clear beyond  
dispute that the constitution of the Commission  
should not be interpreted as any justification for  
delaying evacuation.

Immediately



ME

2- #791 from Paris, Nov. 24, 1931

Immediately after the Secretary General had an hour's interview Sze in which he ~~present~~ <sup>presented</sup> this resolution. He urged that it was very much in China's interest to accept it and stated afterwards that he tried every possible argument even to asking what alternative the Chinese saw to it. Sze however was adamant saying that his instructions permitted of no choice that China could not accept the commission unless accompanied by a time limit for the evacuation. Finally, however, he agreed to telegraph the text to his Government though without hope of its acceptance.

(End section one)

SHAW

WSB

MP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Paris

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be- FROM  
fore being communicated  
to anyone.

Dated November 24, 1931

Rec'd 1 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

791, November 24, 2 p.m.

(Section two.)

Sze then had a long interview with Briand who similarly urged the acceptance of the resolution in China's own interest. He pointed out that the creation of the Commission would in fact constitute the beginning of an effective international interest in Manchuria and the completion in actual practice of the control foreseen in principle at the Washington Conference. He thought that this would constitute a great forward step for China in the handling of the Manchurian problem.

Simon also had a long talk with Sze in which he presented much the same arguments. It is understood, however, that he is himself not so hopeful of an agreed solution and is contemplating what kind of a statement should be made in case of a disagreement.

Under the circumstances, with the Chinese answer not yet finally received it was felt better  
for

MP

2-#791 from Paris, Nov.24, 1931  
(Section two)

for Briand not to present the draft resolution formally to the Japanese. Accordingly the only step that was taken in this connection was for Drummond to transmit it informally and unofficially. It is felt at the moment that should the Chinese finally refuse it would not be best to put it to a public meeting and put them in the position of having to vote against the other members of the Council. The present temper of the members of the Council would seem to be to make every effort to get the Chinese to agree to a proposition which is genuinely felt to be in their long range interest but, if they do not or for internal reasons cannot see it in that way, not to put them in the position of voting alone against a suggestion advocated by the rest of the Council." (End message.)

SHAW

WSB

MET

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

Nanking

FROM

Dated November 24, 1931

Rec'd 2:50 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

URGENT.

November 24, midnight.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

NOV 24 1931

Department of State

793.94

In view of alarming reports current as to  
imminent Japanese action at Chinchow Dr. Wellington  
Koo, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs has this  
evening told me and my British and French colleagues  
that his Government wished to sound our Governments  
out and if feasible make a formal proposition along  
following lines:

"In order to avoid any clash China is prepared  
as a temporary measure pending a general settlement  
of the Manchuria question, if Japan insists on with-  
drawal of troops in the Chinchow area to do so up to  
Shanhaikwan, provided, Japan gives guarantees satis-  
factory to Great Britain, the United States and France,  
not to go into that zone leaving the Chinese civil  
administration

F/DEW

793.94/2863

FILED

NOV 30 1931



MET

2-Nanking, November 24, 1931

administration intact including police".

In view of critical situation we undertook to  
commend this to our respective Governments and to ask  
for a speedy reply.

Repeated to Tokyo for information.

JOHNSON

WSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

November 25, 1931.

NOV 25 31

AMERICAN EMBASSY

PARIS (FRANCE)

CONFIDENTIAL FOR AMBASSADOR DAWES.

The following telegram from Minister Johnson at Nanking  
dated November 24, midnight, is repeated for your information:

QUOTE

(Telegraph Room: Quote text of Nanking's  
November 24, midnight, hereto attached.)

UNQUOTE

I am replying:

QUOTE

(Telegraph Room: Quote text of Department's  
instruction to American Consul, Nanking,  
No. 120, November 25, 4 p. m. hereto attached.)

UNQUOTE

FE:RSM:EMU

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1926 1-138

1 1532

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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Charge Department  
OR

Charge to  
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138  
TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

Washington,

November 24, 1931.

793.94/2863  
AMERICAN CONSUL,

NANKING (China).

120  
URGENT

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE MINISTER.

Replying to your November 24, midnight.

As 'Dr. Koo' states the objective QUOTE in order to avoid any clash UNQUOTE, I feel that, QUOTE as a temporary measure pending a general statement of the Manchuria question UNQUOTE, the Chinese Government would be well advised to withdraw its troops, on its own initiative, to Shanhaikwan. The situation is undoubtedly very delicate. As long as Chinese troops remain at Chinchow, there is the possibility of a clash and of ensuing conflict which would aggravate the situation and probably result in additional loss of life and forced withdrawal of the Chinese forces. I feel that it would be a sound preventive measure for the Chinese Government to withdraw these forces at once. I offer this not as formal advice but as a friendly suggestion made solely in answer to the question put to me by Dr. Koo.

With regard to the question of guarantees, there is not time to enter into and attempt to consummate negotiations |

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

793.94/2863

1 153

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128  
PREPARING OFFICE  
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Charge Department  
OR

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\$

## TELEGRAM SENT

### Department of State

1-128

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

Washington,

- 2 -

which might be necessary. The question of Japan's occupation of South Manchuria is going to have to be dealt with in its entirety and upon its merits, on the basis both of facts and of law, that is, of treaty obligations. The whole world is solicitously interested in the problems presented and is struggling with the question of solution. Nothing can as yet be guaranteed except that every possible effort to prevent war and to make possible a solution by peaceful means will continue to be made.

You should take this up with Dr. Koo immediately, orally and informally, exercising utmost tact and discretion.

*Stimson*

NOV 26 1902

*M*

FE:SKH/ZMF

FE

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ....., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 80.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-128

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gutzgum NARS, Date 12-18-75

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MP

A portion of this telegram  
must be closely paraphrased **FROM**  
before being communicated  
to anyone.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

URGENT

792, November 24, 3 p.m.

FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES.

I have communicated to Sze the substance of your  
589, November 23, 6 p.m. He is wiring his Government  
stating your attitude as explained by me in the follow-  
ing words: (SPECIAL GREEN)

"We have been given to understand by Ambassador  
Dawes that the attitude the United States at this  
juncture with particular reference to the proposal of  
a commission of inquiry is this. The United States  
is inclined to welcome the fundamental idea of the  
League draft resolution as embodying a very important  
principle of future utility. If such a principle is  
now laid down it would be the first time that the  
underlying idea of conciliation treaties known to  
the Western World has been recognized in international  
relations in the Far East.

In

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
NOV 24 1931  
Dated November 24, 1931  
Rec'd 2:58 P.M.  
Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
NOV 24 1931  
Department of State  
F/E  
W/E  
K/E  
F/DEW  
793.94/2864  
DEC 2 1931

793.94  
note  
793.94/118

MF

2-#792 from Paris, Nov. 24, 1931

In essence the proposal contemplates a neutral Commission which would lay the basis for ultimate negotiations between the interested parties themselves leading to an adjustment of all their differences and the establishment of permanent peace between them. In this sense the resolution is commendable.

Construing the resolution by its four corners and referring particularly to the reaffirmation of the Council's previous resolution of September 30, it means (first) the cessation of hostilities and (second) the withdrawal of the Japanese forces as speedily as possible. When the Commission of inquiry reports or possibly at any time the ground would be prepared for negotiations between the two parties. There would be a better chance for successful negotiations in the light of the report of the committee on inquiry than without it. It is believed in these circumstances the element of military pressure leading to the imposition of unfair terms would be less operative. On the whole the resolution is regarded as perhaps the most effective solution that can be practically arrived at in present circumstances; and carries with it a great presumption in its favor so as to involve serious responsibility

in

134  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MP 3-#792 from Paris, Nov. 24, 1931

FROM

in its rejection.

With regard to the counter-proposal of China the United States unhesitatingly states that even from the point of view of China's own <sup>interest</sup> ~~(#)~~ it is not considered that this proposal is as effective as the one which in substance has been reached by the Council. Moreover, several provisions in the counter-proposal strike the United States as entirely impracticable."  
(END SECTION ONE)

SHAW

WSB

(#) apparent omission

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

<sup>MET</sup>  
 This telegram must be  
 closely paraphrased be- FROM  
 fore being communicated  
 to anyone.

Paris

Dated November 24, 1931

Rec'd 3 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

792, November 24, 3 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

Sze in addition asks his Government whether in view of this attitude of the United States, it desires to change its instructions to him to file his former proposal which has been transmitted to you by Johnson. He also recommends to his Government that in case it still desires him to file this former proposal the references to the United States be eliminated. When his Government answers him he says he will inform me.

He wanted me to say to you in regard to this sentence in your telegram "the ultimate solution of this problem must be arrived at by negotiations between the two nations concerned"; that in his judgment there could be no ultimate solution unless these negotiations between the two nations were conducted with neutral observers present as at the Shantung conversations at the Washington Conference.

I now



MET

2-#792, Paris, November 24, 1931  
(SECTION TWO)

I now interpolate report of what I have done in connection with a call of Sweetser who arrived during the preparation of this despatch and in the next section of the despatch will indicate the reasons for the message I have sent to Briand. Sweetser stated that Briand before the Council this morning suggested that it would be a useful contribution if the United States would let its attitude on the draft proposal be known and, if it approved it would so inform the Chinese and the Japanese. Briand also stated that he hesitated to ask the American representative to visit him until they had something decided and that the best course perhaps would be for Drummond to try and see him this afternoon to ascertain if he were able to (END SECTION TWO)

SHAW

HPD

MET

Paris

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Dated November 24, 1931

Rec'd 2:43 p.m.

FROM

Secretary of State,

Washington

792, November 24, 3 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

to offer any assistance or cooperation at this decisive moment. I then sent by Sweetser the following suggestions to Briand confidentially:

(GREEN) "One. The United States is active with the parties.

Two. Will gladly come to see Briand when answer to Sze's despatch is received by the Council which will be some time tomorrow. Parenthetically, Sze has informed the League that he has sent cables to his Government on the situation to which he expects an answer tomorrow.

Three. Mr. Dawes feels that the United States (END GREEN) cannot express any opinion on Council's negotiations until at least the text of the resolution is published".

In your 589, you say, "after you have discussed

the above

MET

2-#792, Paris, November 24, 1931  
(SECTION THREE)

the above with Dr. Sze and have obtained his reaction to it you may, in your discretion, tell M. Briand that we have considered the proposal of the Council, etc". I regard it as absolutely essential, as suggested in your telephone message, that no public reference be made to the cooperative attitude and action of the United States in this matter until the proposed resolution of the League be published. Under the normal procedure of the League the resolution cannot be valid until presented at a meeting of the Council and there agreed to by China and Japan. If I tell Briand about our demands and action before the publication of the resolution, despite anything I might say, he inevitably would use the information in his continuing efforts to bring Japan and China together, which can not be effective unless your messages to them from Washington have changed.

SHAW

GW-HPD

154

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

PARIS

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

FROM

Dated November 24, 1931

Rec'd 4:20 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.



792, November 24, 3 p.m. (SECTION FOUR)

changed their former attitude as expressed by them to Briand. This fact, with the entire absence of effective protection from publicity in League confidential meetings, might then mean that the United States would be represented by the press as engaging in the discussions of plans with the League for the application of League machinery. Again, I want to be sure that the Council, in connection with the presentation of this particular resolution is agreed between themselves. Briand is standing for the continuance of conciliatory negotiations with the Chinese and Japanese while Simon stands for the League to close the whole thing at a public meeting this week for which I understand he is preparing a statement. If, therefore, the attitude and action on the part of the United States becomes public before the publication of an agreed upon resolution it might be represented

AM

2-792, from Paris, November 24, 3 p.m.

represented as not only participating in a question involving the application of the League machinery but taking a position on the matter of applicability which is not yet agreed upon even among the members of the Council.

Now that some time will elapse before we hear from China in answer to Sze's telegram, what is running in my mind at the moment is this: it may be that Briand as Chairman of the Council, can give to the press, well in advance of the time of the public Council meeting the text of the agreed upon resolution which he would present for consideration and, if so, you or I, as you decide, could then make a statement of the favorable  
(END SECTION FOUR)

SHAW

WSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

# TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MF

Paris

This telegram must be  
 closely paraphrased be-  
 fore being communicated  
 to anyone.

Dated November 24, 1931

FROM

Rec'd 3:55 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

792, November 24, 3 p.m. (SECTION FIVE)

favorable attitude of the United States in principle  
 toward the method recommended in the resolution.

On the other hand I reflect that it is possible that  
 the Japanese will not stop their march on Chinchew or  
 withdraw from Tsitsihar, also problematical whether  
 Japan will agree with the resolution, also possible,  
 as Sze says, that if his Government agrees it will  
 fall and chaos will result in China and therefore  
 possible that by tomorrow the negotiations of the  
 League will have gone for naught and its further  
 deliberations have ceased to be of immediate practical  
 interest to the world. Should we in this event after  
 independently having done everything possible by  
 positive act and attitude to bring about success in  
 its negotiations publicly advertise our participation  
 in its failure thus tending to lessen the prestige  
 arising out of our independent position? Inasmuch as  
 we have at least until tomorrow morning to consider  
 this question please give me your comments.

If

154

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MP

2-From Paris, #792, Nov.24, 1931

If I do not receive them I shall as your telegram suggests use my discretion. My inclination, subject to changes which occur from hour to hour in this situation and unless otherwise instructed by you, is at present to let this matter of publication of the nature of our cooperation with the League rest in abeyance until Sze receives his reply.

I shall wire you at once when it is decided whether or not the Council resolution will be published. I assume that if published you yourself from Washington will make the statement of the attitude of the United States toward it or in the event you desire me to make the statement you will give me suggestions in connection therewith. (END MESSAGE)

SHAW

WSB

7

1 1544

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

OIPHER

TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department

OR

Charge to

\$

Department of State

Washington,

November 24, 1931

midnight

AMEMBASSY

PARIS

592  
CONFIDENTIAL FOR DAWES FROM STIMSON.

Your 792, November 24, 3 p. m.

One. As bearing on your problem have just received favorable news from Tokyo. Shidehara together with Minister of War and Chief of Staff agree that there shall be no hostile operations towards Chinchow and have issued orders to that effect. Also agrees to clause in draft prohibiting hostilities provided it is so worded as to permit protection against marauding bandits. Asserts remainder of troops will remain in Tsitsihar only for the few days necessary to succor wounded and pick up dead. Therefore there seems now no substantial likelihood of Japanese opposition to Council proposal.

Two.

793.94  
793.94/2864  
wms  
STOC 112

Initialed for:

W.T.B. ....

W.T.B. ....

T.A. ....

T.A. ....

T.A.-L. ....

C.-A. ....

D.C. ....

[Nothing but address and text of message to be written within the marginal lines. All stamps and numbers to be placed in space below.]

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 191 , .....

Index Bu.—No. 60.

Confidential File



OIPHER

TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department

OR

Charge to

\$

Department of State

Washington,

-2-

Two. When this proposal is compared with Chinese counter proposal the only really irreconcilable elements of latter are (one) the time limit for withdrawal and (two) conference of the powers as proposed both of which seem impossible.

Three. Under these circumstances I am a little afraid of too much finesse on our part. I think Briand is entitled to know our favorable reaction to his proposal in order to help get it through. I should prefer to have it published *before our approval is published* but should be willing to take the chance of leakage rather than risk Briand failing for lack of our help. In fact I have already crossed the bridge because just before your cable arrived Claudel called and read me a digest of the proposal and asked whether I approved, and I told him that I did and had cabled you to that effect. In case the proposal fails by reason of Chinese or Japanese opposition I think it will be comparatively easy to focus responsibility where it really belongs and avoid criticism of our government.

I had

Initialed for:

W.T.B. ....

W.T.B. ....

T.A. ....

T.A. ....

T.A.-L. ....

C.-A. ....

D.C. ....

[Nothing but address and text of message to be written within the marginal lines. All stamps and numbers to be placed in space below.]

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 191 .....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

1-213

CIPHER

TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect  
Charge Department  
or  
Charge to  
\$

Department of State

Washington,

-3-

I had rather have the public feel that an honest proposal of conciliation like this one had failed in spite of our active assistance than for lack of such assistance and the responsibility would be all the heavier on the disputant who had caused the failure. I have today in confidence already educated the leaders of our press on the subject and think that they would help as they have uniformly done thus far.

Four. Under these circumstances you may go ahead and act in your full discretion. Try to get Briand to keep our approval confidential until he has received Sze's reply and has been able to decide whether the matter shall be put to a vote in the Council. When you know what that decision is, you will know whether our position should be made public.

STIMSON

S

Initialed for:

W.T.B. ....

W.T.B. ....

T.A. ....

T.A. ....

T.A.-L. ....

C.-A. ....

D.C. ....

[Nothing but address and text of message to be written within the marginal lines. All stamps and numbers to be placed in space below.]

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 191 , .....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

1-813

1  
Ambassador  
Paris

Confidential for Dames from Stinson

Your 792 November 24 3 P.M.

The As bearing on your problem have just received favorable news from Tokyo. Shidehara together with Minister of War and Chief of Staff agree that there shall be no hostile operations towards Chinchow and have issued orders to that effect.

Also agrees to clause in draft prohibiting hostilities provided it is so worded as to permit protection against marauding bandits. Asserts remainder of troops will remain in Tsitsihar only for the few <sup>days</sup> necessary to succor wounded and pick up dead. Therefore there seems now no substantial likelihood of Japanese opposition to Council proposal.

Two When this proposal is compared with Chinese counterproposal the only really irreconcilable elements of latter are (one) the time limit for withdrawal and (two) ~~the proposed~~ conference of the powers, both as proposed.

2  
of which ~~are~~ <sup>seem</sup> ~~wholly~~ impossible.

Three. Under these circumstances I am a little afraid of too much finesse on our part. I think Briand is entitled to know our favorable reaction to his proposal in order to help get it through. I should prefer to have it published before our approval is published but should be willing to take the chance of leakage rather than risk Briand failing for lack of our help. In fact I have already crossed the bridge because just before your cable arrived Claudel called and ~~had~~ had me a digest of the proposal and asked whether I approved, and I told him that I did and had cabled you to that effect. In case the proposal fails ~~for~~ by reason of Chinese or Japanese opposition, I think it will be comparatively easy to focus responsibility <sup>when it really belongs</sup> and avoid

3

Criticism of our government I have  
today in confidence already educated  
the leaders of our press on the subject  
and think that they ~~would~~ <sup>do</sup> help as they  
have uniformly <sup>done</sup> thus far.

Four Under these circumstances you may  
go ahead and act in your full discretion.

Try to get Brinsford to keep our approval confidential  
until he has received Sz's reply and has been able  
to decide whether the matter should be put to a vote  
~~not~~ in the Council. When you know what ~~that~~  
decision is, you will know whether our position  
should be made public.

Stimson

I had rather have the public feel that an honest  
proposal of conciliation like this <sup>one</sup> had failed in spite  
of our active assistance than for lack of such  
assistance and the responsibility would be all the  
heavier on the disputants who had caused the  
failure.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
NOV 20 1931  
RECEIVED  
CONFIDENTIAL  
NOV 24 1931  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

CONFIDENTIAL  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY

FK RE  
DCR  
file

November 21, 1931.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON  
AND THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR, MR. KATSUJI DEBUCHI.

Manchuria.

793.94

The Japanese Ambassador asked for an interview to communicate some very important matters from his government. When he came he told me that he had communicated to Baron Shidehara the message which I had sent the other day, in which I had summed up the situation as it existed after the capture of Tsitsihar, and that he had notified Shidehara that I must now reserve full freedom to publish every step that had been taken. The Ambassador said that he was now instructed urgently by Baron Shidehara to notify me of the following things:

One. That the Japanese Government was doing its utmost to conform to all of the friendly suggestions which had been made throughout this Manchurian matter by the American Government.

Two. That it was firmly determined to withdraw from the Tsitsihar region as soon as possible, and the Ambassador told me he had received in confirmation of this a direct message himself from the Consul at Cheng Chia Tun that two battalions of infantry and one company of artillery already

FK 793.94/2365

FILED  
NOV 28 1931

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 2 -

already had passed through there on their return from Tsitsihar.

Three. That General Honjo had been strictly instructed not to interfere with the civil government of Tsitsihar, and that the Assistant Chief of Staff of the Japanese Army, who was a very important personage, had been sent from Tokyo to hold General Honjo in check and had already arrived this morning at Mukden.

Four. That Baron Shidehara had instructed the Ambassador to say that the Japanese Government will strictly adhere to the outline of its Manchurian policy as stated in the memorandum which the Ambassador had handed to me on November 9th in answer to my memorandum of November 5th, and that I could rely upon its doing this no matter what news to the contrary I might receive from Paris. (This last remark related to the statement which Yoshizawa had made in Paris two days ago, about which I had reported to Debuchi for Shidehara on November 19th.)

The Ambassador then went on to report to me what he himself had learned from Paris, saying that he did this without the instruction of his government, but that he was in constant communication with Paris and that constant communications

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 3 -

communications were passing between Paris and Tokyo. He asked me if I had heard of the proposals before the League which had come through Matsudaira. I told him that General Dawes had informed me several days ago of a proposal which Matsudaira had suggested, which seemed to me entirely unsatisfactory. I said that this proposal in substance was that Japan and China, without even the presence of any neutral observers, should negotiate the various matters concerning evacuation and concerning the treaties or, in other words, matters in which Japan was on the defensive before the world, while at the same time he had proposed that a neutral commission should investigate the matters between China and Japan of alleged grievances against Japan where China was on the defensive. I said that, in other words Japan was unwilling to submit to neutral opinion even in the shape of observers in matters in which she was the defendant, while she was all ready to consent to a neutral investigation of matters in which China was the defendant, and that this, in my opinion, would not do at all or meet the proposition for which I had contended.

The Ambassador replied that I must have been entirely misinformed. He asked me if I had not heard of the proposals



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 4 -

proposals yesterday. I said that I had heard of them only through the press. The Ambassador said that Japan now had offered to the League to consent to a neutral commission to go to China, including Manchuria, to investigate all matters which were in controversy between China and Japan. I asked him whether by this he included all of the controversies which we had been discussing relating to the evacuation and to the treaties, and he said yes. He said that they only wished to have a high-class commission composed of men of standing in the world; that in September when the League proposed a commission of military attachés they had naturally objected, but now they were in favor of a neutral commission provided it was of high class and they did not even insist that Japan and China should be represented on it. He said they at first proposed that, but the League had replied that that might prevent unanimity in its recommendations. He said that therefore they would be perfectly satisfied to have the Japanese and Chinese representatives go as adjuncts. I asked him point blank whether the Japanese Army authorities had been consulted. He replied that they had and had consented, and that steps were being taken to prepare public

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 5 -

public opinion to agree to the step. He said that Japan hoped to save its face by escaping the provisions of the League Resolution of October 24.

The Ambassador then went on to say that an armistice had been suggested, but that Japan had refused it because it would seem that that would admit a technical state of war. I told him I did not think that was a necessary inference. I said that both China and Japan could agree to a suspension of hostile acts by either government against the other or its nationals without, in my opinion, admitting a state of war. I told him that if he wished to communicate with Shidehara, he could tell Shidehara that I thought the Japanese proposal of a neutral investigation into all these matters was a long step forward by Japan in the direction of bringing itself into alignment with the methods and opinion of the Western world, and I reminded the Ambassador that two years ago, in the case of the controversy between China and Russia, he had told me how Oriental opinion was invariably opposed to neutral investigation and insisted upon direct negotiation. I told him in the second place that he might inform Shidehara I thought that unless a suspension of hostilities was agreed to, the proposal for an investigation

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 6 -

investigation would be greatly marred and would fail to enlist the sympathy of the public opinion of the world, which it otherwise would. He said he would report my views to Shidehara at once.

HLS.

S HLS:HHR

1557  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED



EE  
WTE

AM


This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone.

FROM

Paris

Dated November 24, 1931

Rec'd 6:06 p.m.



F/DEW 793.94/2866

793-94  
Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

794, November 24, 6 p.m.

FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES

Sze informs me this evening that a telegram from  
his government received here at 2:30 p.m. today and  
presumably sent before the receipt of any information  
concerning American attitude on Council resolution lays  
down the following minimum conditions:

One. Immediate cessation of hostilities by Japan.

Two. Withdrawal Japanese troops within some short  
definite period.


Three. Supervision of evacuation by the Commission  
of Inquiry or neutral observers.

The foregoing condition declared to be essential  
otherwise Commission of Inquiry absolutely unacceptable.  
His government also suggests that if scope of commission's  
inquiry is extended to China as well as Manchuria it  
might also be extended to Japan and Korea.

SHAW

CSB

PM RECD



No.D-126

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE

American Consulate General  
Nanking, China,

NOV 24 31

October 21, 1931.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Controversy in Manchuria -  
Foreign Office News Releases.

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Sir:

Referring to my despatch D-117, of October 9, 1931,  
I have the honor to enclose herewith additional transla-  
tions of news releases made by the Chinese Foreign Office  
bearing on the Sino-Japanese controversy in Manchuria.  
They are thirteen in number, ranging in date from  
September 27 to October 18, 1931. It will be noted that  
they bear the caption "Unofficial", by which the Foreign  
Office intimates that it does not assume full responsibi-  
lity for the dependability of the release.

Respectfully yours,

*Willys R. Peck*  
Willys R. Peck,  
American Consul General.

Enclosures:  
Translations of Chinese  
Foreign Office News  
Releases:  
Sept. 27-2 Oct. 7-1  
28-1 10-3  
29-1 15-4  
18-1

In quintuplicate to the Department  
In duplicate to the Legation at Peiping.  
800  
WRP-T


793.94/2867

FILED

DEC 3 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PM RECD



No.D-126

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE

American Consulate General  
Nanking, China,

NOV 24 31


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Willys R. Peck,  
American Consul General.

Enclosures:

Translations of Chinese  
Foreign Office News  
Releases:

Sept. 27-2	Oct. 7-1
28-1	10-3
29-1	15-4
	18-1

In quintuplicate to the Department  
In duplicate to the Legation at Peiping.

800  
WRP-T

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FILED

DEC 3 1931

156  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No.1 to despatch to the Department No.D-126  
of Willys R.Peck,American Consul General at Nanking,  
China, dated October 21, 1931, entitled "Sino-Japanese  
Controversy in Manchuria - Foreign Office News Releases"

Press Release Issued by the Chinese  
Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Unofficial (Translation) Sept. 27, 1931.

AMERICAN AUTHORITIES CONSIDER THE  
MANCHURIAN AFFAIRS WILL DRAG ALONG.

According to the KUO MIN NEWS AGENCY, the American  
authorities firmly believe that the Manchurian incident  
will drag along and that the withdrawal of the Japanese  
troops is possible but some will still stay at important  
places, until a settlement is made. The United States  
Foreign Office is continuing to study treaties in order  
to meet the situation.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure

-2-

Press Release Issued by the Chinese Ministry  
for Foreign Affairs.

Unofficial (Translation) September 27, 1931.

SOVIET PRESS CONSIDERS JAPAN'S INVADING  
MANCHURIA WILL CAUSE INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

Moscow, Sept. 25.--After Japan's invasion into the Chinese Eastern Provinces, the various Soviet Parties and political newspapers have frequently made comments on the matter. An abstract of them is given as follows:

"Japanese imperialists have made preparations for several years for military activities in Manchuria. The case is not at all accidental. The various Powers are competing for their own privileges. The Soviet people should, therefore, closely watch the developments of the case. It is a great mistake if one only studies the situation by confining his consideration to Sino-Japanese relations. Since Japan has decided to seize the best part of entire Manchuria, one cannot help feeling the serious condition of China's foreign relations. The various Powers will, for their own benefit, oppose Japan's continued invasion into Manchuria. The ambition of the imperialists with regard to China has grown as a result of their financial distress. As to the Japanese imperialists, they desire to (1) have China give up competition in the construction of railroads

and



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

and allow Japan the sole right of construction, (2)  
confirm the right of merchants to hold leases, and (3)  
make Manchuria independent and separate from China.  
Therefore, Japan's present action is designed to acquire  
the sole control of Manchuria."

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lutz NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure

-3-

Press Release Issued by the Chinese  
Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Unofficial

(Translation)

Sept. 28, 1931.

NORWEGIAN AND DUTCH DELEGATES

ATTACK THE LEAGUE

Geneva, Sept. 27.--During the debate on the international agreements for the suppression of war at the League today, the Norwegian and Dutch delegates violently attacked the League's policy in adjusting the Sino-Japanese affair. The Norwegian delegate said that the existing international treaties were weaker than mere drafts, and that there was no use making new treaties only to be disregarded by the treaty non-observers at the critical moment. The Norwegian representative, in mentioning the Sino-Japanese incident, also spoke of the League's policy as self-destruction--at least a heavy blow to its own existence. The confidence of the world in the League's suppression of the imperialistic doctrine would be thus undermined and could hardly be restored in a short time.

Enclosure

-4-

Press Release Issued by the Chinese  
Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Unofficial

(Translation)

Sept. 29, 1931.

JAPAN'S SECRET PLAN

Tokyo, Sept. 28.--Japan's present military occupation of Manchuria is not only detrimental to China, but also involves her secret 5-year-plan of preparing for war against the United States and Russia. She fears that in case of war, Manchuria may take part to the detriment of Japan. This is shown by the secret order of the Chief of Staff, "Kin Koo (Japanese)" to the Japanese General in command of troops in Manchuria that the latter should take steps to clear out the Chinese armies from Manchuria. It is more clearly shown by the fact that after receiving the notice of the League of Nations, Japan still advanced troops, on September 25th, toward Taonan, in order to disarm the Chinese colonization troops there. At present, Japan is conducting such propaganda work as is favorable to her among different nations on the one hand, and on the other is preventing them from investigation. Meanwhile, in China, she is employing radicals to mix in various patriotic activities and assassinate important government officers. As to Manchuria, she intends to organize it into a nation independent of China.

1564  
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure

-5-

Press Release Issued by the Chinese  
Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Unofficial

(Translation)

October 7, 1931.

Waichiaopu,--Chiang Tso-pin, Minister to Japan has sent a telegraphic report to the Waichiaopu stating that he has addressed an official note to the Japanese Government of the appointment by the Chinese Government of Generals Chang Tso-hsiang and Wang Shu-chang as commissioners to take over the control of the Eastern provinces.

156

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure

-6-

Press Release Issued by the  
Chinese Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Unofficial

(Translation)

October 10, 1931.

JAPANESE PLANES DISTRIBUTING  
LEAFLETS TO DELUDE THE PUBLIC

Tokyo,--It has been reported in the Japanese newspapers  
that Japanese planes distributed leaflets yesterday (Oct.8)  
to the population at Chinchow, stating briefly:

"The people of the Four Provinces in the Northeast  
have begun to show signs of desertion from Vice  
Commander-in-Chief Chang. He (Chang) has set up a  
provisional government at Chinchow. In order to  
protect her interest, Japan will decidedly not  
recognize this government and, if necessary, will  
destroy it entirely."

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure

-7-

Press Release Issued by the  
Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Unofficial (Translation) October 10, 1931.

GERMAN CONSUL ORDERED TO RETURN  
FROM PEIPING TO LIAONING TO MAKE INVESTIGATION

Berlin, Oct. 9.--This morning the German Foreign Office telegraphed the German Consul to return from Peiping to his Liaoning office in order to investigate the Manchurian affair. The public opinion here is still favorable to China.

1568  
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure

-8-

Press Release Issued by the  
Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Unofficial

(Translation)

Oct. 10, 1931.

SOVIET SHOWING SYMPATHY WITH CHINA

Moscow.--Although Soviet Russia is deeply concerned with the news that the White Russians at Harbin may seize an opportunity for action, yet no statements of intervention have appeared in the Press. There are, however, numerous comments on the Japanese attempt to instigate the Eastern Provinces to declare independence. Russia's Far Eastern troops are, in fact, actively making preparations, but their movement is apparently very cautious, as they observe that the Manchurian situation may become less serious. Their attitude toward China now is still sympathetic.

1560  
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure

-9-

Press Release Issued by the  
Chinese Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Unofficial

(Translation)

Oct. 15, 1931.

ACTIVITIES OF JAPANESE AT HANKOW

Hankow, Oct. 17 -- The report that the recent remittance of 2,500,000 Yen from the Japanese Government to the Yokohama Specie Bank at Hankow is to remedy financial difficulties when China severs her economic relations with Japan is not true. Information from a spokesman of a certain bank at Hankow is to the effect that this remittance will be given to Mitsubishi Shoji Kaisha, Nisshin Kisen Kaisha, Mitsui Bussan Kaisha, etc. to purchase large quantities of raw materials for export. Such raw materials are mostly rice, wheat, and minerals, and a small proportion of cotton and beans. Although it is difficult for them to purchase these products directly, they are making every effort to do so with the assistance of Danish and British merchants.



Enclosure

-9-

Press Release Issued by the  
Chinese Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Unofficial

(Translation)

Oct. 15, 1931.

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Enclosure

-10-

Press Release Issued by the  
Chinese Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Unofficial

(Translation)

Oct. 15, 1931.

JAPANESE PURCHASED LAND AT HANKOW BY MAKING  
CAPITAL OF THE FLOOD DISASTER

From Hankow correspondent -- Japanese here are endeavoring to expand the Japanese Settlement. Recently, houses on the streets "Yi Tze Kai" and "Ma Lou Tou" have been leveled to the ground as a result of the flood disaster. Making capital of this opportunity, the Japanese have spent large sums of money for the purchase through local Chinese of privately-owned land and have moved the boundary-stones of the Peiping-Hankow Railway in order to acquire more land. Many other boundary-stones of the Railway were destroyed and replaced by the boundary-stones of a certain "tang" (Chinese family name), thus facilitating their attempt to purchase such land.

Some time ago, certain Chinese merchants were building houses at Ho Ping Kai and Ma Lou Tou. The Japanese forced the merchants to tear down these structures on the ground that they handicapped communications. Also, the Japanese purchased a vast area of farm land near the railway.

Enclosure

-11-

Press Release Issued by the  
Chinese Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Unofficial

(Translation)

Oct. 15, 1931.

FINANCIAL AND MILITARY PLANS OF JAPANESE AT HANKOW

From Hankow correspondent -- Recently approximately 200 Japanese sailors landed at Hankow for military training. Preparations are being made for building barbed wire barricades. About 600 retired Japanese soldiers organized a so-called Volunteer land corps. They wear the same uniform as that of the cadets of the Wu-Han Military Academy, and are staging "street brawls" in the Japanese settlement. There is a report from a certain Japanese source that if any accident happens at Hankow, 40 Japanese war vessels will come here in two or three days. The hospital at Jeh Chung Kai is used as a military hospital. Practically all military preparations have been made.

40% of the salary of the staffs of the Japanese Consulate General and the Japanese Police office are being contributed for the purchase of coal for the Japanese navy at Hankow. In view of the possible severance of economic relations with China, they have also purchased large quantities of rice from Shanghai, Wuhu and other ports. Recently, the Japanese Government remitted 2,500,000 Yen to the Yokohama Specie Bank, Hankow, to remedy financial difficulties.

Enclosure

-12-

Press Release Issued by the  
Chinese Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Unofficial

(Translation)

Oct. 15, 1931.

JAPAN'S PLANS TO SPY, CAUSE TROUBLE  
AND STOP BOYCOTT ACTIVITIES IN HANKOW

Japanese here mostly disguise themselves in Chinese civilian dress and speak Chinese language. They proceed to Hankow, Wuchang and Yangyang to investigate the status of the anti-Japanese movement. On their arms, they have certain marks in blue ink for recognition purposes. They purchase anti-Japanese slogans and all other anti-Japanese propaganda materials. They also take photos of such slogans. Newspaper clippings relating to the requests for declaration of war, boycott of Japanese goods and the activities of the anti-Japanese Association are pasted in bound volumes and are sent to Japan.

At 2:00 p.m. October 9, after a meeting was held by the officials of the Japanese Army, Navy, and volunteer corps at the Japanese Consulate General, the Japanese police office asked the Chinese Bureau of Public Safety by telephone to remove all the anti-Japanese slogans at Ping Ho Kai, near the Japanese Settlement, saying that, if the Chinese authorities fail to comply with this request, Japanese policemen will be sent to tear such slogans down.

The Japanese police authorities are making every effort to prevent the Chinese policemen and laborers in

Japanese

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

Japanese employ from going on strike. A Savings Society has been organized and a certain percentage of the salaries is deducted for deposits. Such deposits will be refunded with interest if the employees do not violate the regulations. Otherwise, the deposits are subject to confiscation. Other Chinese employees should be guaranteed by their introducers. Laborers working on hulks in the Japanese settlement are given number tags. When the laborers violate the regulations, the tags will be taken back and they will be permanently forbidden to work on the hulks.

Enclosure

-13-

Press Release Issued by the  
Chinese Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Unofficial (Translation) Oct.18, 1931.

NO FIGHTING HAS YET TAKEN PLACE BETWEEN  
TAO-LIAO AND HEILUNGKIANG TROOPS

Peiping, Oct.18 -- General Chang Hai-peng, Garrison Commander of the Tao-nan Tung-Liao District, reported by telegraph that Japanese shipped 8 car-loads of munitions and military supplies from Shenyang. The shipment has arrived at Taonan station, and Japanese intend to supply Mongolian bandits with this shipment. There are in this shipment more than twenty thousand rifles and guns. About 3,000 rifles, 600,000 cartridges and many uniforms have been detained.

Contrary to the above report, however, General Sie Ko, Chief of Staff of the Military Headquarters, Heilungkiang, in his telegrams to Peiping, states the following:

"According to a reliable report, General Chang Hai-peng entered into a conspiracy with Japanese troops and intended to occupy Heilungkiang. Japanese troops promised to supply munitions and share military expenditures."

In spite of the telegraphic report referred to in the preceding paragraph, a telegram dated October 14 from General Hai-peng stated that Japanese troops have badly oppressed his forces, and that indications are

that

-2-

that something worse will happen. His negotiations have been unsuccessful. Therefore he ordered those under his command to retreat to Heilungkiang for defensive purposes.

On the same day, nevertheless, Chief of Staff Sie telegraphed stating that General Chang, supported by Japanese, have moved his troops toward Heilungkiang.

It is heard that no fighting has yet taken place between the two sides.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 25, 1931. *file*

Riga, November 13, 1931, No. 8219.

There is enclosed a translation of an editorial in the PRAVDA, which the Legation believes is aimed at awakening suspicion in the United States as to the ultimate objectives of Japan. Some of the points in this editorial are:

The struggle for Manchuria is inseparable from the struggle of the imperialists for hegemony in the Pacific basin, the principal contenders being the U. S., Great Britain and Japan, the latter being bent on creating not only a continental empire, but also a greater Japan which will include Australia, the Philippines, the Malayan archipelago, etc.

In order to conquer China, Japan must first, as Tanaka pointed out in his confidential report to the highest spheres, first conquer Manchuria and Mongolia. This will retard the industrial development of China and prevent the penetration of the European powers.

The occupation of Manchuria has long been planned, and is the introduction to a new imperialistic carnage.

The American imperialists do not conceal their real hopes, the statement in the

WORLD



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

2

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

WORLD TELEGRAM that "if Russia will be drawn into the war even in a slight measure, it will be forced to give up the five-year plan" expressing most lucidly the true meaning of the anti-Soviet campaign.

The chairman of the Military and Naval Committee of the American Congress, Britten, advocating expansion of naval armaments, said, "Actual military operations are now going on in Asia, where Russia mobilizes colossal land, naval and air forces, the whole world sitting on a volcano whose eruption may be expected at any moment."

The international proletariat must be alert to expose the anti-Soviet campaign of those who want to provoke war.


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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



AM 8000  
LEGATION OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
Riga, Latvia.

November 13, 1931.



F/DEW

793.94/2868

FILED

DEC 4 1931

793.94  
No. 8219

FOR DISTRIBUTION - CHECK		Yes	No
To the Field	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
1	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that the Moscow IZVESTIA editorial of November 4th on the Japanese-Chinese conflict, which was noticed in the Legation's despatch No. 8213, of November 6, 1931, was followed the next day by a more lengthy editorial of the Moscow PRAVDA on the same subject, in which an effort was made to awaken suspicions in the United States as to the ultimate

-2-

ultimate objectives of Japan. The PRAVDA cited from the CHINA CRITIC an alleged secret report of Baron Tanaka, former Prime Minister of Japan, in which Japanese aspirations for a "Greatest Japan," to include the Philippine Islands, Guam, Haiti\*, Samoa, the Malayan archipelago and Australia, were admitted. The pretended "secret report" was stated to have been submitted in 1927 "to the highest spheres." The issue of the CHINA CRITIC was not given a date.

Respectfully yours,

*Felix Cole*

Felix Cole,  
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

✓  
Enclosure:

- 1/ Pull the Masks off the Anti-Soviet  
Provocation Mongers.  
(Moscow PRAVDA, No. 306, November 5,  
1931, Page 1.)

(In triplicate.)

Copy to E.I.C., Paris.

Copy to E.I.C., Paris, for Peiping.

Copy to E.I.C., Paris, for Tokyo.

Copy to American Consul General, Harbin, direct.

Copy to American Embassy, London, direct.

710 R -- Japan-China.

DBM/fk

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\* obviously meaning Hawai

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 0248 of NOV 13 1931  
from the American Legation at Riga, Latvia.

SOURCE: Moscow PRAVDA,  
No. 306, p. 1,  
November 5, 1931.

PULL THE MASKS OFF THE ANTI-SOVIET PROVOCATION MONGERS.

(Translation of excerpts from the leading editorial)\*

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... Apart from everything else, Manchuria is one of the most important strategical place d'armes in the Pacific basin.

The struggle for Manchuria is inseparable from the struggle of the imperialists for hegemony in the Pacific. The principal participants in that struggle are the United States, Great Britain, and Japan. The desire of the imperialists for a new division of the world underlies that struggle. The struggle for hegemony in the Pacific basin is of a world-wide scale, and it is inevitably bound up with the preparations for a new world war. This circumstance interests particularly French imperialism in the struggle for the Pacific, which struggle is part of the struggle for a new division of the world.

Japan's action in Manchuria is an ominous sign of the approach of the new imperialistic war. It  
should

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\*This editorial of three columns sets forth the extension of the Japanese occupation of Manchuria, which "is not an event of local importance..." as the French press especially has been arguing, for "Manchuria has long been an apple of discord among the imperialists, not only because it is a favorable object of colonial exploitation. ..." Translator's note.

-2-

should be remembered that the American-Japanese conflict of interest is generated not only in the clash of these two Powers in China. The peculiar feature in the development of Japanese imperialism is that it is bent upon creating a Japanese continental empire, turning to account for this purpose the tremendous advantages implied by Japan's insular character.

But the aggressive aspirations of Japanese imperialism have for their object not only China alone. The Japanese imperialists aspire not only for a "Greater", but for a "Greatest Japan" which is to include the Philippine Islands, the Malayan archipelago, Guam, Haiti, Samoa, and Australia. In the report of the former Japanese Prime-Minister, Baron Hiiti Tanaka, one of the most prominent protagonists of Japanese imperialism, on the political tasks of Japan in Manchuria and Mongolia, we find an exact enumeration of all these objectives of the imperialistic expansion of the Japanese Empire.

That report, submitted to the highest spheres in 1927, is a convincing refutation of all the various versions offered now and in the past to explain the Japanese occupation in Manchuria.

"The three eastern provinces - so we read in the report - are in a political sense an unfinished spot [on the map of] the Far East. For the sake of its self-defense Japan must eliminate its difficulties in Eastern Asia, pursuing a policy of 'blood and fire'. But pursuing such a policy, we shall find ourselves face to face with the United States. If in the future we  
want

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

want to gain control over China, we shall first have to crush the United States....\* In order to conquer China, we must first conquer Manchuria and Mongolia. ...\* This will not only retard the industrial development of China itself, but will also prevent the penetration of the European Powers into it."

Baron Tanaka had no need to use diplomatic language in a document not intended for the press, but which is reproduced now in the journal, CHINA CRITIC. In that document a candid language is used, in the style of other well-known documents concerning the imperialistic policy of the "world Powers." But we have to emphasize two things: first, the seizure of Manchuria has been in preparation a long time, it has been prepared, so to speak, in a plan-governed way, and Tanaka's report sums up numerous opinions that have been arrived at on this subject. Secondly, it is no mere coincidence that the general tasks of Japanese imperialism in the Pacific basin — to prove the necessity of an expansion of its continental policy — are set forth in a document that is formally devoted solely to preparing the occupation of Manchuria and Mongolia.

This may be explained by the fact that the occupation of Manchuria and Mongolia is regarded in the said document as a most important stage on the road to creating a Japanese continental empire, on the road to enslaving the Chinese people. What is now going on in Manchuria is fully in keeping with the fundamental

theses

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\* ... in "Pravda" text.

-4-

theses of the document mentioned.

The occupation of Manchuria is one of the chapters in the black book of imperialistic diplomacy, in the struggle of the imperialists for the Pacific. It is there that the peculiar features of the struggle of the imperialistic interests in the Pacific basin must be looked for, the features that sharpen that struggle, and predetermine the exceedingly complex character of that world conflict.

The occupation of Manchuria is the foreword, as it were, to a new imperialistic carnage. And if this latter has not yet begun, it is not because the League of Nations, or its appendix, the social-fascist Second International, are preventing it. The League of Nations is the organizing agency of the new war for the division of China. ...

\*\*\*\*\* \*

The American reactionary press is not lagging behind its English colleagues. The NEW YORK TIMES remarks quite innocently: "There cannot be a doubt that, if the events will throw the U.S.S.R. and China into one camp, the world will have to face a problem of exceptional importance." Such efforts to influence public opinion

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\*The task assigned to the Second International is "to screen" Manchuria from the understanding of the "international proletariat", the editorial continues. War has not yet been begun because it has not yet been fully prepared, especially by a fascist smashing of the proletariat and the communistic movement, and because the Soviet Union is pursuing a firm peace policy. The Japanese version of defense of the lives and property of Japanese residents having proven an insufficient justification of the occupation, resort is now had to the "red danger." There follows a lengthy section on the attitude of the press of various countries. Translator's note.

1585

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-5-

opinion in the United States are made every day. In this connection the American imperialists are not at all anxious to conceal their real hopes: "If Russia — says the WORLD TELEGRAM — will be drawn into (the war) even in a slight measure, it will be forced to give up the five-year plan." The true meaning of the anti-Soviet campaign is here expressed most lucidly. It should be noted that inventions about a war with the participation of the U.S.S.R. are also spread by certain groups simply by way of stock-exchange tricks. The rumors as to a mobilization of Soviet troops, spread by some American newspapers, are used by the stock jobbers in Chicago for raising the prices of grain. The American capitalists remember very well how they made their pile in the world war.

However, unsurpassed in its monstrous mendacity remains the statement made by the chairman of the Military and Naval Committee of the American parliament, Britten, who advocates an extension of the program of naval armaments of the United States. "Actual military operations are now going on in Asia @ said he — where Russia mobilizes colossal land, naval, and air forces in Manchuria, the whole world sitting, as it were, on a volcano whose eruption may be expected at any moment." Apparently, the laurels of Herostratus disturb the rest of that American Furishkevich\*, who evidently will succeed in securing for himself a permanent place in the pantheon

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\*A Russian politician, member of the Duma since it was first convened, who had the reputation of an extreme reactionary. Translator's note.



1534  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lutefson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-6-

pantheon of the dishonest.

The international proletariat must be on the alert.  
The anti-Soviet campaign of those who want to provoke  
war must be exposed fully, to the end. Take the masks  
off the faces of those that kindle war! - that is our  
slogan.

js/lr

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
November 25, 1931.

Berne, November 10, No. 2336.

The enclosed editorial from the JOURNAL DE GENEVE is very well written, and is worth reading in full.

From the diplomatic point of view two important moves have been made since October 24: the letter of the President of the Council to the Japanese Government and the note from the United States to Tokyo. The letter from M. Briand is perfect, stating precisely in unanswerable terms the position in law and fact. It has already unsteadied Japanese opinion, which feels less and less sure of itself. The Japanese Government would profoundly have preferred not to have had this authoritative lesson in international law made public.

Mr. Stimson's note, the nature of which is known, is no less important.

During the early stages after contact was established between Geneva and Washington, a difference of opinion appeared as to sending a neutral commission to Manchuria, and it was due to this that the Council adopted a vague resolution in general terms. This was extremely regrettable because before Japan was too deeply involved it might have been possible to effect a withdrawal by the use of vigorous language.

After

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

2

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

After the incident at Kintcheou, feeling in the United States became intense, and the Government decided to be represented at the Council.

Following the resolution of October 24, the American press was excellent, and there is reason to be convinced of the firmness of Mr. Stimson. But certain remarks which Mr. Lauzanne attributed -- rightly or wrongly -- to Mr. Castle were of a nature to encourage the Japanese by disclosing a fundamental difference of opinion between the United States and the League.

The last American note put an end to these uncertainties. It would have been preferable if the Government of the United States had not waited fifteen days to let Tokyo know that it was in full accord with the Council's resolution, but it doubtless wished to ascertain the reaction of American opinion. That is why a very frank course has been taken toward Tokyo. Except for a slight difference in interpretation as to the date of evacuation, the Japanese now know that America is in complete accord with the League on the two fundamental points: no lasting occupation of Manchuria, and no direct negotiations between China and Japan, under pressure of military occupation, as to the meaning of treaties.


The rest of the editorial goes on to point out that Japan is actually making war on China, and concludes by saying that if Europe and America are only waiting for China to retort by military acts they will probably not have long to wait, as the Chinese have their backs to the wall.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75



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LEGATION OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 2336



Berne, November 10, 1931.

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The Honorable

The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to forward herewith in translation an editorial appearing in the JOURNAL DE GENEVE of yesterday written by its political editor William Martin under the title "What is a War?"

This editorial refers to the part taken by the United States in the Sino-Japanese affair and mentions an article by Stéphane Lauzanne which I understand was published in the MATIN of Paris purporting to be based on an interview with the Under Secretary of State.

Respectfully yours,

*Winthrop S. Greene*  
Winthrop S. Greene  
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

Enclosure:

Translation of  
an editorial.

File No. 711/891  
WSG/IM

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### What is a War?

Since the 24th of October, the date on which the Council of the League of Nations definitely established its position in the Manchurian affair, the situation has developed in two opposite directions.

From the diplomatic point of view two important moves have been made; the letter of the President of the Council to the Japanese Government and the note from the United States to Tokio. The letter from M. Briand is perfect; it states precisely in unanswerable terms the position in law and in fact. It is reported that it has already unsteadied Japanese opinion, which feels itself less and less sure of itself. The Japanese Government had so well foreseen it that it would have preferred, and that profoundly, not to have had this authoritative lesson in international law made public.

Mr. Stimson's note which has not been published out the nature of which is known, is no less important. It is sufficient, in order to grasp its importance, to recall how the effort to establish a front of united action between the League of Nations and the United States had been constantly thwarted by the difficulties of communication, by misunderstandings, and by the activities of Japanese diplomacy.

Contact was established between Geneva and Washington on the 24th of September. Almost immediately a difference of opinion appeared as to sending a neutral commission to Manchuria, and the Council of the League of Nations, taking into account the opinion of the Department of State, considered it necessary to adopt a somewhat vague resolution phrased in general terms. This was extremely regrettable

because

- 2 -

because at that moment when Japan was not yet too deeply involved it might conceivably have been possible to effect a withdrawal by the use of vigorous language.

The wavering which occurred between Geneva and Washington having encouraged the Japanese, the incident of Kintcheou took place. Feeling became intense in the United States and the Government decided to be represented at the Council. This was an important step but it was immediately obscured by fresh misunderstandings which, almost brought about the adoption of a resolution which would have been hopelessly inadequate. Fortunately the situation cleared, and as a result the resolution of the 24th of October was adopted.

What was the United States going to do? No one knew and at first there was general concern about it. The American press was excellent on the whole. There are reasons to be convinced of the firmness of Mr. Stimson. But certain remarks which Mr. Stéphane Lauzanne attributed -- rightly or wrongly -- to Mr. Castle, Under-Secretary of State were of a nature to encourage the Japanese by disclosing a fundamental difference of point of view between the United States and the League of Nations.

The last American note to Tokyo put an end to these uncertainties. It would have been preferable certainly, if the Government of the United States had not waited fifteen days to let Tokyo know that it was in full accord with the Council's resolution of October 24. However it doubtless wished to ascertain the reaction of American opinion, which, fortunately, has been excellent. That is why a very frank course has been taken toward Tokyo. Except for a slight difference in interpretation as to

the

- 3 -

the date of evacuation, the Japanese now know that America is in complete accord with the League of Nations on the two fundamental points: - no lasting occupation of Manchuria, no direct negotiations between China and Japan, under pressure of military occupation, as to the meaning of the treaties of 1905 and 1915 (fifth fundamental point). It may be said that before the common front of the United States and the League of Nations the Japanese are now brought to a halt.

This is fortunate, because in the meantime the military operations had progressed to a point where they were becoming of supreme importance. Poor Baron Shidehara, we understand is extremely annoyed by what has occurred. But the military authorities have no respect for the Government. They have seized the revenues from the salt tax because the Minister of Finance has refused them funds; they live on the country, and no human power can bring them to leave it. We have the greatest sympathy for this excellent Mr. Shidehara and poor Mr. Wakatsuki. But what we hear is very disturbing. The world believes in disarmament because too large armies in the hands of their governments are a danger to peace! And now the armies are making war of their own accord.

On this point the Japanese protest "We are not making War!" they say "we are merely insisting that the Chinese respect the treaties". We confess that we do not entirely understand this. What is a War? Clausevitz said: "It is pursuing a policy by military means". What then are the Japanese doing?

The Chinese declared very formally that they were ready to respect all International Treaties which they have entered into with Japan. Among these treaties there, are, it is true, certain ones the import and interpretation of which are subject

- 4 -

ject to differences of opinion -- and this is true we believe of the treaties of 1905 and 1915. It is precisely because of the juridical questions of this type that the system of arbitration and the International Court were created. But if the Japanese intend to oblige the Chinese by military means to declare that white is black and black is white we ask again what this is if it is not war?

We have always believed that a war consisted essentially of military operations which finally result in a treaty. It is difficult to deny that the Japanese are engaging in military operations in Manchuria. They have occupied cities, they have bombarded others, they have killed civilians and soldiers; they have requisitioned supplies, seized State revenues, installed public administrations. They have destroyed the bridge of Tsitsihar by bombs, and have sent sappers, infantry, artillery and aviators to repair it. Finally they demand that the Chinese enter into negotiations with them which will obviously terminate by a treaty which they will be careful to call an accord or protocol. What is war if it is not that?

We have long believed that in case of international complications the difficulty lies in recognizing the aggressor. This is a serious error! The aggressor is easy to identify, he designates himself "Habemus reum confitentem". But what is more difficult is to recognize war, because those who make it decorate it with all sorts of pretty names!

One wonders what Europe and America are waiting for to be thoroughly aroused. In order to understand that this is a war are they waiting for the Chinese to answer the Japanese with common? If that is all, it is a simple matter and we shall not have long to wait, for the Chinese now have their  
backs



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 5 -

backs against the wall. But must the Chinese be obliged  
to kill, in order that we may decide to come to their  
assistance?

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 27, 1931.

Rome, November 10, No. 1130.

There are enclosed two editorials (not translated) expressing some sympathy with the attitude of Japan.

The editorial in the STAMPA emphasizes the necessity for expansion of the 64 million people of Japan, and points out the sacrifices Japan has made in Manchuria and her enormous investments there. After all, it will not be to the advantage of the powers to have Manchuria return to the state of semi-anarchy which has been characteristic of China.

The CORRIERE DELLA SERA holds that Japan is exercising an incontestable right in Manchuria, and is rendering a service to the cause of world order. If one admits the necessity of Japanese expansion, her productive efforts in Manchuria and her legitimate interests in that territory, she must be allowed to protect her vested interests. The right of young and hard-working peoples to live and expand up to the potentialities of their personalities must be recognized.

The comments in these two editorials stand out in clear contrast to the usual treatment of the Manchurian question in the Italian press. There is no change in the neutral and somewhat disinterested attitude in official circles.


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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75





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The Honorable

The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Sir:

With reference to my despatch No. 1104 of October 23, 1931, regarding Italian press comment on the Sino-Japanese difficulties in Manchuria, I have the honor to enclose for the Department's information copies of two editorials from the STAMPA of Turin and the CORRIERE DELLA SERA of Milan expressing a certain amount of sympathy with the attitude assumed by Japan.

The STAMPA states that the Manchurian problem is the most important and difficult problem the League has yet had to confront, since it is not one of purely

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-2-

juridical or political character, but on the contrary has its roots in the "necessity for expansion of a country of 64 million people domiciled on infertile soil." The article proceeds to an historical account of Japan's attempts in the past to erect a Manchurian empire and refers to the Soviet-Japanese agreement of 1925 to respect mutual rights in Manchuria, replacing and reconfirming the former secret treaty of 1910. Because of freedom from Russian opposition, continues the newspaper, Japan has been able to exploit Manchuria, pouring in a capital investment of three billion yen. The jealousy of the other interested powers, adds the newspaper, led them to intercede in securing the annulment of the 21 demands and to accord a sympathetic reception of China's demands for abolishment of the "unequal treaties" even at their own cost rather than that Japan should have a free hand in Manchuria. The murder of Capt. Nakamura and the boycotts are but the immediate cause of Japan's intervention, explains the STAMPA, for she cannot afford to give up a territory for which she has sacrificed so much money and blood and which, moreover, is secured to her by valid treaties. It is because of this last reason that Japan is so intransigent, says the newspaper.

"There is reason to ask whether in the interests of civilization Japan should be hindered in her economic activity in Manchuria. When it comes down to facts, Japan is developing new territories and opening up new markets to international trade, which now needs new outlets more than ever before.

The

-3-

The other powers may request guarantees that their future positions on the Manchurian market will not be adversely affected, but in the long run it would in no way be to their advantage to have Manchuria return to that state of political, economic, and military semi-anarchy which is the present characteristic of the Chinese Empire.

"It is accordingly not altogether contrary to world interests if Japan insists upon her viewpoint and if it is once more recognized that it is difficult, if not impossible, to stem the needs for expansion of a people which feels itself young and strong and whose land does not offer sufficient resources for its existence."

The CORRIERE DELLA SERA in an article even more favorable to Japan points out that the crisis in Manchuria, because of its distance from Europe, does not cause as much concern as its danger warrants, since aside from the military complications which might ensue therefrom, the crisis is putting to a severe test the Kellogg Peace Pact and other treaties designed to prevent war.

Says the newspaper, "Italian public opinion, while assuming a reserved attitude, cannot help but recognize that Japan in defending energetically her own interests in Manchuria is exercising her incontestable right"; and further on the article states, "Judging from facts only, one must admit that Japan is following a logical line and that in making efforts to reestablish tranquillity in Manchuria by military means is rendering a service to the cause of world order." Answering its own question "Is Japan wrong in acting as she has?" the CORRIERE says

that

-4-

that if one admits the necessity for Japanese expansion, her productive efforts in Manchuria, and the legitimate interests of the empire in that territory, it follows that Japan should be permitted to protect her vested rights.

"In the lives of peoples and in international relations there are powerful ideal and historical forces to which it is often useless to oppose the formulae of diplomacy. The latter's skill must accordingly consist rather in creating the conditions favorable to making the new concepts and new agreements prevail; and these conditions today are based upon the recognition of the right of young and hard working peoples to live and expand up to the potential limit of their own personalities. It is not only in the Far East that international policy is confronted by similar problems, which can never be adjusted by palliatives and which cannot be postponed from generation to generation ad infinitum.

"Let us hope that the forceful and disturbing warning coming from far-away Manchuria will be interpreted accurately and that it will urge the European governments to establish new relations upon a basis of greater justice, which is the only truly solid and enduring basis. The consciousness of such justice would also permit other governments to admonish with more authority, in the name of the common civilization, whoever attempted to disturb peace, of which the world has need. Then and only then their voice could cause to fall from the hands of the disputants the arms already brandished and perhaps, as in the present case, already too abundantly used."

These statements of the two authoritative North Italian papers have so far passed without comment in the other press, except for an article in the TEVERE, perhaps because of the amount of editorial space devoted to the recent important domestic events. The TEVERE in reply

asks

-5-

asks pointedly how the CORRIERE arrogates to itself the right to speak for "Italian public opinion" and then demands further:

"We would ask what Italy would get out of the conquest of Manchuria by the Japanese; what ideal or practical advantage would accrue to us from a change of flag at Mukden? Perhaps the Japanese are silently considering letting us share in the exploitation of the 'vast, rich eastern region of the Chinese Republic'? The Milan newspaper styles itself the interpreter of Italian public opinion; could it also be the interpreter of Japanese private opinion? Anything is possible; but we await confirmation."

In connection with the foregoing it must be added that there appears to be no indication of any change in the neutral and somewhat disinterested attitude with regard to the conflict which is prevalent in official circles, and as evidence of this fact there has been an almost total lack of comment on the subject in the GIORNALE D'ITALIA and the MESSAGGERO, generally considered as the unofficial mouthpieces of Foreign Office opinion. The comments of the CORRIERE DELLA SERA and STAMPA therefore stand out in clear contrast to the usual treatment of the Manchurian question in the Italian press.

I am enclosing copies and translations of the two latest official communiques on the Manchurian situation (the Nonni river bridge incident and the situation in

Tientsin)

-6-

Tientsin) issued by the Japanese Embassy in Rome to  
the Italian press and as published by the latter.

Respectfully yours,

*Alexander Kirk*

Alexander Kirk,  
Charge d'Affaires ad interim.

✓  
Enclosures: -copies and trans-  
lations of two  
communiques.  
-clippings.

Copies to E.I.C. Paris.

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Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 1130 of November 10, 1931,  
from the Embassy at Rome.

(Translation from CORRIERE  
DELLA SERA, Milan, November  
8, 1931.)

Communique on Mooni River Bridge Incident,  
issued by Japanese Embassy in Rome,  
November 7, 1931.

On October 17th last the three bridges crossing the river Mooni were destroyed by the Chinese. The Angangki-Taonan railway was constructed with the capital of the Japanese Company of the South Manchurian Railway and is administered by the Chinese Bureau of the Taonan railway. At present the export season is in full swing for an enormous quantity of agricultural products in the zone, particularly soya. The interruption of communications caused by the destruction of the bridges rendered absolutely impossible transportation of agricultural products in the entire northern river zone and menaced serious detriment not only to the entire population, which was gravely affected by the impossibility of exporting its products, but also to the Angangki-Taonan railway. For this reason on October 29th the Japanese Consul at Tsitsihar made representations to General Mah, explaining the absolute necessity for immediate repair of the bridges. General Mah said that he recognized this necessity, but he temporized instead of giving a definite reply.

In the meantime, in view of the gravity of the damages suffered daily by the above-mentioned railways and in view of the imminence of the winter season when the river freezes, the Chinese Bureau of the Taonan-Angangki railways decided to start the reconstruction of the bridges using Japanese engineers and laborers.

General

-2-

General Mah agreed to withdraw the Chinese troops together with those of his opponent (sic) Chiang Hai Peng for a distance of 10 kilometers from the river during the course of reconstruction. In order to prevent attacks by Chinese bandits, it was decided to send 500 Japanese soldiers from Taonan.

On November 4th the Japanese Consul at Tsitsihar, M. Shimizu, visited the zone upon the request of the Government of Heilungkiang to come to an agreement with regard to the withdrawal of troops. He discussed the subject with the representative of the Government of the Province itself, who was the Chief of Staff of the Chinese troops. Major Hayashi of the Japanese troops of Kwantung (South Manchuria) was also present. The Government representative of the Heilungkiang Province declared that the Government had no intention of opposing the Japanese troops and that it would immediately order the withdrawal of the Chinese troops.

Subsequent to this conversation the Japanese troops began to advance, carrying the national banner, toward the spot where the bridges were being repaired. For surveillance of the zone a detachment was sent to Tahsing, which is less than 10 kilometers from the bridge and from which accordingly the Chinese troops should have been withdrawn. However, not only had the troops not been withdrawn, but at 2 p.m., as soon as the detachment of Japanese troops was sighted, the Chinese troops opened a severe attack with infantry and artillery, forcing the Japanese to withdraw until reinforcements should arrive. Until late at night on

November

-3-

November 4th, the Chinese troops did not withdraw to the agreed distance of 10 kilometers north of the river, but continued to attack the Japanese troops, the latter having lost ten men. In view of this situation, the Kwantung military command was forced to order reinforcements to the spot. At dawn on November 5th the Japanese troops occupied a strategic point east of Tahsing. A number of Japanese were killed and wounded.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 1130 of November 10, 1931,  
from the Embassy at Rome.

CORRIERE DELLA SERA, Milan.  
November 8, 1931.

Communique on Nonni River  
bridge incident issued by  
the Japanese Embassy in Rome.

**La versione ufficiale nipponica  
in un comunicato dell'Ambasciata**

Roma, 7 novembre, notte.

Sulle origini e le fasi del grave conflitto sul fiume Nonni, l'Ambasciata del Giappone a Roma fornisce queste notizie:

« Il 17 ottobre u. s., i tre ponti che attraversano il fiume Nonni furono distrutti dai Cinesi. La ferrovia Ang-ang-ki-Tao-nan è stata costruita con capitale della Compagnia giapponese della ferrovia sud-manciuriana, ed è amministrata dalla direzione cinese della ferrovia di Tao-nan. E' attualmente la stagione dell'esportazione dell'immensa quantità di prodotti agricoli della zona, in special modo della soja. L'interruzione delle comunicazioni che si verificò a causa della distruzione dei ponti, rese assolutamente impossibili i trasporti dei prodotti agricoli di tutta la zona settentrionale del fiume e minacciò un danno gravissimo non solo a tutta la popolazione rimasta colpita dall'impossibilità di esportare i prodotti, ma anche alla ferrovia Ang-ang-ki-Tao-nan. Per questa ragione, il 29 u. s., il console giapponese a Tsi-tsi-har fece passi presso il gen. Mah, spiegandogli l'assoluta necessità della riparazione immediata dei ponti. Il gen. Mah dichiarò di riconoscere tale necessità, ma temporeggiò anziché dare una risposta definitiva.

« Intanto, data la gravità dei danni che le suindicate ferrovie subiscono ogni giorno, e data l'imminenza della stagione invernale in cui il fiume rimane chiuso al traffico perché gela, la direzione cinese delle ferrovie Tao-nan-Ang-ang-ki decise d'iniziare i lavori di ricostruzione dei ponti per mezzo di tecnici e di operai giapponesi. Il gen. Mah accettò di far ritirare le truppe cinesi insieme con quelle del suo avversario Ciang-Hai-Peng alla distanza di 10 chilometri dal fiume durante i lavori di riparazione. Per impedire assalti da parte dei banditi cinesi, fu deciso d'inviare 500 soldati giapponesi da Tao-nan.

« Il 4 novembre il console giapponese a Tsi-tsi-har, signor Shimizu, si recò sul posto dietro preghiera del Governo del Hei-lung-kiang, per mettersi d'accordo intorno allo sgombero. Egli ebbe un colloquio in proposito col rappresentante del Governo della provincia stessa, che era il capo di Stato maggiore delle truppe cinesi. Era presente anche il maggiore Hayashi, delle truppe giapponesi di Kwan-tung (Manciuria meridionale). Il rappresentante del Governo della provincia di Hei-lung-kiang dichiarò che il Governo non aveva nessuna intenzione di fare opposizione alle truppe giapponesi, e che avrebbe ordinato immediatamente lo sgombero delle truppe cinesi.

« Dopo il colloquio le truppe giapponesi iniziarono l'avanzata con la bandiera nazionale in testa per raggiungere il posto di riparazione dei ponti. E per la sorveglianza della zona fu inviato un distaccamento a Tah-sing, località che si trova a una distanza minore di 10 chilometri dal ponte, e quindi in un posto che le truppe cinesi avrebbero dovuto sgomberare. Invece non solo il posto non era stato sgomberato, ma alle ore 14, appena scorto il distaccamento dei soldati giapponesi, le truppe cinesi cominciarono un attacco talmente accanito con fanteria e artiglieria, che i Giapponesi furono costretti a ritirarsi in attesa dell'arrivo dei rinforzi. Sino alla notte inoltrata del 4 novembre, le truppe cinesi non si ritirarono a nord del fiume nella zona pattuita di 10 chilometri, ma continuarono ancora ad attaccare le truppe giapponesi che ebbero 15 morti. Data questa situazione, il comando militare di Kwan-tung fu costretto a decidere l'invio di rinforzi sul posto. E all'alba del 5 corrente, le truppe giapponesi occuparono un posto strategico a est di Tah-sing. I morti e i feriti da parte giapponese sono numerosi ».

Enclosure No. 3 to Despatch No. 1130 of November 10, 1931,  
from the Embassy at Rome.

(Translation - MESSAGGERO,  
Rome, November 11, 1931.)

Communique on Tientsin situation issued  
by the Japanese Embassy in Rome on  
November 10, 1931.

The Command of the Japanese garrison troops at  
Tientsin communicates the following to the Japanese  
Embassy in Rome:

At 10 p.m. on November 8th a conflict broke out  
in the Chinese quarters of the city and great confusion  
reigns at present in all the streets of these quarters.  
So far entire calm reigns in the Japanese concession.  
The Command considers the agitation merely as one of  
the usual conflicts among Chinese political factions,  
and it is therefore maintaining an attitude of strict  
neutrality, refraining from any act of intervention.

However, should there be any attempt whatsoever  
to offend the honor of the Japanese Empire or its  
army or any menace to the lives and property of the  
Japanese residents, the Command would be constrained  
to act energetically in defense of the honor of the  
fatherland and would uncompromisingly oppose any mass  
or any troops of any party.

The anti-Japanese organization has recently  
circulated among the people certain alarmist rumors  
such as: Japan is planning the independence of  
Manchuria, offering the throne at Mukden to the  
ex-emperor Suen Tung; Japan has chosen Tientsin as  
the new base of activity, uniting the pro-Japanese  
Chinese and bandits to maneuver a coup-de-main in  
order to occupy the city...etc. These rumors are  
circulating so insistently that even foreign residents

in

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

China have been deeply impressed thereby.

The Command therefore judges it advisable to  
declare now that the Tientsin conflict is in no  
way connected with the Japanese garrison troops.

160

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 4 to Despatch No. 1130 of November 10, 1931,  
from the Embassy at Rome.

MESSAGGERO, Rome,  
November 11, 1931.

Communique on Tientsin Situation issued  
by the Japanese Embassy in Rome,  
November 10, 1931.

### **I disordini a Tien-Tsin**

In un comunicato dell'Ambasciatore giapponese

Il Comando delle truppe giapponesi di presidio a Tien Tsin comunica all'Ambasciata giapponese a Roma quanto segue:

« L'8 novembre alle ore 22, è scoppiata una sommossa nei quartieri cinesi della città e tutte le vie di quei quartieri si trovano attualmente in grande confusione. Fino a quest'ora non vi è nulla da temere nella concessione giapponese dove regna una calma perfetta. Questo Comando considera l'agitazione come uno dei soliti conflitti politici cinesi che erano avvenuti e avvengono tuttora fra le varie correnti politiche. E quindi mantiene l'atteggiamento di rigorosa neutralità, astenendosi da ogni azione di intervento.

Tuttavia, se si verificasse qualsiasi tentativo di offendere l'onore dell'Impero Nipponico o del suo Esercito oppure di minacciare la vita e i beni dei giapponesi, questo Comando sarebbe costretto ad agire energicamente a difesa dell'onore della Patria, affrontando con intransigenza qualunque massa o truppa di qualsiasi partito.

Recentemente l'organizzazione anti-

nipponica ha fatto circolare fra il popolo alcune dicerie allarmistiche, come: il Giappone progetterebbe l'indipendenza della Manciuria e condurrebbe via da Tien Tsin l'Imperatore Suen-Tung dell'ex impero cinese per farlo salire sul treno a Mukden; il Giappone avrebbe scelto Tien Tsin come la nuova base d'azione dove, riunendo i cinesi e i banditi nipponici, farebbe un colpo di mano per occupare militarmente tutta la città... ecc. Queste voci circolavano con tale insistenza che perfino gli stranieri residenti in Cina ne erano rimasti profondamente impressionati. Questo Comando ritiene, perciò, assai opportuno dichiarare sin d'ora che l'attuale sommossa di Tien Tsin non ha nulla a che fare con le truppe giapponesi di presidio ».

IL CORRIERE DELLA SERA. Milan.  
October 30, 1931. Page 1.

Despatch No. 1130

## Il conflitto cino-giapponese

E' difficile persuadersi che l'azione dei Giapponesi in Cina non abbia avuto per fine, almeno inizialmente, un'occupazione territoriale; perchè è difficile ammettere che la protezione dei sudditi e degli interessi giapponesi in Manciuria potesse richiedere gli inopinati atti di guerra compiuti in quelle provincie dalle truppe giapponesi. Inopinati, diciamo, riferendoci al loro improvviso manifestarsi, mentre tali non potrebbero dirsi se messi in relazione coi preparativi dai quali furono preceduti. Citazioni tolte da giornali giapponesi apparsi prima degli avvenimenti manciuriani, e riportate da giornali europei, possono provare quanto fosse diffuso negli ambienti militari giapponesi il sentimento di una guerra prossima con la Cina. E del resto è notorio, e si può anche essere disposti a giustificarlo, che tutta la politica del Giappone nel Pacifico mira ad allargare i confini dell'Impero in Cina. Politica persistente, fatta anzi più penetrante e più tenace dai continui ostacoli che l'hanno attraversata.

Avversato dalle maggiori Potenze europee nel 1895, dopo la guerra vittoriosa contro la Cina che si chiuse col Trattato di Shimonoseki, il Giappone vide allora ridotti i frutti della sua vittoria al solo possesso riconosciuto di Formosa. Umiliato, non rinunziò a vendicarsi; e, dopo un raccoglimento e una preparazione durati due lustri, poté sconfiggere la Russia, impossessarsi delle sue concessioni a Porto-Arthur nel Liao-tung nella Manciuria meridionale, ed occupare la Corea. In seguito, scoppiata la rivoluzione a Nanchino nel 1911 e dichiarata decaduta la dinastia mancese, la diplomazia di Tokio perseguiva il suo piano destreggiandosi fra i maggiori esponenti del nuovo regime ed ottenendone privilegi in cambio degli aiuti loro forniti. La guerra in Europa le offrì inaspettatamente nuovi motivi d'intervento armato in Cina. In forza dell'alleanza con l'Inghilterra, che obbligava il Giappone ad assicurare la difesa marittima delle Indie e degli interessi inglesi nel Pacifico, il Governo giapponese si schierò nell'agosto 1914 dalla parte degli Alleati e dichiarò guerra alla Germania, con l'evidente proposito di trarne profitto realizzando compensi in Cina. Difatti, fra le prime operazioni delle truppe nipponiche, vi fu l'occupazione dello Scian-tung, che quasi poteva dirsi allora sotto il protettorato tedesco. Sopraggiunta poi la rivoluzione russa, divisioni giapponesi entravano nei territori che

al commercio del Giappone. Il governo cinese si rifiuta recisamente di aderire a queste richieste, e trattative erano appunto in corso alla vigilia degli ultimi avvenimenti di Manciuria. Nè sono queste tutte le cause di dissidi. Le industrie giapponesi ebbero uno sviluppo enorme durante la guerra, sia perchè il Giappone fu allora uno dei maggiori rifornitori di materie prime agli Alleati, sia perchè — venuto meno ogni altro concorrente nei mercati di Oriente — il Giappone ebbe modo di aumentare le sue esportazioni

e fu pertanto portato ad accrescere la sua attrezzatura economica. Ne è conseguito, con l'avvento della pace, più forte il bisogno del Giappone di espandersi e di affermarsi in Cina. Ciò non solo per l'incessante aumento della popolazione, le limitazioni imposte all'emigrazione, e — anche — l'avversione del Giapponese ad emigrare troppo lontano dal paese d'origine; ma ancora per la necessità in cui il Giappone è venuto a trovarsi di estrarre dalla Cina le materie prime occorrenti alle più estese sue industrie e di collocarvi il raggiunto più forte gettito di prodotti, non più smaltibile nei territori che lo assorbivano durante la guerra. D'altra parte il Giappone, con la creazione delle sue aziende in Cina, ha contribuito a valorizzarne le risorse, risultato ottenuto con la immobilizzazione di ingenti capitali, con l'impiego di ottimi suoi professionisti tecnici e del meglio delle sue maestranze. Tutto questo, mentre ha giovato alla Cina, facendole realizzare progressi che da sola sarebbe stata incapace di raggiungere, conferisce al Giappone titoli incontestabili di cointeressenza nelle sorti della nuova Repubblica, cointeressenza che è massima in Manciuria, ed in alcune zone così diffusa e predominante da presentare presso che una differenza solo formale dall'esercizio dell'effettiva amministrazione e dell'effettivo governo. Ma di fronte a questa posizione tanto fatigosamente costituitasi dal Giappone, sta ora il giovane nazionalismo cinese, insofferente di soggezioni, animato dal proposito di realizzare la unificazione di tutta la Cina e la sua assoluta indipendenza, nazionalismo profondamente xenofobo, e che sebbene non sia ancora molto forte di numero e di mezzi, lo è di volontà e di fede ed è in via di continuo incremento.

Questi gravi antagonismi possono spiegare quanto sia di difficile soluzione la questione cino-giapponese e quale importanza essa abbia per i due Paesi. Se da un punto di vista teorico i Cinesi hanno diritto di essere padroni in casa propria, non è men vero che il Giappone ha acquistato in Cina, e principalmente nella Manciuria, titoli di proprietà — diciamo pure la parola — che sarebbe iniquo disconoscergli; iniquo non soltanto, ma anche pericoloso, per le insopprimibili esigenze demografiche ed economiche dalle quali il Giappone è attanagliato, e che non si possono alla leggera lasciare insoddisfatte. Bisogna poi tener conto della presenza delle altre Potenze in Cina, gelose delle proprie posizioni e preoccupate di non lasciare modificare a loro danno la situazione nel Pacifico: il che crea compli-

zioni di altro ordine ma non me-



CORRIERE DELLA SERA, Milan.  
November 8, 1931. page 1.

Despatch No. 1130

## LE OSTILITA' IN MANCIURIA

# La battaglia al fiume Nonni è per ora finita Tokio dà ordine di non inseguire i Cinesi

## Complicazioni

Non ci voleva molto a prevedere che la situazione in Manciuria sarebbe peggiorata nonostante l'intervento volontoso ma platonico della Società delle Nazioni e gli amichevoli avvertimenti di alcune grandi Potenze ai due Governi interessati. Si tratta questa volta di una guerra in atto, non di rilevanti proporzioni finora, ma reale: qualcosa di più comunque di una guerriglia, come taluno impropriamente ha creduto di definirla, perché non già forze irregolari sono in presenza, bensì truppe regolari condotte da capi ufficialmente riconosciuti e in diretto quotidiano contatto con i loro diretti superiori politici. Se invece d'avvenire a molte migliaia di chilometri di distanza da noi, simili eventi si svolgessero in una parte del mondo più vicina, essi sarebbero giudicati con ben altro allarme e con ben diversa passione. Ma anche così essi restano eminentemente pericolosi, per sé stessi, per le complicazioni militari che possono derivarne e infine perché rimettono sul tappeto in modo insolitamente brusco e spiacevole la questione della validità dell'attiva del Patto Kellogg e delle altre minori e maggiori convenzioni diplomatiche dirette a rendere impossibile un conflitto armato fra due Stati.

Non spetta a noi entrare nel merito della vertenza cino-giapponese; ma ci è concesso di deplorarla, perché in questo momento di generale disagio non si sentiva il bisogno di una così violenta esplosione di antiche rivalità in Estremo Oriente. E' un esempio che, come tutti i cattivi esempi, può essere seguito altrove, attirando specialmente coloro che da quanto succede in Manciuria deducano la poca efficacia dei patti internazionali e la grande eloquenza, invece, del fatto compiuto.

Pur assumendo un atteggiamento riservato, l'opinione pubblica italiana non può non riconoscere che il Giappone nel difendere energicamente i propri interessi in Manciuria esercita un suo diritto incontestabile. E' spiacevole tuttavia che non sia stato possibile, e forse non sia stato neppure realmente cercato, di assicurare in tempo quegli interessi senza ricorrere alla forza delle armi.

Non si tratta qui di svolgere un'azione di prestigio: nessuno dubita che il Giappone, in virtù della sua possente organizzazione militare, sia in grado di schiacciare o eliminare le resistenze cinesi nella grande provincia di terraferma. Bisogna piuttosto domandarsi se l'uso della forza in questo caso non tenda a suscitare nuovi e più ardenti problemi di natura internazionale, che in questo momento si sarebbero lasciati volentieri dormire. Giudicando solo i fatti, bisogna riconoscere che il Giappone segue una linea logica, e che, sforzandosi di ristabilire la tranquillità in Manciuria *manu militari*, esso rende anche un servizio alla causa dell'ordine mondiale. Ma, riconducendo la questione ai principi, è egualmente certo che il farsi ragione coi propri mezzi non si accorda con la tendenza generale, oggi prevalente fra gli Stati, di dare a questi contrasti una forma e una procedura giuridica. Ha dunque torto il Giappone d'agire come agisce?

La questione posta così sarebbe insolubile. Bisogna, per farsene un concetto esatto, salire più in alto. Le convenzioni internazionali sono una cosa seria e devono diventarle sempre più; e si deve sperare che arrivi un giorno, probabilmente lontano, in cui ogni controversia fra

personalità. Non soltanto in Estremo Oriente la politica internazionale si trova dinanzi a simili problemi che non si potranno mai aggiustare con palliativi o rimandare di generazione in generazione fino all'infinito. Speriamo che l'avvertimento clamoroso e preoccupante che giunge dalla lontana Manciuria sia interpretato nel senso più esatto, e che spinga i Governi europei a stabilire nuovi rapporti sopra una base di sempre maggiore giustizia: unica base veramente solida e definitiva. La coscienza di questa giustizia permetterebbe anche agli altri Governi di ammonire con maggiore autorità, a nome della comune civiltà, chi tentasse di turbare la pace, di cui il mondo ha bisogno. Allora e soltanto allora quella voce potrebbe far cadere di mano ai rissanti le armi già brandite, e magari, come nel caso presente, già anche troppo abbondantemente adoperate.

nella Manciuria, con un governatore militare che avrebbe l'appoggio delle forze di occupazione nipponiche in Manciuria.

Hanno causato apprensione le notizie inviate dal console giapponese ad Harbin, secondo le quali rinforzi cinesi si muovono dalla frontiera siberiana verso Ang-ang-ki, apparentemente allo scopo di lanciare un nuovo attacco contro i Giapponesi. Inoltre un telegramma da Mukden segnala che le ricognizioni aeree compiute dai Giapponesi sulle retrovie cinesi hanno rivelato forti concentramenti di truppe fra Ang-ang-ki e Tah-sing. Numerosi treni di munizioni si dirigono verso la zona delle operazioni dove i Cinesi si preparano a una lotta lunga e ben organizzata. Queste notizie, che per ora non sono confermate da altra fonte, lasciano l'impressione che il conflitto sia tutt'altro che in via di placarsi.

Si nutrono vive apprensioni riguardo alla sicurezza del console giapponese e di dieci sudditi giapponesi residenti a Tsi-tsi-har. Le comunicazioni con quella città sono interrotte, ciò che ha contribuito al diffondersi di voci sensazionali.

Quanto all'atteggiamento del Governo di Mosca i giornali riferiscono che il

CORRIERE DELLA SERA, Milan.  
November 8, 1931. page 1.

Despatch No. 1130

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Vi sono nella vita dei popoli e nei rapporti internazionali delle forze ideali e storiche imponenti, a cui invano talvolta si oppongono le formule della diplomazia. L'abilità di questa deve dunque consistere piuttosto nel creare le condizioni favorevoli per il prevalere dei nuovi concetti e dei nuovi accordi; e tali condizioni oggi si fondano sul riconoscimento del diritto dei popoli giovani e lavoratori a vivere ed espandersi fino alla piena affermazione della propria

personalità. Non soltanto in Estremo Oriente la politica internazionale si trova dinanzi a simili problemi che non si potranno mai aggiustare con palliativi o rimandare di generazione in generazione fino all'infinito. Speriamo che l'avvertimento clamoroso e preoccupante che giunge dalla lontana Manciuria sia interpretato nel senso più esatto, e che spinga i Governi europei a stabilire nuovi rapporti sopra una base di sempre maggiore giustizia: unica base veramente solida e definitiva. La coscienza di questa giustizia permetterebbe anche agli altri Governi di ammonire con maggiore autorità, a nome della comune civiltà, chi tentasse di turbare la pace, di cui il mondo ha bisogno. Allora e soltanto allora quella voce potrebbe far cadere di mano ai rissanti le armi già andate, e magari, come nel caso presente, già anche troppo abbandonate adoperate.

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October 30, 1931. Page 1.

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## Il conflitto cino-giapponese

E' difficile persuadersi che l'azione dei Giapponesi in Cina non abbia avuto per fine, almeno inizialmente, un'occupazione territoriale; perchè è difficile ammettere che la protezione dei sudditi e degli interessi giapponesi in Manciuria potesse richiedere gl'inopinati atti di guerra compiuti in quelle provincie dalle truppe giapponesi. Inopinati, diciamo, riferendoci al loro improvviso manifestarsi, mentre tali non potrebbero dirsi se messi in relazione coi preparativi dai quali furono preceduti. Citazioni tolte da giornali giapponesi apparsi prima degli avvenimenti manciuriani, e riportate da giornali europei, possono provare quanto fosse diffuso negli ambienti militari giapponesi il sentimento di una guerra prossima con la Cina. E del resto è notorio, e si può anche essere disposti a giustificarlo, che tutta la politica del Giappone nel Pacifico mira ad allargare i confini dell'Impero in Cina. Politica persistente, fatta anzi più penetrante e più tenace dai continui ostacoli che l'hanno attraversata.

Avversato dalle maggiori Potenze europee nel 1895, dopo la guerra vittoriosa contro la Cina che si chiuse col Trattato di Shimonoseki, il Giappone vide allora ridotti i frutti della sua vittoria al solo possesso riconosciuto di Formosa. Umiliato, non rinunziò a vendicarsi; e, dopo un raccoglimento e una preparazione durati due lustri, poté sconfiggere la Russia, impossessarsi delle sue concessioni a Porto-Arthur nel Liao-tung nella Manciuria meridionale, ed occupare la Corea. In seguito, scoppiata la rivoluzione a Nanchino nel 1911 e dichiarata decaduta la dinastia mancese, la diplomazia di Tokio perseguiva il suo piano destreggiandosi fra i maggiori esponenti del nuovo regime ed ottenendone privilegi in cambio degli aiuti loro forniti. La guerra in Europa le offrì inaspettatamente nuovi motivi d'intervento armato in Cina. In forza dell'alleanza con l'Inghilterra, che obbligava il Giappone ad assicurare la difesa marittima delle Indie e degli interessi inglesi nel Pacifico, il Governo giapponese si schierò nell'agosto 1914 dalla parte degli Alleati e dichiarò guerra alla Germania, con l'evidente proposito di trarne profitto realizzando compensi in Cina. Difatti, fra le prime operazioni delle truppe nipponiche, vi fu l'occupazione dello Scian-tung, che quasi poteva dirsi allora sotto il protettorato tedesco. Sopraggiunta poi la rivoluzione russa, divisioni giapponesi entrarono nei territori che erano nella sfera d'influenza moscovita, spingendosi fino a Vladivostok, che dovè poi essere sgombrata nel 1922. Venuta la pace, il Giappone vedeva coronati da pieno successo i suoi sforzi, perchè otteneva col Trattato di Versailles il riconoscimento nello Scian-tung di tutti i diritti e di tutte le concessioni già appartenenti alla Germania. Senonchè, a parte il diniego oppostogli dall'America e dall'Inghilterra all'emigrazione gialla nell'America e nell'Australia, nuove e maggiori delusioni lo attendevano ancora una volta, tre anni dopo, a Washington, dove nella Conferenza che ebbe luogo per il Pacifico, risolta dalla Cina la questione dello Scian-tung, i rappresentanti giapponesi, non più sostenuti dall'Inghilterra che non aveva voluto rinnovare l'alleanza, dovettero rinunziare all'espansione in quella provincia.

Questi fatti, più salienti fra i molti che potrebbero ancora ricordarsi, costituiscono circa mezzo secolo di ininterrotte lotte e di duri sacrifici sostenuti dal Giappone per la sua penetrazione in Cina, lotte e sacrifici quasi sempre frustrati nei loro risultati dall'intervento nemico di Potenze straniere.

E' da dopo la guerra mondiale che i rapporti fra la Cina e il Giappone sono andati diventando sempre più tesi. Ad inasprirli ha contribuito l'inframmettersi del Giappone nelle vicende della politica interna cinese. Durante le traversie della rivoluzione

fu pertanto portato ad accrescere la sua attrezzatura economica. Ne è conseguito, con l'avvento della pace, più forte il bisogno del Giappone di espandersi e di affermarsi in Cina. Ciò non solo per l'incessante aumento della popolazione, le limitazioni imposte all'emigrazione, e — anche — l'avversione del Giapponese ad emigrare troppo lontano dal paese d'origine; ma ancora per la necessità in cui il Giappone è venuto a trovarsi di estrarre dalla Cina le materie prime occorrenti alle più estese sue industrie e di collocarvi il raggiunto più forte gettito di prodotti, non più smaltibile nei territori che lo assorbivano durante la guerra. D'altra parte il Giappone, con la creazione delle sue aziende in Cina, ha contribuito a valorizzarne le risorse, risultato ottenuto con la immobilizzazione di ingenti capitali, con l'impiego di ottimi suoi professionisti tecnici e del meglio delle sue maestranze. Tutto questo, mentre ha giovato alla Cina, facendole realizzare progressi che da sola sarebbe stata incapace di raggiungere, conferisce al Giappone titoli incontestabili di cointeressenza nelle sorti della nuova Repubblica, cointeressenza che è massima in Manciuria, ed in alcune zone così diffusa e predominante da presentare presso che una differenza solo formale dall'esercizio dell'effettiva amministrazione e dell'effettivo governo. Ma di fronte a questa posizione tanto faticosamente costituitasi dal Giappone, sta ora il giovane nazionalismo cinese, insofferente di soggezioni, animato dal proposito di realizzare la unificazione di tutta la Cina e la sua assoluta indipendenza, nazionalismo profondamente xenofobo, e che sebbene non sia ancora molto forte di numero e di mezzi, lo è di volontà e di fede ed è in via di continuo incremento.

Questi gravi antagonismi possono spiegare quanto sia di difficile soluzione la questione cino-giapponese e quale importanza essa abbia per i due Paesi. Se da un punto di vista teorico i Cinesi hanno diritto di essere padroni in casa propria, non è men vero che il Giappone ha acquistato in Cina, e principalmente nella Manciuria, titoli di proprietà — diciamo pure la parola — che sarebbe iniquo disconoscergli; iniquo non soltanto, ma anche pericoloso, per le insopprimibili esigenze demografiche ed economiche dalle quali il Giappone è attanagliato, e che non si possono alla leggera lasciare insoddisfatte. Bisogna poi tener conto della presenza delle altre Potenze in Cina, gelose delle proprie posizioni e preoccupate di non lasciare modificare a loro danno la situazione nel Pacifico: il che crea complicazioni di altro ordine, ma non meno importanti delle precedenti.

L'appello fatto dalla Cina al Consiglio della Società delle Nazioni ha imposto a questo un compito quanto mai arduo, ma sommamente benefico per il mantenimento della pace in Cina.

Oggi non si può più mettere in dubbio che senza l'intervento della Lega gli avvenimenti cinesi avrebbero assunto uno sviluppo ben più grave di quello in cui è stato possibile contenerli. La resistenza del Giappone ha dimostrato come esso non sia più disposto a subire la volontà delle altre Potenze senza difendere strenuamente i propri interessi. E il nazionalismo cinese, d'altra parte, ha sostenuto una battaglia diplomatica dalla quale esce sicuramente rafforzato. Nella tempesta che stava per scatenarsi, Ginevra ha potuto darci una tregua, il massimo che potesse aspettarsene e che ha felicemente realizzato. Speriamo che sia tregua lunga; giacchè, quanto all'avvenire in Oriente, troppe incognite vi sono, che rendono difficili le previsioni.

Alberto De Marinis

IL CORRIERE DELLA SERA. Milan.  
October 30, 1931. Page 1.

Despatch No. 1130

# Il conflitto cino-giapponese

E' difficile persuadersi che l'azione cinese nella sfera d'influenza moscovita, spingendosi fino a Vladivostok, che dovè poi essere sgombrata nel 1922. Venuta la pace, il Giappone vedeva coronati da pieno successo i suoi sforzi, perchè otteneva col Trattato di Versailles il riconoscimento nello Scian-tung di tutti i diritti e di tutte le concessioni già appartenenti alla Germania. Senonchè, a parte il diniego oppostogli dall'America e dall'Inghilterra all'emigrazione gialla nell'America e nell'Australia, nuove e maggiori delusioni lo attendevano ancora una volta, tre anni dopo, a Washington, dove nella Conferenza che ebbe luogo per il Pacifico, risolveva dalla Cina la questione dello Scian-tung, i rappresentanti giapponesi, non più sostenuti dall'Inghilterra che non aveva voluto rinnovare l'alleanza, dovettero rinunciare all'espansione in quella provincia.

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E' da dopo la guerra mondiale che i rapporti fra la Cina e il Giappone sono andati diventando sempre più tesi. Ad inasprirli ha contribuito l'inframmettersi del Giappone nelle vicende della politica interna cinese. Durante le traversie della rivoluzione, che si può dire non sia ancora completamente sedata in Cina, il Giappone ha saputo trarre abilmente partito dalle difficoltà in cui si è trovato il Governo centrale per prendere maggiore stabilità in Manciuria. Ciò ha provocato il risentimento del partito nazionale, il *Kuomintang*, e ha dato luogo alle note, violente, ripetute manifestazioni antigiapponesi. Nuove ragioni di contrasto sono poi sorte dalla scadenza dei Trattati riguardanti la extraterritorialità accordata ai sudditi giapponesi. Quelli che seguono le cose di Oriente sanno benissimo che l'abolizione dell'extraterritorialità di cui godono gli stranieri in Cina è stata sempre il primo numero del programma della giovane Cina. Il Governo di Nanchino ha dichiarato più volte di non volere riconoscere i Trattati di extraterritorialità che furono imposti ai passati regimi. Tanto più esso sostiene questo suo punto di vista verso il Giappone, col quale tali Trattati sono scaduti da due anni. Ma il Giappone intende che sia mantenuta la giurisdizione giapponese per i suoi cittadini in Manciuria e nella Mongolia; richiede che in tutti i porti sottoposti a Trattati siano costituiti tribunali speciali con la presenza di un giudice giapponese per giudicare degli affari concernenti Giapponesi, ed esige che tutta la Cina sia aperta al commercio del Giappone. Il Governo cinese si rifiuta recisamente di aderire a queste richieste, e trattative erano appunto in corso alla vigilia degli ultimi avvenimenti di Manciuria. Nè sono queste tutte le cause di dissidi. Le industrie giapponesi ebbero uno sviluppo enorme durante la guerra, sia perchè il Giappone fu allora uno dei maggiori rifornitori di materie prime agli Alleati, sia perchè — venuto meno ogni altro concorrente nei mercati di Oriente — il Giappone ebbe modo di aumentare le sue esportazioni

e fu pertanto portato ad accrescere la sua attrezzatura economica. Ne è conseguito, con l'avvento della pace, più forte il bisogno del Giappone di espandersi e di affermarsi in Cina. Ciò non solo per l'incessante aumento dei suoi abitanti, ma anche per le sue risorse materiali, che sono più importanti delle precedenti.

L'appello fatto dalla Cina al Consiglio della Società delle Nazioni ha imposto a questo un compito quanto mai arduo, ma sommamente benefico per il mantenimento della pace in Cina.

Oggi non si può più mettere in dubbio che senza l'intervento della Lega gli avvenimenti cinesi avrebbero assunto uno sviluppo ben più grave di quello in cui è stato possibile contenerli. La resistenza del Giappone ha dimostrato come esso non sia più disposto a subire la volontà delle altre Potenze senza difendere strenuamente i propri interessi. E il nazionalismo cinese, d'altra parte, ha sostenuto una battaglia diplomatica dalla quale esce sicuramente rafforzato. Nella tempesta che stava per scatenarsi, Ginevra ha potuto darci una tregua, il massimo che potesse aspettarsene e che ha felicemente realizzato. Speriamo che sia tregua lunga; giacchè, quanto all'avvenire in Oriente, troppe incognite vi sono, che rendono difficili le previsioni.

## Alberto De Marinis

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le Puglie, dove si erano recati per co-  
trattare l'acquisto di alcune navi.

CORRIERE DELLA SERA, Milan.  
November 8, 1931. page 1.

Despatch No. 1130

## LE OSTILITA' IN MANCIURIA

# La battaglia al fiume Nonni è per ora finita Tokio dà ordine di non inseguire i Cinesi

### Complicazioni

Non ci voleva molto a prevedere che la situazione in Manciuria sarebbe peggiorata nonostante l'intervento volontoso ma platonico della Società delle Nazioni e gli amichevoli avvertimenti di alcune grandi Potenze ai due Governi interessati. Si tratta questa volta di una guerra in atto, non di rilevanti proporzioni finora, ma reale: qualcosa di più comunque di una guerriglia, come taluno impropriamente ha creduto di definirla, perché non già forze irregolari sono in presenza, bensì truppe regolari condotte da capi ufficialmente riconosciuti e in diretto quotidiano contatto con i loro diretti superiori politici. Se invece d'avvenire a molte migliaia di chilometri di distanza da noi, simili eventi si svolgessero in una parte del mondo più vicina, essi sarebbero giudicati con ben altro allarme e con ben diversa passione. Ma anche così essi restano eminentemente pericolosi, per sé stessi, per le complicazioni militari che possono derivarne e infine perché rimettono sul tappeto in modo insolitamente brusco e spiacevole la questione della validità dell'attiva del Patto Kellogg e delle altre minori e maggiori convenzioni diplomatiche dirette a rendere impossibile un conflitto armato fra due Stati.

Non spetta a noi entrare nel merito della vertenza cino-giapponese; ma ci è concesso di deplorarla, perché in questo momento di generale disagio non si sentiva il bisogno di una così violenta esplosione di antiche rivalità in Estremo Oriente. E' un esempio che, come tutti i cattivi esempi, può essere seguito altrove, attirando specialmente coloro che da quanto succede in Manciuria deducano la poca efficacia dei patti internazionali e la grande eloquenza, invece, del fatto compiuto.

Pur assumendo un atteggiamento riservato, l'opinione pubblica italiana non può non riconoscere che il Giappone nel difendere energicamente i propri interessi in Manciuria esercita un suo diritto incontestabile. E' spiacevole tuttavia che non sia stato possibile, e forse non sia stato neppure realmente cercato, di assicurare in tempo quegli interessi senza ricorrere alla forza delle armi.

Non si tratta qui di svolgere un'azione di prestigio: nessuno dubita che il Giappone, in virtù della sua possente organizzazione militare, sia in grado di schiacciare o eliminare le resistenze cinesi nella grande provincia di terraferma. Bisogna piuttosto domandarsi se l'uso della forza in questo caso non tenda a suscitare nuovi e più ardenti problemi di natura internazionale, che in questo momento si sarebbero lasciati volontieri dormire. Giudicando solo i fatti, bisogna riconoscere che il Giappone segue una linea logica, e che, sforzandosi di ristabilire la tranquillità in Manciuria *manu militari*, esso rende anche un servizio alla causa dell'ordine mondiale. Ma, riconducendo la questione ai principi, è egualmente certo che il farsi ragione coi propri mezzi non si accorda con la tendenza generale, oggi prevalente fra gli Stati, di dare a questi contrasti una forma e una procedura giuridica. Ha dunque torto il Giappone d'agire come agisce?

La questione posta così sarebbe insolubile. Bisogna, per farsene un concetto esatto, salire più in alto. Le convenzioni internazionali sono una cosa seria e devono diventarlo sempre più; e si deve sperare che arrivi un giorno, probabilmente lon-

personalità. Non soltanto in Estremo Oriente la politica internazionale si trova dinanzi a simili problemi che non si potranno mai aggiustare con palliativi o rimandare di generazione in generazione fino all'infinito. Speriamo che l'avvertimento clamoroso e preoccupante che giunge dalla lontana Manciuria sia interpretato nel senso più esatto, e che spinga i Governi europei a stabilire nuovi rapporti sopra una base di sempre maggiore giustizia: unica base veramente solida e definitiva. La coscienza di questa giustizia permetterebbe anche agli altri Governi di ammonire con maggiore autorità, a nome della comune civiltà, chi tentasse di turbare la pace, di cui il mondo ha bisogno. Allora e soltanto allora quella voce potrebbe far cadere di mano ai rissanti le armi già brandite, e magari, come nel caso presente, già anche troppo abbondantemente adoperate.

nella Manciuria, con un governatore militare che avrebbe l'appoggio delle forze di occupazione nipponiche in Manciuria.

Hanno causato apprensione le notizie inviate dal console giapponese ad Harbin, secondo le quali rinforzi cinesi si muovono dalla frontiera siberiana verso Ang-ang-ki, apparentemente allo scopo di lanciare un nuovo attacco contro i Giapponesi. Inoltre un telegramma da Mukden segnala che le ricognizioni aeree compiute dai Giapponesi sulle retrovie cinesi hanno rivelato forti concentramenti di truppe fra Ang-ang-ki e Tah-sing. Numerosi treni di munizioni si dirigono verso la zona delle operazioni dove i Cinesi si preparano a una lotta lunga e ben organizzata. Queste notizie, che per ora non sono confermate da altra fonte, lasciano l'impressione che il conflitto sia tutt'altro che in via di placarsi.

Si nutrono vive apprensioni riguardo alla sicurezza del console giapponese e di dieci sudditi giapponesi residenti a Tsi-tsi-har. Le comunicazioni con quella città sono interrotte, ciò che ha contribuito al diffondersi di voci sensazionali.

Quanto all'atteggiamento del Governo di Mosca i giornali riferiscono che il

CORRIERE DELLA SERA, Milan.  
November 8, 1931. page 1.

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Vi sono nella vita dei popoli e nei rapporti internazionali delle forze ideali e storiche imponenti, a cui invano talvolta si oppongono le formule della diplomazia. L'abilità di questa deve dunque consistere piuttosto nel creare le condizioni favorevoli per il prevalere dei nuovi concetti e dei nuovi accordi; e tali condizioni oggi si fondano sul riconoscimento del diritto dei popoli giovani e lavoratori a vivere ed espandersi fino alla piena affermazione della propria

personalità. Non soltanto in Estremo Oriente la politica internazionale si trova dinanzi a simili problemi che non si potranno mai aggiustare con palliativi o rimandare di generazione in generazione fino all'infinito. Speriamo che l'avvertimento clamoroso e preoccupante che giunge dalla lontana Manciuria sia interpretato nel senso più esatto, e che spinga i Governi europei a stabilire nuovi rapporti sopra una base di sempre maggiore giustizia: unica base veramente solida e definitiva. La coscienza di questa giustizia permetterebbe anche agli altri Governi di ammonire con maggiore autorità, a nome della comune civiltà, chi tentasse di turbare la pace, di cui il mondo ha bisogno. Allora e soltanto allora quella voce potrebbe far cadere di mano ai rissanti le armi già brandite, e magari, come nel caso presente, già anche troppo abbondantemente adoperate.

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Despatch No. 1130

## Le ragioni di un conflitto

Mai la Società delle Nazioni si è trovata di fronte ad una matassa così difficile a dipanare, come quella del conflitto fra Cina e Giappone. Si è visto all'atto pratico come sia complicato mettere in moto la macchina societaria e soprattutto condurla ad un risultato concreto ed immediato. Problema politico, questo, che ha più vasta portata e che si impone anche per il piano Kellogg; ugualmente imperniato sulla buona fede internazionale all'infuori di ogni sanzione di forza.

Quello che ha reso più difficile nel caso speciale il regolamento del conflitto si è che non si tratta di una questione di ordine giuridico o di una divergenza di natura esclusivamente politica, ma di una situazione economica e sociale che ha le sue profonde radici nella necessità di espansione di un popolo di 64 milioni di abitanti confinato in un territorio insulare relativamente povero. Fu questa necessità che già spinse il Giappone a conflitti più o meno cruenti con i Paesi vicini, cioè con la Russia e con la Cina. Con la prima, la guerra del 1904-5 pose fine ad una pressione pericolosa dei Russi che minacciavano di invadere tutto l'Estremo Oriente, con la seconda esiste uno stato più o meno aperto di lotta, cui il trattato di Shimonosaki non ha certo nel 1895, dopo la guerra cino-giapponese, posto fine.

E' inutile nascondere che ai confini dell'Estremo Oriente esiste dunque un focolare d'incendio che rimarrà vivo, sino a che il Giappone non abbia trovato un assetto conforme alle sue necessità di espansione economica, ed alle esigenze che derivano dalla sua pressione demografica.

Appunto per questo la Società delle Nazioni nonostante ogni suo buon volere non potrà regolare definitivamente un contrasto che deriva da un movimento incomprensibile di un popolo troppo stretto nella sua terra.

Infatti la spinta dell'Impero giapponese verso una penetrazione sempre maggiore in Manciuria fa parte di un programma metodico in attuazione da parecchie decine di anni. Al bisogno giapponese di nuovi territori alla sua popolazione, di nuovi sbocchi alla sua produzione, l'Impero Cinese offre il campo più adatto sia per la vicinanza sua al Giappone, sia per la ricchezza di alcune sue regioni, sia per lo stato di debolezza in cui si trova da decenni il suo Governo.

Già dopo la guerra del 1894-95 terminata con decisive vittorie giapponesi, l'Impero del Sol Levante credeva di essere riuscito a metter piede sul continente asiatico facendosi cedere in affitto (formula allora di moda) Port Arthur e la penisola di Liao-tung. Ma le Potenze europee interessate nell'Estremo Oriente costrinsero il Giappone a rinunciare al Liao-tung. La partita era rimessa ma non finita: la seconda mossa giapponese sembrò cambiare obiettivo e invece che contro la Cina fu a tutta prima diretta contro la Russia. Ma le vittorie giapponesi sull'Impero Russo furono pagate sopra tutto dall'Impero Cinese: la Russia fu bensì costretta a cedere una parte dell'isola di Sakhaline, ma ciò che interessò di più il Giappone fu la investitura, ottenuta col trattato di Portsmouth, in tutti i diritti e privilegi che la Russia aveva in Manciuria ed in Mongolia.

Fondandosi su questa base di diritto riconosciuta in seguito anche dagli Stati Uniti, il Giappone intensificò la sua penetrazione sul continente asiatico. Nel 1911 incominciava ad annettersi la Corea, territorio povero, non adatto ad essere colonizzato, ma che costituiva la testa di ponte verso l'Asia mancese e mongolica ed anche un punto sicuro di appoggio contro ogni possibilità di ritorno offensivo dei Russi. Era una misura di precauzione. Invero il Giappone aveva concluso coi Russi un trattato di assicurazione, che serve a spiegare anche l'attuale atteggiamento dei Soviets. Di fatti dal 1910 esiste fra Giappone e Russia un accordo, dapprima segreto ma rinnovato poi nel 1925 in occasione del

mondiale e con cui alcune delle parti dell'Impero Cinese diventavano vassalle del Giappone sia dal punto di vista politico che da quello economico.

Così si spiega come gli sforzi del Kuo-min-tang, cioè del partito e del governo nazionalista cinese, tendenti a far abolire i trattati *inequali* e per ciò *illegali*, abbiano trovato una certa benevola accoglienza presso le Potenze che hanno interessi nell'Estremo Oriente e che anche a costo di sacrifici loro non ritengono di dover lasciare mano libera ai Giapponesi. E così si spiega, meglio che col richiamo alle disposizioni del *Covenant* e del Patto Kellogg, tutto l'interessamento che la Società delle Nazioni porta al conflitto Cino-Giapponese, specialmente nel senso di porre fine al più presto all'occupazione militare della Manciuria che può essere prodromo di una annessione definitiva.

Ma se da un lato si comprende la

pressione internazionale sul Giappone, si comprende pure dall'altro come questo sia poco disposto ad aderirvi. La morte del capitano Nakamura, il boicottaggio delle merci giapponesi, gli assalti dei banditi cinesi costituiscono solo l'occasione dell'azione energica spiegata dal Giappone. In realtà questo considera come questione vitale per il suo avvenire il poter proseguire la sua opera di penetrazione e di sviluppo nel territorio mancese per cui ha già fatto tanti sacrifici di vite e di denaro, e per cui ha una base nei trattati vigenti.

Ed è perciò che la resistenza alle domande della Società delle Nazioni, se ha dato luogo alla promessa giapponese di non mirare ad occupazioni territoriali, ha posto in primo piano il riconoscimento e la garanzia della situazione privilegiata che il Giappone possiede in Manciuria e a cui non vuole in alcun modo rinunciare.

Vi è da chiedere se nell'interesse

della civiltà il Giappone meriti di essere ostacolato nella sua azione economica mancese. In sostanza esso fa un'opera di valorizzazione di territori nuovi e apre nuovi sbocchi al commercio internazionale, che di nuovi sbocchi ha più che mai necessità. Le altre Potenze possono chiedere garanzie perché non venga pregiudicata la loro posizione futura sul mercato mancese, ma non avrebbero in definitiva alcun vantaggio nel ritorno della Manciuria a quello stato di semi-anarchia politica, economica e militare che è oggi la caratteristica dell'Impero Cinese.

Non è perciò un gran male nel mondo se il Giappone insiste nella sua tesi, e se una volta di più verrà a riconoscersi che è difficile, se non impossibile, comprimere la necessità di espansione di un popolo che sente giovane e forte e a cui la sua terra non offre sufficienti risorse vitali.

GINO OLIVETTI.

LA STAMPA, Turin.  
November 7, 1931 page 1.

Despatch No. 1130

## Le ragioni di un conflitto

Mai la Società delle Nazioni si è trovata di fronte ad una matassa così difficile a dipanare, come quella del conflitto fra Cina e Giappone. Si è visto all'atto pratico come sia complicato mettere in moto la macchina societaria e soprattutto condurla ad un risultato concreto ed immediato. Problema politico, questo, che ha più vasta portata e che si impone anche per il piano Kellogg; ugualmente imperniato sulla buona fede internazionale all'infuori di ogni sanzione di forza.

Quello che ha reso più difficile nel caso speciale il regolamento del conflitto si è che non si tratta di una questione di ordine giuridico o di una divergenza di natura esclusivamente politica, ma di una situazione economica e sociale che ha le sue profonde radici nella necessità di espansione di un popolo di 64 milioni di abitanti confinato in un territorio insulare relativamente povero. Fu questa necessità che già spinse il Giappone a conflitti più o meno cruenti con i Paesi vicini, cioè con la Russia e con la Cina. Con la prima, la guerra del 1904-5 pose fine ad una pressione pericolosa dei Russi che minacciavano di invadere tutto l'Estremo Oriente, con la seconda esiste uno stato più o meno aperto di lotta, cui il trattato di Shimonosaki non ha certo nel 1895, dopo la guerra cino-giapponese, posto fine.

E' inutile nascondere che ai confini dell'Estremo Oriente esiste dunque un focolare d'incendio che rimarrà vivo, sino a che il Giappone non abbia trovato un assetto conforme alle sue necessità di espansione economica ed alle esigenze che

accordo, dapprima segreto ma rinnovato poi nel 1925 in occasione della ripresa delle relazioni diplomatiche fra Giappone e Soviets, per cui le due Potenze si impegnavano a rispettare ed a far rispettare i diritti che ciascuna di esse possiede: il Giappone nel Sud ed i Soviets nel Nord della Manchuria.

Questa circostanza spiega come i Russi non siano intervenuti nel conflitto Cino-Giapponese; come d'altra parte il Giappone non abbia esercitato nessuna azione all'epoca della vertenza Russo-Cinese del 1928-29.

Liberatosi così da una eventuale opposizione russa, il Giappone approfittò dei vantaggi che i vari trattati colla Russia e colla Cina gli assicuravano. E non erano pochi. Perché in virtù di essi i Giapponesi si videro riconosciuta la proprietà delle linee della Manchuria del Sud e del Chan-Ching e di altre minori; ed inoltre il diritto di occupare una striscia di terreno di quasi 50 Km. di larghezza da ogni lato della linea ferroviaria. In questo territorio si trovano le ricche miniere di Fu-shun per il carbone, e quelle di Pen-si-hou per il ferro.

Era un campo magnifico di attività che si apriva ai Giapponesi, e bisogna riconoscere che essi dimostrarono di saperne approfittare. I calcoli più modesti fanno salire ad oltre 3 miliardi di yens le somme da essi investite per la messa in valore del territorio mancese, che diventò un paese prospero e tranquillo, da cui la popolazione cinese ha tratto vantaggi non meno grandi dei giapponesi.

Questo sviluppo della potenza dell'Impero del Sol Levante non sembra sia visto di molto buon occhio dalle Potenze interessate nell'Estremo Oriente, tanto che esse intervennero già nel 1922 per annullare le clausole del trattato di Pekino (o trattato delle 21 domande), cui il Giappone aveva costretto nel 1915 la Cina, approfittando del conflitto

mondiale e con cui alcune delle parti dell'Impero Cinese diventavano vassalle del Giappone sia dal punto di vista politico che da quello economico.

Così si spiega come gli sforzi del Kuo-min-tang, cioè del partito e del governo nazionalista cinese, tendenti a far abolire i trattati *inequali* e per ciò *illegali*, abbiano trovato una certa benevola accoglienza presso le Potenze che hanno interessi nell'Estremo Oriente e che anche a costo di sacrifici loro non ritengono di dover lasciare mano libera ai Giapponesi. E così si spiega, meglio che col richiamo alle disposizioni del *Covenant* e del Patto Kellogg, tutto l'interessamento che la Società delle Nazioni porta al conflitto Cino-Giapponese, specialmente nel senso di porre fine al più presto all'occupazione militare della Manchuria che può essere prodromo di una annessione definitiva.

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pressione internazionale sul Giappone, si comprende pure dall'altro come questo sia poco disposto ad aderirvi. La morte del capitano Nakamura, il boicottaggio delle merci giapponesi, gli assalti dei banditi cinesi costituiscono solo l'occasione dell'azione energica spiegata dal Giappone. In realtà questo considera come questione vitale per il suo avvenire il poter proseguire la sua opera di penetrazione e di sviluppo nel territorio mancese per cui ha già fatto tanti sacrifici di vite e di denaro, e per cui ha una base nei trattati vigenti.

Ed è perciò che la resistenza alle domande della Società delle Nazioni, se ha dato luogo alla promessa giapponese di non mirare ad occupazioni territoriali, ha posto in primo piano il riconoscimento e la garanzia della situazione privilegiata che il Giappone possiede in Manchuria e a cui non vuole in alcun modo rinunziare.

Vi è da chiedere se nell'interesse

della civiltà il Giappone meriti di essere ostacolato nella sua espansione economica mancese. In sostanza so fa un'opera di valorizzazione dei territori nuovi e apre nuovi sbocchi al commercio internazionale, che nuovi sbocchi ha più che mai necessità. Le altre Potenze possono dare garanzie perché non venga giudicata la loro posizione sul mercato mancese, ma non hanno in definitiva alcun vantaggio dal ritorno della Manchuria a quello di semi-anarchia politica, economica e militare che è oggi la caratteristica dell'Impero Cinese.

Non è perciò un gran male per il mondo se il Giappone insiste sulle sue tesi, e se una volta di più si riconosce che è difficile, se non impossibile, comprimere la necessità di espansione di un popolo giovane e forte e a cui la terra non offre sufficienti risorse vitali.

GINO OLIVETTI



IL TEMPORE, Roma.  
November 9, 1931.

Despatch No. 1130.

## Scorrerie in Manciuria

East is East and West is West...  
(Rudyard Kipling).

Il lettore milanese che ieri mattina, insieme col caffelatte, ha avuto la sua brava copia del « Corriere della Sera », deve aver provato la sensazione d'aver calzato, senza farci caso, gli stivali del gatto con gli stivali; d'aver fatto un formidabile volo di meridiani; d'aver fra mano non il giornale preferito, ma una copia, mettiamo, dell'« O-saka-Niki Niki », o del « Tokio Asahi ». Ecco che finalmente una parola chiara e definitiva era detta sul famoso conflitto cino-giapponese; il torto e la ragione spartiti come si deve; la storia orientata energicamente verso la strada dritta. In sostanza, il grande giornale milanese, interpretando l'opinione pubblica italiana (la quale opinione pubblica, per vie occulte, gli avrebbe fatto sapere che riconosce al Giappone « un suo diritto incontestabile a difendere energicamente i propri interessi in Manciuria ») dichiarava che i figli del Sol Levante rendono, manu militari, anche un servizio alla causa dell'ordine mondiale. Cosicché il lettore del foglio milanese era insieme avvertito che l'opinione pubblica italiana e la causa dell'ordine mondiale sono in perfetta sintonia con gli interessi nipponici; la prima colazione poteva dunque esser consumata al grido di Nippon Banzai!

Ora anche noi, coi nostri affezionati lettori, facciamo modestamente parte di quella che si costuma chiamare opinione pubblica italiana; e abbiamo le nostre simpatie per la nobile e intraprendente nazione giapponese. Ma non riusciamo a capire, neppure dopo aver riletto l'editoriale del « Corriere della Sera », come sia possibile riconoscere « implicitamente al Giappone la facoltà di tutelare i propri diritti acquisiti e quella specie di ipoteca implicita che esso ha creduto di porre sulla vasta e ricca regione orientale della Repubblica cinese ». Tutto questo è molto implicito e assai poco esplicito. E' implicito per il Giappone che ha le « sue » ragioni, come la Cina ha le « sue »: non è affatto implicito per l'Italia la quale è spettatrice neutrale del conflitto e, quel che più conta, ha responsabilità di giudice quale membro del Consiglio della S. d. N. Anche a voler trascurare le norme

di cortesia che regolano solitamente i rapporti con paesi debitamente riconosciuti, vorremmo sapere quale mai ardita tesi potrebbe condurre la nazione italiana a scoprire nell'attività delle truppe nipponiche in Manciuria un « servizio alla causa dell'ordine mondiale ». Una scoperta siffatta sarebbe naturale se le grandi potenze mondiali avessero solennemente deciso di spartirsi la irrequieta e incorreggibile Cina, per colonizzarla poi in consorzio, secondo i dettami della moderna civiltà. Tutto è possibile, in ipotesi; alcuni anni fa, fu un francese, se non erriamo, a proporre l'elevazione forzata del tenore di vita delle moltitudini cinesi allo scopo di fare dell'Asia quell'enorme mercato che manca alla produzione mondiale. Ma queste sono ipotesi dettate dal delirio della crisi industriale; non sono fatti. I fatti sono il riconoscimento del governo nazionalista di Nanchino; la presenza della Cina, come stato sovrano, a Ginevra; la condanna della guerra, contenuta nel Patto Kellogg, come strumento di politica nazionale.

Si dirà che queste sono parole; e che gli interessi soffocano le parole. Allora domanderemo che cosa ne verrebbe in tasca, all'Italia, dalla conquista della Manciuria da parte giapponese; quale vantaggio, d'ordine ideale o pratico, ricaveremmo noi da un mutamento di bandiera a Mukden. Forse che i giapponesi meditano, in silenzio, di associarci nello sfruttamento della « vasta e ricca regione orientale della Repubblica cinese »? Il giornale milanese, che si dice interprete dell'opinione pubblica italiana, lo sarebbe anche dell'opinione privata giapponese? Tutto può essere; ma attendiamo conferma.

1 6 1 9

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WP

GRAY

FROM Peiping

Dated November 25, 1931

Rec'd 4:10 a. m.

793.94  
Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.

998, November 25, 10 a. m.


Following from Mukden:

"November 24, 7 p. m. Two Japanese companies  
from Chuluho on practice march attacked by Chinese at  
10 a. m., four miles northwest of Chuluho. At two p. m.,  
no information has been received concerning progress of  
fighting. Japanese companies sent from Mukden at 3 p. m.,  
for reinforcement."

Repeated to Nanking.

For the Minister,  
ENGERT

JS



F/DEW 793.94/2871

DEC 1 1931

FILED

1 162

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WP

GRAY

FROM Peiping

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D. *Smt*

Dated November 25, 1931

Rec'd 4:10 a.

Division of

Far Eastern Affairs

NOV 25 1931

Department of State

793.94  
Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

997, November 25, 9 a. m.

Following from Military Attache at Chinchow:

"Arrived at Chinchow 1:30 p. m., November twenty-fourth. Situation quiet, no evidence increase of Chinese forces this area. General Yung, Chief of Staff, expects Japanese attack here, states that he has no definite instructions but will resist unless orders to retreat received from Peking."

Repeated to Nanking and Tokyo.

For the Minister,

ENGERT

JS

F/DEW

793.94/2872

FILED

DEC 1 1931

1 1621

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128  
PREPARING OFFICE  
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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

November 25, 1931.

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

793-94/2872  
AMEMBASSY,

NOV 25 31

PARIS (France).

599 FOR AMBASSADOR DAWES.

For your information. /2872

Under date November 25 the American Legation at Peiping reports the receipt from the Military Attaché at Chinchow of the following: QUOTE Arrived at Chinchow 1:30 p. m., November twenty-fourth. Situation quiet, no evidence increase of Chinese forces this area. General Yung, Chief of Staff, expects Japanese attack here, states that he has no definite instructions but will resist unless orders to retreat received from Peking UNQUOTE.

793 94/2872

FE:MMH:REK

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Enciphered by mmh

Sent by operator M., 19

Index Bu.—No. 80.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-128

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WP

PLAIN

FROM Peiping

Dated November 25, 1931

Rec'd 4:10 a. m.

74-5-ay  
Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

1000, November 25th.

Kuomen report from Nanking twenty-third quote

Wellington Koo as follows:

"We are insisting that articles fifteen and sixteen should be invoked in case Japan should continue to defy the decisions of the League. It is to be hoped that the League will not ignore our demand."

Dr. Koo further said that in case League cannot settle difficulty the nine power treaty may be invoked. He intimated that under the terms of this treaty China can call upon signatory powers to call an international conference for the solution of present conditions.

For the Minister,

ENGERT

JS



F/DEW 793.94/2873

DEC. 1 1931  
FBI-ED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## CONFIDENTIAL

November 25, 1931.  
 12:45 o'clock.

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM OF TRANSATLANTIC TELEPHONE CONVERSATION  
 BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON AND AMBASSADOR DAWES IN PARIS.

Manchuria.

SECRETARY: I just called you to keep in touch - that is all. I telegraphed you last night. I trust you have my telegram.

DAWES: You received my answer, did you not?

SECRETARY: No, not yet. In my telegram I said that Claudel had been in with a message of inquiry from Briand. Have you received the telegram in which I answered your long telegram about the relations with China?

DAWES: Yes. Have you received my 798?

SECRETARY: I do not think so. No, I have not received it. Mine was No. 590.

DAWES: I have received your 590.

SECRETARY: I have not received your 798.

DAWES: Shall I read it to you.

SECRETARY: Can you tell me the substance quicker than reading it?

DAWES: It is in code. I will tell you what the situation is now. Sze has put in the original proposal in which he proposes a time limit, etc., notwithstanding that he, that China, has heard of our attitude through you, or through Johnson or through me. The Council is meeting now. This morning, when I got your 590, I called Drummond and gave him our attitude under the condition that no statements should be made at all about it, that the United States would make no statements, unless the Council except Japan agreed upon the general plan of the resolution, and second I said it was important and this was for Briand's information that the United States Government approves

the

793.94/2873 1/2

Confidential File

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

the general plan of settlement in the proposed resolution of the Council and has so informed both China and Japan. It has urged upon them acquiescence in the general plan embodied in the proposed resolution. He knows that.

SECRETARY: Sze has virtually filed denial -

DAWES: That is his own proposition.

SECRETARY: He adheres to his own proposition. Have you any light on what he is really going to do?

DAWES: Sze has said to me that notice has been given to Briand but he has not told Briand to put that into the Council. Sze has handed this counter-proposal of China, from which he has eliminated all references to the United States, to Briand but has not instructed Briand as yet to send it to the Council.

SECRETARY: So it is there but has not been formally presented.

DAWES: Sze has not told him to present it to the Council and so that leaves the matter open. Now Briand has decided on the following program. His proposal, which he is putting to the Council this afternoon, is that he can publish not the general plan, that is the exact words of the resolution, but he will publish the general plan of the League to be embodied in the proposed resolution, for fear there might be some difficulties on the face of it among all these members of the Council. They were all agreed upon the statement of the general plan to be embodied in the resolution. I told him that in the event they did publish that to telephone me that it was published and to telephone me also the text of what they said, and then I would make this statement: The United States Government approves the general plan of settlement embodied

1625

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

embodied in the proposed resolution of the Council and has so informed both China and Japan. It has urged upon them acquiescence in the general plan embodied in the proposed resolution. That will come out then pretty soon - in half an hour or so - after Briand has given to the press over there the statement of the general plan of settlement embodied in the proposed resolution. That is the way the matter stands now.

SECRETARY: I see.

DAWES: Dr. Sze has been up here to the room and he has a proposal which he wants immediately to be put before the Council and that proposal, which is probably before them now, is that - well, he says that the Japanese are marching on Chinchow and he makes the proposition that the Chinese Army will withdraw behind the Chinese Wall if the Japanese will consent to the establishment of a neutral zone in which there will be stationed French and British troops and troops of other neutral countries. He does not mention the United States. I do not think that would interfere with Briand's going ahead with his idea which is that he can now bring the moral force of the coordinated action of the United States and the League as pressure for peace on the two parties. That is about the situation.

I am waiting now for a telephone call, when the League gets through, of just what Briand is going to say, if anything. Of course, if he does not say anything, nothing is said here.

SECRETARY: All right. I think that stands in a good situation then. I have talked the matter over with the President this morning and he thinks the time has come

when



- 4 -

when our approval of such a plan might well be known and ought to be known.

DAWES: I think so. If they have any plan it will be known probably in an hour; that depends on the Council's announcing the general plan. If they do not adopt the general plan they would not want us to say anything because they have got to get together themselves.

SECRETARY: What is your own private opinion of the likelihood of China coming to accept this Council proposition?

DAWES: I think there is a pretty fair prospect of it. If the United States makes this statement after Briand makes his statement I think that China will be in a better position to come in and I have been urging Sze that if China comes in that will strengthen the position of China. Then when Japan has settled the minor details why China will be in a position to and China will be the one to make the change they are willing, I understand, to make.

SECRETARY: Is Japan ready to accept this proposition?

DAWES: They think that Japan is ready to accept the proposal, virtually yes. There are a few little things to be straightened up but neither Matsudaira nor the Council regards them as insuperable at all. They think they are going to get Japan in.

SECRETARY: That is first-rate. I think the situation looks as well as can be expected at present.

DAWES: It depends a great deal on whether that statement works out of the movement of the Japanese troops within a day or so.

SECRETARY: In regard to the movement of troops you will remember that Shidehara has promised me that there would

be

- 5 -

be no movement toward Chinchow except he spoke of a movement against about 2,000 bandits, which were not very far in that direction. Then in addition to that, Wellington Koo, the new Foreign Minister of China, has telegraphed sounding out our view upon the withdrawal of troops from Chinchow by China as far as the Great Wall, which is practically the same proposition that you say Dr. Sze is now putting up to the Council, and we are answering that telegraph wholly informally and merely in answer to their question that we are inclined to think it would be a prudent thing for them to do. I believe that is all I have for the present.

DAWES: All right, Mr. Secretary. I will sit right here and will call you up if there is anything unusual.

SECRETARY: I am very much obliged. I think you are handling that in just the right way.

DAWES: Statement we ought to make, because it may be necessary for me to ask your opinion on what I say, but I do not think so and I think what I have read you is going to be all right. I have talked with Dr. Sze about using the words "United States Government approves the general plan of settlement embodied in the proposal, and he thinks they are all right. We are all ready to go before the world.

SECRETARY: Since I have been talking to you, your telegram No. 798 has just come in, so I have it before me. I agree with it. It is all right. I notice that I only have Section One, but that seems to be all right.

DAWES: It follows what I said to you.

SECRETARY: Goodbye.

S HLS HHR:VGN

AM

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone.

FROM

PARIS

Dated November 24, 1931

Rec'd 7:33 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.


795, November 24, 7 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES

Following is Sweetser's report of the League  
activities this morning

"Drummond has been informed that the three Japanese  
Ambassadors had cabled to Tokyo to ask if there were any  
truth in the reports that the Japanese intended to take  
Chinchow and to say that if so their task here would be  
very difficult. Shidehara has replied that he had consulted  
the Minister of War and the Chief of Staff and that they  
had said they had no such intention. They reserved the  
right, however, to take what measures of defense might  
be necessary.

The Committee of twelve met again this morning  
from 11 to (#) to consider the situation. Briand reported  
that he had shown the draft resolution to Sze who still  
pressed for evacuation but who had agreed, nevertheless,  
to transmit



AM

2-#795, from Paris, Nov. 24, 7 p.m.

to transmit the text to Nanking. He hoped to have instructions today or tomorrow. Drummond added that Sze had particularly stressed with him the necessity, first, of having observers sent to the spot by the Government's and, second, of appointing negotiators for evacuation at once. (END SECTION ONE)

SHAW

CSB

# apparent omission

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PC

PARIS

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone.

FROM Dated November 24, 1931.

Rec'd. 8 p.m.

SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

795. November 24, 7 p.m. (SECTION TWO).

He also said he had transmitted the draft informally to  
the Japanese under reservation, that it was not final  
and might still be amended by the Council. He had  
the impression that the Japanese would accept.

Cecil said that he thought the Chinese did not  
quite fully understand the draft especially the limit-  
ation as to interference with the military forces. He  
thought that Sze would be greatly helped if he understood  
the Commission could report on the military aspects though  
it could not give orders to the troops. As he understood  
it the Commission could begin its work in the investigation  
and report on the military situation there. If it reported  
in a certain way, the withdrawal of Japanese troops could  
hardly but be expedited. From the very outset the Chinese  
had stressed the desirability of evacuation under the  
supervision

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM

2-#795, from Paris, Nov. 24, 7 p.m.

supervision of League observers: if the Chinese could see that this was a step in that direction it might help them a good deal. He did not think the Chinese understood it in that light: he thought they had secured a good deal more than they realized: he hesitated, however, to press it with them because if they insisted on it too much it might frighten the Japanese. The lester added that Ito had come to see him this morning pointing out that at Saturday's meeting the Japanese had not insisted as heretofore on the discussion of the fundamental points before evacuation and that there was here a definite change in the Japanese attitude.

Madariaga stressed again his distaste for even the appearance that the commission would not be entirely free to consider anything it wished or would be prevented by the military limitation from discussing the principal question at (END SECTION TWO)

SHAW

CSB

AM

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone.

FROM

PARIS

Dated November 24, 1931

Rec'd 8:55 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

795, November 24, 7 p.m. (SECTION THREE AND LAST)

issue which after all was the military occupation. He  
would like to add a sentence that the Commission would  
have every right to secure all information necessary  
for its report to the Council as to the security of  
Japanese subjects and the protection of their property.  
Cecil thought this might have exactly the opposite  
effect in giving a basis to continue the occupation till  
the report of the Commission whereupon Briand suggested  
and the others agreed that the point might be met by  
prefacing the fifth article with the phrase "without  
prejudice to the execution of the above mentioned  
measures"

The Guatemalan representative drew attention to  
the Japanese note of November 15th on the protection  
of railroad interests. He said that the view point  
therein expressed would cause disquietude throughout

Latin

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM

2-#795, from Paris, Nov. 24, 7 p.m.

Latin America where nearly all the railroads had been built by foreign financing. He thought they could not admit the idea of military occupation to protect such railroad investments. The Hague convention of 1907 indeed forbade the use of force by one state to recoup the debts due by another state to its nationals.

Briand agreed that such a thesis was untenable and could not be advanced even indirectly.

The question of the American attitude also came up. Before the meeting Leger stated informally but on behalf of Briand that a most useful contribution could be made by the United States if it were possible to let its attitude on the draft proposal be known and, if it approved it, if it could so inform the Chinese (?).

At the end of the meeting Briand mentioned this point to the Council saying that the American representative wanted to do anything he could to be useful but that he had hesitated to ask him to visit him until he had something decisive. Now, however, he thought that an expression of the American views would be very helpful if the Government felt able to make it;

consequently

*Dwight  
has  
already  
informed  
Sgt.*



163

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM

3-#795, from Paris, Nov. 24, 7 p.m.

consequently it might be wise to take the matter up.  
The best course perhaps would be for Drummond to try  
to see him this afternoon to see if he were able to  
offer any suggestion or cooperation at this decisive  
moment."

SHAW


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1635

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PM RECD

No.D-125



AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,  
Nanking, China.

FE

NOV 24 31

October 20, 1931.


793.94  
with  
893.75

Subject: Precautions against Possible Japanese  
Military Action at Nanking.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.



Sir:

I have the honor to transmit herewith, for the files of the Department, copies of a letter dated October 16, 1931, addressed to this office by Automatic Telephones of China, Federal Incorporated, U. S. A., and of the reply thereto, dated October 20, 1931, both of which letters relate to a request made by the American company that if there are indications of military action by the Japanese Government in this locality, the Japanese Consul be informed that the Company has a specified financial interest in the Nanking Telephone Administration.

The contract through which Automatic Telephones of China, Federal Incorporated, U. S. A., acquired its interests in the telephone equipment of Nanking was concluded on November 7, 1928, between the Ministry of Communications and Automatic Electric, Limited, Automatic Telephones of China, Federal Inc. U. S. A.

being

F/DEW

793.94/2875

FILED


DEC 1 1931

41

-2-

being a subsidiary of Automatic Electric, Limited. The Consulate General has on file no copy of the contract, nor has it been supplied with any documentary proof that the aforesaid relationship exists between the two concerns, but should question arise in the future such evidence would doubtless be readily forthcoming.

Respectfully yours,

  
Willys R. Peck,  
American Consul General.

✓  
Enclosures:

- 1/ Copy of letter dated October 16, 1931, from Automatic Telephones of China, Federal Inc. U.S.A., to the American Consul General, Nanking;
- 2/ Copy of letter dated October 20, 1931, from the American Consul General, Nanking, to Automatic Telephones of China, Federal Inc. U. S. A.

Copy to the Department  
Copy to the Legation, Peiping.

300

WRP:MCL

1637

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch to the Department No.D-125  
of Willys R. Peck, American Consul General at Nanking,  
China, dated October 20, 1931, entitled "Precautions  
against Possible Japanese Military Action at Nanking."

( C O P Y )

AUTOMATIC TELEPHONES OF CHINA  
FEDERAL INC. U. S. A.  
236 SASSOON HOUSE  
SHANGHAI, CHINA

October 16th, In reply refer to  
1931. Nanking 60 - JKB:H

Your reference

American Consul-General,  
Nanking.

Dear Sir:-

Due to the various rumours that have been circulating about Nanking, and which have reached this Office, we have thought it advisable to bring to your attention the fact that this Company has interests in the Nanking Telephone Adm. to the extent of approximately \$560,000.00, by reason of a contract entered into between this Company and the Department of Communications of the Nationalist Government of the Republic of China. One copy of the Contract is lodged with the Department of Communications at Nanking and the other is in the safe in the Office of this Company in Shanghai.

Under the terms of the Contract, this Company supplied and installed telephone equipment for the city of Nanking, on a deferred payment basis. A certain percentage of the Contract price was paid on signing the Contract, the balance to be paid in monthly instalments. The equipment has been in operation now for more than one year, and already twelve monthly payments have been made against the Contract.

In the event that there are indications of military action by the Japanese Government, which might endanger our interests, we respectfully request that the above facts be brought to the attention of the Japanese Consul at Nanking.

We are sending this letter by our Nanking representative, Mr. E. B. Morton, who will submit for your perusal our Office copy of the Contract.

It

1638


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

It will be appreciated if you will acknowledge receipt of this letter.

We have thought it expedient to take these precautions to protect our interests, in the event the city of Nanking is occupied by the Japanese, although the personal opinion of many is that the possibility is very remote.

Yours very respectfully,



AUTOMATIC TELEPHONES OF CHINA  
Federal Inc. U.S.A.

(Signed) J. K. Barrington

J. K. Barrington,  
Chief Engineer.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 2 to despatch to the Department No.D-125  
of Willys R. Peck, American Consul General at Nanking, China,  
dated October 20, 1931, Entitled "Precautions against  
Possible Japanese Military Action at Nanking".

In reply refer to  
File No.300 WRP:MCL

American Consulate General,  
Nanking, China.

October 20, 1931.

Automatic Telephones of China, Federal Inc., U.S.A.,  
236 Sassoon House,  
Shanghai, China.

Sirs:

This office has received your letter of October 16, 1931, (Reference Nanking 60 - JKB:H), in which you state that your Company has interests in the Nanking Telephone Administration to the extent of approximately G\$560,000 and request that, in the event of certain specified eventualities, this and other facts be brought to the attention of the Japanese Consul at Nanking. When handing this letter to the undersigned, your representative also exhibited a signed office copy of the contract of November 7, 1928, with the Ministry of Communications, on which your interests are based.

In reply, I beg leave to state that this office will endeavor to comply with your request in the premises.

Very respectfully yours,

Willys R. Peck,  
American Consul General.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

December 1, 1931.

Shanghai, October 22, 1931, No. 7919.

On October 18 a conflict took place in Shanghai between Japanese marines and Chinese cotton mill workers. The Japanese Consul General stated to the Secretary General of the International Settlement that the Japanese considered the only way to deal with Chinese was by definite and swift action, and that the Japanese marines did fire two shots into the air and would have turned a machine gun on the mob had it not been that the machine gun hung fire. Mr. Cunningham considers that a greater outrage could not have been committed, and that it is thanks to a defective machine gun rather than to the good judgment of the Japanese marines that a reasonable state of peace

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

2

## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

## DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

peace now exists in the Settlement.

After a heated discussion with representatives of the Municipal Council, the Japanese authorities have agreed that no drastic action shall be taken by the Japanese marines except after consultation and agreement with the municipal police. In particular, the Japanese undertake to fire no volley into a mob without first consulting the police.

*E. E. Thomas*  
E. E. Thomas



164

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 27, 1931.

~~SECRET~~

RSM:

*SKH* Note marked passages of the enclosure with this despatch. The Municipal authorities of the International Settlement have had a heated argument with the Japanese at Shanghai in regard to the maintenance of law and order in the Settlement and a tragedy of possible far reaching importance was only averted by the failure of a machine gun to fire.

JEEJ

*[Signature]*

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM RECD

NO. 7919

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Shanghai, China, October 22, 1931.

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Local Sino-Japanese Situation.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

With reference to my confidential telegram of October 21, 2 p.m., concerning the Sino-Japanese situation in Shanghai, I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of a self-explanatory despatch No. 7040 of this date, with its enclosure, to the American Legation at Peiping, the enclosure being a memorandum of a conversation which I had on the evening of October 20, 1931, with Mr. Stirling Fessenden, Secretary General of the Shanghai Municipal Council.

Respectfully yours,

*Edwin S. Cunningham*  
 Edwin S. Cunningham,  
 American Consul General.

✓  
Enclosure:1/- Copy of Shanghai Consulate General's despatch No. 7040, with enclosure.800  
PRJ:NLHIn quintuplicate

4 Carbon Copies

Received *ELJN*

F/DEW

793.94/2876

DEC 3 1931

FILED

1644

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 7040

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE

American Consulate General,  
Shanghai, China, October 22, 1931.

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Local Sino-Japanese Situation.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,  
American Minister,  
Peiping, China.

Sir:

With reference to my confidential telegram of  
October 21, 2 p.m., concerning the Sino-Japanese situation  
1/ in Shanghai, I have the honor to transmit herewith a memo-  
randum of a conversation which I had on the evening of  
October 20, 1931, with Mr. Stirling Fessenden, Secretary  
General of the Shanghai Municipal Council.

Respectfully yours,

Edwin S. Cunningham,  
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

1/- Memorandum of conversation between  
Consul General Cunningham and  
Secretary General Fessenden, dated  
October 20, 1931.

A true copy of  
the signed ori-  
ginal.  
800  
PRJ:NLH #4

In duplicate  
In quintuplicate to Department  
Copy to Minister at Nanking

1 645

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 7040 from E.B. Cunningham,  
American Consul General at Shanghai, China, dated October 22,  
1931, on the subject "Local Sino-Japanese Situation."

Confidential.

Memorandum of Conversation.

October 22, 1931.

Consul General Cunningham  
Secretary General Fessenden.

Subject: Local Sino-Japanese Situation.

Mr. Fessenden stated that the Shanghai Municipal Council had no desire to act independently of the Consular Body concerning the activities of the Japanese military authorities but that it was the Council's intention only to call upon the Consular Body when negotiations should break down or its defense forces should become inadequate. Mr. Fessenden was informed that the suggestion was made some days ago that the Chairman and the Director General should take up the question of military display by the Japanese directly with the Japanese Consul General. The substance of my reports in our interview of October 9, 1931, were repeated. He was assured, however, that as Senior Council I would be very glad to present any request to the Consular Body which the Council might make in an effort to maintain peace in the Settlement.

Mr. Fessenden then stated that on Monday the 19th the Japanese Consul General had called to protest against the action of the municipal police in Robinson Road district on the preceding day and evening. He said that the Japanese Consul General was of the opinion that the police brought on the conflict between the Japanese marines and the cotton mill operators. The Consul General is reported to have stated that the Japanese marines considered that the municipal police authorities were too sympathetic with the Chinese and that they were not capable of dealing with a Chinese mob such as was encountered on Sunday evening. On the other hand Mr. Fessenden stated that he pointed out to the Japanese Consul General that the police authorities had had more experience and were more capable of dealing with a situation of that kind in Shanghai than were the Japanese military authorities and the Consul General admitted that they were very able and efficient in their particular line. Mr. Fessenden stated that he was informed by Consul General Arai that the Japanese considered the only way to deal with Chinese was by definite and swift action and that the Japanese marines did fire two shots into the air and could have turned a machine gun on to the mob had it not been that the machine gun hung fire. This statement of such intention is appalling and we have to thank a defective machine gun for the continuance of a reasonable state of peace and order in the Settlement, rather than the good judgment of the Japanese marines. A greater outrage could not have been committed. The Japanese

Consul

-2-

Consul General advocated the superiority of the Japanese marines to deal with the local situation, and Mr. Fessenden and Captain Martin insisted that the police were better equipped to deal with it than the marines. Furthermore the municipal authorities insisted that they had the first and primary responsibility for maintaining order and they complained bitterly against the Japanese for attempting to take control of the policing in the International Settlement. At the conclusion of the conversation it was agreed that on October 30th there should be a conference of the Japanese Consul General, the Commander of the Japanese marines and the two Japanese members of the Shanghai Municipal Council, the Chairman and the Director General of the Municipal Council, and the Commissioner of Police. This conference was held at 11 o'clock in the Municipal Building. Though the senior officer of marines refused to attend he did send a representative. As a result of this conference it was agreed that no drastic action would be taken by the Japanese marines except after consultation and agreement with the municipal police. Particularly important was the understanding on the part of the Japanese to fire no volley into a mob without first consulting the police. The municipal authorities undertook to inform the Senior Council should conditions become too great for the police to handle. The Senior Council, according to the usual custom, to call upon those powers having military forces to assist the police in preserving order. From Mr. Fessenden's statement it is believed that the conference was far from a peaceful one and perhaps rather strong language was used by both sides, but the result as above summarized is quite satisfactory. It is an acknowledgment by the Japanese of the responsibility placed upon the police for the defense of the Settlement, including the protection of property.

Mr. Fessenden stated that he did not desire to at the present time to bring this to the attention of the Consular Body but he did want to be well informed of each step and the Council had so instructed him. He stated further that unless and until the Shanghai Municipal police found they were inadequate to cope with the situation the various phases should not be brought to the attention of the entire Consular Body.

Mr. Fessenden said he had directed the police advocate to make inquiries of the court to ascertain whether the court would entertain criminal prosecutions against persons displaying anti-Japanese posters in windows which were likely to incite Japanese to take the situation into their own hands, such posters being a menace to the peace of the Settlement, but that the police advocate's reports were by no means encouraging and therefore there was no

intention

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

intention of bringing such criminal prosecutions in the court. He recalled my conversation with Mr. Yu, Secretary General of the Chinese Municipality, and suggested that I might with propriety remind Mr. Yu of his undertaking that these posters would not be displayed if they could be prevented in places frequented by Japanese in large numbers. I told him I would be very glad to do this.

I informed Mr. Passmore that the newspapers had stated that the National Salvation Committee to Resist Japan had arrested people in the Settlement and taken them as prisoners to the Temple of Heaven and were detaining them there. I inquired if this was true. Mr. Passmore stated that unquestionably there are being detained in the Temple of Heaven Chinese whose sole crime was the sale of Japanese goods. He said that he had taken up this matter with the Chinese authorities and assured me that the Mayor of Greater Shanghai and his entire staff were opposed to such high-handed action. He said also that the Chinese officials had undertaken to have these men all released immediately. In regard to the arrest in the Settlement by representatives of the association, he said that this was not true so far as he could ascertain. He said also that application had been made by the association to the Shanghai Municipal Council to provide a police escort for these prisoners to be turned over to the Chinese authorities, but the association was informed that not only would such an escort not be furnished, but that if any attempt was made to forcibly remove the prisoners from the Settlement, even though the persons effecting the removal were Chinese police, they would be arrested and brought before the court on a charge of kidnapping; that the International Settlement authorities would not tolerate any other police authority functioning in the Settlement.

Erwin C. Cunningham

EEB B

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RECEIVED  
NOV 21 1931  
SECRETARY'S OFFICE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
NOV 24 1931  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

November 21, 1931.

NOV 24 1931

Mr. Secretary:

Dr. Feis has called to my attention the news in yesterday's NEW YORK TIMES, page 2, that Japan has recently made large purchases of raw cotton.

This, if a fact, is interpreted to mean that Japan either expects possibly to have to use cotton for war purposes or is indulging in "preparedness" against a possible imposition by the powers of economic sanctions.

FK 793.94/2877

NOV 30 1931

FILED

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RECEIVED  
 NOV 21 1931

SECRETARY'S OFF

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
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NOV 30 1931

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 17, 1931.

Mr. Secretary:

Herewith a brief estimate of  
situation in the Nonni River Bridge  
and Tsitsihar sector.

RECEIVED

NOV 17 1931

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

SKH/REK

1651

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

November 16, 1931.

MILITARY SITUATION IN THE NONNI RIVER AREA

TSITSIHAR SITUATION

NOV 16 1931

NOV 16 1931

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Antecedents.

The bridge over the Nonni River on the Taonan-Anganki Railway, approximately thirty miles in a southerly direction from Anganki, was destroyed some weeks ago by Chinese soldiers of the Tsitsihar forces under the general command of General Ma Chan-shan (Acting Chairman of the Heilungkiang Provincial Government), in an effort to prevent the northerly advance of Chinese troops under General Chang Hai-peng (allegedly a Japanese sympathizer). The Japanese declared that the restoration of the bridge was necessary to insure crop movements and sent a repair crew accompanied by a Japanese military escort, to repair the bridge. The Japanese issued an order to the opposing Chinese generals to withdraw their respective forces ten kilometres in either direction from the bridge. Subsequently, fighting broke out involving the Japanese, and the Tsitsihar troops were forced to retreat from their "first line position" northward to their "second line position". As a result of several engagements casualties occurred on both sides.

Present Situation.

Information which has been received largely from Chinese sources indicates that the Japanese have in the last few days instituted a policy of provoking minor engagements, possibly with the idea of breaking down the morale of the Tsitsihar troops.

FK 795.94/2878

121-2-ADM

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

troops. The main position of the Tsitsihar troops centers about Sanchienfang. Japanese airplanes have recently dropped bombs on the positions held by the Tsitsihar troops, the Japanese and/have attacked heavily with cavalry and artillery. These attacks were intensified on November 12 and 13. In a telegram dated November 15 from the Consul General (Myers) at Mukden it is stated that "after reporting quiet on the Nonni front during the last few days, broken only by minor outpost engagements, Japanese headquarters today was forced by newspaper correspondents, who had seen Tsitsihar despatches to the contrary, to admit Japanese attacks with heavy artillery since November 12". The fact that the repairs to the bridge across the Nonni River were completed by the Japanese on November 14 indicates that the immediate Nonni River bridge area has been within the Japanese lines for some time. FE estimates that the Tsitsihar troops in the area number about 15,000 and the Japanese troops from 3,000 to 4,000. General Honjo (Commander of Japanese forces in Manchuria) is quoted as having said that he intends to open the railway to Tsitsihar and keep it open.

#### Political Factors.

It has been apparent for some time that the Japanese have not desired General Ma Chan-shan to remain in control of the Tsitsihar area or to retain his position as Acting Chairman of the Heilungkiang Provincial Government.

It

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

It seems now well established that, on or about November 12, the Japanese military issued an ultimatum to General Ma demanding that he resign his office as Acting Chairman of the Heilungkiang Provincial Government, that his troops be withdrawn from the city of Tsitsihar (the capital of the Province, about <sup>18</sup>thirty miles north of Angangki), and that no objection be made to the advance of Japanese troops to Angangki or perhaps even to Tsitsihar. General Ma refused to comply. The elimination of General Ma, who is receiving the support of the Chinese Government through Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, would undoubtedly permit the reorganization of the Heilungkiang Provincial Government along lines more favorable to the Japanese, as occurred in the cases of the Kirin and Liaoning Provincial Governments. This gradual breaking down of the old régime indicates, as the Minister (Johnson) states, "that it would be impossible for Chang Hsueh-liang to reestablish his control of Manchuria either by himself or with outside aid."

(NOTE: In a message to the Secretary General of the League, dated November 8, the Japanese Government stated that it was firmly resolved to recall its troops "as soon as the work is terminated". Bridge repairs were completed on November 14.)


RPM  
 RPB/VDM

See map attached.

5/11/44


1 1654

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75



THE NEW YORK TIMES, TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 1931.

THE NONNI RIVER BATTLEFIELD.



Fighting Is Reported Continuing in the Region of Tahsing, With Tsitsihar Menaced by an Advance of Japanese Troops.

CJH

*Nonni River*

Tsitsihar

*Latest telegram: Later than  
attached memorandum*



GRAY

PEIPING via N. R.

Dated November 17, 1931

Rec'd. 10 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.



952, November 17, 5 p.m.

Following from Harbin.

"November 16, noon.

One. Japanese Consul, his staff and remainder Japanese residents, including Major Hayashi, who negotiated with General Ma regarding bridge, of Tsitsihar numbering 13 persons arrived at Harbin yesterday morning.

Two. Local press this morning reports minor clashes at Nonni River front yesterday in which Japanese driven back, some killed and some made prisoners. These reports confirmed by local Chinese officials, who are becoming proud of so called ability of Tsitsihar troops, and are aiding the latter with money gifts and clothing and with words of encouragement. This elation on the part of the Chinese will cause the Japanese military to push onward to save the "face" of the Japanese army, which have been no doubt sending reinforcements to the Nonni front.

Three. Ohashi returned to Harbin yesterday morning and confirmed

1654  
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

CJH

Page 2 - #952 from  
Peiping.

and confirmed to me ultimatum of Honjo delivered to Ma  
on the 15th as mentioned in my telegram November 15,  
1 p.m. (END PART ONE).

ENGERT

JHR

WSB

165

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


AM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 17, 1931

Rec'd 9:20 a.m.



Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

952, November 17, 5 p.m. (Part Two)

Local Commissioner of Foreign Affairs stated that Ma has been requested to give an answer in regard to his willingness to comply with the terms of the ultimatum by noon today and that he expects fighting to take place this afternoon. American journalists who returned from Tsitsihar yesterday morning feel that General Ma is determined to resist Japanese attacks.

Four. There is unrest among Mongols of Barga and I believe that Princes Hu Lan Tai and Ku of the Young Mongol Party are being influenced by the Japanese, not by Soviet Russians, to agitate for Barga autonomy."

Repeated to Nanking.

(End part two end message)

For the Minister

HPD  
WSB

ENGERT



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HS

Tokio

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

FROM

Dated November 25, 1931

Rec'd 5:00 a.m.

Secretary of State  
Washington

235, November 25, 1 p.m.

VERY CONFIDENTIAL. An aid to the solution of the Manchurian situation might be found by arranging that International Commission assist in the personnel of local Manchurian defense committees, by including selected representative non-political citizens, so that they should no longer be composed wholly of men looked on as picked by the Japanese. This might meet the Chinese demand for the International Commission to assist in expediting the Japanese withdrawal of troops, as the successful management of the defense committees would afford protection of life and property--now the main Japanese contention. The Japanese demands for proper police protection would be recognized as reasonable and accepted. I have not (repeat not) sounded official opinion about this.

HPD

FORBES

Confidential File

FK 793.94/2879



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 7926

AM 1100  
EPT. C. STATE  
AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL.

Shanghai, China, October 28, 1931.

793.94  
NOV 1 1931  
SUBJECT: Local Sino-Japanese Situation.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

1/ I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of a  
self-explanatory despatch No. 7042 of this date, with  
its enclosures, from this Consulate General to the  
Legation in regard to the subject above mentioned.

Respectfully yours,

*Edwin S. Cunningham*  
Edwin S. Cunningham,  
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

1/- Copy of Shanghai Consulate General's  
despatch No. 7042, with enclosures.

800  
PRJ:NLH

In quintuplicate

F/DEW

793.94/2880

FILED

NOV 30 1931

No. 7042

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE

American Consulate General,  
Shanghai, China, October 27, 1931.

Subject: Local Sino-Japanese Situation.

The Honorable

Nelson Kruzler Johnson,  
American Minister,  
Peiping, China.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to this Consulate General's despatch No. 7039, dated October 20, 1931, with regard to the Sino-Japanese situation, and to state that the Shanghai Chinese press, as well as the English language press in Shanghai, has followed the action at Geneva with a great deal of interest. There are enclosed herewith translations of two editorials from the Chinese press which deal

1/ with this subject. The first is from the SHUN PAO of  
2/ October 15, 1931, and the second from the SHIN SHIN HSIN PAO of October 20, 1931. In the latter editorial particular reference is made to the obligations of the United States under the Nine Power Treaty signed at the Washington conference in 1922.

Upon the occasion of the adjournment of the Council of the League of Nations on October 24, 1931, the local Chinese press expressed considerable pessimism with regard to the probability that the Japanese troops would withdraw into the South Manchuria Railway zone. The SHUN PAO

stated

-2-

stated that since the Japanese Government is noted for its plots and conspiracies in dealing with proposals involving China, that Government would no doubt create many instances during the next three weeks as grounds on which it might base its refusal to withdraw its troops into the railway zone. The SHIN WAN PAO stated that Japan is the "encroacher" in this crisis and therefore tries to delay the solution of the problem as long as possible in order to more definitely consolidate its position in Manchuria. On the other hand China, being the aggrieved party, desires a speedy solution of the problem. The SHIN WAN PAO prophesies that during the next three weeks it is not likely that Japan will withdraw its troops into the railway zone, but will probably extend its military activities in that area.

Respectfully yours,

Edwin S. Cunningham,  
American Consul General.

800  
FRJ:MLH +77

A true copy of  
the signed original.  
800

In duplicate  
In quintuplicate to Department  
Copy to Minister at Nanking

Enclosures:

- 1/- Copy in translation of editorial  
from SHIN WAN PAO of October 15, 1931.
- 2/- Copy in translation of editorial  
from SHIN WAN PAO of  
October 20, 1931.

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 704V from S. A. Cunningham,  
American Consul General at Shanghai, China, dated October 27,  
1931, on the subject "Local Sino-Japanese Situation."

C O N T E N T S

MY VIEW HELD FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATION.  
CANNOT BE SET

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Before the end of September, the Council of the League of Nations commenced the task of handling the present Sino-Japanese crisis but, immediately after its commencement, the Japanese Government announced again and again that the Manchurian affair was a local question between China and Japan which could be settled by means of direct negotiations between these two countries without the intervention of a third power. The Japanese government objected even to the institution of a commission by the League to look into the real status of the matter. Unfortunately, without penetrating their evil design, proving itself equal to the difficulties and functioning by virtue of the sanctity of agreement, the League, overpowered by the Japanese bullying attitude, perfunctorily discharged its duty by the mere expression of its hope and belief that Japan might withdraw her outrageous troops before October 14th. From September 30th up to a recent date, however, the Japanese not only failed to keep their promise of evacuating the occupied territory in conformity with the resolution adopted by the Council of the League but added fresh outrages to recent enormities. The League has, therefore, called a special meeting but the Japanese insisted on direct negotiations without permitting a third power to intervene. Such a preposterous demand, we are compelled to refute emphatically and reject point blank.

According to common international usage, when any question arises that may become the cause of strained relations between two countries, the proper mode of procedure to be followed is for the parties to seek a solution through diplomatic channel and by direct negotiations. This is inapplicable to the problem now before us. The reasons are as follows:

1. Instead of going through the regular diplomatic channel and manifesting sincerity to carry on direct negotiations with China before September 18th, the Japanese suddenly resorted to force and waged an undeclared war upon China. It would appear that the Japanese diplomacy and statesmanship had got out of shape by that time, otherwise they would have dealt directly with us before September 18th instead of asking for direct negotiations after the use of force. Such an action is inconsistent with reason, egregious, arbitrary and contemptuous to the world. Under no circumstances can China accept the proposal.

2. While China offered absolutely no resistance, the Japanese troops continued to run amuck, occupied Chinese cities, killed Chinese soldiers and civilians, confiscated Chinese property, replaced Chinese flags with Japanese emblems and appointed Japanese nationals as

territorial

-2-

territorial authorities. The only thing that they have not done is the transmission of a formal declaration of war. The relations between China and Japan have been virtually severed inasmuch as the Japanese resorted to force of arms and are treating China as a belligerent. Can a nation be expected to submit cravenly to such uncalled-for indignities as no individual would brook? Would the Chinese people subject themselves to the Japanese whineys and let the invaders dispose of everything at will? How could the Japanese who have alienated themselves from us talk of direct negotiations?

3. In the wake of the Japanese troops that remain on our soil have followed the Japanese warships detailed to all coastal and river ports in China. The planes that bombarded Chinchow are constantly threatening us with serious damages, and rumors concerning the so-called separatist movement of Manchuria and Mongolia are afloat everywhere. Do the Japanese manifest a sincere wish to effect an early settlement of the present issue while their enmities are on the increase? By the outrages perpetrated since September 30th, the Japanese have unveiled their own determination to pursue the "greater land" policy by drastic measures, to disturb peace and to trample international treaties under foot. How could China commence direct negotiations even if she were desirous of following such a course?

4. The outrageous action of the Japanese troops is not merely a simple question between China and Japan. It serves not only to harass China but also to molest the world and threaten mankind with a serious issue. It is not only China but all other countries that should accept the responsibility for the suppression of the outrage tending to jeopardize mankind. China meets her liability to the world and mankind when she makes repeated concessions and bears the affront of the Japanese troops with the greatest possible fortitude. It is hereafter up to the other countries as a whole to prevent continuance and aggravation of such outrageous conduct and to have the trouble maker accept the responsibility that devolves upon her. China cannot and need not carry on direct negotiations with that party.

5. On the 9th instant, the three big heads of the Japanese Ministry of War held a meeting and discussed the question of withdrawal of their troops. Five resolutions were then adopted. The third resolution is that negotiations are to be conducted locally upon the birth of a new regime while the fourth resolution says that evacuation is not to be started until such a new administration as is able to guarantee the safety of Japanese lives and property is established. From these resolutions, it would appear that, in conducting the so-called direct negotiations, the Japanese will not take as the proper party to deal with either the central government of China or the local government of the Northeast. They mean to wait until the separatist movement of Manchuria and Mongolia becomes a success so that they may open a farcical parley with the new regime established under their protection. Unless we agree unconditionally to their term that

the

-3-

the Northeast shall be a vassalage of Japan and add to this agreement a certain number of humiliating treaties, would the Japanese accept our proposals even if we should favor the idea of direct negotiations?

In the light of the foregoing, it is by no means possible for China today to accept the demand for direct negotiations. The position taken by the Chinese people today is that we should place the entire matter on the basis of the sanctity of international agreements and calmly await a fair and equitable decision. If the allies relinquish their duty and shift the responsibility on the shoulder of China, then the course open to us is either to surrender to Japan by the conclusion of a humiliating treaty or to shed our warm blood in an ultimate struggle with might for the sake of equity and justice as well as for our freedom and existence. With a history of civilization covering a period of four thousand years, the Chinese people dare say that they are too proud to bow submission to others at all times and to strike their flag. This being impossible, the only alternative is to await further developments and then fearlessly step out to the path of bloodshed.

The allies are expected to understand that the above is the definite and clear-cut attitude of the Chinese people at the present time. There are in China a few persons who, preferring to remain leisurely and nervously where they are or failing to appreciate the gravity of the situation and the seriousness of the consequence, advocate the acceptance of the demand for direct negotiations the result of which would mean not only disgrace to this nation and a loss of sovereign rights but a wholesale destruction of the spirit of an independent state. Let us spit on their face and take drastic measures to muzzle such persons.

(Translated from CHUNG KAO of  
October 15, 1931.)

Trans. by  
seen by PRJ

Copied by NLM #11  
Compared with MB B

Enclosure No. 2 to despatch No. 704V from W.S. Cunningham,  
American Consul General at Shanghai, China, dated October 27,  
1931, on the subject "Local Sino-Japanese Situation."

C O P Y

THE RELATION OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE LEAGUE  
OF NATIONS AND THE INTEREST IN THE NINE-POWER TREATY.

Accepting the invitation of the League of Nations, the United States has detailed a representative to attend the meetings of the Council of the League. The instructions of the American Government to its representative tell him to confine his speeches to matters that fall within the purview of the anti-war treaty and not to meddle in such financial and commercial measures as are provided for in the 16 articles of the League's covenant. This is not without ground so far as the relation of the United States with the League is concerned. But the responsibility of China lies in something over and above the League's covenant; namely, in the principles laid down in the Nine-power Pact.

We have never lost memory of the fact that, in an endeavor to seek a complete solution for the Far East problem, the American government convened a meeting of the representatives of various Powers at Washington ten years ago. As a result of the negotiations and with a view to maintenance of ever-lasting peace in the Far East, there was concluded the so-called Nine-power Pact whereby the contracting parties agreed not to infringe upon China's sovereign rights and territorial integrity or to enter into any secret agreement that might enable them to acquire special privileges. The treaty was signed by the United States, Belgium, England, China, France, Italy, Japan, Netherlands and Portugal and ratified by the government of each of the signatories. The Japanese government has now arbitrarily commenced military operations in the Three Eastern Provinces of China, occupied Chinese cities, attacked Chinese civilians and soldiers, seized public property as well as private possessions, expelled Chinese authorities, killed certain members of the Chinese police force and pursued such other activities as are detrimental to China's sovereign rights and territorial integrity regardless of justice. The American Government has declared that such actions on the part of Japan affect the provisions of the Nine-power Pact and Senator Borah of the U. S. Senate has voiced the opinion that it is in the Nine-power Pact that a solution should be sought for the Sino-Japanese crisis. As it is gratifying to observe that the United States has never forgotten the pledge contained in the Nine-power Treaty, we cannot but turn our thoughts to the contents of that document.

Chapter 1 of the Nine-power Pact provides that, except China, the contracting parties agree (1st) to respect the sovereignty and independence as well as the territorial and administrative integrity of China, (2nd) to give China ample and free opportunity for development and for the maintenance of an effective and stable government, (3rd) to make an effort individually to establish and maintain the principle of equal opportunities for all international industries and commerce throughout China and (4th) to refrain

from



1666

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

from taking advantage of any opportunity to grasp such special privileges from China as will affect the interest of the peoples of the other friendly states and to refrain from measures tending to menace the safety of other nations.

No government which has affixed its signature to this agreement should forget its contents. How then the Japanese nation would explain its present activities in the Three Eastern Provinces? The occupation of Chinese territory, the seizure of public and private possessions, the commandeering of railways, the persecution of local authorities, the bombardment of Chinchow and vicinity and the presentation of the demand that China must enter into direct negotiations with Japan before the question of withdrawal of Japanese troops can be taken up are all matters that would serve to defeat by a single stroke the intent and purpose of the provisions in the last chapter of the Nine-power pact which is not a treaty between China and Japan but a treaty that must be observed by all of the signatories in their relations with each other. In respect to China, the recent Japanese outrages constitute an infringement upon her rights and territory in contravention of treaty regulations while, in respect to the other signatories to the treaty under review, they manifest a total disregard for contractual obligations. If the other signatories realize that the treaty is one which they are still in duty bound to observe, it is certainly incumbent upon them to adopt immediate measures to rectify the Japanese action that serves to thwart the purposes of that agreement.

Prior to the European war and with a view to preservation of world peace, the powers were bound by similar treaties of which the most notable was the agreement entered into by permanent neutrals. Had that agreement been observed in good faith, the great war would have never been fought. But immediately after the Austro-Servian clash occurred, the permanent neutrality of Luxembourg and Belgium was torn to pieces in an instant and the great war that entailed irretrievable loss was eventually waged. The Nine-power pact is identical in nature to this pre-war engagement and the outbreak of a second world war would be a mere question of time if, in its attempt to gratify selfish desires, any party thereto should snash what is guaranteed by that treaty as a matter of no importance.

It is the United States that played the leading role in the conclusion of the Nine-power pact. What reservations it has made to the League of Nations in respect to freedom of action and speech is a matter of no concern to us but we have already wiped our eyes and are waiting to see what effective measures the United States would take in fighting for the inviolability of the pact.

Translated from the CHIN. TIMES  
(SHIH SHIH HSIN PAO) of October 20, 1931

Trans Ig  
seen by RLS

Copied by NLH +M  
Compared with MB 6

1667

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EE

HS

GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N.R.

Dated November 25, 1931

Rec'd 9:05 a.m.

Secretary of State  
Washington

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
NOV 25 1931  
Department of State

PRIORITY.

1001, November 25, 1 p.m.

Legation's 997 and 998.

Military Attache at Chinchow reports this morning:

"General Yung telephoned he had received information  
Japanese armored train passed through Hsinmin three o'clock  
p.m. November 24th followed, by troop train four o'clock  
p.m. Trains proceeded 20 li south where troops detrained,  
maybe to fight bandits or first move on Chinchow."

For the Minister

WSB

ENGERT

HPD

FK 793.94/2881

FILED

DEC 2 1931

793.94  
note  
894.23

1666

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RECD

No. -----



GENERAL,  
Mukden, China, November 3, 1931.

EE  
ack

NOV 23 31

SUBJECT: The L. E. Gale Company's Waco Aeroplane.

DEC 2 1931  
The Honorable  
The Secretary of State  
WASHINGTON.

Division of  
Far Eastern Affairs  
NOV 25 1931  
Department of State

F/DEW

793.94/2882

SIR:

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of  
my despatch No. 473, to the Legation, Peiping, China,  
dated October 31, 1931, on the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

*M. S. Myers*  
M. S. Myers  
American Consul General.

DEC 3 1931

Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 473.

MSM:HTW  
800

1 166°

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 473

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, China.

October 31, 1931.

SUBJECT: The L. E. Gale Company's Waco Aeroplane.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister,

Beiping, China.

Sir:

793-94/2358

I have the honor to request the Legation to refer to my despatch No. 454 of October 5, 1931, wherein there is a statement (pages 9 and 10) concerning The L. E. Gale Company's Waco aeroplane which was brought to Mukden during the past summer for demonstration purposes and was in the Chinese aerodrome here when it was occupied by the Japanese army on September 19th. The plane had been left in Mukden because of a broken engine which required parts from America to make the necessary repairs.

This Consulate General first informed the Japanese Consulate General of the presence of the plane at the aerodrome and of its American ownership. Permission for Mr. Vincent to visit the aerodrome to ascertain the condition of the plane was refused by the Japanese military headquarters, the reason given being that Japanese newspaper

correspondents

Tel. 864 - Nov. 3, 1931

from Beiping

793-94/2454

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

correspondents had caused trouble when taken on a tour of inspection of the aerodrome. My official request was refused in the face of the fact that only a few days before a large group of Japanese visitors, including women, had been taken through the aerodrome.

The military authorities were then requested, through the Japanese Consulate General, to give this Consulate General a statement relative to the present location and condition of the plane. This request has been repeated both orally and in writing during the past three weeks but no reply has been received other than an unofficial statement from the Japanese Consulate General that it was unable to secure the desired information from the military headquarters. On October 28th, the enclosed communication was addressed to the Japanese Consulate General. No reply has been received. Several days ago General Honjo issued a public statement to the effect that no private property might be removed from government buildings, et cetera, now occupied by the Japanese army, giving at the time an explanation of his position. The Japanese Consulate General referred me to this statement but admitted that it quite obviously did not cover the case in question.

I regret therefore that it is necessary for me to bring the matter to the attention of the Legation with the suggestion that a brief summary of the case be telegraphed to the Department for whatever action it may deem appropriate. It will be observed that a copy of this despatch is being sent to the Embassy at Tokyo.

Respectfully

167  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -


Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers.  
American Consul General.

Enclosure: Communication addressed to Japanese Consulate  
General dated October 28, 1931.

JCV:AAB  
340/800.

Original and one copy to Legation.  
Five copies to Department.  
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.



AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, China.

October 28, 1931.

Sir and dear Colleague,

I have the honor to request you to refer to the correspondence between this office and your Consulate General concerning the Waco aeroplane, property of the L. E. Gale Company, which is now at the Chinese aerodrome.

My request that the Japanese military authorities make arrangements for Mr. Vincent to visit the aerodrome in order to ascertain the condition of the plane was refused. Since that time repeated requests, both oral and written, have been made for a statement from the military authorities concerning the present location and condition of the plane. Although three weeks have passed since the first request was made no reply has been received. The Japanese military authorities' indifference to my reasonable request is difficult for me to understand and gives weight to the rumour that the Waco plane has been destroyed by them. Because of the attitude of the Japanese military authorities, I regret to inform you that I shall be obliged to refer the matter to the Department of State if not given an answer to my request this week.

I

K. Hayashi, Esquire,

Consul General for Japan,

Mukden, China.

167  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -


I have the honor to be,

Sir and dear Colleague,

Your obedient servant,

M. S. Myers.  
American Consul General.

JCV:WYP  
340





DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## DOCUMENT FILE

### NOTE

SEE 393.1154(M) Anderson, Meyer & \_\_\_\_\_ FOR +  
Company/S

FROM Muk den ( Myers ) DATED Nov 3, 1932.  
TO \_\_\_\_\_ NAME \_\_\_\_\_ 1-1127 ...

#### REGARDING:

Antung Electric Light Plant. Closing of by Japanese authori-  
ties - report on -.

793.94/2983

1675

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(F) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 393.1154(M) Anderson, Meyer & FOR #-  
Company/s

FROM Mak den ( Myers ) DATED Nov 3, 1932.  
TO NAME 1-1127 ...


REGARDING:

Antung Electric Light Plant. Closing of by Japanese authori-  
ties - report on -.

793.94/2983

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REC'D





No. -----



AMERICAN CONSULATE,  
Mukden, China, November 3, 1931.

NOV 23 31

SUBJECT: Nonpayment of Checks Held by Frazar,  
Federal Incorporated, U. S.



THE HONORABLE  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE,  
WASHINGTON.

Sir,

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of  
my despatch No. 475, to the Legation, Peking, China,  
dated October 31, 1931, on the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

*M. S. Myers*  
M. S. Myers  
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 475.

MSM:HTW  
800

F/DEW

793.94/2884

JAN 13 1932

FILED

1677

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 475

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, China.

October 31, 1931.

SUBJECT: Nonpayment of Checks Held by Frazar,  
Federal Incorporated, U.S.A.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping, China.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to the Legation's instruction of October 27, 1931, requesting information relative to the refusal of payment by the Bank of China, Mukden, of three drafts drawn in favor of Frazar, Federal Incorporated by the Jehol authorities in payment for motor cars and automotive accessories ordered from Frazar, Federal Incorporated.

The matter was brought to the attention of this Consulate General on October 23rd and was on the same day taken up with the Japanese Consulate General both by written despatch and personal conversations. A copy 1/ of my despatch is enclosed herewith. The Japanese Consulate General promised to investigate the matter with a view to securing payment of the checks. On October 29th an officer of the Japanese Consulate General called at

this

- 2 -

this office to explain that inquiries had revealed that the Bank of China, Mukden, had no accounts in the names of the drawers of the checks in question.

Yesterday an officer of this Consulate General was confidentially informed by the manager of the National City Bank that he was certain that there were, or had been at the time of the Japanese military occupation of Mukden, funds in the Bank of China to the credit of the drawers of the checks held by Frazar, Federal Incorporated. The manager of the bank pointed out, inter alia, that the rejection slip which was returned with the checks would certainly have contained a notation to the effect that the drawers did not have accounts with the bank if such had been the case rather than have the written statement at the foot of the slip that "Japanese Army advises that payments of deposits of all Government offices are suspended".

The above refers to the two checks for \$138,000.00 and \$28,140.00 drawn by the Jehol government authorities. Although payment of the check for \$125,540 drawn by the cashier of the Tang family was refused on the grounds that the drawer of the check should be present at the time of payment, it is believed that payment was refused for the same reason as given for the other two checks. No statement was made at the time the check was presented to the effect that the drawer did not have an account.

As this Consulate General is not in a position to obtain definite proof of the existence of the accounts but believes that they do exist unless they have been

cancelled

1675

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

cancelled or removed since Japanese control over banking in Mukden was established, the points brought out in the previous paragraph were discussed yesterday with the Japanese Consulate General and the request made that it conduct a further investigation. The Japanese Consulate General understood this office's reasons for doubting the correctness of the report that there were no accounts to the credit of the drawers of the checks and is now making further inquiries into the matter. While I am convinced of the sincerity of the Japanese Consulate General's desire to obtain a satisfactory explanation of the matter and, if possible, secure the payment of the checks, I doubt very seriously if an officer of that consulate will be permitted to examine the books of the bank and it is only by so doing that it can be ascertained with certainty whether the Jehol authorities have or did have prior to the military occupation accounts in the Bank of China at Mukden.

The Legation will be informed of future developments.


Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers.  
American Consul General.

1/ Enclosure: Copy of despatch to Japanese Consulate General dated October 23, 1931.

Original and one copy to Legation.  
Five copies to Department.  
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.

JCV:AAB  
340/800.



AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, China, October 23, 1931.

Sir and dear Colleagues,

I have the honour to request your assistance in securing settlement of a difficulty which has been brought to my attention today by the Frazer, Federal Incorporated. The following pertinent extracts from a letter from Frazer, Federal Incorporated will serve to explain the case:

We have in hand three checks totalling silver \$229,780.00, given us as part payment against contracts we hold and orders we have received from the Jehol Motor Bus Service, subsidiary to the Jehol Provincial Government. These contracts and orders for the supply of trucks, buses, passenger cars, parts, tires, gasoline and oil have been given to us during the past two months and have no connection whatever with the present military occupation and the Three Eastern Provinces. They represent the continuance of constant business relations with this organization which we have enjoyed since 1924. Due to our past business relations we have been obliged to make deliveries of a part of the material involved in these transactions against the payment to us of the above mentioned checks which we accepted in good faith.

Yesterday through the National City Bank of New York in this city we presented two checks for \$138,100.00 and \$28,140.00 respectively for collection from the local branch of the Bank of China. These were returned to us yesterday (October 22nd) afternoon with the following notation by the Bank of China;

"Japanese Army advises that payment of deposits of all Government offices are suspended."

K. Hayashi, Esquire,

Consul General for Japan,

Mukden.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Yesterday we ourselves presented the third check for \$123,640.00 to the Bank of China. We were refused payment on the grounds that payment could only be made in the presence of the drawer. In that the "chops" were admitted to be in order this refusal appears ridiculous. It is our opinion substantiated by verbal statements made by the sub-manager of the Bank of China, that payment against this check has been suspended for the same reasons given for refusal to honour the first two above mentioned. We understand that different reasons were given due to the fact that in the case of the first two checks the signature or "chops" are obviously government department signatures whereas the last mentioned check is signed by the cashier of the "Tang" family.

I shall appreciate your inquiring into the case described above with a view to assisting the Fraxar, Federal Incorporated, in securing payment of the checks which they hold. It is hardly necessary for me to invite your attention to the fact that delay in securing payment of so large an amount entails no small loss to the American firm.


I have the honour to be,

Sir and dear Colleagues,

Your obedient servant,

M. S. Myers.  
 American Consul General.

JCV:WYP  
 340






DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REC'D

No. 5268






AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

HARBIN CHINA, October 30, 1931

*Handwritten initials and marks*

SUBJECT: THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN NORTH MANCHURIA  
 NOV 23 1931



SIR:

I have the honor to enclose herewith, for the information  
 1/ of the Department, a copy of my despatch No. 2280, of even  
 date, with enclosure as mentioned therein, sent to the Legation  
 on the subject of Russian, Chinese and Japanese activities  
 in North Manchuria.

Respectfully yours,

*G. C. Hanson*

G. C. Hanson  
 American Consul General

1 enclosure as indicated

F/DEW

793.94/2885

*Handwritten notes:*  
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FILED

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 2280

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

HARBIN, CHINA, October 30, 1931

SUBJECT: THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN NORTH MANCHURIA

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping, China

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of a memorandum  
1/ of a conversation had with a white Russian in the employ of the  
Chinese North-Eastern Navigation Company, the ships of which  
navigate the Sungari and Amur rivers, on the subject of the  
supplying of munitions by the Soviet authorities to the  
Chinese military at Tsitsikar, capital of Heilungkiang Province.  
This steamboat captain has frequently given information to this  
office, much of which has proven to be correct.

I am planning to leave on Saturday, October 31st, at 3 P. M.  
for Tsitsikar, where I shall stay one day, Sunday November 1st,  
and while there I shall attempt to verify the enclosed report.

Respectfully yours,

G. C. Hanson  
American Consul General

1 enclosure as indicated  
Copies sent to:  
Department,  
Embassy, Tokyo,  
Consulate General, Mukden.

GCH/TLL

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HANSON

The steamboat captain came in this morning to tell me that he had just returned from his last trip this season. He had also visited Habarovsk, where he brought ten carloads of soya beans.

He informed me that the political and military leaders of the U.S.S.R. were at the present time exceedingly interested in the political situation in Manchuria and that they followed carefully all developments. On the 15th, 16th and 17th of October they had met in conference at Habarovsk. Representatives of the Amur and Maritime Districts were present. At this conference it was decided immediately to rearrange the composition of the troops in the Far East, and to replace the present troops with men drawn from the Ural. This has now been done.

A representative of Chang Hsueh-liang was in Habarovsk, and requested, in his name and in that of Chinese Commercial Societies of Tsitsihar, that the USSR aid with guns and ammunition. It was decided to send ammunition from the Habarovsk arsenal to Tsitsihar. On October 22nd the Habarovsk military loaded on the Chinese barge No. 27 large quantities of 3" Russian field pieces, ammunition for the same, rifles, machine guns and hand grenades. The barge was towed by the s.s. PAOHSIEN through Lahasusu, where the cargo was illegally passed by the Chinese Customs, and on the same day the cargo was unloaded on the Tsitsihar side of the river near the town of Tsalinho, 223 versts from Harbin. Similar shipments will be made also in the future. The Captain believed that up to the present time already three barge loads had been so shipped.

He claims to have exceptionally good Japanese connections at the present time, and one of his Japanese friends, a military captain connected in some capacity with the South Manchuria Railway's local office, had requested him to draw up a list with detailed information relative to all tugboats on the Sungari river. He was informed that this information was urgently required by the Japanese military.

From his Japanese sources he had also been reliably informed that the Japanese were prepared to occupy the following regions in North Manchuria: 1) Tsitsihar Province, in the direction of the Nonni river, the so-called Utitakan region, and the city and district of Talaishan; (2) Kirin Province - the Second Sungari river, and the city and district of Potune. Inasmuch as these regions are of great importance to the Japanese the occupation will take place by November 10th next, in case the Nonni and Second Sungari rivers are frozen by that time. The Japanese have sent into these regions Korean agents to report on the condition of roads for military truck and automobile traffic. The Japanese evidence great interest in the city of Sansing on the Sungari, the Mutanchiang river and the region around station Loho on the eastern line of the Chinese Eastern Railway.

1685

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Reliable information is to the effect that the tugboats PAOHSIEN, SANSUI, YUNGIEH and TAILER, with a fleet of eight barges, have during the season brought to Khabarovsk from Fuchin and Aolomi, on the Sungari river, a total of 1,260,000 poods (of 36 lbs.) of soy beans and 384,000 poods of wheat.

\*\*\*

TLL/th  
October 30, 1931.

1684

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




No. 1951.

REC'D  
 EMBASSY OF THE  
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA



Paris, November 13, 1931.

NOV 25 31



793.94

F/DEW

793.94/2886

DEC 3 1931

FILED

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,  
 Washington, D. C.

Sir:

In compliance with the Department's instruction No. 293 of August 19, 1930, I have the honor to transmit herewith clippings from the French press, on the subject of the Sino-Japanese conflict, covering the period from November 10 to November 13, 1931, inclusive.

Respectfully yours,

*Williamson S. Howell, Jr.*

Williamson S. Howell, Jr.,  
 Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

Enclosures.....

- 2 -

Enclosures: (single copy).

Clippings from the following newspapers:

November 10, 1931.

- No. 1 - L'HUMANITE
- 2 - L'OEUVRE
- 3 - LE POPULAIRE

November 11, 1931.

- No. 4 - L'ERE NOUVELLE
- 5 - L'HUMANITE
- 6 - LE POPULAIRE
- 7 - LA REPUBLIQUE

November 12, 1931.

- No. 8 - L'AGENCE TECHNIQUE DE LA PRESSE
- 9 - L'ERE NOUVELLE
- 10 - L'HUMANITE
- 11 - LE QUOTIDIEN
- 12 - LE POPULAIRE

November 13, 1931.

- No. 13 - L'AVENIR
- 14 - L'HUMANITE
- 15 - L'INTRANSIGEANT
- 16 - LE JOURNAL
- 17 - LE POPULAIRE
- 18 - LE TEMPS

In quintuplicate.

710.

RS/jdk

Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 1951  
of November 13, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.


Extract from L'HUMANITE, November 10, 1931.

DE JOUR EN JOUR LA MENACE D'AGRESSION ANTISOVIÉTIQUE S'AGGRAVE

**Deux semaines avant la prise de Moukden  
la revue de l'état-major français  
"justifiait" le coup de force japonais**

**Hier  
les troupes  
japonaises  
ont bombardé  
Tien-Tsin**

**A**VANT - HIER, après les durs combats qui s'étaient déroulés sur le pont de la Nonni, les troupes japonaises se portaient à 10 kilomètres du chemin de fer de l'Est et prenaient prétexte de l'affaire de Tsitsikar pour préparer une nouvelle extension de l'occupation militaire. En même temps, des dépêches d'origine nipponne annonçaient



On remarquera que, depuis le 18 septembre, ces rumeurs ont été répandues à quatre ou cinq reprises et, de fait, le gouvernement de Tokio s'efforce de susciter, dans la province du Nord, un mouvement prétendument séparatiste, qui ferait de la Mandchourie une dépendance japonaise et laisserait la voie libre à l'organisation de l'intervention antisoviétique sur une très large échelle.

## Le bombardement de Tien-Tsin

Hier, nouvelle alerte ! Cette fois, c'est au Sud-Ouest que les troupes de Tokio seussent. Tien-Tsin est, à l'heure où ces lignes sont écrites, sous le feu du bombardement japonais.

Dès lors, tout devient parfaitement clair. Fort de l'appui des puissances impérialistes, de l'appui français en particulier, le Japon prétend : 1° S'assurer — non plus seulement en Mandchourie, — mais aussi dans les autres provinces chinoises, les positions de commande ; 2° mettre à profit la situation ainsi acquise pour se précipiter sur le territoire soviétique en se lançant d'abord sur le chemin du fer de l'Est.

Les deux opérations vont de pair et sont étroitement liées l'une à l'autre.

## Florilège de mensonges social-fascistes

Les héros de cette sinistre aventure trouvent une fois de plus pour les excuser et les défendre, les porte-parole les plus authentiques de la 11<sup>e</sup> Internationale.

Dans leur ardeur furieuse à épouser la cause de l'impérialisme français, les gens du *Populaire* accumulent les mensonges les plus insensés et les inepties les plus criantes.

Contemplez, je vous prie, le dernier — le dernier en date car d'autres viendront encore — feu d'artifice de contre-vérités que présente le *Populaire* d'hier.

« Moscou, écrit le journal de M. Blum, n'a rien fait pour essayer d'éviter au moins un conflit avec le Japon. Durant des semaines, le Kremlin s'est tu ! »

Le Kremlin s'est tu ! Mais non, c'est le gremlin du *Populaire* qui s'est bouché les oreilles. L'Etat prolétarien est à bout et intelligible

les rangs des travailleurs à l'heure où la Patrie socialiste est menacée comme elle ne l'a jamais été depuis quatorze années.

Eh bien, il faut qu'on sache que le prolétariat international, le prolétariat français en particulier, ne laissera pas ce crime s'accomplir.

On s'efforce à brouiller les choses et à jeter le trouble dans les esprits. Redoublons d'efforts pour faire la lumière et préparer la réaction prolétarienne.

Il faut que tous les prolétaires conscients soient convaincus du danger.

## Un document-massue

Il faut qu'ils se persuadent au surplus que la France est la grande organisatrice du mauvais coup extrême-oriental. Les preuves abondent qui établissent le rôle monstrueux de l'impérialisme français. Nous en avons fourni ici quelques-unes particulièrement démonstratives. Qu'on nous permette aujourd'hui de livrer aux travailleurs un document de poids.

Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 1951  
of November 13, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'HUMANITE, November 10, 1931.

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qu'une « république indépendante » venait de se constituer en Mandchourie.

On remarquera que, depuis le 18 septembre, ces rumeurs ont été répandues à quatre ou cinq reprises.


Qu'on nous montre donc cette invite. Nous en discuterons. Non seulement la S.D.N. n'a pas levé le petit doigt pour arrêter l'agression japonaise, mais elle l'a estampillée ; elle lui a donné, grâce à Briand, la consécration du pacifisme. La S.D.N. n'a pas été déficiente, comme essaie de le prouver la presse des bonimenteurs socialistes. Elle a été, au contraire, singulièrement active dans le soutien de la plus criminelle aventure, et le grand manager du sanglant coup de force, c'est M. Briand c'est-à-dire le représentant authentique du pacifisme, celui que Blum, Renaudel et Cie voulaient il y a quelques mois installer à l'Elysée !

Par contre, l'Etat soviétique a été depuis longtemps, non point en paroles, mais en fait, le champion de l'indépendance et de la souveraineté du peuple chinois. Il a renoncé aux anciennes prérogatives dont la Russie jouissait en Chine. Y a-t-il au monde un gouvernement socialiste où un délégué socialiste de la S.D.N. qui ait accompli un tel acte ? Répondez, citoyen Henderson ! Répondez, citoyen Boncour !

Donc, deuxième affirmation du *Populaire*, deuxième mensonge.

Nous pourrions enrichir cette liste. Mais la cause est entendue, n'est-ce pas ?

On veut paralyser la riposte ouvrière. On veut jeter le désarroi dans les rangs des « salariaux » — démentir le traité qui fut fait. Le contre-révolutionnaire lit



les rangs des travailleurs à l'heure où la Patrie socialiste est menacée comme elle ne l'a jamais été depuis quatorze années.

Eh bien, il faut qu'on sache que le prolétariat international, le prolétariat français en particulier, ne laissera pas ce crime s'accomplir.

On s'efforce à brouiller les choses et à jeter le trouble dans les esprits.

Redoublons d'efforts pour faire la lumière et préparer la réaction prolétarienne.

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Il faut qu'ils se persuadent au surplus que la France est la grande organisatrice du mauvais coup extrême-oriental. Les preuves abondent qui établissent le rôle monstrueux de l'impérialisme français. Nous en avons fourni ici quelques-unes particulièrement démonstratives. Qu'on nous permette aujourd'hui de livrer aux travailleurs un document de poids.



Le 1<sup>er</sup> septembre dernier, c'est-à-dire quinze jours avant le coup de force de Moukden, la *Revue Militaire Française* publiait — comme par hasard — un important article sur les « Intérêts russes et japonais en Mandchourie ». L'article est signé des initiales R. C. Mais, retenez que la *Revue Militaire Française* est, comme l'indique son titre, « publiée avec le concours de l'état-major de l'armée ».

Elle est par conséquent sous le contrôle direct des grands chefs militaires. L'article qu'elle consacrait le 1<sup>er</sup> septembre aux événements de Mandchourie serait tout entier à citer.

En voici deux passages essentiels. Celui-ci d'abord, consacré à la politique soviétique en Asie :

« S'exerçant contre l'ordre ou plutôt le désordre établi en Chine, la propagande communiste va à l'encontre de la politique des puissances qui y possèdent quelque intérêt. Son but reconnu est, d'après les affirmations maintes fois répétées à Moscou, de jeter bas dans ce pays l'influence économique prépondérante des nations dites capitalistes d'Europe et d'Amérique. Conjugée avec une active campagne anticoloniale dans les colonies asiatiques des grandes puissances, elle se propose de provoquer chez ces dernières, par la fermeture des marchés d'Extrême-Orient, une crise de surproduction d'une gravité telle que la révolution mondiale tant désirée ne pourrait manquer de se produire.

« A ce titre, le Japon, en Mandchourie, est menacé de la même manière que l'Angleterre aux Indes, les Etats-Unis aux Philippines, la France en Indochine et la Hollande en Indonésie. »

On notera l'appel très précis au front unique des grandes puissances impérialistes et l'on rapprochera utilement ces exhortations de la politique pratiquée le mois dernier à Genève.

Autre extrait suggestif. L'auteur de l'article, évoquant le conflit de l'Est chinois de 1929, écrit :

« Au moment le plus critique du conflit, la presse s'est faite l'écho d'une idée sur laquelle peu de renseignements ont transpiré. Il s'agissait d'un projet de contrôle de l'Est chinois par une commission internationale qui eût pris à son compte la part russe de cette entreprise, en garantissant des dettes toujours impayées du gouvernement tsariste.

« Ici s'impose une remarque dont la France eût pu faire son profit si les circonstances l'avaient permis. Il ne faut pas oublier en effet que c'est surtout avec des capitaux français qu'a été construit le transmandchourien. Notre gouvernement aurait donc eu le droit de revendiquer un régime préférentiel au cas où un système impliquant un contrôle international aurait dû être substitué au statut ancien du chemin de fer.

« A plusieurs reprises d'ailleurs, dans les années qui ont suivi la guerre, nos diplomates ont fait valoir nos droits particuliers sur cette voie ferrée et la question reste entière. »

Action commune des impérialismes colonisateurs contre la politique soviétique, contrôle international du chemin de fer de l'Est, prépondérance de la France dans ce régime nouveau. Chantage financier de la France sur l'U.R.S.S.

Tout y est !

Deux semaines avant la prise de Moukden, la revue du général Weygand confessait que le mauvais coup avait été préparé dans les cercles dirigeants français et que ses objectifs étaient parfaitement déterminés.

Est-ce assez dire que c'est sur nous, surtout, prolétaires français, que comptent à cette heure les travailleurs soviétiques et les exploités d'Extrême-Orient ?

Est-ce assez dire que c'est nous d'abord qui aurons à mettre en pratique les grandes directives de notre Internationale communiste dans la lutte contre la guerre.

Pour cela, il ne faut pas attendre le jour de l'explosion.

C'est tout de suite qu'il faut agir, c'est tout de suite qu'il faut organiser la mobilisation des masses ouvrières contre la guerre, pour la défense de l'U.R.S.S.

Gabriel PERI.

Volume 10

Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 1951  
of November 13, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'OEUVRE, November 10, 1931.

### Les "civilisateurs"

La situation s'aggrave en Mandchourie. Les Japonais s'étaient avancés jusqu'à la rivière Nonni. Mais, contre-attaqués par le général mandchou Ma-Chan-Shan, ils auraient battu en retraite.

« Battu en retraite » à cause de la supériorité de l'adversaire ? Non. L'état-major japonais, à en croire le correspondant du *Daily Mail* à Kharbine, se serait simplement aperçu qu'il avait poussé trop loin vers le Nord et qu'il risquait ainsi « de provoquer une intervention armée de l'U. R. S. S. »

« En effet, nous rappellent les « Débats », on sait qu'un traité avait été conclu en 1910 entre le Japon et la Russie, délimitant les zones d'influence respective des deux pays, traité qui a été renouvelé en 1925, et qui laisse à l'influence russe la région empruntée par le train qui relie Hailar, en Sibérie russe, à Vladivostok, en passant par Kharbine. »

Mais n'est-ce pas le *Figaro*, si souvent d'accord avec les *Débats*, qui nous affirmait, l'autre jour, qu'en Mandchourie, « le Japon représente la civilisation » ?

Or si le Japon et la Russie se sont « partagé » la Mandchourie, c'est évidemment pour y accomplir, chacun dans sa sphère, la même besogne vis-à-vis de ces sauvages de Chinois. Alors, la Russie représente aussi la « civilisation » — au même titre que le Japon ? Moi, je veux bien.

Mais qu'en pensent les *Débats* et le *Figaro* ?

Jean Piot,

Page 10

Enclosure No. 3 to Despatch No. 1951  
of November 13, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE POPULAIRE, November 10, 1931.

## LA GUERRE EN MANDCHOURIE

# Le Japon se plaint !

Le Japon est fort mécontent. Et il y a de quoi.

Ces terribles Chinois ne se gênent plus et obligent les doux Japonais à des actes que leur « respect des traités » et leurs « intentions pacifiques » réprouvent.

Ainsi, par exemple, Tokio vient de dévoiler le plan machiavélique du général chinois Ma, qui s'est laissé battre près de la rivière Nonni. Il l'a fait intentionnellement afin d'attirer les troupes japonaises dans la zone du chemin de fer de l'Est chinois dans l'espoir que l'armée nippone se heurterait aux troupes soviétiques.

Telle est l'explication officielle du gouvernement japonais. Mais chose curieuse. Etant au courant de la machination perfide du général chinois, le Japon se laisse prendre au piège et ses troupes avancent vers Tsitsikar.

Le Japon a encore un autre sujet de mécontentement. C'est que le secrétariat de la S.D.N. se permet de publier non seulement les communications japonaises, mais aussi celles de la Chine. Tokio accuse Genève de favoriser ainsi la propagande chinoise. Vraiment la S.D.N., si timide vis-à-vis du Japon, n'a pas mérité un tel reproche !

Je m'excuse de ce ton badin. Mais à la lecture des notes japonaises et des commentaires de la presse française qui essaye de justifier l'attitude de l'agresseur, on se sent désarmé par tant de mauvaise foi et de naïveté feinte.

Et entre temps, la situation s'aggrave. Des incidents se sont produits à Tien-Tsin. Leurs origines sont très suspectes. Mais ils ont eu comme conséquence le bombardement de la ville par les Japonais.

En outre, l'U. R. S. S. intervient. L'Agence Tass dénonce un complot antisoviétique à Kharbine. Sur l'instigation du consul japonais dans cette ville, les Russes blancs prépareraient une attaque contre le consulat soviétique et contre la direction soviétique du chemin de fer de l'Est chinois. On comprend aisément quelles en seront les conséquences.

Ainsi d'heure en heure, les dangers d'une guerre sino-japano-russe deviennent de plus en plus menaçants.

O. ROSENFELD.

Enclosure No. 4 to Despatch No. 1951  
of November 13, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ERE NOUVELLE, November 11, 1931.

## En Mandchourie

par Albert MILHAUD

Il faut examiner avec une extrême attention et infiniment d'esprit critique les nouvelles qui nous parviennent de Chine et du Japon. De toute évidence, les événements et leur interprétation par voie de presse — de presse extrême-orientale — ont pour but d'impressionner l'aréopage pacificateur qui va se réunir le 16 novembre, à Paris. Peut-être, a-t-on, de part et d'autre, l'intention de mettre les « juges » en face du fait acquis.

Il n'y a guère lieu de se dissimuler que la situation est mauvaise. Au Japon, l'opinion, chauffée à blanc, non seulement soutient le gouvernement, mais le pousse. Comme à l'époque de la guerre russo-japonaise, on commence à dire, là-bas, que le destin de l'Empire va se jouer en Mandchourie. Les Japonais, irrités du massacre d'ouvriers agricoles coréens, — leurs sujets et protégés — assassinés en Mandchourie par des cultivateurs chinois, ne le sont pas moins

de l'assassinat d'un de leurs officiers, tué au cours d'un voyage de reconnaissance... Faits éloignés déjà de quelques mois ou de quelques semaines, mais la colère a grondé sourdement et elle a déterminé l'ambiance morale favorable à l'opération militaire le long de la ligne ferrée de Dalong à Tsisikar.

Le boycottage des marchandises japonaises en Chine crée une vive angoisse au Japon, où les affaires ne prospèrent pas beaucoup plus qu'ailleurs. Le gagne-pain de bien des Japonais est mis en question. L'hostilité chinoise menace l'avenir des petits comme des grands. D'autre part, il n'est pas douteux que la nouvelle politique chinoise, qui a pour but de supprimer le vieux statut des établissements étrangers en Chine, atteint les Nippons autant que les Blancs. Aucune apparence de traitement privilégié pour les frères jaunes. Le Chinois est sans pitié. Il est parfaitement décidé à traiter les voisins comme les autres étrangers. C'est-à-dire à les

évincer et à les soumettre au droit commun. Plus de traités inégaux !

Les Japonais savent parfaitement que leur occupation de plus d'un quart de siècle dans la Mandchourie, province chinoise, ne constitue pas, aux yeux des Chinois, un droit définitif. Ce régime provisoire, il n'est pas douteux que les Chinois voudraient y mettre un terme. C'est une grosse entreprise : en attendant, ils construisent une voie ferrée pour concurrencer la ligne du Sud-Mandchourien japonaise, c'est-à-dire le tronçon méridional du railway dont l'autre fraction rejoint le Transsibérien et se trouve aux mains des Soviétiques. Les Japonais considèrent comme une concurrence déloyale cette nouvelle voie ferrée qui va diminuer l'autorité politique, militaire et économique de Tokio dans les plaines mandchoues. C'est donc une guerre sourde que se font les deux peuples, et quand le Japon subordonne toute négociation avec la Chine aux divers points fondamentaux, il montre bien qu'à défaut d'une soumission du Chinois on passera de la guerre sourde à l'autre, après la période inter-

médiaire des *expéditions punitives*, charmant euphémisme par où l'on traduit les bombardements aériens, les déplacements de cavalerie, d'infanterie et d'artillerie et leur entrée en campagne.

Le fond du débat, ce sont les points fondamentaux. Quels sont-ils? Reconnaissance par la Chine des traités existants et des droits acquis par le Japon en Mandchourie; Abstention par les troupes chinoises de toute attaque contre les troupes japonaises dans la zone du chemin de fer; Garanties précises pour la vie et les biens des ressortissants nippons en Mandchourie; Cessation de la campagne antijaponaise en Chine, et enfin, le Règlement des questions de fond par des négociations directes entre les deux gouvernements.

L'acceptation, par la Chine de ces conditions, dont la première est la condamnation du nouveau chemin de fer concurrent du Railway surmandchourien, c'est la soumission. La soumission actuelle du gouvernement chinois au Japon, ce serait la condamnation de Chang Kei Chek, la fin du gouvernement de Nankin et, pour fort longtemps, l'évanouissement de tout espoir d'un gouvernement commun, même faible, pour la Chine entière. La résistance au Japon, au contraire, c'est probablement le seul moyen de recoller la porcelaine de Chine brisée, le seul espoir de rapprocher tous les vieux chefs du Kuomintang et de Nankin. Est-ce à dire que la Chine puisse aller au delà de cette hostilité contre le Japon et qu'elle soit apte à organiser la guerre. Non : elle est elle-même fort au-dessous du tsarisme d'il y a vingt-cinq ans. Mais, à défaut de la guerre, la guerrilla et l'entrée en jeu de la soldatesque innombrable. Les Soviets enverront des tanks et du matériel de guerre aux frontières pour être à l'abri des surprises, et les Etats-Unis rapprocheront progressivement leurs flotte et flottille d'Extrême-Orient du théâtre de tous ces désordres. Les observateurs de Genève et de Washington seront à pied d'œuvre. Et ensuite? La Société des nations, bombardée par les obus de la diplomatie chinoise et japonaise, s'efforcera héroïquement de pallier le pire. Et pendant ce temps-là, la Conférence du désarmement se prépare sous le rictus narquois des stratèges d'Extrême Orient.

La Mandchourie a déjà fait, au début de ce siècle, bien du mal au monde.

Albert MILHAUD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (5)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 5 to Despatch No. 1931  
of November 13, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'INDEPENDANT, November 11, 1931.

# LA MENACE ANTISOVIETIQUE S'AGGRAVE

## Le complot impérialiste en Mandchourie menace d'heure en heure de prendre le caractère de guerre ouverte contre l'Union Soviétique



Des soldats japonais, revolver au poing, fouillent des passagers chinois de l'express Pékin à Moukden, à la gare de Huang-Kuten

Les articles pro-japonais de la presse honteusement arrosée, la campagne anti-soviétique du *Temps* et du *Populaire*, les fausses nouvelles, dans le genre de celle que nous dénoncions hier (le poste de T.S.F. des P.T.T. lançant la nouvelle de la « déclaration de guerre par l'U.R.S.S. au Japon »), montrent chaque jour plus clairement que nous nous trouvons devant un *plan bien préparé* d'intervention contre l'Union soviétique.

Les faits parvenus à notre connaissance au cours des dernières vingt-quatre heures, corroborent encore plus les craintes qui animent la classe ouvrière internationale, quant au danger qui menace le pays du socialisme.

Les impérialistes japonais veulent, à tout prix se rendre maîtres de Tsitsikar, dont nous avons déjà montré l'importance capitale pour l'U.R.S.S. Mais ils font agir d'abord les mercenaires du général vendu Tchang-Kai-Peng, qui livrent com-

bat aux troupes du général Ma, à cinq kilomètres du chemin de fer de l'Est-chinois. L'Etat-major nippon a fait remettre un ultimatum à Ma, exigeant la reddition immédiate de Tsitsikar à Peng.

La deuxième étape de l'extension de l'occupation de la Mandchourie, se précise donc avec rapidité. La dénonciation du complot des gardes-blancs ourdi par la mission militaire japonaise à Kharbine, et que signalait hier l'agence *Tass*, est une nouvelle preuve que les impérialistes sont décidés à provoquer l'U. R. S. S. par tous les moyens.

Le complot impérialiste auquel participent, outre les généraux japonais, les gardes-blancs de tous les pays et le capital financier hongrois — qui joue le rôle dirigeant — menace d'heure en heure, de prendre le caractère de guerre ouverte contre l'U.R.S.S.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Il serait extrêmement dangereux, dans les circonstances actuelles, de prêter la moindre confiance aux notes de Briand ainsi qu'aux phrases creuses de Tchang-Kai-Chek et de ses agents d'après lesquelles l'avance japonaise contre le chemin de fer de l'Est-Chinois et l'intervention contre l'Union soviétique seraient mal vues ou même empêchées par les puissances impérialistes. C'est le contraire qui est vrai.

Le bourreau Tchang-Kai-Shek ne vient-il pas de demander à la S.D.N. « de constituer une armée internationale destinée à protéger le chemin de fer Sud-Mandchourien ? » N'est-ce pas là, l'appel à l'intervention des forces armées impérialistes pour prêter main-forte aux troupes japonaises contre l'Union soviétique et faciliter la répression du mouvement des masses travailleuses de Mandchourie, que la terreur blanche et les expéditions primitives de l'occupant ne peuvent maîtriser ?

La suggestion de Nankin, dont il faut chercher l'inspiration à Paris et à Washington, ouvre aussi la porte à toutes les combinaisons et marchandages pour amorcer le partage de la Chine entre les impérialistes rivaux.

D'autre part, le gouvernement des « dissidents » de Canton vient en aide au Japon dans ses opérations vers le Nord de la Mandchourie et dans ses desseins d'annexion définitive du pays en partie conquis.

On apprend, en effet, qu'Eugène Chen, ministre des Affaires étrangères cantonnais, a, récemment, informé le Consul du Japon à Canton, qu'il était favorable à la démilitarisation de la Mandchourie, à la nomination d'un homme de paille comme haut-commissaire à Moukden et ajoutait que les troupes japonaises devraient être responsables du « maintien de l'ordre » en Mandchourie.

Cet appui aux visées japonaises épaula la pression militaire sur Tsitsikar, car cette place représente la dernière forteresse de la résistance à l'occupation nipponne. Tsitsikar tombée, les Japonais mettraient un de leurs vils agents à la tête de la province de Heilung-Kiang et pourraient alors traiter avec les trois provinces indépendantes, c'est-à-dire sanctionner l'annexion de fait de la Mandchourie.

Et ils seraient maîtres dans la zone de l'Est-Chinois, qui serait, avec l'appui de la France, enlevée à l'influence de l'U.R.S.S. et remis aux mains des impérialistes de la Russo-Asiatique.

Les provocations les plus insolentes, la campagne de presse, les complots des gardes-blancs, montrent donc clairement la direction de l'occupation japonaise et le rôle véritable des canailles du Kuomintang, instruments dociles aux mains des impérialistes.

Dans ces conditions, la question du front uni à la base contre les nouvelles menaces dont est l'objet l'Union soviétique, contre le dépècement de la Chine, contre la terreur des généraux japonais, d'une part, et des bourreaux du Kuomintang, de l'autre, contre la Société des Nations impérialistes, contre les gouvernements de brigandage d'Angleterre, de France et d'Amérique, est plus que jamais à l'ordre du jour.

Tous les membres du parti alertés, doivent s'employer sans relâche, à démontrer aux larges masses ouvrières, le rôle infâme de l'impérialisme français dans le plan d'agression contre l'U.R.S.S., en Extrême Orient.

Lundi prochain va se réunir, à Paris, le Conseil de la S.D.N., pour « examiner » à nouveau, la situation en Mandchourie. Ce sera un nouveau concile pour le renforcement du front uni des impérialistes contre l'Union soviétique, contre les travailleurs chinois.

Dans les usines et chantiers, nous devons

mettre à nu l'œuvre impérialiste criminelle de la S.D.N. et aussi le rôle impérialiste et antisoviétique du social-fascisme français et international dans la lutte de la bourgeoisie contre l'Etat ouvrier.

Il faut par tous les moyens possibles, empêcher une nouvelle intervention contre la patrie socialiste des travailleurs et des masses opprimées du monde entier.

La guerre impérialiste menace.

L'Union soviétique est en danger !

La mobilisation pour une puissante action contre la guerre impérialiste et pour la défense de l'U.R.S.S., de tous les ouvriers communistes, socialistes, sans parti est la tâche pressante des heures présentes.

M. MAGNIEN.

Pop. 11

Enclosure No. 6 to Despatch No. 1951  
of November 13, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE POPULAIRE, November 11, 1931.

## Les troubles de Tien-Tsin ont été provoqués par le Japon

Les Japonais ont adressé un ultimatum  
au général Ma, à Tsitsikar

*Dans une note adressée à la S. D. N., la Chine accuse formellement les Japonais d'avoir provoqué les troubles de Tien-Tsin. Par contre, le Japon rejette naturellement toute la responsabilité sur les « bandits » chinois et sur l'agitation anti-japonaise soutenue par les autorités de Nankin.*

*Mais une communication de source japonaise semble expliquer cette affaire ténébreuse. Les commandants des garnisons étrangères et les consuls étrangers, à Tien-Tsin, émus par les troubles, se sont réunis pour examiner les mesures à prendre en vue de protéger les vies et les biens des étrangers. Ainsi, grâce aux événements de Tien-Tsin, le Conseil de la S. D. N. qui se réunira le 16 novembre à Paris, sera saisi de rapports des gouvernements ayant des concessions à Tien-Tsin, qui se plaindront de l'insécurité des étrangers en Chine. Ainsi la thèse du Japon serait justifiée. Son action militaire en Mandchourie apparaîtrait alors comme une opération de police ayant pour but de sauvegarder les intérêts de tous les étrangers en Chine.*

*On comprendra que dans ces conditions, nous nous refusons d'admettre aussi bien la version japonaise des événements de Tien-Tsin que l'explication naïve des « troubles spontanés ». Ceux-ci servent trop bien les intérêts du Japon pour être indépendants de la volonté du commandement japonais.*

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*Quant à la région de Tsitsikar, les combats semblent interrompus. Mais de nouvelles batailles sont en perspective. Les Japonais n'ont pas abandonné leur projet de s'emparer de ce centre important. Ils ont adressé au général Ma un ultimatum pour lui enjoindre de remettre le pouvoir entre les mains des autorités « autonomes », qui sont en réalité des créatures du Japon.*

*Si Tokio réussit à s'emparer de Tsitsikar avant le 16 novembre, le Conseil de la S. D. N. se trouvera devant la situation suivante : dans les trois capitales de la Mandchourie, à Moukden, à Kirine et à Tsitsikar, le pouvoir sera entre les mains des « gouvernements autonomes » qui proclameront « l'indépendance » de la Mandchourie... sous la protection généreuse de Tokio.*

*On pourra discuter alors pour savoir si oui ou non, le pacte Kellogg est violé et si le Covenant n'a pas été quelque peu oublié. — O. R.*



Ref. 11

Enclosure No. 7 to Despatch No. 1951  
of November 13, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LA REPUBLIQUE, November 11, 1931.

## AUTOUR DU CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS

# L'armée de la civilisation

Republique

11/11

Nous n'avons pas le droit de laisser nos adversaires continuer leur affreuse campagne sur le Japon, gendarme de la civilisation et pacificateur possible de la Chine. La thèse est soutenue dans tous nos organes réactionnaires et modérés. Et il est bien entendu que la Chine est en plein état d'anarchie, tandis que le Japon, équipé à l'européenne, jouit d'un gouvernement régulier et fort, mais la civilisation ne réside pas uniquement dans l'ordre apparent, dans les polices et les gendarmeries.

Déjà, il y a quelques jours, M. Stéphane Lauzanne écrivant dans le *Matin* nous rapportait ce propos de quelques Américains :

— Gardez bien votre armée. Elle est la gardienne de la civilisation.

Je me défie grandement pour ma part de ces bras séculiers que l'on voudrait volontiers offrir à la « civilisation » et j'ai été effrayé, il y a huit jours, de voir M. Léon Blum écrire dans le *Populaire* à propos d'un projet de restauration des Habsbourg : « Qu'en pense Paris ? Qu'en pense Londres ? Qu'en pense Prague ? »

Mais que pouvaient en penser ces trois capitales ? Et si elles avaient pensé que la restauration des Habsbourg était néfaste à l'Europe et que cependant la Hongrie et l'Autriche l'eussent désirée ? Prague et Bucarest auraient-elles dû mobiliser ? Mais si l'Italie avait pensé le contraire ? Avec sa méthode, M. Léon Blum mettait le feu à l'Europe.

Je sais bien que la S. D. N. aurait pu intervenir pour préciser les conditions d'une intervention. A temps ? C'est douteux. Et puis voit-on la S. D. N. commandant à l'armée tchécoslovaque de marcher sur Vienne ou sur Budapest ?

Dans le cas du Japon et de la Mandchourie, il y a quelque chose de pire. C'est que l'armée du Japon risque d'apparaître non pas comme l'armée de l'ordre, mais comme l'armée du capitalisme ou du moins d'un certain capitalisme. En effet, nous avons souligné déjà plus d'une fois que la Mandchourie avait été colonisée par des millions de coolies chinois et quelques milliers d'ingénieurs japonais, appuyés par quelque trente milliards de francs de capitaux investis.

S'il n'y avait que cela !... Mais voici

que tandis que monte le flot japonais, descend le flot russe. Si les Japonais ont des droits sur la Mandchourie du Sud, les Soviets ont des droits sur la Mandchourie du Nord. Les chemins de fer nord-sud sont contrôlés par les uns, les chemins de fer est-ouest par les autres. Que l'armée japonaise apparaisse par trop comme l'armée du capitalisme, ou d'un certain capitalisme, l'armée soviétique fera entendre qu'elle est l'armée du prolétariat. Les deux impérialismes se renforceront chacun d'une idéologie et la guerre qui peut les mettre aux prises débordera le plan national pour prendre le caractère d'une guerre civile. Tout cela pour dire que si le Japon représente une civilisation, comme le disent nos confrères, les Soviets pourraient bien représenter une autre civilisation aussi, ou tout au moins un aspect de la civilisation assez différent du premier. Et nous ne parlons que du Japon et des Soviets. Pourquoi les Etats-Unis, l'Angleterre, la France n'interviendraient-ils pas, toujours au nom de la civilisation ?

Mais, bien pire. Cette armée japonaise baptisée de la civilisation par nos confrères nationalistes, la S. D. N. la considère comme une armée qui poursuit des buts impérialistes avoués. Et il semble bien que Genève ait vu juste.

La vérité est qu'il faut que toutes les armées renoncent à se croire et à se dire les « bras séculiers » de la civilisation. L'ordre dans le monde devrait être organisé par Genève, mais s'il pouvait l'être — et il suffirait pour cela que le Bureau eût plus d'audace qu'il n'en a, et qu'un Briand ne fût pas combattu par les ministres de son propre pays — les armées et les marines nationales ne devraient en aucun cas être utilisées comme moyens d'action par la S. D. N. Une armée internationale, tant qu'on voudra. L'emploi d'armées ou de marines nationales, jamais.

Au surplus, pour l'heure, nous continuons de considérer l'armée japonaise comme une armée qui domine son gouvernement et veut tout bonnement annexer la Mandchourie et reculer les limites de l'Empire. Jusqu'à preuve du contraire, cela ne s'appelle pas, ou ne s'appelle plus, en 1931, servir la civilisation.

Pierre DOMINIQUE.

Enclosure No. 8 to Despatch No. 1951  
of November 13, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'AGENCE TECHNIQUE DE LA PRESSE, November 12, 1931.

### La Question du Jour

## De Corse en Chine



La Chine est un pays charmant (air connu). La Corse aussi — et l'édilité ajaccienne de M. François Coty ne suffit pas plus à l'enlaidir que la turbulence des autres « bandits d'honneur ».

Mais toutes charmantes que soient ces contrées accidentées, il s'y passe pourtant des choses dont il vaudrait mieux se préserver.

Pourquoi réunir, fût-ce par la pensée, la Corse à la Chine? Voici : la situation est identique — toutes proportions de grandeur réservées. En Corse comme en Chine, des bandes tuent et pillent. Quand en Corse ils se comptent cent, ils sont cent mille en Chine. C'est toute la différence. Pour rétablir l'ordre en Corse, la France a dû équiper une petite expédition qui n'a rien de pacifique et qui, pourtant, ne heurte, en aucune manière, ni les accords de Locarno, ni le pacte de la Société des Nations, ni le pacte Briand-Kellogg, qui met la guerre hors la loi. Car si la guerre est hors la loi, le banditisme l'est aussi. Pour obtenir paix et sécurité, il convient que messieurs les brigands commencent. Or, messieurs les brigands n'ont que recommencé de rançonner et de tuer, en Corse comme en Chine; — en Corse, l'unité reste l'unité, en Chine l'unité est le millier; répétons-le : c'est toute la différence.

Personne ne s'avisera de contester la légitimité, ni même la nécessité, de l'expédition des six cents gardes mobiles partis de Marseille sur l'El Djem pour exterminer les brigands corse. M. Pertinax lui-même, quelles que puissent être ses impertinences envers la vérité, ne raille pas pour cela M. Briand, l'assemblée de Genève et le pacifisme. Pas plus qu'il ne dira que M. Chiappe, belliqueux gardien de la paix publique, offense la Dame de l'Ariana, dont les constructions ne sont d'ailleurs pas aussi fragiles qu'on veut bien le dire. Pourtant, tous les « bien-pensants » font grief à M. Briand des affaires de Mandchourie, parce que notre ministère des Affaires étrangères a été requis d'intervenir par l'unanimité des nations associées. Il était le technicien de la paix, ou, si vous préférez, le colonel des pompiers. Le feu avait pris à l'autre bout de l'Asie. Tout le monde s'est tourné vers lui en appelant au secours. Il paraît que cela le diminue, tant la logique nationaliste a des subtilités inaccessibles au vulgaire.

Pourtant, il est indiscutable qu'il existe une très grande différence entre ce qui se passe en Corse et ce qui se passe en Mandchourie. En Corse, la France intervient — grâce à Louis XV, — en territoire français. En Mandchourie, au contraire, les Japonais interviennent — grâce au concert européen qui dicta les traités — en territoire chinois. Il en résulte qu'une mesure de police devient une guerre et que — style Pertinax-Buré-de Wendel — la Société des Nations a fait faillite.

Pourtant!

A Tien-Tsin, les postes de police chinois furent attaqués par des émeutiers. Cela s'accompagna de violentes échauffourées. L'artillerie japonaise crut devoir intervenir pour assurer la protection d'une zone neutre. Mais elle a tiré à blanc. Vous voyez que tout cela ne ressemble pas à la guerre.

Est-ce à dire que ce soit rassurant? Nullement. Il y a toujours danger à jouer avec le feu. Et quand les canons s'en mêlent, ils risquent de ne pas tirer longtemps à blanc. Mais enfin, s'il n'y avait pas la Société des Nations et sa mystique, où en seraient maintenant les Japonais? Plus loin qu'à Tien-Tsin, à coup sûr, et leurs coups de canon n'auraient rien d'un avertissement. Il y a donc quelque chose de changé dans le monde, et même lorsqu'ils croient avoir raison, les Etats n'osent plus se faire justice eux-mêmes.

Cela dit, nous reconnaissons bien volontiers que tout le malentendu provient de ce que les Japonais opèrent en territoire chinois. En territoire chinois, puisque la carence du gendarme chinois est établie — comme celle du gendarme corse — une intervention étrangère peut paraître nécessaire. Encore faut-il qu'on n'en puisse discuter la légi-

vent être nécessaires — doivent ne s'effectuer que sur mandat de la Société des Nations, par les gendarmes de la Société des Nations. Pourquoi, en attendant qu'une organisation de police internationale puisse être créée, ne demanderait-on pas aux Etats de mettre à la disposition de la Société des Nations et sous les ordres de ses commissaires, une fraction des forces nationales? Si des troupes japonaises étaient intervenues en Mandchourie dans de telles conditions, en vertu d'un semblable mandat, personne n'aurait rien pu objecter à leur activité. Tandis que dans les conditions actuelles, rien ne légitime l'intervention japonaise. C'est le Japon qui se met hors la loi. Par lui, la guerre menace. Est-il donc si difficile de proposer clairement, au grand jour, la formule par laquelle la paix du monde serait enfin placée sous la sauvegarde de justes lois?

(AGENCE TECHNIQUE DE LA PRESSE)

Enclosure No. 8 to Despatch No. 1951  
of November 13, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'AGENCE TECHNIQUE DE LA PRESSE, November 12, 1931.

### La Question du Jour

## De Corse en Chine



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vent être nécessaires — doivent ne s'effectuer que sur mandat de la Société des Nations, par les gendarmes de la Société des Nations. Pourquoi, en attendant qu'une organisation de police internationale puisse être créée, ne demanderait-on pas aux Etats de mettre à la disposition de la Société des Nations et sous les ordres de ses commissaires, une fraction des forces nationales? Si des troupes japonaises étaient intervenues en Mandchourie dans de telles conditions, en vertu d'un semblable mandat, personne n'aurait rien pu objecter à leur activité. Tandis que dans les conditions actuelles, rien ne légitime l'intervention japonaise. C'est le Japon qui se met hors la loi. Par lui, la guerre menace. Est-il donc si difficile de proposer clairement, au grand jour, la formule par laquelle la paix du monde serait enfin placée sous la sauvegarde de justes lois?

(AGENCE TECHNIQUE DE LA PRESSE)

Enc. 12

Enclosure No. 9 to Despatch No. 1951  
of November 13, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ERE NOUVELLE, November 12, 1931.

# LE FEU en Extrême-Orient

par Edouard HERRIOT

En vérité, radicaux mes amis, radicaux mes frères, tout va bien, du moins pour nous. J'observe que le *Temps* est maussade ; mais c'est la saison. Il nous accuse d'avoir fait beaucoup de bruit pour rien ; souvenir classique. *Much ado about nothing*. Et c'est un fait que notre congrès fut parfaitement calme. Je vois aussi que M. Jean Luchaire s'efforce à opposer les « vieux radicaux », dont je suis l'un, aux jeunes radicaux par lui représentés. Notre parti serait donc comparable à ces terres andalouses, dont parlait un ancien voyageur, où l'hiver et l'été semblent mêlés ensemble, neige sur les sommets, au sol lauriers nouveaux. Je sais que M. Jean Luchaire ne me refusera pas ses bienveillants conseils. Déjà, l'on avait tenté de m'opposer au rapporteur de notre politique extérieure. Nous nous sommes bien facilement mis d'accord. Je connais Cot ; il est pareil à un vin généreux ; il lui manquait seulement un peu de bouteille ; le cru est de qualité.

..

Et maintenant ? — Maintenant, au travail. De toutes parts, les difficultés s'offrent à ce rationalisme que notre parti doit appliquer à la politique. La paix étant notre préoccupation principale, nous sommes bien obligés, Cot ou moi, d'observer les dangers qu'elle court en Extrême-Orient. Affaire grave, très grave. Affaire qu'il faut analyser avant d'en juger. On ne peut plus douter que le Japon exécute en Mandchourie un plan concerté, en corrélation étroite avec les expéditions de jadis contre la Chine et contre la Russie. Depuis le traité de Portsmouth (septembre 1905), cette puissance tient à sa discrétion la Corée, qui lui sert de base pour attaquer la Mandchourie, et l'on se souvient sans doute que l'assassinat du prince Ito à Kharbin fut l'origine des mesures qui conférèrent au Japon la pleine souveraineté sur la presqu'île. Rien d'instructif comme la savante progression avec laquelle a opéré le Japon depuis le jour où une histoire de forêts sur l'Amnok provoqua la guerre avec la Russie.

Aujourd'hui, Japon et Corée sont également surpeuplés, et il suffit de jeter les yeux sur une carte pour voir combien peut sembler tentante une extension dans cette Mandchourie qui possède, tracée en partie par l'important fleuve Yalou, une longue frontière commune avec la Corée. Le pays des Mantchous produit en quantité considérable une soie sauvage due à un ver qui se nourrit des feuilles du chêne. Elle se prête à la culture du coton et du riz ; elle a des prairies, donc des troupeaux.

mules. Quelles que soient les raisons qui l'ont provoqué et les conditions dans lesquelles il a eu lieu, le bombardement de Tien-tsin, si la nouvelle s'en confirme, est un fait d'une extrême gravité.

Mais, si, d'autre part, le général Ma ouvrait les hostilités dans le Nord, ce serait la guerre, la vraie guerre, l'atroce guerre. Ma gouverne la province de Hei Long Kiang, dont la capitale est cette ville de Tsitsikar, sur la Nonni, bien souvent citée dans les derniers jours. Un pont en fer de quatre travées franchit la rivière ; la région n'est guère ouverte au commerce étranger que depuis une vingtaine d'années ; des temples bouddhiques, des monastères de lamas s'érigent dans un pays si souvent ravagé par la guerre, au cours de l'histoire, qu'il a fallu y construire une ville murée, sous la protection d'un maréchal tartare. La guerre est là, qui rôde, sur ces terres aujourd'hui sillonnées par le chemin de fer de l'Est Chinois que l'on pensait devoir être un instrument de civilisation, dans un étrange paysage où s'élèvent, autour d'anciens bassins d'eau salée, des plateaux de sable, les cimes des monts Khingan, de sombres forêts de pins et de mélèzes où s'enfoncent comme des coins les roches pourpres à taches blanches du porphyre. Un effort a été tenté par la Chine, en ce début de siècle, pour organiser en province civile, sous l'autorité du vice-roi des Trois Provinces Orientales de Moukden, cette région du Hei Long Kiang où circulent présentement les bandes armées de Ma et les troupes japonaises, ces dernières appuyées, selon toute vraisemblance, sur la Soungari, le Fleuve-des-fleurs-de-pin.

La rigueur du climat rendra bientôt les opérations difficiles en avant de Kharbin ; elle va « geler », suivant un mot à la mode, les positions des uns et des autres, et c'est un élément dont la diplomatie doit tenir compte. On pouvait espérer que la civilisation, la création de ports et d'ateliers, l'installation d'industries humaniseraient un pays qui a connu, lui aussi, pendant des siècles et des siècles, la folie de la guerre et la fièvre de l'or. Il n'en est rien. De Moukden, où il s'est installé, l'état-major japonais surveille, avec une minutie que l'on imagine, ces contrées mal défendues par leurs occupants, ces parcours d'où sont partis, jadis, les conquérants de Pékin. Derrière sa rouge frontière, à Mantchouria, gardée par le Fleuve-du-dragon-noir, la Russie des Soviets épie, Washington est aux écoutes. Si les nouvelles qui nous parviennent sont exactes, on se demande comment se desserrera une forte prise qui

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elle a des prairies, donc des troupeaux. Le Japon y a introduit des immigrants par centaines de milliers et des capitaux par milliards. Pour résumer en une formule simple et sommaire de nombreux renseignements, il ne semble pas impossible que le Japon ait voulu utiliser, pour régler les difficultés qu'accumulait contre lui l'administration de Chang Sue Liang, les circonstances spécialement favorables que lui créent les embarras présents des grandes puissances européennes. Première conséquence de notre désunion.

..

L'heure actuelle est particulièrement grave. Voici le trouble dans Tien-tsin, à quatre-vingts milles de Pékin. Suivant certaines dépêches, les troupes japonaises auraient bombardé la vieille cité chinoise dont les Boxeurs, en 1900, avaient fait un camp retranché si formidable, mais que les conventions récentes ont privé de ses fortifications. Que se passe-t-il, en ce moment, sur les deux rives du Hai-po, le long des concessions européennes ? On nous dit que les opérations militaires ont eu seulement pour objet de protéger les intérêts japonais. Nous connaissons ces for-

mules. Quelles que soient les raisons qui l'ont provoqué et les conditions dans lesquelles il a eu lieu, le bombardement de Tien-tsin, si la nouvelle s'en confirme, est un fait d'une extrême gravité.

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M. Aristide Briand, bien ou mal soutenu (?), a fait, de toute évidence, les efforts les plus patients, les plus héroïques. Mais on ne semble pas avoir compris encore, en Europe, l'importance de la rivière Nonni, cette Marne mandchourienne ; la gravité des incidents survenus à Tchang-tchouen (sur le chemin de fer de Kharbin à Moukden) où les avoirs des banques chinoises (de la *Chinese Treasury*, je pense) auraient été saisis. La Mandchourie est occupée, bien occupée, solidement occupée. Pendant que délibérait une Société des Nations, où les Etats-Unis et la Russie se présentent de la façon que l'on sait, le Japon agissait. — Mes jeunes amis du parti radical doivent comprendre maintenant pourquoi j'ai parlé de la paix avec une certaine gravité.

Hgcm:12

Enclosure No. 10 to Despatch No. 1951  
of November 13, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'HUMANITE, November 12, 1931.

Debout pour la défense de l'U. R. S. S. et de la révolution chinoise !

## A TIEN-TSIN, LA GARNISON FRANÇAISE EST MOBILISÉE CONTRE LES TRAVAILLEURS CHINOIS

Le plan impérialiste de la provocation antisoviétique en Extrême-Orient et du dépeçement de la Chine pour son exploitation renforcée et pour en faire une base d'action contre l'U. R. S. S., se réalise ponctuellement et avec rapidité.

Pendant qu'au Nord de la Mandchourie les préparatifs de la prise de Tsitsikar et de la main-mise sur l'Est Chinois se poursuivent activement, une manœuvre de grand style est engagée à Tien-Tsin pour faciliter l'intervention des puissances.

### A Tien-Tsin

Les nouvelles parvenues dans la journée d'hier à Paris confirment tout ce que nous avons dénoncé dans l'Humanité des desseins impérialistes, avec l'impérialisme français comme principal inspirateur.

Les émeutes de Tien-Tsin ont repris dès avant-hier. Des combats entre Chinois et Japonais ont eu lieu dans l'espace compris entre la ville chinoise et la concession japonaise. On annonce que des effectifs chinois pouvant comprendre 30.000 hommes s'apprêtent à attaquer la concession japonaise. Plusieurs coups de mortiers de tranchées ont été tirés par les Japonais qui ont fait usage de fusils et de mitrailleuses.

Il faut chercher une explication de ces faits. Il n'est pas douteux que le mouvement de masse antijaponais ne fait que se développer dans toute la Chine. Les ouvriers et les paysans de Mandchourie, par la grève, par la résistance à l'occupation nipponne, se soulèvent contre l'impérialisme oppresseur. Dans les autres régions de Chine, la poussée antiimpérialiste croît sans cesse en force et en étendue. Les masses travailleuses chinoises, manifestant leur sympathie agissante pour les Soviétiques et l'armée rouge chinoise, mènent une lutte de plus en plus implacable contre tous les impérialismes et contre les bourreaux du Kuomintang, de gauche comme de droite, dont la politique livre la Chine aux forbanes qui se la veulent partager.

Dans les événements de Tien-Tsin, il est probable qu'une grande part de cette agitation antiimpérialiste soit à la base du mouvement antijaponais.

Mais il n'est pas exclu non plus que des provocations japonaises aient joué pour déclencher des « attaques » contre la concession chinoise afin de justifier encore le renforcement de l'occupation nipponne de la Mandchourie et faciliter la sanction officielle de la S. D. N.

Cependant, cette provocation — hypothèse très vraisemblable comme on va le voir — n'a pas pour unique but de favoriser les desseins de l'Empire du Soleil Levant.

### Vers l'intervention

Le plan général, c'est l'intervention des grandes puissances impérialistes en Chine. Mais il faut trouver le prétexte devant l'opinion ouvrière alertée. Le prétexte de la « sécurité » à sauvegarder est une chose qui n'est pas encore usée. Aussi bien les combats dans les rues de Tien-Tsin mettent « en danger cette sécurité » des concessions étrangères.

C'est dans ces conditions que des démarches ont été entreprises pour provoquer l'intervention des autres puissances.

Les commandants des détachements étrangers à Tien-Tsin ont eu une conférence avec le commandant des forces japonaises du Nord de la Chine afin d'« envisager les mesures à prendre en commun pour rétablir l'« ordre ».

Les garnisons étrangères ont été mobilisées pour assurer la défense des différentes concessions. La garnison française a reçu l'ordre de se tenir prête à toute éventualité.

Voyez-vous, camarades ouvriers, quel plan se dessine ? Comprenez-vous quels sont les buts véritables de répression du mouvement révolutionnaire antiimpérialiste en Chine par les forces d'occupation étrangères et, par développement logique, de participation à l'aggression japonaise préparée contre l'Union soviétique ?

Les forces françaises de Tien-Tsin joueraient le principal rôle à côté du Japon dans cette œuvre criminelle, étant les plus fortes dans cette ville (les Japonais n'ont que 600 hommes). En effet, c'est à Tien-Tsin que se trouve le commandement supérieur des troupes françaises de terre en Chine.

### Les forces militaires françaises

En plus on y compte :

- la direction de l'intendance ;
- le service de l'artillerie et du génie ;
- un parc d'artillerie ;
- un détachement de gendarmerie ;
- le 16<sup>e</sup> régiment d'infanterie coloniale (état-major et deux bataillons) ;
- le groupe mixte d'artillerie coloniale (deux batteries, moins une section) ;
- deux sections de chars de combat ;
- un détachement de télégraphistes coloniaux ;
- un détachement de commis ouvriers d'administration coloniale ;
- un détachement d'infirmiers coloniaux.

Nous parlons ici des seules forces militaires cantonnées à Tien-Tsin, car à Shanghai, à Canton, à Hankéou, à Pékin, à Tong-Kou, de nombreux effectifs sont casernés représentant 5 à 6 mille hommes de troupes de combat. Et le Waldeck-Rousseau ainsi que cinq avions et les notilles du Yang-Tsé-Kiang et du Li-Kiang représentent encore près de 1.700 hommes ou officiers sans compter les marins en dépôt, etc.

Rappelons encore que le porte-avions géant Béarn est parti récemment pour l'Extrême-Orient.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

L'impérialisme français veut renouveler son œuvre criminelle de 1927, quand les balles françaises couchaient les ouvriers révolutionnaires de Tien-Tsin et de Shanghai. La lutte contre la révolution chinoise, contre les Soviétistes chinois, seules forces libératrices de la Chine sous le joug, la balkanisation de cet immense pays sont les buts immédiats des impérialistes de Paris, avec le renforcement du faisceau des provocations à la guerre contre l'Union Soviétique.

L'affaire de Tien-Tsin, jointe aux opérations de guerre contre Tsitsikar, est donc une nouvelle raison de renforcer la lutte contre notre propre impérialisme, pour empêcher l'intervention des puissances en Chine.

### **Une armée internationale ?**

Nous signalions hier que Tchang Kai Shek « suggérait » la constitution d'une armée internationale pour assurer la sécurité en Mandchourie et disions que c'était l'appel à l'intervention. Les derniers événements nous ont rapidement donné raison. Et de son côté, le gouvernement de Tokio a fait dire par un porte-parole que :

*Les milieux officiels espèrent qu'à la prochaine réunion de la Société des Nations qui aura lieu lundi prochain, le Japon réussira à faire adopter son point de vue suivant lequel seuls les étrangers sont capables de donner à la Chine un gouvernement honnête.*

*En conséquence, il sera nécessaire d'établir une sorte de direction étrangère permanente en Chine afin d'assurer la paix, l'ordre, un bon gouvernement et le respect des traités.*

*On ajoute que la Chine y consentira sans tarder si elle est sincère dans ses protestations de bonne foi.*

Toutes les conditions impérialistes sont donc réunies pour l'intervention et le partage de la Chine. A la prochaine session de la S.D.N. à Paris, Briand, s'il est encore au Quai d'Orsay, aura beau jeu pour faire adopter toutes résolutions nécessaires à la bonne réalisation du plan infâme de dépècement de la Chine et de guerre antisoviétique.

Mais le mouvement antiimpérialiste ne fera que s'étendre et l'intervention des puissances ne fera qu'exacerber la lutte pour la libération du pays.

Quant à nous, pour défendre l'U.R.S.S., pour empêcher l'intervention de répression et de partage de la Chine, il faut porter des coups sans cesse plus sensibles, dans tous les domaines, à notre impérialisme fauteur de guerre, chien enragé de la contre-révolution en Extrême Orient.

**M. MAGNIEN.**




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Le prolétariat français a témoigné ainsi sa volonté de s'opposer résolument aux entreprises lourdes à cette heure contre les révolutionnaires d'Extrême-Orient. Il n'en faut point douter un instant : L'acte de brigandage accompli par le Japon ne se propose pas seulement comme objectif d'instaurer en Extrême-Orient la prépondérance de l'impérialisme nippon, mais encore, mais surtout de créer au nord de la Chine une base d'opérations militaires contre l'U.R.S.S. *et contre les soviets chinois.*

## Les Soviets chinois !

Au cours de ces trois dernières années, les révolutionnaires chinois ont soutenu près de 300 combats. Ils luttèrent contre un adversaire mieux équipé et supérieur en nombre. L'en-



Ils ne pouvaient compter que sur l'appui d'une classe ouvrière et d'une paysannerie épuisées par les privations de tous ordres. L'ennemi, lui, était subventionné par les impérialistes. Son armée était encadrée d'officiers des grandes puissances. Parfois même, les impérialistes agissaient sans intermédiaire. *Qu'on se souvienne des sanglants exploits des avions français dans le Kiangsi il y a un peu plus d'un an.*

Tchang Kai Shek, d'ordre des gouvernements de Londres, de Washington, de Paris, avait juré d'exterminer le communisme. Ses armées lui avaient fourni 20 divisions, 3 escadrières, 50 officiers d'état-major. Il fut littéralement écrasé au mois de janvier de cette année dans le Kiangsi.

A l'heure présente, il y a dans l'Inde, le Sud et le Centre de la Chine, 9 rayons soviétiques, c'est-à-dire 300 districts qui peuplent 60 à 80 millions d'habitants. L'armée rouge chinoise — car il y a une armée rouge chinoise qui rêve de marcher sur les traces de sa devancière — compte 100.000 hommes et est soutenue par 4 à 5 millions

Lutter contre la guerre, c'est vulgariser l'œuvre des Soviets chinois, c'est redoubler de vigueur dans la bataille de classe contre l'impérialisme français.

**Gabriel PERL.**



## VIVENT LES SOVIETS DE CHINE !

Comme il se devait, le congrès de la Confédération générale unitaire a adressé au cours de l'une de ses premières séances, un message ardent de solidarité au congrès des Soviets chinois convoqué pour les 7 et 8 octobre dans la province de Kiangsi.

Le prolétariat français a témoigné ainsi sa volonté de s'opposer résolument aux entreprises ourdies à cette heure contre les révolutionnaires d'Extrême-Orient. Il n'en faut point douter un instant : L'acte de brigandage accompli par le Japon ne se propose pas seulement comme objectif d'instaurer en Extrême-Orient la prépondérance de l'impérialisme nippon, mais encore, mais surtout de créer au nord de la Chine une base d'opérations militaires contre l'U.R.S.S. et contre les soviets chinois.

C'est parce que le Japon assume cette fonction contre-révolutionnaire, que la plus agressive des puissances capitalistes — nous parlons de la France — l'encourage de toutes ses forces dans son dessein.

Les Soviets chinois !

Il est bien évident que l'une des tâches essentielles qui s'imposent à nous est de faire connaître les luttes sévères qu'ont dû mener depuis plus de trois ans les constructeurs du système soviétique en Asie et les résultats auxquels ils sont parvenus.

Au cours de ces trois dernières années, les révolutionnaires chinois ont soutenu près de 300 combats. Ils luttaient contre un adversaire mieux équipé et supérieur en nombre. L'en-

ponaise à Pin-Tchang, intervention française dans le Kiangsi. D'autre part, ils durent résoudre le problème complexe de la révolution agraire dans les conditions particulières de l'économie agricole chinoise. Il leur fallut plusieurs fois se remettre à la besogne, corriger des erreurs, rectifier des fautes, renouveler les expériences. Le problème, certes, n'est point encore résolu dans son ensemble. Mais nos camarades, avec une obstination qui tient de l'héroïsme, s'appliquant à lui trouver une solution correcte.

Dès maintenant, d'ailleurs, des progrès immenses ont été accomplis dans l'organisation de la répartition des terres, des institutions soviétiques de crédits ont été créées pour aider les paysans pauvres.

Des coopératives s'organisent. Des ateliers s'ouvrent où viennent travailler les artisans jusqu'alors frappés par le chômage. Le pouvoir soviétique a inscrit dans son programme l'application généralisée de la journée de huit heures.

Le contrôle ouvrier s'applique à la surveillance des prix de vente, à la lutte contre la spéculation. Les Soviets confisquent les entreprises dont les patrons n'appliquent pas les décrets du pouvoir soviétique.

Le Parti communiste qui est le guide éclairé et sûr de ce mouvement et qui a groupé des millions d'hommes sous le drapeau rouge, compte par milliers ses héros et ses martyrs.

Les plus valeureux de ses militants ont été torturés, crucifiés, sont morts après d'incroyables supplices. Son secrétaire général, San Tchou Fa, tombé aux mains des bourreaux du Kuomintang, a été assassiné.


Mais cette terreur sans nom a décuplé l'ardeur combative des bolcheviks chinois.

Ils sont aujourd'hui à la pointe extrême de la lutte engagée par la réaction mondiale contre la Révolution.

Ils savent, ces millions d'hommes groupés sous le signe de la faucille et du marteau, que l'impérialisme français est leur plus mortel ennemi, l'instigateur de toutes les agressions ourdies contre eux. Et ils comptent sur la solidarité active des prolétaires de France. Ne décevons pas leur attente.

Lutter contre la guerre, c'est vulgariser l'œuvre des Soviets chinois, c'est redoubler de vigueur dans la bataille de classe contre l'impérialisme français.

Gabriel PERI.



nes et est soutenue par des milliers de partisans. Elle est composée avant tout de paysans pauvres. Ses régiments ont des sections politiques qui dirigent l'éducation des soldats.

Ce n'est pas tout. La révolution pendant ces derniers mois a gagné de proche en proche. Dans le Honan, dans le Kanson, la paysannerie est en pleine effervescence. Le *North China News* écrivait la semaine dernière : « Les communistes ont intensifié leur propagande pour les fêtes du XIV<sup>e</sup> anniversaire de la Révolution d'Octobre et en faveur du soutien de l'armée rouge et de la défense de l'Union Soviétique. On découvrit dans les casernes des proclamations invitant les soldats et marins de Grande-Bretagne et des Etats-Unis à défendre l'Union soviétique et à renverser le capitalisme et l'impérialisme. »

Et voici en quels termes, il y a quelques mois, un attaché d'ambassade britannique décrivait l'essor soviétique en Chine : « Il faut reconnaître, — déclarait-il, — que le communisme a pris du pied en Chine. Ce n'est plus la propagande des rouges venue du dehors. Ce n'est plus seulement un facteur politique. C'est une force sociale. L'anéantissement du communisme, — et c'est ainsi seulement qu'on peut s'en débarrasser, — ne peut être atteint qu'au prix d'un gros effort. Car, le communisme est fort par la clarté de son but et la capacité de ses chefs. Les forces potentielles de la nouvelle conscience de classe du prolétariat, comme base du développement de l'activité communiste en Chine, ne doivent jamais être négligées... »

Il va de soi qu'au début de leur constitution, les Soviets chinois se sont heurtés à des difficultés immenses. D'une part, ils eurent à faire face à l'intervention armée des puissances ; intervention américaine à Jo-Tjo-Tu, intervention ja-

Quot 12

Enclosure No. 11 to Despatch No. 1951  
of November 13, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE QUOTIDIEN, November 12, 1931.

### Le Japon propose d'internationaliser le territoire chinois...

On manquait de nouvelles sensationnelles. En voici une, qui nous vient de Tokio par Londres, et que transmet l'Agence Reuter. Un porte-parole du gouvernement japonais a affirmé à cette agence que « la question de la Mandchourie est une question de vie ou de mort pour son pays ».

Ce n'est évidemment pas cela qui surprend, car nul n'ignore les besoins d'expansion de la population japonaise, incapable de vivre sur ses îles et ne cessant de se multiplier...

Ce qui étonne, ce qui émeut, c'est lorsque l'on entend dire que « les milieux officiels espèrent qu'à la prochaine réunion de la S. D. N., lundi prochain, le Japon réussira à faire adopter son point de vue selon lequel, seuls, les étrangers sont capables de donner à la Chine un gouvernement honnête. En conséquence, il sera nécessaire d'établir une sorte de direction étrangère permanente en Chine, afin d'assurer la paix, l'ordre, un bon gouvernement et le respect des traités ».

C'est ce que l'on peut appeler une contre-offensive. Mais elle est un peu... audacieuse.

Car enfin, de quoi s'agit-il ? D'obéir aux suggestions du Conseil qui demande au Japon de retirer ses troupes de Mandchourie... Et, au lieu de cela, le Japon propose... la mise en tutelle de toute la Chine !...

Ainsi, par un biais, il demande bien plus que ce qu'il désirait obtenir dans le groupe V de ses vingt et une demandes de 1915. Il est vrai qu'il envisage un condominium de toutes les puissances, mais avec l'espoir d'être, de cette opération, le principal bénéficiaire.

Utopie dangereuse, surtout en un moment où, plus que jamais, la Chine tend à prendre conscience de son unité ethnique et nationale... Il est vrai aussi qu'un proverbe latin affirme que « la fortune vient en aide aux audacieux » ! A condition de ne point dépasser certaines bornes... — TRENCANEL.

Pop. 12

Enclosure No. 12 to Despatch No. 1951  
of November 13, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE POPULAIRE, November 12, 1931.

## Etrange déclaration de Vorochilov

Les nouvelles de Mandchourie deviennent de plus en plus alarmantes. L'affaire de Tien-Tsin est loin d'être liquidée. Les troubles continuent et les garnisons étrangères sont alertées.

Une note chinoise, parvenue hier à Genève, confirme les renseignements de la veille, également de source chinoise. La Chine accuse formellement le Japon d'avoir provoqué les troubles à Tien-Tsin. Elle prétend en posséder des preuves. La police aurait fait une douzaine de prisonniers, tous des hommes à la solde du Japon. Elle aurait mis la main sur un convoi de fusils, de cartouches et de grenades, provenant de l'arsenal de Moukden, occupé par le Japon le 18 septembre.

Par contre, une note japonaise, également publiée à Genève, rejette toute la responsabilité sur les Chinois et représente l'action militaire du Japon comme une simple protection de la concession japonaise à Tien-Tsin.

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D'autre part, on apprend de sources japonaise et chinoise que des gouvernements « autonomes » se sont établis à Moukden et à Kirin. Un communiqué chinois annonce, en outre, que le Japon veut établir un gouvernement « autonome » à Tsitsikar. Le Japon ne le nie pas. Mais il déclare ne pas vouloir attaquer le Chemin de fer de l'Est Chinois, qui est sous le contrôle russe.

Il semble que le gouvernement des Soviets a confiance dans cette déclaration japonaise. En tout cas, Moscou n'a encore fait à ce sujet aucune démarche auprès du gouvernement de Tokio. Bien que la presse communiste parle, dans des termes violents, des intentions impérialistes du Japon vis-à-vis de la Chine, le gouvernement soviétique n'a pas dit un seul mot qui serait une désapprobation de l'agression japonaise.

Il y a plus. Tandis que l'*Humanité* proteste tous les jours de ses sentiments pro-Chinois et nous accuse de « soutenir l'impérialisme japonais », les dirigeants de Moscou ont une attitude contraire.

Ainsi, je trouve dans la *Pravda* du 6 novembre une interview que Vorochilov, commissaire à la Guerre, avait donnée à M. Cook, représentant de l'Agence *United Press*. Le passage suivant mérite toute notre attention :

En répondant à la question, que peut-on attendre de la prochaine session de la S.D.N. en ce qui concerne le problème mandchou, Vorochilov a répondu : « Je ne crois ni à la sincérité ni à l'efficacité de l'action de la S. D. N. ».

C'est net. Mais la *Pravda* ajoute :

Malgré le ton violemment antijaponais de l'éditorial d'aujourd'hui du journal « *Izvestia* », Vorochilov a déclaré que « l'attitude du gouvernement des Soviets dépendra entièrement de la sincérité (sic !) du gouvernement japonais et de son désir de conserver avec nous des rapports de bon voisinage, ainsi que le gouvernement japonais le proclame tout le temps. En ce qui nous concerne, ajouta Vorochilov, nous sommes et nous restons pour le maintien des rapports de bon voisinage avec le Japon. »

Que les communistes français nous expliquent cette attitude de l'U. R. S. S. qui insiste sur ses rapports amicaux avec l'impérialisme japonais et ne dit pas un mot en faveur de la Chine, dont le territoire est violé !

O. ROSENFELD.

Annex 13

Enclosure No. 13 to Despatch No. 1951  
of November 13, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'AVENIR, November 13, 1931.

## La Crise de la Société des Nations

La Société des Nations est en pleine crise. Le conflit sino-japonais, qu'elle a ambitionné d'apaiser, a fait éclater à la fois l'insuffisance de ses moyens d'action et les faiblesses de sa politique. Les gens raisonnables qui apprécient les difficultés de sa tâche lui auraient plus volontiers pardonné son impuissance, à laquelle ils s'attendaient, que son inhabileté, qu'ils soupçonnaient moins. Il est grave, pour le conseil de la S. D. N., d'avoir donné au monde le spectacle d'une diplomatie s'exerçant à contre-sens avec une obstination qui devient émouvante, sans cesser pour cela d'être pénible. On l'accuse d'avoir enfreint sa propre loi, d'avoir manqué d'objectivité et même d'une certaine honnêteté en usant d'intimidation à l'égard d'une des parties en cause; mais on l'accuse plus encore d'avoir, par incompréhension des réalités de la situation en Mandchourie, compliqué fâcheusement les choses en développant le mouvement antijaponais sur le théâtre des difficultés et des désordres.

On ne peut guère ne pas s'apercevoir de ces errements. Ils sautent aux yeux. Alors, on se prend à réfléchir, on substitue, mentalement, au conflit sino-japonais un imaginaire conflit européen et l'on se dit :

— Le cas échéant, voilà donc comment réagirait le conseil de la S. D. N. ! Voilà l'aide dont il est capable ! Voilà toute la sécurité que son concours peut nous offrir !

Il devient trop évident qu'on ne peut sans péril laisser à cet organisme le soin de veiller seul sur la paix.

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Sans doute, par son existence même, la Société des Nations constitue un obstacle aux entreprises bellicistes. Les nations qu'elle a plus ou moins entravées dans une foule de pactes, d'engagements moraux et de déclarations de principe éprouvent bien quelque hésitation, au moment d'en venir aux mains, lorsqu'elles s'entendent rappeler ces platoniques obligations. Il en sera ainsi, du moins, jusqu'à ce qu'un belligérant se sente assez fort de son droit pour passer outre, résolument. Ce précédent une fois créé, l'œuvre purement rédactionnelle de la Société des Nations sera bonne à jeter au feu.

Ce n'est pas l'institution qu'il faut blâmer; elle répond à un idéal élevé; elle réalise une conception chère aux esprits généreux; elle est basée sur des principes dont la justesse n'est pas niable. Et l'on pouvait à bon droit s'imaginer, le jour où on l'a inventée, qu'elle organiserait la sécurité progressivement en dotant la communauté des nations d'un droit public international moderne, d'un code de procédure de la paix et de juridictions correctes offrant aux justiciables toutes les garanties d'une justice impartiale et pertinente. Tel a bien été, au surplus, dès le premier jour, le programme de la S. D. N. D'où vient qu'après douze ans d'existence il faille constater aujourd'hui le néant de ses multiples efforts ?

La faute en est aux puissances dirigeantes, à leur refus systématique de prendre des engagements sérieux, à leur recherche des solutions les plus notoirement inefficaces, au soin qu'elles ont mis en toute circonstance à préférer les formules vagues ou simplement abstraites aux textes concrets, précis et constructifs.

Tel est l'aboutissement inévitable des délibérations sanctionnées suivant le principe de l'unanimité, qui est à la fois une sauvegarde et une cause d'affaiblissement.

Que voulez-vous, à l'heure présente, que le conseil de la S. D. N. puisse offrir aux puissances en conflit pour les engager à régler pacifiquement leurs différends ? Il a montré, en maintes circonstances, son inaptitude à arbitrer lui-même les affaires qu'on lui a soumises. Pas une seule fois il n'a su faire abstraction de préoccupations politiques et n'a donné aux parties en cause cette impression qu'il était animé d'un esprit de solidarité internationale. Quand les représentants de l'Angleterre, de l'Allemagne,

en avait priés et d'assurer le respect des textes, ils ont essayé de rendre des services aux parties en cause. On attendait d'eux un avis; ils ont envoyé trois solutions, dont aucune ne constituait à proprement parler la thèse officielle de la Cour de La Haye.

Et le conseil de la S. D. N. a été, de son côté, tout heureux de n'avoir pas lui-même à prendre une décision plus courageuse, les auteurs du protocole litigieux, MM. Curtius et Schober, ayant, fort à propos, déclaré y renoncer volontairement, reportant ainsi à plus tard la solution d'une difficulté qui exigeait une décision immédiate et définitive.

En évitant de se prononcer catégoriquement sur un point d'intérêt capital — puisqu'il s'agissait de dire si les traités avaient été violés — le conseil de la S. D. N., aussi bien que la Cour de Justice de La Haye, a gravement compromis les intérêts de la paix. Les juges de La Haye, en particulier, ont perdu l'occasion qui s'offrait à eux de montrer aux nations la valeur des institutions du Droit. Les peuples ont compris ce jour-là qu'ils ne pouvaient pas, sans péril pour leurs intérêts moraux et matériels, s'adresser à ce tribunal, coupable de véritable forfaiture en évitant de statuer dans la première affaire vraiment importante et de conséquence qui lui ait été soumise.

La Société des Nations n'est donc pas outillée pour mettre fin pacifiquement à un conflit de quelque envergure. Les organismes qu'elle a créés n'ont ni l'autorité, ni l'intégrité, ni le caractère qu'exigerait une telle entreprise. Ils inspirent une grande méfiance.

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Dans le conflit sino-japonais, le conseil n'a pas été au fond des choses, il ne s'est pas attaqué à la racine du mal; il s'en est bien gardé; il n'a pas cherché à établir solidement la paix; il s'est contenté de dire aux intéressés : Disputez-vous, mais ne vous battez pas. Il ne s'est donc pas occupé de faire disparaître la cause du conflit. Il ne le pouvait d'ailleurs pas. Sa faiblesse vient, en effet, de ce qu'il est obligé de demander partout et à tous le respect du *statu quo*, alors que, dans certaines contrées du monde, c'est précisément ce *statu quo* qui rend la paix hargneuse et précaire. La Société des Nations agit comme si la géographie politique de l'univers avait trouvé sa forme définitive à partir du jour où le Covenant a été signé; elle s'est instituée la gardienne de cet équilibre, et les changements, même pacifiques, qu'on voudrait y apporter lui sont insupportables. Les besoins d'expansion des nations surpeuplées et, comme le Japon, trop à l'étroit sur leur territoire, sont cependant générateurs de difficultés, d'incidents perpétuels. La Société des Nations ne peut que recommander, en pareil cas, la temporisation. Elle ne réussit, en mettant les choses au mieux, qu'à obtenir l'ajournement des conflits, qui demeurent latents. Elle maintient peut-être la paix, mais cette paix reste précaire et pleine d'insécurité.

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La crise économique l'a trouvée aussi impuissante. Elle a apporté le même esprit d'irrésolution à l'étude des grands problèmes dont les peuples attendent impatientement la solution. Elle a ébauché des projets : aucun d'eux n'a pu aboutir. Elle n'a même pas voté la plus anodine recommandation. Totalement désespérée par l'observation de phénomènes qui dépassent son entendement, elle s'est rejetée sur le désarmement, comme si elle attendait sérieusement de la conférence internationale de février prochain des solutions susceptibles d'alléger les budgets, d'améliorer les trésoreries, de rendre la sécurité aux nations et la confiance aux hommes d'entreprise.

Et pourquoi donc serait-elle plus capable de résoudre ce problème mieux que les autres ? L'aborde-t-elle seulement du bon côté ? En matière d'armements, n'est-ce pas aujourd'hui le chapitre des gaz asphyxiants qui est le plus préoccupant, le plus propre à inquiéter les masses, le plus spécifique de la guerre

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On veut habituer les nations à plaider au lieu de se battre, lorsqu'elles estiment qu'il a été porté atteinte à leurs droits. Mais quel tribunal a-t-on mis à leur disposition? La Cour de Justice Internationale et d'Arbitrage de La Haye. Cette juridiction unique porte le poids d'une énorme responsabilité et ne semble pas s'en douter. Pour amener, en cas de difficultés, toutes les puissances à prendre le chemin de La Haye et à s'en remettre obligatoirement du bien-fondé de leur cause à la décision des arbitres, une chose est particulièrement nécessaire: il faut que ce tribunal se dresse comme une grande force unanimement respectée et qu'on ne puisse mettre en doute son indépendance, ses lumières, sa vigueur intellectuelle et morale, la droiture et l'impartialité de ses décisions.

Or, l'essai qui a été fait, par le conseil de la Société des Nations, de la compétence juridique des juges de La Haye dans la question du protocole de Vienne relatif au projet d'union douanière austro-allemande, a été, à cet égard, tout à fait décourageant. Ces juges se sont montrés hésitants et timorés, incapables de s'élever au-dessus des préoccupations d'ordre national et de se prononcer selon leur conscience, sans tenir compte de considérations extérieures à leur mission. Au lieu de dire le droit, comme on les

en avait priés et d'assurer le respect des textes, ils ont essayé de rendre des services aux parties en cause. On attendait d'eux un avis; ils ont envoyé trois solutions, dont aucune ne constituait à proprement parler la thèse officielle de la Cour de La Haye.

Et le conseil de la S. D. N. a été, de son côté, tout heureux de n'avoir pas lui-même à prendre une décision plus courageuse, les auteurs du protocole litigieux, MM. Curtius et Schober, ayant, fort à propos, déclaré y renoncer volontairement, reportant ainsi à plus tard la solution d'une difficulté qui exigeait une décision immédiate et définitive.

En évitant de se prononcer catégoriquement sur un point d'intérêt capital — puisqu'il s'agissait de dire si les traités avaient été violés — le conseil de la S. D. N., aussi bien que la Cour de Justice de La Haye, a gravement compromis les intérêts de la paix. Les juges de La Haye, en particulier, ont perdu l'occasion qui s'offrait à eux de montrer aux nations la valeur des institutions du Droit. Les peuples ont compris ce jour-là qu'ils ne pouvaient pas, sans péril pour leur sécurité.

La crise économique l'a trouvée aussi impuissante. Elle a apporté le même esprit d'irrésolution à l'étude des grands problèmes dont les peuples attendent impatiemment la solution. Elle a ébauché des projets: aucun d'eux n'a pu aboutir. Elle n'a même pas voté la plus anodine recommandation. Totalement désespérée par l'observation de phénomènes qui dépassent son entendement, elle s'est rejetée sur le désarmement, comme si elle attendait sérieusement de la conférence internationale de février prochain des solutions susceptibles d'alléger les budgets, d'améliorer les trésoreries, de rendre la sécurité aux nations et la confiance aux hommes d'entreprise.

Et pourquoi donc serait-elle plus capable de résoudre ce problème mieux que les autres? L'aborde-t-elle seulement du bon côté? En matière d'armements, n'est-ce pas aujourd'hui le chapitre des gaz asphyxiants qui est le plus préoccupant, le plus propre à inquiéter les masses, le plus spécifique de la guerre de demain? C'est cependant le seul dont la S. D. N. ne s'occupe pas. Elle veut limiter le tonnage naval, les effectifs terrestres, les dépenses officielles de guerre; elle ne souffle pas mot de l'arme la plus redoutable et la plus susceptible de se passer de toutes les autres. Elle l'ignore parce qu'elle a voté jadis une convention qui en interdit l'emploi!...

Ces légèretés, ces inconséquences, cette propension à se satisfaire de formules générales et dépourvues de sincérité, qui n'engagent d'ailleurs à rien, comme celle de la trêve des armements, expression théâtrale sans portée pratique et sans réelle efficacité, condamnent les méthodes de Genève. Elles prouvent qu'au sein de la S. D. N. personne ne possède cette vue réaliste des choses qui fait distinguer le possible de ce qui ne l'est pas encore et ne le sera probablement jamais.

Les peuples, à de certains moments, ont pu croire en la Société des Nations. Ils sentent maintenant que les réalités de la paix lui échappent et ils éprouvent le besoin de s'organiser sans elle. Ils la croient frappée d'impuissance; ils n'en attendent plus rien d'heureux, et, si la ligue dont la tâche unique était cependant de fortifier la paix, ne change pas radicalement de mentalité et de façon de faire, l'échec moral qui l'atteint dès à présent ne pourra pas être surmonté. Elle tombera en désuétude.

Maurice DUVAL.


Enclosure No. 14 to Despatch No. 1951  
of November 13, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'HUMANITE, November 13, 1931.

Debout pour la défense de l'U. R. S. S. et de la Révolution chinoise!

## DE NOUVELLES TROUPES JAPONAISES SONT ENVOYÉES EN MANDCHOURIE

Le « Populaire » continue l'odieuse campagne  
sur la prétendue « entente entre le Japon et l'U. R. S. S. »



Une auto blindée japonaise gardant une banque à Tsinanfu, après l'occupation  
de cette ville par les troupes nippones.

A la veille de la tenue de la session du Conseil de la S.D.N., le gouvernement de Tokio a décidé l'envoi immédiat de la 8<sup>e</sup> division japonaise pour renforcer les troupes d'occupation en Mandchourie.

Quatre destroyers ont été dépêchés à Port-Arthur. Un croiseur à Sasebo, la station navale la plus méridionale du Japon, est prêt à prendre le départ pour la Chine.

Au Nord, la menace contre Tsitsikar n'est en rien atténuée, au contraire, puisque les rassemblements de troupes japonaises continuent. Les milieux officiels nippons essayent de faire croire qu'ils ne disposent que de 2.000 hommes sur la rivière Nonni. Mais on apprend qu'à Talai, à la tête de pont de la rivière, il y avait, à la fin de la semaine dernière, plus de 4.000 fantassins japonais, plus deux compagnies de cavalerie avec 240 wagons de matériel de guerre et d'approvisionnement, 13 wagons sanitaires, six avions, plus de 40 canons de campagne, deux canons

lourds, des autos blindées et des trains blindés.

Avec les mercenaires du général Tehang Hai Peng, on voit donc que les forces destinées à s'emparer éventuellement de Tsitsikar et de couper ainsi le chemin de fer de l'Est chinois sont très importantes en face des troupes de Ma qui défend la ville avec 10.000 hommes.

Le danger de la provocation antisoviétique par l'accentuation de l'occupation japonaise reste donc des plus menaçants et nous avons dénoncé hier les plans d'intervention des puissances qui se précisaient.

### Le « Populaire » récidive

C'est dans ces conditions que le Rosenfeld du *Populaire* continue à se livrer à ses criminelles insinuations au sujet d'une prétendue entente entre le Japon et l'U.R.S.S. pour le partage de la Mandchourie.

Camouflant, falsifiant les faits, le coquin qui rédige la chronique internationale de l'organe social-fasciste ose affirmer que « le gouvernement soviétique n'a pas dit un seul mot qui serait une désapprobation de l'agression japonaise ».

Les ouvriers qui ont lu et médité la réponse de Karakhan à la démarche insolente de l'ambassadeur du Japon, ont pu juger comment nos camarades condamnent la violation du territoire chinois par les troupes de l'impérialisme nippon.

Mais il va plus loin. Reproduisant, en falsifiant le texte, un interview de Vorochilov, commissaire du peuple à l'armée, dans laquelle notre camarade affirme ne croire ni en la sincérité ni en l'efficacité de l'action de la S. D. N., Rosenfeld cherche à faire croire que l'U. R. S. S. est d'accord avec le Japon dans l'action de brigandage de ce dernier en Manchourie.

Nous avons toujours ici affirmé la volonté de paix de l'U. R. S. S., que le gouvernement soviétique fera tout son possible pour conserver la paix, pour poursuivre en paix l'édification du socialisme.

Vorochilov, dans son interview, n'a fait que réaffirmer l'attachement à la paix des ouvriers et paysans soviétiques, mais en spécifiant que l'attitude du gouvernement soviétique dépend de celle du gouvernement japonais. Si la provocation à la guerre prend la forme d'actes nettement hostiles, comme les préparatifs contre le chemin de fer de l'Est chinois et la fomentation de complots par les gardes blancs — amis de Rosenfeld — le font craindre, l'U. R. S. S. saura répondre comme doit le faire le pays de la révolution triomphante — après avoir épuisé tous les moyens de conserver la paix et les possibilités de rapports normaux avec le Japon.

La nouvelle canaillerie du *Populaire* nous donne une idée de la valeur des protestations des social-démocrates prétendant se dresser contre l'invasion japonaise en Mandchourie. Leurs faits et gestes quotidiens les démasquent comme de véritables complices des plans criminels des impérialistes contre les masses travailleuses chinoises et contre l'U. R. S. S.

### **La préparation du conseil de la S.D.N.**

Avec un tel appui des social-fascistes, l'impérialisme français pourra continuer son rôle dirigeant pour le dépècement de la Chine et pour soutenir le Japon à la prochaine session du Conseil de la S. D. N. qui va s'ouvrir lundi prochain à Paris.

Le gouvernement japonais y déléguera, en plus de M. Yoshisawa, les ambassadeurs japonais à Londres et à Rome.

L'impérialisme américain sera représenté par le général Dawes, actuellement ambassadeur des Etats-Unis à Londres, et par M. Prentiss Gilbert, consul à Genève, qui auront pour tâche de défendre les intérêts américains en Chine devant les autres rivaux.

Des négociations ont déjà commencé à Paris et Londres, par des conversations entre Briand et le chargé d'affaires des Etats-Unis, entre sir John Simon et l'ambassadeur du Japon, qui s'est entretenu aussi avec le général Dawes.

Les impérialistes sont d'accord pour se partager la Chine, pour lutter contre le profond mouvement de libération nationale et pour abattre les soviets chinois. Corroborant les déclarations que nous avons déjà rapportées de Tchang Kai Shek et de personnalités japonaises quant à l'« opportunité » d'une action concertée des puissances pour le « maintien de l'ordre » en Chine par l'instauration d'un gouvernement « stable », lord Robert Cecil a déclaré, avant-hier, que l'Angleterre était pleinement de cet avis, naturellement. Mais il n'en reste pas moins que les antagonistes interimpérialistes vont s'aiguïser dans la lutte pour la place prépondérante.

Cependant on aurait tort de se laisser entraîner par cette dernière considération et d'oublier une seule minute le danger qui menace l'U. R. S. S. en Extrême-Orient, qui sera plus grave encore après les délibérations de Paris.

Il faut donc redoubler de vigilance. Il faut accentuer la lutte contre l'impérialisme français par l'action de masse dans les usines, dans les ports, sur tous les terrains de la lutte de classe. Nos camarades du Parti doivent faire connaître à tous les travailleurs les plans des impérialistes, démasquer devant les ouvriers socialistes le rôle infâme des chefs de leur parti dans la préparation de la guerre contre l'U.R.S.S.

Par une agitation incessante nous devons faire se lever les larges masses ouvrières pour empêcher la guerre antisoviétique, pour soutenir la lutte héroïque des travailleurs et des Soviets chinois.

**M. MAGNIEN.**



Int. 13

Enclosure No. 15 to Despatch No. 1951  
of November 13, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'INTRANSIGEANT, November 13, 1931.

## La vérité sur le conflit sino-japonais

« L'Intransigeant » envoie  
sur place un de ses meilleurs  
observateurs : Antoine E.  
Zischka.

Nos lecteurs n'ont pas oublié le sensationnel reportage que notre collaborateur Zischka a fait sur la Chine inondée. Survolant l'immense désert d'eau, il a décrit, avec vigueur et réalisme, l'épouvantable détresse de ces millions d'individus que les flots du Yang-Tsé-Kiang avaient chassés de leurs villages.

Le choléra et la peste s'étaient rapidement abattus sur eux, en faisant un lamentable troupeau d'êtres faméliques.

Zischka retourne pour nous aujourd'hui en Chine. Notre envoyé spécial est aujourd'hui à Vienne où un avion l'attend, qui le mènera, il l'espère, en six jours en Mandchourie. Il suivra pour nous les événements qui s'y déroulent. Il nous rendra compte au jour le jour du conflit qui met aux prises Japonais et Chinois de l'armée du général Ma.

Cette guerre mandchourienne — car c'est bien d'une guerre qu'il s'agit — vante d'être suivie de près par un grand journal français désireux d'apporter à l'opinion française des informations objectives sur des événements qui mettent aux prises aussi directement les armées que les diplomates. Le reportage de A. E. Zischka va permettre aux lecteurs de L'Intransigeant de connaître la vérité sur ce grave conflit.



jour 13

Enclosure No. 16 to Despatch No. 1951  
of November 13, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE JOURNAL, November 13, 1931.

### A LA VEILLE DE LA RÉUNION du Conseil de la S.D.N.

L'intervention de M. Dawes  
ambassadeur américain  
à Londres laisse prévoir  
une action prudente des Etats-Unis

Si une chose peut surprendre, ce n'est pas que le conflit sino-japonais ne soit point encore réglé, c'est que l'incendie n'ait point déjà gagné tout l'Extrême-Orient, quand on considère la quantité d'huile jetée sur le feu par ceux-là mêmes qui se représentent comme les champions de l'apaisement. Récapitulons seulement les fausses nouvelles lancées, dans ces derniers jours, par les sources d'information anglo-saxonnes.

On a annoncé que le général chinois Ma Tchang Chan avait déclaré la guerre, à la suite de l'échauffourée de la rivière Nonni. En fait, les Chinois se sont tenus tranquilles dès qu'ils se sont rendu compte que les Japonais cherchaient uniquement à reconstruire le pont du chemin de fer détruit. On a annoncé que les Japonais, ayant fomenté des troubles à Tien-Tsin pour trouver une occasion d'intervenir, ont bombardé la ville. En fait, les Japonais se sont bornés à tirer quelques coups à blanc, pour faire respecter leur concession menacée par des désordres entre factions chinoises. Il suffit d'ailleurs d'un moment de réflexion pour se rendre compte qu'ils n'ont aucun intérêt à une extension du conflit en Chine. On peut leur supposer l'intention de profiter de l'occasion pour renforcer leur position en Mandchourie, mais pas pour chercher à multiplier leurs embarras.

Les Japonais ont annoncé officiellement qu'ils procédaient à la relève d'une brigade sans dépasser l'effectif de 13.000 soldats accordé par les traités. Immédiatement on a annoncé qu'ils envoyaient des renforts en Mandchourie.

Le record de l'invraisemblance est la nouvelle qui attribue aux Japonais une initiative tendant à un règlement international, alors que la cause même de la prolongation du conflit est la volonté ferme du Japon de régler seul ses affaires avec la Chine.

Il est grand temps, en vérité, que la réunion du conseil du 16 novembre oblige les puissances à sortir de la confusion des actions internationales. Le conseil de la Société des nations doit trouver une issue à l'impasse où il s'est fourvoyé. Les Etats-Unis envoient à Paris le général Dawes, leur ambassadeur à Londres, pour suivre l'affaire de près en l'absence de M. Edge. C'est peut-être la principale raison d'espérer. En effet, les Américains qui ont été introduits dans l'affaire par la Société des nations elle-même, se sont montrés un élément de bon sens et de réalisme. Ils ont déjà évité bien des imprudences et nous espérons qu'ils continueront. — S.-B.

Pop 13.

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From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE POPULAIRE, November 13, 1931.

## LA GUERRE EN MANDCHOURIE

# A la veille d'une bataille devant Tsitsikar

Lundi prochain se réunira à Paris le conseil de la Société des Nations. M. Briand le présidera, ayant à ses côtés M. Simon, ministre des Affaires étrangères de la Grande-Bretagne. Le général Dawes, ambassadeur américain à Londres, assistera à titre d'observateur. Le délégué du Japon, M. Yoshizawa, ambassadeur à Paris, sera assisté par ses collègues de Londres et de Rome, MM. Matsudaira et Yoshida. Les autres puissances, membres du Conseil, seront représentées par leurs délégués habituels.

Le Conseil se trouvera devant une situation de beaucoup plus grave qu'en octobre. Le Japon n'a pas suivi les recommandations formulées par le Conseil le 24 octobre. Non seulement les troupes nippones n'ont pas été évacuées, mais elles ont, au contraire, occupé une nouvelle zone dans le Nord de la Mandchourie.

Elles se trouvent à quelques kilomètres de la ligne du chemin de fer de l'Est chinois et se préparent à occuper Tsitsikar.

On lira plus loin le résumé de quatre notes que la Chine a transmises à la S. D. N. Elles donnent un aperçu général de la situation. Les faits qu'elles exposent ne sont pas niés par le Japon. Celui-ci essaiera seulement de les « expliquer » pour justifier son attitude. Les « bandits » chinois joueront certainement un rôle important dans l'exposé japonais. Et il n'est pas impossible que les diplomates nippons insinuent, de temps en temps, que parmi les « bandits » se trouvent des « instructeurs » soviétiques. Certains télégrammes de Tokio le laissent entrevoir.

Dès hier, M. Briand, président en exercice du Conseil de la S. D. N., a adressé aux gouvernements de Tokio et de Nankin, une nouvelle note. En voici les principaux passages :

« Après avoir étudié soigneusement ces réponses (les réponses japonaises et chinoises à sa note précédente), ainsi que les dernières communications reçues, je crois devoir insister de nouveau sur l'engagement pris par les deux gouvernements de faire tous leurs efforts pour éviter toute aggravation de la situation.

« J'insiste également pour que les commandants des forces en présence reçoivent les ordres les plus stricts de s'abstenir de toute initiative d'action nouvelle.

« J'estime enfin très important que des facilités soient données aux observateurs que les membres du Conseil enverraient sur les lieux, notamment aux environs du pont sur le Nonni et à Anshan, pour recueillir les informations prévues par la résolution du 30 septembre. »

Ce document ne diffère pas sensiblement des notes et résolutions précédentes. Il est conçu dans un style si diplomatique qu'il a plutôt la forme d'une circulaire bureaucratique que d'un rappel à l'ordre émanant de l'institution internationale chargée de protéger la paix. Mais j'avoue qu'elle est néanmoins plus catégorique que les étranges déclarations de Vorochilov, que j'ai reproduites hier. Tandis que le commissaire bolcheviste éprouve le besoin d'afficher en ce moment des sentiments amicaux à l'égard de l'impérialisme japonais qui est en train d'annexer la Mandchourie, le président du Conseil de la S. D. N., invite, au moins, les deux parties à ne plus se battre.

Il va de soi que la timide intervention de M. Briand ne modifiera pas la situation. Le Japon est décidé à s'emparer de Tsitsikar. Et les dernières nouvelles font craindre qu'une grande bataille ne s'engage incessamment dans la région de Tsitsikar.

Cependant, le Temps a cru bon d'écrire hier :

Depuis que M. Briand, appelé à la présidence du conseil de la Société des Nations, a pris l'affaire en main en cette qualité, sa diplomatie a réussi à réparer en partie les erreurs commises précédemment en obtenant que toute menace de guerre proprement dite soit

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Même la feuille bolcheviste — qui est pourtant très embarrassée par l'attitude équivoque de l'U. R. S. S. — n'a pas atteint ce degré de stupidité.

O. ROSENFELD.

TEMPS 13

Enclosure No. 18 to Despatch No. 1951  
of November 13, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE TEMPS, November 13, 1931.

#### LE DIFFEREND SINO-JAPONAIS

Le conseil de la Société des nations se réunira lundi prochain, à Paris, pour examiner la situation créée par le différend sino-japonais relatif à la Mandchourie. Au moment où, le 26 octobre, lors de la dernière réunion de Genève, il fut décidé de se réunir de nouveau le 16 novembre, on avait l'espoir que, malgré toutes les difficultés auxquelles on s'était heurté jusque-là et malgré le refus du Japon de se rallier à la résolution du conseil dans les termes où celle-ci avait été adoptée, un accord interviendrait entre temps qui rendrait inutile la nouvelle réunion. Cet espoir ne s'est pas réalisé, car, au cours de ces dernières semaines, la situation s'est compliquée sur le terrain en Mandchourie et les choses seront plus difficiles à régler maintenant qu'elles ne l'étaient lors de la récente réunion du conseil. Est-ce à dire que la crise est sans issue et qu'il faut se résigner à envisager le pire? Nous ne l'avons pas cru au moment où la controverse entre Tokio et Nankin en arrivait à sa phase la plus aiguë et où la réaction japonaise à Moukden même faisait craindre un conflit déclaré; nous ne le pensons pas davantage maintenant que les engagements qui ont eu lieu sur la rivière Nonni entre les forces nippones et les troupes du général Ma Tchang Chan ont donné à la situation un aspect tragique. Certainement, le Japon ne veut pas s'engager dans une véritable guerre et la Chine, elle, ne peut raisonnablement envisager une telle aventure où elle aurait tout à perdre et rien à gagner. Quant à supposer que la Société des nations, qui n'a pas d'autre tâche que d'empêcher une guerre déclarée et que de faciliter un règlement du différend par des négociations directes entre les deux parties, veuille donner à son intervention un caractère tendant à l'isolement diplomatique du Japon, ce qui poserait pour cette puissance la question de savoir si elle doit rester au conseil de Genève ou s'en retirer, c'est une absurdité qu'il serait absolument vain de discuter.

Ce qui est vrai, c'est qu'en se laissant trop impressionner par des incidents violents et des accidents qui ne sont que des conséquences directes et indirectes de fautes commises auparavant, on en arrive à perdre de vue qu'à l'origine de ce différend il y a surtout les manquements répétés de la Chine à l'égard et à la lettre des traités, les attentats commis contre des officiers japonais et contre les positions nippones sur le chemin de fer Sud-Mandchourien et, enfin, l'atmosphère créée par la violente campagne antijaponaise qui s'est étendue à tous les centres chinois importants et dont le boycottage commercial n'est qu'une des manifestations. Certes, le Japon a pris une initiative pouvant difficilement se concilier avec les règles du droit international en ayant recours, pour défendre ses droits et ses intérêts menacés, à des mesures militaires en dehors de la zone du chemin de fer qu'il contrôle en vertu de traités formels, mais les procédés des autorités chinoises, l'impuissance de celles-ci à réprimer le banditisme et les excès d'une soldatesque livrée à elle-même, les difficultés, enfin, de la situation générale en Mandchourie, où le Japon a le devoir de protéger les grands intérêts qu'il a su s'y assurer avec des forces relativement faibles, expliquent l'énergie de sa riposte s'ils ne la justifient pas en droit.

Il tombe sous le sens qu'on doit tenir compte de cet état de choses si on veut apprécier équitablement les faits et ne pas chercher l'impossible en essayant de résoudre une crise de cette nature par des formules absolues ne s'adaptant pas avec toute la souplesse nécessaire aux réalités du moment. Le véritable problème qui se trouve posé en Mandchourie du fait des menées chinoises et de la riposte nipponne a été en quelque sorte noyé dans une avalanche de notes, de réponses et de mises au point portant surtout sur des incidents d'importance secondaire et qui n'étaient pas toujours clairement établis. C'est surtout par l'exploitation peu scrupuleuse de fausses nouvelles, ou d'informations insuffisamment contrôlées qu'on a cherché à fausser l'opinion internationale et à donner à ce différend une gravité qu'on ne lui eût jamais connue si on s'en était strictement tenu aux faits et si on l'avait traité comme un conflit local, à régler sur place par les autorités des deux parties. Du côté japonais on s'est plaint de l'accueil trop facile fait, même dans certains milieux informés de Genève, à des communications de la Chine qui avaient trop le caractère de documents de propagande et qui tendaient à tirer le meilleur parti possible de rumeurs sensationnelles aussitôt démenties. Quand on examine attentivement le dossier de presse du différend sino-japonais de ces dernières semaines, on reste stupéfait devant l'amas de fausses nouvelles, de bruits tendancieux, de rumeurs sensationnelles, de faits controuvés par la plus élémentaire enquête, qui en constitue l'essentiel. C'est avec cela qu'on alarme l'opinion, qu'on improvise un courant dans un sens déterminé, qu'on crée un véritable esprit de guerre.

Il est temps que cela prenne fin et qu'on en revienne aux faits, à la réalité immédiate. Depuis que M. Briand, appelé à la présidence du conseil de la Société des nations, a pris l'affaire en main en cette qualité, sa diplomatie a réussi à réparer en partie les erreurs commises précédemment en obtenant que toute menace de guerre proprement dite soit écartée et en ouvrant la voie à un règlement pacifique. Il faut maintenant que le conseil de la Société des nations achève son œuvre au cours de sa réunion du 16 novembre et qu'il liquide pratiquement un différend qui, dégagé de toutes les considérations par lesquelles on a voulu le compliquer, a


un caractère essentiellement local. Le Japon a donné l'assurance formelle qu'il n'a pas de visées territoriales en Chine, qu'il ramènera toutes ses forces dans la zone du chemin de fer dès que les autorités chinoises auront donné les garanties nécessaires pour la sécurité des ressortissants nippons, mais il veut que, par les négociations directes à engager, la Chine reconnaisse et confirme les droits qu'il tient des traités. La précaution n'est peut-être pas inutile avec une puissance dont on connaît les dispositions à enfreindre les stipulations des accords internationaux.

Toutes les informations que l'on possède à cette heure prouvent que le Japon est enclin à la conciliation pour autant, cela va de soi, qu'on assure le respect de ses droits. Il importe donc que la Chine fasse preuve de la même bonne volonté, qu'elle se prête avec sincérité à un accord de principe pour la solution d'un différend dont la responsabilité première lui incombe en grande partie, accord devant fournir une base pour un règlement durable des relations sino-japonaises et une féconde collaboration des deux pays dont la Chine sera la principale bénéficiaire.


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75



No. 1967



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FILED

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

In compliance with the Department's instruction No. 293 of August 19, 1930, I have the honor to transmit herewith clippings from the French press, on the subject of the Sino-Japanese conflict, covering the period from November 14 to November 16, 1931, inclusive.

Respectfully yours,

For the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim:

*Williamson S. Howell, Jr.*  
Williamson S. Howell, Jr.,  
First Secretary of Embassy.

Enclosures.....

4

- 2 -

Enclosures: (single copy).

Clippings from the following newspapers:

November 14, 1931.

- No. 1 - L'OEUVRE
- 2 - LE PETIT PARISIEN
- 3 - LA REPUBLIQUE

November 15, 1931.

- No. 4 - L'ECHO DE PARIS
- 5 - EXCELSIOR
- 6 - L'HUMANITE
- 7 - L'INFORMATION
- 8 - JOURNAL DES DEBATS
- 9 - L'OEUVRE
- 10 - LE POPULAIRE

November 16, 1931.

- No. 11 - L'AVENIR
- 12 - L'ERE NOUVELLE
- 13 - EXCELSIOR
- 14 - FIGARO
- 15 - L'HUMANITE
- 16 - LE JOURNAL
- 17 - LE MATIN
- 18 - L'OEUVRE
- 19 - LE PETIT PARISIEN
- 20 - LE POPULAIRE
- 21 - LE QUOTIDIEN
- 22 - LA REPUBLIQUE
- 23 - LE TEMPS

In quintuplicate.  
710.  
RS/jdk

Annexe 14

Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 1967  
of November 17, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'OEUVRE, November 14, 1931.

## L'AFFAIRE SINO-JAPONAISE DEVANT LE CONSEIL DE LA S. D. N.

# ET D'ABORD, DE QUOI S'AGIT-IL ?

Moukden, Kharbine, Tchang-Sue-Liang, Tsitsikar, Nonni, Ma-Tchan-Chan, Anganki, Tchang-Hai-Peng...

Pour beaucoup d'entre nous, il faut bien l'avouer, c'est sous l'aspect de cette salade de noms propres — villes, fleuves et généraux — que se présente l'imbroglio mandchou, forme la plus récente du fameux « casse-tête » chinois.

Essayons d'y voir clair — carte en mains.


La Mandchourie est chinoise. Mais parmi ses lignes de chemins de fer, il en est dont le « contrôle » appartient à d'autres puissances : Russie et Japon.

En ce qui concerne le tronçon sud de la ligne de Kharbine à

puisque, de la fin septembre à la mi-octobre, la situation n'a pas changé: les Japonais occupent toujours le sud-ouest de la Mandchourie, et la Chine, par la voix du docteur Sze, proteste toujours.

Que s'agit-il d'obtenir ? Que le Japon évacue les territoires qu'il occupe, puis qu'il entame des négociations avec la Chine au sujet du régime des chemins de fer mandchous — car c'est, on le verra, le problème.

Le premier geste de M. Briand à Genève est de proposer que l'on invite les Etats-Unis à prendre part aux débats.



Port-Arthur et trois de ses embranchements, ils sont passés en 1905, à la suite de la guerre russo-japonaise, du contrôle de Saint-Petersbourg sous celui de Tokio. En vertu de conventions plus tacites qu'expresses, le gouvernement japonais entretenait, aux abords de cette voie, un corps de 14.000 hommes pour en garantir la sécurité. Malgré ces 14.000 hommes, il paraît que des incursions venant de l'ouest troublaient le trafic ou menaçaient les Japonais établis dans les centres desservis par la ligne. Sous ce prétexte — vrai ou faux — les Japonais décidèrent, en septembre, d'élargir la « zone de protection », occupent Moukden et font avancer leurs troupes vers l'ouest. Les Chinois se retirent sans résistance et se replient jusqu'à la Grande Muraille, aux limites de la Chine proprement dite.

— Et c'est dans cette histoire que votre Briand va fourrer son nez !

— Non. C'est de cette affaire que la Chine, membre de la Société des Nations, saisit le Conseil de Genève, alors que M. Briand n'y assiste pas. Sous la présidence de M. Lerroux, le Conseil demande à la Chine et au Japon de régler pacifiquement le différend

— En vertu de quoi, puisqu'ils ne font pas partie de la S.D.N. ?

— En vertu du pacte Kellogg, dont ils sont signataires, tout comme la Chine et le Japon.

— Mais cela ne soulevait-il pas des objections ?

— Cela en a soulevé, de la part du Japon en particulier. Mais nous reviendrons sur ce point... Quant au débat lui-même, il se déroule assez lentement, entrecoupé de conversations entre les intéressés et M. Briand qui, entouré de la confiance de tous (y compris les Américains, qui ont répondu à l'invitation qu'on leur avait adressée), dirige les négociations. Le Japon affirme qu'il ne prépare aucune annexion et qu'il est prêt à évacuer ce qu'il a occupé depuis le milieu de septembre, mais à cinq conditions.

De ces cinq conditions, la Chine peut en accepter, et en accepte quatre. Elle ne croit pas pouvoir accepter la cinquième, qui lui demande « la reconnaissance explicite de toutes ses obligations découlant des traités à l'égard du Japon, y compris les 21 demandes. »

La Chine n'y peut souscrire. Pourquoi ? Parce qu'elle ne peut traiter avec le Japon sur le fond du litige, tant que son territoire est occupé. Si, pour en obtenir l'évacuation, elle accepte la signature

Oeuvre 14

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of November 17, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'OEUVRE, November 14, 1931.

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
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Quant au débat lui-même, il se déroule assez lentement, entrecoupé de conversations entre les intéressés et M. Briand qui, entouré de la confiance de tous (y compris les Américains, qui ont répondu à l'invitation qu'on leur avait adressée), dirige les négociations. Le Japon affirme qu'il ne prépare aucune annexion et qu'il est prêt à évacuer ce qu'il a occupé depuis le milieu de septembre, mais à cinq conditions.

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La Chine n'y peut souscrire. Pourquoi ? Parce qu'elle ne peut traiter avec le Japon sur le fond du litige, tant que son territoire est occupé. Si, pour en obtenir l'évacuation, elle accepte la cinquième « condition », elle a, d'avance, cédé sur le fond même de ce litige, que voici :

Jean Plot.



Enclosure No. 23 to Despatch No. 1967  
of November 17, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris,

Extract from LE TEMPS, November 16, 1931.

LE CONSEIL DE LA SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS  
ET LE DIFFÉREND SINO-JAPONAIS  
~~LA FRANCE ET L'ESPAGNE~~

Le conseil de la Société des nations se réunit demain, à Paris, au quai d'Orsay, pour procéder à nouveau à l'examen de la situation créée en Mandchourie par le différend sino-japonais. Sir John Simon, ministre des affaires étrangères de Grande-Bretagne, représentera l'Angleterre à cette réunion et le général Dawes, ambassadeur américain à Londres, y représentera les Etats-Unis à titre d'observateur — mais d'observateur actif, le gouvernement de Washington s'étant solidarisé, on le sait, avec le conseil de la Société des nations dans l'effort nécessaire pour hâter un règlement pacifique entre la Chine et le Japon.

A s'en tenir aux informations qui nous parviennent de Mandchourie, de Nankin et de Tokio, la situation n'apparaît guère plus favorable maintenant que lors de la dernière réunion du conseil à Genève, à la fin du mois d'octobre. Les deux puissances en cause restent sur leurs positions respectives sur le terrain diplomatique et les incidents violents qui se sont produits au cours de cette dernière quinzaine, à Tien-Tsin, d'abord, en Mandchourie, sur la rivière Nonni, ensuite, ne sont pas précisément de nature à favoriser la conciliation. Il est vrai que plus que jamais il ne faut accueillir qu'avec une extrême réserve les nouvelles relatives à des combats qui semblent bien n'être que de simples engagements, mais qu'on s'entend à exploiter dans certains milieux pour essayer de faire pression sur l'opinion internationale et d'entraîner le conseil de la Société des nations au delà de ce qu'il peut entreprendre raisonnablement en vertu de l'article 11 du pacte. Il est très difficile de juger de la situation en ne tenant compte que des faits clairement établis, mais on s'expose à s'égarer à coup sûr si on s'abandonne à la confusion extrême que cherchent à créer ceux qui mettent leur suprême espoir dans les campagnes tendancieuses qu'on voit se développer depuis des semaines et qu'on a commis l'erreur de ne pas décourager tout de suite dans quelques milieux influents de Genève.

L'apaisement ne peut résulter que d'une détente entre Japonais et Chinois sur le terrain, en Mandchourie même. Or, il est bien évident que si les Japonais sont disposés, dans une certaine mesure, à la conciliation si leurs intérêts et les droits qu'ils tiennent des traités sont sauvegardés, les Chinois, eux, ne se prêteront à un arrangement sauvant la face pour les deux parties que lorsqu'ils seront convaincus qu'ils n'ont aucun avantage politique immédiat à attendre de l'intervention de la Société des nations. C'est pourquoi la tâche du conseil, telle qu'elle se présentera demain, sera singulièrement délicate. D'une part, il ne peut répudier ce qu'il a accompli jusqu'ici, dans l'esprit de Genève, pour essayer d'empêcher le pire; d'autre part, il ne peut encourager les Chinois à la résistance en exerçant sur le Japon une pression qui pourrait, d'ailleurs, avoir pour effet d'éloigner cette puissance de la Société des nations; enfin, il y a le fond même du problème, les droits du Japon tels qu'ils résultent des traités, et la défense légitime par cette puissance des intérêts qu'elle a su se créer en Mandchourie.

Les pourparlers engagés sur le terrain par le général japonais Honjo avec le général chinois Ma Tchang Chan ont-ils des chances d'aboutir rapidement? Cela dépendra surtout, on peut le supposer, de la tournure que prendra demain le débat au sein du conseil réuni à Paris. En somme, le général Honjo propose au général Ma Tchang Chan de retirer les forces chinoises concentrées dans la région de la rivière Nonni et de les ramener à leur base de Tsitsikar, tandis que les Japonais, une fois cette condition remplie, retireraient leur propres troupes de la rivière Nonni. La menace la plus immédiate et la plus dangereuse se trouverait ainsi écartée. Mais il est à craindre que le général Ma Tchang Chan, qui a réussi à grouper rapidement des forces assez importantes en face de troupes nippones peu nombreuses, ne souscrive à ces conditions que si le débat au sein du conseil de la Société des nations démontre aux Chinois que le moment est venu pour eux de se prêter sincèrement à un arrangement politique satisfaisant pour les deux parties.

Sur quelles bases un compromis peut-il être trouvé? Il importe avant tout de se dégager des accusations portées par les adversaires aux prises et des démentis cinglants qui les suivent inmanquablement. C'est cette controverse diplomatique sur des faits échappant à tout contrôle qui empoisonne l'atmosphère et qui donne à la crise le caractère aigu qu'on lui connaît aujourd'hui. Les Américains, dit-on, ont élaboré un projet de compromis que le général Dawes aurait mission de développer et de défendre au conseil, dont la session se prolongerait pendant une semaine. Pourtant, on ne possède aucune précision, à cette heure, sur la suggestion que se réserverait de faire le porte-parole des Etats-Unis. La seule chose qu'on discerne avec quelque netteté, c'est qu'il faudrait obtenir du Japon qu'il active le repli de ses troupes tout en amenant la Chine à admettre que des négociations directes avec Tokio seront engagées avant que les forces nippones soient toutes rentrées dans la zone du chemin de fer Sud-Mandchourien.

En réalité, c'est là tout le problème politique à résoudre, mais rien ne permet jusqu'ici d'affirmer en toute certitude que les deux gouvernements intéressés sont disposés à se prêter à une telle solution. Il faut souhaiter que la raison et le sens des réalités politiques de l'heure présente l'emportent dans des conditions assurant au conseil toute l'autorité nécessaire pour que ses recommandations soient accueillies de bonne foi à Tokio et à Nankin.

En 1915, pendant que le monde avait les yeux tournés ailleurs, le Japon a imposé à la Chine un traité, dont le gouvernement de Nankin a toujours contesté la validité. En vertu de ce traité, la Chine s'engageait, notamment, à ne pas construire en Mandchourie de lignes de chemin de fer pouvant faire concurrence à la ligne de Kharbine à Port-Arthur, contrôlée par les Japonais. Or il est incontestable qu'elle en a construit, et par exemple (voir la carte) celle de Soloun à Sseupingkai et celle de Kirin à Moukden. Mais il est incontestable aussi qu'elle les a construites avec l'assentiment japonais : bien mieux, avec, pour une bonne part, des capitaux japonais. Et, dans la construction de ces lignes, le Japon est intervenu à tel point que, s'il a permis et financé leur établissement, il a empêché la construction de certains tronçons, comme celui qui, allant de Payintala vers Soloun et Mandchouli, eût assuré une liaison directe, sans détour par Moukden et Kharbine, entre Pékin et le Transsibérien.

Or de la construction de ces lignes, faite par la Chine avec son assentiment et son concours, le Japon — invoquant le traité de 1915 — tire argument aujourd'hui pour demander quoi ? Pour demander la fusion des chemins de fer du sud de la Mandchourie sous une seule direction qui — en fait — serait la sienne. A quoi la Chine objecte que, si elle est disposée à un accord entre les différentes compagnies, elle ne saurait admettre une fusion qui — en fait également — la déposséderait.

La Chine refusant donc d'accepter la « cinquième condition », le Japon n'a pas pris l'engagement « d'évacuer », comme le demandait la résolution votée par l'unanimité des autres puissances, groupées autour de M. Briand. On a décidé alors de lui laisser le temps de la réflexion et l'on a fixé au 16 novembre — c'est-à-dire à après-demain — la date d'une nouvelle réunion qui, comme on sait, va se tenir à Paris.

Depuis la dernière réunion de Genève, qu'a fait le Japon ?

Un général chinois — Tchang-Hai-Peng — ayant proclamé l'indépendance de la province nord de la Mandchourie, le Hei-Long-Kiang — en accord, semble-t-il, avec les Japonais — le gouvernement de Pékin a envoyé des troupes contre ce rebelle. Des combats — entre Chinois — ont eu lieu sur la rivière Nonni — combats au cours desquels un viaduc près de Tsitsikar a été détruit. Notez que ceci se passe sur une ligne purement chinoise, à 500 kilomètres au nord de la ligne contrôlée par les Japonais. Ceux-ci n'en ont pas moins vu là une occasion d'intervenir et de prendre pied ainsi dans le Hei-Long-Kiang, où leur avance n'a été limitée, apparemment, que par la crainte d'une intervention russe. Tsitsikar étant déjà dans la « zone d'intérêts » de Moscou.

Telle est la situation devant laquelle va se trouver le Conseil de la S.D.N. Des bruits d'accord ont couru ces jours derniers, et l'on ne saurait douter qu'il y ait, au Japon, des éléments pondérés, partisans d'une politique de sagesse. Il semble malheureusement qu'ils soient trop souvent débordés par les éléments militaires — très puissants dans le royaume du Mikado.

Nos lecteurs excuseront l'aridité de cet exposé.

Il était nécessaire avant d'examiner, comme nous nous proposons de le faire à la veille de la réunion du Conseil, l'importance et les répercussions des événements de Mandchourie, et le sens de l'action entreprise par le Conseil de la S.D.N., puis si implicitement, si utilement, par Aristide Briand.

par le conflit sino-japonais, la Société des Nations, et, d'une manière générale, les peuples civilisés peuvent-ils apporter un remède ?

S'ils ne l'ont pas fait jusqu'ici, c'est, me semble-t-il, parce qu'ils n'ont pas encore pris l'habitude de se placer en face des problèmes, et de les considérer avec l'esprit international qui s'impose à partir d'aujourd'hui.

Il est, au contraire, peu de cas qui doivent relever plus simplement, plus naturellement de l'action de la Société des Nations.

La Chine se plaint de l'agression japonaise en Mandchourie. Cette occupation, le gouvernement japonais la motive par les craintes qu'il exprime : craintes de ne pas voir suffisamment protégées, au cours des incidents actuels, la ligne de chemins de fer Kouan-Tcheng-Tsé-Port-Arthur, d'une part, la sécurité des ressortissants japonais dans cette région, de l'autre.

Tels étant les termes du débat, sa solution, à ce point de vue international que j'indiquais tout à l'heure, ne saurait faire de doute. La Société des Nations peut et doit constituer d'urgence, avec des contingents fournis par ceux des Etats participants qui ne sont pas intéressés au conflit, la garde internationale destinée à assurer la police de la région troublée. Lorsque l'entente aura pu se faire, et, par suite, les troubles s'apaiser, le mandat de cette troupe internationale prendra fin et elle se retirera.

C'est précisément ce caractère provisoire et, d'autre part, localisé, de la solution dont il s'agit, qui la rendrait d'une application particulièrement simple.

On voit, sans qu'il soit nécessaire d'insister, l'avantage que ni l'un ni l'autre des Etats en conflit ne saurait en prendre sérieusement ombrage. Ce n'est pas de difficultés matérielles, ni même morales, qu'il est question. C'est une attitude nouvelle, en dehors de tous les précédents, qu'il faudrait avoir le courage de prendre.

Les gouvernements voudront-ils adopter cette attitude, si différente de celles qui leur sont habituelles, mais si imposée par la logique ? Je ne sais. Mais qu'ils doivent ou non s'y décider au bout du compte, l'opinion publique mondiale a le devoir de le leur demander énergiquement.

Le Bureau de la Ligue des Droits de l'Homme a bien voulu, sur ma proposition, prendre une résolution dans ce sens.

Jacques Hadamard.

P.P. 14

Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 1967  
of November 17, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE PETIT PARISIEN, November 14, 1931.

## S'ACHEMINE-T-ON VERS UN RÈGLEMENT DU CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS ?

P.P. 14  
L'ouverture de deux négociations parallèles, l'une administrative, en Mandchourie, sous l'œil d'une commission d'observateurs étrangers, l'autre, politique, en Europe, loin de toute pression intéressée et portant sur les « cinq points fondamentaux japonais » pourrait en fournir les bases



Le général Dawes (à gauche), ambassadeur des Etats-Unis à Londres, qui est arrivé hier à Paris pour suivre les travaux du conseil de la Société des nations

Les appels réitérés à la conciliation adressés par M. Briand, en tant que président du conseil de la S. D. N., aux gouvernements de Tokio et de Nankin vont-ils enfin porter leurs fruits ? Des indications nous parviennent qui sont, à cet égard, assez encourageantes, mais dont on ne saurait encore, néanmoins, tirer des conclusions trop optimistes. Nous apprenons notamment que, du côté japonais, on serait assez disposé à reprendre certaines suggestions faites à Genève au cours des dernières négociations confidentielles d'octobre, et qui pourraient effectivement fournir une base d'accord entre les deux parties en cause. Le fait que ce soit justement le Japon qui y pense nous paraît du meilleur augure pour la session qui va s'ouvrir lundi au Quai d'Orsay.

Il s'agirait, de la part des deux gouvernements japonais et chinois, d'engager deux négociations parallèles et presque simultanées. La première, qui aurait lieu sur place, en Mandchourie, aurait un caractère local et plutôt administratif. Elle mettrait en pré-

sence le commandant des forces militaires nippones et les autorités chinoises et aurait trait, d'une part, au retour des troupes d'occupation japonaises dans la zone du chemin de fer soumise à leur surveillance, et, d'autre part, aux mesures d'ordre à prendre par la Chine pour assurer, en même temps que s'effectuerait ce retrait, la sécurité des ressortissants et des biens japonais. Albert JULLEN.

Cette première négociation se déroulerait — comme les mesures auxquelles elle donnerait lieu — sous le contrôle d'une commission d'observateurs étrangers, commission dont le cabinet de Tokio accepterait désormais la constitution, à condition que ces observateurs fussent choisis parmi les attachés militaires étrangers accrédités au Japon. Le commandant en chef des troupes japonaises et le consul général du Japon à Moukden estiment qu'il y aurait le plus grand intérêt à ce que cette commission militaire se rende compte — et informe les gouvernements étrangers et le conseil — de l'état d'anarchie qui règne en Mandchourie, du chiffre réduit des contingents japonais et de la tâche formidable qui leur incombe pour maintenir l'ordre.

La seconde négociation, elle, serait d'ordre essentiellement politique et porterait sur les « cinq points fondamentaux » formulés par le Japon dans sa déclaration du 24 octobre. Elle n'aurait lieu ni au Japon ni en Chine, mais en Europe — Paris, Londres ou Genève — afin d'éviter toute pression soit des éléments militaires, soit de l'opinion publique des deux pays intéressés. L'engagement formel devrait être pris au prochain conseil par l'une et l'autre partie que ces pourparlers directs s'ouvriraient le jour même où les troupes japonaises auraient terminé leur mouvement de retrait. Les deux gouvernements devraient, en outre, s'engager à faire aboutir cette négociation dans un délai raisonnable. Il serait inadmissible, en effet, que la Chine pût faire indéfiniment traîner les conversations, comme ce fut trop souvent le cas dans le passé, et se soustraire ainsi à toute obligation. Faute de résultats dans un laps de temps déterminé, les deux intéressés réserveraient leur liberté d'action.

Telle est, dans ses grandes lignes, la combinaison qui est actuellement « dans l'air ». On nous dit que la première partie aurait déjà reçu l'agrément des autorités de Tokio, qui examinent maintenant la seconde. Il se pourrait que la présence simultanée, dans la capitale japonaise, de M. Walker, membre du secrétariat de Genève et porte-parole de sir Eric Drummond, et de M. Sato, l'ambassadeur du Japon à Bruxelles, pour qui les affaires de la S. D. N. n'ont pas de secrets, exerce une influence favorable sur leur décision. Il y a là, en tout état de cause, d'heureuses dispositions de la part du Japon et un terrain d'entente possible. Pour que cette dernière puisse se réaliser, il faut, d'une part, qu'il soit bien entendu que la Chine ne pourra, suivant son habitude, ni faire traîner les choses en longueur ni se soustraire si peu que ce soit à ses engagements : il faut, d'autre part, que le Japon, agissant en grande puissance mondiale qu'il est, et non pas seulement en puissance asiatique, mette son honneur et son prestige à faire cesser un conflit qui, avec un peu de prudence, n'aurait pas dû éclater. — A. J.

Enclosure No. 3 to Despatch No. 1967  
of November 17, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LA REPUBLIQUE, November 14, 1931.

## L'attitude de l'U. R. S. S.

Avant-hier, j'ai publié ici une déclaration de Vorochilov. J'ai demandé aux communistes français de nous expliquer les étranges propos du commissaire du peuple à la guerre.

L'Humanité a répondu, hier. Voici le texte même de sa « réponse » :

Le danger de la provocation antisoviétique par l'accentuation de l'occupation japonaise reste donc des plus menaçants et nous avons dénoncé hier les plans d'intervention des puissances qui se précisent.

C'est dans ces conditions que le Rosenfeld du « Populaire » continue à se livrer à ses criminelles insinuations au sujet d'une prétendue entente entre le Japon et l'U. R. S. S. pour le partage de la Mandchourie.

Camouflant, falsifiant les faits, le coquin qui rédige la chronique internationale de l'organe social-fasciste ose affirmer que « le gouvernement soviétique n'a pas dit un seul mot qui serait une désapprobation de l'agression japonaise ».

Les ouvriers qui ont lu et médité la réponse de Karakhan à la démarche insolente de l'ambassadeur du Japon, ont pu juger comment nos camarades condamnent la violation du territoire chinois par les troupes de l'impérialisme nippon.

Mais il va plus loin. Reproduisant, EN FALSIFIANT LE TEXTE, un interview de Vorochilov, commissaire du peuple à l'armée, dans laquelle notre camarade affirme ne croire ni en la sincérité ni en l'efficacité de l'action de la S. D. N., Rosenfeld cherche à faire croire que l'U. R. S. S. est d'accord avec le Japon dans l'action de brigandage de ce dernier en Mandchourie.

Nous avons toujours ici affirmé la volonté de paix de l'U. R. S. S., que le gouvernement soviétique fera tout son possible pour conserver la paix, pour poursuivre en paix l'édification du socialisme.

Vorochilov, dans son interview, n'a fait que réaffirmer l'attachement à la paix des ouvriers et paysans soviétiques, mais en spécifiant que l'attitude du gouvernement soviétique dépend de celle du gouvernement japonais. Si la provocation à la guerre prend la forme d'actes nettement hostiles, comme les préparatifs contre le chemin de fer de l'Est chinois et la fomentation de complots par les gardes blancs — amis de Rosenfeld — le font craindre, l'U. R. S. S. saura répondre comme doit le faire le pays de la révolution triomphante — après avoir épuisé tous les moyens de conserver la paix et les possibilités de rapports normaux avec le Japon.

La nouvelle canaillerie du Populaire nous donne une idée de la valeur des protestations des social-démocrates prétendant se dresser contre l'invasion japonaise en Mandchourie. Leurs faits et gestes quotidiens les démasquent comme de véritables complices des plans criminels des impérialistes contre les masses travailleuses chinoises et contre l'U. R. S. S.

Passons sur les injures. Je me suis depuis longtemps habitué à la manière de l'Humanité. Pour être juste, je dirai même que, comparé au langage des journaux soviétiques de Moscou, le style de l'Humanité me paraît presque amical et élégant.

Mais voici ce qui est plus grave. L'Humanité déclare que j'ai falsifié le texte de l'interview de Vorochilov.

Or, elle se garde bien d'en publier un autre. Pourtant c'est si simple de me confondre. On n'aurait qu'à publier, l'un en regard de l'autre, le texte « authentique » et mon texte « falsifié ». L'Humanité doit posséder le premier, puisqu'elle affirme que le mien est faux. Alors ?

En réalité, la très aimable réponse de l'Humanité n'est qu'un aveu de son embarras. Elle est elle-même très troublée par l'attitude de l'U. R. S. S. Et pour cause. Il suffit de lire « mon » texte de l'interview de Vorochilov pour s'en rendre compte. Je crois utile de le mettre encore une fois sous les yeux de mes lecteurs qui ne manqueront pas, j'en suis sûr, de demander, à leur tour, des explications aux communistes qu'ils rencontrent dans les réunions.

Le voici :

En répondant à la question, que peut-on attendre de la prochaine session de la S. D. N. en ce qui concerne le problème mandchou, Vorochilov a répondu : « Je ne crois ni à la sincérité ni à l'efficacité de l'action de la S. D. N. ».

Malgré le ton violemment antijaponais de l'éditorial d'aujourd'hui du journal Izvestia, Vorochilov a déclaré que « l'attitude du gouvernement des Soviets dépendra entièrement de la sincérité (sic !) du gouvernement japonais et de son désir de conserver avec nous des rapports de bon voisinage, ainsi que le gouvernement japonais le proclame tout le temps. En ce qui nous concerne, ajouta Vorochilov, nous sommes et nous restons pour le maintien des rapports de bon voisinage avec le Japon. »

(Pravda du 6 novembre, résumé d'une interview accordée par Vorochilov au représentant de l'United Press)

Il en résulte que contrairement aux affirmations de l'Humanité, le gouvernement des Soviets ne s'inquiète nullement de la violation du territoire de la Chine par l'armée du Japon impérialiste. Même en ce moment Vorochilov croit utile d'afficher ses sentiments amicaux à l'égard du gouvernement nippon, qui n'est pas, autant que je sache, communiste ou communistisant.

Cela s'explique peut-être par l'affaire de 1929. L'Humanité se rappelle certainement une certaine note de Litvinov concernant le droit des Soviets d'user des armes pour protéger leurs intérêts en Mandchourie...

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La journée d'hier apporte une justification aux craintes que nous avons exprimées hier. La bataille devant Tsitsikar est imminente si elle n'a pas déjà commencé.

O. ROSENFELD.

Echo 15

Enclosure No. 4 to Despatch No. 1967  
of November 17, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ECHO DE PARIS, November 15, 1931.

## Le Conseil de la S.D.N. se réunira demain à Paris pour examiner derechef les affaires de Mandchourie

Le Conseil de la Société des Nations, réuni exceptionnellement à Paris pour faire droit aux convenances personnelles de M. Briand, évoquera, demain, lundi, le conflit sino-japonais de Mandchourie.

C'est la troisième fois que le Conseil se met à la besogne. Le 30 septembre, il ne put aboutir qu'à une résolution équivoque, essayant d'associer l'eau et le feu, la thèse japonaise d'un accord préalable à l'évacuation et la thèse chinoise d'une évacuation préalable à l'accord. Le 22 octobre, le Conseil, revenant à la charge, inclina nettement vers la thèse chinoise — ce qui lui valut la présentation d'un contre-projet japonais. Le Japon n'ayant pas adhéré au texte du 22 octobre et l'unanimité étant requise aux termes de l'article 11 du pacte invoqué par la Chine pour réclamer l'intervention du Conseil, cette deuxième session se termina sans qu'une résolution possédant une valeur juridique certaine, eût prévalu.

Depuis lors, le gouvernement de Tokio a énoncé les cinq conditions définitives auxquelles la Chine devra se soumettre si elle veut obtenir le rappel des troupes japonaises qui tiennent le pays, en dehors du sud mandchourien, et, entre le 29 octobre et le 7 novembre, il a procédé, avec M. Briand, à un échange de notes qui n'a point fait avancer l'affaire d'un seul pas. Les deux points de vue subsistent intégralement. Le Japon ne fera rentrer ses soldats dans la zone du chemin de fer que la vie de ses sujets et leurs biens effectivement protégés, que les engagements contractuels de la Chine clairement reconnus par le gouvernement de Nankin. Quant à la Chine, elle réclame le départ des troupes nippones contre l'octroi de simples promesses qui, en ce qui concerne le respect des engagements contractuels, laissent subsister le doute. Voilà où nous en sommes.

Les engagements contractuels dont le Japon se réclame s'échelonnent depuis le traité russo-japonais de Portsmouth du 5 septembre 1905. Ils sont formulés dans le traité sino-japonais du 25 décembre 1903 interprété, sur un point important, par la Conférence de Washington de 1921-1922; dans l'accord sino-japonais du 4 septembre 1909 qui vise la région de Chientao, et dans l'accord sino-japonais de 1915 ayant trait, notamment, aux droits des ressortissants japonais en Mandchourie, pour autant qu'il fut approuvé par la susdite Conférence de Washing-

ton. Tels sont les titres du Japon. Les examiner en détail nous entraînerait dans un dédale interminable. Qu'il nous suffise de dire que, dans notre récent séjour aux Etats-Unis, nous avons appris, de bonne source, que M. Mac Murray, ancien ministre à Pékin, dont l'ouvrage sur les traités conclus par la Chine fait autorité, donnait raison au gouvernement de Tokio. Du reste, le gouvernement nationaliste de Nankin n'hésite pas à invoquer le droit naturel contre le droit écrit — et ce point est extrêmement grave. Si l'on n'y prend garde, la Société des Nations, conduite par des mains imprudentes, créera un précédent que d'autres seront heureux de pouvoir exploiter, tôt ou tard, contre le traité de Versailles. C'est ce que l'idéologue du Quai d'Orsay n'a pas su discerner.

Mais la question est-elle une question de droit écrit? A côté des traités formels, les puissances ayant des intérêts en Chine, n'ont-elles pas toujours considéré qu'elles étaient, en tout cas, autorisées à secourir par les armes les personnes et les biens de leurs nationaux? Actuellement, on compte, dans les eaux chinoises, 30 navires anglais, 29 japonais, 25 américains. Autour de Shanghai, les puissances ont-elles jamais hésité, aux heures critiques, à pousser leurs forces armées dans ce qu'elles appellent la « zone d'extension »? En 1927, quinze mille anglais ont librement débarqué à Shanghai et, pour moitié, se sont installés au delà de la concession.

Avec tous ces détails, dans l'esprit, on ne comprend vraiment pas qu'une querelle soit cherchée aux 14.000 Japonais chargés de garder le sud-mandchourien parce que 4.000 d'entre eux sont appostés, à l'extérieur de la zone du chemin de fer, pour surveiller et prévenir les mouvements et les attaques de bandes chinoises dont les effectifs sont évalués à 200.000 hommes. La Mandchourie est la seule province chinoise qui ressemble à une région policiée. Veut-on la réduire à la condition du reste de la Chine?

Toute l'action du conseil de la Société des Nations repose sur l'hypothèse qu'il se rencontre un gouvernement chinois capable de faire sentir son autorité comme n'importe quel gouvernement. L'hypothèse est démentie, depuis 1919, par des faits presque quotidiens.

La vérité est que le secrétariat de la Société des Nations, ému de la décadence rapide de l'institution, et voulant à tout prix en relever la fortune, ne s'est soucié que d'emporter un succès d'apparence. Peu lui a importé d'aviver le conflit par son intervention. En particulier, il a voulu se servir de l'occasion pour rallier les Etats-Unis. En quoi il a montré qu'il n'était point sûrement informé

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

des dispositions de Washington. A l'heure actuelle, il n'est même pas sûr que les Etats-Unis se fassent représenter au Conseil et le général Dawes déclare que, de toute façon, il n'y paraîtra point en personne. Nous espérons que le Conseil aura la sagesse de borner ses efforts. Déjà, Genève annonce qu'une nouvelle session aura lieu au début de décembre. Autant dire que les plus fanatiques n'attendent pas grand'chose de celle qui commence.


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Enclosure No. 5 to Despatch No. 1967  
of November 17, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from EXCELSIOR, November 15, 1931.

## LES PRINCIPAUX ÉLÉMENTS DU CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS DE MANDCHOURIE



### LA SITUATION A LA VEILLE DE LA RÉUNION DU CONSEIL DE LA S.D.N. A PARIS

SITUATION INTERIEURE EN CHINE ET EN MANDCHOURIE	SITUATION MILITAIRE EN MANDCHOURIE	SITUATION DIPLOMATIQUE
<p>Le gouvernement de Nankin est partisan de la résistance au Japon, avec recours à la Société des Nations.</p> <p>Le gouvernement dissident de Canton est d'avis d'engager immédiatement des négociations directes avec Tokio.</p> <p>Le maréchal Tchang Hsue Liang, gouverneur de la Mandchourie, rallié à Nankin depuis fin 1928, est à Peking comme commandant des provinces du nord de la Chine. Le gros de son armée (200.000 h.) occupe la zone Pékin-Tien-Tsin. Sur les trois gouverneurs des trois provinces de la Mandchourie (Moukden, Kirin, Tsitsikar), un seul, le général Ma, lui est resté fidèle. Les deux autres sont dissidents et pro-Japonais. Et le général Ma a un rival: le général Tchang Hai-Peng, pro-japonais.</p> <p>***</p> <p>Donc, anarchie gouvernementale en Chine et locale en Mandchourie.</p>	<p>Les Japonais n'avaient que 7.500 soldats en Mandchourie, avant le 18 septembre 1931. Ils en ont actuellement 15.000. C'est le chiffre fixé par les traités pour garder leurs 1.149 km. de voies ferrées et la zone correspondante (10 mètres de chaque côté des voies et 15 hommes par km).</p> <p>Les Japonais occupent actuellement, en plus, 664 kilomètres de voies ferrées pour protéger la vie et les biens de leurs nationaux (200.000 Japonais, 700.000 Coréens, sujets japonais, pour 29 millions de Chinois).</p> <p>L'action du Japon s'est surtout portée, depuis le 2 novembre, sur la réparation des ponts de la Nonni et sur la protection de la ligne Anganchi-Taonan-Sussping-kai, nécessaire au commerce des Chinois et des Japonais de la région et au transport, vers Dairen, des produits de la Mandchourie du Nord. Dans cette action, les Japonais se sont heurtés aux troupes chinoises du général Ma, fidèle du maréchal Tchang Hsue Liang, lequel n'a pas appuyé par les armes l'action, isolée, de son lieutenant.</p> <p>Les Japonais sont à même de s'opposer à l'envoi de tout renfort chinois en Mandchourie par la seule voie ferrée Pékin-Moukden. Les troupes chinoises en Mandchourie sont au nombre de 50.000 hommes. Et il y a de nombreuses bandes de brigands.</p> <p>***</p> <p>Donc le Japon semble maître de la situation militaire en Mandchourie.</p>	<p>Action de la S. D. N. et attitude du Japon et de la Chine</p> <p>Action de conciliation. « Recommandation » votée à Genève, le 29 octobre dernier, à l'unanimité, sauf par le Japon: retrait progressif des troupes japonaises, avant le 16 novembre, dans la zone fixée par les traités; protection par la Chine de la vie et des biens des ressortissants japonais sous le contrôle des représentants des puissances; négociations de deux parties, avant l'évacuation, sur toutes les questions en suspens, en particulier sur celle des chemins de fer de Mandchourie (lignes chinoises concurrençant les japonaises).</p> <p>Le Japon affirme son respect de l'intégrité territoriale de la Chine et nie tout encouragement de sa part à la dissidence chinoise en Mandchourie. Mais il demande à la Chine la réputation de toute conduite politique ou commerciale agressive, l'assurance de la protection de la vie et des biens de ses nationaux et le respect de ses droits en Mandchourie, droits consentis par traités. Ce sont les « principes fondamentaux » sur lesquels il veut négocier avec la Chine avant tout retrait de ses troupes dans la zone prévue par les traités.</p> <p>La Chine accuse le Japon de fomenter la dissidence en Mandchourie, d'y prélever des impôts, et elle demande au Japon de renoncer à un accord sur les « principes fondamentaux » avant le retrait de ses troupes dans la zone fixée par les traités. La Chine attribue les troubles de Mandchourie à l'occupation illégale japonaise.</p> <p>La Chine a demandé et le Japon a refusé un arbitrage sur les traités sino-japonais relatifs à la Mandchourie. La Chine nie et le Japon affirme l'existence d'un protocole secret de 1905 sur les chemins de fer.</p> <p>***</p> <p>Donc, désaccord fondamental entre la Chine et le Japon, et inexécution de la « recommandation » du Conseil de la Société des Nations.</p>
		<p>Action des Etats-Unis et de la Russie</p> <p>Les Etats-Unis ont un observateur au conseil de la Société des Nations pour toutes les questions autres que celles dérivant du pacte Briand-Kellogg. En vertu du traité de Washington de 1922, garantissant l'intégrité territoriale de la Chine, les Etats-Unis désapprouveraient toute occupation permanente de la Mandchourie par le Japon. Ils n'ont pas endossé la « recommandation » du conseil de la Société des Nations invitant le Japon à retirer ses troupes avant le 16 novembre dans la zone prévue par les traités. Un observateur américain est en Mandchourie.</p> <p>L'U. R. S. S. a donné l'assurance au Japon qu'elle observait la neutralité en Mandchourie (négaration de toute aide soviétique au général Ma). De son côté, le Japon a affirmé aux Etats-Unis qu'il respecterait le chemin de fer de l'Est-Chinois, d'administration russe.</p> <p>***</p> <p>Donc, des complications ne semblent pas probables de la part des Etats-Unis et de la Russie, en Mandchourie.</p>

Enclosure No. 6 to Despatch No. 1967  
of November 17, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'HUMANITE, November 15, 1931.

Luttons pour la défense de l'U.R.S.S.!

## LES TROUPES JAPONAISES DÉCLENCHENT L'OFFENSIVE CONTRE TSITSIKAR MAIS SONT REPOUSSÉES PAR LES CHINOIS

Les cercles financiers de France provoquent ouvertement  
à la guerre contre l'Union soviétique

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L'attaque japonaise a été décidée après l'expiration du délai donné au général Ma, dans l'ultimatum de l'état-major nippon, pour évacuer Tsitsikar. On sait que Ma a ouvertement déclaré qu'il refusait de se rendre aux volontés des impérialistes de Tokio.

Les dépêches rapportent qu'avec rapidité 4.000 hommes ont attaqué les troupes chinoises, soutenus par un violent bombardement aérien, pendant qu'un régiment de cavalerie tentait un mouvement enveloppant. Cependant, les Chinois, passant à la contre-offensive, ont réussi à repousser les Japonais.

### La bataille de la Nonni

Le correspondant du journal travailliste *Daily Herald* rapporte que l'aile droite japonaise s'est trouvée sérieusement menacée, presque complètement encerclée.

Quelques heures plus tard, les Nippons auraient déclenché une nouvelle offensive, jetant les unes après les autres leurs colonnes d'attaque sur les lignes ennemies, et s'acharnant à les enfoncer sur les points jugés les plus vulnérables. Toutefois, d'après un message Central News les Chinois auraient non seulement résisté à toutes ces attaques, mais seraient rapidement passés de la défensive à l'offensive par la brusque entrée en action de leur cavalerie.

D'autres câbles de Tokio, corroborant ces renseignements, notent que des télégrammes reçus tard dans la nuit signalent que le gros de la cavalerie du général Ma est en train d'esquisser, à cinq milles à droite du pont de la Nonni, un mouvement tournant sur l'aile droite de l'armée japonaise, commandée par le général Hasebe.

Ainsi, cette première offensive de l'armée japonaise pour couper le chemin de fer de l'Est chinois et s'emparer de Tsitsikar a subi un premier revers. Mais la bataille continue, les avions japonais continuent à semer la mort parmi les Chinois qui résistent aux plans criminels des impérialistes.

D'autre part, un télégramme de Shanghai signale que Tchang Haï Peng, le général vendu au Japon, qui appuie les opérations de l'armée du Mikado, à la tête de deux mille hommes, a déclenché une attaque par surprise contre les forces du général Ma Thang Tchan qui, à quelques milles au sud-ouest d'Anganchi, ont d'abord reculé, puis ayant reçu des renforts, ont repris le dessus, mettant les mercenaires de Peng en déroute.

### Le rôle des travailleurs anglais


Il nous faut encore aujourd'hui, au sujet de cette résistance acharnée des troupes de Ma, relever une nouvelle ignominie des travailleurs anglais, dignes tenants de leurs semblables de Paris : le *Daily Herald* que nous citons plus haut explique le succès des Chinois sur la rivière Nonni par la présence « d'une brigade de choc russe » qui aurait soutenu la contre-offensive de Ma.

Le *Daily Herald* écrit que « les Japonais se seraient repliés en bon ordre et vigoureusement défendus contre l'attaque brusquée de la brigade soviétique ».

C'est une nouvelle canaillerie destinée à accréditer la version japonaise et de la presse impérialiste française, de la participation de l'Armée Rouge

l'U.R.S.S. à la guerre contre le Japon inspirée par les impérialistes de Paris si bien soutenus par le journal de M. Blum. Les dépêches de l'Agence Tass, qu'on lira par ailleurs, font de nouveau litière de ces mensonges provocateurs.

Mais il existe une « brigade de choc » impérialiste qui pousse à la guerre antisoviétique et dont les



agissements ont leur reflet en Bourse. Le sang coule en Mandchourie. Le Japon porte la guerre sur un immense territoire et menace l'U.R.S.S. et les Soviets chinois : à la Bourse les valeurs montent à mesure que la mort étend ses méfaits !

Le *Capital* du 9 novembre écrit :

« Dans certains milieux on attribue l'amélioration de la Bourse à l'aggravation du conflit en Mandchourie ; il développerait, en effet, la demande en métaux... »

Mais le *Capital* est dépassé en cynisme par la feuille financière la *Situation économique et financière*. Ce journal écrit :

« ... Peut-être, enfin, le raffermissement des matières premières est-il le résultat des préparatifs militaires au Japon ET AILLEURS (c'est nous qui soulignons), déterminés par les événements de Mandchourie. »

« ... Au risque de nous faire houspiller par ces « foudres-de-peace », nous écrivons donc qu'une guerre en Mandchourie, ou même un développement important de l'occupation militaire japonaise, qui entraînerait sans doute des opérations soviétiques parallèles, agiraient dans le sens de la hausse des matières premières. Dans tous les pays du monde, une armée en campagne constitue un élément important de consommation, voire de gaspillage ; de plus, les hommes mobilisés sont enlevés aux travaux productifs. Chacun sait cela en France, par expérience. Abstraction faite de tout senti-





Ham. 15

Enclosure No. 6 to Despatch No. 1967  
of November 17, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'HUMANITE, November 15, 1931.

**Luttons pour la défense de l'U.R.S.S. !**

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
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POU YI  
ex-empeur de Mandchourie, qui  
voudrait, sous la protection du Japon,  
repandre « du service »

dans les rangs des troupes antijaponaises de Mandchourie. Comme on voit, partout, tout est mis en œuvre par la social-démocratie internationale pour soutenir les impérialistes dans leur préparation à la guerre contre les ouvriers et les paysans de l'Union soviétique.

### Les provocateurs de guerre

Il n'y a pas de « brigade de choc soviétique » dans les troupes chinoises qui défendent Tsitsikar. Cette légende abominable n'est que pour couvrir la provocation patente contre

ment humanitaire et de toute considération politique, il nous faut donc admettre, en nous maintenant dans le domaine économique, que ce sont là des facteurs qui — s'ils prenaient une réelle extension — contribueraient à l'allègement des stocks de matières premières, au ralentissement du « dumping » et à l'accroissement de la demande d'un certain matériel...

Telles sont, selon nous, les diverses raisons qui ont motivé, cette semaine, la reprise de la Bourse...

Notre Internationale communiste et notre Parti ont depuis longtemps alerté les travailleurs contre le danger de guerre que la crise économique ne fait qu'aggraver et précipiter l'explosion. Nous avons, dès le début de l'invasion japonaise de la Mandchourie, montré quel caractère revêtait cette opération de brigandage impérialiste. Chaque jour nous appelons les ouvriers à lutter pour la défense de l'U. R. S. S. menacée, contre la guerre impérialiste, contre l'impérialisme français qui est à la tête des préparatifs de la guerre antisoviétique, qui a réglé l'affaire mandchoue en favorisant les buts annexionnistes de l'Empire du Soleil Levant.

Aujourd'hui, les feuilles financières appellent ouvertement à l'extension de la guerre, au pillage, au meurtre de millions d'hommes, de femmes, d'enfants... pour trouver une issue à la crise ! Déjà les requins, excités par l'odeur de la poudre et du sang qui se répandent en Extrême-Orient, escomptant l'extension du conflit et la guerre contre l'U.R.S.S. — cela est dit en toutes lettres dans l'extrait ci-dessus ! — spéculent sur les cadavres et la destruction systématique pour augmenter leurs profits, pour tenter d'éviter l'écroulement du régime. Le canon tonne en Mandchourie, les avions bombardent les villes ouvertes... « la cote s'améliore en Bourse » !

La voilà la « brigade de choc » de la provocation à la guerre, dont les social-fascistes du monde entier et surtout de France, d'Angleterre, d'Allemagne sont les principaux auteurs.

Contre tous ces brigands, renforçons la lutte de masse par le front uni de tous les travailleurs contre la guerre impérialiste, pour la défense de l'U. R. S. S. et le soutien de la révolution chinoise, pour la paix.

**M. MAGNIEN.**


Enclosure No. 7 to Despatch No. 1967  
of November 17, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'INFORMATION, November 15, 1931.

## Le conflit sino-japonais

Le Conseil de la Société des Nations poursuivra lundi à Paris la session exceptionnelle ouverte à Genève le mois dernier afin de découvrir les moyens d'apaiser le différend sino-japonais. C'est le 26 octobre, après plusieurs jours écoulés à attendre des satisfactions promptes et décisives, que l'on décida de remettre au 16 novembre la prochaine séance. Le temps, la réflexion, les conseils devaient amener les deux parties à fournir à la Société des Nations au moins les preuves psychologiques d'une bonne volonté pouvant permettre de déclarer que le risque du conflit armé était désormais écarté. Le temps a passé et les conseils n'ont point manqué. Mais les réactions des gouvernements chinois et japonais n'ont rien modifié de leurs positions réciproques. La situation est donc présentement ce qu'elle était aux environs du 16 octobre. Elle est même plus grave puisque la pénétration des troupes nipponnes en Mandchourie s'est étendue et que l'abondance des polémiques commentant une incessante éclo-sion de notes contradictoires rend les événements plus obscurs et plus malaisés les conciliations. Ces débats rétrospectifs sont inutiles en telle matière. N'est-il pas permis cependant, afin d'éviter de nouvelles erreurs, de se demander si la hâte que le secrétariat de la S. D. N. déploya il y a un mois pour se saisir sans plus de délai des événements de Mandchourie et

notamment dans les discussions de la Conférence navale de Londres, n'a pas droit, de la part de la France, à une considération spéciale. Mais ce n'est pas de sentiments qui seraient cependant légitimes qu'il s'agit. Pour régler la controverse sino-japonaise, mieux vaut tenter de dégager d'abord les points qui paraissent acquis. D'abord les adversaires affirment tous deux un égal désir d'éviter la guerre déclarée ; ensuite ils souhaitent voir des observateurs impartiaux sur les lieux du conflit. Mais il y a autre chose qui touche au fond même du problème. On sait que, pour le Japon, les origines du conflit et la justification de ses mesures de défense sont dans les attaques que les Chinois au-ralent lancées contre la zone du chemin de fer établi en Mandchourie avec des capitaux japonais et dans les constructions de réseaux chinois construits dans cette zone, au mépris des traités. La Chine a nié les attaques ; elle a contesté également, d'après des déclarations qui semblent bien avoir été faites le 30 octobre à Nankin par M. Wellington Koo, l'existence de pareils traités. Or, il est établi que ces traités existent. Signés le 22 décembre 1905 par les plénipotentiaires de la Chine et du Japon, ratifiés à Pékin le 23 avril 1906, accompagnés de procès-verbaux qui forment l'ensemble des engagements réciproques en date du 22 décembre 1905, ils contiennent une stipulation



pour persuader M. Aristide Briand de mettre son grand prestige au service du Conseil n'a pas été le fait d'un zèle naturel, mais qui procédait de quelques illusions ?

Dans l'échange quotidien d'accusations, auquel la Chine et le Japon procèdent à l'usage de la Société des Nations, nous nous gardons de prétendre que telle est absolument juste et telle rigoureusement fausse. Ce sont, de même que la plupart des télégrammes répandant les informations sensationnelles, des documents de propagande. C'est le jeu normal des adversaires d'employer ces moyens et l'Extrême-Orient ne manque ni d'ingéniosité ni d'astuce. Mais c'est aussi le fait de juges que l'éloignement rend impuissants à former leur conviction autrement qu'en équité, de faire référence au bon sens plutôt qu'à d'inapplicables protocoles. Ainsi, lorsque le Japon affirme qu'il n'y a pas acte de guerre parce que les troupes qu'il a dépêchées en Mandchourie poursuivent des bandits armés et non des troupes régulières, il passe peut-être la mesure. Mais, quand la Chine réclame les bénéfices du pacte Kellogg en soutenant qu'elle est sans reproche, on est en droit de se demander

aux termes de laquelle : « Le gouvernement de la Chine s'engage pour protéger les intérêts du chemin de fer sud-mandchourien à ne construire aucune ligne principale dans le voisinage du dit chemin de fer et parallèle à ce chemin de fer, ni aucun embranchement qui serait préjudiciable aux intérêts du chemin de fer sus-mentionné ». Si l'on examine la carte que nous publions ci-contre, on verra aussitôt que ces engagements n'ont pas été respectés. D'où une présomption en faveur du Japon. D'où tout au moins l'assurance que ses réclamations actuelles se fondent sur des contrats réguliers.

Nous pensons que l'expérience et l'autorité de M. Briand et l'atmosphère qui portera les esprits à la mesure, engageront le Conseil de la Société des Nations siégeant à Paris à tenir compte des faits, des droits acquis, des situations et des difficultés. S'il veut aplanir le conflit qui, depuis les derniers jours d'octobre, est allé chaque jour empirant, il le peut en envoyant sur place des observateurs qualifiés comme les attachés militaires dont le Japon accepterait certainement la présence et les observations et en recommandant avec le concours possible de l'ins-


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que nous publions ci-contre, on verra aussitôt que ces engagements n'ont pas été respectés. D'où une présomption en faveur du Japon. D'où tout au moins l'assurance que ses réclamations actuelles se fondent sur des contrats réguliers.

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FERNAND DE BRINQ



Debate 15

Enclosure No. 8 to Despatch No. 1967  
of November 17, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from JOURNAL DES DEBATS, November 15, 1931.

LES CAUSES  
DU CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS

**La Compagnie du Sud-Mandchou**

Les Japonais ont formulé en cinq points leur attitude vis-à-vis de la Chine : 1° abstention de tout acte d'agression de la part de la Chine; 2° qu'elle cesse de recourir à des actes d'hostilité (boycottage des marchandises nippones, maintien du fermage aux Japonais; etc.); 3° proclamation de l'intégrité territoriale de la Chine; 4° protection efficace des ressortissants nippons en Chine et de leurs propriétés; 5° respect des traités existants.

La Chine répond : « Nous ne saurions respecter des traités inégaux qui nous ont été imposés. »

Le problème semble dépasser, comme on le voit, le cadre juridique; il est à la fois politique, économique et social.

Le conflit, dont la phase militaire se déroule pour le moment dans la région de la rivière Nonni, porte principalement sur le Sud-Mandchou. Il n'est pas sans intérêt d'en analyser les divers aspects.

La Compagnie du Sud-Mandchou n'est pas seulement une société qui exploite le trafic ferroviaire — comme certaines informations ont pu le laisser supposer — sur la ligne qui va de Dairen à Moukden et Chang-Choung, et dont les ramifications pénètrent de nombreuses autres régions de la Mandchourie, mais aussi une organisation admirablement outillée pour l'exploitation de toutes les zones que traverse le Sud-Mandchou.

En 1905, lorsque la Russie rétrocéda au Japon le Sud-Mandchou, les dépendances de ce dernier étaient encore assez limitées. Dès 1907, la société de la ligne du Sud-Mandchou se transforme en « Compagnie du Sud-Mandchou et des exploitations dépendantes », au capital de 440 millions de yens (5 milliards de francs environ, dont 2 sont souscrits par le gouvernement japonais).

Une importante administration est mise sur pied. Elle est composée d'un président, un vice-président, et huit directeurs chargés de diriger les douze départements administratifs, dont les diverses activités dépassent singulièrement le cadre économique et s'étendent au domaine social : trois collèges, huit écoles et quatorze hôpitaux japonais existent aujourd'hui en Mandchourie.

40.000 employés, dont 30.000 au moins de nationalité japonaise, assurent les divers services de cette vaste organisation, sans compter tous les employés des sociétés dont la Compagnie a assumé l'exploitation.

La mise en valeur de la Mandchourie s'opère avec une rapidité étonnante. Les mines de charbon de Fushun produisent à elles seules sept millions de tonnes de charbon par an; celles de fer, environ 200.000 tonnes de minerai par an. Les puits de pétrole de Fushun constituent un réservoir dont la capacité est estimée à plus de 5 millions de tonnes. La construction du port de Dairen représente un investissement d'un milliard. Le trafic du port est assuré par 39 navires japonais, appartenant à la Compagnie.

Au total, on évalue les capitaux nippons investis en Mandchourie à 24 milliards de francs.

Quelle est l'attitude de la Chine devant un

tel essor? Elle encourage, au début, l'immigration des Chinois dans les provinces de l'Est. La population, qui atteignait à peine un million d'habitants en 1905, augmente rapidement. Elle est de trente millions environ aujourd'hui.

Puis la construction de lignes de chemins de fer qui pourront faire concurrence au Sud-Mandchou est décidée.

Le Japon proteste : en vertu du traité de 1905, disent les Nippons, la Chine s'est engagée à ne pas construire de ligne parallèle au Sud-Mandchou. Les Chinois le nient. Les Japonais déclarent que, si une telle clause n'est pas insérée dans le traité de Pékin du 22 décembre 1905, entre le Japon et la Chine, il en a été convenu verbalement ainsi.

D'autre part, le bail du Sud-Mandchou, entre la Russie et la Chine, était de vingt-cinq ans. Il devait venir à expiration en 1923. Dès 1915, les Japonais réclament et obtiennent que ce bail soit porté à 99 ans, et qu'il ne vienne par conséquent à expiration qu'en 1997. Les Chinois résistent d'abord à cette exigence, puis cèdent; mais depuis, ils ne cessent de déclarer que ce bail leur a été extorqué par la force.

Aussi n'hésitent-ils pas à construire deux lignes de chemins de fer, presque parallèles au Sud-Mandchou. Que font les Japonais? Ils protestent, mais néanmoins ils prêtent de l'argent à la Chine pour ces constructions ferroviaires. Il y a là un point qui semble en contradiction avec cette défense pour les Chinois de construire des lignes parallèlement au Sud-Mandchou.

Quoi qu'il en soit, les Chinois construisent trois lignes de chemin de fer : Taonan-An-ganchi, Szuspingkai-Taonan et Tahushan-Tugliao, qui relient l'Est-Chinois à la ligne Pékin-Moukden.

Puis ils s'attachent à faire dériver le trafic des marchandises dirigées sur Dairen, port de première importance, sur Yinkow, port chinois. Pour faire prime, ils réduisent les tarifs. En 1930, une nouvelle baisse des tarifs est décidée : elle est de l'ordre de 30 %; en outre, les Chinois décident que pour les cocons de soie qui seront embarqués à Yinkow, une diminution ultérieure de 15 % sera accordée.

Enfin, ils caressent le grand projet de construire un port à Halutao, au sud-ouest de Dairen, qui doit menacer sérieusement le trafic du Sud-Mandchou.

Ces différentes tentatives sont couronnées par un commencement de succès : en 1930, un million de tonnes préfèrent emprunter les lignes chinoises, et le Sud-Mandchou, de ce fait, subit une perte sèche de 350 millions de francs.

Cette menace grandissante émeut les Japonais. D'autres questions les inquiètent. Le problème sans cesse soulevé des tarifs les agace. La question du fermage à des citoyens japonais en Mandchourie les préoccupe. Le boycottage périodique des marchandises nippones, dont les exportations en Chine représentent une somme de 5 milliards par an, leur fait rubir des pertes appréciables et menace leur budget. Une atmosphère défavorable se crée et pèse sur les relations entre les deux pays.

Il n'en fallait pas tant pour que la moindre étincelle mit le feu à la poudre et déclenchât le conflit qui existait à l'état latent.

MAURICE LACHIN.

Enclosure No. 9 to Despatch No. 1967  
of November 17, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ŒUVRE, November 15, 1931.

**L'AFFAIRE SINO-JAPONAISE  
DEVANT LE CONSEIL DE LA S. D. N.**

*Œuvre 11/15*  
**Ça commence  
à Moukden...**

— Qu'est-ce qu'on a fait à Genève? demandait un homme d'affaires important, au lendemain de cette session spéciale de la Société des Nations, en octobre, où Aristide Briand joua le rôle capital que l'on sait.

— Ce qu'on a fait? On a évité la guerre.

— Bel ouvrage!

Je vous donne le propos comme authentique. Il y a des gens, à l'heure qu'il est, pour penser qu'une « bonne petite guerre », là-bas, en Extrême-Orient, à des milliers de kilomètres de chez nous, serait excellente pour rendre aux affaires un peu d'activité et « conjurer la crise ». Et ils vous rappelleront qu'à chaque moment nouveau de tension entre la Chine et le Japon a correspondu, à la Bourse de New-York, par exemple, une hausse des valeurs d'armement ou des valeurs métallurgiques.

Et voilà qui vous explique pour une part l'attitude de certains journaux — on en trouve chez nous — pour qui il n'y a pas lieu de réfréner les ardeurs du Japon et qui, indignés, remplacent la formule bien connue par celle-ci, exactement contraire :

— Alors? on sépare, ici!

Disons-le tout net : une société qui n'envisagerait, aux crises économiques dont elle peut souffrir, d'autres solutions que des guerres « lointaines », faisant marcher le commerce de la ferraille, se condamnerait elle-même.

Et puis, y a-t-il des guerres « lointaines » dont on puisse garantir qu'elles resteront telles? Il n'y a pas un mois, nous montrions ici comment, de proche en proche, et par le canal de l'U. R. S. S., intéressée au premier chef dans les affaires d'Extrême-Orient, un conflit, d'abord « localisé », pouvait embraser le monde...

Et voilà de quoi justifier, amplement, l'intervention de la Société des Nations...

Et puis, admettons que, pour l'instant, le conflit, même s'il s'aggravait, reste limité à la Chine et au Japon.

On nous dit :

— Eh bien! qu'ils se débrouillent! Ça n'est pas « nos oignons ». D'ailleurs, devant la Chine anarchique, le Japon représente « l'ordre et la civilisation ». Pourquoi manifester, en faveur de la Chine, tant de partialité?

Car il paraît que M. Briand a un faible pour la Chine.

Notons d'abord que les deux parties en présence ont rendu, à son impartialité, à son équité, à son souci de conciliation, un égal hommage. L'action diplomatique de M. Briand, en vue de ne pas envenimer les débats, n'a-t-elle même pas consisté à empêcher la Chine d'invoquer telles dispositions de l'article 15 du pacte de la Société des Nations qu'elle était, juridiquement, en droit d'invoquer?

Donc, impartialité complète. Ce qu'on a tenté de faire jusqu'à maintenant, c'est moins de placer le Japon devant des sanctions possibles ou devant l'éventualité d'une intervention comme celle que propose M. J. Hadamard, que de le mettre en présence de ses responsabilités devant l'opinion publique mondiale. Opinion publique dans laquelle il y a malheureusement les « failles » que nous signalions tout à l'heure, puisqu'il se trouve des gens pour pousser les éléments militaristes japonais à envoyer promener la Société des Nations et ses avis, et à poursuivre leur action, « au nom de l'ordre et de la civilisation »...

**Jean Plot.**

Que le Japon représente l'ordre, c'est possible. Mais quel ordre?

Je renvoie nos lecteurs à mes explications d'hier. En l'occurrence, qu'a fait le Japon? Il a laissé, pour ne pas dire qu'il a fait, construire par la Chine des lignes de chemins de fer, à l'aide d'emprunts dont les contribuables chinois paient les intérêts. Ces lignes viennent aboutir, presque toutes, à la ligne Kharbine-Port-Arthur, — dont il contrôle lui-même, directement, le tronçon méridional, — et alimenter ce tronçon. Et puis, tout à coup, sous prétexte que ces lignes ont été construites en violation du traité — contesté — de 1915, il demande la fusion de tout le réseau sud-mandchou. Autrement dit, il veut le contrôle de tous les chemins de fer, donc de toute l'activité économique de la Mandchourie méridionale. Intérêts économiques? D'accord : sans parler de l'intérêt stratégique. Or, qui commande la Mandchourie méridionale tient, au moindre incident, Pékin à sa merci. De Pékin, il est aisé de s'immiscer dans les affaires intérieures — pour nous si compliquées, souvent si inintelligibles — de la Chine...

— Eh bien! quoi! le Japon mettra de l'ordre en Chine!

— Ça s'appelle, n'est-ce pas? établir un « protectorat ». Au profit de qui? Des puissances qui, comme nous, ont en Chine tant d'intérêts commerciaux ou financiers? Ne prétions pas au subtil Japon pareille naïveté. Et puis, la Chine — ou simplement la Chine maritime — sous un protectorat japonais, c'est l'équilibre du Pacifique rompu. Croyez-vous la Russie, croyez-vous les Etats-Unis, croyez-vous l'Angleterre d'humeur à admettre cette rupture? C'est donc, à brève échéance, en supposant qu'on réussisse aujourd'hui à le « localiser », l'extension du conflit, dégénérant en guerre mondiale. (Car bien malin celui qui nous démontrerait que nous réussirions à rester à l'écart!)

Et quel serait, en tout cas, dites-moi? au bout de peu de temps, le sort de notre Indochine? Ma foi, perdue pour perdue, je ne vous cacherais pas que j'aimerais mieux la rendre aux Annamites que de l'abandonner à l'impérialisme japonais!...

Et vous voudriez que devant toutes ces menaces, des gens qui ont à la fois le souci de la paix et celui des intérêts véritables de leur pays soient demeurés les bras croisés?

— Peut-être fallait-il agir. Mais ils s'y sont mal pris!

— C'est ce que nous allons voir.

J. P.

P&P, 15

Enclosure No. 10 to Despatch No. 1967  
of November 17, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE POPULAIRE, November 15, 1931.

populaire LA GUERRE EN CHINE n/15  
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de se désolidariser de Vorochilov**

Allons, bon ! L'*Humanité* perd la tête. Avant-hier elle m'accusait d'avoir « falsifié » le texte des déclarations de Vorochilov. Hier, elle s'est ravisée. Ce n'est plus le *texte* que j'ai « falsifié », mais la *présentation* du *texte*.

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L'organe du parti socialiste prête à la *Pravda* un texte qui est de M. Cook lui-même. Nous avons sous les yeux le numéro du journal du 6 novembre, où le texte de M. Cook est bien reproduit, mais n'émane aucunement de nos camarades soviétiques.

Or, dans le *Populaire* du 12 novembre j'ai écrit : « Je trouve dans la *Pravda* du 6 novembre une interview que Vorochilov, commissaire à la Guerre, avait donnée à M. Cook, représentant de l'Agence *United Press* ». Et hier, reproduisant une deuxième fois les déclarations de Vorochilov, j'ai indiqué : « *Pravda* du 6 novembre, résumé d'une interview accordée par Vorochilov au représentant de l'*United Press* ».

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L'*Humanité* ne peut donc pas se dérober en essayant de se désolidariser d'avec Vorochilov. Il lui faut s'expliquer au sujet de la déclaration étrange du commissaire bolcheviste, qui, je le répète, éprouve le besoin d'afficher publiquement son amitié pour le Japon impérialiste, au moment même où les troupes nippones procèdent à l'occupation d'un territoire chinois.

C'est très grave, *parce qu'une telle attitude ne peut être interprétée par le Japon autrement que comme un encouragement*.

Ainsi nous nous trouvons en présence de la situation suivante :

Le Japon viole les traités et occupe un territoire chinois ; la S. D. N. se borne à des manifestations platoniques et demande, très timidement, à l'agresseur de s'arrêter ; l'U. R. S. S. ne fait même pas cela, mais proteste de ses sentiments amicaux à l'égard de l'agresseur. Ce dernier, constatant la faiblesse de l'une et « l'amitié » de l'autre, poursuit tranquillement l'occupation de la Mandchourie ; la guerre entre la Chine et le Japon en sera la conséquence ; une autre guerre peut en résulter parce que, par la force des choses, le Japon finira par entrer en conflit avec l'U. R. S. S. Donc, sans le vouloir, l'U. R. S. S. peut être entraînée dans une guerre.

Je n'ai cessé de souligner ici la gravité du conflit en Mandchourie. Et c'est pour empêcher ses conséquences — la guerre sino-japono-russe — que le *Populaire* a réclamé, aussi bien de la S. D. N. que de l'U. R. S. S. et des Etats-Unis, une action commune susceptible d'isoler le Japon et de le faire réfléchir avant de s'engager trop dans l'aventure.

A présent, il est presque trop tard. Par la faute de la S. D. N., d'une part, par l'aveuglement de Moscou, d'autre part, rien n'a été fait. L'action morale n'est plus efficace. Il faudra songer à des mesures de pression d'ordre financier et économique.

On aurait pu s'en passer et éviter au monde l'angoisse des dernières semaines.

Et c'est cette attitude que l'*Humanité* qualifie dans les termes suivants :

Menteurs, faussaires, Blum-Rosenfeld, en falsifiant les textes de si ignominieuse façon, se dévoilent comme les plus criminels provocateurs à la guerre contre les ouvriers et paysans de l'Union soviétique.

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PbP, 15

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Extract from LE POPULAIRE, November 15, 1931.

populaire LA GUERRE EN CHINE 11/15  
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N'insistons pas. Même au temps de Florimond Bonte, l'*Humanité* était plus intelligente.

S. O. ROSENFELD.

Avenir 16

Enclosure No. 11 to Despatch No. 1967  
of November 17, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'AVENIR, November 16, 1931.

## Un conseil pour rien

Avenir

11/16



On ne sait si le Conseil de la S. D. N. avait vraiment espéré que le 16 novembre la situation en Mandchourie serait plus claire que le 23 octobre ; en ce cas son attente aurait été déçue. Heureusement la fiction peut aujourd'hui comme alors embellir la réalité : le Japon n'ayant pas déclaré la guerre à la Chine par les moyens épistolaires et solennels en honneur chez les blancs, on a tout loisir de considérer comme simples amusements les coups de canon, les bombardements aériens et les batailles anecdotiques dont des dépêches contradictoires nous rapportent quotidiennement les péripéties. Grâce à ces petites opérations qui n'ont comme on voit rien de belliqueux, les Nippons ont pris en Mandchourie des positions qu'on a tout lieu de supposer solides et c'est fort bien ainsi. C'est fort bien parce qu'ils ont, pour agir comme ils l'ont fait, des raisons très fortes tirées des traités : et nous sommes de ceux qui considèrent le respect des traités comme une condition sine qua non de l'ordre international. D'autre part, en assurant la sécurité de leurs ressortissants dans les zones soumises à leur influence, en exigeant la liberté du commerce et le fonctionnement normal des voies ferrées dont ils ont la garde, ils appliquent la politique même que les grandes puissances ont toujours pratiquée à l'égard de la Chine. Il n'est donc que de laisser un peu de temps au gouvernement de Tokio pour que la solution du conflit mandchourien se dégage d'elle-même. En continuant à montrer beaucoup de patience, le Conseil

de la S. D. N. finira par avoir raison : la paix régnera dès que les généraux chinois, qui jouent chacun sa partie sans s'occuper des fantômes de gouvernements de Nankin et de Canton, auront été successivement battus ou achetés. Et le Conseil pourra se réjouir de n'avoir pas pris une peine inutile. On fera semblant de l'approuver.

A la vérité, du moment que les Soviets ne tiennent décidément pas à se mêler à cette affaire et que les Etats-Unis observent une attitude prudente, il est bien inutile de se mettre martel en tête. Le Japon ne déclarera jamais la guerre à la Chine, puisqu'il n'y a pas de Chine, phénomène important dont la S. D. N. n'a pas tenu un compte suffisant ; il se bornera à protéger la Mandchourie contre les raids des généraux qui ne sont que des chefs de bande. Que veut-on de plus ? On devrait l'en remercier et ne pas mettre les prétendus gouvernements de Nankin et de Canton dans l'obligation, toujours désagréable, de reconnaître qu'ils ne gouvernent rien.

Contrairement à ce que l'on pouvait craindre dans le début, cette histoire se présente fort bien. Nos amis japonais, qu'on a ennuyés avec quelque légèreté, oublieront philosophiquement la littérature diplomatique dont on les a inondés, ils prendront plus solidement pied sur le continent asiatique, et nous serons tranquilles pendant quelque temps — jusqu'au jour où éclatera l'inévitable conflit du Pacifique qu'aucune S. D. N. ne pourra ni prévenir ni arrêter.

SENATUS.

Enc 16

Enclosure No. 12 to Despatch No. 1967  
of November 17, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ERE NOUVELLE, November 16, 1931.

## Editorial

Nous ne savons pas si la Chine a raison quand elle proclame que les traités qui confient au Japon la garde ou la surveillance des chemins de fer de Mandchourie sont « inégaux », donc iniques.

Nous ne savons pas non plus si le Japon a raison quand il déclare que ces traités sont excellents, qu'ils assurent la prospérité d'une grande région, et qu'ils ne doivent pas être révisés.

Mais ce dont nous sommes sûrs, c'est que les uns et les autres ont eu tort quand ils ont pris les armes et qu'ils ont prétendu faire respecter ou valoir leurs droits à coups de canon, et ce que l'on doit réprouver et condamner, ce sont aussi bien les agressions ou les actes de banditisme dont se plaint le Japon que cet envoi d'un ou deux corps d'armée nippons, que la Chine reproche à son voisin.

Les deux adversaires sentent si nettement qu'en l'occurrence ils n'ont pas agi au mieux des intérêts de la paix qu'ils n'ont en ce moment qu'une préoccupation, c'est de se rejeter l'un sur l'autre la responsabilité du premier acte de violence. Et le Japon, maintenant, déclare qu'il n'a envoyé des troupes que pour se défendre, tandis que la Chine assure que ses soldats ne sont intervenus que pour empêcher des empiètements inadmissibles.

Si la Chine avait à protester contre une injustice, si le Japon avait à s'élever contre la violation d'un traité, ne pouvaient-ils point saisir le Conseil de la S. D. N. de leurs plaintes et porter devant ce haut aréopage de tels différends ?

Un jour, le président Aristide Briand déclarait que l'esprit de paix n'aura vraiment pénétré toutes les nations que lorsqu'elles auront compris qu'il n'est pas plus permis à des peuples qu'à des individus de se faire justice eux-mêmes. Grandes et nobles paroles ! On en sent aujourd'hui toute la portée, et tout le mal vient de ce que la Chine et le Japon n'ont pas pu ou n'ont pas voulu faire leur cette thèse.

Mais le mal étant fait, il faut le réparer. C'est la tâche du Conseil. Elle n'est pas aisée. Elle est d'autant plus ingrate que les hommes chargés d'arbitrer et de résoudre ce conflit n'ont, pour se faire écouter, que la simple force de la persuasion, et le Conseil n'a pas d'autre arme à son service que l'autorité, la noblesse et le talent de ceux qui le composent. Qui donc, dans ces conditions, pourrait lui faire grief s'il échoue ? Mais aussi il n'est personne qui ne doive lui rendre un magnifique hommage s'il réussit.



Enclosure No. 13 to Despatch No. 1967  
of November 17, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from EXCELSIOR, November 16, 1931.

## LE CONSEIL DE LA S.D.N. SE REUNIT AUJOURD'HUI A PARIS POUR S'OCCUPER DE LA MANDCHOURIE



L'ARRIVÉE DES DÉLÉGUÉS ANGLAIS ET JAPONAIS. — A gauche : LORD TYRRELL REÇOIT SIR JOHN SIMON. A droite : MM. YOSHI-ZAWA ET MATSUDEIRA, AMBASSADEUR DU JAPON A LONDRES.

A Tokio, on déclare que les troupes japonaises ne quitteront pas le territoire mandchou avant le rétablissement d'une situation normale.

### LES COMBATS CONTINUENT SUR LA RIVIÈRE NONNI

C'est aujourd'hui, à 16 heures, que le conseil de la Société des nations se réunira, au Quai d'Orsay, en vue de l'examen du conflit sino-japonais et avec l'espérance d'obtenir un résultat satisfaisant.

M. Scialoja est arrivé à Paris hier matin. Sir John Simon et M. Lerroux sont venus respectivement de Londres et de Madrid. M. Zaleski n'arrivera qu'aujourd'hui.

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Le chef de la délégation japonaise sera toujours M. Yoshizawa, ambassadeur du Japon à Paris, assisté de M. Matsudeira, ambassadeur à Londres et ami personnel du général Dawes, qui, comme nous l'avons déjà dit, vient participer, au nom des Etats-Unis, aux conversations privées du conseil.

La Petite Entente sera représentée par M. Fotich, ministre adjoint des Affaires étrangères de Yougoslavie.

M. von Bülow viendra renforcer, au cours des conversations secrètes, M. von Mutius, qui a représenté l'Allemagne en octobre à la Société des nations.

#### La situation de la Chine

Il ne faut pas se dissimuler la complexité du problème extrême-oriental, où s'enchevêtrent toutes sortes d'influences et d'intérêts rivaux.

Considérer la Chine comme une république « une et indivisible », gouvernée selon les us et coutumes des démocraties occidentales, unifiées et centralisées, serait une erreur. Mais il serait également dangereux de méconnaître son sentiment national et ses efforts douloureux de réorganisation sur des principes modernes.

La Chine est sourdement travaillée par des influences étrangères rivales. La propagande soviétique y exploite des passions xénophobes qui, de tous temps, se manifestèrent par de sanglants désordres. Elle est, depuis quinze ans, déchirée par des rivalités de généraux et gouverneurs de provinces, tantôt à la tête de troupes régulières, tantôt à la tête de troupes rebelles ou de bandes vivant de brigandage. Il n'existe pratiquement pas de garanties que ces troupes, changeant à tout instant de chefs, obéiront aux ordres d'un pouvoir central, sans législation, sans code et sans tribunaux.

Derrière cette Chine en effervescence, mais qui garde les traditions d'une civilisation plusieurs fois millénaire, il y a l'U.R.S.S. à qui il importe de ne fournir aucun prétexte d'intervention.

#### Les intérêts économiques en Chine

Le conseil de la Société des nations devra nécessairement tenir compte de l'instabilité de la situation politique,

de matières premières et revaloriserait les stocks de produits manufacturés.

Animé de l'idéal le plus noblement humain, le conseil de la Société des nations se gardera, sans doute, de pousser les choses à l'extrême en se prononçant sur des principes d'une application hasardeuse, en des pays fort différents de nous, d'idées et de mœurs.

#### La fonction du Japon en Mandchourie

Pour comprendre la nervosité du Japon, qui paraît avoir largement dépassé, du point de vue purement stratégique, la zone de contrôle des chemins de fer, que lui reconnaissent les traités, il sied de ne pas oublier que la fermeture du marché chinois, pour les importations et les exportations japonaises, équivaldrait à une complète asphyxie économique. L'Amérique et l'Australie opposant, à l'émigration et à la production nipponnes, des barrières infranchissables, le Japon n'a guère d'autre exutoire que la Corée et la Mandchourie, d'où il tire un ravitaillement nécessaire à ses îles surpeuplées.

Cela ne justifie nullement certains plans de conquêtes territoriales prêtés à quelques dirigeants de l'Empire du Soleil-Levant, où il semble bien que les éléments militaires aient quelque peu échappé au contrôle des pouvoirs civils. Mais on peut trouver, dans l'inquiétude du peuple japonais en face du mouvement de boycottage chinois, aggravant la crise qui sévit au Japon comme dans tous les pays industriels, quelques circonstances atténuantes.



Exc 16

Enclosure No. 13 to Despatch No. 1967  
of November 17, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from EXCELSIOR, November 16, 1931.

## LE CONSEIL DE LA S.D.N. SE REUNIT AUJOURD'HUI A PARIS POUR S'OCCUPER DE LA MANDCHOURIE



L'ARRIVÉE DES DÉLÉGUÉS ANGLAIS ET JAPONAIS. — A gauche : LORD TYRRELL REÇOIT SIR JOHN SIMON. A droite : MM. YOSHI-ZAWA ET MATSUDEIRA, AMBASSADEUR DU JAPON A LONDRES.

A Tokio, on déclare que les troupes japonaises ne quitteront pas le territoire mandchou avant le rétablissement d'une situation normale.

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Le ~~Royaume-Basque~~ ~~sera représenté~~ devra nécessairement tenir compte de l'instabilité de la situation politique,


de matières premières et revaloriserait les stocks de produits manufacturés.

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Le salon de l'Horloge du ministère des Affaires étrangères.

en Chine. Il ne devra pas davantage perdre de vue que ce pays est, par excellence, le pays des mirages d'expansion économique. C'est l'étonnement de tous les voyageurs d'y voir pulluler, côte à côte, les missions et les comptoirs étrangers. Dans les moindres agglomérations, l'on y rencontre des commis-voyageurs et des propagandistes de l'Y.M.C.A. Les rivalités commerciales renforcent, en Extrême-Orient, les rivalités d'influences. Le boycottage organisé des produits anglais, puis japonais, ne fut pas une mauvaise affaire pour tout le monde. De semblables manœuvres peuvent atteindre, à tour de rôle, toutes les productions étrangères.

Ce n'est donc pas seulement entre gouvernements et états-majors que le conseil de la Société des nations doit s'efforcer de faire régner la paix, mais encore, entre des intérêts adverses, exploitant quelque troubles locaux pour évincer des concurrences gênantes.

L'expérience a prouvé que les forces du progrès scientifique et industriel ne concourent pas toutes au développement de la civilisation. Certains partisans de la politique du pire escomptent secrètement les profits d'une guerre asiatique, qui stimulerait les marchés

Il ne s'agit d'ailleurs point de donner raison à l'une et tort à l'autre des deux parties, mais de les amener à des transactions raisonnables, ménageant à la fois leurs intérêts essentiels et leurs légitimes susceptibilités nationales. La prospérité économique de tous les peuples d'Extrême-Orient ne peut que gagner à leur bonne collaboration.

**Les aspects juridiques  
du conflit**

Ces considérations ne font que souligner la force des positions juridiques prises par le conseil de la Société des nations à l'égard des deux pays voisins, qui n'ont aucune raison sérieuse de devenir des pays belligérants.

Il serait injuste d'accuser le conseil de partialité. Il a usé de tous les ménagements possibles envers les deux gouvernements en conflit. L'article 11 du pacte a été seul admis comme base de la négociation, l'article 15, autorisant le conseil à se prononcer à la majorité des voix, risquant d'envenimer la querelle et d'aboutir à des sanctions. Par la voix de son président, le conseil a multiplié les adjurations aux deux parties de cesser toute hostilité.

Des engagements ont été pris de part et d'autre sur des bases acceptées d'un commun accord. Sous divers prétextes, ces engagements n'ont pas été tenus. L'on a ergoté sur des formules, tandis que se développaient des opérations militaires. Si les dernières dépêches étaient exactes, il y aurait sur la rivière Nonni, dans une zone qui semble fort éloignée des bases d'occupation japonaise, deux armées, de forces inégales, prêtes à en venir aux mains.

L'heure n'est plus où le conseil puisse tenter de départager les responsabilités d'adversaires qui rejettent l'un sur l'autre des torts, sans doute réciproques. C'est l'avance des troupes et leur choc qu'il faut arrêter, aucun arrangement de bonne foi et de bonne volonté n'étant possible si l'une ou l'autre des deux parties menace d'en arriver à l'*ultima ratio* des canons et des mitrailleuses.

Le Japon peut et doit rester un facteur d'ordre et d'équilibre en Extrême-Orient. La Chine peut et doit évoluer rapidement vers un régime stable qui lui permettra de développer ses immenses ressources naturelles. Ceci, comme cela, n'est possible que dans la paix. Dans le débat politique et juridique qui va s'ouvrir, le conseil de la Société des nations donnera la mesure de son autorité morale et le Japon et la Chine administreront la preuve de leur capacité de grands Etats. — MARCEL PAYS.

FIG. 16

Enclosure No. 14 to Despatch No. 1967  
of November 17, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from FIGARO, November 16, 1931.

## L'Extrême-Orient

### au Quai d'Orsay



Le Conseil de la S. D. N., qui se réunit aujourd'hui au Quai d'Orsay sous la présidence de M. Briand, a été salué par les Japonais et les Chinois avec tous les égards qui lui sont dus. Ils ont tiré en son honneur, à Tsitsikar, une salve où ils lui ont fait, en coups de canon, plus large mesure qu'aux plus puissants souverains.

Le Conseil répondra, coup pour coup, par un bombardement de notes qui n'arrêtera pas l'autre, le papier diplomatique n'ayant force exécutoire que s'il est garanti par l'encaisse métallique des armes. Or, la S.D.N. en est totalement dépourvue. Il est vrai que M. Hadamard, professeur au Collège de France, propose dans l'*Œuvre* de combler cette lacune en la dotant de contingents fournis par les Etats non intéressés dans le conflit. La France ayant, sous le signe du briandisme, le monopole du désintéressement, c'est l'inviter à déclarer la guerre au Japon pour l'amour de la paix.

Si la situation est grave, comme le proclament les augures de Genève, ce n'est pas du tout parce qu'elle révèle leur faillite ; c'est parce que, sous l'inspiration de M. Briand, ils utilisent leur prestige, c'est-à-dire leur budget, contre les intérêts solidaires de la paix, de la civilisation et de la France.

Nous n'ignorons pas que la S. D. N. sera vantée tant qu'elle sera rentée. Sa faillite n'en est pas moins ancienne. Elle date du jour où elle a chassé la Belgique de son Conseil pour y installer une Allemagne non repentante, relapse, acharnée à violer tous ses engagements et à répudier toute responsabilité dans la guerre, cette guerre juste que Mgr Schreiber, évêque de Berlin, bénissait récemment devant des pacifistes français. Le jour où elle a ainsi couronné le crime qu'elle a pour objet de prévenir ou de réprimer, elle s'est suicidée ; elle a mis son autorité morale au pair de son pouvoir matériel qui a toujours été nul.

Après avoir ainsi vendu son âme au Méphisto germanique, la S. D. N. n'a plus été que son instrument et celui de Moscou. Quand elle sera requise par nos alliés de la petite Entente d'enquêter sur les armements frauduleux de la Hongrie, elle se récusera parce que derrière Budapest se dresse l'ombre complice de Berlin. De même, son *Bureau international du travail*, si empressé à brimer notre industrie, affecte d'ignorer l'esclavage du prolétariat russe.

La S. D. N. est très capable de favoriser le réarmement des agresseurs de 1914 et la contrebande de guerre en Chine, mais elle est incapable d'empêcher le moindre conflit. Tous les initiés savent que le conflit gréco-bulgare dont, au dire de M. Briand, la solution est le triomphe de Genève, n'était qu'un incident de frontière survenu en dehors de la volonté des gouvernements, que, s'il en avait été autrement, le veto de la France et de l'Angleterre, maîtresses de la mer et seules dispensatrices des crédits, aurait suffi à imposer la paix et que, d'ailleurs, le gouvernement hellénique avait donné à ses contingents locaux l'ordre de se retirer avant que Genève n'ait été saisi par Sofia. En l'espèce, la S. D. N. n'avait d'autre troupe que les carabiniers d'Offenbach, et d'autre génie que celui du bluff.

Aujourd'hui, son impuissance en Extrême-Orient permet de mesurer la régression qui s'est opérée, au nom du progrès, dans la vie internationale. En 1900, lors de l'insurrection des Boxers, les Puissances s'étaient associées pour sauvegarder leurs droits en Chine et les troupes françaises y avaient accepté le commandement d'un maréchal allemand. Aujourd'hui, dans cette Chine, terre classique de l'intervention européenne, les nations réunies dans une société patentée n'envisagent même pas cet effort de solidarité. Cependant, l'anarchie actuelle est autrement grave que celle de 1900, en elle-même par les attentats qu'elle engendre, et surtout par les répercussions nouvelles dont elle est susceptible. Le tremblement de terre de 1914-1918 a libéré en Extrême-Orient des forces qui se coalisent contre l'homme blanc et qui provoqueront un nouveau tremblement de terre si elles sont abandonnées à elles-mêmes.

Mais elles ne sont pas abandonnées à elles-mêmes : elles trouvent des alliés à Genève et au Quai d'Orsay, comme à Moscou. En se prononçant contre le Japon, M. Briand a travaillé contre la paix qui serait déjà faite si la Chine n'avait été encouragée dans sa résistance à de justes réclamations, contre la civilisation dont le Japon est le soldat méconnu, contre la sainteté des traités qui ont été déchirés par la Chine ; enfin, ce qui doit le consoler, contre la France en lui aliénant le Japon, notre ex-allié de la grande guerre, et, pour bien des raisons, notre allié naturel d'aujourd'hui.

Peut-on espérer que le Palais-Bourbon exercera un droit de regard sur son voisin du Quai d'Orsay




FIG. 16

Enclosure No. 14 to Despatch No. 1967  
of November 17, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from FIG. 10, November 16, 1931.

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Peut-on espérer que le Palais-Bourbon exercera un droit de regard sur son voisin du Quai d'Orsay alors que nos députés, plongés dans l'hypnose préélectorale, ne peuvent apercevoir qu'une toute petite Chine à travers une immense circonscription ?



# Le Japon, la Chine et la Société des Nations

## L'enseignement de la xénophobie dans les écoles primaires chinoises

Le dernier des cinq points fondamentaux dont le Japon exige la reconnaissance par la Chine porte sur le respect des engagements pris en vertu d'accords internationaux.

Qu'un pays faisant partie de la Société des Nations feigne, en temps de paix, d'ignorer les obligations inscrites dans les traités sans que la Société des Nations élève la moindre protestation, on a déjà peine à le croire, et c'est pourtant la réalité. Mais que la Société des Nations réserve ses sévérités, non au délinquant, mais à la personne lésée, il n'est pas besoin de charger les adversaires de la Société des Nations de la discréditer. Elle y pourvoit.

En effet, ou le gouvernement japonais formule des accusations gratuites, et il serait facile de le confondre — cela n'est pas dans les habitudes du Japon d'agir à la légère — ou ses affirmations sont fondées, et la justice, d'accord avec le bon sens, exige que des représentations — à défaut de sanctions — soient faites à la Chine.

Au lieu de cela, Genève n'a de foudres que pour les Japonais. Ah ! la vanité des hommes, que de sottises elle fait commettre !

\*\*\*

Le deuxième des cinq points fondamentaux posés par les Japonais est la cessation de l'antijaponisme et du boycottage des produits japonais qui en est la conséquence. Avec raison, les Japonais affirment que l'attitude du gouvernement de Nankin est inamicale à leur égard, que la campagne d'agitation est non seulement tolérée par lui, mais organisée sous sa direction. Elle est, en cela, en violation flagrante des règles et coutumes qui régissent les rapports des peuples civilisés entre eux. L'organisation de ce mouvement antijaponais est de beaucoup antérieure à l'avance des troupes japonaises hors la zone du chemin de fer sud-mandchourien.

Les Chinois ne peuvent donc pas prendre pour prétexte cette avance pour justifier, ou tout au moins pour excuser, cette violation des traités internationaux qu'est le mouvement antijaponais.

D'aucuns, pour des raisons de rivalité commerciale, se réjouissent secrètement de l'ostracisme qui frappe le Japon, ses ressortissants et ses marchandises en Chine. Mauvais calcul ! C'est une haine commune qui frappe en Chine Européens, Américains et Japonais. Et s'il existe, à l'heure actuelle, un mouvement antijaponais très prononcé, les sentiments xénophobes couvent, eux aussi, sous la cendre.

N'est-ce pas un homme d'Etat américain qui déclarait, l'autre jour, que dans le conflit sino-japonais, le Japon représentait l'ordre, la civilisation et, de plus, le bon droit évident ?

Toute diminution du Japon en Chine est un malheur européen.

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D'ailleurs, il suffit de suivre de près le mouvement antijaponais en Chine pour se rendre compte qu'il n'est qu'une des phases de la lutte entreprise par les Chinois contre tous les étrangers.

Face à l'unanimité faite à Genève autour de la Chine, il faut dresser la solidarité d'intérêt de toutes les puissances étrangères en Chine. Ce sont elles qu'on vise à travers le Japon.

Les preuves surabondent.

Nous en détachons de frappantes, recueillies au cours d'une étude que nous venons de faire sur la

plus odieuse forme de xénophobie, celle qui s'attache à fausser l'esprit de la jeunesse des écoles, incapable de réagir. Car il y a une vaste entreprise de xénophobie, non pas, nous le répétons, patronnée par le gouvernement central et les autres, mais dirigée par eux, qui répand dans les écoles primaires de Chine et de Mandchourie la haine de l'étranger, quel qu'il soit : l'étranger tout court.

Ce sont des extraits que nous donnons de livres de lecture en usage dans les écoles primaires. Si ces livres sont d'auteurs différents, ceux-ci ont un point de ralliement : leurs sentiments xénophobes.

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Voulez-vous savoir ce qu'on entend par les grandes puissances ?

« Ce sont celles qui disposent de grandes forces armées. Elles en usent pour opprimer les peuples faibles, se servant, en outre, des avantages que leur procurent les traités inégaux (imposés). En ce qui touche la Chine, ces grandes puissances l'oppriment à l'aide des traités inégaux. On compte six à sept de ces puissances. Il y a, par exemple, l'Angleterre, le Japon, la France, les Etats-Unis, etc. Et, parmi elles, les plus tyranniques sont l'Angleterre et le Japon. »

Et un autre manuel nous apprend que la politique en honneur chez ces grandes puissances est l'impérialisme.

« Par impérialisme, l'on n'entend pas désigner une forme de gouvernement, mais une politique suivie par une nation à l'égard d'autres nations. Par exemple, l'Angleterre et le Japon sont des monarchies constitutionnelles, mais la politique de ces deux pays concernant les Indes et la Corée est l'impérialisme. La France et les Etats-Unis sont deux Etats démocratiques ; c'est néanmoins de l'impérialisme que leur politique vis-à-vis de l'Annam et des îles Philippines.

« Qu'est-ce donc par l'impérialisme ? C'est tout simplement l'emploi de la force pour faire courber les faibles sous la loi du plus fort. Les pays qui pratiquent l'impérialisme invoquent toutes sortes de raisons pour le justifier, par exemple : les pays à civilisation avancée doivent conduire les pays arriérés dans la voie du progrès et les aider à exploiter les richesses naturelles, cherchant ainsi le bonheur de l'humanité... »

« La population totale de l'univers est d'environ 1.500.000.000 d'êtres humains. Sur ce nombre, 250.000.000 seulement représentent les peuples opprimés. »

« Pourquoi les 1.250.000.000 restant ne se révolteraient-ils point ? La Chine, avec ses 400.000.000 d'habitants, est le plus important des peuples opprimés. »

« Il faut donc abattre les principes impérialistes. »  
« Il n'est pas besoin d'affirmer que cela ne sera pas difficile. »

Sept questions suivent cet exposé :

- a) Qu'est-ce que l'impérialisme ?
- b) Quels sont les pays impérialistes d'aujourd'hui ?
- c) Quels sont les prétextes invoqués par ces pays pour se justifier ?
- d) Pour quelles raisons l'impérialisme est-il appelé à disparaître ?
- e) Pourquoi y a-t-il nécessité pour la Chine à combattre les nations impérialistes ?
- f) Comment la Chine y parviendra-t-elle ?

g) Que fera la Chine pour les autres peuples opprimés ?

Les commentaires des instituteurs doivent être éloquentes !

Ainsi, par le fait de ces nations de proie, la Chine actuelle est comme un corps mutilé auquel manquent des membres.

« Les territoires perdus dans les temps récents sont : Wei-Hai-Wei, Port-Arthur, Dairen, la presqu'île de Kow-Loon (en face de Hong-Kong), Kwang-Chow-Wan. Auparavant, nous avions perdu la Corée, Formose, les îles Pescadores, la Birmanie, l'Annam, etc., etc. »

Il ne faut pas rester sur ces amputations successives, rétorque un autre livre de lecture.

« Dans quelle mesure notre territoire est-il amputé ? »

« Pourquoi notre territoire est-il amputé ? »

« Pourquoi devons-nous recouvrer les territoires perdus ? »

« Notre pays est amputé par suite de territoires cédés à bail. L'Angleterre est à Wei-Hai-Wei, le Japon à Port-Arthur et à Dairen, la France à Kwang-Chow-Wan. »

« Il y a les concessions : Shang-Hai, Tien-Tsin, Hankow, etc. »

« Il y a les territoires cédés : l'Angleterre nous a volé Hong-Kong et le Japon Formose. Il y a les territoires envahis : la Corée par le Japon, l'Annam et la Birmanie à notre frontière sud par la France et l'Angleterre. La Russie, à nos frontières nord-est et nord-ouest, s'est livrée également à l'invasion. »

« C'est en nous menaçant ou en nous trompant que les puissances impérialistes nous ont volé ces territoires. Il faut arriver à reconstituer la Chine telle qu'elle était avant ces diminutions successives. Pour y parvenir, il faut employer tous les moyens. Tant que les territoires perdus ne seront pas de nouveau chinois, il y aura de la souffrance parmi le peuple. »

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Telles sont les constatations que nous avons faites et que l'on peut faire après nous.

Les textes sont là.

Ce qu'il y a de particulièrement grave à cette forme de l'antijaponisme et de la xénophobie, c'est qu'elle crée un état d'esprit indélébile.

Dans cinq ans, dans dix ans, cette jeunesse formera la masse des Chinois. Et l'enfant qui aura sucé de ce lait empoisonné sera francophobe tout autant qu'antijaponais.

Qui peut mesurer, dès aujourd'hui, les très graves conséquences qui découleront un jour de ce chauffage à blanc de la jeunesse chinoise ?

En épaulant la Chine à Genève, le conseil de la Société des Nations entend-il donner blanc-seing à cette action subversive qui est certainement le seul point commun de tous les gouvernements et sous-gouvernements chinois, qu'ils soient de Nankin, de Canton, de Moukden ou d'ailleurs ?

L'anarchie est moins souvent engendrée par les fauteurs de désordre professionnels que par les hommes de bonne volonté qui, par ignorance, faiblesse, aveuglement et orgueil, confondent le bien et le mal, ne différencient point l'ordre du désordre et traitent sur un pied d'égalité la vérité et l'erreur.

Est-ce à créer l'anarchie dans le monde que tend l'action du conseil de la Société des Nations ?

Auguste Raynal.

Hann 16

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of November 17, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'HUMANITE, November 16, 1931.

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Mais sa fonction propre, son objectif précis, est de faire naître ce mystère dont parlait Lénine, de brouiller les choses à plaisir, de couvrir d'un étincelant manteau les opérations les plus suspectes, de jeter le désarroi, de semer la confusion dans les rangs ouvriers.

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Jeter le voile sur les préparatifs guerriers, préparer des millions d'hommes à aller à la guerre sous le drapeau du pacifisme, voilà la fonction propre de la S.D.N.

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Qu'on en juge : Le 18 septembre, le Japon s'empare de Moukden et envahit la Mandchourie. Ce coup de force ne surprend personne. Il ne surprend pas, dans tous les cas, les cercles dirigeants français qui, par avance, l'avaient justifié dans un remarquable article de la *Revue Militaire*, du général Weygand.

Le conseil se réunit une première fois le 25 septembre, une seconde fois le 14 octobre. Par deux fois, il *entérine l'agression japonaise et conseille à la Chine d'entrer en négociations directes avec le partenaire japonais qui occupe son territoire.*

Comme il est indispensable — indispensable au succès du coup de force — de paraître impartial, le conseil se grime en juge Salomon. Il recommande au Japon d'évacuer le territoire un jour ou l'autre. Le Japon ne se soumet point à cette injonction. Et le scénario tend à prolonger l'illusion et à épaissir le mystère, à faire croire que la « volonté de paix de la S.D.N. » se heurte à la volonté de guerre du Japon. Mais l'illusion est trompeuse et la réalité bouscule cette mise en scène.

*De fait, l'impérialisme japonais agit avec l'appui de toutes les grandes puissances qui font la loi à la S.D.N.*

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Tandis que Vandervelde et Renaudel dénonçaient « les projets annexionnistes » du bolchevisme, Litvinov a révélé l'activité des gardes blancs, soutenus par le Japon.

En affirmant sur tous les tons qu'elle désirait la paix, que la politique d'agression, de dépècement, n'était pas la sienne, l'U. R. S. S. a éventé le piège d'*agents provocateurs* que lui tendaient les chefs social-fascistes.

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Il agit avec la complicité de l'Angleterre et avec celle des Etats-Unis. Laval, à Washington, a acquis aux Japonais la bienveillance des Yankees, et ceux-ci, au surplus, ne veulent point faire un geste qui pourrait entrainer le rapprochement de l'impérialisme nippon avec le concurrent britannique.

Il agit avec la complicité du Kuomintang contre-révolutionnaire, qui réclame ouvertement de la S.D.N. une intervention militaire en Chine.

Il agit — ne l'oublions jamais — avec le concours honteux de la social-démocratie française, dont la cause maudite se confond avec celle de l'impérialisme français.

Si l'écœurement ne vous fait pas peur, relisez attentivement la presse socialiste depuis le 18 septembre. Nous vous mettons au défi d'y relever la moindre attaque contre l'impérialisme français.

Les attaques venimeuses, les insinuations perfides, le journal de M. Blum les réserve à l'Etat soviétique qui, seul, malgré les menaces et les provocations, représente les intérêts de la paix soviétique ; qui, seul, a aidé la Chine dans ses efforts libérateurs ; qui, seul, a renoncé aux privilèges im-

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
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Extract from LE JOURNAL, November 16, 1931.

**LE CONSEIL DE LA SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS**  
qui se réunit aujourd'hui à Paris  
va s'occuper, pour la troisième fois,  
du conflit sino-japonais

Par SAINT-BRICE

Or donc, le conseil de la Société des nations va, pour la troisième fois, s'occuper du litige sino-japonais. On voudrait qu'avant d'aborder ce débat, qui doit être décisif — car il n'y a vraiment plus de faute à commettre — les membres du conseil daignent jeter les yeux sur la carte de la Mandchourie et sur la charte de la Société des Nations. L'examen de la carte, où sont marquées les positions actuelles des deux parties, est singulièrement éloquent. Nous avons sous les yeux un pays grand comme deux fois



l'Allemagne, dans lequel le Japon a le droit et le devoir d'assurer la gestion et la circulation de voies ferrées s'étendant sur plus de 1.000 kilomètres. Dans ce pays, il y a 30 millions de Chinois, dont les neuf dixièmes ont été amenés par le régime de l'occupation japonaise. Il y a 100.000 soldats chinois répartis un peu partout; il y a des centaines de bandes de brigands. Voilà pour les éléments de trouble. Pour le service d'ordre, 13.000 soldats japonais. Pas un de plus.

Imaginez dans quelle situation ces soldats se trouvent et demandez-vous s'ils peuvent avoir quelque intérêt à provoquer des désordres.

Par ailleurs, le préambule de la charte de la Société des nations engage tous les membres à assurer le respect scrupuleux de toutes les obligations des traités dans les rapports mutuels de peuples organisés. Demandez-vous aussi s'il n'y a pas, parmi les deux parties, un peuple qui ne représente que dans une très faible mesure ce qu'on peut appeler et ce qu'on considère en Europe comme un peuple organisé. Lequel ?

Après quoi, les membres du conseil doivent avant tout se mettre bien en face de la situation exacte. Le conseil s'est déjà occupé deux fois de l'affaire. La première intervention, dans la seconde quinzaine de septembre, a abouti à une résolution unanime — condition essentielle de validité — en vertu de laquelle le Japon s'engage à faire rentrer ses troupes dans ses lignes le plus tôt possible, dès qu'il aura obtenu de la Chine des garanties pour l'exécution des traités, pour le respect de

la vie et des biens de ses nationaux.

La seconde intervention, qui a eu lieu du 14 au 24 octobre, a laissé les choses en l'état. En effet, le projet de résolution du 24 octobre au soir, qui assignait au Japon un délai expirant le 16 novembre pour retirer ses troupes, est nul, en raison du veto catégorique opposé par le Japon. L'article 11 de la charte, qui vise le cas de menace de guerre, stipule qu'une résolution du conseil n'est valable que si elle réalise l'unanimité, y compris les voix des parties intéressées.

On pourrait soutenir dans une certaine mesure que la Chine ayant accepté le projet est liée moralement et rechercher jusqu'à quel point elle a exécuté l'engagement qui la concernait et qui comportait la recherche du règlement de son litige avec le Japon. Par contre, le projet ne peut avoir ni valeur légale, ni même valeur morale à l'égard du Japon qui a refusé catégoriquement de l'accepter, en posant comme condition préjudicielle un accord directement négocié avec la Chine sur les cinq points fondamentaux qui se résument tous dans l'exécution des traités.

Formule vague, dit-on. Le Japon ne sera certainement pas embarrasé pour la préciser, notamment en ce qui concerne les principaux traités dont la violation a provoqué l'action militaire et dont le gouvernement de Tokio a précisé le respect.

Les traités en question sont le traité de 1906, par lequel la Chine a accepté les clauses du traité de Portsmouth transférant au Japon une partie des droits concédés par la Russie; le traité de 1909 qui a pré-



clisé les droits du Japon en Mandchourie; enfin le fameux traité de 1915, que la Chine refuse de reconnaître, bien qu'elle l'ait ratifié officiellement. Et c'est là le fond même du conflit.

En somme, si l'on veut se dégager de toutes les fausses nouvelles, de toutes les polémiques, de toutes les manœuvres qui ont embrouillé l'affaire, si on veut considérer les seules possibilités de règlement, le cas se ramène à quelques considérations très simples.

Premièrement, la preuve a été faite largement depuis deux mois qu'en dépit d'hostilités continuelles, aucun des deux pays ne désire aller jusqu'à la guerre. Ce ne sont certes pas les prétextes qui ont manqué.

Deuxièmement, la Chine ne veut pas engager de négociations sur le fond même du litige sous la menace de pression militaire. Elle entend par là que les troupes japonaises doivent rentrer dans leurs lignes avant toute discussion.

Troisièmement, le Japon soutient qu'il ne peut pas retirer ses trou-

des nations. En septembre, le Japon se montrait très opposé à l'enquête parce que celle-ci semblait devoir porter sur son action militaire. Après deux mois écoulés, qui ont montré que le Japon n'a pas ajouté un seul soldat aux effectifs consentis par les traités, l'enquête se trouverait évidemment amenée à porter sur la difficulté de ramener les troupes japonaises dans leurs lignes avant que soient données les garanties sérieuses réclamées par le Japon.

Une troisième combinaison pourrait être la reprise d'une idée suggérée dans la matinée du 24 octobre par M. de Madariaga. Le délégué espagnol proposait que la négociation politique s'engageât le jour même où l'évacuation des troupes japonaises serait achevée. Cette solution réclamerait, évidemment, des garanties contre les manœuvres d'attermlement dans lesquelles la diplomatie chinoise est si experte. Il faudrait fixer un délai bref et limité pour la négociation politique, en stipulant pour les deux parties la reprise de leur liberté d'action à défaut d'accord.

On voit que la Société des nations peut aisément trouver une solution honorable et équitable. Tout devrait la conduire à entrer dans cette voie. Tout d'abord, après deux tentatives infructueuses, le crédit de la Société demande qu'on aboutisse. L'atmosphère de Genève ayant donné tout ce qu'on pouvait attendre de son action émolliente, on peut espérer trouver à Paris des dispositions plus propices aux vues politiques. Enfin, des changements intéressants interviennent dans le personnel. L'Angleterre va être représentée par son nouveau ministre des affaires étrangères. Sir John Simon apportera la mentalité d'un juriste de profession, qui sera peut-être plus efficace que les idéologies singulièrement flottantes de lord Robert Cecil. L'Amérique aura, en la personne du général Dawes, un observateur de plus de poids que son consul général de Genève. S'il est vrai que le délégué du Japon doive être assisté des ambassadeurs japonais à Londres et à Rome, il y a un élément très important — car l'ambassadeur à Londres, M. Matsudeira, a noué, au cours de la conférence de Londres et au cours d'une précédente ambassade à Washington des relations très cordiales avec le général Dawes.

Est-il vrai que les Etats-Unis tiennent un compromis en réserve? On souhaiterait que la Société des nations, après tant d'épreuves, ne laissât pas aux Américains l'honneur de régler cette affaire.

Saint-Brice.



MM. ZALESKI (à gauche)  
et CHLAPOWSKI

pes aussi longtemps qu'il n'aura pas obtenu pour la vie de ses nationaux et pour leurs biens, menacés non seulement en Mandchourie, mais en Chine, par des campagnes d'excitation et un boycottage organisé, toutes les garanties de reconnaissance et d'exécution des traités.

Quatrièmement, la Société des nations n'a pas à intervenir dans le règlement du conflit en se substituant aux parties. Son rôle se limite à assurer la paix et aussi à faire reconnaître la validité des traités.

Dans ces conditions, ce ne sont pas les possibilités de solution qui manquent, bien qu'il soit prématuré d'indiquer celle sur laquelle on va s'orienter.

On peut tout d'abord revenir à une suggestion qui avait été formulée, le 20 octobre, par sir Eric Drummond et que des circonstances malencontreuses ont seules empêché d'aboutir. Le secrétaire général avait formulé, dans une proposition comportant trois alternatives, deux négociations parallèles: l'une sur l'évacuation, l'autre sur le règlement du litige politique. Le délégué du Japon, l'ambassadeur M. Yoshizawa, demanda à en référer à son gouvernement. Trois jours après, il apportait une acceptation. Pourquoi faut-il que, dans l'intervalle, le projet ait été abandonné à la suite de la fausse nouvelle d'un refus japonais?

L'idée est intéressante et peut être reprise. Même pour faciliter l'acceptation de la Chine, on pourrait concevoir deux négociations parallèles,



MM. SCIALOJA (à droite) et MANZONI

mais distinctes: la négociation sur l'évacuation aurait lieu sur le terrain même, la négociation politique à Londres ou à Paris. On ne pourrait pas, dans ces conditions, parler de pression militaire. Le Japon n'aurait-il pas jusqu'à accepter de né-

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Cette combinaison n'est pas la seule qu'il soit possible d'envisager. Dès le début du conflit, on a songé à une enquête menée par la Société

Matin 16

Enclosure No. 17 to Despatch No. 1967  
of November 17, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE MATIN, November 16, 1931.

## Pour l'ordre ou pour le désordre

### LE CONSEIL DE LA S.D.N. AURA A SE PRONONCER LA-DESSUS DANS L'AFFAIRE DE LA MANDCHOURIE

S'il était permis d'adresser une recommandation aux membres du conseil de la Société des nations, qui doivent aujourd'hui se réunir en session extraordinaire à Paris, pour s'occuper de l'affaire de Mandchourie, on leur dirait :

— Votre premier devoir est de faire de l'ordre. Car il est vain de croire que la paix peut naître du désordre. Or, vous avez devant vous deux pays, dont l'un représente un ordre peut-être un peu rude, mais dont l'autre est la personnification du plus affreux désordre. Ne vous perdez donc pas dans la procédure. Regardez les faits et surtout les gens. Les ayant regardés bien en face, ne faites et ne dites rien qui puisse affaiblir la puissance d'ordre et encourager la puissance de désordre...

Cette recommandation est d'ailleurs celle qui s'étale tout au long dans les journaux d'Amérique, dont nul ne peut prétendre qu'ils aient montré, dans le passé, une partialité exagérée pour le Japon.

Le jour même où je quittais New-York, le Times publiait une lettre exprimant la même idée dans les mêmes termes. Elle était signée de M. Herbert Bayard Swope, ancien rédacteur en chef du World, frère de M. Gerard Swope, président de la General Electric, qui écrivait ce qui suit :

« Depuis des centaines d'années, la Chine essaye de pêcher dans toutes les eaux troubles avec des cannes dépourvues d'hameçons. Il faut en finir et se demander s'il vaut mieux voir ce vaste pays ouvert au commerce ou bien au brigandage, à la paix ou bien à l'anarchie. En tout cas, dans la partie de la Chine qu'il occupe, le Japon représente l'ordre et le progrès. C'est ce que demande par-dessus tout le monde entier. On nomme, dans tous les pays civilisés, des curateurs qui sont chargés de gérer les biens de ceux qui sont incapables de le faire par eux-mêmes. Le Japon joue le rôle de curateur en Mandchourie : ne pourrait-on le laisser faire ? »

Ne croyez pas que ce soit là une opinion individuelle. Le département d'Etat à Washington tient un langage identique. Nous l'avons signalé. Répétons-le.

— Sans doute, dit-il, le Japon a eu tort de sortir de la zone de police qui lui a été fixée par les traités, et il convient qu'il y rentre. Mais il a été provoqué à en sortir — comme l'Europe et l'Amérique sont provoquées à chaque instant en Chine — et il faut que ces provocations cessent au plus tôt. Nos agents les plus pro-chinois reconnaissent que la seule province chinoise où règne en ce moment l'ordre est la partie de Mandchourie qu'occupent les Japonais. Et ils déclarent que les Chinois, qui y résident, s'ils pouvaient exprimer un désir, demanderaient avant tout que la zone soit élargie et non pas rétrécie. C'est là un fait dont on ne peut pas ne pas tenir compte. De toutes façons, la zone où règne l'ordre ne doit point être mise en péril. Quant à la Mandchourie, elle ne sera pas conquise et annexée parce que 4.000 soldats japonais ont débordé leur ligne de cantonnement pour y faire un peu de police.

Ajouterons-nous que, derrière les deux parties que la S. D. N. prétend citer à sa barre, il y en a une troisième qui pousse de toutes ses forces à l'anarchie où elle est passée maîtresse — la Russie soviétique ? C'est elle qui est derrière la Chine. C'est elle qui l'encourage. On ne peut ignorer ses machinations sinistres. On ne peut ignorer son art de distiller le poison. Prendre parti pour la Chine, c'est prendre parti pour la Russie soviétique. Les deux corruptions se rejoignent et se confondent. Le conseil de la S. D. N. va-t-il travailler pour la corruption ou pour l'ordre ? C'est toute la question. Il n'y en a pas d'autre.

Le conseil fera bien, en tout cas, de se souvenir qu'au-dessus de ses arrêts, il y a ceux des opinions publiques des nations qu'il représente. Il y a quelques jours, le Daily Mail lui signifiait nettement que l'opinion publique anglaise n'admettrait pas un instant qu'une mesure de coercition quelconque soit prise à l'égard du Japon. Ce qui est vrai de l'opinion anglaise l'est de l'opinion française et aussi de l'opinion américaine.

Si le conseil veut recourir à la coercition, qu'il y recoure pour les auteurs de désordre : pas pour les agents de l'ordre. Pour les brigands : pas pour les gendarmes.

Stéphane Lauzanne



Usance 16

Enclosure No. 18 to Despatch No. 1967  
of November 17, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ŒUVRE, November 16, 1931.

**L'AFFAIRE SINO-JAPONAISE  
DEVANT LE CONSEIL DE LA S. D. N.**

## Procédure de paix

Ouvrè — 11116

Et d'abord, écartons de nouveau l'objection saugrenue, mais trop souvent émise, qu'en s'occupant du différend sino-japonais, la Société des Nations se mêle de ce qui ne la regarde pas.

De ce différend, elle a été régulièrement saisie par un de ses membres : la Chine.

Se dérober ? C'était se discréditer aux yeux de l'opinion publique.

— Et si, dans sa tâche de médiatrice, la Société des Nations échoue ?

— Si elle échoue, elle peut s'en trouver affaiblie. Mais, aux yeux de l'opinion publique, c'est la puissance récalcitrante qui sera discréditée. Vous me direz que cela lui est bien égal. Voire !...

Quoi qu'il en soit, qu'a fait la Société des Nations, notamment au cours de cette session d'octobre dont Aristide Briand fut le protagoniste ?

A-t-elle brandi des foudres, fait peser des menaces de sanctions, imaginé même une intervention de police du genre de celle que suggère avec force M. Hadamard ? Non. S'est-elle érigée en tribunal ? Non. Elle a été ce qu'elle devait, en de pareilles circonstances, être d'abord (et c'est, malgré qu'on en ait, ce qui fait sa force) : un lieu de rencontre où les thèses s'affrontent, mais où la discussion directe, courtoise — et publique — remplace avantageusement les échanges de notes de la diplomatie secrète.

La Société des Nations a joué là son rôle primordial de conciliatrice. N'a-t-elle pas réussi à convaincre la Chine qu'il ne convenait pas d'invoquer tout de suite tous les textes juridiques que celle-ci eût été en droit d'invoquer ? D'autant plus en droit que, dans toutes les autres occasions où la Société des Nations a déjà été appelée à intervenir, — il ne s'agissait alors, il est vrai, que de pauvres affaires européennes — aucun de ses membres ne s'est montré plus intransigeant, plus chatouilleux sur le droit, plus attaché à la lettre du Covenant que le Japon.

— Mais n'a-t-on pas commis une faute à l'égard de celui-ci en invitant, pour la première fois, à propos d'une affaire où il est intéressé, l'Amérique à prendre part aux délibérations d'une Société dont le Japon fait partie, et elle, non ?

— Pardon. Le conflit sino-japonais n'est-il pas le premier conflit de quelque importance dont la Société des Nations ait eu à connaître depuis la signature du pacte Briand-Kellogg ? Et alors, le pacte Briand-Kellogg — signé par le Japon — ça compte, ou ça ne compte pas ?

Quand il a été signé, d'aucuns ont dit :

— Un chiffon de papier de plus !

D'autres ont dit :

— Le pacte Briand-Kellogg ? C'est la fin de la Société des Nations.

Or, un conflit d'intérêt mondial — mais oui ! — se présentant, M. Briand a entendu montrer que, d'une part, le pacte Kellogg pouvait permettre à l'Amérique d'efficaces interventions, et que, d'autre part, loin de la réduire à l'impuissance, en la « noyant » dans une formule plus vaste et plus vague, le pacte Kellogg donnait à la Société des Nations une force nouvelle.

— L'un élimine l'autre ! disait-on.

— Non, répond-il. Ils se complètent.

Jean Piot.

Les vrais amis de la Société des Nations ont toujours souhaité voir les Etats-Unis se rapprocher d'une institution dont un de leurs présidents avait été le principal inspirateur. Par le canal du pacte Briand-Kellogg, l'incident sino-japonais aura été l'occasion — quelles que soient les précautions oratoires dont on l'entoure — de ce rapprochement souhaité !

Quant aux détracteurs systématiques des procédures pacifiques chères à M. Briand, ils ont mauvaise grâce, après avoir raillé à l'avance l'inefficacité du pacte, à protester aujourd'hui, où il se révèle « opérant ».

« Concilier », donner force d'action au pacte Kellogg, rapprocher l'Amérique de la Société des Nations, porter ainsi le débat devant une assemblée vraiment internationale, telle a été, jusqu'à présent, dans l'affaire de Mandchourie, la méthode de M. Briand.

Et si cette méthode est mauvaise, on est bien obligé de constater qu'à sa suite, toutes les nations — le seul Japon excepté — l'ont faite leur.

Ce qui prouve au moins que le ministre des affaires étrangères de France jouit, dans le monde, d'un singulier prestige.

Nous laisserons aux « patriotes » de profession le soin de s'en affliger.

J. P.

PP16

Enclosure No. 19 to Despatch No. 1967  
of November 17, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE PETIT PARISIEN, November 16, 1931.

## AUJOURD'HUI S'OUVRE AU QUAI D'ORSAY LA PREMIERE SEANCE DU CONSEIL DE LA S.D.N.

Les délégations des diverses puissances au conseil de la S.D.N. qui tient aujourd'hui sa première séance au Quai d'Orsay, sont presque au complet.

M. Zaleski, ministre des Affaires étrangères de Pologne, est arrivé hier à 15 heures.

M. von Bülow, secrétaire d'Etat auprès de la Wilhelmstrasse, s'est mis en route pour Paris dans la soirée d'hier.

A 17 h. 35, lord Tyrrell, ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne à Paris, MM. Yoshizawa et Arita, respectivement ambassadeurs du Japon à Paris et à Vienne, ont été reçus à la gare du Nord et sir John Simon, chef du Foreign Office, a été salué au nom de M. Briand, par M. Carré, chef-adjoint du protocole.

Sir John Simon sera assisté par sir John Pratt, particulièrement versé dans les questions touchant à l'Extrême-Orient, par M. Cadogan, par son secrétaire particulier, sir Walter Selby, et par sir Arthur Willert, conseiller du service de presse.

Le vicomte Cecil, délégué britannique à la S.D.N., a quitté Londres, quelques heures après sir John Simon, pour se rendre également à la séance du conseil.

Il est à noter que, dans les milieux diplomatiques de Londres, on envisage sous un jour plus optimiste le conflit sino-japonais. On observe en effet que, dans la dernière résolution votée par le conseil de la S.D.N., aucune date n'a été mentionnée pour l'évacuation de la Mandchourie et que cette absence de limite de temps ne peut que contribuer



M. Yoshizawa (à gauche) reçoit, à la gare du Nord, M. Matsudeira

à apaiser les susceptibilités de Tokio. On estime également que les commentaires de la presse britannique et de la presse française, ainsi que les récentes déclarations publiques de lord Grey, de sir Herbert Samuel et de sir John Simon lui-même ont eu un effet favorable sur l'opinion publique au Japon en montrant qu'à Londres comme à Paris on n'est animé d'aucun parti pris contre le Japon et qu'on ne méconnaît ni ses intérêts légitimes, ni ses droits acquis.

Ces remarques fortifient l'espérance que l'on nourrit à Paris et dans les milieux autorisés, d'arriver à une solution du conflit sino-japonais.

P.P.16

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of November 17, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE POPULAIRE, November 16, 1931.

# La dernière occasion

**L**E Conseil de la Société des Nations s'assemble aujourd'hui à Paris. Nous déplorons de ne pouvoir lui souhaiter une plus cordiale bienvenue.

Qu'il ne se le dissimule pas : vis-à-vis de l'affaire sino-japonaise, devenue la guerre sino-japonaise, il a conduit l'opinion publique de déception en déception. Il a manqué de courage, de clairvoyance, j'oserais presque dire de dignité. Il n'a su répondre à un attentat flagrant que par le ménagement et la temporisation. Sans s'incliner précisément devant la force, il n'a pas su rompre avec elle, soulever et armer contre elle la conscience universelle.

Comprendra-t-il enfin la faute commise et les conséquences funestes qu'elle engendrerait en se prolongeant ? Nous le souhaitons, avec d'autant plus d'ardeur que nous avons fondé plus d'espoir sur l'organisme de Genève. Mais nous n'osons plus guère y croire. Cependant, aujourd'hui, tous les voiles sont déchirés. Le Conseil ne se trouve plus en présence des prodromes hypocrites de la guerre, mais de la guerre elle-même, de la guerre ouverte, presque déclarée. Le Japon a signé le *covenant* ; il est même une des puissances fondatrices de la Société des Nations. Il a adhéré au Pacte Kellogg. Il est lié par les conventions d'arbitrage. S'il peut impunément « recourir à la guerre » contre un voisin sans défense, s'il peut, au nom de sa force et de la conscience qu'il a de sa force, renier ses engagements, mettre en échec et en défi les procédures internationales, tout l'édifice de Genève s'ébranle du coup. A quoi bon parler désormais d'organisation juridique de la Paix ? Sous quel désaveu dérisoire s'ouvrira la Conférence de Désarmement ? Que devient la Société des Nations elle-même ?

Le Conseil tient aujourd'hui dans ses mains l'honneur et l'existence même de la S. D. N. En vain nous objectera-t-on qu'il est impuissant, que la règle de l'unanimité l'enchaîne, que le Japon invoque déjà l'illégalité des décisions préparatoires sans son aveu. La Société des Nations n'a de raison d'être que dans la mesure où elle se montre capable d'empêcher les conflits armés entre les puissances qui y participent. Là est pour elle la fin et par conséquent la loi suprême. Si la règle de l'unanimité y fait obstacle, qu'elle ait le courage d'en sortir, de la rompre. Que, pour remplir sa fonction et obéir à sa loi, elle n'hésite pas à violer sa légalité formelle. Si un acte révolutionnaire peut seul préserver la paix, qu'elle ne tarde pas plus longtemps à l'accomplir.

N'hésitons pas d'ailleurs à le proclamer une fois de plus. La règle de l'unanimité est pour la S. D. N. un germe mortel, auquel on ne peut permettre de se développer davantage. L'exemple du Japon devrait mettre un terme à toutes les hésitations. Il est inconcevable et intolérable que l'action internationale puisse être paralysée par le veto de la puissance précisément intéressée à s'y soustraire. La règle de l'unanimité a été introduite pour réserver les

souverainetés nationales. Mais si l'on prétend réserver dans leur intégrité les souverainetés nationales, il n'y a plus de Société des Nations.

Retenons enfin, pour notre propagande, cette circonstance essentielle. Pourquoi le Japon se dérobe-t-il à l'intervention de la S. D. N., à la décision éventuelle des arbitres ? Parce qu'il est armé, parce qu'il se sent le plus fort, parce que la force crée la tentation d'user de la force. Nous sommes donc fondés à affirmer que le désarmement est la vraie garantie, la vraie caution, la vraie sanction des procédures arbitrales. Le cas japonais illustre avec éclat notre formule : Sécurité par l'arbitrage et le désarmement.

Sans doute en remontant aux causes, nous trouverions à l'agression japonaise non pas des excuses — la guerre n'a jamais d'excuse — mais des explications. Le Japon ne peut plus nourrir sur son étroit chapelet d'îles volcaniques une population qui croît avec une terrible rapidité. Si la S. D. N. avait eu, en temps opportun, la sagesse de poser ce dangereux problème des migrations, si elle avait eu l'énergie de prendre position contre le protectionnisme humain, plus barbare et plus redoutable pour la paix que tous les autres, elle aurait exercé la véritable action de prévention contre le conflit actuel. Souhaitons que cette leçon non plus ne soit pas perdue, mais les causes ne sont pas des justifications. Un fait domine tout : la guerre, non plus seulement la menace, mais la réalité de la guerre. Si elle n'est pas arrêtée sur l'heure, elle aura fait une victime de plus : l'organisation de la Paix.

LEON BLUM

Quot. 16

Enclosure No. 21 to Despatch No. 1967  
of November 17, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE QUOTIDIEN, November 16, 1931.

## La tâche difficile de la Conférence sino-japonaise

**F**IN octobre dernier, le Conseil de la S. D. N., limité dans son action par la clause irréalisable de l'unanimité, dut s'arrêter à un compromis. Il fit donc des vœux, il adressa des recommandations à deux de ses associés en conflit : la Chine et le Japon.

C'est alors que Tokio formula les cinq points fondamentaux sans lesquels l'accord lui semblait impossible. Nankin, tout en affirmant sa volonté de conciliation, n'y put souscrire complètement.

Les incidents se multiplièrent en Mandchourie.

En ce moment même, d'importantes opérations militaires se poursuivent sur la rivière Nonni.

M. Aristide Briand, assumant une tâche singulièrement ardue, câbla en Extrême-Orient, du 29 octobre au 7 novembre, des notes pleines de sagesse auxquelles il fut répondu avec une courtoisie toute diplomatique.

Et voici, de nouveau, ce matin même, le Conseil devant l'obstacle, dans le salon de l'Horloge, au Quai d'Orsay.

Ce grave problème de la paix et de la guerre est dominé, bien moins par le droit inscrit dans les traités que par des faits difficilement contrôlables, à quelques mille lieues de Paris.

Le Japon se dit toujours prêt à évacuer les territoires qu'il occupe au sud de la ligne de l'Est chinois, mais il exige des garanties pour la sécurité de ses ressortissants et l'exploitation normale du chemin de fer de Mandchourie.

La Chine ne cesse de promettre, mais on veut douter de ses possibilités. Tout semble encore conditionné par des *mais* et des *si*.

Et voilà l'imbroglio, il faut dire le casse-tête chinois, sur lequel doit se prononcer le Conseil de la Société des Nations.

On peut se demander, encore aujourd'hui, s'il convenait de mettre à une si grave épreuve l'organisme de Genève et, par surcroît, la précieuse autorité de M. Aristide Briand.

Certes, l'avantage du règlement d'un nouveau différend international ne serait pas sans valeur, à l'actif de la S. D. N., mais l'échec peut compromettre l'avenir et jeter un doute dans l'esprit des peuples qui se plaisent à mettre toute leur confiance dans le grand conseil international.

D'autre part, le désir légitime d'entraîner les Etats-Unis dans la Société genevoise pouvait-il compenser l'inévitable complication que devait provoquer la participation américaine aux débats de cette sorte de tribunal des conflits ?

Autant de questions à poser,

auxquelles il est trop facile de répondre.

Il serait donc présomptueux d'attendre de cette troisième conférence sino-japonaise des résultats complets, c'est-à-dire un règlement définitif.

Les deux nations en cause en viendront, semble-t-il, à des négociations directes, après quelques escarmouches. On est en droit de regretter qu'elles n'aient pas su commencer par où elles vont finir.

Nous en sommes à exprimer le vœu que les négociations en cours n'aggravent rien, tant il paraît improbable qu'elles puissent rien résoudre.

LE QUOTIDIEN.

Ref. 16.

Enclosure No. 22 to Despatch No. 1967  
of November 17, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LA REPUBLIQUE, November 16, 1931.

## LE CONSEIL DE LA S.D.N. ET LA PAIX ASIATIQUE

Report. 1116

Le conseil de la S.D.N. se réunit aujourd'hui pour connaître du conflit sino-japonais.

La situation est sérieuse. Les Japonais paraissent aujourd'hui aussi résolus à jouer la partie contre les Chinois qu'ils étaient résolus en 1904 à la jouer contre les Russes !

Ici, tout ce qui souhaite le désordre et l'utilisation des gros armements, vole au secours du gouvernement de Tokio.

Il n'est pas défendu de penser que d'aucuns espèrent qu'une avance japonaise en Mandchourie mettrait en cause la puissance moscovite !

On pourrait ainsi atteindre par l'Asie l'U.R.S.S. qu'on a renoncé à atteindre par l'Europe.

Beau moment pour tous ceux qui veulent l'échec de la conférence du désarmement.

Les Nippons, désavoués publiquement, reçoivent donc des encouragements secrets qui expliquent leur superbe.

La Chine anarchique et fiévreuse n'offre évidemment pas la réplique qui conviendrait.

Les uns calculent, les autres intriguent, des haines séculaires heurtent des ambitions neuves !

Des vents d'Occident soufflent sur les vieilles passions orientales et les pays sont travaillés par des mouvements contradictoires !

Les Japonais précis, organisés, pensent que l'heure est venue de réaliser une emprise sur ces lieux dont, au lendemain de la victoire de Moukden, l'arbitrage du président Roosevelt les empêcha d'être vraiment les suzerains.

La tâche du conseil sera dure. Mais la question est pour lui d'importance capitale. Il doit marquer son autorité et faire prévaloir son arbitrage, sous peine de n'être plus qu'un syndicat d'insuffisance.

Nous faisons à ce propos confiance à M. Aristide Briand.

« Encore... » diront certains.

Oui, « encore », et pour la raison excellente que la paix n'est jamais vaincue quand on ne se résigne pas à sa défaite.

Toutes les guerres sont nées du fait que quelque part, quelqu'un finissait par les considérer comme fatales !

Nous verrons si les soutiens discrets du Japon sauront passer de l'encouragement privé à l'encouragement public.

Les peuples attendent. M. Briand depuis six ans a toujours été leur interprète. C'est une force, c'est même une force si redoutable que beaucoup ont essayé de la ruiner, mais que nul n'a osé la défier.

Gabriel CUDENET.

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Reproduit de *LA REPUBLIQUE*

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
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Gabriel CUDENET.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



November 21, 1931.

RECEIVED

NOV 21 1931

MANCHURIA SITUATION

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

F/DEW

793.94/2888

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711.94

In the light of recent developments, it would seem that all attempts to differentiate between one or another of the administrative branches of the Japanese Government and the "Government" itself must, for the time being at least, be given up. Japanese military forces have occupied South Manchuria and have announced that they will not withdraw until a settlement with China has been arrived at. The Japanese Foreign Office confirms this. The Japanese nation appears solidly to approve. Whatever may have been the political situation in China on and before September 18, the occupation of Manchuria and the announcement of intentions are now the acts of the Japanese State. That State declares that it will continue the occupation until China has come to terms.

This constitutes unquestionably a declaration of intention to use force in pursuit of an objective of policy.

The problem confronting the American Government and the League of Nations is no longer that of preventing war or a breach of treaties; the question which we are called upon to answer is, force having been used, treaties having been broken,

Chinese

- 2 -

Chinese territory being in occupation of a Japanese armed force and Japan having demanded that China make treaties under the pressure of that force, what are we going to do about it?

There has been a good deal of canvassing of possibilities.

It is understood that none of the powers have any thought of using armed force in meeting this situation.

It appears to be conceded that withdrawal of diplomatic representatives would serve no useful purpose.

Thought is being given to the possibility of application by the League of economic sanctions.

Thought also is being given to the possibility of some type of official denunciation of Japan as a law breaker.

It seems desirable that before proceeding far with the discussion of possible courses of action which might be or should be entered upon at the present stage, a clear conception of present objectives be arrived at. Keeping in mind the fact that Japan is in possession in South Manchuria and has announced that she intends to stay there until the Chinese give them satisfaction, is there any action which the powers can take which will alter that situation? I think there is none that would directly and immediately cause Japan to reconsider or to withdraw from her present position and attitude.

There are, however, steps which the powers might take which, if taken, would amount to more morally than anything that



- 3 -

that they have done so far and would have a more of advantageous and less of disadvantageous effect practically than would any of the various measures which have been considered in inter-powers discussions so far. Nothing is going to alter the fact that Japan has broken treaties, that she occupies Manchuria, that she defies the powers, and that they cannot put her out. But the powers can, if they will, take steps toward preventing her from profiting by what she has <sup>fact</sup> done; and in so doing they can bring the diplomatic situation to a state of ~~equilibrium~~ *equipoise*.

Japan's declaration that she intends to make use of her present position in Manchuria to compel China to conclude with her a new treaty (or an agreement confirming old treaties) constitutes a repudiation by Japan of her obligations under various multilateral treaties and a defiance by her of the other signatories of those treaties. Can the powers afford to let this happen without promptly expressing themselves?

It is believed that the powers should forthwith serve notice that they will recognize no treaties which Japan may conclude with China under these circumstances. This would be sufficient reply to Japan. It would be a step which could be taken by any or all powers without reference to the fact that we are not all signatories of all of the treaties under which action might be taken. It would involve no question of use of force or of sanctions of any sort. It would conflict with no action or position (hitherto taken) and would

- 4 -

would establish no limitations as to action which may be  
(hereafter taken). As a notice, it could later, if and  
when circumstances might warrant, be canceled or revoked.

Such a step would show that the powers "mean business".  
It would give the Pact of Paris "teeth". It would answer  
the charge that the League and the various governments are  
impotent.

It is believed that it is the only step on which there  
is likelihood that all of the powers could readily and  
promptly be brought to agree.

*SKH in book*

FE:SKH/ZMF

1 1764

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

1 138  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR

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# TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138  
TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

Washington,

November 23, 1931,  
10 pm.

Amembassy,

Paris, France.

*793.94*  
*Imperial Ministry*  
592

CONFIDENTIAL FOR DAWES FROM STIMSON. /

My 589 of November 23, 6 pm.

If the Council should find serious difficulty in gaining the consent of China to the Council proposal, as it now stands, I think that Briand might well insist that Japan should further agree therein to an immediate evacuation of Tsitsihar. There are no Japanese nationals to be protected in that locality and no legitimate object in remaining there. The occupation of Tsitsihar and the losses inflicted upon the Chinese defenders have made a most painful impression throughout our press. Insistence upon immediate retirement would tend to support the League's position and help Chinese government to obtain popular support in accepting the Council proposal. I am cabling Tokyo urging immediate withdrawal and also warning Japan that further expedition to Chinchow, as forecast in the press, would in my opinion render any further efforts at conciliation useless.

STIMSON

S

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

793.94/2888A

Triple priority

Nov 23-1931

18Pm

Ambassy  
Paris

This cable was sent in confidential Code.  
It should be carefully paraphrased before  
being communicated to anyone.

59/Confidential for Dawson from Stimson

My 589 of November 23 6 P.M.

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gaining the consent of China  
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1761  
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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further efforts at conciliation useless.

Stimson

1 0767

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Mutan O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
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TELEGRAM SENT

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
\$

Department of State

Washington,

November 23, 1931,  
10 p m.

797-24  
Amembassy,

Tokyo, Japan.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

241.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR FORBES FROM STIMSON.

My 240, November 23, 7 pm.

Please add to my message to Shidehara that my support of the Council proposal containing the Japanese proposal for an impartial investigation is also conditioned upon the immediate withdrawal of the Japanese troops from Tsitsihar which he assured me through Ambassador Debuchi would take place. There are no Japanese nationals to be protected in that locality and the occupation of Tsitsihar and the heavy losses inflicted upon the Chinese defenders have already made a most painful impression throughout this country. Failure to withdraw from Tsitsihar and any similar expedition to Chinchow, would in my opinion render any further efforts at conciliation between the two nations quite futile.

STIMSON

S

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1930 1-138

793.94/2888B

Triple Priority

Nov 23-1931

10pm

Ambassador

Tokyo

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It should be carefully paraphrased before  
being communicated to anyone.

241 Confidential for Forbes from Sumison

My 240 November 23 7 P.M.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Shinson



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

XI-24  
OK. W  
For M  
letter (or phone)  
immediately.  
I see no  
objection. Do  
you?  
SKH

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CABLEGRAMS: { INTRIMMISSION, NEW YORK  
INMISCO, LONDON

CODES: { MISSIONS  
CHINA INLAND MISSION

TELEPHONE: { NEW YORK: CALEDONIA 9137  
LONDON: SLOANE 1425

## INTERNATIONAL MISSIONARY COUNCIL

Composed of the following Organizations

NATIONAL MISSIONARY COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIA  
SOCIÉTÉ BELGE DE MISSIONS PROTESTANTES AU CONGO  
NATIONAL CHRISTIAN COUNCIL OF CHINA  
CONSEIL PROTESTANT DU CONGO  
DANSK MISSIONSRAAD  
DEUTSCHER EVANGELISCHER MISSIONSBUND  
SOCIÉTÉ DES MISSIONS ÉVANGÉLIQUES DE PARIS  
CONFERENCE OF MISSIONARY SOCIETIES IN GREAT  
BRITAIN AND IRELAND


NATIONAL CHRISTIAN COUNCIL OF INDIA, BURMA, AND  
CEYLON  
NATIONAL CHRISTIAN COUNCIL OF JAPAN  
KOREAN NATIONAL CHRISTIAN COUNCIL  
COMMITTEE ON COOPERATION IN LATIN AMERICA  
NEAR EAST CHRISTIAN COUNCIL  
COMMISSIE VAN ADVIES (THE NETHERLANDS)  
NETHERLANDS INDIA  
NATIONAL MISSIONARY COUNCIL OF NEW ZEALAND  
NORSK MISSIONSRAAD

FOREIGN MISSIONS CONFERENCE OF NORTH AMERICA  
(UNITED STATES AND CANADA)  
NATIONAL CHRISTIAN COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINE  
ISLANDS  
NATIONAL CHRISTIAN COUNCIL OF SIAM  
MISSIONARY SOCIETIES OF SOUTH AFRICA  
SUOMEN LAHETYSEUVOSTO  
SVENSKA MISSIONSRADET  
ASSOCIATION OF MISSIONARY SOCIETIES IN SWITZER-  
LAND


Chairman: JOHN R. MOTT, 230 Park Avenue, New York City

Secretaries: J. H. OLDHAM; WILLIAM PATON, 2 Eaton Gate, London, S.W. 1

A. L. WARNSHUIS, 419 Fourth Ave., New York City



November 23, 1931.



793.94  
Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck,  
Department of State,  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Dr. Hornbeck:

We have been urged by responsible people in our constituency to send a message to both the National Christian Council in China and the National Christian Council in Japan.

I enclose a tentative draft of such a message as has been suggested.

I send this for your information and also to ask for your counsel. Please let me know whether the Department of State would have any objection to our sending such a message. We are planning to have a committee meeting at noon on Wednesday, November 25th, and I shall be greatly obliged if you would let me know by that time if you have any objections to the action as proposed.

Yours very sincerely,

*A. L. Warnshuis*

Enc.  
ALW/MIS

F/DEW

793.94/2889

NOV 25 1931

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

November 23, 1931.

To:

The National Christian Council in China -

The National Christian Council in Japan:-

The Federal Council of Churches and Foreign Missions Conference representing American Christian people deeply concerned Manchurian situation. Peaceful settlement highly important for world disarmament conference and enduring world peace. Without prejudgment issues earnestly suggest Christian forces Japan China renew efforts influence governments seek peaceful solution observing Paris Pact. We join our prayers with yours for peace.

(Signed) Gulick  
Warnshuis.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

BRUNO WEYERS

EXPORT  
IMPORT  
DOMESTIC



RECEIVED

NOV 17 1931

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

165 BROADWAY

NEW YORK



The Honorable Henry L. Stimson,  
Secretary of State,  
Washington, D.C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

FAR EASTERN QUESTION

I received a letter from a Japanese - who some years ago was New York Manager of Mitsui & Company and now is one of the Directors of Mitsui in Tokio, Japan. The communication so finely gives the Japanese side of the question that several friends - big in business affairs - think that in justice to Japan, I should let you see the sight of same. Therefore, I beg to enclose Mr. Fukui's letter dated October 20th and copy of my reply.

Will you please return the enclosures to me when you are through with them, and oblige,

Sincerely yours,

*Bruno Weyers*

FILED  
NOV 24 1931

E/DEW

793.94/2890

TELEPHONE CORTLANDT 7-8317  
CABLES WEYERS, NEW YORK

Copy:MLM:SS  
Comp: MLM:SS

116, 6chome, Aoyama-minamicho,  
Akasakaku, Tokyo, Japan.

Sept. 5th, 1931.

Mr. Bruro Weyers,  
165 Broadway,  
New York City, N. Y.,  
U. S. A.

Dear Mr. Weyers:-

More than two decades have been passed since I saw you last. The memory of the wonderful and most enjoyable time Mrs. Fukui and myself have spent with you and Mrs. Weyers at your beautiful home has never failed from our recollection and is always afresh in our mind. Indeed, we often think of you both as a remembrance of our happy stay in your country. Our mutual friend Mr. E. W. Frazar who has given me the address of yours, was kind enough to tell me the recent well beings about you, and I hasten to drop a few lines to tell you how I am glad to know it, reminding me those olden times we met together a quarter century ago. Please be rest assured that we unfailingly treasure the friendship we enjoyed with you and with the people of your country which made our life in America so interesting and beneficial.

Hoping

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

Hoping you will find that in best of health, and  
with kind regards to Mrs. Weyers to which Mrs. Fukui  
joins me most heartily.

Yours very sincerely,

F. FUKUI

Copy:MLM:SS  
Comp: 114413

116, 6 chome Minamicho,  
Aoyama, Akasaka-ku, Tokyo,  
Japan.

October 20, 1931.

Mr. Bruno Weyers  
165, Broadway,  
New York City,  
N. Y. U. S. A.

My Dear Mr. Weyers:-

Thank you for your telegram of the 15th inst., and  
note that you have received my letter of the 5th Sept.  
last. I greatly appreciate your kind remarks about  
this country's stand on the League question.

With regard to the Japan-China trouble, I hope  
sooner or later the world understands how and why Japan  
took the stand she is now so firmly and determinately  
taking and I sincerely trust your country will be the  
first to realize and appreciate Japan's right. So far,  
it is very unfortunate that the real aim of China is  
misapprehended by the world at large and it seems to  
us that their propaganda always overrules the essential  
cause of the trouble; they are spreading over, all the  
time, among their own people the antipathetic feeling  
towards Japan even inserting it in their National Readers

to

-2-

to be taught among their young generation, materializing it by boycott etc. etc. injuring the honour and fame of Japan, thus planting the very source of the nations' quarrel, for the hidden object of swallowing up the treaty of 1915 under a false charge of being signed by duress and thus annulling the Japan's rights on Manchuria, the rights Japan legally won after two decisive wars fought with the nation's existence at stake. No weapon would therefore be possible to let the people of Japan to concede in the point, and hence she is so firmly standing and fighting the case most decidedly. I really hope that your Government and people will soon see our points and assist us in solving the trouble without further confusion and delay.

It would be next to impossible to understand the psychology of China and the Chinese, especially so in so apart a country as in America--more so unless a nation has direct and serious touch with them. I trust your people see us from the precedents what and how we dealt with and handled international affairs so-to-for, under the unfailing doctrine of the "Bushido"--a doctrine of the justice and righteousness--by which our people are all brought up.

Hoping you will find this letter in best of your health, and with kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

F. FUKUI



Copy:MLM:SS  
Comp: MLM:SS

BRUNO WEYERS

EXPORT  
IMPORT  
DOMESTIC

165 BROADWAY  
NEW YORK

November 14, 1931

My dear Mr. Fukui:-

I was delighted to get your letter of September 5th. It was wonderful to hear from you after a lapse of a quarter of a century. This illustrates what a great thing memory is - to take one back to a friendship 25 years ago.

I have also received your fine communication of October 20th in acknowledgment of my cable, and I was very glad to receive same - telling as it did the Japanese side of the Far Eastern trouble.

In the first place, I did not answer yours of September 5th sooner, because I wanted to give a fitting reply to you - and I am now in my country home - Supawina Farm, Wayne, New Jersey - writing to you - not the farm that I had when Mrs. Fukui and you honored us with a visit. We now have a place of 30 acres - Tennis Court - Swimming pool - three horses for the four daughters - although two of our girls are married - so only two are still home. I do hope Mrs. Fukui and you will again visit America so that the Weyers family may again have the honor of a visit from you Folks. May we expect you sometime? Mrs. Weyers and I have often spoken about Mrs. Fukui and you.

Now maybe, you would like to hear something from one American - myself - what he thinks about his experiences with the Japanese over a long business period.

I

-2-

I came in contact with a great many during that long time and never had one unpleasant experience. On the contrary, they were delightful - like with your goodself - leaving only pleasant memories. Many a time I have been tricked out of money with Americans, but not once by a Japanese. Furthermore, many lovely gifts in my home are from Japanese - just in appreciation for some little courtesy rendered. I well remember when I was New York Manager of Frazar and Sale, I had a Japanese in my employ, for about six years - his name was Mr. Kasahara. When he received a cable to go home to Japan - a great friendship had sprung up between us - and when we shook hands goodbye, he had tears in his eyes and he said "I don't want to leave you". Well, to make a long story short, for six years just before Christmas I would receive a beautiful gift expressing his love for me - but the seventh year I did not hear from him - and the reason was because he had passed on - he was no longer on this plane of existence - he had gone on to his God. I shall never forget that friendship - the loyal friendship of a Japanese.

Referring to your letter of October 20th, it so beautifully gives the Japanese side of the case that I have taken the liberty of showing it to some of my dear business friends and it has made a profound impression on them. I read it to seven friends at a luncheon this week and do you know some of them thought that in justice to your Nation I should send your communication on to Secretary of State Stimson.

I have a soft spot in my heart for Japan and the Japanese and I will tell you why. Forty-nine years ago when I was twelve years old, I started my business career in the Japan and China trade as office boy for Frazar and Company (with Mr. E. W. Frazar's father) and finally became New York Manager. During that time I had a good deal to do in the pioneer days of opening up business between Japan and the United States. In those days Mr. E. W. Frazar's father had only two helpers in New York City, a Mr. Wallace Peck and myself and we three started the Raw Cotton shipments from New York City to Japan via the Suez Canal Steamers - the next year we started this Raw Cotton business from Houston, Texas and other southern points via overland route to San Francisco to Japan. We opened up the Northern Pacific Railroad

with

-3-

with Japan by putting on sailing vessels to bring tea from Japan to Tacoma - then we put on steamers - then Frazar and Company dropped the Northern Pacific Agency and we opened up the Canadian Pacific Railway with Japan by putting on sailing ships - then came the steamers Parthia, Abyssinia and Batavia - we held the Canadian Pacific Agency for a long while. We started the Canadian Pacific Railway in taking piece goods (sheetings, drills and jeans) from New England Mill points in the United States to China - also raw cotton shipments from New York City via Canadian Pacific to Vancouver to Japan.

Frazar and Company put the first Baldwin locomotive in Japan. We secured the Agency of the General Electric Company for Japan and installed Electric Light Plants in many of the Japanese cities. Then we took on the Westinghouse Electric Manufacturing Company Agency, and so it went from one thing to another - many things.

In my office a couple of months ago was Mr. William H. Brenner an Electrical Engineer - whom we sent to Japan to install the first Electric Light Plant in the Mikado's Palace. I well remember the Japanese who was sent on to this Country - Professor Fujika. I had the handling of the shipment of this order - about \$100,000 worth of material.

As for the start of the South Manchurian Railway contracts, I think you know the part I took in this. I got my firm to send two men to South Manchuria to exploit the manufactures of the American Car & Foundry Company and other manufactures of railway materials. It is on record that my old firm took me to task for making contracts with American Manufacturers to exploit their wares - saying if you were out here you never would have committed the concern to the expense of sending men to South Manchuria and after we secured the big railroad orders for cars, locomotives, steel rails, etc. I said it was probably a good thing that I never had been in the Far East, because I would have seen through the same "blue spectacles". Another incident of many years ago I well remember is how Mr. Thomas A. Edison - who has just passed on - entrusted Mr. E. W. Frazar's father with the presentation of an Edison Phonograph to the Empress of Japan - China and Korea. I had the care of the shipment of these machines by express to the Far East.

-4-

I could go on writing a lot more why I feel so close to Japan - but I do not want to bore you further. But some day maybe we will meet either in Japan or the United States and then we will have a fine talk together.

During the World War I acted as New York Agent of the Hudson's Bay Company who were the Transport Agents of the French Government for foodstuffs. I had 300 ships under my jurisdiction, loading from every port in the United States and Canada to France, for which work I received the Cross of the Legion of Honor. This work entailed the shipment of over eight and a half million tons of foodstuffs.

In closing I want to say my sympathy in this Far East question is with Japan and I hope the World at large will see the Japanese side of it.

I will be glad to hear from you at any time.

Yours sincerely,

BRUNO WEYERS

Mr. F. Fukui,  
116, 6 chome Minamicho,  
Aoyama, Akasaka-ku, Tokyo  
Japan

1 178

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

November 24 1931

In reply refer to  
FE

Mr. Bruno Weyers,  
165 Broadway,  
New York, New York.

Sir:

The receipt is acknowledged of your letter  
of November 16, 1931, bringing to the attention  
of the Department certain correspondence between  
you and Mr. F. Fukui, 116, 6 chome Minamicho, Aoyama,  
Akasaka-ku, Tokyo, Japan, which has been read with  
interest.

The enclosures to your letter are herewith  
returned.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

Maxwell M. Hamilton,  
Assistant Chief,  
Division of Far Eastern Affairs.

Enclosures: Correspondence  
between Mr. F. Fukui  
and Mr. Weyers.  
Stamped envelope.

FE:RFB/VDM

FE

m.m.h.



F.W. 793.94/2890


178

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE



DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS



November 20, 1931. JCR file

MANCHURIA SITUATION.

Proposal to send a Commission to China.

Our efforts, and those of the League, have so far been directed toward a restoration of peaceful conditions in Manchuria through a return to the status quo ante, and an insistence that Japan should not settle her differences with China under threat of military force. Japan has gone ahead and is now in full military occupation of all the important strategic points in south Manchuria. It appears from Yoshizawa's statement before the Council on November 18 that Japan means to hold this position until she has reached a settlement with China on her own terms.

If a commission, such as has been proposed, should be sent to China, leaving the military situation and other matters as they are, would it not (a) amount to an acceptance of the status quo established by the Japanese military occupation and a recognition of Japan's de facto position in Manchuria thus established; and (b) imply surrender on the fundamental point for which we have thus far stood? Would not this objection apply whether the commission were for the purpose of making recommendations or merely a fact-finding body?

The principal possible advantages of sending such a commission would appear to be (a) that it might afford the League

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- 2 -

League a way out of its present impasse and (b) that it would give time for the situation in Japan to cool off and keep the way open for further attempts to settle the issues by negotiation.

It may be doubted whether a commission would contribute much to our knowledge of the essential facts. The facts relate to two sets of events: (1) occurrences before September 18; (2) Japan's military and other activities on and since September 18. We are now trying to deal with the latter. A commission would be likely to lead us away from that and draw our attention to the former - which involves the question of the long-standing issues as contrasted with the question of breaches of the Covenant and the treaties with which we are immediately concerned.

Whether or not such a commission should be sent, whether under Article 11 or under Article 15 of the Covenant, would seem to be a question for the League to decide.

With special reference to Simon's inquiry "whether in case under Article 15 a commission of the League members is sent to report on the situation the United States would be inclined to appoint a member or if not a member an associate investigator" (Paris' 765, November 18):

The commission referred to is to be appointed and to function under Article 15 of the Covenant and would therefore be a part of the machinery of the League with which we could not consistently be associated by appointing a

member.

- 3 -

member.

As to appointing an "associate investigator" this might also identify us with the machinery of the League further than would be advisable and might moreover interfere with the free working of the commission appointed by the League.

Such an association with a League commission might lead to further complications whether (a) an "associate investigator" concurred with the findings of the League commission, in which case the question of further action under Article 16 might arise; or (b) in case our investigator dissented in whole or in part from the findings of the commission such divergence of view would require explanation which might give rise to renewed doubts of our support of the League in its efforts.

It seems advisable that we retain our independence of action, as we have from the first; that we decline, for the reasons given, to take part in such a commission either as a member or as an "associate investigator"; and that we reserve, until the occasion shall arise, our decision as to whether or not, should such a commission be sent by the League, we should send our own independent observers on a similar mission.

As the situation now presents itself, is it not the logical thing, so far as we are concerned, for us together with the co-signatories of the Pact of Paris and the Nine-

Power



- 4 -

Power Treaty to join in making a reservation of our rights under any treaties or arrangements which may be made between Japan and China under existing conditions, leaving it to time and circumstances to wear down the martial excitement in Japan and give an opportunity quietly to work out plans for a satisfactory solution by negotiation?

FE:SKH:EJL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

NOV 20 1931

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

November 19, 1931.

Conversation.

The Secretary of State

Dr. Hawking Yen, Chinese Chargé d'Affaires

(Present: Mr. Hornbeck and Mr. Yu, First  
Secretary, Chinese Legation)

Dr. Yen called and presented to the Secretary his  
credentials.

The conversation turned on the subject of the  
Manchuria situation. In the course thereof Dr. Yen  
stated that various Chinese official leaders placed  
special reliance on the Nine Powers Treaty. He said  
that W. W. Yen in particular has stressed to him the  
importance of that Treaty. He inquired what would be  
the attitude of the American Government if the question  
of invoking that Treaty were raised.

The Secretary of State replied that we had had most  
if not all of various possibilities in mind; that at the  
time when the trouble began the Council of the League  
was in session, China had appealed to the Council, the  
Council had taken full "jurisdiction", and the American  
Government had both acted independently and given its

moral

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-2-

moral support to the action taken by the League.  
For practical purposes there had been and there is going on a conference of the Powers. For that reason there had arisen so far no need for calling a separate and additional conference. Two conferences sitting at the same time to deal with the same question would mean weakness rather than strength. As to what would be our position if the question of invoking the Nine Powers Treaty were raised, it was our consistent practice to keep in mind the saying: "Don't cross a bridge until you come to the river". He felt that the representatives of the various Powers were very actively struggling with the Manchuria problem at Paris just now and that we should concentrate our attention on their efforts.

*SKH*

FE:SKH:EMF



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 20, 1931.

*DCR file*

Nine Power Pact.

Possible statement for telephone or telegram, to Dawes.

I note the view which you have expressed that it is quite likely that before a permanent and really constructive settlement of the situation can be reached resort may have to be made to the Nine Power Pact.

I think that this may prove to be the case. However, I do not feel that the time has yet come for us to propagate that idea.

I think we should continue to watch and help with the efforts of the Council to come to conclusions with regard to its own course of action. So long as there is promise of their agreeing on something which may be helpful, it would only complicate matters if anybody injected a proposal which in itself would imply that their efforts are of no use or have failed. Not until they have failed or it becomes obvious that they will fail, need the proposal that there be a conference under the Nine Power Treaty be made. Meanwhile, for four

confidential

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not  
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- 2 -

confidential information and guidance, I think that if and when the time comes -- that is, if it ultimately appears that there is no other resort -- when the time comes for resort to the Nine-Powers Pact, we will be prepared to do our duty in connection therewith. We should not, at this time, say much about it. We should wait for the suggestion to originate with and emanate from some other government. Our position in a conference called under that treaty would be stronger if we went there in response to an initiative taken by some power other than ourselves. I think that we should let the present conference carry the ball until it or some of its full members propose that the ball be passed to some other conference. At any rate, we should let the present conference run its natural course and give indication of success or failure before injecting a proposal for a different conference.

Just now, I think that you might still continue to press the idea of direct negotiations with neutral observers.

FE:SKH/ZMF

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone.

Dated November 25, 1931

FROM

Rec'd 11:55 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

DOUBLE PRIORITY.

798, November 25, 2 p.m.


FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES. /2864 conf-

Your 592, November 24, midnight, authorizing

me to act with full discretion received. I then  
called to my office Sir Eric Drummond who has been  
representing Briand in conferences with me. With  
the understanding that the announcement is not to  
be published until (first) there is agreement of all  
the members of the Council except from China and  
Japan upon the general plan of the resolution and  
(second) until after the publication by the Council  
of the text of the proposed resolution.

I have sent to Briand through Sir Eric Drummond  
the following statement: (SPECIAL GREEN) "the United  
States Government approves the general plan of settle-  
ment embodied in the proposed resolution of the

(Government of



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MET

2-#798, From Paris, November 25,  
1931

>  
Government of the United States) and has so informed  
both China and Japan. It has urged upon them  
acquiescence in the general plan embodied in the  
proposed resolution" (END SPECIAL GREEN).

It is also definitely understood that I  
shall make the statement to the public and not  
the League when I am notified by Briand that the  
two conditions which I have imposed <sup>been</sup> have made.  
(END SECTION ONE)

SHAW

WSB

CJH

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be Paris  
closely paraphrased before  
being communicated to anyone. FROM Dated November 25, 1931  
Rec'd. 12:07 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

DOUBLE PRIORITY. 798, November 25, 2 p.m. (Section two).

I followed the above method in compliance with the  
spirit of your 590 and before Sze's answer has been received.  
It is now left to Briand's discretion as to whether our  
announcement will be most helpfully made before or after  
he receives Sze's answer. I do not believe that the, <sup>matter of</sup> ~~and~~  
the time of our announcement as related to Sze answer is  
of vital importance since the fact of our (\*) is generally  
known to all parties. My personal opinion is that if  
Sze's answer conveys China's agreement, which is improbable,  
the prior announcement will have done no harm and if Sze's  
answer from China is <sup>unfavorable</sup> ~~it~~ it will still give China another  
chance for reconsideration before the public Council meeting,  
and after any new status of world public opinion which may  
be created by the announced specific cooperation of the  
League and the United States to secure a peaceful settlement.  
(End message)

SHAW

(\*) apparent omission.



AM

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM PARIS

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Dated November 25, 1931

Rec'd 1:05 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

DOUBLE PRIORITY

799, November 25, 4 p.m.



FROM AMBASSADOR DAVES

Sze has just sent to Briand so-called Chinese counter-proposal. It is to be assumed of course that he has been instructed to do this by his Government after they had received statement of attitude of the United States both through Johnson and myself. You will note that this counter-proposal eliminates references to the United States and also note that Sze has not (repeat not) as yet asked Briand to present counter-proposal to Council.

Chinese counter-proposal is as follows:

(GREEN) "Article One. Immediate cessation of all military activity in any way tending to aggravate the situation.

Article



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AM

2-#799, from Paris, Nov. 25, 4 p.m.

Article Two. Withdrawal of Japanese forces within the railway areas; such withdrawal to begin at once, proceed progressively and be completed within two weeks.

Article Three. China to assume full responsibility for the security of the lives and property of Japanese nationals in Manchuria. In this connection China is ready to cooperate in any reasonable measures looking to the establishment of additional guarantees of security by means of neutral aid or otherwise.

Article Four. The details of evacuation and the taking over of territory, as well as the measures to safeguard security of Japanese life and property in Manchuria, to be subject of discussion and agreement between China and Japan in the presence of neutrals representing the Council.

Article five. The creation by the League of a neutral commission to supervise the evacuation and the taking over of the evacuated territories and to study and report upon the situation in Manchuria for the information of the Council and of the conference herein-after mentioned in paragraph seven.

Article

AM

3-#799, from Paris, Nov. 25, 4 p.m.

Article Six. The mutual reaffirmance by both China and Japan of the principle of respect for international treaties, especially the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Paris Pact for the Renunciation of war, and the Washington Nine Power Treaty.

Article Seven. The convocation of a conference of all interested powers to discuss and settle all questions between China and Japan relating to Manchuria on the basis of the principles embodied in the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Paris Pact for the Renunciation of War and the Washington Nine Power Treaty, with a view to safeguarding peace in the Far East and promoting the economic development of Manchuria through international cooperation".

SHAW

1 797  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 894.00/322 FOR # 383

FROM Japan (Forbes) DATED Nov 7, 1931  
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING:

Failure of the civilian branches of the Japanese Government to check effectively the activities of the Japanese military since the incident of Sept. 18

ek

793.94/2896

Tokyo, Japan, November 7, 1951.

No. 383

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to comment on the failure of the civilian branches of the Japanese Government to check effectively the activities of the Japanese military since the incident of September 18th, in spite of the fact that genuine efforts have been made to do so.

This has been, I feel, fundamentally due to the structure of the Government. The army has practically autonomous power in military matters at a time of crisis, a power in part an inheritance from the feudal clans and  
in

in part delegated to it following the Restoration. After the Emperor was restored to power in 1868, the feudal armies were reorganized into the Imperial Army and it was only natural that it considered itself the successor of the loyal clans in being the protector of the Throne. This attitude was made effective by the fact that the Chief of the Army General Staff has direct access to the Emperor and is responsible to him alone in matters of strategy and tactics. All other officials of the Government, with the exception of the Chief of the Navy General Staff, can approach the Emperor only through the intermediation of the Minister concerned, in practice with the approval of the Prime Minister. It is this qualification of direct access to the Emperor which makes difficult, if not impossible, adequate control of the military by the Cabinet in a situation such as the present one. Once the Chief of the General Staff has obtained the Imperial sanction, the civilian authorities may find themselves in a dilemma, not only because of the sanctity investing the person of the Emperor and his decisions but because the downfall of the Cabinet can be precipitated by the resignation of the Minister of War if it is followed by refusal of acceptance of the portfolio on the part of those military officers eligible for the position.

The Cabinet can control the situation by withholding supplies to the Army. Such action would, of course, precipitate a political crisis. It might result in the fall of the Government. It usually is settled by compromise through the intervention of personages of great

-114-

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

public prestige. These are men of age and experience and are generally referred to as Elder Statesmen or "Genro". Prince Saionji is called in the public prints "the only surviving Genro". As a matter of fact, the institution is a necessity, in view of the complicated structure of the Japanese Government.

This division of power explains, in part at least, the discrepancies between statements made by officials of the Foreign Office and statements and acts of the military. For example, as the Embassy reported in its telegram No. 196 of October 26th, the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs told Mr. Neville that no additional troops would be sent to Manchuria while almost at the same moment the General Staff was informing the Military Attaché that the despatch of an additional brigade to Manchuria was under consideration. The present movement of Japanese forces beyond the Nonni River, as reported in the press, is another instance. The Foreign Office stated that Japanese troops had been sent to the Nonni River for the sole purpose of repairing the bridge that was destroyed by Tsitsihar forces. According to press accounts, however, Japanese forces have engaged Chinese troops in battle at a point several miles north of the river. The independence of the military from civilian control makes possible actions that are contrary to the stated policy of the Cabinet and of which the Cabinet may be in ignorance at the time of their occurrence.

This multiplex form of Government results also in delays of decision affecting foreign policies. These delays may have an unfortunate effect. An instance of

this may quite possibly be the failure of Mr. Yoshizawa to state Japan's case adequately at the meeting of the Council of the League of Nations on October 24th. Mr. Yoshizawa, I am told, received his instructions only two hours before the meeting opened. It had been necessary that those instructions receive the approval not only of the Foreign Office but also of the Cabinet and probably the Chief of the General Staff, following which they were submitted to the Emperor for sanction, this latter step involving their scrutiny by the Emperor's advisers - the Keeper of the Privy Seal and the Grand Chamberlain. It may have been this inevitable delay which was the real cause of Mr. Yoshizawa's inadequate presentation of Japan's policy and the resultant impairment of Japan's position in the eyes of the world. At any rate, I feel that Japan's poor presentation to the League Council of its point of view arose in no unimportant measure from this division of power.

There have been other factors contributing to the difficult position of the Cabinet. The temper of the army has been - and is - such that too great opposition by the civilian government to the activities of the military might result in its fall. The army is undoubtedly excited and is convinced that its activities should not be hampered by the Cabinet. Although this point of view may not now be so true of the higher officers as it was recently, it would seem still to be true of the lower ranking officers. In fact, I have heard from more than one source that the junior officers are the chief



chief source of any apprehension that may exist. For example, I am informed that there is an organization of 2,000 officers of the lower ranks which is extremely chauvinistic and potentially a source of danger to the Government. In case of their deciding upon any direct action, their troops, being under their direct command, would probably be more loyal to them than to very senior officers.

There is an important part of the public that has become imbued with this militant spirit. This is to be expected of the reserves, since they have had military service, of the nation-wide Young Men's Associations, which have recently been the object of considerable army propaganda, and of the various reactionary societies. The reactionary societies have become increasingly active since September 16th. For example, 1,200 members of the Great Japan Justice Association, according to the press, offered prayers at Meiji Shrine in Tokyo on November 1st that "Japan may emerge victorious from the present struggle over Manchuria". The organization of students has been effected by army officers. The recently formed Union of Patriotic Students held a demonstration at the Yoyogi Parade Ground at Tokyo on November 6th. 10,000 students are reported by the press to have participated. Following the meeting, they marched to the entrance of the Palace and paid their respects, then proceeded to the Foreign Office to advise the Minister for Foreign Affairs to resign, and finally presented to Count Makino a resolution criticizing his failure to assist the Emperor as he should. The head of this  
organization

1  
organization is Goro Shiba, a retired general. The Patriotic Ladies Society has decided to send two representatives to Manchuria "to console" the Japanese soldiers. The Japanese League of Juveniles held meetings at the Meiji Shrine on November 3rd and 4th. The press states that 8,000 boys were present and that it was decided to send 25 of them to Manchuria "to console" the soldiers. These various activities may not in themselves be important, but they illustrate the activities of the military, which is behind them, and also the state of mind of a section of the people.


Respectfully yours,

W. Cameron Forbes

Embassy's File No. 800.

LES/AA

Copy to Peking.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Quitsen NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 861.5017 Living Conditions/360 FOR #1239

FROM China ( Engert ) DATED Oct. 26, 1931  
TO NAME 1-1127 070

REGARDING: Japanese preparations for action in Manchuria.  
Memorandum of conversation between Mr. Johnson and  
Oskar P. Trautmann, German Minister to China, on  
Oct. 5 concerning the statements by Karakhan regarding--.

793.94/2897

1eb

Peiping, October 26, 1931.

No. 1239

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Sir:

1/ I have the honor to transmit herewith a memorandum of a conversation between Mr. Johnson and Mr. Oskar P. Trautmann, the new German Minister to China, which took place on October 5, 1931. Mr. Trautmann states that when he called on Mr. Karakhan in Moscow in the early part of September, Mr. Karakhan expressed the opinion that Japan was preparing to take some action in Manchuria.

The German Minister also referred to conditions in Russia which he thought had been much affected by the general world depression because of the fall in prices of raw products. On the other hand, he felt that conditions in Moscow were somewhat better compared

- 2 -

pared to a year or so ago when he had been  
there last.

Respectfully yours,

For the Minister:

C. Van H. Engert,  
First Secretary of Legation.

Enclosure:

- 1: Copy of memorandum of  
conversation dated  
October 5, 1931.

800.

CVHE/js.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1  
Original No. 1239

Memorandum of Conversation

Peiping, Oct. 5, 1931

H.E. Mr. Oskar P. Trautmann, German Minister

Subject: Conditions in Russia

The German Minister, Mr. Trautmann, made his first call this morning and we talked generally about mutual friends and about conditions in Manchuria. He stated that he had seen Karakhan when passing through Moscow and that the latter had stated that he thought Japan was preparing to take some action in Manchuria. Neither of us felt that we could decide whether Karakhan had previous knowledge or whether he was merely basing his statement upon publicity emanating from Japan.

He stated that in regard to Russia, the Russians were suffering from the present world depression in a way probably little known outside of Russia. Russia was paying for world goods with raw products in a market where prices had fallen to such a point that she was paying three times for her imports what she had paid in recent years. The result was that much needed raw products were going out of the country. He stated, however, that conditions in Moscow as compared with what he had seen a year or more before indicated that the people were in somewhat better condition than they had been. Certainly the lines at the food shops were smaller. He had seen no evidence of unusual activity on the borders of China.

Nelson Trusler Johnson  
American Minister

NTJ/hp

180

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R.Swatow/47 FOR # - to Legation

FROM Swatow ( Berger ) DATED Oct.10,1931.  
TO NAME 1-1127 o.p.

REGARDING:

Swatow anti-Japanese movement. Local Chinese advocate action against Japanese. Japanese products boycotted. Japanese shipping so stringently boycotted that their only communication with shore is by Japanese Consul's motor boat. Japanese coasting vessels no longer enter commercial anchorage. Precautions taken to prevent acts of violence toward Japanese.

jr

793.94/2898

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

ANTI-JAPANESE MOVEMENT:

The news of the Japanese military activities in Jehden and other places in Manchuria greatly aroused the local Chinese. Even the wealthy merchants who ordinarily desire nothing so much as peace and quiet were incensed and, I am reliably informed, in their clubs and other meeting places advocated forceful action against the Japanese should the League of Nations not be able to settle the matter and secure the withdrawal of the Japanese troops from Manchuria.

Local action against the Japanese took the form however of a very peaceful but nevertheless stringent boycott of the Japanese and their products. An anti-Japanese boycott organization was formed and representatives of this  
organization



-2-

organisation visited all Chinese firms where Japanese goods were inventoried and sealed to prevent their sale or use. All Japanese shipping was boycotted so stringently that the ships were unable even to communicate with the shore except by the Japanese Consul's motor boat. One Japanese ship with a cargo of coal for Swatow remained in port for several days seeking by bribery to land her cargo but was unable to accomplish anything. When she was ready to put to sea a very severe northeast storm blew up and she was forced to remain in port. She finally left port with barely sufficient water and bunker coal to reach Formosa. The Japanese coasting vessels which ordinarily call at Swatow en route from Hongkong to Formosa no longer enter the commercial anchorage.

Local sentiment seemed to be unanimously behind the boycott but the Chinese authorities, both municipal and military, took elaborate precautions to prevent acts of violence toward the Japanese. The students, who seem always to be ready for any excuse to leave their studies, were very active in anti-Japanese propaganda work in the interior as well as in the city of Swatow.

GENERAL:

The Swatow district was generally most quiet and peaceful at the end of September. The American missionaries whose work took them into the interior reported that the villages were very quiet with very little banditry and clan fighting.

The U. S. S. "Bulmer" was at Swatow from October 15th to the end of the month.

-4-

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

David C. Berger,  
American Consul.

Five copies to the Department of State.  
One copy to the Consulate General, Shanghai.  
" " " " " " Canton.  
" " " " " " Hankow.  
" " " " Consulate, Hanking.  
" " " " " " Amoy.  
" " " " Commander of U. S. S. "Sigsbee".

800.  
DOB:L

A True copy of  
the signed orig-  
inal *DOB*

793.94/2898

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

GREEN

Paris

FROM Dated November 25, 1931

Rec'd 11:14 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.

805, November 25, 11 p.m.

FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES.


Following is communique issued by the League  
tonight. Shortly afterwards I gave out statement  
contained in my 798, November 25, 2 p.m.

"In the hope of establishing a resolution to be  
adopted unanimously, including the votes of the two  
parties, in conformity with Article 11 of the Covenant,  
a draft scheme has been drawn up which deals separately  
with the withdrawal of the Japanese troops within the  
railway zone and the appointment of an international  
commission.

The substance of the scheme, which has been  
communicated to the two parties, is as follows:

The resolution of September 30th is recalled and  
reaffirmed. The two parties declare that they are  
solemnly bound by that resolution. The two governments  
are accordingly invited to take all steps necessary to

assure



F/DEW 793.94/2899

DEC 5 1931

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AM

2-#805, from Paris, Nov. 25, 11 p.m.

assure its execution so that the withdrawal of the Japanese troops within the railway zone -- a point to which the Council attaches the utmost importance-- may be effected as speedily as possible.

The two parties undertake:

To give to the commanders of their respective forces the strictest orders to refrain from any initiative which may lead to further fighting and loss of life; and to take all measures necessary to avoid any further aggravation of the situation.

The members of the Council are invited to furnish it with information received from their representative on the spot.

It is proposed to appoint a commission to study on the spot and to report to the Council on any circumstances which, affecting international relations, threatens to disturb peace between China and Japan or the good understanding between them on which peace depends. China and Japan would each be represented by an assessor.

The appointment and deliberations of the commission would not prejudice in any way the engagement taken by the Japanese Government and correlatively the resolution of September 30th regarding the withdrawal of the Japanese troops within the railway zone."

SHAW

GW

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

cib

GRAY

Paris

FROM

Dated November

Recd 11 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington.


804, November 25, 10 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES.

Following is Sweetser's report:

"The twelve members of the council meeting at five o'clock today in entire privacy at Drummond's suggestion in order to avoid any premature publicity, took note of information received as to the views of the United States and decided to issue a resume of the draft resolution as it now stands. The Council members also considered a statement from Sze.

Meeting shortly after in ordinary private sessions Briand drew attention to a communication from the Japanese speaking of a Chinese concentration at Chinchow and asking that the troops be withdrawn. This was in the form of a request and not a demand but it seemed to Briand a little strong to ask that Chinese troops withdraw from Chinese territory. Cecil then stated that Sze had told him that they could not withdraw unless neutral troops took their place



F/DEW

793.94/2900

FILED

DEC 5 1931

-2- #804 from Paris, November 25,  
10 pm. (SECTION ONE)

place. Briand said that a note had been received to that effect asking that a neutral zone be established under control of foreign troops in which case they would withdraw behind the Great Wall. Already he noted a number of foreign observers were on the spot. Evidently Koo was preoccupied to avoid armed contact and was taking only defensive measures.

Cecil thought that special action should be taken by all the governments including the United States if it were possible. The seizure of a great town like Chinchow would be a deliberate insult at this moment when the Council was meeting to elaborate plans for a settlement. Briand then proposed two things: first, that he as President send a new appeal both parties in special relation to Chinchow and, second, that the individual governments intervene in the same sense and also send observers if possible. Accordingly an identic cable was sent this evening by Briand and to both governments in the name of the Council pointing out that the Council's efforts for peace would be vain if new incidents occurred and drawing special attention to the situation around Chinchow. Already certain governments had sent observers there: the responsibility however rested with the two governments to prevent

-3- # 804 from Paris, November 25,  
10 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

to prevent further loss of life.

The Council members then took up again the draft resolution to which some slight verbal changes were suggested to make it still clearer that the Commission while not inferring with actual military movements was nevertheless fully entitled to report upon the military side of the situation as well as the other sides.

A draft statement to the press summarizing the resolution as it now stands was then presented. Briand pointed out that it would be better to give a summary on good authority than to give the full text as thereby the Council members would not be bound to actual phraseology. (END SECTION ONE)

SHAW

JS

AM

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

Paris

**FROM**

Dated November 25, 1931

Rec'd 11:30 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

804, November 25, 10 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

Madariaga however once again expressed the disquietude felt by himself and certainly shared by several other members of the Council lest the publication of any such statement might appear to commit the Council members and thus in case China refused put them in the position of voting against her. This would reverse the situation in that previously Japan had been alone but in this contingency China might be isolated.

Both Briand and Cecil spoke against this interpretation. The former stressed the fact that the Council was still working under Article 11 and that necessarily it must make the effort to secure unanimity. The case was very exceptional, given a Japanese controlled railway on Chinese soil. No one not even the Chinese had suggested any other article than 11 the commission would be of great value to China; it would even provide a kind of internationalization



AM

2-#804, from Paris, Nov. 25, 10 p.m.

internationalization for Manchuria.

Cecil thought the Council members must get on to a result. They had provisionally approved a draft resolution, given it to the parties 48 hours ago, and ought to inform the public of its general lines. World opinion was somewhat mystified by conflicting reports; the Council must shortly have another public meeting.

Briand also mentioned for the first time some kind of general statement to accompany the draft resolution. It was not quite clear what he meant; Cecil however urged that the first thing was to publish the communique tonight reserving until later any additional explanation of the juridical side of the matter which obviously must be gone into with great care.

The next meeting of the twelve was fixed for 4 o'clock tomorrow with the possibility of a public session on Friday at 10:30. It was expected that the Chinese reply would be received during the course of the day tomorrow". END MESSAGE

JS

SHAW

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAIL

GREEN

FROM

PARIS

Dated November 25, 1931

Rec'd 4:10 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington


803, November 25, 8 p.m.

FROM AMBASSADOR DAVES

Dr. Sze has just handed me the following statement which he has sent to Drummond for immediate transmission to the Council:

"Positive information of the utmost urgency just received from my government indicates that notwithstanding Japanese assurances to the contrary the Japanese army is converging on Chinchow. A serious conflict therefore impends between the Japanese and Chinese forces which China earnestly wishes to avoid and it would seem that it can be prevented only if without any delay the Council interposes some decisive action. My government accordingly asks the Council at once to take all necessary steps for the establishment of a neutral zone between the present stations of the Chinese and Japanese forces; such zone to be occupied by British, French, Italian and other neutral detachments under Council authority.

In such



F/DEW

793.94/2901

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182  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MAM

2- #803, from Paris, November 25,  
1931

In such circumstances China could and would if  
requested by the Council in the interest of peace with-  
draw her forces within the Great Wall.

Please bring this communication to the immediate  
attention of the Council".

SHAW

CSB

1821

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ RECEIVED  
to anyone.

Nanking

Dated November 25, 1931

Rec'd 8:15 a.m.

Secretary of State,

FROM

Washington

November 25, 3 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.


Department's 119, November 23, 6 p.m.

One. In a conversation with Koo last evening

I communicated to him the substance of your comments  
upon the proposed resolution of the Council as tele-  
graphed to Dawes.

Two. I also communicated to him Department's  
comment upon Chinese counter-proposal.

Three. The Chinese express the not unreasonable  
fear that by the time that any Commission can reach  
Manchuria from Europe the Japanese will have been in  
undisturbed occupation long enough to have encouraged  
the organization of an independent government which  
would be ready to recognize Japan's position in Man-  
churia and they have hoped that the League would take  
this possibility into consideration and act to prevent  
it.



F/DEW

793.94/2902

DEC 11 1931

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MET

2-Nanking, November 25, 1931

it.

Four. I am at a loss to understand why it should be reported in Paris that I have "told the Chinese Government that the United States is willing to go much further than the League in support of the Chinese position". I have not at any time committed myself to the Chinese or to anyone else as to what position I thought the Government of the United States would adopt in regard to this question.

Five. It has been my understanding that the Government of the United States was giving whole-hearted support to the League's efforts in this matter and I have so informed the Chinese.

Six. The continued advance of the Japanese in Manchuria, in open defiance of all of the efforts of the League and of the United States to create an atmosphere conducive to a settlement of the differences between China and Japan, is bearing terribly upon the Chinese. The driving of Chinese soldiers out of Tsitsihar had as little excuse as did the seizure of Mukden on the night of September 18th and we are now informed that the Japanese (END SECTION ONE)

WSB

JOHNSON

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

NANKING

Dated November 25, 1931

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone.

FROM  
Rec'd 26th, 1:24 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

November 25, 3 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

are preparing to drive the Chinese away from Chinchow  
and thus eliminate from Manchuria the last vestige of  
Chinese control within that area. In view of all the  
circumstances, in view of Japan's commitments under  
the Covenant of the League, the Nine Power Treaty  
and the Anti-War Pact, I cannot escape the feeling  
that such conduct is unconscionable. Rightly or  
wrongly, the Chinese have looked for aid to the  
nations party to these agreements and thus far their  
confidence in those agencies has been without result  
in spite of the League's resolution of October 24 and  
~~October~~ <sup>September</sup> 30. After a period of two months instead of  
amelioration of the situation the Chinese find that  
Japan has succeeded in the complete destruction of all  
Chinese authority in those areas. They have seen  
Japan utterly and shamelessly defy every effort of the  
League, in fact it would appear that Japan has timed  
every

AM

2-from Nanking, Nov. 25, 3 p.m.

every advance in such a way as to indicate to China and to the world the low esteem in which she holds the League and world opinion. In the face of such provocation as the Chinese have had it seems to me that the Chinese have and are exercising great restraint and I feel most emphatically that the Powers owe it to themselves to take serious measures not only to prevent the complete destruction of all confidence in the support and intentions that were behind the Covenant, the Washington treaties and the Kellogg Pact, but also the complete destruction of government in China.

Seven. The Chinese are desperate. The activities of the Japanese unrestrained by the rest of the world are fanning hatreds in the younger generations of Chinese which some day will produce most dangerous fruit. Whatever may have been Japan's grievances against China prior to September 18th, I know of nothing that China has done since that would justify the program which since that date Japan has insisted on following.

(END MESSAGE)

JOHNSON

GW

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

GRAY

Paris

FROM Dated November 25, 1931

Rec'd 11:40 p.m.


Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.

806, November 25, 12 p.m.  
FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES.

Following is text of identical telegram addressed by  
Briand as President of the League Council this afternoon  
to the Chinese and Japanese governments:

"On behalf of my colleagues on the Council I have  
the honor to make the following appeal to the Japanese  
and Chinese Governments. The Council is striving to  
achieve a peaceful settlement of the dispute but its  
efforts would be in vain if fresh engagements were to  
occur between Chinese and Japanese forces. The Council  
specially calls the attention of the two governments to  
the situation existing in the Chinchow region.  
Already certain governments have decided to send observers  
there. But it is for the two parties to give the commander  
of their respective forces the strictest orders to  
refrain from any action which might lead to further  
engagements and further loss of human life. My

colleagues



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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM

2-#806, from Paris, Nov. 25, 12 p.m.

colleagues and I rely on the will of the two governments  
to take all needed measures for this purpose urgently."

SHAW

JS

RR TELEGRAM RECEIVED

The portion of this telegram  
in confidential code must be  
closely paraphrased before  
being communicated to anyone.

Paris

Dated Nov. 26, 1931.

Recd. 6:53 P. M.

793.94  
with  
507.0112  
Secretary of State,  
Washington.


807, November 26, 9 P. M.

FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES.

Following is summary of Sweetser's report.

"Briand reported confidentially to the twelve  
members of the Council today that he had had a very  
promising conversation with Sze this afternoon. The  
latter had now received his instructions and though  
he had not fully deciphered them he understood they  
gave him considerable liberty. It was Briand's under-  
standing that China would be able to negotiate on the  
basis of the general lines announced yesterday.

(GRAY) Also reported a conversation with  
Yoshizawa who left an aide memoire regarding the very  
serious situation around Chinchow and the necessity of  
immediate steps to obviate a collision. The aide mem-  
oire said "such an eventuality would be particularly  
unfortunate at a moment when thanks to the Council's  
efforts



F/DEW

793.94/2904

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DEC 2 1931

807 from Paris

-2-

efforts a satisfactory solution of the Manchurian incident seems to be in sight."

In view of communications from both Governments on this subject it was agreed that those Governments with observers at Chinchow might instruct them to examine together the possibility of establishing a neutral zone in order to prevent a collision.

Scialoja announced that Italy was ready to send troops to such a zone. No immediate comment was forthcoming; Cecil later said he had consultation his government on the subject.

Finally, in the hope that agreement may be reached on the general lines announced, a drafting committee was appointed to meet tomorrow at 10:30 consisting of Briand, Cecil, Madaiaga and Colban."

JHR

SHAW

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

PLAIN

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 26, 1931

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

1011, November 26,

PEIPING LEADER remarks editorially today "League must be given to understand that any further attempts at occupation by Japanese means real war. So far there has been war but except at Nonni River on one side only. Japan has made war while China has been non-resistant. But there can now be no quibbling and no evasion stop further armed resistance.

There has already been a proposal for an international police force appointed by League to supervise Japanese evacuation of Manchuria and responsible Chinese officials have agreed to this. Such an international force at Chinchow would unquestionably preserve peace of Manchuria as Japanese would not dare touch foreign troops. If foreign troops in North China, including Shan Haikuan and Chinwangtao take no action to preserve peace it means the powers stand for war. If League does not take action at once to interfere with Japanese invasion of new territory

F/DEW

793.94/2905

FILED

DEC 1 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

2-#1011, from Peiping, Nov. 26

AM

territory it means that League will not act to prevent war. If United States Government takes no action to uphold Kellogg Anti-War Pact it means that United States is indifferent to breaking of Pact which it initiated."

For the Minister

ENGERT

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

PLAIN

FROM Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 26, 1931

Rec'd FOREIGN AFFAIRS

NOV 27 1931

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

1009, November 26.

Kuo Wen reports from Shanghai twenty fourth  
interview with WangChing Wei: "Touching on Manchurian  
crisis Wang said that China had never faced a graver  
foreign problem than present Sino-Japanese conflict.  
If he should go to Nanking he would not shirk his  
responsibility but would do his best to assist the  
Government in solving the crisis.

Asked why China should raise so much opposition  
to occupation of Manchuria by Japan, whereas there was  
much less agitation when Soviet Russia invaded and  
occupied outer Mongolia, Wang explained that Japanese  
occupation of Manchuria is different from Mongolian  
question in three respects. First, Mongolian trouble  
arose during the regime of Marshall Tuan Chi Jui as a  
result of which the Tuan Government fell. Secondly,  
outer Mongolia is inhabited by Mongolians, whereas  
in Manchuria there are Chinese

Mongolians

E/DEW

793.94/2906

DEC 1 1931

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM

2-#1009, from Peiping, Nov. 26

Mongolians and Moslems in addition to the Manchus. At the First National Congress of the Koumintang in 1924 a declaration was made to effect that China must secure unity of all five races which make up this Republic. Thirdly, Russians have not gone so far as the Japanese who have killed many innocent people, injured Pu Yi to a restoration plot, seized salt revenues and committed other outrages."

For the Minister.

ENGERT

ARL

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

FROM Dated November 26, 1931

Rec'd 6:10 a.m.

793.94  
Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

1008, November 26, 9 a.m.

Following from Mukden:

"November 25, 5 p.m.


Japanese officially reported that their forces returned to Chuliuho last evening, having lost 4 killed. In this connection it may be remarked that fortuitous encounters should be extremely rare in view of constant observation activities of Japanese airplances.

Private information is to effect that armored train went to Hsinmin last evening and after firing about twenty shots into air returned. Many Chinese residents has left Hsinmin."

For the Minister

ENGERT

GW



F/DEW

793.94/2907

FILED



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

GRAY

FROM Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 26, 1931

Rec'd 6:10 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.

COPIES SENT TO NOV 27 1931  
O.N.I. AND M.I. Department of State

1012, November 26, 3 p.m.

Following from American Consul General at Harbin:

"November 25, noon.

One. Missionary Vos ~~(\*)~~ under date of November 23rd from Tsitsihar City that he found everything apparently quiet, that there were a great many Japanese soldiers on the streets, that the Japanese flag was flying over the Kuomintang building and that a Japanese airplane had flown over the city dropping printed matter. Local Japanese Consulate General has confirmed to this office the press reports that at the request of <sup>the</sup> Japanese military four Japanese bankers had gone from Harbin to Tsitsihar to control the Kuanghsinlessu, or Provincial Bank there and to put the finances of Heilungkiang Province into good shape.

Two. Local Chinese populace very much worried over rumored occupation of Harbin by Japanese troops in the near future despite Japanese consular assurances to the contrary. (END PART ONE)

ENCERT

(\*) Apparent omission

F/DEW

793.94/2908

FILED

DEC 2 1931

793.94  
note

393.1115-12  
702 6193

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 26, 1931

Rec'd 6:44 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

1012, November 26, 3 p.m. (PART 2)

I do not believe that Japanese troops will come here if the local Chinese authorities acknowledge the authority of Hsi Chiang's Kirin government and if Ma and his troops do not use the Huhai railway to embarrass pro-Japanese regimes at Tsitsihar and Harbin.

Three. Center of Japanese military activities against Chinese has shifted from Tsitsihar to Chinchow where, as in the case of Ma at Tsitsihar, the Japanese military will probably claim that a concentration of Chinese troops is a menace to the small Japanese defense army in Manchuria and that this menace must be alleviated by timely Japanese offensive.

702-6193  
Four. New Soviet Consul General, Slavutskwei and Vice President of Board of Directors of the Chinese Eastern Railway, Kusnetsoff, arrived at Harbin from Moscow yesterday morning. (END PART TWO)

ENGERT

GW

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

GRAY

FROM Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 26, 1931

Rec'd 6:44 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.

1012, November 26, 3 p.m. (PART THREE)

Five. Referring to my telegram of November 14,  
noon, paragraph No. four, the railway police, but  
not the railway guards, are paid by the Chinese  
Eastern Railway. The commander of the latter, Ting  
Chao, has informed me that the Kirin detachments of  
the guards are being paid regularly by the new  
government at Kirin and that the Heilungkiang  
detachments of the guards were paid by the Heilungkiang  
Government two months in advance. The matter of  
furnishing pay for these guards is of great importance".

Repeated to Nanking. (END MESSAGE)

For the Minister

CW

ENGERT

183  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

AM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

FROM

Dated November 26, 1931

Rec'd 12:32 a.m.

793-94  
Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
NOV 27 1931  
Department of State

1007, November 26, 8 a.m.

From Military Attache at Chinchow yesterday:

"From Hsinmin General Yung received telephone  
message 5 p.m. November 25, Japanese are entering  
city in force and taking over control civil government.  
Magistrate placed under military guard."

Repeated to Nanking and Commander-in-Chief.

For the Minister

Engert

G. W.

F/DEW

793.94/2909

DEC 2 1931

FILED

AM

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

FROM PEIFING

Dated November 26, 1931

Rec'd 8:55 a.m.

793.94  
Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.

1010, November 26, 1 p.m.

Following from Mukden: "November 25, 2 p.m.

STRICTLY COFFIDENTAIL

All indications point to an early Japanese drive against Chihnsien-preliminary movements to create the usual Japanese influence are now under way in order to encompass the total diminution of Marshall Chang's power and Nanking's influence in Manchuria. Occupation of strategic centers by Japanese troops will ensure Japanese domination of the whole country and will enable Japan patiently and confidently to await China's acceptance of its demands. With a free field Japanese efforts towards establishing and consolidating independent governments will be strengthened independent movements are fostered not spontaneous-and an autonomous Manchuria under Japanese influence and protection appears extemely probable. The existence of rampant banditry and the totally inadequate armed forces of independent governments


Japanese

F/DEW

793.94/2910

FILED

DEC 5 1931



AM

2-#1010, from Peiping, Nov. 26, 1 p.m.

--Japanese restrictions are being placed on their formation--  
gives Japan a reasonable although self imposed pretext  
for the continued military occupation of Manchuria until  
the situation has been settled to its satisfaction."

For the Minister

ENGERT

GW

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be- \_\_\_\_\_ NANKING  
fore being communicated  
to anyone.

FROM Dated November 26, 1931  
Rec'd 12:40 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.


November 26, 5 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

Your 120, November 25, 4 p.m.

I communicated substance of this message to Doctor Koo this evening. I was careful to point out that this was a friendly suggestion on your part and not formal advice. Doctor Koo made a note of what I had to say. He stated that it was very difficult for the Government to withdraw its troops from Chinchow in the face of the present attitude of the people. He called attention to the fact that Nanking at this very time is full of thousands of students from Shanghai, Hangchow and other places and that others are coming, all demanding that the President sign an undertaking to go north and to remain there until occupied territory has been recovered. He referred also to the unwillingness of the League to put a time upon the evacuation of Japanese troops from Manchuria and stated that this was a demand coming to the Government from all sides here in China and that to agree to less would involve great difficulties here.

He



F/DEW

793.94/2911

DEC 2 1931

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM

2-from Nanking, Nov. 26, 5 p.m.

He again expressed himself as much worried over the movement for an independent government in Manchuria which he stated was gaining ground. November 26, 8 p.m.

JOHNSON

GW



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HS

GREEN

Paris

FROM

Dated November 26, 1931

Rec'd 10:00 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington


808, November 26, 11 p.m.

FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES.

I have just received the following letter from  
Drummond:

"May I draw your attention to a point in yesterday's discussion of the twelve members of the Council other than Japan and China which I think may have a special interest for your Government.

After it had been decided that the President of the Council should send a telegram to both the Chinese and Japanese Governments in connection with the threatening situation at Chinchow, the suggestion was made that the various governments might in addition and on their own responsibility take individual action. Two possibilities therefor were suggested. First, the despatch of telegrams to the two governments exhorting them against any action which would aggravate matters in that region; and, second, the despatch of as many observers as possible to the vicinity of Chinchow. The Council finally agreed that it would



HS

2- # 808, from Paris, November 26, 1931

would be very helpful if the Government of the United States felt itself able to take independent action on these lines at the same time as the other governments."

JS

SHAW

793.94  
with  
5 to 6.112

MET

GRAY & GREEN  
TELEGRAM RECEIVED  
Paris

Dated November 26, 1931

Secretary of State,  
Washington

809, November 26, midnight.

FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES.

Following is Sweetser's complete report, a  
summary of which is contained in my telegram 807,  
November 26, 9 p.m.

"The situation seemed to clear considerably  
today for the first time following yesterday's pub-  
lication of the general lines of the Council's  
project of agreement and the American communication  
thereon together with Briand's report this afternoon  
of a promising conversation with Sze who had just  
received his instructions. The chief preoccupation  
now centers around Chinchow where the Council members  
decided to recommend cooperative action to establish  
a neutral zone and Italy offered to send troops.

At the opening of the meeting of the twelve  
members of

FROM  
Rec'd 1:39 a.m. 27th

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF EASTERN AFFAIRS  
NOV 23 1931  
RECEIVED - DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
FIVE

Del E. Hawkins  
(Rec'd 1:39 a.m. 27th) + to Tokyo  
and to Paris.

F/DEW

793.94/2913

FILED

DEC 2 1931

MET

2-#809, Paris, November 26, 1931

members of the Council not including the parties  
Briand reported a conversation with Yoshizawa who  
had handed him the following aide memoire.

'One. Faithful to its desire for peace and  
the resolution of September 30th the Japanese Govern-  
ment wishes at all costs to avoid a collision in the  
Chinchow district where some twenty thousand men are  
at present concentrated. Moreover the army of General  
Chang Hsueh Liang numbering about one hundred thousand  
men is west of the Great Wall.

Two. The military government of Chinchow con-  
tinues and of this the Japanese government has fresh  
evidence, to engage in a campaign of provocation  
designed to <sup>foment</sup> ~~frustrate~~ disorder in the districts  
bordering on the South Manchurian Railway zone.  
Further the words and acts of the President of the  
Chinese Republic himself give evidence of marked  
hostility to our troops. The Japanese command however  
has endeavored to maintain peace and avoid any incident.

Three. It should also be pointed out that Japanese  
columns are compelled from time to time to carry out  
police

MET

3-#809, Paris, November 26, 1931

police operations against large bands of Chinese brigands and irregulars who are ravaging the districts bordering on the railway zone and who often attack the zone. In the course of one of these expeditions a collision might occur with Chinese regular troops several detachments of which are in advance of the main Chinchow forces in the district along the right bank of the Liao river.

Four. Thus should the present situation be prolonged and although the Japanese forces are firmly decided not to take the initiative of an offensive action, it is to be feared that a fortuitous incident might occur, the consequences of which might be of extreme gravity. A conflict between our forces and those of Chinchow would bring about an advance of Chang Hsueh Liang's army from its positions within the Great Wall.

Five. To obviate such an eventuality it is absolutely necessary to take immediate steps to prevent any aggravation of the situation and to obviate the possibility

MET

4-#809, Paris, November 26,  
1931

possibility of a collision. Such an eventuality would be particularly unfortunate at a moment when thanks to the Council's preserving efforts a satisfactory solution of the Manchurian incident seems to be in sight.

Six. It is in the hope of a rapid intervention to preclude any danger that the Japanese Government requests the Council to give its serious attention to these facts and to recommend urgently that the Chinese forces should not concentrate to the West of Liao.

Paris, November 26, 1931'.

Briand stated he had informed Yoshiziwa of the steps taken as regards the telegram yesterday to the two governments and the despatch of observers. He expressed to his colleagues the view that any new incident while negotiations were in progress would be an attack on the Council and would be 'insupportable'. He had examined with Mr. Yoshiziwa whether it would be possible with the help of observers to create a neutral zone. This however presented difficulties

from

MET

5-#809, Paris, November 28, 1931

from the Japanese viewpoint as they desired their troops to give a certain freedom to move about quickly. The suggestion was however not rejected; hence the Council should examine whether it were feasible. Briand was distinctly worried about Chinchow; there seemed two very distinct currents in Japan.

Drummond raised the point whether the observers could not be given definite instructions. Cecil said that if they acted separately they would not succeed. They should accordingly endeavor to act together. He would be glad for his part to instruct the British observer to act with his colleagues. Obviously a plan could not be drafted in Paris; the details must be left to the man on the spot.

Briand agreed with this viewpoint. If a group of observers could be constituted it would form a definite center and might greatly aid the Commission. At Madariaga's suggestion the following identic text was later prepared and approved as an aid to the various governments.

'Both the Chinese and Japanese representatives

call

MET

6-#809, Paris, November 26, 1931

call Monsieur Briand's attention today to the still dangerous situation which existed in the Chinchow region. Monsieur Briand consulted his colleagues, other than the Chinese and Japanese representatives and it was agreed that those governments which were able to send observers to the region of Chinchow should be requested to give them the following instructions:

*Inv. to  
Hankow  
Nov. 29/31*

✓ One. The observers shall in concert with one another examine the possibility of establishing as between the Chinese and Japanese troops a neutral zone or any other system calculated to prevent any collision between the troops of the two parties.

✓ Two. The said observers will in concert with one another consider the means of establishing liason with the commanders of the Japanese and Chinese forces with a view to the necessary arrangements being made.

The Chinese and (Japanese?) governments have been informed of the above proposal'.

Later in the meeting Scialoja remarked that Italy was ready to send troops to the zone. There

was



MET

7-#809, Paris, November 26, 1931

was at the moment no comment on this suggestion. Later Golban drew attention to the fact that the Council had a definite proposal from the Chinese for such action; obviously it should reply in one way or another; possibly the members of the Council having troops in that region could consult together. Cecil stated he had already communicated with his Government on the subject. Briand added that if several nations could join in this move it might be possible to have an appreciable force. The suggestion however seemed a surprise; there is not much momentum behind it at the moment.

Briand also reported a conversation held just previously with Sze, which had seemed to him most promising. The Chinese representative said that he had now received his instructions and though he did not fully know their contents nor expect to have them completely deciphered before tomorrow morning he understood they gave him considerable liberty. Briand expressed the opinion that China would be able to negotiate on the same basis as announced yesterday by

the

MET

8-#809, Paris, November 26, 1931

the other members of the Council and that the situation seemed to him to be orientated towards a solution.

He thought the Council would be able to give Sze certain psychological satisfactions for the benefit of his public opinion and had assured Sze that the Council was anxious to do everything possible to help him.

Briand then suggested that a small drafting committee might be appointed to save time. This was done as the communique later expressed it 'in the hope that an agreement will be reached on the general line of the preliminary draft communicated to the press yesterday'. The members appointed were Briand, Cecil, Madariaga and Colban. The first meeting will be held tomorrow morning when the committee will consider not only any retouches to the draft resolution which they may think it possible to accept to aid either the Japanese or the Chinese, but also the general declaration which the President of the Council plans to make after the adoption of the resolution in order to restate and to keep unimpaired certain broad principles of international law involved in the dispute.

A brief discussion also ensued regarding the

size

MET

9-#809, Paris, November 26, 1931

size of the commission. Briand stated that the Japanese had suggested three members; he wondered if this was enough. Mutius thought it was. Scialoja pointed out the burden that would rest on the third member if the first one disagreed and also the difficulty that might arise in case of sickness. Madariaga thought that with a region so vast to cover and with the possible need of subcommittees the number was small. Drummond drew attention to the question of expense; he thought it might be best to delay decision until discussion with the parties.

Finally, there was an exchange of views on procedure. At the present moment it is arranged that the drafting committee shall meet tomorrow morning to consider the draft resolution and the President's declaration; it shall then as soon as possible have a preliminary discussion with the Chinese and the Japanese separately and report to the other members of the Twelve; and finally the full group will meet with the representatives of each party. Therefore if all goes well a public meeting will be held but probably not this week".

GW

SHAW

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HS

FROM GRAY

Amoy via N.R.

Dated November 27, 1931

Rec'd 11/28/31

Secretary of State

Washington

November 27, 2 p.m.

Anti-Japanese boycott rigidly enforced in this district. Anti-Japanese feeling strong amongst Chinese authorities, leading Chinese and students. Minor anti-Japanese demonstrations. Situation remains as set forth in my telegram of October 19, 9 a.m.

Repeated to Legation.

G.W.

FRANKLIN

WSB

F/DEW

793.94/2914

FILED

DEC 2 1931

793.94  
with  
693.9412

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

GRAY

FROM Peiping via N.R.

Dated November 27, 1931

Rec'd 3:15 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

1014, November 27, 1 p.m.

Legation's 947, November 17, 10 a.m., and 989,  
November 23, noon.


Desired report made in despatch No. 490, November 23rd from American Consulate General at Mukden to the Legation. Copies transmitted directly to the Department and Tokyo.

For the Minister

PERKINS

GW-HPD

Salt revenue.



F/DEW 793.94/2915

FILED

NOV 30 1931

793.94  
note.  
843.51- Salt Funds

MP

GRAY

TELEGRAM RECEIVED


Tientsin

Undated

FROM

Rec'd 6:23 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.



F/DEW

PRIORITY

The Following telegram has been sent to the  
Legation today:

"November 27, 10 a.m. There was a fresh outbreak of disorders in Chinese city near Japanese concession borders last night about 8:30, the disturbance it is alleged originating between Chinese police and so called plain clothes men. Japanese claim many rifle bullets and some shrapnel or mountain gun shells fell in Japanese concession and that the Chinese authorities were requested to stop this firing into the concessions and then having failed to do so the Japanese returned the fire. In the course of the disturbances rifle, machine guns, trench mortars, hand grenades and perhaps mountain guns were used. Some forty or fifty trench mortar shells were fired and Chinese claim many of them were directed by the Japanese towards the Public Safety Bureau, telephone office and the provisional government headquarters and that some damage was done to provisional headquarters and telephone office.

Firing

793.94/2916

FILED

DEC 21 1931

793.94  
not  
823.1027

MP

42- From Tientsin, Nov.27, 1931

Firing kept up at intervals practically throughout the night. Rifle firing is now being heard and a very tense situation prevails. Some of the barricades in the Japanese concession were removed yesterday and many Japanese volunteers had been relieved from this service. The exact responsibility for the disorders last night as in the case of the November 8 disturbances is not known. Repeated to the Department and Nanking."

LOCKHART

WSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 52

AMERICAN CONSULATE,

Foochow, China, October 30, 1931.

SUBJECT: Anti-Japanese Demonstrations of Students  
of American Financed Institutions.

THE HONORABLE  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

PM RECD  
NOV 27 31  
DEPT OF STATE  
COMM

I have the honor to report that this Consulate  
was recently placed in an embarrassing position by  
the students of certain local mission schools with  
American interests.

On October 12, 1931 about 100 students from the  
Fukien Christian University, a local institution of  
higher learning, paraded before the Japanese Consulate  
General here and shouted insulting remarks in English  
(or remarks that the Japanese Consul General consider-  
ed to be insulting). Under the belief that the  
Fukien Christian University is an American controlled  
institution, the Consul General for Japan at Foochow  
made a strong protest to this Consulate. He stated  
that he was very anxious to avoid trouble of any kind  
in Foochow, but if there was a repetition of such  
demonstrations and the Chinese authorities failed to  
curb them, there would be no alternative but for him  
to take positive and drastic measures to see that they  
were not again repeated. Although the Consulate  
feels that it is in no wise responsible for the actions

of

FE

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
NOV 23 1931  
Department of State  
December 22 1931  
Dist. to  
Peking  
Dec. 21, 1931  
F/DEW  
793.94/2917

with  
393.1164

DEC 22 1931



-2-

of the Chinese students of an American school, it felt that it was necessary to preserve the peace on Nantai Island (the principal area of American residences in Foochow including the Consulate, and also other foreigners), and in view of this fact despatched a letter to the Chinese president of the Fukien Christian University, a copy of which is enclosed herewith together with the reply from the Dean of the University.

The status of the Fukien Christian University is typical of foreign financed institutions of learning in China. The university campus is American property and is registered as such in this Consulate. The school is largely financed with American funds but the President is Chinese and actually the institution is under Chinese control. Some of the faculty are Americans but they do not have a controlling voice in the management of University affairs. Another factor in the case is that one of the British missions has a small interest in the University. There is also enclosed a copy of a letter, dated October 30, 1931, addressed to this Consulate by an American faculty member of the Fukien Christian University, which shows very clearly its (the Fukien Christian University's) anomalous status.

Another incident occurred when the school girls of the Hwa Nan College, an American financed institution, but Chinese controlled, pasted posters with

reading

-3-

reading matter derogatory to Japan on the walls of the compound of the Japanese Consulate General. The Japanese Consul General states that he is not protesting against placards which are not couched in violent terms such as "Kill the Japanese" etc., and further that the wall surrounding his Consulate General is the only place where he is insisting that no placard of any description can be posted.

Now it happened that the students of no other schools, Chinese Government or otherwise, gave cause for complaint by the Japanese Consulate General in so far as demonstrations were concerned. This was due, no doubt, not only to the fact that the students in the mission schools have become more bold as they believe they entertain a measure of protection from the foreign countries having an interest in their schools, but also to the fact that the Provincial Government took strict steps to avoid any such contingency, and has successfully prevented any untoward "incidents" that might have added fuel to the fire of the Sino-Japanese controversy. Of course, here as elsewhere, a Japanese boycott has been in full effect and the city has been plastered with anti-Japanese propaganda, consisting of placards containing phrases with the most violent and sinister implications.

The effective co-operation of the Provincial Government, the Japanese Consulate General, the

American

-4-

American faculty members of the American financed schools and this Consulate has kept peace on Mantai Island, "a consummation devoutly to be desired." Although the Provincial Government showed great foresight and made every effort to keep the peace, such was not the case with the local Tang Pu (黨部) or Party Headquarters, which organization, in spite of the policies of the Provincial Government, was undoubtedly responsible for the student demonstrations of October 12, 1931.

Bishop John Gowdy, Mr. Everett M. Stowe, Reverend R. W. McClure and other Americans connected with the Fukien Christian University inform this Consulate that they, as well as the Chinese teachers and students of the Fukien Christian University, consider that this demonstration was a rash act with little good to result therefrom, but that they (the students) were forced into it through the pressure of agents of the Tang Pu and the Chinese Government schools. These gentlemen state that the students set out on this parade in fear and trembling and were glad when they arrived back on the campus without having met with any serious accidents.

Respectfully yours,

*Gordon L. Burke*  
Gordon L. Burke,  
American Vice Consul.

Enclosures:

1. Mr. Burke to the President of the Fukien Christian University, dated October 13, 1931.
2. Mr. Chen to Mr. Burke, dated October 16, 1931.
3. Mr. Beach to Mr. Burke, dated October 30, 1931.

800  
GLB:CRW:ETH

In quintuplicate.  
Copy to the Legation.

1 861

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No.1 to despatch No.52 of Gordon L. Burke, American Vice Consul, Foochow, China, dated October 30, 1931, on the subject: Anti-Japanese Demonstrations of Students of American Financed Institutions.

AMERICAN CONSULATE, Foochow, China, October 13, 1931.

The President,  
Fukien Christian University,  
Kueichi.

Sir:

The Consul General for Japan at Foochow informed this Consulate on the morning of October 12, 1931 that about one hundred students from the Fukien Christian University had just paraded past his Consulate shouting many insulting remarks in English.

In view of the American interests involved it is requested that you take prompt and effective measures to control your students in the future. Many foreigners, including Americans, have their homes on the island of Nantai, and so it is the sincere wish of this Consulate to see complete peace preserved here. It is the belief of this office that student parades should not be held on Nantai Island, as such parades are the potential source of disturbing the peace which this Consulate is desirous of maintaining.

The Chief of the Bureau of Public Safety of the Municipality of Foochow has informed the writer that he is bending all his efforts to keep the students from precipitating any unhappy incidents and it is this Consulate's desire that the Fukien Christian University give him full cooperation in the matter.

It is suggested that you take prompt measures to bring about a satisfactory settlement of the above-mentioned incident.

You are requested to give me an early reply to this letter.

Very truly yours,

Gordon L. Burke,  
American Vice Consul.

A true copy of  
the signed original  
D.B.T.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No.2 to despatch No.52 of Gordon L. Burke, American Vice Consul, Foochow, China, Dated October 30, 1931, on the subject: Anti-Japanese Demonstration of Students of American Financed Institutions.

COPY.

FUKIEN CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY

Foochow, China.

October 16, 1931.

The American Consul,

Foochow.

Dear Sir:

On account of the absence of the President, your letter dated the 13th inst. has been brought to my attention. Concerning the parade of our students on Nantai Island on October 12, the matter has already been taken up by the Chinese government, whose orders we shall, of course, obey.

We have exact record of the slogans which the students shouted in English when they passed the Japanese Consulate on October 12, and if you should desire to know precisely what was said, we would be glad to furnish the information.

Very truly yours,

(signed) Theodore H. E. Chen  
Dean

Copy to Bishop John Gowdy

A true copy of  
the signed original  
L.B.T.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No.3 of despatch No.52 of Gordon L. Burke,  
 American Vice Consul, Foochow, China, dated October 30,  
 1931, on the subject: Anti-Japanese Demonstration of  
 Students of American Financed Institutions.

COPY.

Fukien Christian University.

October 30, 1931.

The American Consul,  
 Foochow, China.

Sir:

A short time ago you had occasion to send instructions to the American citizens in this University regarding passports, etc. The letter was sent to the "Administration of Fukien Christian University."

I have consulted with the other American members here and am writing in accordance therewith. As you probably are aware there are no Americans in the Administration of this college. To address the Administration in regard to student behavior or property is probably correct. This college is diplomatically under the control of a Board of Managers in Foochow, Registered under the Nanking Government and at the same time apparently under the control of a Board of Trustees in New York City. Each presumes itself to be in complete ultimate control. So much for that part of it.

But when it comes to matters of Citizenship, passports, et al, safety of persons, travel in the interior, it appears to us American that you would delay any letters to us by from 12 hours to two or three days, sometimes if you send it to the "Administration of FCU." Therefore we suggest that you either address the "Americans at FCU" or as we agree, address it to me as the senior member of this American group. Such letters should not be opened and subject to the knowledge of the Chinese office force.


Yours truly,

(Signed) Fred P. Beach.

(Of the American Board Mission.)

RECEIVED  
 OCT 31 1931  
 D.B.T.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



Mr. Jacobs: *J. Jacobs*  
~~Mr. Hornbeck:~~

In a case such as this I do not think that Burke should have written to the Chinese President of the University. The University is under Chinese administration and control. The activities of the Chinese students complained of by the Japanese Consul took place off the University grounds and did not menace the safety of the physical property of the University. The activities had a very remote if any bearing upon the American financial interests in the University. Mr. Burke might perhaps have brought the matter to the attention of the senior American member on the staff of the University but even that, in my opinion, would not have been appropriate under the circumstances.

*MMH*

MMH/VDM

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

XII-18

(H)  
(J)

Don't you  
think it right  
has my best for  
Burlin to  
have written  
to both?

Watt



1866

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

December 22 1931.

No. 654

The Honorable

Nelson T. Johnson,  
American Minister,  
Peiping.

Sir:

Referring to despatch No. 52 of October 30, 1931, from the American Vice Consul at Foochow, entitled "Anti-Japanese Demonstrations of Students of American Financed Institutions" (a copy of which was apparently sent the Legation), the Department notes that Mr. Burke, following the receipt of a letter from the Japanese Consul General protesting against action by the Chinese students of Fukien Christian University, addressed a letter to the President of the University, who is a Chinese citizen, requesting that steps be taken to control the activities of the students. It seems to the Department that, rather than to have written to the President of the University, Mr. Burke should in the premises have replied to the Japanese Consul General, stating that the Fukien Christian University, although financed in part by American funds, thereby creating an American interest, is administered and controlled by the Chinese, and that as the question involved in this case was one of administration it would seem that complaints, if any, should be addressed to the administrative authorities.

In

793.94/2917

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

In this connection attention is invited to the Department's instructions No. 871 of May 23, 1928, No. 1402 of November 15, 1929, and No. 327 of December 8, 1930, which pertain to the question of jurisdiction over educational institutions under Chinese administration and control and to the question of the exercise by the Chinese authorities of jurisdiction over Chinese citizens enrolled in or connected with educational institutions, whether American or Chinese.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

W. R. Castle, Jr.

793.94/2917

A true copy of  
 the signed original  
*[Signature]*

FE:MMH:AT  
 12/19/31

~~FE~~  
*[Signature]*

*[Signature]*

DEC 21 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

December 3, 1931.

Foochow, October 30, No. 52.

On October 12 about 100 students of the Fukien Christian University paraded before the Japanese Consulate General shouting insulting remarks. The Japanese Consul General protested to the American Consulate.

The status of Fukien Christian University is typical of foreign financed institutions of learning in China. The campus is American property and the school is largely financed with American funds. There are Americans on the faculty, but none in the administration, and the school is actually under Chinese control.

This particular incident was of a minor sort, but it emphasizes the anomalous position of American-supported schools in China.

2  
EBT

No. 30

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Tientsin, China, October 21, 1931.

793. af  
SUBJECT:

Statements Relating to Bombing of  
Passenger Train on September 24,  
near Hsinluntien and Bombing of  
Chinchow on October 8.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON.

PM RECD  
NOV 25 31  
I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy, in  
triplicate, of my despatch No. 39 of this date, to  
the Legation at Peiping, on the above mentioned subject.

Respectfully yours,

*F. P. Lockhart*  
F. P. Lockhart,  
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

To Legation at Peiping, October 21, 1931.

800  
FPL/DA:w

Original and 2 copies to Department.

F/DEW

793.94/2918

NOV 3 1931

18

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 39

Enclosure No. <u>1</u> in <u>1</u>
No. <u>39</u> , Dated <u>Oct 21/31</u>
<u>Consul General</u>

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Tientsin, China, October 21, 1931.

SUBJECT: Statements Relating to Bombing  
of Passenger Train on September  
24, near Hsinluntien and Bombing  
of Chinchow on October 8.

The Honorable Nelson T. Johnson,  
American Minister,  
Peiping, China.

Sir:

1/ I have the honor to enclose herewith a mimeograph-  
ed statement entitled "An Indictement", now being  
circulated at Tientsin by Chu Hsin Hui, concerning the  
bombing of passenger train No. 102 between Masanchin  
and Hsinluntien, 30 kilometers west of Mukden, by a  
Japanese airplane on September 24. As will be observed  
some of the statements are in the form of affidavits  
and contain the version of eye witnesses.

2/ There is also enclosed a statement describing the  
bombing of Chinchow on October 8. Both pamphlets are  
illustrated and are being transmitted for such informa-  
tion as may be gleaned therefrom. It is realized that  
the Legation and the Department may already have in  
their possession copies of the two statements.


Respectfully yours,

F. P. Lockhart,  
American Consul General.

800  
FPL/DA:w

Enclosures:  
1/, and 2/, as noted.

Original and 2 copies to Legation.  
In triplicate to Department.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

A N N O U N C E M E N T

Ch u H s i n H u i

Tientsin

October 1931

## P R E F A C E

"Tokio, September 30. - The Chinese delegates' accusation to the League that a Japanese plane on Sept. 24th attacked a passenger train on the Peping-Mukden Railway is officially denied."

To the above news message broadcasted all over the world through the powerful and much respected Reuter's Agency, this little booklet owes its publication. A Collection of the original official reports, eye-witness accounts, and pictures of the pitiful victims of the most shocking murders ever committed by the uniformed agents of a civilized nation - this booklet was never meant for publication. Gruesome in details and offensive to the taste of gentle readers, the materials for this booklet were collected for the sole and only purpose of indicting in the ordinary court of justice a number of Japanese airmen who wantonly attacked a peaceful passenger train running through the territory of a friendly nation carrying five to six thousand innocent men, women, and children fleeing from the terrifying scene of their looted and burning homes for the only humble purpose of preserving the lives that were given to them by the mercies of God. Any government deserving its name in the estimate of the modern and civilized world, would readily bring those murderers to justice to vindicate the death of the innocent and to make amends for the sorrow and suffering of the living. But the Imperial Government of Japan does not. Instead, it has deliberately come out to the open and allied itself with those murderers by issuing an official denial with a view to whitewashing the dastardly acts of its blood-thirsty agents. As no ordinary criminal courts can take jurisdiction over a government, much less a government said to be in possession of all the destructive powers that modern science and invention can give, we are compelled to submit this case to the judgment of world's citizens. By scrutinizing the facts as assembled in this booklet, our very fair and just readers are left to form your own opinion. Perhaps in these days of world-wide economic crisis and general unrest, there is no human agency to bring these murderers and their wilful accomplice to the altar of justice and retribution. But the world must be acquainted with what actually happened, for death may not be vindicated but truth must not be smothered. And, in the end, truth will prevail.

C a n   l i e s   c o v e r   u p   M u r d e r s !



**KILLED**—Names unknown—Front view



**KILLED**—Names unknown—Bullet hole at the back of the head.



**KILLED**—LI FENG-NIEN, 27, native of Pei Chun, Liaoning  
 employed at the Liaoning Finance Bureau.  
 outlived by mother and wife.



**F. N LI'S MOTHER**—Aged 70



**THE WOUNDED**—Chang Lo-Wen (in black)  
 Chiao Chia-Wei (in white)



**BULLET HOLE**—On window glass of dining  
 car No. 248.



**BULLET HOLE**—On the steel exterior of third  
 class car No. 205—dented inward. Hole of the  
 wooden board interior is one inch lower, proving  
 that the bullet had entered in a downward direction.



- 1 -

WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED. On September 24th, 1931, at 11.45 a.m. when the P. N. R. Through Passenger Express Train No. 102 Up was running between Masanchia and Hsinluntien, at a distance of about 30 kilometres West of Mukden, a Japanese aeroplane opened fire into the train over-crowded with refugees from Mukden City. A large number of casualties resulted. Mr. J. G. Thomson, General Manager & Chief Accountant of the P. N. R. was on the train with his family and a number of foreign ladies. He made a report on this incident and also two wounded passengers who were carried to Tientsin for treatment at the Mackenzie Hospital of the London Mission. When the train arrived at Tientsin Central Station on the following afternoon a large number of foreign and Chinese newspaper men went to the station to examine the damage and the wounded. Dr. Brandt of the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung was also present. Third class car No. 205, on which the greatest number of casualties happened bears a bullet hole resulting from firing by the Japanese. It was examined by Messrs. J. G. Thomson, G. M. & C. A., W. O. Leitch, Engineer-in-Chief, and F. A. Jamieson, Works Superintendent, all of the P. N. R. The car is now under seal signed by these three gentlemen and locked up at the T.S.E. Station to serve as necessary evidence.

OFFICIAL REPORTS AND EYE-WITNESS ACCOUNTS.

1. Passages from a letter written by Mr. J. G. Thomson, General Manager & Chief Accountant of the P. N. R. addressed to B. T. B. Boothby, Esq., Shanghai, dated September 26, 1931, re shooting of Passenger Train 102 Up by Japanese Air-men on September 24, 1931, between Masanchia and Hsinluntien Stations on P. N. R.

"On my way down leaving Huangkatun about 11 a.m. on Thursday morning, we had proceeded less than an hour's journey, or about 34 kilometres, when our train, on which my service car was attached, was attacked by a Japanese aeroplane. Many bullets were fired into the train and the aeroplane itself began its ascent almost directly over the service car. At the next stop the situation was investigated and it was found that 3 people had been killed and 5 wounded (one of the wounded subsequently died). Various marks could be observed on the cars showing where the bullets had entered cars.

"I am to-day reporting to our Consul-General the incident of the Japanese aeroplane gun fire on train 102 on which I was travelling yesterday, as it endangered not only the lives of myself and my family, but the lives of some other ladies of German and Italian nationality who travelled with us in the service car as they could find no other accommodation on the train."

2. Official report by Conductor, etc. of Train 102 Up to the Superintendent of Transportation, P. N. R.

"To the Superintendent of Transportation,  
Head Office.

RE SHOOTING OF TRAIN 102 UP AND KILLING OF PASSENGERS  
BY JAPANESE AEROPLANE ON SEPTEMBER 24th, 1931.

"The undersigned were on duty on Train 102 Up on Sept. 24th. We had to stand on the roof of one of the cars owing to the immense crowd of refugees packed therein. When our train started out from Masanchia, we saw

- 2 -

a Japanese aeroplane (we knew it was Japanese, because it had the red sun insignia on its body and because the Japanese had occupied our aerodome at Mukden and seized all the planes therein) No.920 (some passengers said it was 290 but others said P20) flying in the same direction as our train. Then, it flew back and encircled our train firing a few shots. Suddenly it scooped down near our locomotive almost touching our car tops. At the same time, it swept the train with gun fire. Finally, it flew away in the Eastward direction.

"Upon our arrival at Hsinluntien, we examined our cars and saw one passenger killed on the platform of third class car No.205. His body was at once removed to the station. In all, there were 5 wounded on various cars, one at his hand, one at his left arm, one at his ribs, two at the legs, and one with a bullet breaking through his thigh. The last one died on car No.205 after our train had passed Tahushan and was moved off at Chintuitsu. According to several passengers and Driver Fu, a number of persons were seen to have fallen off the cars during the commotion.

"There is a bullet hole on the front end of car No.205 and another at the right hand side window in the rear of dining car No.248.

"We are not absolutely sure of the number of the aeroplane owing to the suddenness of the attack and resulting confusion.

"The confirmation of our report by long distance telephone, we respectfully submit this report in writing.

(Signed) Chang Kwei-Tuh,  
S.H.K. Conductor.

Tung Huei-Tung,  
S.H.K. Train Ticket  
Examiner.

September 25, 1931."

3. Signed affidavit by wounded passenger Chang-Lo-Wen.

"Undersigned, Chang Lo-Wen, aged 36, a native of Yang-Liu-Chin, and employed at Chief of Aids' Department of the Second Army.

"I travelled from Mukden on September 24, 1931, by Passenger Train 102 Up. As the cars were overcrowded, I had to stand on the platform of the third class car No.205. There were over thirty odd passengers, men, women and children, standing on the platform of the two connecting cars. Passenger Li Feng-Nien was standing besides myself; he had a wife and mother seated inside of the car. During a conversation with Mr. Li, I told him to get inside the car to keep his mother and wife company. He replied, the car was too crowded to get in. There was also an old gentleman, aged 50 or more, accompanied by a woman aged around 30 carrying a baby daughter of 2 to 3 years in her arms. Her two sons aged about 3 and 5 were standing beside her. The family all had Mukden accent. The sons were complaining about the sun heat and mother was comforting them.

- 3 -

"When our train left Huang-ku-tun, I saw two Japanese air squadrons, one flying South-westward and another flying directly West. One of the Westward aeroplanes, followed our train. It circled over our train three times only two or three feet above the car top. As soon as our train left Ma-san-chia, it fired over ten shots at the front of car No.205. The old man was hit first and dropped down from the car platform. The baby daughter slipped through the arms of the frightened woman. She also dropped onto the rail and was followed by her crying sons. The Japanese airman was firing from an angle to the right of the train. All persons of the car platform swung to the left. As a result, quite a number of persons on the left extreme side were crowded off the car platform. They must have perished as the train was going at top speed in order to escape from the air attack. Among those remaining on the platform, one passenger was shot at the back of his head, his face was covered with blood and he died almost instantaneously. Mr. Li was shot in his thigh. At once, he rushed to his mother and wife inside the car, in a fainting condition. I followed him, and seeing his head was dropping, I went to help the ladies to carry him up. As I raised my arm, I saw that my left hand sleeve was full of blood. On closer examination, I discovered that my left arm was shot through. Then, I felt a heated spot on my left-hand side rib. It was wounded.

"As our train stopped at Hsin-lun-tien, I got on to the locomotive for the sake of safety. On my way to Tientsin, I saw Japanese aeroplanes at Chu-liu-ho, Ta-hu-shan, Kow-pang-tze and Chinhsien, all returning from West. I was told that they dropped bombs at these places, and that at Chinhsien one of these aeroplanes wounded a soldier at the Eastern Barracks.

"There were no persons travelling on our train in military uniform.

"I saw Japanese soldiers between Hsin-lun-tien and Chu-liu-ho.

(Signed) Chang Lo Wen."

4. Signed affidavit by wounded passenger Chiao Chia-Wei.

"Undersigned, Chiao Chia-Wei, aged 23, native of Tungchow, a student mechanic in the Mukden Aeronautical School.

"On account of the disturbances at Mukden, I left Huang-ku-tun Station on morning of September 24, 1931, by train 102 Up. As the train was overcrowded with refugees, I had to climb up to the roof of third class car No.205. There were over ten persons including 1 lady and my servant. When our train left Huang-ku-tun Station, a Japanese aeroplane was sighted, flying after our train. It circled over our train three times. As soon as our train started from Ma-san-chia Station, it fired three shots at our locomotive. At once, I yelled out: "All lie down"! This plane is firing at us"! The plane, then, scooped down on us and opened fire at a very close range. I had paralyzing feeling on one of my fingers which bled copiously. The finger was hit.

"There wasn't any passenger on the train in military uniform.

(Signed) Chiao Chia-Wei."

JAPANESE EXPLANATION. The Reuter's Peking Agency cabled out on October 1st the following:

"With reference to the firing on the railway train No. 102 by Japanese airplane on September 24, the Japanese Legation spokesman to-day stated that the Japanese Military Authorities in Manchuria had wired the result of their investigation into the matter. According to their version, on the day in question a Japanese aeroplane went up at Simmintun and was flying South-westward, parallel to the Peking-Mukden Railway when it was fired upon by bandits hidden in a kaoliang field near the line. This is said to have occurred when the plane was 500 metres North of Shang-hokangze and about 15 kilometres Southwest of Simmintun. The aeroplane, the report says, "countered-attacked" and fired about ten rounds at the bandits who were about thirty in number. The plane then had some machine trouble and flew back to Simmintun. The pilot states that he did not notice that any damage had been done to the train, though apparently he admits that the train was in the vicinity."

THE REBUTTAL. The Reuter's rebutted that above message by continuing, "Travellers on the train both foreigners and Chinese, say that a good many shots were fired which they were convinced were directed at the train. At least two Chinese were killed and several wounded. Responsible foreigners on the train saw the aeroplane firing and saw one or more of the Chinese victims".

That the Japanese explanation is a farce can be shown if we remember that 15 kilometres south-west of Hsinmintun, which is itself 60 kilometres West of Mukden makes a total distance of 75 kilometres West of Mukden whereas the scene of the outrage was 30 kilometres West of Mukden. There could be no bandits in the question, real or imaginary!

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

INTRODUCING OUR JAPANESE FRIENDS  
Their "fair and friendly attitude" towards China  
their professed concern for the "common  
existence and prosperity of the  
two sister nations"  
their honor  
and "a local incident"  
THE BOMBING OF CHINCHOW

CHU HSIN HUI  
Tientsin  
October 1931

1

When the Japanese aeroplane fired at a Peking-Liaoning Railway passenger train on Sept. 24th killing two and wounding six passengers, Japan officially explains that the airmen in question were "counter-attacking" a group of Chinese bandits to the South-west of Hsinmin - about forty-five kilometres away from the scene of the murderous attack. A bit of very far-stretched imagination, indeed!

Since then, Japan has performed a number of similar acts and invariably she "explains".

On October 8th at 2.45 p.m., twelve days after the Japanese Government had issued an official statement assuring the world of its "fair and friendly attitude" towards China and exactly one week after Minister Yoshizawa had solemnly engaged Japan's honour to observe League of Nations' resolution to completely withdraw all the Japanese troops from the occupied zone in Manchuria, twelve Japanese aeroplanes visited Chinchow, a Railway Station 236 kilometres i.e. 146 miles West of Mukden, and dropped a great number of bombs, of which at least 30 exploded, killing 16 men and women and seriously wounding 12 including one Russian Professor of the local University, who subsequently succumbed to his wounds in the Railway Hospital.

The Railway Hospital, always flying two red cross flags, was not spared from the attack. Four bombs were dropped to the South-east and three to the North of the Hospital building, the nearest one being only twenty feet away.

We reprint, as below, original Japanese news paper reports and cable dispatches by important and neutral agencies as well as pictures taken on the spot by news paper correspondents who rushed to the scene to witness one of the most atrocious attack on humanity in modern times.

We need only add that not a single shot was fired at the planes by the Chinese. There are hundred and thousand souls in Chinchow to bear witness to that fact.

SPECIAL TO THE OSAMA MAINICHI (A JAPANESE PAPER PUBLISHED IN ENGLISH LANGUAGE).

Mukden, Oct. 9. - Eleven Japanese army planes, including seven from Mukden and from Changchun, which made an air raid of Chinchow yesterday to dislodge the headquarters of the Mukdenite army there, dropped 81 bombs and inflicted much damage to the barracks of the infantry, cavalry and the engineering corps, and the building occupied by the provisional Mukden Government at the place.

No damage was done to the railway station and the railway.

#### REUTER'S REPORT

Peking, Oct. 9. - Reuter's Mukden correspondent travelled down to Chinchow last evening and he has wired confirming previous reports of the Japanese air raid on that town.

He says that the bombs were "evidently aimed against the Government offices located in the Communications University."

- 2 -

Chinchow, Oct. 9. - Sixteen persons were killed and nine wounded in yesterday's bombardment, mostly railway workmen. The wounded include a Russian Professor. Government officials are safe.

The Chinese possessed no anti-aircraft guns. - Reuter.

#### JAPAN GAVE FOUR EXPLANATIONS

Reuter

1

Tokyo, October 8. - The Mukden correspondent of the Nichi Nichi Shinbun declared that the Japanese bombed Chinchow on the ground that the establishment of "a Manchurian Government" there was "detrimental to peace and order."

2

Nippon Dempo

Mukden, October 8. - The Japanese air corps that had reached a decision to essay an air raid on the Chinchow Government set out from Yingchow for the purpose of attacking Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang's detachment, and started bombardment at 2 o'clock in the afternoon. It was observed from the airplane that guns were drawn up at places along the Pei-Ning Railway, while student corps were receiving military training. Trenches were dug and open luggage cars have been prepared to a number of thirty trains. General Wang I-cheh's forces were advancing in several batches taking connection with the Fengtien Forces at Chinchow. The aeroplanes distributed posters saying that Chang Hsueh-liang in neglect of the fact that he is no more liked by the people of the North-eastern Four Provinces has established a provisional government. "Japan" refuses to acknowledge his administration and will take further forward moves with the object of destroying his basis.

3

Nippon Dempo

Tokyo, October 9. - The Tokyo Government with a view to forestalling the "demagogues" by China sent to Minister Yoshizawa by wire the detailed report yesterday afternoon relative to the air raid on Chinchow by the Japanese army, so that he might explain to the League of Nations and the Powers in time.

Following the result of an exchange of views between the Foreign and the Naval authorities, the Government has decided on interpreting the Chinchow affair in the following light:

The air raid on Chinchow by the Japanese army is an act of self-defence and of local incidence, which it was obliged to take from a point of the maintenance of peace and order. The Government does not find anything grave in it. Eight days before the incident, the Chinchow Government notified the Consular authorities in Mukden of the Powers other than Japan of the coming into being of the Government, which goes by the name of the Liaoning Government. Japan was excluded, because the Government was concocting disquieting intrigues, and this impression has apparently induced the Japanese army to resort to the raid of Chinchow.

- 3 -

4

Reuter

Tokyo, October 9. - While an explanation of the Chinchow bombing may be understood from the standpoint of military necessity, it is generally considered here amongst foreign observers that the Government has been placed in an embarrassing position, but official circles, though plainly worried as to the probable reaction abroad, attempt to conceal their concern and profess to feel satisfied with the explanation that the action was unavoidable.

In making a statement with regard to the bombing of Chinchow the War Office denies the report that the planes scattered pamphlets denouncing Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang. \*\*\*

A Mukden message to Tokyo says that a Japanese staff officer, while denying that any Japanese land forces had yet been despatched to Chinchow, stated that their air craft while reconnoitring over Chinchow were fired upon by Chinese, whereupon they dropped about 70 bombs, causing considerable damage to military establishments, but the staff officer asserted that care was taken not to damage civil institutions.

#### UNITED PRESS ACCUSES

United Press

Tokyo, Oct. 13. - A study of Japanese newspapers shows that the aerial attack upon Chinchow, the temporary capital of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, on October 8, was deliberately planned in advance, and that Japanese military plans for the attack were even communicated to the Japanese correspondents in Mukden.

The Osaka Mainichi, one of the two leading newspapers in Japan, printed a dispatch from its Mukden correspondent, dated October 8, which said: "The Japanese forces in Manchuria have decided to attack Chinchow, the seat of the provisional Mukden Government on the Peking-Mukden Railway, for the reason that Chinchow is the headquarters of the Mukdenite forces for disturbing the peace of the South Manchuria Railway territory."

#### CHINESE MAILING

"According to this decision, Japanese army planes flew to Chinchow at noon to-day and distributed by air leaflets warning the Chinese there that the Japanese forces are going to frustrate the Chinchow government to undermine General Chang Hsueh-liang's influence there."

#### AN APPEAL

The following telegram was sent by the foreign and Chinese members of the Chinchow London Mission, Catholic Church, Young Men's Christian Association, Commercial, Agricultural and Manufacturers' Associations, addressed to Marshals Chiang Kai-shek and Chang Hsueh-liang, to be transmitted to the League of Nations Council and all foreign legations and Consulates in China:

"We were very much relieved by the resolution passed by the League of Nations Council that Japan would withdraw all its troops from the occupied zone in Manchuria before October 14th in order to restore the status quo on September 18th."



- 4 -

"Very unexpectedly, twelve Japanese aroplanes flew over our city at 2 p.m. October 8th and dropped a great number of bombs killing 16 men and women and seriously wounding 12 including one Russian teacher. Incalculable damages were done to homes, shops, railway rolling stock, and telegraph wires. Many cattles were killed. The scene of death and destruction was terrible beyond description.

"Chinchow is located 500 Chinese li from Mukden City. Since the Manchurian crisis arose, our city authorities escorted all the Japanese residents here to Mukden, for which our magistrate received a letter of thanks from the Japanese Consulate-General.


"This proves the fact that our city bears no animosity towards the Japanese people or Army. Such inhumane action taken during the time for the withdrawal of troops is absolutely incomprehensible. The lives of our one hundred thousand men, women, and children are now in jeopardy. We appeal to the Governments of all nations to urge the Japanese authorities to stop further air raids on our city."

\*\*\* For once, the War Office. told the truth, as apparently there were no pamphlets dropped from these twelve planes; but, three days after on October 11th at 10.30 a.m. three Japanese aeroplanes revisited Chinchow and distributed from air many handbills. A facimile is reproduced in the pictorial section.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



Five railway men killed.




The dead railway men's quarters in front of which they were killed.




Lun Chao-chien, a railway pump man.

CHINCHOW STATION AND NEIGHBOURHOOD


.. Denote approximately where  
 the bombs struck



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



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The dead railway men's quarters in front of which they were killed.




Lun Chao-chien, a railway pump man.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CHINGCHOW STATION AND NEIGHBOURHOOD

.. Denote approximately where  
 the bombs struck



793.94/2918  
 N

188

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

NS

GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

FROM Dated November 27, 1931

Rec'd 9:45 am  
Division of

Secretary of State  
Washington

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.I.

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
NOV 27 1931

Department of State

PRIORITY

1015, November 27, 7 p.m.

American Consul General at Tientsin just telephoned that Chinese authorities have suggested to Foreign Consuls whose governments have troops stationed in Tientsin that a considerable area north of Japanese concession be policed by foreign forces as the Japanese have demanded the withdrawal of Chinese police from there. The question is to be discussed by consular body tomorrow.

Repeated to Nanking.

For the Minister

HPD

ENGERT

F/DEW

793.9442919

DEC 21 1931

FILED

793-94  
note  
893-0146  
893-102T

MET

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

Tientsin via N.R.

Dated November 27, 1931

Rec'd 9:40 a.m.

COPIES SENT TO  
D.N.I. AND M.I.D.

FROM

Secretary of State,

Washington

PRIORITY.

November 27, 7 p.m.

The following telegram has been sent to the  
Legation:

"November 17, 6 p.m.

The Japanese commandant made the following demands  
on chairman of the Hopei Provincial Government today:


One. That all shooting by Chinese police touring  
Japanese concession area be stopped at once.

Two. That all Chinese soldiers be immediately  
withdrawn to 20 li zone.

Three. That all police armed guards be withdrawn  
to Hopei north of the river.

Four. That all troop movement in Hopei province  
either by "armed or plain clothes forces" be immediately  
stopped.

Five. That all anti-Japanese propaganda and  
demonstrations



F/DEW

793.94/2920

DEC 21 1931

MET

2-Tientsin via N.R., November 27,  
1931

demonstrations be stopped at once.

General Wang has replied to the first demand that orders have already been given to stop the shooting but that further drastic orders would be given to this end at once. With reference to item two General Wang replied that orders have already been issued for withdrawal of troops to 20 li zone. To item three the General stated that to withdraw all police guards north of the river would leave a large area unprotected but that he would withdraw them as soon as some arrangement could be made to afford adequate protection. With regard to item four the General stated that he would proceed to stop the movement of all troops under his command but that he did not have authority over all troops in Hopei Province. As regards item five General Wang stated that drastic orders have already been issued to stop anti-Japanese propaganda and demonstrations but that he will renew the orders.

Desultory firing has continued throughout the  
day



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

3-Tientsin via N.R., November 27, .  
1931.

day in the region of Nankai middle school. Further  
trouble is expected during the night. Repeated to  
the Department and Nanking".

LOCKHART

CSB

MP

Nanking

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone

Dated November 27, 1931

Rec'd 10:05 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

November 27, 4 p.m.

Your 121, November 25, 5 p.m., to Nanking.

One. I communicated the facts orally to Dr.


Koo this morning. Koo thanked me for this information.

Two. Koo reverted to his statement to the effect that they must insist that a time limit be placed upon the evacuation by Japan of Japanese troops in Manchuria. He said that less than this the Chinese Government could not accept as public opinion in China was so stirred up on the subject that no government could stand that agreed to less.

Three. Sir Miles told me in confidence today that in a conversation which he had with Koo yesterday the latter in discussing question of necessity for a time limit to evacuation suggested following as a possible formula that might be used for the purpose of saving the situation. Formula was:

(A). Some fixed period, naturally

as



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DEC 3 1931

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743-94

MP

2-From Nanking, Nov.27, 1931

as short as possible but open to discussion. (B).  
It is to be left to Committee of Inquiry to decide whether measures for the protection of life and property in Manchuria are adequate. If commission decides measures are inadequate they could recommend other steps, that, they could recommend postponement of evacuation.

Four. I feel that this question is a very serious one from the point of view of China for the very existence of Government I am convinced depends upon something definite being done in regard to time Japanese troops remain in occupied territory.


Five. Koo informed me in regard to Chinchow that Chinese Government appreciated friendly suggestion of the Secretary but that his Government felt that in view of attitude of Japanese they could not abandon Chinchow without some guarantee that Japanese would not occupy that area. He stated that Chinese troops now at Chinchow were under orders to refrain from any activities of a provocative character but added that if attacked they would have to resist.

JOHNSON


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186

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



CONFIDENTIAL  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY



November 22, 1931.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON  
AND THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR, MR. KATSUJI DEBUCHI, AT  
WOODLEY.

Manchuria.

793.94

I sent for the Japanese Ambassador to come to my house. When he called I impressed upon him two points. I first told him that the proposed neutral commission for investigation which Japan had suggested, and which the Council of the League of Nations was now discussing, would be futile without provision for a cessation of hostilities. I told him I had been thinking over and studying myself possible provisions for such a cessation of hostilities which would yet leave sufficient flexibility of action of Japanese commanders so that they would be able to protect their nationals against bandit activities and I was satisfied that a provision could be drawn. I said that I had drafted one for practice, but I did not care to suggest any to anybody as the negotiations were now going on in Paris. I told him further that the recent activities of the Japanese troops had demonstrated that no Japanese commander in Manchuria, of no matter how small a garrison, had any reason for apprehension of a successful attack against him by any of the Chinese troops;

F/DEW

793.94/2922

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 2 -

troops; that the Chinese troops had demonstrated their inferiority in combat with even the smallest Japanese forces; that under these circumstances there was no need whatever for the offensive defense upon which the Japanese claimed to rely, and there could be no excuse which would justify a Japanese force in making an offensive attack upon any Chinese troops in Manchuria - they could quite safely await an attack by such Chinese forces. He acquiesced in what I said, pointing out that at Tsitsihar apparently less than 2,000 Japanese troops had been sufficient to destroy an army of 30,000 Chinese. ?

In the second place, I said that under these circumstances if an attack was made by the Japanese forces upon Chinchow there could be no justification or excuse for it, and it would have to be regarded as an aggressive act. I said I had read press statements indicating that such an attack might be in contemplation and I was very apprehensive about it; that if it took place, I should regard it as rendering futile any further efforts at conciliation. He told me he would at once send my views to Baron Shidehara. X  
3?

HLS.

8 HLS:HR

1895

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

**CONFIDENTIAL**

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

NOV 27 1931

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
NOV 23 1931  
Department of State

November 23, 1931.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR,  
MR. PAUL CLAUDEL.

Manchuria.

The French Ambassador called and translated to me a telegram he had received from his Foreign Office. It was in substance to the effect that the French and the British had decided to send representatives to Chinchow as observers (the French representation consisting of M. Lepis, who was Consul at one of their consulates in that neighborhood, and a Commandant F., whose name I did not catch), and that M. Briand would appreciate it if we would send our observers as a demonstration of common action in that neighborhood, which might impress the Japanese.

The Ambassador then told me that the Japanese had proposed a Commission of Study (investigation) to inform the Council as to the problems which existed between China and Japan in respect to Manchuria and that this commission was to have no mandate to intervene in negotiations nor to supervise military action; that Sze had acceded in principle but had renewed his request for evacuation; and that other members of the Council had sought to restrict the activities of the Commission.

As

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DEC 1 1931

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 2 -



As to the first proposition, I told the Ambassador I was a little confused by the different suggestions made to me to send observers to Manchuria; that the Chinese had invited us to send observers of Japanese occupation and we had said we would do so as soon as such request was agreed to by both sides and therefore the evacuation became a practical and imminent possibility. The Ambassador said this was not his present request; that his was for representatives to go to the points of imminent danger in Manchuria so as to observe the respective merits of the two sides and thus to serve as observers of facts. He said he also thought that the presence there of observers from France, Britain and America, would tend to influence considerably the Japanese and Chinese.

HLS.

S HLS:HHR

16.

AMBASSADE  
DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE  
AUX ÉTATS-UNIS



This is a summary of a telegram received by Mr. Briand from the French Minister in China.



The British Minister had not yet received his instructions yesterday. Owing to urgency, however, we have decided to send immediately observers in the region of Chin Chow. - Shankai Kwan which seems to be the spot where hostilities are to be feared. The French and English observers have been instructed to coordinate their action. Our Consul in Harbin and our military attaché will act as observers in the region of Tsitsihar-Ankai with the Consul General for Great Britain and the British assistant military attaché./.

F. W. 793.94/2923

To be added an add. memorie &  
my interview with Claudet today



AMBASSADE  
DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE  
AUX ÉTATS-UNIS



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F. W. 793.94/2923

To be added an order memorie &  
my interview with Claudel today

*Copy for the Department of State  
for the files of the Commercial Office*

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE

can Consulate, Dairen, Manchuria, November 25, 1931.

CONFIDENTIAL

The Honorable

W. Cameron Forbes,  
American Ambassador,  
Tokyo, Japan.

Sir:

Referring to my telegram of the 15th instant, in regard to the movements of the ex-Emperor of China, I have the honor to quote herewith a translation of an announcement made by the Kwantung Government as rendered by the MANCHURIAN DAILY NEWS of November 24, 1931.

"Nov. 22:-

Pu-yi, ex-Emperor of China residing in the Japanese Concession, Tientsin, disappeared on Nov. 10, feeling himself in personal danger on the outbreak of the Tientsin disturbances. He was reported to have landed at Yingkou on Nov. 13, and a request was sent to Kwantung Government for protection. This request was complied with since its rejection might have exposed him to constant personal danger, and thus the Young ex-Emperor has placed himself under Japanese protection.

By the settled policy of Kwantung Government, it is averse to his getting dragged into any political entanglements and the Kwantung Police are taking every care to keep him from outside communication."


The Kwantung Government is maintaining the strictest secrecy concerning his present whereabouts. He is variously reported as being in Port Arthur, Mukden, and at the Tangkangtzu hot springs near Anshan.

I have perhaps attached undue importance to the movements of the ex-Emperor, but it is difficult to

believe

F/DEW

793.94/2923 1/2



- 2 -

believe that they are without political significance.

The Tientsin papers of the 4th instant carried the report that Colonel Doihara, the stormy petrel of the Japanese General Staff in Manchuria and Provisional Mayor of Mukden after the occupation of the city by the Japanese Army, had arrived in Tientsin for the purpose of conducting the ex-Emperor back to Mukden to head an Imperial Government. They added that Chinese press representatives who had sought to interview the young Emperor were refused admittance by Japanese police and plain-clothes men, and that the Emperor was a virtual prisoner in his residence in the Japanese Concession. On the following day the Japanese Consul General branded these reports as false, and even denied the presence of Colonel Doihara in Tientsin. Rioting, reported to the League of Nations by the Chinese delegates as having been engineered by the Japanese military, broke out in Tientsin on the 9th, and on the 10th the ex-Emperor "disappeared". On the 13th the Japanese Consul General announced that the Emperor, having received gifts concealing live bombs and been otherwise threatened, and feeling insecure on account of the rioting, had fled to an unknown destination.

193.94/29234

The undeniable fact that emerges from the newspaper reports and official announcements regarding the ex-Emperor is that he has become a ward of Japan, very likely by coercion. His adoption at this time, when Japan is relentlessly destroying every vestige of Chinese authority in the Northeastern Provinces and fostering a separatist movement, cannot be regarded without

some

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

some suspicion.

Respectfully yours,

Wm. R. Langdon,  
American Consul.

800  
WRL:L

Two copies to the Department.  
Copy to Legation, Peking.  
Copy to Consulate General, Tokyo.  
Copy to Consulate General, Mukden.

A true copy of  
the signed original  
aml

140

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HS

GRAY

FROM

Nanking

Dated November 27, 1931

Rec'd 11:30 p.m.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

NOV 27 1931

Department of State

Secretary of State

Washington

November 27, 4 p.m.

793-94

The following supplements my November 26, 5 p.m., reporting the statement made by Koo: regarding Chinchow Koo said that information received by the Chinese Government led the government to believe that preparations for an attack were being carried on by the Japanese but that the attack would be deferred until the conclusion of the Council meeting in order that Japan might be able to induce the delegates to pass a mild resolution of the sort proposed by the Italians. He said that the Chinese Government could not understand how General Dawes and the Council delegates could be misled regarding the futility of a general assurance from Japan that troops would be withdrawn, previous assurances of the sort accepted in the resolutions of September 30 and October 24 having been flagrantly violating. To the Chinese Government the issue seemed quite plain. The action of Japan in sending troops to occupy regions in Manchuria was either right or wrong. If the League believed it to have been wrong a clear

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793.94/2924

FILED

DEC 5 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

HS

2- from Nanking, November 27, 1931

clear cut denunciation should issue from the Council; if right the Council should say so in which case China would know where she stood. Koo said Chinese popular feeling now demanded affirmative action for recovery of occupied regions either in the form of time limit set by the Council for evacuation or as alternative declaration of war by the Chinese Government. Koo seemed very despondent.

WSB

JOHNSON

1904

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Lutz NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
 PREPARING OFFICE  
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect  
 Charge Department  
 OR

Charge to  
 \$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138  
 TO BE TRANSMITTED  
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
 PLAIN

Washington,

November 27, 1931.

AMEMBASSY,

PARIS (France) NOV 27 31

FOR AMBASSADOR DAWES.

CONFIDENTIAL.

One. A telegram to the Department from the American Minister at Nanking under date November 26/2911 reads in part as follows: Doctor Koo QUOTE [stated that it was very difficult for the Government to withdraw its troops from Chinchow in the face of the present attitude of the people. He called attention to the fact that Nanking at this very time is full of thousands of students from Shanghai, Hangchow and other places and that others are coming, all demanding that the President sign an undertaking to go north and to remain there until occupied territory has been recovered. He referred also to the unwillingness of the League to put a time upon the evacuation of Japanese troops from Manchuria and stated that this was a demand coming to the Government from all sides here in China and that to agree to less would involve great difficulties here. He again expressed himself as much worried over the movement for an independent government in Manchuria which he stated was gaining ground] UNQUOTE.

Two. A telegram from the same source under date

Enciphered by .....

November 27

Sent by operator ..... M., ....., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

793.94/2924

743.94/2924  
 604

1 1905

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
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TELEGRAM SENT

1-138  
TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

- 2 -

November 27/<sup>2924</sup> reads in part as follows: QUOTE Regarding Chinchow, Koo said that information received by the Chinese Government led the government to believe that preparations for an attack were being carried on by the Japanese but that the attack would be deferred until the conclusion of the Council meeting in order that Japan might be able to induce the delegates to pass a mild resolution of the sort proposed by the Italians. UNQUOTE. He said that the Chinese Government could not understand how Paris could be misled regarding QUOTE the futility of a general assurance from Japan that troops would be withdrawn, previous assurances of the sort accepted in the resolutions of September 30 and October 24 having been flagrantly violated. To the Chinese Government the issue seemed quite plain. The action of Japan in sending troops to occupy regions in Manchuria was either right or wrong. If the League believed it to have been wrong a clear cut denunciation should issue from the Council; if right the Council should say so in which case China would know where she stood. Koo said Chinese popular feeling now demanded affirmative action for recovery of occupied regions either in the form of time limit set by the Council

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....



1 1906

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect  
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OR  
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TELEGRAM SENT

1-138  
TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

- 3 -

Council for evacuation or as alternative declaration of  
war by the Chinese Government. Koo seemed very despondent  
UNQUOTE.

*Stinson*  
*SKP*

FE: SKH: REK

*RM*  
FE

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1969 1-138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE UNDER SECRETARY  
NOV 20 1931  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

793-24  
Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
NOV 21 1931  
Department of State

1861 08 AM  
DIVISION OF STATE

Forwarded by Mr. Yen to  
Mr. Gules, Nov 19, 1931  
Rm  
DER

TELEGRAM FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AT NANKING  
DATED NOVEMBER 19, 1931.

RECEIVED

(Received Nov. 19, at 4 A.M.)

NOV 19 1931

A fierce attack opened yesterday morning by a large Japanese army on General Ma's troops north of Tahsing, Heilungkiang, the Japanese using heavy artillery, tanks and aeroplanes. Towards night General Ma's men retreated northward Angangchi station, ten miles from Tsitsihar, fighting still continuing. The Japanese determination to seize Tsitsihar is announced in handbills dropped from the Japanese planes flying over the provincial capital.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

F/DEW  
793.94/2925

Chinese Legation,  
Washington, November 19, 1931.

NOV 22 1931

17  
793.94  
(NOT FOR THE PRESS)  
(FOR DEPARTMENTAL USE ONLY)

Department of State  
Division of Current Information

MEMORANDUM OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE, MONDAY, NOVEMBER 16, 1931

At the press conference this morning Secretary Stimson announced the release of a despatch from Tientsin concerning the situation there. Mr. Stimson also announced the release of another volume of Dr. Miller's Treaty Series.

SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT

Asked if there was anything he could say about the situation in Manchuria, the Secretary replied in the negative. A correspondent then asked if any reports had been received from Ambassador Dawes concerning events in Paris. In reply, Mr. Stimson said he had received some reports from General Dawes but that he did not care to give them out. A correspondent asked if the official advices indicate that a battle is in progress around the Nonni River Bridge. The Secretary replied in the negative. A correspondent asked if the trend of the reports from Ambassador Dawes was hopeful. He was informed in reply that the constant repetition of the word "hopeful" or the constant repetition of statements of "optimism" would produce silly results after a time and that he would not, therefore, comment any further along that line. A correspondent said he realized that in the present situation the Secretary might find it inexpedient to talk for ATTRIBUTION. On the other hand, the United States is taking a very definite part in the negotiations in Paris and it would be helpful, the correspondent said, if the Secretary would discuss the situation FOR BACKGROUND purposes. Mr. Stimson, in reply, said he had done that as much as he could. In fact, he has done it very fully and will continue doing it wherever it is possible and proper to do so. Asked if Ambassador Dawes will sit in the meetings of the Council of the League, the Secretary said he had not done so up to the present. The correspondent then asked if General Dawes has authority to sit

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
NOV 25

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793.94/2926

1931.12.18-ADN

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

in the meetings. He was informed that it has been customary at all international conferences which the Secretary has attended to carry on most of the work at private meetings rather than at public sessions. The Secretary then added that he had given the correspondents a statement regarding Ambassador Dawes' authority in Paris and that he did not care further to discuss it.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT

The Secretary then said that some of the morning News-  
papers had carried a story which required correction. Mr.


Stimson then made the following statement, which may be quoted:

"I want to correct certain erroneous statements  
which have appeared lately in the press.

"It is not true that this Government has changed  
in any way the attitude on the Manchurian situation  
which it has held from the first.

"The American Government has not proposed any  
terms of settlement either to Japan or to China, has  
not been approached by either Government on the sub-  
ject of terms which it might approve, and has made no  
commitments, either express or implied, to either of  
the disputants.

"This Government has consistently urged and is  
continuing to urge that only peaceful means and not  
military pressure shall be used in the settlement of  
the dispute between China and Japan regarding Manchuria.  
It understands that this is the essence of the position  
taken by the nations represented on the Council of the  
League of Nations at Paris. This Government earnestly  
hopes that the negotiations now going on in Paris will  
find a way which will lead to a settlement of the dif-  
ficulty in accordance with these principles."



Press Release  
11/18/31

F/DEW 793.94/2927

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1931.12.18

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
-4-

ARMAMENTS

A correspondent observed that press reports indicated that Mr. Fletcher would head the American delegation to the General Disarmament Conference at Geneva in February. He was informed in reply that the selection of the delegation was in the hands of the President and that any information pertaining thereto must come from the President.

M. J. McDermott.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



(NOT FOR THE PRESS)  
(FOR DEPARTMENTAL USE ONLY)  
Department of State  
Division of Current Information

MEMORANDUM OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE, THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 1931  
SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT

At the press conference this morning a correspondent asked if Under Secretary Castle would give a brief outline of the military situation in Manchuria as the Department knows it from official despatches. The Under Secretary replied in the negative and added that, while the Department is working on the problem and is watching the situation closely, the Secretary asked him to say that the Manchurian situation was one which should not be discussed today. We are working along as well as we can and it is the kind of situation where the Secretary does not want any discussion whatever with the press today on that subject. A correspondent then asked if the Department was still optimistic regarding the outcome of the situation. Mr. Castle, in reply, reiterated that the Secretary does not want any discussion of that subject today.

A correspondent then asked if the Under Secretary would discuss the abstract question of war and if he would tell the correspondents when war actually begins. The Under Secretary declined with thanks.


A correspondent observed that according to a despatch from Paris Ambassador Dawes said it was high time to step lively in this matter and cooperate with the League of Nations and take strong action. He was informed, in reply, that we have heard nothing from Ambassador Dawes along those lines. The correspondent added that the despatch from Paris this morning said that General Dawes had talked with Dr. Sze and that it was later reported that the United States was ready to join in a concerted international move to have Japan withdraw its troops. The despatch added that all Ambassador Dawes said was, "Things are moving fast." Mr. Castle, in reply, said that he had not heard anything about the talk between General Dawes and Dr. Sze.

F/DEW 793.94/2928

1381.26 NOV 22 1931

-2-

Another correspondent said that a despatch from Tokyo this morning said that the Japanese Government had notified the Russian Government not to send troops into Manchuria. Mr. Castle, in reply, said that the Department had not received any despatches pertaining thereto. Asked if the correspondents might assume that Secretary Stimson is in touch with Ambassador Dawes by telephone, the Under Secretary said they had not conversed by telephone for a day or two, but that it was quite possible that General Dawes might ring up if he had something important to say.

According to another correspondent, a press despatch from Paris this morning said that M. Briand called on Ambassador Dawes and asked him to sit in the meetings of the Council of the League. Mr. Castle replied that we had heard absolutely nothing of that. No doubt M. Briand and General Dawes talked with each other, but ~~there has been~~ no suggestion about sitting in the meetings of the Council. 



1 1914  
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR

Charge to  
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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED

CONFIDENTIAL CODE

NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE

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245  
AMEMBASSY

NOV 27 31

TOKYO (JAPAN).

CONFIDENTIAL FOR FORBES FROM STIMSON

NOV 27 1931

2 pm

You will please call on the Foreign Minister and  
after reading him the following message leave a copy with  
him.

(104) QUOTE I have been much <sup>concerned</sup> ~~astonished~~ to learn from the  
President of the Council of the League of Nations that  
Mr. Yoshizawa called upon him Thursday and left an aide  
memoire regarding the very serious situation around Chin-  
chow and the necessity of immediate steps to obviate a  
collision.

Your Excellency will remember that on November 24th  
in response to my representations through Ambassador Forbes  
you assured me, with the concurrence of the Minister of War  
and the Chief of Staff that there would be no movement of  
Japanese troops in the direction of Chinchow and informed  
me that orders to that effect had been given to the  
Japanese troops. In reliance upon this assurance I have  
urged conciliatory steps upon the Chinese Government and an  
acceptance

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ....., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1919 1-138

793.94/2928A

Confidential File

1-1915

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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Collect  
Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
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Department of State

Washington,

- 2 -

acceptance of the proposal of the Council of the League of Nations, which proposal was in part based upon a proposition of the Japanese Government. Inasmuch as according to Mr. Yoshizawa's statement to M. Briand there are only some twenty thousand Chinese troops in the Chinchow district and north of the Great Wall, and inasmuch as Chinchow is substantially 120 miles by rail from the South Manchuria Railway at Mukden, I am quite unable to see how there can be any serious danger to that railway or any serious danger of a clash between Chinese and Japanese troops unless ~~that~~ the latter troops should fail to observe the orders which Your Excellency assured me had been given. UNQUOTE <sup>(End Quote)</sup> As I dictate this cable a press report is brought to me that Japanese troops have already advanced as far as Kowpangtze. If this report is confirmed by the information which you have in Tokyo, you will please tell Shidehara that I am astonished at this information and totally unable to reconcile it with the assurances which he gave me on November 24, and should like to be informed as promptly as possible of the real facts of the situation.

*Stimson*

Enciphered by ATK:MA

Sent by operator M., 19

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

GRAY

PARIS

Dated November 27, 1931

Rec'd 7:18 p.m.

MAIL

Secretary of State

Washington

813, November 27, 9 p.m.



FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES

Following report from Sweetser:

"Monsieur Briand when asked privately today his opinion of the effect of the American announcement said it had come just at the right moment. It had been, he added, decisive.

At the meeting of the twelve members of the Council other than the representatives of China and Japan, Briand read the Chinese note on Chinchow distributed this morning. Cecil said he had telegraphed his government not only urging that observers be sent as had indeed already been done but suggesting also that they cooperate with French, Italian, American, or other observers who might be there. He then distributed the following note

'The British delegate has inquired of His Majesty's Government whether it would be possible to instruct His Majesty's Minister in Nanking to discuss with his colleagues arrangements for a regular concerted organization of



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FILED

DEC 5 1931

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note  
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mam

2- #813, from Paris, November 27,  
1931

of observers with close liaison between the different  
nationalities and collation of reports and with suffi-  
cient observers held in readiness to proceed to locali-  
ties which may be indicated as danger points.

(END SECTION ONE)

SHAW

FW

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

MAH

GREEN

PARIS

Dated November 27, 1931

Rec'd 7:35 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

813, November 27, 9 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

It seems essential that in case of need concerted action should be taken as rapidly as possible and the British delegate ventures to suggest to his colleagues that they might propose to request their governments to send similar instructions'.

Cecil estimated there were already nine observers in Chinchow: two British, two French, two Italian, one American, one German and one Spaniard. Since they had arrived, Briand remarked, the character of the news seemed to have changed; there were not so many alarmist reports as constantly appeared before. Both he and Cecil, however, expressed disquietude on the possibilities in that region; it is evident the Council is watching it with alarm lest the diplomatic settlement which Briand again today thought was close at hand be made impossible. The question of sending troops, however, seemed even less likely today with Cecil's statement that he imagined this might present considerable military difficulty.

mam

2- #813, section two, from Paris,  
November 27, 1931

difficulty.

Briand reported optimistically but not conclusively on his conversation with Sze this morning. The Chinese representative, he said, had not been very precise; his government was under very heavy pressure; he must endeavor to have some kind of satisfaction for his public opinion; he again stressed the need of some kind of delay regarding evacuation. Briand showed how difficult it was to fix a delay in the circumstances and stressed the fact that

(END SECTION TWO)

SHAW

FW

### TELEGRAM RECEIVED

fw

Gray and green.

FROM

Paris,

Dated Nov 27, 1931,

Recd 8.36 pm.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

813, November 27, 9 pm SECTION THREE.

the commission would give a good deal of elasticity to the situation. He urged that the commission would be of enormous advantage to China in that it would establish a real international stake in China's situation and provide for an actual method for making operative the Nine Power Pact, especially with its phrase as to "administrative" integrity. After all, he said, China's present situation is vague, obscure, ill and, as shown by the emergence of the famous fundamental points, which it had since been one of the successes of the present negotiations to push into the background. He thought it an enormous gain that Japan had announced it had no territorial or other ambitions and felt that if this gain could be solidified it would be very important to the whole future of the Far East. Indeed, he thought that the adhesion given by the United States to the Council proposals was due to its preoccupations from the very first moment lest Chinese territorial integrity be

Page two No 813 SECTION THREE from Paris.

be endangered. This would also of course have involved Article X.

Briand said he had told Sze that it might be possible to find some kind of formula which would help him either by connecting evacuation with the commission or by giving the commission instructions in this sense. He agreed strongly with a suggestion by Fotitch that the Council must continue to keep the matter within its own hands and not allow the creation of the commission to give the impression that it has given it no discretion. Cecil hoped that something definite of this sort might be put into the President's statement. In connection with the general public interest in the matter, Briand again expressed his surprise at the very large number of telegrams he had received from all parts of the world. These telegrams showed that public opinion was widely aroused but that at the same time it realized the complexity of the situation. The commission idea had been particularly well received; it was recognized as capable of solving many difficulties.

The drafting committee will meet tomorrow morning to consider Sze's suggested changes." END MESSAGE.

SHAW

FW



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MP

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
 NOV 30 1931  
 DIVISION OF  
 WESTERN AFFAIRS  
 FROM Dated November 27, 1931  
 Rec'd 2:35 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
 Washington.

811, November 27, 5 p.m.

FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES

Following report is from Sweetzer:

"Sze called on Briand this noon to again urge the fixation of an actual date for evacuation even if that date had to be conditional. He stressed the necessity of this for Chinese opinion and some discussion ensued as to whether any method could be found for giving satisfaction. One suggestion now being considered is that the President of the Council in his declaration after the adoption of the report might express the hope that Japanese troops would be withdrawn by the time the Commission arrived. Should, however, the question of security not have been satisfactorily settled by then, the Commission would naturally consider this question first of all. It was pointed out to Dr. Sze that as the whole emphasis of the Council's resolution would be placed on evacuation it would be natural for the Commission to begin its work in Manchuria and in connection with that subject

F/DEW

793.94/2930

FILED

DEC 5 1931

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MP

2- #811, From Paris, Nov.27, 1931

subject.

Sze also expressed anxiety regarding the situation at Chinchow and presented a telegram from his government that

(END SECTION ONE)

SHAW

WSB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAM

FROM

GREEN

PARIS

Dated November 27, 1931

Rec'd 5:35 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

811; November 27, 5 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

An imminent attack was feared and that small neutral detachments, if sent by only one member of the Council, seemed to be essential. Briand assured him that the Council members were giving very serious consideration to the Chinchow situation and informed him that the British and French representatives had last night sent telegrams in accordance with the form suggested yesterday. He also said that Shidehara had told the French Ambassador in Tokyo that after consultation with the Minister of War, strict orders had been given to the Japanese commanders in the field not to attack Chinchow.

Sze's letter to the Secretary-General mentioned above was as follows:

'I have been instructed to bring to your immediate attention the following telegram which I have just received from my government

"An imminent attack on Chinchow is feared in view of the information just received from the highest and most

NAM

2-#811, section two, from Paris,  
November 27, 1935

most reliable sources of a neutral power. The position at Chinchow justifies the most serious apprehensions and may give rise to grave events at any moment. We are informed that the reports from British observers show that there has been no concentration of Chinese troops nor any troop movements from within the Great Wall. In view of the constant allegations by the Japanese to the contrary it is urgent and essential that this information should be published. The whole work of suppressing bandits will be done by the Chinese police so that there would be no danger of complications for neutral detachments. We consider that such detachments should be sent even if by only one member of the Council to see that a neutral zone is respected and that such a zone should be established with all possible speed by neutral observers. Please lay these facts before the Council as a matter imperatively requiring immediate action in view of the alarming situation".

I venture to suggest in the light of the facts revealed by this message that even the instructions given to the neutral observers on the spot may not suffice to avert a catastrophe unless the observers, if in their judgment the local situation so required, could have at their disposal small neutral detachments to organize  
and

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

mam

3- #811, section two, from Paris,  
November 27, 1931

and supervise the neutral zone effectively.

I should be grateful if you would circulate this  
letter to the President and members of the Council other  
than the representatives of the parties".

(END MESSAGE)

SHAW

FW

1 152

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JS  
**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be- PARIS  
fore being communicated  
to anyone.

Dated November 27, 1931  
FROM  
Rec'd 7:07 p.m. DEC 2 1931  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF  
WEST-HIGH  
NOV 26 1931  
Department of State

Secretary of State,  
Washington, D.C.

812, November 27, 8 p.m.

FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES

793-94  
with  
500-112  
793-94118

Matsudaira called this afternoon. It seems that the drafting committee is considering the question of making the number of members of the proposed commission seven instead of three. He feels that the larger commission is more unwieldy and is somewhat apprehensive that some of the smaller powers which have no material interest in the situation wish to be represented. It is his opinion that the commission had best be composed of three members: one American, one British, and one French. He personally would not objection to an Italian also on commission but upon this point he has not yet heard from his government.

The reasons for the larger number advanced on the League Council were the embarrassing situation which would arise if one of the three members should become ill and also the possibility that in order to cover a large area it might be desirable to create sub-committees. Matsudaira's comment upon this is that the smaller the commission the greater will be its authority.

F/DEW 793.94/2931

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DEC 4 1931

-2- from Paris Nov 27, #812

authority.

Another point which he is discussing with the drafting committee is the tentative wording of the proposed resolution:

"The two parties undertake to give the strictest orders to the commanders of the respective forces to refrain from any initiative which may lead to further fighting and loss of life."

Matsudaira says that the clause as it stands would be subversive of the Japanese <sup>t</sup>constitution and that he desires the wording to be:

"The two parties shall refrain from any initiative which may lead to further fighting and loss of life."

While the Council has not yet decided as to the number of members of the proposed commission, Matsudaira thinks they are in favor of a commission of seven members.

Matsudaira is quite sure his government will oppose a large commission. He gives this information in confidence since it is embarrassing for him to mention the elimination of the smaller powers as such.

SHAW

FW

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



193

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

HS

GRAY  
**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

Peiping via N.R.

Dated November 27, 1931

FROM Rec'd 28th, 7:58 a.m.

Secretary of State  
Washington

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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

NOV 28 1931

Department of State

PRIORITY

1019, November 27, 8 p.m.

Following from American Consul General at Mukden:

"November 27, 1 p.m.

Official spokesman gave out following statement from  
Japanese headquarters but stated that it was to be taken  
as unofficial:

'In view of the fact that the present situation has  
become quieter, headquarters has decided to withdraw all  
troops to the east of the Liao River and establish them  
at points within the South Manchuria Railway zone. The  
number of troops outside the zone will be reduced to a  
minimum."

For the Minister

PERKINS

GW

F/DEW

793.94/2932

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DEC 2 1931

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1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

HS

GRAY

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

Beiping via N.R.

Dated November 28, 1931

FROM Rec'd 3:00 a.m.

793.94  
Secretary of State  
Washington

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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.  
mf

W Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
NOV 28 1931  
Department of State  
JAN 2 1932

F/DEW 793.94/2933

1017, November 28, 10 a.m.

Legation's 1007, November 26, 8 a.m.

Military Attache at Chinchow reports that according to reliable information received from German Consul who arrived 27th from Mukden, Japanese will submit ultimatum in immediate future to Young Marshal demanding evacuation of Chinchow and withdrawal of troops inside Wall. He states there is no evidence of active preparation to resist Japanese advance except trenches covering south end of bridge over Taling River and that the report that the forces activity of the Chinese this area to be occupied the Japanese is ridiculous.

DEC 2 1931

FILED

For the Minister

GW

PERKINS

193

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

HS

GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Dated November 28, 1931

Rec'd 2:22 a.m.

FROM

Secretary of State

Washington

1016, November 28, 9 a.m.

Following from American Consul General at Mukden.

"November 27, 7 p.m.

Japanese headquarters reports that an armored train preceding Japanese troops moving west over the Peiping-Mukden Railway met and captured a Chinese Federal Officer's train at Yangkuantaitza, east of Tahushan and will be there tonight.

Estimated strength of Japanese forces engaged in Chienhsien drive thirteen battalions."

"November 27, noon.

Kuangtung army headquarters communique November 27, 11 a.m., substantially as follows:

"Last accounts at eight o'clock Chinese troops having surrounded Tientsin Japanese concession, began artillery and heavy machine gun bombardment. The Japanese garrison commander, after a futile protest, ordered his troops to reply in kind and at two o'clock this morning serious fighting is still in progress. Early today the Kuangtung army, in view of the dangerous situation, has decided to undertake necessary measures."

Two. One

F/DEW

793.94/2934

FILED

DEC 2 1931

MP

2-#1016, From Peiping, Nov.28, 1931

Two. One hundred twenty cars loaded with Japanese troops and military equipment including tanks and artillery left Mukden early today over the Peiping-Mukden Railway in the direction of Chihnsien. McIlroy, who left for the north yesterday afternoon, returned to Mukden this morning and reports that three battalions from Kirin and Ssupingkai are en route as reinforcements and Changchun battalion following closely. Apparently all available troops are being rushed to the front.

Three. Four hundred reserves were called to the colors in Mukden this morning, presumably for local guard duty.

Four. Many air crafts departed this morning from their Mukden bases in a westerly direction.

Five. A Chinese report states that fighting started at Chienhsien <sup>chow</sup> this morning possibly a Japanese air raid.

Six. Telegraphic communication is cut off with Peiping and Tientsin.

Repeated to Tokyo.

FOR THE MINISTER

PERKINS

RR  
HPD

893.72

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1935

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
 PREPARING OFFICE  
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER


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 OR  
 Charge to  
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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

November 28, 1935



AMEMBASSY,

PARIS (France).

606

CONFIDENTIAL FOR AMBASSADOR DAWES.

One. The Department has received from the American Minister at Nanking, under date November 27, a telegram which states that Mr. Koo informed the Minister QUOTE that his Government felt that in view of attitude of Japanese they could not abandon Chinchow without some guarantee that Japanese would not occupy that area. He stated that Chinese troops now at Chinchow were under orders to refrain from any activities of a provocative character but added that if attacked they would have to resist. UNQUOTE

Two. A telegram from same source, November 28, states:

QUOTE Military Attaché at Chinchow reports that according to reliable information received from German Consul who arrived 27th from Mukden, Japanese will submit ultimatum in immediate future to Young Marshal demanding evacuation of Chinchow and withdrawal of troops inside Wall. He states there is no evidence of active preparation

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1935 1-138

793.94/2934

1936

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128  
 PREPARING OFFICE  
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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 Charge Department  
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Department of State

Washington,

- 2 -

to resist Japanese advance except trenches covering south end of bridge over Taling River and that the report that the activity of the Chinese forces this area to be occupied by the Japanese is ridiculous./

Three. | At same time, | a telegram | from | American Consul General, | Mukden, | November 27, | <sup>2932</sup> states: |

QUOTE | Official spokesman gave out following statement from Japanese headquarters but stated that it was to be taken as unofficial:

SUBQUOTE In view of the fact that the present situation has become quieter, headquarters has decided to withdraw all troops to the east of the Liao River and establish them at points within the South Manchuria Railway zone. The number of troops outside the zone will be reduced to a minimum END SUBQUOTE UNQUOTE./

Four. | A later | telegram from | Mukden, | November 27, | <sup>2934</sup> contains | statements | as follows:

QUOTE | Kuangtung army headquarters communique November 27, 11 a.m., substantially as follows:

SUBQUOTE Last accounts at eight o'clock Chinese troops having surrounded Tientsin Japanese concession, began

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 80.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-128

1 1937

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

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TO BE TRANSMITTED  
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- 3 -

artillery and heavy machine gun bombardment. The Japanese garrison commander, after a futile protest, ordered his troops to reply in kind and at two o'clock this morning serious fighting is still in progress. Early today the Kuangtung <sup>(Japanese)</sup> army, in view of the dangerous situation, has decided to undertake necessary measures END SUBQUOTE. UNQUOTE

QUOTE One hundred twenty cars loaded with Japanese troops and military equipment including tanks and artillery left Mukden early today over the Peiping-Mukden Railway in the direction of Chinchow. McIlroy, who left for the north yesterday afternoon, returned to Mukden this morning and reports that three battalions from Kirin and Ssuningkai are en route as reenforcements and Changchun battalion following closely. Apparently all available troops are being rushed to the front.

Four hundred reserves were called to the colors in Mukden this morning, presumably for local guard duty.

Many air crafts departed this morning from their Mukden bases in a westerly direction.

A Chinese report states that fighting started at Chinchow this morning possibly a Japanese air raid.

Japanese headquarters reports that an armored train

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_



1938

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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TO BE TRANSMITTED  
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PLAIN

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- 4 -

preceding Japanese troops moving west over the Peiping-Mukden Railway met and captured a Chinese Federal Officer's train at Yangkuantaitza, east of Tahushan, and will be there tonight.

Estimated strength of Japanese forces engaged in Chinchow drive thirteen battalions.

Telegraphic communication is cut off with Peiping and Tientsin. Repeated to Tokyo. UNQUOTE

*Stimson*

*SKH*

NOV 12 1938  
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mm

FE:SKH/ZMF

*W*  
FE

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

Index Bu.—No. 60.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-128

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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TELEGRAM SENT

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TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE ✓  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

November 27, 1931.

AMERICAN CONSUL,  
NANKING (China).

NOV 27 31

123 DOUBLE PRIORITY.

FOR THE MINISTER.

You should urgently instruct the Military Attaché,  
who I understand is now in the neighborhood of Chinchow,  
to cooperate <sup>fully</sup> with other foreign military observers in  
that region in examining the possibility of finding some  
means calculated to prevent any collision between Chinese  
and Japanese troops in that region and of establishing  
liaison with the commanders of the Chinese and the Japa-  
nese forces with a view to the necessary arrangements  
being made.

*Stinson*

FE:RSM/ZMF

FE

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_ 19 \_\_\_\_\_

Index Bu.—No. 60.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

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1215493

MP

GRAY

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Peiping, via N.R.

Dated November 28, 1931

FROM Rec'd 5:34 a.m.

793-94  
Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
NOV 28 1931  
Department of State

1018, November 28, 11 a.m.

Following from American Consul at Harbin:

"November 27, 1 a.m.

One. Kuohsi, Assistant Manager of the Chinese Eastern Railway, has confirmed to me reports that, acting under instructions of the local Civil Administrator, Chang Ying Shun is leaving Harbin today with six hundred police, part of the two thousand special police recently raised and trained by the Civil Administrator for use at Harbin, for Tsitsihar where they will be used to help police the city. This appears to be preliminary to the Civil Administrator's proclaiming under Japanese influence to that city to take over charge of the Heilungkiang Provisional Government.

Two. Up country inspectors of the Standard Oil Company now report conditions in the vicinity of places mentioned in my telegram of November 23, 5 p.m., have improved."

FOR THE MINISTER

PERKINS

HPD

F/DEW 793.94/2935

FILED

DEC 2 1931

194

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MP

GRAY

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Nanking via N.R.

Dated November 28, 1931

FROM Rec'd 8:55 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I. NOV 28 1931

113, November 28, noon.

743.94

At the present time it is estimated that there are between twelve and fifteen thousand students in Nanking, the majority of whom have arrived during the last three days from Shanghai, Hangchow, Soochow, Wusich, Chinkiang and other nearby cities. The purpose of the visit of these students was to force President Chiang Kai Sheik to issue a signed statement that he would proceed north without delay to recover the occupied areas. The students gathered in front of the Government headquarters on the morning of November 26 with the intention of remaining until President Chiang complied with their demand. Speeches by the President of the Control Yuan and other government officials failed to satisfy them. At about one p.m. on November 27 President Chiang addressed the students and issued a signed statement to the effect that as he had long been determined loyally to serve the party and the country, their petition would be received by him. It is thought that during the afternoon of November 27

the

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793.94/2936

DEC 2 1931

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MP

2-#113, From Nanking, Nov. 28, 1931

the Presidents of the leading Shanghai Universities arrived in Nanking and persuaded the students to return home. It is expected that the students will leave Nanking on the first available trains. Very little anti-foreign agitation except that directed against the Japanese has been reported and no serious incidents have taken place.

Legation informed.

PECK

RR

HPD

MF

2-#113, From Nanking, Nov. 28, 1931

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Legation informed.

PECK



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS



MANCHURIA SITUATION

NOV 23 1931

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

Japan's Promise to Withdraw Troops from Tsitsihar

It is not Japan's need to maintain troops at Tsitsihar. It is not Japan's policy to maintain troops at Tsitsihar. It is not Japan's desire to maintain troops at Tsitsihar.

Of course Japan declares that she will remove her troops from Tsitsihar.

Japan sent troops to Tsitsihar for the purpose primarily of destroying General Ma and the Chinese administration of Heilungoheng and thus completing the destruction of Chinese organized authority, both military and civil (which in most cases have been one and the same) in Manchuria. (Note: In doing that particular thing she has been serving Russian interest as well as Japanese interest -- which may in part account for Russia's easy tolerance of the intrusion into North Manchuria.)

Her full objective having been accomplished, why should Japan continue the presence of her soldiers at Tsitsihar?

F/DEW

793.94/2937

- 2 -

Tsitsihar? For them to remain there would be inconvenient to the soldiers themselves, hazardous from the military point of view, gratuitously irritating to Russia, and annoying to the powers. Of course Japan expects to take them away -- probably in the near future.

But the fact of withdrawal will not in any sense alter the facts that, her diplomatic representatives having stated that Japanese troops were not going to Tsitsihar, Japanese troops went to Tsitsihar and Japanese troops, in course and in consequence of so doing, engaged Chinese troops in battle and destroyed the third and last of the Chinese provincial administrations in Manchuria; and that, for this, regardless of subsequent acts, Japan is legally responsible.

The long and the short of the matter in Manchuria is that the Japanese have by use of force completely destroyed the Chinese administrative organization, including the Chinese agencies for enforcing order, in Manchuria. That, no matter what moves may now and henceforth be made, is the fact which the powers must keep in mind if they are truly solicitous with regard to principles of international law and provisions of the various treaties which they have made which forbid "war" and enjoin use of peaceful means only for the settlement of international disputes.

*SKH*

SKH/ZMF



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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


Peping, September 26, 1931

CIRCULAR No. 49 (Individual)

Subject:- AEROPLANE ATTACK ON  
PEKING-MUKDEN RAILWAY.

NOV 27 31



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7 a 3. ad

The Senior Minister has the honour to circulate herewith, for the information of his Honourable Colleagues, translation of a letter, dated the 26th instant, which he has received from the Peiping Archives Department of the Wai Chiao Pu, having reference to the action of aeroplanes on the Peking-Mukden Railway.

Letter of the Peiping Office of the Waichiaopu in charge of the Archives to the Spanish Minister to China and Dean of the Diplomatic Body Don Justo Garrido y Cisneros, dated September 26th, 1931.

A telegram has been received on September 25th from the Pei - Ming (Peiping -Mukden) Railway Administration to the following effect:

"When the express train No.102 of the Peiping - Mukden Railway was passing on September 24th, at 11.45 in the morning, the station of Hsing-Lung-Tien, there appeared from the left side of the station a Japanese military airplane, which fired at the train from machine-guns, damaging it by bullets in many places, killing two passengers and wounding five persons. On September 25th, when the train No. 105 was passing through the station of T'ung-yang-ho, a Japanese military airplane threw two bombs, luckily without hitting anyone. The train increased the speed, but the airplane was still pursuing it to the distance of several stations. According to another report, to-day, at 11.50 in the morning, a Japanese military airplane was circling over the station of Pai-ch'i-p'u and fired machine-guns, but it has not been possible as yet to ascertain, whether there were any wounded or killed among the railway officials, workmen or passengers. It appears that every train is meeting with such

-2-

such attacks, no consideration being given to the human principles. Where is the reason for these wanton and cruel acts? In view of the above, this Administration has the honour to request Your Office to enter immediately into communication with the Diplomatic Body at Peiping to take measures for restraining these violent actions of the Japanese army, in order to maintain the communication between Europe and Asia and to protect the life of the passengers both Chinese and foreign".

Bringing the above to the knowledge of Your Excellency, the Office has the honour to request to take measures to put a stop to these violent actions of the Japanese military airplanes along the Peiping-Mukden Railway, in order to maintain the communication between Europe and Asia and protect the lives of the Chinese and foreign travellers.

The Office avails itself etc.

Stamp of the Peiping Office of the Waichiaopu in charge of the Archives.

The 26th day of the 9th month of the 20th year of the Republic of China.

MET

GRAY  
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Tientsin

Dated November 28, 1931

FROM

Rec'd 9:50 a.m.

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mt  
893.102T  
Secretary of State,

Washington

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.L.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
NOV 28 1931  
FILE  
Department of State

November 28, 5 p.m.

The following telegram has been sent to the  
Legation and to Nanking:

"The Chinese on their own initiative have  
notified Japanese military authorities this afternoon  
that they will at once withdraw their armed police  
to a safe distance from the Japanese concession. If  
this plan is accepted by the Japanese, as it undoubtedly  
will be the situation ought to be relieved. Consular  
Body has recommended its acceptance and urged both  
sides to discontinue firing and show a conciliatory  
attitude.

There was heavy rifle, machine gun and trench  
mortar firing again this morning beginning at two  
o'clock, alleged from both sides. About two hundred  
additional Japanese marines landed yesterday and today  
and

F/DEW 793.94/2939

DEC 21 1931

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MET

2-From Tientsin, November 28,  
1931

and this has given rise to rumors of an impending  
attack on the native city tonight. Japanese state,  
however, that they intend to confine their activities  
to defending their concession and will not go into  
Chinese territory."

LOCKHART

RR-HPD




DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Muta O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 1987.

Paris, November 20, 1931.



F/DEW

793.94/2940

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

In compliance with the Department's instruction No. 293 of August 19, 1930, I have the honor to transmit herewith clippings from the French press, on the subject of the Sino-Japanese conflict, covering the period from November 17 to November 19, 1931, inclusive.

Respectfully yours,

For the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim:

Williamson S. Howell, Jr.,  
First Secretary of Embassy.

Enclosures.....

DEC 2 1931

FT:END

793.94

- 2 -

Enclosures: (single copy).

Clippings from the following newspapers:

November 17, 1931.

- No. 1 - L'ACTION FRANCAISE  
2 - AGENCE TECHNIQUE DE LA PRESSE  
3 - L'ECHO DE PARIS  
4 - L'ERE NOUVELLE  
5 - EXCELSIOR  
6 - FIGARO  
7 - L'HUMANITE  
8 - LE JOURNAL  
9 - LE MATIN  
10 - L'OEUVRE  
11 - PARIS MIDI  
12 - LE PETIT PARISIEN  
13 - LE POPULAIRE  
14 - LE QUOTIDIEN  
15 - LA REPUBLIQUE

November 18, 1931.

- No. 16 - L'ACTION FRANCAISE  
17 - AGENCE TECHNIQUE DE LA PRESSE  
18 - L'ECHO DE PARIS  
19 - EXCELSIOR  
20 - FIGARO  
21 - L'HUMANITE  
22 - L'INTRANSIGEANT  
23 - LE JOURNAL  
24 - LE MATIN  
25 - L'OEUVRE  
26 - LE PETIT PARISIEN  
27 - LE POPULAIRE  
28 - LE QUOTIDIEN  
29 - LE TEMPS

November 19, 1931.

- No. 30 - L'ACTUALITES  
31 - L'ECHO DE PARIS  
32 - FIGARO  
33 - L'HUMANITE  
34 - LE JOURNAL  
35 - JOURNAL DES DEBATS  
36 - LE MATIN  
37 - LE PETIT PARISIEN  
38 - LE POPULAIRE  
39 - LE QUOTIDIEN

No. 40 - L'EUROPE NOUVELLE, November 7, 1931.

No. 41 - ECHOS DU CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS, November 14, 1931.

In quintuplicate.

710.

RS/jdk

Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 1987  
of November 20, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ACTION FRANÇAISE, November 17, 1931.

## L'affaire de Mandchourie et la caverne du Quai d'Orsay

Sous ce titre, *L'affaire de Mandchourie*, M. Sakamoto, docteur en droit et représentant du chemin de fer sud-mandchourien, vient de publier une substantielle brochure qui expose, de la façon la plus claire, la genèse des événements actuels, déformés comme tout le reste par la presse de fonds secrets prenant son mot d'ordre à la caverne du Quai d'Orsay. Je me contente de citer les passages les plus importants, selon moi, de ce travail qu'appuient toutes les prévisions nécessaires.

L'argument commence ainsi :

Les incidents de ces dernières semaines ne doivent pas être jugés seulement par rapport à la situation générale en Chine et par rapport aux pratiques qui y sont suivies. Ils se sont produits en Mandchourie, dans une région où le Japon a des droits spéciaux, des intérêts considérables. L'action à laquelle le Japon a dû résister ne tend à rien moins qu'à le priver de tous ses droits et intérêts, au mépris des traités, et en dépit de son action bienfaisante dans le pays. Il est donc indispensable d'examiner : 1° la base légale de l'activité japonaise en Mandchourie... 2° l'action civilisatrice du Japon en Mandchourie; 3° les manœuvres et attentats dirigés contre cette action.

La première partie est d'ordre technique et diplomatique. Elle établit les droits des ressortissants japonais en vertu du traité sino-japonais de 1915 et des négociations subséquentes. La seconde partie est d'un ordre plus général. En voici l'essentiel :

On n'exagère rien en disant que la Mandchourie, dont la superficie est de 941.700 kilomètres carrés (environ la France et l'Italie réunies) est, à peu près complètement, une création de l'activité japonaise. Au lendemain de la guerre russo-japonaise, le pays était pauvre, la population clairsemée, les moyens de communication tout à fait primitifs, l'industrie inexistante. Pendant vingt-cinq ans, le Japon a apporté des capitaux, des compétences, des énergies, le sens de l'ordre et du progrès; il a réussi, par son action pacifique et civilisatrice, à développer le pays d'une manière dont les chiffres seuls peuvent donner une idée.

POPULATION. — Il est difficile d'évaluer exactement la population du pays vers 1905; mais on peut estimer qu'en vingt-cinq ans elle a doublé. Elle s'élève actuellement à 29.200.000 habitants, dont 1.328.000 dans la zone japonaise. La densité, qui est d'environ 76 par mille carré hors de cette zone, s'élève, dans la zone japonaise, à 875 par mille carré. Le nombre des résidents japonais s'élève à plus d'un million (dont environ 800.000 Coreïens).

CAPITAUX. — Les capitaux japonais investis en Mandchourie depuis vingt-cinq ans sont les suivants :

Compagnie du Chemin de fer Sud-Mandchourien, 716.201.000 yen; Entreprises affiliées à la Compagnie, 318.392.000 yen; Prêts du gouvernement japonais au gouvernement chinois, 96.731.000 yen; Sociétés et particuliers, 554.277.000 yen.

Au total 1.687.601.000 yen, soit environ 21 milliards de francs.

TRAVAUX PUBLICS. — Le développement des voies ferrées a été remarquable : pour la Chine même, il n'a été construit, depuis 1877, que 8.320 kilomètres, tandis que dans la Mandchourie seule il a été construit, depuis 1897, plus de 5.920 kilomètres, dont 1.750 sino-russes, 1.104 japonais, 140 sino-japonais, 2.880 chinois; sur les 2.880 kilomètres chinois, 650 ont été construits avec des capitaux anglais, et 990 avec des capitaux japonais.

Le port de Dairen, qui a coûté 68 millions de yen (816 millions de francs), est devenu le second en importance de l'Extrême-Orient : le mouvement y a été, en 1929, de 8.211 navires, totalisant 14 millions de tonnes, avec un commerce de 508 millions de yen (6 millions de francs).

Les richesses minières ont été systématiquement exploitées : les mines de charbon de Fushun et Yentai produisent environ 30.000 tonnes par jour; les mines de fer de Penhsihu et Anshan permettent de produire annuellement 250.000 tonnes de fonte. Le pays est, du point de vue agricole, très riche : la production a doublé au cours des quinze dernières années.

M. Sakamoto passe ensuite aux agissements antijaponais : banditisme, problème des chemins de fer, la question des baux de terrains (sans cesse remise en cause par les Chinois, au mépris des traités), enfin la fiscalité monstrueuse-

quantité de résidents japonais à quitter les villes où ils avaient leur installation et leurs affaires, conformément aux traités. C'est ainsi que les consulats et les colonies entières de Chenchow, Yunnanfu, Chentow, Chihfeng ont dû être évacués; la plupart des résidents, en particulier les femmes et les enfants, ont dû quitter Nankin (siège du gouvernement chinois), Hanchow, Suchow, Wuhu, Wenchow, Kiukian, Shasi, Ichang, Chungking, Chansha. En Mandchourie, un grand nombre de ressortissants japonais ont été massacrés.

M. Sakamoto montre enfin que les intérêts européens sont liés à ceux du Japon, dans cette affaire de Mandchourie, d'où peut sortir une guerre générale. Cela n'est aucunement douteux.

Or les gredins qui mènent actuellement le Quai d'Orsay sont en train de nous brouiller avec le Japon, comme ils nous ont brouillés avec l'Italie mussolinienne, qu'ils ont jetée dans les bras de l'Allemagne. Pourquoi cela ? Parce que Philippe Berthelot, concussionnaire notoire, qui remplace Briand gâteux pour toutes les affaires d'Extrême-Orient, est l'homme de la Chine au Quai d'Orsay, comme il fut, en 1921, l'homme de la Banque Industrielle de Chine. L'affaire de Noblet d'Anglure qu'hier encore la Cour de cassation s'appliquait à étouffer, les affaires Hearst et Horan ont levé un coin du voile sur les manœuvres abominables qui sont le corrant de notre ministère des Affaires étrangères. Poincaré et Tardieu, qui connaissaient tout cela (Poincaré avait sacqué Berthelot en 1922, puis, par peur de Briand, il le laissa à la place où on l'avait réintégré!), ont cependant maintenu le chef de la bande, Aristide Briand, au poste où il trahit et vend la France de toutes manières et à tous guichets. Laval continue.

Nous ne sommes pas seuls à parler ainsi. Les *Débats*, *Figaro*, d'autres encore, montrent chaque jour à leurs lecteurs la sentine du Quai d'Orsay et comment elle empoisonne systématiquement notre politique extérieure. La colère monte dans la nation, apathique depuis dix ans, et qui n'a vu, dans les affaires Hanau, Oustric et C<sup>o</sup>, qu'un côté de l'épouvantable gabegie où nous sommes. M. Sakamoto n'a pas abordé ce point, évidemment, dans sa brochure; mais on ne saurait trop signaler l'extrême gravité de cette affaire de Mandchourie où le bon droit est manifestement du côté du Japon et où nous nous appliquons à brimer le Japon, comme nous avons brimé l'Italie, comme nous avons brimé la Belgique en la chassant du conseil de la Société des Nations. Depuis dix ans, nos intérêts vitaux sont saccagés au Quai d'Orsay.

Léon DAUDET.

Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 1987  
of November 20, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ACTION FRANÇAISE, November 17, 1931.

## L'affaire de Mandchourie et la caverne du Quai d'Orsay

Sous ce titre, *L'affaire de Mandchourie*, M. Sakamoto, docteur en droit et représentant du chemin de fer sud-mandchourien, vient de publier une substantielle brochure qui expose, de la façon la plus claire, la genèse des événements actuels, déformés comme tout le reste par la presse de fonds secrets prenant son mot d'ordre à la caverne du Quai d'Orsay. Je me contente de citer les passages les plus importants, selon moi, de ce travail qu'appuient toutes les prévisions nécessaires.

L'argument commence ainsi :

Les incidents de ces dernières semaines ne doivent pas être jugés seulement par rapport à la situation générale en Chine et par rapport aux pratiques qui y sont suivies. Ils se sont produits en Mandchourie, dans une région où le Japon a des droits spéciaux, des intérêts considérables. L'action à laquelle le Japon a dû résister ne tend à rien moins qu'à le priver de tous ses droits et intérêts, au mépris des traités, et en dépit de son action bienfaisante dans le pays. Il est donc indispensable d'examiner : 1° la base légale de l'activité japonaise en Mandchourie...; 2° l'action civilisatrice du Japon en Mandchourie; 3° les manœuvres et attentats dirigés contre cette action.

La première partie est d'ordre technique et diplomatique. Elle établit les droits des ressortissants japonais en vertu du traité sino-japonais de 1915 et des négociations subséquentes. La seconde partie est d'un ordre plus général. En voici l'essentiel :

On n'exagère rien en disant que la Mandchourie est le cœur du mouvement commercial en Extrême-Orient. En 1929, de 8.211 navires, totalisant 14 millions de tonnes, avec un commerce de 308 millions de yen (6 millions de francs).

Les richesses minières ont été systématiquement exploitées : les mines de charbon de Fushun et Yantai produisent environ 30.000 tonnes par jour; les mines de fer de Penhsiha et Anshan permettent de produire annuellement 250.000 tonnes de fonte. Le pays est, du point de vue agricole, très riche : la production a doublé au cours des quinze dernières années.

M. Sakamoto passe ensuite aux agissements antijaponais : banditisme, problème des chemins de fer, la question des baux de terrains (sans cesse remise en cause par les Chinois, au mépris des traités), enfin la fiscalité monstrueusement abusive, le boycott systématique, et toutes les formes d'action antijaponaise :

Cette action prend un caractère véritablement inhumain. On refuse de vendre du lait, du charbon aux Japonais. On empêche les Chinois de travailler pour des entreprises japonaises, de se placer chez des Japonais. On laisse apposer des affiches, répandre des placards qui insultent au massacre des Japonais. On interdit aux pilotes chinois de piloter des bateaux japonais. On refuse de délivrer les lettres ou télégrammes adressés aux Japonais. Une communication du gouvernement japonais au conseil de la Société des Nations, le 18 octobre, donne tous les détails relatifs à ces procédés, entièrement contraires à la pratique des pays civilisés. (En Chine centrale, à Changhaï, Hankeou, Chungking et Hongkong, 215 cas d'outrages, d'insultes et d'oppression contre des ressortissants japonais, 498 cas d'outrages ou de lapidation contre des écoliers japonais. A Hongkong, 5 Japonais tués et 9 blessés.)

Un des résultats immédiats de ces campagnes antijaponaises a été d'obliger une

quantité de résidents japonais à quitter les villes où ils avaient leur installation et leurs affaires, conformément aux traités. C'est ainsi que les consulats et les colonies entières de Chenchow, Yunnanfu, Chentow, Chihfeng ont dû être évacués; la plupart des résidents, en particulier les femmes et les enfants, ont dû quitter Nankin (siège du gouvernement chinois), Hanchow, Suchow, Wuhu, Wenchow, Kiukian, Shasi, Ichang, Chungking, Chansha. En Mandchourie, un grand nombre de ressortissants japonais ont été massacrés.

M. Sakamoto montre enfin que les intérêts européens sont liés à ceux du Japon, dans cette affaire de Mandchourie, d'où peut sortir une guerre générale. Cela n'est aucunement douteux.

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Léon DAUDET.



Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 1987  
of November 20, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from AGENCE TECHNIQUE DE LA PRESSE, November 17, 1931.

## Si, la Paix s'organise



Les salonnards et les plaisantins de salles de rédaction s'en donnent à cœur joie. Le sang coule en Mandchourie. Belle occasion pour se réjouir et dauber sur l'impuissance de la Société des Nations.

La bêtise est une maladie contagieuse. Ses ravages, actuellement, s'étendent. Il faut convenir pourtant que toute seule elle serait presque inoffensive. Mais elle s'appuie sur quelque chose de plus solide que des cervelles exagérément légères. Nous ne savons quel est le nom nippon de saint Georges, mais il est visible et par ailleurs connu que sa cavalerie défile à bride abattue aussi bien à Londres qu'à Paris.

Cela explique bien des choses et notamment l'attitude de presque toute la presse anglaise. Les conservateurs dénoncent à l'avance toute sanction qui pourrait être prise par le Conseil de la Société des Nations contre le Japon. Une campagne s'organise contre la politique de M. Briand. Les Britanniques regrettent le temps où la S.D.N. n'était appelée partout que la S.D.A. — Société des Anglais. Le triomphe électoral conservateur aura donc pour premier effet de faire échec ou de tenter de faire échec à la politique française, et au prestige de notre pays. M. Buré s'en réjouit, cela va de soi. Pour un nationaliste, tout ce qui dessert la politique nationale quand elle est faite par un Français qui n'est pas catalogué comme « bien pensant », est matière à se réjouir. La patrie, pour eux, est partout où l'on combat les hommes qu'ils exècrent. Elle est à Londres, depuis que M. Henderson, qui aimait et comprenait la France et les Français (y compris M. Briand), a dû céder la place à des hommes qui ne portent pas notre pays dans leur cœur. Elle est même, à l'occasion, à Tokio, où, si l'on en croit M. Buré, déjà nommé, « on en veut beaucoup » à M. Briand.

On lui en veut de quoi? D'avoir invité la Chine et le Japon à ne point traiter les pactes et les traités comme chiffons de papier. Le Japon a signé certain pacte Kellogg qui met la guerre hors la loi. Or, sans accepter l'arbitrage du Conseil de la Société des Nations, il se livre, actuellement, à des actes de guerre. Le fond même du débat n'est pas en question. Eut-il cent, mille fois raisons, le Ja-

pon doit être rappelé à l'ordre parce qu'il prétend se faire justice lui-même, ce qui est en opposition avec les principes de toute société policée. Si vous avez à vous plaindre de quelqu'un, si vos griefs sont légitimes, vous n'avez pourtant pas le droit d'aller le rosser. Il y a des tribunaux pour départager les nations. Ne pas s'en remettre à sa décision, c'est se placer hors la loi internationale. Il faut qu'on le sache. Il faut que cela soit dit solennellement.

« Les Nippons, écrit M. Gabriel Cudenet, désavoués publiquement, reçoivent des encouragements secrets qui expliquent leur superbe. » C'est trop évident. On raille la Société des Nations parce qu'elle n'impose pas sa loi, mais on excite, en dessous, ceux qui se dérobent à son arbitrage. Est-ce tolérable? Le *Matin*, pour justifier cette attitude et ces intrigues, montre derrière la Chine la Russie soviétique. C'est une nouvelle adaptation de « l'homme au couteau entre les dents ». Les canons japonais deviennent les protecteurs de l'ordre contre les dévastateurs moscovites. Comme si la sauvegarde de l'ordre n'exigeait pas d'abord le respect des accords et la soumission à l'Assemblée des Nations, juge souverain des peuples!

Au surplus, on a beau faire. La mystique de la paix a pris une telle force qu'il faut bien en subir les effets. Même encouragé par la presse britannique et par le clan français des *Yes*, le Japon est contraint de se modérer. Car il ne suffit pas de montrer que la guerre se rallume aux confins de l'Asie pour nier l'œuvre de paix : il faut se demander ce qui serait advenu en d'autres temps, alors que la guerre passait pour légitime, et qu'on la considérait comme le seul moyen régulier d'obtenir son droit. Quels effectifs nippons seraient en Mandchourie? Où seraient les armées japonaises? Combien y aurait-il de milliers et de milliers de victimes?

La Société des Nations ne dispose d'autre gendarme que la conscience universelle. Mais pour invisible qu'il soit, celui-là est de taille. Il retient, malgré tout, les troupes prêtes à s'embarquer. Il limite l'horreur. Il enchaîne le crime. On n'ose pas aller jusqu'au bout. Et déjà, à Londres hier, à Paris aujourd'hui, des hommes renseignés, qui ont qualité pour parler au nom des intéressés, ont envisagé la possibilité d'un compromis.

Si, la paix s'organise. Il faut chaque jour la conquérir. Mais elle se retrouve chaque matin plus forte, mieux protégée, plus sûre d'elle. Grâce à qui?...

Enclosure No. 3 to Despatch No. 1987  
of November 20, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ECHO DE PARIS, November 17, 1931.

## Le conflit sino-japonais de Mandchourie devant le Conseil de la Société des Nations

**Prudence tardive de M. Briand et du Conseil. On cherche  
un règlement qui sauvera la face**

M. Briand, président en exercice du conseil de la Société des Nations, avait à constater, hier, la vanité des efforts tentés à Genève, en octobre, pour mettre fin au différend sino-japonais de Mandchourie. Dans son projet de résolution du 22 octobre (qui, juridiquement, n'est point valable, le représentant du gouvernement de Tokio ayant refusé de s'y associer), le conseil avait eu l'imprudence de fixer le 16 novembre comme date limite de la retraite des troupes japonaises. Le 16 novembre s'est écoulé et les escarmouches continuent de plus belle. Hier, devant le conseil, M. Briand n'a pas insisté. Il s'est contenté de dire qu'à défaut de portée juridique, le projet de résolution du 16 octobre avait une portée morale. Il a rappelé brièvement ses vaines négociations avec les deux adversaires. Les événements, certes, n'ont pas répondu à ses espérances. Mais les deux parties lui ont fourni des renseignements et c'est un gage de l'esprit pacifique qui les anime.

Ce petit discours fut interrompu, à plusieurs reprises, par des quintes de toux assez pénibles. Petite salle trop remplie et surechauffée. Atmosphère de découragement. Comme le ton a changé depuis octobre ! Alors, on menaçait, on ordonnait, on parlait d'ultimatum. Il y a quinze jours encore, sir Eric Drummond chargeait ses légistes d'examiner un projet de rappel du corps diplomatique de Tokio. Maintenant, on se sent engagé dans une impasse. On cherche très humblement le moyen de rebrousser chemin sans perdre la face.

Une séance secrète a suivi cette séance publique assez futile. M. Briand s'est flatté d'apercevoir les éléments d'un compromis dans la note qui lui fut adressée de Nankin, le 24 octobre, où la Chine se déclare, « comme tout membre de la S. D. N., tenue, aux termes du pacte, de respecter scrupuleusement toutes les

obligations des traités », où elle se dit « déterminée à exécuter loyalement toutes les obligations que lui impose le pacte », quitte à régler par l'arbitrage tous différends avec le Japon relatifs à l'interprétation des traités. Et M. le ministre des affaires étrangères de recommander que la formule d'une éventuelle résolution unanime soit recherchée dans des entretiens particuliers, les séances, privées ou publiques, ne devant survenir que le principe d'une solution une fois trouvé.

Des conversations particulières, l'accommodement de tous, dans la conjoncture, c'est la sagesse, encore que tardive. Mais M. Sze, le délégué de la Chine, demande la parole. M. Briand le met en garde contre le danger d'une discussion immédiate du fond de l'affaire, d'une discussion intempestive. Ici, M. Ypshizawa, ambassadeur du Japon fait un signe d'assentiment. M. Sze proteste de sa prudence. Il veut seulement dire que le peuple chinois souffre depuis deux mois, qu'il désire un règlement aussi rapide que possible. En son nom, M. Sze réclame que les séances publiques commencent dans le délai le plus bref.

Voilà pour cette première journée. C'est tout et ce n'est pas beau-coup. M. Briand est dans l'illusion quant à la valeur pratique du passage de la note chinoise du 24 octobre sur lequel il s'est appuyé. Comme le gouvernement japonais le lui fit observer, dans sa réponse du 7 novembre, ce passage où il est parlé de recours à l'arbitrage tend à remettre en question les traités en vigueur. Sur ce point, le Japon parle dans notre intérêt autant que dans le sien. Allons-nous créer un précédent dont n'importe quel pays vaincu en 1918 pourrait s'autoriser tôt ou tard pour faire démolir graduellement, à La Haye, les traités de paix ?

Cette question incidente mise à part, le trait essentiel de l'affaire sino-japonaise, le trait qu'il ne faut jamais perdre de vue, c'est que la Chine n'a pas de gouvernement capable de se faire obéir et de tenir les promesses, que les engagements de la Chine ne valent rien et que les Japonais, s'ils veulent se maintenir en Mandchourie, n'ont pas seulement à exiger de Nankin la reconnaissance des traités existants, mais encore, pour se renfermer dans la zone du chemin de fer, à attendre le rétablissement en Mandchourie d'un état de paix compatible avec la sécurité de leurs troupes et de leurs ressortissants.

Dans les séances publique et privée du conseil, l'absence de tout représentant des Etats-Unis a été fort remarquée. Les gens du secrétariat avaient la mine allongée. En séance privée, M. Briand a déclaré que, cette fois, le représentant des Etats-Unis ne s'était pas assis à la table du Conseil, mais que le général Dawes était à Paris et que l'Amérique réparaitrait dans la salle si le pacte Kellogg venait en discussion. Le pacte Kellogg viendra-t-il en discussion ? Jusqu'ici, le Conseil ne paraît pas devoir l'évoquer. En attendant, sans plus se soucier de la Société des Nations, le général Dawes (qui a auprès de lui M. Dooman, attaché pendant longtemps à l'ambassade américaine de Tokio), s'emploie à trouver une solution. A deux reprises, hier, avant et après le Conseil, il s'est entretenu avec le nouveau secrétaire d'Etat au Foreign Office, sir John Simon. L'opinion semble prévaloir que la S. D. N. ne se tirera du mauvais pas où la légèreté du secrétariat et de M. Briand l'a engagée qu'en s'assurant la bonne volonté et la coopération du Japon, c'est-à-dire en lui concédant, sous une enveloppe plus ou moins opaque, l'essentiel de ses revendications. Mais que fera le représentant de la Chine ?

PERTINAX.

Enclosure No. 4 to Despatch No. 1987  
of November 20, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ŒRE NOUVELLE, November 17, 1931.

## Le Conseil de la Société des Nations réuni au Quai d'Orsay évoque le litige sino-japonais

*"Il poursuivra la recherche d'une solution, déclare son président, M. Briand, dans l'esprit d'objectivité et d'impartialité dont il ne s'est jamais départi"*

### EDITORIAL

Nous assistons peut-être à la dernière tentative du Conseil de la S. D. N. pour mettre fin au conflit sino-japonais. En l'occurrence, nous ne croyons pas qu'il faille se préoccuper outre mesure des nouvelles diverses et contradictoires qui nous parviennent d'Extrême-Orient. Qui donc, d'ailleurs, pourrait se flatter de démêler la vérité dans ces événements, dont chacun s'efforce d'esquiver la responsabilité, dans des incidents que l'on grossit, ici, et qu'ailleurs on ramène à des proportions infimes? Il y a là quelque chose qui trouble et qui dérouté notre logique occidentale, et si jamais on tente de dégager quelques notions claires et précises de toutes ces affirmations contradictoires, il y a bien des chances pour que l'on perde inutilement un temps précieux.

La vérité, en un mot, nous l'ignorons et nous l'ignorons longtemps encore sans aucun doute. Mais l'intérêt de la paix exige que l'on agisse sans tarder. Pour cela, il n'y a qu'un moyen. Le Japon déclare qu'il retirera ses troupes si la Chine prend l'engagement de

cesser toutes vexations à l'égard des ressortissants nippons et de mettre fin au boycottage des produits japonais. Que le Conseil de la S. D. N. arrache donc cette promesse au gouvernement de Nankin et qu'en même temps il obtienne de celui de Tokio qu'il soit fidèle à la parole donnée. La paix, dès lors, sera sauvegardée, et c'est là l'essentiel.

On objectera bien que les sources de conflit existeront encore dans cet Extrême-Orient, depuis si longtemps en proie à une si dangereuse agitation, et qu'une telle paix ne sera jamais que fort précaire. Peut-être! Mais il appartient alors au Conseil de la S. D. N. de toucher au fond des problèmes et de voir s'il est quelque moyen de les résoudre définitivement.

Pour le moment, il est une seule chose qui compte, c'est le maintien de la paix : il s'agit d'étouffer un incendie qui couve et qui menace de s'étendre. Nous avons confiance que la haute autorité du président Aristide Briand, son incontestable impartialité, permettront d'arriver au résultat souhaité.



Inclosure No. 5 to Despatch No. 1987  
of November 20, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from EXCELSIOR, November 17, 1931.

**Après la séance publique où le président, M. Briand, a rappelé la genèse du conflit et les efforts déjà tentés pour y mettre fin, le Conseil a étudié, en séance privée, une formule transactionnelle proposée, dit-on, par les États-Unis.**

#### LES COMBATS SE POURSUIVENT PRÈS DE LA RIVIÈRE NONNI

Hier, à 16 heures, dans la fameuse salle de l'Horloge, au Quai d'Orsay, où le 5 avril 1919 M. Clemenceau faisait adopter à une vitesse de record les vingt-deux articles du pacte de la Société des nations, M. Aristide Briand a ouvert la 65<sup>e</sup> session du conseil, qui est peut-être la plus importante que l'organisme de Genève ait encore tenue jusqu'à ce jour. Ne s'agit-il pas, en effet, d'enrayer une véritable guerre, puisqu'au moment même où le président ouvrait la séance, les câbles annonçaient qu'une bataille se déroulait en Mandchourie sur les bords de la rivière Nonni. C'est pourquoi on sentait planer sur les délégués de la Société des nations qui siégeaient au conseil une atmosphère d'inquiétude et même d'anxiété.

M. Aristide Briand présidait, ayant à sa droite le représentant de l'Italie et, à sa gauche, le secrétaire général de la Société des nations, sir Eric Drummond.

##### L'exposé de M. Briand

M. Briand, dans un court exposé, coupé continuellement par de pénibles quintes de toux provoquées par le magnésium, exposa la situation depuis le 24 octobre dernier où le conseil s'était ajourné à Genève sans avoir pris de décision définitive.

Il rappela les différentes notes qu'il avait reçues, et notre ministre des Affaires étrangères rappela également les engagements formels qui avaient été pris par les deux parties à Genève : la

Chine respecterait les traités existants et le Japon, par la voix de M. Yoshizawa, s'engageait à empêcher la guerre en Mandchourie; et il ajouta pour terminer :

Si les événements n'ont pas encore répondu aux espoirs que nous formulions en nous séparant le 24 octobre, je dois cependant signaler au conseil que j'ai toujours trouvé les deux parties prêtes à me fournir tous les renseignements que je leur ai demandés. Je veux voir dans ce fait un signe de leur désir de collaborer loyalement avec le conseil au règlement d'un litige dont aucun de nous ne se dissimule la difficulté particulière ni la gravité.

Le conseil — est-il nécessaire de le rap-



SIR JOHN SIMON, ministre des Affaires étrangères de Grande-Bretagne (en haut) et M. VON BULOW, sous-secrétaire d'Etat permanent à la Wilhelmstrasse.

peler ? — poursuivra la recherche d'une solution dans l'esprit d'objectivité et d'impartialité dont il ne s'est jamais départi, sans souci des jugements hâtifs ou des commentaires tendancieux, et préoccupé uniquement, selon la loi de son pacte, de faire régner la paix et la justice dans le respect des obligations internationales.

Sir John Simon, le nouveau ministre des Affaires étrangères d'Angleterre, et M. von Bülow, secrétaire permanent de la Wilhelmstrasse, qui pour la première fois siégeait à la table du conseil, remercièrent M. Briand.

## LE COMMUNIQUÉ

COMMUNION

*Etat-major général de l'armée*

**NOS PREVISIONS**

48°, 411°, 411° 3/5, 414° 1/5.

## UNE TENTATIVE DE CONCILIATION DIRECTE DE M. BRIAND

## LA CHINE ET LES TRAITÉS DE 1915

L'on fait observer, dans les milieux japonais, que si le conseil de la Société des nations suivait le gouvernement chinois sur le terrain de cette contestation, le respect des traités existants ne serait plus qu'une formule dénuée de signification.

Ce fut tout en séance publique, M. Briand, ayant informé ses collègues que plusieurs d'entre eux préféreraient se réunir en privé pour continuer l'examen de la question.

### LE COMMUNIQUÉ

A l'issue de la séance publique tenue par le conseil de la Société des nations le communiqué suivant a été publié par le secrétariat :

Le conseil, siégeant sous la présidence de M. Briand, a repris cet après-midi les travaux de sa soixante-cinquième session.

Le président remercie tout d'abord les membres du conseil qui ont bien voulu accepter que le conseil se réunisse à Paris. Il salue ceux des membres du conseil qui siègent pour la première fois à la table du conseil : sir John Simon et M. von Bülow. Il rappelle ensuite que le conseil est assemblé en vertu de la décision du 24 octobre. Il tient donc à mettre le conseil au courant du développement de l'affaire de Mandchourie.

Dans sa réunion d'octobre, le conseil n'a pas réussi à obtenir l'adhésion des deux parties à la résolution qui garde une haute portée morale. Par ce vote se confirmaient les principes affirmés dans la résolution du 30 septembre, et si le représentant du Japon n'a pas cru pouvoir accepter la résolution du 24 octobre, ses déclarations très nettes au cours de la réunion d'octobre ont prouvé que son gouvernement était fermement décidé à se conformer aux engagements pris par la résolution du 30 septembre.

D'autre part, après la réunion du conseil, le président a reçu de M. Sze une lettre proclamant que la Chine entendait respecter toutes les obligations des traités et qu'elle était décidée à remplir toutes les obligations que lui impose le pacte. La Chine offrait de régler tous ces différends avec le Japon par la voie de décision arbitrale ou judiciaire, conformément à l'article 13 du pacte. Le 26 octobre, en outre, le représentant du Japon, dans une déclaration, a exposé les principes fondamentaux dont le Japon croyait nécessaire l'acceptation par la Chine.

Après avoir examiné ces principes fondamentaux, le président a conclu que les quatre premiers trouvaient leur expression dans le projet de résolution du 24 octobre. Pour le cinquième point, il lui était apparu qu'une solution pourrait être recherchée dans la voie ouverte par la déclaration du Dr Sze. Dans ces conditions, le président a écrit au représentant du Japon pour lui faire part de ses réflexions et lui rappeler la procédure prévue par la résolution du 24 octobre en ce qui concerne les mesures envisagées pour assurer la sécurité des ressortissants japonais et de leurs biens au moment de l'évacuation. Le représentant du Japon, dans sa réponse, s'est demandé si les déclarations de la Chine ne permettaient pas de concevoir des doutes sur le point de savoir si la Chine songeait à mettre en question la validité de certains traités.

Quant à la situation de fait en Mandchourie, le président Briand constate qu'à plusieurs reprises il a dû demander aux parties des renseignements ou leur rappeler les principes contenus dans la résolution du 30 septembre. Il a dû notamment obtenir des renseignements en ce qui concerne la saisie, dont s'était plaint le gouvernement chinois, des recettes de la gabelle en Mandchourie. Si les événements n'ont pas répondu encore aux espoirs formulés le 24 octobre, le président affirme qu'il a toujours trouvé les deux parties prêtes à lui fournir les renseignements demandés.

Il veut voir dans ce fait la preuve de leur désir de collaborer loyalement à la solution du litige dont chacun des membres du conseil ne se dissimule ni le caractère particulier ni la gravité.

Le conseil est à la recherche d'une solution dans l'esprit d'objectivité et d'impartialité dont il ne s'est jamais départi, dans le souci d'éviter tout jugement hâtif ou de caractère tendancieux et préoccupé seulement de faire régner, conformément à son pacte, la paix et la justice dans le respect des obligations internationales.

Sir John Simon (Grande-Bretagne) remercie le président pour l'allusion qu'il a faite à sa personne et l'assure que, comme représentant de l'Empire britannique, c'est avec la plus vive satisfaction qu'il coopérera avec tous les membres du conseil pour atteindre le but souhaité par la Société des nations de renforcer son autorité.

M. von Bülow (Allemagne) remercie le président de ses paroles. Il regrette que, jusqu'à présent, il n'ait pu prendre part lui-même aux délibérations de la question portée à l'ordre du jour. Mais il ajoute qu'il sera heureux d'apporter l'aide de son pays à la recherche de la solution que souhaitent tous les membres du conseil.

Le président Briand déclare qu'un certain nombre de membres du conseil lui ont fait savoir qu'ils pensaient qu'il serait souhaitable que des conversations aient lieu entre les membres du conseil, afin de réaliser un accord sur les méthodes et la procédure à suivre pour atteindre le but souhaité. Une proposition de ce genre est normale et a été faite à maintes reprises. Il est natu-

rellement, la proposition tendrait à maintenir provisoirement l'occupation japonaise en Mandchourie sans assigner un délai fixe pour l'évacuation, afin de permettre au gouvernement japonais d'effectuer le repli de ses troupes dans les meilleures conditions de sécurité pour les personnes et les biens de ses ressortissants. Pendant ce temps de répit, où, de part et d'autre, les troupes chinoises et japonaises devraient s'abstenir de tous actes d'hostilité, le gouvernement chinois et le gouvernement japonais négocieraient directement les questions litigieuses entre eux, en donnant au conseil de la Société des nations l'assurance que les négociations ne traineraient pas en longueur.

### UNE TENTATIVE DE CONCILIATION DIRECTE DE M. BRIAND

Après la séance privée, qui a succédé à la séance publique du conseil de la Société des nations, M. Briand, président en exercice, s'est longuement entretenu, dans son cabinet, avec M. Yoshizawa, délégué du Japon, et le Dr Sze, délégué de la Chine.

C'est bien à une tentative de conciliation et de réconciliation que s'est employé, avant tout nouveau débat, le ministre français des Affaires étrangères, visiblement résolu à tenir également compte de la situation de droit et de la situation de fait pour aboutir à une solution pacifique du conflit.

### LA CHINE ET LES TRAITÉS DE 1915

Le représentant de la Chine au conseil de la Société des nations, Dr Sze, a bien affirmé l'intention de son gouvernement de se conformer aux traités existants. Mais la délégation japonaise ne dissimule pas son inquiétude, en ce qui concerne les stipulations du traité de 1915, fixant le statut des concessions japonaises dans le Kouang-Toung et la durée de la concession des chemins de fer du Sud mandchourien. traité qu'à diverses reprises le gouvernement chinois a contesté comme un « diktat » imposé par le Japon à la Chine.

L'on fait observer, dans les milieux japonais, que si le conseil de la Société des nations suivait le gouvernement chinois sur le terrain de cette contestation, le respect des traités existants ne serait plus qu'une formule dénuée de signification.



Ce fut tout en séance publique, M. Briand ayant informé ses collègues que plusieurs d'entre eux préféreraient se réunir en privé pour continuer l'examen de la question.

### LE COMMUNIQUE

Le représentant du Japon a fait part de ses réflexions et lui rappeler la procédure prévue par la résolution du 24 octobre en ce qui concerne les mesures envisagées pour assurer la sécurité des ressortissants japonais et de leurs biens au moment de l'évacuation. Le représentant du Japon, dans sa réponse, s'est demandé si les déclarations de la Chine ne permettaient pas de concevoir des doutes sur le point de savoir si la Chine songeait à mettre en question la validité de certains traités.

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En ce qui le concerne, il ne verrait que des avantages à ce que la séance d'aujourd'hui soit suivie d'une réunion privée du conseil relative à la procédure, après quoi le conseil, dans une réunion publique, aborderait le fond du problème.

Conformément à la proposition du président, le conseil a tenu une séance privée.

### LA FORMULE TRANSACTIONNELLE DE L'AMÉRIQUE

C'est au cours de la séance privée que l'on commença à étudier sérieusement le problème. Et bien que le communiqué n'en fasse nullement mention, nous pouvons affirmer qu'au cours de cette séance, on estima qu'il était indispensable d'avoir la collaboration des Etats-Unis pour trouver une solution.

Le général Dawes, ambassadeur des Etats-Unis à Londres, est à Paris. Il a mission de suivre les travaux de la Société des nations en simple observateur. Il n'assistait donc pas hier à la séance publique du conseil, mais ne demande qu'à participer aux négociations, et c'est pourquoi on a très sérieusement envisagé de faire sortir le différend sino-japonais du cadre restreint du pacte de la Société des nations pour élargir la question en le plaçant dans le cadre du pacte Briand-Kellogg.

Chine et Japon ont signé cet acte de renonciation à la guerre, l'Amérique également, de même que tous les pays qui, hier, siégeaient au conseil.

Ils peuvent donc collaborer, et nous sommes en mesure d'affirmer que déjà un compromis est envisagé.

Bien que l'on n'ait encore aucune précision sur les lignes essentielles de la formule transactionnelle qui aurait été envisagée à Londres par le général Dawes, ambassadeur des Etats-Unis, d'accord avec sir John Simon, secrétaire d'Etat au Foreign Office, avec M. Matsudaira, ambassadeur du Japon en Angleterre, l'on assure que cette

proposition tendrait à maintenir provisoirement l'occupation japonaise en Mandchourie sans assigner un délai fixe pour l'évacuation, afin de permettre au gouvernement japonais d'effectuer le repli de ses troupes dans les meilleures conditions de sécurité pour les personnes et les biens de ses ressortissants. Pendant ce temps de répit où, de part et d'autre, les troupes chinoises et japonaises devraient s'abstenir de tous actes d'hostilité, le gou-

Enclosure No. 6 to Despatch No. 1987  
of November 20, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from FIGARO, November 17, 1931.

## LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS

### Le suprême effort de la Ligue

Le conseil de la Société des nations, fuyant la bise glacée qui souffle sur les rives du Léman, est venu fixer sa tente, pour quelques jours, sur les bords plus doux de la Seine. Des langues de vipère prétendent que la bise n'est pas seule en cause, et que M. Briand, président de l'illustre aréopage, a prié ses collègues de venir à Paris pour être plus près du Palais-Bourbon et ne point quitter de l'œil son ami Laval. D'autres estiment que la S. D. N., n'ayant pu régler à Genève le conflit sino-japonais, un changement d'air pourrait lui rendre ses hypothétiques forces...

Le changement de décor est, en effet, complet. Le Quai d'Orsay, où l'on se réunit, a certes plus noble allure que l'ancien hôtel genevois où la Ligue a fixé ses pénates. L'historique salon de l'Horloge, tous ses ors rutilant de lumière, a un autre aspect que le hall vitré du Secrétariat des nations, tout bruyant de perruches. La table du conseil est peut-être moins imposante, mais qu'importe! On a renoncé à transporter celle de Genève, comme on le fit en d'autres occasions. Le temps du fétichisme est passé, bien que je ne sois point très sûr que Sir Eric Drummond n'ait pas apporté avec ses documents, ses interprètes et ses dactylos, un peu de la terre sacrée du Quai Wilson.

Le cadre est changé, mais les acteurs sont à peu près les mêmes. On reconnaît, à côté du doyen des pèlerins, sceptique sur tout sauf sur lui-même: M. Scialoja, représentant de l'Italie; M. Zaleski, délégué de la Pologne; M. Lerroux, envoyé de l'Espagne, et, occupant le devant de la scène, les deux frères ennemis: M. Yoshizawa, représentant du Japon, et le docteur Szé, délégué de la Chine. On se montre cependant le beau crâne chauve du nouveau secrétaire d'Etat au Foreign Office, Sir John Simon, qui a remplacé lord Reading, lequel avait succédé à ce pauvre M. Henderson, autre pèlerin que le coup de vent des dernières élections a balayé comme fétu de paille. On remarque aussi le regard félin de M. von Bulow, secrétaire général de la Wilhelmstrasse, qui remplace, avec toute la dignité que lui confère son nom, ce pauvre docteur Curtius qui n'avait pour lui que son grand nez et ses régates bien faites. Dans la salle, on voit les mêmes fonctionnaires et les mêmes journalistes. N'était la Seine qu'on aperçoit par les larges fenêtres, on serait prêt à donner rendez-vous à ses amis genevois pour dîner aux Eaux-Vives.

Mais le canon qui tonne en Mandchourie rappelle chacun à la réalité et fait se soucier peu du cadre où l'on se trouve. Sur la rivière Nonni, des hommes se tuent. Le différend sino-japonais, qui aurait pu être arrêté dès le mois de septembre, si le conseil de la Société des Nations n'avait pas commis des

fautes impardonnables, est parvenu au point imprécis où l'on ne sait plus si l'on est en présence d'un conflit ou d'une guerre. On a encouragé, dans son action xénophobe, une Chine invertébrée que les Soviets soutiennent. On a éconduit le Japon, représentant de l'ordre, qui entendait faire respecter les droits qui lui ont été reconnus en Mandchourie. Pour couronner son œuvre, M. Briand a fait admettre les Etats-Unis à la table du conseil, contre le gré du gouvernement de Tokio. Après ces fausses manœuvres, il n'y a rien d'étonnant à ce que la situation soit plus grave, plus tragique, qu'elle ne l'était il y a quelques semaines.

Dans le discours que M. Briand a prononcé hier après-midi, il n'a pas caché la difficulté que le conseil éprouverait à régler le différend. Sans doute a-t-il jugé que la vieille diplomatie secrète était préférable à la jeune diplomatie publique, car la séance a été rapidement levée et les Quatorze ont siégé à huis clos.

Le Japon, on le sait, se déclare disposé à retirer ses troupes dans la zone du chemin de fer sud-mandchourien, lorsque la Chine aura formellement accepté certains « points » qu'il juge essentiels pour assurer la sécurité et les intérêts de ses ressortissants et faire reconnaître ses droits. Ces points, dont la plupart concernent à la fois la Chine et le Japon, sont au nombre de cinq: répudiation mutuelle d'une politique et d'une conduite agressives, respect de l'intégrité territoriale de la Chine, suppression complète de tous mouvements organisés qui entraveraient la liberté du commerce et exciteraient la haine internationale, protection effective dans toute la Mandchourie des occupations pacifiques des ressortissants japonais, respect des droits contractuels du Japon en Mandchourie. Or, la Chine, qui accepte les autres points, se refuse à négocier sur le dernier avant que les troupes japonaises aient évacué les régions occupées.

La thèse que M. Briand soutient à l'heure actuelle est la suivante: puisque la Chine se déclare en général disposée à respecter les traités, il faut décider, afin de hâter l'évacuation, que le jour même du retrait des troupes japonaises une conférence s'ouvrira entre les deux parties pour négocier sur les traités qui les intéressent. Inutile de dire que cette thèse est vivement combattue par le gouvernement de Tokio, qui ne parvient pas à comprendre l'attitude de M. Briand. Le Japon n'est pas disposé à se priver des positions qu'il détient contre une vague et platonique promesse. Qu'en serait-il si, après avoir retiré ses troupes, la Chine, comme il est probable, se refusait à reconnaître les traités qu'elle a signés?

On attend beaucoup de la présence à Paris du général Dawes, ambassadeur des Etats-Unis à Londres, qui a déjà eu de longs entretiens avec les représentants de la Chine et du Japon. Attendons également. Mais une constatation s'impose d'elle-même: les Etats-Unis, qui ne font point partie de la Société des Nations, sont obligés de suppléer à son activité défaillante. Ce n'est guère flatteur pour la jeune institution de Genève qu'il lui faille déjà un soutien. Ce n'est pas davantage rassurant pour ceux qui ont mis leur sort entre ses mains.

James Donnadieu.



Hum 17

Enclosure No. 7 to Despatch No. 1987  
of November 20, 1931.


From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'HUMANITE, November 17, 1931.

### La réunion du Quai d'Orsay

## LA S. D. N. CHERCHE UNE FORMULE QUI LAISSERA LA VOIE LIBRE A L'AVENTURE ANTISOVIETIQUE DU JAPON

*Pendant que le conseil délibère, les troupes japonaises  
passent à l'offensive et les cercles dirigeants français  
multiplient les excitations à la guerre*



L'ouverture de la séance du Conseil de la S. D. N. au Quai d'Orsay

Le Conseil de la Société des Nations a tenu hier une séance d'ouverture et a délibéré ensuite dans le secret. Les circonstances de lieu et de temps méritent ici de retenir un peu l'attention.

L'organe suprême de la Ligne des Nations s'assemble exceptionnellement dans la capitale de l'impérialisme français, au siège du ministère français des affaires étrangères dans ce Salon de l'Horloge aux lambris dorés, dont les lustres rococos éclairent tant d'opérations malpropres et de redoutables trompe-l'œil.

N'y voyons pas un effet du hasard. Paris demeure le centre de la conjuration guerrière et contre-révolutionnaire. C'est à Paris que devait être consacré le monstrueux coup de force japonais du 18 septembre.

Le Conseil siège sous la présidence de M. Aristide Briand. Ce n'est point une coïncidence non plus, il était essentiel pour la "bonne" exécution du mauvais coup qu'elle fut présidée par le représentant-type du pacifisme impérialiste, par celui qu'adulent en commun M. Blum et sa Sainteté le Pape. Le gendarme est toujours plus dangereux lorsqu'il se déguise en archange !

Enfin, la Société des Nations se réunit à l'heure où la bataille fait rage autour de Tsitsikar et où le Japon se dispose à hisser sur le trône mandchou un empereur de son choix.

Je m'efforce de vous décrire fidèlement l'atmosphère du Conseil. Cette précaution est indispensable à la bonne compréhension des décisions imminentes.

Hier donc, en ouvrant la séance, M. Briand nous infligea l'audition pénible d'un long factum qui résume ce que l'homme de Locarno appelle « les efforts du Conseil ». Ces efforts, à y regarder de près, ont consisté essentiellement à donner la consécration de Genève aux opérations guerrières du Japon.

La manœuvre s'est exécutée en deux temps.

Premier temps. Le Conseil se réunit à Genève à la fin du mois de

septembre. Le Japon déclare naturellement qu'il n'a aucune visée territoriale sur la Mandchourie... dont ses troupes occupent le territoire. Un envahisseur n'a jamais confessé publiquement ses desseins. C'est toujours au nom de la paix ou de la sécurité que les gouvernements impérialistes font la guerre.

Le Conseil satisfait, félicite le délégué nippon et, pour la forme, lui recommande de « poursuivre aussi rapidement que possible le retrait de ses troupes déjà commencé » (déjà commencé... où ? quand ? comment ?)

Deuxième temps. Le Conseil se réunit au mois d'octobre. Cette fois, c'est l'inspirateur direct de Tokio et son complice, c'est le représentant de l'impérialisme français qui prend en mains la direction de la manœuvre.

Sa politique va tendre à l'obten-



Les délégués chinois arrivent au Quai d'Orsay. Au centre : M. SZE

tion de trois résultats complémentaires.

1° Créer un front unique impérialiste et antisoviétique derrière le Japon. De fait, au bout de quelques jours — les conversations Laval-Hoover aidant — les critiques britanniques et américains de Tokio baissent la voix.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

(SUITE DE LA PREMIERE PAGE)

2° Favoriser l'entreprise japonaise en Mandchourie : De fait, et grâce en bonne partie à l'attitude du Kuomintang contre-révolutionnaire, la résolution votée en octobre par le conseil donne satisfaction à toutes les ambitions japonaises. Cela, M. Briand l'avait expliqué dans sa note à Tokio il y a quinze jours. Il y a insisté lourdement encore hier après-midi !

3° Sauvegarder autant que faire se peut les apparences, en donnant à la S. D. N. le travestissement d'un arbitre. Pour cela on fixe une date à l'évacuation et le Japon refuse de se plier à cette recommandation.

Le Japon d'ailleurs sait comment il faut interpréter les décisions de la Ligue. Après octobre, ses troupes avançaient de 600 kilomètres !

Bien plus, obéissant aux injonctions de ses protecteurs et complices, aux injonctions françaises en particulier, il donne à son aventure un caractère antisoviétique de plus en plus accusé. Les gardes blancs complotent à Kharbine et préparent des attentats. On invente des histoires de subsides soviétiques aux généraux chinois, on fait surgir pour les besoins de la cause une brigade communiste de Mandchourie !

Naturellement, les chefs socialistes français se mettent de la partie. C'est pour jouer le rôle très précis d'agents provocateurs. Ils somment l'U. R. S. S. de faire entendre des paroles menaçantes ! L'U. R. S. S. bien entendu ne tombe pas dans ce piège. La jactance est la politique des chiens enragés impérialistes. Elle n'est pas la politique de l'Etat prolétarien.

Par leurs déclarations sans équivoque, Karakhan, Vorochilov, Molotov, Litvinov rappellent aux prolétaires la nécessité urgente d'intensifier la lutte antiimpérialiste et de se grouper autour de l'U. R. S. S. menacée.

Et nous voici à la troisième phase de l'aventure. Il ne fait de doute pour personne, après les premiers contacts d'hier, que le Conseil donnera quitus au Japon.

Le siège des délégations est fait. Le Japon, dit-on, c'est l'ordre contre le désordre. Le Japon, c'est la civilisation contre le bolchevisme. L'ordre en Mandchourie — l'ordre japonais — c'est la condition *sine qua non* de la paix sociale, c'est-à-dire de la lutte contre les Soviets.

« Ce n'est pas la Chine des Soviets, des amazones rouges, des « brigands-institution d'Etat », des émeutes bi-quotidiennes et des boycotts

ges qui peut représenter l'ordre, c'est-à-dire la civilisation », écrivait un journal du soir.

Et M. Lauzanne précisait

« Prendre parti pour la Chine, c'est prendre parti pour la Russie soviétique. Les deux corruptions se rejoignent et se confondent. Le conseil de la S. D. N. va-t-il travailler pour la corruption ou pour l'ordre ? C'est toute la question. Il n'y en a pas d'autre. »

Or cette opinion-là, il convient de le savoir, est celle du Conseil de la S. D. N. unanime.

Un haut fonctionnaire du ministère des affaires étrangères s'écriait hier après-midi, après la séance : « Où irions-nous si la S. D. N. interdisait les opérations de police ! »

Les opérations de police, c'est-à-dire les incursions sur les territoires soviétiques, sont en effet la règle politique suprême des provocateurs de Paris.

Tous sans doute ne s'expriment pas avec la même franchise. Mais je veux épinglez en passant cet argument recueilli sur les lèvres d'un familier du ministre des affaires étrangères.

« Le Japon, disait ce personnage, défend la cause des traités. Si on ne l'encourageait pas, on favoriserait par contre coup les atteintes aux traités de 1919. »

Il reste à découvrir une formule. Elle est déjà en voie d'élaboration. MM. Yoshizawa, Sir John Simon, Briand et le général Dawes sont déjà tombés d'accord pour faire adopter par le Conseil une résolution qui ne fixera plus de délai pour l'évacuation.

A quoi bon en effet fixer des délais lorsque le Japon, maître de la Mandchourie, aura suscité des gouvernements autonomes à sa dévotion ?

Après les séances du Conseil d'hier après-midi M. Briand qui le matin avait conféré avec Sir J. Simon a convoqué dans son Cabinet le Japonais et le Chinois. Il leur a recommandé d'entreprendre aussitôt des entretiens privés. Le représentant du Cabinet contre-révolutionnaire de Nankin a accepté de s'engager dans ce guépier et de pénétrer dans l'engrenage.

Dès lors quelle que soit la formule que les augures découvriront, la cause est entendue contre les Soviets.

Bref, la cause est entendue contre les soviets chinois, contre l'U. R. S. S. Le Japon a, nous ne disons pas les mains libres, mais les mains chargées d'un fusil que lui délivrent les membres du Conseil et leur président français.


Gabriel PERI.

Enclosure No. 8 to Despatch No. 1987  
of November 20, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE JOURNAL, November 17, 1931.

## POUR RESOUDRE LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS

### Le Conseil de la Société des Nations s'est réuni au Quai d'Orsay



La réunion du conseil, dans le Salon de l'Horloge, au Quai d'Orsay.  
Au centre (la tête appuyée sur la main) M. ARISTIDE BRIAND, qui a  
présidé la séance solennelle inaugurale

Pour la seconde fois, le conseil de la Société des nations siège à Paris. Pour la seconde fois, le grand salon de l'Horloge du Quai d'Orsay, encore tout rempli de l'écho de discours par lequel le président Wilson lançait l'idée de la ligue de la paix, va pouvoir constater toute la différence qu'il y a entre de généreuses aspirations qui se flattent d'ignorer les faiblesses humaines et les réalisations aux prises avec l'entraînement des passions et les dures nécessités de la politique. Pour la seconde fois, le salon qui a abrité la préparation de la paix va être témoin d'efforts tentés pour empêcher la reprise de la guerre.

Ce n'est certes pas enregistrer un progrès que d'être obligé de constater que la seconde épreuve est infiniment plus grave que la première. En 1929, quand le conseil de la Société des nations s'est réuni à Paris, déjà sous la présidence de M. Aristide Briand, pour s'occuper du conflit gréco-bulgare, les fusils et les mitrailleuses, qui avaient à peine murmuré quelques balbutiements, s'étaient tus aussitôt à l'appel du ministre des affaires étrangères français. Cette fois, le canon lui-même s'est mis de la partie, et il n'a pas cessé de tonner depuis deux mois. Si les hostilités qui n'ont pu être arrêtées en Mandchourie n'ont, à aucun degré, le caractère d'une guerre dans le sens du droit international, il n'en est pas moins vrai que deux interventions du conseil de la Société des nations ont été totalement impuissantes à contenir l'opposition entre des passions déordonnées et une force d'ordre obligée de faire respecter ses droits.

Bien plus, jamais la tension n'a été si grande qu'au moment où le rideau s'est levé hier, à 16 heures, sur le troisième acte du drame.

Le décor est changé. Nous ne sommes plus à Genève, dans la grande verrière de l'hôtel National, qui, même dans les jours les plus sombres, garde le reflet du lac tout proche. Le cadre du salon de l'Horloge est plus sévère, avec sa décoration rouge et or du Second Empire, dont le temps a atténué les rutilances.

Ce n'est pas seulement le décor qui accuse le changement. L'atmosphère aussi est bien différente. Celle de Paris est beaucoup plus imprégnée de tradition que celle de Genève. Ce n'est pas un mal, puisque la preuve est faite surabondamment qu'il y a dans l'affaire sino-japonaise trop de survivances du passé pour qu'on puisse se flatter de guérir le mal rien que par l'application des traitements modernes.

La grande table en fer à cheval autour de laquelle siège le conseil

Prada; le ministre d'Irlande, M. Lester, et le ministre du Panama, M. Garai.

Le général Dawes, confiné dans le rôle d'observateur, est en marge, de même que le secrétaire général de la Société des nations, sir Eric Drummond. Mais le ministère des affaires étrangères a loué trois câbles pour être relié directement aux Etats-Unis et pouvoir échanger avec Washington des communications en quelques secondes. C'est dire l'importance que l'on attache à la participation américaine.

Là aussi, d'ailleurs, il y a un changement. Quand les Etats-Unis ont été invités à Genève au mois d'octobre, certains se flattaient peut-être de trouver dans leur intervention un élément de pression sur le Japon. Tout au contraire, les Américains ont fait preuve du plus grand sens politique. Il leur est assez difficile, au surplus, d'oublier le précédent du Nicaragua.



1965


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 8 to Despatch No. 1987  
of November 20, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE JOURNAL, November 17, 1931.

## POUR RÉSOUDRE LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS

### Le Conseil de la Société des Nations s'est réuni au Quai d'Orsay



La réunion du conseil, dans le Salon de l'Horloge, au Quai d'Orsay.  
Au centre (la tête appuyée sur la main) M. ARISTIDE BRIAND, qui a  
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Les deux nouveaux délégués : M. von Bülow (à gauche) et Sir JOHN SIMON.

ne se trouve pas sous l'horloge, comme dans les conférences de la paix; elle a été placée à l'autre extrémité du salon pour permettre aux délégués de communiquer directement avec le salon des Ambassadeurs, la rotonde et le cabinet du ministre. Dans le prétoire, s'alignent, d'une part, le corps diplomatique, de l'autre, la presse. Le public se trouve dans la galerie de l'Horloge.

M. Aristide Briand préside. A sa droite, se tiennent M. Scialoja, représentant l'Italie; M. de Bülow qui, pour le début au moins du conseil, représente l'Allemagne à la place de M. von Mutius; le ministre des affaires étrangères espagnol, M. Leroux; le délégué permanent de la Yougoslavie à la Société des nations, M. Fotitch; le ministre des affaires étrangères de Norvège, M. Colban; le ministre du Guatemala, M. Matos; enfin, le délégué de la Chine, le docteur Sze.

A gauche de M. Briand, s'alignent le chef du Foreign Office, sir John Simon; l'ambassadeur du Japon, M. Yoshizawa; le ministre des affaires étrangères polonais, M. Zaleski; le délégué du Pérou, M. Gonzales

La première séance publique du conseil de la Société des nations n'a duré qu'une demi-heure; elle a eu un caractère de pure forme. Elle a été remplie tout entière par le discours d'introduction de M. Briand.

Le ministre des affaires étrangères français a dû faire un très réel effort physique pour surmonter une toux persistante; son allocution a pris, de ce fait, un tour particulièrement émouvant.

M. Briand a commencé par souhaiter la bienvenue à ceux de ses collègues qui participent pour la première fois aux délibérations du conseil, sir John Simon et M. von Low.

Puis il a tracé un tableau très sommaire de la situation, rappelant l'état de droit et l'état de fait. Au point de vue juridique, le conseil se retrouve devant la résolution du 30 octobre qui, seule, a une valeur légale, puisque le veto du Japon a laissé la résolution du 24 octobre à l'état de projet. On peut considérer seulement que l'adhésion donnée à ce projet par treize délégués lui confère un caractère de valeur morale. Il n'est pas inutile de rappeler d'ailleurs que ce projet, en dehors de la détermination d'une date précise pour l'évacuation, confirme les principes de la résolution du 30 octobre, en vertu de laquelle le Japon s'engage à retirer ses troupes dès qu'il aura obtenu les garanties nécessaires pour la sécurité de ses nationaux et la protection de leurs biens et des garanties également pour la stricte observation des traités.

Après avoir rappelé que le Japon, dans ses déclarations réitérées, s'est montré, au moins pendant la session d'octobre, fermement décidé à tenir ses engagements, M. Briand constate que dès la fin de la session d'octobre il a reçu une lettre du Dr. Sze. Dans cette lettre, le représentant de la Chine déclarait que son gouvernement était résolu à se conformer strictement aux engagements contractés par les membres de la Société des nations, notamment à l'article 13 de la charte, en vertu de laquelle on peut avoir recours à l'arbitrage pour interpréter les traités litigieux.

En même temps, une lettre du Japon a précisé le désir du gouvernement japonais d'obtenir l'adhésion de la Chine aux cinq points fondamentaux qui régissent le respect strict des traités existants.

M. Briand a rappelé ensuite la lettre qu'il a adressée, le 29 octobre, au Japon pour lui signifier le mémoire chinois et lui faire observer qu'à son avis ce mémoire donne une satisfaction, au moins relative, au cinquième des points fondamentaux japonais, le seul qui conserve un caractère litigieux, c'est-à-dire celui qui mentionne le respect des droits concédés au Japon par les traités en Mandchourie.

Le 7 novembre, le Japon a fait remarquer qu'à son avis la réponse de la Chine est loin d'être satisfaisante. Elle laisse entendre, en effet, que la Chine serait disposée à porter devant l'arbitrage, non seulement l'interprétation, mais la validité des traités. C'est là évidemment que se trouve le nœud même du problème. Le Japon, pas plus qu'aucune autre

puissance, ne peut, en effet, admettre que l'on soumette à l'arbitrage la validité même d'un traité. En l'espèce il s'agit du traité de 1915 qui a été ratifié officiellement par la Chine.

M. Briand a passé ensuite à un examen de la situation de fait. Il s'est borné à signaler la persistance des troubles. Puis il a rappelé les nombreuses démarches qu'il avait faites pour donner aux deux parties des appels de sagesse et pour leur demander des renseignements. Il veut retenir surtout l'empressement avec lequel la Chine comme le Japon ont répondu d'abord à ses appels. C'est la preuve que les deux parties se trouvent entièrement d'accord avec le conseil pour collaborer à un règlement pacifique du conflit.

M. Briand conclut en exprimant l'espoir que le conseil saura régler l'affaire dans un esprit d'objectivité et d'impartialité, en se dégageant des jugements hâtifs et des commentaires tendancieux.

Après quelques paroles de remerciement de sir John Simon et de M. von Bülow, M. Briand propose au conseil de se réunir en séance privée pour examiner la situation de plus près et rechercher notamment la meilleure procédure à suivre.

Ainsi en a-t-il été fait.

La séance privée a commencé à 18 heures 30.

#### La séance privée

La séance privée a été, elle aussi, extrêmement brève; elle n'a pas duré plus d'une demi-heure.

Au cours de cette séance privée, M. Briand a fait l'exposé de la situation, tel qu'il l'avait développé déjà en séance publique, mais il a fourni quelques précisions et il a insisté de nouveau sur ce point qu'à son avis le litige réside dans le cinquième des points fondamentaux du Japon, c'est-à-dire dans la nécessité d'assurer le respect des traités. Il n'a pas dissimulé la difficulté d'arriver à un accord, étant donné les divergences de vues des deux parties, mais il a exprimé l'espoir que, grâce à des échanges de vues amicaux et avec l'appui de tous ses collègues, il parviendrait à trouver une solution.

Dans son allocution, le président du conseil de la S. D. N. a fait allusion à une participation directe des Etats-Unis, en rappelant ce qu'il avait dit déjà à Genève, à savoir qu'il ne doutait pas que, si l'on était appelé à remettre en cause le pacte du Pacifique et le pacte de Paris, les Etats-Unis ne fussent amenés à participer plus directement aux travaux du conseil.

Il est à noter que le représentant du Japon n'est pas intervenu au cours de la séance privée. Le représentant de la Chine, lui, n'a prononcé que quelques paroles, pour déclarer qu'il s'en remettait à l'activité du conseil et qu'il espérait que celui-ci saurait donner une issue favorable à un conflit grave, qui soumet la Chine à une très pénible épreuve.

M. Briand a proposé à ses collègues de lever la séance pour permettre des conversations particulières. Les plus importantes de ces conversations auront lieu, naturellement,

entre le président du conseil et les représentants des deux parties intéressées, M. Yoshizawa et le docteur Sze.

#### M. Briand reçoit M. Yoshizawa et le docteur Sze

M. Briand les a reçus tous les deux, hier soir, le Japonais d'abord, le Chinois ensuite. Les deux entretiens ont été consacrés à l'examen du terrain des rapprochements possibles. Il y a deux grosses difficultés à surmonter l'une, du côté des parties, c'est la nécessité de donner au Japon les garanties de respect des traités; l'autre, du côté de la S.D.N., qui ne peut laisser créer le précédent d'une pression militaire.

Officiellement, la prochaine séance est fixée à la fin de la matinée, mais on pense qu'elle sera remise pour permettre le développement des conversations. — S.-B.



Enclosure No. 9 to Despatch No. 1987  
of November 20, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE MATIN, November 17, 1931.

### Le conseil de la S. D. N. délibère pour la troisième fois sur le conflit sino-japonais sous la présidence de M. Briand

Donc, hier après-midi, à 16 heures, le conseil de la S. D. N., réuni au Quai-d'Orsay en session extraordinaire, sous la présidence de M. Briand, a repris, pour la troisième fois, le difficile et laborieux examen du conflit sino-japonais.

A la porte du salon de l'Horloge, où se pressent, quelques instants avant l'ouverture de la séance publique, deux cent journalistes, appartenant à toutes les nationalités, une carte est fixée : c'est celle de la Mandchourie, naturellement ; on y peut suivre le développement des récents combats le long de la Nonni, la marche en avant vers Tsitsikar des bandes du général Ma Chan Shan.

Il n'y a rien de tel que de voir de près, si l'on ose dire, le théâtre des opérations, pour se faire une conception plus adéquate de la situation.

Car, tout à l'heure, dans la salle aux boiseries dorées, au lustres illuminés, la discussion, fatalement, ne laissera apparaître que le côté académique du problème.

Vient à passer le docteur Sze, délégué de Nankin, qui tient en main les feuillets de son premier discours. Mais on nous assure que les membres du conseil insistent successivement auprès de lui pour que son « speech » ne sorte pas encore du domaine confidentiel.

Maintenant, les représentants des puissances prennent place à la table des délibérations.

Voici M. de Bülow (Allemagne), Sir John Simon (Angleterre), MM. Lerroux (Espagne), Zaleski (Pologne), etc.

Quant au général Dawes, l'« observateur » américain, inutile de le chercher du regard, il n'est pas là.

Fidèle aux recommandations de M. Stimson, le général Dawes restera dans les coulisses, pendant les séances publiques, — à moins que, d'une façon ou d'une autre, le pacte Kellogg contre la guerre n'y soit mis en cause.

Trois coups de mallet ; éclairs de magnésium ; M. Briand parle :

Après avoir souhaité la bienvenue aux « nouveaux », M. de Bülow et Sir John Simon, le président fait le point des pourparlers.

Il rappelle, d'abord, le sens général des « résolutions » votées à Genève, le 30 septembre et le 24 octobre derniers ; il s'attache, ensuite, à démontrer, une fois de plus, que quatre des cinq conditions fondamentales posées par le Japon à l'évacuation du territoire chinois se trouvent déjà dans le texte adopté,

il y a trois semaines, par le conseil.

Reste la cinquième condition, qui a trait au respect par la Chine des obligations des traités. « A ce sujet, ajoute M. Briand, j'ai reçu du docteur Sze une lettre dans laquelle la Chine offre de régler les différends juridiques avec le Japon par la voie de décision arbitrale ou judiciaire ».

Abordant la situation de fait en Mandchourie, M. Briand déclare : « A plusieurs reprises, j'ai dû demander aux parties des renseignements ou leur rappeler les principes contenus dans la résolution du 30 septembre. Je dois reconnaître que les précisions demandées m'ont été fournies. Je vois dans ce fait la preuve que le Japon et la Chine désirent collaborer loyalement à la solution du litige dont chacun des membres du conseil ne se dissimule ni la gravité, ni le caractère particulier. »

Sur la proposition de son président, le conseil décide alors de tenir immédiatement une séance privée.

A peine les portes se sont-elles refermées sur le « public » qui vient de se retirer, que le docteur Sze intervient.

— Au nom de mon gouvernement et de mon opinion publique, je prie le conseil, dit-il, d'agir rapidement.

M. Briand lui donne acte de cette requête, puis il interroge ses collègues en ce qui concerne la procédure, la méthode de travail à suivre. Il est finalement entendu que le président, aussitôt après la réunion, verra, tour à tour, M. Yoshizawa et le docteur Sze et que, ce matin, au cours d'un débat privé, il rendra compte de ses conversations.

Débarrassé des contingences de la journée, l'état actuel des négociations peut se résumer ainsi : Quoi qu'il arrive, le conseil dans son action, ne franchira jamais les limites que lui trace sa résolution du 24 octobre. En d'autres termes, le conseil, sur la pression de l'Amérique et l'Angleterre ne s'enfoncera pas plus avant dans le maquis de la procédure. Evoqué sous le couvert de l'article 11 du pacte, le conflit sino-japonais continuera d'être discuté sur le terrain de l'article 11. Donc, pas de recours possible à l'article 15, à l'article 16, aux sanctions économiques, par conséquent.

Ceci posé, le conseil va s'efforcer de provoquer le « départ » de pourparlers directs entre la Chine et le Japon sur les questions de fond (validité des traités, etc.). Ces entretiens auront, ou plutôt auraient, lieu ultérieurement à Genève. D'autre part, dès que ces conversations, dont le cadre reste, d'ailleurs, à établir, seraient réellement amorcées, le Japon, sans qu'un délai précis lui soit impart, serait invité à retirer progressivement ses troupes de Mandchourie et à les ramener ainsi dans sa zone. Bref, telle est pour le moment, la voie dans laquelle M. Briand et ses collègues désirent s'engager.

Enclosure No. 10 to Despatch No. 1987  
of November 20, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'OEUVRE, November 17, 1931.

## LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS

### LE CONSEIL DE LA SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS s'est réuni hier au Quai d'Orsay sous la présidence de M. Aristide Briand

Des "conversations" auront lieu ce matin  
et une séance publique se tiendra cet après-midi

Nous avons reçu de M. Sakamoto, « docteur en droit, représentant du chemin de fer sud-mandchourien », une brochure où il défend, en un style fort élégant, la cause japonaise. En intervenant même sur des points du réseau ferré mandchou dont il n'a ni le contrôle ni la garde, le Japon ne fait que veiller, dans l'intérêt de ses ressortissants, des étrangers, et des Chinois eux-mêmes, à la régularité du trafic. Et pour le reste, il ne demande que le respect des traités.

Je voudrais simplement faire observer que si une grève générale éclatât sur les chemins de fer allemands, ou autrichiens, ou espagnols, dont la bonne marche intéresse tout le trafic européen, nous n'interviendrions pas militairement, sous prétexte que l'Allemagne, l'Autriche ou l'Espagne ne seraient pas en mesure de faire rouler leurs trains.

— Mais le cas n'est pas le même : la Mandchourie du Sud est une sorte de « protectorat » japonais.

— Ah bon ! Alors, il faut le dire... Quant au respect des traités, quand M. Raymond Poincaré a essayé de l'obtenir par l'expédition militaire de la Ruhr, nous avons critiqué, ici, cette méthode. On n'attend pas de nous, j'imagine, que nous approuvions, s'il s'agit du Japon, ce que nous blâmons quand notre propre pays était en cause...

Réuni hier après-midi, le Conseil de la Société des Nations, après une courte séance publique, s'est constitué en comité privé. Un communiqué nous a appris que, sur la proposition de M. Aristide Briand, la matinée d'aujourd'hui serait consacrée à des « conversations ».

— C'est la même méthode qu'à Genève, le mois dernier.

— La même.

— Oui. Alors, la Société des Nations n'est plus qu'une « parlote », où l'on parle d'ailleurs beaucoup plus dans les coulisses que sur la scène.

— Je sais qu'il est de bon ton de se gausser, en ce moment, de la Société des Nations et de ses efforts, et de se réjouir de la tablature que lui donne l'affaire sino-japonaise. Mais voulez-vous noter que cette affaire est la plus compliquée et la plus délicate peut-être de toutes celles qui pouvaient lui être soumises : un théâtre très lointain, des informations divergentes et difficiles à contrôler, un pays organisé en face d'un pays anarchique (mais enfin, on a admis celui-ci à la Société des Nations, et on ne l'a pas trouvé trop anarchique, en temps utile, pour signer avec lui des traités dont on demande aujourd'hui l'application...). Bref, le pire imbroglio. Or on ne saurait nier que la Société des Nations, en intervenant, a évité l'aggravation et, sans doute, l'extension du conflit. Et quant à l'imbroglio, M. Aristide Briand, après des semaines d'efforts, a pu montrer, dans son discours d'hier, comment on l'avait démêlé, et à quels nœuds déjà plus simples on l'avait réduit.

N'est-ce pas un résultat ?

Il n'est pas pleinement satisfaisant ? Il se peut qu'on se heurte à des difficultés nouvelles, à d'irréductibles mauvaises volontés. D'où l'on conclura — d'où l'on conclut déjà — que la Société des Nations est peut-être capable de « dire le droit », mais sans l'être de le faire appliquer, et que cela suffit à la condamner.

Etrange conclusion ! Cela ne prouve-t-il pas simplement qu'il faut la fortifier ?

Et quand de bons esprits comme M. J. Hadamard songent à la constitution d'un corps de police international pour maintenir, en Mandchourie, l'ordre « légal », ce « corps de police » n'est-il pas la préfiguration de cette force permanente que, selon la doctrine de Léon Bourgeois, d'aucuns, comme M. Jean Hennessy, voudraient voir mise à la disposition de la Société des Nations ?

Ça fait « rigoler » Emile Buré.

Mais ça, ça ne prouve rien.

Jean Plot.

Enclosure No. 11 to Despatch No. 1987  
of November 20, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from PARIS MIDI, November 17, 1931.

### LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS

## Le Conseil de la S. D. N. doit pouvoir délibérer en toute objectivité

Jusqu'ici, il faut l'avouer, le Conseil de la S.D.N., bien qu'il en soit à son troisième examen de l'affaire, n'a pas obtenu beaucoup de résultats pour la solution du conflit sino-japonais. Aujourd'hui même, après une soirée et une matinée de conversations, l'impression est assez fâcheuse : on ne semble pas encore avoir réussi à amener Chinois et Japonais à des négociations directes.

A vrai dire, on ne voit pas comment on pourrait trop s'en étonner. Généralement, quand un différend est soumis à un tribunal, on laisse les juges connaître des événements et prononcer leur sentence en toute impartialité. Il faut croire que c'est là un privilège imparti seulement aux cours civiles. Depuis la naissance du conflit mandchou, en effet, on assiste à de curieux phénomènes de pression, non point électorale, mais judiciaire. Ici, nous ne sommes ni pour ni contre le Japon, ni pour ni contre la Chine. Il nous est d'autant plus facile de nous montrer quelque peu surpris des campagnes entreprises systématiquement pour démontrer l'innocence et le bien-fondé des réclamations japonaises.

— C'est de la Chine, ce pelé, ce galeux, que nous vient tout le mal. Haro, donc, sur la Chine !  
Voilà le refrain à la mode !

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Nous ne pensons pas que la Chine ait, au contraire, fatalement raison : mais ces essais tendancieux d'orien-

tation de l'opinion, tandis que le Conseil délibère, nous semblent parfaitement déplacés.

Que M. Yoshisawa plaide son dossier, voilà qui est bien. Que le D<sup>r</sup> Sze plaide le sien, c'est parfait. Mais qu'on laisse agir la S.D.N. en toute objectivité.

Autrement — et il n'est pas dit d'ailleurs que ce ne soit pas le but poursuivi — c'est sur la S.D.N. elle-même que retomberait la responsabilité de ces manœuvres. Déjà, le silence russe, le revirement américain, qui paraissent encourager le Japon, sont pleins de mystère. Il ne faut pas que ce mystère s'étende à l'attitude des puissances à l'intérieur de la S.D.N. Il ne faut pas qu'elles aient l'air de s'y livrer à des marchandages, à des maquignonnages indignes d'un aréopage comme celui de Genève. Le Conseil n'apparaîtrait plus alors que comme une façade destinée à abriter des combinaisons plus ou moins intéressées. Ce serait la mort de la S.D.N.

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C'est là évidemment une question de pure moralité. Mais n'est-ce pas précisément le rôle de la S. D. N. d'apporter des principes plus élevés et des méthodes plus justes dans les relations internationales ?

A vouloir influencer les membres du Conseil on fait une mauvaise besogne, une double mauvaise besogne : on diminue l'autorité de la S.D.N., et on sert mal son pays.

Gabriel Perreux.



Enclosure No. 12 to Despatch No. 1987  
of November 20, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE PETIT PARISIEN, November 17, 1931.

#### POUR RESOUDRE LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS

## Le conseil de la S. D. N. s'est réuni au Quai d'Orsay

M. Aristide Briand, président en exercice, a fait, en séance publique, un exposé de la situation, puis le conseil a tenu une brève séance privée. De nombreux entretiens particuliers ont eu lieu hier et se poursuivront aujourd'hui



Au centre : M. Briand ; à gauche : M. von Bülow ; à droite : sir Eric Drummond et sir John Simon

Le conseil de la S. D. N. a tenu hier après-midi sa première séance. Ce fut, comme on le verra plus loin, et conformément aux habitudes de Genève, une séance de pure forme, destinée à permettre à ses membres de prendre officiellement contact et au président, en l'espèce M. Aristide Briand, de les mettre au courant de l'état actuel du différend sino-japonais, à la solution duquel ils sont appelés à collaborer.

La prise de contact collective était d'autant plus nécessaire que deux délégués, deux ministres des Affaires étrangères — celui de Grande-Bretagne, sir John Simon, et celui du Reich, M. von Bülow — siégeaient pour la première fois à la table du conseil. Quant à l'exposé de M. Briand, il ne l'était pas moins, puisque, depuis la dernière session, c'est-à-dire depuis le 24 octobre, il a été amené, en sa qualité de président en exercice, à prendre une série d'initiatives dont il devait compte à ses collègues.

En dehors de cela, on ne pouvait rien attendre, ni de la séance publique, qui d'ailleurs a été fort courte, ni même de la réunion privée qui l'a suivie et qui fut elle-même très brève, puisque, à 17 h. 15, ceux qui y avaient pris part s'étaient déjà séparés.

Les résultats concrets, s'il doit y en avoir — et tout le monde l'espère sincèrement — viendront plus tard, lorsqu'ils auront été mûrement préparés, au cours de nombreux et discrets échanges de vues. Au point où en sont les choses, contrairement à la thèse soutenue à la séance privée par M. Sze, le délégué de la Chine, les discussions au grand jour ne pourraient que compromettre l'accord escompté.

D'ores et déjà, deux constatations encourageantes s'imposent. Et d'abord, le déplacement que n'ont pas hésité à effectuer sir John Simon, le général Dawes, venu participer aux consultations au nom des Etats-Unis; M. Zaleski; M. Lerroux; le représentant de la Petite Entente, M. Fotitch; M. Scialoja, et, enfin, M. von Bülow, pour ne citer que ces quelques noms, prouve, non seulement l'importance qu'on attache partout à une entente entre le Japon et la Chine, mais le vif désir qu'on a de travailler à sa réalisation. D'autre part — et c'est là le second point intéressant — l'exposé de M. Briand montre combien ont été heureuses les initiatives prises par le ministre des Affaires étrangères français et combien elles ont contribué à restreindre les divergences entre les deux parties en cause.

En fait, comme il l'a simplement indiqué en séance publique, mais comme il l'a plus fortement souligné en séance privée, ces divergences ne portent plus que sur le cinquième point fondamental formulé par le Japon, à savoir « le respect des droits concédés au Japon par les traités en Mandchourie ». Or si l'on tient compte de la déclaration faite le 24 octobre par M. Sze sur « la ferme résolution de la Chine d'exécuter loyalement toutes les obligations que lui impose le pacte de la S. D. N. » un effort de bonne volonté, de part et d'autre, devrait permettre de trouver un terrain d'entente.

Ce terrain d'entente, on s'évertue, depuis que le champ d'action est ainsi circonscrit, à le découvrir. On s'y est employé à Washington, au cours d'entretiens entre le secrétaire d'Etat et l'ambassadeur du Japon; à Londres, au cours d'entrevues entre le général Dawes et son collègue japonais, M. Matsudeira, qui a eu également des conversations avec sir John Simon; à Paris, enfin, et surtout, où M. Briand

dont on reconnaît les graves difficultés, en raison de l'anarchie chinoise et de la présence, en Mandchourie, à côté des forces régulières qui n'obéissent que très imparfaitement à Nankin, de soldats débandés qui ont constitué de véritables associations de bandits et imposent au commandement japonais la plus grande prudence dans ses mouvements de repli. Ce n'est, toutefois, que ce soir, après les négociations confidentielles prévues pour la matinée et l'après-midi, qu'on commencera à voir un peu clair.

Pour le moment, bien que la délégation japonaise comprenne un nombre inusité de personnalités éminentes : MM. Yoshizawa, ambassadeur à Paris, Matsudeira, ambassadeur à Londres, Yoshida, ambassadeur à Rome et ancien sous-secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires étrangères, et Arita, ministre à Berne et ancien directeur d'Asie au ministère des Affaires étrangères, c'est toujours à Tokio qu'est le nœud de la question. Or il n'apparaît pas, d'après les dépêches reçues hier, qu'on y ait sensiblement changé d'attitude en ce qui concerne les satisfactions à obtenir de la Chine sur le cinquième point fondamental. Le point d'ailleurs est très épineux et commande, de la part du conseil, la plus grande circonspection. L'idée — mise en avant par le délégué chinois, M. Sze, et reprise de divers côtés — de soumettre à l'arbitrage la validité de certains traités est particulièrement dangereuse.

Elle est d'autant plus dangereuse que dans le cas présent le traité au sujet duquel le gouvernement de Nankin ferait volontiers une discrimination et dont Tokio demande au contraire la stricte exécution — celui de 1915 — a été non seulement signé, mais ratifié par la Chine. On voit où pourrait entraîner un pareil précédent et on comprend qu'il y ait au sein du conseil de nombreux membres peu disposés à le créer... On comprend également que si un accord doit intervenir sur des points aussi délicats, ce n'est que par des négociations discrètes, confidentielles même, qu'on l'obtiendra. Qu'on ne s'étonne donc pas que M. Briand se soit abstenu hier soir de fixer la date de la prochaine séance publique et qu'il n'ait même pas de façon formelle indiqué à ses collègues celle de la prochaine séance privée.

Albert JULLIEN.

#### LES SEANCES DU CONSEIL

C'est devant une assistance particulièrement nombreuse que s'est ouverte à 16 heures, dans les salons du ministère des Affaires étrangères spécialement aménagés à cet effet, la 65<sup>e</sup> session du conseil de la S. D. N.

En vue de cette affluence des mesures spéciales avaient été prises : installation de cabines téléphoniques permettant de communiquer directement non seulement avec Paris, mais avec les grandes capitales étrangères; installation également de fils télégraphiques spéciaux reliant directement au Quai d'Orsay les grandes compagnies de câbles franco-américaines, la présence à Paris du général Dawes et sa participation, sinon aux négociations confidentielles engagées dans la coulisse, intéressant au plus haut point les journaux d'outre-Atlantique.

M. Aristide Briand, qui présidait, était encadré d'une part du secrétaire général de la S. D. N., sir Eric Drummond, et, de l'autre, du représentant de l'Italie, M. Scialoja, qui remplace M. Grandi, actuellement en Amérique.

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En fait, comme il l'a simplement indiqué en séance publique, mais comme il l'a plus fortement souligné en séance privée, ces divergences ne portent plus que sur le cinquième point fondamental formulé par le Japon, à savoir « le respect des droits concédés au Japon par les traités en Mandchourie ». Or si l'on tient compte de la déclaration faite le 24 octobre par M. Sze sur « la ferme résolution de la Chine d'exécuter loyalement toutes les obligations que lui impose le pacte de la S. D. N. » un effort de bonne volonté, de part et d'autre, devrait permettre de trouver un terrain d'entente.

Ce terrain d'entente, on s'efforce, depuis que le champ d'action est ainsi circonscrit, à le découvrir. On s'y est employé à Washington, au cours d'entretiens entre le secrétaire d'Etat et l'ambassadeur du Japon ; à Londres, au cours d'entrevues entre le général Dawes et son collègue japonais, M. Matsudeira, qui a eu également des conversations avec sir John Simon ; à Paris, enfin et surtout, où M. Briand est intervenu à maintes reprises auprès des deux partenaires.

Nous avons signalé vendredi dans quelle direction on s'orientait : double négociation parallèle et simultanée, l'une en Mandchourie, entre les autorités locales japonaises et chinoises, touchant le retrait des troupes nippones vers la zone du chemin de fer et les mesures de sécurité à prendre par les Chinois pour protéger les biens et les sujets japonais, dans le territoire ainsi abandonné, tout cela sous le contrôle des observateurs militaires étrangers dont plusieurs sont déjà sur place, l'autre en Europe, loin de toute pression et portant exclusivement sur la question des traités, c'est-à-dire sur le fameux cinquième point. C'est, en effet, dans ce sens général qu'on a travaillé à Washington, à Londres et, depuis quarante-huit heures, à Paris où les entrevues se sont succédé entre M. Briand et le général Dawes, entre ce dernier et M. Matsudeira, entre sir John Simon et son collègue français, entre le chef du Foreign Office et M. Matsudeira, sans parler des entretiens que sir Eric Drummond et M. Avenol — qui ont déjeuné hier au Quai d'Orsay — ont eus, de leur côté, avec les délégations américaine, britannique et japonaise...

Dire qu'on a fait de grands progrès serait exagéré. Néanmoins, l'impression qui se dégage de toutes ces conversations, c'est un désir très net d'aboutir à un accord qui, tout en tenant compte de la situation spéciale de la Chine, donne dans la plus large mesure possible satisfaction au Japon,

dont on reconnaît les graves difficultés, en raison de l'anarchie chinoise et de la présence, en Mandchourie, à côté des forces régulières qui n'obéissent que très imparfaitement à Nankin, de soldats débandés qui ont constitué de véritables associations de bandes et imitent au commandement.

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M. Aristide Briand, qui présidait, était encadré d'une part du secrétaire général de la S. D. N., sir Eric Drummond, et, de l'autre, du représentant de l'Italie, M. Scialoja, qui remplace M. Grandi, actuellement en Amérique.

A gauche, à côté de sir Eric Drummond, siégeaient, dans l'ordre, sir John Simon, ministre des Affaires étrangères de Grande-Bretagne; M. Yoshizawa, le porte-parole du gouvernement de Tokio, ambassadeur à Paris; M. Zaleski, ministre des Affaires étrangères de Pologne; le délégué du Pérou, M. Prada; celui de l'Etat libre d'Irlande, M. Lester, et enfin celui du Panama, M. Garay.

A droite, près de M. Scialoja étaient successivement assis, le représentant de l'Allemagne, M. von Bülow; celui de l'Espagne, M. Lerroux; le ministre adjoint des Affaires étrangères de Yougoslavie, M. Fotitch; le représentant de la Norvège, M. Colban, celui du Guatemala, M. Matos, et enfin le porte-parole de la Chine, M. Sze.

En sa qualité de président en exercice du conseil, notre ministre des Affaires étrangères — qui, dans cette même salle du Quai d'Orsay, réussit jadis à arrêter les hostilités gréco-bulgares et à provoquer un règlement amiable entre Athènes et Sofia, — exposa avec son éloquence et son tact coutumiers l'état actuel du conflit sino-japonais.

#### L'exposé de M. Briand

M. Briand remercia d'abord les membres du conseil qui ont bien voulu accepter que le conseil se réunisse à Paris. Il salua ceux des membres du conseil qui siègent pour la première fois à la table du conseil: sir John Simon et M. von Bülow. Il rappela ensuite que le conseil s'est assemblé en vertu de la décision du 24 octobre. Dans sa réunion d'octobre, le conseil n'avait pas réussi à obtenir l'adhésion des deux parties à la résolution qu'il avait préparée, mais il s'était séparé sur un vote qui garde une haute portée morale. Par ce vote se confirmaient les principes affirmés dans la résolution du 30 septembre et si le représentant du Japon ne crut pas pouvoir accepter la résolution du 24 octobre, ses déclarations très nettes montrèrent que son gouvernement était fermement décidé à se conformer aux engagements pris par la résolution de septembre. D'autre part, après la réunion du conseil, le président a reçu de M. Sze une lettre proclamant que la Chine entendait respecter toutes les obligations des traités et qu'elle était décidée à remplir toutes les obligations que lui impose le pacte. La Chine offrait de régler tous ses différends avec le Japon par voie de décision arbitrale ou judiciaire, conformément à l'article 13. Le 26 octobre, en outre, le représentant du Japon, dans une déclaration, a exposé les principes fondamentaux dont le Japon croyait nécessaire l'acceptation par la Chine.

Poursuivant son exposé, M. Briand a déclaré:

— Ayant examiné avec toute l'attention qu'il méritait le texte des principes fondamentaux japonais tels qu'ils étaient rendus publics, il m'est apparu, d'une part, que les préoccupations que traduisaient les quatre premiers de ces principes trouvaient, dans la plus large mesure, leur expression dans le projet de résolution soumis au vote du conseil le 24 octobre et que, d'autre part, en ce qui concerne le cinquième, c'est-à-dire le respect des droits concédés au Japon par traités en Mandchourie, une solution pourrait sans doute être recherchée dans la voie qu'avait ouverte la déclaration du Dr Sze.

C'est dans ces conditions que, m'autorisant du mandat que le conseil m'avait confié pour l'intervalle de nos réunions, j'ai écrit au représentant du Japon pour lui faire part de mes réflexions et lui rappeler la procédure prévue par le projet de résolution du 24 octobre pour garantir la sécurité des personnes et des biens préalablement à l'évacuation.

Dans sa réponse, en date du 7 novembre, le représentant du Japon m'a informé de ses objections relatives au cinquième des points fondamentaux. Il se demandait si les termes de la communication du représentant de la Chine n'autorisaient pas un doute sur l'interprétation du gouvernement chinois quant à la validité de quelques-uns des traités qui constituent la base des relations entre le Japon et la Chine, ce que le gouvernement japonais ne saurait accepter en aucun cas.

Tel est le point auquel est arrivé le différend si on le considère du point de vue juridique et dans le développement des textes.

#### La situation en Mandchourie

J'en arrive à la situation de fait en Mandchourie. A cet égard, j'ai eu plusieurs fois aussi à user des pouvoirs que m'avait accordés le conseil, soit pour demander aux deux parties en cause des renseignements, soit pour rappeler les principes contenus dans la résolution du 30 septembre.

J'ai tenu, en premier lieu, à obtenir des éléments d'information lorsque le gouvernement chinois m'a signalé, les 3 et 4 de ce mois, qu'une partie des revenus de la gabelle, revenus qui servent de gage à certains emprunts internationaux, aurait été saisie dans certains des territoires occupés.

J'ai tenu, en second lieu, dans deux circonstances où les nouvelles reçues pouvaient faire craindre une rencontre entre les forces armées, à rappeler aux gouvernements les obligations qui découlaient pour eux de la résolution du 30 septembre, en leur demandant de vouloir bien donner les ordres nécessaires à leurs commandants d'armées pour qu'il n'y soit pas manqué.

Si les événements n'ont pas encore répondu aux espoirs que nous formulons en nous séparant le 24 octobre, je dois, cependant, signaler au conseil que j'ai toujours trouvé les deux parties prêtes à me fournir tous les renseignements que je leur ai demandés. Je veux voir dans ce fait un signe de leur désir de collaborer loyalement avec le conseil au règlement d'un litige dont aucun de nous ne se dissimule la difficulté particulière ni la gravité.

Le conseil — est-il nécessaire de le rappeler ? — poursuivra la recherche d'une solution dans l'esprit d'objectivité et d'impartialité dont il ne s'est jamais départi, sans souci des jugements hâtifs ou des commentaires tendancieux, et préoccupé uniquement, selon la loi de son pacte, de faire régner la paix et la justice dans le respect des obligations internationales.

#### La séance privée

Après quelques mots de remerciements de sir John Simon et de M. von Bülow, M. Briand proposa au conseil de lever la séance publique et de siéger en séance privée, ce qui fut fait.

Au cours de celle-ci, les membres du conseil s'attachèrent surtout à étudier la procédure de leurs délibérations ultérieures.

Le président annonça que le général Dawes avait été envoyé par le gouvernement américain à Paris pour prendre une part active aux consultations relatives à l'affaire de Mandchourie. M. Briand ajouta qu'il a des raisons de penser qu'il peut compter sur la plus

complète collaboration du général Dawes avec le conseil.

M. Sze, délégué de la Chine, déclara que depuis deux mois, le peuple chinois traversait une très dure épreuve et exprima l'espoir que le conseil pourrait régler le plus tôt possible le problème qui lui est soumis et en tenant surtout des séances publiques.

A l'issue du conseil M. Briand s'est longuement entretenu avec M. Yoshizawa, puis avec M. Sze.

Enclosure No. 13 to Despatch No. 1987  
of November 20, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE POPULAIRE, November 17, 1931.

## LE CONSEIL DE LA S. D. N. S'EST REUNI HIER, A PARIS EN SESSION EXTRAORDINAIRE

Après une séance publique de pure forme et une courte séance  
privée, le Conseil s'est ajourné à aujourd'hui pour permettre  
aux représentants des Etats de se livrer à des « conversations »

**Le délégué des Etats-Unis, le général Dawes, se tient  
en contact avec le Conseil, mais n'a pas assisté aux réunions**

Le Conseil de la S.D.N. appelé, une  
fois de plus, à examiner la situation en  
Mandchourie, s'est réuni hier en session  
extraordinaire au Quai d'Orsay, sous la  
présidence de M. Aristide Briand qui  
n'a pas pu se rendre à Genève en rai-  
son du grand débat sur la politique  
extérieure qui s'engage aujourd'hui  
même à la Chambre française.

Avant de s'ajourner, en octobre, au  
16 novembre, le Conseil avait voté une  
longue résolution, demandant au Japon  
de commencer immédiatement et de

néral, reprochent à la S.D.N. de ne pas  
vouloir se prononcer nettement, haute-  
ment pour un système permettant de  
dénoncer, dès le commencement d'un con-  
flit, l'agresseur et de fixer les sanc-  
tions : cependant l'acte d'agression  
(quelles que soient les explications  
qu'on puisse donner de ses origines de  
la part du Japon, ne peut faire aucun  
doute.

*Un Etat, faisant partie non seulement  
de la S.D.N. mais de son Conseil, s'est  
mis en flagrante opposition avec les  
engagements qu'il a signés.*

« La S.D.N. se montre impuissante »,  
dit-on. Certes, si le Japon est absolu-  
ment décidé de réinstaller à Moukden  
l'ancienne dynastie mandchoue, la S.D.  
N., telle qu'elle est conçue actuellement,  
ne pourra pas l'empêcher.

Ne disposant que d'un outillage de  
paix imparfait, n'ayant jamais défini  
d'une façon précise les conditions dans  
lesquelles un Etat devrait être dénoncé et  
traité comme « agresseur », n'ayant  
jamais fixé d'une façon définitive l'em-  
ploi des moyens de contrainte à l'égard  
du pays convaincu de jouer le rôle de  
l'agresseur, n'ayant jamais stipulé  
d'une façon vraiment claire les obliga-  
tions internationales destinées à assu-  
rer l'exécution des sentences arbitrales,  
la S.D.N. court, chaque fois qu'elle in-  
tervient dans un conflit aigu, le redou-  
table risque : d'éveiller d'immenses  
espoirs dans les masses et de voir, si  
elle ne réussit pas, exploiter son échec  
contre l'idée fondamentale même qui lui  
a donné naissance et que nous devons,  
nous autres, défendre avec plus de  
passion clairvoyante que jamais.

J'ai senti le besoin de faire ces ré-  
flexions parce que je me sens en  
désaccord avec des amis qui ne font,  
selon moi, en parlant de l'action ou de  
l'inaction de Genève, pas suffisamment  
la distinction entre la S.D.N. en tant  
qu'institution internationale et les dif-  
férents Etats souverains qui la compo-  
sent, entre les responsabilités qui in-  
combent à la S.D.N. en tant que S.D.N.  
et celles qui pèsent sur certains Etats,  
certains gouvernements.

S. GRUMBACH.



M. Yoshizawa, ambassadeur japonais  
à Paris, et M. Matsudaira, ambassa-  
deur japonais à Londres (à droite).

poursuivre progressivement le retrait  
de ses troupes à l'intérieur de la zone  
de chemin de fer, afin que le retrait  
complet puisse être effectué avant la  
prochaine réunion du Conseil ».

Hélas ! depuis, la situation s'est sin-  
gulièrement aggravée en Mandchourie.

A J'évacuer les zones, que ses  
troupes n'auraient jamais dû occuper,

et à envoyer de nouvelles troupes.  
Mais, hélas, la résistance passive  
qui n'a cessé de se manifester : des gé-  
néral, il sera difficile de dire  
dans quelle mesure ils agis-  
sent en leur propre nom, et  
la défense armée.

ous tonnent, les obus éclatent  
à mort, des blessés : c'est là  
guerre encore limitée  
mais une guerre quand même.

Les appels répétés que M. Aristide  
Briand, en sa qualité de Président du  
Conseil de la S.D.N., a envoyés à To-  
kyo, n'ont été suivis d'aucun acte confor-  
me aux recommandations du Conseil.  
C'est cette situation que le Conseil doit  
maintenant examiner.

Et pendant qu'il se réunit, la sara-  
bande de tous les pêcheurs dans l'eau  
trouble, de tous les éléments louches,  
de tous les ennemis de la S.D.N., de tous  
les fanatiques de la souveraineté natio-  
nale, de toutes les plumes achetées par  
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qu'occupe le Japon, a osé parler au  
gouvernement de Tokio un langage de  
paix.

Ne touchez pas au Japon ! crient ac-  
tuellement les mêmes gens qui, en se



Enclosure No. 13 to Despatch No. 1987  
of November 20, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE POPULAIRE, November 17, 1931.

## LE CONSEIL DE LA S. D. N. S'EST REUNI HIER, A PARIS EN SESSION EXTRAORDINAIRE

Après une séance publique de pure forme et une courte séance  
privée, le Conseil s'est ajourné à aujourd'hui pour permettre  
aux représentants des Etats de se livrer à des « conversations »

**Le délégué des Etats-Unis, le général Dawes, se tient  
en contact avec le Conseil, mais n'a pas assisté aux réunions**

Le Conseil de la S.D.N. appelé, une  
fois de plus, à examiner la situation en  
Mandchourie, s'est réuni hier en session  
extraordinaire au Quai d'Orsay, sous la  
présidence de M. Aristide Briand qui  
n'a pas pu se rendre à Genève en rai-  
son du grand débat sur la politique  
extérieure qui s'engage aujourd'hui  
même à la Chambre française.

Avant de s'ajourner, en octobre, au  
16 novembre, le Conseil avait voté une  
longue résolution, demandant au Japon  
de commencer immédiatement et de

néral, reprochent à la S.D.N. de ne pas  
vouloir se prononcer nettement, haute-  
ment pour un système permettant de  
dénoncer, dès le commencement d'un con-  
flict, l'agresseur et de fixer les sanc-  
tions : cependant l'acte d'agression  
(quelles que soient les explications  
qu'on puisse donner de ses origines de  
la part du Japon, ne peut faire aucun  
doute.

*Un Etat, faisant partie non seulement  
de la S.D.N. mais de son Conseil, s'est  
mis en flagrante opposition avec les  
engagements qu'il a signés.*

« La S.D.N. se montre impuissante »,  
dit-on. Certes, si le Japon est absolu-  
ment décidé de réinstaller à Moukden  
l'ancienne dynastie mandchoue, la S.D.  
N., telle qu'elle est conçue actuellement,  
ne pourra pas l'empêcher.

Ne disposant que d'un outillage de  
paix imparfait, n'ayant jamais défini  
d'une façon précise les conditions dans  
lesquelles un Etat devrait être dénoncé et  
traité comme « agresseur », n'ayant  
jamais fixé d'une façon définitive l'em-  
ploi des moyens de contrainte à l'égard  
du pays convaincu de jouer le rôle de  
l'agresseur, n'ayant jamais stipulé  
d'une façon vraiment claire les obliga-  
tions internationales destinées à assu-  
rer l'exécution des sentences arbitrales,  
la S.D.N. court, chaque fois qu'elle in-  
tervient dans un conflit aigu, le redou-  
table risque : d'éveiller d'immenses  
espoirs dans les masses et de voir, si  
elle ne réussit pas, exploiter son échec  
contre l'idée fondamentale même qui lui  
a donné naissance et que nous devons,  
nous autres, défendre avec plus de  
passion clairvoyante que jamais.

J'ai senti le besoin de faire ces ré-  
flexions parce que je me sens en  
désaccord avec des amis qui ne font,  
selon moi, en parlant de l'action ou de  
l'inaction de Genève, pas suffisamment  
la distinction entre la S.D.N. en tant  
qu'institution internationale et les dif-  
férents Etats souverains qui la compo-  
sent, entre les responsabilités qui in-  
combent à la S.D.N. en tant que S.D.N.  
et celles qui pèsent sur certains Etats,  
certains gouvernements.

S. GRUMBACH.



M. Yoshizawa, ambassadeur japonais  
à Paris, et M. Matsudaira, ambassa-  
deur japonais à Londres (à droite).

poursuivre progressivement le retrait  
de ses troupes à l'intérieur de la zone  
de chemin de fer, que le retrait  
gu... mais une recommandation du Conseil  
mais une situation que le Conseil doit  
maintenant examiner.

Et pendant qu'il se réunit, la sara-  
bande de tous les pêcheurs dans l'eau  
trouble, de tous les éléments touchés,  
de tous les ennemis de la S.D.N., de tous  
les fanatiques de la souveraineté natio-  
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Milton O. Gustafson

12-18-75

Pour le règlement du conflit de la Mandchourie

## La session extraordinaire du Conseil de la S. D. N. s'est ouverte hier à Paris

M. Briand a exposé, à la séance publique,  
les grandes lignes du différend sino-japonais  
et les efforts faits par le Conseil pour le résoudre




Photo Wide World.

Cliché Quotidien.

Une vue de la séance du Conseil de la S. D. N., dans le salon de l'Horloge,  
au quai d'Orsay.




Photo Wide World. Cliché Quotidien.

MM. YOSHIZAWA (à gauche)  
et MATSUDEIRA,  
respectivement ambassadeurs du  
Japon à Paris et à Londres.

Cette 65<sup>e</sup> session extraordinaire du  
Conseil de la S. D. N., qui s'est ouverte  
hier au quai d'Orsay, sera-t-elle la der-  
nière de celles qui auront été consacrées  
au conflit sino-japonais ?

On l'espère, ou l'augure. Ce qui est  
certain, c'est que les membres du Con-  
seil — et ils sont, cette fois, particuliè-  
rement bien choisis — sont décidés à  
en finir avec cette irritante affaire.

On n'est pas loin, à Washington —  
toute autre considération laissée de côté  
— de voir dans le Japon une puissance  
d'ordre et d'organisation qui peut s'exer-  
cer utilement en Extrême-Orient. La ré-  
cente déclaration de M. Castle est, à cet  
égard, significative.

Mais la question est autre, pour le mo-  
ment. Le Conseil paraît anxieux de trou-  
ver une solution honorable pour les par-  
ties en cause; or ces parties sont trois:  
la Chine, le Japon et la S. D. N.

On parle d'un compromis possible qui  
comporterait deux sortes de négociations  
parallèles et simultanées: 1<sup>o</sup> Mesures  
administratives et locales à concevoir en  
vue de l'évacuation des troupes japo-  
naises en Mandchourie; 2<sup>o</sup> Négociations  
politiques sur les cinq points fondamen-  
taux, dont les quatre premiers — M.  
Briand l'a bien souligné — sont admis  
de part et d'autre, et dont le cinquième  
reste à résoudre.

Or, c'est ici que s'accuse la divergence.  
Car, si le Japon demande une entente  
préalable avec la Chine sur ce point  
(respect des traités consacrant les droits  
nippons en Mandchourie) avant d'éva-  
cuer, la position de M. Briand paraît  
être jusqu'à présent assez différente. Le  
président du Conseil propose que, le  
jour où les Japonais auront évacué la



Photo KEYSTONE.

Cliché Quotidien.

M. VON BULOW (au centre)  
à son arrivée à la gare du Nord.

Mandchourie, Tokio et Nankin entament  
des négociations sur le cinquième point.

Il s'agit de rapprocher ces points de  
vue, et il ne s'agit, en somme, que de  
cela. Ce ne doit pas être impossible.

T.

Enclosure No. 15 to Despatch No. 1987  
of November 20, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LA REPUBLIQUE, November 17, 1931.

## UNE EXPÉDITION INTERNATIONALE Qu'irions nous faire en Mandchourie ?

## M. Aristide Briand au secours de la paix asiatique

Ce n'est pas tous les jours qu'en matière de politique étrangère, on a quelque occasion de rire. M. Hadamard, professeur au Collège de France et pacifiste convaincu et militant, vient de nous en fournir une. Prenons-la aux cheveux comme le recommandaient les Anciens.

M. Hadamard aurait, dans l'intérêt de la paix, fait la proposition suivante :

*La Société des Nations peut et doit constituer d'urgence, avec des contingents fournis par ceux des Etats participants qui ne sont pas intéressés au conflit, la garde nationale destinée à assurer la police de la région troublée.*

Nos soldats auront demain, grâce à M. Hadamard, l'honneur d'être gardes nationaux en Mandchourie, et se faire éventrer par les bandits chinois en défendant glorieusement le drapeau de la Société des Nations.

Remarquez que nous avons nous-mêmes défendu le principe d'une force armée internationale susceptible de faire respecter les décisions de la S. D. N. Mais nous avons toujours soutenu que cette force devait avoir un recrutement international et volontaire. Libre à chacun de recevoir des coups pour les Chinois. On peut se demander, au cas où un gouvernement innocent suivrait M. Hadamard dans ses folles rêveries, si les engagés volontaires de la coloniale par exemple seraient tenus en conscience de partir en Mandchourie.

— Au service de la France, dirait-on.

Du tout. Au service de la S. D. N.

Je ne dis pas que le service ne soit pas honorable. Je pense que cela demande un engagement spécial.

Mais laissons ce détail. On comprend fort bien où M. Hadamard veut en venir. Il veut réagir, et c'est fort bien, contre ceux de nos confrères qui prétendent que le Japon représente en Mandchourie la cause de l'ordre et de la civilisation.

Et chacun sait que ce n'est pas là

notre avis. La technique japonaise est supérieure à la chinoise ; la civilisation ou mieux la culture chinoise est très supérieure à la japonaise.

Peu importe. Supposons le problème résolu et que dix ou vingt mille hommes partent là-bas comme gendarmes.

D'abord qui seront-ils, ces pandores du nouvel âge ?

Anglais, Français, Italiens ? Bon. Et les Allemands ? Oui, bien entendu, il y aura des Allemands. Mais alors vous les mettez sur le plan des autres. Si vous leur demandez des hommes et du sang, donnez-leur des droits égaux aux vôtres. Et les problèmes militaire, maritime et colonial, pour ne parler que de ceux-là, se posent aussitôt.

Cependant ce corps expéditionnaire arrive dans le pays. C'est assez loin. Il y a toutes les chances du monde que, comme les carabiniers de l'opérette, il arrivera quand tout sera réglé. Mais supposons qu'il soit en Mandchourie encore à temps. Supposons aussi que les bandits qui là-bas ne se différencient pas beaucoup des réguliers l'attaquent vigoureusement... Qu'un mouvement analogue à celui des Boxers se développe ! Que le débarquement des *Internationaux*, plus ou moins bien compris par les Chinois, soit tenu par eux pour l'intervention des « étrangers » hais, et qu'une formidable vague nationaliste balaye soudain le pays.

Ce ne sont pas les Japonais qui en partiront, ce sera l'Indochine et rien que l'Indochine.

Merci bien.

En vérité, défions-nous des interventions saugrenues. Nous n'avons pas un homme de plus à envoyer là-bas. Si j'en crois les renseignements que je possède, nous en maintenons à Tien-Tsin et ailleurs, déjà beaucoup trop. Que M. Hadamard parte, nous n'y voyons pas d'inconvénient. Mais que nos soldats restent chez nous.

Pierre DOMINIQUE.

M. Briand a ouvert la session du Conseil de la S. D. N. en donnant aux intéressés des conseils qui, à certains moments, ont pris le caractère d'avertissements.

On nous dira qu'un discours n'a jamais empêché de se battre des gens résolus à la bataille. Mais il y a des discours et discours, et quand le porte-parole de la France invite deux nations à ne pas prendre les armes, il s'agit d'autre chose que d'un effort de rhétorique.

Le Japon aurait tort de s'imaginer qu'il est le seul maître des destinées asiatiques.

Le problème du Pacifique est un problème qui intéresse l'Occident.

L'impérialisme nippon, s'il réalisait ses desseins, ne remporterait qu'une victoire à la Pyrrhus ! Un autre impérialisme s'élèverait rapidement pour contester les résultats acquis. On surveille les décisions de Tokio à Washington. On les surveille même de très près.

Le gouvernement japonais serait imprudent de heurter à la fois la Russie et les Etats-Unis.

D'aucuns objectent que le Japon est un élément d'ordre sur lequel il faut s'appuyer contre les éléments de désordre ! A ce compte-là, on devrait approuver les impériaux d'avoir, en 1792, essayé d'écraser la France de la Révolution !

Tous les conquérants ont toujours prétendu qu'ils allaient faire la police chez les barbares ou chez les agités.

Il s'agit de savoir si, en 1931, trois ans après la signature du Pacte Kellogg, la guerre, mise hors la loi, retrouvera une excuse pour reprendre place parmi les instruments de la politique nationale d'un grand pays.

Le Conseil de la S. D. N. a, en ce moment, entre les mains le sort, non seulement d'un organisme déterminé, mais de tout le système de la paix, tel qu'il a été organisé depuis dix ans !

Ce Conseil est présidé par l'homme dont le nom est devenu le symbole même des idées sur lesquelles ce système repose. Il faut le suivre.

Gabriel CUDENET.

A.F.18

Enclosure No. 16 to Despatch No. 1987  
of November 20, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ACTION FRANÇAISE, November 18, 1931.

## **La Ligue et le Japon**

Le Conseil de la Ligue, rassemblé à Paris, a marqué un léger changement d'attitude à l'égard de l'affaire de Mandchourie. Le pays des Cheng, des Chang et des Cha n'est plus aussi Chou-Chou. La thèse des Japonais a été prise en plus sérieuse considération. Pourquoi ?

En premier lieu parce que la Société des Nations, qui était partie en avant sans réfléchir, a dû se rendre compte de sa légèreté. Elle avait cherché avant tout un succès diplomatique, ce qui est toujours mauvais. Elle voulait avoir empêché une guerre. Elle avait aussi mal apprécié ses moyens d'action que la nature du conflit.

Les moyens d'action, ce ne sont pas des troupes pour séparer les combattants. L'idée magnifique de M. Hadamard, qui était d'envoyer des soldats français faire la guerre à la guerre dans les environs de Moukden, n'a pas été retenue. Mais il eût fallu peser à la fois sur les deux parties pour les obliger à respecter la décision du Conseil. Or, la Chine a deux gouvernements, l'un à Canton, l'autre à Nankin, qui tous deux n'ont qu'une autorité faible et circonscrite. La Chine est un corps sans tête. Elle est amorphe. Il serait vain de chercher à lui faire sentir des responsabilités.

Il n'en est pas de même du Japon. Mais le Japon, ayant une tête, s'est prémuni. Sa diplomatie n'est pas restée inerte. Elle a demandé et obtenu à Washington l'assurance que les Etats-Unis ne s'associeraient pas à des sanctions économiques et financières si, par hasard, la Ligue décidait d'en prendre. A Londres, elle a trouvé bon accueil. Le résultat des élections anglaises a été de ramener au pouvoir une équipe qui a le sentiment des grands intérêts politiques. Si M. Baldwin a prononcé l'autre jour, au sujet de l'Allemagne, des paroles qui trahissent des illusions regrettables, les conservateurs sont plus aptes que les socialistes à comprendre que le Japon défend en Mandchourie la cause des traités et de l'ordre.

En définitive, ne pouvant rien sur la Chine, n'osant rien contre le Japon, la Société des Nations, après avoir cherché une occasion de rehausser son prestige, ne cherche plus qu'à sauver la face. Elle reconnaît que le conflit ne peut pas être résolu par des moyens uniquement juridiques. C'est-à-dire qu'elle s'est trompée sur les éléments de la cause. — J. B.



A.F.18

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Enclosure No. 17 to Despatch No. 1987  
of November 20, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from AGENCE TECHNIQUE DE LA PRESSE, November 18, 1931.

## La Question du Jour

18

# D'ABORD LA PAIX



Au moment même où nous répétons qu'il y a quelque chose de changé dans le monde, le Conseil de la Société des Nations était réuni dans le Salon de l'Horloge, au ministère des Affaires Etrangères.

Cette reconstitution genevoise sur les bords de la Seine fut des plus opportunes et des mieux réussies. L'atmosphère y était, et non pas seulement le personnel — à défaut du cadre. On pouvait craindre que l'air de Paris ne fût pas favorable à la sérénité qu'on cultive si facilement sur les bords du Léman. Eh bien, non. Rien n'est changé. Les mêmes hommes — et des hommes nouveaux aussi, puisque sir John Simon, ministre des Affaires étrangères de Grande-Bretagne, et M. von Bülow, représentant de l'Allemagne, siégeaient pour la première fois au Conseil — se sont trouvés autour du même « fer à cheval » traditionnel et presque symbolique pour « faire la paix ».

Et dans les « couloirs », de très jeunes attachés, des journalistes, représentant les pays les plus divers, les plus opposés parfois, fraternisaient gaie-ment.

Naturellement, les circonstances voulaient que l'Asie fût plus spécialement présente. Place aux jaunes!... Quantité de Japonais et de Chinois devaient, mêlés. Mieux — et ceci donne à rêver sur l'évolution des mœurs asiatiques: beaucoup de jeunes Chinoises et de jeunes Japonaises babillaient gracieusement, autour des tables et des cabines téléphoniques de la presse.

Aucune nervosité. Aucune hostilité apparente. La jeunesse cherchait naturellement la jeunesse sans se demander quel était son pays.

Les esprits chagrins vont répétant: « C'est la guerre, malgré la Société des Nations, le Pacte Kellogg et M. Briand. Le sang coule, des hommes se battent. Donc, les pacifistes ont échoué. »

Hélas! Les sociétés sont policées, et cependant il se commet des crimes. Tout ce qu'on a pu faire, c'est que l'assassinat ne fût plus considéré comme légitime. On a mis les assassins hors la loi. On les recherche, on les démasque, on les dénonce, et, quand il se peut, on les châtie. Beaucoup échappent. D'autres bénéficient du doute. D'autres encore obtiennent qu'on leur accorde des circonstances atténuantes. Le crime n'en est pas moins le crime et dénoncé comme tel.

Ainsi la guerre. Autrefois, elle était considérée comme légitime. On se faisait rendre justice par les armes. Aujourd'hui, chacun sait qu'il n'a pas le droit de se faire justice lui-même, et les plus foux s'appliquent à se justifier et proclamer qu'ils ne font pas la guerre.

Autrefois, si, pendant le cours d'hostilités même limitées, les ressortissants des pays en conflit s'étaient rencontrés fraternellement, on aurait de part et d'autre mobilisé les juges des conseils de guerre. Intelligences avec l'ennemi. C'était décisif. Aujourd'hui, ces intelligences avec l'ennemi paraissent normales, nécessaires. On compte sur elles pour sauver ou rétablir la paix. On les encourage. On les protège. Les Chinois et les Japonais qui se rencontrent dans les salons de notre Quai d'Orsay sont plus cousins qu'ennemis. Ils le sentent. Ils le disent. Ils le montrent. Grande leçon.

Est-ce à dire que cette fraternisation spontanée suffise à tout? Certes non, et M. Briand montre par sa prudence que le péril est grand. Il est vrai qu'on lui fera grief de ses réserves. On lui ferait grief plus encore — et avec plus de raison — d'une témérité qui pourrait être dangereuse.

Pour se rendre compte des incidences du problème mandchou, il suffit de voir l'attitude du général Dawes et de M. Scialoja. Si le premier se réserve, il n'est pas impossible qu'il pense à ce qui se pourrait produire, quelque jour, au Mexique. Le second, qui remplace M. Grandi, précisément à Washington dans le même instant, ne serait assurément pas fâché de voir se créer, en Mandchourie, avec l'approbation du Conseil de la Société des Nations, un précédent qui pourrait fort bien servir la

de ceux du salon de l'Horloge, sont tout bruyants de rumeurs. On parle beaucoup de la proposition de résolution de M. Daladier. Certains vont jusqu'à mettre en cause l'Elysée, où l'on serait préoccupé de ne pas laisser se faire les élections avec un gouvernement et une majorité que compromet avec obstination M. Louis Marin. Tout cela ne facilite pas l'œuvre de paix.

En revanche, une voix nette et claire s'est fait entendre, après un long silence: celle de M. Clémentel, président du comité national du commerce extérieur et fondateur de la Chambre de Commerce Internationale. Parlant de la crise mondiale, il a dit: « Il appartient aux nations conductrices de l'économie mondiale: Allemagne, Amérique, France et Grande-Bretagne, de résoudre le problème de la réorganisation économique dont dépend l'avenir même du monde. Le premier objectif à obtenir doit être le désarmement matériel et moral, politique et économique de toutes les nations. »

Ne pensez-vous pas qu'au risque de scandaliser le protocole, on aurait pu afficher utilement ces sages propos dans le salon de l'Horloge, pendant qu'y siègent les délégués des nations.

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(AGENCE TECHNIQUE DE LA PRESSE)

Enclosure No. 17 to Despatch No. 1987  
of November 20, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from AGENCE TECHNIQUE DE LA PRESSE, November 18, 1931.

## La Question du Jour

# D'ABORD LA PAIX



Au moment même où nous répétons qu'il y a quelque chose de changé dans le monde, le Conseil de la Société des Nations était réuni dans le Salon de l'Horloge, au ministère des Affaires

Etrangères.

Cette reconstitution genevoise sur les bords de la Seine fut des plus opportunes et des mieux réussies. L'atmosphère y était, et non pas seulement le personnel — à défaut du cadre. On pouvait craindre que l'air de Paris ne fût pas favorable à la sérénité qu'on cultive si facilement sur les bords du Léman. Eh bien, non. Rien n'est changé. Les mêmes hommes — et des hommes nouveaux aussi, puisque sir John Simon, ministre des Affaires étrangères de Grande-Bretagne, et M. von Bülow, représentant de l'Allemagne, siégeaient pour la première fois au Conseil — se sont trouvés autour du même « fer à cheval » traditionnel et presque symbolique pour « faire la paix ».

Et dans les « couloirs », de très jeunes attachés, des journalistes, représentant les pays les plus divers, les plus opposés parfois, fraternisaient gaiement.

Naturellement, les circonstances voulaient que l'Asie fût plus spécialement présente. Place aux jaunes!... Quantité de Japonais et de Chinois devaient, mêlés. Mieux — et ceci donne à rêver sur l'évolution des mœurs asiatiques: beaucoup de jeunes Chinoises et de jeunes Japonaises babillaient gracieusement, autour des tables et des cabines téléphoniques de la presse.

Aucune nervosité. Aucune hostilité apparente. La jeunesse cherchait naturellement la jeunesse sans se demander quel était son pays.

Les esprits chagrins vont répétant: « C'est la guerre, malgré la Société des Nations, le Pacte Kellogg et M. Briand. Le sang coule, des hommes se battent. Donc, les pacifistes ont échoué. »

Hélas! Les sociétés sont policées, et cependant il se commet des crimes. Tout ce qu'on a pu faire, c'est que l'assassinat ne fût plus considéré comme légitime. On a mis les assassins hors la loi. On les recherche, on les démasque, on les dénonce, et, quand il se peut, on les châtie. Beaucoup échappent. D'autres bénéficient du doute. D'autres encore obtiennent qu'on leur accorde des circonstances atténuantes. Le crime n'en est pas moins le crime et dénoncé comme tel.

Ainsi la guerre. Autrefois, elle était considérée comme légitime. On se faisait rendre justice par les armes. Aujourd'hui, chacun sait qu'il n'a pas le droit de se faire justice. Les mandchous, le problème mandchou, il suffit de voir l'attitude du général Dawes et de M. Scialoja. Si le premier se réserve, il n'est pas impossible qu'il pense à ce qui se pourrait produire, quelque jour, au Mexique. Le second, qui remplace M. Grandi, précisément à Washington dans le même instant, ne serait assurément pas fâché de voir se créer, en Mandchourie, avec l'approbation du Conseil de la Société des Nations, un précédent qui pourrait fort bien servir la politique fasciste en Albanie.

Enfin, si le Japon transgresse le pacte, en se livrant à des actes de guerre, il faut reconnaître que la Chine choisit bien mal son temps pour soulever un problème spécialement grave. M. Sze, en effet, ne demande pas seulement le retrait des troupes nippones; il réclame, en même temps, la révision du traité de 1915, qui fut non seulement signé, mais ratifié par la Chine. Cette fois, c'est M. von Bülow qui dresse l'oreille...

M. Briand n'est pas homme à jouer avec le feu, et c'est fort heureux: tout flamberait vite.

Pourquoi ne pas ajouter qu'il faut prendre garde aux conséquences que pourrait actuellement avoir une initiative prématurée en matière de politique intérieure? Les couloirs du Parlement, si proches

de ceux du salon de l'Horloge, sont tout bruyants de rumeurs. On parle beaucoup de la proposition de résolution de M. Daladier. Certains vont jusqu'à mettre en cause l'Elysée, où l'on serait préoccupé de ne pas laisser se faire les élections avec un gouvernement et une majorité que compromet avec obstination M. Louis Marin. Tout cela ne facilite pas l'œuvre de paix.

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Enclosure No. 18 to Despatch No. 1987  
of November 20, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ECHO DE PARIS, November 18, 1931.

AU CONSEIL DE LA S.D.N.

**Le conflit sino-japonais  
de Mandchourie**

Réunis en séance officielle, hors de la présence des délégués japonais et chinois, à la fin de la matinée d'hier, les membres du conseil de la *Société des Nations* ont pu constater que les conversations particulières engagées lundi n'avaient pas donné de grands résultats. Avant de s'essayer à une ébauche de règlement susceptible d'être acceptée par le Japon, ils ont décidé d'amener les deux parties à préciser dans certains détails le sens des notes qu'elles adressèrent au conseil. Qu'est-ce que la Chine entend, au juste, par l'observation des traités en vigueur, par les conflits d'interprétation qu'elle veut soumettre à la procédure arbitrale ?

Quels traités le Japon demande-t-il à la Chine de confirmer ? Ces traités sont-ils simplement de portée économique ? Englobent-ils des clauses politiques ? Le Japon déclare que l'article 3 du protocole attaché au traité sino-japonais du 22 décembre 1905, pour régler les constructions de chemin de fer a été violé. Quel est le catalogue complet de ces griefs ?

M. Matsudaira s'est entretenu assez longuement, hier soir, avec sir John Simon, tandis que M. Yoshizawa rendait visite à M. Briand. Mais il ne semble pas que les deux ambassadeurs aient répondu de façon définitive aux questions qui leur étaient posées. M. Yoshizawa avait préparé un exposé assez ample de la thèse japonaise et il se servira de ce document à la première séance publique. Mais peut-être tous les points soulevés, hier, par les membres du Conseil n'y sont-ils point traités et Tokio devra-t-il être consulté.

Les traités dont les Japonais exigent l'application sont, évidemment, le traité sino-japonais du 22 décembre 1905 par lequel la Chine accepte le traité russo-japonais de Portsmouth ; le traité du 4 septembre 1909 et le traité de janvier 1915 (les fameuses 21 demandes) dont il ne subsiste plus qu'un petit nombre de clauses ayant trait à la Mandchourie et fixant, notamment, le régime d'établissement des ressortissants japonais et coréens. Parmi les questions auxquelles donnent lieu ces divers instruments, il en est que la Chine (autorités centrales ou autorités locales) est, à la rigueur, capable de résoudre, par exemple celle des lignes ferrées concurrentes du Sud manchourien et de ses embranchements — sur ces lignes, une guerre de tarifs se déroule contre le Japon. Mais il en est d'autres, le banditisme, le boycottage, les refus de location de terrains, etc., à propos desquelles éclate, en tout état de cause, l'impuissance des pouvoirs chinois. Le fait que le Japon n'allègue pas cette impuissance et préfère plaider la mauvaise volonté, ne rend pas le problème plus aisément soluble.

Répudiation par le Japon de toute arrière-pensée politique et organisation d'une force de police japonaise veillant à la défense du chemin de fer et des résidents japonais, tel est, avec la confirmation des traités sur lesquels reposent les intérêts japonais de Mandchourie, la seule issue que l'on aperçoive. Pour le conseil, ce ne sera pas tâche facile que de mettre tout cela en forme d'accord avec le gouvernement de Tokio.

PERTINAX.

Exe 18

Enclosure No. 19 to Despatch No. 1987  
of November 20, 1931.

From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from EXCELSIOR, November 18, 1931.

## LE CONSEIL DE LA S. D. N. DEMANDERAIT L'AVIS DE LA COUR DE LA HAYE SUR LES DROITS RESPECTIFS DE LA CHINE ET DU JAPON

*Une déclaration de M. Stimson  
sur l'attitude des États-Unis.*

LE GÉNÉRAL CHINOIS MA TCHANG SHAN  
RÉPONDRAIT PAR DES CONTRE-PRO-  
POSITIONS A L'ULTIMATUM ADRESSÉ  
PAR LE COMMANDEMENT JAPONAIS

Cependant que M. Briand siégeait hier au banc du gouvernement à la Chambre des députés, où se discutaient les interpellations sur la politique étrangère, les négociations particulières se sont continuées l'après-midi, et il semble que le général Dawes y ait joué un rôle prépondérant. Jusqu'à ce jour on avait évoqué pour résoudre le problème mandchourien le pacte de la Société des nations et le pacte Briand-Kellogg. L'ancien vice-président des États-Unis, lui, a mis en jeu le traité de Washington au cours des conversations qu'il eut hier après-midi à l'hôtel Ritz, non seulement avec le représen-

### *La séance de la matinée*

Dès hier matin, en séance publique, le conseil de la Société des nations, composé de tous ses membres, à l'exception toutefois des délégués intéressés, japonais et chinois, écoutèrent un long exposé du président au sujet des négociations qu'il avait eues la veille, tard dans la soirée, avec le Dr Sze et M. Yoshizawa. Ils tombèrent d'accord pour exiger, avant de se réunir à nouveau, une explication nette et précise du cinquième point japonais, c'est-à-dire celui se rapportant aux traités existants.

Le conseil veut savoir exactement quels sont les traités évoqués et si ceux-ci font mention d'une sécurité nécessaire avant de permettre aux Japonais d'évacuer les territoires occupés en Mandchourie.


Et là nous sommes en pleine incertitude, car la plupart de ces traités n'ont pas été publiés.

Les Chinois parlent des traités de 1915, ils affirment qu'ils les reconnaissent et, tout en contestant leur valeur juridique, se disent prêts à les exécuter. Mais il n'en est pas de même de ceux de 1905, qu'ils considèrent comme imposés par la force et qui, disent-ils, n'ont pas été signés.

Enfin, quelle est la valeur des traités de 1896 signés entre la Russie et la Chine, paraphés pour celle-là par le prince Lobanoff, alors ministre des Affaires étrangères du tsar, et pour celle-ci par le célèbre Li Hung Chang? Il s'agissait de traités secrets qui donnaient, dit-on, des droits de construction de chemins de fer à la Russie.

Or, en 1905, par le traité de Portsmouth, la Russie, défaite, passa tous ses droits au Japon. Mais la Chine, elle, prétend ne les avoir jamais signés, et c'est pourquoi, de plus en plus, on a l'impression très nette que l'affaire ne se terminera que devant la Cour de La Haye, lorsque le conseil décidera de demander à celle-ci un avis consultatif.

Il y a aussi une convention secrète du 22 décembre 1905 qui n'a jamais été publiée et qui, disent les uns, empêcherait la Chine de construire des chemins de fer qui seraient en concurrence avec le Sud-Mandchourien, clause secrète qui, d'après les autres, n'aurait jamais été ratifiée. C'est sur ces différents points qu'il sera vraisemblablement nécessaire d'obtenir l'avis consultatif de la Cour internationale de La Haye, que les membres de la Société des nations ne peuvent refuser. — MAURICE-RAYMONDE.



M. SZE, délégué chinois (à gauche) et  
M. YOSHIZAWA, un des représentants  
du Japon.

tant de la Chine, le Dr Sze, mais aussi avec l'ambassadeur du Japon à Londres, M. Masuidera, avec sir Eric Drummond, secrétaire général de la Société des nations, et, tard dans la soirée, avec M. Massigli, directeur des services français de la Société des nations.

Et il convient dès lors de rappeler l'article premier du traité de Washington: « Les puissances contractantes s'engagent à respecter la souveraineté et l'indépendance, ainsi que l'intégrité territoriale et administrative de la Chine. »

FIG. 18

Enclosure No. 20 to Despatch No. 1987  
of November 20, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from FIGARO, November 18, 1931.

## Le Conseil de la S.D.N. cherche sa voie

FIGARO 11/18

Quel admirable contraste ! Pendant que le canon tonne en Mandchourie, le Quai d'Orsay, où siège le Conseil de la Société des nations, ne retentit d'aucun écho. Le salon de l'Horloge, réservé aux séances publiques, reste fermé. Seul, le salon de la Rotonde a vu s'assembler hier matin, pendant une heure, les membres du Conseil, à l'exception des représentants de la Chine et du Japon. L'animation n'était guère plus grande dans la vaste salle où dactylos et journalistes ont été parqués, séparés par des tentures, ce qui eût très bien fait comme « Cité des Nations » à l'Exposition coloniale. Mais quels documents mystérieux peuvent donc taper ces demoiselles ?...

La journée d'hier a comporté deux ordres de négociations, qui se sont déroulées, comme il convient, avec une lenteur extrême-orientale : la séance du Conseil, dont nous venons de parler, et les entretiens privés. M. Briand, sir John Simon et le général Dawes ont reçu, au début de la matinée et successivement, M. Yoshizawa, délégué du Japon, et le docteur Szé, représentant de la Chine. Les trois négociateurs ont ensuite mis le Conseil au courant de leurs démarches. Enfin, dans la soirée, M. Briand, retour de la Chambre, a vu entre deux sommes M. Yoshizawa.

Aucun progrès sensible n'a été réalisé, puisqu'on a décidé d'ajourner toute séance publique. Une nouvelle réunion privée aura lieu ce matin.

Nous avons déjà indiqué que le Japon refusait d'évacuer ses troupes avant que la Chine ait formellement reconnu ses droits en Mandchourie. De son côté, la Chine se refuse à négocier avec le Japon aussi longtemps que des troupes nippones occuperont son territoire. Cela prouverait déjà que le gouvernement de Nankin conteste la validité des traités. Mais on en a une preuve de plus : il demande que l'affaire soit soumise à la Cour de justice internationale de La Haye. On comprend fort bien que le gouvernement de Tokio n'accepte pas cette procédure. Il y aurait un danger évident à remettre en question les pactes en vigueur. On sait, d'autre part (voir le récent projet d'accord douanier austro-allemand), de quelle façon la Cour comprend parfois sa mission. Tout cela n'est guère de nature à donner confiance aux Japonais, à les pousser à retirer leurs troupes avant d'avoir obtenu de la Chine la promesse formelle qu'elle respectera les traités. Mais le gouvernement de Nankin voudra-t-il s'engager dans cette voie ? C'est le point essentiel à régler.

En somme, ces deux jours de négociations secrètes ne paraissent avoir donné aucun résultat. Le conseil de la Ligue s'est peut-être aperçu un peu tard qu'il avait eu grand tort de prendre parti à la légère pour la Chine contre le Japon. Le Quai d'Orsay a beau publier, chaque jour, une liste impressionnante de télégrammes adressés à M. Briand pour le féliciter de ses efforts pacificateurs, nous persistons à penser que son action a été néfaste. Mieux eût valu qu'il laissât au représentant de l'Espagne le soin de poursuivre les délicates négociations que celui-ci avait entreprises en septembre. Il n'aurait pas ainsi compromis l'amitié du Japon, précieuse pour notre pays.

James Donnadien.


Milton O. Gustafson

12-18-75

La réunion du Quai d'Orsay

## La France est l'instigatrice de l'agression antisoviétique de l'impérialisme japonais

■ ■ ■ ■ ■  
AU COURS DE DÉLIBÉRATIONS SECRÈTES, LE CONSEIL  
SOUS LA DIRECTION DE BRIAND  
SE PRÉPARE A DÉLIVRER UN BLANC-SEING AU CABINET DE TOKIO  
■ ■ ■



Pendant que la S. D. N. continue ses palabres, la guerre sévit en Mandchourie. Voici le général HONJO, commandant de l'armée de Canton, quittant son quartier général

La grande opération de brigandage japonais en Extrême-Orient est entrée depuis hier dans une étape nouvelle.

Jusqu'ici on déclarait encore — pour la forme — que le Japon devait dans un certain délai évacuer la Mandchourie. Ainsi l'on espérait sauvegarder aux yeux des masses populaires le « prestige » de la Société des Nations. Le Japon d'ailleurs ne se trompa jamais sur la signification des recommandations du Conseil.

Depuis le 18 septembre, les troupes japonaises ont avancé de 600 kilomètres, au point de menacer directement Tsitsikar et la voie ferrée de l'Est chinois. Dans le même temps, les Blancs s'agitent à Kharbine et y préparent des attentats. Rappelons pour mémoire que l'animateur de ce mouvement est le fameux ataman Seménoff, qui jouit de tout temps de l'appui de la France.

Aujourd'hui la France et son représentant qui préside le Conseil veulent accomplir un pas de plus.

Il s'agit d'abord de ne contrarier en rien l'offensive militaire japonaise qui se propose d'enlever Tsitsikar et d'instaurer à Moukden une dynastie autonome, c'est-à-dire aux ordres de Tokio.

Il s'agit ensuite d'obtenir l'adhésion de la Chine à ces traités de 1915 qui organisaient la mise en coupe réglée de la Chine par le Japon.

Le représentant chinois a déjà donné une première satisfaction à ses interlocuteurs en acceptant d'entrer en négociations directes avec son partenaire japonais.

Pour nous, le fait n'est pas dépourvu d'une certaine importance, car il illustre à merveille la politique du « Kuomintang » contre-révolutionnaire.

Le Kuomintang a fait régner la terreur et la misère sur tout le pays. Il a répandu par torrent le sang des révolutionnaires, il a obéi aux injonctions de ses maîtres impérialistes et perpétré le mauvais coup de 1929. Il livre aujourd'hui la Mandchourie et la Chine aux brigands impérialistes.

L'attitude de M. Sze à Paris confère une force singulière au mot d'ordre de notre Parti communiste chinois, souvent développé dans ce journal : la lutte contre l'agression impérialiste est inséparable de la lutte renforcée contre le Kuomintang.

Et, notons en passant, que les représentants de ce Kuomintang sont



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Et, notons en passant, que les représentants de ce Kuomintang sont ceux auxquels, à Bruxelles, F.O.S., ouvrit toutes larges ses portes, et dont M. Vandervelde a exalté la politique !

Tel est le premier résultat des « contacts » pris depuis lundi au Quai d'Orsay et dont M. Briand a rendu compte, hier matin, à ses collègues, dans une séance secrète du Conseil et qui ont été suivies dans la journée d'hier de conversations menées par le général Dawes et sir Eric Drummond, secrétaire général de la S.D.N., avec les représentants chinois et japonais, puis d'une nouvelle visite de M. Yozheva à M. Briand.

Le Temps fournit sur l'orientation du débat des indications qu'il est utile d'épingler.

« Ce qu'on peut tenir pour acquis, c'est que personne ne songe à engager le Conseil de la Société dans une voie où il se heurterait à coup sûr à l'opposition irréductible du Japon, avec, comme conséquence possible, la ruine de cette puissance de l'institution internationale de Genève. »

Et encore : « Le Conseil de la Société des Nations ne se laissera pas égarer par ces manœuvres obliques et saura s'en tenir aux réalités avec lesquelles il faut toujours compter si on veut pratiquer une politique de paix véritablement féconde. La réalité la plus certaine, la plus évidente ici, c'est que le Japon tient des traités des droits spéciaux en Mandchourie, droits qu'il n'abandonnera pas. »

On ne saurait être plus clair ni affirmer plus catégoriquement la volonté de la France de consacrer le coup de force mandchou et d'encourager les nouvelles conquêtes.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(SUITE DE LA PREMIERE PAGE)

Ainsi, chaque jour qui passe précise, en en soulignant la portée, le rôle de tout premier plan que joue l'impérialisme français dans l'aventure d'Extrême-Orient.

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Aussi bien ne s'agit-il point là d'une position exceptionnellen à laquelle le cabinet de Paris ne se serait rangé qu'après de longs tâtonnements.

Bien avant le conflit, dans le concert contre-révolutionnaire en Extrême-Orient, la France n'a cessé, malgré les apparences, de tenir une place de choix.

N'oublions pas que, d'après les statistiques américaines, le capital français est représenté en Chine par 181 firmes. Au surplus, la France contrôle pratiquement la province du Yunnan, que traverse le chemin de fer Haiphong-Yunnanfo, construit avec des capitaux français. On se souvient du zèle avec lequel le gouverneur socialiste Varenne ouvrit le territoire indochinois aux transports d'armes et de munitions destinées aux généraux contre-révolutionnaires.

La proximité de l'Indochine en état d'agitation révolutionnaire extrême devait inciter le gouvernement français à suivre avec l'attention la plus grande les remous de la jeune Chine. De fait, ce sont des avions français qui, les premiers, intervinrent dans le Kiangsi contre les Soviétiques chinois.

En outre, nous l'avons établi dès le 1<sup>er</sup> septembre, la revue officielle de l'état-major français justifiait par avance l'opération japonaise en lui assignant un objectif antisoviétique extrêmement précis. Enfin, un correspondant ouvrier nous déclare — et il a à peine besoin de souligner l'importance de cette information — que, depuis quelques semaines, des contrôleurs japonais sont entrés aux Aciéries de la Marine de Saint-Chamond.

Comme le dit l'Information, la France est « l'îlot solide où se sont amarrées et préservées non seulement les monnaies, mais bien d'autres choses encore qui forment la base de la civilisation capitaliste.

Passons sur la « solidité » de l'îlot. Il est, à vrai dire, battu par la tempête. Mais il reste que la France est bien, comme l'expose le journal financier, le gendarme de l'univers.

Et c'est en Extrême-Orient, à l'heure présente, que ce gendarme a pris sa faction.

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Cette politique a trouvé d'ardents zéloteurs dans l'état-major du parti socialiste. Hier, l'un d'eux est entré en lice dans le *Populaire* : c'est M. S. Grumbach, ancien collaborateur du 2<sup>e</sup> bureau, qui, entre autres exploits récents, fit escorte le mois dernier à MM. Laval et François-Poncet à Berlin. M. Grumbach chante donc la louange de M. Briand. Il déplore que « les appels réitérés de M. Briand soient demeurés sans effet ». Il vitupère contre la presse « de réaction », laquelle exprime avec une diligente fidélité les pensées de l'impérialisme français, dont M. Briand est le représentant. L'impérialisme français est blanc comme neige. C'est la presse impérialiste qui est coupable !

M. Paul Faure nous avait chanté déjà une chanson de même goût. Pour lui, tous les malheurs de ce temps proviennent des fabricants d'obus !

Maudire la presse de réaction, vitupérer contre les fabricants d'obus, mais féliciter Briand et Laval et accompagner les pèlerins impérialistes dans leurs pérégrinations ! Toute la politique social-démocrate est là.

\*\*

L'impérialisme français eût souhaité, pour réaliser plus aisément ses desseins, que l'U.R.S.S. se départît de sa politique de paix et qu'elle proférât des menaces. Nous avons vu comment les agents provocateurs du *Populaire* se sont évertués pendant quinze jours à inciter l'U.R.S.S. à abandonner sa politique pacifique traditionnelle.

L'U.R.S.S. n'est pas tombée dans le piège. L'U.R.S.S. ne tombera pas dans ce piège.

Et son attitude permettra le rassemblement de millions d'hommes et de femmes autour de la patrie socialiste menacée.

Mais ce rassemblement urge. Le travail d'éclaircissement sur les événements d'Extrême-Orient, l'organisation de la riposte ouvrière contre la guerre antisoviétique, l'examen pratique de nos méthodes de lutte contre la guerre, le travail de masse pour la défense de l'U.R.S.S., voilà la tâche dont nos cellules doivent s'emparer sans délai. Il n'en est pas de plus pressante à cette heure si grave.

Gabriel PERI.

Int. 18

Enclosure No. 22 to Despatch No. 1987  
of November 20, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'INTRANSIGEANT, November 18, 1931.

## Une solution pourra-t-elle être trouvée ?

### Le général Dawes suit les événements du dehors

Si la Société des Nations, par les deux précédentes sessions extraordinaires, n'avait pu qu'empêcher le conflit sino-japonais de s'envenimer, elle eût déjà fait quelque chose.

Elle a fait « ce quelque chose » dont parlait hier un délégué du Pérou et c'est à son actif. Elle ne pouvait faire ni plus ni mieux. Au moment du conflit bugaregrec, les circonstances n'étaient pas les mêmes et le succès de la S.D.N. était désiré non seulement par les puissances témoins de l'incident, mais surtout par la Grèce et la Bulgarie qui attendaient toutes deux cette providentielle intervention qui tirait l'une et l'autre d'un mauvais pas.

Que pourra faire, au cours de cette troisième session extraordinaire le Conseil de la S.D.N. ? Bien sûr par grand chose de plus qu'elle ne fit déjà, c'est-à-dire des recommandations de sagesse, de prudence et de patience aux uns et aux autres. C'est le maximum possible et c'est sans doute assez peu.

M. Briand, hier soir, en séance privée, le constatait pour le déplorer.

— Ah ! si l'Amérique voulait, disait le délégué du Guatemala, hier, après la séance publique. Mais l'Amérique voudra-t-elle ? Sans doute a-t-elle envoyé M. Dawes. L'ambassadeur américain à Londres suit les événements mais du dehors de la coulisse...

Il y a là une sorte de pas en arrière par rapport à l'invitation de siéger qui avait été acceptée le mois dernier en faveur de M. Prantiss Gilbert et qui d'ailleurs n'a jamais été traduite par une collaboration bien active. Serait-ce à dire qu'au lieu d'agir de concert avec les autres signataires du pacte Kellogg, les Etats-Unis reprendraient leur ligne d'action parallèle peut-être à celle de la S. D. N., mais indépendante et distincte ?

Ami personnel du général Dawes, l'ambassadeur du Japon à Londres, M. Matsudeira, assiste son collègue de Paris, M. Yoshizawa, qui reste à la tête de la délégation japonaise, tandis que le dossier de la Chine continue, comme à Genève, d'être plaidé par le docteur Sze.

Après les semaines qui se sont écoulées sans apporter autre chose que de nouveaux éléments de trouble, on se retrouve toujours en présence du même point de vue de droit pur, à savoir que rien n'autorisait le Japon à sortir de sa zone pour occuper Moukden, Kirin et s'avancer vers le nord. Le pacte de la S. D. N. n'admet pas qu'on se fasse ainsi justice à soi-même.

« — En droit pur, écrit le *Journal des Nations*, la Chine a parfaitement raison de refuser toute conversation sous la menace des canons japonais : l'évacuation d'abord, position juridiquement inexpugnable dans le cadre du Covenant. Et

... celle de recommencer ! C'est la vie...  
qui vellissent aux destins du « Gros Caill » :  
tion, il ne restera qu'une ressource à ceu-  
me, tant, parle d'abandonner la compéti-  
main, ce sera peut-être Deschamps. Et com-  
sionnel ; hier, c'était au tour d'ignat, de-  
L'autre jour, Comboudoux passait profes-  
lule amère.  
chantés, et ils avaient avec petite cette pi-  
Jolly et Royère ne sont pas autrement en-  
Jolly, mais il n'empêche que M. H. Robert  
phrases mots. Ce n'est pas la première  
ques heures une équilibre qu'ils ont montée en  
Gallou Sport, de voir disparaître en quel-  
que cela leur arrive, aux dirigeants du Gros  
Ah ! ce n'est certes pas la première fois  
admirable avec...

Int. 18

Enclosure No. 22 to Despatch No. 1937  
of November 20, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'INTRANSIGEANT, November 18, 1931.

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Un fait certain, c'est que le Conseil a pu constater hier soir, au Quai d'Orsay, que le point de vue de la Chine comme celui du Japon est resté inchangé.

Alors ?

On négocie ! On recommence les mêmes conversations de Genève. On implore les délégués de Pékin et de de Tokio et cependant ils ne peuvent rien ou presque rien. Pendant ce temps, les mitrailleuses continuent, elles aussi, à être en action de temps en temps.

Depuis 11 heures ce matin les « douze » siègent dans le bureau de M. Briand. La délibération est absolument secrète et il est impossible de savoir où on en est à l'heure où je vous M. Briand. La délibération est absolue où on en est à l'heure actuelle. Lord Cecil est sorti de séance à 1 h. 5 et M. von Bulow est sorti 5 minutes après.

La S.D.N. semble à présent craindre d'être entrée dans une impasse. Elle cherche avant d'aller de l'avant le moyen de faire machine arrière honorablement. Si elle le trouve tout de suite, la séance publique aura lieu aujourd'hui même. —

A. DE GOBART.

Enclosure No. 23 to Despatch No. 1987  
of November 20, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE JOURNAL, November 18, 1931.

## LE CONSEIL de la Société des Nations a poursuivi hier l'examen du conflit sino-japonais

La journée d'hier consacrée aux conversations particulières n'a pas enregistré ce qu'on pourrait appeler un progrès sérieux vers la solution du conflit sino-japonais. Cependant, elle a apporté des éclaircissements intéressants sur les dispositions des parties et sur des esquisses de combinaisons.

Le fait le plus important a été la longue conversation que M. Briand a eue, à la fin de la journée, avec l'ambassadeur du Japon à Paris, M. Yoshizawa. Cette conversation se rattache étroitement à la délibération secrète du conseil qui a eu lieu à la fin de la matinée, en dehors des parties en litige.

Au cours de cette séance, les membres du conseil ont constaté que le nœud du problème est la nature des traités conclus entre la Chine et le Japon. Le conflit est né du fait que, non seulement la Chine ne respecte pas ses traités, mais qu'elle conteste la validité de certains d'entre eux et qu'elle voudrait les remettre en question, sous prétexte de recourir à l'arbitrage. Au contraire, le Japon exige que la Chine reconnaisse de nouveau, formellement, la pleine validité de ces traités. Le Japon ne fait aucune distinction ; il réclame que la consécration nouvelle qui seule peut supprimer les contestations s'applique à tous les traités.

Au cours de la délibération secrète du conseil, il avait été entendu que M. Briand chercherait à obtenir du Japon des précisions sur ce point. En réalité, l'intervention de M. Briand, dans la conversation qu'il a eue avec M. Yoshizawa, a eu un caractère plus précis. Le président du conseil a esquissé ce que l'on pourrait appeler les bases d'un compromis. Il a suggéré l'idée que l'on pourrait faire une distinction entre les traités. Les traités concernant la sécurité de la vie et des biens des Japonais devraient être confirmés avant le retrait des troupes. Par contre, les traités concernant les avantages économiques, c'est-à-dire les constructions de chemins de fer, les exploitations de forêts en Mandchourie, ne feraient l'objet de négociations directes entre la Chine et le Japon qu'après le retrait des troupes.

La distinction est, à vrai dire, assez difficile à comprendre. En effet, la garantie de la sécurité de la vie et des biens des Japonais ne résulte pas de traités ; elle découle des devoirs que tout gouvernement d'un Etat organisé assume à l'égard des étrangers. C'est un principe fondamental du droit des gens. Par ailleurs, les biens des Japonais, qu'il s'agit de protéger, découlent, en partie au moins, du développement des traités économiques.

Il semble bien que l'idée de M. Briand soit de donner en fait satisfaction aux désirs des Japonais en laissant seulement aux Chinois une satisfaction de forme. Mais la formule envisagée ne semble pas répondre très exactement à l'intention. Elle est juste assez vague pour permettre toutes les équivoques.

Il n'apparaît pas que la délégation japonaise puisse accepter le projet tel qu'il est ; en tout cas, elle devrait demander des instructions à Tokio et il faudrait attendre la réponse avant d'aborder la rédaction d'un projet de résolution.

Voilà le bilan de l'activité du côté de la Société des Nations. Mais, en marge de la Société des Nations, il y a le général Dawes qui est loin de rester inactif. L'ambassadeur des Etats-Unis à Londres s'est entretenu avec le représentant de la Chine, le docteur Sze. Il a reçu aussi la visite de l'ambassadeur du Japon à Londres, M. Matsudaira, qui est peut-être le facteur le plus important de la négociation du côté japonais. Ce diplomate est allé également rendre visite à sir John Simon.

L'idée des Anglais et des Américains paraît être de tâcher de faire aboutir la combinaison des deux négociations parallèles : une négociation pour le règlement des différends politiques et une négociation sur l'évacuation. Le gouvernement japonais n'a rien fait encore qui permette de penser qu'il donne son adhésion à cette solution.

SAINT-BRICE.

Enclosure No. 24 to Despatch No. 1987  
of November 20, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE MATIN, November 18, 1931.

## LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS

Sécurité et respect des traités  
Tel fut hier, le sujet des discussions



De haut en bas : SIR JOHN SIMON  
(Angleterre) et M. DE BULOZ  
(Allemagne) arrivant au Quai-d'Orsay.

Discussions abstraites que celles auxquelles, soit en séance privée, soit au cours de conversations particulières, se sont livrés, hier, les membres du conseil de la S.D.N. et, toujours activement et utilement secondés dans les coulisses par le général Dawes, l'« observateur » américain.

D'ailleurs, on peut dire, sans aucune ironie, que l'importance indéniable de ces nouveaux échanges de vues est en

fonction directe de leur caractère abstrait. Aux animateurs de la négociation actuelle n'appartient-il pas, en effet, de trouver, de mettre sur pied une formule d'accord assez souple, mais aussi assez juste pour satisfaire à la fois Genève, le Japon et la Chine, pour n'humilier personne, plus exactement.

Or, un tel résultat ne saurait être obtenu qu'à une condition essentielle. Et cette condition, la voici : Il faut absolument que le conseil, loin de s'attarder aux conséquences, à l'interprétation de la « résolution » votée à Genève le 24 octobre dernier, celle qui fixait, par conséquent, un délai strict dans la forme à l'évacuation du territoire chinois par Tokio, celle, enfin, qui « tombe » irrémédiablement du fait que les Japonais ne l'ont pas acceptée, revienne, bon gré, mal gré, à son point de départ. En d'autres termes, il faut absolument que le conseil revienne à son texte du 30 septembre qui, on s'en souvient, avait été adopté à l'unanimité de ses membres, les représentants de la Chine et du Japon y compris.

Pourquoi, demandera-t-on, le texte en question avait-il contenté tout le monde ? Il avait contenté tout le monde pour la bonne raison qu'il y était clairement spécifié que la fin de l'occupation en Mandchourie devait dépendre et de la sécurité et du respect des traités. A ce moment-là, Nankin avait fait dire : « oui », parce que l'on ne voit pas comment il aurait été à même d'affirmer officiellement son intention de répudier les traités.

D'autre part, le gouvernement japonais n'avait aucun motif de repousser une « résolution » qui lui apportait les garanties nécessaires.

C'est donc plus tard que les difficultés sont venues. Elles sont venues précisément dès l'instant où le conseil, désirant aller vite en besogne et ne se souciant, selon le droit, que de la fin de l'occupation, a pensé qu'il était préférable d'escamoter du concept « sécurité » le respect des traités, ce dernier point promettant de donner lieu à des pourparlers interminables (projet du 24 février et qui a obtenu le sort que l'on sait).

On aperçoit ainsi la marche arrière que le conseil, à l'instigation de M. Briand, de M. Scialoja et de Sir John Simon, s'appête à exécuter avec toute la discrétion nécessaire. Au demeurant, nous indiquerons franchement qu'il y a déjà eu, dans ce sens, un très net commencement d'exécution. A M. Matsudeira, ambassadeur du Japon à Londres et qui collabore présentement à Paris avec M. Yoshizawa, le général Dawes a, dès hier soir, exposé les nouvelles directives du conseil.

« La sécurité et le respect des traités sont choses étroitement liées, associées, aurait déclaré l'« observateur » des Etats-Unis à son éminent interlocuteur. Partant de ce principe, il « nous » importe maintenant de savoir quels sont exactement les traités que vous entendez invoquer. Donnez-nous, à ce sujet, les indications indispensables. Ensuite, nous aviserons. »

Du côté chinois, voyons la réaction : Le docteur Sze va certainement soutenir que certains des contrats auxquels les Japonais se réfèrent ont été signés dans des conditions spéciales.

A quoi, du reste, on peut répondre en disant que ces traités n'en existent pas moins, puisque, durant quelques années, la Chine les a respectés.

Telle est la situation. Mais la solution du conflit demandera encore du temps et beaucoup de patience.

Document 18

Enclosure No. 25 to Despatch No. 1987  
of November 20, 1931.

From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ŒUVRE, November 18, 1931.

#### LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS

### LE CONSEIL DE LA S.D.N. s'est réuni hier en séance privée

Il attend, avant la réunion de ce matin,  
"certaines précisions"

Le communiqué qu'on lira d'autre part, publié à l'issue de la séance privée tenue hier matin par le Conseil de la Société des Nations, expose que ledit Conseil s'est ajourné à aujourd'hui 11 heures, dans l'attente « de certaines précisions qui ont été demandées ».

Demandées à qui ?

Apparemment au Japon.

Depuis des semaines, en effet, celui-ci, à toutes les propositions qu'on lui fait ou qu'on lui transmet touchant les garanties de sécurité en Mandchourie ou la reconnaissance par la Chine de certains droits qu'il prétend tenir des « traités » — desquels ? car ils sont très nombreux, — répond régulièrement que ces propositions sont insuffisantes.

Or à ceux qui allèguent que la formule de « l'exécution des traités », dont le Japon a fait son cheval de bataille, est une « formule vague », notre confrère Saint-Brice, du *Journal*, assurait l'autre jour que « le Japon ne serait certainement pas embarrassé pour la préciser ».

C'est justement ce qu'on lui demande de faire.

Mais comment le Japon ne se sentait-il pas encouragé dans une attitude d'intransigeance par le ton de certaine presse française ou anglaise ?

Il y a des gens, répétons-le, qui agissent exactement comme s'ils souhaitaient voir le conflit s'aggraver.

La raison ? Un journal financier ne nous la fournit-il pas, qui écrivait le 13 novembre :

*« Il semble que les entreprises indo-chinoises aient beaucoup plus à gagner qu'à perdre à une extension du conflit japonais. Les guerres n'ont jamais enrichi les belligérants, mais elles ont toujours très largement profité aux pays voisins, qui y trouvent une excellente occasion de se ménager des débouchés abondants et rémunérateurs. »*

Il est vrai qu'on pouvait lire dans le même numéro cet effarant commentaire sur la « bonne tenue » de certaines valeurs :

*« Les entreprises d'armements travaillant pour la Défense nationale tournent à plein. Cette situation s'explique parfaitement par l'imminence de la Conférence du désarmement de février prochain, les Etats ayant intérêt, en effet, à s'armer au maximum, puisqu'on ne désarme jamais que sur la base acquise. »*

*« Dans cet ordre d'idées, Hotchkiss est particulièrement favorisé. Les achats discrets dont bénéficie le titre depuis un certain temps laissent entrevoir une hausse sensible des cours à brève échéance. »*

Avec une guerre immédiate en Extrême-Orient, la hausse deviendrait vite, n'est-ce pas ? une vertigineuse ascension.

Et il n'est pas jusqu'à un grand quotidien de province, le *Journal du Havre*, qui n'écrive :

*« Toute question de sentimentalité mise à part, cette guerre, on ne saurait le nier, pourrait ramener la prospérité par la consommation qu'elle susciterait. »*

On raisonnait déjà comme cela au moment de ces guerres balkaniques dont la dernière fut... la guerre de 1914.

Mais quand on affirmera devant

October 18

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From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'OUVRE, November 18, 1931.

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Et il n'est pas jusqu'à un grand quotidien de province, le *Journal du Havre*, qui n'écrive :

*« Toute question de sentimentalité mise à part, cette guerre, on ne saurait le nier, pourrait ramener la prospérité par la consommation qu'elle susciterait. »*

On raisonnait déjà comme cela au moment de ces guerres balkaniques dont la dernière fut... la guerre de 1914.

Mais quand on affirmera devant vous qu'en l'affaire actuelle, le Japon « représente la civilisation », vous saurez désormais ce que ça veut dire.

Jean Plot.



Enclosure No. 26 to Despatch No. 1987  
of November 20, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE PETIT PARISIEN, November 18, 1931.

## LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS

### Le conseil de la S. D. N. a tenu hier une séance secrète en l'absence des parties

Des précisions demandées à  
la délégation japonaise con-  
cernant le cinquième point  
de ses revendications fon-  
damentales ont été partiel-  
lement fournies, en fin d'a-  
près-midi, par M. Yoshizawa  
à M. Aristide Briand

Les membres du conseil de la Société  
des nations autres que les représen-  
tants des parties, ont procédé, ce matin,  
à un échange de vues. Ils ont été d'ac-  
cord que, dans l'état actuel de la ques-  
tion et en vue d'obtenir certaines  
précisions qui ont été demandées, leur  
prochaine réunion n'aurait lieu que  
demain matin, à 11 heures.

Au cours de cette réunion, les mem-  
bres du conseil s'occuperont de fixer  
la date de la prochaine séance publique  
du conseil.

Tel est le bref communiqué fait à  
la presse, au début de l'après-midi  
d'hier, à l'issue de la réunion secrète  
que les douze membres du conseil —  
Chine et Japon non compris — ve-  
naient de tenir, de 11 h. 45 à 12 h. 45,  
au Quai d'Orsay.

La convocation adressée dans la  
matinée à chacun des intéressés les  
priait simplement, au nom du prési-  
dent, de venir prendre part, au minis-  
tère des Affaires étrangères, à « un  
échange de vues ». S'il y eut effecti-  
vement échange de vues — auquel  
participèrent d'ailleurs principalement  
le secrétaire d'Etat britannique au  
Foreign Office, sir John Simon, et le  
délégué de l'Italie, M. Scialoja, — la  
plus grande partie de la séance fut,  
comme lundi, occupée par un exposé  
de M. Briand.

Lorsque avait pris fin, la veille, la  
précédente réunion privée, le ministre  
français avait successivement reçu,  
dans son cabinet, les représentants  
des deux gouvernements aux prises :  
M. Yoshizawa et le Dr Sze. Au cours  
de ces entretiens, il n'avait pas seule-  
ment fait appel à leur esprit de conci-  
liation, mais il s'était efforcé de faire  
préciser par chacun d'eux leurs points  
de désaccord et les propositions  
concrètes qu'ils seraient prêts à for-  
muler pour faire disparaître ces diver-  
gences. Le ministre français des  
Affaires étrangères, dont tous les  
efforts tendent, on le voit, à circons-  
crire de plus en plus les causes de  
mécontentement, désirait, naturellement,  
mettre ses collègues au courant de  
ces conversations et de leurs résultats.

Ces derniers, autant que nous en  
pouvons juger par ce qui nous a été  
rapporté, étant plutôt maigres et les  
précisions fournies par les intéressés  
plutôt insuffisantes, M. Briand sug-  
géra de demander notamment à la  
délégation japonaise d'exposer en dé-  
tail les revendications qu'englobe le  
cinquième point fondamental mis en  
avant par le gouvernement de Tokio  
dans sa déclaration du 26 octobre. Ce  
cinquième point a trait, on le sait, au  
« respect des droits concédés au Japon  
par les traités en Mandchourie ». Les  
membres présents du conseil ont  
estimé avec leur président, dont ils  
ont pleinement approuvé l'initiative,  
que cette formule était vraiment trop  
vague et qu'il convenait de faire indi-  
quer exactement de quels traités il  
s'agit.

Ce point fixé, ils ont été d'avis, tou-  
jours avec M. Briand, que si, parmi ces  
traités, certains ne sont pas sans liai-  
son avec les questions de sécurité qui  
font l'objet des quatre premiers points  
fondamentaux japonais, au sujet des-  
quels il ne saurait y avoir de diver-  
gences de vues sérieuses, certains  
autres, en revanche, pouvaient avoir  
trait à des questions — d'ordre éco-  
nomique ou politique, par exemple —  
n'ayant que des rapports extrêmement  
lointains avec les garanties que le  
cabinet de Tokio peut légitimement  
réclamer comme condition du retrait  
de ses troupes. Il est évident que cer-  
tains droits d'ordre économique n'ont  
rien à voir avec la protection des biens  
et des ressortissants japonais et que  
ce serait compliquer singulièrement  
les choses que de laisser à ce point  
élargir le débat.

Ainsi donc, ce sont ces explications  
que M. Yoshizawa a été, peu après,  
prié de donner au conseil dans l'espoir,  
d'ailleurs, non seulement de



M. Lerroux

de construire un chemin de fer de  
Kainai à Kirin.

C'est enfin le traité de 1915 qui, sur  
vingt et une demandes adressées à la  
Chine par le cabinet de Tokio, faisait  
droit à sept d'entre elles, et dont le  
gouvernement chinois, bien qu'il ait été  
signé et ratifié, voudrait aujourd'hui  
contester la validité.

Nous avons signalé hier que c'était  
là le point essentiel du différend actuel  
et nous avons montré le précédent fâ-  
cheux que risquerait de créer l'admis-  
sion de cette prétention chinoise ou  
même le renvoi de la question à un  
arbitrage, fût-ce celui de la Cour de  
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que M. Yoshizawa a été, peu après,  
prié de donner au conseil dans l'espoir,  
fondé d'ailleurs, non seulement de  
restreindre davantage encore le champ  
des divergences, mais d'accroître, par  
là-même, les chances de rapproche-  
ment entre les deux parties. Le chef  
de la délégation japonaise, dont  
M. Briand reconnaissait lundi qu'il  
l'avait toujours trouvé prêt à lui four-  
nir les éclaircissements désirables, n'a  
pas tardé à répondre à l'appel qui lui  
était adressé. Dès 18 heures, il était  
au Quai d'Orsay et, au cours d'une  
conversation de quarante-cinq minutes,  
donnait au ministre français, à peine  
rentré de la Chambre, quelques-unes  
des précisions souhaitées.

Ces précisions concernent tout par-  
ticulièrement les traités concédant au  
Japon des droits en Mandchourie et  
dont Tokio réclame la stricte exécution  
comme condition du repli de ses  
troupes d'occupation dans la zone du  
chemin de fer soumise à leur contrôle.  
Ces traités, nous assure-t-on, ne sont  
qu'au nombre de trois. C'est d'abord  
le traité du 22 décembre 1905 et le  
protocole de Pékin d'avril 1906 qui y  
est attaché, le premier transférant  
au Japon les droits que possédait la  
Russie — avant sa guerre malheureuse  
avec les Japonais et la paix de Ports-  
mouth qui en fut la conclusion — sur  
la presqu'île de Liao-Toung et le che-  
min de fer de Tchang-Tchoun à Port-  
Arthur, le second réglant toute une  
série de questions relatives à ce che-  
min de fer, appelé plus tard Sud-  
Mandchourien, et interdisant notam-  
ment à la Chine la construction  
d'aucune grande ligne voisine et paral-  
lèle susceptible par suite de nuire à  
ses intérêts.

C'est ensuite le traité du 4 septem-  
bre 1909, dit traité de Chientao, qui  
ouvrait aux étrangers, et en particu-  
lier aux Japonais, la région voisine de  
la frontière coréenne et accordait au  
Japon, outre certains droits de protec-  
tion pour ses ressortissants, le droit



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1995

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

On comprendra que le Japon insiste pour le strict respect de cet instrument diplomatique quand on saura qu'il renouvelle et porte à quatre-vingt-dix-neuf ans la durée du bail de la presqu'île de Liao-Toung où se trouvent Port-Arthur et Dairen (ancien Dalny), qu'il renouvelle de même et pour la même durée la concession du Sud-Mandchourien et du chemin de fer Moukden-Antoung et enfin qu'il reconnaît aux ressortissants japonais des droits commerciaux, agricoles, miniers, industriels et de résidence non seulement dans la Mandchourie du Sud, mais même dans la Mongolie orientale. On voit, en effet, l'importance qu'il présente pour un pays qui a fait, dans ces régions, les sacrifices et les efforts considérables consentis par le Japon.

Voilà ce qu'a très vraisemblablement exposé en détail M. Yoshizawa à M. Briand. En revanche, il a été certainement moins précis en ce qui concerne la distinction qu'on lui demandait de faire entre ceux de ces traités qui intéressent exclusivement la sécurité des biens et des sujets japonais, et dont la reconnaissance peut raisonnablement conditionner le retrait des troupes, et ceux qui ne visent que des droits ou des avantages d'ordre économique. A cet égard, nous croyons savoir que le chef de la délégation japonaise — qui a sollicité l'avis du gouvernement de Tokio — a réservé sa réponse définitive.

Quoi qu'il en soit, il est clair qu'un léger progrès a été ainsi accompli et que ce matin, à 11 heures, quand le conseil se réunira à nouveau en séance privée, il lui sera possible de serrer davantage le problème et d'en entrevoir peut-être plus nettement la solution éventuelle. Peut-être aussi les nombreuses conversations particulières qui ont eu lieu au cours de l'après-midi d'hier, et qui ont mis notamment en présence, à 16 heures, à l'hôtel Ritz, M. Matsudeira et le général Dawes, et, à 17 heures, à l'ambassade de Grande-Bretagne, M. Matsudeira et sir John Simon, auront-elles, de leur côté, contribué à éclaircir un peu la situation...

POP. 18

Enclosure No. 27 to Despatch No. 1987  
of November 20, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE POPULAIRE, November 18, 1931.

#### LA GUERRE EN MANDCHOURIE

### LE CONSEIL DE LA S. D. N. SE REUNIRA AUJOURD'HUI pour fixer sa prochaine séance publique

Hier, les membres du Conseil  
ont converse en l'absence des parties  
intéressées

On cause dans les coulisses. Sir Eric Drummond, le secrétaire général de la S.D.N., voit les uns et voit les autres. M. Aristide Briand écoute le Chinois et écoute le Japonais. Le général Dawes qui représente les Etats-Unis et sir John Simon, qui dirige depuis peu de semaines le Foreign Office à Londres, étudient les dossiers et s'entre-tiennent avec les « techniciens » des questions asiatiques.


Personne ne saura dire ce qui se passera à la prochaine séance publique du Conseil qui doit être fixée ce matin, en séance privée.

Le représentant de la Chine, le Dr Alfred Sze, se déclare prêt à accepter le renvoi des questions litigieuses devant la Cour de La Haye. Il n'a pas manqué de le dire au général Dawes et à Sir John Simon, qui essayeront sans doute d'amener le Japon à imiter cet exemple.

Mais en attendant, les trois ambassadeurs japonais, qui représentent le gouvernement de Tokio dans les négociations, qui ont lieu sous l'auspice du Conseil de la S. D. N., ne paraissent manifester nulle envie d'aller devant la Cour de La Haye — qui est cependant présidée actuellement par un juge japonais — pour savoir si les « accords » sino-japonais de 1905 concernant les chemins de fer mandchous, doivent être considérés comme juridiquement valables.

Tokio déclare « vouloir respecter » le pacte Briand-Kellogg! Nankin et le général Ma déclarent qu'ils ne désirent nullement se battre! Mais on se bat!

Le moment viendra où le Conseil, dans son ensemble, se verra obligé de



La foule devant le ministère  
des Affaires étrangères.

faire des propositions concrètes. Il est compréhensible qu'il fasse encore un effort pour rapprocher les points de vue de la Chine et du Japon avant de fixer, devant l'opinion publique mondiale, les responsabilités incombant aux uns ou aux autres. En dernier lieu, il ne pourra cependant pas esquiver ce devoir primordial.

S. G.

Milton O. Gustafson

12-18-75

## Le Conseil de la S. D. N. attend que le Japon lui apporte des précisions sur un projet de compromis




Photo Wide World. — Clôché Quotidien.

**LE DOCTEUR SZE**  
arrivant hier matin au Quai d'Orsay

La deuxième journée de la session du Conseil de la S. D. N. s'est passée en conversations et réunions privées qui n'ont pas, jusqu'à présent, beaucoup éclairci le ciel plutôt gris du Quai d'Orsay.

Gris et morne... car plus d'un observateur entrevoit, avec pessimisme et douleur, un échec pour la S. D. N. au bout de toutes ces négociations.

Telle est l'atmosphère, du moins jusqu'à présent, et bien des gens à mine attristée portent déjà, sans grand courage, le deuil des trop vastes espoirs qu'avait fait naître l'expectation de l'organisme de Genève.

Comme il ne semble plus possible de trancher le conflit par une de ces décisions d'autorité — ou de bon sens — devant lesquelles chacun s'incline, la principale préoccupation, ainsi que nous le disions hier, est maintenant de « sauver la face » et de permettre aux partis en cause de s'en sortir par un compromis qui, tout en n'ayant rien réglé, aura l'air d'avoir arrangé quelque chose.

C'est pourquoi l'on a adopté, au Conseil, le système des entretiens et des réunions privées où il est possible de discuter, de concéder ou de se reprendre, sans s'exposer à des commentaires d'une opinion publique peu apte, souvent, à saisir les nuances de certaines choses.

Pour qui lira avec attention le communiqué officiel d'hier, un membre de phrase mérite de retenir l'attention : c'est celui où il est dit que « certaines précisions ont été demandées ».

A quoi ? Sur quoi ? Tâchons d'éclaircir le mystère.

Il y a quelques jours, à Londres, ont lieu une conférence réunissant autour de la même table trois hautes personnalités : le général Baues, ambassadeur des Etats-Unis ; M. Matsubara, ambassadeur au Japon, et sir John Simon, ministre des Affaires étrangères. Les trois interlocuteurs élaborèrent un projet de compromis dont le texte fut immédiatement expédié à Tokio, car il appartient, en définitive, au gouvernement nippon, de se prononcer sur ces propositions premières.

C'est ce projet, reçu à Paris, auquel il a été déjà fait allusion dans la presse, et que connaît sans nul doute M. Briand, lequel se déclarait, lundi, d'accord avec le général Baues.

La réponse de Tokio se fait attendre. Le Conseil, en l'attendant, regarde à l'horizon.

Mais on comprend que Tokio veuille gagner du temps... afin de ne rien lâcher des atouts qu'il a mis dans son jeu.

Sur la question du « principe » — point fondamental — respect des traités, l'équation sera longue à faire. La Chine présente à peu près de la sorte : « Que le Japon retire ses troupes des régions où les traités ne lui donnent pas droit d'arrêter, qu'il respecte lui-même son engagement point. A quoi le Japon ? C'est précisément la violation, par les Chinois, des droits que nous avons obtenus dans ces régions qui nous a obligés d'intervenir. »

Le Conseil aura bien du mal à accomplir tout cela. Et pourtant, il faut — et l'on désire — en finir, sans avoir l'impression d'avoir échoué.

1998

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TEMPS 18

Enclosure No. 29 to Despatch No. 1987  
of November 20, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE TEMPS, November 18, 1931.

#### LA SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS ET LE DIFFÉREND SINO-JAPONAIS

Le conseil de la Société des nations s'est réuni hier dans les conditions prévues pour procéder à un nouvel examen du différend sino-japonais. Cette première séance publique a été consacrée à l'exposé du président en exercice, M. Briand, puis il a été décidé d'avoir recours à des réunions privées et à des conversations particulières avant d'aborder le fond du problème dans une nouvelle séance publique.

Cette méthode offre des avantages. Il est certain que moins on discutera publiquement des questions aussi délicates que celles dont dépend un accord sino-japonais, plus sûrement on facilitera l'évolution nécessaire de l'attitude prise par deux gouvernements très préoccupés l'un et l'autre de sauver la face pour leurs deux politiques et qui redoutent les réactions dans leurs pays respectifs d'une opinion fort excitée à propos des événements de Mandchourie. La méthode des conversations particulières convient tout particulièrement pour user les résistances, tout en ménageant l'ambur-propre de chacun et préparer ainsi le terrain à un honnête compromis. C'est dans ce sens que doit travailler le conseil de la Société des nations et non pas, comme le voudraient certains, en précisant la menace d'une intervention qu'il serait d'ailleurs pratiquement impossible d'exécuter avec succès.

M. Briand a fait le point dans son exposé en constatant que des cinq conditions fondamentales fixées par le Japon pour un règlement avec la Chine, quatre se trouvent inscrites dans la résolution du conseil du 24 octobre, la cinquième seule restant en discussion. Cette dernière est celle de la confirmation formelle par la Chine des traités existants, notamment du traité de 1915. Or, d'une communication faite par le représentant de la Chine, au nom de son gouvernement, lors de la précédente session du conseil, il résulte que la Chine affirme sa volonté de respecter les traités, ainsi que l'exige d'ailleurs l'engagement général qu'elle a pris en entrant à la Société des nations. Y a-t-il là un biais de nature à faciliter un accord? Le Japon voudra sans doute obtenir une confirmation plus directe et plus précise. Quant à savoir si un recours à l'arbitrage est possible dans le cas actuel, comme on le suggère de différents côtés, la question est très délicate. Il ne serait pas sans inconvénient, à un point de vue général, d'admettre que l'on pût se prononcer par simple voie d'arbitrage sur la validité de traités signés et ratifiés par les puissances qui y sont parties. Le précédent serait dangereux. En raison du désordre politique qui règne en Chine, de la campagne antijaponaise qui s'y développe et des excès en Mandchourie et à Tien-Tsin d'éléments sans responsabilités mais encouragés à toutes les violences contre les Nippons, on comprend parfaitement que le Japon réclame de la Chine l'engagement formel de respecter les traités par lesquels des droits spéciaux lui ont été reconnus en Mandchourie.

C'est là évidemment le point sur lequel l'accord sera le plus difficile à réaliser, l'opinion publique au Japon ne permettant pas au gouvernement de Tokio de transiger sur le principe de la confirmation des traités et l'état des esprits en Chine rendant très difficile au gouvernement de Nankin de souscrire à cette condition. Les conversations particulières qui ont lieu actuellement permettront-elles de trouver un terrain d'entente? On veut l'espérer. M. Briand et sir John Simon s'y emploient activement et il est certain que le général Dawes, bien que s'en tenant scrupuleusement à son rôle d'observateur,

usera de toute l'influence des Etats-Unis pour faciliter la conciliation. Ce qu'on peut tenir pour acquis, c'est que personne ne songe à engager le conseil de la Société dans une voie où il se heurterait à coup sûr à l'opposition irréductible du Japon, avec, comme conséquence possible, la retraite de cette puissance de l'institution internationale de Genève. Le conseil a été saisi du différend sino-japonais en vertu de l'article 11 du pacte qui dit que « toute guerre ou menace de guerre, qu'elle affecte directement ou non l'un des membres de la Société, intéresse la Société tout entière et que celle-ci doit prendre les mesures propres à sauvegarder efficacement la paix des nations ». La tâche du conseil consiste donc uniquement à sauvegarder la paix et il ne saurait être question d'étendre son intervention en invoquant les stipulations de l'article 15 du pacte.

L'impression existe que, du côté chinois, on a laissé se compliquer la situation parce qu'on y attendait de l'initiative du conseil de la Société des nations plus que celle-ci ne peut raisonnablement donner et parce qu'on y espérait que le conseil exercerait sur le Japon une telle pression que le gouvernement de Tokio devrait céder devant la menace d'un recours à des mesures extraordinaires. Ceux qui ont encouragé la Chine dans de telles illusions sont responsables en grande partie des difficultés avec lesquelles on se trouve aux prises actuellement. A aucun moment le conseil de la Société des nations n'a orienté son action dans ce sens; pas un instant, il n'a songé à sortir du rôle qui doit être le sien aux termes de l'article 11 du pacte, rôle tout de conciliation, de tact et de mesure, ayant pour objet non pas de généraliser un conflit de caractère purement local en provoquant l'intervention de tierces puissances, mais d'empêcher qu'un tel différend ne dégénère en guerre déclarée et de favoriser son règlement pacifique par l'ouverture de négociations directes entre les deux parties en cause.

Les violents incidents de ces dernières semaines semblent bien avoir été provoqués dans le dessein de placer le conseil devant une situation de fait nouvelle, lui imposant de prendre d'autres mesures que celles prises jusqu'ici et qui n'ont pas produit tous les effets qu'on en attendait. Du moins est-on porté à penser que c'est dans ce sens que d'aucuns ont voulu exploiter les événements de Mandchourie avec toutes les menaces de guerre sino-japonaise et de complications russo-japonaises qu'ils pouvaient comporter. Le conseil de la Société des nations ne se laissera pas égarer par ces manœuvres obliques et saura s'en tenir aux réalités avec lesquelles il faut toujours compter si on veut pratiquer une politique de paix véritablement féconde. La réalité la plus certaine, la plus évidente ici, c'est que le Japon tient des traités des droits spéciaux en Mandchourie, droits qu'il n'abandonnera pas, et que le règlement de son différend avec la Chine doit donc s'adapter équitablement au respect de ces droits comme à l'engagement pris par le gouvernement de Tokio d'évacuer les localités chinoises encore occupées dès que la sécurité des ressortissants nippons y sera garantie. Il ne doit pas être impossible de trouver une solution de la crise sur ces bases, et maintenant que l'on a le sentiment que le conseil de la Société des nations ne poussera pas plus loin son intervention que ne le lui commande l'article 11 du pacte, il est probable qu'on sera davantage disposé à la conciliation du côté chinois. Les excuses présentées par le commandant des troupes chinoises à Tien-Tsin au commandant des forces nippones dans cette ville pour les actes d'hostilité commis contre la concession japonaise et la nouvelle que le général Ma Tchang Chan serait disposé à souscrire aux conditions du général japonais Honjo pour mettre fin aux hostilités dans la région de la rivière Nonni constituent des indications intéressantes sous ce rapport.

act. 19  
Enclosure No. 30 to Despatch No. 1987  
of November 20, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from ACTUALITES, November 19, 1931.

## La Mandchourie moderne

Par M. A LE PAGE

Au moment où le Conseil de la Société des Nations est réuni à Paris pour rechercher, une fois de plus, les moyens d'apaiser le conflit sino-japonais, il n'est pas sans intérêt de connaître la situation exacte de la Mandchourie moderne, au double point de vue politique et économique.

Il faut, tout d'abord, rappeler que la Mandchourie, dans le cours de l'histoire chinoise, a eu constamment un sort distinct de celui de la Chine proprement dite ; c'était un territoire tributaire, habité par une population spéciale et jouissant d'une sorte d'autonomie, sous l'autorité de gouverneurs d'origine mandchoue.

Le traité de Shimonoseki (17 avril 1895), qui mit fin à la guerre sino-japonaise, céda au Japon la presqu'île de Liaotoung, au Sud de la province de Moukden ; mais, sur l'intervention de la Russie, le Japon dut renoncer à cette cession. En 1896, la Chine concédait à la Russie le droit de construire en Mandchourie le chemin de fer de l'Est-Chinois. En 1898, elle lui donnait à bail, pour une durée de vingt-cinq ans, l'extrémité de la presqu'île de Liaotoung (Dalny-Dairen et Port-Arthur).

Le traité de Portsmouth, qui mit fin à la guerre russo-japonaise (5 septembre 1905), céda au Japon, sous réserve du consentement de la Chine, le bail de la presqu'île de Liaotoung ainsi que le chemin de fer de Changchun à Port-Arthur (Chemin de Fer Sud-Mandchourien). Le 22 décembre 1905, un traité sino-japonais donna le consentement de la Chine à ces cessions. En 1915, un nouveau traité intervint entre la Chine et le Japon, qui avait exigé certaines améliorations à son statut en Mandchourie. C'est ainsi, notamment, que le bail de la presqu'île de Liaotoung et la concession du Chemin de Fer Sud-Mandchourien furent portés à 99 ans et que les ressortissants japonais obtinrent le droit de résider, de faire du commerce et d'exploiter des entreprises agricoles ou industrielles en Mandchourie du Sud. Tel est, en résumé, le point de départ de l'action du Japon en Mandchourie.

Lorsque le Japon y prit pied, cette grande province, dont la superficie égale environ celles de la France et de l'Italie réunies, était fort pauvre, habitée par une population clairsemée, manquait de moyens de communications et l'industrie y était à peu près inexistante.

Depuis 1905, la population a presque doublé et s'élève actuellement à 29.200.000 habitants. La densité de la population qui est de 76 par mille carré, hors de la zone japonaise, atteint, dans cette zone 875 par mille carré.

Le développement des voies ferrées a été particulièrement rapide ; alors qu'en Chine il n'a été construit, depuis 1877, que 8.320 kilomètres de chemins de fer, il a été établi en Mandchourie, depuis 1897, 5.920 kilomètres, dont 1.750 de chemins de fer sino-russes, 1.104 de chemins de fer japonais, 140 de chemins de fer sino-japonais et 2.880 de chemins de fer chinois.

Le port de Dairen, qui a coûté 68 millions de yen (816 millions de francs), est devenu le second port d'Extrême-Orient ; le mouvement y a été en 1929 de 8.211 navires, totalisant 14 millions de tonnes, avec un commerce de 508 millions de yen (6 milliards de francs).

Les richesses minières ont été systématiquement exploitées : les mines de charbon de Fushun et Yentai produisent environ 30.000 tonnes par jour ; les mines de fer de Penhsihu et d'Anshan permettent de produire annuellement 250.000 tonnes de fonte. La production agricole a doublé au cours des quinze dernières années.

Tous ces résultats sont démontrés clairement par les chiffres du commerce extérieur ; en 1907, les importations représentaient une valeur de 30 millions 685.000 taëls (valeur du taël en 1929 : 16 fr. 43) contre 22.042.000 taëls aux exportations ; la balance était donc déficitaire de plus de 8.500.000 taëls. En 1929, les importations se sont élevées à 329.604.000 taëls et les exportations à 425.661.000 taëls, ce qui représente un commerce total de 755.225.000 taëls au lieu de 52.727.000 en 1907 et une balance en excédent de 96 millions de taëls.

Il est indiscutable que les progrès accomplis sont dus en grande partie aux Japonais qui, depuis vingt-cinq ans, ont investi en Mandchourie plus de 1.500 millions de yen, soit environ 21 milliards de francs. Ils ont puissamment contribué, notamment, au développement des voies ferrées et des ports, ainsi qu'à l'amélioration des conditions d'existence, par l'établissement d'adductions d'eau dans les villes, la création d'écoles et d'hôpitaux.

Aussi l'immigration s'est-elle développée en Mandchourie, où les Chinois eux-mêmes viennent chaque année en nombre considérable ; c'est ce qui explique l'accroissement rapide de la population dans ces vingt dernières années.

De tout ce qui précède, il ressort nettement que la Mandchourie, grâce à l'activité japonaise, est en bonne voie de se moderniser et de parvenir au point de développement que doivent lui assurer ses richesses industrielles et agricoles. Cette transformation, si elle doit bénéficier en premier lieu au Japon, n'est pas sans importance pour les autres nations étrangères, dont certaines, comme l'Angleterre et les Etats-Unis, ont vu, en vingt ans, s'accroître dans des proportions considérables le chiffre de leur commerce avec la Mandchourie.

On comprend mieux, dans ces conditions, que le Japon, menacé par l'envahissement du désordre chinois dans la province — peut-être avec la complicité des Soviets — et par une agitation anti-japonaise allant jusqu'au « boycottage » des produits japonais, soit intervenu énergiquement pour sauvegarder, en même temps que les biens et la vie de ses ressortissants, l'avenir de l'œuvre économique entreprise pour moderniser la Mandchourie.

« Actualités. ».

A. Le Page.



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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ECHO DE PARIS, November 19, 1931.

#### LA DETRESSE DU CONSEIL DE LA S.D.N.

### Entre le Japon et la Chine l'abîme s'élargit

Il importe d'enregistrer aussi exactement que possible les divagations du conseil de la Société des Nations aux prises avec l'affaire sino-japonaise, car ce qu'il fait et ce qu'il ne fait pas nous éclairent mieux que les plus savants raisonnements sur son incapacité et sa faiblesse. A coup sûr, des hommes intelligents se rencontrent autour de la table du conseil. Pris ensemble, ils ne sont qu'une masse faible et moutonnaire.

A ceux qui éprouvent encore des doutes sur le fond de l'affaire, nous recommandons la lettre de Shanghai publiée dans le numéro du Times du 18 novembre. Ils y verront, sur la foi d'un témoin averti, combien il est absurde de considérer la Chine comme un pays organisé comparable aux autres pays qui députent à Genève. La Chine peut être une civilisation, une opinion publique et un mouvement nationaliste. Elle est aussi une anarchie et, quotidiennement, les gouvernements étrangers se reconnaissent le droit d'aviser par leurs propres forces à la défense de leurs nationaux. En ce moment même, ils contestent la prétention des ministres de Nankin de prendre sous leur autorité, à la date du 1<sup>er</sup> janvier, les concessions de Shanghai. En ce moment même, ils entretiennent sur le Yang-tsé-Kiang des navires de guerre et des corps de débarquement. Alors pourquoi parler et agir comme si, en Mandchourie, la Chine était à même de défendre les personnes et les biens japonais ? La vérité est que la Chine n'est pas à sa place dans la Société des Nations. Elle n'a pas de frontières certaines, elle n'est pas capable d'exécuter ses obligations internationales. Elle ne figure dans l'assemblée et, à plus forte raison dans le conseil, que par une fiction.

De cette erreur fondamentale, l'admission dans l'établissement genevois d'une Chine nébuleuse, proviennent les difficultés inextricables dans lesquelles le conseil se débat aujourd'hui. Parce que la Chine siège dans la Société des Nations, le conseil s'entête à lui appliquer des règles et des raisonnements qui répugnent à la nature des choses. Et le Japon, il va sans dire, n'accepte pas que la nature des choses soit violentée à son détriment.

Hier, en séance dite secrète, M. Yoshizawa, le représentant du gouvernement de Tokio, a établi: 1<sup>o</sup> Que les « cinq points fondamentaux » énoncés dans la note japonaise du 26 octobre n'étaient que de simples têtes de chapitres et que les chapitres seraient remplis au cours des pourparlers directs avec Nankin; 2<sup>o</sup> Que le Japon ne rappellerait ses soldats dans la zone du sud-mandchourien qu'une fois les traités en vigueur acceptés derechef par la Chine et qu'une fois donnée la preuve tangible que le gouvernement chinois est à même d'observer ses engagements.

Ces déclarations très nettes de M. Yoshizawa ont réduit à néant les fragiles combinaisons édifiées par M. Briand sur les textes péniblement agencés par le Conseil, le 30 septembre et le 22 octobre. Quiconque connaît l'état réel des affaires mandchouriennes ne pouvait attendre du Japon une autre attitude.

Dans la même séance, le délégué de la Chine, M. Sze, a, bien entendu, poussé le Conseil à poursuivre le déroulement logique de la procédure et, puisque l'article 11 du Covenant (action du conseil pour arrêter des menaces de guerre) s'est révélé futile, à porter l'affaire sur le terrain de l'article 15 (règlement pacifique des conflits) et de l'article 16 qui édicte des sanctions. M. Sze n'a pas encore demandé formellement l'application de ces deux articles, mais il a menacé de présenter, demain, une requête formelle. Chemin faisant, il a déclaré que son pays n'achèterait point l'évacuation des troupes japonaises au prix du traité de 1915. Ainsi, entre Japon et Chine, l'abîme s'élargit.

Quel parti prendra le conseil ? Il a trop sacrifié à la fiction pour revenir à la réalité et, d'autre part, continuer dans la voie où il est engagé est bien dangereux. Une démonstration pratique de la vanité des articles 15 et 16 assènerait à la Société le coup de grâce. Ne sachant à quel saint se vouer, le conseil, confirmant la décision prise, le matin même, dans une première séance, s'est simplement résolu à interroger M. Yoshizawa sur le sens des mots « sécurité effective » employés dans la note japonaise du 7 novembre, et M. Sze, sur le passage embrouillé relatif à l'observation des traités et à l'arbitrage qui se rencontre dans la note chinoise du 24 octobre, principal motif d'espérance de M. Briand. Gageons que les réponses de MM. Yoshizawa et Sze ne feront pas sensiblement avancer les choses.

Avant-hier soir, prenant en considération la détresse du Conseil, les délégués japonais ont proposé l'envoi d'une commission d'enquête en Mandchourie. La commission serait calquée sur le modèle de la commission qui opéra dans les Indes britanniques, précisément sous la présidence de sir John Simon. Mais, en contre-partie, les Chinois devraient s'engager dans des pourparlers directs avec Tokio. De cette façon, la

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Conseil pourrait clore une session  
pénible et séjourner à des temps  
meilleurs. Le Conseil ne se sent pas  
encore mûr pour un tel dénoue-  
ment. Peut-être s'y ralliera-t-il  
quand il aura, pendant quelques  
jours encore, donné du front sur  
tous les murs de l'impasse.

**PERTINAX.**



FIG. 11

Enclosure No. 32 to Despatch No. 1987  
of November 20, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from FIGARO, November 19, 1931.

## Le secret de M. Briand



Hier, il y a eu deux mois, que le Conseil de la S.D.N., réuni actuellement au Quai d'Orsay, a été saisi du conflit sino-japonais. C'est le 17 septembre que le télégraphe lui a annoncé l'occupation de Moukden par les Japonais.

Depuis, sous la présidence de M. Briand et sur son initiative, les pompiers de Genève n'ont rien négligé pour attiser le feu en Extrême-Orient. Ils ont encouragé, par leur appui, la xénophobie chinoise et mis en jeu l'amour-propre national du Japon, par la publicité de leurs remontrances, ainsi que par leur appel au concours des Etats-Unis.

Il est vrai que, d'après le témoignage d'un des hommes qui connaissent le mieux la Chine, M. Green, ancien rédacteur en chef du *North China Daily News*, qui vient de publier, dans le *Daily Telegraph*, une étude sur les armées chinoises, celles-ci ont des titres sérieux aux faveurs de nos pacifistes. M. Green nous apprend que la Chine a plus de soldats sous les armes que n'importe quelle nation, leur total s'élevant au moins à deux millions et demi. Et leurs chefs méritent les sympathies de nos humanitaires, car, toujours, d'après le même témoin, ils imposent une discipline de fer et sont accompagnés de bourreaux toujours « prêts à s'acquitter de leur tâche immédiatement ». Cette justice sommaire flatte l'horreur de nos antimilitaristes pour les conseils de guerre dont les généraux chinois ne s'embarrassent pas. Enfin, comme vient de l'écrire M. Stéphane Lauzanne, prendre parti pour la Chine, c'est prendre parti pour la Russie soviétique.

Le militarisme, l'anarchie, la torture, les Soviets, la violation des traités, comment résister à tant d'attraits, surtout quand on a pour idéal la paix par le droit, l'ordre par la douceur, le triomphe de la civilisation, l'observation des engagements internationaux ? L'infidélité à de si nobles causes est d'autant plus enivrante qu'elles sont plus sacrées ; elle prend un goût de profanation qui réjouit les plus blasés.

Tant de sadisme nous afflige dans notre sollicitude pour la S.D.N., et plus encore parce que, grâce à M. Briand, c'est la France qui en paie les frais. En dehors des raisons européennes qui commandaient à ce grand Européen de ne pas favoriser la Chine, il y a des raisons plus spécifiquement françaises de ne pas nous aliéner le Japon. Notre domination en Indochine serait en péril si nous n'avions de bons rapports avec lui ; nos intérêts sont solidaires des siens dans la question du désarmement naval ; enfin, sa situation en Mandchourie, où les traités lui confèrent des droits spéciaux, est analogue à notre situation au Maroc. Si la propagande communiste y suscitait un autre Abd el Krim et nous imposait l'alternative de l'abdication ou de l'expédition, le précédent établi contre le Japon par M. Briand risquerait de se retourner contre nous. Justement, les organes les plus autorisés de la presse anglaise, le *Times* et le *Morning Post*, proclament le bon droit du Japon en Mandchourie, parce qu'il y possède des intérêts vitaux, garantis par traité, comparables aux intérêts de la Grande-Bretagne en Egypte.

Ces considérations élémentaires n'auront pas échappé à la sagacité de M. Briand. Mais, comme il préside le Conseil de la S.D.N., il est obligé de prendre un détour pour la torpiller et dégager l'enseignement salutaire que ce désastre comporte à notre usage. Nationaliste méconnu, il a sacrifié l'institution à notre sécurité ; il a tout combiné pour que nos pacifistes les plus fanatiques comprennent la folie qu'il y aurait à placer la paix sous la protection de Genève et se disent : « Puisque après deux mois de palabres, la S.D.N. n'a fait qu'envenimer les choses en Extrême-Orient, où il ne s'agit pourtant que d'une opération de police, ce serait bien pis en Europe, le jour où l'Allemagne entreprendrait la guerre totale. Deux mois, c'est plus qu'il n'en faudrait à un Reich sur-armé pour envahir une France désarmée par l'idéologie genevoise. Il atteindrait les rives de la Bidassoa alors que, sur les bords du Léman, on délibérerait sur la définition de l'« agresseur ».

Sachons gré à M. Briand d'avoir, dans sa sagesse et son patriotisme, adapté une maxime célèbre du maréchal Lyautey. Impossible de mieux manifester la faiblesse de la S.D.N., afin de nous en éviter l'emploi.

## Le Conseil de la S.D.N. au point mort

Le Conseil de la Société des nations siège à huis clos, sans désespérer, mais il n'a abouti à aucun résultat dans l'affaire qui l'occupe. Il est au point mort, et tous les efforts tentés pour le sortir de cette fâcheuse position restent vains. Dans un communiqué distribué lundi soir, on assurait qu'une séance publique aurait lieu incessamment. Or, aucune décision n'a été prise. On siégera encore ce matin dans le secret. C'est dire que le conflit est loin d'être réglé.

Le Conseil a tenu deux séances dans la journée d'hier. La première a eu lieu le matin et n'a pas duré moins de deux heures. Les délégués de la Chine et du Japon n'y assistaient pas. Elle était destinée à permettre à M. Briand, sir John Simon et le général Dawes, de mettre leurs collègues au courant des entretiens qu'ils avaient eus avec les représentants des deux parties. Les divers orateurs ont, paraît-il, affirmé la volonté du Conseil de maintenir et d'assurer — mieux vaudrait dire de rétablir — l'autorité morale de la Ligue. Mais vouloir n'est pas toujours pouvoir, surtout lorsque de graves fautes ont été commises.

L'après-midi, une nouvelle séance a eu lieu, qui a duré plus de trois heures. Elle a consisté en une audition séparée des représentants du Japon et de la Chine. Aucun communiqué n'a été publié à l'issue de cette réunion. Nous savons cependant que des explications très précises ont été demandées à M. Yoshizawa sur les traités que le gouvernement de Tokio désire voir reconnaître par la Chine, avant de retirer ses troupes dans la zone du chemin de fer sud-mandchourien. M. Briand a tenté de faire une discrimination entre ces traités. Il voudrait que le Japon exigeât seulement aujourd'hui la reconnaissance des pactes touchant à la sécurité des ressortissants nippons en Mandchourie. Ceux qui sont relatifs à des questions politiques ou économiques seraient réglés plus tard. M. Yoshizawa a vivement critiqué cette thèse. Le Japon demande la reconnaissance par la Chine de tous les traités qu'elle a signés et ratifiés. Il ne songe pas à faire dépendre le retrait de ses troupes d'un règlement détaillé de tous les problèmes qui divisent les deux pays. Il veut simplement un accord de principe, quitte à négocier ensuite.

De son côté, le docteur Szé a exposé la thèse de son gouvernement. Il a débuté par une vigoureuse protestation contre la prise de la ville de Tsitsikar. Puis il a abordé le fond du débat. La Chine reste sur ses positions, en ce sens qu'elle n'accepte pas de négocier sur les traités conclus par elle avec le Japon, aussi longtemps que les troupes nippones occuperont certains de ses territoires. Elle n'insiste plus cependant pour que la Cour de La Haye se prononce sur la validité de ces conventions. Ceci est dû à la ferme attitude de plusieurs puissances : elle n'entendent pas que des pactes en vigueur soient mis en discussion ; elles ne veulent pas que le gouvernement de Nankin s'élève, devant un tribunal international, contre tous les traités qu'il qualifie d'« inégaux ». Ainsi, il suffit parfois de montrer un peu d'énergie envers la Chine pour la ramener à la raison. On aurait dû s'en apercevoir plus tôt. Le conflit sino-japonais ne serait pas en l'état actuel.

Somme toute, le Conseil ne parvient pas, mieux que précédemment, à mettre d'accord les deux parties sur le point essentiel qui les divise, à savoir : l'évacuation des troupes nippones et la reconnaissance des droits japonais en Mandchourie. Il est bon que chacun sache au juste ce que peut la Société des Nations. Il y a quelques années, un haut fonctionnaire du secrétariat de Genève, cherchant à réduire mon scepticisme sur les pouvoirs de la Ligue, me démontrait avec force arguments qu'aucune guerre n'était possible. Voyez plutôt ce qui se passe en Mandchourie ! Qu'arriverait-il si un plus grave conflit se produisait ? Pour prendre un exemple concret, que ferait le conseil si l'Allemagne attaquait la Pologne ? Il se réunirait gravement, chercherait à déterminer les responsabilités, dissenterait à l'infini et ne prendrait aucune décision. La Ligue ne peut rien parce qu'elle n'a pas de force à son service. La leçon qui nous est donnée aujourd'hui ne doit pas être perdue à la veille de la conférence du désarmement.

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Extract from L'HUMANITE, November 19, 1931.

## UNE AGRESSION OUVERTE CONTRE LA PATRIE SOCIALISTE

# Les troupes japonaises ont occupé Tsitsikar

**FORT DE L'APPUI DE LA FRANCE  
L'IMPÉRIALISME NIPPON MENACE DIRECTEMENT  
LE TERRITOIRE SOVIÉTIQUE**

*« Nous ne voulons pas un pouce de terre  
étrangère, mais nous ne laisserons pas toucher  
à un pouce de notre sol. »*

**STALINE**  
(Discours au XVI<sup>e</sup> Congrès)

**LES OUVRIERS FRANÇAIS DOIVENT SE CONSIDÉRER  
DÉSORMAIS MOBILISÉS  
AU SERVICE DE LA DÉFENSE DE L'ÉTAT PROLÉTARIEN  
POUR LA LUTTE CONTRE L'IMPÉRIALISME FRANÇAIS**



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Nos camarades sont invités à se référer à la carte que nous publions ci-joint. Ils verront la position exacte de la ville qui vient de tomber aux mains des Japonais et ils comprendront la portée immense de l'action militaire que nous signalons plus haut.

Pour s'emparer de Tsitsikar, les Japonais contrairement d'ailleurs à l'engagement formel qu'ils prenaient dans la note adressée la veille à Moscou, ont franchi la ligne du chemin de fer de l'Est Chinois.

En d'autres termes, il ne s'agit plus aujourd'hui d'une provocation plus ou moins vague, mais d'un acte d'agression délibéré, disons le mot, d'un acte de guerre !

Et cet acte de guerre s'accomplit dans une région du monde où se perpétra en 1929 l'attentat monstrueux contre la République prolétarienne. On se souvient qu'à cette époque, le gouvernement mandchou, aux ordres des puissances impérialistes, exécuta le raid de Kharbine, emprisonna les fonctionnaires soviétiques du chemin de fer. Puis poussant son attaque, pénétra en territoire soviétique et incendia des villages.

C'est alors qu'après avoir utilisé tous les moyens pacifiques en son pouvoir, l'Etat prolétarien se défendit par la force des armes et infligea aux envahisseurs le châtiment terrible qu'ils méritaient.

Depuis le 18 septembre, nous n'avons douté à aucun instant que le coup de force japonais ne fût dirigé contre l'Union soviétique. Aussi bien il y a trois ans, en 1927, l'impérialisme nippon qui compte parmi les puissances antisoviétiques les plus agressives, avait-il tout crument exposé ces projets.

Il faut remettre sous les yeux de nos camarades ce document fameux dans lequel en 1927 le baron Tanaka, président du conseil japonais, exposait à l'Empereur le plan d'une politique positive du Japon en Mandchourie.

« Dans le programme de notre agrandissement national, une autre guerre avec la Russie en Mandchourie pour obtenir les ressources de la Mandchourie du nord semble une mesure nécessaire. A moins que cet écueil ne soit détruit, notre navire d'état ne peut avancer tranquillement. Il nous

retrait immédiat des forces militaires et navales françaises en Extrême-Orient. Il faut qu'ils exigent l'expulsion des gardes blancs. L'attaque impérialiste est déclenchée ! L'heure a sonné de la contre-attaque prolétarienne.

**Gabriel PERI.**

Maitres de Tsitsikar, les Japonais peuvent demain s'installer dans la Mandchourie du nord et lancer leurs troupes sur le territoire soviétique. Leur victoire d'hier est un appel à l'action des gardes blancs de l'ataman Semenov, dont nul n'ignore la turbulence depuis un mois.

L'Etat prolétarien a montré qu'il savait garder son sang-froid. Après les déclarations catégoriques de Vorochilov, de Molotov, de Karakhan, de Litvinov, plus aucun doute ne subsiste sur la volonté de paix de l'Etat prolétarien. Mais cette volonté est une volonté révolutionnaire, une volonté de lutte de classe.

C'est au nom de la Révolution que l'U.R.S.S. veut la paix, elle la veut pour la sauvegarde de l'édification socialiste, elle la veut pour la protection de ses géants industriels.

C'est-à-dire que sa volonté de paix est aussi inébranlable que sa volonté de défendre les conquêtes de la Révolution d'Octobre !

« Nous ne convoitons pas un pouce de territoire étranger. Mais nous ne permettons pas que l'on touche à un pouce de territoire soviétique ! » disait Staline au 16<sup>e</sup> congrès.

Voilà la pensée qui aujourd'hui ins-



Un blockhaus de soldats

pire les millions d'hommes et de femmes qui construisent le socialisme.

Mais cette pensée, elle doit inspirer les travailleurs du monde entier.

Elle doit inspirer avant tout les prolétaires de France.

L'impérialisme français, disons-le encore et encore, est l'instigateur de l'abominable aventure qui menace à cette heure la Patrie socialiste.

Enclosure No. 33 to Despatch No. 1987  
of November 20, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'HUMANITE, November 19, 1931.

## UNE AGRESSION OUVERTE CONTRE LA PATRIE SOCIALISTE


# Les troupes japonaises ont occupé Tsitsikar

**FORT DE L'APPUI DE LA FRANCE  
L'IMPÉRIALISME NIPPON MENACE DIRECTEMENT  
LE TERRITOIRE SOVIÉTIQUE**

*« Nous ne voulons pas un pouce de terre  
étrangère, mais nous ne laisserons pas toucher  
à un pouce de notre sol. »*

STALINE  
(Discours au XVI<sup>e</sup> Congrès)

**LES OUVRIERS FRANÇAIS DOIVENT SE CONSIDÉRER  
DÉSORMAIS MOBILISÉS  
AU SERVICE DE LA DÉFENSE DE L'ÉTAT PROLÉTAIRE  
POUR LA LUTTE CONTRE L'IMPÉRIALISME FRANÇAIS**



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Pour s'emparer de Tsitsikar, les Japonais contrairement d'ailleurs à l'engagement formel qu'ils prenaient dans la note adressée la veille à Moscou, ont franchi la ligne du chemin de fer de l'Est-Chinois pour obtenir les ressources de la Mandchourie du nord semble une mesure nécessaire. A moins que cet écueil ne soit détruit, notre navire d'état ne peut avancer tranquillement. Il nous faut exiger de la Chine, le droit de construire toutes les lignes militaires d'importance. Lorsque ces chemins de fer seront achevés, nous déverserons nos forces dans la Mandchourie du Nord aussi loin que possible. Quand la Russie soviétique interviendra comme elle le fera certainement ce sera une occasion pour ouvrir un conflit.

On ne saurait être plus clair, et l'on comprend mieux lorsqu'on a lu ces textes, les excitations de la presse capitaliste et social-fasciste française de cette dernière période.

Depuis 15 jours, les journaux français annoncent quotidiennement des transports de troupes soviétiques vers la Chine, l'envoi de brigades communistes en Mandchourie. Ces mensonges sont chaque matin répandus à des millions d'exemplaires.

Et pour compléter cette mauvaise besogne, les agents provocateurs du Populaire poussent l'ignominie jusqu'à sommer l'U.R.S.S. d'intervenir. Rapprochez les articles du Popu des phrases du baron Tanaka et vous apprécierez la canaillerie des chefs réformistes.

Le Popu écrit : « L'U.R.S.S. reste muette ». Le baron Tanaka avait proclamé : « Quand la Russie soviétique interviendra, comme elle ne manquera pas de le faire, ce sera l'occasion d'ouvrir le conflit ».

Utilisez ces deux textes, camarades ouvriers, servez-vous-en comme d'une arme puissante contre les gardes blancs de la S.F.I.O.

Oui, le danger antisoviétique était évident pour nous dès le premier jour. Mais depuis hier, ce danger est décuplé.

Maîtres de Tsitsikar, les Japonais peuvent demain s'installer dans la Mandchourie du nord et lancer leurs troupes sur le territoire soviétique. Leur victoire d'hier est un appel à l'action des gardes blancs de l'ataman Seménof, dont nul n'ignore la turbulence depuis un mois.

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L'impérialisme français, disons-le encore et encore, est l'instigateur de l'abominable aventure qui menace à cette heure la Patrie socialiste.

C'est lui qui a encouragé, soutenu, excité le Japon.

Ce sont ses journaux qui ont écrit, que le sort de la civilisation et de la barbarie se jouerait sur les plaines sibériennes.

Ce sont ses feuilles de bourse, qui ont célébré la guerre mandchoue, comme une opération lucrative, susceptible de provoquer la hausse des métaux.

C'est son ministre des affaires étrangères qui — aidé en besogne par le Kuomintang contre-révolutionnaire et par les agents provocateurs S.F.I.O. — a donné la consécration du pacifisme genevois à l'attentat japonais.

C'est la France qui entretient sur son territoire, les généraux de l'armée blanche, lesquels à cette heure, recrutent ici même, une armée de mercenaires, comme le fait l'un d'entre eux à Marseille, ainsi qu'un *rabcor* nous le signale.

Défendre l'U.R.S.S. c'est d'abord concentrer toutes nos forces et toutes nos énergies dans la lutte contre l'impérialisme français.

Il faut qu'en masse, ce soir, les prolétaires de Paris, viennent à la Grange-aux-Belles préparer l'organisation de leur riposte.

Il faut qu'ils accourent en province aux meetings et aux manifestations du Parti.

Il faut que dans toutes les villes, dans tous les villages, la grande voix des travailleurs retentisse, pour s'affirmer solidaire de l'U.R.S.S. et organiser pratiquement cette solidarité.

Il faut que du Nord au Midi, les ouvriers et les paysans, réclament le

retrait immédiat des forces militaires et navales françaises en Extrême-Orient.

Il faut qu'ils exigent l'expulsion des gardes blancs.

L'attaque impérialiste est déclenchée !

L'heure a sonné de la contre-attaque prolétarienne.

Gabriel PERI.

RECEIVED: 12-18-75  
Milton O. Gustafson

# Les Japonais occupent Tsitsikar tandis qu'à Paris le Conseil de la S.D.N. prodigue ses efforts pour apaiser le conflit

Il est indiscutable que l'affaire sino-japonaise ne prend pas bonne tournure. Mais ce n'est pas parce que, au moment même où les opérations militaires se développent, le conseil de la S. D. N.



Dr Szé M. YOSHIKAWA

se traîne en délibérations secrètes ; c'est parce que ces délibérations secrètes ne font que souligner les contradictions fondamentales dont il faudrait se dégager pour trouver une solution.

Si fâcheuse que soit la reprise des combats, qui, ainsi qu'on le lira dans nos dépêches, ont amené les Japonais à occuper Tsitsikar, elle n'est qu'un épisode secondaire, aussi longtemps que la Société des nations ne s'en mêle pas. Que pourrait-elle, d'ailleurs, y faire ? Tâcher d'établir les responsabilités des premiers coups de fusil ? Autant vaudrait chercher une aiguille dans une botte de foin. S'interposer entre les combattants ? Ce serait aller au-devant d'un éclat d'impuissance. De deux choses l'une, en effet : ou bien les combats sont le développement fatal du conflit, ou bien ils sont l'effet de manœuvres calculées pour amener la Société des nations à une action inconsidérée. De toute manière, le seul moyen de réaliser l'apaisement est d'amener les deux adversaires à régler leurs litiges. C'est ici, précisément, que le cas devient embarrassant.

Pourquoi ? Tout simplement parce qu'on retrouve les erreurs initiales. Le litige ne peut être réglé que par des négociations directes entre les parties. Ces négociations ne peuvent porter que sur la confirmation et les garanties d'exécution des traités dont la violation met la Chine et le Japon aux prises. La Chine refuse, invoquant le fait que sa présence dans la Société des nations garantit la correction de son attitude. Comment le conseil peut-il l'amener à accepter une négociation dont l'admission est la négation même du postulat de la correction de la Chine, membre de la Société des nations ? Voilà toute l'affaire.

Mardi, le conseil semblait incliner à chercher une distinction entre les traités intéressant la sécurité des vies et des biens des Japonais et les traités concernant les avantages économiques accordés au Japon en Mandchourie. Distinction plus équivoque encore que subtile, puisque c'est la violation même des traités comportant des avantages économiques qui met en péril les personnes et les biens.

Est-ce pour cela qu'on n'en a plus reparlé hier ? La discussion a eu un caractère beaucoup plus général, portant sur les principes mêmes du conflit. Au cours d'une séance secrète de la fin de la matinée, le conseil a décidé d'entendre séparément les représentants des deux parties.

C'est le Japon qui a été le premier sur la sellette dans la Rotonde du Quai d'Orsay. L'audition de M. Yoshizawa n'a pas duré moins de deux heures. L'ambassadeur du Japon a commencé par reprendre toute l'argumentation de la note japonaise du 6 novembre. On se rappelle que cette note répondait à une lettre de M. Briand, qui semblait considérer l'adhésion générale de la Chine au principe de la charte de la Société des nations comme une garantie suffisante pour donner satisfaction aux cinq points fondamentaux du Japon. Le gouvernement de Tokio répondait que les garanties lui paraissaient, au contraire, absolument insuffisantes ; qu'il ne pourrait se contenter de rien moins que d'une reconnaissance formelle et de garanties précises d'exécution des traités, notamment de ceux concernant les droits des Japonais en Mandchourie.

Ces explications ont-elles été jugées insuffisantes ? Toujours est-il que le délégué du Japon a été pris de formuler par écrit les demandes de son gouvernement.

Après quoi, M. Briand a fait une suggestion qui s'inspire manifestement de la première proposition de Sir Eric Drummond, du 20 octobre, sans en avoir la précision. La première proposition Drummond visait, on se le rappelle, deux négociations parallèles, l'une sur les litiges politiques, l'autre sur les conditions d'évacuation. M. Briand s'est borné à suggérer que le Japon pourrait poursuivre l'évacuation dès qu'il serait entendu qu'une négociation directe s'engagerait sur les cinq points fondamentaux et que les délégués pour cette négociation auraient été désignés.

M. Yoshizawa a déclaré de la manière la plus catégorique que le Japon ne poursuivrait pas l'évacuation avant d'avoir obtenu l'entente préalable sur les cinq points.

On a procédé ensuite à l'audition du délégué chinois, audition qui a duré un peu plus d'une heure. Le docteur Szé a commencé par se retrancher derrière le pacte de la Société des nations, soutenant une fois de plus que l'adhésion donnée par la Chine au Covenant devrait être considérée comme une garantie suffisante de sa correction internationale.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

Invité à préciser quels sont les traités qui, à son avis, forment le fond du litige, le délégué chinois a reconnu que son gouvernement conteste la validité du traité de 1915. Il prétend que ce traité a été imposé par la force et il n'a pas dissimulé que la Chine désire consulter la cour de La Haye sur sa validité.

Il est très intéressant de signaler que cette déclaration a provoqué des manifestations d'opposition très nette de certains membres du conseil. Faut-il s'en étonner quand on sait que le traité de 1915, signé le 25 mai, a été suivi de l'échange formel des ratifications le 8 juin ? C'est donc un traité en bonne et due forme.

Devant l'opposition rencontrée du côté de certains membres du conseil, le délégué chinois a cherché à évoluer. Il a invoqué l'accord de Washington de 1922 qui garantit l'intégrité de la Chine. Comme si le traité de 1922 n'avait pas été conclu par les puissances sur la base du statut déterminé par les traités existants, notamment par celui de 1915 !

Le conseil se réunira ce matin de nouveau en séance secrète pour examiner la situation, évidemment très délicate, provoquée par l'opposition absolue des points de vue des deux parties.

#### L'espoir d'une solution

Le salut va-t-il venir de l'activité beaucoup plus pratique qui se développe en marge du conseil de la Société des nations entre les Anglais, les Américains et les Japonais ? Il n'est pas interdit de l'espérer.

L'ambassadeur du Japon à Londres, M. Matsudaira, dont nous avons déjà signalé l'intervention au cours des derniers jours, a vu deux fois, hier, sir John Simon qui, soit dit en passant, doit passer la journée à Londres pour assister à une réunion du cabinet anglais. Le déplacement ne manquera pas d'opportunité.

Dans la soirée d'hier, au moment même où M. Yoshizawa exposait au conseil que le Japon se trouve dans la nécessité d'obtenir une consécration formelle de tous les traités, M. Matsudaira se rencontrait avec le général Dawes. L'entretien s'est appliqué à dégager une solution politique, c'est-à-dire une solution s'élevant au-dessus de tous les détails techniques.

Cette solution pourrait se présenter ainsi. Le Japon, en maintenant sa volonté formelle de faire consacrer tous les traités et d'obtenir des garanties d'exécution, affirmerait son désir de maintenir l'attitude d'un membre fidèle de la Société des nations, soucieux de collaborer avec elle et de contribuer à la sauvegarde de l'organisme. Le Japon accueillerait favorablement l'intervention de la Société des nations en vue de maintenir l'ordre en Mandchourie. Dans cet esprit, il accepterait l'envoi, par la S. D. N., d'une commission d'observation sur place. Faire consacrer les traités et laisser à la Société des nations la responsabilité d'en garantir l'exécution, voilà qui n'est pas maladroit. Il sera intéressant de voir ce qu'en pensera le conseil. — S.-E.



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

Seibats

Enclosure No. 35 to Despatch No. 1987  
of November 20, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from JOURNAL DES DEBATS, November 19, 1931.

Les travaux du Conseil de la S. D. N. se poursuivent dans la coulisse. Ce matin, le Conseil a tenu une séance privée pour prendre connaissance des conversations qui ont été engagées avec les représentants du Japon et de la Chine. Jusqu'ici le résultat de ces échanges de vues ne paraît pas décisif. Cependant on a pris un bon parti en recourant à des pourparlers directs et plus ou moins confidentiels. En raison de la nature très spéciale du conflit, le Conseil s'était placé, au mois d'octobre, dans une position très difficile en appliquant la procédure normale et en sommant les Japonais de retirer leurs troupes avant sa plus prochaine réunion. La S. D. N. agissait comme si elle se trouvait en présence d'un différend occidental, sans se préoccuper de savoir, d'une part, si la Chine n'avait pas tenté d'éluder des engagements pris et, d'autre part, de connaître exactement les exigences du Japon. On était évidemment dans une impasse, à laquelle on cherche une issue.

On s'est donc avisé, un peu tard, de demander quelques explications aux Chinois et aux Japonais. Ces derniers ont été notamment priés d'indiquer d'une façon très précise les traités auxquels il est fait allusion dans leur déclaration du 26 octobre dernier, où le gouvernement de Tokio réclame (cinquième point) « le respect des droits concédés par les traités au Japon en Mandchourie ». Il est clair, en effet, que, si l'on est en droit d'exiger des uns qu'ils ne recourent pas indûment à la force, on a, par contre, le devoir d'imposer aux autres le respect des traités qu'ils ont signés. Le problème a deux aspects qu'il faut envisager simultanément, faute de quoi la S. D. N. compromettrait son autorité, qui ne saurait se maintenir que si ses dirigeants font preuve à la fois d'équité et de sens pratique.

On ne doit pas oublier, d'ailleurs, que le Conseil de la Ligue, contrairement à une opinion qui a cours dans quelques milieux, n'est pas un supergouvernement et, qu'en fait, il est seulement la réunion des délégués d'un certain nombre de puissances qui, comme cela est inévitable, craignent de créer, dans un sens ou dans un autre, un précédent qui pourrait leur être nuisible. Qu'on le trouve bien ou qu'on le juge mauvais, il en est ainsi, et l'on n'obtiendra jamais aucun résultat satisfaisant si l'on ne tient pas compte d'un fait certain. L'attitude des Etats-Unis est à cet égard très caractéristique. Hier, M. Stimson a déclaré que, si le gouvernement de Washington n'avait jamais promis au Japon de ne pas participer à des sanctions que la S. D. N. prendrait contre lui, « il n'était cependant pas prêt à décider jusqu'à quel point il pourrait s'associer à des mesures éventuelles de rigueur contre le Japon » ; le secrétaire d'Etat américain a ajouté que c'était pour cela que le général Dawes ne siégeait pas au Conseil. L'hésitation des Etats-Unis s'explique ai-

sément, comme le dit ce matin sans ambages la *Chicago Tribune* : si, d'un côté, l'Amérique ne voit pas avec faveur les progrès de l'influence japonaise en Chine et si elle peut être tentée d'invoquer le traité, relatif au Pacifique, dit des neuf puissances, elle redoute, d'un autre côté, que, si l'on condamne trop sévèrement le Japon, sa propre action dans l'Amérique centrale, où elle intervient souvent sans se gêner plus que le Japon en Mandchourie, ne puisse être un jour contrecarrée. D'autres puissances ont également des préoccupations particulières. On ne comprendrait rien aux choses si l'on se figurait que le Conseil siège dans l'empyrée. Il est d'élémentaire probité de voir les faits tels qu'ils sont.

Pour peu qu'on y mette de part et d'autre de la bonne volonté, le différend peut très bien se régler; mais la solution ne sera sans doute trouvée que sous la forme d'une sorte de compromis. Si ce n'est pas le cas, on n'aperçoit pas du tout ce que le Conseil sera en mesure de faire. En attendant, la situation locale se complique. Le général Ma Chang Chan, dont on ne sait pas exactement quels sont les rapports avec le gouvernement de Nankin, ne s'est pas entendu avec le général Honjo, commandant en chef des troupes japonaises. Ces dernières ont repris leur offensive et ont occupé hier Aganchi, localité qui est, non loin de Tsitsikar, sur la ligne de l'Est chinois, contrôlée, de concert avec la Chine, par les Soviets. Néanmoins, le gouvernement de Moscou ne semble toujours pas désireux d'intervenir. C'est un état de choses bien curieux. On ne peut pour l'instant que le constater sans en tirer aucune conclusion politique.

PIERRE BERNUS.

Matin 19

Enclosure No. 36 to Despatch No. 1987  
of November 20, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE MATIN, November 19, 1931.

## LES DÉBATS DU CONSEIL DE LA S.D.N.

### Pas de progrès sensibles

A la vérité, lorsque l'on fait, en toute objectivité, le bilan de la journée d'hier, au cours de laquelle les troupes japonaises ont occupé Tsitsikar et Anganchi, tandis que le conseil de Société des nations se réunissait par deux fois en séance privée au Quai-d'Orsay, on arrive nécessairement à cette double conclusion :

Il est d'abord certain que le développement des opérations militaires en Mandchourie n'a pas manqué d'avoir à Paris des répercussions immédiates.

Sans transition, M. Yoshizawa, ferme et tenace, a visiblement repris l'ascendant sur son collègue et compatriote, M. Matsudeira, conciliant et pratique.

Mardi soir, M. Matsudeira, pendant une longue et franche conversation avec le général Dawes, l'« observateur » des Etats-Unis, avait finalement admis : 1° l'éventualité de pourparlers directs entre la Chine et le Japon au sujet de l'interprétation « formelle » de certains traités parmi ceux dont la validité est contestée par le représentant de la partie adverse, le docteur Sze ; 2° la participation exclusive du gouvernement de Nankin à cette négociation, alors que M. Yoshizawa voulait discuter avec un « pouvoir » mandchou encore hypothétique.

Cette ébauche d'entente est maintenant sérieusement compromise par l'action de l'état-major du Mikado, comme nous le verrons par la suite.

Il est un deuxième point — nous avons parlé d'une double conclusion — sur lequel nous voudrions brièvement insister : à n'en pas douter l'évolution des échanges de vues autour de la « sécurité » et du respect des traités finit par poser tout le problème du Pacifique.

Plusieurs conventions sino-japonaises sont liées — ne serait-ce qu'à titre de réciprocité — aux intérêts américains.

Et c'est ce qui explique l'attention soutenue et vigilante avec laquelle Washington suit désormais les péripéties du débat.

Voyons maintenant les détails de la journée :

Hier matin, le conseil de la S. D. N. s'était employé à rédiger un questionnaire à l'usage des Japonais et des Chinois. Aux premiers, il s'agissait de demander quels étaient, à leur avis, les traités qui rentraient dans le concept de la sécurité.

Et les seconds devaient dire ce qu'ils entendaient par « respect des traités ».

Ce questionnaire avait son importance, puisque le conseil se propose de mettre sur pied une « résolution » qui, avec toute la souplesse désirable, s'appuiera sur la sécurité et le respect des droits acquis.

Dans l'après-midi, M. Yoshizawa et le docteur Sze ont successivement répondu aux questions n° 1, 2, etc.

Toutefois, il serait excessif de prétendre que leurs observations, exposées dans une atmosphère de malaise, ont donné tous les apaisements souhaitables.

M. Yoshizawa, qui n'a pas particulièrement goûté la procédure du questionnaire, a, conformément à ses nouvelles instructions, maintenu l'intangibilité des revendications japonaises. En ce qui concerne les traités, il s'est montré, comme récemment à Genève, très sobre d'explications.

Le sûr, néanmoins, est que, pour lui, tous les textes signés, sous quelque forme que ce soit, par la Chine et le Japon ne souffrent aucune discussion et que Nankin, par conséquent, aura à les ratifier, à les confirmer en bloc. Voilà donc les difficultés qui réapparaissent !

Les déclarations du docteur Sze n'ont pas non plus brillé par la précision. Il a naturellement contesté la portée de l'accord de 1905, de la clause secrète de cet accord, surtout. En tout cas, le délégué chinois a pu difficilement nier

que son gouvernement, des années durant, avait respecté, exécuté les contrats aujourd'hui en cause. Si ces contrats ont été observés, c'est donc qu'ils existent. Le conseil tiendra ce matin une nouvelle séance privée. Il faut espérer que le calme et la modération succéderont à la confusion, à la nervosité d'hier.



PP 19

Enclosure No. 37 to Despatch No. 1987  
of November 20, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE PETIT PARISIEN, November 19, 1931.

## Le conseil de la S. D. N. a entendu les délégués chinois et japonais

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Le conseil devait ainsi se trouver en mesure de faire le point. Disons tout de suite que l'impression générale qui s'est dégagée des divers exposés entendus a été assez confuse. Au cours d'entretiens privés, on dit, en effet, souvent des choses dont il n'est pas possible de faire officiellement état. Les sons de cloche parfois, selon qu'on s'adresse à tel ou tel membre d'une délégation, ne sont pas toujours concordants... Bref après une discussion prolongée et à laquelle presque tous les délégués européens — M. Briand, sir John Simon, MM. Scialoja, Zaleski, Fotitch et sir Eric Drummond notamment — ont pris part, les douze membres du conseil présents ont estimé nécessaire d'entendre séparément, dans l'après-midi, les représentants du Japon et de la Chine et de faire préciser nettement et ouvertement par chacun d'eux la position de son gouvernement. En conséquence, il fut décidé de tenir à 16 heures une nouvelle séance et d'y convoquer d'abord M. Yoshizawa et ensuite M. Sze.

Pour donner à ces auditions un caractère plus intime — celui d'une consultation amicale — la réunion, au lieu de se tenir dans le grand « Salon de l'Horloge », comme les précédentes,



Sir John Simon et lord Cecil arrivant  
au Quai d'Orsay

eut lieu dans « La Rotonde », qui est de dimensions plus restreintes et donne sur le jardin du ministère des Affaires étrangères. Malheureusement, l'impression générale qui s'en est dégagée n'en a pas été pour cela plus favorable. Au contraire, presque tous les membres du conseil que nous avons vus, au moment de leur départ, un peu après 20 heures, ne nous ont pas caché leur déception — celle surtout que leur a causée l'attitude du délégué japonais.

Bien qu'il s'exprimât dans sa propre langue, au lieu de le faire, comme jadis, en anglais ou en français, M. Yoshizawa, qui avait pour traducteur M. Motono, le fils de l'ancien ambassadeur et ancien ministre des Affaires étrangères du Japon, a parlé avec autant de lenteur, a fait preuve d'autant d'hésitations que lors de ses déclarations passées aux précédentes sessions de Genève. « On s'attendait à des éclaircissements, à des précisions dénotant un indiscutable désir d'entente, m'a dit un de ses auditeurs. Nous n'avons eu que des explications embrouillées où nous n'avons décou-

marquer M. Briand quand il a demandé à M. Yoshizawa si le Japon se refuserait à procéder au retrait de ses forces militaires lorsque aurait été admis le principe des négociations directes, entre le Japon et la Chine, sur ces cinq points fondamentaux et que les deux parties auraient nommé leurs plénipotentiaires, (on sait que la Chine a déjà désigné les siens) et quand il a souligné l'effet apaisant que ne manqueraient pas d'avoir ces deux ordres de faits sur l'opinion publique des deux pays. Cette question ne fut pas, paraît-il, sans embarrasser quelque peu M. Yoshizawa qui dut reconnaître qu'on n'estimait pas nécessaire, à Tokio, que les négociations fussent terminées pour évacuer les régions occupées en dehors de la zone du chemin de fer, mais qui n'en revint pas moins à sa théorie des garanties indispensables, de la part de la Chine, concernant la vie et les biens des ressortissants japonais...

Cette impression regrettable de flottement, d'hésitation fut encore accrue en fin d'après-midi par les nouvelles d'ordre militaire reçues de Mandchourie et annonçant l'occupation, par les troupes nippones, d'Anganki et de Tsitsikar, villes où certains négociateurs japonais avaient donné leur parole, notamment au général Dawes, que les forces du général Honjo ne pénétreraient pas. Sans doute, il faut tenir compte de ce fait que l'anarchie la plus complète règne dans cette région où Nankin n'a aucune autorité, que les forces japonaises sont peu nombreuses et qu'elles ont à se défendre non seulement contre celles du général Ma, mais contre les entreprises des bandits qui infestent le pays.

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L'audition du docteur Sze, qui se poursuivit de 19 à 20 heures, bien que plus habile, ne fut pas, au fond, beaucoup plus satisfaisante. Le délégué chinois a eu beau affirmer à nouveau la volonté de son gouvernement d'exécuter toutes les obligations auxquelles l'astreint sa qualité de signataire du pacte, il a eu beau faire preuve de plus de clarté et de moins d'indécision dans ses réponses que son collègue japonais, son attitude n'est pas telle, cependant, qu'elle rende un accord plus aisé.

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Et, en effet, ce que le chef de la délégation japonaise a paraphrasé, c'est la thèse déjà exposée dans sa réponse à M. Briand, en date du 6 novembre; c'est la déclaration qu'il a faite, avant-hier soir encore, à notre ministre des Affaires étrangères et qu'il a accompagnée de la remise d'un aide-mémoire. Cette thèse est la suivante: les trois traités essentiels — que nous avons énumérés hier — de 1905, 1909 et 1915 constituent un ensemble de garanties de sécurité qu'il est impossible de dissocier, car elles tendent toutes à la protection des existences et des biens des ressortissants japonais en Mandchourie. Par « biens japonais », on entend aussi bien, à Tokio, les chemins de fer que les exploitations minières, industrielles, agricoles, forestières, créées avec des capitaux japonais et administrées par des sujets japonais.

On s'explique, par suite, que le cabinet nippon considère ses cinq points fondamentaux comme « les têtes des chapitres » sur lesquels doivent porter les négociations futures et fasse, de leur nouvelle reconnaissance par la Chine, la condition du retrait de ses troupes vers la zone du chemin de fer, où leur présence est autorisée. Il est bien évident, toutefois, qu'une pareille thèse, poussée à l'extrême, rendrait tout accord pratiquement impossible.

C'est certainement là ce qu'a voulu

marquer M. Briand quand il a demandé à M. Yoshizawa si le Japon se refuserait à procéder au retrait de ses forces militaires lorsque aurait été admis le principe des négociations directes, entre le Japon et la Chine, sur ces cinq points fondamentaux et que les deux parties auraient nommé leurs plénipotentiaires, (on sait que la Chine a déjà désigné les siens) et quand il a souligné l'effet apaisant que ne manqueraient pas d'avoir ces deux ordres de faits sur l'opinion publique des deux pays. Cette question ne fut pas, paraît-il, sans embarrasser quelque peu M. Yoshizawa qui dut reconnaître qu'on n'estimait pas nécessaire, à Tokio, que les négociations fussent terminées pour évacuer les régions occupées en dehors de la zone du chemin de fer, mais qui n'en revint pas moins à sa théorie des garanties indispensables, de la part de la Chine, concernant la vie et les biens des ressortissants japonais...

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Il a repris, en effet, en ce qui concerne les traités signés avec le Japon, et notamment en ce qui concerne celui de 1915, sa théorie des « conditions imposées par la force », et il a contesté leur validité, qu'il s'est, une fois de plus, déclaré prêt à soumettre à l'arbitrage de la cour de justice.

Cette suggestion, dont nous ne saurions trop souligner le caractère dangereux, lui a d'ailleurs valu, de la part du représentant de la Yougoslavie, cette réplique fort juste qu'il n'est pas de traité qui n'ait été dans une certaine mesure « imposé » et qu'à ce compte aucun d'eux ne serait valable. Or le traité de 1915 a bien été signé le 25 mai 1915 à Pékin par le gouvernement chinois, qui a échangé les ratifications à Tokio le 8 juin suivant : sa valeur ne saurait, en conséquence, être contestée.

Mais le docteur Sze a une autre corde à son arc, et c'est le « traité des neuf puissances », concernant la Chine, intervenu en 1922 à Washington à la suite de la conférence navale, traité derrière lequel il s'est alors retranché.

Bref, quand on s'est séparé un peu après 20 heures, l'atmosphère plutôt favorable qu'avaient créée hier les conversations du Quai d'Orsay entre M. Briand et M. Yoshizawa, de l'hôtel Ritz entre le général Dawes et M. Matsudeira d'une part et le docteur Sze d'autre part, et, enfin de l'ambassade britannique entre sir John Simon et M. Matsudeira, avait fait place à une atmosphère de gêne et d'inquiétude.

La nuit dissipera-t-elle cette impression ? Tous les membres du conseil le souhaitent sincèrement. Ils se réuniront, en tout cas, ce matin à 11 heures, sans les deux parties, pour étudier à nouveau la situation et rechercher les moyens d'effectuer enfin un rapprochement entre les gouvernements de Tokio et de Nankin.

#### UN PROJET JAPONAIS POUR REGLER LE DIFFEREND

19 novembre, 2 heures.

L'impression fâcheuse laissée par la séance privée du conseil paraît s'être un peu améliorée au cours de la soirée, à la suite de nouvelles conversations particulières entre le général Dawes, M. Matsudeira et sir John Simon. Nous apprenons en effet, tard cette nuit, que ces conversations pourraient avoir une influence très importante sur le développement de la situation.

Il nous revient notamment que M. Yoshizawa aurait fait parvenir à M. Briand, comme on le lui a demandé, un projet de solution résumant les revendications du Japon et s'inspirant justement des idées essentielles émises au cours de ces divers entretiens.

Aux termes de ce projet qui, pour sortir de l'impasse actuelle, laisserait de côté les questions techniques, le Japon demanderait la reconnaissance en bloc des traités existant entre le Japon et la Chine et, en retour de cette reconnaissance garantissant la vie et les biens de ses ressortissants, il assurerait la Société des nations de son entière collaboration en vue du maintien de l'ordre en Mandchourie.

A cet égard, il accepterait l'envoi sur place par la S. D. N. d'une commission d'observateurs.

Que vaut ce projet dont ce ne sont évidemment là que les points principaux et comment sera-t-il accueilli tant par la Chine que par le conseil ?

Nous ne saurions le discuter à cette heure tardive. Il montre toutefois de la part de la délégation japonaise le désir de réparer, dans une certaine mesure, l'erreur commise hier après-midi et, tout en sauvegardant les intérêts japonais, de maintenir l'autorité de la S. D. N.

A cet égard, c'est un progrès qu'il convenait de signaler.

A. J.

Page 17

Enclosure No. 38 to Despatch No. 1987  
of November 20, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE FOULAIRE, November 19, 1931.

## Le Conseil de la S.D.N. au pied du mur



Le Dr SZE, délégué de la Chine.

*Au lieu d'avoir dit dès hier soir que cet acte de guerre constitue, de la part du Japon, une violation flagrante des principes fondamentaux de la S.D.N., le Conseil siégeant en séance secrète, après avoir entendu le Japonais et le Chinois, s'est ajourné à ce matin.*

Jusqu'ici, M. Aristide Briand a vaillamment défendu la seule thèse conforme à la légalité de la S.D.N.

Est-ce que son état de fatigue, est-ce que les résistances qu'il a rencontrées et qu'il rencontre jusque dans son entourage, seraient capables de diminuer sa volonté de faire tout le devoir, qui lui incombe, dans sa qualité de président du Conseil de la S.D.N. ? Et cela au moment le plus difficile, le plus tragique de l'existence de l'institution de Genève ?

Ce serait un grand malheur pour le monde.

Peut-être qu'en effet, la S.D.N., dans sa structure actuelle, comme je l'ai déjà dit ici, ne peut-elle rien faire pour empêcher le Japon, si celui-ci y est décidé, d'aller jusqu'au bout de ses plans de domination en Mandchourie ! Peut-être que les circonstances l'obligeront d'avouer son impuissance ! Qu'elle dégage au moins ses responsabilités et qu'elle mette le Japon, au risque même de le voir quitter la S.D.N., en accusation !

Certes, toutes les traditions diplomatiques se dressent contre une attitude pareille ! Tous les égoïsmes nationaux peuvent voir un intérêt à se coaliser contre cette sanction qui ne serait cependant que morale et qui devrait se prolonger par des mesures financières et économiques contre l'Etat responsable d'avoir violé le Pacte de la S.D.N., le Pacte Briand-Kellogg et le Pacte des neuf puissances dit du Pacifique !

Mais en restant lui-même fidèle au texte et à l'esprit du Pacte, le Conseil sauvera au moins l'honneur de la S.D.N. et réservera l'avenir.

*S'il devait être défaillant, si le calcul des uns, la lâcheté des autres devaient amener les membres du Conseil, sur lesquels pèsent actuellement des responsabilités plus grandes que jamais, à préférer une déclaration de carence qui ne ferait aucune distinction entre le Japon et la Chine, à une position franchement contre celui qui doit être considéré, en l'occurrence, comme l'Etat agresseur, la Société des Nations entrerait dans une crise dont les conséquences apparaissent incalculables.*

Jamais, depuis la guerre, l'édifice de paix n'a été autant en danger qu'à ce moment.

Jamais toutes les forces sombres du passé n'ont eu autant le droit d'espérer...

Le Japon, encouragé par les hésitations des principales puissances représentées au Conseil, encouragé par les lamentables tergiversations des Etats-Unis et par le silence gêné de l'Angleterre, s'est moqué de toutes les recommandations du Conseil, de tous les rappels aux textes des traités et des pactes.

Et cependant, hier, à la Commission des affaires étrangères, j'ai entendu un collègue -- puisqu'il a l'intention de répéter publiquement ce qu'il nous a dit au cours de la séance, je peux bien donner son nom : M. Franklin-Bouillon -- caractériser comme criminelle « toute politique qui s'opposerait en l'Extrême-Orient, au Japon ».

*Comme si une victoire du Japon sur la S.D.N. ne constituerait pas le succès le plus néfaste pour ceux qui ne veulent pas que la S.D.N. ait des droits de sanctions contre les fauteurs de guerre, pour ceux qui ne veulent rien savoir du front unique opposé à tous contre l'Etat agresseur, principe dont la France n'a cessé de réclamer l'inscription dans les statuts de la S.D.N.*

Comme si la victoire du Japon sur le Conseil ne constituerait pas l'encouragement le plus dangereux de tous ceux qui, en Allemagne ou dans d'autres pays, pensent pouvoir un jour se soustraire au contrôle de la S.D.N.

*C'est l'avenir de la paix de l'Europe qui se joue actuellement en Asie. Et si lointain que soit le théâtre de guerre, ce sont les intérêts les plus immédiats des Etats de notre propre continent qui y sont engagés.*

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

**Le Japon « facteur d'ordre »...**

Par une folle aberration, une grande partie de la presse française voit ou croit de voir dans le Japon un facteur d'ordre appelé à mettre fin à « l'anarchie chinoise ». Funeste illusion!

Les conséquences d'une défaite infligée par le Japon à la S.D.N., seraient redoutables pour l'ordre de paix dans le monde entier! Et cette défaite deviendrait d'autant plus sensible, que les membres du Conseil n'auraient pas eu le courage ou la clairvoyance de proclamer ouvertement les responsabilités de l'Etat agresseur, de l'Etat violant les engagements inscrits dans le Pacte, de l'Etat en révolte contre les recommandations du Conseil de la S.D.N.

Dans sa séance d'aujourd'hui qui sera secrète, comme celle d'hier, le Conseil aura à fixer l'orientation de ses efforts futurs. Qu'on invite, au nom du pacte Kellogg, le général Dawes d'y assister. Que lord Cecil qui remplacera Sir John Simon, obligé de retourner à Londres, essaye de mettre en pratique les adjurations qu'il a si souvent adressées à la S.D.N. Que M. Aristide Briand, président du Conseil, ne se laisse pas détourner du chemin sur lequel il s'était engagé jusqu'ici.

S'il y a encore un moyen pouvant faire réfléchir le Japon, empêcher la Chine de proclamer la guerre de défense, c'est une attitude franche du Conseil et des Etats-Unis. Le monde les attend à l'œuvre...

S. G.

Quot. 14

Enclosure No. 39 to Despatch No. 1987  
of November 20, 1931.

From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE QUOTIDIEN, November 19, 1931.

## Pendant que l'on délibère...

LES événements gagnent de vitesse les décisions des hommes d'Etat.

Tandis que le Conseil de la S. D. N. délibère, les troupes japonaises agissent. Elles ont occupé Tsitsikar. C'est-à-dire le noeud de voies ferrées qui assure les communications entre la Mandchourie et la province de Vladivostock.

Faut-il dire que cette information sensationnelle a jeté une vive émotion parmi les diplomates réunis, hier après-midi, au Quai d'Orsay ?

Ni les recommandations des deux premières conférences ouvertes à Genève pour régler le conflit sino-japonais, ni les interventions pressantes de M. Aristide Briand, n'ont pu maîtriser l'impatience des troupes en présence.

Et cela est d'une terrible gravité. Nous voyons, en ce moment, combien sont impuissantes les barrières de papier que les plus grandes nations du monde se sont efforcées d'élever pour la sauvegarde de la paix.

Ce n'est pas seulement l'autorité de la S. D. N., qui s'avère inefficace, c'est aussi le pacte Briand-Kellogg, signé par les deux pays dont les troupes s'entre-choquent en Extrême-Orient.

Il est écrit, dans la Charte de la Société de Genève qu'il faudra recourir à l'arbitrage avant toute action militaire.

Il est écrit, dans le pacte Kellogg, que les Etats signataires « s'engagent à ne recourir en aucun cas à la guerre pour des fins politiques »... On a fait plus encore, on a adopté une formule laconique, en écrivant : *la guerre est mise hors la loi !*

Et c'est l'illégalité de la guerre qui l'emporte, sur tous les moyens juridiques pour la rendre à jamais impossible.

Rien n'est plus douloureusement déconcertant.

Nous avons toujours lutté, au *Quotidien*, avec une conviction ardente et sincère, pour imposer la confiance dans les garanties que nous offraient les conventions, les traités et les pactes.

Nous avons cru, et nous voulons croire encore à la valeur irrésistible des forces morales appuyées sur Genève, sur La Haye, sur Locarno. Or, voici le démenti des faits.

Faut-il se résigner à voir l'Asie s'enflammer ?

Nous ne voulons pas croire à une telle catastrophe. Il y a toujours, pour les hommes de grande foi, un effort à tenter.

Toutes les volontés de paix doivent être tendues, aujourd'hui, pour empêcher ou tout au moins limiter le désastre, arrêter l'effusion du sang.

Mais quel attristant prélude à la Conférence prochaine du désarmement !

LE QUOTIDIEN.

## Les événements de Mandchourie

Le Conseil de la S. D. N.  
a tenu deux séances secrètes  
et a entendu séparément  
les délégués japonais et chinois  
sans rien conclure

Les affaires de la S. D. N. ne s'arrangent pas. Celles de la Chine non plus. Les deux séances « secrètes » tenues hier, à onze heures et à dix-sept heures, par « les Douze », ne semblent pas avoir avancé les choses, et le fait qu'aucun communiqué n'a été publié dans le cours de la journée est, par lui-même, assez significatif.

Ce n'est point à dire que négociations et pourparlers aient échoué, mais la position du Japon — renforcée, peut-on même dire, par ses derniers succès militaires — demeure la même, et se précise : négociations directes avec la Chine sur les cinq points fondamentaux. En ce qui concerne le cinquième point — qui est celui sur lequel on discute, et qui concerne le respect des traités, d'où découlent les droits du Japon en Mandchourie — Tokio précise maintenant qu'on ne doit faire aucune distinction entre eux. Et c'est cela que M. Yoshizawa n'a pas manqué d'exposer hier, entre dix-sept et dix-neuf heures, aux Douze, devant qui il s'est exprimé en japonais, afin sans doute que sa pensée fût plus précise.

On comprendrait mal cette insistance du gouvernement japonais à vouloir faire accepter par Nankin les traités en question comme ayant une égale valeur juridique, si l'on ne savait qu'en fait le gouvernement chinois n'a jamais entendu mettre lesdits traités sur un même pied.

Précisons.

Les traités concernant les droits du Japon en Mandchourie sont de trois sortes.

Il y a le traité du 22 décembre 1905, complété par le protocole d'avril 1906. Il y a le traité de Chientao, conclu le 4 septembre 1909. Il y a enfin le fameux traité, dit « des vingt et une demandes », signé — partiellement — le 25 mai 1915 à Pékin et, à Tokio, en juin de la même année.

Or, dans sa position actuelle, le Japon demande à la Chine de reconnaître à ces trois instruments diplomatiques la même valeur.

A quoi la Chine répond — et c'a été, hier après-midi, le rôle du docteur Sze de le faire au nom du gouvernement national de Nankin — que leur valeur est essentiellement inégale.



Enclosure No. 40 to Despatch No. 1987  
of November 20, 1931.

From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'EUROPE NOUVELLE, November 7, 1931. 1495

M. Borah. — Non, j'ai parlé de « revision ».  
Le reporter. — Parfaitement.  
Un autre reporter. — Quelles seraient ces modifications ?

M. Borah. — J'en ai mentionné quelques-unes. Par exemple, si j'étais libre d'agir à ma guise, je retrancherais les réparations.

Le reporter. — Le statut territorial ?

M. Borah. — Puis, je modifierais le corridor polonais si faire se pouvait ; je modifierais la situation en ce qui concerne la Haute-Silésie, si cela m'était possible.

Le reporter. — Malgré le plébiscite ?

M. Borah. — A mon sens, le plébiscite tendait en sens contraire. Je pense que les suffrages avaient un sens contraire.

Le reporter. — Et quelle serait la procédure que vous conseilliez de suivre à cet effet, monsieur le sénateur ?

M. Borah. — Cela pourrait se faire, à condition de s'en tenir aux méthodes pacifiques, si les nations intéressées se réunissaient en vue d'effectuer le changement.

Le reporter. — Ne pensez-vous pas que si on réunissait les nations en conférence, afin d'examiner toutes les modifications, un malaise terrible régnerait dans toute l'Europe ; que les prétentions seraient exagérées ; que la réunion d'une si grande conférence pourrait donner lieu à toutes sortes de difficultés ?

M. Borah. — C'est vrai, si on entendait réunir toutes les nations intéressées au Traité de Versailles ; mais si on ne voulait s'occuper que d'une question spéciale, comme celle du corridor polonais, ou d'une autre question du même genre, on ne réunirait pas toutes les nations. On ne réunirait que les trois ou quatre nations particulièrement intéressées.

Le reporter. — C'est la procédure qui, à votre avis, serait possible et désirable ?

M. Borah. — Oui.

Le reporter. — Pensez-vous, monsieur le sénateur, que la force de la Russie, j'entends sa force commerciale autant que militaire, devrait ou ne devrait pas exercer une influence sur le désarmement de l'Europe ? Trouvez-vous que la Russie est agressive ?

M. Borah. — Vous connaissez mes opinions au sujet de la Russie.

Le reporter. — Je ne connais pas vos opinions à l'égard de la Russie, en tant que force économique.

M. Borah. — J'ai été partisan de la reconnaissance de la Russie, et je pense que tant que nous ne nous déciderons pas à la reconnaître, la solution du problème européen sera beaucoup retardée. En d'autres termes, nous ne pouvons pas aller trouver la France, la Tchécoslovaquie, la Yougoslavie, la Roumanie, et leur déclarer : « Nous pensons que vous avez une trop grande armée, trop de soldats. Nous pensons que vous devriez désarmer », alors que la Russie est à leur porte avec 600.000 hommes bien disciplinés et que nous autres, éloignés d'elle de 5.000 milles, nous avons d'elle une si grande peur que nous ne sommes pas disposés à la reconnaître. Je crois que dans cette affaire l'initiative appartient aux Etats-Unis.

Le reporter. — De même, monsieur le sénateur, je pense que vous êtes bien d'avis que nous ne pouvons pas demander aux gens de modifier les réparations prévues au Traité de Versailles tant que nous n'aurons pas fait acte de notre disposition à annuler toutes nos créances de guerre ?

M. Borah. — Ma foi, je voudrais que ces deux faits...

Le reporter. — Voudriez-vous que là encore nous fissions le premier pas ?

M. Borah. — Je ne voudrais pas que dans cette affaire un pas précède l'autre. (Rires.) Je voudrais qu'ils fussent l'un et l'autre, simultanément, un fait accompli, parce que je craindrais qu'il ne surgît quelque difficulté.

Le reporter. — Monsieur le sénateur, si aucun autre journaliste français n'a de question à vous poser, puis-je me faire leur porte-parole à tous en vous remerciant vivement de l'exposé très franc et très convaincant de vos opinions sur ces questions.

M. Borah. — Eh bien, Messieurs, j'ai parlé franchement — peut-être pas d'une façon diplomatique — mais c'est à vous, Messieurs, de décider ce que vous voulez publier de tout ce que j'ai dit. Votre jugement sur ce point vaut mieux que le mien ; mais les questions m'ayant été posées, j'ai pensé qu'elles demandaient des réponses franches, et autant que je l'ai pu, je vous les ai données. Je suis très heureux d'avoir eu l'occasion de m'entretenir avec vous.

Le reporter. — Merci. Nous vous sommes tous très reconnaissants.

(Traduit du « New-York Times »)

#### IV. — M. Hoover à la presse (24 octobre 1931).

Le président du conseil des ministres de France nous a fait un grand honneur en venant dans notre pays, surtout en ces temps de grave responsabilité.

J'ai confiance que sa visite aura des résultats profitables pour l'avenir. Je n'ai pas besoin de répéter que l'objet de nos conversations a été de trouver des terrains d'entente permettant d'accroître la confiance dans les relations internationales et dans le monde économique.

J'ai plusieurs fois affirmé que le monde souffrait plus d'une confiance gelée que de disponibilités gelées.

La presse joue un rôle important dans le développement de la bonne volonté qui doit servir de base à cette confiance, en préparant les terrains sur lesquels puisse progresser la coopération et l'action constructive.

J'ai foi que vous, de la presse française, emporterez d'agréables souvenirs de votre visite et que vous comprendrez la bonne volonté et l'esprit amical du peuple américain.

#### V. — Communiqué de MM. Laval et Hoover (25 octobre 1931).

L'amitié traditionnelle des Etats-Unis et de la France, l'absence entre nos deux gouvernements de tout différend, la tradition d'une longue collaboration en vue de la paix du monde, tradition à laquelle le Pacte Briand-Kellogg est venu donner un nouvel éclat, rendent possible et opportun pour les représentants de nos gouvernements l'examen, sous tous leurs aspects, des nombreux problèmes dans lesquels ils sont tous deux intéressés.

Le devoir des hommes d'Etat est de ne négliger aucun moyen de collaboration pratique pour le bien commun. Ce principe est particulièrement important au moment où le monde attend une direction qui l'aide à surmonter la dépression présente, si funeste à tant de foyers.

Les relations confiantes entre les gouvernements sont un élément essentiel du relèvement rapide que nous devons rechercher. Nous avons entrepris la tâche qui nous incombait dans un esprit d'entière franchise.

Les progrès que nous avons accomplis sont réels. Nous avons examiné la situation économique du monde et l'ensemble des relations internationales qui s'y rapportent : les problèmes de la conférence actuellement en vue pour la limitation et la réduction des armements, l'effet de la dépression sur les paiements des dettes intergouvernementales, la stabilisation des changes internationaux, et autres sujets économiques ou financiers.

Une discussion familière et cordiale nous permet de nous rendre compte d'une manière plus précise de la nature des problèmes envisagés. Nous n'avons pas eu l'intention d'engager nos gouvernements, mais plutôt de chercher sur le terrain des faits le moyen pour chacun de nos deux pays d'agir d'une manière plus efficace dans son propre domaine.

C'est notre résolution commune que la conférence pour la limitation et la réduction des armements ne laisse pas passer la grande occasion qui s'offre, et sache s'acquitter de ce qui constitue sa tâche véritable : l'organisation solide et durable de la paix.

En ce qui concerne les obligations intergouvernementales, nous reconnaissons qu'avant l'expiration de l'année de suspension Hoover, un arrangement couvrant la période de dépression économique peut être nécessaire, arrangement sur les termes et conditions duquel nos deux gouvernements font toutes réserves. L'initiative de cet arrangement devra être prise par les puissances européennes principalement intéressées, dans le cadre de l'accord en vigueur avant le 1<sup>er</sup> juillet 1932.

Nous nous sommes occupés spécialement des principaux moyens grâce auxquels les efforts de nos gouvernements pourraient s'employer à la restauration de la stabilité économique et de la confiance, en particulier. Nous sommes convaincus de l'importance de la stabilité monétaire comme élément essentiel de la restauration de la vie économique normale dans le monde, pour laquelle le maintien de l'étalon-or en France et aux Etats-Unis constitue un facteur de première importance.

Nous continuerons à étudier toutes les méthodes susceptibles de conduire à la stabilité des changes. Bien que, dans le court délai dont nous avons disposé, il ne nous ait pas été possible de formuler des programmes définis, nous avons pu constater que nous envisageons sous le même jour la nature de ces problèmes économiques et financiers. Cette identité de vues est de nature à faciliter pour nos gouvernements respectifs une action efficace.

(Ce texte a déjà été donné dans L'Europe Nouvelle du 31 octobre 1931. Nous le republions pour la commodité du dossier.)



## Pacifique et Colonies

### Le conflit d'Extrême-Orient.

Le Conseil de la Société des Nations doit se réunir le 16 novembre pour reprendre en mains le règlement du conflit sino-japonais. Depuis qu'il s'est séparé, les choses ont considérablement évolué. Le Conseil se trouvera, le 16, devant une situation nouvelle. La vivante chronique de M. Roger Lévy permet de suivre cette évolution. La lettre adressée, le 29 octobre, par M. Briand à M. Yoshizawa — qu'on trouvera plus loin parmi nos documents — montre que la période des arguties japonaises est passée : le problème est enfin posé dans toute sa clarté. Il est possible maintenant de tirer les leçons que comporte l'affaire.

Premièrement : la Chine a, fort justement d'ailleurs, excipé de l'article 11 du Pacte. Mais une décision efficace impliquait l'assentiment de tous les membres du Conseil. Cet assentiment général n'a pas été obtenu et le Japon a pu, par son veto, tenir en échec tout le mécanisme de Genève. Exemple admirable du danger, souvent indiqué, que présente la fameuse règle de l'unanimité.

Deuxièmement : la Société des Nations, soucieuse d'appliquer dans toute sa rigueur la procédure qui fut prévue et mise au point dans un esprit occidental, pour des problèmes occidentaux, s'est trouvée gênée, maladroite, dans un différend exclusivement oriental. Quel rapport existe-t-il entre l'« Etat » chinois et un Etat français, anglais, allemand ? Aucun. Le souci d'universalité de l'institution de Genève s'est révélé, à l'épreuve, une faiblesse. Là où la Société des Nations peut être véritablement efficiente, c'est quand elle intervient entre des puissances de même densité politique. Son avenir est avant tout dans les limites occidentales ; précisons : dans les limites de l'Union européenne.

Troisièmement : les Etats-Unis ont été invités à collaborer. Ils ont accepté. On voyait déjà en eux le bras séculier qui allait agir. Or, voici que, très rapidement, Washington s'est bien gardé de faire le gendarme. Loin de faire cavalier seul, l'Américain s'est contenté d'apposer une quatorzième signature à côté des treize signatures genevoises, et ceux qui, déjà, opposaient l'énergie réaliste des Yankee à l'éloquence inutile du Conseil, ont déchanté. L'Amérique n'a peut-être pas fait un pas vers la Société des Nations ; elle a du moins trouvé prudent de se mettre temporairement à son ombre, sans doute parce qu'elle ne tenait pas à prendre ses responsabilités.

Or, dans cette affaire exceptionnellement difficile, pour toutes les raisons que nous venons de dire, tous ont, d'instinct, tourné les yeux vers le seul homme dont l'autorité morale pouvait être efficace, vers l'homme qui, précisément, a tenu à renforcer le cadre européen de la Société des Nations. Tout ce qui a pu être obtenu, c'est à M. Briand qu'on le doit.

Un dernier point : il s'est — il faut bien le dire — trouvé des voix pour affirmer qu'après tout, une guerre, si loin de nous, si spéciale, aurait son utilité. Il s'en trouve maintenant pour interpréter l'affaire mandchourienne comme l'amorce d'un conflit russo-japonais. Nous avons le devoir ici d'intervenir, de dénoncer un état d'esprit aussi monstrueux. La guerre, où qu'elle soit, quels que soient les belligérants, est toujours la guerre. Et nous lui disons : Non. — E. N.

### La session extraordinaire du Conseil de la S. d. N. (13 octobre - 24 octobre). — Présence des Etats-Unis. — Et la Russie<sup>(1)</sup> ?

Le 30 septembre dernier, le Conseil de la Société des Nations se séparait, à Genève, non sans adresser ses recommandations à la Chine et au Japon. Il s'ajournait au 14 octobre pour une nouvelle session que le conflit mandchourien en pleine évolution l'obligeait de prévoir. Mais les

termes de cette résolution indiquaient assez, dans leur prudence voilée, que le Conseil croyait alors à une détente qui le dispenserait d'un nouveau voyage. Ces espoirs furent déçus. La session prévue pour le 14 dut même être avancée sur la demande expresse du représentant de la Chine, lequel disait avoir reçu des renseignements graves concernant des opérations militaires « d'un caractère offensif de la part des forces japonaises en Mandchourie ». Il s'agissait notamment du bombardement par avions de la ville de Kintcheou.

De son côté, le gouvernement japonais signalait l'existence en Chine d'un fort mouvement antijaponais : vexations obligeant les ressortis-

(1) Cf. nos articles des 5 septembre et 3 octobre 1931 où sont exposées les positions des puissances en Mandchourie depuis trente ans, et relatés les incidents du 18 septembre. Le numéro du 3 octobre contient encore les documents diplomatiques publiés dans la période 18-30 septembre 1931. — R. L.

L'article qui suit fait partie du dossier 30 B (La S. d. N. et l'Extrême-Orient), 150 B (Les Etats-Unis et les problèmes du Pacifique), et 156 B (La Chine et le Japon).

sants japonais à évacuer certaines localités, et boycottage des marchandises japonaises.

On voit ainsi que le conflit qui oppose le Japon et la Chine déborde infiniment le lieu même des hostilités ou tout au moins des échauffourées.

### *Une discussion juridique : le représentant des Etats-Unis peut-il siéger à la table du Conseil ?*

On s'est donc réuni à Genève le 13 octobre.

Le représentant de l'Espagne, M. de Mada-riaga, a cédé la présidence à M. Briand qui, en l'acceptant gaillamment, a marqué dès l'abord la difficulté de la discussion qui s'ouvrirait.

Retenons pour exemple, avant que ne s'élève le dialogue des représentants autorisés chinois et japonais, à la table du Conseil, ce que quelques textes officiels ou officieux offrent quotidiennement à l'attention anxieuse d'un Occidental, par la voie des journaux :

Les Chinois se plaignent que 100 cavaliers japonais aient été aperçus à Hsinmin (cette constatation ne peut éveiller aucune idée précise chez le lecteur qui ne consultera aucune carte et ne comprendra pas si cette ville est dans la zone S. M. R., si sa position stratégique est d'importance, etc.) ;

Les Chinois annoncent la présence d'aéronefs japonais au-dessus de Kharbine ;

Les Chinois annoncent que les Japonais arment les Mongols, lancent des bombes sur des terres chinoises...

De leur côté, les Japonais relatent des actes de brigandage à Moukden ou aux environs non placés sous le contrôle des troupes japonaises ;

Les Japonais se plaignent que des comités nationaux du parti nationaliste en Chine mènent une propagande, organisent des manifestations antijaponaises ;

Les Japonais signalent que leurs ressortissants en Chine centrale et à Changhaï se réfugient dans les consulats ou sur les navires japonais croisant normalement dans les eaux chinoises.

Mentionnons, en passant, telle dépêche *Reuter*, c'est-à-dire d'origine britannique, qui fait état d'opérations japonaises autour de Moukden, dans un sens nettement défavorable au Japon.

De ces réalités, le Conseil de la S. d. N. va être distrait un moment par un fait nouveau, d'ailleurs d'un intérêt capital, mais qui relève d'abord des fictions diplomatiques et des abstractions juridiques.

En effet, le 16 octobre, M. Briand rappelait que le Conseil, dans sa session de septembre, avait décidé d'ouvrir ses dossiers aux Etats-Unis : la proposition de communiquer tous documents concernant le conflit ayant été adoptée le 22 septembre, la question maintenant se pose de savoir s'il n'y a pas lieu de resserrer encore cette collaboration, de la faire passer du domaine écrit au domaine verbal en invitant — conformément à de nombreux précédents qui ont été pratiqués vis-à-vis du gouvernement des Etats-Unis, non pas quand il s'agissait du Conseil, mais quand il s'agissait de Commissions — le gouvernement des Etats-Unis à prendre place à la table du Conseil.

Suit alors une très subtile discussion.

M. Yoshizawa, ambassadeur du Japon, invoque l'article 4 du Pacte, paragraphe 6, où il est écrit : « Tout membre de la Société qui n'est pas représenté au Conseil est invité à y envoyer siéger un représentant lorsqu'une question qui l'intéresse particulièrement est portée devant le Conseil ».

La question en suspens intéresse sans doute par-

ticulièrement les Etats-Unis : n'intéresse-t-elle pas au même chef l'U. R. S. S. ou la Turquie ?

Devant cette incertitude, le représentant du Japon est fondé à demander si l'Américain siégera en *observateur*, sur un pied d'égalité avec les autres membres, ou s'il aura les mêmes droits et les mêmes devoirs que ceux-ci ?

Un précédent sera-t-il créé ? La décision d'inviter un Etat non-membre ne devrait-elle pas être prise à l'unanimité, selon la règle normale préconisée dans le Pacte ?

A quoi M. Briand réplique qu'on est en face d'un cas de procédure et que l'invitation peut être décidée à la majorité.

Or donc le Conseil, après de louables efforts pour lier le Pacte Briand-Kellogg et celui de la S. d. N., décide, en séance privée, à l'unanimité moins une voix (la formule vaut d'être retenue), qu'il y a lieu d'envoyer l'invitation au gouvernement des Etats-Unis.

M. Yoshizawa proteste : la question, aux yeux de son gouvernement, est *constitutionnelle*.

Mais MM. Briand et Grandi, forts de la décision prise à l'unanimité en septembre pour la communication des pièces aux Etats-Unis, pensent qu'on peut étendre la collaboration écrite à la présence effective... La lettre d'invitation est envoyée ; le 16 octobre, M. Prentiss Gilbert prend place enfin à la séance du Conseil.

Est-il besoin d'ajouter que les souhaits de bienvenue qui l'y saluaient signifiaient assez que, dans les annales de la S. d. N., un acte d'importance venait de s'accomplir : pour la première fois depuis onze ans que la S. d. N. existe, — elle qui naquit de la volonté du président Wilson, mais que, pour les raisons que l'on sait, les Etats-Unis n'ont pas voulu rallier, — pour la première fois un représentant de cette République des Etats-Unis qu'entraînent en quelque sorte malgré elle l'enchaînement des causes et des faits et aussi ses intérêts vivaces en Mandchourie — s'assied, observateur quasi-silencieux (mais de quel poids peut être un tel silence !) à la table du Conseil.

*« Retirez vos troupes », disent les Chinois. — « Oui, après entente préalable sur les principes fondamentaux », répondent les Japonais.*

Ouverte le 13 octobre, la session extraordinaire du Conseil devait se prolonger jusqu'au 24.

M. Yoshizawa affirmait tout de suite que son pays n'a aucune visée territoriale en Mandchourie et qu'il a la ferme intention de retirer ses troupes dès que les circonstances permettront de le faire sans danger. « Ce retrait est déjà commencé. Plus de la moitié des troupes envoyées après le 18 septembre en dehors de la zone ont été ramenées à proximité et il ne reste plus, loin d'elle, qu'environ 2.250 hommes. »

2.250 hommes ! Est-ce pour la présence de ces minces effectifs répartis sur un territoire plus grand que la France — en dehors, il est vrai, des étroites bandes territoriales et des villes réservées aux Japonais — que le conflit demeurera latent et menacera de s'envenimer encore ? Oui, mais il y a les principes ; et d'autres causes plus profondes que nous n'avions pas mentionnées le 3 octobre, afin de ne pas fatiguer le lecteur par les mille facettes du problème mandchourien. Nous en montrerons tout à l'heure.

Le Conseil croit pouvoir mettre d'accord les antagonistes. Le 22 septembre, il rédige une résolution qui, rappelant essentiellement les termes de celle du 30 septembre, demande le retrait pro-

gressif des troupes japonaises à l'intérieur de la zone du chemin de fer et des mesures chinoises en vue d'assurer la sécurité aux ressortissants japonais, et conseille aux deux gouvernements de constituer entre eux quelque commission de conciliation.

« De quoi s'agit-il en somme, dit M. Briand. — On entend cette voix grave qui tente d'arranger les choses, cette parole mesurée et sage qui force l'admiration de tous les membres du Conseil, ainsi qu'en témoignent leurs déclarations multipliées. — De quoi s'agit-il en somme ? Voici un pays qui occupe un territoire. Il y a des ressortissants, des intérêts. On lui dit : « Il faut cesser l'occupation. » Il répond : « Je ne demande pas mieux, je ne l'ai pas faite avec satisfaction et si j'avais pu m'en dispenser je n'y aurais pas manqué. »

Le Japon va-t-il accepter la résolution du Conseil ? Que non pas. Il lui soumet un contre-projet, dont les termes ressemblent bien, à première lecture, sur plus d'un point, à ceux de la résolution. Mais un paragraphe 4 stipule que le Japon procédera au retrait dans la zone du chemin de fer de ses troupes se trouvant encore dans quelques localités et en dehors de ladite zone avec l'apaisement des esprits et la détente de la situation par la réalisation d'une entente préalable entre les gouvernements chinois et japonais sur les principes fondamentaux régissant les relations normales, c'est-à-dire permettant d'avoir l'assurance de la sécurité de la vie des ressortissants japonais et de la protection des biens leur appartenant...

Principes fondamentaux ? Quels principes ? « Ouais, s'exclame Lord Cecil, quelle est l'entité mystérieuse qui porte le nom de principes fondamentaux ? »

Il est très difficile pour le Conseil de procéder à l'examen de points de ce genre avant de savoir exactement ce que ces mots veulent dire.

L'ambassadeur espagnol Salvador de Madiaga renchérit : « L'évacuation dépend de la sécurité, la sécurité dépend de l'apaisement, et l'apaisement dépend du règlement d'un certain nombre de questions qui n'ont rien à faire avec la sécurité ni avec l'évacuation. » Et son dernier et frappant argument sera : « J'éprouve de sérieux doutes à accepter la thèse suivant laquelle un gouvernement est responsable de la sécurité de ses ressortissants dans un pays étranger. »

Au vote sur le contre-projet japonais, une seule main se lève en sa faveur : celle de M. Yoshizawa. Au vote sur la résolution du Conseil, toutes les mains l'approuvent — sauf celles du Japonais. L'unanimité requise n'a pu être trouvée. Le Conseil, une fois encore, s'ajourne ; cette fois, au 16 novembre.

#### Principes fondamentaux.

Le Japon — cela est clair — veut profiter de la situation pour débrider l'abcès, améliorer ses relations avec les Chinois sur toute l'étendue de la Chine, pour faire reconnaître de nouveau ses droits spéciaux sur la Mandchourie.

Nous avons exposé précédemment la place particulière que le Japon s'est faite en Mandchourie depuis trente ans : chemins de fer, villes, hôpitaux, industries, mines, tous les éléments de prospérité, il les y a apportés ou créés. Un appel de la population chinoise par ces mesures, par cette prospérité, a été provoqué. Mais on conçoit que la masse chinoise, en énorme majorité, puisse être mécontente contre les Japonais ou leurs res-

tissants Coréens, et veuille les mettre à la porte de chez elle.

Et les traités ?

Voici la contradiction fondamentale du débat.

La Chine parle de la S. d. N. et du Pacte Kellogg, « ces ancrs de salut auxquelles elle a amarré son navire ». La Chine invoque l'article 11 ; elle réclame aide et protection à la Société des Nations, dépositaire des traités, gardienne de cette fiction en devenir : la justice internationale. Fort bien. Quant au Japon, respectueux, lui aussi, de traités et de pactes, il n'admet pas que l'on parte en guerre..., fût-ce contre des traités, les inégaux ou les autres ! Il déclare qu'il soumettra bientôt au Conseil une liste de traités dont, selon lui, la Chine n'a pas observé les clauses.

#### Qui a tort et qui a raison ?

Dans cet imbroglio qui a tort et qui a raison ?

Les Chinois méritent-ils d'être encouragés s'ils veulent développer eux-mêmes des réseaux de chemins de fer en Mandchourie ? On n'oserait le nier.

Et pourtant : « A la base de cette partie du problème, écrit M. Jean Escarra (1), il y a la question si débattue du protocole secret du 22 décembre 1905. Ce protocole, d'après les Japonais, aurait été joint au Traité de Pékin, en date du même jour, par lequel la Chine donnait son adhésion aux stipulations du Traité de Portsmouth dans lesquelles elle était directement intéressée (transfert par la Russie au Japon de la ligne Tch'ang-tch'ouen-Dairen et du territoire à bail du Kouan-tong). L'article 3 de ce protocole serait ainsi rédigé :

« Le gouvernement chinois, en vue de protéger les intérêts du *South Manchurian Railway*, s'engage, tant que ledit chemin de fer ne lui aura pas fait retour, à ne construire aucune ligne principale dans le voisinage de ce chemin de fer, ou parallèle à ce chemin de fer, ni aucune ligne secondaire qui pourraient porter préjudice aux intérêts du chemin de fer susmentionné. »

Dans ce cas, plusieurs lignes récemment construites en Mandchourie par la Chine sont en contradiction avec cette clause. Mais le gouvernement chinois fait observer que ces lignes sont des entreprises privées.

« Il n'est pas possible de prendre parti », conclut M. Escarra, qui ne cache pourtant pas ses sympathies de juriste à l'égard de la Chine. Et voilà résumée une de ces causes profondes auxquelles nous faisons allusion et qui motivent d'innombrables discussions entre la Chine et le Japon.

Autre aspect des intérêts japonais sur les lignes de chemins de fer ; il en est sur lesquelles le Japon exerce un contrôle parce qu'elles ont été construites par la Chine avec des capitaux empruntés aux Japonais. Parmi celles-ci, il y a précisément la ligne Kirin-Tch'ang-tch'ouen, d'une importance exceptionnelle puisqu'elle est la base de l'expansion japonaise à l'Est du S. M. R. Or c'est Kirin que les Japonais, soi-disant pour se défendre, ont occupé au lendemain du 18 septembre.

#### Faites entrer l'ours moscovite...

Quand le représentant du Japon discutait la présence de l'observateur américain au Conseil,

(1) On ne saurait assez recommander la lecture et l'étude de l'important ouvrage que M. Jean Escarra vient de consacrer à *La Chine et le droit international* (A. Pedone, 1931) ; c'est le plus lumineux exposé, la plus précise et abondante documentation sur la condition internationale de la Chine contemporaine.

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L'EUROPE NOUVELLE

« ins-inspecteurs » européens, donneront à leurs compatriotes les premiers soins, dirigeront sur l'hôpital les malades gravement atteints et s'attacheront à vulgariser dans les villages les règles élémentaires d'hygiène.

Voici donc créé — au prix de quel labeur soutenu ! — l'organisme qui permettra d'engager enfin avec quelque succès la lutte contre la maladie. Cela ne suffit pas. Il faut également commencer le bon combat contre les principales causes de cette effroyable mortalité qui, à une mère, enlève sept à huit enfants sur dix. Il s'agit ici, non pas seulement de guérir, mais encore et surtout de prévenir. Présider autant que possible aux naissances, soigner bébés et mamans, éduquer celles-ci ; c'est un nouvel effort à accomplir et c'est l'initiative privée qui va tout d'abord s'en charger.

En 1901, en effet, le docteur Nillet crée à Tananarive une maternité qui prend immédiatement une telle importance que, dès 1902, le général Galliéni la subventionne, l'annexe comme école de sages-femmes à l'Ecole de médecine, institue un diplôme et, la même année, décide que désormais sera réservé aux sages-femmes munies de ce diplôme ou d'un titre français, le droit d'exercer dans la colonie.

Ainsi s'asseyait sur de solides fondations le gros œuvre de l'assistance médicale. Avec persévérance, les gouverneurs généraux qui succèdent à Galliéni vont s'attacher à terminer l'édifice, à l'agrandir, à bâtir des annexes. Au centre, la petite école de 1896 et l'hôpital modeste qui s'y accroche sont remplacés aujourd'hui par des bâtiments qui couvrent plusieurs hectares et qui, installés suivant les règles de la technique la plus moderne, sont peut-être les plus beaux de nos établissements coloniaux et peuvent soutenir avantageusement la comparaison avec les hôpitaux des colonies étrangères. La section de Madagascar à l'Exposition a montré d'ailleurs aux visiteurs une fidèle reproduction en relief de cet ensemble imposant.

Au fur et à mesure que se forme le personnel et que s'accroissent les ressources, l'assistance se développe ; dans tous les principaux centres des hôpitaux sont créés ; peu à peu, dans toutes les régions, s'ouvrent des dispensaires et des maternités. Partout la population demande, réclame médecins et sages-femmes, s'offre à construire bénévolement les bâtiments nécessaires. Il faut, trop souvent résister, refuser ou du moins surseoir faute de personnel. Au reste, en cette matière, les chiffres sont particulièrement éloquentes :

- En 1896 : 40.000 consultations ;
- En 1904 : 1.400.000 consultations ;
- En 1930 : 2.205.000 consultations.

Pendant cette dernière année, les hôpitaux ont traité 51.000 indigènes et les maternités pratiqué 36.000 accouchements !

C'est qu'aujourd'hui l'organisation créée il y a 35 ans à peine comprend 6 hôpitaux régionaux, 46 centres hospitaliers complets (avec maternités et dispensaires), 9 hôpitaux avec dispensaires (sans maternités), 123 postes sanitaires complets (dispensaires et postes d'accouchements), 52 dispensaires et 25 postes d'accouchements isolés.

Le seul hôpital principal de Tananarive, centre d'instruction des élèves de l'Ecole de médecine, peut recevoir 400 à 500 malades.

Quel que soit son développement, cette organisation ne peut porter tous ses fruits qu'à la condi-

tion d'être secondée par des laboratoires, des établissements de préservation et des œuvres sociales.

Le gouvernement hova avait vainement tenté d'enrayer la variole, qui faisait de nombreuses victimes. En 1898 est décrétée la création à Tananarive d'un Institut Pasteur qui, dès l'année suivante, fournit le vaccin jennérien en quantité suffisante pour répondre à tous les besoins. Peu à peu toute la population de la Grande Ile est vaccinée et la variole disparaît.

L'Institut installe ensuite un service antirabique et la rage est vaincue à son tour.

Enfin l'étude des maladies infectieuses, la préparation et la distribution de sérums et de vaccins, la lutte contre la peste obligent l'établissement à étendre de plus en plus ses moyens d'action. Local à l'origine, il est d'ailleurs rattaché depuis peu à l'Institut Pasteur de Paris par une convention conclue entre celui-ci et le gouverneur général.

Les services rendus par l'Institut sont incalculables et mériteraient une étude spéciale à laquelle nous ne pouvons malheureusement consacrer ici la place nécessaire.

Comme la variole, la lèpre avait préoccupé les dirigeants malgaches aussi bien que les Missions. Celles-ci avaient fondé quatre léproseries ; elles existent toujours et l'A. M. I. en a ajouté six. Au total ces établissements hospitalisent aujourd'hui environ 3.000 lépreux qui y vivent sans contrainte. En outre, dans cinq villages spéciaux sont cantonnés 500 malades.

A partir de 1921 il a fallu entreprendre une lutte sévère contre la peste qui, malgré les précautions prises, avait pénétré sur les hauts plateaux. Elle y demeure à l'état endémique, mais les épidémies ont été rapidement supprimées par des mesures énergiques.

J'ai à peine besoin de dire que le paludisme et les maladies vénériennes, si fréquentes parmi les Malgaches, sont combattus avec tous les moyens dont peut disposer la colonie. Un service antipaludique a été créé pour Tananarive et les environs immédiats. Un Institut prophylactique des maladies vénériennes fonctionne aujourd'hui au chef-lieu suivant la méthode syphilimétrique du docteur Vernes et, cette année même, des filiales seront installées auprès des principaux hôpitaux régionaux.

La tuberculose, qui exerce ses ravages dans certaines régions, va faire à son tour l'objet de mesures spéciales.

Si j'ajoute qu'un asile d'aliénés aux multiples pavillons entourés de jardins permet de soigner Européens et Malgaches à quelques kilomètres de Tananarive, j'aurai terminé ce résumé de l'œuvre d'assistance entreprise par Galliéni et que ses successeurs ont améliorée, développée sans cesse avec une continuité de vues qu'on ne saurait trop souligner.

Est-ce à dire que l'édifice est terminé ? Nullement.

Avant même de quitter Paris pour rejoindre son poste, M. le gouverneur-général Cayla s'entretenait longuement d'une action nouvelle avec M. le médecin inspecteur général Lasné et c'est en plein accord avec l'ancien collaborateur de Galliéni et avec M. le médecin général Letonturier, directeur de l'A. M. I., qu'il vient d'établir le programme dont je dois me borner à tracer les grandes lignes.

Au chef-lieu de chaque région, les installations actuelles constitueront le noyau d'un dispensaire d'hygiène sociale, véritable polyclinique, qui

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comprendra un laboratoire parfaitement outillé et quatre dispensaires prophylactiques : anti-paludique, antivénérien, antituberculeux, anti-lépreux. Tout malade venu à la consultation sera l'indicateur inconscient qui conduira au lieu de naissance du mal : famille, village. Un personnel spécialisé établira avec certitude le diagnostic de la maladie, qui déclenchera aussitôt les mesures à appliquer soit à l'individu, soit à la collectivité : traitement, hospitalisation du malade, soins à la famille, visite de la maison, cordon sanitaire, etc.

Même résultat lorsqu'il s'agira d'un malade contagieux qui ne peut se déplacer : une ambulance permettra de le transporter rapidement et, dans le même temps, les mesures de préservation seront prises.

Dans la lutte contre le paludisme, les dispensaires régionaux joueront un rôle primordial : prospection des foyers palustres, indications prophylactiques, précisions sur les travaux d'assainissement à entreprendre.

Le nombre des villages de lépreux sera accru. Les malades non contagieux seront traités dans les dispensaires régionaux et non plus internés dans les léproseries.

Pour combattre la peste, il est indispensable de prévoir des lazarets pour isoler les suspects et de reconstruire, suivant un type imposé, inaccessibles aux rats, les maisons contaminées dont la démolition sera reconnue nécessaire.

La lutte contre la mortalité infantile sera intensifiée. J'ai dit déjà combien l'A. M. I. prend soin des mères ; les consultations de nourrissons assureront la surveillance après la naissance. Mais il faut également se préoccuper du traitement des bébés malades. L'hôpital fondé spécialement pour les enfants à Tananarive ayant donné d'heureux résultats, le programme comporte la création de vingt-trois établissements analogues, soit un par circonscription médicale.

Bien qu'en général les Malgaches s'empressent de recourir aux médecins, ils répugnent encore, dans certaines régions, à se séparer de leur famille pour être hospitalisés. Des administrateurs ont tenté de vaincre cette difficulté en construisant, à proximité de formations sanitaires ou de maternités, des habitations réservées aux parents des malades ou des parturientes. Ces essais ont été couronnés de succès et ils seront multipliés.

La protection sanitaire des travailleurs, déjà assurée dans les camps des ouvriers au service des travaux publics, sera étendue progressivement aux autres services publics et aux organisations privées. Logements salubres pour les travailleurs et leur famille, vivres et vêtements de travail, service médical, infirmeries, quinine préventive, surveillance sanitaire des familles demeurées au village d'origine, toutes ces mesures à la fois de protection et d'éducation, ne peuvent donner que d'excellents résultats pour l'avenir de la race.

Mesures pratiques de propagande, que complètera un système de vulgarisation des notions d'hygiène et de prophylaxie : distribution de tracts soigneusement rédigés, affichage d'images et de panneaux avec légendes en langue malgache dans les lieux publics, les bureaux des chefs indigènes, les salles de consultation, édition de photographies, projection de films, etc...

Enfin à la direction du service de l'A. M. I. s'organise — sans frais, d'ailleurs — un bureau démographique qui va centraliser tous les renseignements sur l'hygiène et la prophylaxie.

Le rôle que sont appelés à jouer désormais les

grands centres sanitaires régionaux conduit tout naturellement à compléter l'équipement des hôpitaux de ces centres. Chacun d'eux sera doté d'installations modernes (elles existent à Tananarive) de chirurgie et de radiologie permettant de pratiquer tous les examens et toutes les opérations.

Dans le même ordre d'idées, l'Institut Pasteur s'augmentera dès cette année d'un pavillon supplémentaire et sera pourvu de l'outillage et du mobilier nécessaires à ses nouveaux laboratoires.


Mais ce programme, en gestation depuis 1930, comment le réaliser à brève échéance alors que les dépenses courantes de l'organisation actuelle absorbent la plus grande partie des recettes normales de l'A. M. I. ? Fort opportunément le Parlement, en examinant au mois de janvier 1931 le projet d'emprunt de 700 millions à contracter pour la colonie pour l'exécution de ses grands travaux, a ajouté à cette somme un supplément de 30 millions spécialement affecté aux services de médecine sociale et d'hygiène. M. le gouverneur général Cayla a pu aussitôt soumettre au ministre le programme mûri depuis de longs mois et que je viens de décrire. Les fonds nécessaires sont aujourd'hui réunis, le programme est d'ores et déjà en cours d'exécution.

Avoir, en si peu d'années, réussi par la seule vertu d'une charité active et d'une bonté persuasive, ce tour de force d'amener l'indigène à demander nos soins, à « se laisser guérir » par des mains étrangères ; avoir bâti avec des ressources minimes l'édifice d'assistance qui a servi de modèle à toutes nos colonies, cela seul, déjà, témoigne de l'idéal qui a constamment guidé l'action « colonisatrice » de la France.

Mais cela ne suffit pas encore : il faut, maintenant, faire comprendre aux Malgaches que si guérir est bien, prévenir est mieux et qu'eux-mêmes doivent être les meilleurs artisans du relèvement de leur race.

Cette éducation, que le gouverneur général veut entreprendre sur une grande échelle, les femmes françaises l'ont commencée déjà avec cette bonté du cœur qui, dès les premières années de l'occupation, les a rapprochées des mères malgaches. Mais en cette matière comme en tant d'autres l'action collective est seule durable. Aussi, en 1915, se fonde la « Croix-Rouge de Madagascar » qui, affiliée plus tard à la Croix-Rouge française, prend rapidement un grand essor sous la présidence que, comme un flambeau, se transmettent les femmes de nos gouverneurs-généraux.

L'œuvre prolonge en quelque sorte, au bénéfice

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des enfants, l'action de l'assistance médicale indigène. Des dispensaires spéciaux sont ouverts, où les dames de la Croix-Rouge assistent aux consultations, conseillent les mères, les encouragent, pèsent les bébés, veillent à l'établissement et à la présentation régulière des fiches des petits malades. Des distributions de vêtements sont organisées.

A Tananarive, en 1929, le dispensaire de la Croix-Rouge a donné près de 136.000 consultations. L'hôpital des enfants a reçu 906 malades et la mortalité n'a été que de 2,42 pour cent ! Dans les autres dispensaires, 50.000 consultations ont été enregistrées. Durant la même année on a distribué 1.850 vêtements.

Avec un dévouement inlassable, dames européennes et indigènes des comités se sont mises au service de l'œuvre qui, parce que protectrice de l'enfant, va plus que toute autre droit au cœur des Malgaches.

Indépendantes l'une de l'autre, Croix-Rouge et Assistance médicale indigène sont cependant unies par le même idéal. Elles représentent ici la France maternelle, celle à qui jamais humain n'a fait appel en vain.

Docteur FONTYNOU,  
directeur de l'Ecole de médecine de Tananarive.  
Membre correspondant de l'Académie de médecine  
et de la Société de chirurgie.

## Sources et Documents

### Les affaires de Mandchourie.

Les documents que nous publions aujourd'hui font suite à ceux qui ont paru dans le numéro de *L'Europe Nouvelle* du 30 octobre 1931. Ils sont commentés, d'autre part, page 1496. Ce sont :

La demande de convocation urgente du Conseil de la S. d. N. par M. Alfred Sze, représentant de la Chine, en date du 9 octobre, suivie de trois télégrammes (Doc. I);

Un télégramme du 9 octobre de la délégation japonaise à la S. d. N. sur le mouvement antijaponais en Chine (Doc. II);

Le mémorandum japonais remis à Nankin le 9 octobre (Doc. III);

La convocation du Conseil, en date du 9 octobre (Doc. IV);

Une communication en date du 11 octobre du consul des Etats-Unis d'Amérique à Genève, signalant la présence de deux observateurs américains en Mandchourie (Doc. V);

Un message du secrétaire d'Etat des Etats-Unis, en date du 12 octobre (Doc. VI);

Un télégramme japonais, en date du 11 octobre (Doc. VII);

La réponse chinoise, en date du 12 octobre, au mémorandum japonais du 9 octobre (Doc. VIII);

Une communication du gouvernement du Japon au président du Conseil, en date du 9 octobre (Doc. IX);

La proposition du président du Conseil (15 octobre) visant à inviter les Etats-Unis à envoyer un représen-

tant au Conseil (Doc. X);

L'acceptation des Etats-Unis, en date du 16 octobre (Doc. XI);

Le mémorandum japonais, en date du 17 octobre, discutant le bien-fondé de la présence des Etats-Unis au Conseil (Doc. XII);

La réponse de M. Briand, président du Conseil de la S. d. N., en date du 18 octobre, au mémorandum précédent (Doc. XIII);

Le projet de résolution du Conseil, en date du 22 octobre (Doc. XIV);

Les amendements au projet de résolution présentés par la délégation japonaise, en date du 23 octobre (Doc. XV);

La déclaration publiée à Tokio, le 26 octobre, par le gouvernement japonais (Doc. XVI), où sont exposés les cinq principes fondamentaux autour desquels tourne la discussion.

La lettre adressée par M. Briand à M. Yoshizawa, le 29 octobre 1931 (Doc. XVII). — R. L.

P.-S. — Les documents qui suivent font partie des dossiers 30 B (*La S. d. N. et l'Extrême-Orient*) et 156 B, (*La Chine et le Japon*).

#### I. — Demande de convocation du Conseil de la S. d. N. par M. Alfred Sze, représentant de la Chine (9 octobre 1931).

Monsieur le secrétaire général,

Je viens de recevoir des renseignements d'une telle gravité sur de nouvelles opérations militaires d'un caractère offensif de la part des forces armées japonaises en Mandchourie, que je me vois dans l'obligation de demander, au nom de mon gouvernement, la convocation urgente d'une réunion du Conseil, afin que ce dernier puisse décider des mesures à prendre en ces circonstances.

J'ai l'honneur d'attirer votre attention sur le fait que ces opérations militaires ont eu lieu en dépit des assurances répétées, données par le gouvernement japonais au Conseil qu'il procéderait à un retrait rapide de ses troupes et qu'aucune action tendant à aggraver la situation ne serait entreprise.

Je vous adresse ci-joint des copies des câblogrammes que j'ai reçus ce matin.

SAO-KE ALFRED SZE.

#### Texte des câblogrammes de Nankin, en date du 9 octobre 1931, reçus par la délégation chinoise.

Un message de Tchén-Tchéou signale que le 8 octobre, entre 13 heures et 14 heures 15, douze avions japonais ont survolé Tchén-Tchéou et ont lancé trente-six bombes, visant surtout les bâtiments de l'Université où le gouvernement provincial se trouve provisoirement installé. Les bâtiments de l'Université ont été endommagés; on ignore encore s'il y a des morts et des blessés. Le wagon de service n° 141 a été atteint par une bombe qui a tué deux laveurs de wagons chinois. Le dépôt de locomotives a été également bombardé. Les communications télégraphiques entre Chan-Hai-Kouan et Tchén-Tchéou sont interrompues.

Un nouveau message signale que cinquante ou soixante bombes ont été lancées; plusieurs locomotives ont été détruites; la gare du chemin de fer était remplie de voyageurs au moment du bombardement; le nombre

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total des morts et blessés n'est pas encore connu. Les provocations délibérées des Japonais passent tout ce que l'on peut endurer.

Les Japonais arment activement les Mongols en divers endroits. Un télégramme de Tcheng-Tchia-Toung déclare que les Mongols concentrés à Taling-Tchen esquissent un mouvement d'indépendance à l'instigation des Japonais. Le chef du parti jeune mongol a été pressenti par les Japonais en vue de proclamer l'indépendance. Le chef de l'armée mongole a été contraint de prendre le commandement des forces mongoles du district avec le titre de commandant en chef de l'armée mongole autonome. Cette armée va d'ici quelques jours marcher sur Tcheng-Tchia-Toung. Un premier lot d'armes fourni par les Japonais comprend 3.000 fusils, un million de cartouches, quatre mortiers de tranchée, quatre canons de montagne et leurs munitions, deux avions, le tout provenant de l'arsenal de Moukden.

## II. — Télégramme reçu par la délégation japonaise à Genève (9 octobre 1931).

Mouvement antijaponais qui s'était de nouveau déclenché au mois de juillet dans toutes parties Chine à la suite des événements survenus en Corée paraissait se calmer en apparence, mais en réalité il ne faisait que s'organiser de manière plus calculée et plus dissimulée interdisant tout optimisme à cet égard. Il a suffi présente affaire de Mandchourie pour que ce mouvement s'accroisse subitement. Dans toute Chine des démonstrations de violence et de malveillance sans précédent ont éclaté se manifestant par meetings populaires, processions, discours, télégrammes, circulaires, affiches, etc. De plus à Changhaï ainsi que dans d'autres villes, efforts énergiques sont déployés en vue d'amener rupture relations économiques avec Japon. Non seulement des partis politiques, des étudiants, des chambres de commerce et des associations professionnelles adhèrent à ce mouvement, mais nombreux fonctionnaires du gouvernement chinois semblent se mêler audit mouvement.

Il est également noter que ce mouvement antijaponais tant qu'il s'est manifesté dans la région de Canton et dans Chine septentrionale a amené contrôle des autorités jusqu'à un certain degré, tandis que le long du fleuve Yangtsé et dans régions soumises à influence de gouvernement nationaliste Nankin contrôle exercé par autorités est si faible que situation à Changhaï et Nankin est des plus critiques. Ainsi à Changhaï des associations antijaponaises ont décidé de rompre relations économiques avec Japon et dans ce but ont interdit tout achat, vente ou transport des marchandises japonaises tout trafic avec Japonais et le fait de servir Japonais ou employer Japonais. Punition pour toute infraction à ces interdictions est même exécutée. En outre, marchandises japonaises ne peuvent être ni vendues ni achetées. On se livre à manifestations diverses telles que saisie marchandises japonaises (depuis vingt-neuf septembre deux cas se sont produits où marchandises appartenant à Japonais ont été saisies), refus des banques et agents de change chinois de faire opérations avec Japonais comme refus des Chinois de faire transactions avec banques japonaises, expulsion des locataires japonais des maisons appartenant aux Chinois, refus par associations chinoises de procéder aux transactions des marchandises japonaises, refus de réparer navires japonais, menaces contre Chinois au service de maisons ou particuliers japonais (à la suite pareilles menaces agents chinois employés par compagnies Nissin, Yusen, Chosen, Mitsui, Mitsubishi et Shokin ont été obligés déclarer qu'ils quitteraient leurs places).

Jusqu'à présent aucun Japonais n'a été tué, mais il se produit journellement plusieurs cas où on jette pierres à enfants japonais ou on les moleste quand ils se rendent à école. Mêmes faits sont également produits contre adultes. Journellement des ressortissants japonais sont l'objet de nombreuses vexations au sujet poste, télégraphe et téléphone. A Nankin, étudiants y compris ceux école navale se livrent activement à manifestations antijaponaises. Après mauvais traitements infligés vingt-huit septembre à monsieur Wang, ministre des affaires étrangères de Chine, consulat japonais a été obligé faire préparatifs en vue de transporter éventuellement au bord fleuve. Sur recommandation instante de monsieur Chiang Kai Chek, mouvement étudiants à Nankin est sensiblement calme. Il est à présumer que situation qui règne à Changhaï et Nankin se répande rapidement tout le long du fleuve Yangtsé et dans autres parties du pays. C'est surtout en amont fleuve Yangtsé que situation semble devenir de plus en plus critique.

Etat des dégâts causés aux ressortissants japonais en Mandchourie connus au cinq octobre 1931 et situation des soldats chinois débandés.

Un : dans environ Tiehling A) vingt-deux septembre dans province Tiehling trois à quatre cents soldats chinois débandés (nombre augmente sans cesse) firent apparition bord rivière Fanho (affluent de Liecho) et ensuite attaquèrent dizaine villages. Suite ces attaques vingt et un Coréens dont deux femmes furent blessés, vingt et une maisons furent brûlées et cinquantaine maisons détruites ou pillées. B) Trente septembre dans province Fanhohata (située nord-est Fuchun) trois Coréens

furent assassinés par seize soldats chinois. C) Dans partie occidentale chemin de fer Sud-Mandchourien dans circonscription Tiehling environ trois mille soldats chinois débandés pillèrent et incendièrent maisons à Enghot (situé ouest gare de Luansishan du chemin de fer Sud-Mandchourien). Environ trois cents Coréens furent obligés réfugier Luansishan. D) Environ deux mille trois cents soldats chinois et bandits montés firent apparition dans province Changtu. E) Dans province Hsian environ trois mille soldats chinois débandés firent apparition et vingt-sept septembre une femme japonaise fut assassinée.

Deux : dans environs Hailung à Peishanchengtzu environ quatre mille soldats chinois débandés firent apparition et vingt-sept septembre un Japonais fut grièvement blessé.

Trois : Dans environs Sinmifu vingt-quatre septembre soldats chinois débandés environ six mille tuèrent deux Japonais à Lantipaotzu (situé dans province Sinmifu).

Quatre : dans environs de Yingkou deux octobre sept cents soldats chinois débandés et bandits occupèrent ville de Newchwang et y incendièrent maisons. Vingt et un résidents japonais Newchwang durent réfugier au bord mer sous protection une compagnie soldats japonais accompagnés de agents police. A Tienchuangtai deux octobre trentaine bandits attaquèrent quinze familles paysannes coréennes et emmenèrent dix-huit de leurs femmes comme otages.

Cinq : dans environs Autung premier octobre chef bataillon chinois qui se trouvait Hsinyen se fit bandit. Même jour sept soldats chinois débandés blessèrent deux Coréens aux environs Tungyuanpao (situé sur ligne chemin fer Autung-Moukden). Trois octobre soldats chinois débandés firent apparition partout dans environs Autung.

Six A) Dans environs Kirin trois octobre un millier soldats chinois débandés pillèrent Chaingmi ; B) Depuis trois octobre environ deux mille soldats chinois débandés pillent villages environ Kuanmashan.

Sept : dans environs Changchun dix-neuf septembre un employé compagnie chemin fer Sud-Mandchourien disparut près Itienpao (situé sur ligne chemin de fer Est chinois).

Huit : dans environs Tung Liao vingt-trois septembre cultivateurs employés par maison Okura furent attaqués sur la route par bandits chinois montés qui enlevèrent un d'eux comme otage tandis que les autres réussirent réfugier Tung Liao.

## III. — Mémoire japonais remis à Nankin (9 octobre 1931).

Premièrement gouvernement japonais précisa déjà affaire Mandchourie est seulement résultat profond sentiment antijaponais en Chine, lequel prit forme spécialement provocatrice dans récent défi aux troupes japonaises les forçant recourir à mesures légitime défense. Responsabilité pour situation actuelle retombe naturellement sur gouvernement chinois. Gouvernement japonais demanda maintes reprises gouvernement chinois prendre mesures appropriées pour arrêter mouvement antijaponais, qui prend forme tellement systématique dans divers endroits Chine. Désirant maintenir relations cordiales entre deux pays, gouvernement japonais montra la plus grande patience et tolérance espérant encore amélioration possible cette situation déplorable. Malheureusement toutefois cette agitation antijaponaise semble prendre maintenant proportions alarmantes. On apprend que sociétés antijaponaises Changhaï et ailleurs adoptèrent résolutions non seulement pour mettre en vigueur prohibition commerce et transport marchandises japonaises, mais pour ordonner annulation contrats existants et généralement prohiber toutes transactions, et annuler contrats travail entre Chinois et Japonais afin réaliser ainsi soi-disant « Ruptures relations économiques avec Japon ». A cette fin examen et détention marchandises et personnes intimidation et violence et divers autres moyens sont employés pour donner suite à telles résolutions et peines sévères sont appliquées quiconque n'exécute pas lesdits ordres. Quelques sociétés vont jusqu'à menacer de peine capitale. En outre cas expropriation détention marchandises appartenant Japonais et menaces et violences contre leurs vies et biens sont devenus si nombreux et fréquents en Chine, que Japonais ont été forcés se retirer totalement ou partiellement de diverses localités. Deuxièmement, on doit noter que mouvement antijaponais en Chine est même comme instrument de politique nationale sous direction parti nationaliste, qui vu organisation politique particulière Chine est inséparable dans fonctions du gouvernement. Ce mouvement doit donc être distingué clairement d'un mouvement naissant spontanément dans peuple. Il est donc évident que mouvement actuel antijaponais en Chine contrevient non seulement à lettre et esprit traités existants entre deux pays, mais constitue forme acte hostile sans employer armes contraire à toutes règles justice et amitié. Gouvernement chinois assumera responsabilité très sérieuse s'il manquait prendre mesures promptes et effective pour supprimer cette agitation.

En outre en appliquant peines à individus sociétés anti-japonaises, qui sont organisations purement privées usurpent clairement autorité gouvernement national. Troisièmement, on se rappellera qu'à réunion récente Conseil Société Nations Genève représentants chinois aussi bien que japonais donnèrent assurance que gouvernements respectifs s'efforceraient prévenir aggravation situation. Gouvernement chinois évidemment contrairement cet engagement aggrave en fait situation en faisant aucun effort honnête ou effectif pour restreindre activité sociétés anti-japonaises, qui met en danger vies et biens aussi bien que liberté commerce sujets japonais dans différentes parties Chine. Quatrièmement, gouvernement japonais désire appeler une fois de plus attention sérieuse gouvernement chinois sur ces actes des sociétés anti-japonaises, et déclarer en même temps que gouvernement chinois sera tenu responsable toute conséquence de son échec supprimer mouvement anti-japonais, et accorder protection adéquate vies et biens des sujets japonais en Chine.

#### IV. — Convocation du Conseil (9 octobre 1931).

Président Conseil me demande transmettre membres Conseil communication suivante : Vu informations reçues j'ai adressé aux gouvernements chinois et japonais appel suivant : d'après informations reçues il se produit en Mandchourie et ailleurs des incidents qui ne peuvent qu'exciter les esprits et par suite rendre un règlement plus difficile. Dans ces conditions, en attendant la réunion du Conseil, j'estime que j'ai le devoir comme président en exercice de rappeler aux deux parties les engagements pris devant le Conseil de s'abstenir de tout acte pouvant aggraver la situation. J'ai également le ferme espoir que l'une et l'autre partie prennent des mesures entièrement conformes aux assurances données au Conseil et dont il a pris acte dans sa résolution du 30 septembre.

LERROUX, DRUMMOND.

Par note ce jour distribuée à tous membres du Conseil représentant Chine ayant reçu graves informations demande convocation immédiate Conseil. Vu cette demande j'ai décidé ma réunion Conseil prévue pour mercredi 14 octobre aura lieu Genève mardi 13 octobre midi. En vue cette réunion ai honneur proposer envoi aussi rapide que possible au secrétaire général pour transmission au Conseil de toutes informations sur évolution situation obtenues par membres du Conseil conformément alinéa 9, résolution du 30 septembre.

LERROUX,  
président Conseil.

#### V. — Communication du consul des Etats-Unis d'Amérique à Genève.

Monsieur le secrétaire général,  
J'ai l'honneur de vous informer que, le 6 octobre, le sous-secrétaire d'Etat a fait savoir à la presse que M. Salisbury, secrétaire de l'ambassade des Etats-Unis d'Amérique à Tokio, et M. Hanson, consul général des Etats-Unis à Kharbine, ont été chargés par le secrétaire d'Etat de se rendre en Mandchourie du Sud et d'y entreprendre un voyage d'observation. Il y a lieu de noter, à cet égard, que ces fonctionnaires ont été envoyés au su et avec l'approbation des gouvernements japonais et chinois et qu'ils ont pour mission de voyager, d'observer et d'adresser un rapport à leur gouvernement. Il ne leur a été donné aucun autre mandat.

(Signé : ) PRENTISS B. GILBERT.

#### VI. — Message du secrétaire d'Etat des Etats-Unis au secrétaire général de la S. d. N. (12 octobre 1931).

Je suis fermement d'avis que notre coopération dans le traitement ultérieur de cette question difficile doit être régie d'après les principes qui ont été suivis depuis les débuts de ces incidents à un moment où, heureusement, siégeaient à la fois l'Assemblée et le Conseil. Le Conseil a délibéré longuement et d'une manière approfondie sur cette question, et le Pacte de la Société fournit un mécanisme déjà heureusement mis à l'épreuve en vue du traitement de questions de ce genre. Les gouvernements chinois et japonais ont exposé et défendu leur cause devant le Conseil et, par l'intermédiaire des comptes rendus publiés sur les débats qui ont eu lieu au Conseil, le monde entier a été tenu au courant. Le Conseil de la Société des Nations a formulé et esquissé une ligne de conduite à suivre par les deux pays. Comme les deux gouvernements ont pris des engagements vis-à-vis du Conseil, il est hautement désirable que la Société ne relâche en aucune manière sa vigilance et qu'elle ne manque en aucune façon d'exercer toute la pression et de faire usage de toute l'autorité dont elle dispose en vue de régler les mesures que devront prendre, en la matière, le Japon et la Chine. De son côté, le gouvernement américain, agissant indépendamment par ses voies diplomatiques, essaiera de renforcer l'action de la Société des Nations et manifestera clairement qu'il ne se désintéresse pas de cette

question et qu'il ne perd pas de vue les obligations que le Japon et la Chine ont assumées envers les autres signataires du Pacte de Paris ainsi que du Pacte des neuf Puissances, si le moment venait où il semblerait opportun que ces obligations fussent mises en avant.

#### VII. — Télégramme reçu de Tokio par la délégation japonaise (11 octobre 1931).

Le mouvement anti-japonais se poursuit dans toute la Chine. Ci-dessous les derniers renseignements concernant les principales villes chinoises :

**Shanghai.** — Les mesures de coercition violente se poursuivent : le refus des banques et des changeurs chinois de faire des affaires avec les Japonais s'étend de plus en plus et avec la démission forcée des agents chinois des banques japonaises, le volume des transactions en effets et en monnaies a considérablement diminué, au point que les firmes et usines japonaises éprouvent de grandes difficultés à recevoir des lettres de change ou à changer l'argent des salaires. La pression de l'Association anti-japonaise s'exerce sur tout le commerce et de nombreux contrats sont annulés. Les bateliers et transbordeurs obéissant aux injonctions de l'Association anti-japonaise refusent de transporter nos marchandises et les dockers au service des maisons japonaises ont également été obligés de se soumettre à ces mesures d'intimidation à partir du 5 octobre. Depuis le 6, aucune marchandise n'a pu être manutentionnée. Dans les usines, les produits s'accumulent et beaucoup d'entre elles vont être obligées de fermer. Les résidents japonais n'obtiennent qu'avec la plus grande peine les objets usuels (riz, charbon, lait, journaux, etc.). L'Association anti-japonaise a infligé des amendes de plusieurs milliers de taels à des commerçants chinois ayant vendu des marchandises japonaises, celles-ci ont été saisies, les délinquants ont été photographiés revêtus d'habits spéciaux de « traîtres au pays » et les photographies insérées dans les journaux.

Le 7 octobre, des rouleaux de papier journal, appartenant à une firme japonaise, ont été saisis en pleine rue ; une centaine de journaux japonais vendus par des Chinois ont été détruits ; un magasin de jouets japonais, établi dans la ville chinoise, a été complètement pillé.

Nos ressortissants sont journellement insultés on leur lance des pierres. Par exemple, le 4 octobre, deux surveillantes d'une filature ont été battues et grièvement blessées dans la rue.

**Nankin.** — Les manifestations d'étudiants se calment peu à peu, mais la rupture des relations économiques devient de jour en jour plus efficace. Les agents et employés de la Compagnie de navigation Nisshin ont été obligés de donner leur démission ; l'Association anti-japonaise a traîné dans les rues de la ville, à titre d'exemple, trois marchands chinois ayant vendu des marchandises japonaises.

**Wuhu.** — Le transport des passagers et des marchandises de la Compagnie Nisshin a été interdit ; depuis la fin du mois de septembre, les marins et les résidents japonais éprouvent les plus grandes difficultés à se ravitailler.

**Hankow.** — Le 3 octobre, l'Association anti-japonaise a obligé les commerçants à payer une taxe d'enregistrement de 15 0/0 *ad valorem* sur les marchandises japonaises en stock ; ces marchandises doivent être vendues dans les vingt jours ; passée cette date, elles seront saisies. A partir du 6 octobre, l'Association anti-japonaise a envoyé un délégué au bureau de poste pour opérer une censure sur tous les colis venant du Japon. De nombreuses marchandises japonaises appartenant à des Chinois ont été saisies.

Les agents chinois des Compagnies japonaises ont dû abandonner leurs fonctions le 5 octobre ; le nombre des employés venant au travail diminue de jour en jour ; les banques et changeurs chinois ont annoncé le 6 octobre leur refus de poursuivre des relations commerciales avec les banques et les firmes japonaises. Les agents et caissiers chinois des banques et firmes anglaises, américaines et françaises, ayant également refusé d'accepter les chèques japonais, toutes les transactions en monnaie japonaise ont été arrêtées. C'est la première fois que les organisations bancaires chinoises ont unanimement refusé d'avoir des relations d'affaires avec les Japonais. Si cette situation se poursuivait, les relations économiques entre Chinois et Japonais deviendraient absolument impossibles.

**Chungking.** — Les approvisionnements de nos navires de guerre et des résidents japonais ont été saisis. L'Association anti-japonaise exerce une pression violente sur les agents de la Compagnie Nisshin, sur les pilotes, les interprètes du consulat et autres employés chinois pour qu'ils abandonnent leurs fonctions. Certains employés d'usines japonaises ont été enlevés et traînés dans les rues de la ville par l'Association anti-japonaise.

**Fuchow.** — Obéissant aux injonctions de l'Association anti-japonaise, les changeurs, etc., refusent de travailler avec les Japonais ; 500.000 silver dollars de dépôts ont été retirés de la Banque de Formose ; les marchandises même chinoises ne peuvent être débarquées des bateaux japonais. Les relations d'affaires des Japonais et des maisons de Formose avec les maisons chinoises sont interrompues.

**Swatow.** — Le débarquement des marchandises sur



bateaux japonais est interdit. De nombreux Chinois ont vu saisir leurs marchandises d'origine japonaise; de lourdes amendes leur ont été infligées. Des groupes d'étudiants sont passés dans les magasins chinois et ont apposé des scellés sur les marchandises japonaises.

Canton. — Les autorités ont pris des mesures relativement efficaces pour réprimer la violence des mouvements antijaponais, mais les manifestations d'étudiants et les menaces contre les employés chinois des firmes japonaises se poursuivent. Depuis le 3 octobre, les navires chinois à destination de Hongkong refusent d'embarquer les marchandises devant être transbordées dans ce port sur les navires japonais, et nos grandes compagnies de navigation (Yusen, Shosen) voient leur fret diminuer considérablement. Les compagnies de navigation côtière japonaises n'obtiennent plus aucun fret chinois. Les coolies employés par les Japonais ont été l'objet de mesures d'intimidation et se sont mis en grève, empêchant l'emmagasinement et le transport des marchandises.

### VIII. — Réponse de la Chine au mémorandum du Japon du 9 octobre (12 octobre 1931).

« En réponse au mémorandum du gouvernement japonais en date du 9 courant, le gouvernement chinois a l'honneur de formuler les observations suivantes :

Au mépris du droit international et en violation des dispositions du Pacte de la Société des Nations, ainsi que du Traité de paix de Paris et du Traité des neuf Puissances signé à Washington, le Japon a envahi et occupé brusquement et sans provocation certaines parties des provinces chinoises de Liaoning et de Kirin, renversé l'administration légale des provinces et des districts, et commis, au cours de cette invasion un grand nombre d'actes de guerre, ainsi que d'autres actes non autorisés par le droit international même en temps de guerre, tels que le meurtre de civils innocents, le bombardement de villes non fortifiées, le bombardement de trains de voyageurs, l'enlèvement et la saisie de biens publics et privés, etc.

La Chine et le Japon étant l'un et l'autre liés par les accords internationaux susmentionnés, qui imposent à leurs signataires l'obligation de rechercher le règlement pacifique de tous les différends, la Chine a immédiatement adressé un appel au Conseil de la Société des Nations. Le Conseil a invité le gouvernement japonais à donner des ordres pour que les troupes japonaises soient immédiatement retirées des zones occupées depuis le 18 septembre et a décidé d'accepter l'engagement solennel pris par le Japon de satisfaire à cette demande, fixant sa prochaine réunion au 14 octobre, au cas où l'engagement en question n'aurait pas encore été exécuté à cette date.

Le gouvernement chinois s'est abstenu, dès le début, de tout acte d'hostilité et est allé jusqu'à donner à ses forces militaires des ordres stricts les invitant à n'opposer aucune résistance, quelle qu'elle fût, à l'avance continue des troupes japonaises, malgré des actes de provocation accusant une gravité croissante et s'exerçant dans des zones de plus en plus étendues.

La discipline la plus rigoureuse a été en même temps imposée à la nation pour assurer à tous égards la protection des personnes et des biens des Japonais résidant dans les territoires chinois placés sous l'administration chinoise, et le fait qu'aucun incident regrettable ne s'est produit dans la zone étendue placée sous la juridiction chinoise prouve de façon concluante que l'engagement pris par le gouvernement chinois envers le Conseil de la Société des Nations est observé de la façon la plus scrupuleuse. Des ordonnances et des proclamations réitérées du gouvernement ont maintenu dans les limites légales la juste indignation de la population chinoise et un appel du gouvernement chinois, en date du 7 octobre, ordonnant à toutes les autorités locales « d'assurer la pleine et entière protection des étrangers et d'empêcher les éléments indésirables de profiter de la situation pour provoquer des manœuvres illégales », est venu renforcer les autres ordres donnés par le gouvernement, au moment où il n'était que trop évident que le gouvernement japonais ne respectait pas l'engagement qu'il avait pris de retirer ses troupes.

Agissant aux termes de la résolution du Conseil de la Société des Nations, le gouvernement chinois a nommé deux hauts fonctionnaires, chargés de reprendre en charge les localités à évacuer et a dûment adressé une notification à cet effet au gouvernement japonais et au Conseil; toutefois, le gouvernement japonais n'a pas encore mis à exécution son intention déclarée de retrasférer aux autorités chinoises les localités occupées par ses troupes. Comme le montre le rapport d'un observateur neutre, les localités, telles que Chenyang, Kirin, Tounhoua, Tchouliouho, Sinmin, Tientchangtai, etc., se trouvent encore sous le contrôle des troupes japonaises. Pendant ce temps, ces troupes continuent à tuer et à blesser des citoyens inoffensifs et à détruire les biens sans la moindre justification.

Le monde a donc lieu d'être surpris que, dans son indignation, le peuple chinois se soit borné à refuser d'acheter les marchandises japonaises. La liberté du choix des achats est un droit personnel que n'entrave aucun gouvernement, et si tout gouvernement a le

devoir de protéger les ressortissants étrangers, il n'est tenu ni par aucun principe reconnu de politique intérieure, ni par aucune règle de droit international, d'interdire ou de punir l'exercice d'un droit élémentaire qui appartient à tout citoyen. S'il existe une responsabilité quelconque en cette matière, elle incombe entièrement au gouvernement japonais qui, par de nombreux actes inamicaux a, depuis l'incident de Ouanpaouchan, créé cette aversion générale contre les marchandises japonaises.

Alors que le gouvernement chinois observe très scrupuleusement la résolution du Conseil de la Société des Nations en adoptant des mesures spéciales pour la protection de la vie et des biens des Japonais et en s'abstenant de tout acte tendant à aggraver la situation, de sorte que, comme il a été déjà dit, aucun ressortissant japonais n'a été victime d'un incident regrettable, les soldats japonais ont continué, dans les provinces du Nord-Est leurs actes d'agression qui ont abouti à une récente attaque aérienne sur Ichintcheou, où les autorités civiles de la province de Liaoning ont établi leurs bureaux provisoires depuis l'occupation de Chenyang, capitale de la province. Cet acte belliqueux a, comme le sait le gouvernement japonais, amené le Conseil de la Société des Nations à décider de se réunir avant la date primitivement fixée. Le gouvernement chinois prend acte avec satisfaction de la mention faite par le gouvernement japonais, de la responsabilité des deux pays à l'égard de la Société des Nations, mais il désire signaler que c'est le Japon qui, au cours des dix derniers jours, a commis divers actes qui ont tellement aggravé la situation que la résolution du Conseil de la Société des Nations n'a pu être mise à exécution, ce dont le gouvernement chinois ne peut être tenu pour responsable.

Le gouvernement chinois continuera à faire tous ses efforts pour protéger la vie et les biens des ressortissants japonais, malgré les extrêmes difficultés imputables aux actes incessants d'agression de la part des troupes japonaises, et il rendra le gouvernement japonais responsable de toute conséquence regrettable provenant de l'emploi continu, par le Japon, de forces militaires en tant qu'instrument de sa politique nationale, notamment en raison du fait que les deux gouvernements ont présenté leurs arguments devant le Conseil de la Société des Nations, qui a prescrit une ligne de conduite à suivre par les deux pays.

Fermement convaincu que le manque actuel de compréhension et les difficultés que rencontrent les échanges commerciaux entre les peuples chinois et japonais sont le résultat inévitable des nombreux actes illégaux des troupes japonaises, le gouvernement chinois est persuadé que, si le gouvernement japonais fait des efforts pour éliminer les causes qui ont amené la déplorable situation actuelle, il s'ensuivra d'heureuses améliorations dans les relations entre les deux pays et le maintien de la paix mondiale.

### IX. — Communication du gouvernement du Japon au Conseil de la S. d. N. (9 octobre 1931).

1. Le gouvernement japonais, tout en poursuivant dès le début des incidents actuels la ligne de conduite qu'il s'était tracée d'empêcher toute aggravation de la situation et de ramener ses troupes dans la zone du chemin de fer Sud-Manchourien au fur et à mesure que la sécurité du chemin de fer et la protection des ressortissants japonais et des biens leur appartenant seraient effectivement assurées, a toujours été convaincu qu'une solution amicale de cet incident ne pouvait être obtenue que par des négociations directes entre le Japon et la Chine. C'est dans cet esprit que le Japon a répondu au message du président du Conseil de la Société des Nations et qu'il a adhéré à la résolution votée à la dernière séance du Conseil.

2. Les opérations militaires en Mandchourie sont arrivées à un point stationnaire et le gouvernement japonais ne constate actuellement aucun développement particulier de la situation. Divers faits pouvaient être considérés comme créant un nouvel état de choses. Par exemple, les troupes japonaises ont parfois été obligées de se porter au secours des nombreux Coréens qui ont été victimes d'attaques violentes de la part des soldats chinois et des brigands dans les environs de la ligne du chemin de fer. Ces troupes, après avoir assuré la protection des Coréens et les avoir placés en sécurité, sont immédiatement retournées dans la zone. Ou encore des avions, partis en reconnaissance à la nouvelle que les troupes chinoises fugitives se rassemblaient dans les environs de Chinchow et se préparaient à troubler l'ordre le long du chemin de fer Sud-Manchourien, ayant été assaillis par les troupes chinoises, ont riposté en lançant des bombes.

Cependant, il est superflu de faire remarquer que les troupes japonaises ne pouvaient humainement laisser nos ressortissants coréens exposés sans défense à de telles violences. L'incident de Chinchow est facilement explicable lorsqu'on connaît les circonstances actuelles de la situation. L'atmosphère de surexcitation créée par les mesures de défense que les forces japonaises ont dû prendre devant l'action provocante des troupes chinoises de Mandchourie ne s'est aucunement détendue. Il est clair qu'il n'existe point un état de guerre, mais les troupes japonaises se trouvent dans la nécessité d'ob-

server attentivement les mouvements des troupes chinoises et de prendre de minutieuses mesures de sécurité. C'est dans ces conditions que l'incident de Chinchow s'est produit. Considérer un tel événement, conséquence de la situation de fait, comme ayant un caractère d'aggravation de la situation, est, de l'avis du gouvernement japonais, une appréciation inexacte de l'ensemble de la situation.

3. On a dit également que la situation s'aggravait du fait que les unités navales japonaises se dirigeaient vers le Yangtsé. La réalité est toute différente. Devant les mouvements antijaponais par lesquels la Chine elle-même aggrave la situation, le Japon a constamment adopté une attitude de patience et de calme. Il a évacué ses consulats et ses ressortissants des zones dangereuses du Haut-Yangtsé. Des vaisseaux de guerre ont été dirigés sur Changhaï vers l'époque où une protestation concernant les mouvements antijaponais était présentée au gouvernement chinois. Cet envoi n'a eu pour but que de dissiper l'inquiétude causée par les menaces dirigées contre la vie et les biens de nos ressortissants et afin d'assurer, le cas échéant, leur protection et ne dépasse pas les mesures usuelles prises par les Puissances dans les cas analogues.

4. Il se dégage des discussions du Conseil, ainsi que de la résolution adoptée, que l'on paraît croire qu'avec le retrait des troupes actuellement en dehors de la zone du chemin de fer, les autorités chinoises pourront à leur place assurer le maintien de l'ordre. Malheureusement, la situation est telle qu'elle vient d'être expliquée ci-dessus et le maintien de l'ordre local non seulement ne peut être assuré d'une façon aussi simple, mais le fait que dans certains points du territoire chinois éloignés du théâtre des événements actuels, les menaces contre la vie et les biens de nos ressortissants croissant chaque jour nécessitent même l'envoi de renforts navals, permet de se rendre aisément compte des difficultés que rencontre l'exécution du plan de retrait intégral des troupes japonaises dans la zone du chemin de fer.

5. Le gouvernement japonais estime que dans les circonstances actuelles, la nécessité la plus urgente est de ramener une détente des sentiments des peuples japonais et chinois par une coopération mutuelle. Dans ce but, il est essentiel de s'entendre sur quelques grands principes devant servir de base au maintien des relations normales entre les deux pays. Lorsque ces principes auront été établis, il ne manquera pas de s'ensuivre une détente des sentiments nationaux et les troupes japonaises pourront se retirer sans appréhension dans la zone du chemin de fer Sud-Mandchourien. Le gouvernement japonais se déclare prêt à entrer en pourparlers avec les représentants responsables de la Chine pour s'entendre sur ces points fondamentaux.

**LIBRAIRIE DU RECUEIL SIREY**  
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**X. — Proposition du président du Conseil  
visant à inviter le gouvernement des États-  
Unis à envoyer un représentant au Conseil  
(15 octobre 1931).**

Au cours des débats, l'opinion a déjà été exprimée que la question très importante dont était saisi le Conseil touchait à l'observation des obligations résultant non seulement du Pacte de la Société des Nations, mais aussi de celles du Pacte de Paris.

Cette déclaration est incontestablement fondée, puis-que aux termes de l'article 2 de ce pacte.

« Les Hautes Parties Contractantes reconnaissent que le règlement ou la solution de tous les différends ou conflits, de quelque nature ou de quelque origine qu'ils puissent être, qui pourront surgir entre elles, ne devra jamais être recherché que par des moyens pacifiques. »

Au premier rang des signataires du Pacte de Paris figurent les États-Unis d'Amérique ; ils en ont été un des promoteurs et il doit m'être permis de rappeler que j'ai eu l'honneur d'être avec le secrétaire d'État américain d'alors un des auteurs de ce Pacte. Ainsi, les États-Unis se trouvent particulièrement intéressés à assurer un règlement du présent différend par des moyens pacifiques.

D'ailleurs, le gouvernement américain, avec lequel des communications sur le différend dont nous sommes saisis ont déjà été échangées, vient d'exprimer chaleureusement sa sympathie pour l'attitude adoptée par la Société des Nations, et il a affirmé son désir de renforcer l'action de la Société. Je suis sûr de répondre au vœu de mes collègues en proposant que nous invitions le gouvernement des États-Unis à envoyer un représentant s'associer à nos efforts en prenant place à la table du Conseil ; il sera ainsi en mesure de faire connaître son opinion sur la manière dont, soit dans l'état actuel des choses, soit dans leur développement ultérieur, il pourrait être donné effet aux dispositions du Pacte de Paris, et l'occasion lui sera d'autre part fournie de suivre nos discussions sur l'ensemble du problème.

J'ai la conviction que l'action qui serait entreprise en vertu de ce Pacte ne pourrait que renforcer les efforts que poursuit actuellement le Conseil, conformément aux obligations qui résultent pour lui du Pacte de la Société des Nations, afin d'obtenir un règlement pacifique du problème qui lui est soumis.

[Signé :] A. BRIAND,  
président en exercice du Conseil.

**XI. — Acceptation des États-Unis (16 octobre 1931).**

Excellence,

J'ai l'honneur d'accuser réception de votre communication, adressée le 16 octobre au secrétaire d'État des États-Unis d'Amérique, dans laquelle vous reproduisez le texte d'une proposition adoptée par le Conseil de la Société des Nations. Vous adressez, conformément à cette proposition, une invitation au gouvernement des États-Unis d'Amérique, d'envoyer un représentant pour prendre place à la table du Conseil, de manière à le mettre en mesure d'examiner avec le Conseil les rapports entre les dispositions du Pacte de Paris et la situation malheureuse existant actuellement en Mandchourie, en même temps que de suivre les discussions du Conseil sur les autres aspects du problème auquel celui-ci a à faire face.

Je suis chargé par le secrétaire d'État d'accepter, au nom du gouvernement des États-Unis, votre invitation à envoyer un représentant et de vous faire savoir qu'il m'a désigné pour remplir cette fonction.

[Signé :] PRENTISS GILBERT.

**XII. — Mémoire japonais relatif à la  
présence de l'observateur américain (17 octobre 1931).**

1. Le gouvernement du Japon a jusqu'ici apporté une collaboration sincère à l'œuvre de la Société des Nations et s'est attaché de toute façon à augmenter son prestige. Il considère que l'action de la Société des Nations doit toujours se conformer strictement aux dispositions du Pacte, et qu'il importe que cette action elle-même revête un caractère pondéré et correct. S'écarter de ces principes pour des raisons d'opportunité ne paraît pas au gouvernement du Japon propre à maintenir l'autorité de la Société des Nations.

2. Lorsque le Conseil de la Société des Nations a discuté la question d'inviter le gouvernement des États-Unis d'Amérique à envoyer siéger au Conseil un observateur, le représentant du Japon a exprimé d'une façon détaillée ses doutes quant à l'interprétation du Pacte, à savoir si le fait qu'un observateur d'un État non membre siège au Conseil est compatible ou non avec les dispositions du Pacte de la Société des Nations, et si la question de l'invitation pouvait ou non être considérée selon le Pacte comme une question de procédure. Bien que le représentant du Japon ait demandé

au Conseil d'examiner ces points, celui-ci n'a pas procédé à une étude approfondie des questions soulevées par lui et a également rejeté sa demande de les renvoyer à l'examen d'un comité d'experts juridiques. Le président du Conseil, réservant pour l'avenir toutes ces questions juridiques et mettant au vote la question de l'invitation, sans tenir compte de l'opposition du représentant du gouvernement du Japon décidant également qu'il s'agissait d'une question de procédure, a déclaré que la proposition avait été adoptée à la majorité.

3. L'opinion a été émise que le gouvernement des Etats-Unis d'Amérique étant partie au Pacte de Paris devrait avoir l'occasion d'exprimer son avis au Conseil de la Société des Nations uniquement en ce qui concerne l'application de ce traité. Le gouvernement du Japon, non seulement est fermement convaincu de ce que la situation actuelle n'est pas telle qu'il existe un danger de guerre entre le Japon et la Chine, mais considère aussi, le Pacte de Paris étant un traité entre plusieurs dizaines d'Etats comprenant des Etats non membres, qu'accorder au seul représentant des Etats-Unis l'occasion de siéger au Conseil et d'y prendre la parole soulève une question ardue. Ceci indiquerait également que l'invitation des Etats-Unis n'est pas simplement une question de procédure.

4. Le gouvernement du Japon ne peut s'empêcher de se demander avec une profonde anxiété si l'action de procéder précipitamment à la décision par majorité est correcte, tout en réservant pour l'avenir la question préalable de savoir si une proposition nécessite l'unanimité ou si elle peut être décidée à la majorité. Il serait désireux de savoir à quelle occasion les questions juridiques réservées seront mises en discussion, et quel sera le rapport entre le vote du 15 octobre et le résultat éventuel de ces discussions.

Avant de décider de l'attitude à prendre à l'égard de l'ensemble des questions soulevées actuellement, le gouvernement du Japon serait heureux de connaître l'avis de M. le président du Conseil quant aux points mentionnés ci-dessus.

### XIII. — Réponse du président du Conseil à la note du représentant du Japon (18 octobre 1931).

Genève, le 18 octobre 1931.

Monsieur l'ambassadeur,

1. J'ai l'honneur d'accuser réception à Votre Excellence du memorandum qu'Elle a bien voulu me faire tenir par sa lettre du 17 octobre.

2. J'ai à peine besoin de dire, et je suis sûr d'être l'interprète de tous mes collègues du Conseil, que j'apprécie hautement la valeur de la collaboration que le Japon a prêtée à la Société des Nations, ainsi que les efforts qu'il n'a cessé d'accomplir pour augmenter le prestige de la Société. Dois-je ajouter que nous sommes tous d'accord avec le gouvernement japonais pour penser que des raisons d'opportunité, qu'elles soient, ne sauraient nous justifier à nous mettre en contradiction avec les articles du Pacte qui constitue la charte des membres de la Société ?

3. Votre Excellence se rappellera que, dans une lettre qu'Elle a bien voulu m'adresser le 15 octobre, Elle a exprimé déjà certaines appréciations au sujet des mesures prises par le Conseil dans l'affaire qui fait l'objet de la dernière note de Votre Excellence.

Avant consulté quelques-uns de mes collègues, que mon prédécesseur à la présidence, avec l'approbation du Conseil, s'était adjoints pour l'aider dans sa tâche, j'avais examiné avec le plus grand soin les questions que vous souleviez alors, et auxquelles j'avais ensuite répondu par ma lettre du 15 octobre.

4. J'avais espéré que cette lettre aurait apaisé les scrupules de votre gouvernement, car elle faisait ressortir clairement qu'à mon avis, et de l'avis des personnalités que j'avais consultées, un malentendu était à l'origine des questions qui m'étaient posées.

5. Au cours des séances du 15 et du 16 octobre, j'ai eu soin de marquer — et ma déclaration a rencontré l'approbation de mes collègues — que la proposition dont le Conseil était saisi avait un objet nettement limité, puisqu'elle tendait simplement à compléter les dispositions déjà adoptées pour faciliter l'information du Conseil et que les questions juridiques, de caractère général, sur lesquelles Votre Excellence attirait l'attention, ne se posaient pas et devaient, par conséquent, demeurer entièrement réservées; j'ai ajouté que, vu les circonstances de l'affaire, la solution de ces questions n'était pas nécessaire pour permettre au Conseil de se prononcer sur la proposition qui lui était soumise.

6. Au surplus, ma lettre du 15 octobre, et j'attire l'attention de Votre Excellence sur ses paragraphes 2 et 3, a expliqué pour quelles raisons, et dans quelles conditions, un représentant des Etats-Unis était invité à prendre place à la table du Conseil. Les déclarations formulées par divers membres du Conseil à la séance du 16 octobre sont également explicites à cet égard.

7. Telle étant la situation, j'estime, d'accord avec mes collègues, qu'il ne servirait à rien d'entreprendre,

à l'heure actuelle, une étude juridique du problème, qui, quelque importants et intéressants qu'ils puissent être en eux-mêmes, ne se posent pas en l'espace, mais qui pourront d'ailleurs, si tel est le vœu des membres de la Société, faire l'objet d'un examen ultérieur.

8. J'ai conscience que le gouvernement japonais, pour les raisons que j'ai exposées, sera d'accord avec nous pour reconnaître qu'une telle étude serait, en tout cas, sans rapport avec le vote émis par le Conseil le 15 octobre.

9. J'ose exprimer l'espoir que les explications qui précèdent convaincront le gouvernement japonais que mes collègues et moi avons soumis à l'examen le plus attentif les vues qu'il avait chargées Votre Excellence de nous faire connaître, et que nous avons eu le plus grand souci de ne rien faire qui aille à l'encontre d'un article du Pacte de la Société des Nations ou de la pratique du Conseil.

[Signé :] A. BRIAND,  
président en exercice du Conseil.

### XIV. — Projet de résolution du Conseil (22 octobre 1931).

Le Conseil, comme suite à sa résolution du 30 septembre,

Constatant qu'en plus de l'appel fait par le gouvernement chinois en vertu de l'article 11 du Pacte, l'article 2 du Pacte de Paris a été invoqué par un certain nombre de gouvernements,

1. Rappelle les engagements pris par les deux gouvernements dans la résolution du 30 septembre, notamment la déclaration du représentant du Japon selon laquelle son gouvernement poursuivra aussi rapidement que possible le retrait de ses troupes pour les ramener dans la zone du chemin de fer, dans la mesure où la sécurité de la vie des ressortissants japonais et la protection de leurs biens seront effectivement assurées, ainsi que la déclaration du représentant de la Chine, selon laquelle son gouvernement assumera la responsabilité de la sécurité des ressortissants japonais et de la protection des biens leur appartenant en dehors de ladite zone; — ce qui implique de la part du gouvernement chinois l'engagement d'assurer une protection effective aux ressortissants japonais résidant en Mandchourie;

2. Rappelle en outre que les deux gouvernements ont donné l'assurance qu'ils s'abstiendront de tout susceptible d'aggraver la situation; qu'ils tiennent de s'abstenir de toute politique ou action susceptible de compromettre les mesures propres à toute agitation hostile;

3. Rappelle la déclaration du représentant du Japon selon laquelle le Japon n'a aucune visée territoriale en Mandchourie; constate que cette déclaration est conforme aux termes du Pacte de la Société des Nations, ainsi que du Traité des neuf Puissances dont les signataires se sont engagés « à respecter la souveraineté, l'indépendance et l'intégrité territoriale et administrative de la Chine »;

4. Convaincu que l'exécution de ces assurances et de ces engagements est essentielle pour le rétablissement des relations normales entre les deux parties :

(a) demande au gouvernement japonais de commencer immédiatement et de poursuivre progressivement le retrait de ses troupes à l'intérieur de la zone du chemin de fer afin que le retrait complet puisse être effectué avant la prochaine réunion du Conseil;

(b) demande au gouvernement chinois, en exécution de l'engagement qu'il a pris, d'une manière générale, en ce qui concerne la protection de la vie et des biens des ressortissants japonais en Mandchourie, d'adopter en vue de la prise en charge du territoire évacué, toutes dispositions propres à assurer la sécurité de la vie des ressortissants japonais qui y résident et la protection de leurs biens, — invite en outre le gouvernement chinois à attacher aux autorités chinoises désignées à ces fins des représentants d'autres Puissances afin que ceux-ci puissent suivre l'exécution des dispositions dont il s'agit;

5. Recommande aux gouvernements chinois et japonais de désigner immédiatement des représentants pour régler les détails d'exécution de l'évacuation et de la prise en charge des territoires évacués, afin que ces opérations puissent s'accomplir de façon régulière et sans retard;

6. Recommande aux gouvernements chinois et japonais d'entamer, dès l'achèvement de l'évacuation, des négociations directes sur toutes les questions en suspens entre eux, notamment sur celles qui résultent des derniers événements et celles qui ont trait aux difficultés dues à la situation du chemin de fer de Mandchourie.

A cette fin, le Conseil suggère aux deux gouvernements de constituer une Commission de conciliation ou quelque autre organisme permanent du même ordre.

7. Le Conseil décide de s'ajourner au 16 novembre, date à laquelle il procédera à un nouvel examen de la situation, mais autorise son président à le convoquer à une date antérieure s'il l'estime opportun.



**XV. — Amendements au projet de résolution  
présentés par la délégation japonaise (23  
octobre 1931<sup>(1)</sup>).**

Le Conseil,  
Comme suite à sa résolution du 30 septembre;  
Constatant qu'en plus de l'appel fait par le gouver-  
nement chinois en vertu de l'article 11 du Pacte, l'article 2  
du Pacte de Paris a été invoqué par un certain nombre  
de gouvernements :

1. Rappelle les engagements pris par les deux gouver-  
nements dans la résolution du 30 septembre, notamment  
la déclaration du représentant du Japon selon laquelle  
son gouvernement poursuivra aussi rapidement que pos-  
sible le retrait de ses troupes pour les ramener dans la  
zone du chemin de fer, dans la mesure où la sécurité  
de la vie des ressortissants japonais et la protection de  
leurs biens seront effectivement assurées, ainsi que la  
déclaration du représentant de la Chine selon laquelle  
son gouvernement assumera la responsabilité de la sécu-  
rité des ressortissants japonais et de la protection des  
biens leur appartenant en dehors de ladite zone ; ce  
qui implique de la part du gouvernement chinois l'en-  
gagement d'assurer une protection effective aux res-  
sortissants japonais résidant en Mandchourie ;

2. Rappelle en outre que les deux gouvernements ont  
donné l'assurance qu'ils s'abstiendront de toute mesure  
susceptible d'aggraver la situation ; qu'ainsi ils sont  
tenus de s'abstenir de toute politique ou action agres-  
sive et doivent prendre les mesures propres à mettre fin  
à toute agitation hostile ;

3. Rappelle la déclaration du représentant japonais  
selon laquelle le Japon n'a aucune visée territoriale en  
Mandchourie ; constate que cette déclaration est con-  
forme à l'esprit du Pacte de la Société des Nations,  
ainsi que du Traité des neuf Puissances dont les signa-  
taires se sont engagés « à respecter la souveraineté,  
l'indépendance, l'intégrité territoriale et administrative  
de la Chine ».

4. Prend acte, de nouveau de la déclaration du repré-  
sentant du Japon, faite le 13 octobre, selon laquelle le  
gouvernement du Japon procédera au retrait dans la  
zone du chemin de fer de ses troupes se trouvant  
dans quelques localités en dehors de ladite zone  
l'apaisement des esprits et la détente de la situa-  
tion ; la réalisation d'une entente préalable entre les  
gouvernements chinois et japonais SUR LES PRINCIPES  
TAUX régissant les relations normales, c'est-  
à-dire d'avoir l'assurance de la sécurité de  
ressortissants japonais et de la protection des  
appartenant ;

5. Recommande aux gouvernements chinois et japo-  
nais de se concerter immédiatement dans le but de réa-  
liser l'entente mentionnée au paragraphe 4 ;

6. Recommande aux gouvernements chinois et japonais  
de désigner des représentants pour régler les détails  
d'exécution de l'évacuation et de la prise en charge des  
localités évacuées ;

7. Prie les gouvernements chinois et japonais de vou-  
loir tenir le Conseil au courant du développement des  
pourparlers entre eux et l'état d'exécution de la pré-  
sente résolution ;

8. Autorise son président à prendre, après l'examen  
des communications et sous toutes réserves qu'il juge  
nécessaires pour assurer l'exécution de la présente réso-  
lution, et à convoquer le Conseil à tout moment en vue  
de procéder à un nouvel examen de la situation.

**XVI. — Déclaration publiée à Tokio par le  
gouvernement japonais (26 octobre 1931).**

Sur demande de la délégation japonaise, ai l'honneur com-  
muniquer la déclaration du gouvernement japonais publiée  
à Tokio le 26 octobre :

1° Représentant japonais Conseil Société Nations  
proposa le 22 octobre certains amendements à la résolution  
soumise au Conseil touchant deux questions :

1. Retrait troupes japonaises dans zone chemin de fer ;

2. Négociations directes entre Chine Japon.

Cependant, lesdits amendements aussi bien que réso-  
lution elle-même échouèrent, faute d'obtenir approba-  
tion unanime Conseil.

2° Comme gouvernement japonais a souligné diver-  
ses reprises, toute l'affaire mandchourienne fut occa-  
sionnée seulement par attaques violentes et provoca-  
trices lancées par armée chinoise contre zone chemin  
de fer. Certains petits contingents japonais restant  
encore à quelques points hors de cette zone sont instam-  
ment exigés par danger vies et biens auquel nom-  
breuse population japonaise dans cette région est expo-  
sée. Présence effectifs aussi limités peut aucunement  
être représentée comme moyen pour Japon dicter à  
Chine termes règlement difficultés actuelles. Rien est  
plus loin des pensées du Japon que faire peser pres-  
sion armée sur Chine pendant ces négociations.

3° Gouvernement japonais exprima diverses occa-

(1) Les trois premiers paragraphes correspondent aux  
trois premiers paragraphes du document précédent.

sions ferme détermination souffrir aucun retranche-  
ment ou diminution droits et intérêts Japon qui sont  
vitaux pour existence nationale et font partie du com-  
plexe de ses relations politiques et économiques avec  
Chine. Malheureusement, mouvements en Chine pour  
soi-disant « recouvrement des droits » ont récemment  
atteint développement extravagant tandis que senti-  
ments antijaponais encouragés ouvertement dans ma-  
nuels employés dans diverses écoles en Chine et se sont  
enracinés dans âme chinoise. Défiant les traités et  
insoucieuse de toute l'histoire, agitation vigoureuse a  
été poursuivie en Chine pour miner droits et intérêts  
Japon même les plus vitaux. Dans situation actuelle,  
retrait complet troupes japonaises dans zone chemin de  
fer avec simple assurance du gouvernement chinois  
créerait situation intolérable exposant sujets japonais  
aux plus graves dangers. Expérience passée et situa-  
tion actuelle Chine démontrent clairement risque pareils  
dangers.

4° Gouvernement japonais est convaincu que dans  
situation actuelle, sécurité sujets japonais en Mand-  
chourie peut guère être assurée sans se précautionner  
en vue faire disparaître antipathies nationales et sus-  
picion existant dans relations mutuelles des deux puis-  
sances. A cette fin, il exprima déjà dans note ministre  
affaires étrangères 9 octobre au ministre chinois à  
Tokio, disposition entamer négociations avec gouver-  
nement chinois sur certains principes fondamentaux  
devant régler relations normales entre les deux pays.  
Cette note fut communiquée en son temps au Conseil.  
Convaincu que cette procédure est seule appropriée  
pour sortir de situation, gouvernement japonais s'en est  
constamment tenu à ses propositions dans ce sens pen-  
dant récentes discussions au Conseil. Principes fonda-  
mentaux qu'il a eus à l'esprit ont trait à

1. Répudiation mutuelle de politique et conduite agres-  
sives ;

2. Respect de intégrité territoriale chinoise ;

3. Suppression complète de tout mouvement organisé  
entravant liberté du commerce et suscitant haine  
internationale ;

4. Protection effective dans toute Mandchourie de  
toutes occupations pacifiques des sujets japonais ;

5. Respect des droits contractuels du Japon en Mand-  
chourie.

Gouvernement japonais croit que ces points étant  
en entière harmonie avec buts et aspirations Société  
des Nations et formant base naturelle, de laquelle paix  
Extrême-Orient doit dépendre, se recommandera à  
approbation de opinion publique mondiale. Motif refus  
du représentant japonais déposer lesdits points sur  
table du Conseil était que par leur nature ils devaient  
former le sujet de négociations entre les parties direc-  
tement intéressées.

5° Soucieux du bien-être futur des deux nations,  
gouvernement japonais estime nécessité urgente actuelle  
est d'arriver à solution du problème par coopération  
des deux pays et ainsi chercher voie bonheur prospé-  
rité commune. Sa volonté reste inchangée et persis-  
tante d'entamer négociations avec gouvernement chi-  
nois touchant susdits principes fondamentaux relatifs  
relations normales entre Japon, Chine, et touchant  
retrait troupes japonaises dans zone Sud-Mandchourien.  
rien.

**XVII. — Lettre de M. Briand à M. Yoshizawa  
(29 octobre 1931).**

Monsieur l'ambassadeur,

En ma qualité de président du Conseil de la Société  
des Nations, j'ai étudié avec le plus grand soin la  
déclaration du gouvernement japonais, datée du 26 oc-  
tobre, que Votre Excellence a bien voulu me faire com-  
muniquer télégraphiquement, ainsi qu'aux membres du  
Conseil, par l'entremise du secrétaire général.

Je crois devoir vous soumettre quelques remarques  
au sujet de cette communication.

Depuis la dernière réunion du Conseil, où le projet  
de résolution que mes collègues m'avaient chargé de  
rapporter a recueilli l'approbation de tous les membres  
du Conseil, à l'exception du représentant japonais, la  
position de la question soumise à notre examen se  
trouve clairement dégagée de la façon suivante : indé-  
pendamment du vote émis au dernier Conseil, qui  
garde toute sa force morale, nous demeurons, juridi-  
quement, en face d'une résolution valide, celle qui  
avait été adoptée à l'unanimité le 30 septembre et qui  
garde toute sa force exécutoire. Par cette résolution,  
le Conseil a pris acte de la déclaration du représentant  
du Japon aux termes de laquelle le gouvernement japo-  
nais « poursuivra, aussi rapidement que possible, le  
retrait déjà commencé de ses troupes pour les ramener  
dans la zone du chemin de fer, dans la mesure où la  
sécurité de la vie des ressortissants japonais et la pro-  
tection de leurs biens seront effectivement assurées et  
espère réaliser complètement cette intention dans le  
plus bref délai ».

Le représentant du Japon n'avait point indiqué alors  
que des questions, comme celle d'un accord sur les  
droits contractuels du Japon en Mandchourie, fussent

#10

L'EUROPE NOUVELLE

phérie av  
le centre.  
plus frappan  
tats des trent  
effet, depuis 19  
est restée à peu près la même, celle des autres  
communes du département de la Seine est pas-  
sée, dans la même période, de 950.000 à 2 mil-  
lions d'habitants, marquant ainsi une progres-  
sion qui s'impose à l'attention de tous les urba-  
nistes.

Mais il ne faut point s'en tenir à l'examen des  
statistiques, si instructif soit-il. Il faut aussi, en  
témoin attentif des faits économiques et sociaux,  
jeter un regard sur la physionomie du Paris  
moderne.

Le centre, autrefois marqué par la place de  
l'Opéra, a gardé toutes ses fonctions, mais n'a  
pas cessé de s'étendre. Il a débordé dans tout le  
quartier des Champs-Élysées où le commerce rè-  
gne aujourd'hui en maître, et il atteint actuelle-  
ment l'Etoile. Les affaires occupent toujours plus  
de place et contribuent à refouler vers la péri-  
phérie toute une partie de la population qui ne  
peut trouver dans le centre les logements dont  
elle a besoin. La banlieue elle-même voit ses  
limites reculer toujours plus loin. Toutes les com-  
munes des environs de Paris se sont peu à peu  
réunies et, pour ainsi dire, soudées les unes aux  
autres. Ainsi s'explique la naissance d'une vaste  
agglomération que l'on appelle le grand Paris et  
qui, aujourd'hui, est formée d'éléments dis-  
parates, apparaît dans le, dans un prochain  
avenir, comme une seule et même cité, harmonieuse  
et ordonnée. On considère actuellement que  
cette agglomération s'étend sur les départements de  
Seine-et-Oise de l'Yonne et une partie du

privées et de coordonner les efforts vers des fins  
rationnelles.

Pour remédier utilement à cette situation  
fâcheuse, il convient de ne plus se laisser guider  
par le hasard, mais au contraire de prévoir et  
de diriger les événements.

La solution la plus méthodique consiste à orga-  
niser, au lieu de l'extension circulaire de Paris,  
une extension dirigée suivant un certain nombre  
de lignes droites entre lesquelles on pourra mé-  
nager les espaces libres dont nous parlions plus  
haut. Mais quel que soit le sens d'orientation de  
ces lignes droites, quelle que soit également, par  
rapport à Paris, la distance des centres qui s'éta-  
bliront sur leur parcours, il est évident que le  
problème des transports se posera avec une acuité  
toujours plus grande et que la coordination des  
différents moyens de transports deviendra de plus  
en plus une nécessité primordiale. Il n'est qu'un  
trop facile de l'expliquer : chaque matin, il faut  
prendre le plus près possible de leur résidence  
pour les amener à proximité du lieu de leur tra-  
vail tous ceux que les affaires appellent à Paris.  
Le soir, à la sortie du bureau et des magasins,  
quelquefois à midi pour le déjeuner, il faut  
reconduire cette foule chez elle.

Il s'agit donc de créer pour une population  
sans cesse plus dense des transports rapides  
grand débit, coordonnés, capables, en un mot,  
fournir aux heures « de pointe » un  
rapport avec les besoins des usagers  
à leur profit, une liaison entre  
points de la région parisienne.

Envisagé sous cet  
aspect, le problème de  
banisme devient  
port.

C'est à ce

L'EUROPE NOUVELLE

1509

liées en rien à la question de sécurité de la vie et des biens des ressortissants japonais.

J'observe par ailleurs que dans les deux projets de résolution soumis au Conseil le 24 octobre, la rédaction des trois premiers paragraphes est identique, Votre Excellence ayant renoncé à l'amendement qu'Elle avait présenté au paragraphe 3. Ces trois paragraphes peuvent donc être considérés comme exprimant la volonté des deux parties.

Par sa déclaration du 26 octobre, le gouvernement japonais fait, d'autre part, connaître que, en faisant allusion à certains principes fondamentaux, il avait en vue les suivants :

1° « Répudiation mutuelle de la politique et de la conduite agressive » ; or, le paragraphe 2 des deux projets présentés le 24 octobre déclare que les deux gouvernements « sont tenus de s'abstenir de toute politique ou action agressive » ;

2° « Respect de l'intégrité territoriale de la Chine » ; or, le paragraphe 3 des deux projets enregistre un engagement à cet effet ;

3° « Suppression complète de tous les agissements organisés entravant la liberté du commerce et excitant la haine entre les nations » ; or, le paragraphe 3 des deux projets stipule que les deux gouvernements « doivent prendre les mesures propres à mettre fin à toute agitation hostile » ;

4° « Protection effective dans l'ensemble de la Mandchourie pour permettre aux ressortissants japonais d'y vaquer à toutes occupations pacifiques » ; or, le premier paragraphe des deux projets enregistre l'engagement du gouvernement chinois d'assurer une protection effective aux ressortissants japonais résidant en Mandchourie ».

En fait que, d'une part, le représentant de la Chine a fait connaître les termes de la résolution que j'ai proposée, mes collègues, et que, d'autre part, le représentant japonais renferme les principes auxquels je viens de me référer, les deux gouvernements sont entièrement d'accord.

Respect des droits concédés en Mandchourie ».

A cet égard, je me permets d'attirer l'attention de Votre Excellence sur les termes « en date du 24 octobre que m'a adressée le représentant de la Chine, et dans laquelle le docteur Sze, comme tout membre de la Société des Nations, est tenue, aux termes du Pacte, « de respecter scrupuleusement toutes les obligations des traités ». Le gouvernement chinois, pour sa part, est déterminé à exécuter loyalement toutes les obligations que lui impose le Pacte. Il est disposé à donner des preuves de cette intention, en s'engageant à régler par voie de solution arbitrale ou judiciaire, ainsi que le stipule l'article 13 du Pacte, tous différends avec le Japon, relativement à l'interprétation des traités ». Il m'apparaît donc, et les autres membres du Conseil, y compris, j'ose l'espérer, Votre Excellence, seront unanimes à partager cette manière de voir, que le gouvernement chinois a pris devant le Conseil, où le Japon occupe un siège permanent, des engagements conformes aux principes fondamentaux auxquels s'est référé le gouvernement japonais.

Dans ces conditions, j'ai le ferme espoir que le gouvernement japonais, désireux de remplir l'engagement qu'il a contracté solennellement, aux termes de la résolution du 30 septembre, et qu'aussi bien il n'a cessé de confirmer par ses déclarations réitérées, au cours de la dernière réunion du Conseil, dans les séances des 22, 23 et 24 octobre, « poursuivra aussi rapidement que possible le retrait de ses troupes dans la zone du chemin de fer », et qu'il pourra ainsi, « réaliser complètement cette intention dans le plus bref délai ».

En raison de l'extrême importance que votre gouvernement attache à la sécurité de la vie et des biens des ressortissants japonais dans les territoires évacués par ses troupes, je me permets d'attirer l'attention de Votre Excellence sur le paragraphe 5 de la résolution soumise au Conseil le 24 octobre, qui recommande aux deux gouvernements « de désigner immédiatement des représentants pour régler les détails d'exécution de l'évacuation et de la prise en charge des territoires évacués, afin que cette opération soit accomplie de façon régulière et sans retard ».

Je vous prie d'agréer, etc...

Signé : A. BRIAND

103

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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From the Embassy at Paris

PS  
PR

# Echos du Conflit Sino-Japonais

L'Association générale  
■ des ■  
Chinois en Belgique  
28, rue des Joyeuses Entrées  
■ Louvain, Belgique ■

N° 1

14 novembre 1931

# Echos du conflit Sino-Japonais

## SOMMAIRE

Introduction.

Carte.

Photos.

Déclarations :

1. Un cri d'alarme contre la guerre. Manifeste de l'Association générale des Chinois en Belgique.
2. Déclaration du Comité du Kuomintang en Belgique.
3. Un message adressé au peuple du monde, par l'Union des Chambres de Commerce dans toute la Chine.

Les événements de Moukden. La Société des Nations et la constitution du nouvel ordre des choses, par M. Paul Otlet.

Discours de M. le Professeur Mortier.

Le conflit Sino-Japonais dans son cadre historique, par Fan-Jen.

Près de quarante ans de politique de pénétration japonaise en Chine, par Jean Ho.

La partie internationale de l'invasion japonaise, par Siu-King-Yuan.

L'Impérialisme japonais, par Toutsien.

Le barbarisme japonais et le sentiment patriotique des citoyens chinois, par M. Conli.

Le projet de « Politique Positive » présenté à l'Empereur, par M. Tanaka.

Le conflit Sino-Japonais, par M. Wickham Steed.

Chronique des actions japonaises.

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## INTRODUCTION

### Échos du conflit sino-japonais !

Voilà deux mois déjà que tous les jours, les journaux vous en apportent. Il n'est plus personne qui ignore l'incroyable invasion japonaise.

Voilà deux mois que la diplomatie japonaise à laquelle il nous faut rendre hommage, essaye de convaincre toutes les chancelleries d'Europe et d'Amérique de son point de vue ! Que de nouvelles quotidiennement, viennent remplir la presse, venant de Tokio et défendant toujours l'armée de l'invasion.

Nous sommes convaincus, chers lecteurs, que vous êtes trop avertis pour vous être laissés tromper. Votre amour de la Justice vous a rechercher la vérité à travers toutes ces nouvelles. Votre amour de la paix mondiale vous a donné un sens nouveau qui vous a permis de voir de quel côté se trouve le droit et la justice.

Ce que vous avez senti, ce que vous avez déjà entrevu par vous-même et à travers les communiqués inévitablement soucieux de l'amour propre japonais de Genève et de Monsieur Briand, nous voulons vous le faire voir lumineusement en vous fournissant tous les documents, tous les matériaux originaux nécessaires.

Nous sommes des étudiants, éloignés de notre pays. Nos cœurs saignent en pensant à la souffrance de nos frères de Mandchourie et de toute la Chine. C'est sans doute pour les servir que nous publions ces pages, mais c'est aussi par amour de l'humanité toute entière.

Lisez et jugez.

Les trois photos que nous reproduisons ici ont été publiées dans « *Le Monde Illustré* », journal de Peiping (Pekin). Voici comment ils ont été pris :

« ... Un étudiant de l'Université « Nord-Est », après que l'armée japonaise eut occupé Mukden et commencé à s'y livrer au massacre, se déguisa en paysan, cacha sur lui un petit appareil photographique et risqua sa vie pour avoir quelques preuves éclatantes des crimes japonais... »

*Le Monde* (15 octobre 1931).


« *Le Monde* » a agrandi les photos originales et en a publié six, sans doute des mieux réussies. Nous en reproduisons ici trois.



Paysan chinois enterré vif par les soldats japonais. On voit à la droite de la photo le buste sous terre, et les jambes sortant du sol.



Au milieu, un soldat chinois les mains levées.  
A gauche, trois soldats japonais dont l'un essaie sa baïonnette sur le soldat chinois.  
A droite, un soldat japonais enfonçant sa baïonnette dans le dos d'un policier chinois.



Des soldats japonais placés derrière des étudiants et des paysans chinois à genoux, enfoncent leur baïonnette dans le dos de ceux-ci.

## Un cri d'alarme contre la guerre

### Manifeste de l'Association générale des Chinois en Belgique

Dans un moment si tragique, où la crise gronde à travers le monde foudroyant à maintes reprises et à maints endroits les plus affaiblies des créations du génie humain, et semant sur son passage la panique affolante et une misère accrue ; dans un moment où, dans tous les coins du monde, acculés par la nécessité, des efforts surhumains sont menés avec une sincérité et une rapidité réconfortantes, en vue de parer au naufrage de l'humanité à la dérive ; dans un moment où, encore tout convalescente après une lutte de vingt ans, depuis la fondation de la République, et absorbée dans le travail de sa rénovation, de collaborations économique et industrielle avec les pays du monde, la Chine vient d'être frappée de la plus effroyable des inondations qu'elle ait jamais connues ; dans un moment précis où la chute imminente de la livre sterling semait le désarroi et portait l'effervescence à son paroxysme dans le monde entier ; dans un moment, enfin, où tous les peuples sont plus ou moins plongés dans la plus profonde des inquiétudes ou dans un deuil le plus désolant, ne savons-nous pas qu'au milieu de tout ce fracas, nous avons encore et précisément la grande surprise de déplorer une brusque agression armée du Japon contre la Chine ?

Point n'est besoin d'entrer dans les détails et d'établir vainement, par le menu, les causes immédiates du conflit ; cela ressemblerait tout simplement à de l'enfantillage.

Au moment même où toute l'attention de la Chine était tournée vers le sauvetage des dizaines de millions de victimes des inondations, les canons japonais déchirèrent soudain le ciel serein de la Mandchourie, (c'était dans la nuit du 18 septembre), et en moins d'un jour tous les points stratégiques en Mandchourie furent simultanément occupés par les troupes japonaises. L'arsenal de Moukden fut bombardé, un immense atelier de construction d'avions incendié, un des plus grands postes de T. S. F. détruit, sans parler des pertes de vies humaines subies par les populations prises au dépourvu.

— 4 —

Il est clair que, d'après les faits mêmes, l'attaque fut bel et bien organisée, soigneusement préparée, et déclanchée sous un commandement unique. Nul doute qu'elle n'ait été préméditée.

N'est-ce pas le Japon qui a voulu la guerre ?

Et, comme toujours, il n'y a pas eu de déclaration de guerre.

Où est donc l'honneur ?

Où est donc le cœur humain ?

Et, la meilleure preuve que le Japon est seul responsable, c'est que les troupes chinoises n'ont opposé aucune résistance contre l'attaque et ont reçu, par la suite, l'ordre de se retirer, du Maréchal Tchang Sueh Liang, alors absent de Mandchourie.

Il nous semble d'ailleurs bien difficile et même ridicule de concevoir que la Chine ait pu provoquer la guerre et la décommander lorsqu'on la lui sert ; d'autant plus que la Chine se trouve devant d'énormes difficultés intérieures et qu'à fortiori, elle n'aurait pu songer un instant à s'offrir le luxe de se mesurer avec un adversaire notoirement redoutable.

Nous passons sur les griefs du Japon en ce qui concerne les fréquentes frictions entre résidents japonais et chinois en Mandchourie, où les japonais veulent s'imposer en maîtres absolus.

Mais, il ne semble pas sans intérêt de dire un mot sur les véritables origines du conflit. Nous estimons que rien ne vaut mieux, à ce sujet, que de citer ici un passage des déclarations faites au Japon par feu le baron Tanaka, ex-premier ministre du Japon, passage dans lequel on note ce qui suit :

**« Pour conquérir le monde, il faut d'abord conquérir la Chine ; et pour conquérir la Chine, il faut commencer par conquérir la Mandchourie. »**

Si, en résumant, nous croyons voir dans la brusque explosion de ce coup de force prodigieux, le Japon profiter de la situation générale mondiale très défectueuse, pour satisfaire ses appétits gloutons, en allant soigner tout particulièrement ses intérêts propres en Mandchourie, ne faut-il pas craindre que ce conflit, dû-t-il durer encore, n'allume des troubles dans le monde entier. On ne peut songer, sans être saisi d'un frisson d'horreur, à ce que le monde fût si près de se laisser entraîner dans un abîme.

Hélas ! le monde connaîtra-t-il à temps le danger qu'il court en

— 5 —

laissant compromettre la paix universelle par les ambitions politiques, sans cesse aiguës vers de nouvelles aventures, d'un pays rempli de belliqueux comme le Japon ? Prendra-t-il à temps les mesures préventives **contre les menées si variées mais si machiavéliques, de ce Japon militariste qui ne semble pas craindre d'être violateur de droit, et violateur des Traités qui portent sa propre signature ?**

Imbu par tradition, de folie des conquêtes, le Japon, nation guerrière par essence, constitue en Extrême-Orient un véritable volcan. Et, ne faut-il pas le croire, **c'est la paix du Monde que, de sa constante menace d'éruption, ce volcan dangereux, à potentiel élevé, fait courir le risque d'un effondrement fatal.**

*Devant la gravité de l'heure, le devoir de tous les défenseurs de la vraie civilisation n'est-il pas de fraternellement s'unir, de donner le signal d'alarme, de démasquer les loups et, tirant de sa torpeur l'humanité souffrante et abandonnée, la ramenant dans la confiance du triomphe final de la justice sans tache et des vérités sans ombre, de lui rendre conscience de sa force irrésistible, de la conduire enfin au-dessus des passions aveugles et destructives, vers la conception du bien général, vers une vie meilleure, digne de l'homme, vers l'idéal commun qui n'est pas une utopie et auquel, plus que jamais, tous les peuples de la terre, tous atteints de maux communs s'aggravant sans cesse, ont le légitime droit d'aspirer et la plus pressante nécessité d'arriver.*

*Pas de violence, non plus de passion qui tue la raison. Mais du calme, de la volonté, de la fermeté.*

*En avant, Justice sans tache, Vérités sans ombre.*

*En avant, le bon sens et la conscience humaine.*

*En avant, tous les intellectuels et tous les hommes qui sur toute la surface de la terre, pensent humainement.*

*A chacun de nous de prendre sans plus de retard, sa part dans l'effort d'apaisement, vis-à-vis de l'orage qui agite l'Océan humain, car c'est nous-mêmes qui formons avec la masse amorphe et innocente, cette humanité agonisante. Prenons conscience de notre devoir d'hommes. Unissons-nous.*

### Déclaration du Comité du Kuomintang en Belgique

Le 18 septembre dernier, à 10 heures du soir, les troupes japonaises, sans aucune provocation, ouvraient le feu sur les soldats chinois, près de Moukden.

Elles bombardaient, ensuite, l'arsenal et les casernes de cette ville, incendiaient les dépôts de munitions, désarmaient les garnisons chinoises de Chang-Chung, Kouang-Tcheng-Tseu et d'autres localités et, finalement, occupaient militairement les villes de Moukden et Antung et autres points stratégiques, ainsi que les bâtiments publics de la région.

Et, depuis le 19 septembre, cette occupation — qui s'est encore étendue — continue, bien que, conformément aux instructions du Gouvernement National de la République Chinoise, l'armée régulière chinoise et la population civile n'aient opposé aucune résistance et se soient abstenues de tout acte susceptible d'aggraver la situation.

Le caractère de cette offensive brusquée et préméditée n'a pas échappé aux Européens avertis des choses d'Extrême-Orient et c'est ainsi que, dès le 20 septembre, un grand organe de la presse française pouvait écrire ce qui suit :

**« On croit donc discerner, dans cette manœuvre (du Japon) une action qui dérive beaucoup moins de l'improvisation que d'un plan stratégique dont l'application est méthodique et calculée. »**

Et, en effet, il en est bien ainsi.

Pour justifier son action, le Ministère de la guerre japonais a publié, le 19 septembre, un communiqué expliquant que trois ou quatre compagnies de soldats chinois ayant bombardé et détruit une partie du chemin de fer sud-mandchourien et attaqué la garde japonaise, celle-ci avait riposté en attendant l'arrivée d'un bataillon de renfort.

Un communiqué de la Légation de Chine à Bruxelles a réduit à néant cette allégation mensongère. Nous ne pouvons mieux faire que de la reproduire ci-dessous :

« Relativement aux origines du conflit sino-japonais, on a fait cir-

— 7 —

» culer le bruit — de source japonaise — qu'elles résidaient dans la  
» destruction, par des soldats chinois, d'un pont du chemin de fer  
» sud-mandchourien.

» Cette allégation, qui n'a d'autre but que de déplacer les responsabilités, est entièrement fausse.

» De rapports adressés par la Direction du chemin de fer Pékin-Moukden au Gouvernement chinois, il résulte que le pont de Lao-Ho, dont il est question ci-dessus, a été détruit par les Japonais eux-mêmes, avant toute attaque des troupes chinoises. Le pont détruit, les Japonais ont amené, sur le terrain, des cadavres de soldats chinois, cette macabre mise en scène devant, dans leur esprit, étayer l'accusation mensongère qu'ils se proposaient de lancer.

» Il est à remarquer, encore, que le pont en question était très sérieusement gardé par les Japonais et qu'ils avaient pris soin, il y a quelque temps déjà, de construire un tronçon de voie indépendante de manière à assurer — dans tous les cas — la circulation des trains.

» D'ailleurs, depuis longtemps, les troupes japonaises cherchaient à soulever des difficultés en Mandchourie.

» Elles avaient même franchi les frontières pour se livrer à des manœuvres qui n'étaient, en somme, que des préparatifs de guerre.

» Ces actes, qui sont de nature à détruire la paix en Extrême-Orient, constituent une violation flagrante des pactes de la S. D. N. et Briand-Kellogg et autres traités internationaux signés par le Japon. »

Le Japon prétend, d'autre part, rendre les autorités chinoises responsables de l'assassinat du capitaine d'Etat-Major japonais Nakamura.

Ce second grief n'est pas plus fondé que le premier. La presse chinoise rapporte, en effet, qu'au mois de mai dernier, le Consulat japonais à Kharbine a bien demandé, aux autorités chinoises, de viser le passeport de voyage d'un de ses ressortissants de ce nom, mais présenté comme exerçant la profession de « **commerçant** ».

En admettant que ce « commerçant » et le soit-disant capitaine d'Etat-Major Nakamura ne soient qu'une seule et même personne, la responsabilité de son assassinat ne saurait retomber sur les autorités chinoises pour la raison que l'accès de la région montagneuse avoisinant Hing-An est interdit aux étrangers, leur sécurité ne pouvant y être garantie à cause des bandits qu'on y rencontre.

1 038

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

— 8 —

Si le Japonais en question n'a pas cru devoir tenir compte de cette interdiction, il savait à quels dangers il s'exposait.

Au surplus, les agissements déloyaux du Japon ne datent pas seulement des événements actuels. Il méditait, depuis longtemps, l'attentat qu'il vient de commettre contre les droits imprescriptibles de la République et l'intégrité du territoire chinois. Il nous suffira de rappeler les incidents de Wang-Pao-Chang, les massacres des Chinois en Corée, les troubles de Tsingtao, etc.

Nous en appelons de cet odieux attentat à tous les Peuples civilisés et, en particulier, à la Nation belge, qui, dans son passé, a souffert les douleurs de l'occupation étrangère.

A l'heure où les plus illustres des hommes d'Etat du monde entier font des efforts désespérés pour découvrir la formule qui, avec la sécurité, assurera à l'Humanité qui n'en peut mais, les bienfaits du désarmement général, il constitue une grave menace pour la paix Extrême-Orient et, l'incendie une fois allumé, nul ne saurait dire où il s'arrêterait.

La Chine qui, se basant sur les dispositions du Pacte, a remis le soin de défendre ses intérêts à la Société des Nations, est en droit d'espérer que l'incident, voulu et préparé par le Japon, recevra une solution équitable et, par solution équitable, elle entend le paiement d'indemnités pour les victimes civiles et militaires de l'agression, pour le pillage de l'arsenal de Moukden ainsi que des banques et biens publics et privés, le châtimement des coupables et des garanties de sécurité pour l'avenir.

Et, ayant foi dans la Justice internationale, elle compte fermement sur l'appui des Etats signataires des pactes de la S. D. N., Briand-Kellogg et autres traités internationaux pour faire triompher son point de vue qui n'est, en réalité, que celui du Droit outragé.

## Un Message adressé au peuple du monde

Par l'Union des Chambres de Commerce dans toute la Chine

Dans la nuit du 18 septembre 1931, les troupes japonaises stationnées dans les différentes parties des provinces du nord-est de la Chine, se mirent simultanément en action et occupèrent Shenyang (Moukden), Changchun, Yinkow, Antung, Koupangtse et les autres positions stratégiques.

Cette action précipitée étonna les chinois et aussi le peuple des autres pays. Une pareille agression fut sans doute préméditée, parceque les militaristes japonais avaient essayé de trouver des prétextes pour réaliser leur ambition démesurée d'établir une hégémonie politique et militaire sur les provinces du nord-est de la Chine. L'affaire de Wanpaoshan fut un incident créé par les japonais en vue de provoquer le ressentiment des chinois contre les japonais. Mais les chinois se tentaient strictement à la politique de non-résistance et l'affaire ne se développant pas dans les proportions aussi grandes que celles désirées par les japonais. Peu de temps après, survint le massacre général et organisé des résidents chinois dans les différentes parties de Corée. Les biens des milliers et des milliers de résidents chinois furent détruits et plusieurs centaines d'entre eux furent grièvement blessés. Le dit massacre des gens innocents avait pour but de provoquer le ressentiment le plus aigu des chinois contre les japonais; mais encore une fois, les chinois montraient un esprit de tolérance et le dessein odieux du militarisme japonais échoua.

Le piège le plus récent tendu par les militaristes japonais fut le cas du capitaine Nakamura. Les japonais prétendirent qu'il avait été assassiné par les soldats chinois durant son voyage en Mongolie intérieure. Lorsqu'on leur demandait, d'en fournir des preuves, ils répondaient que le meurtre leur fut révélé secrètement par quelques chinois. Quand on leur demandait les noms de ces révélateurs chinois, ils répliquaient qu'ils ne pouvaient pas le dire de peur que le danger arrivât à eux. Alors, les militaristes japonais faisaient des préparations

— 10 —

pour commencer les attaques. Cependant les chinois insistaient que si un certain capitaine Nakamura avait été assassiné, le cas pourrait être réglé par les moyens diplomatiques et en conséquence, le gouvernement chinois désignait trois fois les commissaires pour en faire une enquête. Les militaristes japonais, en rendant compte que l'affaire sera réglée par la voie diplomatique, ne voyait plus autre moyen pour accomplir leur dessein que celui d'entreprendre une action militaire directe. Ainsi survinrent les événements foudroyants dans la nuit du 18 septembre. Les militaristes japonais, ayant besoin de trouver des prétextes afin de justifier leur action, proclamaient qu'ils recouraient à des forces militaires en raison de la destruction d'une partie du chemin de fer sud-Mandchourien. Le dit prétexte est cependant très puéril. A partir du moment où le chemin de fer fut occupé par les autorités japonaises, il était toujours sous le contrôle de la police et de l'administration japonaises ; le dit contrôle s'étendait jusqu'au terrain appelé « zone de chemin de fer » situé aux deux côtes du dit chemin de fer. Les soldats chinois n'ont pas eu la permission de traverser librement quelque portion de ce terrain spécial et il n'a pas été possible pour eux d'avoir quelque contact avec le chemin de fer. Ainsi comment auraient-ils pu prendre une opportunité pour détruire même une portion la plus petite du dit chemin de fer. Il est donc évident que le prétexte ci-dessus mentionné a été forgé par les militaristes japonais.

A la suite de l'action précipitée des forces militaires japonaises, tous les soldats chinois avec lesquels les troupes japonaises venaient en contact, furent désarmés et, suivant les informations bien fondées que l'on a reçu jusqu'ici les hauts fonctionnaires du gouvernement provincial de Liaoning étaient emprisonnés ou subissaient des outrages ; l'arsenal et le dépôt des munitions étaient incendiés ou occupés ; un grand nombre des maisons du peuple brûlées. Les pertes déjà connues éprouvées par les chinois sont déjà très élevées, même en l'absence de quelque investigation détaillée.

Il est dit dans les rapports venant de Tokio que les événements se déroulant actuellement sont survenus d'une manière imprévue et qu'ils ne constituent qu'une affaire purement locale. Mais le fait montre qu'une pareille action précipitée ne pourrait résulter que d'un plan prémédité. La préparation fiévreuse des forces militaires pendant les

— 11 —

derniers mois et le fait que pendant quelques heures, toutes les positions stratégiques dans la partie méridionale des provinces du nord-est furent simultanément occupées, prouvent suffisamment que cette agression était préméditée et organisée d'avance. Cependant, le peuple chinois, se tenant fermement au principe du maintien de la paix et respectant les obligations résultant des traités internationaux, ne veulent faire aucune résistance à cette agression dans le but d'éviter des troubles dans l'Extrême-Orient et de conserver indirectement la paix dans le monde entier. C'est pourquoi les chinois ont maintenu jusqu'ici une attitude de tolérance et se tiennent strictement pour le moment à la politique de non-résistance.

A partir du moment où la grande guerre fut terminée, aucun effort ne fut épargné en Chine pour former une nation moderne et pour atteindre ce but, la Chine a fait un bon accueil au placement du capital européen et américain, conformément aux principes édictés par Sun Yat-sen, avec les stipulations équitables, afin d'exploiter les vastes richesses nationales de la Chine. La dite mesure est avantageuse pour le commerce du monde entier ; mais le militarisme japonais pense autrement. Il désire que toute la Chine soit sous le contrôle de l'influence japonaise et que le Japon seul puisse tirer avantage de ses ressources. Il met toutes sortes d'obstacles à la politique de la porte ouverte, et croit que le moment est venu pour la réalisation de sa politique de l'exploitation exclusive, parceque, dans la crise économique actuelle, les puissances occidentales sont préoccupées pour chercher la solution de leurs propres affaires et que la Chine donnant tous ses efforts à la reconstruction nationale, à la suppression d'un demi million de bandits communistes et au secours apporté au peuple victime de la vaste inondation actuelle, se trouve dans une situation difficile à résister aux empiètements étrangers. Ainsi le militarisme japonais met en pratique leur politique d'agression en espérant d'atteindre leur but conçu depuis longtemps. Au cours de la grande guerre en 1914, le Japon saisit l'opportunité pour présenter à la Chine ce qu'on appelle les vingt et une demandes afin de réduire la Chine presque à un état de vasselage. La présente affaire est la reproduction du même dessein doué cependant d'un caractère plus dangereux pour le monde.

Le monde a probablement déjà prêté attention à ce qu'on appelle

— 12 —

la politique japonaise concernant les chemins de fer dans les provinces du nord-est de la Chine. Une ligne appelée ligne Kirin-Hueining est considérée par le Japon comme ayant une très grande valeur stratégique. Cette ligne, une fois achevée, joindrait Kirin en Chine avec Hueining en Corée et de là par le chemin de fer déjà existant, à Seitsin sur le littoral d'est de Corée. Le voyage de Changchun à Osaka, avec l'accomplissement de la construction de cette ligne, ne durerait que 51 heures ; à l'heure actuelle, le même voyage, en passant par Dairen, demande une durée de 92 heures. Il peut donc épargner la moitié de la durée du voyage. En outre, il y a un autre avantage à faire entièrement ce voyage dans les eaux japonaises au nord de la baie Tsushima sans la moindre crainte de quelque intervention de la part des navires de guerre étrangers. Ainsi, en cas où des hostilités éclateraient entre le Japon et une autre puissance étrangère, la ligne Kirin-Hueining permettrait au Japon de transporter sans interruption les matériaux et les marchandises de quelque partie des provinces du nord-est au Japon, aussi bien que d'envoyer des troupes japonaises directement dans le cœur de ces provinces.

La ligne Kirin-Hueining traverse en même temps les régions de grands forêts, possédant suffisamment de bois à fournir au Japon pour une durée de deux cents ans. Elles pourraient fournir au Japon du bois avec une valeur plus de 100.000.000 yen. Il y a aussi, le long de la ligne à Hsinch'iu, les mines de charbon, susceptibles de fournir au Japon, non seulement une quantité inépuisable de charbon, mais aussi une quantité inépuisable d'huile. Cette ligne, si sa construction était achevée, ferait une course parallèle avec la portion d'est du chemin de fer de l'est chinois et se terminerait à un port qui ne gèle pas durant les mois d'hiver de sorte que Vladivostok se transformerait en un port sans utilité et que le trafic dans la partie orientale du chemin de fer de l'est chinois serait sérieusement affecté.

Le gouvernement chinois, en se rendant compte de l'importance capitale de cette ligne au point de vue politique et économique, a non seulement empêché les japonais de le construire, mais encore n'a pas donné la permission aux chinois eux-mêmes de se mettre à la construction. Les japonais désirent ardemment de construire ce chemin de fer jusqu'à dire en Japon que la construction de la dite ligne est une question de vie et de mort pour la nation japonaise. Une portion

— 13 —

de ce chemin de fer à été déjà construite. La ligne entre Kirin et Tunhwa, d'une longueur de 123 milles, fut construite par la Chine avec l'aide de l'emprunt japonais. Entre la Rivière Tumen, frontière entre la Chine et la Corée, et Tienpaoshan il y a un chemin de fer léger. La partie non construite entre Tunhwa et Tienpaoshan est d'une longueur de 65 milles. Nous pensons que les japonais se mettent immédiatement à la construction de la partie sus-visée du chemin de fer Kirin-Hueining durant le temps de la présente occupation militaire des provinces du nord-est. L'effet que cette ligne pourrait faire produire à l'avenir est vraiment plus que ce qu'on peut en imaginer. Il n'est pas besoin de parler des conséquences que la Chine en subirait. C'est sur ce que nous voulons attirer l'attention du monde.

Il y a aussi un nombre de chemins de fer que le gouvernement japonais désire de construire. La ligne entre Changchun et Talai au nord-est de Harbine permettrait aux japonais de pénétrer dans la partie septentrionale des provinces du nord-est de la Chine ; la ligne entre Taonon et Solun et celle entre Tungliao et Jéhol les permettraient de pénétrer dans l'intérieur de la Mongolie. Ils entreprendront à la construction de ces lignes, si le temps et les circonstances leur permettent. En outre, le Japon déclare ouvertement de vouloir obtenir les droits mentionnés ci-après et d'atteindre leur but par les voies militaires : droit d'avoir la propriété en Chine, droit de ne pas payer les taxes, droit d'avoir un contrôle sur les mines de fer et de charbon et sur les forêts dans les provinces du nord-est de la Chine, droit d'avoir la police en Chine, droit de prolonger le droit d'administration du chemin de fer Changchun-Kirin jusqu'à 99 ans, droit d'avoir le monopole de certains produits spéciaux de Mandchourie, droit d'offrir un emprunt à la Chine au moment de la rétrocession du chemin de fer de l'est chinois, droit d'exercer un contrôle sur les havres à Antung et à Yinkow et le droit relatif au transport, droit de contrôler conjointement la banque centrale pour la Mandchourie, si elle s'établit, droit relatif au pâturage et à l'élevage des animaux, droit relatif à l'augmentation du nombre des conseillers japonais politiques, financiers et militaires etc. De plus, le Japon veut détruire le chemin de fer entre Tahushan et Tungliao et celui entre Shenyang et Kirin construits par la Chine et le port de Hulutao. Que pense-t-on de ces ambitions colossales du Japon impérialiste ?

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## Les événements de Moukden, la Société des Nations et la constitution du nouvel ordre des choses

En réponse à l'exposé des étudiants Chinois

par M. le Professeur PAUL OTLET.

Les événements de Moukden se passent dans la lointaine Asie. Et pourtant ces événements doivent nous intéresser considérablement.

Tous grands événements suscitent naturellement en nous trois mouvements : l'un de notre esprit, l'autre de notre sentiment, le troisième de notre volonté.

I. Lesquels des Chinois ou des Japonais obtiennent notre sympathie en l'occurrence ? Ce sont les Chinois parce qu'ils sont agressés et non agresseurs. La Chine a été attaquée inopinément, au moment où les inondations étaient pour elle une calamité, au moment où les préoccupations de la crise détournaient l'Europe et l'Amérique de tout autre souci.

II. Mais il faut nous élever du sentiment jusqu'à l'idée et soumettre à un raisonnement sérieux ce qui se passe. La Chine très correctement a fait appel à la Société des Nations. Cela doit spécialement nous intéresser, car si le Conseil de la Société des Nations pour des motifs quelconques montrent ni assez de vigilance, ni assez de puissance, nous aurions reconnu de quelle valeur il serait pour nous même le jour où nous aurions à recourir à lui contre quelque adversaire puissant. Le conflit ainsi constitue un précédent plein d'importance. Tous les droits sont solidaires, « hodié tibi, cras mihi », « Aujourd'hui c'est toi, demain c'est moi ». Insistons sur le danger mondial de voir la Chine entraînée à son tour dans la voie des grands armements et sur les dangers pour tous de voir un immense pays de 450 millions d'habitants transformé en un organisme militaire qui serait bientôt ami de l'esprit de domination et de conquête. — Mais si nous sommes informés des faits mêmes de la violence exercée sur la Chine on nous fait connaître aussi les cau-

— 17 —

ses de ces faits. Le Japon convoiterait la Mandchourie, il la voudrait pour lui, car il poursuivrait un plan dont les étapes seraient, Mandchourie, Chine, Asie, Monde.

A la vérité il y a causes plus profondes encore. Le Japon manque de territoire cultivable pour une population qui grandit. Doit-il restreindre sa population ? Doit-il la placer sous un niveau de vie très bas ? Doit-il s'industrialiser à l'extrême et pouvoir ainsi à sa substance faire ce qu'a fait la Belgique ? Le Japon s'est posée la question et comme nul ne lui a garanti l'écoulement d'une production surindustrialisée il se voit forcé à mettre en œuvre la méthode coloniale. Celle-ci a l'origine est basée sur la violence, sur la ruse, ou sur l'inconscience des colonisés. En dernière analyse l'attaque de Moukden s'expliquerait ainsi.

III. C'est pourquoi après notre sentiment, après notre raison, notre volonté doit entrer en jeu. Il importe d'abord que nous agissons pour appuyer de toutes nos forces la cause de la Chine devant la Société des Nations et devant l'opinion ; pour obliger la Société des Nations à aller éventuellement jusqu'au bout des procédures et des moyens à mettre en œuvre qui sont les siens ? Il importe ensuite de proclamer qu'en même temps que respect est assuré au droit, des mesures soient prises pour faire naître un droit nouveau adéquat aux nouvelles conditions du monde. Car, nous devons nous en persuader de plus en plus, le monde actuel vit sans un plan, sans un ordre qui réponde aux nécessités, aux besoins d'aujourd'hui. Le monde est devenu bien petit pour ceux qui l'occupent, au regard des moyens techniques d'y circuler et des moyens sociaux de l'utiliser. Tout problème immédiatement prend un aspect international et c'est en fonction du monde tout entier qu'il doit être résolu. Des agressions comme celle de Moukden seront rendues impossibles le jour où les nations seront désarmées, où une force collective de police existera et pourra occuper elle-même les lieux devenus litigieux ; où les chemins de fer stratégiques seront devenus des lignes internationales ; où les grandes entreprises en pays étrangers auront elles-mêmes pris la forme internationale ; où la colonie elle-même sera également un fait collectif ; où un régime sera en vigueur qui obviendra à l'accaparement des territoires pour les uns au détriment des autres, faisant intervenir les organismes des Etats là où il ne devrait avoir en présence que les intérêts des individus protégés interna-



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

— 18 —

tionalement par la loi et l'organisation supranationale. Que cet état de choses, sorte d'événements asiatiques ou d'événements européens, qu'importe. Voilà pourquoi ceux d'Asie se présentent chronologiquement les premiers. Sachons leur apporter toute notre attention, tout notre intérêt, toutes nos constructives protestations.

## Discours de M. le Professeur Mortier

MESDAMES, MESSIEURS,

En entrant dans cette salle de réunion ce soir, je ne croyais nullement y prendre la parole. J'y étais venu pour répondre à l'aimable invitation de nos amis chinois et pour entendre leur exposé sur les récents événements. Et si je devais prendre présentement à la lettre une parole que fit remarquer jadis le grand philosophe K'oung-tze, je serais bien décidé à ne rien dire en ce moment d'incertitude et d'anxiété. N'était-il pas écrit sur le socle de la statue de bronze du temple de Lou : « Beaucoup de paroles amènent la défaite ».

Et cependant, devant l'invitation répétée qui me fut faite, je ne puis me résoudre au silence.

Et d'abord, je suis bien d'accord avec Madame Wang-Te-Jen, qui nous a entretenus des multiples qualités des chinois et de leur amour de la tranquillité. Durant mon séjour en Chine, j'ai pu m'en rendre compte en mainte circonstance.

En ces dernières années, nous avons tous suivi avec grand intérêt, les efforts de ce peuple nombreux en vue de suivre les progrès de ce siècle. Comme il avait à cœur de s'adapter aux perfectionnements nouveaux tout en maintenant, comme de juste, ses qualités natives et les enseignements de sagesse de ses anciens !

Nous avons vu notamment les initiatives dans l'organisation judiciaire du pays à l'effet de garantie à tout concitoyen, la justice et un traitement humanitaire, de même que la sécurité et la confiance aux étrangers.

L'outillage économique de cet immense territoire fut l'objet de soins assidus. Des routes, des chemins de fer furent construits. On continuait, là où les circonstances le permettaient, l'entretien, si nécessaire des digues de ces gigantesques fleuves dont la surélévation du lit fluvial et les crues subites constituent un danger permanent.

On a entamé une lutte contre le paupérisme et son interminable cortège de misères physiques et morales, qui sévissent depuis des siècles

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

— 20 —

dans ce vaste pays. — Tant d'êtres humains qui naissent à la rue, qui vivent à la rue, qui meurent à la rue sans avoir connu ni toit, ni demeure !

Signalons les tentatives d'organisation ouvrière et les œuvres sociales dans le but de laisser bénéficier le travailleur de la protection et du bien-être auxquels il peut prétendre.

Enfin, que dire de ce mouvement en faveur de l'instruction dont la présence de si nombreux étudiants à l'étranger et, notamment ici, parmi nous, indique l'importance.

Et voilà, qu'au milieu de ces louables efforts, en ce face de besoins souvent si prodigieusement disproportionnés, la population de la Chine doit envisager deux grandes calamités nouvelles : la guerre extérieure et l'effroyable inondation.

La guerre extérieure ! Nous comprenons si bien nous, l'anxiété de nos amis chinois, éloignés de leur pays à la nouvelle des menaces de guerre : anxiété qu'augmentent le manque de détails précis, la parodie des informations officielles, les nouvelles contradictoires, la confusion des noms de localités et de personnes : toutes choses inhérentes à semblables situations.

Nous avons été heureux d'apprendre par la voix de Monsieur le Président de cette Association l'esprit de paix, le désir de justice et de vérité qui animent la colonie chinoise. Ces déclarations, nous les avons multipliées par milliers et par millions et nous nous sommes trouvés devant une Chine pacifique. Aussi nous avons le ferme espoir que ce danger de guerre, sera conjuré. Nous enrégistrons cette attitude de dignité de nos amis chinois. Elle nous rappelle la dignité ferme et confiante du grand Laotze dans l'expectative des événements.

Au cours de son discours, Monsieur le Président nous a dit qu'il ne désirait point nous parler, en cette circonstance, du grand malheur de l'inondation : voulant laisser cette souffrance des populations sinistrées dans toute sa pureté.

Il n'en doit pas être du même pour nous belges. Si nous avons l'espoir encore de voir conjurer une calamité de guerre de la terre chinoise, nous nous trouvons d'autre part devant un cataclysme qui est devenu déjà réalité : réalité effroyable : nous en sommes émus profondément.

Au cours de l'histoire, la Chine fut en proie à une longue série de

— 21 —

dévastations du fleuve Jaune, du fleuve Bleu, du fleuve Blanc et de tant d'autres. Que de villes ensevelies, que de masses humaines englouties, que de champs fertiles dévastés ! Ne citait-on pas le cas d'un million d'hommes noyés entre les années 1880-1889 dans la région du fleuve Jaune.

Mais aujourd'hui, nous voilà témoins de la plus grande dévastation que l'humanité connut jamais. Depuis plus d'un mois la Chine est aux prises avec le plus effrayant ennemi intérieur : une désolation qui doit absorber toute son attention, tous ses efforts, toutes les disponibilités de ses ressources. On annonce que plus de 3 millions d'hommes auraient péri, que des millions d'habitants sont sans abri.

Les belges, fréquemment instruits à l'école de l'épreuve et des malheurs, ne cessent cependant de porter leur attention sur les malheurs des peuples, même les plus éloignés : peuples éprouvés par les épidémies, les tremblements de terre, les inondations.

Vous avez appris qu'un comité vient d'être constitué à l'effet de recueillir des secours aux sinistrés de Chine. J'ai la conviction que nos compatriotes ne s'en tiendront pas aux paroles, mais qu'ils marqueront leur sympathie avec efficacité.

D'autre part, Mesdames, Messieurs, j'exprime le vœu le plus ardent pour que la voix et l'appel de l'humanité et de la paix dominant, en ces jours, toute autre voix, pour le bien du monde.

## Le Conflit Sino-Japonais dans son cadre historique

par FAN-JEN

MESDAMES, MESSIEURS,

Voilà bientôt deux mois que vous entendez parler du conflit Sino-Japonais. Eclaté à l'autre bout du monde, ce conflit vous semble toujours enveloppé d'un brouillard. Vous y devinez quelque chose, mais vous ne parvenez pas à voir la chose telle qu'elle est. Cela parce que 1° vous êtes trop loin de l'extrême-Orient ; 2° parce que le Japon, ayant de longue main préparé son agression actuelle, a fabriqué beaucoup de fausses nouvelles en sa faveur ; 3° parce que le Japon a monopolisé de fait les communications du territoire occupé avec le reste du monde, et enfin 4° parce que les nouvelles parvenues dans les journaux européens, émises de différentes agences, sont quelquefois partiales, souvent contradictoires et toujours superficielles et fragmentaires.

Le conflit Sino-Japonais n'est pas un simple conflit local. Mesdames et Messieurs, il est de nature à troubler la paix du monde, à déclencher une guerre mondiale. Il est nécessaire qu'on le connaisse plus en détail et plus à fond. Si, comme on me l'a dit, lorsque l'on me chargeait de faire cette conférence, si vous avez la bonne volonté de bien comprendre ce grave accident, de ma part, je ferai tout mon possible pour vous en instruire en vous en donnant une vue d'ensemble.

Je vous dirai d'abord un mot sur le Japon et la Chine, un mot sur le territoire occupé que le Japonais appelle Mandchourie. Je vous exposerai ensuite le conflit avec ses causes immédiates, les actes de guerre du Japonais au Nord de la Chine, et les crimes qu'il y commet.

Je placerai donc ainsi le conflit dans un cadre général, car quelque brusque qu'il soit, le conflit actuel est un aboutissement naturel des longs préparatifs du Japon : et celui-ci a beau dissimuler l'importance du fait, l'occupation de la Mandchourie est son premier pas vers la conquête mondiale. Ma conférence vous donnera sans doute, l'impres-

— 23 —

sion d'une *oratio pro domo*, par cela même que je suis un Chinois et que la Chine est un des 2 principaux personnages dans la tragédie, et par cela encore qu'au cours de cette conférence, je profiterai de toutes les occasions pour réfuter certaines opinions erronées répandues en Europe. Mais je tâcherai de garder le point de vue objectif. En ce qui concerne mes raisonnements, j'en appelle à votre esprit de justice et à votre jugement impartial, et pour les faits rapportés qui ne laisseront pas de vous étonner, je me fonde sur des documents authentiques. Vous êtes juges, Mesdames et Messieurs, vous aurez le dernier mot.

Ce que vous savez sur le Japon et la Chine, c'est que le Japon est un petit pays insulaire situé à l'Est de la Chine comme l'Angleterre est à l'Ouest de l'Europe, que ce petit pays insulaire est européenisé, c'est-à-dire, industrialisé depuis 50 ans, qu'il est parvenu au rang des grandes puissances du monde et tâche même d'en être la première ; que la Chine, au contraire, un vaste pays continental, est encore en retard au point de vue matériel, que depuis un siècle ce malheureux pays se débat sous les chaînes forgées par certains pays occidentaux, que depuis la révolution de 1911 il est en proie aux guerres civiles et qu'aujourd'hui même, malgré les grands efforts du peuple chinois et les progrès réalisés, il n'a pas encore atteint son idéal et n'est pas encore parvenu à la place que lui assignent sa longue et glorieuse histoire, son vaste territoire et sa nombreuse population. Tout cela est vrai, Mesdames et Messieurs, mais tout cela ne suffit pas pour comprendre et juger ni la Chine et le Japon, ni le conflit Sino-Japonais actuel. Si l'on se contentait de ces quelques données élémentaires, l'on aboutirait à des jugements erronés.

Ainsi, un de vos compatriotes m'a dit que, puisque la Chine a tant de territoire et que le Japon en a si peu, il est juste que le Japon prenne une partie du territoire Chinois.

Or, justifier de cette manière une convoitise japonaise, ce serait soutenir un communisme international et demander un nouveau partage du monde. Et puis, n'oublions pas que la Chine a un quart de la population mondiale et n'a qu'un douzième de la superficie habitable du monde entier. Elle est tout aussi débordée de population que le Japon. A qui devrait-elle demander un supplément de terrain qui lui serait dû ?

Un autre de vos compatriotes encore me dit que la Chine, étant plus lente que le Japon dans les progrès matériels, cela prouve que le peu-

— 24 —

pie chinois est de qualité moindre que celle du peuple japonais, et que, par conséquent, il est raisonnable de laisser celui-ci aider la Chine à se construire.

Ce raisonnement qui paraît plus juste que le premier, n'est pas moins erroné si l'on l'examine de près. Car 1° les progrès matériels dépendent plus des circonstances que de la qualité d'un peuple et 2° le Japon depuis plus de trente ans, ne pense qu'à nous piller au lieu de nous aider.

Mais ne perdons pas le temps avec de pareils sophismes. Traçons en deux mots l'histoire contemporaine du Japon et de la Chine, et vous comprendrez et jugerez mieux leur conflit.

Le Japon et la Chine, Mesdames et Messieurs, deux pays de la même race, autrefois de la même langue, partis de la même situation, ont aboutis aujourd'hui à des résultats très différents et suivent deux tendances diamétralement opposées.

Au cours du siècle dernier, l'Angleterre et la France ont, à plusieurs reprises, brisé la porte de la Chine, les coups de leur canon tirés contre la Chine ont réveillé dès le début le Japon, qui par sa situation insulaire et par sa petitesse, a presque échappé au regard des Européens. Mais effrayé du péril dont il se croyait menacé, n'étant pas encore accablé de coups comme la Chine et n'ayant pas comme la Chine une cour impériale traîtresse à renverser, il se jeta directement dans la voie d'industrialisation et de militarisation ; il a obtenu de rapides résultats grâce à son territoire peu étendue et à sa population peu nombreuse. En Chine, il n'en est pas de même. Les pays européens et américains, ayant connu la richesse de la Chine, se fondaient en coups sur elle. La Cour Mandchoue, corrompue et ignorante, qui régnait alors en Chine, ne cherchait qu'à se conserver au lieu de sauver le pays. Pour régénérer la Chine, on a eu d'abord à renverser la Cour impériale ; et puis après la révolution de 1911, on a eu à réveiller une masse populaire immense opprimée, terrorisée et enfermée dans l'ignorance depuis trois cents ans ; on a eu ensuite à détruire les généraux, résidus de la féodalité, qui tous avant de disparaître, se faisaient la guerre en s'appuyant sur des puissances étrangères et en ruinant le pays ; on a eu, enfin, et on a toujours à se libérer des chaînes que les pays étrangers nous a forgées avec des traités inégaux et dont la Chine se trouvait déjà accablée à son réveil. Voilà autant de travaux qui ont détourné l'activité de la Chine de sa construction matérielle.

— 25 —

Mais si la Chine est lente dans ses progrès matériels, le peuple chinois est prompt à son réveil. Il a embrassé un idéal qui lui est légué par ses pères et qui ne manquera pas de faire sa grandeur. Vous avez sans doute entendu parler du confucianisme, Mesdames et Messieurs. C'est une école philosophique qui attache une importance prépondérante à la morale et qui dirige toute l'activité humaine vers l'ordre et la paix. Quoique certaines idées du Confucianisme aient été dans la suite mal interprétées et aient produit de tristes effets sur la Chine, quoique depuis 20 ans on s'occupe à en détruire les abus, on n'a jamais cessé de conserver religieusement l'essence de la doctrine : le pacifisme. Peu importe que les généraux se fassent la guerre, le peuple avec le pacifisme, prendra tôt ou tard le dessus. Peu importe que des circonstances fâcheuses l'entravent jusqu'ici dans la poursuite de son idéal, il se dressera, il luttera avec une élite intellectuelle en tête, il travaillera pour lui et pour l'humanité et il ne désespère pas d'atteindre un jour son but.

Tout autre est l'idéal du peuple japonais. Il est relativement jeune à côté du peuple chinois, il a toujours sa première fougue de la jeunesse. Naturellement belliqueux, il est rendu ambitieux par des circonstances. Car, n'ayant pas eu un idéal préexistant, il tâche d'en trouver un à son réveil. Or, son réveil se fit parmi les expansions politiques et économiques fiévreuses de certaines puissances, européennes. Il suit ces exemples, il se forme un esprit de conquête, et le voilà dès lors rêvant sans cesse la conquête du monde entier.

Si je signale cet esprit du peuple japonais, Mesdames et Messieurs, je ne prétends pas le juger. Je sais bien qu'en Europe, malgré les atrocités dont ils ont souffert, certains ont encore un faible pour les conquérants. Mais que cet esprit de conquête soit admiré ou blâmé, il est incontestable qu'il existe chez le Japonais. Tanaka, ex-premier ministre du Japon, n'a pas craint de parler ouvertement de la politique japonaise *de fer et de sang* et de la conquête du monde entier dans son rapport fait à l'empereur le 25 juillet 1927.

Les Japonais en Mandchourie, à en croire les journaux, n'ont pas craint de manifester dans des drapeaux leur idéal cristallisé en ces termes : « *Seuls nous Japonais marcherons sur les 5 grands continents* ». Maintes preuves témoignent cette ambition.

Et rien qu'en examinant la politique intérieure du Japon, on se rend compte que depuis 50 ans l'activité japonaise est dépensée plus à des

— 26 —

constructions militaires qu'à des entreprises productives, ce qui est contraire à la politique belge et que vous, belges, vous êtes à même de juger mieux que n'importe qui.

Etant donné les différences de circonstances et de caractères qu'il existe entre les deux peuples chinois et japonais, vous concevez bien maintenant que les conflits continuels entre la Chine et le Japon sont fort naturels. « *Pour conquérir le monde, il faut d'abord conquérir la Chine* » a déclaré l'ex-premier ministre Tanaka, et de fait c'est par la Chine que la conquête du japonais a commencé depuis à peu près 40 ans. En 1894 il fit sa première guerre contre la Chine, en 1905 il fit sa seconde guerre contre la Russie : guerre contre la Russie, c'est autant dire guerre contre la Chine, parce que le champ de bataille fut dans le nord du territoire chinois et que les profits de guerre que le Japon arrachés à la Russie sont des privilèges sur la Chine. Par suite de ces deux victoires, le Japon fit céder par la Chine les îles de Formose et des Pescadores, se fit donner à bail le Port Arthur et le Dairen, s'annexa la Corée, et s'empara d'une partie du chemin de fer Mandchourien que la Chine avait permis à la Russie d'exploiter avec un caractère essentiellement commercial et que, aujourd'hui, le Japon appelle chemin de fer sud-Mandchourien. Dès lors sa politique de conquête est mise en train, elle ne s'arrête plus.

La conquête poursuivie sans relâche par le Japon sur la Chine se fait de plusieurs manières. Grâce aux droits arrachés à la Chine conjointement avec les autres puissances et que je n'ai pas le temps d'énumérer, la conquête japonaise est toujours économique ; mais selon l'occasion qui se présente, elle est souvent diplomatique et militaire à la fois, et quelque fois encore, purement militaire. Ainsi en 1915, lorsque le monde entier s'occupait à se battre et que Yuan Che-Kai intriguait en Chine pour se proclamer empereur, le Japon imposa à la Chine un traité dit « des 21 demandes » ; il exigea à la Chine des privilèges et lui posa des conditions qui équivalaient à une vassalité presque complète ; et il appuya ses demandes par des menaces de guerre. Yuan Che Kai céda, mais malheureusement pour le Japon, le peuple chinois, guidé par les intellectuels, se souleva et exécuta le boycottage des produits japonais. Les 21 demandes sont presque toutes annulées, mais certaines d'entre elles n'ont pas laissé de créer quelques questions pendantes entre le Japon et la Chine.

— 27 —

Remarquons en passant que cette affaire traversa toute la période de la guerre mondiale, que le Japon et la Chine étaient tous deux des alliés, que les conférences de Versailles et de Washington n'ont pas donné complète satisfaction à la justice, et qu'enfin la Chine n'a pas voulu signer le traité de Versailles ainsi que les Etats-Unis.

Comme politique purement militaire, je citerai, avant l'agression japonaise actuelle en Mandchourie, celle de 1928 à Changtong. L'armée du parti Koumingtan avançait vers le Nord contre Tchangtsolin, alors dictateur militaire en Chine. Effrayé devant les progrès rapides de l'armée nationaliste et triste de voir l'unification de la Chine sur le point de se réaliser, le Japon envoya une armée à Changtong pour barrer la route à l'armée révolutionnaire sous prétexte de protéger ses nationaux contre l'anarchie de la guerre civile. Il massacra nos civils, tortura et tua avec une atrocité inouïe Tsai Konche, fonctionnaire politique et diplomatique de Tsinan. Cette expédition téméraire n'a abouti à aucun effet en sa faveur ; mais il en tente déjà une seconde et plus terrible maintenant en Mandchourie.

Je ne vous dirai pas, Mesdames et Messieurs, toutes les intrigues du Japon qui ont pour but d'empêcher l'unification et la construction de la Chine. Les Européens, pourvu qu'ils aient fait attentions, les connaissent déjà. Je vais vous parler un peu de la « politique de scorpion », politique japonaise envisagée à un autre point de vue.

Vous savez que le Japon possède au Nord de la Chine, la Corée, et au Sud, les îles de Formose. Ces deux possessions seraient comme les deux pinces du scorpion. D'une des 2 pinces, la Corée, il prendrait la Mandchourie et de l'autre, Formose, il saisirait Fou Kien ; et de sa queue, que représentent son armée et sa marine, il frapperait Changtong qui est en face et avancerait jusqu'au cœur de la Chine.

Cette politique ingénieuse, Mesdames et Messieurs, le Japon fait tout son possible pour la réaliser. Si vous étudiez un peu l'histoire politique du Japon, vous le voyez sans cesse, ainsi qu'un scorpion, remuer ses deux pinces et agiter sa queue ; et c'est toujours la Mandchourie, le Changtong et le Fou Kien qu'il convoite. Mais malheureusement pour lui, le mouvement révolutionnaire et nationaliste prenant source au Sud de la Chine, passe comme un courant électrique jusqu'au Nord. Depuis que le parti nationaliste a pris le pouvoir, le Fou Kien et le Changtong deviennent de plus en plus difficiles à toucher. Dès lors, il

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— 28 —

ne lui reste plus que la Mandchourie, morceau à la portée de sa pince droite et sur lequel se porte sa prétention immédiate. « POUR CONQUERIR LE MONDE, IL FAUT D'ABORD CONQUERIR LA CHINE, a déclaré Tanaka, ET POUR CONQUERIR LA CHINE, IL FAUT D'ABORD CONQUERIR LA MANDCHOURIE ». Le Japon commence donc par conquérir la Mandchourie.

Le nom Mandchourie prête à des équivoques, Mesdames et Messieurs : c'est un nom historique tout comme l'*Armorique* en France, mais depuis longtemps ce nom est tombé en désuétude. Ce nom désigne une région qui depuis des siècles fait partie du territoire chinois et qui comprend 3 provinces : Liaoling, Kilin et Heilongkiang.

C'est dans cette région qu'habitaient autrefois les Mandchous. Mais depuis la dernière dynastie, les Mandchous sont pour la plupart tout à fait sinisés. Actuellement, il y a dans les 3 provinces à peu près 30 millions d'habitants dont tous chinois, avec quelques centaines de milliers de Mandchous. Les Japonais et les Coréens y sont au nombre de deux cents mille. Ces trois provinces ont un sous-sol très riche et l'agriculture y est florissante. Comme elles sont voisines de la Corée et de la Sibérie, le Japon et la Russie depuis 40 ans, n'ont cessé de les regarder avec convoitise. Depuis la guerre russo-japonaise de 1905, l'influence du Japon y a considérablement augmenté. Il y possède en bail le chemin de fer dit Sud-Mantchourien, avec le droit de police ou plutôt de garnison le long du chemin de fer ; il y a établi de nombreuses maisons industrielles et commerciales ; il y possède en outre les 2 ports : Port Arthur et Dairen dont le bail est expiré depuis 8 ans. Si le Japon se contentait de ses entreprises économiques, la Chine l'aurait toléré. Mais sa prétention politique est manifeste. Il a en Mantchourie comme autorité militaire, le commandant de l'armée japonaise ; comme autorité économique, la Compagnie du Chemin de fer Sud-Mandchourien ; comme autorité diplomatique le Consul Japonais de Chen-Yang (Moukden) ; et comme autorité administrative le Bureau Kwantong à Dai-ren. Sous prétexte de protéger ses intérêts, il essaie sans cesse d'arracher de nouveaux privilèges. Il fait tout son possible pour empêcher l'unification réelle de la Mandchourie au Gouvernement Central de la Chine et les constructions économiques par les chinois en Mandchourie ; car c'est seulement dans ces conditions qu'il peut espérer se rendre maître du Nord-Est de la Chine.

Le soutien réel qu'il a prêté à Tchang Tso-Lin (ancien gouverneur

— 29 —

chinois ambitieux de la Mandchourie) contre le gouvernement central est une chose prouvée et connue de tout le monde. Le Japon l'a même secouru une fois quasi publiquement avec son armée, lorsque l'armée révolutionnaire de Kouo-Song-lin s'approcha en 1926 de Moukden. Comme en 1928 Tchang-Tso-Lin, reculant devant l'armée nationaliste, se rendit de Pékin à Moukden, et que le Japon craignait qu'une fois rentré, Tchang-Tso-Lin ne redevint maître de la Mandchourie, il le fit assassiner d'une bombe en chemin de fer. Ceci est encore une chose connue et avouée. Mais malheureusement pour le Japon, Tchang-Asuéliang, fils de Tchang-Tso-Lin, malgré les intrigues japonaises, est parvenu à succéder à son père en Mandchourie ; et plus malheureusement encore, le jeune général penchait de plus en plus vers le nationalisme et finit par se rallier au gouvernement central de Nankin. Dès lors, le Japon ne put plus dormir : son autorité en Mandchourie est supplantée par celle du gouvernement chinois. Mais il y a plus : depuis les dernières années, les Chinois en Mandchourie se sont consacrés eux-mêmes à des constructions économiques ; le chemin de fer Sud-Mandchourien devant la concurrence des chemins de fer chinois, perd peu à son importance, de même que Dai-ren devant la construction récente du port Aouloutao. Ainsi d'une part l'influence politique du Japon s'affaiblit et d'autre part son importance économique diminue sans cesse. Il a beau créer, boudier, mais il n'a pu se plaindre. Et dire que « pour conquérir la Chine, il faut d'abord conquérir la Mandchourie » ! Ne faut-il pas maintenant tenter un coup d'effort pour s'assurer définitivement cette région tant désirée ? Voilà, Mesdames et Messieurs, les véritables causes du conflit Sino-Japonais actuel.

Quant aux causes immédiates, ce ne sont que des prétextes, des mèches qui servent à faire éclater la poudre longuement préparée. Le Japon donne comme causes du conflit d'abord l'assassinat du capitaine Nakamura et ensuite l'attaque du chemin de fer Sud-Mandchourien par des soldats chinois. Mais avant d'aborder ces deux questions, remontons plus haut et racontons en deux mots l'incident de Wan-Pao-Chan survenu au cours des mois de mars à août. L'origine de l'affaire fut la dispute entre un groupe de cultivateurs chinois et un groupe de cultivateurs coréens dans la sous-préfecture Wan-Pao-Chan, province Kilin. Ces derniers ayant sous-loué d'un chinois un terrain inculte, creusèrent des canaux d'irrigation et élevèrent des digues pour détour-

— 30 —

ner le cours d'eau. Ce qui causerait un grave préjudice aux cultivateurs chinois. Ceux-ci se plaindraient aux autorités chinoises et interdiction fut faite aux coréens de poursuivre les travaux. Mais le consul japonais de Tchang-Tchong, accompagné de policiers japonais, les engagea à continuer. Après un mois de négociation, le consul japonais ne se rendit pas à la raison et le 2 juillet, les forces japonaises campées dans les lieux en question, ouvrirent le feu de leurs mitrailleuses sur les cultivateurs chinois, qui se mettaient en devoir de combler les canaux d'irrigation. L'affaire passa bientôt de la Chine en Corée, elle fut colportée, amplifiée, commentée par la presse japonaise et coréenne. Les coréens, surexcités, soulevèrent dans différentes villes de la Corée, s'armèrent quoi de bâtons, quoi de couteaux, et massacrèrent les chinois qu'ils rencontrèrent. Le consul chinois même fut menacé. Au total, des centaines de chinois furent tués ou blessés, des dizaines de milliers rapatriés et les dégâts montèrent à des millions de *Yens*. Remarquons que la Corée est une colonie japonaise, magnifiquement disciplinée pour prévenir toute révolte, au point qu'en temps normal, aucun rassemblement n'est toléré, que la moindre arme est interdite et que même les couteaux de cuisines doivent être fixés par des chaînes au lieu d'emploi. Et cette fois-ci, les émeutiers coréens s'assemblèrent par milliers et la police, d'ordinaire diligente en Corée, resta pour la première fois inerte ! Le Japon sentit qu'il avait fait une gaffe, d'autant plus que le peuple chinois, toujours paisible, aimant toujours la justice, resta calme quoique excité et que le gouvernement chinois fit entrer l'affaire dans la voie diplomatique et légale. C'est alors que l'assassinat du capitaine Nakamura et l'attaque du chemin de fer Sud-Mantchourien se firent entendre.

De ces 2 faits, Mesdames et Messieurs, invoqués par les japonais, on ne sait jusqu'ici rien de positif. Les journaux japonais affirment la vérité sans pouvoir donner toutefois de preuves sérieuses. Les journaux chinois doutent même de l'existence du capitaine Nakamura, croyant que c'est le japonais qui invente cette histoire pour contre-balancer les massacres de Wan-Pao-Chan et de Corée ; car avant son départ, pour son expédition dans la Mantchourie, le prétendu Nakamura n'avait pas averti l'autorité chinoise locale ni demandé un passe-port. Quant à l'attaque du chemin de fer dont le japonais accuse les soldats chinois, les presses chinoises prouvent l'invention des japonais qui

— 31 —

voulaient donner une raison à son acte militaire. Mais n'entrons pas dans des discussions subtiles. Disons seulement ceci : même si les faits invoqués par les japonais existaient, constitueraient-ils un *cassus belli*? Pourraient-ils justifier une agression qui est de nature à troubler la paix mondiale? Pourquoi le Japon n'attend-t-il pas pour agir la fin de l'enquête sur l'assassinat ? Pourquoi ne demande-t-il pas une enquête sur l'attaque du chemin de fer ? Pourquoi refuse-t-il même l'enquête qu'on lui propose ? Voilà ce que le Japon n'a jamais expliqué.

Les prétextes ne sont jamais que des prétextes, Mesdames et Messieurs. La vérité est que le japonais est toujours opportuniste. De même qu'il a profité du chaos de la guerre mondiale pour imposer à la Chine le traité des 21 demandes, de même qu'il a profité des luttes entre l'armée nationaliste et celle de Tchang-Tso-Lin pour tomber sur Changtong ; de même, cette fois il a profité des malheurs en Chine et de la crise dans le monde entier pour envahir la Mantchourie. La Chine est couverte d'affamés et de morts par suite des inondations sans précédentes, le gouvernement Chinois occupé à combattre les communistes, le monde entier occupé à faire face à la crise et à consolider la paix, n'est-ce pas là le moment pour le Japon de réaliser son rêve ?

Je ne m'étendrai pas longuement, Mesdames et Messieurs, sur les actes de guerre que fait l'armée japonaise depuis le 18 septembre. Vous les avez sans doute suivis dans les journaux européens. Je vous rappellerai seulement que sans ultimatum, sans aucune avertissement, l'armée japonaise attaqua Moukden pendant la nuit du 18-19 septembre, que, successivement, elle a incendié la garnison chinoise de Pe-tagin, détruit le dépôt de canons, occupé les postes de T. S. F. et de P. T. T. et l'arsenal de Moukden, un des plus grands de la Chine, dont la perte monte à 200 millions de dollars, emprisonné le gouverneur civil et les fonctionnaires chinois, mitraillé les policiers et des civils chinois, détruit les universités avec les bibliothèques, tué les étudiants, pris les avions chinois au nombre de 200, pillé les dépôts de munitions, les banques chinoises et l'ancien Palais impérial où se trouvaient quantité de livres et d'objets précieux, enfin construit des tranchées et organisé l'administration japonaise. Je vous rappellerai encore que successivement, grâce à la non-résistance de l'armée chinoise, ordonnée dès le début par Tchang-Hsue-Liang, l'armée japonaise s'est emparée de la plupart des villes et des gares dans 3 provinces de Mandchourie

— 32 —

et même de certaines villes de Jehol, qu'elle y a pillé, tué, commis les mêmes crimes, qu'elle a bombardé certaines villes comme King-Tchou, Sing-Ming, Tong-Lioa, Fang-Chan, etc., qu'elle a excité, poussé les anciens militaristes chinois comme Tchang-Hai-Pong, les anciens politiciens coë Yuan King-Kai, les partisans attardés de l'empire coë le Prince Kong à proclamer l'indépendance et les soutient ouvertement dans leurs hautes trahisons.

Je vous dirai enfin, Mesdames et Messieurs, d'après les journaux chinois, pour compléter la presse européenne, que le japonais, habitué à la cruauté commise depuis plus de vingt ans à la Corée et connue maintenant de tout le monde, commet actuellement en Mandchourie des atrocités à faire frémir. Ainsi, un caporal chinois, pris à l'improviste, résiste aux japonais. Il est tué avec tous ses soldats déjà désarmés, et on va jusqu'à massacrer tous les 17 membres de la famille du caporal, hommes et femmes, vieillards et enfants. Ainsi, un paysan regarde une affiche qui défend de stationner, par le fait même de regarder, il est considéré comme ayant commis un crime, il est enterré vif. Ainsi encore on rapporte que les soldats japonais mettent à genoux contre le mur des paysans chinois et des jeunes filles chinoises et les poignent dans le dos, lentement, à tour de rôle, pour se faire plaisir. On rapporte encore comment le japonais tue les policiers et les soldats qui lèvent les mains pour demander quartier.

Les scènes que je viens de citer, Mesdames et Messieurs, ne sont que des échantillons, ne sont-ce pas là des actes à faire révolter toute l'humanité ? Commettre de telles cruautés, faire des actes de guerre sans déclarer la guerre, violer la souveraineté d'un pays inoffensif, comme la Chine, violer ainsi le Pacte de la S. D. N. et le Pacte Briand-Kellog, dont tous les deux partis sont signataires, compromettre ainsi la paix universelle, détruire les grandes œuvres d'un pays qui se construit et qui se lève, barrer ainsi la route à un grand pays qui prend son essor et qui n'a d'autre volonté que de pouvoir contribuer au bonheur de l'humanité.

Tout cela, Mesdames et Messieurs, de quel nom le qualifierez-vous ? Mettez-vous à la place du Japonais, seriez-vous capables de commettre de tels crimes ? Après de tels actes, est-il donc étonnant que le Japon s'oppose à l'enquête internationale et persiste à empêcher l'intervention de la S. D. N. ?

— 33 —

Le Japon soutient que c'est une affaire locale, est-ce là vraiment une affaire locale ? Est-ce une affaire locale, lorsqu'il fait tant d'opérations militaires dans tant de villes chinoises et surtout lorsqu'il envoie des avions militaires ou des croiseurs presque partout dans la Chine ?

Le Japon demande la négociation directe. Evidemment, les pays qui ont leur souveraineté intacte doivent négocier directement. Mais demander la négociation les armes à la main, le couteau sur la gorge, est-ce là une demande sincère ? La Chine, membre de la S. D. N. et signataire du Pacte Kellog, ne doit-elle pas, avant de prendre les armes, prouver d'abord sa volonté de ne pas troubler la paix ? et publier au monde entier les crimes des ambitieux ?

Pour justifier son agression, le Japon dit qu'il protège ses intérêts. Quels sont donc ses intérêts qui se trouvent menacés ? Lorsque la Chine entreprend en 1924 la construction d'un chemin de fer de Moukden à Kilin en territoire chinois, le Japon crie qu'on compromet ses intérêts. Sont-ce donc ces intérêts qu'ils prétendent protéger ? Et puis, quels sont ses intérêts, que protège-t-il dans les villes chinoises où il n'y a pas d'établissements japonais, où il n'y a pas eu de trouble avant l'arrivée de l'armée japonaise et que pourtant il attaque avec fureur ?

Le Japon, pour refuser le retrait de ses troupes, publie qu'il y a des bandits en Mandchourie. Or, entendons-nous bien sur ce que le Japon appelle des bandits en Chine. D'après un livre japonais intitulé « L'Administration de la Mandchourie et de la Mongolie », très répandu au Japon, les étudiants chinois mêmes sont qualifiés de bandits par les japonais, parce qu'ils sont « fêrus du soi-disant patriotisme » dit l'auteur. Dr Sen Yat-Sen, fondateur de la République Chinoise, n'est pas un bandit, mais il est le chef des étudiants, il est presque bandit, selon l'auteur japonais. Est-ce cette sorte de bandit dont parle le Japonais en Mandchourie ? Maintenant, regardons la chose de plus près. Le directeur de la Compagnie du chemin de fer Sud-Mandchourien a raconté nettement dans un rapport fait au gouvernement Japonais, comment il stipendie les bandits en Mandchourie, comment il les achète pour ses intrigues. Ceci est un document publié, c'est prouvé. Faut-il s'étonner maintenant de voir le japonais crier « au bandit ! » ? Et puis, dans les journaux chinois, on rapporte maintes fois que des bandits coréens pillent les villages chinois, et que si les gens des villages résistent, ils sont, eux, au lieu des Coréens, traités de bandits par les Japonais. Faut-il dire que toutes ces nouvelles sont des mensonges ?



— 34 —

Et puis encore, dans certains journaux français du mois dernier, on dit que le Japonais traite de bandits les soldats chinois séparés de leurs chefs par l'armée japonaise et qui résistent à l'attaque. N'est-ce pas là une opinion juste ? Et enfin, je vous ai rapporté les scènes terribles des chinois civils enterrés vifs ou poignardés. Si ces victimes avant de mourir, se rassemblent, si, par instinct, elles résistent, alors, vous résistez contre le massacre, vous êtes bandits ! Voilà ceux que les Japonais appellent bandits chinois. Est-il besoin de vous faire remarquer que dans les journaux, on parle de bandits plus souvent que jamais depuis l'agression japonaise en Mandchourie. Quels que soient ces prétendus bandits, n'est-ce pas le Japon, son agression qui les a fait naître ?

Le Japon, pour prolonger son occupation de la Mandchourie, a demandé à la Chine de faire d'abord le mouvement populaire qu'il appelle « anti-japonais ». Or, ce mouvement spontané, paisible et pourtant énergique est des plus beaux, des plus nobles du monde. Il consiste à l'organisation de la garde nationale, et au boycottage des produits japonais. L'organisation de la garde nationale est un acte légitime lorsque le pays est en danger, et le boycottage, c'est la rupture des relations économiques avec un pays criminel ; c'est l'arme la plus efficace, la plus paisible que la S. D. N. même a adoptée pour sanctionner sa décision. Le Japon qui a excité ce mouvement en Chine, a-t-il le droit de s'en plaindre ? L'agression japonaise, c'est la cause, le mouvement patriotique du peuple chinois, c'est l'effet. Demander de faire cesser le mouvement patriotique chinois avant de retirer les troupes japonaises, c'est demander de faire cesser l'effet pour faire disparaître la cause. Ne dirait-on pas que c'est absurde ?

Enfin, ne discutons plus sur tous ces sophismes japonais, Mesdames et Messieurs, votre bon sens vous dit bien plus et bien mieux que moi. Je crois que j'ai dit tout ce que je puis dire sur le conflit Sino-Japonais. Je ne puis aller plus loin, car l'affaire est trop récente et elle est encore dans son plein *devenir*. Vous connaissez mieux que moi sans doute l'inquiétude et l'attitude des différents pays du monde qui voient dans ce conflit le symptôme d'une seconde guerre mondiale. Vous savez aussi la situation embarrassante de la S. D. N. qui, par l'arrogance du Japon, voit son autorité compromise.

Quant à la Chine, elle a faim de justice, elle aime la paix, mais elle

— 35 —

doit aussi défendre son existence. Malgré les nouvelles contradictoires des journaux français et belges, les différents partis politiques chinois tendent actuellement à s'unir pour sauver la patrie. Mais en Chine, il y a un peuple. Le peuple chinois ne s'est jamais divisé. Le mouvement patriotique a pénétré tout le pays, il est archi-intense cette fois, et ce qui est encore plus admirable, tous se passe en ordre depuis deux mois.

Nous connaissons nos devoirs, Mesdames et Messieurs. Le peuple chinois est *un*, le territoire chinois doit être *un*. Les provinces du Nord-Est menacées, c'est la Chine entière menacée. L'ambition, le crime le plus noir plane sur nous, nous ne devons pas le laisser franchir la Chine pour dévaster le monde entier. Nous aimons la paix, nous aimons la justice. Mais aimer sans agir, ce n'est pas aimer, nous devons lutter pour elles. Dès aujourd'hui, d'une manière ou d'autre, quoi qu'il puisse nous arriver, nous exterminerons le crime. Tant qu'il reste un chinois, la Chine ne périra pas ! Tant que la Chine ne périt pas, la paix, la justice seront soutenues !

Et vous, Mesdames et Messieurs, vous qui avez souffert de l'ambition d'autrui, vous dont les blessures faites à la dernière guerre ne sont pas encore cicatrisées, vous, belges, qui aimez et réclamez la paix et la justice plus sincèrement que tout autre, rappelez-vous toujours la maxime du Japon : « *Pour conquérir le monde, il faut conquérir la Chine, et pour conquérir la Chine, il faut conquérir la Mandchourie* ». L'agression actuelle, c'est le premier pas du Japon vers sa conquête du monde. Si la guerre éclate en Orient, ce sera la guerre du monde, et une guerre mondiale ne saura pas vous épargner. Vérifiez ce que j'ai dit, jugez donc. La paix, la justice et même votre intérêt vous le commandent.

## La Portée Internationale de l'invasion japonaise

par SIU KING-YUAN

Le Japon est le seul pays qui ait profité de la guerre de 1914-1918 au détriment des autres nations soit au point de vue économique, soit au point de vue de sa puissance grandissante dans le monde entier.

Après l'événement du 19 septembre, la presse de Tokio déclarait : « Désormais, nous savons que la question d'Orient sera résolue non plus par les européens et par les américains, mais par le Japon seul ».

Quel est donc le motif de la politique japonaise ? Si la politique du Japon n'était fondée que sur des nécessités nationales, pour assurer des débouchés à l'excédent de la population d'une part, obtenir d'autre part, des marchés pour ses surproductions économiques, nous pourrions ne pas le craindre. Cette politique tient-elle dans le double objectif indiqué ?

Dans un sens, oui. Cependant, dans un autre sens, ce n'est pas tout. Le Japon porte ses regards beaucoup plus loin que cela. D'après un rapport daté du 25 juillet 1927 du Baron Tanaka, ancien premier ministre du Japon, intitulé : « La Politique d'expansion du Japon en Mandchourie », on peut voir fort nettement que le Japon convoite plus que les 3 provinces du Nord-Est de la Chine. Ses visées politiques ne se bornent nullement à satisfaire les nécessités d'existence de la nation japonaise. Ce n'est pas non plus la Chine seule qu'il désire soumettre à sa puissance impérialiste. Tanaka, dans son rapport a écrit : «...Pour dominer la Chine il est nécessaire d'abattre en premier lieu les forces des Etats-Unis d'Amérique...; pour conquérir la Chine, il faut commencer par conquérir la Mandchourie, et pour conquérir le monde, il faut commencer par conquérir la Chine. Dans le cas où toute la Chine sera conquise par nous, les autres petits Etats de l'Asie centrale, les Indes, etc., auront peur de nos forces et ils viendront eux-mêmes se soumettre à nous. Le monde saura, alors, que l'Asie nous

— 37 —

qui, elle aussi, rêvait de suprématie en Extrême-Orient et avait commencé la pénétration par la construction de chemins de fer.

En 1904, ces rivalités aboutissent à la guerre russo-japonaise. Le traité de Portsmouth, qui y met fin, consacre la suprématie du Japon. Celui-ci obtient la rétrocession du ch. de fer du sud-Mandchourien et le protectorat sur la Corée, qui, en 1910, est définitivement annexée au Japon. En 1910, le Japon et la Russie décident de poursuivre une politique commune d'exploitation des voies ferrées construites auparavant par les Russes avec l'autorisation de la Chine. Cette décision est prise malgré une proposition américaine tendant à l'internationalisation de ces voies ferrées.

Dès lors l'invasion économique japonaise se précise en Mandchourie.

C'est ainsi qu'actuellement le capital japonais investi dans le chemin de fer sud-mandchourien s'élève à plus de 10 milliards. Six autres milliards sont investis dans des affaires industrielles et commerciales. 130 sociétés japonaises ont un capital dépassant pour chacune 8 millions ! 17 maisons financières soutiennent l'effort japonais.

Pourtant il n'y a pas plus de 200.000 Japonais en Mandchourie ; mais, à l'heure actuelle, le Japon tend à peupler lui-même la Corée et à envoyer en Mandchourie les Coréens. D'après le journal *I-Che-Pao*, les Japonais seraient actuellement en Corée au nombre de deux millions. Ils rendaient la vie impossible chez eux aux Coréens et, quand ceux-ci ont quitté leur pays pour aller en Mandchourie, ils deviennent, à leur tour, une cause de difficultés pour les Chinois, parce que le Japon se met à les protéger contre ces derniers.

de Wan-Pao-Chang et les massacres des Chinois en incidents

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Les incidents de Wan-Pao-Chang et les massacres des Chinois en Corée, dont nous avons entretenu les lecteurs de ce journal dans son numéro du 22 septembre, ne sont, entre mille autres, que des incidents provenant de cette politique. (Le Journal *Libre Belgique*).

L'idée de l'invasion économique en Mandchourie entraîna avec elle tout un plan politique. Il fallait au Japon que l'influence du gouvernement central de Chine ne se fit pas trop sentir en Mandchourie, car il voulait y garder les coudées franches. Dès lors toutes ses interventions tendirent à ce but.

Profitant de ce que le monde entier était en guerre de 1914 à 1918, le Japon détruit la puissance allemande en Extrême-Orient, s'empare

— 38 —

du magnifique port de Tsingtao construit par les Allemands, de la voie ferrée de Kiao-Tcheou à Tsin-Nanfou. Déjà maître de Lao-Tong, il tient Pékin dans de véritables tenailles. Dans la crainte d'un plus grand mal, Yuan-che-Kai, premier président de la république chinoise, signe le 9 mai 1914, les 21 articles qui livraient pratiquement la Mandchourie et la Mongolie à l'action des Japonais. Les Etats-Unis et l'Angleterre virent la chose trop tard. On réunit une conférence à Washington en 1921 et, sous la pression diplomatique, le Japon du tendre Kiao-Tcheou à la Chine et renoncer aux privilèges des 21 articles. Cela n'empêcha pas, hélas ! le Japon de revenir de temps en temps, sous divers prétextes, occuper Kiao-tchou et Tsi-nan-fou, et d'invoquer encore parfois le fameux traité des 21 articles.

L'on arrive en avril 1928, à la marche triomphale des armées nationales chinoises vers Péking. On est à une minute de l'unification de la Chine et du ferme établissement du pouvoir central sur toutes les provinces, même excentriques.

L'unification chinoise pouvait être un obstacle à l'influence japonaise dans le Nord. Les armées de Chang-Kai-Shek, le président actuel, arrivent dans la province de Chantoung. Sous prétexte de protéger éventuellement ses nationaux au passage des troupes, le Japon occupe sans avertissement, sans incident préalable, Tsingtao et Tsi-Nanfou. Voulant coûte que coûte créer un incident justificatif, les Japonais, au nombre d'une vingtaine, s'emparent, le 3 mai, du nouveau gouverneur chinois, Tsai-Kon-Se, le frappent à coups de lanières et finissent par le mutiler et faire disparaître son cadavre. Ce drame était de nature à créer un « casus belli » qui dans la prévoyance politique de la Chine, voulant à tout prix la paix, eût réalisé ce que le Japon désirait : détourner de Pékin les troupes nationales et retarder l'unification de la Chine.

Les armées nationales, ayant laissé Tsang-So-lin, dictateur de la Mandchourie, y rentrer, le Japon risqua de trouver devant lui un pouvoir fort et d'autant plus fort que dorénavant il était uni à Nankin. Il fallait à tout prix l'empêcher.

Le 2 juin 1928, à 4 heures 30 du matin, Tsang-So-lin est assassiné en chemin de fer par une bombe de construction japonaise. Et fin février 1929, ce fait, nullement nié au Japon, est porté publiquement à la tribune des deux chambres japonaises, ce qui valut au baron Tanaka,

— 39 —

premier ministre, de vives attaques de ses adversaires politiques partisans d'une politique de paix.

Nous ne reviendrons pas ici sur les incidents qui ont provoqué le conflit actuel. Mais quels qu'ils soient, à la lumière du passé, ils montrent à l'évidence que le Japon continue à poursuivre une même politique.

Cette politique est claire : c'est l'annexion, plus ou moins ouverte, de la Mandchourie et c'est d'empêcher les aréopages internationaux d'intervenir sous le même prétexte toujours : il ne s'agirait que de conflits locaux. Grâce à cette politique que semble devoir encore une fois triompher à Genève, un simple prétexte d'incident local permet au Japon d'accentuer sans cesse son emprise et de ne pas renoncer à ce qu'il a officiellement promis de renoncer.

Tous ces « conflits locaux » aboutissent à l'antagonisme résultant de circonstances politiques permanentes. C'est à celles-ci qu'il faut mettre fin par une solution d'ensemble.

## Près de quarante ans de politique de pénétration japonaise en Chine

LE PRETEXTE DES INCIDENTS LOCAUX

par JEAN HO

Trop habitués à ne considérer les conflits en Extrême-Orient que comme conflits locaux, toutes les puissances et l'opinion mondiale ont donné, depuis un siècle, un triste exemple de manque de sens politique. Chaque fois qu'un conflit a mis aux prises le Japon et la Chine, elles se sont aperçues trop tard des répercussions internationales de leur abstention et ont dû intervenir, mais trop tard. C'est que le Japon a une politique permanente et une : distraire l'Europe et l'Amérique de ses ambitions, profiter des moments de difficultés intérieures des autres puissances et augmenter sans cesse son emprise sur la Chine du Nord.

Il y a là pourtant un problème qui, s'il ne trouve pas bien vite une solution, pourrait mettre un jour ou l'autre le feu aux poudres.

Qu'on nous permette d'en indiquer ici les grandes lignes.

Le Japon est un petit pays, très pauvre en terre cultivable, n'ayant pour ainsi dire aucune richesse dans son sous-sol. Il ne peut nourrir sa population. Celle-ci, qui était de 79 millions d'âmes en 1920, était montée au chiffre de 89 millions en 1930.

Dès qu'il se sentit suffisamment fort au point de vue militaire, le Japon rêva tout naturellement d'une politique d'expansion. Les îles du Pacifique sont bien gardées par l'Amérique ; l'Angleterre a une politique de porte fermée en Australie. Des yeux (japonais) se portèrent sur l'immense voisin, la Chine, riche et pacifique. Sous prétexte de rendre l'indépendance à la Corée, le Japon, en 1894, déclara la guerre à la Chine. Il obtint l'indépendance de la Corée par le traité de Shimonoseki en 1895. Dès lors il allait jouir d'une influence prépondérante de ce côté et rencontrer en face de lui la politique impériale de la Russie,

— 41 —

appartient et personne n'osera nous exploiter désormais. C'est la politique dictée par notre Mikado Meiji (Mutouhito) et c'est le plan à suivre pour l'existence de notre pays....

Lorsque nous posséderons la Mandchourie, en utilisant sa force, nous tiendrons en main toutes les richesses de la Chine. Cette source de richesses nous utiliserons pour dominer les Indes, les petits Etats de l'Asie Centrale et l'Europe...»

D'après Tanaka, le Mikado Mutenhito avait déjà conçu le plan et dicté la politique d'expansion du Japon sous son règne.

Nous avons appris également dans l'histoire des derniers années combien le caractère japonais est beligieux et combien ses ambitions sont exagérément grandes. Si le Japon, à l'heure actuelle, n'a point encore poussé ses conquêtes à travers le monde entier et si ce peuple a tardé avant de proclamer ouvertement qu'il veut être à lui seul le maître de l'univers, c'est qu'il lui manque encore la subsistance nécessaire pour vivre indépendamment des autres. Voyons quel danger cela nous réserve pour l'avenir du monde si on commet l'erreur de favoriser davantage l'accroissement des forces japonaises.

Pour aveugler leur ambition agressive, les japonais criaient très haut, que ce territoire, la Mandchourie, n'appartient pas historiquement à la Chine. Cela n'est pas du tout exact. Le gouvernement japonais, en déclarant la guerre à la Russie en 1904 et en participant à la Conférence de Washington en 1922, a respectivement affirmé deux fois la souveraineté de la Chine sur la Mandchourie. Le représentant japonais a même manifesté un certain désintéressement sur la question de la Mandchourie. Pourquoi ? Parce qu'il connaît ce que signifient les engagements et les traités internationaux d'après la pratique allemande d'avant-guerre. Il est sûr qu'un jour il peut déchirer ces chiffons de papiers et qu'il proclamera « La Force prime le Droit ». Le Japon, comme nous le savons, est membre de la Société de Nations et signataire du Pacte Briand-Kellog. Nous n'avons pas besoin d'analyser ici les dispositions contenues dans les articles du Pacte de la Société de Nations et dans le Pacte Briand-Kellog qui condamnent catégoriquement le recours à la guerre pour le règlement des différends internationaux. Sans doute que le Japon les a complètement oubliées ! Que pensent les autres signataires des dites ententes ! Voilà presque deux mois écoulés et on n'a pas encore pris une seule mesure effective. On

— 42 —

demande si la Société de Nations possède encore son prestige. Est-ce déjà dès maintenant l'effondrement de son œuvre ?

Quoi qu'il en soit on peut assurer que la question ne manque pas de gravité, et que, d'ici peu, s'il n'y a pas une résolution décisive, une guerre sanglante éclatera dans le monde entier. Car à l'heure actuelle, une guerre ne peut plus se localiser comme autrefois, elle aura tout au moins une répercussion mondiale économique. Donc, il n'y a pas seulement entre la Chine et le Japon un incident local, puisqu'il pourrait s'en suivre une guerre mondiale.

## L'Impérialisme Japonais

par TOUTSIEN

Bien qu'il y ait déjà une dizaine d'années que la guerre mondiale soit passée, les européens, particulièrement les Belges et les Français, n'en ont peut-être pas encore perdu le souvenir pénible et angoissant. Tout le monde se plaint vivement des atrocités de la grande guerre, c'est parce qu'on a subi, on a vu, on a entendu les animosités et les férociétés que la guerre a amenées. Maintenant que pareilles choses se passent à distance, en Extrême-Orient, les européens et même les Belges et les Français n'y prêtent pas la même attention et ne jugent pas de la même manière. Pourquoi ? Justement parce qu'on est loigné ; et qu'on n'a pas subi, ni vu, ni même entendu ce qui s'est passée là-bas.

Cependant je suis convaincu que les européens si sensibles, si humains et si solidaires, seront certainement touchés en entendant les atrocités et les faits horribles que l'impérialisme japonais a accomplis en Extrême-Orient.

Depuis 1910 le Japon a annexé la Corée, il l'a colonisée, les Coréens ont perdu toutes leur liberté : Ils ne peuvent ni se déplacer à leur gré, ni fréquenter les écoles à leur choix. Leurs biens, surtout les terres sont systématiquement confisqués et deviennent ainsi la propriété des Japonais. Les ouvriers et les cultivateurs sont condamnés à un état si misérable que leurs confrères de l'Europe ne savent sûrement pas se l'imaginer. Mais cela s'explique facilement si l'on sait que le Japon ne veut rien d'autre chose que le territoire de Corée ; la population coréenne, il n'en a pas besoin. De là les massacres en masse et les émigrations considérables des Coréens en Chine et en Sibérie.

Ce n'est pas tout. Pour protéger l'administration et prévenir les révoltes, il a défendu aux Coréens de posséder des armes. Si on en trouve dans une famille, celle-ci toute entière, sans excepter les enfants, est fusillée sur-le-champ. Et même, les couteaux de cuisine sont soigneusement cadénassés à l'endroit où on les emploie.

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— 44 —

Voilà un triste exemple parmi les milliers d'autres. En Formose et dans les autres colonies japonaises, pareille politique est pratiquée également. Les révoltes et les massacres y sont du pain quotidien !

Les Occidentaux mettront probablement en doute la véracité de ces faits. Mais je vous assure, peuples civilisés, il vous suffirait de voyager une fois dans ces colonies pour constater les mêmes faits et dédaigner peut être plus que moi ces êtres féroces que vous croyez civilisés.

Maintenant, passons aux affaires sino-japonaises. Je dis « affaires » et non pas « conflits » comme on dit, parce que jusqu'à présent, la Chine n'a jamais répondu par le moindre signe militaire aux occupations par des troupes japonaises de ses 2 provinces du Nord-Est, c.-à-d. Liao-Hing (Moukden) et Kirin, et la province de Hei-Long-Kian, qui forment ce qu'on appelle la Mandchourie.

D'après les nouvelles de la presse, les troupes japonaises ont bombardé Moukden ainsi que son arsenal dans la nuit du 18 septembre sans avertir les civils et sans faire la moindre déclaration. En un jour la moitié de la province fut occupée par ces troupes barbares. Les établissements publics furent détruits, les femmes violées; les hommes fusillés sans excepter les enfants; l'université de Moukden et les écoles pillées; plus de 5000 étudiants et étudiantes chassés; un immense atelier de construction d'avions ainsi que la résidence du Maréchal Tchang-Sueh-Liang incendiés, il y eut encore beaucoup d'autres dégâts, dont nous ne pouvons pas encore donner tout le détail à l'heure actuelle. On reste encore sans nouvelles du gouverneur de Moukden, ainsi que de son secrétaire en chef.

Cela ne suffit pas encore aux Japonais. Sous prétexte de protéger les résidents japonais en territoire chinois et leurs propriétés qui, d'ailleurs ne furent jamais en danger, ces troupes barbares se répandirent sur tout le territoire des 2 provinces précitées. Ils ont pillé, incendié et détruit tous les villages et toutes les villes sur leur passage. Les fonctionnaires civils, les enfants, les femmes dépourvus de toute défense ont été massacrés. Un instituteur a été brûlé vif et on a vu incendier un jardin d'enfants ! Toutes ces animosités, tous ces faits cruels et barbares nous sont connus par des lettres de famille, tandis que les sources officielles les ont cachées ou les ont laissées dans l'ombre. Or, les européens, si éloignés de là-bas, ne sauraient naturellement pas les

— 45 —

voir, ni même en entendre des échos, et à plus forte raison, ne peuvent ils pas comprendre à fond. Mais tout s'explique si l'on sait le plan que le Japon a soigneusement préparé. (Le plan d'annexion de la Mandchourie et de la Mongolie prescrite par le ministre du Japon, *Tanaka*).

D'après ce fameux plan, le Japon annexera le plus vite possible les 3 provinces du Nord-Est de la Chine (c.-à-d. la Mandchourie) et une partie de la Mongolie. Pourquoi ? Parce que d'abord, c'est un immense débouché pour ses produits manufacturés, ensuite c'est un pays excessivement riche qui produit abondamment les pois et autres céréales, dont les Japonais ne savent pas se dispenser. Les forêts, les mines d'or, de houille et de fer, dont le Japon est dépourvu, y abondent. Enfin et surtout, ce vaste territoire plus grande que la Grande Bretagne, constitue un grand débouché pour sa population.

Dès lors, on comprend facilement pourquoi le Japon ose violer le Pacte de la S. D. N. et les traités internationaux, et pourquoi le Japon ose troubler la paix du monde. On comprend aussi pourquoi le Japon pille partout et massacre par milliers les chinois et les coréens.

Encore une fois, son but unique est d'annexer les territoires riches qu'il regarde comme indispensables pour sa prospérité à lui et pour satisfaire son ambition impérialiste !

Devant cette agression si barbare, si injuste et si cruelle, le peuple chinois, tout en faisant un appel au monde civilisé et solidaire, n'a rien d'autre à faire qu'à se sacrifier, corps et âme, pour la Patrie et pour l'humanité tout entière.



## Le barbarisme japonais et le sentiment patriotique des citoyens chinois

par CONLI

Les chinois ont poussé assez de cris d'alarme sur les massacres de leurs compatriotes innocents, à la suite de l'invasion japonaise dans leur territoire depuis le 18 septembre. Et, partout on entend la voix et l'appel de la paix et de la justice. Partout ! même dans certains milieux japonais consciencieux ! Que doivent faire ceux qui connaissent mieux les faits et qui, à cause de cela, ne peuvent se taire ? Puisque le barbarisme rencontre encore son ennemi, c'est-à-dire puisqu'il existe encore l'ami de la paix, de la justice et de l'humanité, nous nous faisons un devoir de renseigner ceux qui sont trompés par le mensonge des japonais, sur certains faits fondamentaux qui nous permettent un jugement objectif.

Mais le Japon n'a-t-il pas prétendu que la sécurité de la vie et des biens des japonais, nécessite son activité militaire dans les trois provinces chinoises du Nord-Est (Mandchourie) ? N'a-t-il pas signalé la cessation des agissements anti-japonais des chinois comme une principale condition du retrait de ses troupes ? N'a-t-il pas déclaré que la responsabilité de son activité militaire incombe au gouvernement chinois ? Bref, pour pouvoir répondre à ces questions-là, il faut et il suffit de connaître : 1° les causes réelles de l'occupation territoriale des troupes japonaises ; 2° leurs actes depuis le 18 septembre ; 3° l'attitude du gouvernement chinois ; 4° les caractères des agissements des citoyens chinois à l'égard des japonais.

1. *L'invasion des troupes japonaises a pour causes principales* : 1° l'ambition de dominer le monde entier ; 2° la jalousie de l'exploitation des richesses chinoises par les chinois.

L'invasion du Japon au Nord-Est de la Chine n'est pas son but définitif. Son ambition ne se limite même pas à la domination de la Chine entière. Et nous en serons persuadés, dès que nous aurons lu quelques

— 47 —

lignes du fameux projet du soi-disant « politique positive », présenté à son empereur par un ex-premier ministre, appelé Tanaka : « ...La guerre russo-japonaise (en 1904) avait le même but et les mêmes effets qu'une guerre entre le Japon et la Chine. Si nous voulons dominer la Chine, la question préalable, est d'abattre la Russie en 1904. Mais pour conquérir la Chine, il nous faut d'abord conquérir la Mandchourie et la Mongolie ; comme si nous voulons conquérir le monde entier, nous devons conquérir d'abord la Chine. Quand la Chine sera entièrement conquise par notre grand empire, d'autres peuples asiatiques comme ceux de l'Asie Mineure, de l'Asie Centrale, les Indes, etc., nous seront certainement soumis par respect et par crainte. Alors, les pays du monde entier seront convaincus que l'Asie est notre Asie et n'oseront jamais nous attaquer. Voilà le plan traditionnel de sa majesté l'Empereur Mayki, ce dont la réalisation est la condition vitale de l'empire du Japon... » Un discours de l'administrateur de la société du chemin de fer Sud-Mandchourien peut aussi nous servir de preuve de l'ambition des japonais. Ce discours fut prononcé à la fête de la dixième année de l'établissement de la société qui est sous la direction du gouvernement japonais, et peut être considéré comme un argument officiel. « Nous avons eu assez de succès admirables, dit l'administrateur, par l'intermédiaire de la société. Mais, conclue-t-il, d'après l'importance de notre société, ce que nous avons fait dans un passé de dix ans, ne constitue qu'un pas d'un voyage de 100 lis (un li = 0 km. 624) ». Or, le Japon est en train de continuer son long voyage en commençant par la conquête des provinces de Nord-Est de la Chine !

Cette terrible politique extérieure n'est d'ailleurs pas celle d'un seul parti, mais c'est celle de tous les partis politiques du Japon. Le Japon a maintes fois tenté de réaliser la dite politique dangereuse. En effet, il s'est emparé de Tsing-Tao en 1915, de Port Arthur et Darien en 1920, de Chanton en 1925. Mais, n'ayant jamais réussi à détruire définitivement l'intégrité territoriale de la Chine, en vainquant la justice et l'opinion publique, il attendait les circonstances plus favorables, susceptibles d'une invasion plus forte et où aucune résistance n'est possible.

Ces quelques années, les chinois exploitant eux-mêmes le Nord-Est, les japonais se déclarent menacés par cette rivalité avec eux. « Les chinois affluent à la Mandchourie de plus en plus, dit Tanaka dans son projet, avec un progrès formidable. Ils y sont si nombreux que nos

— 48 —

droits et privilèges sont forts menacés...». Une pareille jalousie rend beaucoup plus impatients les japonais qui attendent les bonnes circonstances.

Or, cette année, les circonstances favorables leur sont arrivées : l'inondation a détruit une bonne partie de la fortune des chinois, tandis que le gouvernement chinois se préoccupe de porter secours aux sinistrés. Tout le monde sait que ce désastre naturel en Chine est si grave que presque toutes les personnes et tous les gouvernements du monde y apportent leurs secours. Mais le Japon, au lieu de le faire comme les autres, essaye de la conquérir, d'aggraver la situation pitoyable des malheureux, de compléter les œuvres du désastre naturel !

II. *L'invasion commença en effet le 18 septembre.* Comme les soldats chinois conformément au commandement de leurs supérieurs, ne résistaient pas à l'avance des troupes japonaises, celles-ci se sont emparées successivement des points stratégiques du Nord-Est comme Sun-Yan (Moukden), Kirin, Anton, Yinkéou, etc.

Notons quelques-uns des actes barbares des troupes japonaises dans les pays occupés. Les massacres civils sans résistance surtout des étudiants, se répandent partout. Tous les passants, à cause d'une réponse jugée inopportune, sont suspectés d'espionnage et tout de suite tués. Tous les domiciles des endroits occupés, sont violemment saisis sous prétexte d'assurer la sécurité publique. Et la saisie n'est pas sans rémunération ; tous les objets de valeur sont emportés à titre de confiscation ! Les troupes japonaises ont incendié et détruit l'arsenal, l'aérodrome. Elles s'emparent des établissements publics jusqu'à l'université et aux écoles. Pour produire le désordre, c'est-à-dire le prétexte d'une occupation permanente, les japonais ont désarmé les gendarmes, les policiers et certains soldats chinois de telle sorte que des pauvres diables se conduisent comme bandits en profitant de l'occasion comme le Japon ! Qui est donc responsable des violences des bandits d'occasion ?

Alors, instinctivement, qui est-ce qui haïssent les victimes nombreuses du désastre s'aggravant sans cesse depuis le 18 septembre ? Les victimes ! Qu'elles sont nombreuses ! Les uns sont tués, les autres ont perdu leurs chers parents, leurs chers amis ou leur fortune entière. Quant aux tués, ils ont leur mort différente, c'est-à-dire qu'ils ont été

1059

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
State letter, August 10, 1972  
*Quintan* NARS, Date 12-18-75

— 49 —

exécutés de différentes manières : les gens moins coupables (sous les yeux des japonais), sont fusillés à genou, d'autres sont tués à la baïonnette et les désobéissants enterrés vivants ! Une photo reproduit dans le présent numéro cette histoire inouïe, triste et qui entache l'humanité et la civilisation moderne. N'est-ce pas encore une excitation suffisante et directe ? Est-ce que tout cela est nécessaire à la protection des biens des japonais en Mandchourie ?

III. Le gouvernement chinois, devant une si vive agression, est toujours fidèle au maintien des pactes de paix sans donner aucun ordre de représailles à ses troupes. Ce qui est bien clair ; personne ne croirait que si les troupes chinoises avaient reçu l'ordre de représailles, les japonais puissent occuper si facilement la Mandchourie. C'est en montrant sa confiance en autorité et en impartialité de la S. D. N., que la Chine lui demande toujours une solution pacifique et juste, tout en qualité de membre de la S. D. N., mais non pas pour lui demander la protection, comme l'a prétendu le gouvernement japonais. Si elle a refusé les négociations directes, c'était pour aboutir à une solution efficace, dénuée de violence, qui ne serait possible qu'après le retrait des troupes japonaises. En effet, elle s'est déclarée, à maintes reprises, prête à entamer les négociations directes dès le retrait des troupes japonaises.

IV. Non seulement, le gouvernement chinois a tant de patience en face de l'invasion japonaise, mais les citoyens chinois n'en ont pas moins ! Excités par le barbarisme japonais, ils n'ont adopté qu'une politique de non-collaboration avec les japonais. Ils n'ont pris que des mesures pacifiques plus directes à l'égard de leurs compatriotes qu'à l'égard des japonais agresseurs. S'ils pratiquent la rupture des relations économiques, c'est une affaire intérieure, mais ils ne forceraient pas les japonais à recommencer les relations économiques. En s'abstenant d'acheter les marchandises japonaises, ils n'ont jamais forcé les japonais à ne pas les vendre. Réciproquement, en s'abstenant de vendre les marchandises aux japonais, personne ne les oblige d'acheter les marchandises chinoises. Si les étudiants chinois ne veulent pas faire leurs études aux universités prises des mains des chinois par les japonais, c'est que les chinois ne veulent pas s'en faire esclaves. Si les chinois ne veulent plus travailler avec les japonais, c'est parce que les

— 50 —

japonais violent leur droit, la justice et menacent la paix. C'est pour la co-existence et le progrès de l'humanité que les peuples doivent collaborer l'un avec l'autre. Mais si le travail des uns constitue et fortifie l'instrument des autres, employé à l'exploitation des collaborateurs et à la destruction du progrès de l'humanité, c'est comme si nous donnions au bourreau un sable tranchant avec lequel il nous tuerait plus tard. « Nous avons le droit, dit Mahatma Gandhi, d'enlever des mains d'un fou, l'arme dangereuse ». Et, c'est ainsi qu'est conçue la rupture des relations économiques des chinois avec les japonais.

En un mot, on doit dire que la non-collaboration des chinois avec les japonais a ses caractères suivants : a) pacifique, b) passif, c) c'est l'expression du sentiment patriotique, d) c'est une mesure de légitime défense. Nous devons donc dire que c'est toujours permis tant en morale qu'en droit.

La rupture des relations économiques étant consécutive à l'invasion du Japon, il a tort de déclarer nécessaire d'occuper le territoire chinois pour faire cesser le sentiment soi-disant anti-japonais. N'est-ce pas une faute de prendre cause pour effet et d'agir hors du droit et contre la justice !

## Le Projet de „Politique Positive” présenté à l'Empereur

par TANAKA

Le premier ministre Tanaka, avec tous ses collaborateurs, a l'honneur de présenter tout respectueusement à sa Majesté l'Empereur, une politique positive et fondamentale sur l'exploitation de la Mandchourie et de la Mongolie.

### I. La politique positive vis-à-vis de la Mandchourie et de la Mongolie.

La Mandchourie et la Mongolie se composent des trois provinces : Fon-T'ien (actuellement appelé Liao-Lin), Kirin et Heilemkiang, de la Mongolie intérieure et de la Mongolie extérieure. Elles ont une superficie de 74.000 lis carrés et une population de 28.000.000 d'habitants. Elles sont trois fois plus grandes que notre territoire entier. Leur population entière n'égale que le tiers de la nôtre. La Mandchourie et la Mongolie sont appréciables non seulement à cause de leur étendue immense et de leur population peu nombreuse, mais aussi et surtout parce que les mines, les forêts qui s'y trouvent, constituent des richesses innombrables. Et, c'est pour éterniser la prospérité de notre Empire en exploitant ces richesses que, sous prétexte de « co-existence » et de « co-prospérité », nous avons établi la société du chemin de fer Sud-Mandchourien, par l'intermédiaire de laquelle nous avons versé beaucoup de capitaux dans l'exploitation des chemins de fer, des transports maritimes, des mines, des forêts, en agriculture, à l'élevage, dans la soustraction du fer, de l'acier. Le versement atteint la somme de 440.000.000 de yens. C'est vraiment l'organisation la plus importante de l'Empire. D'ailleurs, quoique cette société soit nominalement semi-publique, elle est, en réalité, toujours sous la direction de notre gouvernement. Si nous lui attribuons les pouvoirs, diplomatiques, policiers et politiques qui lui permettront de développer notre impéria-

— 52 —

lisme et de se transformer en une société spéciale, elle aura certainement le même succès que le gouvernement Nipon en Corée. Alors, tout le monde connaîtra l'importance de nos droits et privilèges en Mandchourie et en Mongolie. C'est pourquoi tous les cabinets, conformément à la volonté de sa Majesté l'Empereur Mayki, pratiquent la politique traditionnelle d'étendre l'organisation de la société pour réaliser notre politique de « nouveau continent », qui est nécessaire à la vie et à la prospérité de l'Empire. Cependant, après la grande guerre, les circonstances ont mal tourné, aussi bien au point de vue extérieur qu'au point de vue intérieur. Les autorités des trois provinces du Nord-Est, de plus en plus réveillées, commencent à développer progressivement leur industrie. Si la vitesse du développement est vraiment admirable, elle est aussi dangereuse. Ainsi, nos autorités en Mandchourie ne peuvent plus se mouvoir sans difficultés. Et, de nombreuses conséquences malheureuses nous empêchent de réaliser notre politique traditionnelle sur l'exploitation de la Mandchourie et de la Mongolie. D'autre part, le parti des 9 puissances a limité si bien nos droits et privilèges dans les pays, que nous ne pouvons plus y agir avec liberté et que la vie même de l'Empire en est ébranlé. Si nous ne nous efforçons pas à surmonter ces obstacles pour assurer les conditions vitales de notre Etat, il ne pourra jamais développer son essor. D'ailleurs, les richesses se concentrent dans la Mandchourie septentrionale. Si nous n'avons pas de communications qui y aboutissent, il est évident que nous n'avons pas de moyens d'approprier les richesses de la Mandchourie ni celles de la Mongolie. Notre droit aux richesses, acquis par la guerre russo-japonaise, est même limité par le pacte des 9 puissances, qui entrave notre pénétration rapide dans le pays. Mais au contraire, les Chinois y affluent d'une manière progressive. Chaque année, il y a environ 1.000.000 d'habitants chinois qui y vont. Ils y sont si nombreux que nos droits acquis sont menacés et que nous ne pouvons peupler ce pays de nos 800.000 citoyens, population d'excédents annuels, qui sont sans moyen de vivre au Japon. C'est très désastreux pour le soutien vital de notre population.

Si nous laissons encore les Chinois émigrer vers la Mandchourie et la Mongolie, sans chercher une mesure limitative, ils y seront au moins à un nombre de 6.000.000 au bout de cinq ans. Alors, nous aurons plus de difficultés à surmonter. Depuis que notre développement en Chine

— 53 —

est limité par le pacte des 9 puissances, l'opinion publique de tout notre pays le discute avec acharnement. Dès lors, sa Majesté l'Empereur Taïtsen convoqua en secret Saïobo, des personnages militaires et autres pour délibérer sur une solution de nature à écarter les difficultés résultant du dit pacte. Ainsi, j'ai reçu l'ordre d'aller demander conseil, en secret, aux importants politiciens de l'Europe et de l'Amérique. Ils me répondent tous que le promoteur du dit pacte est le gouvernement des Etats-Unis et que les autres pays signataires sont tous en faveur du développement de nos autorités en Mandchourie et en Mongolie pour ainsi faciliter la protection du commerce international et assurer leurs intérêts. Ce sont les renseignements recueillis en Angleterre, en France, en Italie et dans d'autres pays et qui méritent notre confiance en leur sincérité. Je regrette beaucoup qu'à l'occasion des difficultés intérieures des autres pays et sur le point de mettre en pratique le projet relatif à la destruction du pacte de Washington, le cabinet du parti Seyakai fut soudainement privé du pouvoir, avant de pouvoir le réaliser avec succès. Quel malheur ! Lors de mon voyage en Europe et en Amérique, où j'ai délibéré en secret sur le développement de la Mandchourie et de la Mongolie, je passais par Shanghai où les chinois ont tenté de m'assassiner ; ils ont blessé une dame américaine. Je suis convaincu que j'ai pu sortir du danger, parce que j'étais béni par l'esprit de nos ancêtres impériaux. La providence me commande ainsi, tacitement, de me sacrifier pour établir une nouvelle relation en Extrême-Orient et pour aider l'empire à former un nouveau continent. Au point de vue politique, les trois provinces orientales sont mal constituées. Nous autres, Japonais, nous devons, pour notre propre protection et celle des autres, enlever les obstacles de l'Orient par le fer et le sang. Mais si nous voulons ainsi nous assurer de la possession des 3 provinces orientales, la Chine excitera certainement les Etats-Unis d'Amérique à nous attaquer. Et, nous serons obligés de prendre les armes contre les Américains. Par exemple, quant à l'attentat contre moi à Shanghai, la Chine en est purement et simplement acquittée ! Si nous ne voulons pas nous sacrifier, la prospérité de l'Empire n'aura jamais la possibilité de se développer. La guerre russo-japonaise (en 1904) avait le même but et les mêmes effets qu'une guerre entre le Japon et la Chine. Si nous voulons dominer la Chine, la question préalable, c'est d'abattre les puissances américaines ; c'est presque aussi

— 54 —

nécessaire que d'abattre la Russie en 1904. Mais pour conquérir la Chine, il nous faut d'abord conquérir la Mandchourie et la Mongolie ; comme si désireux de conquérir le monde entier, nous devons d'abord conquérir la Chine. Quand la Chine sera entièrement conquise par notre grand Empire, d'autres peuples asiatiques comme ceux de l'Asie Mineure, de l'Asie Centrale, des Indes, etc., nous seront certainement soumis par respect et par crainte. Alors les pays du monde entier seront convaincus que l'Asie est notre Asie et n'oseront jamais nous attaquer. Voilà le plan traditionnel de sa Majesté l'Empereur Mayki ; sa réalisation est la condition vitale de l'Empire du Japon

(à suivre)

## Le conflit sino-japonais

par M. WICKHAM STEED

M. Wickham Steed, l'éminente autorité en matière internationale, explique aux lecteurs du *Sunday times*, le 8 nov., quelques tenants et aboutissants du conflit sino-japonais et voici les principaux passages de son très intéressant article :

« La question a deux extrémités, l'une proche et l'autre éloignée. La première intéresse la S. D. N. et les nations qui la composent. Cette fois les Etats-Unis se sont joints à la ligue, en qualité de signataires du traité Briand-Kellogg, de renonciation à la guerre.

» De quelque façon qu'on regarde la situation le Japon est virtuellement en guerre avec la Chine en Mandchourie. Les combats qui ont eu lieu sur le cours supérieur de la rivière Nonni, dans le nord de la Mandchourie, loin de tout lieu où des troupes japonaises, d'après les traités, ont le droit de se trouver, ne peuvent se distinguer de la guerre proprement dite, de même, que d'autres actes de guerre, que les forces japonaises ont commis en divers autres endroits de Mandchourie, au cours des dernières semaines. La Chine qui est membre de la S. D. N. et qui comme le Japon y possède un siège, a attiré l'attention du Conseil sur les opérations des Japonais de Mandchourie, au cours des dernières conformément à l'article 11 du Pacte, qui déclare que toute guerre ou menace de guerre, intéresse la S. D. N. tout entière, et qui donne droit à chaque membre de la ligue, d'attirer l'attention du Conseil sur toute circonstance qui menace de troubler la paix internationale. La Chine était représentée par le Dr Alfred Sze, diplomate expérimenté et d'éducation occidentale. Le représentant du Japon était M. Yoshizawa, ambassadeur à Paris, un gentleman caractérisé par une certaine lenteur d'esprit, et qui ne peut presque pas parler français ou anglais et qui apparemment n'était pas capable de comprendre clairement ce qui lui était dit dans l'une ou l'autre de ces langues.

Cette circonstance jointe aux difficultés inhérentes à la situation et la nécessité de câbler entre Genève et Nankin et Tokio et vice-versa

— 56 —

empêcha le conseil de la Ligue de réaliser des progrès sensibles en septembre. Il s'ajourna jusqu'au milieu d'octobre pour trouver que la situation n'avait fait qu'empirer. Entre-temps les Etats-Unis avaient autorisé un délégué américain à se joindre au conseil de la S. D. N. si on l'y invitait en qualité d'observateur et ce au nom du pacte Briand-Kellogg.

Malgré l'opposition japonaise le représentant des Etats-Unis fut invité à prendre place au conseil. Le Japon soutint que cet acte n'étant pas décidé à l'unanimité n'avait aucune valeur. Le gouvernement de Tokio se montra également obstiné sur la question de cesser ses opérations extra légales, sinon illégales en Mandchourie, de sorte qu'à la fin d'octobre le conseil s'ajournera à nouveau, cette fois, jusqu'au 16 novembre. Après avoir voté une résolution invitant le Japon à commencer immédiatement le retrait de ses troupes de ces parties de la Mandchourie dans lesquelles elle n'avaient aucun droit de se trouver et d'achever cette évacuation avant le 16 novembre.

Depuis lors les combats sur la rivière Nonni ont eu lieu apparemment à l'occasion de la réparation d'un pont qui est très proche du chemin de fer de l'est chinois, administré en commun par la Chine et la Russie. Les circonstances exactes sont encore obscures, mais une chose est claire, c'est que les troupes japonaises n'avaient aucun droit d'être là, le droit des Japonais étant limité à la zone du chemin de fer du sud de la Mandchourie.

Les Japonais soutiennent que des actes de brigandage de Chinois et le meurtre impuni d'un officier japonais les ont forcés à agir en état de légitime défense et qu'on ne peut pas, par conséquent, qualifier d'actes de guerre des mesures prises dans ce sens. Cette prétention des Japonais paraît fondée. On ne doit pas oublier que leurs intérêts en Mandchourie sont importants.

Mercredi après-midi, l'ambassadeur américain à Tokio informa le ministre des affaires étrangères du Japon que les Etats-Unis se solidaient avec la résolution votée par le conseil de la S. D. N. Nous constatons donc que le conseil de la Ligue, y compris la Chine et soutenu par les Etats-Unis, conteste au Japon le droit de régler les choses par la force. Si la S. D. N. faiblit dans son opposition à une grande puissance dans une affaire comme celle-ci, ses partisans craignent qu'elle ne se discrédite et que la conférence du désarmement de l'année pro-

— 57 —

chaine, si elle se réunit, ne se termine par un piètre échec. A moins que les choses ne s'améliorent cette semaine, la Chine pourra modifier sa position à Genève. Son appel à la S. D. N. pourra n'être plus basé sur l'article 11 du pacte, mais bien sur l'article 15, et si le Japon continue à rester réfractaire, les autres membres de la Ligue pourront se trouver obligés à décider s'il y a lieu d'avoir recours au boycottage financier et économique du délinquant, prévu à l'article 16 du pacte. Sur ce point, il est bon de ne pas oublier que le pacte de Genève n'est pas un vague document humanitaire. Il forme partie essentielle de tous les traités de paix et lie les signataires aussi indissolublement que n'importe quelle autre partie de ces traités.

Telle est, selon l'auteur, la situation en ce qui concerne l'« extrémité proche » du problème. L'extrémité éloignée commence avec les empiètements de la Russie en territoire chinois à la fin du siècle dernier, la guerre entre le Japon et la Chine de 1893, l'occupation russe de la Mandchourie en 1900, la guerre russo-japonaise de 1904-1905 et l'établissement subséquent par le Japon de droits ferroviaires et commerciaux en Mandchourie. Quand éclata la grande guerre, en 1914, le Japon hésita un instant, ses autorités militaires opinant que l'Allemagne gagnerait, conseillaient de profiter de l'occasion pour développer la puissance japonaise en Extrême-Orient. On a publié un mémoire qu'aurait présenté à l'Empereur le baron Tanaka en juillet 1927, esquissant une « politique positive » en Mandchourie comme un pas en avant vers la conquête de la Chine d'abord, de l'Asie centrale et de l'Inde ensuite. L'authenticité de ce document ne paraît, avoir, jusqu'à présent, été contestée par personne.

Et M. Steed conclut : « J'ai l'impression que les troubles actuels ne constituent pas uniquement une mise à l'épreuve des signataires du Pacte de Genève et de Pacte Kellogg et que la situation contient le germe d'une des plus grosses questions qu'il serait possible de soulever. En la traitant, la S. D. N. et les Etats-Unis auront besoin de tout le tact, de toute la patience et de toute la fermeté possible. S'ils réussissent à la régler avant que la guerre soit déclarée, ils auront rendu au monde entier, y compris le Japon, le plus grand service ».

## Chronique des Actions japonaises

### 18 SEPTEMBRE :

Les soldats japonais, après avoir détruit une partie du chemin de fer du sud Mandcourien (20 li = 7 miles environ), se dirigèrent vers le camp du Nord en déclarant que les soldats ont détruit une partie du chemin de fer du sud-Mandchourien. A 10 heures du soir, le camp du Nord fut cerné par les troupes japonaises qui commencèrent à tirer et à bombarder aussitôt. Le nombre de victimes chinoises n'est pas encore connu. A 12,30 heures les soldats chinois, obéissant à l'ordre du gouvernement local, furent désarmés sans résistance et ainsi le camp du Nord fut occupé.

### 19 SEPTEMBRE :

A 2 heures du matin le camp du Nord fut incendié et les troupes japonaises commencèrent le bombardement des alentours.

A 6.30 h. les armées entrèrent dans la ville du Liao-Ning (Moukden) sans rencontrer la moindre résistance et on annonça formellement l'occupation de Liao-Ning.

Le quartier général du Honjo avec 200 officiers, s'installa à Liao-Ning et ordonna la marche des armées vers l'Ouest. L'arsenal du Nord-Est fut bombardé et occupé. Les policiers de la ville furent désarmés et beaucoup tués. Le gouverneur et les grands personnages furent arrêtés et détenus dans le quartier général japonais.

Les avions militaires japonais arrivèrent de Corée à Liao-Ning.

Les lignes télégraphiques et téléphoniques furent coupées par les japonais. Les communications dans la ville furent totalement interdites.

Dans la ville de Liao-Ning, grand massacre de la population chinoise, surtout des étudiants et des étudiantes. Ceux de Fong-Yung et une partie de l'université du Nord-Est, furent d'abord insultés puis tués. Les autres furent dispersés de force.

Le même jour, Ying-Keou, New-Chanug au Sud ; Kanpentze à l'Ouest ; Kan-chen-tze, Chang-Chun à l'Est et Liao-Yuan au Nord furent occupées systématiquement.

Une 3<sup>me</sup> armée fut envoyée de Corée à Liao-Ning.

— 59 —

### 20 SEPTEMBRE :

En plus, les japonais, occupèrent Hulu-tao, un grand port commercial de l'Est, Wan-pao-shan et Nanning.

La ligne téléphonique de Peiping à Kirin fut coupée.

Chang-Chun, la ville commerçante et la plus florissante, fut incendiée par les japonais. Les gouverneurs et sous-gouverneurs furent tous massacrés.

Le cabinet des ministres à Tokio annonça la mobilisation des vaisseaux à Sasebo, base des forces maritimes japonaises.

Deux réunions urgentes du cabinet des ministres furent tenues à Tokio. Les décisions prises furent ainsi connues :

1) instruction serait donnée aux diplomates japonais dans les divers pays d'annoncer que l'affaire du 18 septembre à Liao-Ning est « self-defense » ! ; l'incident étant « purement local » ;

2) le gouvernement japonais ne tolère ni « médiation » ni « intervention » d'une tierce puissance.

### 21 SEPTEMBRE :

A 7 heures du matin. Les avions militaires japonais bombardèrent Hsin-Mintun et Tahushan.

A 6 heures du soir, les troupes japonaises entrèrent dans la ville de Kirin. Tous les établissements gouvernementaux furent occupés et les gouverneurs furent emprisonnés.

Un Japonais fut nommé gouverneur de Liao-Ning. Le nombre de soldats japonais à Shan-kai-Kuen fut augmenté.

Le chemin de fer de Chang-Chun à Kirin fut occupé, et les 8 districts de « Yenki iron mines » connues comme Chien-Tao, furent également occupés.

Deux croiseurs japonais furent envoyés à Chinouantao, de même qu'à Chefoo, Lungkow et Nanking.

En même temps, plusieurs canonnières apparurent le long du fleuve Yangtze ainsi qu'à Tangkow. Le même jour, 80 soldats japonais furent envoyés de Tientsin à Peiping.

Un champ d'aviation fut installé à Chang-Chun pour les avions militaires japonais.



— 60 —

Tous les chemins de fer pris par le Japon furent placés sous la direction de l'administration du « south Manchourien Railway ».

22 SEPTEMBRE :

Chang-Chiatun et Taonan furent occupés. Les marins japonais furent débarqués à Chinouan-Tao.

Les corps massacrés à Liao-Ning furent brûlés par les japonais.

Bombardement de la ville de Chin-Chow où le gouvernement provincial et provisoire de Liao-Ning est rétabli récemment.

23 SEPTEMBRE :

Des nouvelles troupes furent envoyées de Corée et Lungshan pour remplacer les troupes de Kirin qui partaient vers Harbin.

Un grand nombre de soldats japonais fut envoyé vers Jehol et Hailung-Kiang.

300 soldats japonais et 2 trains blindés arrivèrent à Tung-liao ; la ville de Tung-liao ainsi que le chemin de fer de Setao, furent occupés.

Les aréoplanes militaires bombardèrent la ville de Chang-Chun.

Les écoles de Liao-Ning furent cernées par les soldats japonais et de nombreux élèves tués.

24 SEPTEMBRE :

Le développement de l'occupation fut arrêté par suite de l'intervention de la S. D. N.

Les japonais creusèrent des tranchées à Liao-Ning.

25 SEPTEMBRE :

200 bandits (Coréens, Chinois, Japonais), dirigés par les japonais, pillèrent un train de voyageurs.

Nouveau bombardement de Chin-chou.

Les magasins alimentaires à Liao-Ning furent pillés par les soldats japonais.

Toutes sortes de taxes furent établies par les japonais dans les régions occupées.

Fong-Yung, un recteur d'une université privée, fut arrêté.

Tous les établissements publics furent obligés de hisser le drapeau japonais.

— 61 —

26 SEPTEMBRE :

Un certain Yuan Chin-kai fut poussé par les japonais à proclamer l'indépendance des 3 provinces Nord-Est chinois. En même temps les autorités de Tokio annoncèrent l'interdit d'aider ce mouvement.

La chambre de commerce à Liao-Ning fut dissoute par le Japon.

Une collection précieuse de littérature chinoise, d'histoire, de philosophie et de commentaires sur les classiques de la bibliothèque de Liao-Ning fut emportée par les autorités japonaises. En même temps une collection de haute valeur historique de l'ancienne famille impériale disparut également.

Des marins japonais débarquèrent à Haichou malgré la protestation des garnisons locales.

Tshima, un croiseur japonais fut envoyé à Shanghai.

(à suivre)

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 24, 1931.

I telephoned Dr. Warnshuis  
and informed him that there was  
no objection on the part of the  
Department to sending such a  
message to the National Christian  
Council in China and in Japan.

MMH/REK

*MMH*

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