

**NATIONAL  
ARCHIVES  
MICROFILM  
PUBLICATIONS**



# ROFL



**NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS**

Microfilm Publication M976

RECORDS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RELATING TO POLITICAL RELATIONS  
BETWEEN CHINA AND JAPAN, 1930-1944

Roll 6

1930-39

793.94/2941-3080  
Nov.-Dec. 1931



**THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES  
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE  
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**

WASHINGTON: 1975



## NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

### INTRODUCTION

On the 96 rolls of this microfilm publication are reproduced the records from the decimal file of the Department of State, 1930-44, that relate to political relations between China and Japan. The records are mostly instructions to and despatches from diplomatic and consular officials; the despatches are often accompanied by enclosures. Also included in these records are notes between the Department of State and foreign diplomatic representatives in the United States, memorandums prepared by officials of the Department, and correspondence with officials of other Government departments and with private firms and persons. The State Department divided the decimal file into chronological segments to retire inactive records. This division has been maintained in this microfilm publication. The records for the period 1930-39 are filmed on rolls 1-88 and those for 1940-44 on rolls 89-96.

The Lists of Documents or "purport lists" filmed on rolls 345 and 346 (1930-39), roll 532 (1940-June 1944), and roll 628 (July-Dec. 1944) of M973 give brief abstracts of the documents reproduced in this microfilm publication and serve as a finding aid to the documents themselves. The arrangement of the entries on these lists generally corresponds to the arrangement of the documents in the file.

From 1910 to 1963 the State Department used a decimal system for its central files, assembling and arranging individual documents according to subject and assigning decimal file numbers. The decimal file consists of nine primary classes numbered 0 through 8, each covering a broad subject area. The records reproduced in this microfilm publication are in Class 7, political relations of states. Each country had been assigned a two-digit number. The country numbers assigned to China and to Japan, for example, are 93 and 94, respectively. Thus, documents bearing the file number 793.94 concern political relations between China and Japan.

When one or more digits follow the second country number, they represent a specific subject. This number, in turn, may be followed by a slant mark (/). In such cases the numbers after the slant mark were assigned to individual documents as they were accumulated on a specific subject. For example, a decimal file number taken from a document reproduced in this microfilm publication is 793.943/5. The number 3 following the country number for Japan (94) signifies that the subject is extraterritoriality, and the number after the slant mark indicates the number of documents on this subject.



## NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

The documents under one subject classification are generally in chronological order, coinciding with the assigned document number, which follows the slant mark. There are instances, however, when a document file number was not assigned until a date considerably later than the one on which the document was received.

In July 1944 the number after the slant mark began to reflect the date of the document instead of the number of documents; for example, a document dated November 20, 1944, would be numbered /11-2044. Documents dated as early as 1939 but not indexed until after July 1, 1944, also have been assigned date numbers.

Cross-reference sheets referring to related records under other subject classifications in the decimal file have been reproduced as they occur, and appropriate cross-reference notations appear in the Lists of Documents.

The file contains documents that were security classified by the State Department, as well as those received from and classified by foreign governments and other Federal agencies. Documents that have not been declassified are not available as part of this microfilm publication. The National Archives and Records Service (NARS) does not have authority to make reproductions of such documents available to searchers. Documents that remain classified have been removed from the file and replaced by a withdrawal notice that identifies the document and indicates the reason for its removal.

The records reproduced in this microfilm publication are part of General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, and are a continuation of the records concerning political relations between China and other states, 1910-29, which have been microfilmed as NARS M341.

In the same record group are several diplomatic correspondence series containing documents on relations between China and the United States. They are copies of instructions from the State Department to U.S. Ministers to China, 1843-1906 (rolls 38-43 of M77); notes to the Chinese Legation in the United States from the Department, 1868-1906 (rolls 13 and 14 of M99); despatches from U.S. Ministers to China to the Department, 1843-1906 (M92); and notes from the Chinese Legation in the United States to the Department, 1868-1906 (M98). Also related to matters concerning China are communications to special agents of the United States from the Department, 1852-86 (roll 154 of M77).

Several series of volumes contain material on relations between Japan and the United States. There are copies of instructions from the State Department to U.S. Ministers to



## NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

Japan, 1855-1906 (rolls 104-108 of M77); despatches from U.S. Ministers to Japan to the Department, 1855-1906 (M133); notes to the Japanese Legation in the United States from the Department, 1860-1906 (rolls 66 and 67 of M99); and notes from the Japanese Legation in the United States to the Department, 1858-1906 (M163). Also related to matters concerning Japan are communications to special agents of the United States from the Department, 1823-86 (rolls 152 and 154 of M77); and despatches from special agents to the Department, 1794-1837 (roll 10 of M37).

Despatches from U.S. consular officials in China and Japan before 1906 are available as separate microfilm publications for each post. Complementary to the despatches from consuls are instructions to consuls.

The method of arranging the diplomatic and consular series cited above was discontinued in 1906, when the State Department adopted the practice of filing incoming and outgoing correspondence, memorandums, and other documents by subject in a single numerical series. Information on documents relating to China and Japan for the 1906-10 period may be found through the use of card indexes and Lists of Documents in the National Archives of the United States. The Numerical File is available as microfilm publication M862.

Several series in the State Department decimal file, 1910-29, that relate to Chinese and Japanese affairs are available as microfilm publications. In Class 7 there are two series regarding Chinese affairs: one concerning political relations between the United States and China (M339) and the other concerning political relations between China and other states (including Japan) (M341); and two series regarding Japanese affairs: one concerning political relations between the United States and Japan (M423) and the other concerning political relations between Japan and other states (M424). Class 8, internal affairs of states, has records concerning internal affairs of China (M329) and internal affairs of Japan (M422). Additional documents are in the remaining classes of the State Department decimal file:

- Class 0. General. Miscellaneous.
- Class 1. Administration, Government of the United States.
- Class 2. Extradition.
- Class 3. Protection of Interests.
- Class 4. Claims.
- Class 5. International Congresses and Conferences. Multi-lateral Treaties. League of Nations.
- Class 6. Commerce. Customs Administration. Commercial Relations, Treaties and Conventions. Commercial and Trade Agreements.



## NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

In Records of Boundary and Claims Commissions and Arbitrations, Record Group 76, there are records relating to the Claims Commissions of 1858 and 1901 between the United States and China.

In Records of International Conferences, Commissions, and Expositions, Record Group 43, are records of several conferences in which the United States and Japan participated. There are records of the Washington Conference on Limitation of Armament, 1921-22, which met to consider the limitation of armaments and certain questions relating to Pacific and Far Eastern problems. There are also records of the Commission To Represent the United States at the Grand Exhibition of Japan, 1917. The exhibition was planned for 1912 but had been postponed, and the records relate mainly to the visit of U.S. Commissioners to Japan in 1908 and to their conferences with Japanese officials. Other relevant records in Record Group 43 are those concerning the Sino-Japanese Dispute, 1930-32 (documents gathered by Gen. Frank McCoy, U.S. representative on the Lytton Commission), those of the U.S. Element, Allied Council for Japan, 1946-52, and those of the Far Eastern Commission, 1945-51.

In Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Record Group 84, are records originally kept at U.S. diplomatic and consular posts. Among these are records of the U.S. Legation (later Embassy) in China, 1843-1945, and of the U.S. Legation (later Embassy) in Japan, 1855-1936, as well as those of various consular posts in those countries.

The records reproduced in this microfilm publication were prepared for filming by Ralph E. Huss, who also wrote these introductory remarks.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

GREEN

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Dated November 28, 1931

FROM Rec'd 10:10 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington


239, November 28, 8 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

I have delivered your message in 245. Baron

Shidehara states that there has been no change in the plan or intention of his government in regard to movement against Chinchow; the evacuation of Tsitsihar is progressing steadily and is a matter of days; that in the region of the Liang river there have been movements against bands of bandits, as indicated in last paragraph of my telegram and they have been dispelled, and troops now withdrawing towards Mukden, but may have to operate again if at any time further bands of Chinese bandits advance.. He informs me that troops had not advanced to Kowpangtze and statements to that effect are unwarranted.

Very confidential. Baron Shidehara informs me that he





MET

2-#239, Tokyo, November 28,  
1931

that he has been placed in a most embarrassing, and as he terms it, untenable position by statements appearing in the press purporting to be given out by you to the effect:

First, that he was giving out the fact of agreement between the Chief of Staff and the Minister of War which he requested should be confidential when he gave it to me.

Secondly, that movements of troops have been in contravention to his representations, which he denies.

And thirdly, that he has expressed a regret for the action of the Japanese troops in Manchuria. The allegation that you have given out these statements which appear in an Associated Press despatch has resulted, so Baron Shidehara informs me, in his <sup>now</sup> being subjected to most acrimonious and bitter attacks from his army. He has, through the French Ambassador, been conducting negotiations with Briand which has resulted in an accord being reached between the Chinese and Japanese in principle in regard to further movements in the vicinity of Chinchow, the Chinese agreeing to



MET

3-#239, Tokyo, November 28,  
1921.

agreeing to withdraw troops to a certain line and the Japanese also withdrawing, the administration of the region between being left in Chinese civil hands under the protection of Chinese police. The ~~the~~ *effect* limits of this region is now under discussion and conversations are being held to determine that and perhaps other details. Baron Shidehara says that the object which he and you desire was in a fair way apparently of accomplishment but that he greatly fears these press reports from Washington may jeopardize the success of the whole agreement by encouraging the Chinese to propose or make unreasonable demands. May I express the hope that you can issue a statement to the press that you have assurances that there has been no misrepresentation to you and that the representations are being carried out. I am personally convinced that Baron Shidehara has been acting in entire good faith, and he wishes me to express his confident belief that you have only friendly feeling towards him and that both he and you are ardently desirous of accomplishing the same object, namely, the ~~main~~ maintenance of peace. I am appending text of the message purporting to be given out by you in Washington which is causing

so



MET

4-#239, Tokyo, November 28,  
1931.

so much excitement here and making Baron Shidehara's position difficult.

"This is not the first time America has had reason to watch with suspicion the actions of the Japanese army since the incident of September 18th. From the very outset the Tokyo Government asserted that Japan has no aggressive designs and desires only to protect the rights and interests of Japan, and yet city after city has been attacked by the Japanese army. Some of them are actually several hundred miles away from the South Manchurian Railway. Each time an attack has been made the Japanese Government has expressed regret and stated that it would not be repeated. The American Government at first had simply an impression that a portion of the army, which was not under the complete control of the Government, went too far in its action. The note received only three days ago was a definite promise by both civil and military authorities; therefore the American Government believed till today that everything would proceed peacefully; on November 23rd, when Stimson received news of the danger of Japan attacking Chinchow,

he



MET

5-#239, Tokyo, November 28,  
1931.

he notified the Japanese Government that his patience had reached an end. He warned the Japanese Government that an attack on Chinchow would destroy entirely the peaceful negotiations now going on in Paris. Baron Shidehara replied that Japan has no intention of attacking in the direction of Chinchow and that he had so informed the Japanese military commanders in Manchuria".

The Foreign Office has given to the press a "vigorous written statement" in regard to this alleged statement, speaks of Stimson's precipitate action disclosing confidential exchanges and speaks of his flying into fulminations, losing his head in critical moments, states he is misinformed in manner and in matter. In regard to the Japanese army running amuck, asks if he considered the meaning of his words before using them, and other bitter comments.

FORBES

CSB



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect  
Charge Department

Charge to  
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

November 28, 1931.

NOV 28 31

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

AMEMBASSY

TOKYO (JAPAN)

Your 239, November 28, 8 p.m.

The statement quoted therein as having been given out by me is untrue in every particular. No such attitude by me towards the Japanese Government has ever been expressed either in public or private. On the contrary, as Ambassador Debuchi well knows I have used every endeavor for the past two months to restrain any expressions by the American press which might be embarrassing to a peaceful solution of the Manchurian controversy. I have already publicly denied the story as reported from Tokyo and have given you in my 247<sup>2963a</sup> of November 28, noon, the only words used in the press conference on the subject. They were made in answer to reports of a general movement on Chinchow by General Honjo's army and expressed my reasons for not crediting those reports. I am glad now to have Baron Shidehara's confirmation that they are not true.

S:HLS:VGN

STIMSON.

Enciphered by 2

Sent by operator M., 1931

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

793.94/2941



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY

Embassy  
Tokyo

~~Confidential for the Ambassador~~

Your 239 November 28 8 P.M.

The ~~message~~ <sup>statement</sup> quoted therein as having been given out by me is untrue in every particular. No such attitude by me towards the Japanese government has ever been expressed either in public or private. On the contrary, as Ambassador Dabuchi well knows I have used every endeavor for the past two months to restrain any expressions by the American press which might be embarrassing to a peaceful solution of the Manchurian controversy.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

I have already publicly denied the story as reported from Tokyo and have given you in my 247 of Nov. 28, noon the ~~actual~~ <sup>only</sup> words used in the press conference on the subject. They were made in answer to reports of a general movement on Chinchow by General Hanyu's army and expressed by my reasons for not crediting those reports.

I am glad now to have Baron Shidehara's confirmation that they are not true.

Stimson



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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




PM RECD

EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Berlin, November 19, 1931.

No.

NOV 28 31



F/DEW

793.94/2942

793.94

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that the Sino-Japanese conflict in Manchuria and the efforts made by other powers to bring it to a peaceable termination are being followed with great interest in Germany. With the exception of the Nationalist press which may be counted on for envious admiration of any manifestation of forceful national activity, the German press sympathizes on the whole with China from a feeling of kindred weakness. It is generally agreed that the Council of the League of Nations is confronted with a very difficult task in its attempt to terminate the conflict, which is regarded as a war in all but name, as the powers are expected to be averse to the

application

JAN 14 1932

FILED



-2-

application of coercive measures partly owing to the desire not to establish a precedent and partly from inability to risk them during the present economic crisis. Unless some solution is found, however, the prestige of the League is expected to suffer. Several papers have pointed out America's interest in allaying the conflict but do not expect active steps from the United States.

The semi-official DEUTSCHE DIPLOMATISCH-POLITISCHE KORRESPONDENZ (November 7) stressed the difficulties which would confront the special session of the Council of the League of Nations at Paris when it assembled there on November 16th, but felt justified in assuming that in the end the powers involved would be reasonable enough to avoid anything which would aggravate a conflict which was already causing anxiety all over the world. The KORRESPONDENZ was gratified at the Soviet assurances of non-intervention.

The independent Nationalist BERLINER BOERSEN ZEITUNG (November 12) seized the opportunity to contrast the attitude of France towards Germany, which it characterized as the outcome of a policy of violence, with that of Japan towards Manchuria, which it believed was a product of national necessity as the natural resources of Japan were insufficient for her growing population. Manchuria offered Japan coal, iron-ore, oil, and lumber, all of which she direly needed and could obtain nowhere else so conveniently. While this paper

believed



-3-

believed that Japan was a strong enough military power to cope with China and, if need be, with the Soviets as well, it pointed out that a Chinese boycott of Japanese goods would be ruinous for Japanese economic life. The BOERSEN ZEITUNG also called attention to rumors of some sort of a Polish-Japanese agreement against Russia, their common enemy.

"The various actions of the League Council", said the democratic DER DEUTSCHE VOLKSWIRT (November 13) "have merely had the 'success' that, despite overt acts of war and bloodshed, the situation has not as yet come to a formal state of war which would have resulted in the recall of the diplomatic and consular representatives." This weekly concluded that the League Council would find itself vis-a-vis an extremely difficult task as China might possibly appeal to Article 15 of the Covenant of the League which provided for certain coercive measures which none of the powers, however, would be willing to adopt.

The democratic FRANKFURTER ZEITUNG (November 8) regarded the advance to the Nonni River as "the worst manifestation of Japanese militarism". Japan's activity in Manchuria was a derision of the Council of the League of Nations which would have to arouse itself to decisive action. What had developed in Manchuria was really war and the only reason it was not yet termed such was that both parties avoided this appellation. The Covenant of the League clearly prescribed what was to be done in case of war, in case of the attack of one member of the

League



-4-

League by another. "Is the League man enough to call the Japanese Government to order in accordance with the Covenant, in view of the fact that it is a question of attacks of a most flagrant nature on Japan's part?" This paper then went on to express the fear that such would not be the case, despite the fact that the situation was favorable for lining up the United States and the Soviets with the League, because some of the powers might fear that such action against a major power would establish a precedent which might prove a hindrance when they later attempted to enforce their own interests vis-à-vis dependent countries. It was further stated that this was a question of principle in which Germany was greatly interested in view of her menaced position in Europe, and that, therefore, she should be represented at the Paris session of the Council by a person of authority.

On November 13th, this paper added that unless the weaker, disarmed party in the Manchurian conflict could be protected against the stronger, all hopes of early disarmament would have to be abandoned. America, more than any other country, was interested in seeing to it that no violence was done China in Manchuria and that Japan did not turn the Manchurian provinces into a sort of Japanese colony. America's policy in the East had always been directed towards the maintenance of the open door.

According to the Social Democratic VORWAERTS, the moment when the powers were hampered by the economic crisis had been advisedly seized upon by Japan for her imperialistic advance in Manchuria, after waiting ever


since



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since 1921 when she had been compelled by English and American pressure to desist from military occupation of Manchuria and Eastern Siberia. Armed intervention, which at another time would have been seriously considered by America, was precluded for some time to come by the state of American finances, and the same applied to the powers in the League who, according to the text of the Covenant were obligated to protect China with all means, including military means. Presumably economic measures would suffice to bring Japan to terms, but these also could not be applied for the time being, for, in view of unemployment, trade with Japan could not be foregone.

Respectfully yours,



Frederic M. Sackett.


Copies to E.I.C., Paris  
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101

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



*Handled over to  
the Chinese charge*

*XI-23-31*

*MS  
EE  
OK  
944  
file*

TELEGRAM FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AT NANKING  
DATED November 23, 1931.

RECEIVED

NOV 23 1931

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

Chinese Consul at Seoul reports that on the 21st

3,000 Japanese troops and on the 22nd 1,000 Japanese troops  
and aviation corps passed Seoul toward Mukden.

F/DEW

793.94/2943

Chinese Legation,

Washington, November 23, 1931.



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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NOV 23 1931

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

RESOLUTION OF THE FOURTH KUOMINTANG CONGRESS, Nov. 21, 1931

NOV 27 1931

Department of State

Whereas since the military occupation of the various places in the North-Eastern Provinces by Japan, the League of Nations twice adopted resolutions calling for the complete withdrawal of Japanese troops within a stipulated period and under the observation of neutral representatives;

Whereas while China has fulfilled every obligation laid down in these resolutions, Japan not only defied world opinion, but even carried further her policy of military aggression, with the result that Chinese troops in Heilungkiang had to resort to measures of self-defense causing the situation more and more critical;

Whereas just at a time when the Council of the League was in full session, Japanese troops forcibly occupied Tsitsihar, Capital of the Heilungkiang Province, thus again widening the area of the Japanese invasion;

Whereas the recognized authority for the safeguarding of justice is in danger of yielding to sheer force, while all the agreements designed for the preservation of peace among civilized nations seem destined to complete failure;

In the interests of our national preservation and for the maintenance of international justice and peace, the representatives of the Kuomintang in Congress assembled do therefore solemnly resolve:

1. That

F/DEW

793.94/2944

Handed to S. K. H.  
by the Chinese  
Charge XI-23-31



- 2 -

1. That the act of self-defense on the part of General Ma Chan-Shan, Chairman of the Heilungkiang Province, against the unlawful advance of Japanese troops is an act not only for the defending of Chinese territory in face of foreign aggression, but also upholding international justice and peace and perpetuating at a sacrifice the Covenant of the League, the Anti-War Pact, the Nine Power Treaty and all the other international agreements and this Congress calls the serious attention of all the members of the League and the signatories of the Anti-War Pact and the Nine Power Treaty to the sacred obligations they have assumed under these instruments;

2. That the National Government, in carrying out all its policies, domestic as well as foreign, and all the measures of expediency in respect to the forcible occupation of the North-Eastern Provinces by Japan, has faithfully performed its duty to the Chinese nation and is fully empowered, in all matters pertaining to the protection of the country and the safe-guarding of its territorial integrity, to adopt whatever necessary measures for lawful defense, while this Congress pledges at whatever sacrifice its full support to the National Government.

Chinese Legation,

Washington, November 23, 1931.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 24, 1931. *noted HKS*

Mr. Secretary:

The formula which we have commonly used, and which has been generally accepted, with reference to our Open Door Policy and the integrity of China includes both "the territorial and administrative integrity of China". The Nine-Powers Treaty reads:

"(1) To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China;"

You may have noted that since the present troubles in Manchuria began in September last, the Japanese Government in their communications to ourselves and to the League appear to have confined their statements to the "territorial integrity" and to have omitted any reference to the "administrative integrity" of China.

In view of the developments in Manchuria and the opposition which the Japanese have openly shown to the administration of Marshall Chang, should this omission of any reference to "administrative integrity" be considered as accident or as design?

SICK

RSM  
FE:SKH/ZMF

F/DEW

793.94/2945

*Handwritten notes:*  
FLE  
JCR  
JCR



1017

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138  
TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

Washington,  
November 27, 1931.

793.94  
AMEMBASSY,

NOV 27 31

PARIS (France).

FOR AMBASSADOR DAWES.

CONFIDENTIAL.

One. I have informed the press of the promises which were given by the Japanese Foreign Office, Minister of War and Chief of Staff, of which you have been informed in my 590, November 24, midnight, paragraph one.

Two. I have sent to the American Ambassador at Tokyo, today, a telegram which reads as follows:

QUOTE (Telegraph room: Send text of 245/ November 27, 2 p. m., as marked on attached copy). UNQUOTE.

793.94/2945A

FE:SKH:REK

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 L-138



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138  
TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

Washington,

November 27, 1931.

NOV 27 31

AMERICAN CONSUL,

NANKING (China).

FOR THE MINISTER.

I have sent to the American Ambassador at Tokyo,  
today, a telegram which reads as follows:

QUOTE (Telegraph room: Send text of 245, November  
27, 2 p. m., as marked on attached copy). UNQUOTE

I have informed the press regarding the promises  
made by the Japanese Foreign Office, Minister of War  
and Chief of Staff, of which you were informed in my  
121, November 25, 5 p. m. to Nanking, and Tokyo's  
telegrams therein referred to.

~~You may in your discretion inform Dr. Koo orally  
that I am making representations to the Japanese Govern-  
ment in the sense indicated.~~

FE:SKH:REK

FE

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-138

793.94/2945B



1 1015

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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Charge to  
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TELEGRAM SENT

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

November 23, 1931.

743  
AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO, (JAPAN).

240  
CONFIDENTIAL FOR FORBES FROM STIMSON.

Ambassador Debuchi has reported to me that at the meeting of the Council of the League of Nations in Paris, Japan proposed the appointment of a neutral commission to investigate all matters which were in controversy between China and Japan and to report the results of this investigation to the League. I have since received from Paris the draft of a proposal now pending before the Council which is evidently based upon the Japanese proposal mentioned by Debuchi. For your confidential information, <sup>as this may not have been shown to you before</sup> I am sending a separate cable to you quoting this resolution.

In the proposal now before the League there is contained a provision calling upon China and Japan to give the strictest orders to the commanders of their respective forces to refrain from any initiative which may lead to further fighting and loss of life and to take all measures necessary to avoid any

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19

Under Reg. No. 20.

793.94/2945C



1 1020

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR

Charge to  
\$

## TELEGRAM SENT

### Department of State

1-138  
TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

Washington,

- 2 -

any further aggravation of the situation. Please call  
upon Baron Shidehara and express to him my very strong  
feeling that while the Japanese proposal for such an  
impartial investigation is, in my opinion, a ~~very~~ long  
step forward in the pending negotiations, it would  
nevertheless be quite futile for accomplishing the  
beneficent purpose intended and winning the support of  
the opinion of the world unless it contained at least  
some such provision for the cessation of hostilities  
during the investigation proposed. Please convey to him  
further that I have read with great apprehension  
reports in the press giving the impression that the  
Japanese military command is planning a military  
expedition against the forces of the Chinese Government  
near Chinchow and <sup>that</sup> I sincerely trust that there is  
no foundation for this report. If such an expedition  
were effected it would, in my opinion, render quite  
~~impossible any useful work on the part of the Commission as~~  
~~futile any further negotiations such as those so~~  
wisely suggested by the Japanese Government.

S HLS:HHR

*Stimson*  
STIMSON.

*W.K.*

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Washington, Naval Radio

November 23, 1931.

793.94  
AMLEGATION,

NOV 23 31

PEIPING (China).

431  
On November 20, at Paris, Ambassador Dawes made a statement to the press as follows: QUOTE I have been directed to come to Paris for the purpose of discussing with the representatives of the different nations assembled here the crisis which is taking place in Manchuria. As a signatory of the Pact of Paris and of the so-called Nine-Power Treaty, the United States is deeply interested, with its fellow signatories, in seeing that the lofty purpose of those treaties is fulfilled. It has been the hope of my government that a settlement in accordance with the principles of those treaties would be arrived at through discussion and conciliation during the conferences in Paris and that the presence here of a representative of the United States would contribute to bring about a solution through this method. The United States is of course not a member of the League of Nations, and it therefore cannot take part in the discussions bearing upon the application of the machinery of the League Covenant. Since in the present crisis it may be possible that such discussions may arise, it is obvious that my presence at the meetings of the

793.94/2945D

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Council

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19 \_\_\_\_\_



1022

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
PREPARING OFFICE  
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Department of State

Washington,

- 2 -

Council would not only be inappropriate but might even, embarrass the efforts of the Council itself. But the position thus necessarily assumed by the United States in no way indicates that the United States is not wholly sympathetic with the efforts being made by the League to support the objective of peace in Manchuria. The United States must, however, preserve its full freedom of judgment as to its course UNQUOTE.

Repeat to Nanking and to Tokyo.

*Stinson*  
*SKH*

FE:MMH:REK  
*mmh*

*mmh*  
FE

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1950 1-138



102

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

NOVEMBER 20, 1931

China

Ambassador Dawes reported from Paris that he made the following statement to the press at 12:00 noon, Paris time:

"I have been directed to come to Paris for the purpose of discussing with the representatives of the different nations assembled here the crisis which is taking place in Manchuria. As a signatory of the Pact of Paris and of the so-called Nine-Power Treaty, the United States is deeply interested, with its fellow signatories, in seeing that the lofty purpose of those treaties is fulfilled. It has been the hope of my government that a settlement in accordance with the principles of those treaties would be arrived at through discussion and conciliation during the conferences in Paris and that the presence here of a representative of the United States would contribute to bring about a solution through this method. The United States is of course not a member of the League of Nations, and it therefore cannot take part in the discussions bearing upon the application of the machinery of the League Covenant. Since in the present crisis it may be possible that such discussions may arise, it is obvious that my presence at the meetings of the Council would not only be inappropriate but might even embarrass the efforts of the Council itself. But the position thus necessarily assumed by the United States in no way indicates that the United States is not wholly sympathetic with the efforts being made by the League to support the objective of peace in Manchuria. The United States must, however, preserve its full freedom of judgment as to its course."

\*\*\*\*\*



1024

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
PREPARING OFFICE  
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TELEGRAM SENT

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TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

November 27, 1931.

NOV 27 31

793.94  
AMEMBASSY,

PARIS (France).

FOR AMBASSADOR DAWES.

CONFIDENTIAL.

I have sent to the American Minister at Nanking,  
today, a telegram as follows:

QUOTE (Telegraph Room: Send text of 123, November 27,  
1 p. m., as marked on attached copy). UNQUOTE.

~~I have informed the press of the promises which were  
given by the Japanese Foreign Office, Minister of War and  
Chief of Staff, of which you have been informed in my  
590, November 24, midnight, paragraph one.~~

793.94/2945E

Stinson

OKH

FE:SKH:REK

FE

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138



1 1025

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

L 128  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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OR

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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE ✓  
PLAIN

743.94

NOV 23 1931

November 23, 1931.

American Consul,

Nanking (China)

118 Following is text of Council Resolution as  
transmitted from Paris.

Confidential for Johnson and not for trans-  
mission to the Chinese Government.

QUOTE. One. The Council recalls and ~~(it) a sharp~~ reaffirms  
the resolution passed unanimously by it on September 30  
by which the two parties declare that they are solemnly  
bound. It, therefore, calls upon the Chinese and Japanese  
Governments to take all steps necessary to assure its execu-  
tion so that the withdrawal of the Japanese troops within  
the railway zone - a point to which the Council attaches  
the utmost importance - may be effected as speedily as  
possible.

Two. Considering that events in Manchuria have  
assumed an even more serious aspect since the Council  
meeting of October 24 calls upon the two governments.

(a) - To give the strictest orders to the commanders  
of their

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

Index Bu.-No. 50.

Index Bu.-No. 50.

1-128

1-128

793.94/2945F



1 0 0 2 6

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and -5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lutz NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
PREPARING OFFICE  
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## TELEGRAM SENT

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

## Department of State

Washington,

American Consul Nanking, page 2.

of their respective forces to refrain from any initiative which may lead to further fighting and loss of life.

(b) - To take all measures necessary to avoid any further aggravation of the situation.

Three. Invites the two parties to continue to keep the Council informed as to the development of the situation.

Four. Invites the other members of the Council to furnish the Council with information received from their representatives on the spot.

Five. Desiring on the other hand in view of the special circumstances of the case to contribute towards a definitive and fundamental solution of the questions at issue between the two governments,

Decides to appoint a commission of three members to study on the spot and to report to the Council on any circumstances which, affecting international relations, threaten to disturb peace between China and Japan or the good understanding between them upon which peace depends.

The

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19 \_\_\_\_\_

Index Bu.—No. 60.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1955 1-138



1 0027

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1 138  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
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Collect  
Charge Department  
OR  
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Department of State

Washington,

American Consul, Nanking, page 3

The Governments of China and of Japan will each have the right to nominate one assessor to the commission. It is understood that, should the two parties initiate any negotiations, these will not fall within the terms of reference of the Commission, nor will the Commission supervise the movements of the military forces of either party.

N. B. The President after the adoption of the resolution will state

(a) That each of the two governments will have the right to indicate to the chairman of the commission any question, the examination of which it particularly desires

(b) That the commission may, should it so desire, furnish the Council with interim reports. UNQUOTE.

*S. J. ...*

U WRC/AB

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1969 1-138



1 1028  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

1 128  
PREPARING OFFICE  
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NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE ☒  
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Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
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Department of State

Washington,

743 94  
November 23, 1931.  
NOV 23 1931  
6 PM

AmEmbassy,

Tokyo.

239

Confidential for the Ambassador and not  
for transmission to the Japanese Government.

Following is text of Council Resolution as  
transmitted from Paris:

QUOTE. One. The Council recalls and ~~(2) a sharp~~ *reaffirms*  
the resolution passed unanimously by it on September 30  
by which the two parties declare that they are solemnly  
bound. It, therefore, calls upon the Chinese and Japanese  
Governments to take all steps necessary to assure its  
execution so that the withdrawal of the Japanese troops  
within the railway zone - a point to which the Council  
attaches the utmost importance - may be effected as  
speedily as possible.

Two. Considering that events in Manchuria have  
assumed an even more serious aspect since the Council  
meeting of October 24 calls upon the two governments.

Enciphered by .....

(a) To give

Sent by operator ..... M., ....., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

6. NOTIFICATION PRINTING OFFICE: 1936 1-128

793.94/29450



1 1029

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
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Collect  
Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
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Department of State

Washington,

AmEmbassy, Tokyo, page 2.

(a) To give the strictest orders to the commanders of their respective forces to refrain from any initiative which may lead to further fighting and loss of life.

(b) To take all measures necessary to avoid any further aggravation of the situation.

Three. Invites the two parties to continue to keep the Council informed as to the development of the situation.

Four. Invites the other members of the Council to furnish the Council with information received from their representatives on the spot.

Five. Desiring on the other hand, in view of the special circumstances of the case, to contribute towards a definitive and fundamental solution of the questions at issue between the two governments.

Decides to appoint a commission of three members to study on the spot and to report to the Council on any circumstances which, affecting international relations, threaten to disturb peace between China and Japan or the good understanding between them upon which peace depends.

The Governments of China and of Japan will each

Enciphered by .....

have

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....



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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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## TELEGRAM SENT

1-128

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

## Department of State

Washington,

AmEmbassy, Tokyo, page 3.

have the right to nominate one assessor to the commission.  
It is understood that, should the two parties initiate  
any negotiations, these will not fall within the terms of  
reference of the Commission, nor will the Commission super-  
vise the movements of the military forces of either party.

N. B. The President after the adoption of the  
resolution will state

(a) That each of the two governments will have the  
right to indicate to the chairman of the commission any  
question, the examination of which it particularly desires

(b) That the commission may, should it so desire,  
furnish the Council with interim reports. UNQUOTE.

*Stanton*

*h/r*

U WRC/AB

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 60.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1966

1-128



1031

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*No Circulating*  
*Off*  
*Ans*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE SECRETARY

November 28, 1931.



MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON  
DIVISION OF THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR, MR. KATSUJI DEBUCHI.

The Manchurian situation.

The Japanese Ambassador said he had come down to give me some fragments of hopeful news. In the first place he told me that the evacuation of Tsitsihar was practically completed; that it had taken a long time, owing to some 300 frost-bitten troops who had to be looked after carefully; and that now there were left there only two companies.

The Ambassador then told me that he wanted to reassure me about the movement on Chinchow; that he had every reason to believe that that had been stopped and that the troops which had been advancing towards Chinchow had in some measure returned. I pressed him on this point as to the date of his reports and he asserted his latest report, that he told me confidentially was from their Military Attaché, was later than my last report which was dated November 27, at 7:00 p.m.

The Ambassador went on to ask me whether I had heard about the suggestion for evacuation made by the Chinese Minister, Wellington Koo, and produced two papers

FILED

F/HS

793.94/2945-1/2



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 2 -

papers, one being a suggestion made by Koo, and the other the reply of the Japanese Government, which are annexed hereto as "A" and "B" respectively. He said he thought this was of great importance.

I then brought up the report through Tokyo about the statement made by the Foreign Office based on a report of what I said yesterday. The Ambassador said he had heard it but that he attached very little importance to it. I showed him the copy of the alleged statement made by me which I had just received from Forbes, attached to his message No. 239, of November 28, 8:00 p.m. I asked the Ambassador to read it and asked him whether he believed I had ever said anything like that. He said no, of course not. I then told him that I had denied it and showed him the copy of the telegram of November 28th which I had sent to Tokyo giving what I had actually said, and let him read that. He said that the matter was of little importance in his opinion, except that he was very sorry that the spokesman of the Foreign Office had apparently lost his head and made an attack on me. I told him that I had not supposed the original despatch to me was confidential because it had not said in the body of the message that the remarks made by Shidehara to Forbes were confidential,



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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 3 -

confidential, and had only contained the message at  
the top. He told me not to worry about that; that he  
would straighten it out.

HLS.

S HLS:HHR



A.

SUGGESTION MADE BY THE CHINESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN  
AFFAIRS TO THE REPRESENTATIVES OF GREAT BRITAIN,  
THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE AT NANKING  
ON NOVEMBER 24, 1931.

---

Pour eviter tout acte d'hostilite, et si le Japon  
insiste sur la necessite du retrait des troupes Chinoises  
de la region de Kinchow jusqu'a Shanhaikouan, la chine est  
prete a acceder a ce desir. Et ainsi entendu qu'il ne sagira  
que d'une mesure temporaire en attendant le reglement gen-  
eral de la question de Mandchouriea intervenir, et sous les  
conditions suivantes:

Le Japon garantirait a la France, l'Angleterre et l'  
Etats Unis que ses troupes ne penetrerait pas dans cette  
zone ou l'administration Chinoise continuerait de fon-  
ctionner, police comprise.



1035

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

B.

REPLY OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT HANDED TO THE  
FRENCH AMBASSADOR AT TOKYO ON NOVEMBER 27, 1931.

---

The Japanese Government share with the French Government the earnest hope that hostilities between the Japanese and Chinese forces may be averted in the region of Chinchow. Accordingly, should China withdraw her troops entirely from Chinchow and the neighborhood to Shanhai-Kwan and places west thereof, and maintain only the administration (including the police) of the district from Chinchow to Shanhai-Kwan, the Japanese Government are ready to undertake in principle that the Japanese troops will not penetrate into the zone thus evacuated by the Chinese troops, unless in the unlooked-for event of some serious emergency arising to jeopardize the security of the lives and property of Japanese subjects in north China and the safety of the Japanese garrisons stationed there. The Japanese Government are prepared to cause the competent Japanese authorities at any time to discuss locally with the Chinese authorities of the district the exact definition of the line above referred to, and the details relating to the execution of this arrangement.



1036

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GW

FROM


GRAY

Hankow via N.R.

Dated Nov. 29, 1931

Rec'd. 5:03 a.m.

Secretary of State  
Washington.



F/DEW

793.94/2946

119, November 29, noon.

An American missionary at Kiukiang has received a letter dated November 28th, from the Japanese Consulate at Kiukiang, reading as follows:

"As I am desirous of knowing the number of missionaries belonging to your mission in this Province, I shall be very much obliged if you will kindly let me know the following at your earliest convenience:

(1). Names of places where missionaries belonging to your mission are staying in this Province.

(2). The number of missionaries (their families included and male, female separated) belonging to your mission and their houses at each place."

Repeated to Legation and Hanking.

ADAMS

HPD

DEC 5 1931


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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY



Mr. Secretary:

Mr. Charles P. Sherrill asked that the following message be given you:

"I have telephoned to the Chamber of Commerce in New York and they will telegraph the Secretary the text of the cablegram of the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce. I suggest that the only action to be taken at the monthly meeting of the Chamber next Thursday will be to present a Resolution heartily commending the State Department's efforts to preserve Peace."

Mr. Sherrill is stopping at the Shoreham Hotel and will be here until next Wednesday. If you wish anything more done please let him know.

*[Handwritten signature]*

793.94/2946-1/2

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FILED

1933

*[Handwritten mark]*



1038

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HS CORRECTED COPY ✓

GRAY

FROM

Tientsin via N.R.

Dated November 29, 1931

Rec'd 4 a.m.

COPIES SENT TO  
UNCLASSIFIED  
mf

Secretary of State

Washington, D.C.

November 29, noon.

The following to the Legation, Nanking:

"Intermittent rifle shots were heard at about 12:30 last night and at 4:30 and 5 this morning followed by 7 or 8 shots from trench mortars. Responsibility for firing not determined but Chinese claim that they fired no shots and that their police were attacked by about 20 long-gowned men under cover of machine gun and trench mortar fire and that the attackers were repulsed by fear of having hand grenades thrown at them by the police. Armed police will probably withdraw to a considerable distance, possibly as far as Hopei, today under agreement being arranged with the Japanese. Japanese state that they are expecting further reinforcements from Japan."

GV

LOCKHART

DEC 21 1931

FD 793.94/2947

793-94/2947

FF

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
NOV 30 1931  
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H



1030  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CJH

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

TIENTSIN via N. R.

Dated November 29, 1931  
FROM

Rec'd. 4 a.m.

COPIED  
O.H. L. AIR



Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.

November 29, noon.

The following to the Legation, Nanking:

"Intermittent rifle shots were heard at about 12:30 last night and at 4:30 and 5 this morning followed by 7 or 8 shots from trench mortars. Responsibility for firing not determined but Chinese claim that they fired no shots and that their police were attacked by about 20 long-gowned men under cover of machine gun and trench mortar fire and that the attackers were repulsed by fear of having hand grenades thrown at them by the police. Armed police will probably withdraw to a considerable distance, possibly as far as Hopei, today under agreement being arranged with the Japanese. Japanese state that they are expecting further reinforcements from Japan".

LOCKHART

GW

F/DEW

793.94/2947



104  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E)-and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CJH

GRAY

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Dated November 29, 1931

Rec'd. 9:25 a.m.  
FROM

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

1022, November 29, 5 p.m.

Following from Mukden

"November 29, 1 p.m.

Reliably informed that Japanese Military trains  
despatched over Peking-Mukden Railway have returned".

Repeated to Minister at Nanking.

PERKINS

HFD

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.L. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
NOV 30 1931  
Department of State

F/DEW

793.94/2948

793.94  
note  
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REC'D  
NOV 30 1931  
FILED



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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\$

AM 2500  
TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-128  
TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

Washington,

November 30, 1931.

793-94/2948  
AMEMBASSY,

NOV 30 31

PARIS (France).

607 FOR AMBASSADOR DAWES.

Telegram from <sup>Mukden Consulate General</sup> ~~Peking Legation~~, November 29, states

QUOTE Reliably informed that Japanese Military trains  
despatched over Peking-Mukden Railway have returned UNQUOTE.

Referring to your 817/1949 November 29, 2 p. m., I am  
giving instruction in the sense of last paragraph.

793-94/2948

Simon  
676

OR  
NOV 30 1931.

FE:SKH:REK

FE

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19 \_\_\_\_\_

Index Bu.—No. 80.

NOV 30 31



AM 2500



1 1042

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec: 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM  
CORRECTED COPY

PARIS

Dated November 29, 1931

Rec'd 12:20 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

DOUBLE PRIORITY.

817, November 29, 2 p. m.

FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES.

Sze called this morning, still discussing on every occasion a time limit in the Chinese counter-proposal. The argument I used with him with, I think, some effect, was that if he can obtain proper confirmation of today's press reports that the Japanese Army is removing to the east of the Liao River he should immediately abandon any further pressure for a time limit clause and make an announcement at once that the Chinese accept the League plan of settlement. By acting thus quickly, giving as his reason the actual movement and commenced withdrawal the Japanese troops he can, with the Chinese people, relegate the academic time limit issue and save the prestige of the Chinese Government at home.

Such

793.94/2949

DEC 3 1931

RECEIVED



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2- #817, from Paris, Nov.29, 2 p. m.

Such action on his part would unquestionably stimulate Japanese acquiescence in the League Plan. Chinese acquiescence in the League Resolution, based on the actual commencement of Japanese troops withdrawals, would make an unfavorable change in the Japanese attitude much more unlikely, in view of the fact that the troop withdrawals thus far made more firmly commit her in world opinion to her announced program of troop withdrawal. Such action would also stimulate Japan to a more receptive attitude toward certain details of the League Resolution which are still under discussion between the Council and the Japanese and lead to a speedier agreement all round.

— Sze seemed to accept these views but wishes to have confirmation of the reported withdrawal portions of the Japanese army to east of the Liao River before acting. He says that if the neutral observers now in Chinchow would confirm this news it would be of great assistance to him. I think that a public announcement by these observers, if it could be made in accordance with the facts, might result in immediate Chinese acquiescence. Would it not be well for you to make some suggestions to our American observer in this connection? A joint or even a several announcement by observers as to the actual



104  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lutz NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

3- #817, from Paris, Nov. 29, 2 p.m.

the actual progress of troop withdrawals could not but  
be welcomed by both Japan and China.

SHAW

GW



1045

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

WHB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This message must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to any one.

PARIS  
Dated November 29, 1931  
FROM

Rec'd 12:20 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.


DOUBLE PRIORITY.

817, November 29, 2 p.m.

FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES.

793.94  
Sze called this morning, still discussing on every occasion a time limit in the Chinese counter-proposal. The argument I used with him with, I think, some effect, was that if he can obtain proper confirmation of today's press reports that the Japanese Army is removing to the east of the Liao River he should immediately abandon any further pressure for a time limit clause and make an announcement at once that the Chinese accept the League plan of settlement. By acting thus quickly, giving as his reason the actual movement and commenced withdrawal the Japanese troops he can, with the Chinese people, relegate the academic time limit issue and save the prestige of the Chinese Government at home.

Such action on his part would unquestionably stimulate Japanese acquiescence in the League Plan. Chinese acquiescence in the League Resolution, based on the actual commencement of Japanese troops withdrawals, would make an



F/DEW

793.94/2949

DEC 10 1931

FILED



-2-

unfavorable change in the Japanese attitude much more unlikely, in view of the fact that the troop withdrawals thus far made more firmly commit her in world opinion to her announced program of troop withdrawal. Such action would also stimulate Japan to a more receptive attitude toward certain details of the League Resolution by the Japanese and effect a speedier agreement all round.

Sze seemed to accept these views but wishes to have confirmation of the reported withdrawal portions of the Japanese army to east of the Liao River before acting. He says that if the neutral observers now in Chinchow would confirm this news it would be of great assistance to him. I think that a public announcement by these observers, if it could be made in accordance with the facts, might result in immediate Chinese acquiescence. Would it not be well for you to make some suggestions to our American observer in this connection ?. A joint or even a several announcement by observers as to the actual progress <sup>of</sup> troop withdrawals could not but be welcomed by both Japan and China.

SHAW

GW



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department

OR

Charge to

\$

## TELEGRAM SENT

1-128

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

## Department of State

Washington,

November 30, 1931.

713-94/2949  
AMLEGATION,

PEIPING (China).

CONFIDENTIAL AND URGENT.

One. Following from Dawes, Paris, November 29, QUOTE S:  
~~seemed to accept these views but~~ wishes to have confirmation  
of the reported withdrawal portions of the Japanese army to  
east of the Liao River ~~before acting~~. He says that if the  
neutral observers now in Chinchow would confirm this news it  
would be of great assistance to him. I think that a public  
announcement by these observers, if it could be made in  
accordance with the facts, might result in immediate Chinese  
acquiescence. Would it not be well for you to make some  
suggestions to our American observer in this connection? A  
joint or even a several announcement by observers as to the  
actual progress of troop withdrawals could not but be welcomed  
by both Japan and China UNQUOTE.

Two. Please, relay above to Margetts, and state that  
Department suggests that Military Attaches collaborate and  
promptly send joint or identical statements if possible to  
their respective Governments QUOTE as to the actual progress  
of troop withdrawals UNQUOTE.

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ....., 19.....

Three.



1048

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

# TELEGRAM SENT

1-138  
TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
\$

## Department of State

Washington,

- 2 -

Three. Inform Nanking of the above and of your  
action.

*Stinson*  
*WY*

NOV 30, 1961.

FE:SKH:REK

FE

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_ 19 \_\_\_\_\_

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1959 1-138



CJH

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be carefully paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

TOKIO

Dated November 29, 1931  
FROM

Rec'd. 5:38 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

240, November 29, noon.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

793 <sup>ad</sup>  
In my interview with Baron Shidehara reported in my No. <sup>2556</sup>234, November 24, 10 p.m., he detailed, with an express request that it be confidential and for my information only, the series of interviews he had held with the General Staff and the Secretary of War leading up to a final sequel in regard to withdrawal from Tsitsihar, and no further advance on Chinchow excepting operations such as were necessary to disperse bandits in threatening positions. At this point I asked him to stop, and said: "May I cable to Washington in the following sense", and then worded what I proposed to send and then ~~sent~~ <sup>under their</sup> as near as I could remember it. To this he assented. Although marking my telegram "confidential" I now blame myself for not having inserted a further indication that Baron Shidehara wanted this part kept from the public the difficulty being that, as the Minister of War ~~AN~~ and I believe also the Chief of Staff report

directly to the



F/DEW

793.94/2950

DEC 3 1931

FILED



105

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



HS

C O R R E C T E D P A G E

Page 2-#240 from Tokio

directly to the Emperor, the Minister for Foreign Affairs is not authorized to speak for them and any public indication that he has aroused antagonism which renders his position most difficult. I have not wired the full text of the vigorous statement given out by the Foreign Office last night as I am sure the press will have done so. I assume Baron Shidehara felt it necessary to do this on account of its effect here and that it would placate his critics. I hope that the Department can make a reply conciliatory in tone which will help his position. In speaking of bandits recently dispersed, Baron Shidehara further informed me that they were in groups exceeding a thousand, which indicated that they must have been financed probably from Chinchow, and sent out to harass the movement of Japanese troops. Smaller groups of bandits can subsist on the country but large groups have to carry their sustenance.

HPD

FORBES

FN.  
1743.94  
295-0



CJH

Page 2 - #240 from Tokio.

directly to the Emperor, the Minister for Foreign Affairs is not authorized to speak for them (?) (?) public indication that he has and causing antagonism which renders his position most difficult. I have not wired the full text of the vigorous statement given out by the Foreign Office last night as I am sure the press will have done so. I assume Baron Shidehara felt it necessary to do this on account of its effect here and that it would placate his critics. I hope that the Department can make a reply conciliatory in tone which will help his position. In speaking of bandits recently dispersed, Baron Shidehara further informed me that they were in groups exceeding a thousand, which indicated that they must have been financed probably from Chinchow, and sent out to harass the movement of Japanese troops. Smaller groups of bandits can subsist on the country but large groups have to carry their sustenance.

FORBES

HFD

*See corrected page*  
*[Signature]*

743:94/295-0



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

## TELEGRAM SENT

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

Collect

Charge Department

OR

Charge to

\$

Department of State

Washington,

November 30, 1931.

AmEmbassy,

Tokyo, Japan.

FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

OF THE AMBASSADOR.

250  
Your 240, November 29. In your  
239, November 28, 8 p. m. you state that, in  
informing you of the agreement between himself,  
the Chief of Staff and the Minister of War,  
Baron Shidehara requested that this should be  
kept confidential. The mere initial preface  
to your cable 234 of November 24, 10 p. m. that  
it was QUOTE Confidential for the Secretary  
UNQUOTE was not regarded as a direction that all  
the facts in the cable must be kept secret. Such  
a direction is an indication that the cable is  
for the personal attention of the Secretary and

does not

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_,

Index Bu.—No. 50.

A. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1930

1-138

Confidential File

793.94/2950



1 1053

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1 128  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-128

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
\$

Department of State

Washington,

AmEmbassy, Tokyo, page 2.

does not carry, under the practice of the Department, the intimation that privacy as to any special facts had been requested by the other government. You are, therefore, correct in feeling that in such a case specific mention of the secrecy of any part of the communication should be made, in order that no misunderstanding shall arise.

The communication to me of the impressive fact that the Japanese Government, as represented by both the civil and military branches, had taken the important step of directing that Chinchow should not be occupied was, under the circumstances, not the kind of information which this Government would naturally expect to have been given or receive in confidence. Accordingly neither I nor my advisers had any idea that the announcement of that step would be embarrassing to Shidehara. On the contrary, the statement which I made was for the purpose of answering and calming the disquieting reports coming through

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....



1 1054

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lutz NARS, Date 12-18-75

1 128  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

1-128

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

AmEmbassy, Tokyo, page 3.

through the press that a general movement by the  
Japanese Army had begun against Chinchow.

As long ago as November 19, immediately after  
the news of the Japanese occupation of Tsitsihar, I  
notified Shidehara, through Debuchi, that the situa-  
tion was rendered so serious by that occupation that  
I must reserve the right to inform the American public  
fully in respect to the efforts which our Government  
was making under the treaties to which we are parties  
to preserve peace in Manchuria and that in this con-  
nection it might become necessary to make public all  
notes, memoranda and other steps which we had taken  
for that purpose. In case of a final failure of  
the efforts at conciliation and settlement now being  
made at Paris, it <sup>will have</sup> ~~might~~ become necessary for this  
Government to publish a record of its long and patient  
efforts to prevent such a failure. It is in the  
light of the above possibility that you will realize  
the special importance of specifically indicating any  
communications made to you as strictly confidential,

Enciphered by .....

either

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1969 1-128



1 1055

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
\$

## TELEGRAM SENT

### Department of State

Washington,

1-138  
TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

AmEmbassy, Tokyo, page 4.

either wholly or in part.

I have caused an investigation of the Rengo press statement published in Japan and reported in your 239 and find that Rego misattributed to me certain personal opinions expressed by the writer of the Associated Press report on which the Rengo despatch was based. As I have already informed you, I have never expressed such opinions, either in public or in private. It is only fair for you to know, however, that they fairly represent widely current criticisms which have prevailed in this country ever since the bombing of <sup>Chinchow and the occupation of</sup> Tsitsihar. It is this feeling which has caused me, in the interest of good relations between our two countries, to be so anxious that no further military advance should be made by the Japanese Army.

*Stinson*  
*AKG*

NOV 30, 1931.

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

Index Bu.—No. 60.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1935 1-138



No Distribution

Anembarsy

Tokyo

In the confidential information, R. Ambassadors.

~~Special for Tokyo~~

In your 239 November 28 8 P.M. You state  
that in informing you of the agreement between  
himself, the Chief of Staff and the Minister of War  
Baron Shidehara requested ~~that when to go~~  
that it should be kept Confidential.

Unfortunately in your 234 of November 24 10  
10 P.M. this request of Shidehara was not  
conveyed to me. The mere initial preface  
to the cable to the effect that it was ~~Conf~~

Quote Confidential for the Secretary unquote  
under the practice of the Department is regarded  
as a direction that the cable is for the personal attention  
of the Secretary and not for the general files and  
does <sup>not (repeat not)</sup> carry the intimation that <sup>as to any special fact stated therein</sup> privacy was requested  
by the other government. In such a last mentioned case  
the request is <sup>usually</sup> ~~is~~ <sup>is</sup> ~~stated~~ <sup>stated</sup> in the body of the cable,  
I should prefer the request to be ~~stated~~ <sup>stated</sup> ~~in the body of the cable~~ <sup>in the body of the cable</sup> Furthermore

on November 19<sup>th</sup> immediately after the  
news of the Japanese occupation of Tsitsihar



2

I notified Shidekara through Wrbuchin that the situation was ~~now~~ rendered so serious by that ~~actual~~ occupation that I must reserve the right to inform the American public fully in respect <sup>to</sup> the efforts which our government was making under the treaties to which we are parties to preserve peace in Manchuria, and that <sup>therefore</sup> I reserved the right to make public all notes, memoranda and other steps which we took for that purpose. He must have been in possession of this notice for several days before his communication with you.

Finally the communication to me of the impressive fact that <sup>represented by both civil and military branches</sup> his government <sup>had</sup> taken the <sup>important</sup> ~~important~~ step of directing that Chinchow should not be occupied,



4

and I find that Rengo misattributed to me certain personal opinions <sup>expressed</sup> ~~written~~ by the ~~Associated Press~~ <sup>writer</sup> of the Associated Press report upon which the Rengo despatch was based. As I have already informed you no such opinions have been even been expressed by me either in public or private. They however fairly represent widely current <sup>criticisms</sup> ~~views~~ which have prevailed in this country since the bombing of Chinchow and the occupation of Tsitsihar, and they represent the feeling here which has in the interest of good relations between the two countries caused me to be so anxious that no further military advance should be made by the Japanese army.

In the light of all of the facts, and inasmuch as in case of a final failure of the efforts at conciliation and settlement now being made at Paris, it may become



5-  
necessary for this government to make  
public its long and patient efforts  
to prevent ~~to prevent~~ such a failure.  
I suggest that it would be wise to  
abstain as far as possible from ac-  
cepting from the Japanese Foreign  
Office confidential communications of  
a nature which will bear upon this  
Government's action. And in case  
where it seems necessary to do, please  
let the cable expressly report that a request  
for such privacy is made.

In the light of the above possibility you will realize the  
great importance of specifically indicating any communications made  
to you either wholly or in part as strictly confidential in order that  
no misunderstanding may arise.



3  
under the circumstances <sup>then</sup> existing,  
was not the kind of information which  
~~he should have given us or we received~~  
This Government would <sup>naturally</sup> expect to have been  
given or received in confidence.

~~On the contrary the statement~~  
~~When the opportunity occurs I desire~~  
Accordingly neither I nor ~~either~~ of my advisers  
had any idea that the announcement of that  
step would be embarrassing to Shidehara.

On the contrary the announcement was made  
for the purpose of answering <sup>calming</sup> the disquieting  
reports coming through the press, that a general  
movement by the Japanese army had begun  
against Chinchow.

I have caused an investigation of the  
Rengo press statement published in  
Japan and reported ~~by~~ in your 239



CJH

GREEN  
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Dated November 29, 1931

TOKIO

FROM  
Rec'd. 7:27 a.m.

793.94  
Secretary of State,  
Washington.

241, November 29; 6 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

I had an interview with Baron Shidehara at three p.m. this afternoon, giving my observations your 249. He was amazed when I made him read statement summarized to you last night given out to assembled press representatives in writing by authorized spokesman Foreign Office. He had neither seen nor authorized it and stated that it did not express his views in any respect. His statement to representatives of Japanese press given at four p.m. yesterday afternoon was to the effect that he did not believe statement of Associated Press attributed to you could have been given out by you, as he knew it was wholly unlike you. He dwelt further on the subject of the proposed accord with Chinese in regard to operations around Chinchow by stating that Wellington Koo had made a proposal through Briand which the Japanese had accepted in substance; that he had not intended his assurance to you that Japanese troops would not occupy Chinchow to be published because he and his military colleagues feared that  
with this



F/DEW

793.94/2951

DEC 9 1931

FILED



CEH

Page 2 - #241 from Tokio.

with this assurance the Chinese would say there was now no further object in entering into the accord and would withdraw Wellington Koo's offer. He states that the Chinese troops in considerable numbers are nearer Mukden than Kowpangtze and are occupying Tahushan, and he fears premature announcement of Japanese intention will result in further advances and bringing about a situation that can only be met by further fighting. It seems as though influence of the United States and all other powers interested in promoting peace might be used in insisting that the Chinese adhere to their offer and reach agreement along the lines on which negotiations were proceeding. The newspaper statement which I cabled you yesterday was our translation from the Japanese papers. It runs closely parallel to the English version appearing in the JAPAN ADVERTISER.

Word has just come in that the Foreign Office has disavowed the press statement issued last night stating that the press despatch had been accepted without verification and that the Foreign Office statement had been issued without the authority of the Foreign Minister.

FORBES

HPD



CJH

GRAY  
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PEIPING via N. R.

Dated November 29, 1931

FROM

Rec'd. 2:35 a.m.

COPIES SENT TO

O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

793.944  
793.94118  
Secretary of State,

Washington.

1020, November 29, 10 a.m.

Following from Military Attache at Chinchow.

"Confidential. General Jung (in prior telegrams erroneously given as Yung) requested the foreign observers to meet with full powers at five p.m. today to discuss the arrangements of evacuation neutral zone between opposing forces. British and French observers have received instructions regarding the matter. General Jung stated that he would discuss with his officers and submit maps showing limits of neutral zone he would be prepared to guard. I shall take no active discussion in matter awaiting instructions. No changes at Tahushan today".

Following from the Minister at Nanking:

"November 28, midnight.

Please transmit the following to Military Attache, Chinchow:

"You should cooperate fully with other foreign military observers in examining the possibility of finding some means calculated to prevent any collision between Chinese and Japanese troops

F/DEW

793.94/2952

FILED

NOV 5 1931



CJH

Page 2 - #1020 from Peiping

Japanese troops in that region and of establishing liaison with the commanders of the Chinese and Japanese forces with a view to the necessary arrangements being made. You should consult with British Military Attache, asking him to show you instructions which he has received from British Government (which British Minister has shown me). You should avoid any action that might involve the United States in collective responsibility".

FOR THE MINISTER

BERKINS

HPD



1065

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gutzfelm NARS, Date 12-18-75

CJH

GREEN AND GRAY  
TELEGRAM RECEIVED  
PARIS

Dated November 28, 1931

FROM d. 10:28 p.m. 1931

793.94  
rel 500-0112

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

816, November 28, 11 p.m.


FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES.

Following report is from Sweetser.

"Briand reported to the twelve this afternoon that information from French sources indicated a concentration of some five thousand Japanese troops two days ago near Mukden, with indications looking to an advance on Chinchow. He was not sure, however, whether the likelihood still persisted.

The British also circulated to the Council two reports from observers. The first gave details of the situation at Tientsin and at Chinchow, in the latter case saying the Chinese neither intend nor are able to put up a resolute defense. The second reported Tsitsihar as completely under Japanese military control but with order prevailing and the military authorities announcing their intention of withdrawing to Toanan the 2500 troops who are in poor condition with over 350 out with frostbite. Briand also said the American Military Attache at Chinchow would cooperate with the other observers to prevent collisions between the Chinese and Japanese forces.

Cecil reported





106F

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Huntzsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

CJH

Page 2 - #816 from Paris.

Cecil reported on today's meeting of the drafting committee with a general discussion following the lines of this morning's message (see my No. 815, November 28, 6 p.m.). In reply to questions he expressed the opinion that the Council could give Sze satisfaction on his two principal points. On the first, fixation of the actual date of evacuation, he thought Sze would accept the formula proposed this morning and since put into the following phraseology :

'Should such withdrawal not have been completely effected before its arrival the Commission might be called upon to ascertain for the information of the Council how far the measures taken by the Chinese authorities to safeguard the lives of Japanese nations and protect their property, have been put into operation and have proved effective'.

As regards Sze's second point, his request for a League commission of observers, Cecil felt he could be satisfied by the system worked out by the Council provided it were clearly understood and explained in the President's speech.

Briand said it now seemed time to come out of the tunnel. The Council must know definitely and shortly whether it is to succeed or not. It was agreed consequently to press matters as quickly as possible with two meetings tomorrow. The drafting committee would meet the Japanese at eleven to receive their suggestions for changes in the resolution.

The Committee of



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CJH

Page 3 - #816 from Paris.

The Committee of twelve would meet at four to consider the Japanese suggestions and the general declaration to be made by the President of the Council. The new text presented to Chinese as a bridge on evacuation would not be presented to the Japanese until accepted by the Chinese.

Outside the Council uneasiness has been created amongst both officials and journalists by strange news reports from Japan. Reuters correspondent received a message from Tokyo today that Rengo had quoted the United Press in Paris as saying that Briand had announced to Sze that, if Japan attacks Chinchow, Article 16 would be applied with American cooperation. Any such statement was denied on Briand's part; similarly the United Press correspondent denied having sent it.

Late this afternoon Havas distributed to the French press a long Tokyo despatch which Reuter had distributed to the British press quoting opinion in Japan and especially at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as affronted at statements attributed to Mr. Stimson. Shortly after, the United Press had a despatch from New York denying either that Mr. Stimson had made the declarations given or that the Associated Press had carried them as Rengo reported".

SHAW

HPD



1066


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75





EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Warsaw, November 9, 1931.

No. 1074



NOV 28 31



F/DEW

793.94/2954

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Zaleski, will leave Warsaw on November 14, to attend the extraordinary session of the Council of the League of Nations, which is to deal with the pending Sino-Japanese dispute. Reference has been made to the attitude of Poland in this dispute in despatch No. 1066 of November 4, 1931, enclosing in full the recent speech of the Minister for Foreign Affairs before the Foreign Relations Committee of the Sejm, in which, on pages twelve and thirteen, Mr. Zaleski's remarks in detail will be found.

Respectfully yours,

*John C. Wiley*

John C. Wiley,  
Charge d'Affaires ad interim.

500.  
GAA:BJD

DEC 5 - 1931



1069

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793 94  
not  
500 c. 12

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GREEN

PARIS

FROM Dated November 28, 1931

Rec'd 3 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

815, November 28, 6 p.m.

FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES

Following is Sweetser's report:

"Doctor Sze accompanied by Doctor Willoughby and Colonel Olds presented to the Drafting Committee this morning China's suggested changes to the Council's draft resolution. He prefaced the discussion by saying that while China was entirely willing to discuss these details in Paris a new situation seemed to be developing in Manchuria where the Japanese appeared to be either unwilling or unable to carry out their agreements. He wondered therefore if the negotiators here might not be obliged to await the turns of events.

Drummond drew his attention to reassuring press despatches appearing in the afternoon papers and giving definite indications of withdrawal around Chinchow. Cecil, after stating that British official information indicated no

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
NOV 30 1931  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
F/DEW  
793.94/2955  
DEC 10 1931  
FILED



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MAM

2- #815, from Paris, November 28,  
1931

no disturbing change in the military side beyond the appearance of a Japanese aeroplane over Chinchow, decided as Chairman of the Committee that these broader questions were outside its competence.

The only amendment suggested to the first paragraph  
of

(END SECTION ONE)

SHAW

FW



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAM

GREEN

PARIS

FROM

Dated November 28, 1931

Rec'd 3:20 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

815, November 28, 6 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

the Council's resolution was the addition of the phrase that the withdrawal of Japanese troops be 'attested by neutral observers'. Cecil and Madariaga both felt and Sze agreed that this provision could better be inserted later.

Then followed a substantive amendment (One A) as follows:

'(One A). Calls upon the Japanese Government to begin at once the withdrawal of its troops to the railway areas, to proceed progressively with such withdrawal and to bring it to completion within (blank) weeks; provided, however, that if the Commission of Inquiry hereafter referred to shall find that the measures adopted by China for insuring the safety of Japanese lives and property are inadequate it may recommend the amplification of the said measures or additional guarantees'.

Cecil



107

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

mam

2- #815, section two, from Paris,  
November 28, 1931

Cecil pointed out that this presented the old time limit difficulty which would destroy any possibility of unanimity in the Council. He himself would have liked a date but the others could not be brought to agree on it. Experience already had shown a date to be impossible; the appointment of a commission considerably changed the situation as its very first task would be to consider and to report upon evacuation. In reply to Colonel Olds inquiry as to what would happen in case of a dispute between the commission and one of the governments Cecil pointed out that the matter could be referred to the Council and stated that the events of the last few days had shown that the Council's wishes

(END SECTION TWO)

SHAW

FW



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HSM

GREEN

FROM

Paris

Dated November 28, 1931

Rec'd 4:40 p. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

815, November 28, 6 p. m. (SECTION THREE).  
had weight with the proposal.

Sze again urged, however, that China must have some definite assurance as to the termination of the evacuation; it must have confidence in one way or another that the Japanese troops would be withdrawn reasonably soon. Cecil agreed with this desire but pointed out that, if it came to trying to fix a definite date, the Japanese might quite well urge that the Council does not at the moment have sufficient information and was in fact appointing a commission for the very purpose of securing information on this and other subjects. Madariaga suggested replacing all of the paragraph after the word 'areas' with the provision that in case of disagreement between the  
parties



#815, November 28, 6 p. m., (SECTION THREE) from Paris

-2-

parties they could appeal to the commission who could in turn report to the Council. Cecil hesitated, however, making the commission so much a court of appeal.

Leger thereupon suggested adding a sentence at the very end of the resolution to the effect that, should evacuation not have been possible before the arrival of the commission, the latter should assure itself for the information of the Council as to how far the measures undertaken by China for the protection of Japanese lives and property had become effective. He pointed out that what China wanted was a guarantee against excessive demands or prolonged occupation. The commission would not necessitate delay; it was being sent out without prejudice to evacuation; it could, however, report on the efficacy of measures taken by both sides. (END SECTION THREE).

SHAW

FW



1075

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED  
GREEN

HSM

Paris

FROM

Dated November 28, 1931

Rec'd 5:22 p. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

815, November 28, 6 p. m. (SECTION FOUR).

Cecil supported this view saying that the Council could indicate that one of the first tasks of the commission would be to consider evacuation and recommend as to date if that evacuation has not already taken place; the Council could hardly, however, dictate to the commission in advance.

Olds urged again that the total absence of any stated period looked to the Chinese like a postponement to the Greek kalends. If a provisional date could be put in, even if made subject to adjustment, it would help greatly. What the Chinese wanted was a definite goal and not a complete uncertainty.

Colban found Leger's suggestion very acceptable. He felt it would give China very definite guarantees of withdrawal. The Council would continue its jurisdiction  
in



1076  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

#815. November 28, 6 p. m. from Paris (SECTION FOUR)

-2-

in the matter; the commission would represent it on the spot; he did not think China should fear indefinite occupation. Evacuation is the counterpart of security; the commission can report on both and thus give real, not paper, satisfaction.

In reply to Sze's question as to whether the commission could make an interim report on this special subject, Cecil said the Council wanted the commission to be as authoritative and powerful as it could possibly be. They wanted to secure the very best possible membership and must therefore give the commission the widest terms of reference. The situation involved was one of immense international complexity unlike anything else in the world. He thought however that the President (END SECTION FOUR).

SHAW

FW



1077  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

### TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HSM

GREEN

FROM

Paris

Dated November 28, 1931

Rec'd 9:20 p. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

815, November 28, 6 p. m. (SECTION FIVE).

of the Council could make a full declaration on these points. In reply to Olds' renewed query as to whether the commission could make an interim report on evacuation without waiting for its report on the whole of Manchuria, Madariaga drew attention to the first paragraph putting withdrawal in the very fore, but at the same time urged a certain elasticity in order to meet the circumstances in the case. It was then agreed at Sze's suggestion that the commission would give him a draft on the lines suggested by Leger. The committee then passed to (One B) and (One C) of the Chinese proposals reading as follows:

'(One B) Calls upon the Chinese and Japanese Governments to appoint representatives to arrange the details of the execution of evacuation and of taking

over



-2-from Paris Nov 28, #815 sec 5.

over the districts evacuated.

(One C) In order to give effect to the resolution of September 30th and also in pursuance of its unanimous decision of September 22nd authorizes and requests the President of the Council at once to appoint representatives on the spot whose duty it shall be to endeavor, in consultation with the Chinese and Japanese representatives, appointed for the purpose, to find adequate means of enabling the Japanese troops to withdraw immediately to the railway zone, without danger to the lives and property of Japanese nationals in Manchuria'

Also an addition was suggested to paragraph four as follows:

(end section five)

SHAW

FW



CJH

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Dated November 28, 1931

FROM

Rec'd. 9:55 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

815, November 28, 6 p.m. (SECTION SIX).  
'and to get into touch with the parties as to the  
localities and subjects with regard to which either  
of the parties wishes this information'.

Cecil, however, said it would create difficulties  
to attempt to establish a system of League representatives  
on top of the government observers - now on the spot. At  
the moment there are already nine observers at Chinchow;  
it would not be possible to get so many through the  
League and it would even raise the question of unanimity  
with Japan. Olds, however, wondered if there were not  
a difficulty about government observers; if, for instance,  
they sent in a scathing report, the government receiving  
it might not want to pass it on. Both Cecil and Colban  
thought that League observers could not report as freely  
as government observers; they must necessarily be very  
cautious; government observers could be freer and thus  
send in fuller information. Colban suggested that the  
system of cooperation among the government observers already  
arranged might be explained fully by the President of the  
Council



CJH

Page 2 - #015, Section Six.  
from Paris.

Council showing that several governments had sent observers; that the Council had suggested that they cooperate; that several governments had issued instructions in this respect; that the observers were actually working in this sense; and that the Council was being informed. In response to Olds' suggestion that the present provisions on this subject were inadequate, Cecil agreed that the President of the Council would do well to state what had been done and (END PART SIX)

SHAW

HPD



1081

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(B) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CJH

GREEN  
TELEGRAM RECEIVED  
PARIS

Dated November 28, 1931

FROM  
Rec'd. 9:30 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

#815, November 28, 6 p.m. (SECTION SEVEN)

how the whole system of information was being organized.  
A further paragraph ( Four A) was also suggested.

'(Four A). It is understood that against the  
withdrawal of the Japanese troops the Government of  
Japan shall retain within the railway areas only such  
guards as it claims a treaty right to maintain there".

She said this provision was very important. It  
was involved under the Portsmouth Treaty and other  
agreements and led to the question of reciprocal with-  
drawal. Cecil, however, felt that such a provision would  
be very difficult for the Council in that it would do the  
very thing they had avoided so far of drawing the Council  
into a discussion of treaties. Drummond also said such  
questions could be brought before the Commission; Cecil  
felt that the Commission's most important task would be  
to explore these treaties.

She stated he would later wish to put forward ideas  
regarding the Commission, especially as to its terms of  
reference.



CJH

Page 2 - #815 from Paris.  
(Section seven).

reference. Cecil reiterated the Council's desire to give it the most general powers and did not want to cut them down in any way but that he would be glad to have any suggestions on the subject.

It was thus left that the Committee would send Sze a formula on evacuation; that Sze would send in his views on the Commission; and that the drafting committee would report to the twelve at four o'clock". (END MESSAGE).

SHAW

HPD



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 30, 1931

Rec'd 7:20 a. m.

743-94  
 Secretary of State,  
 Washington.

COPIES SENT TO  
 O.H.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

NOV 30 1931

1025, November 30, 3 p. m.

One. Legation is reliably informed that Marshal Chang informed the Japanese that subject to approval by Nanking, he was willing withdraw his troops to Shanghai-kwan provided the Japanese would retire to Mukden. It would appear, however, that Japanese withdrawal had already begun prior to the marshal's stating.

Two. Yesterday a bomb exploded in the residence of the Japanese naval attaches at Peiping, outside the Legation quarter. Investment is proceeding. Repeated to Nanking.

PERKINS

WSB

F/DEW

793.94/2956

FILED

DEC 23 1931

702-9493



1084

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

CORRECTED COPY

COPIES SENT TO  
EX-111 AND M.A.A.

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 30, 1931

Rec'd 7:20 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

1025, November 30, 3 p. m.

One. Legation is reliably informed that Marshal Chang informed the Japanese that subject to approval by Nanking, he was willing withdraw his troops to Shanghai-kwan provided the Japanese would retire to Mukden. It would appear, however, that Japanese withdrawal had already begun prior to the marshal's stating.


Two. Yesterday a bomb exploded in the residence of the Japanese naval attaches at Peiping, outside the Legation quarter. Investigation is proceeding.

Repeated to Nanking.

PERKINS

WSB

793.94/2956





1085

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

HS

GRAY

Nanking

Dated November 30, 1931

Rec'd 7:30 a.m.

793-94  
note  
843.102T

COPIES SENT TO  
CHINA AND M.I.D.

Secretary of State  
Washington

TRIPLE PRIORITY

November 30, 3 p.m.

I have just received the following message from  
Tientsin through my British colleague.

"American, French and Italian Consuls and I have  
received a letter from Governor stating that as a serious  
situation will arise after withdrawal of armed special  
police from area adjacent to the Japanese concessions  
which he fears ordinary city police will be inadequate to  
control. He asks us to transmit request to our Ministers  
to devise some means of preserving peace in that area tem-  
porarily.

My United States and French colleagues and I after  
discussion with British and British commanders, American  
Commandant being absent, and with consent of those present  
submit following proposal which appears to be only plan  
offering a possible solution.

Two. Chinese city police to be reorganized under  
neutral board consisting of French, Italian and British  
concession police representatives and an American civilian.  
Three.

843.105

6 LHM  
DEC 31 1931

F/DEW 793.94/2957



HS

2-from Nanking, November 30, 1931,  
7:30 a.m.

Three. Three. Nanking Government must give its consent to this proposal .

Four. We consider consent of Japanese authorities is essential but their participation in the board undesirable.

Five. Above arrangement to be merely temporary measure to tide over present crisis.

It is unanimous opinion of us all that no proposal to patrol area concerned with any international military force is feasible."

Two. I have authorized Lockhart to proceed provisionally with the above mentioned plan. We are informing our Consuls at Tientsin that consent of Chinese and Japanese to the putting into effect of this plan should be obtained locally.

Three. The objections to this plan are obvious to us but as a plan locally worked out we feel that it is the only method offered to us in a situation fraught with grave consequences unless something is done. I have told Lockhart that the Department will telegraph directions to him should it object to his participation.

WSE

JOHNSON



1087

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138

*Spencer*  
TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

Collect  
Charge Department

Department of State

Charge to  
\$

Washington,

November 30, 1931.

*10*

*793-94/2957*  
*note*  
*807-102T*  
*843-105*

AMERICAN CONSUL,

NANKING (China).

*128*  
FOR THE MINISTER. *2957*

Your November 30, 3 p.m., from Nanking.

Plan reported and your instruction to Lockhart  
in reference to policing Tientsin approved. Inform  
*Lockhart.*

793.94/2957

*Spencer*  
*H.H.*


FE:SKH/ZMF

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 80.

NOV 30 1931



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MP

GRAY AND GREEN

Paris

FROM Dated November 30, 1931

Rec'd 1:34 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

819, November 30, 2 a.m.


FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES

Following is report from Sweetser.

"Two meetings were held today, the first of the  
Drafting Committee with Ito in the morning to discuss  
Japan's suggestions regarding the draft resolution, and  
the second of the Committee of twelve in the afternoon  
to consider this and other questions.

Ito presented a memorandum explaining that the  
purpose behind the Japanese suggestions was to simplify  
the resolution as much as possible and leave all details  
and commentary to the President's speech. He thought  
this would turn several difficulties felt by both dele-  
gations and increase the chance of unanimity.

The first amendment, he suggested, was purely one  
of drafting, omitting the word 'recalls' in the first  
paragraph, to which the Committee agreed. In this same  
paragraph





MP

2-#819, From Paris, Nov. 30, 1931

paragraph also he asked to have omitted the phrase 'so that the withdrawal of the Japanese troops within the railway zone - a point to which the Council attaches the utmost importance - may be effected as speedily as possible'. Part of this he felt to be an appreciation which had better go in the President's speech; the rest he thought should not be given unless accompanied by the counterbalancing part of the September 30 resolution regarding safety. The Council members seemed to feel however that the resolution ought to start with special emphasis on evacuation even as, one member stated, in view of Japan's insistence on her intention in this regard and it is probable that Ito's point would be met by adding another phrase: 'On the resolution of September 30'.

In the second paragraph Ito proposed that it be stated that the situation had grown worse 'in other parts of China' as well as in Manchuria. He mentioned especially the boycott and the situation in Tientsin to justify this. The Committee felt however that these more general matters could only be handled by the commission; it thought it could meet Ito's point by leaving out the phrase



MP

3-#819, From Paris, Nov.30, 1931

phrase 'in Manchuria'.

In this same paragraph Ito urged for constitutional reasons the omission of the phrase as to giving commanders of the respective forces the strictest orders as in the case of Japan, troops serving abroad are under the control of the Emperor. This point could be met without loss to the resolution but more doubt was felt regarding Ito's suggestion that the phrase that the two parties would 'undertake' certain obligations be replaced with the phrase that it was their 'intention' to do certain things.

As regards the commission, Ito strongly urged limiting the number of members to three though he frankly stated that he could give no convincing reason therefor. In reply to comments as to the immense task before the Commission, the wide area to be covered, and the many subjects, diplomatic, military, economic, etc., Ito urged that most all these questions were technical and the Commission could have as many experts as it desired. No decision was taken but the tendency is towards a commission of five.

The most serious difficulty faced both in the

drafting



MP

4-#819, Fram Paris, Nov.30, 1931

Drafting Committee and in the Committee of Twelve was in connection with his suggestion that the President's declaration expressly admit the right of the Japanese forces to take such measures as are indispensable to protect the life and property of Japanese subjects against bandits and other lawless elements in Manchuria. Ito explained that the situation there was very abnormal; that the Japanese position must be clear of any ambiguity; and that this particular text had been expressly sent him from Tokyo. Various members of the Drafting Committee objected to provisions, however. Cecil pointed out that it is very difficult to distinguish between police actions and acts of war on another country's territories. Colban feared the provision might create some permanent right of intervention. Madariaga took much the same view. Cecil in reporting to the Twelve in the afternoon even more emphatically stated that this suggestion seemed to open the door to all sorts of dangers, and permitted raids which might become real military movements resulting in the capture of cities. He wondered if it might not be possible to induce the Japanese to agree that in case it were necessary to take  
action



MP

5-#819, From Paris, Nov.30, 1931

action against bandits in the future they would invite a neutral observer to accompany them and notify the League of the facts. Briand shared these preoccupations; he did not know how clearly to distinguish police measures from military action; he did not see how the Chinese could agree to such a declaration affecting a large part of their territory; he seriously doubted if measures such as had been taken would be <sup>Consequently</sup> with article two of the Kellogg Pact. Fotitch was afraid any such declaration might create a new doctrine of international law; Lester feared to have the Council give any appearance of moral sanction to military actions taken by one country in another. It was agreed that Briand would try to find a text which would give the Japanese the possibility of reasonable police action against bandits up to the time of the completion of the evacuation but without raising the larger questions.

Briand announced the receipt of a telegram that the Japanese had begun withdrawal from Tsitsihar to Taonan. He thought there was a certain amelioration of the military situation. If this turned out to be the case the Council must profit by it and act quickly. It was accordingly arranged to try to have three meetings tomorrow, first with Sze in the morning, then with

Yoshizawa,



IP

6-#819, From Paris, Nov.30, 1931

Yoshizawa, and finally with the Twelve.

A special request was made by Cecil to give the Chinese satisfaction regarding some kind of permanent organization of military observers who should be able to collate reports and act quickly if necessary. He said the Chinese were very anxious to know what sort of assurance could be given them in this respect as they feared that once the Council were gone the Japanese would become even more active. Cecil said that his Government would be willing to instruct its Minister in Peking to discuss some permanent liaison amongst the military observers and asked if the other members of the Council would do likewise. The French and Spanish representatives immediately replied in the affirmative; the German said he had already asked his Government but had not yet had a reply." November 30, 4 a.m.

SHAW

HD



MEF

GRAY  
**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

Tientsin via N.R.

Dated November 30, 1931

FROM

Rec'd 9:05 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington

November 30, 5 p.m.

The following telegram has been sent to the

Legation:

"November 30, 4 p.m. While situation remains tense and there continues to be enormous movement of refugees into foreign areas from Chinese city and Japanese concession, there is prospect of improvement due to the withdrawal of armed police to Hopei which the Mayor has formally announced and also incident to Japanese withdrawal from vicinity of Chinchow. Some rifle and machine gun (7) occurred this morning about four o'clock which Chinese claim was done by the Japanese, and which resulted in two Chinese civilians being killed.

The arrival of Japanese reinforcements scheduled for tomorrow however and numbering about 450 men may cause fresh concern among Chinese. One company numbering 150 men arriving at Tangku tomorrow will be despatched to Chinwangtao. Repeated to Department and Nanking".

LOCKHART

WSB

F/DEW

793.94/2959

FILED

DEC 21 1931

793-94  
note  
583-102T

COPIES SENT TO  
CHINESE LEGATION  
ME

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
NOV 30 1931  
FILE  
Department of State



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

793.94  
note  
500.0112  
MET

FROM

GREEN

Paris

Dated November 29, 1931

Rec'd 30th, 12:18 a.m.

Secretary of State,


Washington

818, November 29, midnight.

FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES.

Following report from Sweetser:

"Yoshizawa brought disturbing news to Briand tonight. He stated that Koo recently informed the British, French and American representatives in Nanking that China was prepared to withdraw her troops from Chinchow on condition that Japan give a guarantee to the three Powers that she would not send her troops into that area. Wilden reported this to Paris and Tokyo where Martel communicated it to Shidehara. The latter accepted the proposal for Chinese withdrawal but refused the guarantee suggesting instead, it is understood, that Japan would not send troops into the district unless the safety of Japanese there or in North China demanded it.



F/DEW

793.94/2960

FILED

DEC 10 1931



1097  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D). or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#818, from Paris, November 29,  
1931, rec'd 31st, 12:18  
a.m.

it. It was, however, on the basis of the Koo proposal, Yoshizawa informed Briand, that Shidehara persuaded the Japanese military authorities to the withdrawal which is now under way. Yoshizawa urged upon Briand that Koo must continue the negotiations thus started; otherwise the Japanese military leaders will feel themselves tricked. He left with Briand a stiff memorandum in which he claimed that grave consequences might ensue. (END SECTION ONE)

SHAW

GW



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

GRAY

Paris

FROM

Dated November 29, 1931

Rec'd 30th, 12:39 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

818, November 29, midnight. (SECTION TWO)

Yoshizawa asked Briand if he could not bring pressure to bear on the Chinese to continue these negotiations and make good what he called Koo's promise. Briand replied he could hardly ask the Chinese to complete their part of the proposal for the withdrawal of Chinese troops if the Japanese were unwilling to complete their part as to the guarantee to the three Powers. Then followed a discussion on this point of the guarantee at the last of which Yoshizawa indicated that Japan would probably be willing to take some kind of engagement toward the Council in place of a guarantee toward the three Powers. Just why or how far this suggestion would go is not clear nor it is sure whether its terms would be acceptable to the Chinese. The situation here has been rendered confused by this new and uncertain negotiation in the East; the feeling is



1098

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#818, Paris, November 29, 1931,  
rec'd 31st, 12:39 a.m.

is growing however that the Japanese intend, by  
negotiation or otherwise to clear Manchuria of  
Chang's troops.

An indication of the view of the Japanese Gov-  
ernment and the form of its conditions are shown  
in the following letter circulated tonight and in  
its turn complicating the situation as regards the  
Council's suggestions for a system of observers at  
Chinchow:

'With reference to my letter of November 27,  
I have the honor to acquaint you that my Government  
has just informed me that it has examined with  
great care the proposal submitted to the governments  
represented on the Council.

The policy which the Japanese Government has  
so far consistently pursued in the true interest  
of good (END SECTION TWO)

GW

SHAW



## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GREEN

Paris

Dated November 29, 1931

Rec'd 30th, 12:57 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

818, November 29, midnight. (SECTIONS THREE AND FOUR.)  
relations between China and Japan has been not to resort,  
in disputes capable of direct settlement with China, to the  
interposition of third parties; and it cannot but pursue  
this line of conduct in the present case.

Within these limits it will of course always be  
prepared to give the fullest consideration to any means  
of avoiding a conflict. It was in this spirit that it  
welcomed China's recent proposal which was transmitted to  
it by His Excellency, the French Ambassador at Tokyo.

As you have certainly been informed by M. de Martel,  
Baron Shidehara, when expressing to the latter the hope  
which the Japanese Government shares with the French  
Government, that hostilities would be avoided in the

Chinchow



REP

2- #818, from Paris, Sections three  
and four, Nov. 29, midnight.

Chinchow district, informed him that if China withdrew her troops entirely from the Chinchow district to Shanghai-kwan and west of that place and only maintained the administration (including the policing) of the Chinese district at Shanghaikwan, the Japanese Government would be prepared to undertake in principle that Japanese troops would not enter the zone thus evacuated by the Chinese troops except in the unexpected case of serious and urgent circumstances threatening the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals in northern China and the safety of the Japanese troops stationed therein.

The Japanese Government at the same time expressed its readiness to order its competent authorities on the spot to enter into negotiations at any moment with the local Chinese authorities regarding the exact determination of the above mentioned zone and the detailed measures for giving effect to this arrangement.

Under these circumstances it would be desirable, in the opinion of the Japanese Government, to see how the above mentioned suggestions will be received'.

This



1101  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

3- #818, from Paris, Sections three  
and four, Nov. 29, midnight.

This letter Briand presented today to the twelve members of the Council, other than the Chinese and Japanese, who approved the following reply which may be supplemented by a further reply tomorrow.

'I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated November 28 in which you communicated to me your Government's opinion on the proposal which I transmitted to you on November 26th.

I cannot help thinking that a misunderstanding exists with regard to the (\*) of this proposal which does not constitute, as you seem to think, an invitation "to resort to the interposition of third parties" in a dispute capable of direct settlement between Japan and China.

What my colleagues on the Council and myself contemplated ~~was~~ certain measures to be taken in a dangerous situation to which Your Excellency, like the Chinese representative, had drawn my attention. The measures in question were exceptional measures to be taken rapidly to avoid a conflict between the opposing forces in the district of Chinchow and thus to prevent loss of human

life



REP

4- #818, from Paris, Sections three  
and four, Nov. 29, midnight.

life. It is for this reason that my colleagues and I regard it as extremely important that the facilities mentioned in my letter of November 26 should be given to the representatives sent to the spot by certain powers. Moreover, the exceptional measures contemplated may be taken without prejudice to the wider proposals which your Government may wish to submit to the Chinese Government.

I further venture to remind you that as regards the particular case with which we are dealing, viz, the danger of encounters between Japanese and Chinese forces in the Chinchow district, the Chinese proposal for the creation of a neutral zone involved the despatch of international detachments to the said zone. For this proposal which raised difficulties of a practical nature, my colleagues (which\*) and I substituted the suggestion ~~which~~ <sup>recommend</sup> I again wish to (\*) to your Government's attention".

(END SECTIONS THREE AND FOUR) (END MESSAGE).

SHAW

HPD

(\*) Apparent omissions.



No. 176 Political.

AMERICAN CONSULATE,

Geneva, Switzerland, November 14, 1931.

CONFIDENTIAL.

SUBJECT: Memorandum on the Sino-Japanese Conflict since  
October 24 prepared for Mr. Shaw, American  
Embassy, Paris.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to transmit herewith copies of a memorandum prepared by the Consulate for Mr. Shaw, of the American Embassy at Paris, entitled "The Sino-Japanese Conflict - Summary of Events and Negotiations since the Council's draft resolution of October 24". This memorandum was hastily prepared in the hope that it might be useful to Mr. Shaw in his study of the present status of the Sino-Japanese conflict as it will be presented to the Council of the League of Nations on Monday, November 16. It is not intended of course that this memorandum should cover all the events which have taken place in Manchuria since October 24, but an effort has been made to select the salient points from the mass of information which has been placed at the Consulate's disposal by the League, particularly the elements having a direct bearing on the negotiations looking toward a solution of the conflict.

Respectfully yours,

Prentiss B. Gilbert  
Prentiss B. Gilbert.  
American Consul.

Enclosure: Memorandum.  
Original and 4 copies to Department.  
1 copy to Legation, Berne.

\* Carbon Copies  
Received

F/DEW

793.94/2961

DEC 14 1931

FILED



Geneva, Switzerland, November 14, 1931.

CONFIDENTIAL.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. SHAW, AMERICAN EMBASSY, PARIS.

SUBJECT: The Sino-Japanese Conflict - Summary of  
Events and Negotiations since the Council's  
Draft Resolution of October 24.

The following is a summary indicating the general course of events in connection with the negotiations on the Sino-Japanese conflict since the last Council meeting on October 24 (See Consulate's telegrams Nos. 259 and 260, of October 26, 5 P.M., and October 27, 9 A.M., respectively):

(1) Sze handed to Briand a note dated October 24 in which he declared that China, like every member of the League of Nations, was bound by the Covenant to a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations and that the Chinese Government was determined loyally to fulfil all of its obligations under the Covenant. It was prepared to give proof of this intention by undertaking to settle all disputes with Japan as to treaty interpretation by arbitration or judicial settlement, and in pursuance of that purpose was willing to conclude with Japan a treaty of arbitration. It will be noted that in this note no reference was made to the question of the validity of treaties between China and Japan.

(2) About October 26, Drummond, in a conversation with Sato, suggested that the Chinese note referred to above might offer a basis for the acceptance by Japan of the

Council's



- 2 -

Council's draft resolution of October 24. This note would offer an opportunity to Japan to recede somewhat from her position on that date by stating that the stand taken by the Japanese on the Council was intended to obtain from China an admission that she was prepared to respect her treaty obligations and that inasmuch as this admission had now been obtained, the Japanese could accept the resolution referred to. It was expected that Sato would present this idea to his government on his arrival in Japan before November 16. Nothing further has since been learned on this head.

(3) On October 26, the Japanese Government sent a telegram to Drummond containing the text of a declaration published in Tokio on the same date. This declaration reaffirmed the Japanese position as taken before the Council in its meetings from October 22 to October 24. It set forth the five fundamental points on which Japan desired an agreement with China prior to evacuation. These points disagreed, however, with reports in the press on the same subjects which were said to have emanated from official Japanese sources. Moreover, the phraseology of the declaration left the impression that the settlement required by Japan was much wider than that indicated in a literal interpretation of the points enumerated. The result of this declaration was a feeling of uncertainty in the minds of Briand and Drummond in regard to the extent of the Japanese demands.

In view of this situation and the fact that the Japanese declaration was evidently an appeal to public opinion, it was felt that an immediate counter-move should be made by

the



- 3 -

the League. In consequence, Briand transmitted to Yoshizawa on October 29th a note referring to the Japanese declaration and calling to the attention of the Japanese Government the fact that the Council's resolution of September 30 retained its full executory force and that the moral force of the draft resolution of October 24 remained unimpaired. In addition, he pointed out that the first three paragraphs of the draft resolution of October 24 covered the first four points enumerated in the Japanese demands as stated in their public declaration and that the fifth point regarding the respect for treaty rights of Japan in Manchuria was met by the Chinese note of October 24 which formally recorded the determination of China to respect all treaty obligations. Briand then expressed the hope that the Japanese Government would appoint, in accordance with paragraph 5 of the Council's draft resolution of October 24, representatives to settle the details relating to evacuation and security, and would give effect as soon as possible to its undertakings under the Council's resolution of September 30.

The Japanese reply to Briand's note of October 29 was not sent until November 7. In this reply, the Japanese Government re-affirmed its concurrence in the Council resolution of September 30 but asserted that the necessary conditions for the security of Japanese nationals had not yet been assured. Moreover, the note pointed out that the draft resolution of October 24 was not sufficiently explicit or comprehensive to cover all the implications of the first

four



- 4 -

four points of the Japanese demands and that as regards the final point concerning the respect of treaty rights in Manchuria, the Chinese note of October 24 gave rise to doubt as to whether the Chinese Government did not contemplate the calling in question of the validity of some of the treaties forming the basis of relations between Japan and China. Such a development could not be accepted for a moment by Japan. The note contended that the five fundamental principles of the Japanese declaration of October 26 were no more than those that are commonly observed in the intercourse of ordered communities with one another and reiterated that the Japanese Government had no thought of insisting on the final adjustment of the whole series of questions pending between China and Japan as a condition precedent to the withdrawal of troops.

In the meanwhile, on October 31, the Chinese Government transmitted a memorandum to Drummond in answer to the Japanese declaration of October 26. This memorandum brought forward no new elements in the negotiations but simply restated the Chinese position, particularly with reference to the question of the security of Japanese nationals. In this connection, it quoted statements of Secretary Hughes during the Washington Conference in reply to a similar position taken by the Japanese with regard to the withdrawal of their troops from Eastern Siberia.

(4) Sze presented a note to Drummond dated November 3 calling attention to the fact that no progress had been made since September 30 to carry out the Japanese commitments to evacuate made in the resolution of that date. The note was accompanied



- 5 -

accompanied by a memorandum setting forth the alleged attempt of the Japanese to consolidate their hold in South Manchuria and cited as evidence of this intent the seizure of the salt revenues, the fomentation of disorder and measures taken to disintegrate Chinese authority. The memorandum also alluded to the threat of the Japanese to use measures of force to insure the repairing of the railway bridge over the Nonni river.

In the memorandum cited above, the Chinese Government also called attention to its note of October 27 to Tokio and the Japanese reply of October 31 concerning the appointment of representatives to arrange the details of evacuation. The memorandum gives the names of the commission appointed for that purpose by the Chinese Government.

On November 3, Sawada addressed a communication to Drummond embodying the Japanese note of October 31 referred to above which states that the resolution of October 24 (providing inter alia for the appointment of such representatives) is not in force and insists again upon a preliminary agreement on the fundamental principles enumerated in the Japanese declaration of October 26.

In further connection with this subject, the Chinese representative on the Council transmitted a letter dated November 12 setting forth the plans of the Chinese Government for taking over the occupied areas in Manchuria. This letter is couched in much more definite terms than previous communications on the subject and not only gives the names of the members of the Chinese Commission appointed for

that



- 6 -

that purpose, but also defines to some extent the powers which would be accorded to the Commission and indicates briefly the measures envisaged for the accomplishment of the Commission's task.

(5) On November 4 Sze communicated to Drummond a telegram from Nanking dated November 3 giving further details in regard to the seizure by the Japanese of the salt revenues and the amounts involved.

In view of these allegations, Briand addressed a note to Yoshizawa on November 5 calling attention to the Chinese accusations and requesting an explanation for the enlightenment of the members of the Council.

Yoshizawa replied in a letter dated November 6 refuting the Chinese accusations in regard to the seizure of the salt revenues, stating that the revenues had been taken over by the Chinese Committee for the Maintenance of Order at Mukden.

(6) The dispute over the Nonni river railway bridge formed the subject of a series of communications to the League from the Chinese representative which indicated that extensive fighting had taken place there and that the situation was becoming graver every day. These notes occasioned a series of replies from the Japanese attempting to show that the repairing of the railway bridge was essential to the economic welfare of the country and attempting to shift the responsibility for the situation to the Chinese military.

As a result of these incidents and others of a similar nature, Briand on November 6 despatched an identic telegram to Tokio and Nanking requesting the governments to desist

from



- 7 -

from further measures tending to aggravate the situation and suggested that instructions in that sense be issued without delay to the officers commanding their respective forces.

In reply to this telegram, both the Chinese and Japanese Governments despatched telegrams under date of November 8 setting forth their respective viewpoints in regard to the events leading up to and resulting from the Nonni river bridge incident. In regard to the facts and the motives behind the incident, the two telegrams are in complete contradiction, each disclaiming responsibility: the Chinese maintaining that the Japanese advance of troops was entirely unprovoked and unjustifiable, the Japanese maintaining that to repair the bridge was essential to the economic welfare of the country and that inasmuch as the Chinese had refused to repair the bridge, the Japanese were obliged to send a crew for that purpose and troops to protect them, and that ensuing hostilities were provoked by Chinese troops.

On November 11 Briand despatched a second identic telegram to Nanking and Tokio stating that after carefully studying their replies to his previous telegram and the latest communications received, he wished to insist once more that both governments make every effort to avoid any aggravation of the situation and urged that the commanders of opposing forces should receive strictest orders to refrain from initiating any fresh action. Moreover, he called their attention to the extreme importance of granting facilities to the observers whom the members of the Council might send to the scene to collect information in accordance

with



- 8 -

with the Council resolution of September 30.

The Japanese and Chinese governments both replied on November 12 by telegram, each giving assurances from its own point of view. Not only were assurances given that efforts would be made to cease hostilities, but it is important to note that the Japanese Government assured the President of the Council that it intended to continue to supply the Council with complete information as provided in the September 30 resolution and also to grant every facility to neutral observers repairing to the scene of conflict for the purpose of gathering information.

(7) On November 7, the Consulate was informed that Sugimura had been in London and Paris in conversation with the British, French and Japanese to work out a solution acceptable to Japan in regard to the Japanese demands. His project comprised a plan to begin simultaneously two sets of negotiations, the first set comprising questions relating immediately to evacuation and security, and the second set comprising questions relating to the "five points" of Japan. Of the five points, those relating to security, comprising the first four and part of the fifth, would be negotiated at once, while that portion of the fifth point which did not relate to security should not be begun until after the completion of the evacuation. On November 9 the Consulate was informed that Yoshizawa had adopted this proposal as his own and had telegraphed it to Tokio. Nothing further has been heard on this score.

(8) No information has been received which would

indicate



1011  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 9 -

indicate that the Japanese have changed their position in the least since the last meeting of the Council on October 24. Technically, the position remains the same as on that date, the only change in the status of the Sino-Japanese conflict being the aggravation of the actual situation in Manchuria as shown by the serious events which have recently taken place, particularly the hostilities centering about the repairing of the Nonni river railway bridge.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

PM RECD



NO. 178. Political.

AMERICAN CONSULATE,

Geneva, Switzerland, November 17, 1931.

NOV 30 31




SUBJECT: Acknowledgement of Summaries of Information  
from Manchuria.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:



793.94/2379a

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the  
Department's instruction of October 28, 1931 enclosing  
copies of three summaries of information in regard to  
conditions in Manchuria. This information has been trans-  
mitted to Sir Eric Drummond for his personal and con-  
fidential use, in accordance with the instructions con-  
tained in telegrams on this subject on previous occasions.

Respectfully yours,

*Prentiss B. Gilbert*  
Prentiss B. Gilbert,  
American Consul.

Original and four copies to Department of State,  
One copy to American Legation, Berne, Switzerland.

F/DEW

793.94/2962

FILED



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

REF .

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DEC 1 1931  
DIVISION OF  
WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS  
Paris  
Dated November 30, 1931  
Rec'd 1:25 p. m.

F/DEW

793.94/2963

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

DOUBLE PRIORITY.

821, November 30, 5 p. m.

FROM AMBASSADOR DAVES.

Sze is acting along the lines of my suggestion reported  
in my telegram 817, November 29, 2 p. m. He sent a  
representative to me with his exact statement to the  
Council from which I quote as follows:

"I am prepared to say to you now that if it can be  
established by neutral observers definitely verifying  
actual withdrawal of Japanese beyond Liao River, China  
is willing to leave out of the resolution the time limit  
for complete evacuation.

China is making this concession on the time limit  
entirely on the assumption that in fact Japan is  
definitely withdrawing from Chinchow".

SHAW

WSB

DEC 10 1931

FILED

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with  
500.0112



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

REP

GREEN

Paris

Dated November 30, 1931

Rec'd 3:03 p. m.


Secretary of State,  
Washington.

822, November 30, 6 p. m.

FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES.

Following is report from Sweetser:

"She opened this morning's meeting of the drafting committee with a statement that new complications seemed to be arising in Manchuria and that events might quite well swamp the negotiations in Paris. In reply to his question as to whether the observers had sent any definite news on Japan's reported withdrawal, Cecil stated that the British Military Attache with the Japanese had just reported that he had witnessed the withdrawal of Shin Min and Massigli stated that reports from French observers with both forces stated that the advance had not only stopped but withdrawal had begun though it was not yesterday clear whether this tendency was provisional or permanent.



F/DEW

793.94/2964

FILED

DEC 9 1931

793.94  
note  
500.C112



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REF

2- #822, from Paris, Nov.30,6p.m.

permanent.

Cecil then replied to Sze's request for information as to the plan concerning observers by stating that the members of the Council desired to have a definite though fluid organization working upon the control of the diplomatic representatives at Peiping and able to go from place to place to work in unison and to collate reports.

(END SECTION ONE).

SHAW

CSB



REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GREEN

FROM Paris

Dated November 30, 1931

Rec'd 4 p. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

822, November 30, 6 p. m. (SECTION TWO).

He agreed with Olds' definition that this would be<sup>s</sup> sort of flying squadron of observers able to go to any spot of danger working under the orders of the governments and reporting to those governments which in turn would report to the Council. In reply to Sze's question whether he might have the names and posts of the observers Cecil said he was willing to give all details possible, that at the moment the British had observers at Mukden, Chinchow and Tsitsihar and that in addition there were at Chinchow the French Consul General from Mukden and a military officer; the German Consul General from Mukden; the Italian Consul General from Tientsin and the American Military Attache and a language officer. As regards cooperation Messigli stated that the Chinese General at Chinchow had already convened a meeting of observers and established contact. Sze pointed out however that yesterday's

Japanese



REP

2- #822, from Paris, Nov. 30, 6 p.m.  
Section Two.

Japanese note seemed to put in jeopardy the whole principle of this system which constituted a very valuable guarantee for China.

Sze then made an important general declaration that China's chief interest is in withdrawal and that if the fact of partial withdrawal can be established she would not insist on full immediate withdrawal. He did not give further details beyond indicating the importance he attached to some immediate Japanese action in this respect.

A detailed discussion then followed on China's suggested amendments to the resolution. The Leger proposal aimed to

SHAW

WSB



## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAH

GREEN

FROM

PARIS

Dated November 30, 1931

Rec'd 4:17 p.m.

Secretary of State  
Washington

822, November 30, 6 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

prevent the appointment of the commission from being used to delay evacuation was discussed from two viewpoints. First the Chinese wished to have it re-phrased so as not to give the impression that the commission should investigate only China's obligations regarding security but should also discuss Japanese obligations as well. Several drafts were suggested to meet this difficulty. Second was the more serious question as to whether this provision should be embodied in the resolution or in the President's declaration. Cecil seemed to feel that the Chinese purpose might be better attained in the latter way which would naturally allow greater detail and explicitness than the former. Sze however supported strongly by both Olds and Willoughby urged as a matter of prime importance to China that this provision be included in the resolution itself which seemed to him the more binding and which certainly would be the document scanned by Chinese opinion. If an actual time limit were not fixed the Chinese must have something very substantial



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

mam

2- #822, section three, from Paris,  
November 30, 1951

substantial giving hope of early withdrawal. The Committee took no decisions, Cecil however suggesting the possible compromise of including the provision in the resolution but handing its substance to the Chinese in advance to be telegraphed to Nanking. In this same connection Sze urged that while he of course himself understood that the President of the Council could convene that body at any moment of

(END SECTION THREE)

SHAW

WSB



MET

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GREEN

Paris

FROM

Dated November 30, 1931

Rec'd 3:49 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

822, November 30, 6 p.m. (SECTION FOUR)

emergency and that a regular session was scheduled for mid-January, still it would help his public opinion if the precedent followed in the resolutions of September and October could be repeated and some public indication of an early meeting given. It was thought that satisfaction could be given to this request by the President stating that the Council remained seized of the question, entrusts its President with following it, and will meet again in extraordinary session, if necessary, before the January session.

The next most important point raised by the Chinese was the addition of the sentence 'any question which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of either party, may be considered by the commission only with the consent of such party'. Cecil reacted very strongly against this suggestion, which he felt



112  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#822, from Paris, November 30,  
1931, rec'd 3:49 p.m.  
(SECTION FOUR)

felt would cripple, if not destroy, the Commission.  
It was impossible he thought to draw a formula which  
would really distinguish between domestic and inter-  
national issues without threatening the Commission's  
whole competence. The Committee had tried to meet  
this difficulty, however, by limiting the questions  
to those 'affecting international relations'. Massigli  
pointed out that what was desired was to get a photo-  
graphic impression of the situation; a clause so  
ambiguous as Sze's might be used to exclude almost  
everything.

(END SECTION FOUR)

SHAW

CSB-HPD



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAM

GREEN

PARIS

FROM Dated November 30, 1931

Rec'd 4:25 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

822, November 30, 6 p.m. (SECTION FIVE)

As to the numbers of the Commission, Sze expressed the opinion that three members would not be sufficient with so large an area and so many subjects to be covered. China would really like 9 or 11 members. Cecil reacted immediately against this, however, on the double ground that it would not lead to rapid and effective decision nor insure the high type of membership desired. Massigli added that many members meant many views and that the Commission would after all report to the Council which is a large body. Olds thought three too small in view of possible sickness and the necessity of dividing up the work. Cecil concluded that he had never considered more than five.

Following this discussion Cecil informed Sze that he gathered from neutral sources that the system of government in Manchuria had broken down. He asked him to turn over in his mind whether he had any suggestion to offer to meet this suggestion. The Council seemed to be evolving a system for limiting military aggression but had as yet done nothing to meet the problem of lawless bands roaming the country, as  
is



mam

2- #822, section five, from Paris,  
November 30, 1931

is a quite familiar phenomenon following military occupation.

After Sze's withdrawal Cecil stated he had just received an embarrassing letter from Ito to the effect that after his return from yesterday's meeting, he had received new instructions from Tokyo. He enclosed a memorandum which seemed to go back upon much of the progress made yesterday and which sought <sup>anew</sup> ~~a new (\*)~~ to include in the text of the resolution the right of the Japanese to take such measures as necessary for protection against bandits. Cecil thought such a provision would be fatal and that the Council neither would nor could agree to it. In view, however, of the fact that this letter and memorandum was felt to put the committee back where it had been before Ito's memorandum and discussion of yesterday it was decided to see him again this afternoon".

(END MESSAGE)

SHAW

CSB

(\*) apparent omission



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

AM RECD TELEGRAM SENT

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

Collect  
Charge Department

OR  
Charge to  
\$

Department of State



Washington,  
November 30, 1931.

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (Japan).

251

Reference Department's 230, November 16, 2 p.m.,  
second paragraph and Embassy's 240, November 29, noon.

Department requests more frequent and complete  
telegraphic reporting.

Department especially requests <sup>more complete</sup> account of your  
most recent conversations with Shidehara.

Department requests that Embassy give greater care  
in preparation of its telegrams, including acknowledgment  
or reference to previous, ~~specification where matters are~~  
~~strictly confidential~~, etc., etc.

Slinson


WLL

FE:SKH/ZMF

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 60.



AM RECD

1-138

793.94/2964A

793.94  
with  
124.946  
124.94664



NAM

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GREEN  
PARIS

BY RECEIVED

Dated November 30, 1931

DEVISION OF FROM

Rec'd

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DEC 1 1931

Secretary of State

Washington

823, November 30, 11 p.m.

FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES

Following is report from Sweetser. 1931

"The Japanese submitted to Briand tonight what was considered to be a very important private document regarding Chinchow. They propose, in effect, that, with their own withdrawal already under way, the Chinese similarly withdraw their troops from Chinchow leaving the control of the district in the hands of the Chinese authorities reenforced by a sufficient extra number of police troops to maintain order. These arrangements including the number of extra police, would be elaborated between the Japanese Consul and the Chinese authorities. Briand immediately transmitted the proposal to Sze with the hope that it might provide a solution for the most serious remaining military problem and consolidate the withdrawal of Japanese troops already stated by both British and French observers to have begun.

At this afternoon's meeting of the twelve Cecil reported on this morning's meeting of the drafting committee with Sze, who he said seemed inclined to be moderate because of the news regarding withdrawal. Sze had seemed (END SECTION ONE)

CX

SHAW

F/DEW

793.94/2965

793.94  
note  
500.C112

DEC 1 1931



1127  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

HSM

GREEN

Paris

Dated November 30, 1931

Rec'd 10:40 p. m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
NOV - 1 1931  
DIVISION

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

823, November 30, 11 p. m. (SECTION TWO).

satisfied that the system of observers as explained to him would work quickly in emergency; had said that though he would like nine or eleven members of the commission he would not make an issue of this point; had on the advice of his two American advisers reduced the limitation on the competence of the commission to domestic questions to a phrase 'without prejudice to the right of the commission to exercise its full discretion to control its own agenda' and had abandoned or received satisfaction on certain other small points.

The only outstanding point with the Chinese, Cecil concluded, was as to the relationship between evacuation and the commission. A new text had been prepared by the Secretariat which Sze accepted; the

only



#823, November 30, 11 p. m. (SECTION TWO) from Paris

-2-

only point at issue was whether it should be in the resolution or the President's declaration. Sze insisted on the former, Cecil preferred the latter especially as a balance to demands by the Japanese but it might be possible to reach a compromise by including it in the resolution but giving it to Sze formally in advance. The suggested text was as follows:

'Should the engagements taken by the two parties according to the resolution of September 30th not have been executed by the time of the arrival of the commission, the commission shall as speedily as possible report to the Council on the situation with such recommendations as it may think fit.' (END SECTION TWO).

SHAW

FW



cib

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Paris

RECEIVED

Dated November 30, 1931

1931 FROM

Recd December 1, 12:42am.

VISION OF

Secretary of State

Washington.

823, November 30, 11 p.m. (SECTION THREE).

Cecil also stated that, following a disquieting letter from Ito the drafting committee had met with him this afternoon and been somewhat reassured. Ito had in fact transmitted his instructions from Tokyo but Cecil had the impression that on most points agreement was possible.

As regards one point to which Ito attached great importance, Ito himself rather felt it better to include the phrase regarding evacuation 'a point to which the Council attached great importance' in the President's declaration; this was in fact a commentary which the council ~~was~~ could use as a bargaining point.

There remained one very big question as to what was to be done about bandits. Here the situation was worse than yesterday as to the Japanese Cabinet despite Shidehara's effort's to have this provision included in the President's declaration, had decided that it ought to appear in the resolution itself. This seemed to Cecil really impossible. It would reduce the whole negotiation to nothing and had not the slightest



113  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

2-#823, from Paris, November 30, 11pm.,  
(SECTION THREE).

slightest defense <sup>in</sup> ~~(#)~~ international law. He had told Ito  
he thought there was no hope of the Council's agreeing to  
its inclusion in the resolution but said with some reluc-  
tance that it might be put in the President's declaration.  
If this were justified at all it was only because of the  
very exceptional circumstances prevailing in Manchuria  
through the breakdown of civil government. This to Cecil,  
is the most difficult point in (END SECTION THREE)

SHAW

(#) Apparent omission.

CIB



1 1 3 1  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WP

FROM GREEN & GRAY

Paris

Dated November 30, 1931

Rec'd 1:00 a. m. December 1.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

823, November 30, 11 p. m.

(SECTION FOUR)

the whole negotiations now that China's moderated attitude has removed the difficulty as to a time limit. It was extremely repugnant to him that one power should be allowed to send troops to scatter bandits on the territory of another and it would be very difficult for the Chinese to accept it as it would constitute an admission that they cannot maintain order on their own soil.

Madariaga said he attached very great importance to inserting in the resolution the Chinese suggestion regarding the relationship of evacuation and the commission. He thought the Council should take a definite position on this point and suggested that it might ask the Japanese to agree to this in return for giving up the commentary on evacuation to which they objected. This the Council agreed to do.

A



113  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 - No. 823, section 4 from Paris

A further report followed on the bandit question.

Colban was anxious to have the twelve take a definite position on this; he felt that any such authorization as the Japanese asked should be highly exceptional and not more formal than by inclusion in the declaration. The Panaman representative felt that this point must be very carefully guarded; all Latin America would be anxious about it. Cecil said nothing could be done till the Japanese had had time to communicate today's discussion to Tokyo where a cabinet meeting would undoubtedly be necessary. Briand however urged that each member of the Council do whatever he could. (END SECTION FOUR).

SHAW

CIB



113

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

7

**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

WP

GREEN

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED

Paris

NOV 1 1931

FROM Dated November 30, 1931

DIVISION OF

Rec'd 11:15 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

823, November 30, 11 p. m.

(SECTION FIVE)

to induce the issue to be moderate on this last remaining point and expressed the view that it would be very valuable if General Dawes also could see any way to help in this matter.

Cecil then proposed a meeting of the drafting committee tomorrow morning to put the small changes recommended by both sides into final form for distribution privately to the members of the Council tomorrow noon. No further meeting of the twelve seemed desirable until a reply had come from Tokyo on the all important point of bandits. At that time it might be necessary to have a public meeting on this point to let the two parties thrash it out." (END MESSAGE).

SHAW

CIB



HS

GRAY

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Peiping via N.R.

Dated December 1, 1931

Rec'd 6:11 a.m.

FROM

Secretary of State

Washington

1028, December 1, 1 p.m.

Following from American Consul General at Mukden:

"November 30, 2 p.m. Referring to my telegram November 29, 1 p.m. headquarters today announced that Japanese forces despatched toward Chihnsien have been withdrawn to the east of Liao River.

Two. Headquarters reports that Chinese troops east of Chihnsien are being augmented and that yesterday afternoon 6 troop trains were seen moving from Chihnsien toward Tahushan.

Three. Peiping-Mukden Railway telegraph line was cut yesterday in several places. Repair train despatched this morning. Management expects to resume railway traffic tomorrow.

Four. Unconfirmed report is to the effect that 25 aircraft consigned to Marshal Chang were unloaded at *Chin* Wangtao on the 23rd."

"November 30, 6 p.m. Headquarters reports that 3,000 Heilungkiang troops, location unannounced, marching on Tsitsihar."

KLP

GW

For the Minister

PERKINS

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 1 1931  
Department of State

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O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

F/DEW

793.94/2966

793-94  
note  
893.0146



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138  
TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

December 1, 1931.

AMEMBASSY,

DEC 1 31

PARIS (France).

CONFIDENTIAL FOR AMBASSADOR DAWES.

793.94/2966 613  
note  
894.00  
One. The Ambassador at Tokyo reports under date  
894.00/324  
December 1 that the immediate Cabinet crisis seems to have  
passed; that it is reported that the young and insurgent  
element in the army is quite out of sympathy with the more  
conservative views of the Minister of War and the Chief of  
Staff; <sup>and</sup> that the Ambassador has been informed of a number of  
extraordinary and contradictory press notices issued in  
Mukden by the Japanese military authorities to representatives  
of the press, ~~and that it is reported that it is common talk~~  
~~among the older and wiser Japanese men of prominence that the~~  
~~younger element in the army are very much out of hand~~ *THAT*

Two. The Consul General at Mukden reports under date  
November 30 <sup>2966</sup> that Japanese headquarters <sup>that day</sup> ~~today~~ announced that *THAT*  
Japanese forces despatched toward Chinchow have been withdrawn  
to the east of the Liao River; that <sup>Japanese</sup> headquarters report that  
Chinese troops east of Chinchow are being augmented and that *on*  
<sup>preceding</sup> ~~yesterday~~ afternoon six troop trains were seen moving from  
Chinchow toward Tahushan; that Peiping-Mukden Railway telegraph

Enciphered by .....

line

Sent by operator ..... M., ....., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-128

793.94/2966



1 1 3 6

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
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OR

Department of State

Charge to  
\$

Washington,

- 2 -

line was cut yesterday in several places <sup>but</sup> and that the  
management expects to resume railway traffic on December 1;  
~~and~~ that there is an unconfirmed report to the effect that  
twenty-five airplanes consigned to Marshal Chang were  
unloaded at Chinwangtao on November 23; ~~Under date November~~ <sup>MMH</sup>  
~~23~~ The Consul General states that Japanese headquarters  
report that three thousand Heilungkiang troops, location  
unannounced, are marching on Tsitsihar.

*Stinson*  
*SKH*

FE:MMH:REK  
*MMH*

RAM  
FE  
*SKH*

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_



1 1 3 7

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

REF

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

TOKIO

Dated December 1, 1931

Rec'd 4:27 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

245, December 1, 3 p. m.

Referring to your 258, we will endeavor to make our statements more complete with references to previous messages as directed and will endeavor to exercise the utmost care in their preparation. Detailed operations have been under the handicap of moving this week with files in transit; the staff at night has worked in overcoats due to defects in heating system and the equipment has not wholly arrived or been installed.

FORBES

GW

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DEC 1 1931

Department of State

F/DEW

793.94/2967

FILED

DEC 3 1931

793.94  
note  
124.946



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER


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Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

November 28, 1931.



NOV 28 31

Nov NOV 28 31

793-94  
AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (Japan).

247 Very urgent.  
CONFIDENTIAL

For your information.

At press conference on November 27, correspondents brought to attention of the Secretary press despatches to the effect that General Honjo's army had moved southward from Mukden and was encamped thirty-five miles north of Chinchow and that Japanese bombing planes were operating in that area. The Secretary said:

QUOTE I will simply say I am at a loss to understand that, in view of very definite assurances that have been given to me on that subject. We have no confirmation of them and I am speaking therefore solely from the press despatches but not for quotation but for attribution. On the twenty-third of November, I asked <sup>our</sup> ~~my~~ ambassador in Tokyo to tell Baron Shidehara, the Foreign Minister of Japan, that I had seen with great apprehension press reports giving the impression that the Army Commanders of Japan were planning military expeditions against the forces of

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

793.94/2967A



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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PLAIN

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Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
\$

## Department of State

Washington,

- 2 -

China in the neighborhood of Chinchow and that I sincerely trusted that there was no basis for that report. The following day, November 24, I was assured by Baron Shidehara, the Foreign Minister of Japan, through Ambassador Forbes that he and the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff were all of them agreed that there should be no hostile operations toward Chinchow and that military orders to that effect had been issued. In view of that it is difficult for me to understand the press report about the advance of General Honjo's Army. UNQUOTE

This is all that was said by the Secretary on that subject.

Repeat to Nanking and Paris. No 605

FE:SKH/ZMF FE

NOV 28 1961.

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1959 1-138



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gutzman NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-126  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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OR

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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

1-126  
TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

NOV 30 1931.

6P

AmEmbassy,

Paris.

For Ambassador Dawes.

The Italian Ambassador saw the Under Secretary this afternoon to ask whether the Department would instruct you to say to Mr. Yoshizawa that the United States hoped an Italian might be included on the Committee to be appointed by the League of Nations to study the situation in Manchuria. Mr. Castle told the Ambassador that this would not be possible, since the Committee was purely and simply a League committee, in the formation of which this Government could not take any part; that this being the case, if the Japanese Ambassador should ask you whether this Government would object to an Italian member of the Committee, you would quite naturally answer that we would not object, since we have nothing to do with the appointment of the Committee.

U WRC/AB

N

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-126

793.94/2967B



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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Charge Department

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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138  
TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

Washington,

November 28, 1931.

793-94  
AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (JAPAN)

NOV 28 31

249 CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM STIMSON.

I am informed that some eleven observers, representing the British, French, Italian and other Governments are now at Chinchow. The American Military Attaché from Peiping arrived there on the twenty-fourth.

Margetts has been instructed QUOTE to cooperate fully with other foreign military observers in that region in examining the possibility of finding some means calculated to prevent any collision between the Chinese and Japanese troops in that region and of establishing liaison with the commanders of the Chinese and the Japanese forces with a view to the necessary arrangements being made. UNQUOTE I understand that McIlroy is now at Mukden. If it can be arranged without inconvenience or embarrassment, I should like to have McIlroy join Margetts and cooperate with Margetts on the mission indicated above and the general mission of observation. I have consulted the War Department and we agree in the hope that McIlroy will do this,

121-494  
Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1926 1-128

793.94/2967C



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
PREPARING OFFICE  
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1-138

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PLAIN

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR

## Department of State

Charge to  
\$

Washington,

- 2 -

provided, in his careful discretion, he feels that he  
can do so without embarrassment in his relations with  
the Japanese and to the mission in which he is engaged  
on their invitation. He should inform us of his  
decision. <sup>in close paraphrase</sup> Please transmit this message ~~verbatim~~ to  
McIlroy together with such instructions as you may  
wish to add. <sup>sk24</sup>

*Stimson*

*At Secretary's direction  
Approved by Mr. Castle*

FE:SKH:EMU

*RAM*  
FE

*Concurrence with Colonel Smith + Colonel Foy*  
Enciphered by *Q M.I.D. War Dept.*  
Sent by operator *M.*, 19 *27*

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1955 1-138



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REF

FROM GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated December 1, 1931

Rec'd 6:15 a. m.

COPIES SENT TO  
U.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DEC 1 1931

Department of State

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

1027, December 1, noon.

Department's 123, November 27, 1 p. m., to Nanking.

- Following from Minister:

"November 30, 3 p. m.

Your November 29, 11 a. m.; my November 28, midnight.

Inform Military Attache at Chinchow that I understand new instructions have been sent today to British Military Attache. You should also inform him that I understand that Paris proposal upon which other military observers are ~~reliably informed~~ <sup>working</sup> is as follows:

A. Observers to concert together with a view to possibility of establishing between Chinese and Japanese troops a neutral zone or any similar arrangement for avoiding a clash between them.

B. Observers should concert methods of establishing liaison with commanders of Japanese and Chinese with a view to making necessary arrangements.

I understand

F/DEW

793.94/2968

DEC 7 1931

FILED

793.94  
note  
793.94/18



114

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REF

2- #1027, from Peiping, Dec. 1, noon.

I understand British instructions contemplate the making of arrangements for a regular concerted organization of observers with liaison between different nationalities and collation of reporters and with sufficient observers held in readiness to proceed to the localities which may be indicated as danger points.

British observer has been instructed to concert with his colleagues at Chinchow with a view to the accomplishment of the above proposals. You are authorized to proceed along similar lines but should keep the Legation and the Department currently informed of all arrangements."

For the Minister

PERKINS

KLP



14  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

December 1, 1931.

Mr. ~~Secretary~~:

It seems to me that we should leave it to Dr. Sze to inform General Dawes -- if he chooses to do so.

In this whole matter, it seems to me we might best leave it to the people who are in Paris to wrestle with this problem, giving our assistance, where and when asked, in the form of such instructions as may be necessary, to our Military Attaché.

SKH

DAM  
SKH/ZMF



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

A portion of this telegram  
must be closely paraphrased  
before being communicated  
to anyone.

Secretary of State,

Washington

December 1, 5 p.m.

My November 24, midnight; and Department's 120,  
November 25, 4 p.m., to Nanking.

Instructions contained in the Department's 123,  
November 27, 1 p.m., to Nanking, have been transmitted  
to American Military Attache at Chinchow.

I have just seen Koo who tells me that apparently  
there has been a misunderstanding in regard to the  
situation at Chinchow on the part of the Japanese. He  
states that the Japanese refused to accept the proposal  
of the Council of the League in regard to military  
observers and has so notified Briand. He informed  
me that the Japanese Minister called upon him yesterday  
and brought up the question of Chinchow intimating that  
Japan had accepted tentative suggestion of Dr. Koo  
contained in my November 24, midnight, as a formal  
proposal and was demanding that Chinese now evacuate  
territory

Nanking

Dated December 1, 1931

Rec'd 10 a.m.



F/DEW

793.94/2969

DEC 3 1931

FILED

793.94  
note  
793.94/118



MET

2-from Nanking, December 1, 1931

territory up to and inside of Great Wall at Shanhaikwan, Japan undertaking not to send troops into areas thus evacuated but reserving the right to despatch troops into such area or beyond in case of bandit activities or emergency.

CONFIDENTIAL, Misunderstanding appears to have arisen through the fact that French Ambassador in Tokyo communicated to Japanese the proposal as a formal proposal on the part of the Chinese. Situation at this moment is that Chinese have accepted Council's proposal and have instructed their military at Chinchow to work with foreign military observers along that line. Japanese have not accepted Council's proposal but state that they have accepted Chinese proposal of November 24. Shigemitsu told Koo that if Chinese refused to abide by what he calls proposal of November 24 Japanese military will be incensed and situation may become once more dangerous. The above is for the confidential information of the Secretary. December 1, 6 p.m.

JOHNSON

WSB



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HS  
FROM

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Dated December 1, 1931

Rec'd 9:50 a.m.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 1 1931  
Department of State

Secretary of State

Washington

246, December 1, 4 p.m.

743-94

Referring to my telegram No. 241, I can think of nothing further of importance to tell of my last interview with Baron Shidehara except to say that he was much calmer in tone than the first time and gave a detailed explanation of the causes of existence of embarrassment which he had not intimated in an earlier interview. He is still being criticised quite sharply by the Army and undergoing newspaper attacks. He told me a representative of the Army had called on him and expressed to him the fear that the announcement of a Japanese agreement not to occupy Chinchow would encourage the Chinese so as to upset any hope of an accord. Speaking of the critical statements given out by his office spokesman he said it was contrary to his method of dealing with public questions; that he tried to make all his utterances conciliatory in tone. On Saturday night, the evening of the publication of the Associated Press messages I issued the following statement to the Japanese public:

(Green) "In the absence of exact information the Embassy

F/G  
793.94/2970

DEC 3 1931  
FILED



HS

2-#246 from Tokyo, December 1, 1931

Embassy is unable to make any statement on the alleged interview with the Secretary of State. It is hoped that the situation will be viewed calmly by the public until the receipt of official reports, which it is hoped will clear up any misunderstanding. (End Green)"

This, given out, appeared on the front pages of the Japanese papers and had a good effect. The following day after I had shown Baron Shidehara the substance of your number 248 he asked me if I could not make a further statement to the press which I did as follows:  
(Green)  
"The American Embassy has received advices from the State Department in Washington that the interview purporting to have come from Secretary Stimson is utterly at variance with his attitude. The Secretary of State has never held or expressed in public or private an attitude towards the Japanese Government such as that indicated in the press report but on the contrary has used his influence to restrain any expression by the American press which in his words "might be embarrassing to a solution of the Manchurian controversy". (End Green) He has publicly denied that the words as quoted were his. The newspapers here, with still a few repercussion, agree that the episode is closed unless it should have the effect of nullifying the accord which is now hoped is in process of adjustment.

CSB

FORBES




DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gutzfom NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 180. Political.

AM. RECD  
AMERICAN CONSULATE,

Geneva, Switzerland, November 17, 1931.



SUBJECT: Sino-Japanese Conflict - Transmitting  
Second Number of a Pamphlet Prepared  
by the Geneva Research Information  
Committee.

1-1065 GPO

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to refer to Consulate's despatch  
No. 180 Political of November 3, 1931, transmitting copies  
of a pamphlet on the Sino-Japanese conflict prepared by  
the Geneva Research Information Committee. Four copies  
of the second number of this series, entitled "The  
League and Manchuria - the Second Phase of the Chinese-  
Japanese Conflict, October 1 to October 24, 1931" are  
enclosed with this despatch.

For comment on this publication the Department is  
referred to the despatch cited above.

Respectfully yours,

*Prentiss B. Gilbert*  
Prentiss B. Gilbert.  
American Consul.

Enclosures:

4 copies of pamphlet  
as mentioned above.

Original and Five Copies to Department of State.  
One Copy to American Legation, Berne, Switzerland.

F/DEW

793.94/2971

MAY 23 1932

FILED



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1  
with No. 180 Pol. of  
November 17, 1931

# THE LEAGUE AND MANCHURIA

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THE SECOND PHASE OF THE CHINESE-JAPANESE CONFLICT

OCTOBER 1-24, 1931

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GENEVA SPECIAL STUDIES

Vol. II. — No. 11

NOVEMBER 1931

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Price: Two Swiss Francs or Fifty Cents (postpaid).

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GENEVA RESEARCH INFORMATION COMMITTEE  
4, Rue de Monthoux, Geneva

793.94/2971



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

#### NOTE

This day-by-day account of events in the conflict between China and Japan, and of League action is dealing with them, begun last month with the outbreak of trouble in September, has been carried on with the purpose of recording at the time the circumstances and conditions in which negotiations were conducted and of supplying a current analysis of developments and discussions through reference to documentary and historical sources. It is believed that these Studies will prove useful in future also to the student or historian making a more comprehensive and definitive investigation of the subject. For that reason, daily dispatches and exchanges of notes have been cited as fully as possible.

A Third Study is in preparation for the next phase of the problem from October 24th to the close of the ensuing Council session.



## THE LEAGUE AND MANCHURIA

### The Second Phase of the Chinese-Japanese Conflict

*October 1st-24th, 1931.*

Prepared under the supervision of the Geneva Research Information Committee

THE effort of the League of Nations to keep peace between China and Japan in Manchuria seemed, when the Council adjourned on September 30th, to offer reasonable hope of early success. Between October 1st and 13th, however, when the Council gathered in emergency session a day earlier than expected, there came grave new developments. These revealed that there were at stake not only the whole system for maintenance of international order but perhaps also the plans for the Disarmament Conference, with all they involved for political stability and economic recovery throughout the world.

In its final resolution adopted unanimously with the assent of both China and Japan, the Council had requested both parties "to do all in their power to hasten the restoration of normal relations between them". It recorded the Japanese representative's statement that his Government had no territorial designs in Manchuria and would continue as rapidly as possible the withdrawal of its troops, already begun, "in proportion as the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals is effectively assured". It likewise recorded the Chinese representative's statement that his government would assume responsibility for the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals outside that zone "as the withdrawal of Japanese troops continues and the Chinese local authorities and police forces are established". Both representatives had further given assurances that their Governments would "take all necessary steps to prevent any

extension of the scope of the incident or any aggravation of the situation".

Hardly a week had elapsed before the lull following the adjournment of the Council was broken by a new act which showed it to have been only a false calm between storms. Japanese airplanes flying on October 8th over the Chinese town of Chinchow, south-west of Mukden on the railway to Peking, bombed it, acting only as a retaliation, they claimed, for shots fired at them; two days before the Japanese commander had declared the army would not recognize the Manchurian authorities who were establishing an administration there upon instruction from the Nanking Government. This led to a Chinese request the next day for immediate re-assembly of the Council.

In the interval before the members of the Council could gather in Geneva, the Japanese Government transmitted to the League on Monday, October 12th, a communication which—although its significance hardly seemed to be realized at the time—changed the basis for consideration of the dispute as laid down in the Council's unanimous resolution of September 30th. It presented the new condition that Japan and China must agree upon certain "main principles" to form a foundation for normal relations between the two countries before the Japanese forces could retire without apprehension within the South Manchuria Railway zone.

On the same day, by a strange coincidence, the continuing interest of the United States was made evident by publication of a message



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to the Council from the Secretary of State, presented by the American Consul at Geneva, Prentiss Gilbert. Expressing the belief that cooperation should proceed along the lines followed since the trouble commenced, this message offered the strongest encouragement and reassurance. Recognizing that the League Council had outlined a course of action to be followed by the two countries, it urged that, since both Governments had made commitments to the League, the League should "in no way relax its vigilance and in no way fail to assert all the pressure and authority in its competence with a view to regulating the action of Japan and China". The American Government on its part undertook to try "to reinforce League policy" by acting independently through its own diplomatic channels.

#### OCTOBER 1st—12th

THE scene of action and interest shifted with the adjournment of the Council, to the Far East, although the parties defended their tactics there before public opinion and sought to reinforce their position in the Council by constant communications to Geneva. The Japanese representative resumed the interchange of correspondence with a letter following the last session on Wednesday, September 30th, circulated to the Council on Thursday October 1st, responding to two questions which had been put by the representative. On the basis of information from the government in Tokio, the letter first asserted that no Chinese civilian had been arbitrarily arrested, and that property, including public buildings and monuments, had been protected; and second, that no train had been bombarded on the Peining line, but instead a reconnoitering airplane, fired upon by Chinese soldiers, had returned the fire, taking care not to endanger a train seen in the neighbourhood. An attached telegram said that the policing of the Chinese area and the open town of Mukden had been assured by Chinese police under Japanese direction, control would be transferred to a Chinese committee, and nearly all Japanese sentries were being withdrawn.

At the same time, word came in dispatches to the London *Times*, that J. G. Thomson, the British General Manager of the Peking-Mukden Railway, supported the charge that a Japanese airplane had fired on a passenger train. In a report to the British Consul at Tientsin, he stated that on Thursday, September 24th, he was travelling with his family in a train packed with Chinese refugees, there being no soldiers on the train or in the vicinity, and that machine gun fire from the airplane killed two Chinese and wounded several others. Other Peking-Mukden trains had been fired upon, and traffic was at a standstill. Similarly, United Press dispatches said that Japanese airplanes were pursuing Chinese soldiers reported to have sacked a number of Korean villages and killed three hundred people.

Meanwhile the movement of revolt in Manchuria against the administration of Chang-Hsueh Liang, the Military Governor associated with the Nanking Government, threatened to spread more widely in the absence or disability of local Chinese authorities. Chinese spokesmen charged that the Japanese military commanders were encouraging rebellion; the Japanese Prime Minister in Tokio issued a declaration denying responsibility and insisting that strict neutrality must be observed in regard to the attempts to set up an administration independent of Nanking.

The Chinese representative on the Council resumed on Friday, October 2nd, the transmission of the series of telegrams giving information on local conditions, of which thirty-seven had already been communicated. Number 38 reported Japanese cavalry and artillery gathering at Sinmin. Number 39 declared that Japanese troops had sealed telegraph and telephone rooms at the Huangkutung station, prohibiting their use and censoring dispatches and news, and had confiscated grain from a warehouse.

#### Anxiety Increases

Reports from the Far East to the London *Times*, the Paris *Herald* and the *Journal de Genève* indicated increased skirmishing between Chinese and Japanese troops at various points

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in Manchuria, attacks on trains and robbing of passengers by irregular bands of Chinese soldiers, and Soviet cavalry demonstrations on the Siberian-Manchurian border to prevent frontier raids by Chinese bandits. The economic situation in Mukden was described as growing steadily worse; the closing of two provincial banks had left nearly 60,000 Chinese government and industrial employees, including teachers and clerks, without pay.

The effect of the whole conflict and the uncertainties it created, upon European conditions and policies, began to show in editorial comments. M. Saint-Brice, writing in the Paris *Journal* of October 2nd, said:

"It may be asked whether results have been attained by the action of the Council or in spite of it... The shock has been avoided; but if it is because the Chinese count on the League of Nations to regulate matters in their stead, and this is the impression that they have given at Geneva, then their deception is bitter. The Japanese have not let themselves be manoeuvred out of position. They have insisted that the dispute must be settled directly. They have rejected any enquiry."

On the same day, the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* commented editorially:

"The League of Nations has failed in dealing with the Chinese-Japanese conflict... It has been proved that the League at Geneva, whose character is not free from suspicion, does not dare to take the least step against a Great Power."

#### Brigandage and Bombing

The Japanese delegation returned to the controversy on Saturday, October 3rd, with a summary of telegrams depicting brigandage and violence in towns and localities not controlled by Japanese troops, attacks on Japanese and Korean residents, bandit raids on villages and trains, evacuation of Japanese women and children from parts of Manchuria remote from the railway to the railway zone, also intensive anti-Japanese agitation throughout China and propaganda in favour of breaking off trade

relations. Despite this, another telegram reported withdrawal of a battalion which had been brought from Korea to reinforce the railway guards, and retirement of various local detachments.

The Chinese delegation countered with a telegram, No. 40, to the effect that Japanese troops were still in occupation of Mukden, Kirin and other important cities, and that in the circumstances it was impossible for the Chinese authorities to carry out their administrative responsibilities.

Rioting at Newchwang, an important Manchurian treaty port, was described in cable dispatches to the London *Times* and other papers, which said that Chinese police were resisting bandit soldiers. Japanese airplanes were declared to have bombed a larger body of Chinese troops who had fired on them while they were flying over the Chinese railway line east of Mukden leading to Kirin. From Tokio came reports of looting and pillaging of Japanese and Korean settlements, and killings of Japanese and Korean residents, and also a statement that three Manchurian provinces had set up independent governments.

October 4th, Sunday, was quiet. Chang Hsueh Liang, the Manchurian Governor, was reported to have expressed, in a press interview, the hope of prompt settlement of the dispute, and to have declared that he was ready to return to Mukden and take over administration if the Japanese would withdraw to their zone. In Moscow, conferences began between Mr. Litvinoff, Commissar for Foreign Affairs, and the new Ambassador from Japan, Mr. Hirota. In Nanking, Mr. Frank Lee, vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, took over the conduct of policy temporarily following the resignation of Dr. Wang, the Foreign Minister, suffering from the attacks made on him by dissatisfied Chinese students.

#### China Tries a Move in Manchuria

The Chinese representative sent word on Monday, October 5th, of a critical decision: General Chiang Kai Shek, the President of the



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National Government, had ordered Marshal Chang Hsueh Liang to appoint high military officers, commanding Manchurian forces, to take over places to be evacuated by Japanese troops and to be responsible for the restoration of order. At the same time the Chinese series of telegrams giving information from localities was continued. No. 41 reported Japanese military occupying another railway station and telegraph office, and a Japanese airplane dropping bombs. It further gave a statement from "a banker escaped from Mukden" in regard to alleged business and social disorder there. The same telegram said that north-east Manchuria was entirely isolated, with newspapers barred, mail censored, telegrams not transmitted, and wireless stations occupied, and that the population was organising "Self Decision Associations" against the independence movement said to be incited by Japanese-owned newspapers published in Chinese. No. 42 gave a translation of a letter from a Japanese Chief of Division to Mr. Tokarjevsky, manager of the branch office of the Skoda works at Mukden, regarding seizure of Chinese airplanes.

Cable dispatches from Peking to the London *Times* said that Chang Hsueh Liang minimized the seriousness of the Manchurian independence movement. Japanese forces from Yingkow, the port of Newchwang, had occupied the Chinese city of Newchwang following the reported trouble with bandits there. The United States Legation had received telegraphic word that the Nanking Foreign Office was requesting the United States to appoint representatives to investigate the Manchurian situation before the the Council of the League of Nations should reconvene. Further, the Spanish Consul-General in Shanghai was said to have been instructed to proceed to Manchuria for an enquiry.

From Tokio came the news that four Japanese destroyers had been ordered to go to Shanghai because of dangers to Japanese residents created by unfriendly agitation in the region of the Yangtze river.

Further evidence of the reaction that the conflict had on world politics appeared in the *Deutsche Tageszeitung*, which maintained in a long article that the League of Nations had

been shown unable to give real protection to a weak nation, and concluded:

"We know now for certain that this 'egg-dance' is the best that the Council is able to perform in such cases and that only the possibility of safeguarding our rights without foreign assistance can give us protection and real security."

#### China Moves Again; Japan Retorts

New steps taken by China in the attempt to resume authority and responsibility in Manchuria followed, on Tuesday, October 6th, the announcement of the preceding day that orders had gone forward to Chang Hsueh Liang. The Chinese delegation transmitted another special cable to the effect that the Manchurian Governor had appointed two generals to take over places to be evacuated by the Japanese and to restore order. No. 43 in the Chinese series of telegrams of general information reported scouting and bombing by Japanese airplanes over Chinese territory, seizure by Japanese troops of the machinery department, telegraph office and engineering department at Huangkutung, and various movements of Japanese military companies.

General Honjo, Commander of Japanese forces in South Manchuria, meanwhile declared in Mukden, according to cable dispatches to the London *Times* from Tokio, that the Japanese would not recognize the authority of Chang Hsueh Liang, named by Nanking to resume administration in Manchuria. The Foreign Office in Tokio stated that General Honjo's pronouncement was made without official instructions. Two more destroyers were ordered to the Yangtze; and further troubles were reported with bandits and murders of Koreans in Manchuria.

At Mukden, the British Government representative protested on behalf of the British-Chinese Corporation, interested in the Peking-Mukden railway, against the Japanese occupation of part of its line. He asked that the central station at Mukden be opened for the passage of guarded Chinese trains and that traffic also be permitted to Yingkow, the port of Newchwang.

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#### Japan Depicts Disorder

Wednesday, October 7th, brought from the Japanese delegation to the League important new communications and indications of policy. A telegram from Paris, under date of the preceding day, stated that the Japanese government was continuing to urge the Chinese authorities to take measures for the protection of Japanese nationals in Manchuria and not hesitating at extreme measures in the withdrawal of Japanese residents to safe localities, with the purpose of not aggravating the situation. These measures were described in a detailed annex. In spite of them, the Japanese message charged that Chinese disbanded soldiers and brigands were daily committing numerous acts of violence against Japanese and Korean nationals in the interior of Manchuria and that in addition the anti-Japanese movement was extending in China with the situation becoming more and more serious. The bases for complaints of violence were given in two further detailed annexes. A second telegram of the same date gave information as to transfers and withdrawals of Japanese troops. Still another telegram, of the 7th gave reports from Manchuria that various separatist movements had broken out and that, regarding them as purely Chinese affairs to be dealt with by the inhabitants of Manchuria themselves, formal instructions had been issued to Japanese Consular authorities to forbid Japanese residents to take any part.

The separatist movements in Manchuria, according to Peking dispatches to the London *Times* the same day, did not have any popular backing, their promoters being officials dissatisfied with Chang Hsueh Liang who were taking the opportunity to set up an administration antagonistic to him. Chang had twice sent an emissary to the Japanese Legation in Peking with a view to opening negotiations for evacuation of territory and transfer of authority, with no practical result.

From Nanking there were reports that China, hitherto divided, was uniting in the common emergency. Overtures for peace and understanding between the Nationalist Government and the dissident faction at Canton were holding

out hope of success, and that Chang Kai Shek might agree to relinquish the presidency in favour of the Cantonese leader, Hu Han Min, a prisoner in his own house since March.

Tokio reported that another cruiser had been ordered to Shanghai with four hundred marines, bringing the strength of Japanese forces landed there above 1,000, as a step to support a further protest against agitation endangering Japanese residents in China and the boycott threatening to ruin Japanese trade. The Naval Office had also ordered two squadrons at the bases at Kure and Sasebo to prepare for action in the event of need. Japanese armed forces at Shanghai were said to be fewer than those of the other Powers. The Japanese Consul at Nanking had informed the American and British Consuls that in case of necessity he would order evacuation of the consular staff and all Japanese nationals in order to avoid conflicts with the Chinese.

Editorial comment in American and British papers now began to broaden out the discussion of the affair and its significance. The *Manchester Guardian*, in an editorial of Wednesday, October 7th, entitled "The League Must Act" said in regard to the Japanese undertaking to withdraw troops:

"The League Council made a mistake in not insisting upon supervision, on behalf of the League, by neutral representatives on the spot, who would have reported on the progress of events.... The League Council may or may not be impotent to restrain a Great Power, especially in the Far East, from making a war. That remains to be seen... This is the first time the League has been threatened with a first class war, and if the League fails to act its whole machinery will have been discredited. Action, with or without success, is called for."

Walter Lippmann, in his department "Today and To-morrow" published in the New York *Herald-Tribune* and the Paris *Herald*, writing on the Manchurian problem, gave this analysis of its implications:

"It is easy to say, of course, that the Manchurian affair demonstrates the futility of all international effort to maintain peace... The existing international machinery of peace is inadequate. That does not, how-



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ever, make it useless. To argue that it is useless is as unreasonable as to say that doctors are useless because there are diseases that they cannot cure. In medicine to know that is to have the strongest incentive to expand and deepen research. Why then, in human affairs, should we throw up our hands and quit because we are reminded how difficult the problem is?

"As a matter of fact, the Manchurian affair has marked a definite step forward in the organization of international relations... For ten years Europe has been asking us what we would do if the League were confronted with a great issue of Europe. For four years Europe has been asking us how we would reconcile our obligations under the Kellogg Pact with our supposed hostility to the League. We have steadfastly refused to answer either question and our refusal has contributed to the uncertainties of Europe. Secretary Stimson has now given a demonstration which answers these questions. He has shown by his action that in a crisis we shall consult with the League and formulate a common policy with it."

#### Chinese Alleges Political Plotting

The Chinese representative transmitted two more telegrams on Thursday, October 8th. No. 44 reported movement and withdrawal of troops and Japanese nationals at various points. No. 45 gave information of the seizure of Chinese airplanes at Mukden, of the Japanese reorganization of a trench mortar arsenal for manufacturing motor trucks, and of disorder and confiscation of stores at the Mukden arsenal and searching and looting of the houses of Manchurian officials.

Further agreements between the Cantonese dissidents and the National Government at Nanking were reported in dispatches to the *London Times*, with arrangement for a final peace conference at Shanghai. At Peking, Chang Hsueh Liang, the Manchurian Governor, accused the Japanese of lending aid to a movement in Mongolia to establish the independence of the country, and of sending five train-loads of munitions guarded by Japanese troops for delivery into the interior.

From Washington came the important news that American representatives were to visit Manchuria and send official information.

#### Japanese Airplanes Bomb Chinchow

Into the exchange of charges and counter-charges, claims and counter-claims, there broke on Friday, October 9th, the news of the Japanese bombing at Chinchow, decisively changing the situation for the worse. At once there was communication between the President of the Council in Madrid and the Secretary-General in Geneva, on arrangements to summon the members in extraordinary session, followed by communication with the Foreign Offices in London, Paris, and other capitals. The Chinese representative meanwhile wrote to the Secretary-General:

I am in receipt of such serious information regarding further aggressive military operations upon the part of Japanese armed forces in Manchuria that I am compelled to ask in behalf of my government that a meeting of the Council be forthwith summoned in order that it may determine what action shall be taken in the premises.

I have the honour to call to your attention that these military operations have taken place despite the repeated assurances given by the Japanese Government to the Council that its troops would be rapidly withdrawn and that no action would be taken which would tend further to aggravate the situation.

With this letter he transmitted three new telegrams of information. The first, Number 48, reported that the preceding afternoon, October 8th, twelve Japanese airplanes had circled over Chinchow and dropped thirty-six bombs, chiefly directed at the University buildings where the Manchurian Provincial Government was temporarily located. A bomb striking a railway service car had killed two Chinese; others had been dropped on the locomotive shed. Number 47 gave a latter report that fifty or sixty bombs were dropped and several locomotives destroyed, and that the railway station was crowded at the time and the total casualties not yet ascertained. Number 48 from Nanking dealt with the rumored Mongolian independence movement; it asserted that the Japanese were arming the Mongols in several places, had urged the chief of the Young Mongol party to declare independence and

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forced the head of the Mongol forces to assume command under the title of Commander-in-Chief of the Autonomous Mongol Army, and had supplied a first instalment of arms consisting of three thousand rifles, 1,000,000 rounds of ammunition, four trench mortars, four mountain guns, and two airplanes, all from the Mukden arsenal.

The Japanese delegation again presented a long detailed telegram on the subject of anti-Japanese demonstrations throughout China and efforts to bring about a complete break in economic relations with Japan. It contended that, while the agitation was to a certain extent restricted in northern and southern China, in districts under the influence of the Nationalist Government the control exercised was so weak that the situation was most critical at Nanking and Shanghai. Further it specified damages suffered by Japanese and Koreans in Manchuria.

League action began immediately. The President of the Council telegraphed to both China and Japan:

Information received tends to show that incidents are taking place in Manchuria and elsewhere which cannot but embitter feeling, and thus render settlement more difficult. In these circumstances, and pending the Meeting of the Council, I feel it is my duty as President of the Council to remind the two parties of the engagements taken before the Council to refrain from any action which would aggravate the situation, and to express the confident hope that steps are being taken on both sides to execute fully the assurances given to the Council and embodied in its resolution of the 30th September.

The text of this telegram was communicated to the other Members of the Council and also to the United States, to which communications at this stage were addressed to the Secretary of State in care of the American Consulate at Geneva, according to the following form:

In accordance with the decision taken by the Council of the League of Nations on September 22nd, the Secretary-General of the League of Nations has the honour to forward herewith, for the information of the Government of the United States of America, (a) document(s) regarding the appeal of the Government of China to the League under Art. 11 of the Covenant.

Geneva, October, 1931.

The same day the President of the Council sent a second telegram to his colleagues in the following terms:

By letter of today's date which is being distributed to Members Council Chinese representative on Council has asked by reason of serious information received that a meeting of Council be forthwith summoned. In view this request I have decided that the meeting of Council convoked for Wednesday October 14th should now be held at midday on Tuesday October 13th at Geneva. Considering early date of meeting would suggest that any information as to development of situation obtained by Members of Council in accordance with paragraph nine of resolution of September thirtieth should be forwarded as soon as possible to Secretary-General for transmission to Council.

The Japanese army's latest move in Manchuria led the *London Times* correspondent in Tokyo to cable that it apparently intended to prevent Chang Hsueh Liang from establishing at Chinchow a base where an administration could be set up and his army reformed, and that the Japanese airplanes there scattered leaflets (the text of which was later transmitted to Geneva) warning the people of the army's refusal to recognize his government and determination to take action against it.

In the same despatch, published on October 9th, he reported that Foreign Minister Shidehara was sending to Nanking a new protest against anti-Japanese agitation, characterizing the boycott as "an instrument of national policy" violating treaties and constituting "a form of hostile agitation without the use of arms" and concluding that Japan would hold China responsible for failure to suppress the movement and protect Japanese lives and property.

The Peking correspondent of the *Times* on the same date quoted J. G. Thomson, the British manager of the Peking-Mukden Railway, in substantiation of the report that twelve Japanese airplanes circled over Chinchow and dropped thirty-six bombs. Other cables to the *Daily Herald* from Mukden told of the departure of Japanese troops with artillery for a point on the Peking-Mukden line threatened by Chinese soldiers.



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#### China Presses for Troop Withdrawal

The next day, Saturday, October 10, brought word of significant new developments. The Chinese representative transmitted a message from Nanking concerning the bombing of Chinchow, and requesting the Council to take urgent measures for the conservation of peace and to send a League Commission to investigate the grave situation there. He expressed his hope that, pending a decision on this request, the Council would arrange to obtain immediate information.

Three more telegrams in the Chinese series were submitted. Number 49 reported Japanese airplane scouting and troop fighting along the Peking-Mukden Railway. Number 50 described the movement of a Japanese armored train, and charged that at one point five Japanese airplanes had dropped bombs killing several Chinese. Number 51 gave supplementary details in regard to the bombing of Chinchow.

A practical time-limit for the arrangement to evacuate points held outside the railway zone appeared in another notification to Japan. As reported by the Chinese representative to the Council on the 10th, this step had been taken the preceding day, a telegram of that date reading:

Chinese minister in Tokyo notified Japanese Government on October 6th that Chang Tso Hsiang and Wang Shu Chang have been appointed representative to take over places to be evacuated by Japanese military forces and asked for telegraphic instructions to be sent to Japanese military commanders to begin handing over. No reply received up to date. Chinese Minister is instructed to deliver second note as follows:

"Fulfillment of Council resolution September thirtieth requires immediate transfer to Chinese authorities of localities occupied by Japanese troops since September eighteenth. Chinese Government having pledged itself to assume responsibility for safety of lives and property of Japanese nationals during process of withdrawal of Japanese troops and reestablishment local Chinese authorities and police forces notified Japanese Government October sixth of appointment of its representatives and asked it to make immediate arrangements to enable Chinese troops effectively to take possession evacuat-

ed localities and thus to protect lives and property of residents in conformity with its undertaking given at Council. As no reply received and matter extremely urgent I am instructed to request: firstly, that Japanese Government indicate immediate localities to be taken over this week; secondly, that in the course of the day instructions to be telegraphed to military commanders so that reoccupation can begin tomorrow."

The Japanese Government forwarded a telegraphic version of its warning memorandum of October 9th to the Nanking Government, which had been reported in press despatches from Tokyo; this was circulated by the Secretary-General to the Council on the 10th:

Firstly, Japanese Government has already made it clear that Manchurian affair is nothing but outcome of deeprooted anti-Japanese feeling in China, which has taken specially provocative form in recent challenge to Japanese troops, compelling latter to resort to measures of self-defence. Responsibility for present situation naturally lies with Chinese Government. Japanese Government has time and again requested Chinese Government to take proper steps to check anti-Japanese movement, so systematically carried out in various places in China. Being desirous of maintaining cordial relations between two countries, this Government has exercised greatest patience and forbearance in hope that this deplorable state of affairs may yet improve. Unfortunately however this anti-Japanese agitation seems now to be assuming alarming proportions. It is learned that anti-Japanese societies at Shanghai and elsewhere have passed resolutions not only to enforce prohibition of trading in and transportation of Japanese goods, but to order cancellation of existing contracts, and otherwise to prohibit all business transactions and to cancel contracts of employment between Chinese and Japanese, in order thus to effect so-called 'severance of economic relations with Japan'. For that purpose examination and detention of goods and persons, intimidation and violence, and various other means are being employed to give effect to such resolutions, and severe penalties are meted out to any who may fail to comply with these orders, some societies even going so far as to threaten capital punishment. Moreover cases of expropriation and detention of goods owned by Japanese people, and of threats and violence against their

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lives and property have become so numerous and insistent throughout China, that they have been forced to withdraw totally or partially from various localities.

Secondly it is to be noted that anti-Japanese movement in China is conducted as instrument of national policy under direction of nationalist party, which in view of peculiar political organization of China is inseparable in function from Government. That movement must therefore be clearly distinguished from one which originates spontaneously amongst people. It is therefore evident that present anti-Japanese movement in China is not only in contravention of letter and spirit of treaties existing between two countries, but constitutes form of hostile act without use of arms contrary to all standards of justice and friendship. Chinese Government will be assuming very serious responsibility, if it should fail to take prompt and effective measures to quell that agitation. Moreover in meting out penal sentences to individual citizens, anti-Japanese societies, which are purely private organisations, are clearly usurping authority of national government.

Thirdly, it will be remembered that at recent meeting of Council of League of Nations at Geneva Chinese representative as well as Japanese gave assurance that their respective governments would endeavour to prevent aggravation of situation. Chinese Government, obviously against that pledge, is actually aggravating situation by making no honest or effective effort to restrain activities of anti-Japanese societies, which are jeopardizing lives and property as well as liberty of trade of Japanese subjects in different parts of China.

Fourthly, Japanese Government desires to call once more serious attention of Chinese Government to those actions on part of anti-Japanese societies, and to declare at same time that Chinese Government will be held responsible for whatever may be consequences of its failure to suppress anti-Japanese movement, and to afford adequate protection to lives and property of Japanese subjects in China.

The same day came the first response to the request of the Council for information from the Governments represented on it. From the British Government there was a telegram to the effect that on the 6th the points outside the railway zone still occupied by Japanese forces were Mukden, Kirin, Taonan, and other

important towns, and that Japanese armored trains were operating along lines south and west from Mukden.

From Tokyo a correspondent reported to the London *Times* that the Japanese Cabinet, while deploring the attack on Chinchow, would not disavow it because of being in agreement with the army's purpose to forestall Chang Hsueh Liang's return to power.

From Peking another correspondent gave word that several members of the British Legation were leaving to investigate the situation in Manchuria, and that Consuls and their nationals had been warned to be ready to withdraw.

#### Washington and Geneva

From Washington special cables to the Paris *Herald* said that following a Cabinet meeting President Hoover had decided to act in an effort to prevent war, either by invoking the Briand-Kellogg Pact or the Nine Power Treaty on China.

Uncertainty as to how far the United States would support the League in dealing with the situation prevailed at Geneva; expectant interest in the approaching Council session increased with the satisfying news that Lord Reading, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, would attend to speak for Great Britain, accompanied also by Viscount Cecil, while Briand, Minister of Foreign Affairs, would come for France, and Grandi, holding a like post, for Italy. Rumors multiplied that the Council would invite the United States to appoint an observer to sit with it.

Further, the London *Daily Telegraph* claimed to be reliably informed that the chief signatories to the Briand-Kellogg Pact had started negotiations for simultaneous action in common to remind China and Japan of their obligation under its terms to settle their differences without recourse to war.

Meanwhile despatches from Kobe stated that after the Japanese Cabinet decided to send two war vessels to Shanghai, the Navy Minister determined to send four—two to proceed to Hankow up the Yangtze River and the other two to different ports. Reports from



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Tokyo claimed that Chinese troops had violently bombarded the Japanese airplanes patrolling over Chinchow, forcing them to reply in self-defense by bombing the town.

#### Japan Indicates New Demands

Mention of the "fundamental points" that later caused so much difficulty in League consideration of the dispute appeared for the first time in the Japanese government's reply, dated October 9th, which the Japanese representative had circulated to the Council on Sunday, October 11th, to the Chinese notes regarding arrangements for evacuation of Manchurian territory. Because of its importance in joining the issue between the two countries, the telegraphic version sent to the Council is given in full:

First part of Chinese Government's note states that "Japanese representative on League of Nations has formally declared for withdrawal of all Japanese troops in different districts and reestablishment of situation existing before September eighteenth, and adds that Council's resolution ordered total withdrawal of Japanese troops before meeting of October fourteenth". As appears from Japanese representative's repeated statement to Council, the withdrawal of Japanese troops in railway zone is conditional on security of our railways and protection of life and property of our nationals in Manchuria. Moreover Council's resolution of September thirtieth contains no provision ordering total withdrawal of our troops before Council meeting of October fourteenth.

Regarding points raised in second part of Chinese note, Japanese Government is prepared to define its attitude as follows:

(1) Military operations undertaken by Japanese army along South Manchurian railway line since incident of night of September eighteenth between Chinese and Japanese troops near Mukden were designed solely to avert by preventive action the potential menace constituted by presence in these districts of Chinese armies in crushingly superior numbers. Japanese troops have in fact suffered considerable losses of men in spite of proclamation of non resistance of Chinese troops.

(2) Chinese Government proposes appoint Generals Chang Tso Hsing and Wan Shu Chang to arrange with Japanese military authorities for suitable means of maintaining order in certain localities in railway zone after withdrawal of Japanese troops. The present concentration in these localities of armed Chinese soldiers to cope with any eventuality, although maintenance of order is sole object in view, would very probably under present circumstances as at time of incident have regrettable effect of reviving troops' feeling of serious impending menace. In view of extreme tension of national feeling on both sides danger of conflict between troops of both parties is probably greater than at any moment hitherto.

(3) Japanese Government considers most urgent task of moment is collaboration of our two Governments, with a view to calming excited national feelings by rapidly establishing through direct negotiation fundamental points capable of constituting a basis allowing of resumption of normal relations. Once national feelings are allayed by direct negotiation, Japanese troops might without overmuch apprehension return entirely to railway zone, thus facilitating assertion of authority and maintenance of order in localities in question.

(4) Japanese Government is ready to negotiate immediately with responsible representatives of Chinese Government in order to establish fundamental points referred to.

Further cases in which Japanese residents in China had left towns where they were living, in order to seek refuge from the risks of anti-Japanese agitation, appeared in another telegram transmitted on the same day by the Japanese representative, laying emphasis on troubles in communities situated along the Yangtze river.

#### Japan Reviews Her Case

The Japanese Government re-stated to the Council its attitude of relations to China in another long telegram, circulated on Sunday, October 11th: It argued that (1) it had spared no effort to circumscribe events and settle matters by direct negotiations, and had drawn up a plan for withdrawing troops within the

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railway zone progressively as security might be assured; (2) it was formally resolved to follow up this line of conduct, and was continuing to put forward the idea of direct negotiations to reduce the extreme tension and eradicate the "deeper causes" of trouble; (3) the Chinese Government had withdrawn its unofficial proposal for direct negotiations which the Japanese Government accepted, on the ground that the League Council was dealing with the matter, and the Japanese Government was glad to think that the Council favoured direct negotiations when it called upon both parties in its resolution of September 30th to leave no stone unturned in order to hasten the re-establishment of normal relations; (4) the Chinese Government might explain its inactivity in regard to protection of Japanese nationals by the flight of local officials and dispersion of Chinese troops as a result of Japanese operations, which were only a result of provocation by Chinese soldiers and constituted measures of protection against the anti-Japanese movement; (5) finally, in response to the Chinese note regarding withdrawal of troops and assumption of responsibility for maintenance of order in Manchuria, the Japanese Government had urged the necessity of immediate negotiations on points raised as well as "fundamental points indispensable for re-establishment of normal relations."

The message concluded that improvement in the situation depended solely on the sincerity displayed by the Chinese Government.

In the hurry of receiving and distributing information from various sources, Japan's first full mention of the "fundamental points" which determined her new line of policy passed without attracting much public notice.

The Chinese delegation circulated on the same day six new telegrams in its series. No. 52 told that the chief of the Office for Foreign Affairs at Chientao and his staff had been expelled by Japanese soldiers on September 29th. No. 53 again charged that the Japanese military were materially assisting the Mongols in an independence movement by sending them large supplies of fire-arms. No. 54 specified important cities still under the control of Japanese forces, with the postal and telegraph

offices occupied. No. 55 stated that Japanese with an armed train had damaged the railway at a point on the Peking-Mukden line, that an airplane had dropped handbills warning residents not to approach the point where mines had been laid, and that connection between the eastern and western Chinese railways was completely interrupted. No. 56 gave a translation of a text purported to be that of handbills dropped by Japanese airplanes at Chinchow on the 8th, as published in the Japanese papers of the 9th, reading as follows:

"Chang Hsueh Liang, that most rapacious wanton, stinking youth, is still failing to realize his odiousness and has established a Provisional Mukden Government at Chinchow to plot intrigues in the territories which are safely under the rule of the troops of the Great Japanese Empire, when the heart of the Manchurian mass is no longer with him, his ground is lost and the four provinces of the North East are going to revolt against him. The Imperial army, which, in accordance with the principles of justice, is endeavouring to safeguard its interests and to protect the masses, will never recognize the Provisional Government of Chang Hsueh-Liang at Chinchow, and therefore it is obliged to take drastic measures to suppress such a government. The people of Chinchow should submit to the kindness and power of the army of the Great Japanese Empire and should oppose and prevent the establishment of Chang Hsueh-liang's government, otherwise they will be considered as decidedly opposing the army of the Great Japanese Empire, in which case the army will ruthlessly destroy Chinchow. The people of Chinchow are hereby enjoined carefully to consider their situation and to take such decisions as they will deem wise."

No. 57 supplied a translation of the appeal issued by the Chinese Government on Wednesday October 7th to the people: In the situation created by floods and by the Japanese action in Manchuria, the Government urged that "during the strict time limits fixed by the Council of the League of Nations for the withdrawal of Japanese troops, every Chinese national should all the more remain calm and strictly observe public order so as to deprive foreigners of any kind of possible excuse." Local authorities were made responsible to



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protect the lives and property of all foreign residents and to exert special caution against disturbances and lawlessness.

The British Government forwarded a telegram from Peking in which, under date of October 9th, the British Consul-General at Tientsin gave information from Mr. Thomson of the Peking-Mukden Railway tending to confirm earlier reports of the bombing of Chinchow.

The German Government likewise communicated a telegram, circulated on the 11th, from the German delegation at Peking, giving information from the German Consul at Mukden that on October 9th there had been no change in the number of Japanese troops, whose distribution altered daily, that quite recently troops had been concentrated in camps and replaced by Japanese gendarmerie and Chinese police, and to combat fugitive soldiers and bandits there were almost daily expeditions into Chinese territory and airplane observations to the west, accompanied by bombing when the Japanese said they were attacked.

Meanwhile news dispatches to the Paris *Herald* from Washington said that Ambassador Debuchi of Japan had called on the Secretary of State to discuss the bombing of Chinchow, which he claimed did not indicate a more aggressive attitude toward China but was an isolated military incident with unfortunate consequences; the sending of Japanese warships to Chinese waters was also a precautionary measure, and Japan was standing by its public denial of desire for annexation in Manchuria. Cables from Shanghai described Japanese air attacks on several Chinese concentrations in Manchuria, bombing of a railhead north-west of Mukden, and scouting observation as far as a point near Tientsin.

#### Japan Emphasizes Her "Fundamental Points"

Monday, October 12th, brought news which made it finally clear that the League was entering a different phase of action in a changed situation. Japan now faced the Council of the League itself, in reply to the president's telegram of the 9th, with her insistence upon settlement of the "fundamental points" al-

ready hinted to China. Japan's response to the President of the Council, transmitted by the Japanese representative, took up the situation under these headings:

(1) While pursuing the line of action which it had decided upon from the outset, of preventing any aggravation and bringing back Japanese troops into the railway zone as and when security of nationals and of property was assured, the Government expressed conviction that a friendly solution of the difficulty could only be obtained by direct negotiations between Japan and China.

(2) Military operations were described as having come to a standstill, skirmishes between Chinese and Japanese forces and bombings by airplanes were discussed, and at the same time it was asserted that "no state of war exists" but that the Japanese troops were obliged to take measures of precaution and that in such conditions the Chinchow incident occurred.

(3) The argument was advanced that the dispatch of Japanese naval units to the Yangtze did not aggravate the situation, but that by anti-Japanese agitation China was making matters worse while Japan was adopting an attitude of patience and had evacuated consuls and nationals from danger zones, only sending warships in connection with a protest against anti-Japanese movement to dissipate excitement caused by threats to the lives and property of her nationals and to ensure their protection in accordance with the usual action taken by Powers in similar situations.

(4) The question was raised whether the Chinese authorities would be able to guarantee order outside the Manchurian railway zone if Japanese troops should be withdrawn, since Japanese residents in China far from the scene of trouble had to face menaces to the safety of their lives and property.

(5) The contention was made that to relieve tension by mutual cooperation it was "essential to agree upon certain main principles to form a foundation for the maintenance of normal relations between the two countries," and that once these principles had been laid down, tension would undoubtedly relax and the

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Japanese forces would be able to retire without apprehension within the railway zone.

The message concluded with an offer to open negotiations with responsible representatives of China on these "fundamental points".

The Japanese bureau accredited to the League of Nations backed up the position assumed by Japan by transmitting on the same day the text of an official telegram from Tokio giving details concerning the anti-Japanese movement in a number of towns throughout China. It further communicated an important Japanese version of the bombing at Chinchow and the circumstances leading to it:

The atmosphere of tension which prevailed between the Japanese army in Manchuria and the army of General Chang Hsueh Liang in consequence of recent events at Mukden has, unfortunately, not yet been dispelled. Far from taking effective steps to improve the atmosphere, the Chinese authorities are allowing the anti-Japanese movement to develop everywhere. Moreover, the Peitay- ing formations, pushed back by our troops, had reformed and were moving in the direction of Chinchow, where Generals Chang Hsueh Liang and Chang Tso Hsiang have their headquarters. We had received reliable information to the effect that the Chinese troops were concentrating east and west of the railway and were preparing to take advantage of the small strength of the Japanese guards to attack them from both sides. In view of this alarming news, the Japanese commander, wishing for accurate information as to these movements of troops in order to avoid a surprise attack, sent eleven aeroplanes to make a reconnaissance in the direction of Chinchow, where they were received with a heavy fire. In self-defence they replied with bombs, directed solely against the military headquarters and the seat of the provincial government, care being taken to avoid damaging other buildings.

It should be further borne in mind that this reconnaissance and the ensuing actions were carried out in the discretion of the Kwantung army, and that the Japanese commander never intended them as anything but legitimate and indispensable precautions for the safety of the troops in the present state of affairs in Manchuria.

The Chinese representative submitted five more telegrams supplying information from

special localities. No. 56 reported the movement of an armored train with ammunition on the Peking-Mukden railway, and details of damages to the line. No. 59 stated that Japanese aircraft had flown on October 10th over Chinese territory within the Great Wall. No. 60 repeated and supplemented data concerning the arrival of an armored train at Tung Liao. No. 61 had a significant bearing on the Japanese version of the Chinchow incident, denying as "absolutely groundless" the allegation that the bombing was provoked by Chinese soldiers who shot at the airplanes because the troops at Chinchow had no anti-aircraft guns and "did not shoot at the airplanes with rifles", and arguing that since Chinchow is about two hundred miles distant from Mukden a raid by airplanes loaded with bombs must have been premeditated. No. 62 supplied a cablegram received from the Peking-Mukden railway administration at Tientsin saying that the Japanese had dynamited the track at a point cutting the important north western connection, that the north-eastern connection, was cut on September 18th, and the port of Yingkow occupied on the 19th, thus bottling up the Peking-Mukden railway and benefiting the Southern Manchuria railway.

The British Government confirmed, in a telegram from its Consul-General at Tientsin the report as to a Japanese armored train and removal and mining of the track at one point. It further communicated a statement of its Consul-General at Mukden that the Japanese had given to the American Consul the number of troops there outside the railway zone as 2,000, and that no further withdrawals from the zone were believed to have taken place during the last forty-eight hours.

Official word came through the American Consul in Geneva, Mr. Gilbert, that the Secretary of the American Embassy at Tokio, Mr. Salisbury, and the American Consul-General at Harbin, Mr. Hanson, had been directed by the Secretary of State to undertake a tour of observation in Southern Manchuria, with the knowledge and approval of the Japanese and Chinese governments, in order to report to the government of the United States.



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#### Encouragement from America

Attention centered, however, to the disregard of Japan's vitally important telegram to the President of the Council, upon the message circulated by the Secretary-General from the Secretary of State of the United States. Realized by observers in Geneva to set up the most significant milestone yet passed in relationships between the League and the United States, this communication temporarily eclipsed for a moment even the dispute which the Council was to take up again the next day. It read as follows:

It is my belief that our co-operation in the future handling of this difficult matter should proceed along the lines which have been followed ever since the trouble first commenced and which fortunately found in session both the Assembly and the Council. The latter has deliberated long and earnestly on this question and the Covenant of the League provides well tried machinery for the handling of such questions. The Governments of China and Japan have presented and argued their cases before the Council and through published accounts regarding proceedings there the world has been informed. The League Council has formulated and outlined a course of action to be followed by the two countries; as both Governments have made commitments to the Council it is highly desirable that the League in no way relax its vigilance and in no way fail to assert all the pressure and authority in its competence with a view to regulating the action of Japan and China in the premises. The American Government on its part, acting independently through its diplomatic channels, will try to reinforce League action and will make it evident that it has not lost interest in the question and is not oblivious to the obligations which Japan and China have assumed to other signatories of the Pact of Paris as well as the Nine Power Pact, if a time should come when it would seem advisable that those obligations be brought forward.

Publication of this letter aroused much indignation in Japan; and the situation in the Far East tightened anew. The Tokyo correspondent of the London *Times* cabled that the Japanese War and Foreign Offices were considering the terms of a new declaration of policy. Mean-

while the Chinese Minister to Japan had called on the Foreign Minister to present a memorandum calling for evacuation of districts outside the Southern Manchuria railway zone within a week.

The *Times* Shanghai correspondent cabled that the Chinese Government "does not or cannot control the anti-Japanese organisations; and the boycott and confiscation of Japanese goods, the intimidation of Chinese in Japanese employ, and the enforced stoppage of business with Japanese banks, all involving action contrary to the law of the land, are in full swing all along the Yangtze." Other dispatches reported anti-Japanese boycotting and rioting in Canton, with twelve persons killed, twenty injured, and a number of shops carrying Japanese goods raided and wrecked. Mr. Shigemitsu, Minister from Japan, returned to Nanking to present the new Japanese protests and proposals of negotiations.

The meaning of the affair for international relations and limitation of armaments commanded increasingly widespread consideration. Dispatches from Washington held that the key to relations between Japan and the United States was to be found in China and that unless Japanese policy in Manchuria should be modified there would probably be an end to consideration of the truce in naval armaments on which were founded such great hopes.

The Paris *Temps* wrote:

"Excitement at Geneva over the turn of events in the Far East makes it still easier to understand that the Council of the League will be much embarrassed in action and that the Cabinet at Washington cannot be less so. . . . How is it possible to act effectively when not a single Power, the United States less than any other, can wisely contemplate in the present international situation and in the midst of the crisis that the whole world is combatting, any intervention which might open the door to military adventure?"

The *Manchester Guardian*, on the other side, argued:

"The League Covenant was intended to apply to bad times, and if its provisions do not work at a critical moment, the sooner we know it the better. . . . The League

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machinery must therefore be tested. . . . the immediate urgent need is to prevent the menace of war from becoming war at all, and it is possible that a speedy and frank report from the League on the history and the merits of this dispute, with recommendations as to how it should be handled, would prevent the worst from happening."

The *Daily Herald*, *Daily Telegraph*, and *Times* likewise commented on the seriousness of the situation, the editorial in the *Times* concluding:

"In the present condition of Europe, a blow to the prestige of the League would be the worst possible prelude to the Disarmament Conference and the worst possible disservice to international finance and commerce."

Such were the situation and the state of mind on the day preceding reassembly of the Council.

#### TUESDAY, OCTOBER 13th.

The first two meetings of the Council in extraordinary session, on October 13th, showed at once that the dispute was to be considered with the broader and deeper consciousness of its full implications which the march of events and the passage of time had evoked, and also that it was to involve the whole historic case as between China and Japan in Manchuria.

The morning discussion began with an invitation to M. Briand to assume the Presidency. M. de Madariaga of Spain, taking the chair on behalf of M. Lerroux, explained that his Foreign Minister was detained in Spain by pressing duties and had requested him to propose this invitation to the representative of France, as the Power which normally should have succeeded to the position if the privilege had not been yielded according to tradition at the beginning of the session following upon the Assembly. M. Briand praised the conduct of preceding sessions by M. Lerroux and, remarking that a sort of malignant fate imposed on him anxious presidencies in taking his country's turn,<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> M. Briand also presided during the Greek-Bulgar and Bolivia-Paraguay disputes.

accepted the office. He then summed up the situation since the adjournment on September 30th, referring to the President's reminders to both disputants on October 9th of the undertakings into which they had entered, the bombing of Chinchow, the Japanese protests against unfriendly agitation in China, the Chinese Government appeals and measures which outside Manchuria had prevented loss of life, the Chinese proposals for troop withdrawal, the Japanese replies insisting on direct negotiations first, and the maintenance of information to the United States which had expressed full agreement with action taken. He then called upon the representative of China as the nation at whose request the meeting was summoned.

#### China Defines a World-Wide Issue

In a speech full of restrained feeling, the Chinese delegate reviewed the circumstances under which China had first appealed to the League, placed her case in its hands, and accepted a procedure which seemed to the Council to offer a way of clearing up the situation although it was far from accord with her own judgment and wishes.

Arguing that her apprehensions had been confirmed, he spoke of the bombing of Chinchow as an outrage at a place far beyond the localities under Japanese occupation on September 30th, which forced his Government to ask the Council to meet as soon as possible. He urged that the immediate issue was the devising of means for a complete withdrawal of Japanese troops to their zone and restoration of the state of affairs prevailing before September 18th. To this purpose he cited the remarks of the President on September 30th, and of Viscount Cecil at the second meeting, who had then also quoted arguments at the Council sessions in Paris in October, 1925, by M. Briand, Sir (then Mr.) Austen Chamberlain, Viscount Ishii, M. Scialoja, and others, that a State could not justify the invasion of another State on the ground of defense and protection.

Contending that China had held loyally to her obligations as a member of the League, he reviewed her appeal to the Council for with-



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drawal of troops, and the official declarations of President Ching Kai Shek to the people calling on them to preserve order and respect foreigners. He concluded:

The Covenant and the Briand-Kellogg Pact are our two sheet-anchors, to which we have moored our ship of state and with the help of which we believe we shall ride out this storm. But, Mr. President and Members of the Council, the Covenant and the Briand-Kellogg Pact are also the corner-stones of the world-wide edifice of peace that has been so laboriously erected in the twelve years since the World War, and if they crumble the edifice collapses. For is it likely that the nations who had witnessed this tragic collapse of the Covenant and the Briand-Kellogg Pact at the first great test, with all its dire consequences throughout the East—is it likely that these nations would assemble quietly at Geneva in February to disarm? Would they not rather draw the conclusion that after all each state must rely on its own armed force and that alone? To say more on this point would be to labour the obvious: it is clear that of the Members of the League and the United States of America cannot co-operate successfully to avert this threat to peace, one of the first results will be the collapse of the disarmament movement. And with the idea of disarmament goes the idea of international security, for the two are indissolubly linked.

If we fail now, when America offers her co-operation, and fail in February with disarmament, what chance have we of working out some form of permanent association, some provision for conference under the Briand-Kellogg Pact to avert threats of peace? And, finally, if we fail in these things and the world is thrown back on suspicious nationalism, hostile alliances, and a race in armaments, if the East is plunged into a state of turmoil, what chance have we of securing effective co-operation over the financial and economic crisis that bears so heavily on the world? That crisis widens and deepens daily, almost hourly, and we are aware all of us, that only far-reaching and close co-operation between the civilised nations can avert disaster.

However remote and irrelevant this disturbance in the Far East may seem to the West, engrossed in its pressing cares—and it is natural that it should so seem—the web of fate binds us all together, and unless we can co-operate effectively in this

grave emergency we shall fail in disarmament, we shall fail to instil any confidence in international security and order, and we shall fail to grapple with the world economic crisis.

China has put herself in the hands of the League and abides the issue with confidence in her destiny and in the moral forces of civilization. The League cannot fail, for its success is bound up with the interests of all civilised nations, with that of Japan and America as well as that of China and the other Members of the League.

#### Japan Advances Her Treaty Claims.

Japan took up, in the afternoon, the defense of her position. Referring first to the President's summary of the situation and to statements by the Chinese delegate, the Japanese representative admitted that no Japanese had recently been killed outside Manchuria; but he repeated that they had been molested, pillaged, deprived of supplies, and otherwise unjustifiably treated. This had led to the despatch of naval units to the Yangtze, where warships of all Powers are normally stationed, to ensure the evacuation and protection of nationals and even consulates. The President's reference to Japanese proposals of direct negotiation to settle all questions, he thought, might be misleading; the Chinese Minister at Tokio had demanded a fixed date for withdrawal of troops to their zone, and the Japanese Foreign Minister had replied that in order to restore calm and facilitate early withdrawal there should be an understanding on a preliminary basis for re-establishing normal conditions. The Chinese delegate he understood had spoken of withdrawal of troops from Manchuria, but that was outside the discussion.

China had not been able to realise her excellent intentions in ordering her people and soldiers to keep the peace, Mr. Yoshizawa argued, for at Changchun alone 150 Japanese troops were killed or wounded and in Manchuria there were daily attacks upon Japanese by uniformed soldiers. Further, the Chinese Nationalist party, closely associated with the Government, was conducting violent anti-Japanese agitation; and President Chiang-Kai-Shek was present at a meeting in Nanking

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resulting conflict ended in the rout of Chinese forces in Korea and Manchuria.<sup>1</sup>

When peace was concluded, Mr. Yoshizawa continued, China ceded by the Treaty of Shimonoseki, April 17, 1895, the southern part of the Manchurian peninsula of Liaotung to Japan.

China likewise recognized by the same treaty, as a matter of record, the independence of Korea; Japan then brought the country under her domination, after the murder of the Queen, on October 8, 1895, in which the Japanese Minister was implicated, and annexed it in 1910.<sup>2</sup> Further China was forced to cede Formosa and the Pescadores, and to agree to pay a large indemnity.

Collective intervention by France, Germany and Russia, Mr. Yoshizawa stated, forced Japan to cede that territory.

The three Powers had, in fact, discussed on April 10th, before the treaty was signed, measures to be taken on the ground that possession of the Liaotung peninsula, far separated from Korea, constituted a menace to Peking and to peace; and before its ratification on May 8th they sent their recommendation that the territory be restored to China; Japan yielded on November 8th, receiving in exchange increased indemnity.<sup>3</sup>

China made a secret treaty with Russia in 1896, Mr. Yoshizawa averred, specifically directed against Japan. It opened Manchuria to Russia, granting privileges including the right to build a railway across the northern provinces.

This was the agreement concluded between Li Hung Chang and Foreign Minister Lobanoff, after preliminary discussions between Li and Count Witte; in its final form as later published and recognized by China, it bound the two parties to support each other in case of any aggression by Japan against

on September 22nd, organized by the party, which circulated a telegram through China advising an economic rupture with Japan. On the other hand the Japanese Government had given orders, which had been carried out, to protect Chinese residents everywhere.

In regard to the bombing of Chinchow and circumstances leading to it, he considered sufficient information had already been transmitted; and he then read his Government's reply, published the day before, to the telegram sent by the President of the Council on the 9th.

Asserting that propaganda had distorted the facts about Manchuria and that the party responsible had incurred grave responsibility toward the League and the whole world, the Japanese spokesman then proceeded to plead his country's cause on historical grounds.

Chinese agitation in Korea in 1894 had become so menacing for Japan, he stated, that she was bound to resort to war.

The Japanese representative was referring here to the circumstances that led to the Chinese-Japanese War of 1894-95: In the earlier year the King of Korea, then a weak state tributary to China and under the influence of a Chinese Resident, appealed to the Chinese Emperor for aid in suppressing a rebellion of questionable origin. In accordance with the Tientsin Treaty of 1885, China notified Japan of her intention to send a small force, and did so; Japan, although uninvited, sent a larger force. China had declared her action in accord with her practice of protecting tributary states; Japan retorted that she had never recognized Korea as tributary to China. In the meantime Korea put down the rebellion. Japan proposed to China that they together should reform Korean administration. China refused on the ground that she did not interfere in the internal affairs of vassal states. Japan gave notice that she would undertake the task alone; and called on the King of Korea to declare independence of China. Japanese forces occupied the royal palace, took the King in custody, and his aged father was appointed as regent. Aroused, China dispatched reinforcements, against a Japanese warning. The regent declared war on China and asked Japan to aid in expelling Chinese troops. The

<sup>1</sup> WILLIAMS, E. T., *China, Yesterday and Today*, page 406-7; see also MORSE, H. B., *International Relations of the Chinese Empire*, Vol. 111, pp. 19-22, 45-7; and BRINKLEY, F., *History of the Japanese People*, pp. 700-1.

<sup>2</sup> WILLIAMS, *Op. cit.*, pp. 407-8.

<sup>3</sup> MORSE, *Op. cit.*, p. 47.



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Russian territory in Eastern Asia. China or Korea, provided against any peace treaty with an adverse party, and for Russian military use of ports and also of the Chinese Eastern Railway toward Vladivostok which it authorized the Russo-Chinese Bank (later the Russo-Asiatic Bank) to build.<sup>1</sup>

The treaty ran for fifteen years, presumably expiring in 1911. French capital participated in the financing of the bank and of the Franco-Russian "Chinese 4 Percent Gold Loan" of 1895.<sup>2</sup>

China then granted Russia in 1898 a lease of the Liaotung Peninsula that Russia had prevented Japan from securing. Mr. Yoshizawa asserted, and also the right to build a railway through South Manchuria.

This agreement, to run for twenty-five years, covered territory including Port Arthur and Talien, called by the Russians Dalni and by the Japanese Dairen, to which Russia was enabled to extend her Manchurian rail system, thus gaining an ice-free outlet.<sup>3</sup> China was to fortify both ports, retaining control unless war emergencies should require otherwise.<sup>4</sup> Germany secured a ninety-nine year lease on Kiaochow, in Shantung, with mining and railway concessions. Great Britain, after striving to offset the Russian policy in Manchuria with loans, reached an understanding with Russia as to her position there, secured from China a sphere of interest in the Yangtze basin, and leased Wei-hai-wei, across from Port Arthur, for as long a period as Russia should retain control there. Japan acquired rights in Fukien; France directed her interest farther south.

In 1899, the American Secretary of State, John Hay, formally proclaimed the doctrine of the "Open Door", which the English also had advocated unofficially.<sup>5</sup>

Taking advantage of the Boxer troubles of 1900, Mr. Yoshizawa pursued his argument.

<sup>1</sup> YOUNG, C. W., *The International Relations of Manchuria*, Appendix A.

<sup>2</sup> YOUNG, *Ibid.*, p. 35; MORSE, *Op. cit.*, p. 82.

<sup>3</sup> YOUNG, *Ibid.*, p. 13-14.

<sup>4</sup> MORSE, *Ibid.*, p. 104.

<sup>5</sup> COOLIDGE, A. C., *The United States as a World Power*, p. 221.

Russia installed her troops in Manchuria, and Japan found through negotiations that Russia regarded acquisition of the territory as a fact, which Japan could not admit for she regarded it as a menace that meant her ruin.

At that time, Secretary Hay began to urge the principle of preserving the integrity of China, as a supplement to the "Open Door". The first Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902, following upon Chinese-Russian agreements as to the new position in Manchuria, stated as its purpose the maintenance of the principles of the integrity of China and Korea and of the "Open Door"; it led in turn to a Russian-Chinese convention restoring Chinese authority in Manchuria and the withdrawal of Russian troops from certain ports, and to a further Russian proposal of a convention to establish special privileges against which the United States, Great Britain, and Japan protested.<sup>1</sup>

#### Japan Ousts Russia from Manchuria.

Ignoring the Chinese-Russian secret treaty and relying on the declaration of neutrality China had made, Mr. Yoshizawa asserted, Japan then drove Russia out of Manchuria, and so safeguarded both her own security and the integrity of that part of China.

When the Russo-Japanese war began in 1905, Secretary Hay, for the United States, insisted upon the importance of limiting its area<sup>2</sup>; and both belligerents accepted this condition to the great gain of China, over whose territory their conflict was fought.

By the Treaty of Portsmouth of 1905, Mr. Yoshizawa then stated, Russia ceded to Japan the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula, which she had secured from China, and also her railway rights south of Changchun in central Manchuria north of Mukden.

President Roosevelt of the United States had proposed the peace negotiations; and China had reserved the right to agree on any question affecting her

<sup>1</sup> MORSE, *Ibid.*, pp. 417-21.

<sup>2</sup> COOLIDGE, A. C., *Ibid.*, p. 333.

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interests.<sup>1</sup> The treaty recognized the Japanese position in Korea and Chinese sovereignty and rights of development in Manchuria, except for the Liaotung Peninsula lease conveyed to Japan and the control of the railway line to Changchun; affirmed the American doctrine of the "Open Door"; ceded (Article V) not only the Liaotung lease with Port Arthur and Talien but also rights in territorial waters and harbor works; ceded (Article VI) not only the railway to Changchun with its branches, leaving Russia in control to the north, but also mining and property rights; provided (Article VII) that Japan and Russia should operate their respective Manchurian railways for commercial and industrial purposes but by no means for strategic purposes, and (Article VIII) that a separate convention should regulate railway operation.<sup>2</sup>

#### China and Japan's Claims in Manchuria

China recognized the transfers of rights concerning her, Mr. Yoshizawa concluded, by the Treaty of Peking signed on December 22, 1905.

This treaty<sup>3</sup>, based on recognition in the Treaty of Portsmouth that provisions affecting China were subject to her consent, confirmed (Article 1) the transfers and assignments made by Russia to Japan by Articles V and VI of that treaty; and also, in a significantly worded paragraph (Article 11), engaged Japan to conform to the original agreements concluded between China and Russia, in regard to leased territory as well as in matters of railway construction and exploitation "so far as circumstances permit", and specified that in case any question should arise in the future on these subjects, "the Japanese Government will decide it in consultation with the Chinese Government." So was drafted a formula for procedure in direct negotiations between Japan and China.

A Supplementary Agreement,<sup>4</sup> concluded at the same time, made a series of important provisions, many of which are involved in the current controversy

<sup>1</sup> MORSE, *Op. cit.*, p. 433.

<sup>2</sup> U. S. Foreign Relations. 1905. P. 824 ff.

<sup>3</sup> British and Foreign State Papers, 1904-5. Vol. XCVIII, pp. 740-41.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 742-4.

while others may be: With the stated view of regulation for their guidance certain questions in which they are both interested in Manchuria, in addition to the main treaty, the parties agreed that (Article I) China would open cities of international residence; (Article II) in view of the Chinese desire for withdrawal of Japanese and Russian troops and railway guards as soon as possible and in order to meet this desire, if Russia should withdraw her railway guards or China and Russia should arrange other proper measures, Japan would take similar steps, and when tranquillity should be re-established in Manchuria and China should be capable of affording full protection to the lives and property of foreigners, Japan would withdraw her railway guards simultaneously with Russia; (Article III) Japan would notify China as to evacuation of territory, and China should be authorized to send troops to restore order; (Article IV) Chinese property should be restored; (Article V) Japanese monuments and tombs should be safeguarded; (Article VI) China would recognize Japan's right to maintain and improve the military railway built from Autung on the Korean border to Mukden, which after fifteen years should be sold to China at an appraisal value; (Article VII) a convention should regulate connecting railway services; (Article VIII) all railway materials should be exempt from taxation; (Article IX) Japanese settlements in Yingkow, Antung, and Mukden should be subject to specified regulations; (Article X) a joint stock forestry company should exploit timber rights on the Yalu River; (Article XI) "most favored nation" treatment should apply in frontier trade.

In relation to Article II of this Supplementary Agreement, dealing with prospective withdrawal of railway troops and guards, it must be recorded that following negotiations between China and Soviet Russia from 1919 and 1920 on, the policing of the Chinese Eastern Railway in Manchuria, built by Russia and held by her after the Russo-Japanese War, has been in the hands of the Chinese authorities, the guards being employed by the joint management of the railway; and particularly since the Chinese-Russian railway agreement of 1924, the Chinese have assumed the policing of the line over which Chinese



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troops have been transported.<sup>1</sup> This situation has so far never given rise to a serious claim by the Chinese Government—although various demands have been made, particularly at the Washington Conference—for withdrawal of the Japanese guards along the South Manchurian Railway.

Extension of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1905<sup>2</sup> reaffirmed the principles of the integrity of China and of the "Open Door", not mentioning Manchuria but recognizing Japan's paramount interests in Korea. The Root-Takahira notes of 1908 reemphasized the principles in an understanding between Japan and the United States.<sup>3</sup> The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was renewed in 1911<sup>4</sup> for ten years, not mentioning Korea, which Japan had annexed, but adhering to the principles of the integrity of China and the "Open Door". It was terminated definitely at Washington in 1922.

Mr. Yoshizawa then outlined Japan's claim as to her position and record in Manchuria:

Twice the Japanese nation had staked its existence in order to avert what would have been an imminent peril in Korea and in Manchuria, and she considers those regions as closely related with her own fate. All questions connected with them touch a chord of sentiment in the Japanese nation, and these are factors which cannot be set aside when the question of Manchuria is being considered.

The Japanese nation has no territorial ambitions in that country, but she possesses vital political and economic interests there. She is the defender of the principle of equal opportunity and of the open door for the economic activities of all nations. Foreign trade has increased tenfold since Japan came to Manchuria.

China has also secured immense advantages through the development of these provinces. While no new important railway line has been constructed in China for the last twenty years, a thousand kilometres of track have been laid down in the three provinces. Every year hundreds of thousands of Chinese settle there. The population has been doubled in twenty years. The riches

of the soil supply considerable advantages to the country. Industry has developed there; schools, hospitals and experimental stations have been set up, towns have been built and communications improved. Manchuria has become an important factor in Chinese and in world economy.

It is not surprising that Japan, after having sacrificed so many men and so much money in the struggle for security, should consecrate efforts with a view to the development of Manchuria. The most important factor of such development is the maintenance of order. For many years armed bandits had ravaged the country and ransacked the towns. The presence of Japanese forces contributed greatly to the strengthening of the feeling of security in those regions. The firmness of Japanese policy prevented the civil wars which ravaged China for twenty years from troubling the peaceful and laborious activity of Manchuria.

The Japanese people have invested enormous capitals in the country: more than 2,000,000,000 Yen, or 5,000,000,000 Swiss Francs. By treaty and by hard work they have acquired rights and interests which are of enormous importance for their economic and their national life. They are convinced that if these were prejudiced in any way their life would be prejudiced, and Japan's demand to be allowed to live and work freely in Manchuria, side by side with the Chinese, appears to be a legitimate and moderate one.

Now, for some years, the leaders of China seemed to wish to neglect these historical facts which I have just placed before you, and the rights and interests of Japan have been subject of innumerable attacks. Not only have the Japanese been subjected to most unjustifiable vexations, but the essential rights resulting from treaties have been openly violated.

The leaders of China, Mr. Yoshizawa felt, were seeking to suppress Japanese rights in Manchuria. He quoted the former Minister of Foreign Affairs in China, Dr. C. T. Wang, as having declared at a meeting on February 2nd last that if Japan would not withdraw the South Manchurian railway guards, China would have to bring up armed forces to oppose them. The attitude of the authorities in the north-east towards the South Manchurian Company and Japanese and Korean nationals had been increasingly menacing; a number of Koreans

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had been massacred; and the Japanese Captain Nakamura had been assassinated by Chinese troops.

The attack on Captain Nakamura and his party, here referred to, took place on June 27th, according to press reports at the time, at a point along a projected railway to Taonan in the Heilungchiang province.<sup>1</sup> Captain Nakamura was travelling on a passport validated by Chinese authorities, for the stated purpose of geological exploration, but the Japanese army staff afterward recognized him to have been in its service and regarded his killing as a direct affront.

Attacks on Japanese railway guards had become increasingly frequent during the summer, said Mr. Yoshizawa, and the political situation more and more strained, until Chinese troops in uniform attacked the railway on the night of September 18th. Nevertheless, Japan still held to the desire which she believed the Council shared, to enter into direct negotiations with China; but the political conditions in China were very confused. The Japanese commanders had considered it indispensable to take measures of defence of Japan's position in Manchuria. The government still intended to withdraw its troops to the railway zone as security for its nationals should become effective. But in finding a solution to the far-reaching problem, not too much importance should be attached to questions of theory or doctrine, and as far as possible account should be taken of the practical and political facts.

Any proposal not based on the living reality could not attain its object. The Council could best help by finding means to bring about a general pacification of public opinion, a moral disarmament of the nations. If the Chinese governments made real efforts to quiet anti-Japanese agitation and to agree with Japan on a "preliminary basis" for re-establishment of normal relations, it would contribute greatly to restore peace and remove the chief obstacle barring the way to the withdrawal of troops. That depended upon the security and protection

of Japanese nationals which would be brought about by the method recommended, and so might be realized the principles contained in the Council's resolution of September 30th. Guided by the same desire the Japanese Government had replied to the note of the Chinese government with information of its views.

#### China's Counter-Claims

Without waiting for another session, the Chinese representative replied at once to certain of the Japanese delegate's contentions. In regard to historical claims, he had established his position ten years ago at the Washington Conference; and on these and other points he could not agree. Upon the charge concerning the speech made by Dr. C. T. Wang in February, he commented that a member of the Chinese Foreign Office went to the Japanese Legation and explained the remarks to have incorrectly reported; that explanation was accepted, and he felt the charge could be dismissed.

Chinese resentment against Japanese and other foreigners, he said in taking up the serious allegations concerning anti-Japanese agitation, was caused by positions that foreign powers assumed; and the occupation of Manchuria and bombing of Chinchow had intensified feeling particularly against the Japanese. Nevertheless, no Japanese in China outside Manchuria had been killed; and the Chinese courts were open to suits for civil damages. The anti-Japanese movement was spontaneous on the part of the people themselves, he averred, adding: "I know of no accepted principle of international law whereby a government, no matter how strong, how powerful, how autocratic, can compel its people to buy from people whom they do not like."

Notwithstanding, when citizens of Canton burned goods believed to be Japanese, the Chinese police did not hesitate to fire on their own people; in so far as the law permitted, extreme measures were taken to preserve peace, property and life.

Japanese army airplanes were continuing to drop bombs on open towns in Manchuria, as indicated by two telegrams which he read

<sup>1</sup> YOUNG, *Op. cit.*, pp. 223-234.

<sup>2</sup> YOUNG, *Ibid.*, p. 116-17.

<sup>3</sup> WILLIAMS, *China Yesterday and Today*, p. 425.

<sup>4</sup> YOUNG, *Ibid.*, p. 117.

<sup>1</sup> *International Gleanings from Japan*, published by the League of Nations Association of Japan, Vol. 7, No. 9.



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concerning incidents west of Mukden on the Peking-Mukden railway. With reference to the security of Japanese nationals in China, he related that a few days before the bombing of Chinchow the Japanese and Korean residents of the town asked local authorities to escort them to places of safety, and this was done. He then read a detailed telegram, dated October 12th, from Mr. Sherwood Eddy, dealing with the capture of Mukden, alleging a carefully prepared offensive plan and efforts to establish independent governments in Manchuria, and urging action by the League of Nations and signatories of the Kellogg Pact.

#### Direct Negotiation and the "21 Demands"

Legitimate defence could not be urged in justification of such measures, the Chinese delegate continued, referring once more to statements on this point by the president of the Council and Viscount Cecil at a meeting in Paris in 1925. China could not agree to direct negotiations so long as Japanese troops remained illegally upon her soil and there were no arrangements for evacuation. Because of its conviction that such negotiations could not lead to satisfactory results, the Chinese government had placed the matter in the hands of the League. Japan had, in effect, rejected direct negotiations, when she did not limit her action on September 18th to meeting the precise local condition, and instead sent large numbers of troops into Chinese territory, established military occupation of important places and carried on operations destroying many Chinese lives and much Chinese property. As to the real intention of Japanese policy, as represented in the reconnoitering trip made by Japanese airplanes over Chinchow, which led to the bombing of the town, he read part of document No. 56 in the Chinese series, giving the text of proclamations dropped in the town against the government of Chang Hsueh Liang and threatening destruction unless the people opposed it.

Finally, in regard to the historical survey presented by the Japanese delegate, the Chinese representative pointed out that there had been no mention of the treaties of May 1915 which

resulted from the "21 Demands" made by Japan on China.

These famous demands, presented by Foreign Minister Hiroki, followed a long period of complicated negotiations by the Powers in the Far East and also Japan's intervention against Germany in the World War in 1914, and capture of the German concession of Kiaochow with the aid of a small British contingent from Wei-hai-wei. American protests in connection with the demands resulted in withdrawal of certain clauses most clearly contrary to the principles of the integrity of China and of the "Open Door". Ensuing discussions between the two parties, in which China resisted Japan so far as she could, resulted in the transformation of the original 21 demands into 24 aimed, among other objects, at recognition of the Japanese position in Manchuria as naturally predominant and special.<sup>1</sup> China had to extend the Liaotung Peninsula lease to ninety-nine years, expiring in 1997, the Southern Manchuria railway rights to 2002, and the Antung-Mukden railway rights to 2007. She further had to revise loan agreements, assent to conditions for Japanese investment of capital, mining rights, land leases for thirty years renewable on expiration, and commercial and residential privileges in Manchuria, and accept Japanese advisers in financial, military and political affairs. She likewise had to consent in advance to any arrangement Japan might make with Germany regarding Kiaochow, and to yield concessions more extensive than Germany had held.

The Chinese Government at the time and later contested the validity of these agreements on the ground that they were secured under duress.

#### Japan Complains of Attacks

The Japanese delegate, resuming the debate, contended that the results of the Washington Conference confirmed the views he had expressed in regard to Japan's position in Man-

<sup>1</sup> See YOUNG, *Japan's Special Position in Manchuria: Its Assertion, Legal Interpretation and Special Meaning*, one of three volumes on *Japan's Jurisdiction and International Legal Position in Manchuria*, published by the Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1931, for a general discussion of the subject.

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churia. He further said that his version of the speech made by Dr. Wang was based upon a telegram from the Foreign Minister in Tokio, upon which he relied. In dealing with the anti-Japanese movement in China, he had intended to point out that the orders given by leaders of the Chinese Government had not been observed; and he added further cases of firing on Japanese merchant vessels and warships and assaults on Japanese residents.

The incident at Chinchow, he explained further, had arisen because the Chinese army sent soldiers east of the town to make contact with troops east of the Southern Manchuria railway, and because the Chinese army fired on Japanese airplanes.

#### Japan Instances Direct Negotiations

Arguing again in favor of direct negotiation, and agreement on "certain principal points" to serve as a basis for negotiation, he said that such agreement was not intended to include a settlement of the conditions resulting from the present conflict, but were meant to be preliminary to withdrawal of troops to the railway zone. In favor of this policy, speaking directly across the table to Dr. Sze, he recalled that at the Washington Conference, Baron Shidehara, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, had made an arrangement with the Chinese delegate there for evacuation of Japanese troops from the province of Shantung and about three years ago he himself had negotiated with Dr. Wang a detailed programme for evacuation of points then held by Japanese troops in China, which was not carried out although at the request of the Chinese government Japan withdrew her forces from the territory in which they were stationed.

Reference to the direct negotiations between China and Japan at the Washington Conference concerned special sessions, held apart from the conference itself, to settle differences between the two nations, at which, as a matter of fact, the Governments of the United States and Great Britain appointed each an observer to sit and employ their good offices in endeavors to adjust any difficulties arising. The negotiations, which lasted

nearly ten weeks, ended in a Chinese-Japanese treaty providing conditions for the return of Kiaochow and the Shantung concessions to Chinese control.<sup>1</sup>

#### China Draws a Distinction

In rebuttal, the Chinese delegate asked for proof of the attack by Chinese soldiers on the Japanese airplanes over Chinchow, since he had already offered information that the Chinese army had no anti-aircraft guns there. As to previous direct negotiations for the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China, he himself had dealt with Baron Shidehara in Washington and in another case the Japanese representative had dealt with the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs; but the present case was not analogous to those two previous cases. If either of them had been similar, China would have gone to the League and asked for an examination.

He again emphasized the failure of the Japanese delegate to mention the results to China of direct negotiations carried on with Japan in 1915 upon presentation of the "21 Demands".

The Japanese spokesman took occasion simply to remark that he was not in agreement on certain points advanced by the Chinese delegate.

Lord Reading, speaking for the first time on behalf of Great Britain, asked for information regarding two bombing operations about which the Chinese delegate had submitted telegrams; and Mr. Yoshizawa promised to secure it.

The President of the Council then suggested postponement of further discussion. Both parties had been fully heard; Japan had repeated her assertion that she was prepared to evacuate the positions occupied upon assurance of security, while China had again offered pledges to avoid reprisals and restrain her people from unfriendly acts. The Council faced the highest and most redoubtable duty that had been placed upon it and would fulfil its task with the necessary firmness. When the League had previously been able to act effectively, it was because both parties had given full assistance; and he asked that nothing occur to make the

<sup>1</sup> WILLIAMS, E. T., *China Yesterday and Today*, p. 518.



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situation more difficult, for both nations must realize the terrible responsibilities which would rest on the one who would go further and cause a catastrophe. They had not broken contact, but had come to discuss the matter at the Council table; and this showed confidence in the League which must be maintained with patience.

The same day the Japanese Bureau accredited to the League forwarded a telegram from the Foreign Minister in Tokio, giving the number of Koreans killed by Chinese in Manchuria since the beginning of the incident up to October 9th as 88, and the number of Koreans who had fled for refuge as about 1200. The Bureau also communicated information as to the sending of three cruisers and four torpedo boats to Shanghai to protect Japanese residents along the Yangtze.

#### China Denies Responsibility

The Chinese representative transmitted the text of his Government's reply to the Japanese memorandum in regard to withdrawal of troops and anti-Japanese agitation, reading in part:

"In reference to memorandum of Japanese Government of ninth instant Chinese Government has honour to make following observations:

In defiance international law and in violation provisions of Covenant League of Nations as well as Peace Pact of Paris and Nine-Power Treaty signed at Washington, Japan has suddenly and without provocation invaded and occupied portions of the Chinese provinces Liaoning and Kirin, overturned lawful provincial and district administrations, and in course of invasion, committed many acts of war, and others not permitted by international law even in war, such as killing of innocent civilians, bombardment of unfortified towns, bombing of passenger trains and removal and seizure of public and private property, etc.

China and Japan both being bound by above mentioned international agreements imposing on their signatories obligation to seek for peaceful settlement of all disputes, China at once appealed to Council of League of Nations. Council called upon Japanese Government to give orders for immediate withdrawal of their troops from areas occupied since September 19th and decided to

accept solemn pledge given by Japan to comply with its request, fixing its further meeting for October fourteenth should by that time that pledge remain unfulfilled.

Chinese Government refrained from very beginning from any and every act of hostility, going to length of strictly ordering all military forces not to offer resistance in whatever form to continuous advance of Japanese troops, and in spite of provocative actions increasing every day in intensity and embracing ever wider areas.

At same time strictest discipline was imposed on the nation for protection in every way of lives and property of Japanese residents within Chinese territory under Chinese administration and the fact that no untoward incident has occurred anywhere in the vast areas under Chinese jurisdiction proves conclusively that the undertaking given by Chinese Government to Council of League of Nations is being observed most scrupulously. Repeated Government orders and proclamations have confined righteous indignation of our people within legal bounds.

Acting upon resolution of Council of League of Nations, Chinese Government has appointed two high officers to take over places to be evacuated and duly notified Japanese Government and Council to that effect, but Japanese Government has not yet carried out its declared intention to hand over places under their occupation to Chinese authorities.

It must therefore be a matter of surprise to the world that popular indignation in China has limited itself to mere refusal to purchase Japanese goods. Freedom to choose one's purchases is an individual right with which no Government interferes, and, while it is the duty of every Government to protect foreign nationals, it is bound neither by any recognised standard of governance nor by any principle of international law to prohibit or punish exercise of an elementary right of citizenship. If there be responsibility at all in the matter, it entirely lies with Japanese Government which has by many acts of unfriendliness... created this general prejudice against Japanese merchandise.

While Chinese Government is observing with greatest scrupulousness resolution of Council of League Nations by adopting special measures for protection of Japanese lives and property and by refraining from all acts tending to aggravate situation, with the result, as already stated, that no untoward incident has happened to any Japanese subject, Japanese military have continued

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their aggressive actions in North Eastern provinces which have culminated in recent aerial attack on Chinchow where provincial civil authorities of Liaoning have established their provisional offices since occupation of Shenyang, its capital. This act of war, as Japanese Government is aware, has led Council of League Nations to decide to meet earlier than on date originally fixed. Chinese Government notes with satisfaction reference made by Japanese Government to responsibility of both countries to League of Nations but desires to point out that it is Japan that has committed during past ten days various acts which have so aggravated situation that resolution of Council League of Nations has failed to be carried out, for which Chinese Government cannot be held responsible.

Chinese Government will continue to exert its best to protect lives and property of Japanese subjects although in the face of the greatest difficulty due to the unceasing aggressive acts on the part of the Japanese troops, and will hold Japanese Government responsible for any unfortunate consequences resulting from continued employment of military force by Japan as an instrument of her national policy, especially in view of fact that both Governments have presented their cases before Council of League of Nations which has prescribed a course of action for two countries to follow.

Firmly believing that the present lack of understanding and the difficulties in the commercial intercourse between Chinese and Japanese people are inevitable outcome of numerous unlawful acts of Japanese troops, Chinese Government is confident that, if Japanese Government should exert itself to remove causes that have brought about present deplorable situation, gratifying results will be secured in improvement of relations between two countries and maintenance of world peace.

Meanwhile further information came from governments on the Council. France supplied data, as to the area in Manchuria controlled solely by Japanese troops, who were limited in number, as to their distribution, which varied with the use of armored trains, and as to the employment of airplanes; and reported that the Civil Governor of Mukden had been arrested, but that Chinese officials elsewhere had not been detained. It further described the situation in the interior as serious because of the presence of brigands and deserters.

Germany sent a letter giving details of the strength of Japanese military occupation at Mukden and others points, totalling a little over 5000 men.

From the Far East, a disturbing Nanking despatch from the Reuter agency quoted President Chiang Kai Chek as declaring at a political meeting that if the League and the Kellogg Pact signatories should fail in their duties, "China will not hesitate to make the supreme sacrifice of bankrupting the country for half a century to go to war in order to uphold the dignity and sacred rights of international agreements." The report was widely printed in newspapers of the 13th, but later denied by the Chinese Government.

The Peking correspondent of the London *Times* cabled an account from Chinese sources that Japanese airplanes had again flown over Chinchow to drop proclamations against the administration of Chiang Hsueh Liang. The Tokio correspondent of the *Times* sent word that Japanese officials denied seeking any new privileges in their undefined "fundamental points." Other Tokio messages indicated disturbance over the attitude assumed by the United States.

In Geneva, at the moment, the question was coming to the fore as to whether the United States would now consent to have an observer sit with the Council in its deliberations. The American Consul, Mr. Gilbert, had lengthy conversations with the Secretary-General of the League and was in frequent communication with the Department of State. From Washington, the United Press reported Secretary Stimson as saying that the American offer to support the League by independent action did not mean a "hands off" policy, but the contrary.

#### WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 14th

With the Council in closed session discussing an invitation to the United States and with conferences continuing between the Secretary-General and the American Consul, the disputants resumed their debate on Wednesday, October 14th, in terms of communications and telegrams. The Chinese representative added



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ten more to his series of cabled dispatches of information. No. 63 gave a Nanking message received from Robert E. Lewis, an American, under date of the preceding day, regarding conditions at Chinchow, which was bombed by twelve Japanese airplanes on October eighth, interviews with officials, effects of the Japanese bombs including the killing of one soldier, wounding of one Russian professor who died two days later, and killing of seventeen others in different parts of the city, and saying the Chinese had no air defence guns and not a shot was fired at the Japanese by the Chinese. The resident Japanese had left Chinchow thirteen days before under full protection of the Chinese; the Japanese authorities had officially thanked the Chinchow Chinese authorities for this protection.

No. 64 stated that upon learning of a Japanese news agency report that a Japanese had been killed at Tsingtao, President Chiang Kai Shek ordered the mayor there to arrest all suspects for public trial and to send information.

No. 65 gave the text of the memorandum handed to the Chinese government at Nanking by Mr. Shigemitsu, the Japanese envoy, upon arrival, stated to differ from the version telegraphed from Japan to the Council:

1. Japanese Government made clear Manchurian affair is nothing but outcome of deep-rooted anti-Japanese feeling in China which (had) taken specially provocative form in recent challenge to Japanese troops compelling latter resort measures self-defence. Responsibility for present situation naturally lies with Chinese Government. Japanese Government time and again requested Chinese Government take proper steps check anti-Japanese movement so systematically carried out various places in China. Being desirous maintaining cordial relations between two countries this Government exercised greatest patience and forbearance in hope that this deplorable state of affairs may yet improve. Unfortunately this anti-Japanese agitation seems now assuming alarming proportions. Learned that anti-Japanese societies Shanghai and elsewhere passed resolutions not only enforce prohibition trading in and transportation of Japanese goods but order cancellation existing contracts and otherwise prohibit all business transactions and cancel contracts employment between Chi-

nese and Japanese in order thus to effect the so-called severance of economic relations with Japan. For that purpose examination and detention goods and persons intimidation and violence and various other means being employed give effect such resolutions and severe penalties meted out to any who may fail comply with these orders, some societies even going so far as threaten capital punishment. Moreover cases expropriation and detention of goods owned by Japanese people and threats and violence against their lives and property become so numerous and insistent throughout China that they have been forced withdraw totally or partially from various localities.

2. It be noted that anti-Japanese movement in China is conducted as instrument of national policy under direction of Nationalist Party which in view peculiar political organisation China is inseparable in function from Government. That movement must therefore be clearly distinguished from one which originates spontaneously amongst people. Therefore evident that present anti-Japanese movement in China is not only in contravention of letter and spirit of treaties existing between two countries but constitutes a form of hostile act without use of arms contrary to all standards of justice and friendship. Chinese Government will be assuming very serious responsibility if it should fail take prompt and effective measures to quell that agitation. Moreover in meting out penal sentences to individual citizens anti-Japanese societies which are purely private organisations are clearly usurping authority National Government.

3. Will be remembered that at recent meeting of Council Geneva Chinese representative as well as Japanese gave assurance that their respective Governments would endeavour prevent aggravation of situation. Chinese Government obviously against that pledge is actually aggravating situation by making no honest or effective effort restrain activities anti-Japanese societies which are jeopardizing lives and property as well as liberty, trade, Japanese subjects different parts of China.

4. Japanese Government desires to call once more serious attention Chinese Government to these actions on part anti-Japanese societies and declare at same time that Chinese Government will be held responsible for whatever may be consequences of its failure to suppress anti-Japanese movement and to afford adequate protection to lives and property of Japanese subjects.

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No. 66 supplied an official translation of the exact words used by President Chiang Kai Shek at a memorial meeting on October 11th, since foreign press agency reports had attributed to him a threat that China would declare war if she failed to obtain satisfaction from the League:

As our nation forms a part of the League of Nations we have above all the duty of supporting international law and covenants. Not only have we this solemn duty but every nation has a like duty. Today we are trying earnestly to secure by peaceful means to uphold the Briand-Kellogg Anti-war Pact and the League of Nations Covenant so that even though Japan invades our soil, we have not declared war because in upholding international justice and pacts and covenants we ought to exercise the greatest patience. But if even then the international law and covenants could not be preserved we should not shrink from any sacrifices to discharge our duties. In the maintenance of responsibilities to the covenants and pacts of course it is vital if war could be avoided. But if nations are driven to war to defend the sanctity of international practice and pacts, then any sacrifice should not be regarded as too costly.

No. 67 reported a Japanese airplane machine-gunning a Chinese town and also bombing a Chinese troop train. No. 68 described searching of houses, occupation of administration offices, and disarming of Chinese soldiers, in a large town, and also movements of Japanese armoured cars and scouting planes. No. 69 said that five trains of Japanese troops had proceeded to Chinchow. No. 70 declared that a force of Mongolian and Russian bandits, numbering about 4,000, had attacked a Chinese regiment which had repelled them while Japanese airplanes reconnoitered. No. 71 gave details of bombing of two towns by Japanese airplanes, causing the death of two Chinese soldiers in barracks, and information as to movements and preparations by Japanese troops at various points. The tenth message of the day, unnumbered, supplied a correction of telegram No. 59, reporting Japanese aircraft over territory within the Great Wall, which was found on investigation to be untrue.

The Japanese representative in his turn submitted comprehensive information as to anti-

Japanese agitation throughout China and the situation in various towns in Manchuria. In Shanghai the Chinese Chamber of Commerce had been requested by the anti-Japanese association to notify the International Chamber of Commerce at Shanghai that goods brought by Japanese vessels or by foreign vessels mooring at Japanese wharves could be unloaded only with the greatest difficulty; another resolution informed Chinese traders contracting for foreign goods to stipulate that they should not be imported on Japanese vessels or they would be refused. Along the Yangtze business relations were interrupted, and Japanese residents were leaving towns and conveying their goods to Japanese vessels. At Canton students had plundered a Chinese shop of Japanese goods, in order to burn them; Chinese police officers, upon interfering, were assailed by the crowd which attacked the police station, forcing the police to open fire that caused two deaths and numerous casualties. Destruction of Japanese goods had continued, and a general strike was interfering with unloading of Japanese shipments and conduct of Japanese undertakings. The latest news from Manchuria showed that order was being restored and business resumed. In Mukden a Chinese committee was endeavouring, in concert with the provincial authorities, to check brigandage, while Japanese authorities were distributing food and organising reduced price sales. In Kirin a Chinese Director of Public Safety had taken charge, with the assistance of Japanese military authorities; and since the appointment of a new provincial governor on September 30th order had been restored.

In regard to the movement of Japanese troops at Mukden, another telegram from Tokio indicated improved conditions permitting transfer of the policing of Chinese quarters to Chinese officers, and withdrawal of the staffs of the 77th and 78th regiments to points outside the Chinese town or within the Japanese zone, together with some 1800 troops, leaving between six and seven hundred men in the Chinese districts.

Arrival of another cruiser at Shanghai was confirmed, with the dispatch of reinforcements to the naval barracks.



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In response to the inquiry of the British delegate regarding bombardment of open towns, the Japanese representative offered information from his Government, referring to the alarming situation caused by large bands of brigands and fugitive soldiers on both sides of the Peking-Mukden railway, concentration of Chinese troops, heavy firing upon an airplane scouting in their direction which had replied with bombs, and dispatch of three airplanes in the same direction which also replied with bombs to heavy fire. The machines bore traces of bullets and one of the observer officers had been wounded in the shoulder.

The number of Japanese troops at Mukden and their distribution were described as unchanged in a telegram of October 13th from the German Consulate there, transmitted by the German Government, which said, however, that 400 men had been withdrawn from the international concession to the Japanese concession. The German Consulate-General at Tientsin reported public anti-Japanese demonstrations and acts of boycott, but no serious incident.

News indicating confirmation that Japanese airplanes had dropped bombs on Tausan, on the Peking-Mukden line seventy-five miles south-west of Mukden, was cabled to the *London Times* by its Peking correspondent. Reports by the United Press described Chinese bandits looting railway stations and robbing trains on the same line, and also general movements of Chinese troops northward from the Yangtze valley.

#### Japan and the United States

A Washington dispatch to the *New York Times* indicated that the Secretary of State would authorize the American Consul at Geneva, Mr. Gilbert if an invitation should be issued, to take a seat at the sessions of the Council.

The Japanese Cabinet at Tokio was reported to have discussed the situation created by possible cooperation between the United States and the League and to have instructed its Ambassador at Washington to urge the Secretary of State to have confidence in the declar-

ation that Japan was seeking no new privileges in Manchuria.

The correspondent of the *London Daily Express* at Mukden describes guerilla warfare and propaganda by Chinese against Japan in Manchuria. The Peking correspondent of the *London Times* reported Japanese airplanes scattering new proclamations against the Manchurian authorities at Chinchow, and said the Japanese Legation at Peking had received instructions to request General Chang Hsueh Liang to take precautions against a conflict in case Chinese troops should retire from Chinchow upon points occupied by Japanese detachments under clauses of the treaties following the Boxer uprisings in 1900.

To the *London Times* Professor Gilbert Murray wrote out of his long experience and interest in League affairs:

... There has never been so sharp a test for the League—that is, for the whole recuperative forces of civilization . . . It is not a simple case of military aggression which can be corrected by an order to retire. It is not a definite dispute which can be referred to the international Court. It is one of those complicated tangles of mutual exasperation which are apt to arise on the borders of disturbed or anarchical societies. Fortunately, though the difficulties are great, the forces working for peace are enormously strong. The League, supported by the United States, constitutes an authority whose will even the most powerful and remote nation must hesitate to cross . . .

Reflection on the vital issues concerned in League action continued to appear in contradictory form in the press throughout the world. In Italy the *Stampa* commented:

The problem created by the Manchurian conflict is truly delicate and complex, and it is not in any illusory hope of a miracle by the action of the League of Nations as it has been undertaken in these recent days that we favor its endeavour, which has already become so arduous.

In France the *Temps* argued:

Neither the international institution at Geneva nor the United States, whatever the interest with which they follow the situation

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developing in the Far East, nor any other power, can envisage an intervention of any other character than friendly mediation.

In regard to the Japanese desire for direct negotiations with China, the *London Times* asserted:

It is impossible for the League to agree with the Japanese view that it should meet Chinese complaints by merely recommending to the Nanking to come to terms with their adversary quickly . . . The Covenant only accords to a disputant power the right to take the administration of justice into its own hands when the dispute has been submitted unsuccessfully to the arbitration of the League Council. In this case the Japanese Government have put themselves in the wrong by permitting or failing to prevent repeated military action without submitting the dispute to the arbitration of the League; and to this breach of the Covenant is added a clear departure from the spirit of the Kellogg Pact . . .

#### THURSDAY, OCTOBER 15th

THE imminent prospect that an American representative would take a seat at the next open meeting on the dispute over-shadowed on Thursday, October 15th, every other consideration. For the first time the Council was on the point of establishing official contact with a representative of the Power whose President had been chiefly responsible for founding the League of Nations.

The Committee of Five or the President and one or the other disputant were meanwhile in almost constant conferences; rumors speeded from group to group of correspondents and secretaries through the corridors of the League building. Japan was known to object, according to first report because she disliked the idea of American intervention, then according to later reports on the ground that American representation would be contrary to the Covenant. All the other nations holding seats on the Council were equally known to favor an invitation to the United States. Meanwhile press despatches from Washington carried the news that the Administration there had already indicated its willingness to accept. Prentiss

Gilbert, American Consul at Geneva, was again in frequent conversations with the Secretary-General and individual Council members.

With trouble steadily brewing in Manchuria, time was the essential element in nearly every mind, for peaceful settlement. Japan held that her constitutional point against an invitation to a non-member State was a matter of principle requiring a unanimous vote for decision. The other States held that the question of sending an invitation was a matter of procedure, requiring only a majority vote, particularly since the precedent had been unanimously set in favor of exchanging information with the United States and the step proposed was in effect no more than an improvement of method in order to save time. Attempts to draft a form of invitation that would content all parties repeatedly failed; the Japanese representative felt compelled to reject each suggestion. Finally at a session lasting late into the evening while the hallways were crowded with correspondents and spectators awaiting word, he proposed that his Government's constitutional point be referred to a committee of jurists to be summoned in Geneva. The other delegates protested that no such committee could assemble and deliver an opinion quickly. When Japan refused to be bound in advance by its findings, the proposal was put to vote, which showed the Japanese and German members supporting and all others opposed. Decision to forward an invitation to the United States was then taken, as a matter of procedure, by a vote of thirteen against one—Japan this time voting alone.

#### The Special Position of the United States

Public announcement of the outcome showed that members of the Council had considered the dispute to concern not only execution of the League Covenant but also of the Briand-Kellogg Pact of Paris, and that the invitation should go to the United States as one of the proponents and as the depositary of ratifications of the Pact. This put the American Government in a special position and avoided questions as to others.

The Council's favorable action had reserved



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decision on the constitutional questions raised by Japan as to the legality of such an invitation; and the proposal adopted aimed at requesting the United States to designate a representative to sit at the table of the Council in order to furnish information and make communications.

The text of the proposal of the invitation, elaborated by the President, as circulated under the date of October 15th, read:

In the course of the discussion the opinion has been expressed that the question before the Council concerns the fulfilment of obligations arising not only from the Covenant of the League of Nations, but also from the Pact of Paris.

This opinion is certainly well founded, since in accordance with Article 2 of that Pact:

"The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all dispute or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them shall never be sought except by pacific means."

Foremost among the signatories of the Pact of Paris appear the United States of America. The United States were one of the proponents of the Pact, and I may be allowed to recall that I had the honour to be associated with the then Secretary of State of the United States as joint author. In consequence, the United States may be regarded as being especially interested in ensuring a settlement of the present dispute by pacific means.

Moreover, the Government of the United States, with which communications regarding the dispute before the Council have already been exchanged, had expressed its whole-hearted sympathy with the attitude of the League of Nations, and has affirmed its desire to re-inforce the action of the League. I feel confident that I shall be meeting the wishes of my colleagues in proposing that we should invite the Government of the United States to be associated with our efforts by sending a representative to sit at the Council table so as to be in a position to express an opinion as to how, either in view of the present situation or of its future development, effect can best be given to the provisions of the Pact. By this means also the opportunity will be afforded him of following our deliberations on the problem as a whole.

I am sure that any action that might be taken under the Pact could not but

strengthen the efforts which are now being made by the Council in accordance with the obligations imposed upon it by the Covenant of the League of Nations to effect the peaceful settlement of the problem under discussion.

What most observers felt to be the significance of the day was thus characterized by William Martin in the *Journal de Genève*:

Certain fears have been shown that the Kellogg Pact might be contrary to the Covenant of the League. The reverse is true. They supplement and reinforce each other. We witness the absorbing spectacle of the United States being invited to the table of the Council as the depository of the Kellogg Pact, and itself refraining from invoking it in order not to create a duality of powers. . . . How, after that, can it be pretended that the security of peaceful peoples remains in peril?

In Paris, the *Journal des Débats* commented:

Matters must be kept clear, for other nations besides the United States might consider themselves equally concerned in the Manchurian affair and demand to take part in the deliberations. That might, for example, be true of Soviet Russia.

News from the Far East during the day was slight. A Peking despatch to the London *Times* reported five Japanese troop trains carrying cavalry and infantry, arriving at Sinmin, west of Mukden. A Japanese battalion was described in a Mukden despatch to the *Paris Herald* as dispersing a demonstration by 5000 Chinese soldiers in a region to the west.

#### FRIDAY, OCTOBER 16th

A full debate on the question of sending an invitation to the United States, which the Council felt it had settled in private session, had to be held at the morning session on Friday, October 16, when the Japanese delegate persisted in maintaining his objection. The President first stated the situation, recalling that the Council had in its previous meetings in September unanimously expressed the desire that the United States should cooperate with it by some means to secure a successful solution

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of the conflict, in the sense that the Council would throw open its documents to the American Government, which, on its part also, might indicate to the Council whatever it felt would be of interest. Subsequently the question arose whether this cooperation could not pass from the stage of correspondence to the stage of verbal communication—in other words, whether following numerous precedents in regard to commission meetings, the Council should invite a representative of the United States to take a seat at its table. That view had secured practically unanimous consent and the President therefore had drafted an invitation which he proposed that the Council should adopt if it agreed to the procedure. He then read the text of the proposal, as previously given.

The Japanese representative, M. Briand continued, had expressed doubts on constitutional and juridical points, although he did not take a different view from his colleagues on the point whether cooperation should be made closer, regarding which they were unanimous. Nevertheless, the legal question appeared to him important, and he had sent the following letter to the President of the Council:

During the discussion I had the honour to have yesterday with Your Excellency, I said that I felt certain constitutional doubts regarding an invitation to be sent to the Government of the United States asking that Government to be represented on the Council of the League of Nations. The following are the principal points which in our opinion require elucidation:

(1) When it is proposed to invite a member or a State non-member of the League—let us suppose that they are on a footing of equality according to the Covenant—to send its representative to sit on the Council, should it not be determined whether this member or State non-member is not particularly interested in the question before the Council (Article 4, paragraph 5)?

(2) When a matter is brought up before the Council under Article 11 of the Covenant, is there any member or State non-member that is particularly interested in the question within the meaning of the provisions of Article 4, paragraph 5?

(3) When the Council decided to invite a State non-member to send a representative to the Council on what footing will that representative attend the Council meetings?

If he attends them as an observer according to the traditions which have been established by the League of Nations, will he have the right to take part in the discussions? If he attends on a footing of equality with the members of the Council, has he the same rights and duties as the latter?

(4) If the Council decided to invite a State non-member to attend the discussions of the present session, would the Council consider that it was thereby setting up a precedent necessarily to be followed every time that any question was brought up before the Council under Article 11?

(5) Should not a decision taken by the Council to invite a State non-member to send a representative to the Council be taken by a unanimous vote in accordance with the rule advocated in the Covenant?

I should be very grateful for your opinion on the subject.

To this letter the President had replied:

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 15th inst. I am under the impression that this letter rests on a misunderstanding. Article 4, paragraph 5, of the Covenant does not, in effect, arise. It has never been proposed to invite the representative of the United States of America to sit as a member of the Council, but from the outset, the Council decided unanimously to communicate to the Government of the United States any information relating to this question and to ask that Government to send it any relevant communications on that subject that it might consider useful. That was done, and on several occasions the Council received from the Government of the United States important communications.

What is now proposed is, acting on the same lines and in order to co-ordinate the joint action of the Council and the Government of the United States, to invite the latter Government to send a representative to sit at the Council table without, however, sitting there as a member. In all similar cases that may arise in the future, the Council will no doubt desire to act in the same way.

As you see, the invitation proposed falls clearly within the class of questions of procedure and can, therefore, be decided by a majority vote.

In order to dispel any misunderstanding, I send you the annexed text of the statement I intend making to the Council suggesting to my colleagues to refer the invitation



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in question to the Government of the United States.

Discussion would take place on the principle and terms of the invitation and also on the preliminary legal question whether decision to send it could be taken by a majority vote or would require unanimity. There had already been a fairly lengthy discussion in the private meeting, when the Council decided the question could be settled by a majority vote. The proposal to refer the matter to a committee of jurists had been set aside, on the ground that the special conditions under which the invitation was being considered by the Council precluded the idea of any final resolution of the question of principle. The reservations made by the delegate of Japan would be placed on record and the constitutional problem would remain intact and undecided.

The Council had then voted, with one dissenting voice, to send the invitation to the Government of the United States.

#### Japan Presses Her Objection

Speaking at once for Japan, Mr. Yoshizawa argued that any such questions should be decided by a unanimous vote, and that he favoured referring the matter to the Permanent Court of International Justice for an opinion. He wished to make clear the reasons compelling him to adopt a negative attitude. The Japanese Government considered that the proposal to invite a non-member State to take part in Council discussions, even in an advisory capacity, raised constitutional questions of the greatest importance for the League as a whole, and that such a fundamental decision could not be taken for reasons of expediency, however pressing. So he had proposed that a committee of experts study it. Other members had then put the question whether he would accept the findings of such a committee; but he could not give such assurance because he felt that committees could not anticipate the opinion of the Council. The opinion of the Permanent Court itself was not legally binding on the Council. Since the other members did not consider it expedient to undertake the examina-

tion he considered essential, he had to vote on principle against the invitation of a non-member State.

His position did not relate in any way to the particular case; the Japanese nation entertained the most cordial relations with the American nation and would continue to do so. It specially appreciated the attitude of the United States in the present situation and the ideal of peace animating its government. He had gladly agreed to the proposal to exchange information with the United States, since this involved nothing in conflict with the Covenant.

In any case there was no divergence of opinion as to application of Article 11 to the conflict before the Council and he again emphasized his views regarding the necessity for a unanimous vote on all questions under that article. While the negative vote he had cast was not due to political reasons, his government still maintained its view unless the doubts which it had expressed should be resolved.

#### Great Britain Replies to Japan

Lord Reading, taking up the discussion for Great Britain, contended that the constitutional position was quite simple and free from all juridical difficulties. It was not what decisions they should adopt under Article 11, but whether, under that article, they should send an invitation to the United States to appoint a representative to take part in the discussions under the terms outlined by the President. That was a matter of determination whether the issuing of the invitation involved principle or merely procedure. If it were proposed that a non-member State should take part for the purpose of giving a vote, that would be a constitutional question of the highest importance, and it was agreed that no invitation could be issued. But if it were argued that the question must fall under Article 11, and require unanimity, it would mean that no matter of procedure could be raised under Article 11, which was no different from any other article. And if it was a question of procedure simply, as had been voted the previous night in private session, then clearly the invitation could be issued. There was no need for consultation of experts, but the members of the

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Council ought to decide whether the question was one of procedure. The Japanese delegate himself had argued that there was a distinction between the question of principle and the question of sending the invitation which could be decided by a majority as a matter of procedure. Referring to paragraph 2 of Article 5 of the Covenant, Lord Reading concluded that there could be no doubt that only procedure was concerned. The matter had been discussed at length and he appealed to the Japanese delegate to rest his case.

Mr. Yoshizawa regretted that he could not share Lord Reading's views. The question, in the Japanese view, was one of principle, as he had stated, and he had nothing further to add.

#### Briand Declares the Invitation Approved

The President then re-emphasized the fact that the Japanese representative had always stood with other members of the Council in desiring the largest possible measure of assistance from the United States in the grave matters before it. Considering the constitutional question, it was clear that the Covenant intended the Council to obtain all the information possible in discussing a problem, while in its decisions on the substance of any matter, the rule of unanimity must apply. If it were a question of bringing in a new member with power to vote, there could be no doubt that this rule would hold. When it was proposed to exchange information with the United States, the point might have been argued that the Council had no right to do so. Instead the Council had unanimously agreed, and such cooperation had been going on. He did not think that now, on a proposal to continue it verbally instead of in writing, another unanimous vote was necessary. Nevertheless it had not been a bad thing that the Japanese delegate should have raised objections to be thought over, and his fundamental reservations remained unaffected and on record. M. Briand concluded by announcing that the invitation which the Council had voted to send to the United States would be forwarded, and expressed the hope that it would be accepted.

Mr. Yoshizawa again asserted that, although

appreciating the attitude of the Council, he could not change his own. His government regarded the matter as one of substance requiring a unanimous vote.

Mr. Sokal explained his vote for Poland, although he understood the discussion to be closed in view of the decision taken the day before. The Council had decided to invite a representative of the United States to sit with it in certain conditions and on certain terms, and constitutional and juridical questions which had been raised were fully reserved because at the very beginning a unanimous vote had favoured exchange of information with the United States.<sup>1</sup> They were all aware that the major question, as to who should decide whether a matter was one of principle or procedure, and how, had not been settled. It had not been usual for the Council to regard such decisions as falling within its own competence; it had always referred to the independent judicial organisations concerned for an opinion.

#### Germany Pleads for the New World Order

Mr. von Mutius, on behalf of Germany, made a moving plea for good will in adjustment of all the difficulties before the Council. The present generation had learnt that there are no longer any isolated questions in the world and that all nations were liable to suffer from any war anywhere. That was the consciousness embodied in the League, and he appealed to the disputants to allow its moderating influence to be felt. The League was born of painful experience, and he believed that all the nations involved in the last war would be glad to have recourse to Geneva rather than face such suffering again. The League represented the outcome of a lesson which it desired to apply to this case. If Japan and China would apply it by using methods removed from old-time practice, they would give the world an example of wisdom which could not fail to enhance their prestige. In view of her position and as a disarmed State, Germany was specially interested in the matter and hoped that they would give this example.

<sup>1</sup> The possibility of a precedent involving Soviet Russia, it was generally understood, was in mind.



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Mr. Fotitch, for Yugoslavia, associated himself with the statement made by the Polish representative, saying that when he voted with the majority he had in mind the explanations given by the President and the understanding that the constitutional questions raised were held over for consideration.

Mr. Grandi, for Italy, emphasized anew that the Council was not concerned with a decision under Article 11, which involved the rule of unanimity. It was dealing with a matter of procedure since the merits of the question were settled by the first unanimous vote to exchange information with the United States. Obviously the purpose had been to set up as wide a consultative procedure as possible, and the Council was now merely perfecting such an arrangement.

#### Spain Makes a Point to Japan

Mr. de Madariaga, for Spain, asserted that the President and the British representative had clearly defined the juridical position, and that the unanimous vote in September settled any question of principle. It was a matter of form whether consultation with the United States should be in writing or verbal. Like the President, he felt indebted to the Japanese representative for drawing attention and giving thought to questions of constitution and interpretation when his Government was so much concerned with matters having a direct bearing on the spirit of the Covenant; it was a happy augury that the nation so concerned was defending so firmly the Covenant of the League.

The dispute before the Council was the most essential and serious with which it had ever had to deal; and moral forces should not be spent unduly on constitutional debates. The occasion offered the advantage of advice, help, and influence from the United States, whose Government had made a gesture enabling it to cooperate with the Council; and he was glad that, whatever juridical difficulties there might be, the Council was unanimous concerning to the value of American cooperation.

Mr. Braadland, for Norway, voiced his agreement with the views of the Polish and Yugoslavian representatives.

Dr. Sze, for China, recorded his approval of

the sending of the invitation to the United States in the terms defined by the President, and again urged the need for speedy action to settle the dispute before the Council. His Government, since putting its signature to the Pact of Paris, had renounced war as an instrument of national policy, and adopted the procedure of settling conflicts and disputes, of any nature or origin, by pacific means.

#### France Responds to Germany.

The President, in closing the discussion and complying with the request of Mr. Yoshizawa, gave assurance that the Japanese memorandum submitted to the Council, would form part of the record. He then reinforced what the German representative had said in calling attention to the essence of the task before the Council. Every available moment was being devoted to dealing with it in a period which he desired to be as short as possible. The spirit in which it must be considered was that the matter must be settled in a peaceful way and that its degeneration into war was unthinkable. The obligations of the Covenant rendered such an issue impossible and immoral. The parties to the dispute would defend their interests with vigour, and one of the advantages of the League was that differences could so be put forward frankly. In the cause of peace and to prevent conflicts of this kind degenerating into war, provision had been made for just such discussions.

Turning to the German representative, the spokesman of France voiced deep emotion in hearing him say, if such an institution as the League had existed before the catastrophe of the World War, an institution which would have enabled countries to come together and argue their cases, even bitterly, what loss, pain and misery it might have prevented. Now the institution exists; the countries have pledged themselves to support it; and it is not possible to admit the re-occurrence of such a catastrophe.

The invitation accordingly went forward that noon, addressed to the Secretary of State in care of the American Consulate at Geneva; news of its acceptance arrived early in the

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afternoon, dispelling any fears that Japan's opposition might have caused a change of mind in Washington, and the next Council meeting was fixed for the same day.

#### An American Sits with the Council.

Consciousness that reception of a representative of the United States marked an epoch in League history and in the world's endeavor to secure peace dominated, in the late afternoon, the gathering of the Council. For the time the dispute under consideration almost appeared to be disregarded, yet in fact the meeting only served to deepen emphasis of its meaning to the nations of both hemispheres.

M. Briand began by reading the letter addressed to him by the American Consul at Geneva, in response to the letter of invitation approved at the earlier meeting of the day:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication addressed to the Secretary of State of the United States of America, under date of October 16th, in which you cite a proposal adopted by the Council of the League of Nations. You extend an invitation, in accordance with that proposal, to the Government of the United States to send a representative to sit at the Council table, so that he may be in a position to consider with the Council the relationship between the provisions of the Pact of Paris and the present unfortunate situation in Manchuria, and at the same time to follow the deliberations of the Council with regard to other aspects of the problem with which it is now confronted.

I am directed by the Secretary of State to accept on behalf of the Government of the United States, this invitation to send a representative, and to inform you that he has designated me to act in that capacity.

M. Briand then asked the American representative to take a seat at the Council table, and Mr. Gilbert came forward to his place. In the midst of a deep silence in the Council room, crowded with diplomats, League officials, press correspondents, and spectators seated and standing along the walls and at the doors, the President welcomed him. It was a public demonstration, he felt, of the spirit of good

understanding and cooperation which had joined the efforts of the United States and the League since the beginning of the difficulties submitted for peaceful settlement, to the satisfaction of the two parties concerned—the first link between them since the Pact of Paris placed on record the common determination to seek the solution of disputes by no other than pacific means. The presence of the American representative was significant of the union between the moral forces enlisted in the world in the cause of peace. The Council greeted it as a very great event, justifying the highest hopes, that the American nation was bringing to the League the support of its authority.

Mr. Gilbert, speaking for the first time as an American representative to the Council, paid a warm tribute on behalf of the Government and people of the United States to M. Briand as "the untiring artisan of peace and the co-author of the Pact of Paris". He then defined the American relationship to the Council in its deliberations:

In this moment of deep international concern, I thank you for your invitation to sit in your deliberations and to participate in your discussion in so far as the Pact of Paris, to which my country is a party, is concerned.

The Government of the United States of America has been following with the closest attention the proceedings before the Council, for the settlement of the dispute at present unhappily existing between China and Japan. My Government does not seek to intrude with respect to such measures as you may propose under the Covenant of the League of Nations; and is not in a position to participate with the members of the Council in the formulation of any action envisaged under that instrument, for the composing of differences existing between two of its members. It has already conveyed to you its sympathetic appreciation of your efforts, and its whole hearted accord with the objective you have in view; and it has expressed the hope that the tried machinery of the League may in this case, as on previous occasions, be successful in bringing this dispute to a conclusion satisfactory to both parties. Moreover, acting independently and through diplomatic channels, my Government has already signified its moral support of your efforts in this capacity to bring about a



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peaceful solution of the unfortunate controversy in Manchuria.

In our deliberations as to the application of the machinery of the Covenant of the League of Nations, I repeat, we can, of course, take no part. But the Pact of Paris, bearing as it does the signature of the President of this meeting, together with that of our former Secretary of State, as joint proponents, represents to us in America an effective means of marshalling the public opinion of the world behind the use of pacific means only, in the solution of controversies between nations. We feel not only that this public opinion is a most potent force in the domestic affairs of every nation, but that it is of constantly growing import and influence in the mutual relations of the members of the family of nations.

The timely exercise of the power of such opinion may be effective to prevent a breach of international peace of world-wide consequences. We assume that this may be the reason why the consideration of the relationship between the provisions of the Pact of Paris and the present situation has been brought forward to this body; and the purpose which has moved my Government to accept your invitation is that thus we may most easily and effectively take common counsel with you on this subject.

In turn, various members of the Council associated themselves with what the President had said, and gave impressive indication of the historic importance they felt attached to the first American representation before the Council in a world crisis. Lord Reading, for Great Britain, emphasized that collaboration by a representative of the United States showed that the objects of the Pact of Paris were those pursued also by the League of Nations—the pacification of all controversies instead of arbitrament by war.

Mr. Grandi, for Italy, pointed out that since the 1930 Assembly the League had been seeking means of bringing into harmony its Covenant and the Pact of Paris, greatly desired in view of the fact that the two instruments were complementary to each other. The presence of a representative of the American Government proved, he thought, that harmony did in fact exist between them.

Mr. von Mutius, for Germany, said that his country specially welcomed the generous ini-

tiative of the Pact of Paris uniting the name of Monsieur Briand with that of Mr. Kellogg, the former American Secretary of State, and also the present collaboration.

Mr. de Madariaga, for Spain, underscored the fact that the American spokesman had explained very clearly the grounds on which he was to work at the Council table; he was there on the basis of the Pact of Paris, and if there was the slightest difference in spirit between it and the League Covenant M. Briand would not have produced with Mr. Kellogg the Paris Pact.

Mr. de Matos for Guatemala, Mr. Lester for the Irish Free State, and Mr. Sokal for Poland, spoke in the same sense, urging that the present effective demonstration would greatly facilitate the work of drafting a formula to harmonize the League Covenant and the Pact of Paris.

Mr. Garay for Panama, Mr. Fotitch for Yugoslavia, Dr. Sze for China, and Mr. Barreto for Peru concluded the discussion.

Mr. Gilbert, acknowledging the welcome extended by the various members of the Council, expressed gratification that the spirit manifested was in complete accord with the views expressed by the government of the United States. Thenceforward he attended all Council meetings, both public and private.

Meanwhile other developments took place affecting the substance of the debate. The Japanese delegation denied, in a letter transmitted the same day, the charge of the Chinese delegation to the effect that the text of the Japanese memorandum of October 9th, as delivered at Nanking, differed from the text communicated to the Secretary-General of the League; the only difference to be found, it asserted, related to purely subsidiary words omitted in telegraphic transmission and partially restored in the text circulated to the Council.

The Chinese delegation added five more telegrams to its series of information. No. 72 explained that the alleged murder of a Japanese at Tsingtao had been found to be due to troubles in the Japanese community, and the Japanese had made no representations to the Chinese. No. 73 reported the construction of a large Japanese aerodrome in Manchuria, further bombing and scouting expeditions, and Chinese skirmishing with Mongolian bandits said to

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be aided by Japanese airplanes. No. 74 detailed conditions in Shanghai with Japanese residents masquerading as Chinese. No. 75 described Japanese trench building and mine laying activities in Manchuria, and further bombing. No. 76 said that Japanese scouting airplanes had flown beyond Chinchow along the Peking-Mukden railway.

#### Action in Japan and America.

Action in Tokio and Washington was reported also in connection with American participation. From Tokio, the correspondent of the *London Times* explained the Japanese attitude toward the proposal that an American representative should take part in the deliberations of the Council as due to the fact that never before, when a question arose between States members of the League, had the United States been asked to act jointly with the League, and to a consequent feeling that the United States and the League seemed to want to align themselves only on the Chinese-Japanese question. A United Press dispatch told of a hurried session of the Tokio Cabinet, to consider the situation created by the Council's decision to force through an invitation to the United States. Further, the Secretary of State in Washington was said to have sent two notes to the Tokio Cabinet, the texts of which were not revealed.

From New York, the Havas agency cabled that Mr. Stimson had received the Japanese Ambassador in Washington at the State Department and had assured him that Mr. Gilbert was being admitted to the Council deliberations in Geneva only as an observer and that he would abstain from associating himself with any procedure which might be adopted under the terms of the League Covenant.

In Japan, the influential *Jijishimpo* wrote:

America, from the first period of difficult creative work, withdrew from an enterprise that she had initiated; she did not wish to be entangled in European affairs and adopted a rule of sending only observers to Geneva . . . but when a threat of grave conflict, with incalculable consequences, obscures the Pacific sky, she adopts as an exception quite a different attitude. This time the League of Nations offers an

advantage to the United States as well as to Europe. America officially approves its action, lauds its good offices, is ready to lend aid to its work, and even assumes a part of the responsibilities which the Europeans have decided to face, for after all they are dealing with a serious question interesting the head of the American Government and the American people.

#### SATURDAY, OCTOBER 17th

THE members of the Council went into closed session again on the day following the reception of the American representative, to plunge into the difficult task of trying to find a formula for proposals that might be successfully submitted to the two disputants. On the 17th they reached one significant decision; they determined formally to invoke the Pact of Paris. This was done, according to reliable information, in accordance with the wishes of the United States. The members of the Council who are also signatories of the Pact of Paris decided that their Governments should call the attention of the Governments of Nanking and Tokio to the obligations they had undertaken under Article 2 of this pact, which reads:

The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means.

They further approved the suggestion that M. Briand should forward letters to other signatories of the Pact, including the United States, informing them of this decision.

Japan at this moment elaborated the defence of her position in a long memorandum. It dealt with the question of airplane scouting, explained to be necessary on account of the presence of large bodies of mounted bandits and disbanded soldiers out of control by the Chinese authorities and committing acts of vandalism. Bombing, it was asserted, only took place when the airplanes were attacked, and in no case were bombs dropped on towns or on the peaceful civilian population. The Japanese representative also communicated new



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details as to anti-Japanese agitation throughout China and evacuation of Japanese residents from many points. The Chinese representative added one more telegram, No. 77, to his series, dealing with conditions in Nanking due to demonstrations by Japanese marines and residents, who were dispersed by the International settlement police.

The French Government sent information concerning a conflict south of the Peking-Mukden railway line between a Japanese column and a Chinese body of about 500 brigands and soldiers, and reported the military occupation as remaining unchanged.

From Tokio the United Press cabled that the Japanese Cabinet had ended a special session without deciding to act in any way on the League's decision to invite American participation in the Council sessions, although the Premier publicly expressed doubt, in a statement to the press, as to the legality of the invitation.

The State Department in Washington meanwhile had published the text of its instructions to Consul Gilbert in Geneva, which more specifically defined his relationship to the Council:

You are authorized to participate in the discussion of the Council when it relates to possible obligations of the Briand-Kellogg Pact to which the United States is a party. You are expected to report the result of such discussion to the Department for its determination as to possible action. If you are present at a discussion on any other aspect of the Chinese-Japanese dispute, it must be only as an observer and auditor.

#### Uncertainties about American Policy.

The Washington correspondent of the London Times, in a despatch arousing the widest interest and disquiet in Geneva, reported Secretary Stimson's view to be that the League was in no sense being employed to "implement" the Pact of Paris, but, on the contrary, that if the question of its application arose, the members of the Council would divest themselves of their character as adherents of the League and would act as a group of representatives of the principal signatories of the Paris Pact.

Mr. Stimson, the correspondent further said, had been careful to make clear that the United States had no intention to participate in "sanctions". Where the inter-relationship of China, Japan and Russia is concerned, it was explained, President Hoover and Secretary Stimson had apparently come to feel that League initiative was to be preferred to American invocation of the Pact of Paris, because of non-recognition of Soviet Russia by the United States and of the delicacy of American-Japanese relations. In other words, a technique of intervention was in course of development, so far as the Orient might be concerned, in which the American Government was an essential and willing collaborator but not an initiator of policy acting alone.

Press comments that indicated the response of public opinion in the United States were beginning to reach Geneva. The *New York Times* was quoted as saying:

It is unimportant if communications are by telephone or if the American representative is sitting with the Council. Cooperation is the best hope for peace.

The *New York Evening Post*, on the other hand, was reported to hold:

Stimson must face the responsibility of disregarding the American command to refrain from commitment to the League, or the United States has no real representative government.

Citations of opinion from papers throughout the country showed similarly divided tendencies, the majority favorable but others—notably the *Chicago Tribune*, the *Washington Post*, and the Hearst papers—unfavorable.

#### SUNDAY, OCTOBER 18th

The grave importance that Japan attached to the Council's act in overriding Japanese protests against an invitation to the United States to send a representative to its meetings, appeared in a memorandum that had been forwarded by the Japanese representative to the President of the Council the preceding day,

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with a request for an opinion as soon as possible upon the contentious raised:

1. Up to the present the Japanese Government has co-operated sincerely in the work of the League and has endeavored to increase its prestige by every possible means. It considers that the League's action should in every case be strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Covenant, and that this action should be both impartial and correct. If there is any departure from these principles for reasons of expediency, the Japanese Government is of opinion that the authority of the League is likely to suffer.

2. When the League Council discussed the question of inviting the Government of the United States of America to send an observer to sit on the Council, the Japanese Representative expressed at length his doubts as to the interpretation of the Covenant—that is to say, whether the presence in the Council of an observer of a non-member State was or was not compatible with the provisions of the League Covenant, and whether the question of the invitation could or could not be regarded under the Covenant as a question of procedure. Although the Japanese Representative asked the Council to examine these points, the latter did not go fully into the questions raised by him and likewise rejected his request that they should be referred to a committee of legal experts for examination. The President of the Council left all these legal questions in abeyance and put the question of the invitation to the vote, regardless of the opposition of the Japanese Government's Representative; he also decided that this was a question of procedure and stated that the proposal had been adopted by a majority.

3. The opinion was expressed that as the United States Government was a party to the Paris Pact it should have the opportunity of expressing its opinion before the League Council solely in regard to the application of that Treaty. The Japanese Government is not only firmly convinced that the present situation is not such that there is any danger of war between Japan and China but also considers that, as the Paris Pact is a treaty between a large number of States, including non-member States, the granting of an opportunity to sit on the Council with the right to express an opinion to the United States Representative alone, raises a delicate question. This also shows that the invitation to the United States is not simply a question of procedure.

4. The Japanese Government cannot

help feeling the profoundest misgiving as to the correctness of the precipitate adoption of a majority decision and the leaving in abeyance of the preliminary question whether a proposal requires unanimity or whether it can be decided by a majority. It is anxious to know when the legal questions outstanding are to be discussed and how the vote of October 15th will affect the result of those discussions.

Before deciding upon the attitude which it will adopt in regard to the questions now raised as a whole, the Japanese Government would be happy to have the opinion of the President of the Council on the above-mentioned points.

On the 18th, when this memorandum was made public, the Japanese representative also issued a long detailed statement reviewing the Japanese attitude in the dispute and the reasons advanced in support of it; it emphasized once more the desire to avoid aggravation of the state of affairs, the difficulties created by bandits and fugitive soldiers, the concentration of Chinese forces, the purely scouting operations of airplanes, the effects of propaganda and allegations of complete occupation of Manchuria when Japan had there about 14,000 men out of 15,000 authorized by treaty, the conditions held requisite for the withdrawal of troops to their zone, the menace of anti-Japanese agitation, uncertainty that the Chinese authorities could guarantee security for Japanese lives and property in Manchuria, and doubt that the League of Nations could effectively assume the responsibility. Further details were transmitted of anti-Japanese movements in China and the measures taken to break off both commerce and communications.

Invocation of the Briand-Kellogg Pact by the Council of the League to prevent war in Manchuria was reported in a special cable to the *Paris Herald* to have been approved by the Department of State. From Tokio another dispatch indicated discovery and suppression of a plot to overthrow the Government and set up a military dictatorship in retaliation for a policy in the handling of the dispute which army circles felt to have been too lenient.

In Geneva there were rumors—inaccurate, but interesting as evidence of deepening concern—that the Council members had discussed



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the possibility of convoking the Assembly in extraordinary session—a step taken only once before, in 1926, to discuss the entrance of Germany into the League. Meanwhile there was reassurance in the fact that, despite fears and reports of a possible withdrawal of Japan, the Japanese delegate accepted the new situation, continued in conference with the President of the Council and other members, and also held conversations with the American Consul, Mr. Gilbert. In a press interview, Mr. Yoshizawa said that his country had opposed the presence of an American observer purely on judicial grounds which it still maintained to have been correct.

Press opinion cabled from the United States indicated the *Detroit Free Press*, the *Richmond News*, and other papers in support of the governments policy, and the *Washington Post*, the affiliated *New York Evening Post* and *Philadelphia Public Ledger*, the *New York American* and *New York Sun* in opposition.

#### MONDAY, OCTOBER 19th

To the Japanese representative's inquiry concerning the Council's invitation to the United States, M. Briand replied in a letter dated the same day and made public on the 19th:

1. I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the Memorandum which Your Excellency was good enough to send to me in your letter of October 17th.

2. I need hardly say, and I am sure that I speak for all my colleagues on the Council, that I highly appreciate the value of the collaboration which Japan has given the League of Nations and the efforts which it has invariably made to increase the prestige of the League. Need I add that we all agree with the Japanese Government that no reasons of expediency, whatever they may be, can justify us in placing ourselves in contradiction with the Articles of the Covenant, which constitutes the charter of the Members of the League?

3. Your Excellency will remember that, in a letter addressed to me October 15th, you set out certain considerations in regard to the action taken by the Council in the matter which forms the subject of your latest note.

Having consulted certain of my colleagues,

whom the previous President, with the approval of the Council had requested to assist him, I had most carefully examined the questions which you then raised, and to which I subsequently replied in my letter of October 15th.

4. I hoped that that letter would calm the anxieties of your Government, since it clearly indicated that in my opinion, and in the opinion of those whom I had consulted, the questions put to me were based on a misunderstanding.

5. At the meetings on October 15th and 16th, I was at pains to make it clear—and my statement was endorsed by my colleagues—that the object of the proposal laid before the Council was strictly limited, being merely to supplement the arrangements already made to enable the Council to obtain information with greater ease, and that the legal questions of a general nature to which Your Excellency called attention did not arise, and should, therefore, remain entirely reserved; and I added that in view of the circumstances of the matter, it was not necessary for those questions to be settled before the Council should come to a decision on the proposal submitted to it.

6. Furthermore, my letter of October 15th—I would draw Your Excellency's attention to its second and third paragraphs—explained the reasons why, and the conditions under which, a representative of the United States was invited to sit at the Council table. The declarations made by various Members of the Council at the meeting of October 16th are also explicit on this subject.

7. This being the case, I consider, and my colleagues agree, that no useful purpose would be served by undertaking at the present time a judicial study of problems which, however important and interesting they may be in themselves, do not at the moment arise, though they can be examined later if the Members of the League so desire.

8. I trust that the Japanese Government will, for the reasons I have explained, agree that such a study would in any case be wholly unrelated to the vote given by the Council on October 15th.

9. I venture to hope that the foregoing explanations will convince the Japanese Government that I and my colleagues have given the most serious consideration to the views it requested Your Excellency to express to us, and that we have been most careful to take no action which was in contradiction to any article of the Covenant of the League or to the Council's practice.

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The Japanese delegation communicated a series of seven telegrams: 1, denying the Chinese charge of supplying arms to Mongol rebels from the Mukden arsenal; 2, reporting evacuation of Japanese families; 3, denying airplanes had raided Mongol soldiers in an attack on Chinese forces at Tungliao; 4, reporting withdrawal of railway workers on the Tungliao line; 5, giving details of Chinese fighting with Mongols and subsequent brigandage near Tungliao; 6 and 7, analyzing anti-Japanese agitation at Shanghai.

The Norwegian representative on the Council, finding that his silence on the day when the American representative first took his place at the table was misunderstood, took occasion at the closed morning meeting to express, in a statement later made public, his country's satisfaction at this collaboration.

Opinion in the United States seemed to be settling in favor of the Administration's policy of common action with the League. Comment cabled to Geneva quoted the *Boston Herald*, the *Philadelphia Enquirer*, the *Baltimore Sun*, the *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, the *St. Paul Pioneer Press*, the *Portland Oregonian*, the *San Francisco Chronicle*, the *Los Angeles Times*, and the *Dallas News*, as chiefly in support, and the *Hartford Courant*, the *Chicago Tribune*, and the *New York American* in opposition.

In Europe the French press continued in general to emphasize the realistic difficulties of the controversy, the British press to advocate firm action, the German press to stress the importance of events at Geneva for world politics and disarmament, the Italian, Spanish, and Latin American press to support Council policy, and the Japanese press to evince resentment at influence being brought to bear which was regarded as undue and unjust. At the same time, following conversations in Washington between the Japanese Ambassador and the Secretary of State, Japan withdrew her objection to the presence of an American representative on the Council.

Meanwhile the Committee of Five, the Council as a whole with the exception of the disputants, and the President with individual members, continued conferences in the endeavor to draw up a set of practical suggestions to resolve the difficulty, but without success. Any

recommendation involving direct negotiations while parts of Manchuria outside the railway zone were still occupied met immediate rejection by the Chinese; any attempt to set a time limit for withdrawal, before negotiations and without a preliminary understanding on "fundamental points", or to negotiate in the presence of neutral observers, met equal resistance by Japan. More than once it was thought that a public meeting might be called to discuss the deadlock openly; but since it was evident that no conclusion could be reached, the idea was abandoned. Nevertheless, there was hope that a compromise plan, advanced by M. Briand, might yet offer a way out.

#### TUESDAY, OCTOBER 20th.

JAPAN'S "fundamental points", now revealed to be five in number, became by the 20th the centre of consideration. Conversations concerning them, however, came to a deadlock. While their character was not yet certainly known in Geneva, they were understood to relate generally to guaranties against agitation, aggression, or boycott, on either side, and for territorial integrity, protection of nationals, and particularly to avoidance of competition between Chinese and Japanese railways. M. Briand had suggested a simple formula, it was reported, providing that Japan recall her troops within the railway zone and China undertake to respect all her treaty obligations. The Japanese points involved so many complications as to forecast long negotiations before the withdrawal of troops; on the other hand, the simpler formula required instructions from Tokio to the Japanese delegate. These he had requested, and continued to await.

M. Briand and Lord Reading, urgently required in Paris and London, chafed at the delay; M. Grandi had already left, two days before, for Rome, preparatory to his trips to Berlin and Washington.

The Chinese delegation transmitted five more telegrams: three, Nos. 78, 79 and 80, from Robert Lewis, an American, detailing Japanese activities seemingly intended to establish a hold on Manchuria. No. 81 reported more



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Japanese airplane bombing and scouting. No. 82 described small detachments of Japanese troops at points beyond Chinchow on the Peking-Mukden Railway.

From the Far East came the news that the British Ministers to Japan and China, pursuant to instructions from their Government and the recommendation of members of the Council, had drawn the attention of the Tokio and Nanking Governments to their obligations under Article 11 of the Pact of Paris. At London it was understood that France, Germany, Italy, and Norway were telegraphing notes to Tokio and Nanking along similar lines. From the Ile-de-France on his way to America, Premier Laval had sent a wireless message to M. Briand authorizing him to follow this course.

In Washington, the Administration declared that, as had the members of the League Council, it would also call upon the disputants to observe the Briand-Kellogg Pact and avoid war. The Japanese Ambassador there informed the Secretary of State that Japan was already withdrawing her troops across the Yalu River and her bombing squadrons of airplanes; he also said that railway communications were being restored and banks reopened.

A committee of leading American business men, economists, and international lawyers, according to an announcement by Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler, President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, in New York, inaugurated a study of the implementation of the Briand-Kellogg-Pact, including possible use of economic pressure, to give it effect if a nation should go to war in defiance of it.

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 21st, 1931

PRIVATE negotiations continued on the 21st with increasing rumours in the corridors outside. Reports had it that the Japanese representative had proposed to adjourn the Council for three weeks on the basis of withdrawal of Japanese troops without a time limit and immediate commencement of direct negotiations between China and Japan; but that China had rejected the proposal. Other rumours said

that M. Briand, in view of the desire of Lord Reading to return to London on urgent Government business, and his own to get back to Paris, was proposing adjournment of the Council for two or three weeks with a re-affirmation of essentially the same principles embodied in the previous resolution of September 30th, abandoning the attempt to accomplish more; but that the Japanese were resisting even this very moderate plan and insisting upon a preliminary agreement with China before withdrawal of troops. The hesitation and uncertainty in Council policy were alleged to be due in part to a weakening of support from the United States, on the ground that enough had been done in admonishing the parties and reminding them of their obligations under the Pact of Paris and that a solution could be left for adjustment between them. This version of the American attitude, which caused a certain disturbance and disquietude in American official and unofficial circles, was speedily denied; its circulation, however, served a certain useful purpose in making it possible to clear away confusion, not only among members of the Council but also among representatives of the press and the public, through a strong leading article in the *Journal de Genève*.

#### The "Secret Protocols" of 1905.

Japan meanwhile injected a new element into the controversy, through another long communication to the press discussing primarily her interest in the Southern Manchuria railway. Raising objection against the building of competitive Chinese lines, the communication said:

By the Protocol of Peking of 1905, the Chinese engaged, in order to avoid competition which would be harmful to all interests, not to build railways parallel to the South Manchurian lines.

China, it was further asserted, had violated its pledges, in spite of reiterated protests from Japan.

The Japanese communication had reference here to the much-discussed "secret protocols" of Peking, understood to have been considered at the time when the Japanese and Chinese Govern-

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#### Japan's Points vs. China's

Japan's "fundamental points" were reported by the Tokio correspondent of the *London Times* to be as follows:

1. Both countries agree not to commit any act of aggression;
2. They promise to abstain from hostile agitation, boycotts and propaganda;
3. Japan undertake to respect the territorial integrity of Manchuria;
4. China guarantees the protection of Japanese subjects in Manchuria;
5. Japan and China will make arrangements providing for cooperation in the avoidance of ruinous competition between the South Manchurian and other railways, and China will give effect to all existing railway treaties.

It was becoming increasingly clear that the core of the trouble was Japan's attempt to secure recognition of the "secret protocols" of 1905 in regard to competitive railway building and also the demands imposed by Japan in the treaty of 1915. China was considering some essential points of her own, it was heard, to offset the Japanese "fundamental points". As reported in Geneva, after a conversation between Dr. Sze and M. Briand, these were:

- 1) No negotiations before withdrawal of troops;
- 2) Mutual investigation during and after evacuation;
- 3) Reparations to be the only issue between China and Japan;
- 4) Establishment of a permanent board of conciliation between the two countries.

Two Japanese advisors were participating, according to a United Press dispatch from Tokio, in the new régime which had assumed control of Mukden in opposition to General Chang Hsueh Liang, the Manchurian Governor appointed by Nanking. It was further stated that the provisional governments of all the Manchurian provinces which had turned against him were favourable to Japan and had Japanese advisors. Japan was refusing compensation for foreign goods sold to him and later seized by Japanese military authorities at Mukden; this included American, British, Czech and

ments negotiated the treaty of Peking with it supplementary agreement ratifying in substance the rights acquired by Japan from Russia through the Treaty of Portsmouth after the Russo-Japanese War. It was by these protocols, according to reiterated Japanese claims, that China bound herself not to construct railways parallel to the South Manchurian lines. But no official text of the protocols has been published, and China has steadily contested their validity. A version of them is understood to have been furnished by the Japanese Government to the British Government; but they have not been formally registered for international record. Consequently their contents and meaning remain matters of controversy.<sup>1</sup>

The same Japanese communication discussed Chinese attacks on the South Manchurian railway and telegraph lines, assaults on Japanese soldiers and residents, including the assassination of Captain Nakamura, and opposition to the agricultural and commercial activities of Japanese and Korean residents in Manchuria. It concluded with the suggestion that China must give assurance of cessation of such acts and of security for Japanese subjects in Manchuria under treaties in operation. The Japanese delegation also sent word of withdrawal of more troops to Korea.

China, on its side, transmitted five new telegrams. No. 83 reported shelling by Japanese troops on the 17th and 18th, further airplane scouting, and repair of sections of railway which had been destroyed. No. 84 gave further instances of airplane reconnoitering and bombing. No. 85 supplied another telegram from Robert Lewis in regard to protection of Chinese residents at Tsingtao. No. 86 discussed interference with official and business institutions in Mukden, the arrest and later release of two Americans charged with taking photographs at Huangkutung, and fighting between Chinese troops and Mongolian rebels near Tungliao. No. 87 reported that two Chinese banks at Mukden had reopened under restrictions imposed by the Japanese military authorities.

<sup>1</sup> YOUNG, C. W., *Japan's Special Position in Manchuria*. Pp. 95-ff.



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French airplanes, and American and German wireless apparatus.

From Moscow a report to the *Journal de Genève* described a session of the Political Bureau, the influential body determining Communist policy, attended by Stalin, the general secretary of the party, and Voroshilov and other chiefs of the Red Army, at which Stalin presented a detailed report on the Chinese-Japanese conflict and a formal vote approved the policy followed in the affair by the Soviet Government.

Editorial comment from the United States showed the *New York Herald Tribune*, the *Portland Oregonian*, the *Los Angeles Times* and the *St. Louis Post Dispatch* in general support of the administration's policy of cooperation with the League, and the *New York Evening Post*, *Sun*, and *Telegram*, the *Brooklyn Eagle* and the *Washington Post* raising objections. European opinions continued to follow much the same lines as before, with evidence of increasing interest in the possibility that American cooperation might render practicable a solution of the problem.

#### THURSDAY, OCTOBER 22nd

JAPAN's refusal to accept any of the various compromise plans for a settlement, worked out by the Committee of Five and by individual members of the Council and presented by its President to the Japanese representative, left no choice except another public meeting on the afternoon of the 22nd. There had been press reports from Tokio that the Japanese Government had authorized its spokesman to agree upon immediate withdrawal of troops within the railway zone on condition that China would recognize treaty obligations; but these were apparently misinformed, since his action was quite contrary. The consequence was that the Council members had drafted a much stronger resolution than any that had been privately proposed, and presented it in public for open debate.

An exchange of amenities between Japan and the United States was the prelude to the discussion; while maintaining his legal stand as to the presence of a representative of a non-

member State, Mr. Yoshizawa assured the American representative and the members of the Council that it was the traditional policy of his country to promote friendly relations with the United States and that both the Japanese government and people were determined to live in peace and goodwill with America. Mr. Gilbert, in reply, expressed his appreciation of the spirit in which Mr. Yoshizawa had spoken and said that he never had any thought of attributing the Japanese representative's position to other than juridical considerations; he concluded:

The sentiments which he has expressed as to the relations between our countries are cordially reciprocated. We look upon the long record of peace and friendship between our people and the people of Japan as among the happiest pages in our history, and the thought is furthest from our minds that that record should ever be broken.

The President then turned to the business in hand. He first informed the Council that most of the Governments represented on it had felt it necessary as signatories of the Pact of Paris to send by telegram through their diplomatic representatives an identical note to China and Japan calling their attention to the provisions of this Pact and more especially to the terms of Article 2. He had been requested to inform other signatory Governments of the Pact by telegram of this fact, and communications together with a copy of the identical note had been made through the representatives of the French Government to the various Governments including the United States. Through its diplomatic representatives, the United States sent by telegram a corresponding note to China and Japan. He was not able to inform the Council of action taken by other Governments. As regards reception by the parties of the identical note, he had received the following communication from the representative of China:

The Chinese Government has received from the French Government the communication in which the French Government invites the attention of the Chinese Government to the provisions of the Treaty for the Renunciation of War of August 27th 1927, and expresses the hope that both the Chinese

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and Japanese Governments will refrain from taking any steps that might endanger the success of the efforts already in progress to secure a peaceful settlement of the present situation in China.

The Chinese Government feels thankful to the French Government for the deep concern shown in the development of events in the North Eastern Provinces of China since September 18th, when Japanese troops, in defiance of international law, the Treaty for the Renunciation of War and other international agreements, began their unprovoked attack on Sheuyang (Mukden) and other cities. Being desirous of strictly adhering to the undertakings assumed under international treaties, particularly the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Treaty for the Renunciation of War, China has judiciously refrained from employing force to meet the military aggressions of Japan and has been seeking, from the very beginning, a just and adequate settlement by pacific means. We have therefore entrusted our case unreservedly to the League of Nations. We absolutely rely on the solemn engagements contained in the Treaty for the Renunciation of War, the Covenant of the League of Nations and other international agreements designed for the maintenance of peace, in the belief that Japan will be awakened to her legal as well as moral duty to human civilisation.

The Chinese Government sincerely hopes that the active efforts now in progress in Geneva to arrive at a settlement of the present case in the interests of justice and peace, will soon be crowned with success which will be conducive to the well-being not only of China but of the whole world. The Chinese Government will persist in its own efforts to seek the settlement of all questions of whatever nature by peaceful means, and will give the Council of the League of Nations every assistance in devising a permanent system ensuring the effective observance of this policy in the future in the Far East.

I beg leave also to state that a copy of the above message has been handed to Mr. Wilden by my Government.

#### Mr. Briand Presents the Resolution

M. Briand then summarized the situation and analysed the draft resolution upon which the members of the Council with the exception of the disputants had decided. The views of

the parties had not changed or been modified for the worse; and the important certainty, defining the first duty of the League, was that the conflict was now restricted within limits, with no consideration of a likelihood of hostilities. The Council had endeavoured to draw up a resolution on which the disputants could agree with it, in order to find a way out of very exceptional and special conditions. The remoteness of the trouble and the time required for representatives to obtain instructions had imposed very slow procedure, requiring great patience; but the position might now be described as follows:

Japan said "We had to take certain action, but we wish to bring that action to an end. We desire to evacuate the occupied areas; our only concern is for the security of our nationals, of their lives and property, and when guarantees have been afforded us in this respect we shall be glad to evacuate the territory."

China said: "So far as guarantees for the security of the lives and property of Japanese nationals are concerned, we fully understand that point and are ready to give the necessary assurances. We have studied and will continue to study the best way of affording these guarantees and we are at the disposal of the Council."

The Chinese representative had even indicated readiness to have recourse to the authority of the Council in affording guarantees, and the problem remaining was, as always in public life, to find an adequate formula. The draft resolution to be presented had not yet been accepted by the two parties; it had, indeed, only been given to them that day. Its text might be amended and improved, and in other cases when the Council had to discuss resolutions in the same way, it had been possible to reach a satisfactory solution.

The President then presented the draft resolution:

The Council, in pursuance of the resolution passed on September 30th, and noting that in addition to the invocation by the Government of China, of Article 11 of the Covenant, Article 2 of the Pact of Paris has also been invoked by a number of Governments,



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(1) Recalls the undertakings given to the Council by the Governments of China and Japan in that resolution, and in particular the statement of the Japanese Representative that the Japanese Government would continue as rapidly as possible the withdrawal of its troops into the railway zone in proportion as the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals is effectively assured, and the statement of the Chinese Representative that his Government will assume the responsibility for the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals outside that zone—a pledge which implies the effective protection of Japanese subjects residing in Manchuria;

(2) Recalls further that both Governments have given the assurance that they would refrain from any measures which might aggravate the existing situation, and are therefore bound not to resort to any aggressive policy or action and to take measures to suppress hostile agitation;

(3) Recalls the Japanese statement that Japan has no territorial designs in Manchuria, and notes that this statement is in accordance with the terms of the Covenant of the League of Nations and of the Nine Power Treaty, the signatories of which are pledged "to respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China";

(4) Being convinced that the fulfilment of these assurances and undertakings is essential for the restoration of normal relations between the two parties:

a) Calls upon the Japanese Government to begin immediately and to proceed progressively with the withdrawal of its troops into the railway zone, so that the total withdrawal may be effected before the date fixed for the next meeting of the Council;

b) Calls upon the Chinese Government, in execution of its general pledge to assume the responsibility for the safety and lives of all Japanese subjects resident in Manchuria, to make such arrangements for taking over the territory thus evacuated as will ensure the safety of the lives and property of Japanese subjects there, and requests the Chinese Government to associate with the Chinese authorities designated for the above purpose representatives of other Powers in order that such representatives may follow the execution of the arrangements;

(5) Recommends that the Chinese and Japanese Governments should immediately

appoint representatives to arrange the details of the execution of all points relating to the evacuation and the taking over of the evacuated territory so that they may proceed smoothly and without delay;

(6) Recommends the Chinese and Japanese Governments as soon as the evacuation is completed, to begin direct negotiations on questions outstanding between them, and in particular those arising out of recent incidents as well as those relating to existing difficulties due to the railway situation in Manchuria. For this purpose the Council suggests that the two parties should set up a conciliation committee or some such permanent machinery.

(7) Decides to adjourn till November 16th, at which date it will again examine the situation, but authorises its President to convoke a meeting at any earlier date should it in his opinion be desirable.

#### China Asks for Time to Consider

Dr. Sze, taking up the debate for China, remarked that the resolution did not purport to be a final solution, for it provided a period of roughly three weeks during which evacuation must be completed and made it clear that the Council would meet again on November 16th or earlier. Although the resolution appeared to fall far short of what the Chinese Government considered requisite, it did represent the fruits of more than a month of labour to safeguard peace and secure justice, and must therefore be treated with the care and deliberation merited by its importance. Having hardly had time to telegraph it to his Government, with an urgent request for advice, he was obliged to appeal for a short delay in order to obtain instructions, which he did with the more confidence since this privilege had twice been extended to Japan and also because the League had reached the climax of the second stage of its attempt to grapple with the most serious problem that had come before it since its foundation.

Mr. Yoshizawa, replying for Japan, urged the view that suspension of Council meetings for a few days had represented no waste of time, since views had been exchanged and facts ascertained which gradually gave shape to a possible solution of the conflict. He had sub-

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mitted to his Government all the proposals made at Geneva, and had expressed his views on them. Since the question of Manchuria was of vital importance to Japanese public opinion, he had explained its essential points and emphasized the great difference between Manchurian and European conditions. He repeated the assurance that the Japanese Government had in no respect modified the intentions he had expressed; it had no territorial designs in Manchuria; it had the firm intention to bring back within the railway zone the troops, daily less numerous, remaining outside it; it could do this only when the safety of its nationals and their property were effectively assured; it hoped the day would come soon, but it could not fix a date when circumstances would make it possible for the last of its men to be withdrawn to the zone; the exact moment of this withdrawal did not depend only on the Japanese Government and its goodwill, but upon the peaceful intentions and good will shown effectively by the Chinese Government.

In a communication to the press, the Japanese delegation had indicated a series of violations of pledges and provocative measures, threats to Japanese railways, attacks on their guards, and obstacles to Japanese enterprise, which had brought about the existing state of affairs. The Japanese Government had defined a number of "fundamental points" upon which it considered agreement essential to restore public calm and make it possible, without fear of bloodshed, to abandon the police and security measures which Japanese troops were obliged to take; and it ardently hoped that China would agree to enter into negotiations for an agreement on this subject.

#### Japan Cites the Shanghai Example

Withdrawal of troops and transfer of responsibility to Chinese authorities were not as simple as in the case of measures previously taken in European conflicts. He reviewed again the abandonment of their homes by Japanese and Korean residents in Manchuria, and the anti-Japanese agitation in China which had led to evacuation of many Consulates and nationals to places of safety. The issue was the security

of one and a half million Japanese subjects settled in an area as vast as Europe. He referred to the crisis of anti-foreign agitation in 1927 in China, where there were some 30,000 European and American residents, when the Powers disembarked over 30,000 troops in China, and Great Britain—with somewhat less than 10,000 English residents in the country—withdraw her troops in three stages, in February 1928, October 1928, and March 1929. In Manchuria he had indicated a quite different position, rendered particularly perilous by bandits and disorders. This made it impossible to fix a definite date for the complete withdrawal of Japanese troops. Nevertheless it did not affect Japan's intention to bring within the railway zone the few effectives it still had outside, as soon as possible and, it was hoped, definitively. With China's good will, his Government trusted that this withdrawal could be completed within a very short time.

In regard to the draft resolution, he reserved the right to present observations after thorough study.

The President reviewed briefly what the two spokesmen had said, and acceded to the request for time to consider the draft resolution.

#### China Stresses International Obligations.

Dr. Sze then expressed his interest in the repetition of some of the former assurances given by Japan; and he insisted that, whatever might be the differences between Manchuria and other countries, the obligations that each country assumed under the League Covenant, the Paris Pact, the Nine Power Treaty, or any other treaty, entered into voluntarily without reservation, must be carried out with no excuse. He regretted that other foreign troops than Japanese were still on Chinese soil, but they were not objectionable in the sense that they did not antagonize the people. He might reply to other points at a later meeting.

Mr. Yoshizawa, for Japan, then reserved his right to comment on any statement that the Chinese representative might make.

At this point, the President interposed his influence to forestall further controversy; he urged instead the greatest possible speed in



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transmitting instructions to the two delegates, and said he understood the Japanese instructions were on their way. Mr. Yoshizawa responded that he would have no objection to a meeting the next morning. Dr. Sze suggested that a meeting be held then to hear the Japanese statement, promising to make a statement also if he had received his instructions. The President, however, put off the meeting until 5 o'clock the next afternoon, requesting the Chinese representative to give notice if by then he was still unable to obtain his instructions so that other arrangements could be made.

The Chinese representative transmitted the same day two telegrams. No. 88 described Japanese troop withdrawal from Huangkutung, leaving gendarmes behind; and denied Japanese charges as to agitation in Shanghai. No. 89 reported a Japanese message to General Chang Hsueh Liang, the Manchurian Governor, that 417 cases containing his household and personal effects had been delivered through Dairen at the Chinese port of Tongku, following a previous notification, since he would not be allowed to return to Mukden.

New evidence of the movement for unity between the contending faction of Canton and the Nanking Government came from China; a Havas agency despatch from Shanghai reported that 150 Cantonese delegates had arrived there for a conference with representatives from Nanking.

In New York Mr. Inouye, the Japanese Finance Minister, issued a statement through the Japanese Consulate, in which the London *Times* correspondent reported him as saying that the question in Manchuria was simply one of self-defense, and that there was nothing in the situation which would create war.

#### FRIDAY, OCTOBER 23rd

TOTAL failure to find any meeting ground between the points of view of Japan and the other members of the Council led on the 23rd to the bold plan of a meeting to discuss publicly two contrasted plans—the resolution drafted by Council members apart from the

disputants and a radically different alternative submitted by Japan.

M. Briand opened the proceedings by reading the reply of the Japanese Government to the telegram addressed to it by signatories of the Pact of Paris:

1. The Japanese Government realize as fully as any other signatories of the Pact of Paris of 1928 the responsibility incurred under the provisions of that solemn Pact. They have made it clear on various occasions that the Japanese railway guards in taking military measures in Manchuria since the night of September 18th last have been actuated solely by the necessity of defending themselves as well as of protecting the South Manchurian Railway and the lives and property of Japanese subjects against wanton attacks by Chinese troops and armed bands. Nothing is farther from the thought of the Japanese Government than to have recourse to war for the solution of their outstanding differences with China.

2. It is their settled aim to compose those differences by all pacific means. In the note of the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Chinese Minister at Tokio dated October 9th the Japanese Government have already declared their readiness to enter into negotiations with the responsible representatives of China for the adjustment of the present difficulties. They still hold to the same view. So far as they are concerned they have no intention whatever of proceeding to any steps that might hamper any efforts intended to assure the pacific settlement of the conflict between Japan and China.

3. On the other hand they have repeatedly called the attention of the Chinese Government to the organized hostile agitation against Japan now in progress in various parts of China. The suspension of all commercial intercourse with Japanese at present practised in China is in no sense a spontaneous act of individual Chinese. It is enforced by the anti-Japanese organizations that have taken the law into their own hands and are heavily penalising even with the threat of capital punishment any Chinese who may be found disobeying their arbitrary decrees. Acts of violence levelled against Japanese residents also continue unabated in many places under the jurisdiction of the Government of Nanking. It will be manifest to all fair observers of the actual situation that those activities of the anti-Japanese organizations are acquiesced in by the Chinese Go-

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vernment as a means to attain the national ends of China. The Japanese Government desire to point out that such acquiescence by the Chinese Government in the lawless proceedings of their own nationals cannot be regarded as being in harmony with the letter or the spirit of the stipulations contained in Article 2 of the Pact of Paris.

The President then asked the Chinese and Japanese representatives whether they had received instructions as to the proposed draft resolution, communicated the day before.

Dr. Sze, for China, began with an expression of regret that, after more than a month, Japanese troops were still holding Chinese territory in Manchuria, in spite of cooperation between the League and the United States; and suggested that this might indicate a flaw in the machinery of peace or lack of will to make it work. Nevertheless the Chinese Government accepted the resolution as a minimum marking the present stage in League handling of the problem. The heart of the proposal, he argued, was the provision for another meeting on November 16th, the request to Japan to withdraw troops before that date, and the request to China to associate representatives of other nations with her own in taking over territory and insuring public safety. The delay was very long, and dangerous; he had again reported information that Japanese airplanes had dropped bombs three times in the last two days.

#### China Offers Further Assurances

China would go beyond acceptance of the resolution in order to dissipate Japanese apprehension, and would at once examine in good will any proposals for extending the system of neutral officers or devising other arrangements to guarantee security in reoccupied territory. He understood evacuation to include Japanese forces of all kinds, restoration of all Chinese property, and release of all officials and citizens from restraint. He asked the members of the Council and the representative of the United States to signify readiness to accept an invitation to designate representatives to act with Chinese authorities.

Withdrawal was the only subject before the

Council; and one immediate issue arising in addition was the question of responsibility and reparations. As to this China would accept neutral judgment. But she would not admit military invasion as the occasion for solving other claims, or discuss any subject under pressure of occupation or of conditions resulting from occupation. Any discussions must be on the basis of Chinese rights under the League Covenant, the Pact of Paris, and the Washington Conference treaties.

With normal relations restored, China would be anxious to discuss every issue with Japan; the very shock of the crisis might lead to a resolve to lay a foundation for lasting peace in the Far East; and in this spirit China welcomed the Council's proposal of a permanent conciliation commission.

#### Japan Submits a Counter-Proposal

M. Briand then notified the Council that Japan, objecting to the draft resolution, had indicated an alternative form amounting to a counter-proposal. The Japanese text conformed to the original in its preamble and the first two paragraphs; in the third paragraph it modified the wording to read that Japan's denial of territorial designs in Manchuria was "in accordance with the spirit" instead of "with the terms" of the League Covenant.

Beginning with the fourth paragraph,<sup>1</sup> the Japanese delegation substituted new text, reading:

4. Again notes the statement by the Representative of Japan made on October 13th to the effect that the Japanese Government would withdraw those of its troops still remaining in a few localities outside the said zone as the present atmosphere of tension clears and the situation improves, by the achievement of a previous understanding between the Chinese and Japanese Governments as regards the fundamental principles governing normal relations, that is to say affording an assurance for the safety of the lives of Japanese nationals and for the protection of their property;

5. Recommends the Chinese and Japanese Governments to confer together at once

<sup>1</sup> See P. 48.



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with a view to arriving at the understanding mentioned in paragraph 4;

6. Recommends the Chinese and Japanese Governments to appoint representatives to arrange the details of execution of the evacuation and of taking over the districts evacuated;

7. Asks the Chinese and Japanese Governments to be so good as to keep the Council informed of the progress of the negotiations between them and the position as regards the execution of the present resolution;

8. Authorizes its President to take, after examination of the above communications, all such measures as he may think necessary to ensure the carrying out of the present resolution, and to convene the Council at any time with a view to a fresh examination of the position.

#### Japan Presses Her Claim

With this challenge to their action before them in a formal proposal to replace their plan with the program for which Japan had argued since the resumption of meetings in October, including the "fundamental principles", the other members of the Council turned to the Japanese spokesman. Mr. Yoshizawa, thanking them for their efforts and patience in preventing a conflict and upholding League principles, affirmed once more that his country had no aggressive or belligerent intentions and would withdraw its troops as soon as circumstances permit it to do so without danger. Withdrawal had already begun, and Japan hoped to complete it soon if China by sincere goodwill would cooperate to relax tension. So he accepted the first three points of the resolution.

In regard to point 4, the inability of the Chinese authorities to put down disorder and the danger of clashes between Chinese and Japanese forces made it impossible to fix a date when the last of Japan's men would be brought back within the railway zone. They were not outside it in order to secure concessions or special privileges; but Japan had doubts as to the safeguards proposed by the Council.

The Japanese Government had carefully thought out what "fundamental points" were essential to normal relations with China; there was no question of going into details, but only of removing causes of friction.

As regarded direct negotiations, Japan was ready to respond at any time to suggestions from China, and considered that they could easily settle on the manner in which they should be conducted. Japan had provided that the Council should be kept informed, in order to remove any suspicion of a desire to prolong matters or postpone troop withdrawal. But if the Japanese Government should fix a date for a contingency that would not be dependent on its action alone, it might either have to shirk its responsibility or appear to fail to keep its promise. It "would like the Council to trust to its goodwill and the loyalty which during ten years of close and sincere cooperation with the League of Nations it has throughout given proof."

The speech of the Chinese representative made it seem that all Manchuria was under occupation; but Japan's troops were stationed only in three or four towns. The present condition could not be imagined in Europe, and threatened great danger. The airplane bombing to which the Chinese delegate referred was indicated by a telegram from the Japanese Consul at Mukden to have been in response to heavy rifle fire; it was on a Japanese-built railway near which a struggle between Chinese forces was going on. The atmosphere in Manchuria had not changed; it was shown in a telegraphic despatch which he read in part, from a special correspondent to the *London Daily Telegraph*. The Japanese attitude had been approved by a number of foreign observers, including Mr. Woodhead and Mr. George Bronson Rea.

Dr. Sze, in rebuttal, said that there were other accounts of the Manchurian situation which Mr. Yoshizawa might not care to read. As to excuses for the dropping of bombs along a railway because it was Japanese built, the British, French, Belgians and others had built railways in China but had never dropped any bombs.

#### Great Britain Asks for Definitions

Viscount Cecil, who had taken the place of Lord Reading for Great Britain, took occasion at this point to put questions to the Japanese

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spokesman. The British Government found it difficult to see how bombing incidents could be justified; he knew of no principle of international law supporting it; but he agreed the essential thing was to find a cure for conditions leading to such a result.

As he understood the Japanese resolution, it proposed a preliminary agreement on "fundamental principles" as essential to reestablishment of normal conditions; but nothing had been said about these on September 30th. He would be glad to have more precise explanations as to what they meant. Clearly the Japanese representative must know, and it would be an advantage to the Council members if he would tell them. It was difficult for them to consider a resolution pledging them to such a proposition unless they knew its meaning.

Except for that change, the Japanese proposals did not in substance go beyond the Council resolution of September 30; and the members would have to consider whether the proposals then made had been so successful that they could simply repeat them. But then they fixed a date for the next meeting, while now Japan did not propose to do that although the President could always do so. Further, he inquired what the Japanese representative would assume the powers of the President to be under the terms authorizing him to take any measures he might deem necessary to assure the execution of the resolution. Would he, for example, be able to direct a Commission to proceed to Manchuria? It was important to know what was in the mind of the Japanese Government on these points—the "fundamental principles" and these powers of the President.

#### Japan Avoids Definitions

The bombing that had been discussed, Mr. Yoshizawa said again, was done contrary to the wish of the Japanese Government. As to the "fundamental points", these were set forth in the resolution, matters which would give an assurance for the security of Japanese lives and property. The resolution of September 30 provided for troop withdrawal with such

assurance, and the "fundamental principles" were intended to make protection effective. In regard to the powers of the President, "we had nothing special in view". But the resolution must not be taken to mean objection to a Council meeting on November 16.

Closing the discussion until the next morning, the President remarked that Governments might come together for negotiations on subjects concerning which both had made statements—such as that security must be provided to enable Japan to withdraw troops, on which China agreed and for which measures could be taken quickly—or on subjects concerning which the parties disagreed, requiring a long time for settlement. He wished to know whether the "fundamental points" implied bringing any of this second group of subjects within the scope of negotiations as an element of security, for that would reopen the entire complex problem.

There must perhaps be special regard for the patience of the Chinese representative, but when he brought the case to the League he must have realized the difficulties involved. Such an assembly could not settle it in a few weeks. It had afforded the means for discussion, and also modified the character of the conflict and given assurance that it would be kept within narrow limits. The Council had to obtain unanimity, including the parties concerned; and the League had done its duty in proving that war would be more difficult to wage than in the past.

#### Action and Opinion outside Geneva.

Before the Council meetings, the Chinese delegation had circulated to the members two further telegrams. No. 90 gave details of occupation and looting of houses of prominent Chinese in Mukden. No. 91 described bombing by Japanese airplanes on the Chinese Eastern Railway and on the Taonan railway, and quoted a Japanese news agency report that Japanese airplanes received volleys from Chinese troops in Heilungkiang province and bombed them.

A letter from an American delegate to the biennial conference of the Institute of Pacific relations, set for October 24 at Hankow and cancelled because of the situation, appeared in



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the *Journal de Genève* of the 23rd, describing difficulties in passing through Manchuria toward the end of September, and saying that the Japanese military had completely taken control of the country.

Havas and Reuter despatches from Tokio indicated a clash between Chinese soldiers and Japanese railway guards and troops north of Mukden on the South Manchurian Railway, and the forwarding of more machine guns and automatic rifles to Manchuria by the Japanese Ministry of War. A Reuter despatch from Mukden described the city as being treated as if it were a war camp.

Editorial opinion cabled from the United States seemed to show sentiment swinging more and more in support of the Administration policy, with the *New York Herald-Tribune* and *New York Telegram*, the *Baltimore Sun*, the *Pittsburgh Post*, the *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, the *Richmond Times*, the *St. Paul Pioneer Press*, the *Portland Oregonian*, and the *Los Angeles Times* presenting favourable arguments. Comment from Chinese papers indicated that opinion there regarded the deliberations at Geneva as a test of both the League and the Pact of Paris; while English and European editors pointed out the practical difficulties of action at such a distance, and Austrian and German writers expressed scepticism as to the outcome and its meaning for political order. Some Latin American papers voiced dissatisfaction that the Committee of Five left other Council members out of account in determining action, and argued the Council's policy revealed a lack of resoluteness, perilous to the standing of the League.

#### SATURDAY, OCTOBER 24th

A frontal attack on the Japanese position by certain members of the Council, at the morning meeting of the 24th, took the place of less direct manoeuvres.

Mr. Yoshizawa first defined the position again in response to M. Briand's questions, put at the end of the meeting on the preceding afternoon, in regard to two categories of subjects for negotiation between Japan and China. The "fundamental principles" he said, referred

only to questions coming within the first category, on which understanding could easily be reached before withdrawal of troops. They were intended to restore peace and normal relations. Other unsettled questions could be considered by the two Governments after the troops had been withdrawn. Further, paragraph 8 of the Japanese counter-proposal could be deleted and replaced by paragraph 7 of the original draft resolution calling for another meeting of the Council on November 16.

Viscount Cecil then returned to the effort to render Mr. Yoshizawa's statements more explicit. The additional explanation given in answer to the questions of the preceding day meant, if he understood it, that Japan did not really desire anything different from the proposals in paragraph 4 (b) and paragraph 5 of the Council resolution<sup>1</sup>—a preliminary discussion of details for the evacuation of territory. Then why could the Japanese delegate not accept the clear wording proposed by the President? There was talk of a mysterious entity, "fundamental principles"; and it was impossible for the Council to consider accepting such a phrase without knowing exactly what it meant. If it meant no more than the President's words, why not accept these? If it did mean more than discussion of details of evacuation, and included political questions, he begged this colleague to say so plainly. The Japanese representative must be aware of statements in the press that what Japan really wanted was acceptance by China of existing treaty provisions. Was this statement, printed in italics in the *Journal de Genève*, accurate or inaccurate? It was not quite fair treatment of the Council to ask it to accept such a phrase as "fundamental principles" without telling exactly what was meant. He begged for enlightenment as to why the Japanese Delegation desired it included.

Mr. Yoshizawa responded, deliberately, that he could not take responsibility for press reports. As to the "fundamental principles", his Government had a certain idea which he could not communicate before it had authorized him to do so. It was natural that Japan should desire negotiations with China on certain

<sup>1</sup> See P. 48 and pp. 51-2.



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questions to safeguard Japanese rights and property in Manchuria; and its intention was to conclude a preliminary agreement before evacuation. Failing such action, his Government was convinced that its nationals in Manchuria would be exposed to danger. He trusted that the British representative would be satisfied with the explanations already given.

#### **Spain Advances a New Proposal**

Mr. de Madariaga, for Spain, associating himself with Viscount Cecil and arguing that the question must be solved and should if possible be solved by a unanimous decision, began the skilful elaboration of a new proposal. He emphasized that the Council had two duties—to settle the case in the best interests of both parties, and more imperatively to maintain and reinforce the League, on which world peace depended. It was founded on the territorial integrity and political independence of its members, as provided by Article 10 of the Covenant. What importance did the Japanese delegate attach to his proposed modification in paragraph 3 of the draft resolution, speaking of the "spirit" instead of the "terms" of the Covenant; and what difference was involved?

As to the exact value attached to security, a vital and crucial matter for the League, he spoke not for a country whose security might be imperilled but for one that might be called to defend another. So he was anxious that the meaning of the term should not be expanded at will by any country considering itself threatened. In Manchuria a Japanese element of population and a larger Chinese mass were living together; security in such a case might be difficult to define, but when Japanese troops came outside the Japanese zone it could not be regarded as having been increased. So he saw some danger in claiming the right to stay in a territory without being entitled to be there, on the plea of insecurity, for which the act of occupation might be partly responsible.

As for the "fundamental points", he was not sure whether they were all connected with security and evacuation, and nothing else, because if more were involved then the notion of

insecurity might be expanded indefinitely. Without knowing whether Lord Cecil would be content with the Japanese explanations, for his part he regretted he was not. He referred to a paper of the Japanese representative, replying on these points, to the effect that the "fundamental principles" must be accepted before withdrawal of troops; and he compared it with a Japanese statement of the 13th that the withdrawal of troops was not conditional upon realization of a preliminary understanding with China, but on the security and protection of Japanese nationals which would be assured by pacification. Evacuation appears to depend on security, security on pacification, and this in turn on other questions not related to evacuation or security. It would be in the interests of Japan, which might have to take part in dealing with similar questions under different circumstances, to have security so defined that there could be no idea of extending it to other questions and that the duties of the Council would be circumscribed. He urged, as a solution, satisfying League requirements, separation of the two parties before discussion, evacuation of the country occupied—leaving aside the question of time allowed—and direct negotiations beginning the same day that the evacuation was completed.

#### **Great Britain Suggests Court Settlement**

Viscount Cecil returned to what the Japanese representative had said. Even though his colleague was not responsible for press reports it would be foolish for the Council not to consider, a public statement that Japan desired as the main "fundamental point", before evacuation, to discuss treaties existing with China. He quoted from a Reuter agency telegram from its Tokio representative, indicating the Japanese official attitude to be that "if the League refuses to handle the question of sacredness of treaties, the League should refrain from attempting to force Japan to change its stand." Japan had not presented the Council with any demand referring to treaties. Grave misunderstandings and misrepresentations were about; neither the Council nor any of its members would intimate that there was a question as to the sacredness



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of treaty obligations. The Covenant set out as one of the main purposes of the League "maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations."

Disputes might arise as to the validity or interpretation of a treaty; fortunately, these could be settled authoritatively by appeal to the Permanent Court of International Justice, over which a Japanese national was presiding. But to discuss what treaties mean, which are valid and which are not, as a preliminary to evacuation, would be definitely reversing the order of things. Evacuation ought to take place first, discussion of treaties second as a matter not directly affecting the safety of nationals of Japan.

#### Japan Rejects Compromise Plans

Mr. Yoshizawa, replying first to the questions of the Spanish representative, said in regard to substitution of the word "spirit" for the word "terms" in paragraph 3 of the resolution that the Japanese draft conformed with Article 10 of the League Covenant, and he had no objection to reverting to the original wording. As to the seriousness of stationing Japanese troops outside the railway zone indefinitely, his Government was ready to withdraw them when Japanese lives and property were adequately safeguarded; and a number of legal experts approved its course of action. In the linking of the "fundamental principles" with security and evacuation, Japan held it necessary to reach an agreement to ensure security, and then troops would be withdrawn.

Taking up the contentions of the British representative, Mr. Yoshizawa expressed regret at such a message as the Reuter telegram from Tokio. He added that he had never advised his Ministry of Foreign Affairs of any Council action contrary to the sanctity of treaties; and assured Lord Cecil that he would immediately send a telegram on the subject to Tokio.

The President of the Council thereupon urged a conclusion upon the two texts before it—laying down a fundamental difference regarding subjects to be contemplated in connection with safeguarding the persons and property of

Japanese nationals in Manchuria outside the railway zone.

#### Briand Appeals to Japan

The Council's text had the merit of clarity, since it had not been argued to give rise to various interpretations, while the Japanese text had required a number of explanations and still gave rise to uncertainty. He appealed to the good spirit of the Japanese representative to be conciliatory. The fact of ambiguity alone pointed to choice of the Council's text, based on the obligations and undertakings of both parties, the need that treaties be respected, and the statement of the Japanese representative at the outset that his Government would complete the withdrawal of its troops already begun, as speedily as possible, once security for the lives and property of its nationals could be assured. Obviously if negotiations were to begin as to treaties and railway organization and ways and means of concluding conventions, they would not end in a short time. So the Japanese reference to security must have meant measures of a kind that could be taken swiftly.

The League, as trustee of the obligations assumed by members, had the duty to see that these were honored. Article 10 of its Covenant stated an agreement to respect territorial integrity and political independence. Article 2 of the Pact of Paris stated an agreement to pacific settlement of all disputes. Japan, scrupulous in the discharge of her obligations, could not consider solving the difficulty by other than by pacific means. Public opinion would find military occupation difficult to admit in the category of pacific means. He thought it was outside that class, and its prolongation also prolonged the feeling of uneasiness lest it prove impossible to solve the problem under the terms of the League Covenant or the Pact of Paris.

He asked the Japanese representative, whose shrewdness had often helped the Council to overcome other obstacles, to make a sign of conciliation. The technique of evacuation was known and could be discussed quickly, and that was the kind of procedure visualized in reading the Japanese declaration of September 30. Reservation might be made that any pledge of Japan could only be carried out if China showed

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goodwill in granting conditions of security. The fact that military pressure would be known to be about to cease would have a considerable effect in improving the situation, in both countries as well as in areas occupied by troops. It was important in view of the danger of playing with the existing nervous tension, that such military operations should not continue. Therefore he asked the Japanese representative if he could not agree to the Council's text, after further explanations if necessary. If the Council could reach agreement, it would once again have rendered a great service to mankind by discharge of its duty to prevent any such conflict degenerating into general hostilities.

#### Japan Again Refuses

Mr. Yoshizawa responded briefly that he was unable to accept the draft resolution because it did not, in the Japanese view, adequately safeguard the lives and property of Japanese nationals for which the Japanese Government was responsible. He reaffirmed that Japan had no intention of settling the difficulties by military force, but only desired to make certain of effective protection.

Mr. de Madariaga interposed a final plea. He had grave doubts as to the contention that a government was responsible for the security of its citizens in a foreign country. That raised issues too serious to be discussed at the moment. The difficulty felt by the Japanese, however, he believed to be mainly due to the absence from the draft resolution of reference to the "fundamental principles". The fact that these had not been revealed had caused trouble; but the President had referred to the upholding of the sanctity of treaties, and a passage in the Preamble to the League Covenant read:

In order to promote international cooperation and to achieve international peace and security by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war,  
by the prescription of open, just and honourable relations between nations.

No nation had a higher ideal of honor than Japan; and as for justice, he need only refer to the cooperation of Ambassadors Ishii and

Hayashi and the President of the Permanent Court, Mr. Adatci. So far as open relations were concerned, he was greatly disappointed by the attitude of the Japanese Government.

Understanding that in its view security for its nationals in Manchuria linked up with pacification through agreement on the "fundamental principles", as a preliminary to evacuation of occupied territory, he asked whether the Japanese representative would not withdraw his proposal if the Council's resolution were amended to provide that on the day evacuation were concluded the two parties would begin negotiations on all questions.

Mr. Yoshizawa reiterated the opinion of his Government that the "fundamental principles" should not be set forth in the resolution or discussed at the Council table; they were matters to be discussed between the two parties. It did not hold the view that they did not link up with evacuation or security, but considered an agreement beforehand absolutely essential. He regretted that he could not withdraw the words from the Japanese counter-proposal.

#### An Interval for Final Conciliatory Efforts

M. Briand, adjourning the meeting until four o'clock, once again called the attention of the Japanese spokesman to the impossibility for the Council members to accept in a resolution, and in a spirit of conciliation, a reference to unknown "fundamental principles" without the right to formulate or discuss them. It was asking a sacrifice "beyond the bounds of the possible", and no member could agree.

The Council then rose, without any comment from the representative of China.

Meanwhile, the Chinese delegation had circulated two further telegrams: No. 92, charging two new cases of Japanese airplane bombing; and No. 93, giving details of an assault in Shanghai by Japanese on two Chinese, one a constable who was wounded by a pistol shot, and of a consequent near approach to a clash between Chinese police and Japanese marines.

News of an official announcement at Nanking appeared in the *Journal de Genève*, declaring



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anti-Japanese agitation illegal and indicating that the Government had the purpose to do everything possible to avoid aggravating the situation.

Action at the afternoon session, put off from four until five o'clock, while last endeavors were made to find some meeting ground, was rapid. M. Briand announced the failure of those attempts; nevertheless they had not made the situation worse, but the reverse, since the Japanese delegation had evinced a new desire to enable their country to join the other members in their view. Nevertheless, he was unable to interpret his instructions in such a way as to permit him to go as far as they would have liked. The Council was left with two texts—in the first place, the amended Japanese counter-proposal as discussed during the morning.

Mr. Yoshizawa declared that unfortunately the Japanese delegation had to note a difference still prevailing between the opinion of the Council and that of his Government. He desired to repeat that Japan had no intention of waging war on China, and considered that at the moment there was no threat of war. It had no territorial designs on Manchuria, and was determined to bring its troops back into the railway zone as soon as it was satisfied that the rights and property of its nationals were effectively safeguarded. It felt a more peaceful frame of mind to be necessary, and to this end it proposed a preliminary agreement with China. It was ready to negotiate with China in that connection at any time. He appreciated the patient efforts of the Council. The problems raised were life and death problems for Japan. The position could not be judged merely from the standpoint of ideas or of effect; his Government had endeavored to take account of both:

While desirous of not departing for a single instant from the spirit or the letter of its undertakings, the Japanese Government must shoulder the responsibilities which devolve upon it on the part of its nationals. The Resolution submitted to the Council does not, in its opinion, lay down the conditions which it regards as essential effectively to safeguard the lives and property of its nationals. It is for this reason that, to my

great regret, I cannot accept the Resolution submitted by the President.

#### Japan Votes Alone

The knell of unanimity in the Council having been thus finally sounded, the President put the Japanese amendment to a vote by calling in a formal way for a show of hands. M. Yoshizawa alone raised his hand in support. M. Briand declared it rejected by 13 votes to 1.

He then took the exceptional procedure of calling for an oral vote on the draft resolution which his colleagues had asked him to lay before the Council. For it the roll call showed: the British Empire, China, France, Germany, Guatemala, the Irish Free State, Italy, Norway, Panama, Peru, Poland, Spain and Yugoslavia; against, Japan. The United States, of course, did not vote.

The President declared the resolution "adopted unanimously minus one vote." He expressed his keen regret that the members had not been able to achieve unanimity. But the conflict had been delicate, and exceptional in that it was remote, that rapid communications were impossible, and that a form of procedure was adopted which must not be regarded as a precedent. They had come near to the goal; they had achieved the essential purpose of the League in keeping the conflict within limits. He voiced gratitude for the assistance of the United States which, confining its attention to the Pact of Paris, gave its cooperation on that basis when asked. He requested the American representative to convey the Council's thanks to his Government and say that the moral effect of its support had contributed greatly to limiting the conflict.

The Council would adjourn until November 16th. The resolution whose purpose was clear, was on its table; it was also in the hands of the Japanese representative and his Government. The Council noted a declaration by him that Japan had no desire to seek aggrandizement to the detriment of a neighboring country, no desire to encroach upon the territorial integrity of another member of the League. She had also given assurance of every care to keep the conflict within limits and avoid a new catastrophe; that was of the highest importance.

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Since it was to a certain degree a question of determining whether more or less security could be afforded, the President did not despair that the Japanese Government would go on with the evacuation already begun and show its determination to seek an end to the difficulty, so that at the next meeting the Japanese representative might declare the nightmare past and the hopes of the Council materialized. He hoped to convey good news to the members before the date of the meeting; the best would be that, everything being finished, there would be no need for a meeting, but even so he would wish to convene them again to tell them that news in person.

#### The September Resolution in Force

Both parties and all members, under the resolution of September 30th, were requested to continue to send information to the Council. The resolution just tabled did not supersede the previous one, and the cooperation this set up would go on as before.

Various members—first M. Scialoja for Italy, then Viscount Cecil for Great Britain, M. von Mutius for Germany, M. Yoshizawa for Japan, and M. Braadland for Norway—paid tributes to the skill and wisdom with which M. Briand had conducted the intricate deliberations. Viscount Cecil again laid stress on the need for patience, in action according to the public opinion of the world as an essential support. M. Braadland associated himself with the President's comment on the assistance of the United States.

Dr. Sze, for China, saw little likelihood of an improvement of the situation in Manchuria. Japan was insisting on negotiations which China would not begin until evacuation of her territory was complete and arrangements were made under League auspices to determine responsibilities and damages. He thought the period of adjournment too long, and reserved the right to call an earlier meeting. In conclusion, he joined in the appreciation of the the President's conduct of deliberations—M. Briand's name was associated with the Council's solution of arduous conflicts, a good omen for success in the present conflict.

M. Briand, voicing his thanks and in turn paying a tribute to the preceding work of M. Lerroux, as President during September, which led to the resolution on the basis of which all subsequent work had proceeded. He closed with an appeal again to China and Japan to avoid embittering the situation or aggravating and extending the conflict.

M. de Madariaga added a message of praise from M. Lerroux for M. Briand; and expressed the hope that before the next meeting unanimity would be reached, with the continuing cooperation of the United States.

Amid a deep silence, Mr. Gilbert asked leave to speak. The eagerness with which eyes turned to him and listeners leaned forward to hear, in the expectant wish that the American Government might have authorized its representative to make some declaration in regard to the Council's resolution, had to be chilled. He thanked the President and the representative of Norway for what they had said, and promised to transmit their words to his Government.

Dr. Sze quickly joined his Norwegian colleague in expressing gratification at having the cooperation of the representative of the United States at this meeting; and the President, declaring the agenda exhausted, announced the adjournment until November 16.

Increasing evidence was arriving in the meantime that majority opinion in the United States was in support of American cooperation with the League. Results of a survey of newspapers in the Middle West showed 202 favoring and 28 opposing American participation in the Council. Editorial comments cabled from New York quoted the *New York Telegram*, the *Philadelphia Enquirer*, the *Chicago Daily News*, the *Raleigh News*, and the *Worcester Telegram* advocating the Administration's policy thus far, and the *New York Evening Post* criticising it.

The Hon. Burton L. French, Member of the House of Representatives from Idaho and for some years reporter of the naval budget, passing through Geneva on his return from the meeting of the Interparliamentary Union, attended the closing debates of the Council session; and before departure made a statement to the press in which he said:



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The present moment seems to me the gravest since the war. Its results will have an incalculable effect upon the destinies of mankind. If, as we all hope and pray, they are favorable, the world will have taken a great stride forward in the perfection of the methods of peaceful settlement and in the prospect of disarmament. If they are unfavorable, they would be too terrible to contemplate.

The peace agencies of the world, League, Kellogg Pact, and all, are facing their supreme test. Manifestly I cannot enter into the merits of the dispute between Japan and China; let me only say that two great nations, with which the United States has always and the friendliest of relations, have come to a most bitter conflict. The Council of the League of Nations is making a superb effort to help them to a peaceful solution; our own Government is cooperating to the full through a representative to the Council table, under the Kellogg Pact, and direct diplomatic assistance, to the two States in difficulties.

I have been profoundly impressed with the way both Japan and China have stated their respective cases, the intensity with which they have argued their points, and yet the recognition both gave of their common responsibility to treaty obligations.

Let no one think that this dispute in far away Manchuria, or these negotiations in the Swiss City of Geneva, do not touch us deeply and vitally. They affect our interests and our passion for world peace more profoundly perhaps than any other single event since the World War. People in every town and villages, even in my own inland state of Idaho, may be involved for years to come in their results. Our future international policy, our hopes for the Disarmament Conference, are at stake. If these negotiations shall succeed it will make possible two results: reduction of military burdens of all powers on land and sea, and the setting of an important precedent in the settlement of international disputes. If they fail, it may mean expansion of military preparedness for all powers, and years of delay in attaining a program of peace in the solution of world affairs.

#### China Offers Arbitration

A new move by China, significant as a demonstration of sincerity and of willingness to take any step consistent with her political necessities and declared principles in order to find ways out of the deadlock with Japan, was the sequel to the Council's conclusion. Immediately after the adjournment, Dr. Sze addressed the following communication to M. Briand as its President:

With reference to the observations on treaty obligations made in the Council this morning by the Honourable Delegate for Great Britain, with which I am in hearty agreement, I am authorized by my Government to make the following declaration:

China, like every Member of the League of Nations, is bound by the Covenant to "a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations." The Chinese Government for its part is determined loyally to fulfil all its obligations under the Covenant. It is prepared to give proofs of this intention by undertaking to settle all disputes with Japan as to treaty interpretation by arbitration or judicial settlement, as provided in Article 13 of the Covenant.

In pursuance of this purpose the Japanese Government is willing to conclude with Japan a treaty of arbitration similar to that recently concluded with the United States, or to those concluded of recent years in increasing numbers between Members of the League.

With this offer formally recorded in the impressive terms of government authorization, two decisive and essential questions remained to be resolved before the next gathering of the Council: the possibility of any alteration, upon reflection, in the attitude of Japan; and even more eagerly awaited, the definition by the United States of its attitude toward the policy adopted by all the members of the Council except Japan.






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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM 1100

NO: 177 Political.

AMERICAN CONSULATE,

Geneva, Switzerland, November 16, 1931.



SUBJECT: Transmitting Procès-verbaux of the Meetings of  
the Council held in Geneva from October 13 to  
October 24, 1931.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to refer to the Consulate's despatch  
No. 162 Political, of October 13, 1931, transmitting docu-  
ments concerning the appeal of the Chinese Government under  
Article 11 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

In pursuance of my previous action taken upon the  
Council resolution of September 22, 1931, cited in the des-  
patch under reference, I am enclosing the procès-verbaux of  
the meetings of the Council held in Geneva from October 13  
to October 24, 1931, together with the pertinent documents  
furnished me by the Secretariat. The latter, taken with  
those previously sent, will form a set complete to November  
16, the date of the first Council meeting in Paris.

Respectfully yours,

*Prentiss B. Gilbert*  
Prentiss B. Gilbert,  
American Consul.

Enclosures:

Documents mentioned above  
with list attached.

Original and 5 copies to Department.  
1 copy to American Legation, Berne, Switzerland.

F/DEW  
795.94/2972



By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DESPATCH NO. 177 POLITICAL.

November 16, 1931.

P.V. DOCUMENTS.

C./65th Session/P.V.	8(1)	October 13.
"	9(1)	October 13.
"	10(1)	" 15
"	11(1)	" 16
"	12(1)	" 16
"	13(1)	" 22
"	14(1)	" 23
"	15(1)	" 24
"	16(1)	" 24

M. DOCUMENTS.

C. M. 313 up to  
C. M. 315  
C. M. 317 up to  
C. M. 323  
C. M. 325 up to  
C. M. 338  
C. M. 343 up to  
C. M. 345  
C. M. 349 up to  
C. M. 351  
C. M. 353  
C. M. 359  
C. M. 362  
C. M. 364  
C. M. 371  
C. M. 382  
C. M. 383  
C. M. 387 up to  
C. M. 389  
C. M. 391 up to  
C. M. 394  
C. M. 396 up to  
C. M. 397  
C. M. 399 up to  
C. M. 410  
C. M. 412 up to  
C. M. 416  
C. M. 418 up to  
C. M. 422  
C. M. 425 up to  
C. M. 427  
C. M. 430  
C. M. 432 up to  
C. M. 435.



LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the  
Council and Members  
of the League.

C.708.M.314.1931.VII.

Geneva, October 13th, 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF  
THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Chinese representative on the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Chinese representative, the  
Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the  
following telegram dated October 12th:

Telegram.

The following is the text of the Chinese reply to the  
Japanese memorandum:

"With reference to memorandum of Japanese Government  
of ninth instant Chinese Government has honour to make  
following observations.

In defiance international law and in violation  
provisions of Covenant League Nations as well as Peace  
Pact of Paris and Nine-Power Treaty signed at Washington,  
Japan has suddenly and without provocation invaded and  
occupied portions of the Chinese provinces of Liaoning  
and Kirin, overturned lawful provincial and district ad-  
ministrations, and in course of invasion committed many  
acts of war, and others not permitted by international  
law even in war, such as killing of innocent civilians,  
bombardment of unfortified towns, bombarding of passenger  
trains, and removal and seizure of public and private  
property etc.

China and Japan being both bound by above mentioned  
international agreements imposing on their signatories  
obligation to seek for peaceful settlement of all disputes,  
China at once appealed to Council of League Nations.  
Council called upon Japanese Government to give orders for  
immediate withdrawal of their troops from areas occupied  
since September 18th and decided to accept solemn pledge  
given by Japan to comply with its request, fixing its  
further meeting for October fourteenth, should by that  
time that pledge remain unfulfilled.

Chinese Government refrained from very beginning from  
any and every act of hostility, going to length of strictly  
ordering all military forces not to offer resistance in  
whatever form to continuous advance of Japanese troops,  
and in spite of provocative actions increasing every day  
in intensity and embracing ever wider areas.



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At same time strictest discipline was imposed on the nation for protection in every way of lives and property of Japanese residents within Chinese territory under Chinese administration and the fact that no untoward incident has occurred anywhere in the vast area under Chinese jurisdiction proves conclusively that the undertaking given by Chinese Government to Council of League of Nations is being observed most scrupulously. Repeated Government orders and proclamations have confined righteous indignation of our people within local bounds, and mandate of the Chinese Government issued on October 7th, ordering all local authorities "to give full protection to foreign nationals and to prevent undesirable elements from taking advantage of situation in initiating any unlawful actions" further strengthened Government injunctions just at the time when it became only too obvious that Japanese Government was not fulfilling its pledge of withdrawal.

Acting upon resolution of Council of League Nations, Chinese Government has appointed two high officers to take over places to be evacuated and duly notified Japanese Government and Council to that effect, but Japanese Government has not yet carried out its declared intention to hand over places under their occupation to Chinese authorities. As is shown by the report of a neutral observer, such places and Shenyang Kirin Tuhua Chuliuho Sinmin Tienchengetai etc. are still under control of Japanese troops. Meanwhile these troops keep on killing and wounding innocent citizens and destroying property without slightest justification.

It must therefore be a matter of surprise to world that popular indignation in China has limited itself to mere refusal to purchase Japanese goods. Freedom to choose one's purchases is an individual right with which no Government interferes, and, while it is duty of every Government to protect foreign nationals, it is bound neither by any recognised standard of governance nor by any principle of international law to prohibit or punish exercise of an elementary right of citizenship. If there be responsibility at all in the matter, it entirely lies with Japanese Government which has, by many acts of unfriendliness since Wanpaoshan incident, created this general prejudice against Japanese merchandise.

While Chinese Government is observing with greatest scrupulousness resolution of Council of League Nations by adopting special measures for protection of Japanese lives and property and by refraining from all acts tending to aggravate situation, with the result, as already stated, that no untoward incident has happened to any Japanese subject, Japanese military have continued their aggressive actions in North Eastern provinces which have culminated in recent aerial attack on Chinchow where provincial civil authorities of Liaoning have established their provisional offices since occupation of Shenyang its capital. This act of war, as Japanese Government is aware, has led Council of League Nations to decide to meet earlier than on date originally fixed. Chinese Government notes with satisfaction reference made by Japanese Government to responsibility of both countries to League of Nations but desires to point out that it is Japan that has committed during past ten days various acts which have so aggravated



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situation that resolution of Council League of Nations has failed to be carried out, for which Chinese Government cannot be held responsible.

Chinese Government will continue to exert its best to protect lives and property of Japanese subjects although in the face of the greatest difficulty due to the unceasing aggressive acts on part of Japanese troops, and will hold Japanese Government responsible for any unfortunate consequences resulting from continued employment of military force by Japan as an instrument of her national policy, especially in view of fact that both Governments have presented their cases before Council of League of Nations which has prescribed a course of action for two countries to follow.

Firmly believing that the present lack of understanding and the difficulties in the commercial intercourse between Chinese and Japanese people are inevitable outcome of the numerous unlawful acts of Japanese troops, Chinese Government is confident that, if Japanese Government should exert itself to remove causes that have brought about present deplorable situation, gratifying results will be secured in improvement of relations between two countries and maintenance of world peace."



LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Circulated to the  
Council and Members  
of the League.

C.707.M.313.1931.VII

Geneva, October 13th, 1931.

APPEAL BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Communication by the Japanese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Council  
the following communication from the Director of the Japanese  
League of Nations Bureau

Geneva, October 12th, 1931.

To the Secretary-General.

I have the honour to send you the following information with  
regard to the despatch of certain Japanese warships to Shanghai and  
should be glad if you would be good enough to communicate this to  
the members of the Council.

(signed) S. SAWADA.

October 12th, 1931.

In view of the <sup>very</sup> strained situation created by the development of  
the anti-Japanese agitation in the towns along the Yangtse, the Japan-  
ese Government decided to send to Shanghai the cruiser "Tsushima"  
with four torpedo boats, and subsequently on October 8th the cruisers  
"Tenryu" and "Tokiwa" together with 200 marine fusiliers. However,  
the Government gave formal instructions to the Commander of these  
naval forces to consult the Japanese diplomatic and consular officials  
before landing any fusiliers should events appear to call for such

action. The sole object of these purely precautionary measures,  
which are not in any way exceptional and are merely in accordance  
with the custom followed by nations in such cases, is to protect  
Japanese residents if necessary. Needless to say the Japanese Govern-  
ment wishes to avoid as far as possible any act likely to upset or  
irritate Chinese public opinion and consequently it will not be neces-  
sary to land the marine fusiliers in question if the Chinese authori-  
ties take effective steps to combat the anti-Japanese movement.



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the  
Council and the Members  
of the League.

C.709.M.315.1931.VII.

Geneva, October 13th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11  
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the German Government.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate  
to the Council the following letter from the German Government.

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Geneva, October 13th, 1931.

To the Secretary-General.

Sir,

With reference to our communication of October 11th  
(C.600(a).M.296(a).1931.VII.) and in conformity with paragraph 2  
of the Council Resolution of September 30th, I have the honour  
to communicate to you, on behalf of my Government, for the informa-  
tion of the Council, further information from the German Consulate  
at Mukden.

Strength of Japanese military occupation, outside the  
railway zone, on October 9th: Mukden, Chinese and European  
quarters, 2,700 men, Chiliuko 220, Kirin 1,260, Krin Changchun  
railway 670, Yingkou 180.

(Signed) MUTIUS.



LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the  
Council and the Members  
of the League.

C.712.M.317.1931.VII.

Geneva, October 14th, 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11  
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Representative of China on the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Representative of China, the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council three further cable messages received in addition to the previous sixty-two, copies of which have already been circulated.

No. 63.

Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation,  
dated Nanking, October 13th, 1931.

Following from Chinchow "Have to-day October twelve University inspected Chiaotung, located at Chinchow, which was bombed by twelve Japanese airplanes on October eighth. Interviewed Governor Michuehling, Commissioner of Education Chikungtiang and other officials. Japanese bombs and machine-gun fire entered office of Governor, treasurer and chief of police. Their fire entered main offices of provincial administration at eight places, killing one soldier, and wounded one Russian professor, who died two days later. Seventeen others killed by bombs dropped in different parts of this city. Forty-eight bombs released, some on the railway station, one locomotive and two cars damaged. Seven bombs released at the Railway Hospital, which was flying Red Cross flag. The Chinese had



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no air defence guns, not a shot was fired at the Japanese by Chinese. The resident Japanese had left Chinchow thirteen days before under full protection of the Chinese. The Japanese authorities had officially thanked the Chinchow Chinese authorities for this protection during evacuation. There had been no previous conflicts between Japanese and Chinese in this section of Manchuria. Japanese bombardment evidently for purpose of disorganising and terrorizing Chinese civil administration in efforts to preserve public order. On October eleventh Japanese airplane flew over Chinchow, distributing circulars discrediting the Chinese administration and promising to free them from their present misrule. I have in my possession substantial parts of bombs and one of the propaganda circulars released from the air. Robert E. Lewis."

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No. 64.

Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation,  
dated Nanking, October 13th, 1931.

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Upon learning of an unconfirmed report from Japanese news agency Nippondempo, stating that a Japanese wine-dealer named Komura was killed at Tsingtao at ten o'clock this morning, President Chiang Kai-shek immediately ordered Tsingtao mayor to arrest all suspects for public trial and to render full report of case. As up to ten-thirty to-night no news of reported incidents has been received at the capital, officials are inclined to disbelieve the Nippon despatch.



No.65.

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Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation  
dated Nanking, October 13th, 1931.

Following is text memorandum handed us by Shigemitsu which is different from what Drummond wired us:-

"1. Japanese Government made clear Manchurian affair is nothing but outcome of deep-rooted anti-Japanese feeling in China which taken specially provocative form in recent challenge to Japanese troops compelling latter resort measures self-defence. Responsibility for present situation naturally lies with Chinese Government.

Japanese Government time and again requested Chinese Government take proper steps check anti-Japanese movement so systematically carried out various places in China. Being desirous maintaining cordial relations between two countries this Government exercised greatest patience and forbearance in hope that this deplorable state of affairs may yet improve. Unfortunately this anti-Japanese agitation seems now assuming alarming proportions.

Learned that anti-Japanese societies Shanghai and elsewhere passed resolutions not only enforce prohibition trading in and transportation of Japanese goods but order cancellation existing contracts and otherwise prohibit all business transactions and cancel contracts employment between Chinese and Japanese in order thus to effect the so-called severance of economic relations with Japan. For that purpose examination and detention goods and persons intimidation and violence and various other means being employed give effect such resolutions and severe penalties meted out to any who may fail comply with these orders, some societies even going so far as threaten capital punishment. Moreover cases expropriation and detention of goods owned by Japanese people and threats and violence against



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their lives and property become so numerous and insistent throughout China that they been forced withdraw totally or partially from various localities.

2. It be noted that anti-Japanese movement in China is conducted as instrument of national policy under direction of Nationalist Party which in view peculiar political organization China is inseparable in function from Government. That movement must therefore be clearly distinguished from one which originates spontaneously amongst people. Therefore evident that present anti-Japanese movement in China is not only in contravention of letter and spirit of treaties existing between two countries but constitutes a form of hostile act without use of arms contrary to all standards of justice and friendship. Chinese Government will be assuming very serious responsibility if it should fail take prompt and effective measures to quell that agitation. Moreover in meting out penal sentences to individual citizens anti-Japanese societies which are purely private organizations are clearly usurping authority National Government.

3. Will be remembered that at recent meeting of Council Geneva Chinese representative as well as Japanese gave assurance that their respective Governments would endeavour prevent aggravation of situation. Chinese Government obviously against that pledge is actually aggravating situation by making no honest or effective effort restrain activities anti-Japanese societies which are jeopardizing lives and property as well as liberty, trade, Japanese subjects different parts of China.

4. Japanese Government desires to call once more serious attention Chinese Government to these actions on part anti-Japanese societies and declare at same time that Chinese Government will be held responsible for whatever may be consequences of its failure to suppress anti-Japanese movement and to afford adequate protection to lives and property of Japanese subjects.  
China, October 9th, 1931.



LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

C.713.M.318.1931.VII.

Communicated to the  
Council and the Members  
of the League.

Geneva,

October 14th, 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER  
ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Representative of China  
on the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Representative of China  
the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate  
to the Council two further cable messages received  
in addition to the previous sixty-five, copies of  
which have already been circulated.

No. 66.

Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese  
Delegation dated Nanking, October 14th 1931.

It would appear from the reports of the foreign  
press agencies that a dangerous misconception exists as to the  
actual language used by the President of the National Govern-  
ment of China at the weekly Memorial Meeting October eleventh.  
According to these reports the President is credited with  
language amounting to definite threats that China would declare  
war if she failed to obtain satisfaction at League meeting.  
The following is an official translation of the exact words  
used by the President:-

"As our nation forms a part of the League of Nations  
we have above all the duty of supporting international law and  
covenants. Not only have we this solemn duty but every nation



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

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has a like duty. Today we are trying earnestly to secure by peaceful means to uphold the Briand-Kellogg Anti-War Pact and the League of Nations Covenant so that even though Japan invades our soil, we have not declared war because in upholding international justice and pacts and covenants we ought to exercise the greatest patience. But if even then the international law and covenants could not be preserved we should not shrink from any sacrifices to discharge our duties.

In the maintenance of responsibilities to the covenants and pacts of course it is vital if war could be avoided. But if nations are driven to war to defend the sanctity of international practice and pacts then any sacrifice should not be regarded as too costly."

No. 67.

Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese  
Delegation dated Nanking, October 14th, 1931.

Chang Hsueh-liang reported thirteenth morning after machine-gunning Heishanhsien one Japanese plane turned to Tahushan, dropped several bombs also machine-gunned Chinese troop train Tahushan station. Pursuing train to Kaoshantse Japanese plane again dropped two bombs.



LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to  
the Council and  
Members of the League  
of Nations.

C.714.M.319.1931.VII.

Geneva, October 14th, 1931.

APPEAL BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11  
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the German Government.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit  
to the Council the following letter from the German  
Government.

(Translation)

Geneva, October 14th, 1931.

To the Secretary-General.

Sir,

Further to my letter of 13th instant, I have the  
honour on my Government's behalf to communicate to you for  
the information of the Council the following additional  
news.

1) The German Consulate at Mukden reports under date  
of October 13th: "number and distribution of Chinese  
troops unchanged; 400 men, however, have been withdrawn  
from the international concession at Mukden to the Japanese  
concession;

2) The German Consulate General at Tientsin reports  
on October 13th: "between Peking and Shanhaikuan so far  
no serious incident; no military activity observable on  
either side. Numerous public demonstrations and acts of  
boycott."

(Signed) LUTJUS.



SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS

Communiqué au Conseil  
et aux Membres de la Société.

C.714.M.319.1931.VII. Erratum.

Genève, le 15 octobre 1931.

APPEL DU GOUVERNEMENT CHINOIS EN VERTU DE L'ARTICLE 11  
DU PACTE.

Communication du Gouvernement allemand.

Sous-paragraphe 1) de la lettre du Gouvernement allemand  
lire:

"Le Consulat allemand à Moukden annonce, en date  
du 13 octobre: "nombre et répartition des troupes  
japonaises sans modification;...."

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LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

APPEAL BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11  
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the German Government.

Sub-heading 1) of the letter from the German Government  
should read:

"The German Consulate at Mukden reports under date  
of October 13th: "number and distribution of Japanese  
troops unchanged; ...."

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LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Circulated to the  
Council and Members  
of the League.

C.715.M.320.1931.VII.

Geneva,

October 14th, 1931.

APPEAL BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11  
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to  
transmit to the Council the following communica-  
tion from the Director of the Japanese League  
of Nations Bureau.

Geneva, October 14th, 1931

(Translation).

Sir:

I have the honour to communicate to you herewith  
the latest news which the Japanese delegation has received  
concerning:

1. The anti-Japanese agitation in China;
2. The situation in the various towns of  
Manchuria.

I should be extremely obliged if you would communi-  
cate this news to the Members of the Council.

I have the honour to be, etc.

(Signed) K. YOSHIKAWA.

To His Excellency M. A. BRIAND,  
President of the Council,  
GENEVA.



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The Japanese delegation communicates herewith the latest news that it has received concerning the anti-Japanese agitation in China. This news is based on the reports of the Japanese consular authorities.

SHANGHAI.- Among the resolutions adopted on October 11th by the anti-Japanese Association may be noted the following:

1. The Chinese Chamber of Commerce shall draw the attention of the International Chamber of Commerce of Shanghai to the fact that there will be the greatest difficulty in having goods unloaded which are brought by Japanese vessels or even by foreign vessels mooring at the Japanese wharves.
2. Chinese traders having contracts for the importation of goods with foreign traders must stipulate that the goods shall not be imported on a Japanese vessel and that if the goods have been loaded on a Japanese vessel, the goods will be refused and the other party will be responsible for losses caused by this fact.

KIUKIANG.- The anti-Japanese agitation is growing in violence. The Japanese banks have refused to maintain business relations with the Nisshin Company. The Chinese agents of the Japanese firms, having received scores of threatening letters, have been obliged, to avoid violence, to announce their resignation publicly in the newspapers.

The Japanese residents, the great majority of whose women and children have already been evacuated, are preparing to leave the town and are conveying their goods to Japanese vessels.

SWATOW.- The police openly seize Japanese goods and provisions bought by the Chinese employed in Japanese firms. On October 10th the Japanese Consul made an energetic protest to the Governor of Swatow. On the same day Chinese threw stones at the windows of the Consulate.

CANTON. - On October 10th about 100 students burst into a Chinese merchant's shop, plundered it and carried off the goods of Japanese origin to burn them in the open street. Several police officers endeavoured to stop them but the crowd assailed the police station, whence the police were obliged to open fire, causing two deaths and numerous other casualties. The situation remaining threatening and the police being unable to gain control of the crowd, the military had to be called in.

Next day the destruction of Japanese goods continued and the students went in a body to the Provincial Government House to demand that the Director of Public Safety should resign and that the Chief of the Police Station directly responsible should be shot.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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The coolies having gone on strike, Japanese goods cannot be unloaded. A general strike of the Chinese workmen of undertakings employing Japanese has been decided upon.

SHANGHAI. - On October 10th eight Japanese were assailed by the crowd near the wharf of the South Manchurian Railway and were seriously injured.

CHUNGKING. - In the night of October 10th, eight individuals, two of whom were wearing soldiers' uniform fired three shots into the Police Station of the Japanese Concession and then took to flight after firing shots in different parts of the Concession.

The latest news received by the Japanese delegation concerning the situation in the different towns of Manchuria shows that, the Japanese authorities encouraging the maintenance of order on the Chinese side, and the various Chinese bodies gradually resuming their functions, order is being restored. The banks and money changers have reopened their doors, business has been resumed and the population is regaining its calm.

MUKDEN. - In the Chinese town the Chinese committee for the maintenance of order, which took up its duties on September 30th, is endeavouring, in concert with the provincial authorities, to maintain order. Nevertheless as brigandage (theft and kidnapping) is continuing, the Japanese military authorities have provided the Chinese police with 2,700 small firearms.

Monetary and commercial transactions have been resumed, and our military authorities are distributing food to the poor and organising sales at reduced prices. The Chinese salt tax was re-established on October 1st and resumed operations on the 4th.



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Kirin The maintenance of order in the Chinese Town is in the hands of Chinese Director of Public Safety assisted by the Japanese military authorities. Since <sup>Hsi Chia-jin</sup> the appointment of the Provincial Governor (September 30th) order has been restored in the Chinese Town, but the presence outside the walls of about 6,000 disbanded Chinese soldiers causes grave anxiety to the inhabitants who, fearing an attack by them, are concealing their property and in particular converting their money into Japanese currency. The banks have reopened; on September 25th the Chinese Governor was able to reassure the population by an announcement that the official Bank had ample reserves, none of which had been touched by the Japanese and that there had been no change in the value of Chinese money.

Changchun. All the banks reopened on September 29th and the Chinese Stock Exchange resumed its activity. The uneasiness felt in business circles is gradually disappearing.

Antung. A Chinese Committee for the Maintenance of Order has been formed under the chairmanship of the Prefect and started work on October 5th.

Yingkow. The Chinese Department of Public Safety armed its police officials with revolvers on October 3rd. Order is well maintained and the situation is again normal, traders having resumed business unmolested. The Telegraph Office has been working again since October 3rd and cipher telegrams are accepted.

Ssuepinskai. The Chinese Chamber of Commerce has taken over the provincial administration.

14.X.31. 11.50.



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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Circulated to the  
Council and Members  
of the League.

C.716.M.321.1931.VII.  
Geneva, October 14th, 1931.

APPEAL BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11  
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit  
to the Council the following communication from the  
Japanese representative on the Council.

(Translation)

Geneva, October 14th, 1931.

Sir,

Regarding the movement of Japanese troops at Mukden,  
I have the honour to inform you that, according to an  
official telegram from Tokio, maintenance of order by the  
Chinese having become increasingly effective, the military  
authorities have decided to hand over the policing of the  
Chinese quarters to the Chinese <sup>gendarmes and</sup> police. Consequently,  
the Headquarters Staff of the 77th Infantry Regiment which  
was quartered in the open town has been transferred to  
the former premises of the South Manchurian Railway Hospital  
inside the Zone and the Headquarters Staff of the 78th Regiment  
removed



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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

from the Chinese Town to the Arsenal (outside the Chinese Town). 1800 men have been withdrawn and brought back either outside the Chinese Town or inside the Zone. There are at present only about 400 men left in the Chinese Town and in the open town and 250 men in the industrial quarter.

The cruiser "Tokawa" reached Shanghai on October 10th and reinforcements of 230 men were sent to the Naval Barracks on October 14th.

I should be obliged if you would inform my colleagues on the Council of the above, and have the honour, etc.

(Signed) K. YOSHIKAWA

His Excellency Monsieur A. Briand,  
President of the Council,  
Geneva.



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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Communicated to the  
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Geneva, October 14th, 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11  
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Council the following communication from the Japanese representative on the Council.

Geneva, October 14th, 1931.

To the President of the Council.

Sir,

In compliance with the wishes of the delegate of Great Britain, I duly applied to my Government for information regarding the alleged bombardment of open towns to which the delegate of China referred at yesterday's meeting of the Council.

I have now received a telegram presenting the alleged facts in their true light.

The telegram refers in the first place to the alarming situation due to the presence of large bands of brigands and fugitive soldiers in the Hsinmintung district and on both sides of the Peiping railway. It further states that since October 8th large bodies of Chinese troops have been concentrated in the Tahushan area. An aeroplane that left on the morning of October 13th to make a reconnaissance in that direction was met near Tahushan by very heavy fire, to which it replied with bombs. Following this incident, a flight of three aeroplanes was again sent in the same direction. As these aeroplanes also came under heavy fire in the neighbourhood of Kupangtau, four bombs were dropped; no damage, however, was done. Every care was taken to avoid damaging the railway line. Our machines bore traces of some forty bullets. One of the observer officers was wounded in the shoulder, and a bullet passed through the clothing of another of our airmen.

I should be glad if you would kindly communicate this letter to the other members of the Council.

(Sgd.) K. Yoshizawa.



LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Circulated to the Council  
and Members of the League.

C.718.M.323.1931.VII.  
Geneva, October 14th, 1931.

APPEAL BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11  
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Chinese Representative on the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Council four further cable messages (Nos. 68-71) which have been handed to him by the Chinese Representative on the Council.

No. 68.

Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation, dated Nanking, October 14th, 1931.

October eighth Japanese troops entered and searched Teihling, re-entered ninth, occupied administrations and disarmed soldiers; eleventh two armoured cars from Chanchiatun to Tungliac left over thirty Japanese troops; many Japanese planes reconnoitred Taonan, Sinmin and Changwu.

No. 69.

Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation, dated Nanking, October 15th, 1931.

Five trains of Japanese troops proceeded from Sinmin to Chin-chow on the morning of October 14th. Peking Mukden express trains, both up and down, were detained by Japanese troops at Mashanchiatze.

No. 70.

Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation, dated Nanking, October 15th, 1931.

A telegram from Peking-Mukden Railway Office reports that on the morning of October 14th, a large band of Mongolian and Russian bandits, numbering about four thousand, arrived at Tungliac and attacked the Fourteenth Regiment, which, however, repelled the attack, inflicting heavy punishment on bandits, who have withdrawn to Hsien-kaitan to reassemble and get ready to counter-attack at first opportunity. Our troops have re-taken the streets of Tungliac seized by bandits and are now despatching five hundred soldiers from Chiangwu to reinforce regiment at Tungliac. During action there were Japanese aeroplanes reconnoitering and this is significant when taken in connection with the distribution of arms and ammunition seized from Mukden Arsenal by Japanese troops.

No. 71.

Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation, dated Nanking 15th, October 15th, 1931.

On October 13th, at two-forty three Japanese aeroplanes dropped two bombs on Kuopanitse and continuing flight, dropped three bombs on Peichin, which landed on the Chinese barracks, killing two. Japanese forces at Shanhaikuan were reinforced by over hundred additional men and ten machine guns. Japanese troops are daily transporting lumber from Shenyang to Chuliuho, where they plan to build barracks. On the morning of October fourteenth at five-twenty one Japanese armoured train and four carloads of Japanese troops arrived at Mashanchiatse from Shenyang, the latter left the train and proceeded to occupy neighbouring towns and villages.



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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Circulated to the  
Council and Members  
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C.720.M.325.1931.VII.

Geneva, October 14th, 1931.

APPEAL BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER  
ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Chinese representative on the  
Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to  
the Council the following communication from the Chinese  
Representative on the Council.

Delegation of the Republic of China  
to the Assembly of the League of Nations

Geneva,

October 15th, 1931.

Mr. Sao-Ke Alfred Sze presents his compliments  
to the Secretary-General and begs to state that, according  
to a telegram just received from Nanking, the information  
contained in telegram No. 59 transmitted to him on October  
11th that Japanese aircraft cruised over the industrial  
city of Tongshan on October 10th is found to be untrue,  
after careful investigation.



LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the  
Council and Members  
of the League.

C.721.M.326.1931.VII.

Geneva, October 15th, 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Proposal by the President of the Council that the Government of the United States be invited to send a representative to the Council.

In the course of the discussion the opinion has been expressed that the question before the Council concerns the fulfilment of obligations arising not only from the Covenant of the League of Nations, but also from the Pact of Paris.

This opinion is certainly well-founded, since, in accordance with Article 2 of that Pact:

"The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means."

Foremost among the signatories of the Pact of Paris appear the United States of America. The United States were one of the proponents of the Pact, and I may be allowed to recall that I had the honour to be associated with the then Secretary of State of the United States as joint author. In consequence, the United States may be regarded as being especially interested in ensuring a settlement of the present dispute by pacific means.

Moreover, the Government of the United States, with which communications regarding the dispute before the Council have already been exchanged, has expressed its whole-hearted sympathy with the attitude of the League of Nations, and has affirmed its desire to reinforce the action of the League. I feel confident that I shall be meeting the wishes of my colleagues in proposing that we should invite the Government of the United States to be associated with our efforts by sending a representative to sit at the Council table so as to be in a position to express an opinion as to how, either in view of the present situation or of its future development, effect can best be given to the provisions of the Pact. By this means also the opportunity will be afforded him of following our deliberations on the problem as a whole.

I am sure that any action that might be taken under the Pact could not but strengthen the efforts which are now being made by the Council in accordance with the obligations imposed upon it by the Covenant of the League of Nations to effect the peaceful settlement of the problem under discussion.



Communicated to the  
Council and Members  
of the League.

C.722.M.327.1931.VII.

Geneva, October 16th, 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE  
THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Japanese Government.

" Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the  
Council the following letter from the Japanese Delegation.

Japanese Delegation to  
the League of Nations.

Geneva, October 15th, 1931.

Sir,

In a telegram from the Chinese delegation (No. 65)  
which you were good enough to communicate to the Council  
(C.712.M.317.1931.VII), the Chinese Government appears to  
suggest that the text of the Japanese memorandum dated  
October 9th, which was delivered at Nanking by the Japanese  
Minister in China, is different from that communicated to the  
Secretary-General of the League by the Japanese delegation and  
telegraphed by him to Nanking (published under No. C.630.M.296.  
1931.VII).

As you must have realised, this assertion is mistaken:  
both in substance and in the words employed the two communications  
are identical, the only difference to be found relating to purely  
subsidiary words, such as articles and prepositions, which were  
omitted in telegraphic transmission and partially restored in  
the text handed to you.

I should be very grateful if you would kindly communicate  
these remarks to the Council.

(Signed) S. SAWADA.



MINUTE OF DECISION

C.723 M.328 1931.VII.

Communicated to the  
Council and the Members  
of the League.

Geneva,

October 16th 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11  
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Government of the United States of America.  
Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to  
circulate to the Council the following com-  
munication from the Government of the United  
States of America.

Geneva, Switzerland.

October 16, 1931.

To the President of the Council.

Excellency:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your  
communication addressed to the Secretary of State of the United  
States of America, under date of October 16th, in which you cite  
a proposal adopted by the Council of the League of Nations. You  
extend an invitation, in accordance with that proposal, to the  
Government of the United States to send a representative to sit  
at the Council table, so that he may be in a position to consider  
with the Council the relationship between the provisions of the  
Pact of Paris and the present unfortunate situation in Manchuria,  
and at the same time to follow the deliberations of the Council  
with regard to other aspects of the problem with which it is now  
confronted.

I am directed by the Secretary of State to accept on  
behalf of the Government of the United States, this invitation to  
send a representative, and to inform you that he has designated  
me to act in that capacity.

(signed) PRENTISS GILBERT



LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the  
Council and Members  
of the League.

C.724.M.329.1931.VII.

Geneva, October 16th, 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF  
THE COVENANT

Communication from the Chinese representative on the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Chinese representative the Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Council the following cable messages received in addition to the previous seventy-one, copies of which have already been circulated.

No. 72. Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation, dated Nanking, October 16th, 1931 and referring to Cablegram No. 64, League Document No.C.712.M.317.1931.VII.

The Japanese news agency Nippondempo's sensational report that a Japanese named Komura was brutally murdered by Chinese workmen at Tsingtao has been fully investigated by the local authorities. It has transpired that Komura was done to death on account of a love triangle case among the Japanese community and accordingly the Japanese made no representations to the Chinese authorities.

No. 73. Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation, dated Nanking, October 16th, 1931.

Japanese troops are making an aerodrome covering two thousand mows\* between Yungchi and Peihotawan. October fourteenth four Japanese aeroplanes dropped twenty bombs near Hsinglungtien. Yesterday one o'clock, Japanese aeroplanes flew towards Tailai and Heilungkiang from Tonan and threw two bombs; casualties not ascertained. Colonel Wang, Fortieth Regiment, reported to Chang Hsueh-liang the following:-

Six a.m. October 14th, Mongolian bandits commanded by Pao-tunlin entered through Hsienkai, but were repelled after four hours' fierce fighting. We killed over two hundred bandits and took scores of rifles. Captain Chao was killed during the fight and numerous others wounded and killed. Have ordered First and Fourth Companies to pursue the bandits and make thorough searches near Tungliao. Six Japanese aeroplanes helped the Mongols during action, dropping many bombs. I fear more Japanese assistance in future Mongolian attacks.

\* Six mows equal about one acre.



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No. 74. Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation, dated Nanking, October 16th, 1931.

The following occurring in Shanghai gives an idea of the difficulties which the Japanese are purposely creating for the Chinese authorities. Two Japanese, dressed as Chinese, were arrested by the International Settlement Police last night, following a clash with some Chinese shop-keepers, who attempted to frustrate the disguised Japanese in their efforts to tear down Chinese patriotic posters. The first Japanese was taken into custody at ten p.m., when he and several Japanese, not dressed as Chinese, ran into several Chinese, while tearing down posters. The police arrived in time to prevent bloodshed and arrested one Japanese found in possession of a long knife and a small club. Another Japanese was arrested by the police from Dixwell Road Station at eleven-thirty p.m., under almost similar circumstances. During the latter incident one Chinese was struck on the head by a Japanese and subsequently sent to a nearby hospital by the Chinese Police of the Fifth District Station of the Public Safety Bureau. Still another clash between peaceful Chinese and trouble-making Japanese raiding parties was reported late last night in Chuentung Road, Chapei. The precautions taken by the Chinese Police of the Bureau of Public Safety soon dispersed the crowd. Compare with Japanese efforts to disturb peace at North Szechuen Road on the afternoon of October 11th by Japanese demonstrators tearing down Chinese patriotic posters.

Our police are maintaining order under difficult circumstances.

No. 75. Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation, dated Nanking, October 16th, 1931.

Chinese press reports from Peking fifteenth Japanese troops busy digging trenches and burying mines near Chuliho.

Bombs dropped at Chinchow fifteenth; trenches being dug round city walls. Military practice and manoeuvres daily and nightly. Frightened populace not allowed to go out of the city is hiding underground for fear of aerial bombing. Situation horrible.

No. 76. Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation, dated Nanking, October 16th, 1931.

Chinese press reports from Peking October 16th two Japanese aeroplanes made circuit flights over Shanhaikwan yesterday morning. They later flew over Chinchow and Suichung. The inhabitants of these three cities are gradually pouring into Hopei in view of the rumours of impending troubles.

By fabricating rumours that Shanhaikwan is menaced by Chinese troops, the Japanese authorities hope to justify despatching more troops there. Yesterday morning the Japanese landed two machine guns, forty rifles and twenty-one boxes of bullets at Shanhaikwan for their garrison.

Chang Hsueh-liang has received a telegram from General Chen Kuan Chun reporting that Chinese troops are exercising great vigilance in protecting Japanese lives and property there, and that not a single untoward incident has occurred.



LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Circulated to the  
Council and Members  
of the League

C.725.M.330.1931.VII

Geneva, October 17th, 1931.

APPEAL BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11.  
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation

Note by the Secretary-General

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Council the following communication from the Director of the Japanese League of Nations Bureau.

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A certain degree of anxiety has been displayed with regard to the frequent aeroplane reconnaissances, more particularly in the region of the South Manchurian Railway and the Peining Railway. They have been described as acts of war. This, however, is a distortion of the truth; the Japanese Government is genuinely anxious to avoid aggravating the situation in any way, as it has declared on several occasions. It is not generally realised what serious danger has been caused for some time past by the growing activity of large bodies of mounted bandits, whom the Chinese authorities themselves are unable to control, and by the presence of groups of disbanded soldiers who are committing numerous acts of vandalism. Some of these groups, regaining the main body of the Chinese troops, are re-established as regular formations.



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The bodies of mounted bandits are from 200 to 400 strong and move rapidly from place to place. The groups of disbanded soldiers vary in strength between 2000 and 6000. There are reformed bodies of men numbering some 32,000 in the Chinchow region, and large concentrations are taking place along the Tahushan-Tungliang and Peiping-Mukden lines and east of the South Manchurian Railway. Attempts are being made, with Chinchow as their centre, to create disorder in the Zone.

The presence of large bodies of brigands and fugitive soldiers is a constant menace to our nationals and the Chinese, and sometimes even to our troops. The Chinese police forces are frequently called out, and our troops are obliged to act; they are required to keep a close watch upon the movements of these bands, and to carry out demonstrations should their attitude become too threatening. This is the reason for the frequent aeroplane reconnaissances and for the dropping of bombs when the aeroplanes are attacked. Bombs are in no case dropped on towns or on the peaceable civilian population.

According to information obtained at the beginning of the month, the positions of the principal bodies of bandits and soldiers were approximately as follows:-

1. On the Peiping (Peiping-Mukden) line:

a. Environs of Hsinmintung.

About 2,000 men of the 7th Brigade with 10 guns.

Near Fushun, fugitive soldiers are crossing the Zone and regaining the main body.

To the south, a band of 200 brigands.



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b. Tahushan-Kupantzu (50 km. east of Chinchow).

About 6,000 infantry concentrated in this area with the 6th Artillery Brigade (36 field guns).

300 bandits east of Kupantzu.

c. Chinchow.

The concentration of troops continues; the disbanded men of the 8th Brigade are regaining Chinchow from the direction of Shanhaikwan.

On October 13th, 7,700 men at Chinchow (16 heavy guns and 16 field guns), 6,400 men at Ichou (50 km. east of Chinchow).

In this area there are 32,000 men with 16 heavy guns and 72 field guns.

2. Tahushan-Tsungliao Line.

3,500 men of the 3rd Cavalry Brigade concentrating around Chan-wu. To the west, a body of 200 bandits.

3. Ssupingkai-Taonan Line.

a. Acts of violence by bandits (numbering about 400) are frequent in the neighbourhood of Ssupingkai.

b. Between Ssupingkai and Tchengchiatun: about 200 bandits.

c. Between Chengchiatung and Tsungliang: about 300 bandits. Around Tsungliang: about 300 bandits.

d. Between Tchengchiatung and Taonan, along the track, 2 bodies of 200 bandits.

South of Kailung, 2 bodies of 300 bandits.

e. In the neighbourhood of Taonang, 400 bandits.

A body of 5,500 horse is proceeding northward to the west of the Taonan-Angangchi line.



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4. South Manchurian Line.

a. North-east of Mukden: the disbanded men of the 7th Brigade are moving towards Hsinmin.

b. Environs of Changchun: about 2,000 men of the 23rd Brigade are rejoining the main body at Taonan.

5. Kirin-Changchun Line.

Frequent acts of violence by bandits and soldiers. The 25th Brigade is moving northward. The 661st Brigade is advancing on Niang-Niang-Ku. 200 bandits along the Tunhua Line, 200 near Lung-Chin-Tsung.

6. Chinese Eastern Railway (southern line).

The 22nd Brigade (6,500 men) is concentrated near Chang-Chia-Wan. About 200 bandits in the neighbourhood of Taolaichao.

7. At Hailung, 3,000 Chinese soldiers.  
In this region, 400 to 500 bandits.

8. Antung-Mukden Line.

West of Pensiho, about 400 bandits.  
Near Feng-Hoan-Chen, about 400 bandits.



LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Circulated to the  
Council and Members  
of the League.

C.726.M.331.1931.VII.

Geneva, October 17th, 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11  
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication by the French Government.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the French Government the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following letter dated October 16th.

Geneva, October 16th, 1931.

To the Secretary-General.

Sir,  
Further to my communication of the 11th instant I have the honour to request you to be good enough to communicate to the members of the Council the latest information received by the French Government as to the situation in Manchuria.

It is reported that a Japanese column sent to the district south of the Pekin-Mukden railway line and east of the river Liao <sup>into</sup> came/collision with a large body of soldiers and brigands (about 5000 men). The fighting is continuing but the Staff states that the Japanese troops will not cross to the right bank of the River Liao unless it is absolutely necessary.

From the point of view of the military occupation the position remains unchanged, the extreme points being Taonanfu to the west and Hoening to the east (this latter town is on the Korean frontier).

Lastly, the construction of the Kirin-Hoening railway line is progressing normally.

(Signed) MASSIGLI

For the Minister of Foreign Affairs  
and by authorisation.



LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the Council  
and Members of the League

C.727.M.332.1931.VII.

Geneva, October 17th, 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11  
OF THE COVENANT

Communication from the Japanese Representative  
to the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Japanese Representative the  
Secretary-General has the honour to communicate to the  
Council the following information dated October 15th.

Anti-Japanese agitation.

Tokio, October 15th.

State of anti-Japanese agitation:

Tientsin.- No popular movement, but the Japanese banks  
have decided to refuse to take Japanese banknotes or  
to make advances for the purchase of Japanese goods  
or advances on cash. This decision has not yet been  
put into effect. Some shops are refusing to take notes  
of the Specie Bank (300,000 dollars in circulation).

Ichang. On October 8th stones were thrown by some ten  
young Chinese at the guardship "Futami"; the doors of  
the Japanese hospital were nailed up from outside. On  
October 9th the windows of the Consulate, the elementary  
school, houses occupied by employees of the Nisshin, and  
the Naval Mess, were broken by stone-throwing. On



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October 10th, fires were started in the Mess and five adjoining buildings.

Chungking. - 2 Japanese were attacked by about 40 Chinese in the street.

Swatow. - The Postmen's Trade Union has had letters cancelled with stamps reading: "Do not buy Japanese goods", "The dogs of Japanese soldiers are occupying our territory", "Break off all relations with the vile Japanese", and the like.

The English head postmaster endeavoured to prevent this, but as his advice was not heeded he was forced to agree to these stamps being used on correspondence between Chinese. Letters bearing these stamps are beginning to reach Formosa.

Japanese are now being molested in the neighbourhood of Kwang-Chow-Wan. A Japanese Maritime Customs official at Huang-Puo was attacked by soldiers and a crowd of Chinese, and only escaped through the efforts of a Chinese Customs officer. Japanese residents at Kingchow have had to take refuge at Hong Kong.

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Evacuation of Japanese residents (October 15th, 1931)

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1. Manchuria

Tsitsihar - October 8th, about 40 women and children sent to Harbin; October 12th, the families of members of the Consulate and <sup>all</sup> of residents (24 persons) sent to Harbin.



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Ang-Ang-Hsi - October 10th, all women and children (14 persons) sent to Harbin.

Tunghua and Chai-Ho - October 5th, 21 Japanese and 15 Koreans sent to Kirin; 19 Koreans sent to Cheintao.

Hua-tien - About 790 Korean farmers living along the railway line have reached Kirin.

Hailung - September 24th, 29th and 30th and October 1st, 101 Japanese and 33 Koreans sent to Kirin and Mukden.

Pa-ko-shu - September 30th, 5 Japanese and 13 Koreans sent to the Kaifeng zone.

Tung-Chiang-Kou - October 1st, 4 women and children sent to the Kaifeng zone.

2. Eastern Inner Mongolia.

Ling-si - October 2nd, all employees of the South Manchurian Railway (7 persons) sent to Chienshatung.

Chihfeng - October 13th, 8 women and children sent to Peking.

3. Northern China.

Shanhaikwan - All Japanese old men, women and children have taken refuge in the Japanese military barracks.

4. Central China.

Wenchow - October 9th, all residents (9 persons) sent to Keelung and Kiukow.



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Kiukow - 45 women and children sent to Shanghai.

Liang-Tan - All residents (3 persons) sent to Changsha.

Shasi - October 7th, all residents (6 persons) took refuge on board a warship.

Ichang - October 10th, the 44 residents who had remained all took refuge on board a steamer.

Chungking - October 15th, most of the members of the Consulate and their families and all the residents (about 90 persons) are to leave at once for Hankow.

Chengtu - October 14th, some of the members of the Consulate with their families and some residents are to be sent by river to Chungking.

Sinyang - 1 resident sent to Hankow.

5. Southern China.

Canton - The Japanese resident outside the Zone have been sent to Shamien.

Hongkong and Kowloon - The number of Japanese now in the refugees is about 50 (October 12th).

Yunnan - October 7th, the families of members of the Consulate and a large proportion of the residents (17 persons) sent to Hanoi.



LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the  
Council and Members  
of the League.

C.728.M.353. 1931. VII.

Geneva, October 17th 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11  
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Representative of China,  
on the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Representative of China the  
Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council  
the following cable messages received in addition to the  
previous seventy-six, copies of which have already been cir-  
culated.

No. 77.

Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese  
Delegation, dated Nanking, October 17th. 1931.

Mass meeting in Japanese primary school at one p.m.  
on October 11th demonstrated against China. Two thousand  
Japanese arrived in Jukong Road at two-thirty p.m. with  
Japanese marines parading up and down in trucks or  
stationed at street corners intimidating Chinese crowd.  
Many demonstrators tore down anti-Japanese posters in  
various shop windows along the North Szechuen Road. A  
frenzied Japanese mob marched down the street, shouting  
abusive language. On the wall of an inn was a portrait of  
Dr. Sunyatsen with the national flag and the party ensign.  
The infuriated mob tore down the portrait and trampled on  
it, tearing the flags into bits. Where posters were  
affixed behind display windows, they forced their way in.  
Many window panes were smashed and the doors of Chinese  
shops were quickly closed at the approach of the mob, but  
the Japanese usually succeeded in forcing their way in and  
tearing down the posters. While this was in progress, the  
Chinese began to gather, showing signs of opposition.  
The International Settlement Police arrived on the scene  
and dispersed the Japanese. Two men were slightly injured.



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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Circulated to the Council  
and Members of the League.

C.729.M.334.1931.VII.

Geneva, October 18th, 1931

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT  
UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Japanese Representative on the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the President the Secretary-General  
has the honour to circulate to the Council the following  
communication from the Japanese Representative on the Council.

Geneva, October 17th, 1931

To the President.

Sir,

I am instructed by my Government to transmit to  
Your Excellency the attached memorandum and should be grateful  
if you would give me the opinion requested by my Government as  
soon as possible.

(Signed) K. YOSHIKAWA.

Japanese Representative  
on the Council.



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MEMORANDUM.

1. Up to the present the Japanese Government has co-operated sincerely in the work of the League and has endeavoured to increase its prestige by every possible means. It considers that the League's action should in every case be strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Covenant, and that this action should be both impartial and correct. If there is any departure from these principles for reasons of expediency the Japanese Government is of opinion that the authority of the League is likely to suffer.

2. When the League Council discussed the question of inviting the Government of the United States of America to send an observer to sit on the Council, the Japanese Representative expressed at length his doubts as to the interpretation of the Covenant - that is to say whether the presence in the Council of an observer of a non-Member State was or was not compatible with the provisions of the League Covenant, and whether the question of the invitation could or could not be regarded under the Covenant as a question of procedure. Although the Japanese Representative asked the Council to examine these points the latter did not go fully into the questions raised by him and likewise rejected his request that they should be referred to a committee of legal experts for examination. The President of the Council left all these legal questions in abeyance and put the question of the invitation to the vote, regardless of the opposition of the Japanese Government's Representative; he also decided that this was a question of procedure and stated that the proposal had been adopted by a majority.



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3. The opinion was expressed that as the United States Government was a party to the Paris Pact it should have the opportunity of expressing its opinion before the League Council solely in regard to the application of that Treaty. The Japanese Government is not only firmly convinced that the present situation is not such that there is any danger of war between Japan and China but also considers that, as the Paris Pact is a treaty between a large number of states, including non-Member states, the granting of an opportunity to sit on the Council with the right to express an opinion to the United States Representative alone, raises a delicate question. This also shows that the invitation to the United States is not simply a question of procedure.

4. The Japanese Government cannot help feeling the profoundest misgiving as to the correctness of the precipitate adoption of a majority decision and the leaving in abeyance of the preliminary question whether a proposal requires unanimity or whether it can be decided by a majority. It is anxious to know when the legal questions outstanding are to be discussed and how the vote of October 15th will affect the result of those discussions.

Before deciding upon the attitude which it will adopt in regard to the questions now raised as a whole, the Japanese Government would be happy to have the opinion of the President of the Council on the above-mentioned points.

Geneva, October 17th, 1931.



LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the  
Council and Members  
of the League.

C.730.M.335.1931.VII  
Geneva, October 18th, 1931.

APPEAL BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF  
THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Japanese League of Nations  
Bureau, the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to  
the Council the following communication dated October 18th.

Summary of anti-Japanese measures in China  
(chiefly in the Yangtse region).

Stimulated by the Nationalist Party and the Chinese  
authorities, the anti-Japanese agitation has assumed highly  
disquieting proportions. For reasons which are easy to  
imagine, the Chinese authorities are endeavouring to avoid any  
loss of human life, but they are authorising or encouraging all  
kinds of measures which amount to flagrant acts of hostility  
and violation of both the spirit and the letter of international  
treaties.

The following is a brief summary of the incidents  
in the anti-Japanese agitation and their results.

1. The press campaign is extremely violent, and the  
newspapers are doing everything they can to arouse public



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opinion against Japan.

2. Formation of national anti-Japanese associations.

Associations were formed at Nanking, Shanghai, Hankow and elsewhere as early as September 21st. They have passed resolutions advocating the breaking off of relations with Japan. Large-scale demonstrations have been organized in all the cities under the direction or with the assistance of the Nationalist Party. The resolutions in question are ten in number:

- (1) Not to buy Japanese goods.
- (2) Not to use Japanese goods.
- (3) Not to carry Japanese goods.
- (4) Not to use Japanese money.
- (5) Not to travel on Japanese ships.
- (6) Not to have any personal relations with Japanese.
- (7) Not to work for Japanese.
- (8) Not to make deposits in Japanese banks.
- (9) Not to supply Japanese with food.
- (10) Not to go to Japan either on business or for purposes of study.

An association has been formed to supervise the execution of these resolutions, and offices have been organized for the seizure of Japanese goods. Between October 1st and 10th the six offices organized in the provinces carried out 170 seizures.

The Shanghai anti-Japanese Association has caused several dozen Chinese merchants who broke the rules it laid down to be arrested and/ imprisoned. Most of them have been released on



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payment of fines amounting to several thousand dollars. Ten are still in prison, and three have been condemned to death. (Report from the authorities of the International Concession).

3. Breaking-off of economic relations with Japan.

The following are among the steps taken at the instigation of the anti-Japanese associations:

- a) Resignation of all agents and employees of Japanese firms.
- b) Discontinuance of all monetary transactions with Japanese or in Japanese goods.\*
- c) Prohibition to coolies to unload Japanese vessels (this rule is enforced by the Chinese police).
- d) Prohibition to Chinese pilots to pilot Japanese vessels.
- e) Censorship of Japanese letters and telegrams (including even the official papers of the consulates at Chengchow and Hankow).
- f) Discontinuance of the Japanese printed matter service.
- g) Refusal to receive letters for Japanese or deliver letters to them (Shanghai).
- h) Interruption of the telephone service; interference with the telegraph service. At Yunnan and Wuhu letters and telegrams for the consulates have been intercepted.

4. Maltreatment of Japanese.

Japanese, especially women and children, are being insulted and maltreated in the streets (see previous communication), where posters calling on the people to massacre the



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Japanese have been put up. At Chinkiang anti-Japanese posters have been put up by soldiers.

This is a form of terrorism which, although every effort is made to avoid any overt acts which might lead to foreign intervention, is nevertheless a direct threat to the persons and property of Japanese nationals; it completely prevents any legitimate peaceful activities, and in extreme cases it even makes the Japanese unable to obtain food. In consequence of this agitation, Japanese consulates and Japanese nationals have been evacuated from the following places:

a) Consulate withdrawn and all residents evacuated:  
Chenchow 8, Yunnan 20, Chentu 9, Chihfeng 20.

b) Cities evacuated by a large proportion of the Japanese residents, especially women and children:  
Nanking (including civil and military advisers to the Government) 100, Hangchow 11, Suchow 10, Wuhu 36, Wenchow 14, Kiukan 40, Shasi 7, Ichang 17, Chungking 55; Chansha, all residents have taken refuge on an island.

c) Many residents in other cities on the Yangtse, in South China (Fuchow, Amoy, Swatow, etc), and in towns in Northern Manchuria, have been evacuated (a large number of Japanese nationals have been massacred in Manchuria).

5. Other anti-Japanese demonstrations.

a) Warehouses belonging to Japanese companies have several times been attacked and many goods looted.

b) Japanese goods belonging to Chinese, valued at from \$3,000 to \$10,000, have been seized on many occasions.

c) Not only the employees of Japanese firms but also the Chinese members of the Shanghai Scientific



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Research Institute have been forced to resign their posts.

Other remarkable demonstrations have taken place, including the following:

a) An effigy of the Emperor of Japan has been exhibited head downwards in the street, together with an executioner's knife.

b) Chinese offending against the resolutions of the anti-Japanese associations are dressed up in the costumes of "traitors to the country", and their photographs in this disguise are published in the newspapers.

c) The head of the First Local Section of the Nationalist Party at Shanghai has called a meeting of school-teachers and asked them to punish any children who may buy Japanese goods, the punishment to be inflicted on the parents of children under twelve years of age and on the children themselves if over twelve. Japanese products, it is stated, are being shown in the class-rooms, so that the children can recognise them.



LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to  
the Council and the  
Members of the League.

C.731.M.336.1931.VII.

Geneva,

October 19th, 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER

ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Reply from the President of the Council to the  
Japanese Representative's Note dated October 17th,  
1931.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the President of the  
Council, the Secretary-General has the honour  
to circulate the following reply from the  
President to the Japanese Representative's  
Note, dated October 17th, 1931 (Doc.C.729.M.334.  
1931.VII).

Geneva, October 17th, 1931.

Sir,

1. I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the  
Memorandum which Your Excellency was good enough to send me  
in your letter of October 17th.

2. I need hardly say, and I am sure that I speak for all  
my colleagues on the Council, that I highly appreciate the  
value of the collaboration which Japan has given to the League  
of Nations and the efforts which it has invariably made to  
increase the prestige of the League. Need I add that we all  
agree with the Japanese Government that no reasons of expediency,  
whatever they may be, can justify us in placing ourselves in  
contradiction with the Articles of the Covenant, which con-  
stitutes the charter of the Members of the League?

3. Your Excellency will remember that, in a letter  
addressed to me on October 15th, you set out certain considera-  
tions in regard to the action taken by the Council in the  
matter which forms the subject of your latest note.

Having consulted certain of my colleagues, whom the previous  
President, with the approval of the Council had requested to  
assist him, I had most carefully examined the questions which you  
then raised, and to which I subsequently replied in my letter of  
October 15th.



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4. I hoped that that letter would calm the anxieties of your Government, since it clearly indicated that in my opinion, and in the opinion of those I had consulted, the questions put to me were based on a misunderstanding.

5. At the meetings on October 15th and 16th, I was at pains to make it clear - and my statement was endorsed by my colleagues - that the object of the proposal laid before the Council was strictly limited, being merely to supplement the arrangements already made to enable the Council to obtain information with greater ease, and that the legal questions of a general nature to which Your Excellency called attention did not arise, and should, therefore, remain entirely reserved; and I added that in view of the circumstances in the matter, it was not necessary for those questions to be settled before the Council could come to a decision on the proposal submitted to it.

6. Furthermore, my letter of October 15th - I would draw Your Excellency's attention to its second and third paragraphs - explained the reasons why, and the conditions under which, a representative of the United States was invited to sit at the Council table. The declarations made by various Members of the Council at the meeting of October 16th are also explicit on this subject.

7. This being the case, I consider, and my colleagues agree, that no useful purpose would be served by undertaking at the present time a judicial study of problems which, however important and interesting they may be in themselves, do not at the moment arise, though they can be examined later if the Members of the League so desire.

8. I trust that the Japanese Government will, for the reasons I have explained, agree that such a study would in any case be wholly unrelated to the vote given by the Council on October 15th.

9. I venture to hope that the foregoing explanations will convince the Japanese Government that I and my colleagues have given the most serious consideration to the views it requested Your Excellency to express to us, and that we have been most careful to take no action which was in contradiction to any article of the Covenant of the League or to the Council's practice.

(S) A. Briand

President in Office of the Council.



LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Translation.

C.732.M.337.1931.VII.

Circulated to the  
Council and Members  
of the League.

Geneva, October 19th, 1931.

APPEAL BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE XI  
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication by the Japanese delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Japanese delegation,  
the Secretary-General has the honour to communicate  
the following seven telegrams to the Council.

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I.

Tokio, October 14th, 1931.

A rumour was started by Shang Hsueh Liang to the effect that the Japanese military authorities had supplied Mongol troops with arms and ammunition taken from the arsenal at Mukden. On enquiry, this statement has been found to be entirely without foundation.

II.

Tokio, October 15th.

The Japanese employees and their families (28 persons) on a big farm belonging to the Okura Company situated to the west of Tsungliao endeavoured on September 23rd to reach the safety zone, as their lives were constantly being threatened by the numerous Chinese deserters passing through that district. On the way, they were attacked by bandits, who carried away one of the employees as a hostage, and they had to return to the farm. The Okura Company appealed to the Japanese authorities to help its employees, but the authorities, fearing that they might give rise to misunderstandings by constantly sending out troops to help the inhabitants of the numerous farms situated at a distance from the zone, were obliged to refuse this request. The Okura Company hired a civil aeroplane which on October 14th made several trips in order to assist the 28 persons who had remained on the farm.

III.

Tokio, October 18th.

Our Consulate at Mukden telegraphs that, according to a Reuter telegram from Peking dated October 16th, when Tsungliao was attacked by Mongol soldiers, 6 Japanese aircraft assisted them and dropped bombs on the Chinese. Further, according to a statement from a semi-official Chinese source, Japanese aeroplanes on October 15th attacked Tsungliao and caused 14 deaths. On enquiry, however, these two statements proved to be absolutely false. The "six aeroplanes" seen near Tsungliao on the 14th must have been the civil aeroplane, which made three trips in order to help the 28 employees on the Okura farm (see my previous telegram).

IV.

Tokio, October 18th.

In view of the acute danger of molestation by bandits, all the employees on the Shenshi-tung-Tsungliao railway line have been obliged to withdraw, and traffic on the line has been interrupted since the 17th.



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V.

Mukden, October 18th.

According to a telegram from Chen Chiatung, a body of 1500 Mongols has attacked Tsungliao, and, having been repulsed by Chinese soldiers, is committing acts of brigandage in the neighbourhood.

The region between Cheng Chiatung and Tsungliao is infested with Chinese bandits and the Chinese troops are taking measures to suppress them.

The Japanese military authorities sent 80 men on an armoured car to bring in the Koreans and ascertain the condition of the railway line between Cheng Chiatung and Tsungliao (one of the lines built with Japanese capital). This car was derailed and fired on by Chinese troops. On October 18th a Japanese relief force of 150 men was sent to the spot (telegram from the Mukden Consulate). This telegram is confirmed by a telegram from our Consul at Chen Chiatung, who adds the following further information:

"The body of 1500 Mongols set out towards Tsungliao on October 12th. On the way it was joined by a band of 300 Mongol bandits. After having been repulsed by six hundred Chinese soldiers, the Mongol troops dispersed and are giving themselves up to brigandage. They blew up a railway bridge near Chien Tien."

VI.

Shanghai, October 17th.

"The Anti-Japanese agitation is being carried on in an extremely clever way, so as not to afford any opportunity for foreign intervention and takes the form of terrorism against the Chinese themselves, to which the authorities are turning a blind eye. For example, the Anti-Japanese Associations are recommending that the pillaging of goods belonging to Japanese should be avoided, and at the same time are trying by every means to prevent the Chinese from maintaining relations with the Japanese. They have decreed that staple foodstuffs must not be sold or supplied to the Japanese and several rice merchants whose customers were mainly Japanese have been assaulted. Since October 14th the Japanese Colony (about 30,000 in number) has been obliged to organise a system of direct victualling. The Anti-Japanese Associations are not only preventing Japanese goods from being bought or sold but are forbidding Chinese factories to use Japanese raw materials or goods."



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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"A movement of revolt is arising, however, among Chinese traders against the drastic action taken by the Anti-Japanese Association.

The authorities of the international municipality have protested against the abduction and imprisonment of Chinese merchants, but as they have no right of jurisdiction over premises in the Chinese centre (Temple) they are powerless to act. The Chinese traders who have been thus victimised dare not ask the Chinese authorities for protection, or where they have done so their request has met with no response.

#### VII.

Shanghai, October 18th.

This morning at about half-past ten o'clock a crowd of about 200 Chinese began to distribute anti-Japanese tracts in the neighbourhood of Naigi factory No. 5 (West Suchow Road, in the International Concession); then, having smashed a motorcar belonging to a Japanese, throw stones against the outbuildings of factories Nos. 5 and 6. At 1 p.m. a crowd of several thousand persons made a demonstration at the corner of Robinson Road and Ferry Road and attacked a Japanese laundry.

The International Municipal Council sent a detachment of volunteers and a detachment of Japanese Marines proceeded to the spot. Two police officers were injured.

At about 3 p.m. some 20 persons forcibly entered the premises of the Naigi Company, situated in the Ichang Road. The International Police and the Japanese Marines had to intervene. A crowd of about 3,000 persons demonstrated for several hours in front of these buildings but was eventually dispersed.

(Telegram from the Shanghai Consulate.)



LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to  
the Council and  
Members of the League.

C.733.M.333.1931.VII.

Geneva,

October 20th, 1931.

APPEAL BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER

ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Chinese Representative on  
the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate  
five further telegrams (Nos. 78-82) which he has  
just received from the Chinese Representative on the  
Council.

No. 78.

Text of a telegram received by the Chinese Delegation,  
dated Nanking, October 18th, 1931.

The following telegram has been received from Tsingtao from  
Robert Lewis (an American citizen):

"The following is a true statement of the situation up to date  
from personal observation in Manchuria up to October 16th, supplemented  
by conferences with neutral and other informed persons in various  
parts of Manchuria.

The Japanese Army is feverishly consolidating its hold on all  
the principal towns of Manchuria, outside the railway zone, northward  
including Kirin and Taonan, from Korea on the east into Mongolia on the  
west. They are trying to induce the Mongolian princes to sign away  
their rights and to set up an independent government under Japanese  
protection. The Japanese Army is rooting out at all centres the  
Chinese civil government, who are offering no resistance, and are  
forcing unwilling Chinese individuals to organise puppet independent  
governments in all the main areas. They openly refuse to recognise  
Chinese national and civil authority in Manchuria.

The Japanese have seized the reserves and deposits of the  
larger Chinese banks, the records of corporations, and large quantities  
of both military and industrial supplies. They are feverishly extend-  
ing their telegraph and power plants and cutting out the Chinese ser-  
vice. They have seized the Chinese short wave and other radio plants  
and the Chinese telegraph and telephone systems; they are now opening  
mail in the Chinese post offices, including private letters of  
Europeans. The Japanese are censoring all press despatches; we have  
proved instances, including those of neutral pressmen, where the  
censor has changed the meaning to the exact opposite of that intended.

The Japanese moved four heavily loaded trains of soldiers from  
Mukden on the night of October 13th to the west, seized the Peking-  
Mukden Railway, and now control that line in Manchuria. All other  
Chinese railways in Manchuria have also been seized by the Japanese.  
The local police in all the major towns have been reorganised to be  
under the control of the Japanese Army. On October 14th, they seized  
the Chinese mining administration, throwing 15,000 men out of employ-  
ment. While the negotiations in Geneva have been in progress, the  
Japanese Army has been steadily pushing the seizure and commandeering  
of Chinese property, including the private residences of high Chinese  
officials and of civil organisations.



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I inspected Chinchow and had conferences with all the responsible officials. Without provocation of any kind, twelve Japanese army airplanes dropped 48 bombs and fired machine guns at the offices of governor and other official buildings, at the university, the railway station and even the hospital, which was flying a Red Cross flag. The Chinese did not fire at these 12 aeroplanes.

Neutral opinion in Manchuria is astonished at the aggression of the Japanese and the excuses made for it. The rape of Manchuria by the Japanese Army is now nearly completed.

No. 79.

Text of a telegram received by the Chinese Delegation,  
dated Nanking, October 19th, 1931.

The following telegram has been received from Shanghai from Robert Lewis (an American citizen):

"I have proof that on Friday night, September 18th, the Japanese Army sent through Antung from Korea into Manchuria seven trains fully loaded with soldiers. On Saturday night, September 19th, they sent four additional trains loaded with soldiers into Manchuria through the same place. On Sunday, September 20th, they sent eight further trainloads through the same point into Manchuria. These nineteen trains are now part of their occupying force in Manchuria. (Antung is 161 miles from Mukden, on the Korean border).

"The Japanese have occupied every Chinese public office in Antung, excepting the Customs House which has Europeans in it. They have, however, placed a guard over the Chinese Customs superintendent, and are denying him freedom of action. The Chinese banks have been seized and are now operated by them. They have arrested the Superintendent of Schools, and are forbidding the teaching of Sun Yat-sen's principles.

"The Japanese Army occupied Kirin, 79 miles east of the South Manchurian Railway zone, on September 19th. They seized and hold the telegraph office, the telephone office, the wireless stations, the provincial arsenal, the waterworks, the local office of the Bank of China, the Kirin Provincial Bank, police headquarters and branch headquarters of the Kuomintang Party, and all other public offices. The non-military population was subjected to an exhaustive search. Troops and military cadets were disarmed, and arms and munitions were removed from the Chinese arsenal, including modern rifles, field guns, heavy guns, military motor trucks. They are building a large flying field at Kirin. They impressed certain Chinese and dictated the formation there of a civil government independent of the Chinese provincial and national authorities. The Japanese Army has taken possession of the provincial treasury.

"The Japanese have advanced east from Kirin 130 miles and seized Tunghwa and hinterland. In this part of Manchuria alone, the Japanese army has advanced into Chinese territory 239 miles outside the S.M.R. zone. The Japanese troops were not withdrawn.



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Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation,  
dated Nanking, October 19th, 1931.  
No. 80

The following telegram has been received from Shanghai  
from Robert Lewis (an American citizen);

There were heavy Japanese troop movements through  
Mukden on the nights of October 14th and 15th, and on October  
16th the Japanese army completed the occupation of the Chinese  
railroad westwards from Mukden nearly as far as Shanhaikwan.  
The Japanese army now surrounds Chinchow (where they bombed the  
Chinese civil government on October 8th). The Japanese army  
has occupied the Chinese railway for a distance of 264 miles  
towards Payintala, and controlled the railway to Tsitsihar for  
141 miles. They have occupied the railway from Mukden to  
Hailungcheng and Kirin for about 250 miles and about 239 miles  
of the Chanchun-Kirin-Tunhua Railway. The Japanese army has  
seized and now occupies five important Chinese railways in  
Manchuria, with a total mileage of 1311 miles. All these  
railways are outside the South Manchurian Railway Zone.

The Japanese have armed the Koreans in Mukden and  
raids upon the defenceless Chinese population take place nightly.  
Firing in Mukden streets at night has been a common experience  
since the Japanese occupation. The Japanese army now occupies  
170,000 square miles of Manchuria.

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No. 81.

Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation  
dated Nanking, October 19th, 1931.

Marshall Chang reports that at one p.m. on October  
15th a Japanese aeroplane from Tacnan dropped two bombs on  
Tungliao, killing about fourteen persons, then continuing its  
flight towards Lungkiang. At ten a.m. on October 15th another  
Japanese aeroplane reconnoitred over Lungkiang. At one p.m.  
on October 17th six Japanese aeroplanes reconnoitred over  
Tongshan. On the same day two Japanese armoured trains went  
in the direction of Tungliao. At nine a.m. on October 18th  
two Japanese aeroplanes passed over Kupantze, one proceeding  
to Chinchow.

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No. 82.

Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation,  
dated Nanking, October 19th, 1931.

General Ho Chu-kuo at Shanhaikwan has reported the  
following:

There are now about two hundred Japanese soldiers at  
Shanhaikwan and Chinwantao. They have been joined by about  
sixty Japanese volunteers. They also recently received thirty  
additional automatic firearms.

The Japanese have barracked on the south side of the  
Shanhaikwan and Chinwantao Railway, while our troops are sta-  
tioned on the north side. Agreements have been made among them-  
selves about not crossing the railway. There is no possibility  
of hostile contact; the territory between them is being patrolled  
by efficient police and is becoming virtually a neutral area.



LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

C.743.M.345 1931 VII.

Communicated to the  
Council and Members  
of the League.

Geneva,

October 21st, 1931.

APPEAL BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11  
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Representative of China on the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate two further telegrams (Nos. 86 and 87) which he has just received from the Representative of China on the Council.

No. 86. Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation,  
dated Nanking, October 21st, 1931.

The Mukden correspondent of Reuters reported on October 19th that local conditions there, so far as individuals are concerned, still leave much to be desired. The city is being treated as if it were part of the spoils of war and many Government institutions and private houses of prominent Chinese officials have been completely looted, while Chinese passengers travelling out of Manchuria by the Peking-Mukden Railway are liable to very rough and ready search by Japanese pickets when entraining at Huangkutun.

Even foreigners are not free from molestation for, yesterday, two Americans, Edward Hunter of the Hearst News Service and Professor Dorman of California University were arrested at Huangkutun Railway Station on the pretext of taking photographs but were eventually released with apologies. Japanese soldiers, who are under orders to protect the local branch of an important American bank, have also been found intruding in the manager's private residence.

The situation in the Tungliac district is serious. Heavy fighting is reported to have occurred between Mongol troops and Chinese, and there is a report that a Japanese armoured train has been derailed east of Tungliac.

No. 87. Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation,  
dated Nanking, October 21st, 1931.

Routers reports from Peiping of October 21st state that the Frontier Bank and the Three Eastern Provinces Bank at Mukden have reopened for business, under severe restrictions imposed by the Japanese military authorities now occupying the city.

These restrictions include the following rules, that a supervisor for each bank must be appointed from the Japanese army, that there be special investigators from time to time, that business must be suspended at any time at the discretion of the Japanese army, that the employment of all bank officials be subject to the approval of the Japanese army and that no business regarded as injurious to the interests of the Japanese army may be transacted.

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Communicated to the Council  
and the Members of the League

C.744.M.344.1931.VII.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Geneva, October 21st, 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT

Communication from the Japanese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following letter which he has just received from the Japanese Delegation.

Geneva, October 21st, 1931.

To the Secretary-General.

(Translation)

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that the Japanese Delegation has received a telegram dated October 17th, informing it that the troops from the Shingishu (Corea) garrison which had been sent to Manchuria were all sent back to their garrison on the 16th instant. I had the honour to inform you in a previous letter that some of these troops were sent back to Corea on September 28th.

I should be grateful if you would be good enough to bring this information to the notice of the Members of the Council.

(s) S. SASAKI.



LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the  
Council and Members  
of the League.

C.745.M.345.1931.VII.

Geneva, October 22nd, 1931.

APPEAL BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11  
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Representative of China on the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate a further telegram (No.88) which he has just received from the Representative of China on the Council.

No.88.

Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation, dated  
Nanking, October 21st, 1931.

The Peking-Mukden Railway Office reports that while the Japanese soldiers have withdrawn from Huangtun station, they have left behind military gendarmes. No Japanese soldiers have withdrawn from Chuliuho.

With reference to the communication from the Japanese Delegation on October 18th (C.730.M.335.1931.VII) which gave a "Summary of anti-Japanese Measures in China (chiefly in the Yangtse region)", we have thoroughly investigated the allegations made against the Shanghai Anti-Japanese Association and have ascertained that they are unfounded and that the statement including the report of three Chinese merchants being condemned to death for breaking the rules is absolutely untrue.

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AMERICAN CONSULATE  
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

OCT 25 1931

POLITICAL SECTION

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the  
Council and Members  
of the League.

C.750.M.349.1931.VII.

Geneva, October 23rd, 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11  
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Representatives of China on the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate  
two further telegrams (Nos. 90 & 91) which he has just received  
from the Representative of China on the Council.

No. 90.

Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation,  
dated Nanking, October 22nd, 1931.

Reuters report from Mukden dated October 21st states  
that there has been a good deal of looting going on in Mukden and  
houses of prominent Chinese have been taken over and occupied by  
the Japanese.

The following summarises what has happened to a good many  
residences. General Yung Chen's residence has been occupied by  
Japanese troops since the morning of September 19th, who removed  
all valuables and furniture. General Chu Kwang-mo's residence was  
searched by the Japanese and his motor car taken away. General  
Chen Hsin-ya's residence was searched on September 22nd and all  
valuables removed by Japanese soldiers. General Tang Yu-lin's  
house was also searched and is still occupied by them. It is report-  
ed that silver and other valuables amounting to 40,000 dollars



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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were removed. General Wan Fu-lin's house has also been searched and valuable curios removed. General Wang Yi-chi's house has been fired upon although occupied at present by a German resident. General Chow Li-an's house has had everything removed from it (he was the chief of the Central Purchasing Commission and a trusted advisor of Chang Haueh-liang). The houses of many other public men have been similarly looted. Most of the removing of these valuables was done by plain-clothes men, who had motor trucks at their disposal for transporting them. Where motor cars of these generals and other public men were found, these were "borrowed" by the Japanese army.

No. 91.

Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation,  
 dated Nanking, October 23rd, 1931.

The Director of the Chinese Eastern Railway reports that Japanese aeroplanes on the morning of October 21st flew over Kwantchenze, on the southern section of the Chinese Eastern Railway, dropping five bombs, which however did not damage the railway.

Reports from Tahsing Station on the Taonan Railway state that one Japanese aeroplane appeared over there at one p.m. on October 21st and dropped six bombs. At the time that this message was sent it had not been possible to ascertain the amount of damage done.

The Japanese new agency "Rengo" reports on October 22nd from Mukden that "while making a reconnoitring flight yesterday towards Shuangkiang, Japanese scouting planes received volleys of attacks from the Heilungkiang army which was making an assault on Kiangchiao. As was the case of Chinchow these Japanese aeroplanes were obliged to drop several bombs in order to silence the Chinese army. In view of the seriousness of this outrageous act on the part of the Chinese army, it is understood that M. Shimidzu, Japanese counsel at Tsitsihar, is preparing a strong protest to the local Chinese authorities."



AMERICAN CONSULATE  
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

OCT 25 1931

POLITICAL SECTION

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to  
the Council and  
the Members of  
the League.

C.751.M.350.1931.VII.

Geneva, October 23rd, 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Answer of the Japanese Government to the identical telegram sent  
by the Signatories of the Briand-Kellogg Pact of Japan and China.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Japanese Representative on  
the Council the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate  
the following Note which he has just received.

Text of the Answer.

1. The Japanese Government realise as fully as any other signatories of the Pact of Paris of 1928 the responsibility incurred under the provisions of that solemn Pact. They have made it clear on various occasions that the Japanese railway guards in taking military measures in Manchuria since the night of September 18th last have been actuated solely by the necessity of defending themselves as well as of protecting the South Manchuria railway and the lives and property of Japanese subjects against wanton attacks by Chinese troops and armed bands. Nothing is farther from the thought of the Japanese Government than to have recourse to war for the solution of their outstanding differences with China.

2. It is their settled aim to compose those differences by all pacific means. In the note of the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Chinese Minister at Tokyo dated October 9th the Japanese Government have already declared their readiness to enter into negotiations with the responsible representatives of China for an adjustment of the present difficulties. They still hold to the same view. So far as they are concerned they have no intention whatever of proceeding to any steps that might hamper any efforts intended to assure the pacific settlement of the conflict between Japan and China.

3. On the other hand they have repeatedly called the attention of the Chinese Government to the organised hostile agitation against Japan now in progress in various parts of China. The suspension of all commercial intercourse with Japanese at present practised in China is in no sense a spontaneous act of individual Chinese. It is enforced by the anti-Japanese organisations that have taken the law into their own hands and are heavily penalising even with the threat of capital punishment any Chinese who may be found disobeying their arbitrary decrees. Acts of violence levelled against Japanese residents also continue unabated in many places under the jurisdiction of the Government of Nanking. It will be manifest to all fair observers of the actual situation that those activities of the anti-Japanese organisations are acquiesced in by the Chinese Government as a means to attain the national ends of China. The Japanese Government desire to point out that such acquiescence by the Chinese Government in the lawless proceedings of their own nationals cannot be regarded as being in harmony with the letter or the spirit of the stipulations contained in Article 2 of the Pact of Paris.



LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the  
Council and Members  
of the League of  
Nations.

C.752.M.351.1931.VII.

Geneva,

October 23rd, 1931.

APPEAL BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11  
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication by the German Government.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to communi-  
cate to the Council the following letter from the  
German Government.

Geneva, October 23rd, 1931.

Sir:

With reference to the Council's decision of the 30th  
instant, paragraph 9, I have the honour, at the instance of my  
Government, to submit the following further communication for  
the information of the Council:

"Dispositions of Japanese troops unchanged. Opera-  
tions confined to expeditions against brigands and deserters.  
General position at Mukden quiet, increasing security.

"Municipal administration of Mukden handed over on  
October 20th to the Mayor Chanhsin Fo. Former provincial  
authorities being reinstalled; financial and industrial  
services and traffic commission will soon follow suit.  
Question of the Governor undecided. All new authorities  
have, like the Banks of Issue, received Japanese advisers,  
who are for the most part influential high officials of the  
South Manchurian Railway.

"Railway service to Peking inadequate; Mukden-Hailung  
line again opened."

(Signed) MUTIUS.



LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the  
Council and Members  
of the League.

C.755.N.353.1931.VII.

Geneva,

October 24th, 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER

ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Representative of China on the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate two further telegrams (Nos. 92 and 93) which he has just received from the Representative of China on the Council.

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No. 92.

Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation,  
dated Nanking, October 23rd, 1931.

The authorities at Kirin report that on Wednesday a Japanese aeroplane flew to Munkingchiao and dropped six bombs, causing heavy casualties. On the same day Japanese aeroplanes dropped five bombs on Yichienpao railway station. There has been no withdrawal whatsoever from the occupied areas, but instead the situation has been aggravated by these bombings by Japanese aeroplanes.

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
No. 93.

Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation,  
dated Nanking, October 23rd, 1931.

The Japanese in Shanghai are still bent on creating trouble. Early yesterday morning five Japanese attacked and wounded the Chinese constable, Wang Chang-Shun, in Darroch Road, bordering on the International Settlement. The Japanese first attacked a Chinese chauffeur who had sought help from Wang. When Wang hastened to the scene of the trouble five Japanese sprang upon him, and one of them fired a pistol shot which wounded Wang. About thirty Japanese marines later arrived confronting the party of Chinese police which were then sent there. The marines withdrew after considerable persuasion. The disturbance was witnessed by the police of the International Settlement. The Chinese authorities have protested to the Japanese consul about this shooting and have also notified the Senior Consul and the Municipal Council.



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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75



LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the  
Council and Members  
of the League.

C.761.M.359.1931.VII

Geneva, October 26th, 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Representative of China on the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.  
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The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following communication dated October 24th and addressed to the Acting President of the Council.

41 Quai Wilson,  
Geneva.

October 24th, 1931.

Monsieur le Président,

With reference to the observations on treaty obligations made in the Council this morning by the Honourable Delegate for Great Britain with which I am in hearty agreement, I am authorized by my Government to make the following declaration:

China, like every member of the League of Nations, is bound by the Covenant to "a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations." The Chinese Government for its part is determined loyally to fulfil all its obligations under the Covenant. It is prepared to give proofs of this intention by undertaking to settle all disputes with Japan as to treaty interpretation by arbitration or judicial settlement, as provided in Article 13 of the Covenant.

In pursuance of this purpose the Chinese Government is willing to conclude with Japan a treaty of arbitration similar to that recently concluded between China and the United States, or to those concluded of recent years in increasing numbers between Members of the League.

(signed)

Sao-Ke Alfred SZE.



LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the  
Council and Member  
of the League.

C.764.M.362.1931.VII.  
Geneva, October 28th, 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11  
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Japanese Government.

Note by the Secretary-General.  
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At the request of the Japanese Delegation the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the tenor of the declaration which was published in Tokio on October 26th, 1931, by the Japanese Government.\*

"1. On 22nd October Japanese representative in Council League Nations proposed certain amendments to resolution then before Council with regard two questions of,

- (1) Withdrawal Japanese troops to railway zone, and
- (2) Direct negotiations between China Japan.

However, these suggested amendments as well as resolution itself fell through having failed obtain unanimous approval of Council.

2. As has been repeatedly emphasized by Japanese Government whole Manchurian affair was occasioned solely by violent and provocative attack launched by Chinese army on railway zone. Certain small contingents of Japanese soldiers still remaining at few points outside that zone are insistently demanded by danger to which large population of Japanese in that region are exposed in life and property. Presence of such limited number of troops is quite incapable being represented as means of dictating to China Japan's terms for settlement of present difficulties. Nothing is farther from thoughts of Japan than to bring armed pressure to bear upon China in course of these negotiations.

3. Japanese Government have on various occasions given expression to their firm determination to suffer no abridgment or diminution of rights and interests Japan which are vital to her national existence and which are woven into complex fabric of her political and economic relations with China. Unfortunately so-called "Recovery of Rights" movements in China have recently

\* The declaration has been communicated to the Council by telegram.



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attained extravagant developments while feelings antagonistic to Japan have been openly encouraged in text books used at various schools in China and have become deeply seated in Chinese mind. In defiance of treaties and regardless of all history vigorous agitation has been carried on in China with object of undermining rights and interests of Japan even most vital. As things stand at present complete withdrawal Japanese troops to South Manchuria railway zone under mere assurance of Chinese Government would create intolerable situation exposing Japanese subjects to gravest dangers. Risk of such dangers is clearly evidenced by past experience and by conditions which actually obtain in China.

4. Japanese Government are persuaded that in present situation safety of Japanese subjects in Manchuria can hardly be ensured without provision being made to remove national antipathies and suspicion existing in mutual relations of two powers. With this end in view they have already expressed in note of Minister Foreign Affairs October 9th to Chinese Minister Tokyo their readiness to enter into negotiations with Chinese Government on certain basic principles that should regulate normal interrelationship between two countries. That Note was communicated at time to Council League. Convinced that this method of procedure is alone calculated to open out a way to have situation Japanese Government have consistently held to their proposals in that sense throughout recent discussions at Council League. Basic principles which they have had in mind relate to:

- (1) Mutual repudiation of aggressive policy and conduct,
- (2) Respect for China's territorial integrity,
- (3) Complete suppression of all organized movements interfering with freedom of trade and stirring up international hatred,
- (4) Effective protection throughout Manchuria of all peaceful pursuits undertaken by Japanese subjects,
- (5) Respect for treaty rights of Japan in Manchuria.

Japanese Government believe that all these points being in entire accord with aims and aspirations of League Nations and embodying natural basis upon which peace in Far East must depend will commend themselves to approval of public opinion of world. Refusal by Japanese representative to lay these points on table of Council was due to consideration that they should in their nature properly form subject of negotiations between parties directly involved.

5. With future welfare of both nations in mind Japanese Government feel that urgent need at present moment is arrive at solution of problem by co-operation of two countries and thus seek path of common happiness and prosperity. Their willingness remains unaltered and unabated to open negotiations with Chinese Government on subject of basic principles above formulated relating to normal relations between Japan China and on subject of withdrawal Japanese troops to South Manchuria."

Drummond

Secretary-General.



AMERICAN CONSULATE  
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

NOV 2 1931

POLITICAL SECTION

Enclosure No in List No

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Council  
and Members of the League of  
Nations and to the International  
Committee on Intellectual  
Co-operation.

C.766.N.364.1931.VII.  
C.I.C.I.267.

Geneva, October 28th, 1931.

APPEAL BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Japanese delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the  
Council and to the International Committee on Intellectual Co-  
operation the following communication which he has just received  
from the Japanese Delegation to the League of Nations.

Geneva, October 28th, 1931.

To the Secretary-General.

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that, according to a  
telegram which I have just received, the 8th National Congress of  
Japanese Schoolteachers in the course of its enquiry on co-operation  
between China and Japan has adopted the following resolution.

"The 8th National Congress of Japanese schoolteachers  
draws attention to the fact that the causes of the dispute  
between China and Japan, the most burning aspect of which  
is the Manchurian question, are of long standing.  
In particular the anti-Japanese instruction given in the  
Chinese primary and secondary school text-books is bound  
to have the most unfortunate consequences for the future.

The Congress therefore decides to forward this resolution  
to the League of Nations."

I should be grateful if you would be so good as to  
communicate this resolution to the International Committee on  
Intellectual Co-operation and to the President and Members of the  
Council.

(Signed) S. SAWADA.



AMERICAN CONSULATE  
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

NOV 2 1931

POLITICAL SECTION

Enclosure No

in 14-00000

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the  
Council and to the  
Members of the League.

C.776.M.371.1931.VI.

Geneva, October 29th, 1931.

APPEAL BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT IN VIRTUE OF  
ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit  
to the Council the following communication, which he has  
just received from the President in Office of the Council.

Paris, October 30th, 1931.

I have the honour to communicate to you herewith,  
requesting you to be good enough to transmit it to my  
colleagues on the Council, the letter which, as President  
in Office of the Council, I have just sent to the Japanese  
representative, His Excellency M. Yoshizawa, in reply to  
the Japanese Government's declaration dated October 26th,  
1931.

I have the honour to be, etc.,

(Signed) A. BRIAND.

ANNEX.



- 2 -

Paris, October 28th, 1931.

Your Excellency,

As President of the Council of the League of Nations, I have examined most carefully the Japanese Government's declaration dated October 26th, which Your Excellency was good enough to communicate by telegram to me and to the other Members of the Council through the Secretary-General.

I feel I must submit to you certain observations on this communication.

Since the last meeting of the Council, when the Draft Resolution on which my colleagues had asked me to report secured the approval of all the Members of the Council except the Japanese representative, the position in regard to the question submitted to us for consideration has become clear. It may be stated as follows:

Independently of the vote taken at the last Council meeting, which retains its full moral force, we still have before us, from the juridical standpoint, a valid resolution, namely that which was unanimously adopted on September 30th, and which retains its full executory force.

In that resolution the Council noted the statement made by the Japanese Representative that the Japanese Government "will continue as rapidly as possible the withdrawal of its troops which has already been begun, into the railway zone in proportion as the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals is effectively assured and that it hopes to carry out this intention in full as speedily as may be". No indication whatever was given at that time by the Japanese Representative that matters such as an agreement as to the treaty rights of Japan in Manchuria were in any way connected with the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals.



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It is further to be noted that in the two draft resolutions submitted to the Council on the 24th October the first three paragraphs are exactly the same, Your Excellency having withdrawn the amendment to paragraph 3 which you had submitted. It may, therefore, be assumed that these paragraphs express the will of the two Parties. In their declaration of October 26th the Japanese Government further stated that, when it referred to certain fundamental principles it had in mind the following:

- 1) Mutual repudiation of aggressive policy and conduct - Paragraph 2 of the two drafts submitted on October 24th states that "the two Governments are bound not to resort to any aggressive policy or action."
- 2) Respect for China's territorial integrity.  
Paragraph 3 of the two drafts records an undertaking to that effect.
- 3) Complete suppression of all organised movements interfering with freedom of trade and stirring up international hatred. Paragraph 2 of the two drafts declares that the two Governments "are bound to take measures to suppress hostile agitation";
- 4) Effective protection throughout Manchuria in order to allow Japanese nationals to engage there in any peaceful pursuits. Paragraph 1 of both drafts declares that the Chinese Government are pledged to the effective protection of Japanese subjects residing in Manchuria.

The fact that on the one hand the Chinese Representative accepted the terms of the resolution which I proposed on behalf of my colleagues and that, on the other hand, the counter-draft of the Japanese Representative contained the three paragraphs to which I have referred show that the two Governments are in complete agreement on these four points.



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There remains only the last point:-

"Respect for treaty rights of Japan in Manchuria".

With regard to this point, I would call Your Excellency's attention to the letter addressed to me by the Chinese Representative on the 24th October, in which Dr. Sze declares that "China, like every Member of the League of Nations, is bound by the Covenant to a 'scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations'. The Chinese Government for its part is determined loyally to fulfil all its obligations under the Covenant. It is prepared to give proofs of this intention by undertaking to settle all disputes with Japan as to treaty interpretation by arbitration or judicial settlement, as provided in Article 13 of the Covenant".

It, therefore, appears to me, and I feel sure that my colleagues on the Council, including, I trust, Your Excellency, will agree that the Chinese Government have given to the Council of the League, on which Japan has a permanent Representative, pledges which cover the various fundamental principles raised by the Japanese Government.

In these circumstances I feel confident that the Japanese Government, being desirous of fulfilling the undertaking which is solemnly contracted under the terms of the Resolution of September 30th and which, moreover, it repeatedly confirmed by its declarations during the last session of the Council, at the meetings of October 22nd, 23rd and 24th, will continue as rapidly as possible the withdrawal of its troops into the railway zone and that it will thus be able to carry out that intention to the full in the shortest possible time.

In view of the extreme importance which your Government attaches to the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals in the territories evacuated by its troops,



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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I venture to call Your Excellency's attention to paragraph 5 of the Resolution submitted to the Council on October 24th, which recommends the two Governments "to appoint immediately representatives to settle the details relating to the carrying out of the evacuation and to the taking over of the evacuated territories, in order that these operations may be carried out in a regular manner and without delay."

(Signed) BRIAND.



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AMERICAN CONSULATE  
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

NOV 3 1931

POLITICAL SECTION

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

C.788.M.382.1931.VII.

Geneva, November 3rd, 1931.

Communicated to the  
Council and Members  
of the League.

APPLICATION BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER  
ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Japanese Government.

Note by the Secretary General.

At the request of the Japanese Delegation the  
Secretary General has the honour to communicate to the  
Council the following telegram:

Telegram despatched from Paris at 8.40 p.m. on  
November 2nd.

PLEASE COMMUNICATE TO THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL THE  
FOLLOWING TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM TOKIO:

AT THE REQUEST OF THE SOUTH MANCHURIAN RAILWAY COMPANY AND  
THE MANAGEMENT OF THE TAONAN ANGANGCHI LINE ONE COMPANY  
OF SAPPERS WAS SENT ON NOVEMBER 2ND TO REPAIR THE NONNI  
RAILWAY BRIDGE. IT IS UNDER THE PROTECTION OF TROOPS  
(INFANTRY, ARTILLERY AND AIR FORCE) PROBABLY DETACHED FROM  
CHENCHIATUNG (CONFIRMATION OF THIS POINT HAS BEEN REQUESTED)

(Signed) SAWADA.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AMERICAN CONSULATE  
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

NOV 4 1931

POLITICAL SECTION

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the  
Council and the Members  
of the League.

C.789.M.383.1931.VII.

Geneva, November 3rd, 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11  
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Chinese Government.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following note and memorandum which he has received from the Representative of China.

I. NOTE.

41, Quai Wilson,

Geneva.

November 3rd, 1931.

Sir,

The Chinese Government is gravely concerned over the developments in Manchuria since the adjournment of the Council. The attached Memorandum, which contains a summary of these developments, shows that although ten days have elapsed since the adjournment of the Council on October 24, and more than a month since the adjournment of September 30, not only has there been not the slightest preparation for withdrawal, but, on the contrary, the Japanese Army is steadily extending and consolidating its grip on South Manchuria and is making attempts to penetrate into North Manchuria that are causing anxiety in Moscow.

It may be remembered that, in the Resolution of September 30, which was accepted by and is binding upon Japan, it was stated that the Japanese Government "will continue as rapidly as possible the withdrawal of its troops, which has already been begun, into the railway zone in proportion as the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals is effectively assured". The declaration, made



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over a month ago, that withdrawal had already been begun, is, unfortunately, not substantiated by the facts. Not only has withdrawal not been begun, but the Japanese Government now refuses to honour the promise it made before the Council and declares that it will not begin withdrawal until it has negotiated an agreement with China on certain "fundamental principles". This new policy was set forth in the Japanese Government's note to the Chinese Government on October 9, and again before the Council on October 23 and 24. This position was reiterated a few days ago, when the Japanese Government refused to appoint representatives to discuss with the representatives of the Chinese Government the details and methods of withdrawal as proposed in the resolution submitted by the Council on October 22. The measures proposed in this Resolution, which retains its full moral force, are merely indications of how to carry out the policy to which both parties were pledged by the Resolution of September 30. It is this which makes the Japanese Government's change of attitude and insistence upon an agreement upon "fundamental principles", by means of direct negotiations, as a preliminary to withdrawal, so profoundly disquieting.

This attitude of Japan, as was pointed out in the Council on October 23 and 24, is in violation of Article X of the Covenant and Article 2 of the Pact of Paris. The Chinese Government must reiterate its firm determination never, in any circumstances, to agree to negotiations under the pressure of military occupation, and confidently looks to the Members of the League and the United States of America not to suffer the Covenant, the Pact of Paris and the Washington Nine Power Treaty to be trampled under foot.

(Signed) Sao-Ke Alfred Sze.



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## II. MEMORANDUM ON THE PRESENT SITUATION IN MANCHURIA.

### Situation in Manchuria.

The following is a digest of the information received in cablegrams from Nanking during the last three days:

#### (1) Means to Assure Withdrawal.

The Chinese Government has appointed a commission to arrange with the representatives of the Japanese Government the details of withdrawal, taking over the evacuated areas and assuring the safety of the lives and property of Japanese subjects in those areas. This commission is composed as follows: Chairman, Mr. V.K. Wellington Koo. Members: Messrs. Chang Tso-Hiang, Chang Chun, Wou Tieh Chen, Lo Wen-Kan, Tang Er-Ho and Lui Chi.

On being notified of the appointment of this Commission and requested to designate its own representatives, in accordance with paragraph 5 of the Resolution proposed by the Council on October 22, the Japanese Government replied that this Resolution was not in force, and that, with reference to the taking over of occupied places by the Chinese, the attitude of the Japanese Government had been indicated in its note of October 9 in reply to the Chinese Minister's note of October 5. In its statement of October 26 the Japanese Government had again indicated its policy with regard to the settlement of the Manchurian affair; and that it was hoped that the Chinese Government would agree to this policy and enter into immediate negotiations for an agreement upon fundamental principles for re-establishing normal relations between Japan and China and the withdrawal of Japanese troops to the railway zone.

#### (2) Consolidation of the Japanese Hold on South Manchuria.

General Honjo's headquarters recently informed Mr. Pearson, who is in the employ of the Ministry of Finance, that the entire salt revenue of Manchuria (24,000,000 dollars annually) must go to the Mukden Government. This revenue is the security for various foreign loans, and any tampering with it is a violation



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of international obligations. The recent Japanese raid on the customs office at Mukden, it is feared, foreshadows such activity, in accordance with the "independence" programme of cutting the three Eastern Provinces financially loose from China.

A cable received to-day confirms the fact of the forcible seizure by the Japanese troops of salt revenue of Newchang to the amount of 760,000 dollars.

In Mukden, as reported in the German Government's communication to the Council of October 23 and confirmed by later reports from Nanking, the Japanese have appointed Japanese advisers to all the local authorities, banks of issue and commercial establishments and are, in general, closely controlling the whole public life of the city.

The Japanese have collected and transported to Japan in 600 cases 1,200,000 dollars in cash. Over 300 army sheds have been constructed at Mukden, and 40 at Chuliuh, where an artillery regiment and a cavalry detachment are preparing for a lengthy stay.

The Ministry of Railways reports that the Chinese-owned Mukden-Hailun railway was taken over by the Japanese on October 15 and is being operated under their control.

Japanese troops have built a platform by force between Manchuria and Shinglungtien stations on the Peking-Mukden Railway, for loading and unloading military stores.

(5) Fomenting Disorder and Extending Japanese Influence.

Japanese aeroplanes aided Mongolian bandits against Chinese troops at Tungliao on October 31, and, on the same date, a Japanese armoured train and two troop trains with several carloads of material left Chenghiatun for Chenchiatien near Tungliao.



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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

On November 1 four Japanese armoured trains arrived outside Shutao Station and fired several shots at the city. There are several thousand Mongol bandits behind the Japanese troops preparing an attack on Tungliao.

Mongolian troops and brigands are plundering the Tsitsihar-Taonan Railway with Japanese assistance.

The Japanese are supplying Linyinchin with ammunition to help his so-called self defence army in making an attack on Chinchow to exterminate the influence in Manchuria of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, the representative of the Chinese Government.

The Chairman of the provincial government of Heilun-kiang, the northermost of the Manchurian provinces, was visited by a representative of General Honjo, with the demand that he repair the bridge over the Nonni River within a week, failing which, it would be repaired by the Japanese with the help of troops. This move was undertaken in order to facilitate the crossing of the river by the Japanese protégé, Chang Hai Peng, who is preparing to attack Heilunkiang. Later, two Japanese representing General Honjo, called upon the Chairman of the Heilunkiang provincial government, and told him that Japan could not recognise his authority because he had been appointed by the Chinese Government, and ordered him to hand over his office to Chang Hai Peng, on pain of being turned out by force.

The Japanese troops in Kirin Province have compelled the local gentry to present a petition to the Japanese staff requesting that Japanese troops remain to ensure order and peace, and have forced the self-constituted provincial government to dismiss the head of the tax bureau and seized the salt revenues.

The above are merely a few salient facts. To them must be added a series of arrests and imprisonments and coercion of every description against all who in any way represent the lawful authority of the Chinese Government; the arrival of more troops and military stores; the activities, military and political, of Japanese aeroplanes; and, in general, the unceasing attempts of the Japanese Army to convert their illegal military occupation into a political and economic stranglehold upon the unhappy country they have invaded.

Geneva. November 3. 1931.



LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to  
the Council and  
Members of the League.

C.793.M.387.1931.VII.

Geneva,

November 4th, 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11  
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Representative of China on the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to  
circulate to the Council the following communi-  
cation which he has just received from the  
Representative of China.

-----  
41 Quai Wilson,  
Geneva.

November 4th, 1931.

To the Secretary-General.

Sir,

I beg to invite your attention to the attached  
information from Nanking, November 3rd, which unhappily more  
than bears out the serious view of the situation in Manchuria  
contained in the Memorandum and covering note I handed to  
you yesterday.

It is now clear that the Japanese Army of Occupation  
are pursuing a deliberate policy of trying to substitute for  
the authority of the Chinese Government the rule of various  
groups and individuals set up and maintained by the Japanese  
themselves.

Yesterday's Memorandum predicted that a further step  
in this policy was imminent. It has now been taken: The Japanese  
military are confiscating the salt revenues and trying to divert  
them into the hands of the puppet authorities set up by themselves.

The serious harm to foreign interest need not be  
emphasised. It is further clear that this policy is a flat  
defiance of the Council's recommendations and a flagrant violation  
of the Covenant, the Pact of Paris and the Washington Nine Power  
Treaty. The situation is of the utmost gravity.

(Signed) Sao-Ke Alfred Sze.



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No. 95.

Text of a cablegram received by the Chinese Delegation,  
dated Hanking, November 3rd, 1931.  
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Please inform the Secretary-General of the League for circulation to the Members of the Council and the Representative of the United States that the Minister of Finance has received the following report from Doctor Frederick A. Cleveland, Associate Chief Inspector of Salt Revenue:

"The Japanese military authorities in Manchuria which have tied up the Salt revenues since September 13th, have now forcibly taken part of the accumulated revenues. The particulars are as follows: On September 19th the Japanese military authorities in Manchuria forcibly entered the District Office at Nerchwang, since which time the Japanese military in occupation have exercised strict surveillance of all revenue transactions and revenue accounts in offices and collecting banks and have refused to permit remittance of funds to the National Government, asserting, however, they did not intend expropriate funds or deprive the Government of its revenues.

"Since September 1st large revenue funds have accumulated which are of two kinds: (1) Duties paid in advance in free trade area of Mukden; (2) Funds of the Government Trading Monopoly of Kirin and Heilungkiang provinces, called 'Kihei'. About October 8th Kihei Monopoly sent to the District Inspectorate of Nerchwang (Yingkou) its cheque for one million eighty thousand dollars (\$1,080,000) drawn on its depository bank but payment was interdicted. Ascertaining that cheque was fully covered by deposits the Inspectorate continued release salt required for distribution to Government Monopoly on credit. Accumulated deposits of duty paid in advance at Nerchwang amounted to six hundred seventy thousand dollars (\$670,000) and at Changchun for Kihei account to two million six hundred thousand dollars (\$2,600,000) on October 29th.

"October 31st at 10 a.m. Mukden District Inspectorate telegraphed to the Inspectorate that the Manager at the Nerchwang Branch Bank of China personally handed us on 30th at 3 p.m., a letter, stating at 11 a.m. to-day Paymaster Iwase of Japanese Military Headquarters, Adviser Tamada Shigeji of the Provincial Government Bank and Provincial Finance Bureau (newly established) and staff officers of Provincial Government Bank with armed men came to his bank demanded handing over salt revenue collections. This was refused but finally at 4 p.m., a sum of six hundred seventy two thousand seven hundred and nine dollars fifty six cents (\$672,709.56) was taken away. It was only after repeated negotiations that a Provincial Finance Bureau's sealed receipt, signed by Tamada Shigeji, was obtained. Under such circumstances we could do nothing.

"Demands for Kihei deposit at Changchun two million six hundred thousand dollars (\$2,600,000) are being made by persons claiming represent certain groups, which have suddenly sprung up, and monopoly since Japanese military occupation. Active agents of these groups, as in the case of expropriation of funds at Nerchwang, seem to be so-called Japanese Advisers. These representatives have threatened to use force in case said deposits at Changchun are not released to them.



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"Chief Inspectors have instructed local representatives that in no case are they to yield to demands for funds subject to its control for two reasons: (1) Because such consent would constitute breach of trusteeship; (2) Because these large sums on deposit, if held under Japanese control or diverted to uses of persons who are unfriendly to recognized authorities, might be potent resource to stimulate opposition to Chinese National Government and foment revolution.

"In addition to foregoing another form of exploitation is threatened, namely: Diversion of revenues as they currently accrue. Average collections for the three North-eastern Provinces have been approximately two million dollars (\$2,000,000) monthly. After deduction of expenses and quotas for service of foreign loans secured on salt, there is an average net balance of one million six hundred thousand dollars (\$1,600,000) monthly. Repeated demands have been made that this monthly surplus be turned over to persons and groups who have support and co-operation of Japanese military authorities in occupation.

"Salt Inspectorate has been instituted as agency for collecting and conserving salt revenue for foreign loan service and other uses and purposes designated by National Government. Against estimated total annual collections one hundred seventy million dollars (\$170,000,000) various appropriations and commitments have been made which including expenses, service of foreign and domestic loans and authorized transfers to local authorities amount to above one hundred twenty five million dollars (\$125,000,000) yearly - about seventy percent of estimated total salt revenue. In existing emergency Chief Inspectors deem it their duty to lay these important impairments of public revenue before you."



AMERICAN CONSULATE  
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

NOV 6 1931

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the  
Council and to the  
Members of the League.

C.794.M.388.1931.VII.

Geneva, November 4th, 1931.

APPEAL BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11  
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Japanese Government.

The Secretary-General has the honour to communicate to the Council a copy of a telegram which he has received from the Japanese Delegation.

Paris, November 3rd, 1931.  
8.32 p.m.

The Chinese Minister at Tokio handed to Baron Shidehara on October 27 a note in which the Chinese Government requested the Japanese Government to appoint representatives to settle the details of the evacuation and the taking over of the evacuated territories in accordance with paragraph 5 of the Resolution adopted by the Council of the League of Nations on October 24. In reply Baron Shidehara sent the Chinese Minister the following note dated October 31 which was published at Tokio on November 3:

Translation.

"Sir: I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your Excellency's note dated October 27. In that note mention is made of paragraph 5 of a resolution of the League of Nations dated October 24. The Japanese Government desires to draw the attention of the Chinese Government to the fact that no resolution was adopted by the Council of the League of Nations on October 24. Your Excellency's note also expresses the Chinese Government's desire that negotiations should at once be opened with a view to the taking over of the territories evacuated by the Chinese troops in the three Eastern Provinces. The Chinese Government had already expressed a similar desire in your Excellency's note of October 5 to which I replied by a note dated October 9. The Japanese Government has announced the line of conduct it proposes to follow in order to settle the Manchurian incidents in a statement published on October 26 and it requests the Chinese Government to be so good as to refer to that document. The Japanese Government is most anxious that the Chinese Government should accept the views of the Japanese Government as expressed in that statement and should enter into negotiations with it as speedily as possible with a view to reaching an agreement on fundamental principles to form the basis for the restoration of normal relations between the two countries and also into negotiations with regard to the withdrawal of the Japanese troops into the South Manchurian Railway zone. I have the honour, etc.

(Signed) Shidehara.

" Sawada.



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AMERICAN CONSULATE  
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

NOV 3 1931

POLITICAL SECTION

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

C.794.M.388.1931.VII.

Communicated to the  
Council and Members  
of the League.

Geneva,

November 5th, 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11

OF THE COVENANT.

Erratum to Document C.794.M.388.1931.VII.

(English text only)

2nd paragraph 10th line: instead of "evacuated by"  
the Chinese troops in the three Eastern Provinces" read:

"evacuated by the Japanese troops ....."



AMERICAN CONSULATE  
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NOV 6 1931

POLITICAL SECTION

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the  
Council and Members  
of the League.

C.795.M.389.1931.VII.

Geneva, November 4th, 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11  
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Chinese Representative.  
on the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following communication which he has received from the Chinese Representative.

Note with reference to the reply of the Japanese Government  
to the identical telegram sent by the Signatories of the  
Briand-Kellogg Pact.

November 4th, 1931.

Sir,

I have now had an opportunity of studying carefully the reply returned by the Japanese Government to the identical telegram sent by the Signatories of the Briand-Kellogg Pact to China and Japan, communicated to the Council and the Members of the League by the Secretary-General on October 23rd.

I wish to submit the following comments on this reply:

1) The Japanese Government allege that the occupation of Chinese territory over a wide area, that began on the night of September 18th and still continues, was a measure of self-defence due solely to the necessity for the Japanese railway guards to defend themselves and to protect the South Manchuria Railway and the lives and property of Japanese subjects against attacks by Chinese troops and armed bands. The Chinese Government has repeatedly denied that there was any such attack and pointed out that no Chinese soldiers are suffered by the Japanese troops to approach within miles of the railway zone, which makes the alleged attack even more difficult to believe. In any case, so long as the Japanese Government are not willing to agree to the impartial enquiry for which the Chinese Government has repeatedly pressed, and on which it still insists as the only method compatible with League principles and practice of establishing the question of responsibility, it is difficult for world opinion to accept the Japanese version.



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In any case, seizing the chief strategic points in an area as wide as the British Isles on the plea of self-defence cannot be regarded as behaviour compatible with the Covenant. On this point it is sufficient to quote the words of M. Briand, when he presided over the special meeting of the Council in 1925:

"He had understood the representative of Greece to indicate that all these incidents would not have arisen if his country had not been called upon to take rapid steps for its legitimate defence and protection. It was essential that such ideas should not take root in the minds of nations which were Members of the League and become a kind of jurisprudence, for it would be extremely dangerous. Under the pretext of legitimate defence, disputes might arise which, though limited in extent, were extremely unfortunate owing to the damage they entailed. These disputes, once they had broken out, might assume such proportions that the Government, which started them under a feeling of legitimate defence, would be no longer able to control them....

At the same time, "Mr. Austen Chamberlain said that the declaration which the President had made as to the role which the League of Nations could play in cases such as that which had brought about the present meeting, and as to the restraint which nations concerned in unfortunate incidents of this character might be expected to exercise in view of the fact that the Council could be immediately convened and could use its good offices to reconcile disputants, was of such consequence for the position of the League of Nations and for the guidance of nations in future that he would like, on behalf of the Government, to express his complete concurrence in all that the President had said and to thank him for having so completely defined the duties of nations and the duties of the League of Nations.

Also, at the same time, "Viscount Ishii said that he entirely agreed with the statement made by the representative of the British Empire endorsing the declaration made by the President".

While feeling it necessary to make the above comments on the Japanese Government's version of events in Manchuria, the Chinese Government is happy to note that the Japanese Government are in their answer adopting the attitude laid down in the Council resolution of September 30th and repeated in the resolution proposed by all the other Members of the Council to Japan on October 22nd. If it really is the intention of the Japanese Government to make withdrawal dependent only upon securing the safety of the lives and property of its nationals in the areas evacuated by the Japanese troops agreement is in sight, for the Chinese Government has strongly emphasised its desire to give such guarantees in the fullest measure and for this purpose to accept without limit the help of the Council of the League of Nations in devising and carrying out local arrangements on the spot.



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2) The Chinese Government is also glad to note the declaration of the Japanese Government that it is their settled aim to compose the differences between Japan and China by all pacific means, and that they have no intention whatever of proceeding to any steps that might hamper any efforts intended to assure the pacific settlement of the conflict. But the Chinese Government feels compelled to point out that Japanese troops are still occupying Chinese territory, and to quote the observations on this subject of M. Briand, the President of the Council, on the twenty-fourth of October last:

"The League, indeed, is the trustee of the obligations assumed by its Members, and it is obviously its duty to see that those obligations are honoured. Article X of the Covenant says nothing else: it states that all the members of the great family of nations agree to respect each other's territorial integrity and political independence. Again, Article II of the Pact of Paris says that 'The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement of solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be settled except by pacific means.....'

"I do not wish to dwell upon it, but I think public opinion would find it difficult to admit that military occupation could be assigned to the category of pacific means. I think that military occupation falls outside that class of measures, and therefore the prolongation of that occupation also involves the prolongation of that feeling of uneasiness which has already lasted too long."

The Chinese Government has already undertaken under the resolution proposed on October 22nd to take steps immediately to discuss with representatives of the Japanese Government the detailed arrangements for withdrawal of Japanese troops and taking over the evacuated areas by the Chinese authorities without danger to the lives and property of Japanese subjects. This, as was pointed out by M. Briand and other Members of the Council on October 13rd and 24th, is the only issue at present before the Council. Any attempt to make evacuation conditional upon the discussion of other issues would be contrary to the course laid down by the Council and constitute an attempt to extort concessions from China as to the future relations between the two countries under the pressure of military occupation. The Council has made it clear that it fully endorsed the attitude of the Chinese Government that such an attempt is a direct negation of the Covenant and the Peace Pact. The Chinese Government would draw attention once more to the declaration of its representative on the Council that "once this unhappy incident is settled and normal relations restored between China and Japan the Japanese Government will find us not only willing but anxious to discuss every issue between the two countries in the most friendly spirit".

This declaration represents the settled policy of the Chinese Government which is conscious that it is at all points in conformity with the Covenant, the Pact of Paris and the



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recommendations of the Council in this conflict.

3) Finally, the Japanese Government contends that the boycott movement in China is contrary to Article II of the Pact of Paris. The Chinese Government is a little surprised at such an argument from such a source, for, surely, if the Pact of Paris could be held to condemn a refusal on the part of private persons in China to buy Japanese goods it must a fortiori condemn a government that keeps its armies in the territory of a fellow signatory of the Paris Pact, and thereby openly violates the letter and the spirit of Article II of that Pact. The remarks of M. Briand quoted in 2) above on this subject would seem to make it perfectly clear that the position of the Japanese Government in this matter is untenable.

The Chinese Government would add that anti-Japanese feeling in China is a direct, natural and inevitable result of the action of the Japanese army in Manchuria, and will die down rapidly as soon as the cause of hostility is removed. The Chinese Government is determined, on its part, not only scrupulously to observe all its obligations under international law and practice to protect the lives and property of Japanese subjects as of other foreigners throughout China, but to go further and do everything in its power to promote good relations with Japan. It is for this reason that the Chinese Government is anxious at the earliest possible moment to conclude a treaty with Japan providing for conciliation and arbitration of all disputes between the two countries.

Please accept, Sir, the assurance of my highest consideration.

(Signed) SAO-KU ALFRED SZE.



AMERICAN CONSULATE  
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

NOV 6 1931

POLITICAL SECTION

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the  
Council and the  
Members of the League.

C.797.M.391.1931.VII.

Geneva, November 5th, 1931.

APPEAL BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER

ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Japanese Government.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to communicate the following telegram which he has received from the Japanese delegation.

Telegram despatched from Paris, November 4th, 9.08 p.m.

With reference to the telegram of November 2nd concerning the despatch of troops to the Nonni bridge, I have the honour to forward a summary of official telegrams received by the Japanese delegation on November 2nd and 3rd giving further information. Please communicate to the President and Members of the Council.

In the course of hostilities in Northern Manchuria between Chang-Hai-Peng's troops and those of the Province of Hei-Lung-Kiang commanded by General Ma-Chan-Shan, the latter, about a fortnight ago, blew up the railway bridge over the river Nonni on the Taonan-Angangchi line, which, it will be remembered, was built with Japanese capital but is under Chinese management. The discontinuance of traffic on this line is having disastrous economic consequences for the Chinese and Japanese population of the district and for the Taonan-Angangchi and South Manchurian Railway Companies, especially at this season, when the produce of the regions through which the lines run should be carried southward. In view of this situation the Japanese consular authorities repeatedly asked General Ma-Chan-Shan to repair the Nonni bridge, but their request was not complied with. Chinese agents and the Japanese adviser to the management of the Taonan-Angangchi railway proceeded to the spot, but General Ma-Chan-Shan's troops would not allow them to approach, and even opened fire on them with machine-guns at 150 metres, after which several rounds were fired by artillery. The management of the Taonan-Angangchi railway accordingly decided to effect the necessary repairs with the help of the South Manchurian Company, and asked the Japanese commander to provide protection for the work, which was to begin at noon on November 4th. On November 2nd some 500 men were sent to Nonni from Kirin and Changchun. At the same time Generals Ma-Chan-Shan and Chang-Hai-Peng were requested to withdraw their troops 10 kilometres from the bridge and to make no further use of it for strategical purposes. The troops have been sent to Nonni solely to protect the works, and will observe strict neutrality as between the belligerents. Should, however, either of the armies present endeavour to hinder them in their duty, all necessary defensive measures would be taken. The troops will be withdrawn as soon as their task is completed.

(Signed) SAWADA.



AMERICAN CONSULATE  
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

NOV 6 1931

POLITICAL SECTION

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the  
Council and Members  
of the League.

C.798.M.392.1931.VII.

Geneva, 5th November 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT

Communication from the Chinese Representative on the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following communication which he has received from the Chinese Representative:-

41 Quai Wilson, Geneva.

November 5th, 1931.

To the Secretary-General of the  
League of Nations.

Sir,

In continuation of my note of the 3rd instant, I beg to call your attention that the concentration of Japanese troops on the Taonan-Angangchi-Tsitsihar Railway line within seventy kilometres of Tsitsihar threatens peace and order in Northern Manchuria. In order to appreciate the gravity of the information just received from my Government, which is summarised below, it must be realised that Tsitsihar is the capital of Heilungkiang the northernmost of the Manchurian Provinces, is situated about six hundred thirty kilometres as the crow flies north of Mukden, and about four hundred kilometres north-northwest of Changchun, the nearest point (and terminus) of the South Manchurian Railway, and can be reached from these points only by crossing the Chinese Eastern Railway.

For some time the Japanese military authorities have been supporting Chang Hai Peng against the lawful government of the Province of Heilungkiang.\* In pursuance of this policy the Japanese recently demanded that the bridge over the Nenai River on the northernmost section of the Taonan-Angangchi line should be repaired. The Chinese Provincial Government then came to an agreement with the Japanese Consul in Tsitsihar as to the immediate repair by the Chinese authorities of this bridge. But Major Hayashi, representing the Japanese Army Command in the Kwangung Peninsula, called on the Provincial Government on November 1st, and informed it that whether or not it was capable of repairing the bridge the South Manchurian Railway had decided to send men on November 4th to repair it under the protection of Japanese troops. He added that Japan was determined to change the political situation in Heilungkiang by force and regardless of the resolution of the Council of the League of Nations. The Japanese Consul replied to the expostulations of the Chinese authorities that he could not check these activities.



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Japanese troops have accordingly been dispatched to the Nonni River bridge, with the ostensible object of assuring the reparation of the bridge, but actually in order to act as a screen for Chang Hai Peng's irregulars and to facilitate their advance into Heilungkiang. This has created a dangerous situation about the Nonni River bridgehead with the prospect of clashes between the troops of General Ma, representing the authority of the Provincial Government of Heilungkiang, and the irregular forces put into the field by the Japanese. Any such development would lead to an advance by Japanese troops on Tsitihar and the cutting of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Already indeed on the morning of November 3rd, part of the Japanese forces crossed the bridge and attacked General Ma's camp, shooting and throwing bombs. As the Chinese troops refrained from returning their fire, the Japanese forces withdrew towards the Nonni River. On the same day Japanese military aeroplanes twice reconnoitred the Chinese camp, and six Japanese troop trains arrived near T'ai and Wumiatso. An armoured train, twenty-two car loads of infantry and artillery, five cars with fieldguns and three with horses are further reported moving in the same direction.

The Japanese denial of the presence of any troops north of the Nonni River bridgehead should be read in the light of the above facts, as also of the official denial, issued in Tokyo in the first few days of the Japanese occupation, that Japanese troops would advance north of Changchun; the advance occurred the moment after the denial had been published.

Further south, at Tungliao, three Japanese armoured trains arrived on October 31st, and six aeroplanes on the next day. A Japanese aeroplane circled over the city at one o'clock on November 1st and machine-gunned the North Gate. Next morning Japanese troops fired on the city and three hours later a Japanese armoured car, advancing behind a barrage of artillery fire, seized the North Station and put up the Japanese flag. During this bombardment five shells hit the South Station, two falling in the railway police quarters, two hitting the east wall of the station and one the junction between the North and South Stations. The Japanese force included a contingent of Mongols in Chinese dress. Two further Japanese troop trains then arrived. Mongol bandits, sheltering behind the Japanese force, have been making raids on the Chinese troops. \* The troops from the armoured train dug trenches around Tzetao Station and unloaded machine guns. The junction between the North and South Stations has been mined by the Japanese.

Five Japanese planes have been flying over Chinchow. In general, much activity by armoured trains and aeroplanes is reported from such widely separated points as Taiman, Chinchow, Shangchitai, Tungliao and Tzechinshan.

(Signed) SAO-KE ALFRED SZE.

\* See p. 5 of C.789.M.383.1931.VII.



AMERICAN CONSULATE  
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

NOV 6 1931

POLITICAL SECTION

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the  
Council and Members  
of the League.

C.799.M.393.1931.VII

Geneva, November 5th, 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT

Communication from the Representative of China on the Council

Note by the Secretary-General.  
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The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following letter which he has just received from the Representative of China:

November 5, 1931.

To the Secretary-General.

Sir,

Unhappily the prediction made in the communication handed to you this morning has been realised and Japanese troops are now actively provoking armed clashes about the Nonni River Bridge, within seventy kilometres of Tsitsihar and less than fifty kilometres from the Chinese Eastern Railway.

According to an urgent message just received from my Government, Japanese troops on the morning of November 4th stated to General Ma, the Chairman of the Heilungkiang Provincial Government, that they proposed immediately to occupy Tashin Station, north of the Nonni River and on the boundary of Heilungkiang Province.

At two o'clock the same afternoon Japanese troops in Chinese dress, accompanied by mounted bandits, fired on the Chinese camp; two Japanese aeroplanes circled over the camp and threw bombs, killing and wounding more than twenty Chinese officers and soldiers. In the last few days six Japanese troop trains have arrived at the bridge-head, with the obvious purpose of affording support to the advance of Chang Hai Peng and his irregulars into Heilungkiang, with the object of stirring up trouble in this province. The Japanese forces with their aeroplanes and bandit-allies are hemming in and harassing the Chinese troops so as to force an engagement.

I am instructed to request you to be good enough to inform at once the President of the Council and ask him to intervene with the Japanese Government to stop these incendiary activities of the Japanese troops, which threaten the gravest complications; for which Japan would bear the whole responsibility.

(Signed) Sao Ke Alfred Sze.

Postscript: Since the above was prepared for typing, a telegram has been received from the Provincial Government of Heilung-kiang, dated November 5th, 4 p.m., stating that from noon to 3 p.m. of that day, five to six hundred Japanese soldiers have crossed the Nonni River, carrying with them many mounted guns as well as a dozen aeroplanes; and have made a fierce attack upon the Chinese troops, killing more than one hundred of them.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

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GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

NOV 7 1931

POLITICAL SECTION

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the  
Council and to the  
Members of the League.

C.800.M.394.1931.VII.

Geneva, November 6th, 1931.

APPEAL BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE

11 OF THE COVENANT.

Communication by the Japanese Government.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to communicate to the Council the following telegram which the Japanese delegation received from Mukden on November 5th.

Telegram despatched from Paris on November 6th at 12.15 a.m.

Despatch of Japanese troops to Chiang Chiao is due to the urgent necessity of repairing Nonni bridge and commander of Kwangtung army has received definite instructions to withdraw his troops upon completion of repair work and not to go further than bridge. Furthermore Japanese army has recommended authorities of Heilungkiang to withdraw troops ten kilometres from northern end of bridge. Information from military source announces however that Heilungkiang troops fired on night of November 2nd on Japanese patrols. Moreover, M. Shimizu, Japanese Consul at Tsitsikar, who was proceeding to Chiang Chiao at the request of Heilungkiang authorities and Major Hayashi of Kwantung army, who was in the locality, arrived, accompanied by envoy (chief of staff) from Heilungkiang at that town on November 4th at 8 a.m., and latter declared his intention not to resist. After departure of these persons Japanese troops sent patrol to Tahsing, locality situated less than ten kilometres from bridge, to protect work of repairing bridge. It advanced with large Japanese flag in front, each soldier carrying a small flag. At about 2 p.m. infantry and artillery of Heilungkiang army began to attack patrol, obliging latter to withdraw to bridge-head to await reinforcements. Heilungkiang troops without withdrawing beyond ten kilometres to north of bridge continued attacks until night of 4th causing loss of fifteen Japanese soldiers. In these circumstances Kwantung army command decided to reinforce detachment in order to take any necessary measures of defence. Morning of 5th detachment occupied important point to east of Tahsing after suffering numerous casualties.

(Signed) SAWADA.



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POLITICAL SECTION

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the  
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of the League.

C.803. M.396.1931.VII.

Geneva,

November 6th, 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11  
OF THE COVENANT

Communication from the Chinese Representative  
on the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.  
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The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the  
Council the following communication which he has just received  
from the Chinese Representative:

41, Quai Wilson,

November 6th, 1931.

To the Secretary-General.

Sir,

I beg to inform you that I have now received the following  
detailed information as to the event at the Nonni River bridgehead  
in the last few days:

After the failure of the Japanese-supported Changhaipeng's  
irregulars, six train loads of Japanese soldiers arrived at Talai  
on November 2nd and notified both General Ma's and Changhaipeng's  
forces to withdraw ten kilometers from the bridge by noon on  
November 3rd. General Ma, the chairman of the Heilungkiang  
Provincial Government, did withdraw his troops accordingly, in  
pursuance of the Chinese Government's pledge to do everything in  
its power to avoid aggravating or extending the conflict.

But the only result was that at 8 o'clock the next morning,  
November 4th, Japanese troops advanced beyond the northern bank of  
the river and captured three Chinese guards. When this act met  
with no resistance over 100 Japanese soldiers at noon that day shot  
at the Chinese troops, killing and wounding several score. In the  
circumstances the Chinese troops were compelled to return the  
Japanese fire in self-defence. Thereupon, at 5 o'clock in the  
afternoon, several hundred Japanese soldiers, accompanied by  
Changhaipeng's irregulars, hotly attacked Tashin Station, north  
of the river, and kept up the attack till nightfall.

The Japanese forces are continually increasing. There is  
urgent need for League intervention to avoid the gravest  
complications.

(Signed) Sao-Ko Alfred SZE.



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GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

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POLITICAL SECTION

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LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the  
Council and Members  
of the League.

C.804.M.397.1931.VII.

Geneva, November 7th, 1931.

APPEAL BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11  
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the President of the Council to the Chinese  
and Japanese Governments.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Council copy of the following telegram which he despatched on November 6th to the Chinese and Japanese Governments.

The President of the Council of the League of Nations requests me to transmit to Your Excellency the following telegram:

"The extension of incidents towards Northern Manchuria and the serious nature of the information supplied regarding those incidents by the Chinese and Japanese Governments cannot but increase the anxiety of the Council and public opinion. As President of the Council I desire to remind you that the Chinese and Japanese representatives have given assurances that their Governments will take all necessary steps to avoid aggravating the situation. The Council placed these solemn undertakings on record in its resolution of September 30th. To fulfil those undertakings it now seems to me necessary for the two Governments to issue instructions without delay to the officers commanding their forces in order to remove all possibility of sanguinary engagements between Chinese and Japanese troops as any further serious incidents may make it even more difficult for the Council to pursue its efforts for the maintenance of peace and the peaceful settlement of the dispute with which it is called upon to deal.

ARISTIDE BRIAND

President of the Council of the League  
of Nations."

(Signed) DRUMMOND

Secretary-General.



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the  
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C.809.M.399.1931.VII.

Geneva, November 7th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF  
THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Japanese delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to communicate to the Council copy of a telegram which he has received from the Japanese delegation.

(Translation)

Paris, November 6th, 1931.  
7.15 p.m.

Acting on instructions received from my Government I have the honour to communicate to you that during the past few days about half Japanese army stationed at Chuliuho and more than half that stationed in the locality of Kirin have been withdrawn, thus reducing number of Japanese troops in these two localities (including Railway guards Kirin Changchun) to fewer than thousand men. I should be very grateful if you would bring the foregoing to the knowledge of the Members of the Council.

SAWADA.



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LEAGUE OF NATIONS

C.810.M.400.1931.VII.

Geneva, November 7th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF  
THE COVENANT.

Letter from the President of the Council to the  
Japanese representative.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to communicate to the Council a copy of the letter which the President in Office sent on November 5th to the Japanese representative, referring to the information contained in the letter and memorandum from the Chinese representative dated November 3rd (Doc. C.789.M.383.1931.VII), and in the further note from Dr. Sze, dated November 4th (Doc. C.793.M.387.1931.VII).

(Translation)

Paris, November 5th, 1931.

Your Excellency,

You have certainly noted the letter and memorandum forwarded by the Chinese delegate to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations on the 3rd of this month and a further note by Dr. Sze dated November 4th, these various documents having been immediately communicated to all the Members of the Council.

The Chinese representative refers in particular to the seizure by the Japanese military authorities of part of the salt revenue of Newchang, which is said to be only the first of other operations of the same nature.

Your Excellency will remember that in paragraph 5 of the Council resolution of September 30th, the Japanese



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Government had already undertaken to "adopt all necessary measures not to extend the incident or aggravate the situation". At the meetings of the Council on October 23rd and 24th, moreover, Your Excellency spontaneously renewed on several occasions the formal assurance that the Japanese Government intended "to bring back its troops within the Railway zone as soon as it could regard the safety of its nationals and the protection of their property as effectively assured," Japan for her part being prepared to facilitate by all the means in her power the "pacification" which appeared to her to be indispensable for the fulfilment of this condition of security formulated by herself.

It is obvious that acts of the kind reported, such as the seizure of the salt revenue cannot be related to the safety of Japanese nationals and the protection of their property and that they would therefore be incompatible with the undertakings entered into before the Council and with the spontaneous assurances recorded by it.

I do not doubt that the Japanese Government, conscious of the obligation resting upon it to take all necessary measures to prevent any aggravation of the situation, will understand the need of furnishing the Members of the Council with the necessary information regarding the incidents in question.

As President in Office, and assuming the responsibility to my colleagues of following the execution of the undertakings recorded by the Council, it is my duty to obtain all information on this matter. I should therefore be glad if Your Excellency would be good enough to forward to me as rapidly as possible all useful information for the complete enlightenment of the Members of the Council.

(Signed) Aristide BRIAND



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11-13-31

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

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League.

C. 811. M. 401. 1931. VII.

Geneva, November 7th 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER  
ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Letter from the Japanese Representative to the  
President of the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to communicate to the Council a copy of the reply of the Japanese representative to the letter from the President of the Council dated November 5th.

Translation

Paris, November 6th, 1931.

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's letter dated November 5th<sup>(1)</sup> in which you asked me for necessary information concerning the alleged seizure by the Japanese military authorities of part of the salt revenue of Newchang.

As soon as I received Dr. Sze's note and memorandum dated November 5th<sup>(2)</sup> I telegraphed to my Government asking it for information on the passage in that memorandum which charges the Japanese troops with forcibly seizing the salt revenue of Newchang to the amount of 760,000 dollars. I received the reply of the Japanese Government this morning, and am sending you herewith a copy. This reply shows, and I venture to call your attention to the fact, that any allegation to that effect directed against the Japanese military authorities is without any foundation whatsoever. If I receive further information on this subject I shall not fail to communicate it to you without delay.

(Signed) K. Yoshizawa.

(1) Document C.810.M.400.1931.VII.

(2) Document C.789.M.383.1931.VII.



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ANTEX.

Telegram received on November 6th from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the alleged seizure by the Japanese military authorities of the salt revenue of Newchwang.

Translation.

As regards the salt revenue of Newchwang the total annual revenue is about 30 million dollars. There remains annually a net balance of over 20 million dollars, after deducting the expenditure and sums assigned for the service of the foreign loans secured by the tax. This balance had previously been placed at the disposal of General Chang-Shue-liang who used it for his military expenditure, etc.

On October 22nd last the Chinese Committee for the Maintenance of Order at Mukden (see communication from the Japanese delegation dated October 14th, Doc. C.715.M.320. 1931. VII. page 3) asked the Newchwang Salt Revenue Office to hand over the balance of the tax receipts. The latter Office agreed to send the said balance which is at present in its possession together with the net balance of the tax to be collected. Thus, the allegation that the Japanese military authorities have forcibly seized the revenue from the salt tax is entirely unfounded. The Japanese military authorities have entirely refrained from interfering in purely Chinese affairs, assuming that there was no reason to object to the Mukden Chinese Committee for the Maintenance of Order, which discharges these duties / in the



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place of General Chang-Shue-Liang, receiving the balance in question from the Newchwang Salt Revenue Office, which is also a Chinese organ.

It should be noted that, although it handed over the balance in question to the above-mentioned Committee, the Newchwang Salt Revenue Office continued and continues to send regularly to the Nankin Government the necessary amounts for the service of foreign loans. Furthermore, as is well known, the Salt Revenue Administration, in contrast to that of the Maritime Customs, has become an exclusively Chinese service since the National Government at the end of 1928 reformed this administration without paying any heed to the protests of the interested Powers.



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C.812.M.402.1931.VII. ✓

Geneva,

November 7th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11  
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Chinese Representative on the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to  
communicate to the Council the following Note from  
the Chinese Representative.

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Sir,

The following information just received clearly reveals the fact that the Japanese military concentration at the Nonni River bridgehead is in pursuance of the deliberate policy of the Japanese Army Command of driving out the representatives of the lawful Chinese Government throughout Manchuria and substituting the rule of persons and groups maintained by the Japanese themselves.

On November 6th Major Shideyoshi Hayashi, representing the Japanese Army Command in the Kwantung Peninsula, informed General Ma, the Chairman of the Heilungkiang Provincial Government, that, the Japanese troops will cease hostilities only if General Ma surrenders his post to Chang Hai Peng, who will set up a committee for the maintenance of order.

This is a further step in the progress so clearly depicted in the information circulated to the Members of the Council during the last few days, and which I venture to recapitulate:

- (1) The Memorandum of November 3 (C.789.p.5) states:

"The Chairman of the provincial government of Heilunjiang, the northernmost of the Manchurian provinces, was visited by a representative of General Honjo, with the demand that he repair the bridge over the Nonni River within a week, failing which, it would be repaired by the Japanese with the help of troops. This move was undertaken in order to facilitate the crossing of the river by the Japanese protégé, Chang Hai Peng, who is preparing to attack Heilunjiang. Later, two Japanese representing General Honjo, called upon the Chairman of the Heilunjiang provincial government, and told him that Japan could not recognise his authority because he had been appointed by the Chinese Government, and ordered him to hand over his office to Chang Hai Peng, on pain of being turned out by force."



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- (2) The Note of November 5 (C.792, pp.1-2) states:

"For some time the Japanese military authorities have been supporting Chang Hai Peng against the lawful government of the Province of Heilungkiang. In pursuance of this policy the Japanese recently demanded that the bridge over the Nonni River on the northernmost section of the Taonan-Angangchi line should be repaired. The Chinese Provincial Government then came to an agreement with the Japanese Consul in Tsitsihar as to the immediate repair by the Chinese authorities of this bridge. But Major Hayashi, representing the Japanese Army Command in the Kwengung Peninsula, called on the Provincial Government on November 1st, and informed it that whether or not it was capable of repairing the bridge the South Manchurian Railway had decided to send men on November 4th to repair it under the protection of Japanese troops. He added that Japan was determined to change the political situation in Heilungkiang by force and regardless of the resolution of the Council of the League of Nations. The Japanese Consul replied to the expostulations of the Chinese authorities that he could not check these activities.

Japanese troops have accordingly been dispatched to the Nonni River bridge, with the ostensible object of assuring the reparation of the bridge, but actually in order to act as a screen for Chang Hai Peng's irregulars and to facilitate their advance into Heilungkiang. This has created a dangerous situation about the Nonni River bridgehead with the prospect of clashes between the troops of General Ma, representing the authority of the Provincial Government of Heilungkiang, and the irregular forces put into the field by the Japanese. Any such development would lead to an advance by Japanese troops Tsitsihar and the cutting of the Chinese Eastern Railway".

- (3) The note of November 5th (C.799) pointed out that armed clashes between the Japanese troops and their irregular allies on the one hand and the forces of General Ma on the other had actually begun and added:

"In the last few days six Japanese troop trains have arrived at the bridgehead, with the obvious purpose of affording support to the advance of Chang Hai Peng and his irregulars into Heilungkiang, with the object of stirring up trouble in this province."

This summary of events makes it clear that the ostensible object of repairing the bridge is merely a pretext, for not only is it unusual to repair bridges with the aid of artillery, infantry and bombing planes, but the Japanese military authorities actually overrode an agreement between the Chinese provincial government and the Japanese consul in Tsitsihar and insisted upon repairing the bridge by these extraordinary and provocative means after General Ma had undertaken to do so himself. This concrete example casts a vivid



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light on the proceedings of the Japanese military in Manchuria and show how on the pretext of maintaining law and order they are everywhere destroying the authority of the lawful Chinese Government and under the guise of "committees for the maintenance of peace and order" or other aliases are setting up and maintaining, at Mukden, Kirin and other points under Japanese occupation, the arbitrary rule of persons and groups who are the puppets and creatures of the Japanese Army Command.

This policy is creating and fomenting disorder in Manchuria. It is also a violation of Article X of the Covenant and Article 1 of the Washington Nine Power Treaty. It is a flat denial of the Council's injunctions and dishonours Japan's repeated and solemn promises before the Council to do nothing that would aggravate or extend the conflict.

(Signed) Sao-Ke Alfred Sze.



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LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the Council  
 and the Members of the League.

C.813.M.003.1931.VII.  
 Geneva, November 8th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Telegram from the Japanese Bureau  
in Paris.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following telegram, which he has just received from the Japanese Bureau in Paris.

Text of telegram.

Please communicate to Members of Council following telegram received today from Tokyo. According to report received by Ministry of War, Japanese troops after occupying Tachsing at midday on 6th instant have ceased to advance northwards. Reinforcements which had not yet rejoined them have also stopped their northward march. Advance of Japanese troops towards Nonni river is due solely to necessity of protecting/repairing bridge, which will last about a fortnight. Government is firmly resolved, as it has already stated, to recall these troops as soon as the work is terminated.

SAWADA.



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POLITICAL SECTION

C. 814 M. 404 1931.VII.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Geneva, November 8th, 1931

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT

Reply of the Japanese Government to the letter of October  
29th, 1931, from the President of the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following telegraphic communication which he has just received from the Representative of Japan on the Council.

To the Secretary-General.-

Pursuant to instructions from Tokio have to-day handed M. Briand, President of Council, following note in reply to his letter dated October 29th, please communicate it Members Council.

YOSHIKAWA.

Text of Note.

1. "I have honour acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's Note October 29th, in which you were so good as to make certain observations on Declaration of Japanese Government of October 26th in connection with Manchurian incident. Having referred to Tokyo your communication under acknowledgment, I am now charged to assure You that my Government have submitted it to their most serious consideration and that they highly appreciate Your sympathetic concern in present situation in interest of international peace and good understanding.
2. I am further instructed express entire concurrence of my Government in Your Excellency's remark that Resolution adopted by Council of League Nations on September 30th remains in full force and effect. Japanese Government are determined to carry it out in letter and in spirit and they reaffirm their earnest desire to proceed to withdrawal of Japanese troops to railway zone with minimum of delay.
3. But Resolution of September 30th consecrates principle that effective security must at same time be assured for lives and property of Japanese subjects and in state of tension which at present unfortunately exists it is not possible to hope that withdrawal of Japanese forces would immediately give place to régime of settled peace and order under Chinese auspices. Japan and China would simply be exposed to speedy recurrence of untoward incidents. There can be no security for foreign residents where hostile agitation against them is allowed to proceed, where efficient protection to them in their peaceful pursuits is denied by local authorities or where their treaty rights are systematically ignored. Having regard to actual conditions in Manchuria, Japanese Government have regretfully been brought to conclusion that dangers involved in precipitate recall of Japanese troops could not be averted by measures of supervision such as are recommended in opposed Resolution of October 24th referred to in Your Excellency's Note under review.
4. It is pointed out in Your Note that first four points of five fundamental principles mentioned in Japanese Declaration of October 26th are virtually embodied in proposition of October 24th.



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Your Excellency however will no doubt perceive that terms of proposition are not sufficiently explicit or comprehensive to cover all implications of four points in question. As regards final point, viz, guarantee of respect for Japanese treaty rights in Manchuria, terms of letter addressed to you on October 14th by Chinese representative seem to give rise to doubt whether it is in contemplation of Chinese Government to call in question validity of some of treaties constituting basic embodiment of relations between Japan and China. It may be needless state that Japanese Government could not for a moment entertain such contention. Nothing can be more destructive of established order of whole world than to permit any power to challenge binding force of treaties concluded with all solemnity of international usages. Japanese Government trust that they have made it clear that five fundamental principles mentioned in Japanese Declaration of October 26th are no more than those that are commonly observed in intercourse of ordered communities with one another. Unless and until arrangement is reached between Japan and China on bases of those principles no measure of security for lives and property of Japanese subjects sufficient to enable withdrawal of Japanese troops to railway zone can possibly be assured. Japanese Government believe that course of procedure now indicated is in entire agreement with Resolution of Council of September 30th. It is far from their thoughts to insist on final adjustment of whole series of pending questions between Japan and China as condition precedent to withdrawal of troops. All that they urge upon China for present is frank recognition by direct negotiations between two parties of fundamental principles that should govern normal relations between any two nations. Such accord will be long step towards replacing present tension by sense of stability between peoples of two countries whose interest is to be on basis of "terms."

YOSHIKAWA.



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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the  
Council and Members  
of the League.

C.816. M.405.1931.VII.

Geneva,  
 November 9th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11  
OF THE COVENANT.

Reply from the Japanese Government to the Telegram of the  
President of the Council dated November 6th.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to communicate to the Council the following telegraphic communication from the Japanese representative on the Council.

(Telegram despatched from Paris, November 8th, 1931, at 9.20 p.m.)

Translation.

Acting on instructions from my Government I transmit to you reply to the telegram from His Excellency M. Briand:

(1) The Japanese Government has honour to acknowledge receipt of your telegram, which reached Tokio November 7th.

(2) Troops of Heilungkiang stationed north of Nonni river, violating agreements which had been made, opened fire on Japanese troops sent for protection repairs to Nonni railway bridge: this was reason of engagements which took place between Japanese and Chinese troops.



(3) The Taonan-Angangchi railway was constructed by South Manchurian Railway Company under contract and handed over to the Chinese authorities in 1927. Since then latter have always refused to pay costs of construction though repeated applications have been made to them for the purpose. They have also refused to convert their debt into a loan. Thus this railway though in the hands of the Chinese authorities may practically be considered as property belonging to the South Manchurian Railway. This railway is one of the lines feeding the South Manchurian.

(4) When about mid October army of Heilungkiang had destroyed Nonni bridge, the Taonan-Angangchi railway administration obtained permission from the authorities of Heilungkiang to send employees to repair bridge. Latter were attacked by Heilungkiang troops and could not carry out their task. Nevertheless, any delay in restoring the bridge at this period of the year when traffic in agricultural produce is heaviest, causes serious loss to the South Manchurian Railway.

(5) Japanese Consul at Tsitsikar has on several occasions, with a view to protecting interests of South Manchurian Railway, called upon authorities of Heilungkiang to repair the bridge, but latter have systematically adopted dilatory attitude and always been unwilling to give him a definite reply.

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-2-

However, date when Nonni River begins to freeze was approaching and there was reason to fear that it would soon be impossible to undertake work. The Taonan-Angangchi railway administration therefore decided to ask assistance from Southern Manchurian Railway to begin work as from November 4th and at the same time asked for protection of Japanese troops.

6) Japanese command having considered that for the purpose of preventing any engagement between Chinese armies in presence on both banks of the river, it was necessary that they should withdraw 10 kilometres, sent on November 2nd through Japanese Consul at Tsitsihar and through staff of the Kwantung troops to the authorities of Heilungkiang, request that their troops should be withdrawn to that distance from the north bank of the Nonni River. Authorities of Heilungkiang agreed to do so. However, orders given by them were not carried out by their troops and on November 4th the latter had not only not withdrawn from the banks of the Nonni but they opened heavy fire on our troops who were approaching the bridge. We lost 15 men. Our troops withdrew for a moment but having obtained reinforcements began on November 6th at noon, to repel troops of Heilungkiang north of Tahsing railway.

7) The sole object of movement of Japanese troops in Nonni area is thus protection of the employees of the Taonan-Angangchi railway administration engaged in repairing the bridge. They were compelled by treacherous attack directed against them by Chinese troops to drive the latter back.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Our central military authorities had already on November 6th given orders to limit operations to what is strictly necessary. Moreover, detachments which had been sent as reinforcements are now stopped at Supingkai and Chenchiatung.

8) Japanese troops are endeavouring, as indicated above, to prevent any encounter with Chinese troops and Japanese Government considers there is no reason to fear aggravation of the situation if the Chinese do not resort to new acts of hostility.

(Signed) YOSHIZAWA.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

Communicated to the Council  
and the Members of the League.

C.817.M.406.1931.VII.  
Geneva, November 9th, 1931.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Reply of the Chinese Government to the telegram dated November 8th, 1931, from the President of the Council. \*)

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following telegraphic communication which he has just received from the Representative of China on the Council.

"Nanking, November 8th, 1931 (4 p.m.)

"Kindly forward following telegram to His Excellency Briand President of Council League Nations:

"Shinese Government has received telegraphic communication from Your Excellency and has honour to reply as follows:

In dealing with invasion and occupation various places in Manchuria by Japan Chinese Government has consistently relied on efforts of League Nations in hope world peace will be maintained by pacific settlement present question. It has therefore faithfully fulfilled obligations set forth in Council's resolutions especially obligation not to resort any aggressive policy or action so as to aggravate existing situation, thereby contributing to success of efforts members of Council.

However Japan has not only failed even indicate her intention abide by recommendations of Council but has continuously extended scope of her military aggressions. Since September thirtieth Japan had in disregard of resolution of Council progressively continued her unlawful actions culminating in bombardment Chinchow October eighth. Since October twentyfourth Japan has in defiance pronounced wish of Council committed more acts of war which have considerably aggravated situation. Chinese representative has communicated to Council reports of unfortunate events of last two weeks including seizure Newchang of large amounts salt revenue of Chinese Government.

November second large detachments of Japanese troops advanced to Nonni River bridge which is only ninety kilometres from capital Heilungkiang. Using bandits and rebels as their tools Japanese troops later crossed river and attacked Chinese troops. The latter who were stationed more than ten kilometres away from bridge have been compelled adopt necessary defensive measures in order repulse attack deliberately started by Japanese troops. Situation in Heilungkiang is most grave and Japan's intention occupy Tsitsihar by force thus consummating overthrow of established legal authority and creating subservient administration in North Manchuria has now been brought full light. Chinese Government earnestly hopes that Governments of the various Powers will immediately send representatives to observe real situation on spot and to secure evidence of flagrant violations Council's resolutions by Japan.

Chinese Government always believes League Nations is supreme institution world for maintenance peace. It is therefore confident that most effective means permitted by Covenant of League will be used by Members of Council to stop Japan's aggressive actions and to cause her carry out recommendations of Council and that particularly labours Your Excellency as President Council will be most fruitful so that peace and justice as result of these efforts on part League will finally prevail. (Signed:) Chiangun Frank W. Lee, Acting Minister Foreign Affairs.

(signed:) WAICHIAO FU

\*) Document C.804.M.397.1931.VII.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the  
 Council and Members  
 of the League.

C.818.M.407.1931.VII.

Geneva, November 9th, 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11  
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Chinese Representative on  
the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Chinese Representative, the  
 Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the  
 following letter dated November 9th.

To the Secretary-General.

Sir,

I beg you to be good enough to circulate to the President  
 and the Members of the Council the following report from Doctor  
 Frederick A. Cleveland, Associate Chief Inspector of Salt Revenue:

"We have received from our representatives at Changchun  
 a telegram dated November sixth "Today all the funds of  
 the Bank of China and of the Bank of Communications,  
 Changchun, amounting to two million six hundred thousand  
 dollars, were forcibly removed to the Bank of the Three  
 Eastern Provinces, Changchun, by a transportation officer  
 authorised by the Japanese military authorities. We  
 protested in vain. The transportation officer formally  
 notified us today that he cannot recognise the salt  
 inspectorate". Therefore not only is Japanese denial  
 of not having seized the salt revenue of Newchwang  
 incorrect but the Japanese military authorities continue  
 to seize the salt revenues elsewhere through agents  
 created, directed and completely controlled by the  
 Japanese military authorities themselves."

Seizures of salt revenues up to last Saturday, the 7th  
 instant, have been as follows: (1) At Newchwang dollars six hundred  
 seventy two thousand, (2) At Changchun dollars two million six  
 hundred thousand. In both cases the demands made, and the receipts  
 issued for the funds seized were by a Japanese officer and supported  
 by the Japanese military. And, since September 18th, the Japanese  
 military authorities have forbidden any remittances to be made to  
 the National Government.



LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the  
Council and Members  
of the League.

C.818.M.407.1931.VII.

Geneva, November 9th, 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11  
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Chinese Representative on  
the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the request of the Chinese Representative, the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following letter dated November 9th.

To the Secretary-General.

Sir,

I beg you to be good enough to circulate to the President and the Members of the Council the following report from Doctor Frederick A. Cleveland, Associate Chief Inspector of Salt Revenue:

"We have received from our representatives at Changchun a telegram dated November sixth "Today all the funds of the Bank of China and of the Bank of Communications, Changchun, amounting to two million six hundred thousand dollars, were forcibly removed to the Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces, Changchun, by a transportation officer authorised by the Japanese military authorities. We protested in vain. The transportation officer formally notified us today that he cannot recognise the salt inspectorate". Therefore not only is Japanese denial of not having seized the salt revenue of Newchwang incorrect but the Japanese military authorities continue to seize the salt revenues elsewhere through agents created, directed and completely controlled by the Japanese military authorities themselves."

Seizures of salt revenues up to last Saturday, the 7th instant, have been as follows: (1) At Newchwang dollars six hundred seventy two thousand, (2) At Changchun dollars two million six hundred thousand. In both cases the demands made, and the receipts issued for the funds seized were by a Japanese officer and supported by the Japanese military. And, since September 18th, the Japanese military authorities have forbidden any remittances to be made to the National Government.



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

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In the light of the facts given in this report and of the details, including names, dates and places, contained in Dr. Cleveland's first report (C.793 November 4th) as to the seizure by force of the salt revenue by the Japanese military and their agents, it is clear that the Japanese denial of responsibility for these illegal seizures is untrue. There is now abundant proof contained in the information submitted by the Chinese Government to the Members of the Council, to the United States and to world public opinion, for the statement that the Japanese military authorities are pursuing a deliberate policy of steadily extending the areas of occupation, of subverting the authority of the Chinese Government, of substituting persons and groups set up by and subservient to themselves, and of forcibly diverting the revenue of the Chinese Government, including those which are the guarantee for international loans, to these purposes and to their own use.

It is scarcely necessary to point out that such proceedings are entirely unconnected with the question of the safety of Japanese subjects and property in Manchuria, and are not compatible with Japan's obligations, as a Member of the League and signatory of the Paris Pact, nor with the undertakings the Japanese Government has itself made to the Council of the League, nor with the Washington Nine Power Treaty, to which Japan is a party.

The situation is now perfectly clear, and the Chinese Government confidently looks to the Members of the League of Nations, the United States of America and the public opinion of the civilised world to uphold the sanctity of the Covenant, the Pact of Paris, and the Nine Power Treaty by whatever means the situation demands.

(Signed) SAO-KE ALFRED SZE.



LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the  
Council and Members  
of the League.

C.826.M.408.1931.VII.

Geneva, November 10th, 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11  
OF THE COVENANT.

Telegram from the Bureau of the Japanese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.  
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The Secretary-General has the honour to communicate to the Council the following telegram dated Paris, November 10th, 12.15 a.m., just received from the Japanese Delegation.

"The present situation of Japanese and Chinese forces in the neighbourhood of Nonni bridge and Angangchi is:

"1) Japanese forces between Chianchao and Tahsing do not exceed 1,000 men. Reinforcements have been held up en route and returned to their garrisons.

"2) Chinese forces between Angangchi and Tsitsihar, 12,000 with 31 guns. Reinforcements are being urgently brought up. The 26th and 28th Infantry Corps with 4 guns are moving on Angangchi. Troops have been sent from garrison at Kirin, including one cavalry regiment which is already on the spot. One cavalry regiment is on the road from Zakho north of Tsitsihar. 2,000 railway guards in Angangchi district are concentrated in the neighbourhood of the latter. One cavalry regiment has left Manchuli. There are 4,000 men to the west of Angangchi between Fularchi and Chinghsinchen. There are accordingly over 20,000 men round about Angangchi.

"The few Japanese troops, whose sole object is to protect the works on the Nonni bridge, are confronted with forces more than ten times superior to themselves, and the latter are being reinforced continually. If Chinese troops, tempted by the disproportion in the effectives, venture on acts of war, a dangerous situation may arise. The Japanese Government draws attention earnestly to present position.

SAWADA.



Communicated to the  
Council and the  
Members of the League.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

C.827.M.409.1931.VII.

Geneva, November 10th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11  
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Chinese Representative  
on the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following letter, dated November 10th, which he has received from the Chinese Representative.

To the Secretary-General.

Sir,

The following information, just received from my Government, reveals the bloodshed and disorder at Tientsin as but a further step in the policy of the Japanese authorities of suborning the dregs of the population in order to foment revolt against the Chinese Government:

On the 7th and 8th of November the Chinese authorities received information indicating that the Japanese had decided to utilise elements among the Chinese population hostile to the Government, so as to disturb peace and order in Tientsin and Peiping before November 16th. On the morning of November 8th it was reported that the Japanese distributed more than 500 small arms to anti-Government Chinese. On the night of November 8th, at half past ten, more than two thousand men, in separate groups and flaunting Japanese flags, issued from the Japanese Concession and made surprise attacks on the police stations in Sanpeikwan and Heikwanse which are contiguous to the Japanese Concession in Tientsin and also that in Nankai which is contiguous to the Japanese Barracks. They had planned to proceed to the Provincial Government and the Municipality as well as to the Public Safety Bureau. Fortunately effective defence measures had been taken by our police so that order was quickly restored. At four o'clock on the morning of the 9th, when the irregular forces from the Japanese Concession had been mastered by the Chinese police, the Japanese Commander at Tientsin requested General Wang, Chairman of the Hopei Provincial Government, by telephone, to withdraw Chinese military and police forces to a distance of three hundred metres from the Japanese Concession by six a.m. General Wang asked the reason for this request and pointed out that there was no military force but only Chinese police and members of the Public Safety Bureau; as they were at that very moment doing their duty by putting an end to the disturbance precisely within the three hundred metre zone it was difficult to order their withdrawal.

The Japanese authorities at 5.30 again pressed their demand upon the Provincial Government. This time, as the irregulars had either returned to the Japanese Concession or been killed or captured, General Wang ordered the withdrawal to take place as requested before 6.0 a.m. Nevertheless, at 6.30 a.m., the Chinese City was suddenly bombarded by more than 30 shells, coming from the direction of Heikwanse, the Japanese Barracks and the Garden of the Japanese Concession. The Japanese Commander excused himself when asked by the Chinese authorities for an explanation by saying that he knew nothing about the incident. But to the representatives of other nations he is said to have explained that it was due to a clash between the 29th Brigade of the Kirin Army and the police force and members of the Public Safety Bureau at Tientsin. It is a sufficient commentary on this explanation to point out that there is no Kirin Army at Tientsin, nor, for that matter, any 29th Brigade in the Kirin Army.

(Sgd) Sao-Ke Alfred Sze.



LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the  
Council and Members  
of the League.

C. 829.M.410.1931.VII.

Geneva, November 10th, 1931.

APPEAL BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Communication by the Japanese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to communicate to the Council the following telegram dated Paris, November 10th, 1.30 p.m. which he has just received from the Japanese Delegation.

"Communication latest information concerning concentration Chinese troops Tsitsikar region:

1) Heilungkiang army sent approximately two thousand men reinforcements infantry, artillery and engineers direction Chiang Chao from November 3rd to 5th.

2) November 6th, two trains soldiers arrived Angangchi from Manchuli.

3) November 6th afternoon, reinforcement from Hetho region sent in Nonni direction by motor lorry.

4) November 6th, one thousand three hundred men, four guns, sent from Harbin to Angangchi.

5) November 7th, 8 a.m., troops stationed on eastern part of East Chinese about one thousand men left for Angangchi by train, fifty waggons some of them armoured.

6) November 7th, morning, two detachments East Chinese Southern sent to guard lines west of Harbin.

7) Ma Chan Shan has decided, in agreement with General Officer Commanding railway guards to concentrate the latter's troops at Tsitsikar, movements begun November 6th.

SAWADA.



LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the  
Council and Members  
of the League of Nations.

C.831.M.412.1931.VII.

Geneva, November 11th, 1931.

APPEAL BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11  
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to communicate to the Council the following telegram dated Paris, November 10th, at 8.5 p.m., which he has just received from the Japanese Delegation.

I have honour to communicate to you summary of telegrams received by Japanese Delegation regarding incidents which took place at Tientsin the day before yesterday and today:

November 8th at about 10 a.m. our Consul General at Tientsin was informed that disturbances had taken place in Chinese town. A riot was said to have broken out at the instigation of reactionary elements and fights were taking place between Chinese police forces and the rioters. Our General Consulate immediately had measures of security taken by Japanese police.

At 11.30 our troops were stationed along the line of demarcation between Japanese concession and Chinese town. Nevertheless a fusillade having been heard in the southern part of the town in the direction of the Japanese barracks, a rumour had spread that military action was being taken by the Japanese troops. In order to check the spread of this false report Japanese authorities immediately informed General Wang Chu Chang, in command of the second army corps at Tientsin, through the French Consul that the rumour was absolutely false and that there had even been casualties among the Japanese. They also made a verbal protest to the Chinese police forces against the assertion that the Japanese were responsible for the events.

Fighting was taking place on the borders of our concession and at about midnight a Japanese sentry was killed by shots from Chinese police. The proximity of Japanese and Chinese forces, which at one time were only fifty metres apart, being liable to give rise to unfortunate incidents, especially during the night, staff of Japanese garrison asked General Wang to withdraw his forces to a distance of 300 metres from the concession before 6 a.m.

At 2 a.m. commander of Japanese troops held a meeting of the chiefs of the French, British, Italian and American garrisons and gave them full information as to measures he had taken, inviting them to visit line of protection. Commanders of foreign garrisons declared themselves satisfied with information given and returned to their headquarters at about 4 a.m. without carrying out the proposed inspection.

At about 4.30 a.m. again a Japanese M.C.O. was hit by Chinese projectiles and Japanese command repeated its request to General Wang. The Japanese command having also convinced the provincial authorities of the necessity of separating the Japanese and Chinese forces, withdrawal of the latter was decided for 7 a.m. The rioters had been dispersed by Chinese forces, but a few skirmishes were still taking place on the banks of the Peiho.

At 7 a.m. the Chinese troops had not yet moved off and were even firing at Japanese forces, who were replying from within the concession. Nevertheless, as a result of further urgent representations of the Japanese authorities with a view to avoiding conflict, Chinese soldiers finally moved off at about 8 a.m. After 9 a.m. noise of fusillades was dying down. As a measure of prudence our General Consulate ordered that Japanese residents still outside the concession should be brought within the latter.

SAWADA.



LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the  
Council and the  
Members of the League.

C.833.M.413.1931.VII.

Geneva,

November 11th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER

ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Chinese Representative on the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following letter, dated November 11th, which he has received from the Chinese Representative.

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Communication from the Chinese Representative on the  
Council concerning the situation about the Nonni River bridgehead.

November 11th, 1931.

Sir,

The following information just received from the Chinese Government shows that the Japanese military authorities have not abandoned their ambition to overthrow the Provincial Government of Heilungkiang and replace it by creatures of their own, as they have already done in Mukden and Kirin, and that the situation about the Nonni River bridgehead remains grave.

General Honjo, the Japanese Kwantung Army Commander, notified General Ma, the Chairman of the Heilungkiang Provincial Government, on November 8th that he should state what were his intentions before midnight, if he wanted to prevent Japanese troops from entering Tsitsihar.

At noon of November 8th Major Shideyoshi Hayashi, representing General Honjo, notified the Heilungkiang Provincial Government that the only way to maintain order and to avoid further fighting was for General Ma to surrender his post to Chang Hai-Peng "by peaceful means".

The Chinese Government is informed that there were at Talai, within easy reach of the Nonni River bridgehead, during the last week-end, more than four thousand Japanese troops and two companies of cavalry with two hundred and forty car-loads of military supplies, thirteen car-loads of field hospitals, half a dozen aeroplanes, more than forty field guns, two heavy guns, two armoured cars and one military wireless apparatus. There are also said to be ten car-loads of bridge-building materials.

(Signed) Sao-Ke Alfred Sze.



LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the  
Council and the Members  
of the League.

C.334.M.414.1931.VII.  
Geneva, November 11th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11  
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Chinese Representative  
on the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following letter, dated November 11th, which he has received from the Chinese Representative.

Communication from the Chinese Representative concerning disorders  
in Tientsin.

November 11th, 1931.

To the Secretary-General.

Sir,

I have received the following further evidence in support of the statement contained in my note of yesterday (C327 of Nov. 10th) that the disorders in Tientsin were instigated by the Japanese military authorities:

On November 7th and 8th the Hopei Provincial Government was informed that the Japanese Military Headquarters in Tientsin had been giving arms and ammunition to notorious characters, such as Lilienhsiang and Changpi, with instructions to organise a force of plain-clothes irregulars and plan an attack on the headquarters of the Provincial Government, the Municipal Offices, and the Bureau of Public Safety, on November 8th. The Consuls in Tientsin were accordingly informed of these reports and precautionary measures were taken. The result was that when the irregulars erupted from the Japanese Concession on the evening of November 8th, as described in my previous note, they were repulsed, but only after fierce fighting, in which they made a counter-attack and for a time held the 6th Chinese police station in the 1st police district and the 6th Chinese police station in the 2nd police district. A dozen prisoners were made who corroborated the report that the attack had been instigated by the Japanese. The arms taken from these prisoners were of Japanese make. On examining shells fired from the Japanese Concession to the Chinese city it has been found bearing following words "made 15th year Taisho".

On the morning of November 10th a motor car coming from the Japanese Concession to the Chinese city was searched by the Chinese police and found therein 15 rifles and 20,000 rounds of ammunition, all made by the Mukden Arsenal, which was seized by the Japanese troops on the night of September 18th and occupied by them since that date. In the same motor car there were also hand-grenades bearing the following words "15th year Taisho".

(Signed) Sao-Ke Alfred SZE.



1304  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

AMERICAN CONSULATE  
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

NOV 13 1931

POLITICAL SECTION

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the  
Council and Members of  
the League of Nations.

C.835.M.415.1931.711

GENEVA, November 11th, 1931.

APPEAL BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11  
OF THE COVENANT.

COMMUNICATION BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL TO  
THE CHINESE AND JAPANESE GOVERNMENTS.

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Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to communicate  
to the Council copy of the following telegram which he has to-day  
sent to the Chinese and Japanese Governments:

PRESIDENT OF COUNCIL REQUESTS ME TO TRANSMIT  
TO YOUR EXCELLENCY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM: "REQUEST YOU TO THANK  
CHINESE AND JAPANESE GOVERNMENTS FOR REPLIES THEY HAVE MADE TO  
TELEGRAM I SENT THEM THROUGH YOU ON NOVEMBER SIXTH. AFTER  
CAREFULLY STUDYING THESE REPLIES AND THE LATEST COMMUNICATIONS  
RECEIVED I FEEL I MUST TO INSIST ONCE MORE ON UNDERTAKING  
ENTERED INTO BY BOTH GOVERNMENTS TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO AVOID  
ANY AGGRAVATION OF SITUATION. I ALSO URGE THAT COMMANDERS OF  
OPPOSING FORCES SHOULD RECEIVE STRICTEST ORDERS TO REFRAIN FROM  
INITIATING ANY FRESH ACTION. LASTLY I CONSIDER IT EXTREMELY  
IMPORTANT THAT FACILITIES SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE OBSERVERS  
WHOM THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL MAY SEND TO THE SCENE,  
PARTICULARLY NEIGHBOURHOOD OF NOMNI BRIDGE AND ANGANGCHI, TO  
COLLECT INFORMATION REFERRED TO IN RESOLUTION OF SEPTEMBER  
THIRTIETH: ARISTIDE BRIAND PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL"

DRUMMOND SECRETARY-GENERAL.



1305

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

AMERICAN CONSULATE  
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

NOV 13 1931

POLITICAL SECTION

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the  
Council and Members  
of the League.

C.838.M.413.1931.VII.

Geneva,

November 11th, 1931.

APPEAL BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER

ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Communication by the Japanese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the Japanese Delegation's request the  
Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to  
the Council the following communication dated  
November 10th.

Communication by the Japanese Delegation concerning the  
activities of bandits in Manchuria.

Banditism has from the earliest times been the scourge  
of Manchuria. As a consequence of the economic development of  
this province and the immigration of Chinese from Shantung the  
number of bandits has considerably increased. Their activities  
have developed particularly in the districts under Chinese control,  
the Japanese and Russian railway guards having always been able to  
repulse their attacks with success. During the various hostilities  
of the last few years (revolt of Kuo Sung-ling, December 1925,  
war between the North and South, 1927-1928, Chinese-Russian con-  
flict 1929) bandits were often incorporated in the Chinese armies.  
When they did not receive their pay or were discharged these ban-  
dits resumed their illegal activities, and again formed gangs,  
which devastated the country.

The number of bandits was estimated at about 50,000 in  
1930, of whom about 17,000 were in the province of Mukden. Before  
the war they formed veritable little armies, sometimes possessing  
machine guns or small pieces of artillery. Since the war these



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AMERICAN CONSULATE  
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

NOV 13 1931

POLITICAL SECTION

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the  
Council and Members  
of the League.

C.33.M.413.1931.VII.

Geneva,

November 11th, 1931.

APPEAL BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER

ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Communication by the Japanese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

At the Japanese Delegation's request the  
Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to  
the Council the following communication dated  
November 10th.

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Communication by the Japanese Delegation concerning the  
activities of bandits in Manchuria.  
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Banditism has from the earliest times been the scourge  
of Manchuria. As a consequence of the economic development of  
this province and the immigration of Chinese from Shantung the  
number of bandits has considerably increased. Their activities  
have developed particularly in the districts under Chinese control,  
the Japanese and Russian railway guards having always been able to  
repulse their attacks with success. During the various hostilities  
of the last few years (revolt of Kuo Sung-ling, December 1925,  
war between the North and South, 1927-1928, Chinese-Russian con-  
flict 1929) bandits were often incorporated in the Chinese armies.  
When they did not receive their pay or were discharged these ban-  
dits resumed their illegal activities, and again formed gangs,  
which devastated the country.

The number of bandits was estimated at about 50,000 in  
1930, of whom about 17,000 were in the province of Mukden. Before  
the war they formed veritable little armies, sometimes possessing  
machine guns or small pieces of artillery. Since the war these



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bands have been smaller, but their attacks have been increasing every year. In 1929 there were 363 attacks against the South Manchurian Railway alone.

Since the events of September there has been a recrudescence in the activities of the bandits, and their bands often number as many as 600 men. Moreover, gangs of deserting soldiers also ravage the country, burning, plundering, carrying off hostages or massacring not only foreign residents, but also the Chinese inhabitants.

The bandits and deserters have even attacked towns and villages, which they have laid regularly under contribution, as well as engineering works and railway tracks.

The Chinese troops and police are endeavouring to meet the danger constituted by these gangs of bandits and fugitive soldiers; in the last month and a half they have had to organise 49 expeditions and have had two men killed and many wounded. On their side, the Japanese troops have had to safeguard the railway lines and the lives and properties of the Japanese and Koreans living along the railway outside the railway zone. To undertake the task of also protecting the Japanese nationals residing in the interior would have necessitated the use of forces infinitely larger than the number of troops at present stationed in Manchuria (14,400). It has therefore been necessary to bring back within the safety zones the Japanese and Koreans living along the railway lines. Nevertheless, many Koreans for whom this withdrawal would have meant the loss of a whole year's labour have often been unable to resign themselves to abandoning their crops, despite the exhortations of the civil and military authorities.

To perform their mission of protection, troops have been posted at a few places outside and at some distance from the railway zone (Kirin, Chenchiatung and Chuliuho). From these centres



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of protection and from the zone itself, detachments are sent as circumstances require to drive back the gangs of bandits or deserters. The great extent of the zone to be watched and protected made it necessary, in view of the limited number of troops at the disposal of the Japanese, to send armoured railway wagons and aeroplanes. It was during the flights undertaken by the Japanese air force that occurred the so-called "bombardments" which have been taken hold of by Chinese propaganda to impress world opinion.

The Chinese authorities have made use of the bandits to attack the Japanese railways and even our troops. The Chinese command at Chinchow has organised bands without uniform who carry on active guerilla warfare, and several Japanese officers and soldiers have been killed by them, notably at Mukden, Ssuningkai, Yingkow, etc.

The damage suffered by Japanese nationals has been considerable. According to the information obtained by the Japanese authorities there have been from the middle of September to October 27th, 577 attacks of bandits or soldiers, whose number appears to be about 85,000. 3 Japanese, 165 Koreans and 1 foreigner have been killed. 3 Japanese and 25 Koreans have been carried off as hostages. There have been 3 cases of arson of houses belonging to Japanese, 3 cases of complete pillage, 28 cases of damage of houses belonging to Koreans and 56 cases of pillage. One farm was attacked; there have been 2 cases of attack and occupation of towns and villages, one of which was completely burned down. A passenger trains was derailed, 5 boats attacked and telephone and telegraph wires cut on six occasions. The following have been evacuated: Japanese 1157, Koreans 2115; refugees, Japanese 802, Koreans 1546.



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The damage suffered by the Chinese has also been considerable. There were 104 cases of arson, 15 attacks against the Chinese police forces, 96 Chinese were killed and 216 carried off as hostages.

We give below a summary of the activities of the Chinese bandits and fugitive soldiers, chiefly since the beginning of October.

1. District traversed by the South-Manchurian line.

1) Main line and Fushun line: Numerous gangs of bandits are to the east and west of the line between Mukden and Ssupingkai.

a) Some of the Chinese troops who were expelled from the garrison of Peitaying have been re-formed by the Chinese authorities, but there are still a few groups in the neighbourhood of Tiehling and to the east of Kaiyuan, which are plundering and massacring Japanese and Chinese residents. Two of these groups endeavoured to cross the South-Manchurian Railway Zone in the neighbourhood of Luan Shih Shan, and the Japanese troops were obliged to advance to meet them and drive them back. The second of these groups, which numbered about 1,200 men, possessed machine-guns and artillery.

b) District of Ssupingkai: The Japanese troops repulsed the attacks of a group of 300 bandits at Pamiencheng (end of September). Other bands appeared to the south-east of this locality, one of which was 2,000 strong.

c) A band of 400 soldiers ravaged the region to the north-east of Tiehling.

d) South-east of Ssupingkai: At the beginning of October a gang of 500 bandits, and at the end of



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October another of 200 bandits, were driven back by the Japanese troops. During the last expedition the latter lost several killed and wounded.

e) Mukden: At the end of October, Japanese troops repulsed an attack of about 200 fugitive soldiers.

f) Kungjuling: At the end of October the Japanese troops repulsed an attack of bandits; numerous police were killed and wounded inside the Zone by soldiers in civilian clothes. A further attack by bandits was repulsed at the end of the month to the north of Kungjuling.

2) Southern district:

a) A group of 500 bandits attacked the Zone near the station of Chianshan and carried off Japanese as hostages.

b) Yingkow line: Several hundred mounted bandits attacked and plundered the Chinese town of Newchang. At the beginning of October troops went to the rescue of the Japanese nationals and brought them back.

Tienchwangtai (opposite Newchang) was several times attacked by bandits, whom the Chinese police repulsed; the Japanese troops evacuated the Koreans in the danger zone.

c) Antung-Mukden line: Numerous Koreans were the victims of bandits in the neighbourhood of Antung and between Antung and Chikwanshan. Small detachments were sent on several occasions to drive them off.

II. 1) District of Kirin: Large contingents of deserters are in the neighbourhood of this locality (1500 in the actual neighbourhood, 1,000 to the east in the vicinity of the Kirin-Tunhua railway, and 2,000 to the south). More than 40 Koreans have been massacred. The provincial authorities of Kirin are endeavouring to restore order in the district.



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2) District of Chenchiatung:

a) The district of Tsungliao and that traversed by the Chenchiatung-Tsungliao line are infested by brigands and disbanded soldiers. A large Japanese farm was attacked by 300 mounted bandits; 12 Koreans were shot and 170 have disappeared. Several bridges have been destroyed and railway traffic has been interrupted since October 21st. Nearly all the Koreans of this district have been evacuated to Chenchiatung and Ssuningkai.

b) Japanese troops have several times had to send armoured railway wagons on reconnaissance in the district to the north of Chenchiatung.

c) To the north of Chuliuko there are large contingents of disbanded soldiers, and Japanese troops have had to intervene on two occasions.

III. 1) Numerous gangs of bandits and soldiers are ravaging the Tongpientao. A bank has been called upon to pay 15,000 dollars to the bandits.

2) District of the Tahushan-Tsungliao Railway:

The Koreans have repeatedly asked for the protection of the authorities. Many of them have been massacred. Officers on the staff of Marshal Chang-Hsue-Liang have got into touch with the mounted bandits of this district with a view to an attack on the Japanese troops.

3) On the Peiping-Mukden line, to the west of Hsinming, trains have on several occasions been attacked by the bandits, who are very active throughout this district. A troupe of about 600 disbanded soldiers appeared there towards the end of October coming from the direction of the Kirin-Tunhua line.



AMERICAN CONSULATE  
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

NOV 13 1931

POLITICAL SECTION

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

C.838.M.418.1931.VII.

Communicated to the  
Council and the Members  
of the League.

Geneva,

November 12th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER  
ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Chinese Representative on the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate  
to the Council the following letter, dated November 11th,  
which he has received from the Chinese Representative.

Communication from the Chinese Representative  
concerning Fuchowan Colliery.

To the Secretary-General.

Sir,

A Japanese detachment of 50 soldiers with machine-guns has seized an important Chinese mine - the Fuchowan colliery of the North-eastern Mining Corporation. The Japanese immediately appointed a Japanese superintendent and Japanese advisers in all departments, while compelling the Chinese staff to remain. This mine is a privately owned commercial enterprise, belonging to a group of Chinese Banks and individuals, and was started three years ago with a capital of three million silver dollars. It produces 250,000 tons of anthracite per year, and has been coveted by the Japanese for a long time. The mine is situated near Dairen, but outside of the leased territory. The seizure is an act of pure spoliation, with no shadow of legal justification.

I have the honour to request that the President of the Council be good enough to ask the Japanese Government to give instructions that this property be restored to its lawful owners and to give strict orders to its military officials that, in order that the situation in Manchuria may not be further aggravated, there shall be no other acts of a similar unlawful character.

(Signed) SAC-KE ALFRED SZE.



AMERICAN CONSUL  
GENEVA, SWITZ R

NOV 13 1931

POLITICAL SECTION

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the Council  
and the Members of the League.

C.839.M.419.1931.VII.

Geneva, November 12th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT

Communication from the Chinese Representative on the Council

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following letter, dated November 12th, which he has received from the Chinese Representative.

To the Secretary-General.

Sir,

The Japanese military authorities, who seized all the official documents at Mukden and Kirin after driving out the representatives of the lawful Chinese Government and substituting puppet governments of their own, are now altering and forging land deeds and mining licenses in favour of Japanese. Over 2,000 land-owners in Mukden alone have already suffered in this fashion.

A typical instance is a proclamation by the so-called Shiuwo Agricultural Company, one of the mushroom growths of the Japanese occupation, addressed to Chinese land-owners stating that:

"Estate at Isekwantum, west of Mukden, sold by original owner King, who sold to Lee and Yang in 1914, then Lee and Yang leased to Japanese, Kose and Katamabe, who transferred rights to this Company. All land deeds, plans and other evidences are in our possession. You are cultivating our land without our consent which is illegal. If you want to continue the cultivation, come to us before November 6th and sign new contract of lease, otherwise said estate will be leased to others.

(Signed) Shiuwo Agricultural Company,


October 31st."

Thus the Japanese occupation, as time passes, not only extends the area occupied but increases its hold on the country. Undertaken ostensibly to protect the lives and property of Japanese subjects, it began by destroying all the Chinese organs of government and supplying Mongol bandits and other disaffected elements with arms and went on to instal Japanese advisers in banks and commercial establishments, setting up puppet administrations under Japanese control, and to seize the salt revenues and other monies. It has now gone on to seize private property, such as coal mines, and carry out large-scale falsifications of title deeds to land.

(Signed) Sao-Ke Alfred SZE



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75



LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the  
Council and the  
Members of the League.

C.840.M.420.1931.VII.

Geneva, November 12th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11  
OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Chinese Representative  
on the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the  
Council the following letter, dated November 12th, which he has  
received from the Chinese Representative.

Communication regarding the situation about the Nonni River bridgehead.

To the Secretary-General.

Sir,

The situation about the Nonni River bridgehead remains  
dangerous. In spite of the Chinese troops having retreated to  
Sanchianfan, 30 Km. from the bridge, in compliance with the request  
of the League Council to avoid aggravating the situation, the  
Japanese force, four thousand strong, are steadily pressing forward,  
and at 10 o'clock on the night of November 10th several Japanese  
aeroplanes again dropped bombs on the Chinese camp, killing and  
wounding several soldiers.

(Signed) Sao-Ke Alfred Sze.



AMERICAN CONSULATE  
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

NOV 13 1931

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Council  
and the Members of the League.

C.841.M.421.1931.VII  
Geneva, November 12th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT

Communication from the Chinese Representative on the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.  
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The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following letter, dated November 12th, which he has received from the Chinese Representative:

Communication concerning the plans of the Chinese Government for taking over the occupied places in Manchuria.

To the Secretary-General.

Sir,

Under instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you of the plans for taking over the occupied places in Manchuria.

In pursuance of the Resolution of October 24th of the Council of the League of Nations, the Chinese Government has taken necessary steps for taking over different places in Manchuria now under the occupation of Japanese troops as well as for making such arrangements as will ensure the safety of the lives and property of Japanese subjects in evacuated territory.

On November first, the Chinese Government announced the appointment of a commission for the re-occupation of evacuated territory in the North East Provinces, which is composed of seven members, namely, Dr. V.K. Wellington Koo, Chairman, General Chang Tso-Hsiang, Mr. Chang Chun, Mr. Wu Tieh-Chen, Dr. Lo Wen-Kan, Mr. Tang Er-Ho and Mr. Liu Chih. This Commission will be entrusted with the work of arranging with the representatives to be designated by the Japanese Government necessary details regarding the evacuation and re-occupation as well as the actual taking over and rehabilitation of evacuated places.

In executing their task, the members of the Commission will request the representatives appointed by the different Powers to associate with them as closely as possible. It is expected that these representatives will observe the workings of the Commission in relation to reoccupation, accompany its members to the places for actual re-occupation and remain in such places until they are sure that peace and order are effectively maintained. All necessary facilities will be accorded to these foreign representatives and all information regarding evacuation and taking over of the evacuated territory will be given to them without delay.

The best disciplined soldiers, gendarmes and police will be, upon selection by the Commission, despatched by the Chinese Government to places to be actually taken over. For the effective maintenance of peace and order after evacuation and re-occupation of each place, the Chinese Government will authorise the Re-occupation Commission to proclaim martial law when it is deemed necessary, and enforce it for a short period of time, during which any disturbance of peace or any act of violence against the life and property of residents will be severely dealt with according to martial law.

Special precautions will be taken for ensuring the safety of all Japanese nationals. In view, however, of the many dangerous acts incompatible with the maintenance of peace recently committed by Japanese subjects in various parts of China, especially in Manchuria, the Japanese Government is expected to warn Japanese subjects in evacuated territory against taking any undesirable course of action so as to ensure the successful execution of measures of protection by the Chinese Government.

(Signed) Sao-Ke Alfred Sze.



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AMERICAN CONSULATE  
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND  
NOV 13 1931  
POLITICAL SECTION

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Communicated to the Council C.842.M.422.1931.VII  
and the Members of the League. Geneva, November 12th, 1931

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Chinese Representative on the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following letter, dated November 12th, which he has received from the Chinese Representative.

To the Secretary-General.

Sir,

I beg you to be good enough to request the President of the Council to intervene without delay with the Japanese Government in view of the very serious developments threatened by the following information, which has just been received from Tsitsihar.

At noon to-day, November 12th, the Heilungkiang Provincial Government received an ultimatum from General Honjo requesting General Ma, the Chairman of the Provincial Government, to resign and evacuate Tsitsihar immediately. Japanese troops will take Tsitsihar along the Taonan-Angangchi Railway. The Chinese troops have retreated to San Chien Fang Sze, which is 17 miles from Tamsin station. The latter is now in the hands of the Japanese. If the latter carry out their announced intention, which is a flagrant violation of the promises but just made by the Japanese Government to the Council, it is probable that there will be serious fighting at any moment.

(Signed) Sao-Ko Alfred Sze.



LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the Council  
and the Members of the League.

C.846.M.425.1931.VII.  
Geneva, November 13th, 1931.

APPEAL BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Communication by the Japanese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary General.

The Secretary General has the honour to communicate to the Council the following telegram which he has just received from the Japanese Delegation.

Paris, November 13th, 1931, 12.55 a.m.

Have the honour to communicate to you reply from Baron Shidehara to the telegram received November 12th and request you to forward it to His Excellency M. Briand, President of the Council:

"(1) As formally stated in Japanese Government's reply dated November 8th to M. Briand's communication, Japanese troops near Nonni bridge have received instructions not to extend military operations as long as Chinese forces undertake no acts of hostility. I wish however to draw Your Excellency's serious attention to fact mentioned several times in communications to Council from Japanese representative that forces more than ten times superior to ours in number massing at Tsitsikar and Angangchi and district south of these localities constitute for Japanese troops a serious menace which is hourly growing more definite.

(2) The Japanese Government proposes to continue to supply to Council the most detailed information as provided in paragraph 7 resolution September 30th. The Japanese Government has made a point from the outset of present events of granting widest facilities in its power to officials of Governments represented on Council who have come to Manchuria to gain an idea of the situation, and no change has occurred in its attitude in this respect. SHIDEHARA".

SAWADA.



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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the  
Council and the  
Members of the League.

C.847.M.426.1931.VII.

Geneva, November 13th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Chinese Government.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following telegraphic communication, which he has received from the Chinese Government.

Nanking, November 13th, (9.55 p.m.)

Chinese Government acknowledges with sincere thanks receipt of communication from president of Council telegraphically transmitted by you yesterday in which he again evinced deep concern in serious situation that prevails in Far East. Aside from measures which are absolutely necessary for defence against further deliberate attacks by Japan Chinese Government will strictly refrain as heretofore from taking any action by the use of force. The situation however is every day becoming more dangerous and exasperating on account of increasing acts of aggravation on part of Japan. Japanese troops are being concentrated around Nonni bridge in Heilungkiang with declared intention of capturing Tsitsikar its capital and Japanese commander has even demanded General Ma, chairman of provincial government, to hand over administration to Changhaipeng, the rebel leader, who is in full co-operation with Japanese troops. Recently Japanese indulge in all kinds intrigues and machinations to create disorder in various places in China. And latest developments in Tientsin which were entirely plotted and directed by Japanese who used Japanese barracks and Japanese concession as base of operations have caused increasing anxiety in minds foreigners as well as Chinese. Under these circumstances Chinese Government heartily welcomes neutral observers who may be sent for obtaining true information to scenes of activities of Japanese troops particularly Nonni bridge district and Angongchi in Heilungkiang, and Tientsin and other important points and will accord these observers all necessary facilities to ensure successful execution of their mission. Please transmit above message to President council.

Chinglun Frank W. Lee.  
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.



LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

C.848.M.427.1931.VII.

Communicated to the  
Council and the Members  
of the League.

Geneva,

November 13th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER  
ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Chinese Representative on  
the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following letter, dated November 12th, which he has received from the Chinese Representative.

Communication from the Chinese Representative in continuation of his note circulated in Document C.842.M.422.1931.VII.

Sir,

In continuation of my urgent note of this afternoon I beg to inform you that I have received a further telegram from General Ma, also dated November 12th, from Tsitsihar, in which he says that to-day Major Hayashi has delivered to him a note from General Honjo containing the following demands:

- "(1) Chairman Ma must resign his office;
- (2) The troops of Heilungkiang must be withdrawn from Tsitsihar, the capital city of Heilungkiang; and
- (3) A part of Japanese troops, in order to ensure the security of the Taonan-Angangchi Railway, will advance to occupy the Station of Angangchi.

"The time limit for the reply to the above demands expires at 12 o'clock midnight of Nov.12th.

(Signed) HONJO."



LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

C.848.M.427.1931.VII.

Communicated to the  
Council and the Members  
of the League.

Geneva,

November 13th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER  
ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Chinese Representative on  
the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following letter, dated November 12th, which he has received from the Chinese Representative.

Communication from the Chinese Representative in continuation of his note circulated in Document C.842.M.422.1931.VII.

Sir,

In continuation of my urgent note of this afternoon I beg to inform you that I have received a further telegram from General Ma, also dated November 12th, from Tsitsihar, in which he says that to-day Major Hayashi has delivered to him a note from General Honjo containing the following demands:

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- (2) The troops of Heilungkiang must be withdrawn from Tsitsihar, the capital city of Heilungkiang; and
- (3) A part of Japanese troops, in order to ensure the security of the Taonan-Angangchi Railway, will advance to occupy the Station of Angangchi.

"The time limit for the reply to the above demands expires at 12 o'clock midnight of Nov.12th.

(Signed) HONJO."



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gutzelm NARS, Date 12-18-75

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The message from General Ma adds that "according to a reliable report the Japanese army at the Nonni River bridgehead has been increased by two batteries of heavy artillery and that they are preparing to advance for attack. This noon Japanese cavalry and artillery attacked our cavalry; the engagement is now in progress."

"The above makes it clear that the Japanese army wishes to occupy Tsitsihar, the capital city of Heilungkiang, and to seize the administration. They have now openly declared this to be their intention. They are at present committing acts of war without a formal declaration. Please bring the above information immediately to the attention of the President and the Members of the Council with the request that they send neutral observers to supervise the withdrawal of Japanese troops."

In bringing the above to your attention I beg to point out the flagrant and bare-faced manner in which the Japanese military are violating the solemn undertaking repeatedly given to the Council by the Japanese Government to refrain from aggravating or extending the conflict and are revealing as worthless the assurances given to the President of the Council by the Japanese Government as recently as November 8th, only four days ago (C.373-M.403. 1931.VII), to the effect that Japanese troops after occupying Tashing at mid-day on November 6th had ceased to advance northwards and reinforcements on the way had also been stopped.

The Japanese Government on the same occasion assured the President of the Council that the advance of Japanese troops towards the Nonni River was due solely to the necessity for protecting the work of repairing the bridge. This statement is impossible to reconcile with the proceedings of General Honjo and his emissaries as revealed in the above despatch and my previous note.

(Signed) SAO-KE ALFRED SZE.



LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the  
Council and Members  
of the League.

C.852.M.430.1931.VII.

Geneva,

November 13th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Chinese Representative on the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to circulate to the Council the following letter, which he has just received from the Chinese Representative.

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COMMUNICATION CONCERNING SALT REVENUE.

Geneva, November 13th, 1931.

To the Secretary-General.

Sir,

I beg to inform you that I am instructed to convey to you for circulation to the Members of the Council the following cable message.

"With reference to the Japanese denial of interference with the salt revenue, please communicate the following to the Secretary-General of the League for circulation to the Members of the Council. Dr. Cleveland submits the following digest of concrete facts as reported by revenue offices and banks:

"(1) FACTS SHOWING FORCIBLE ENTRY: On September 19th the Japanese military authorities with twenty armed soldiers forcibly entered the District Office of Newchwang, covered the Salt Inspectorate officers and the personnel with rifles, told them not move, took three rifles from the office guards, and, after visiting all departments, posted armed guards at the gate, took possession of the accounts, placed their own accountant in the office and took possession of banks acting as fiscal agents for the Salt Inspectorate.

"(2) FACTS SHOWING CONTINUED INTERFERENCE BY JAPANESE MILITARY SINCE SEPTEMBER 19TH: The Japanese military authorities have dictated conditions governing the action of revenue officers, and have exercised surveillance by agents with military guards; they have obtained information concerning daily collections and deposits; they have enjoined the transfer of funds; they have forbidden the payment of a cheque for one million and eighty thousand dollars (\$1,080,000) drawn by the salt monopoly on the Changchun depository in favour of the Salt Inspectorate in payment of revenue on salt obtained on credit; they have repeatedly refused the request of



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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revenue officers to raise the embargo on the remittance of revenues to the National Government; they have compelled the accumulation of deposits representing six weeks salt revenue in banks which amounted to more than three million dollars (\$3,000,000) before expropriation began.

"(3) FACTS SHOWING SEIZURE OF FUNDS BY THE JAPANESE MILITARY AT NEWCHWANG: On October 30th the salt fiscal agent reported: 'At 11 a.m. to-day Paymaster Iwase of Japanese Military Headquarters, Adviser Yamada Shigeji of Provincial Government Bank and Provincial Finance Bureau (newly established) and staff officers of the Provincial Government with armed men came to this bank, first inspected the salt account and then demanded the handing over of salt revenue collections. I pointed out to them that, according to letter from Fengtien District Inspector, no salt revenue fund could be withdrawn without cheque signed by them, and that, according to usual bank procedures, funds could be paid out only on production of cheques. I therefore asked them to obtain a cheque from the District Inspector if they wanted any money. They replied, however, that the salt revenue fund must be handed over to-day, with or without District Inspector's consent; that they would hold themselves responsible if the District Inspector should put any blame on me; and that refusal to hand over the money would be considered as wilful resistance. Their attitude was very over-bearing, and all that we said was of no avail. Finally, at 4 p.m., the sum of six hundred seventy-two thousand seven hundred and nine dollars and fifty-six cents (\$672,709.56) was taken away. It was only after repeated insistence that a Provincial Finance Bureau's sealed receipt, signed by Yamada Shigeji, was obtained. Under such circumstances we could do nothing.'

"(4) FACTS SHOWING REVENUE OFFICERS CONFIRMATION OF PARTY DEMANDING FUND ON OCTOBER 30th, CONSISTED OF THREE OF FOREIGN NATIONALITY, INCLUDING ONE IN UNIFORM, WHO WERE LATER JOINED BY THREE CHINESE FROM THE PROVINCIAL BANK: The Bank of China Manager affirms that, upon requiring a cheque, he was told that none was necessary under previous procedure; after resisting five hours, and being threatened with military force, he there-upon issued draft for three hundred fifty thousand dollars (\$350,000) on his Mukden Bank in favour of the Lianning (Mukden) Finance Commissioner, a cheque to bearer of two hundred thousand silver Yen (Y200,000) on the Yokohama Specie Bank of Newchwang, and the balance on notes of the Yokohama Specie Bank, Ltd.

"(5) FACTS SHOWING SEIZURE OF FUND BY JAPANESE MILITARY IN CHANGCHUN ON NOVEMBER 6th: The following is a message from salt officers, confirmed by the fiscal agent: 'To-day all funds in the Bank of China and Bank of Communications at Changchun were forcibly removed in the presence of military to the Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces at Changchun by transportation officers sole signature on the basis of a circular authorised by the local foreign military. We have protested in vain.'

"Dr. Cleveland reports a telegram received, dated November 9th, from special deputy stating that there had been a further expropriation of seven hundred twenty thousand dollars (\$720,000) at Changchun.

"Photo-static copy of the receipt by Japanese officers for the money taken at Newchwang is being furnished to the foreign legations in China."

(Signed) SAO-KE ALFRED SZE.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to the  
 Council and the Members  
 of the League.

C.854.M.432.1931.VII.

Geneva, November 14th, 1931.

APPEAL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to communicate to the Council the following letter which he has received from the Japanese Delegation:

Paris, November 12th, 1931.

"Sir,

"The Japanese Government has not felt itself under the obligation to deal point by point with the numerous inaccuracies, circulated in the form of official communications to the League of Nations, by the Chinese delegation, which has, moreover, admitted that such inaccuracies exist (Council Meeting of October 13th, Chinese communication C.720.M.325.1931.VII). As I have pointed out on several occasions, the Japanese Government, out of respect for the Council and in its desire not to mislead public opinion, has considered it its duty to communicate to the Council and Press nothing but scrupulously exact information, and to avoid anything which might have the appearance of a propaganda campaign. It regrets all the more that the Chinese delegation should have seen fit to support its case by methods scarcely calculated in the present serious circumstances to maintain the atmosphere of calm which is essential to the rapid and successful solution of the question under examination by the Council.

"These sensational communications, which have been widely circulated owing to their publication by the Secretariat of the League, have unfortunately considerably disturbed public opinion, and have created a state of mind which is much to be regretted and is far from being that desired by the League.

"The Japanese delegation, in support of the views which it has set forth above, is desirous of drawing your attention to certain entirely incorrect statements made by the Chinese Delegation, more particularly concerning the recent incidents in the neighbourhood of the railway bridges of Taonan-Angangchi on the River Nonni.

"The Japanese delegation has already explained the importance of the resumption of traffic upon this line and the circumstances of the line itself, which was constructed by the South Manchurian Railway Company for China, who has, up to the present, not discharged its liabilities to the Company. It was only after the failure of repeated requests made by the Japanese consular authorities to General Machanshan for the carrying out of the necessary repairs, (contrary to the impression conveyed by the Chinese communication C.758.M.392.1931.VII, paragraph 2) and in face of the imminent danger of the freezing of the River Nonni, which would have prevented any works, that the administration of the Taonan-Angangchi Railway Company decided to undertake the work itself with the assistance of the South Manchurian Railway and



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sent a force of about 500 Japanese soldiers to the spot in order to provide protection for the work. An agreement was come to between the two Chinese Generals on the spot, under which their troops were to be withdrawn 10 kilometres from the nearest bridge in order to avoid any further conflict between them. This agreement was broken by the troops of General Machanshan, who fired upon the Japanese detachments which were advancing under the protection of the agreed distinguishing marks and thus caused the loss of fifteen Japanese soldiers. On the night following this unfair attack the Japanese troops, having obtained reinforcements, repulsed the forces of General Ma, at the cost of heavy losses to themselves.

The Chinese delegation alleges that the Japanese troops were supporting General Chang-Haipeng against General Ma and that the troops of the former were advancing under cover of Japanese forces. This statement is entirely false. In any case, if the Japanese command had entertained any far-reaching military plans, would it have been content with sending to the Nonni bridges so small a force as 500 men? and after having secured reinforcements (700 men) and driven back the troops of General Ma, would it not have pursued its advantage instead of stopping the advance at the railway station of Tashing, 2 km. distant from the northern bridge-head? These considerations are alone sufficient to prove how inaccurate are the allegations to which I have just referred.

The Chinese delegation further declares (Doc.C.812.M.402.1931.VII) that Major Hayashi stated that "Japan was determined to change the political situation of the province of Heilungkiang by force and regardless of the resolution of the Council of the League," and further that he informed General Ma "that the Japanese troops would cease hostilities only if General Ma surrendered his post to General Chang-Haipeng". The Japanese Government is in a position to give an emphatic denial to the assertions of the Chinese delegation.

I will not deal with the stories of Japanese forces said to include a contingent of Mongolian troops dressed in Chinese costume (Doc.798.M.392.1931.VII) or of aeroplanes assisting Mongolian bandits in their attack on the Chinese (denied in my communication C.732.M.337.1931.VII) or of statements such as that of the attack on the South Manchurian railway, which could not have taken place since no Chinese soldier was authorised to go even within several miles of the railway zone (in certain places this zone is no more than 10 metres on either side of the track). I have already had occasion to report instances of Chinese attacks inside the zone itself (Council meeting, October 13th and communication to the press, October 18th, 1931).

The Chinese delegation denounces the alleged Japanese policy of breaking up the central authority in favour of regional authorities. In my communication to the Council of October 7th, 1931 (C.676.M.283.1931.VII) I have already explained the attitude of the Japanese Government which forbade all its nationals to mix themselves up in any way with local independence movements. The Chinese delegation considers that the assistance given by the Japanese authorities in the establishment of local committees for the maintenance of order is an infringement of the authority of the Chinese Government. It will readily be realised that unless they themselves took charge of the maintenance of order and administration of those places from which the Chinese authorities had withdrawn (which would certainly have been done in the case of a military occupation) the Japanese authorities had no alternative but to encourage the formation by the Chinese themselves of bodies responsible for the maintenance of order. These bodies have under their control Chinese police forces, and perform the duties of the absent Chinese administrative authorities.



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
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The efficient performance of their duties by these bodies will make much easier the rapid withdrawal of troops, which is desired by the Japanese Government, as has been formally stated on several occasions.

I am obliged to state that, contrary to the allegations of the Chinese Delegation, which would like to make Japan responsible for the less favourable situation, it is the anti-Japanese conspiracies in China and Manchuria which are aggravating it appreciably.

In China the anti-Japanese agitation instigated by the Nationalist party is being vigorously pursued. In Manchuria the civil and military authorities are setting the population against us. General Chang-Suehliang is endeavouring to stir up strife in the South Manchurian Railway zone and around the points of concentration of the Japanese forces. He has arranged for groups of bandits to worry the residents and Japanese soldiers (the visit to Changwu, the centre of the bandits' activities, on October 13th of the staff officers Mote-chend and Kao, the activity of the bandits on the Taonan-Anganchi line since the beginning of November are clear proofs of this). The Chinese are endeavouring to stir up incidents by all the means in their power so as to throw the responsibility on Japan. The concentration of Chinese forces at Tsitsihar and to the south of that district, which is increasing daily, is a direct threat to peace. This is an extremely grave situation which deserves the serious consideration of the Council.

In short the Chinese Delegation, by means of active propaganda, is endeavouring to distort the facts and to alarm public opinion. It is attempting to cast doubts upon the veracity of the Japanese Government's declarations of its intentions and its respect, of which it has always given proof, for international obligations. The Japanese Government profoundly deplores this attitude, which cannot fail to create still greater unrest and give a most unfair view of the situation.

(Signed) YOSHIKAWA.

Japanese representative on the Council  
of the League of Nations.



LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Communicated to  
the Council and the  
Members of the League.

C.855.M.433.1931.VII.

Geneva,

November 14th, 1931.

APPEAL FROM THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Chinese Representative  
on the Council.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to  
circulate to the Council the following letter,  
which he has received from the Chinese Representative.

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LETTER COMMUNICATING NOTE ADDRESSED TO THE CHINESE  
GOVERNMENT BY THE JAPANESE MINISTER AT NANKIN.

Geneva, November 13th, 1931.

To the Secretary-General.

Sir,

I beg to transmit to you the following English translation of a note, addressed by the Japanese Minister in China to my Government, which I have just received from Nanking:

"During the disturbances in the Chinese City, Tientsin, on November 8th, the soldiers and Pacantui\* despatched by the Chinese authorities to the vicinity of the Japanese barracks in Tientsin, fired indiscriminately at the troops and Japanese Concession, causing the death of two Japanese soldiers and one Japanese woman besides wounding others.

"By exchange of notes between the two countries in 1902, for handing back Tientsin, the Chinese Government undertook, for the purpose of preventing conflict between Chinese and foreign troops, to prohibit Chinese troops to march or to be stationed within twenty li of foreign troops stationed in Tientsin.

"In the present case, the troops and police which the Chinese authorities despatched to the vicinity of the Japanese barracks have not been withdrawn after repeated requests by the Japanese Consul-General. This is not only an infraction of the above-mentioned exchange of notes, but the Chinese Government should bear heavy responsibility for indiscriminate shooting which caused deaths of our nationals.

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\* Roughly equivalent to special constables in England.



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"Acting under instructions from the Japanese Government, I have the honour to request the Chinese Government to withdraw speedily the Chinese soldiers and police in Tientsin outside the distance stated in the above-mentioned exchange of notes. If withdrawal is delayed, the Japanese authorities will exercise the rights based on the exchange of notes and will, for the protection of life and property of Japanese nationals in the Japanese Concession, adopt necessary measures for the consequences of which the Chinese Government should be held entirely responsible."

In communicating to you the above English translation of the Japanese note, which amounts to an ultimatum, I beg to draw your attention to the threat contained in the concluding paragraph. Experience of the last two months proves that such threats may be followed by hostilities at any moment. In this case, particularly after the attempted rising which originated in the Japanese Concession in Tientsin, acts of war would be aimed directly at the machinery of the Central Government, with all the implied consequences. The Chinese Government therefore requests, on the basis of the Covenant and the Council Resolutions, most urgent intervention to prevent hostile Japanese action, and the immediate despatch of neutral observers, drawn from military officers of troops stationed in Tientsin, to the zone bordering on the Japanese concession, to whom and to whose assistants or accompanying guards, every facility will be given by Chinese authorities for the exercise of their functions. In view of imminent danger, I ask this request to be dealt with as one of the utmost urgency.

(Signed) Sao-Ke Alfred Sze.



LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Circulated to the  
Council and Members  
of the League.

C.856.M.434.1931.VII.

Geneva, November 15th, 1931.

APPEAL BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE COVENANT.

Communication from the Japanese Delegation.

Protest against the publication by a Geneva newspaper of an  
alleged memorandum by Baron Tanaka.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to communicate to the Council the following note which he has just received from the Japanese Delegation:

Paris, November 12th, 1931.

"An important Geneva newspaper has published under the heading "Comment les Japonais se representent le respect des traites" ("What the Japanese mean by respect for Treaties"), extracts from an alleged memorandum said to have been submitted by Baron Tanaka on July 25th, 1927, to the Emperor of Japan regarding the policy to be followed by Japan in China.

This is one of the numerous apocryphal documents which Chinese propaganda has made every effort to circulate for some years past. The document in question has been known to the Japanese Government for some time but that Government considered it unnecessary in view of the obvious inaccuracy of its contents and relying on the intelligence and common sense of readers to publish a denial. Moreover, Chinese propaganda has never dared to present this document officially, although it has frequently caused it to be circulated secretly, in particular at the Pacific Conference held at Kyoto in 1929.

However, in view of present circumstances and the importance given to this document, the Japanese Delegation wishes to declare formally that it is a forgery from beginning to end and that the policy advocated therein in no way represents the views of any responsible Government of Japan of whatever party.

The article in the Journal de Genève does not quote the full text but its nature can be clearly seen from the facts mentioned. For instance, it is stated that Baron Tanaka was sent on a mission to Europe and submitted this memorandum on his return. Actually, the only journeys to Europe made by Baron Tanaka were in 1912 and 1913. It is also stated in the document in question that it was on his return from his visit that an attempt on Baron Tanaka's life was made at Shanghai. The attempt on Baron Tanaka's life was actually made on his return from a return-visit to the Governor-General of the Philippines in February 1922.

The Japanese Delegation strongly deplores the fact that an important organ of the press, published in the very town where the League of Nations has its seat, should have thoughtlessly reproduced this forged document. It has accordingly sent to the newspaper in question the denial, a copy of which is attached and, at the same time, wishes to draw your attention and the attention of the Council to the dangers which may arise from the circulation of such documents and the harmful affect it may have on world opinion. The Japanese Delegation is not in a position to state from what source the Geneva press obtained this document but it feels obliged strongly to denounce such a manoeuvre.

I shall be glad if you will kindly communicate this letter to the President and Members of the Council.

I have the honour etc.,

(Signed) S. Sawada.

Director of the Japanese League of Nations Bureau



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Copy of the denial sent by the Japanese Delegation to the Journal de Genève.

Referring to article which appeared this morning concerning alleged memorandum, Baron Tanaka, Japanese Delegation, states that document in question is a forgery from beginning to end and that policy advocated therein in no way represents the views of any responsible Japanese Government of whatever party. This document already circulated by Chinese at Pacific Conference, Kyoto, 1929, and on various subsequent occasions, Japanese Government considered it unnecessary to deny in view of obvious inaccuracy of its contents and relying on common sense readers. However, in view of present nervousness and importance your newspaper published seat of League of Nations and considering you grossly deceived, appeals to your courtesy to publish present denial.

Suzuki.

League of Nations Bureau.

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LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Circulated to the Council  
and Members of the League.

C.857.M.455.1931.VII.

Geneva, November 14th, 1931.

APPEAL BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT UNDER ARTICLE XI OF THE COVENANT

Communication from the Japanese Delegation.

Situation in the Nomon District.

Note by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has the honour to communicate to the Council the following telegram just received from the Japanese delegation:

Paris, November 13th, 1931.  
- 5:43 p.m.

In continuation of previous communications, I have the honour to inform you of situation near Nomon:

1. Principal forces Japanese troops are at present at Tahsing. Principal forces Ma-Chan-Shan concentrated near Anganchi have outposts on a line running east - west with Tang-chir (between Tahsing and Anganchi) in the centre and are carrying out an enveloping movement.

2. Ma-Chan-Shan forces more than ten times greater than ours, as already communicated. As distance between outposts is 4 - 8 km. the danger to our troops is becoming imminent.

3. Moreover large number of telegrams from all parts of China addressed to Ma-Chan-Shan urging him to take offensive, in particular strong hostile spirit at Harbin, etc.-- are creating extremely dangerous atmosphere.

4. Large Chinese forces are advancing; Taonan threatening our troops on the right.

(Signed) SAMADA



C./65th Session/P.V.8(1).

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

SIXTY-FIFTH SESSION OF THE COUNCIL

MINUTES

EIGHTH MEETING (PUBLIC)

*Held on Tuesday, October 13th, 1931, at 12 noon.*

Present: All the representatives of the Members of the Council, and the Secretary-General. Germany was represented by M. VON MUTIUS, the British Empire by Lord READING, Spain by M. DE MADARIAGA, the Irish Free State by Mr. LESTER, Norway by M. COLBAN, Peru by M. BARRETO, Poland by M. SOKAL and Yugoslavia by M. FOTITCH.

2946. **Presidency of the Council.**

M. DE MADARIAGA, speaking on behalf of M. Lerroux, informed the Council that the latter, who was detained in Madrid by his duties there, was unable, to his very great regret, to preside over the meetings to be held in continuation of the sixty-fifth session of the Council. M. Lerroux had asked him to assure his colleagues on the Council that he would follow their work with profound interest. He had always had faith in the League of Nations, and was sure that, with the wisdom of the Council and the close co-operation of the two Powers most directly concerned, it would find a solution in the interests of the two Powers and of the peace of the world.

M. Lerroux had also asked M. de Madariaga to suggest to the Council, on his own initiative, that it would be of advantage if the Chair were occupied by the representative of the Power which should normally occupy it, although it had become customary, by a tradition of courtesy, for the Presidency of the Council at the second of its two sessions held in September to be retained by the representative of the Power carrying out those duties at the first session. M. de Madariaga therefore asked the representative of France to be good enough, if his colleagues on the Council saw no objection, to take the Chair.

M. BRIAND was sure he was interpreting the feelings of the Members of the Council in expressing deep regret that M. Lerroux' duties prevented him from coming to Geneva to occupy the position which he had filled so satisfactorily in the past. During the present session, he had had to consider and settle, or attempt to settle, one of the most delicate and serious problems which could arise before the Council of the League of Nations. He had brought his experience and talent to bear on the problem, and had shown such moral authority in carrying out this task, that it was regrettable that he could not continue the work he had begun so well.

M. Briand also regretted that in M. Lerroux' absence M. de Madariaga, with whose experience, ability and moral authority the members of the Council were acquainted, could not take the place of his chief. The reasons for which his Government and he himself had felt themselves unable to adopt that course must, however, be respected.

M. Briand accepted the office of President since, in fact, in accordance with the rule of alphabetical order, the Presidency of the Council passed to his country. He added that, in the present grave circumstances, he would do his utmost, with the help of all his colleagues, to obtain satisfactory results and to see that once again, with the help of the two Members of the Council most closely concerned, the League of Nations carried out effectively its rôle, which was to safeguard peace.

(M. Briand took the Chair.)



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2947. Appeal from the Chinese Government under Article 11 of the Covenant (continuation).

The PRESIDENT made the following statement:

The Council separated on September 30th after adopting unanimously a resolution the last two paragraphs of which were as follows:

"The Council, . . .

"Decides, in the absence of any unforeseen occurrence which might render an immediate meeting essential, to meet again at Geneva on Wednesday, October 14th, 1931, to consider the situation as it then stands;

"Authorises its President to cancel the meeting of the Council fixed for October 14th should he decide, after consulting his colleagues, and more particularly the representatives of the two parties, that, in view of such information as he may have received from the parties or from other members of the Council as to the development of the situation, the meeting is no longer necessary."

I think I am correctly interpreting the feelings of the members of the Council in stating that in adopting this resolution they firmly hoped that the meeting of October 14th would prove unnecessary, because the two parties would, as far as possible, have carried out the undertakings which they accepted before the Council.

The Council noted, on the one hand, the declaration made by the representative of Japan that his Government not only had no territorial designs in Manchuria, but would continue, as rapidly as possible, the withdrawal of its troops, which had already been begun, into the railway zone in proportion as the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals was effectively assured. The Japanese representative added that his Government hoped to carry out this intention in full as speedily as might be. On the other hand, the Council noted the declaration of the representative of China that his Government would assume responsibility for the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals outside the railway zone as the withdrawal of the Japanese troops continued and the Chinese local authorities and police forces were re-established.

The Chinese and Japanese representatives also gave assurances that their respective Governments would take all necessary steps to prevent any extension of the scope of the incident or any aggravation of the situation.

The Council's hopes have not been realised, although on October 9th, M. Lerroux, as President in Office of the Council, solemnly reminded the two parties of their undertakings before the Council. The meeting contemplated for October 14th has had to be summoned earlier, at the request of the representative of China, who has informed the Secretary-General that he has received information of a serious character from his Government with regard to further offensive military operations on the part of Japanese forces in Manchuria. This information relates principally to the bombardment of Chinchow.

Further, the Japanese Government has drawn attention to the existence in China of an anti-Japanese movement which is manifesting itself in particular in the boycotting of Japanese goods and in certain acts of annoyance which are compelling Japanese nationals to evacuate certain localities. This movement is dealt with in a note handed by the Japanese Minister at Nanking to the Chinese Government, and communicated to the Council through the Japanese Government.

It appears, however, from the information at the Council's disposal that the Chinese Government has issued appeals and taken measures which at any rate outside Manchuria have prevented loss of human life. The Council hopes that this attitude will be maintained, as it is essential that calm and moderation should prevail on both sides.

In addition, the Chinese Government has informed the Council that it has made proposals to the Japanese Government, through its representative at Tokio, with a view to accelerating the evacuation of the districts occupied by Japanese troops in Manchuria outside the railway zone. The Japanese Government has communicated its reply to the Council, in which it rejects the proposals submitted to it and urges the necessity for direct negotiations between the two Governments with a view to settling all the questions at issue between them.

Finally, I must point out that the Government of the United States of America, which in circumstances of which you are aware has been kept informed of our discussions, has informed us that it is in full agreement with the Council's action. It also announces that it has sent two officials to Manchuria as observers.

Such is the present situation. As we are meeting to-day at the request of the Chinese representative, my colleagues will certainly desire to hear him first. I therefore call on him to address you.

M. SZE made the following statement:

I am speaking under the stress of great emotion, and, for fear lest that emotion may betray me into the use of words which may be deemed intemperate, I shall read what I have to say.

I am deeply conscious of the duties which the present serious circumstances impose upon me, and I shall strive, therefore, to utter no single word which may embitter the situation. But I do deem it necessary and proper that I should make known to the Council, in all frankness, the feelings

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of the Chinese people and of their Government with regard to the present crisis. I shall add, also, a statement of the issue that is now immediately before the Council, and of the very great importance of that issue.

No sooner had China been taken unawares by the events which followed the night of September 18th than she made an appeal to the League of Nations. Her territory was occupied by foreign forces and she had fallen a victim to forms of violence which generally prompt a people to use violence in return. But China refrained from this instinctive reaction and turned instead to the institution at Geneva which had been created to protect peace and to secure international justice and right. She placed her case unreservedly in the hands of the League and agreed to be guided in her actions by such decisions as the League might take. In this way, as you will all agree, China has given ample proof of her good faith and of her fundamentally pacific intentions. Indeed, she has done more than this. In her desire to facilitate the task of the Council, she has maintained her action within the limits which have seemed to her most conducive to an amicable solution of the controversy.

Furthermore, China has given an additional proof of her conciliatory spirit by accepting, for the time being, a procedure which, though far from being in accordance with her own wishes and best judgment, seemed to the Council to offer a feasible way of so clearing the situation in Manchuria that the further steps for a complete settlement might be more easily taken. This procedure has been put to the test and, unfortunately, has confirmed the apprehensions which the Chinese Government felt regarding it.

When, on September 30th, the Council adjourned its meetings for two weeks, it was hoped that, by October 14th, the Japanese troops would have been withdrawn to the railway zone or outside China, and that the *status* as it existed prior to September 18th would have been substantially restored. Instead of this hope being realised, we find, on the contrary, that not only has this withdrawal not been affected, but further acts of occupation, aggression and violence committed by Japanese troops have occurred, which have culminated in the bombing of the Chinese city of Chinchow by twelve Japanese military aeroplanes, with resulting destruction of property and the loss of a considerable number of civilian lives. It was the seriousness of this military outrage, perpetrated far beyond the localities which the Japanese troops were occupying when this Council adjourned on September 30th, that compelled my Government to ask that this body again meet at the earliest possible moment in order that it might take such action as the situation, thus increased in its gravity, might demand.

At previous meetings of the Council, I have sought to emphasise the point that the immediate issue before this body is the devising of effective means whereby a complete withdrawal of the Japanese troops to the positions or stations occupied by them prior to September 18th may be promptly secured and, in general, the *status quo ante* restored.

This is the first and preliminary step which it is imperative should be taken at once, and it is one which does not involve questions of fact existing prior to September 18th, nor should it be confused with the later distinct steps which will need to be taken in order that satisfactory relations between China and Japan may be fully re-established and maintained.

In this connection, I will quote the statement by the President of this body at its meeting on September 30th. He said:

"The Council . . . has singled out one object as being of immediate and paramount importance—namely, the withdrawal of troops to the railway zone."

As regards the urgency of the necessity for the immediate withdrawal of the Japanese troops, I venture to quote the words of Lord Cecil at the second meeting of the present session of the Council. He said:

"I do feel . . . rather strongly that any troops which are on the territory belonging to the other party ought to be withdrawn without delay. That is the course which has been taken in previous cases, and I hope we shall not make any difference in our dealings with one country rather than another."

Then, after quoting the strong words of M. Briand delivered at the Council session in Paris in October 1925, that a State could not justify the invasion of another State's territory on the ground of legitimate defence and protection, Lord Cecil observed:

"This statement was approved by my predecessor, Sir (then Mr.) Austen Chamberlain, on behalf of the British Empire, by Viscount Ishii, speaking for Japan, by M. Scialoja, speaking for Italy, and by a number of other Members of the Council. I think [added Lord Cecil] it may be regarded as the *locus classicus* as to the policy and procedure of the Council in cases of this kind."

In conclusion, I wish to touch upon certain wider issues. Throughout this time of trial, my country—I say it in all humility, but I say it with proud conviction of its truth—my country has borne itself with flawless loyalty to its obligations as a Member of the League of Nations. When our territory was suddenly invaded on a vast scale, our towns laid waste and our peaceful citizens done to death, what was our reply? It is on record in three documents.

The first is China's appeal to the League when, as I have already pointed out, the Chinese Government gave strict orders to use no violence, since it had entrusted China's case unreservedly to the League.



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The second is the proclamation of the head of the Government, Marshal Chiang Kai-shek, to the nation on September 22nd:

"An hour of unprecedented gravity has struck for the entire Chinese nation. Without warning and contrary to all practice of the civilized world and all covenants freely contracted, the Japanese army has invaded our territory on September eighteenth, killed our citizens and inflicted indignities on our civilian and military authorities. This invasion continues. The challenge thrown to us is a challenge also to all nations. The League of Nations was established to prevent war and bring collective action into play to stop aggression. We have immediately informed the League of the aggression and have asked to obtain as a first step the immediate withdrawal of the invaders. The Council of the League is dealing with the matter at Geneva to-day. We have asked the Council, once the Japanese troops withdraw, to help in finding a peaceful solution of this conflict. We are confident that every impartial enquiry will give us the fullest justice and compensation. As we have entrusted our case to the League, the National army has received the strictest orders to avoid all possibility of clash with the invaders. We exhort the entire nation to maintain dignified calm. We have ordered all civilian authorities to take the strictest measures to protect Japanese citizens in our midst. We know how often the innocent are made to suffer for the misdeeds of militarists."

The third is the appeal to the nation by President Chiang Kai-shek on October 7th:

"In view of the situation created by the recent inundation which has rendered millions of citizens homeless and destitute, and of the external aggression which stirred our people with indignation, the present appeal is made to every Chinese. The Government, having the responsibility of dealing with the foreign Powers, is of course acting for the welfare of the nation in conformity with public opinion. However, during the time-limit fixed by the Council of the League of Nations for the withdrawal of Japanese troops, every Chinese national should all the more remain calm and strictly observe public order so as to deprive foreigners of any kind of possible excuse. The local authorities are held responsible for the protection of the lives and property of all foreign residents and, for the maintenance of order, they must also exert special caution to prevent rebellious elements from using the opportunity for starting disturbances and indulging in lawlessness. The flood relief work must be continued with increased energy and not in the least neglected."

China has therefore offered no resistance, withdrawn her troops, and maintained an attitude of dignified calm. She has done so because she is a loyal Member of the League of Nations and has put her trust in the League.

The Covenant and the Pact of Paris are our two sheet-anchors, to which we have moored our ship of State and with the help of which we believe we shall ride out this storm.

Nevertheless, the Covenant and the Pact of Paris are also the corner-stones of the worldwide edifice of peace that has been so laboriously erected in the twelve years since the world war, and, if they crumble, the edifice collapses.

For is it likely that the nations who had witnessed this tragic collapse of the Covenant and the Pact of Paris at the first great test, with all its dire consequences throughout the East—is it likely that these nations would assemble quietly at Geneva in February to disarm? Would they not rather draw the conclusion that, after all, each State must rely on its own armed forces, and on those alone? To say more on this point would be to labour the obvious—it is clear that if the Members of the League and the United States of America cannot co-operate successfully to avert this threat to peace, one of the first results will be the collapse of the disarmament movement.

With the idea of disarmament goes the idea of international security, for the two are indissolubly linked. If we fail now, when America offers her co-operation, and fail in February with disarmament, what chance have we of working out some form of permanent association, some provision for conference under the Pact of Paris to avert threats to peace?

Finally, if we fail in these things and the world is thrown back on suspicious nationalism, hostile alliances, and a race in armaments, if the East is plunged into a state of turmoil, what chance have we of securing effective co-operation in connection with the financial and economic crisis that bears so heavily on the world? That crisis widens and deepens daily, almost hourly, and we are aware, all of us, that only far-reaching and close co-operation between the civilized nations can avert disaster.

However remote and irrelevant this disturbance in the Far East may seem to the West, engrossed in its pressing cares—and it is natural that it should so seem—the web of fate binds us all together, and, unless we can co-operate effectively in this grave emergency, we shall fail in

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disarmament, we shall fail to instil any confidence in international security and order, and by the same motion we shall fail to grapple with the world economic crisis.

China has put herself in the hands of the League and abides the issue with confidence in her destiny and in the moral forces of civilisation. The League cannot fail, for its success is bound up with the interests of all civilized nations, with those of Japan and America as well as those of China and the other Members of the League.

*The continuation of the discussion was adjourned to the next meeting.*



AMERICAN CONSULATE  
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

NOV 3 1931

POLITICAL SECTION

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LEAGUE OF NATIONS

SIXTY-FIFTH SESSION OF THE COUNCIL

MINUTES

NINTH MEETING (PUBLIC).

*Held on Tuesday, October 13th, 1931, at 3.30 p.m.*

Present: All the representatives of the Members of the Council and the Secretary-General. Germany was represented by M. VON MUTIUS; the British Empire by Lord READING; Spain by M. DE MADARIAGA; the Irish Free State by Mr. LESTER; Norway by M. COLBAN then by M. BRAADLAND; Peru by M. BARRETO; Poland by M. SOKAL; and Yugoslavia by M. FOTITCH.

2948. Appeal from the Chinese Government under Article 11 of the Covenant (continuation).

M. YOSHIZAWA. — I have listened with great attention to the Chinese representative's statement. But, before answering him, I should like, in order to avoid any misunderstanding, to add a few observations to what the President has said.

He told us that, from the information at the Council's disposal, the Chinese Government had issued appeals and taken steps which, at any rate outside Manchuria, have avoided any loss of human life. The Chinese representative in his speech also emphasised the same point. It is happily true that no Japanese has been assassinated outside Manchuria recently as a result of the present agitation, so far at any rate as we know.

But the Council is aware, from the communications which it has received, of the indescribable treatment and molestation of Japanese nationals in China. In Chinese cities, our nationals are every day roughly handled, their property is stolen, food for their everyday needs is refused or taken away from them in the open street. Women have been assaulted and injured by the crowd. The populace even molests children. During the last fortnight, there have been numerous cases of Japanese children being beaten or pelted with stones on their way to school. At Kowloon, in territory under British control, the Chinese have created serious disturbances by attacking Japanese, and several of the latter have been killed.

The danger to our nationals has been so pressing that a few naval units have had to be sent up the Yangtse (where numerous warships of the various Powers are normally stationed in peace time), to ensure the protection and evacuation of Japanese residents and even of some of our consulates. The Japanese residents of Hanchow and Chinchow, with their women and children, and those of Nanking, Wuhu, Suchow, Ichang, and Chungking, have had to be evacuated. At Changsha, Swatow and Hong-Kong the Japanese residents have had to be concentrated in places of refuge. The consulates in the Yangtse cities may be withdrawn at any moment and that of Changchow has already been withdrawn.

The President spoke of a proposal of the Japanese Government with regard to the need for negotiations between the Chinese and Japanese Governments to settle all the questions on which the two Governments differ. That might give an inaccurate impression. The Chinese Minister at Tokio asked the Japanese Government to fix a date for the definitive withdrawal of the troops within the railway zone. The reply of the Minister for Foreign Affairs was to the effect that the Japanese Government desired the withdrawal to take place as soon as possible, but that the extremely dangerous atmosphere prevailing constituted a serious peril, and he accordingly proposed, in order to dispel this atmosphere of tension and restore calm, to come to an understanding with China on the re-establishment of normal conditions as a preliminary basis. It is not a question of the settlement of all the points at issue, but an understanding which would relieve the tension between the two peoples and so facilitate the rapid withdrawal of the troops.



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The Chinese delegate, if I rightly understood him, spoke not only of a withdrawal of the Japanese troops within the zone, but also of the evacuation of Manchuria altogether. That is a point which is outside the present discussion—a point on which the Japanese Government's opinion is already known.

The Chinese delegate also referred, quoting documents in support of his argument, to the Chinese Government's intentions in regard to the attitude of the Chinese troops in Manchuria and of the Chinese population in general in relation to Japanese nationals. He said that orders had been given to the troops and advice given to the population. I am compelled, however, to note with regret that in spite of the excellence of these intentions they have not proved effective in the case of the troops; for as I have already informed the Council, the Japanese troops in Changshun alone have had 150 killed and wounded, while attacks are being made every day in Manchuria by uniformed soldiers on our nationals. As regards the protection of the life and property of Japanese nationals in China itself, I cannot but observe that there has developed an agitation of unparalleled violence since the beginning of the present incidents, directed by the Chinese Nationalist Party, which no one can dissociate from the Chinese Government. The anti-Japanese associations, students' clubs and Chambers of Commerce are endeavouring, with official encouragement, to bring about a complete severance of trade relations with Japanese nationals, who (as I have already said) have great difficulty even in procuring food. The anti-Japanese associations molest in every way Chinese who have relations with our nationals and endeavour to bring to a standstill the most legitimate economic activities of our people in China. It is extremely disquieting to note that the places in which this anti-Japanese agitation is most violent are precisely those which are under the direct control of the Chinese Government. General Chang-Kai-Shek even attended in person a meeting organised by the Nationalist Party at Nanking on September 22nd, which despatched a circular telegram all over China recommending that trade relations with Japan should be broken off.

On the other hand, I may say that, since the beginning of the present incidents, the Japanese Government has given instructions, which have been strictly carried out, that Chinese nationals should everywhere be protected and not be molested in any way.

As regards the Chinchow incident, to which the Chinese delegate referred as one of the reasons for the meeting of the Council, I have informed the Council of the circumstances in which this incident took place, and I think it is in possession of full particulars on the subject.

In this connection, I should like to have read to the Council my Government's reply to the President's telegram dated October 9th.

The following communication from the Japanese Government was read:<sup>1</sup>

"1. The Japanese Government, while pursuing from the outset of the present incidents the line of action which it had decided upon of preventing any aggravation of the situation and of bringing back its troops into the South Manchurian Railway zone as and when the safety of the railway and the protection of Japanese nationals and their property was effectively ensured, has always been convinced that a friendly solution of this incident could only be obtained by means of direct negotiations between Japan and China. It was in this spirit that Japan responded to the message of the President of the Council of the League of Nations and endorsed the resolution voted at the Council's last meeting.

"2. The military operations in Manchuria have come to a standstill and the Japanese Government does not see that there has been any special development in the situation. Various facts could be regarded as creating a new state of affairs. For example, the Japanese troops have sometimes been obliged to go to the assistance of the numerous Koreans who have been victims of violent attacks on the part of Chinese soldiers and brigands in the neighbourhood of the railway line. These troops, after ensuring the protection of the Koreans and placing them in safety, immediately returned to the Zone. Or again, aeroplanes, having set out on reconnaissance on hearing that the fugitive Chinese troops were reassembling in the neighbourhood of Chinchow and were preparing to disturb order along the South Manchurian Railway, and having been assailed by the Chinese troops, retaliated by dropping bombs.

"Nevertheless, it is superfluous to remark that the Japanese troops could not humanly be expected to leave our Korean nationals exposed without defence to such outrages. The Chinchow incident is easily explicable if the present circumstances of the situation are borne in mind. The atmosphere of over-excitement created by the measures of defence which the Japanese forces have been obliged to take in face of the provocative action of the Chinese troops in Manchuria has been in no way alleviated. It is clear that no state of war exists, but the Japanese troops are obliged to observe attentively the movements of the Chinese troops and to take meticulous measures of precaution. It is in such conditions that the Chinchow incident occurred. To regard such an event, which is the consequence of the existing circumstances, as constituting an aggravation of the situation is in the Japanese Government's opinion to show a wrong appreciation of the situation as a whole.

"3. It has also been stated that the situation was being aggravated by the fact that Japanese naval units were being sent to the Yangtse. The real facts are quite different. In face of the anti-Japanese agitation by which China herself is aggravating the position, Japan has uniformly adopted an attitude of patience and of calm. She has evacuated her consulates and her nationals from the danger zones of the Upper Yangtse. Naval vessels were sent to Shanghai at the time when a protest against anti-Japanese agitation was presented to the

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Chinese Government. The only object of this action was to dissipate the anxiety caused by the threats to the lives and property of our nationals and to ensure, if necessary, their protection. It does not exceed the usual action taken by the Powers in similar circumstances.

"4. From the proceedings of the Council and from the resolution adopted there would appear to be a belief that, when the troops at present outside the railway zone are withdrawn, the Chinese authorities will be able to guarantee the maintenance of order in their stead. Unfortunately, the situation is as has just been described above, and not only would it be impossible to ensure the maintenance of order locally in such a simple fashion but the fact that, at certain points in Chinese territory remote from the theatre of current events, threats against the lives and property of our nationals multiply daily and even call for the despatch of naval reinforcements gives some idea of the obstacles hampering the execution of the plan of withdrawing entirely the Japanese forces within the railway zone.

"5. The Japanese Government considers that, in the existing circumstances, the most pressing necessity is to relieve the tension between the Japanese and Chinese peoples by mutual co-operation. To this end, it is essential to agree upon certain main principles to form a foundation for the maintenance of normal relations between the two countries. Once these principles have been laid down, the state of tension between the two nations will undoubtedly relax and the Japanese forces will be able to retire without apprehension within the South Manchurian railway zone. The Japanese Government is prepared to open negotiations with the responsible representatives of China on these fundamental points."

M. YOSHIKAWA, continuing, said:

I regret to see that the vigorous propaganda which has taken place in connection with current events has had the most unfortunate results on the international situation. By misrepresenting the facts and creating exaggerated alarm it has given rise to profound misunderstandings and an extreme nervousness which make it increasingly difficult to consider the situation calmly.

The party which, by spreading sensational and tendentious news, has thus misled public opinion incurs a very grave responsibility, not only in relation to its own country, but also in relation to the League of Nations and the whole world. The Japanese Government for its part, conscious of its responsibilities and actuated by the desire to preserve in the Council's discussions that atmosphere of serenity which is alone worthy of the Council and, at the same time, best fitted for a rapid solution of the question, would have felt that it was lacking in due respect to the Council, to China and to the public opinion of the world, if it had submitted information which was not strictly checked. The Japanese Government has also refrained from drawing attention to the attitude of the Chinese authorities in regard to Japan, which has led to the present events.

I regret that, in view of the situation thus created, I am compelled to insist on certain facts in connection with Chinese policy in relation to Japan, particularly in Manchuria.

The incidents in Manchuria have been the occasion of a variety of opinions and judgments, and I confess that I have not seldom been struck by the unfairness of many of them. It appears to me that the picture given of the relations of Japan and Manchuria is not an accurate one. It is essential that the Council should be informed on this question, and I desire with its permission to give here as briefly as possible certain fundamental elements of the position.

I begin with the historical facts.

In 1894, Chinese intrigues in Korea had become extremely threatening for Japan, and the latter was forced to have recourse to war. At the peace, China ceded to Japan under the Treaty of Shimonoseki the southern portion of the Liao-tung peninsula. The collective intervention of France, Russia and Germany on the ground that the possession of Liao-tung was a threat to Peking and to the general peace compelled Japan to forego the possession of this territory. In the following year (1896), China concluded a secret treaty of alliance with Russia directed specifically against Japan, under which she opened up Manchuria to Russia, giving the latter special privileges and the right to construct a railway across the Amur and Kirin provinces. In 1898, China of her own initiative gave Russia a lease of the territory of which the latter had previously deprived Japan, together with the right to build a new line in South Manchuria. Relying on the complaisant attitude of China, Russia continued to lay hands on Manchuria and, taking advantage of the Boxer disturbances, installed Russian troops in the province. That constituted a mortal threat to Japan, and the Japanese Government accordingly entered into negotiations with Russia to obtain consideration for Japanese interests. The records of these negotiations show that Russia regarded the possession of Manchuria as an established fact. That Japan could not admit, for it would have meant acquiescence in her own loss. Acting in ignorance of the secret Russo-Chinese treaty and relying on the Chinese declaration of neutrality, Japan thrust Russia out of Manchuria by an exhausting war of eighteen months and, while assuring her own security, at the same time safeguarded the integrity of this part of Chinese territory. Under the Portsmouth Peace Treaty, Russia ceded to Japan the lease of Liao-tung and the Russian rights to the railway line south of Changshun. China recognised these cessions by the Treaty of Peking of December 22nd, 1905.

The Japanese nation had twice risked its very existence to avert imminent peril in Korea and Manchuria, and it regards these regions as being closely associated with its destiny. All matters relating to them touch a particularly sensitive chord of Japanese national feeling. These factors cannot be left out of account in considering the Manchurian question.

The Japanese nation has no territorial ambitions in Manchuria: but it has vital political and economic interests there. It is the champion in Manchuria of the principle of equal opportunity

<sup>1</sup> Document C.706.M.312.1931.VII.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

and the open door for the economic activities of all nations. Foreign trade has increased ten times over since the arrival of Japan in Manchuria.

China had also derived immense advantages from the development of these provinces. Whereas no new railway of any importance has been built in China itself for the last twenty years, a thousand kilometres of railway have now been laid down in the three provinces. Each year hundreds of thousands of Chinese came to settle there. In twenty years, the population has doubled. The riches of the soil yield the inhabitants large profits. Industry has developed, and schools, hospitals and experimental stations have been erected. Cities have been built, communications have been improved. Manchuria is on the way to become an important factor in the economic life of China and the world.

It is not astonishing that Japan, after sacrificing so many lives and so much money in her struggles to safeguard her own security, should devote great efforts to the development of Manchuria. The first factor of such development is the maintenance of order. For a number of years past, armed bandits have been ravaging the countryside and levying contributions on the towns. The presence of Japanese forces has contributed immensely to increase the sense of security in these parts. The firmness of Japanese policy has prevented the civil wars which have devastated China for the last twenty years from interfering with the peaceful and laborious activities of Manchuria.

The Japanese people have invested large amounts of capital—more than two milliards of yen, or five milliards of Swiss francs—in these provinces. By treaties and by hard work, it has acquired rights and interests which are of primary importance alike for its economic and for its national existence. The Japanese nation is convinced that any attack on these rights and interests is an attack on its very existence; and it appears to me that the Japanese demand for possibilities of living and working freely in Manchuria side by side with the Chinese is at once legitimate and moderate.

For some years past, however, those who are responsible for the government of China have sought, it would seem, to ignore the past history of the question to which I have referred, and the rights and interests of Japan have been the object of innumerable attacks. Not only have the Japanese been subjected to indescribable vexations, but essential treaty rights have been openly violated.

Since the assumption of power by the Nationalist Government, even responsible statesmen have permitted themselves to make public pronouncements of a regrettable character in favour of the total abolition of our rights in Manchuria. To quote one example alone, the former Chinese Foreign Minister did not hesitate at a meeting on February 2nd last to say, with regard to the railway guards on the South Manchurian Railway, that, if Japan was not prepared to withdraw them, China would be compelled to resort to force, and that her military preparations would be sufficient to compel Japan to give way.

The campaign of insult and contempt of Japan has not failed to have its effect in Manchuria, and the attitude of the authorities in the north-east in relation to the South Manchurian Company and in relation to Japanese and Korean nationals has for some time past been singularly provocative. The latter are not only subjected to threats and arbitrary imprisonment, but their very lives and property are the object of attack, making it impossible for them to stay in Manchuria. Recently we have had occasion to deplore the massacre of a number of Koreans living in the district of Wanpaoshan.

The assassination of Captain Nakamura by Chinese troops is another instance of the insolent attitude of the Chinese in relation to us.

Acts of provocation in connection with the railway guards have also become frequent. The following are some examples of this. On July 14th last, a Japanese railway guard was arrested by the Chinese police within the railway zone itself. On August 5th, another Japanese guard was seriously wounded by a Chinaman to the south of Hai-Cheng station. On August 17th, the railway guard at Kuochiatien was forced to repel an attack of Chinese who endeavoured to prevent the passage of the train. On September 13th, the telegraph line was cut near Laokukoo station.

In face of these provocations, the Japanese Government adopted a patient and conciliatory attitude; but it was inevitable that the political atmosphere should be overcast, and that the Japanese nation should be animated by feelings of the liveliest indignation in the face of such proceedings. In Manchuria, however, the Chinese authorities, taking advantage of the Japanese Government's conciliatory attitude, became more and more arrogant and vexatious, and the tension became such that any new incident was capable of leading to a catastrophe. It was in these circumstances that the attempt by Chinese troops on the South Manchurian Railway took place on September 18th last.

The attack itself throws a singular light on the state of mind of the Chinese authorities. Up to that time, attacks by bandits on the railway line or in the zone had been frequent; but action by Chinese troops in uniform had never yet taken place.

The origins of the present events are therefore deeply rooted in the past, and the Japanese people cannot admit that these events should be treated as an isolated or fortuitous act, without referring to the sources of the trouble in the hope of improving matters in the future. The Japanese Government ardently hopes that China will appreciate the seriousness of the present situation and be prepared to modify her past attitude and enter on a new course of rational and constructive co-operation with a view to eliminating all causes of future conflicts between our two nations.

I have also to draw the Council's attention to another point. I have repeated more than once that the Japanese Government was perfectly ready to enter upon direct negotiations with China. Up to the present, we have not found it possible to realise this aspiration, which is that of the Council itself. I think that the delay is due in part to the internal political situation in China, which is extremely confused. Negotiations are taking place between the Nanking and Canton Governments; in the north Chang-Hsueh-Liang is endeavouring to maintain his position; while Feng-Yoo-Siang and Sung-Chuang-Fan appear to be making common cause.

I have given this account to the Council of the history of the problem, its importance for us, and the attitude of the Chinese authorities, as well as the possible solution. I apologise for the claims I have made on your patience, but I have been compelled to dwell at length on all these points, for the interest at issue is a vital interest, for the safeguarding of which the Japanese people has not hesitated to make the heaviest sacrifices in all the history of its existence as a nation. The complexity and importance of the problem now before the Council make its task particularly delicate.

In face of the situation created by the systematically vexatious manner in which the Chinese authorities deal with our essential rights and interests, the command of the Japanese troops considered it indispensable after the incident of September 18th to take legitimate defensive action with a view to averting at any cost the imminent danger which threatened the very existence of the Japanese in Manchuria. It is from this point of view that the operations undertaken by our troops over a relatively wide radius should be considered.

I have already stated on behalf of my Government that it is firmly resolved to withdraw its troops within the railway zone in proportion as the security and protection of our nationals is effectively assured. There is no change in my Government's view on this fundamental point.

In seeking a solution for a question of this range, too great importance cannot and should not be attached to theoretical arguments and possibilities. It is essential to take the widest views of the practical and political realities of the situation. Any proposal which is not based on the vital realities of the international situation cannot be successful. The present situation is greatly disturbed by the violent anti-Japanese agitation which is redoubling its strength throughout China and by the acts of cruelty to which numbers of Koreans and Japanese have fallen victims during the last few days. Under these conditions, the essential and most useful task of the Council appears to me to look first of all for means of calming the minds of the public and creating a moral disarmament between the two nations. The public opinion of my country, excited beyond measure by the proceedings of the Chinese authorities, cannot be calmed until it is convinced that the perpetual menace to our rights and opportunities in Manchuria has ceased. Conscious as it is of these apprehensions, and inspired by a lively desire for a relaxation of the prevailing tension, my Government has not ceased to inform the Council and the Chinese Government of the desirability of inaugurating negotiations in the spirit of the Council's resolution of September 30th. For the same reason, my Government immediately took the opportunity offered by the Chinese Government's Note of October 4th to inform it once more (by its reply of October 9th) of its attitude in the matter.

If the Chinese Government were to make serious efforts to check the anti-Japanese agitation and to arrive in common accord with us at a preliminary basis for the re-establishment of normal relations between the two countries, it would do much (I am convinced) to promote the relaxation and pacification which is so eminently desirable, thus removing the most serious obstacle to the withdrawal of our troops. The withdrawal of our troops is not conditional on the realisation of such an understanding. It is, I repeat, conditional on the security and protection of our nationals. That would, in practice, be assured by the procedure which my Government has not ceased to advocate. By all these measures and arguments taken together, we can give effect to the principles of the Council's resolution by establishing a good understanding between the two nations, as Article 12 of the Covenant says.

M. SZE. — I have followed carefully the Japanese representative's statement. He has dealt with a number of points which, in my opinion, and I am sure in your opinion, are irrelevant to the issue before you. He spoke about past history: I had the honour ten years ago to discuss many of the points to which he has referred with the representatives of Japan in Washington, and the stand I took then I take to-day. On many other points also I do not agree with him.

I must clear up one allegation he made with reference to a speech by Dr. C. T. Wang in February last at Ning-po. On that occasion a member of the Chinese Foreign Office explained to the Japanese Legation that the speech had been incorrectly reported. The explanation was accepted, and the allegation can therefore be dismissed without further discussion.

The Japanese representative referred to a number of other irrelevant points. I need not deal with them at length. I wish, however, to reply to them briefly. He mentioned anti-Japanese feelings and referred in particular to Hong-Kong and Kowloon, which are British possessions. I do not wish to conceal from you that there is still intense feeling in China, and that it has potentialities of danger, but the important point is to find out what caused this feeling. It has been said of philosophers that they kick up a dust and then complain that they cannot see. Is the situation not somewhat similar when the Japanese complain of the anti-Japanese feeling which exists in China? We must ascertain the reason for the continued occupation of a large part of China for almost a month and for the sufferings of the Chinese people.

Even after the Japanese representative had promised in this room that there should be no aggravation of the situation, the town of Chinchow was bombed by twelve aeroplanes and handbills were dropped. It has been said that these aeroplanes went to Chinchow to reconnoitre, but is it usual to send twelve bombers to reconnoitre and to drop bombs on a civilian population? I need not remind the Japanese representative of the importance attached to the appearance over a country of foreign aeroplanes. Only last summer two American aviators who were making a scientific tour round the world were detained when passing over Japan for reasons which were



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stated. And these were not armed aeroplanes. In speaking of anti-Japanese feelings, I would remind you that a *communiqué* sent to the Council by the Japanese representative himself states that no Japanese have been killed in China proper.

I notice one of the *communiqués* issued by the Japanese representative complains that Chinese subjects are being compelled to break their contracts with Japanese subjects. But here we have contractual obligations, and the Chinese courts are open to Japanese subjects who can sue for civil damages.

Seeing, however, that China has been subject for so long to foreign occupation and that the people have suffered greatly, they cannot be blamed for entertaining feelings of resentment. Indeed, it is surprising that these feelings have been kept within such reasonable limits by pacific means only. These anti-Japanese feelings are spontaneous movements on the part of the people themselves. I know of no accepted principle of international law whereby a Government, however strong, powerful or autocratic, can compel its people to buy from persons whom they do not like. The newspapers contain a report of anti-Japanese demonstrations in Canton two days ago. The citizens of Canton began to burn goods which they believed to be Japanese. Whenever they went beyond the law, the Chinese police had no hesitation in firing on their own people. That is to say, the authorities did not hesitate to take extreme measures in order to preserve peace, property and life.

I said that I would not dwell on the historical aspect of this question, but in order that my silence may not be misunderstood, I repeat that I do not accept the allegations made by the Japanese delegate, but maintain the position I adopted at the Washington Conference.

While we were sitting here this morning and again while we are sitting here this afternoon, Japanese army aeroplanes continue to drop bombs on open cities in Manchuria, and with your permission I beg to read to you two telegrams I have received. The first is dated October 13th, 9.40 a.m., and reads as follows:

"Japanese aeroplane opened machine-gun fire and dropped five bombs on Tausan, 130 kilometres west of Mukden — Peiping-Mukden Railway."

The second, dated October 13th, 3.45 p.m., reads as follows:

"Three Japanese aeroplanes bombed Koupangtze, 172 kilometres west of Mukden — Peiping-Mukden Railway."

The Japanese representative spoke of the security of Japanese nationals in China. A few days ago, before the city of Chinchow was bombed, the Japanese and Korean residents asked the local authorities to escort them to places of safety. Forty-four persons were so escorted. The Chinese authorities will fulfil their duty to protect Japanese nationals and escort them unmolested wherever they desire to go.

I have a cablegram which may be of interest to the Members of the Council. It was addressed to me by an American, Mr. Sherwood Eddy, who has devoted his entire life to the promotion of goodwill and a better understanding among the nations of the world.

This cablegram, which is dated October 12th, reads:

"I was present at capture Mukden. Evidence of many witnesses interviewed at time and on spot points to premeditated carefully prepared offensive plan of Japanese army without provocation of any Chinese attack producing bitter resentment when China suffering with flood disaster and world preoccupied. Japanese troops not withdrawn but all strategic points Southern Manchuria still held by Japanese and Chinchow bombed. I have testified, under oath sent Nanking and Geneva, to evidence of efforts to establish puppet independence Governments Manchuria under Japanese military control. I have forwarded sworn statement of interviews with Chinese leaders Manchuria who testify to repeated pressure of Japanese to induce them to head independence governments. Universal indignation in China taking form economic boycott which government cannot control. Efforts of Nanking Governments still peaceful non-resistance which imperil Government if pacific settlement fails. Situation critical grave developments imminent. All Orient looking to League of Nations and Kellogg Pact signatories for action. Asia believe League and Pact are on trial as well as Japan and China. Notable turning towards Soviet Russia as an ally and Communism is developing threatening widespread anarchy if League and Pact fail in this supreme crisis and menace of war. — SHERWOOD EDDY."

The Japanese representative spoke of measures of legitimate defence. I think we have already heard about that in this very room. Lord Cecil dealt clearly with the point and also called the attention of the Japanese representative to the Minutes of a previous meeting in Paris, which was presided over by M. Briand.

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With these few words, I propose to reserve my case until a subsequent occasion, when I may take the opportunity of replying to the Japanese representative at greater length.

I would merely add one word with regard to the direct negotiation to which the Japanese representative has referred. Japan's demand that China should resort to direct negotiations for the settlement of the present controversy is futile, for China will never agree to such a course so long as Japanese troops are illegally upon her soil and while satisfactory arrangements have not been made for compensating China for the wrongs done to her since September 18th.

Resort to direct negotiations between the Governments of China and Japan for determining the responsibilities of the two Governments for the events beginning on the night of September 18th and settling the reparations due from one country to the other cannot be entertained by the Chinese Government. Because of its conviction that such negotiations could not be expected to lead to satisfactory results, the Chinese Government placed the whole matter in the hands of the League.

Indeed, Japan herself first rejected direct negotiations. After the occurrences of September 18th, she did not limit her action to meeting the precise local condition (whatever that was) by localised action, and dealing with the immediate need for defence (if there was such a need). Without waiting for direct negotiations, she sent large numbers of troops into China, established military occupation in important places over a wide area of China, and carried on military operations which resulted in the loss of many Chinese lives and the destruction of much Chinese property. Thus Japan herself abandoned any possible resort to direct negotiations and made it necessary for China to appeal to the League to prevent further acts of violence and to help her to obtain relief and reparation for the injuries already committed. Surely, it is not now right or reasonable for Japan to claim that the adjustment of the whole controversy should be effected through direct negotiations.

In referring to the bombardment of the open town of Chinchow, where many lives were lost, I hesitated to read the whole document describing the real intention of the Japanese reconnaissance, but, with your permission, I will read a part of that handbill, omitting that part which is not suitable for reading in public:

"The Imperial [Japanese] Army, which, in accordance with the principles of justice, is endeavouring to safeguard its interests and to protect the masses, will never recognise the Provisional Government of Chang Hsueh-Liang at Chinchow, and therefore it is obliged to take drastic measures to suppress such a Government. The people of Chinchow should submit to the kindness and power of the army of the Great Japanese Empire and should oppose and prevent the establishment of Chang Hsueh-Liang's Government, otherwise they will be considered as decidedly opposing the army of the Great Japanese Empire, in which case the army will ruthlessly destroy Chinchow."<sup>1</sup>

I would add one word with reference to the Japanese representative's historical survey. He did not mention the treaties of May 1915, resulting from the "Twenty-One Demands" which his country addressed to China.

M. YOSHIKAWA. — It is my duty to reply to the Chinese representative point by point.

I considered it necessary to explain the history of Manchuria in order to give you an idea of our position in regard to China. I know that the Chinese representative was present at the Washington Conference and explained China's attitude on that occasion, but I do not wish to enter into the details of the discussions which took place at that time.

The results embodied in the treaties, protocols and Minutes confirm the views I have expressed.

The Chinese representative refuted my statement with regard to the speech made by Dr. C. T. Wang, ex-Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs. That statement was based upon a telegram from the Minister for Foreign Affairs in Tokio, and I am convinced that I have not been misinformed.

He then referred to the anti-Japanese movement in China. In this connection, I intended to point out that the orders given by the Chinese Government, or the leaders of the Government, have not been faithfully observed. I have already communicated certain information to the Council in document C.703.M.309.1931.VII, and, in addition to that information, we have been informed of many cases of maltreatment of Japanese residents in China by the Chinese population.

Prior to the incident of September 18th, we had for some years past been subjected to much ill-treatment and outrage. I will give one example relating to Japanese merchant vessels and warships fired upon by Chinese soldiers. During the year March 1930 to February 1931, merchant vessels and warships were fired upon 145 times by Chinese soldiers. That is a single case, which I take the opportunity of mentioning here, but if necessary I can at a later date give my colleagues information regarding other cases of outrages committed upon our nationals in China.

I would further mention that stones were thrown at Japanese school-children in Shanghai. Ninety-six such cases have occurred since September 18th.

<sup>1</sup> Document C.694.M.299.1931.VII.



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The Chinese representative then dealt with the Chinchow incident. The circumstances have been fully explained in the note which I addressed to the President of the Council and I need not therefore go further into details. My note fully explains my Government's attitude. I wish, however, to add one word. The Japanese army, which is outnumbered, is very sensitive to any attack made by the Chinese army, and the incident in question arose from the fact that the Chinese army sent many soldiers east of Chinchow disguisedly to make contact with troops east of the South Manchuria railway. Moreover, Japanese aeroplanes were fired upon by the Chinese army and found it necessary to drop bombs.

The Chinese representative also referred to a new incident reported to have taken place at Koupangtze. I have not yet been informed of this incident.

He stated that the Japanese consuls expressed their thanks for the protection of Japanese residents in Chinchow. If those residents have been protected, our consuls ought to express their thanks which, of course, I fully endorse.

I would point out that, although our nationals in China are being subjected to maltreatment, Chinese nationals living in Japan are protected, and as I stated in my last statement, the Chinese Minister in Tokio expressed his thanks for that protection.

The Chinese representative referred to the calamity caused by the flood. I may say that the Japanese population—not only Government officials, but the entire nation—expressed its most cordial sympathy in a concrete manner. Government officials, including the higher officials of the Foreign Office, made contributions, and relief associations sent a delegation to China with an enormous amount of material and money. They were unable to get into touch with the proper quarters, however, and were obliged to return to Japan.

The Chinese representative referred to direct negotiations. As I informed the Council at its last meeting in September, we have been and shall be faithful to the principle of direct negotiation. In the proposal contained in the reply addressed to the President of the Council, my Government suggests that it is essential to reach agreement on certain principal points as a basis for negotiation. My Government's intention is that these negotiations shall not include details relating to the settlement of the conditions resulting from the incident of September 18th, but shall only deal with the bases of negotiation, with a view to reaching agreement with China on the matter of evacuation, and so on. Without such preliminary negotiation, it is impossible for us to withdraw our troops into the railway zone in view of past experience in analogous cases. For instance, as the representative of China well knows, on the occasion of the Washington Conference Baron Shidehara, Minister for Foreign Affairs, made an arrangement with the Chinese delegate for the evacuation of our troops from the Province of Shantung. About three years ago when we had withdrawn our troops from Tsinan, I myself negotiated with Dr. C. T. Wang, and a detailed programme for evacuation was agreed upon between us, which, at the request of the Chinese Government, was not carried out. A little later on, in conformity with a request made by the Chinese Government, we scrupulously withdrew our troops from the territory in which they were stationed. In view of this experience, my Government finds it necessary to come to some arrangement as a preliminary to the complete withdrawal of our troops.

M. SZE. — The representative of Japan has been good enough to tell us that the Japanese army is very sensitive to criticism. But that sensitiveness is not a monopoly of the Japanese army.

With reference to the Chinchow incident, he said that Chinese soldiers fired upon Japanese aeroplanes, which were forced to drop bombs. I wonder whether he would produce before the Council evidence of that attack. As I have already said, there are no anti-aircraft guns in the possession of the Chinese Army at Chinchow or at the railway station.

He referred to the flood. When I first addressed the Assembly, I gave due recognition to Japan for her assistance. As regards subsequent events, I had the honour to circulate two telegrams, one from the people who were starving in Hankow and one from the Chairman of the Flood Relief Commission, and there is therefore no need for me to go into the matter further.

The representative of Japan also referred to experience of previous direct negotiations for the withdrawal of troops. In one case, I had the honour of negotiating with Baron Shidehara in Washington, and in another the Japanese representative himself negotiated with the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs; but the present case is not analogous to those two previous cases. Had they been similar cases, China, as a loyal Member of the League, would have asked the League to examine them.

Moreover, in referring to what might be expected, in the light of previous experience, from direct negotiations, he omitted to refer to the results for China of the direct negotiations carried on with Japan after the latter had presented its "Twenty-One Demands" in 1915.

M. YOSHIZAWA. — It is unnecessary for me to make any further observations at the moment. I would merely say that I disagree with the representative of China on certain points.

Lord READING. — With reference to the two telegrams read by the Chinese representative regarding bombing operations, I hope that the Japanese representative will obtain full information for us, and will present it to the Council without delay.

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M. YOSHIZAWA. — I shall not fail to ask my Government for full information.

The PRESIDENT. — We have heard the very complete explanations of the parties to this dispute. We note that Japan repeats the assurance given at a previous meeting that she has no ulterior motive and is ready to evacuate the places which her forces have occupied, provided, and this is her only reservation, she feels that the security of the persons and property of her nationals is guaranteed. The representative of China has told us that his country has no intention whatever of resorting to reprisals, and that, in spite of the excited state of her people, China is refraining from anything which might lead her nationals to commit serious acts.

To my mind, at least, that is a situation which—seeing that it exists between two Members of the League of Nations, both of whom, by exceptional good fortune, are Members of the Council—gives reason to hope that this dispute, though already serious, will not assume the proportions of a catastrophe. That is my impression after hearing the Japanese representative's statement that, as regards guarantees and conversations for the purpose of obtaining them, he has not in mind negotiations on the situation as a whole, but simply the possibility of conversations on questions relating directly to the problem of the occupation. It is also my impression after hearing the affirmation of the Chinese Government's intention to protect the lives and property of Japanese nationals. I cannot, then, believe that a dispute of this kind will lead to an irremediable situation.

The Council is faced with one of the most important and difficult duties which the League of Nations could be called upon to perform. It will perform that duty with the necessary firmness when it has obtained full information as to the causes and extent of the dispute, and the means of settling it.

I have been confronted in the past with similar—though not identical—cases, and I can say that what enabled the League of Nations and the Council to discharge their duty was the confidence which both parties placed in the League.

The representative of China has just told us—and I am not surprised—that the situation with which his country is faced naturally causes irritation, and may lead to serious events. The Japanese representative has said that certain military acts have been carried through under the influence of anxiety. Soldiers readily feel such anxiety, and when they do so they act. That I understand. But I want to distinguish between facts capable of explanation, which do not create an irremediable situation and those which may place us before such a situation. The League of Nations has been able to act effectively and to settle disputes because the parties, trusting in the League, have been prepared to do everything in their power to facilitate its task.

I therefore ask for an assurance that pending a solution the situation shall not become worse, that no new incidents shall render our task more troublesome and the settlement more difficult. I know our colleagues; I know that the two great nations they represent here realise what a terrible responsibility would rest on the nation which, at so grave a time, brought about a catastrophe that would be felt throughout the world.

I am sure our colleagues will advise their Governments to have confidence and patience, and to avoid anything which might render the situation more serious and complicate the Council's task, which is already so heavy. I am convinced that we shall then achieve the object we all desire.


Let us not go into details to discover which points are strictly accurate and which not quite so accurate, but let us look at the situation as a whole. Two nations opposed to each other as a result of a serious misunderstanding are still in touch; they have not broken off relations and their representatives are even sitting at the same table and are able to discuss matters calmly, coolly and courteously, as we have heard them do to-day. What a lesson for those who say that the League of Nations is not worthy of the confidence which the nations have placed in it!

The confidence in the League shown by both parties must continue. It must be accompanied by patience if we are to do our share. We can assure the two parties that we shall not fail in our duty. We shall discharge it resolutely with the means—unfortunately limited—at our disposal. Nevertheless we shall fulfil it. I am sure that if you will help us—and I do not doubt that that is your intention—we shall achieve the aim we all desire.

The next meeting will take place at a later date, of which I will inform the Members of the Council.



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C./65th Session/P.V.10(1).

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

SIXTY-FIFTH SESSION OF THE COUNCIL

MINUTES

TENTH MEETING (PRIVATE).

*Held on Thursday, October 15th, 1931, at 5.30 p.m.*

Present: All the representatives of the Members of the Council, and the Secretary-General.

2949. **Appeal from the Chinese Government under Article 11 of the Covenant (continuation):**  
**Proposal to invite the Government of the United States of America to be represented on the Council.**

The PRESIDENT recalled the satisfaction expressed at previous meetings at the close contact established between the Council of the League and the Government of the United States of America. The Council had taken steps to keep the United States Government informed of the developments of the question with which the Council was at present concerned. It had also expressed the hope that the United States Government would in its turn send communications to the Council. The United States Government had welcomed this form of co-operation.

The Council had further expressed its appreciation of the fact that the United States Government had embarked on closer collaboration with the Council.

In accordance with the above desire, he had drafted an invitation to the United States Government in the following terms: <sup>1</sup>

"In the course of the discussion, the opinion has been expressed that the question before the Council concerns the fulfilment of obligations arising, not only from the Covenant of the League of Nations, but also from the Pact of Paris.

"This opinion is certainly well founded, since, in accordance with Article 2 of that Pact:

" 'The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts, of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means.'

"Foremost among the signatories of the Pact of Paris appear the United States of America. The United States was one of the proponents of the Pact, and I may be allowed to recall that I had the honour to be associated with the then Secretary of State of the United States as joint-author. In consequence, the United States may be regarded as being especially interested in ensuring a settlement of the present dispute by pacific means.

"Moreover, the Government of the United States, with which communications regarding the dispute before the Council have already been exchanged, has expressed its wholehearted sympathy with the attitude of the League of Nations, and has affirmed its desire to reinforce the action of the League. I feel confident that I shall be meeting the wishes of my colleagues in proposing that we should invite the Government of the United States to be associated with our efforts by sending a representative to sit at the Council table so as to be in a position to express an opinion as to how, either in view of the present situation or of its future development, effect can best be given to the provisions of the Pact. By this means, also, the opportunity will be afforded him of following our deliberations on the problem as a whole.

<sup>1</sup> Document C.721.M.326.1931.VII.



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"I am sure that any action that might be taken under the Pact could not but strengthen the efforts which are now being made by the Council in accordance with the obligations imposed upon it by the Covenant of the League of Nations to effect the peaceful settlement of the problem under discussion."

The President added that the text submitted was, of course, open to amendment.

M. YOSHIZAWA asked that the letter which he had addressed to the President that morning should be read to the Council, together with the reply of the latter.

The PRESIDENT said that he would not have ventured to communicate to the Council the Japanese representative's letter or his own reply without having first received M. Yoshizawa's permission to do so. As, however, the latter had expressed a wish for the letters to be communicated to the Council, he would now have them read.

*Letter, dated October 15th, 1931, from M. Yoshizawa to the President of the Council.*

"In the course of the conversation I had with you yesterday, I had the honour to inform you that I felt certain doubts on constitutional grounds as regards the question of inviting the United States Government to be represented in the Council of the League of Nations.

"The following are the main points which, we think, need to be cleared up:

"(1) When there is any question of inviting a Member of the League or a non-member State (we will assume that they are on a footing of equality according to the Covenant) to send a representative to sit on the Council, ought it not to be settled whether the question before the Council specially affects the interests of that Member or non-member State (Article 4, paragraph 5)?

"(2) When a question is brought before the Council under Article 11 of the Covenant, can there be any Member or non-member State whose interests are specially affected by the matter within the meaning of Article 4, paragraph 5?

"(3) When the Council decides to invite a non-member State to send a representative to the Council, on what footing will he sit in the Council?

"If he sits as an observer according to League precedent, is he entitled to take part in the discussions?

"If he sits on a footing of equality with the Members of the Council, has he the same rights and duties as they have?

"(4) If the Council should decide to invite a non-member State to be present at the proceedings of this session, would it be the Council's intention to create a precedent which would necessarily be followed whenever any matter was brought before the Council under Article 11?

"(5) Should not the Council's decision to invite a non-member State to send a representative to sit in the Council be taken unanimously, according to the normal rule laid down in the Covenant?

"I should be very grateful if you would give me your views on this matter, and I have the honour, etc.

(Signed) YOSHIZAWA,

*Japanese Representative on the Council."*

*Letter, dated October 15th, 1931, from the President of the Council to M. Yoshizawa.*

"I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 15th instant.

"My impression is that that letter is based on a misconception. Article 4, paragraph 5, of the Covenant does not come into the matter. It has never been suggested that the representative of the United States of America should be invited to sit as a Member of the Council; but at the outset the Council unanimously decided to communicate all information relating to the question to the United States Government, and to ask the latter to make any communications to the Council that it might think fit. That is what has been done, and, accordingly, the Council has on several occasions received important communications from the United States Government. The present proposal, made with the same intention and in order to co-ordinate the joint efforts of the Council and the United States Government, is that the latter should be invited to send a representative who would sit at the Council table, but not as a Member.

"In any similar cases which may occur in the future, the Council will probably decide to act in the same way.

"As you will see, the question of the proposed invitation is quite definitely one of procedure, and can therefore be decided by a majority vote.

"To prevent any misunderstanding, I enclose the text of the remarks I propose to make to the Council when I ask my colleagues to address the invitation to the United States Government.

(Signed) A. BRIAND,

*President in Office of the Council."*

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M. YOSHIZAWA said that the substance of the President's reply, which had just been read, was at complete variance with his own opinion on the matter. Under these circumstances he could not accept the President's proposal.

It was not, in his opinion, a question of procedure. All decisions on questions arising in virtue of Article 11 of the Covenant had to be unanimous. In support of that view, he quoted an opinion of the Permanent Court of International Justice issued in 1925 to the following effect:

"In a body constituted in this way, whose mission is to deal with any matter 'within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world', observance of the rule of unanimity is naturally and even necessarily indicated. Only if the decisions of the Council have the support of the unanimous consent of the Powers composing it will they possess the degree of authority which they must have; the very prestige of the League might be imperilled if it were admitted, in the absence of an express provision to that effect, that decisions on important questions could be taken by a majority. Moreover, it is hardly conceivable that resolutions on questions affecting the peace of the world could be adopted against the will of those amongst the Members of the Council who, although in a minority, would, by reason of their political position, have to bear the larger share of the responsibilities and consequences ensuing therefrom."

The Japanese representative then caused to be read the following memorandum embodying the Japanese Government's opinion on the question:

"I. An invitation to the representative of any non-member State to take part in the proceedings of the Council of the League of Nations would raise rather difficult constitutional questions when the Council is dealing with a matter submitted to it under Article 11 of the Covenant.

"The provisions of the Covenant relative to the invitation of a Member of the League of Nations to take part in the Council's proceedings are explicit. According to Article 4, paragraph 5:

"Any Member of the League not represented on the Council shall be invited to send a representative to sit as a member at any meeting of the Council during the consideration of matters specially affecting the interests of that Member of the League."

"We are aware of one concrete case in which the Council was called upon to pronounce on the scope and practical application of the provisions of the above paragraph.

"From the decision taken by the Council on that occasion, it appears that a matter specially affects a Member of the League when the Council is discussing a particular question of limited scope, whereas a matter of general interest does not specially affect any one Member even though it may affect a certain number of Members. In respect of matters coming within this latter category, the question of inviting a Member to send a representative to take a seat at the Council table would not arise.

"II. Apart from the case dealt with in Article 17, the Covenant of the League of Nations contains no provision defining cases in which a non-member State shall be invited to send a representative to take a seat at the Council table unless the Council takes action in pursuance of treaty provisions expressly recognising its competence to deal with a matter affecting a non-member State (for example, the frontier dispute between Turkey and Iraq submitted to the Council in 1924).

"It may be argued that the Council is free to decide whether or not it is desirable to invite a non-member State to send a representative to take a seat at the Council table. Without going into this point, it may nevertheless be maintained that, if in a given case the Council decides to invite a non-member State to send a representative to take a seat at the Council table, it should at least comply with the spirit of the Covenant. This spirit is expressed in the decision of the Council to which reference is made above.

"In accordance with that decision, it seems natural and desirable that a non-member State should be invited to send a representative to take a seat at the Council table when the latter is dealing with a question which specially affects its interests. Such is the case when the Council has to deal with a concrete and definite question. The position is different when the question at issue is a general one.

"III. Article 11 (paragraph 1) refers to cases of war or threat of war which are a matter of concern to the League of Nations as a whole, irrespective of whether any one Member of the League is directly affected or not (the same argument applies to the provisions of Article 11, paragraph 2).

"When a Member of the League submits a matter to the Council under Article 11, that matter concerns the League as a whole—that is to say, all the Members of the League. In addition to the parties at issue, all Members of the League have an equal interest in a matter submitted to the Council under Article 11. According to the Covenant, therefore, no Member can be peculiarly interested in such a matter. When all the Members are interested, it is impossible for any one Member to be particularly interested.

"Should the Council, when discussing a matter submitted to it in pursuance of Article 11, invite any Member not represented on the Council, it must invite all the Members of the League—a deduction which has not hitherto been made.



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"Even if we admit the hypothesis of the Council's freedom of decision, it is impossible to deduce from it the conclusion that the Council is free to regard a given State as being peculiarly interested in the matter submitted to it, for the simple reason that Article 11 cannot be of peculiar interest to any given State. A decision by the Council to invite a non-member State to send a representative to take a seat at the Council table would, for the reasons mentioned above, be contrary to the fundamental principles of the Covenant.

"IV. Even if the above arguments were regarded as irrelevant, difficult questions would be raised if the Council were to decide to invite any non-member State to send a representative to take a seat at the Council table.

"In the first place, it would be necessary to decide in what capacity the representative of a non-member State would sit at the Council table. At first sight it might be maintained that he would sit there as an observer. Leaving out of account the fact that such a procedure would be unprecedented, it should be pointed out that, according to the traditions established in practice by the organs of the League, an observer enjoys a unique position. Difficult questions would also be raised if the representative of a non-member State were to sit at the Council table on a footing of equality with the other Members. In the first place, it is necessary to decide whether, through the mere fact of sending a representative to sit at the Council table, the non-member State would assume the same rights and duties as any other Member of the Council. In the second place, we should know whether the Council is not obliged to accede to a request from any other non-member State for the right to send a representative to sit at the Council table. Finally, we should know whether the Covenant recognises a difference of rights and duties between Members of the Council as such, as the presence at Council meetings of the representative of a non-member State might lead to differences of rights and duties according to the decision taken in respect of the previous point.

"V. Even if it is admitted on the above considerations that the Council has complete freedom of decision as regards the invitation of a non-member State to send a representative, the question then arises of how such a decision is to be taken. Except where otherwise expressly provided in the Covenant, decisions of the Council require the agreement of all the Members of the League represented at the meeting, it being understood that all matters of procedure may be decided by a majority vote.

"Without attempting a detailed discussion of what is meant in the Covenant by 'all matters of procedure', it may be said that the expression refers to all matters not relating to the substance or merits of a problem. In the present case, two things have to be distinguished—namely, the question of substance arising in regard to the invitation of a State not a Member of the League, and the question of the sending of the actual invitation after the question of substance has been settled. As regards the question of substance, the merits of the case have to be considered in the light of the considerations above indicated, the decision on which can only be taken by a unanimous vote. The only question on which a majority vote is allowable is the question of the sending of the invitation, for this is a question of procedure.

"It should, moreover, be noted that any action taken by the Council under Article 11 is of such importance that it should be decided in accordance with the normal rule which requires unanimity. (See the Opinion of the Permanent Court of International Justice, Series B, No. 12, pages 29 and following.)"

Lord READING was not clear whether the Japanese representative did or did not object to the invitation which the President had proposed. If he did not object, the question was settled.

M. YOSHIZAWA replied that he had not said that he had any objection to raise to the invitation. He was not prepared to say at the moment whether he had any objection. What he had said in his letter was that he had some doubts as regards the question raised by the invitation, which not only involved an important constitutional issue, but also raised a large number of other legal points. Until his doubts in the matter were resolved, he could not say whether he had or had not an objection to raise. He asked the Council to refer the matter to a committee of legal experts, which would report to the Council.

The PRESIDENT said that the Council had two questions before it—one a question of principle or a constitutional question, and the other a question of fact. The latter could be settled by a vote. If it appeared that there was opposition to the proposed invitation, the question arose whether a simple majority vote was sufficient for the acceptance of the proposal. The best solution in so delicate a matter would be unanimous agreement. He observed that the Japanese representative had always welcomed the previous efforts of the Council to associate the United States of America with the Council for purposes of mutual co-operation; and he had expressed satisfaction at the communications which had passed between the Government in Washington and the Council. If he felt that this form of co-operation was not one to be rejected, that would, in fact, settle the matter. He could then proceed to make a reservation concerning the constitutional questions he had raised.

If, on the other hand, the Japanese delegate rejected the substance of the proposal, the problem then became very much more difficult to solve.

M. Briand asked the Japanese representative to consider what his proposal really meant; he thought there was a misunderstanding between his Japanese colleague and himself.

M. Yoshizawa was obsessed by the machinery of Article 4, paragraph 5, of the Covenant, which had, indeed, been applicable to a large number of cases that had arisen. Was this a similar case? Not at all. It was quite a different case. In the case which M. Yoshizawa had in mind,

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a Member of the League which was not a Member of the Council was "invited to send a representative to sit as a Member at any meeting of the Council during the consideration of matters specially affecting the interests of that Member of the League". In such a case, the representative of the State in question was not invited to take his place at the Council table for the purpose of making communications but to incorporate himself with the Council. He became for all purposes a Member of the Council. He deliberated and voted with the Council, and took part in all its decisions.

If such were the present case, he could well understand the hesitation of the Japanese representative. But what was proposed in the present instance was merely to prolong, by more continuous contact, a form of co-operation which already existed. The co-operation in question had taken the form up to the present of a diplomatic exchange of notes and information. Would it not be simpler if this communication were made by word of mouth? The United States representative would not thereby become a Member of the Council. He would not vote. He would merely take his seat at the Council table, listen to the discussion on behalf of his Government, and make communications to the Council. There was not much difference between this new form of co-operation which M. Briand proposed and the form of co-operation which had existed for the last few weeks.

He warmly urged the Japanese representative to reflect as to the course he was taking. Did he really think it desirable to raise, in connection with this relatively moderate proposal, a big constitutional discussion on far-reaching questions of principle?

If the Japanese representative did not desire to raise objections to the proposed invitation, he asked him to simplify the problem by treating it as a pure question of fact. If he could see his way to take up such an attitude, it could not fail to have a satisfactory moral effect.

In any case, it would be understood that the point raised by the Japanese representative would remain fully reserved.

M. YOSHIZAWA said he was grateful for the President's sympathetic observations. Japan had maintained very intimate relations with the United States of America in the past; it still maintained such relations and would unquestionably continue to do so in the future. But the point under discussion seemed to him to have nothing to do with the political relations between the Japanese Government and the Government of the United States. The point under discussion, as he had already said, was one which concerned the very constitution of the League of Nations. He regretted that his own view differed from that of the President. He had already explained the reasons for the difference, and he had nothing to add to what he had already said on the subject.

Lord READING said he would consider it most unfortunate if the very important question which at present divided the Japanese and the Chinese Governments were to be in any way put on one side or its solution postponed because an accessory constitutional question had been raised. He, too, thought that there was a mere misunderstanding between his Japanese colleague and the other Members of the Council. He had not much to add to the apposite observations made by the President. Like the latter, he was sincerely desirous that the Council should be able to realise unanimous agreement. There should not be any expression of divergent opinion in that agreement, or, at any rate, no negative vote.

In reality, the difference to which he had just referred resolved itself into very little, when once the question was approached in its true aspect. He proposed to explain once more what exactly should be understood by the President's proposal. The situation presented itself as follows:

An appeal was addressed to the Council in virtue of Article 11. The Council proposed to invite the representative of a Government to take his place at the Council table. There was no question of this representative participating in the decisions which the Council would have to take under the Covenant. The fear of the Japanese representative seemed to be that the representative of the United States would sit as a Member of the Council.

If that were the case, the question of the invitation would, in fact, become a question of substance, instead of being a question of procedure. But that was not the case, since the invited representative would sit, not as a Member, but merely for the purpose of making verbal communications to the Council and informing his Government.

The Council would be happy if the authorised representative of the United States Government was in a position to place it directly in touch with his Government's views on questions as important as that of the Chinese Government's appeal. The excellent relations which existed between the Japanese Government and the Government of the United States, to which M. Yoshizawa had just referred, were one more reason in favour of this direct co-operation.

Moreover, on several occasions the League of Nations had benefited by this co-operation of the United States of America, and Japan had derived profit from it in the past, as had the other Members of the League. If the question were approached from this angle, the delicate constitutional problem raised by the Japanese representative disappeared entirely. Moreover, as the President had said, if M. Yoshizawa desired, it was perfectly possible to reserve this constitutional question.

Above all, the Council should not lose sight of, or relegate to the background, the real question which was responsible for the present meeting of the Council. The question was one of putting into practice, with the assistance of the Japanese and Chinese representatives, all possible peaceful means for the purpose of preventing acts of hostility which might speedily become acts of war.

Lord READING, reverting to the proposal made by the Japanese representative to submit the question which caused him concern to a committee of experts, thought there was again the same confusion to which he had referred. This also applied to the quotation which M. Yoshizawa had read from an opinion of the Permanent Court of International Justice. The question was, in reality, quite different.



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All the Members of the Council were undoubtedly agreed in thinking that, if a question of substance were raised in virtue of Article 11, unanimity of the Members should be the rule. But in this case no question of substance arose; it was a question of procedure. The Council was dealing with the question of inviting a non-member State to appoint a representative for the purpose of making communications and taking part in discussions. As this representative would not have a right to vote on any matter, how could it be a question of substance to decide whether it was desirable or not to address such an invitation to the Government of the United States?

Moreover, the Japanese representative had himself stated in writing at the end of his memorandum that "the only question on which a majority vote is allowable is the question of the sending of the invitation, for this is a question of procedure". Lord Reading thus felt justified in assuming that the Japanese representative himself admitted that the question was one of procedure. The invitation in itself had obviously nothing to do with Article 4. But the whole argument of the Japanese representative was based precisely on that article.

Again, if the Council invited the United States Government to send a representative to the Council as a Member, Lord Reading could understand M. Yoshizawa's scruples. But, on the contrary, the Council was discussing a question which actually came very closely within the limits of the sentence his colleague had himself written.

To sum up, Lord Reading thought that M. Yoshizawa had himself concluded in his memorandum that the question of the invitation was a question of procedure. In view of the delicate character of the subject under discussion, Lord Reading hoped M. Yoshizawa would not persist in the misunderstanding which he had himself done his best to dissipate, and to which the President's letter to the Japanese representative had already drawn attention.

M. YOSHIZAWA said he understood Lord Reading's point; but, unfortunately, the latter's opinion differed from his own.

Lord Reading had quoted a sentence from the Japanese memorandum. He would ask him to give his attention also to the sentences preceding the one quoted.

M. Yoshizawa further referred to a sentence in the President's proposal to the following effect: "The representative of the United States Government will thus be in a position to express an opinion as to how, either in view of the present situation or of its future development, effect can best be given to the provisions of the Pact". That was a very important point.

He hoped the President would now take into consideration his proposal to refer the constitutional point he had raised to a committee of legal experts.

M. DE MADARIAGA was in complete agreement with the President and Lord Reading. The wording of the President's letter did not in any way go beyond what Lord Reading had said.

He did not propose to dwell on the difference between Japan and the other Members of the Council, or on the distinction between the question of procedure and the question of substance. He would merely note the differences of view in M. Yoshizawa's successive statements.

He wished, however, to point out to the latter that the real issue with which the Council was confronted was the question of *time*. It was now October 15th; ever since September 18th—that was to say, for nearly a month past—a state of affairs had prevailed in Manchuria which was very difficult to define, and as to which he would only say that it was not exactly in conformity with the spirit of the Covenant.

The Japanese representative had read a document to the Council in which he maintained that the latter should act in the spirit of the Covenant in connection with the application of Article 11. But were not certain recent events in conflict with the spirit of the Covenant? He did not presume to offer an opinion; he merely registered the facts. However, he was surprised that stress should be laid on a subtle legal point and that, in connection with the proposed invitation to the United States, consideration should be given to the infinitesimal extent to which the Council might be departing from the spirit of the Covenant, while the real question of the application of the spirit of the Covenant—that was to say, the question of the events in Manchuria—was left apparently in suspense.

He felt sure M. Yoshizawa would do the Council the justice to admit that, from the first, it had appreciated the very great difficulties of the situation, the immense distance of the scene of events from Geneva, and the complexity of the factors involved, and that it had carefully avoided any precipitate decision in regard to the substance of the matter. The substance of the matter consisted in the somewhat serious operations which could not frankly be described as anything other than "military" operations. Both sides admitted that cities had been bombarded from the air. That was a very serious situation of fact. He did not presume to pass judgment on the questions of responsibility. He merely pointed out that there was responsibility, and that the public opinion of the world was moved.

He accordingly appealed both to the Council and to the Japanese representative. The Council was hard pressed by the consideration of *time*. It was already an open secret that the Council was proposing to address an invitation to the United States. The question of that invitation called for solution at the earliest possible date, and it was desirable that the decision in the matter should be unanimous.

He had every respect for the legal scruples of the Japanese representative, and he supported the President's proposal. He urged M. Yoshizawa to accept the proposal to invite the United States Government to take a place at the Council table in the terms proposed by the President and Lord Reading, the legal question which had been raised being strictly reserved.

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He begged M. Yoshizawa to endeavour to realise, and to inform his Government, that the Council was moved both by its responsibility and by the growing pressure of public opinion, and that it was bound to take up and solve the substance of the question as soon as possible.

The PRESIDENT observed that the Council had before it two possibilities. Either it must vote on the proposal for the invitation which was put forward at the beginning of the meeting, ascertain whether there was a majority in favour or unanimous agreement, and, in the event of the proposal being accepted, take the necessary action. Or, on the other hand, the Council might accept the Japanese representative's proposal to appoint immediately a committee of jurists to settle the difficulty as quickly as possible.

But, in the latter case, did the Japanese Government intend to accept the Committee's opinion, whatever it might be, and to defer to it? If not—if, that was to say, the Japanese Government was not prepared to undertake to accept the Committee's opinion—it was really not worth while to undertake the study in question. Time pressed, as the Spanish representative had pointed out. The question of the invitation could not be left over for reasons of tact and delicacy, which the Japanese representative would be among the first to appreciate.

He fully realised M. Yoshizawa's situation. The nation to which M. Yoshizawa belonged was a generous nation, but it nevertheless found itself in the position of having to resist. But, even at the risk of unduly pressing the point, he wished to make a last effort to persuade his Japanese colleague. He reminded him that everything had been said which had to be said as to the nature of the step which it was proposed the Council should take, and as to the question of principle, which would be reserved in its entirety. He could not help thinking that, if M. Yoshizawa could make an effort of goodwill in the matter, the Council would be able rapidly to come to a decision. The serious scruples of the Japanese representative would be met, since the precautions with regard to the future which the latter considered essential would have been taken into account, and that to the fullest possible extent. The question of fact, however, would be settled, and the United States would continue to co-operate with the Council in a form which was practically the same as before.

He begged M. Yoshizawa not to raise any difficulty in the way of the proposed invitation. All his reservations would be duly recorded and the questions raised thereby would be reserved.

M. YOSHIZAWA replied that he must ask the President to appoint a committee of legal experts to study the question of principle. In making that request he was complying closely with his Government's instructions.

Lord READING asked M. Yoshizawa to say whether he was prepared to accept the decision of the committee of experts, if it were set up.

M. YOSHIZAWA said he could not give a final answer as to whether he would or would not be able to accept the result of the experts' investigation. He would, of course, give the fullest attention to their report, if the Committee were appointed.

The PRESIDENT said that M. Yoshizawa's reply brought the Council face to face with an extremely delicate situation. Time pressed. The painful aspects of this matter of the proposed invitation—if a final solution were not reached—were plain to all. On the other hand, if the Council set up a committee of experts and the latter gave their opinion in accordance with the views of the present majority of the Council, and the Japanese representative then proceeded to make reservations as to the committee's decisions, the situation would be even worse than at present. In these circumstances he could not believe that the Japanese representative desired to expose the Council to such a risk.

He repeated once more that the question of fact must be promptly settled. The question of principle would be duly reserved by the Japanese representative, and the views of the latter recorded. He might add that the Council was in some sense a committee of experts, and certain of its members possessed both profound legal knowledge and a political sense, which was not a combination to be despised where it was a question of throwing light on legal questions.

M. Briand added that, for reasons of tact and feeling, he would prefer, if it could be avoided, not to put the Japanese representative to the necessity of facing a vote of his colleagues.

He added that M. Yoshizawa appeared to have doubts as to certain terms used in the proposed form of invitation. He could only reply that it was perfectly possible to word the invitation differently. He was prepared to go to the utmost length in accepting any changes which M. Yoshizawa might desire to make. Certain words might even be omitted altogether without any serious inconvenience. For several days past, however, the Press had been announcing that the United States Government was on the point of co-operating more fully with the Council and that a United States representative would take his place at the Council table. The Council could not therefore wait any longer.

M. YOSHIZAWA thanked the President for his proposal to omit, if necessary, the words to which he had drawn attention in the President's proposal; the question he had raised, however, was a question of substance and not of form. He pressed for the appointment of a committee of experts as he had proposed.

The PRESIDENT thought he would be expressing the feeling of his colleagues in saying that, if the proposed machinery of a committee of experts had been capable of yielding a sure and certain solution of the difficulty, the Council, in a spirit of conciliation, would have favourably considered the suggestion to appoint such a committee. As, however, M. Yoshizawa had said that the committee's decision might still give rise to objections by Japan, valuable time might



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be uselessly wasted if the committee were appointed, and the resulting situation would be still further aggravated.

The moment had come for the Council to vote.

M. YOSHIKAWA appreciated the conciliatory attitude of the President. He was acting under instructions which had been telegraphed to him from Tokyo. He could not undertake to accept in advance the committee's conclusions.

The PRESIDENT said that, in the light of such instructions, the Council could not consider the appointment of the committee. He perfectly understood that M. Yoshikawa must abide by his instructions; and he thought no Member of the Council would deny that he had carried them out very faithfully, and, indeed, very energetically.

He once more pointed out to the Japanese representative that it would be perfectly possible for him to vote in favour of the proposal, since the legal points raised by the Japanese Government were reserved in their entirety. M. Yoshikawa's position, both in relation to his Government and to his own conscience, would thus be free from all reproach.

Dealing with another aspect of the matter, M. Briand said that, occasionally, questions of procedure took the place of questions of substance in a rather curious way. Thus, in the present instance, the question of principle relating to co-operation with the United States Government had arisen at the time when it was being considered whether the Council should enter into communication with that Government. The Council had then unanimously settled the question of principle by deciding that it was desirable to establish contact with the United States Government and to co-operate with it by correspondence. The question which had now arisen was merely whether the contact thus established should in future take the form of communications by word of mouth. He really did not see how that could be a matter for serious discussion. The preliminary question of principle had been settled long ago; and the constitutional point raised by the Japanese representative would be duly reserved.

The President then put to the vote the Japanese representative's proposal for the creation of a committee of experts to study the constitutional difficulty to which the Japanese representative had drawn attention.


*The Japanese representative's proposal was rejected by twelve votes to two (Germany and Japan).*

The PRESIDENT put to the vote the principle of his proposal to "invite the Government of the United States to be associated with our efforts by sending a representative to sit at the Council table", subject to such amendments of the wording as might be made at the next meeting of the Council.

*The principle of the proposal was adopted by thirteen votes to one (Japan).*

*The Council reserved the question of the final wording of the invitation for consideration at the next meeting.*





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C./65th Session/P.V.II(I).

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

SIXTY-FIFTH SESSION OF THE COUNCIL

MINUTES

ELEVENTH MEETING (PUBLIC).

*Held on Friday, October 16th, 1931, at 10 a.m.*

Present: All the representatives of the Members of the Council and the Secretary-General.

2950. **Appeal from the Chinese Government under Article 11 of the Covenant** (continued).

The PRESIDENT. — At the last public meeting, the representative of Great Britain asked a question relating to a particular point. I understand that a reply was subsequently sent to him, as well as to all the other Members of the Council.

At a previous meeting, when the Council was called upon to examine the grave problem of which you are aware, the question arose as to the attitude to be adopted in regard to the Government of the United States of America, whether and by what means its special position should be taken into account and whether it should not be associated in some way with the efforts of the Council. The latter unanimously expressed its desire that the United States should co-operate with the Council to some extent, in order to bring about a satisfactory settlement of the dispute.

The principle of co-operation was then unanimously accepted, and it was decided that this co-operation should assume the form of written communications with the Government of the United States.

Action was taken in this sense, and communications were exchanged. The Council received encouragement from the Government of the United States and an expression of its sincere desire that our efforts should be successful; that was a proof that the Government of the United States intended to do everything in its power to assist us in our task.

Soon afterwards, a number of Members of the Council asked themselves whether that co-operation could not be made closer and could not pass from the written word to speech; whether, in accordance with numerous precedents relating to the Government of the United States—in the case, not of the Council, but of Committees—the Government of the United States should not be invited to the Council table. That point of view was regarded with sympathy by practically all my colleagues, and I immediately gave my attention to drafting the invitation which would be sent to the Government of the United States, should the Council desire to persevere in its intention.

(The invitation<sup>1</sup> read at the previous (private) meeting was then re-read to the Council.)

Before this text was referred to the Council, the representative of Japan had certain doubts on juridical and constitutional grounds, and thought it his duty to inform me of his views on the matter. Our colleague had no intention, of course, of separating himself from us as regards the desirability of closer co-operation with the United States. On that point we are unanimous. But the legal question appeared important to the representative of Japan, and he accordingly addressed to me a letter which was read to the Council at yesterday's meeting.<sup>2</sup>

I sent to him a reply, which was also read at the previous meeting.<sup>3</sup>

The discussion is now open, in the ordinary course, on the principle of this invitation, on its terms, and on the preliminary legal question whether the invitation can be sent by a majority, as in a case of procedure, or whether, on the contrary, unanimity is required. On this point a somewhat full discussion has already taken place at the private meeting of the Council.

<sup>1</sup> See Minutes of the tenth meeting of the sixty-fifth session of the Council, page 1.

<sup>2</sup> See Minutes of the tenth meeting of the sixty-fifth session of the Council, page 2.

<sup>3</sup> See Minutes of the tenth meeting of the sixty-fifth session of the Council, page 2.



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The point was raised whether, the question being no longer open as a result of the vote taken on September 30th, it could be dealt with as a matter of procedure. It was proposed that this problem should be referred to a committee of legal experts. The Council thought, however, after discussion, that it was in a position itself to take a decision. In this discussion it was specifically stated that the very special conditions in which the question arose before the Council precluded the idea of an absolute and final settlement of the question of principle. In addition, it was, of course, understood that note was taken of the reservations made by the Japanese representative, and that the constitutional question remained intact and could not be settled by the vote which had been given.

The Council then had to take a decision on the substance of the matter—that is to say, the invitation. It decided, with one adverse vote, that an invitation should be sent to the Government of the United States of America.

Such are the circumstances in which the question is presented to the Council at this public meeting.

M. YOSHIKAWA. — In my opinion, the Council requires to be unanimous on this question, as is shown by the opinion of the Permanent Court of International Justice.

Yesterday I gave the Council my Government's opinion on the occasion of the debate on the possibility of extending an invitation to the United States Government to send a representative to sit on the Council. I wish to indicate very clearly the reasons which obliged me to give a negative opinion in spite of the pressing solicitations of my colleagues.

My Government considers that the proposal to invite a non-member State to take part in the Council's discussions in an advisory capacity raises constitutional questions of the greatest importance to the whole League of Nations, and it considers that a fundamental decision of this kind cannot be taken for reasons of expediency, however important, without previously being seriously considered. I accordingly proposed that a committee of legal experts should be appointed to study the question. The question was then raised as to whether I would accept the conclusions of this committee of experts. I was naturally unable to give this assurance since, in my opinion, if the Council is sovereign, the committees which it appoints cannot prejudge the Council's decisions. Even the opinion of the Permanent Court of International Justice does not legally bind the Council. I was therefore unable to give the assurance I was asked for and the appointment of a committee of experts was abandoned.

The Council not having thought it desirable to proceed to an examination which in my opinion was essential owing to the gravity of the questions raised, I was obliged to vote on principle against an invitation to a non-member State.

This is in fact a question of principle and not a particular question, for, as I made a point of stating yesterday, the Japanese nation maintains and will continue to maintain the most cordial relations with the American nation. It particularly appreciates the friendly and comprehending attitude of the United States Government in the present circumstances and the high ideals of peace pursued by that Government. When at the Council's meeting of September 22nd it was proposed that all the documents concerning the question submitted to the Council should be sent to the United States for their information, I willingly accepted this proposal as it was not in contradiction with the principles of the Covenant. The exchange of information between the Council and the United States Government has since then been effected in the most satisfactory manner. In these circumstances, I cannot help feeling some surprise at the hasty manner in which the Council thought to take the decision of inviting an observer to sit at its table in an advisory capacity, despite the fact that this action raises serious doubts in connection with the constitutional principles of the League of Nations.

I should like to add that if there may have been some difference of opinion with regard to the application of paragraph 5 of Article 4 of the Covenant, mentioned in the arguments I put forward, there is none as regards the application of Article 11 to the dispute which is before the Council, and I desire to maintain the point of view which I put forward with regard to the obligation of a unanimous vote on questions relating to this article.

Such is the position taken up by my Government. The negative vote which I gave yesterday is not dictated by political reasons, but it was on the basis of broader considerations that I opposed my colleagues' view. Even now the Japanese Government is obliged to maintain its attitude on these questions unless the doubts it has expressed regarding them are resolved.

Lord READING. — As the representative of Great Britain, I am sorry that in these discussions I have been unable to agree with the representative of Japan.

I suggest that, if the question at issue is viewed in its proper proportions, then it is quite simple. But nothing is easier than to make juridical questions difficult if there is any confusion with regard to the matters to be considered, and I therefore propose to state the position.

The real question we are discussing at this moment is whether the United States of America, which is not a Member of the League, shall be invited to appoint a representative to take part in our discussions, and whether such an invitation shall be extended in the terms suggested in the President's proposal. If my Japanese colleague will forgive me for saying so, that is hardly a constitutional question.

If we were proposing to invite a non-member State to take part for the purpose of voting on the measures to be adopted under Article 11 of the Covenant, that would raise a constitutional question of the highest importance involving Article 4, paragraph 5, and our vote would have to be unanimous. That was the decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice, with



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which I entirely agree. The decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice is not relevant, however, when we are dealing with questions of procedure.

To suggest that, because the substance of the question concerns Article II, there must be unanimity, is to assume that no question of procedure can ever be raised under Article II. That can scarcely be correct. We all agree with the Japanese representative that, on questions of substance, the Council's decision must be unanimous, except when it is expressly stated that a majority vote is sufficient. When, however, a proposal relating to procedure is adopted, as it was last night, by all the Members of the Council, with the exception of the Japanese representative, the vote is clearly valid, and the invitation to the United States of America can be issued.

On juridical grounds, the matter is so simple—and I want to emphasise that—that no consultation of experts is required. The issuing of an invitation to the United States of America is admittedly a matter of procedure. May I remind the Japanese representative of his own thesis? The passage to which I refer is as follows:

"In the present case, two things have to be distinguished—namely, the question of substance arising in regard to the invitation of a State not a Member of the League, and the question of the sending of the actual invitation after settling the question of substance. As regards the question of substance, the merits of the case have to be considered in the light of the considerations above indicated, the decision on which can only be by a unanimous vote. The only question on which a majority vote is allowable is the question of the sending of the invitation, for this is a question of procedure."

Stress is laid upon the words: "The only question on which a majority vote is allowable is the question of the sending of the invitation, for this is a question of procedure". I agree absolutely. That is just the case we are putting forward. There is no disputing the fact that on a question of procedure we can act by a majority vote, and for the purpose of record, I will read the text of Article 5, paragraph 2, of the Covenant of the League of Nations:

"All matters of procedure at meetings of the Assembly or of the Council, including the appointment of Committees to investigate particular matters, shall be regulated by the Assembly or by the Council and may be decided by a majority of the Members of the League represented at the meeting."

That, I submit, deals conclusively with the point at issue, and there cannot, therefore, be the slightest doubt that, whether it is viewed juridically or from a larger aspect, the question is one of procedure only. The objection of one Member of the Council to issuing an invitation to the United States of America, if persisted in, should be duly recorded but should not prevail against the decision of the majority.

I would point out to the representative of Japan that this matter has been discussed at length. We had a very detailed discussion last night, and we have heard a very carefully prepared argument which lost none of its vigour by being precise. My Japanese colleague has dealt with the question from the juridical aspect and also from the larger aspect, as it affects all the Members of the League. He has put forward his arguments with such persistence, emphasis and ability, that we have had to consider the question from all sides. Therefore I would now appeal to him to rest content, knowing that the object we have in mind has not the slightest reference to any differences between his Government and the Government of the United States of America, which are on excellent terms. He has raised a constitutional point, and, having considered it, we should get on with what is, after all, our real purpose, our important purpose, our solemn purpose, and should determine one of the most important questions that has ever come before the Council of the League of Nations. That question is so important that we must give it our most serious consideration. We shall have the valuable assistance of our Japanese and Chinese colleagues in arriving at a conclusion which will once again justify the existence of the League of Nations and result in pacification. Without the League troubles of a most serious character might arise.

M. YOSHIZAWA. — I have listened with great interest to Lord Reading's clear and perspicuous statement. Unfortunately, I cannot share his views. My case may be put very simply. The matter is one of substance and not of procedure. In my statement I said that my Government considers that the question of inviting a non-member State to take part in the discussions of the Council, even though its representative has no vote, is a constitutional question. That is the Japanese case. As the question is a question of substance I proposed that it should be submitted to a committee of experts.

The PRESIDENT. — I think we have every reason to congratulate ourselves on the fact that a public discussion on these delicate matters has made it possible to bring out the real nature of the differences of view with which the Council was faced when it had to take a decision.

None of these differences affect our unanimous desire that the United States of America should afford us, in the grave question with which we are dealing, the fullest possible assistance. The Japanese representative has never disagreed with us on that point. On the contrary, he has constantly affirmed the sincere friendship of Japan for the United States and has reminded



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us that, in all circumstances, Japan was one of the first to ask that the United States Government should, whenever possible, be represented by an observer. It is therefore a purely legal question that has preoccupied the Japanese representative and other of my colleagues.

I must add that I, for my part, have given serious attention to this question. I will not say that I had any hesitation, for my views on the subject were sufficiently clear. They are that the Covenant of the League intends the Council to obtain all possible material, so that it may have at its disposal all the information it desires when it has to discuss a question. What the Covenant does not intend is that the component factors of the decision should be modified except by a unanimous vote.

If the question, for instance, is one of admitting to the Council a new Member, and a *fortiori* a representative of a country not a Member of the League, and of according to it the same powers as are possessed by all the Members of the Council—i.e., not merely to express an opinion but also to take part in the decision—there can be no possible doubt. In that case the question of unanimity definitely arises. But that is not so in the present case. This is only one procedure added to another.

When it was suggested that our documents should, as an exceptional measure, be communicated to the United States Government, that it should be kept informed from day to day of what we were doing and that it should be invited to co-operate with us and keep us informed in the same way, certain persons might perhaps have argued that the Council had no right to follow such a procedure. I do not think that such a view could seriously have been maintained, but it might at least have been put forward. On the contrary, general satisfaction was felt when the proposal was put forward to communicate our documents to the United States Government and to ask it to do the same for us. Consequently, so far as written communications are concerned, through the diplomatic channel, what we desired was settled and that, unanimously. If, however, it is held that unanimity is required to modify this procedure and to make it oral instead of in writing, that amounts to saying that the first vote no longer holds good. I do not believe that this is the case. We are, after all, only continuing what has already been decided. It is therefore a mere question of procedure, which can be settled by a majority vote.

The statement of our Japanese colleague has not been without value. I think it has caused us to reflect on the gravity of the decisions which the Council may take even when it is merely a matter of collecting information. It is all to the good that we should be reminded of the respect due to the constitution of a body like the League. The reservations of our colleague have been duly and officially noted. He has formulated them with a force worthy of the highest praise, a force which made it difficult for me to discuss matters with him yesterday, because I was aware how indiscreet my insistence was and because I said to myself that, after all, my colleague was entitled to express the scruples he felt. I ought almost to congratulate him on having persisted in so unshakable an opinion. Nevertheless, seeing that the controversy is a purely juridical one, it need not cast any shadow on the efforts we have to make.

I now inform the Council that the invitation, which has been adopted unanimously apart from one vote, will be sent to the United States Government. I venture to express the hope that it will be received favourably.

M. YOSHIZAWA. — I thank you, Mr. President, for your kind words. Unfortunately, for the reasons I have just stated, I am unable to alter my attitude. As I have said, my argument is very simple; my views differ from those of my colleagues. In other words, my Government considers that this is a question of substance regarding which the decision of the Council ought to be unanimous. I have nothing further to add.

M. SOKAL. — I should like briefly to explain the reasons for which I voted as I did yesterday. The Council has decided, in certain specified circumstances, to invite a representative of the United States of America to sit at the Council table. In this connection, certain constitutional and legal points were raised, but, as our President has stated, these points remain entirely reserved. I wish to say that, in agreeing yesterday with the majority of the Council, I did so in the light of this declaration by our President.

The other problem which has been raised—namely, whether the question should be regarded as a question of procedure or one of substance—has been avoided through the explanation that in the present case it does not arise, because the exchange of information with the United States of America was decided at the outset unanimously; but everyone must see that the general question, which is of great constitutional importance—namely, who is entitled to decide whether a question submitted to the Council is a question of procedure or one of substance, and how the matter is to be decided—was not in any way prejudged yesterday and also remains entirely reserved.

May I remind the Council that, as far as I can remember, it has never in the course of its practice considered that it has jurisdiction to settle a doubt of this kind and, in this connection, it has left the decision to the qualified independent bodies.

I would request the President to be good enough to have this declaration recorded in the Minutes.

The PRESIDENT. — The statement of the representative of Poland has been duly noted.

M. VON MUTIUS. — Now that the question of the letter of invitation to the United States Government seems to be settled, may I be allowed to revert to the substance of the question before us?



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After hearing the statements of the representatives of China and Japan and the discussion which followed these statements, I am more convinced than ever that a speedy settlement of this dispute in the Far East will require a great effort of goodwill, indeed, all the goodwill of the parties to the dispute. Germany is not less interested in this settlement than the other Members of the League. For my part, therefore, I would also appeal most earnestly to the goodwill of the parties.

I think our generation has learned that there is no longer any isolated problem in the world, even though that problem may at first sight seem to affect only two neighbouring countries and appear to be eminently local in character. The interdependence of modern States, owing to improvements made in the means of communication, has become so great that all nations will suffer from the material and moral consequences of a war in whatever part of the world it may occur. This is the concept of facts and the resulting spirit that have taken form within the League, of which Japan and China are distinguished Members. I think it must surely be in the interests of both parties that they should not adopt an uncompromising attitude, but should look further forward in time and space and should allow the salutary and moderating action of the League to be exercised in the decisions now to be taken, because the hour has come when only acts can count, and not mere words and statements.

The League of Nations came into existence as the result of cruel experiences in the past. I fully believe that, in the past, all the countries which have suffered through the war would have been glad if they could have applied to the supreme tribunal of Geneva to have avoided another course which proved to be so calamitous. The League of Nations, mindful of the lessons of history, must keep those sufferings clear in its memory for the sake of the future of mankind and must emphasise their importance in the present question.

If Japan and China would regard their dispute in this light and not hesitate to accept decisions freed from the political methods and customs of the past, they would give to all the nations of the world an example of wisdom which no one could ignore and which would certainly increase their prestige throughout the whole world. Germany, being conscious of her geographical, economical and social situation and being a disarmed State, particularly desires that this example of moderation and prudence should be afforded by Japan and China. She will, to the best of her ability, endeavour to co-operate in achieving this result.

M. FOTITCH. — I approve unreservedly the declaration made by the Polish representative.

I wish to state that I agreed with the majority of the Council—after hearing our President's explanations—on the understanding that the questions of a constitutional nature raised by the representative of Japan and those to which special reference was made by the representative of Poland in his statement have not in any way been prejudged by the Council's vote.

The PRESIDENT. — The statement of the representative of Yugoslavia has been duly noted.

M. GRANDI. — I agree with the remarks which have been made on several occasions by our President.

I would draw your attention to a very important observation by the representative of Great Britain concerning a passage in the speech made by the Japanese representative—namely, that the point we are now considering is not connected with Article II. Obviously, questions coming under that article are subject to the rule of unanimity; there can be no doubt about that. But the present question is, I think, purely one of procedure, since the question of substance was settled on the day on which the Council decided unanimously to keep the United States Government informed and receive such information from that Government as it might deem expedient to communicate to the Council. Clearly, all that was a procedure of consultation within the most ample meaning of the phrase.

We are not called upon now to take a decision on a new point, but simply to improve, in a formal direction, a decision unanimously reached by the Council. That was why I felt that I could perfectly well vote in favour of our President's proposal.

I am particularly glad our discussions may result in facilitating co-operation, in so important and difficult a case, with a country like that of the United States of America, which will join its efforts to ours and, in particular, to those which have been and will be made by the representatives of Japan and China.

M. DE MADARIAGA. — I desire to associate myself with those of our colleagues who feel that the President has clearly defined the juridical situation, as the representative of Great Britain also defined it.

I am consequently of opinion that the question of substance, if there is one—for I desire to indicate clearly that the question whether there is, is still hypothetical—was settled unanimously at the beginning of the session. We here are discussing only a question of form; whether our co-operation with the representative of the United States shall be by word of mouth or in writing.

I should like to add a few words. I support the tribute paid by the President to the attitude of the representative of Japan. I believe that the Council is indebted to him for having drawn the attention of the League of Nations to the importance of constitutional questions. I also believe that among the numerous claims of our colleague to our esteem and admiration, not the least will be that he raised this juridical question relating to the application of the rule of unanimity,



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at a time when his mind and that of his Government must be deeply concerned by events which affect very closely, and I must say very seriously, the spirit of the Covenant and its application. I would very respectfully point out to the Council that I see, in the fact that the nations most directly interested in the problem are upholding the Covenant with such great interest and resolve, a happy augury for a favourable solution to the question.

I would also point out that we should not spend too much time on or go too closely into questions relating to the juridical interpretation of the Covenant, but should keep in view the whole compass of the serious situation with which we are faced. I am particularly glad that the representative of Germany reminded us of that. We are probably faced with the most serious problem which the Council of the League has ever had to solve—for I am convinced that we shall solve it—since its creation. We should, I think, be wasting the moral force which is our only strength—without it the Council of the League of Nations would not exist, since the Council is only an instrument for the application of the moral force of the world—if we lost ourselves in the consideration of constitutional points.

Once again, I do not wish to be misunderstood: I fully share the doubts which have been expressed. I feel them myself, and I should not have voted in one sense or another without first carefully listening to and considering the advice of those most competent.

However, we had to remember, as the representative of Germany pointed out, that the time had come to act, to act with due consideration but rapidly, and that consequently we must pass as quickly as possible through this necessary period, which, however, must be short, of juridical studies. We have near us a great nation whose advice, experience and, I may almost say, moral and political power are necessary and even indispensable. The League of Nations is to have the support of all the moral force it can obtain to ensure peace in this serious problem. That great nation is there. It took the necessary steps, at the beginning, with a view to helping the League of Nations to solve the problem. I think it urgent that we should recognise unanimously the importance of the moment and the value we attach to this consultation and co-operation.

For my part, I am glad to note that, whatever juridical or constitutional difficulties are raised by this co-operation, the Council is unanimous as to the necessity, the value and the importance of the co-operation of the United States of America.

M. BRAADLAND. — In general, I support the observations of the representatives of Poland and Yugoslavia.

The PRESIDENT. — The statement of the representative of Norway is noted.

M. SZE. — My Government gives its full approval to the sending of an invitation to the United States of America in the terms suggested, asking them to send a representative to the Council to be present at our discussions. My Government is of opinion that the Council is competent to decide, by a majority vote, to send such an invitation.

I would remind you how urgent it is for the Council to take the speediest action possible for the effective settlement of the serious matter submitted to it by the Chinese Government.

I have listened with considerable interest to the appeal made by the representatives at this table, and I am perhaps only repeating what I have already said when I say that my Government, since it has signed the Pact of Paris, has renounced war as an instrument of national policy in its relations with other Powers, and that it has adopted as its policy that the solution of disputes and conflicts, of whatsoever nature and whatsoever origin, which may arise between nations shall never be sought by other than pacific means.

M. YOSHIKAWA. — I would ask the President to be good enough to have published the memorandum which I submitted to the Council yesterday.

The PRESIDENT. — I can assure the Japanese representative that that memorandum, which forms part of the documentation, will be published together with the other papers.

I should like now, before declaring the meeting closed, to add a few words. I was much interested when the representative of Germany called our attention to what constitutes the essential part of our task. I fully share all his desires. I would add, however, not for the sake of my colleagues, who are already informed, but for public opinion with which we must count, that not an hour passes during which our attention is not given to the serious problem we have to solve. Not for one instant are our minds and consciences forgetful of our heavy responsibilities and our grave duty. At every moment we are preparing matters in such a way that the Council will, I hope, soon be able to perform its task.

Now that we have disposed of the difficulties of procedure—which are not the least of our difficulties—we must firmly resolve to settle the grave problem with which we are faced. We must all be inspired by the idea that it is unthinkable that the dispute should not be settled peaceably, that it cannot be allowed to develop into a new war. I am sure that the parties to the dispute, who are Members of the Council, are of that opinion. They will defend their special interests with ardour, even with asperity. That is not a bad thing, and it is to the honour of the League that its Members can defend their ideas and their interests with asperity. On the contrary, it is the condition of our success. We are approaching the moment when the Members of the Council—those not



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


— 7 —

interested directly and the two Members specially concerned—must manifest their goodwill and spirit of conciliation and join together to accomplish the work of peace for which the League of Nations exists. Our countries have signed the Covenant. They have pledged themselves to maintain peace. They have combined against war, and it is in order to prevent a dispute, when it arises, from degenerating into a war that discussions like the present must be instituted.

It was with profound emotion that I heard the representative of Germany say that untold suffering and misery might have been prevented if, on the eve of the last catastrophe, the nations could have discussed at their ease—even tenaciously—around a table, as we are doing at present.

Now that this is possible, now that we have subscribed to the principles and obligations of the League, we cannot allow the catastrophe to occur. In any case, no one here—I say this to the representative of Germany to show that we share his opinion—will lose sight for one moment of the real object of our discussion. We have not wasted our time to-day, as will soon be seen. It is a special question which we have had to settle. We have settled it as well as we could. But the other and more serious question—the question for which we are here—is not absent from our minds, and I hope that we shall soon prove it.





C./65th Session/P.V.12(1).

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LEAGUE OF NATIONS

SIXTY-FIFTH SESSION OF THE COUNCIL

MINUTES

TWELFTH MEETING (PUBLIC).

*Held on Friday, October 16th, 1931, at 6 p.m.*

Present: All the representatives of the Members of the Council, and the Secretary-General.

2951. **Appeal from the Chinese Government under Article 11 of the Covenant** (continuation):  
Acceptance by the Government of the United States of America of the Invitation to be represented at the Council Table.

At the request of the President, the following letter from the Government of the United States of America, dated October 16th, 1931, was read:<sup>1</sup>

"I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your communication addressed to the Secretary of State of the United States of America, under date of October 16th, in which you cite a proposal adopted by the Council of the League of Nations. You extend an invitation, in accordance with that proposal, to the Government of the United States to send a representative to sit at the Council table, so that he may be in a position to consider with the Council the relationship between the provisions of the Pact of Paris and the present unfortunate situation in Manchuria, and at the same time to follow the deliberations of the Council with regard to other aspects of the problem with which it is now confronted.

"I am directed by the Secretary of State to accept, on behalf of the Government of the United States, this invitation to send a representative, and to inform you that he has designated me to act in that capacity.

(Signed) Prentiss GILBERT."

On the invitation of the President, the representative of the Government of the Republic of the United States of America took his place at the Council table.

The PRESIDENT. — It is a prerogative of your President—and you will allow me to congratulate myself upon it—that he is able to-day to voice the unanimous feelings of his colleagues in expressing to the representative of the United States of America the satisfaction which they feel in welcoming him here, on the terms defined between his Government and the Council of the League of Nations.

In your person, Sir, we are happy to see thus publicly manifested, in clearer form, the spirit of good understanding and loyal co-operation which has throughout united the efforts of the United States of America and the League of Nations since the beginning of the dispute which is now submitted to a procedure for pacific settlement.

Your presence here is the natural and practical outcome of that close *de facto* solidarity which has existed harmoniously between us for a month past to the satisfaction of the two parties concerned. Moreover, it is not the first link between the United States and the League of Nations, since the Pact of Paris has already placed on record our common determination not to seek the solution of disputes except by pacific means.

The nations of the world, watching the progress of every effort towards peace, will not view without emotion this closer co-operation on the part of those who are working against war. Earnestly desiring the intimate collaboration which your presence here represents, they realise to the full the symbolic significance of this public union between the greatest moral forces enlisted

<sup>1</sup> See document C.723.M.328.1931.VII.



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in this world in the cause of peace. They will welcome as a very great event, worthy in their eyes of justifying the highest hopes, the fact that a noble nation like the American nation, which is actuated by the purest ideals of justice and peace, is bringing to the League of Nations the support of its great authority.

On behalf of all my colleagues I have the honour, Sir, to welcome you to the Council table.

Mr. GILBERT. — I wish to thank you, Mr. President, for the kind words you have spoken in your own name and in the name of the Council.

May I be permitted first to convey to you, Mr. President, the sentiments of deep admiration and respect which the Government and the people of the United States entertain towards you as the untiring artisan of peace and the co-author of the Pact of Paris. It is, indeed, a happy augury that you should be presiding over the deliberations of this body at this time, and I wish to assure you of our deep gratification at being once more associated with you in the cause of peace.

In this moment of deep international concern, I thank you for your invitation to sit in your deliberations and to participate in your discussions in so far as the Pact of Paris, to which my country is a party, is concerned.

The Government of the United States of America has been following with the closest attention the proceedings before the Council for the settlement of the dispute at present unhappily existing between China and Japan. My Government does not seek to intrude with respect to such measures as you may propose under the Covenant of the League of Nations; and is not in a position to participate with the Members of the Council in the formulation of any action envisaged under that instrument, for the composing of differences existing between two of its Members. It has already conveyed to you its sympathetic appreciation of your efforts, and its wholehearted accord with the objective you have in view; and it has expressed the hope that the tried machinery of the League may in this case, as on previous occasions, be successful in bringing this dispute to a conclusion satisfactory to both parties. Moreover, acting independently and through diplomatic channels, my Government has already signified its moral support of your efforts in this capacity to bring about a peaceful solution of the unfortunate controversy in Manchuria.

In your deliberations as to the application of the machinery of the Covenant of the League of Nations, I repeat, we can, of course, take no part. But the Pact of Paris, bearing as it does the signature of the President of this meeting together with that of our former Secretary of State as joint proponents, represents to us in America an effective means of marshalling the public opinion of the world behind the use of pacific means only in the solution of controversies between nations. We feel, not only that this public opinion is a most potent force in the domestic affairs of every nation, but that it is of constantly growing import and influence in the mutual relations of the members of the family of nations.

The timely exercise of the power of such opinion may be effective to prevent a breach of international peace of worldwide consequences. We assume that this may be the reason why the consideration of the relationship between the provisions of the Pact of Paris and the present situation has been brought forward in this body; and the purpose which has moved my Government to accept your invitation is that thus we may most easily and effectively take common counsel with you on this subject.

The PRESIDENT thanked the United States representative for his flattering remarks and requested him to convey his appreciation of them to the United States Government.

Lord READING said it must be a satisfaction to all the Members of the Council to find themselves associated, on that very serious occasion, with the representative of the United States, whose interest was in the Pact of Paris. This showed most clearly that the object of the Pact was the object pursued by the League of Nations—the pacification of all controversies, instead of the arbitrament of war.

He counted himself singularly fortunate in that the first occasion upon which he was privileged to represent the British Government at the Council was that upon which the representative of the United States first came to the Council table, and that it was also an occasion on which M. Briand was presiding. Lord Reading fully associated himself with the remarks of the representative of the United States Government with regard to M. Briand, who had devoted so much time, thought and skill to the conduct of the affairs of the League of Nations and to the furtherance of the peace of the world.

M. GRANDI expressed his great satisfaction at the presence of the United States representative at the Council table. That was an event the importance of which all would recognise. It represented the last step in the development of that co-operation which the Council had desired, and had obtained from the outset, and would not fail to facilitate the important, delicate and difficult task devolving on the Council at that moment.

The presence of the United States representative once more showed that the Government and the great American nation were ever ready to work with the League of Nations, whenever the efforts of all nations had to be united to solve difficulties and overcome crises affecting the interests of all countries, as well as the common interest of peace.



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The question before the Council related to the observance of the obligations resulting, not only from the Covenant of the League, but also from the Pact of Paris. It was for that reason that it had been held desirable for the United States representative to be in a position to make known his Government's views as to the manner of giving effect to the provisions of the Paris Pact, in present or future circumstances.

Not only as a signatory of the Paris Pact, but as one of the promoters, and, indeed, as the depositary of that international Act, the United States Government was no less interested in the peaceful settlement of the dispute than the signatories of the Covenant of the League.

Ever since the 1930 Assembly, the League had been endeavouring to harmonise the two instruments, which had the same objects and were in a sense complementary, and designed to operate, as required, in the same direction. The presence at the Council table of the United States representative constituted a proof of the real harmony between the two instruments, and showed that the signatories of both could and should work hand in hand. In that he found a good augury for the rapid and satisfactory accomplishment of the efforts which were being made to ensure the maintenance and consolidation of world peace.

M. VON MUTIUS said that, speaking for a country which had viewed with very special satisfaction the generous action that had led to the Pact, with which the names of M. Briand and the great American statesman were associated, he welcomed the presence at the Council table of the United States representative as a proof of the close co-operation of that country, at a time when appeal was made to the provisions of the Pact.

M. DE MADARIAGA associated himself with the words of welcome addressed to the representative of the United States Government, which had been invited to the Council table on the basis of the Paris Pact.

The connection between the Covenant and the Pact was obvious: if the juridical channels differed, the flow of goodwill that ran along them was evidently the same. Were there the slightest difference in spirit, M. Briand and Mr. Kellogg would not have produced the Pact.

The Council was to be congratulated on having M. Briand as its President. He was so closely identified with the spirit of the Covenant that nothing contrary to that spirit could be expected of him. Reference was often made to the League machinery, but the League was more than a machine. It was a living organism, and, now more than ever, was giving proof of its vitality. Superficial observers circumscribed the activities of the League to European affairs, but in these days all activities became universal. East and West were now united in a common effort, and M. de Madariaga was happy to hail the Council's present efforts by recalling the immortal words, "A living thing is born".

M. MATOS expressed his satisfaction at the presence among the members of the Council of the representative of the great American Republic, whose co-operation would undoubtedly be of the utmost significance and importance for the success of the League's efforts to settle peaceably differences between States.

Mr. LESTER said that it was not inappropriate that the representative of the Irish Free State should wish to join his colleagues in cordially welcoming the representative of the United States of America to the Council table. He represented a great moral force, and his presence was another sign and symbol of the interest which the United States Government attached to the maintenance of peace and the collaboration of all the nations of the world.

M. SOKAL, speaking on behalf of Poland, whose friendly relations with the American people had continued for more than a century, was genuinely glad to associate himself with the congratulations expressed in connection with the United States collaboration with the League. The Members of the League who were signatories of the Briand-Kellogg Pact all regarded it as essential, and, indeed, indispensable, to secure the closest co-operation of the United States, who were the promoters and depositaries of that Act. The harmonising of the Paris Pact with the Covenant of the League would be greatly facilitated by the effective collaboration of the League with the United States of America.

M. GARAY said that his country, which was attached to the United States of America by strong common interests and by close bonds of fellowship, as well as by contractual ties, was very glad to see the representative of the great American Power associated in the Council's work of conciliation and pacification.

He desired that this co-operation, which was of an occasional character, might shortly be transformed into a lasting association on a footing of equality with all the other States represented, an association which the whole world desired and had been awaiting for many years.

M. FOTITCH desired to express his very great satisfaction that the representative of the United States of America was sharing in the work of the Council for the safeguarding of the peace of the world.

M. SZE also extended a hearty welcome to the representative of the United States of America. America, he said, was united to China by that great body of water known as the Pacific Ocean. This was symbolical of the relations of China and the United States of America with the other Powers. The collaboration of the United States of America would greatly facilitate the Council's



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


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task. It was most fortunate for the Council, too, that it should have as its President one of the authors of the great Pact of Paris.

M. BARRETO associated himself with the welcome to the United States of America accorded by previous speakers and thought it a matter for congratulation that that great country was affording its valuable assistance in the work of peace.

Mr. GILBERT was most happy to have heard the concurrence in spirit expressed by the representatives of the Governments on the Council in the views of his Government in this matter, which he had had the honour to present.





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C./65th Session/P.V.13(1).

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

SIXTY-FIFTH SESSION OF THE COUNCIL

MINUTES

THIRTEENTH MEETING (PUBLIC).

*Held on Thursday, October 22nd, 1931, at 4 p.m.*

Present: All the representatives of the Members of the Council, and the Secretary-General. Italy was represented by M. SCIALOJA. The United States of America was represented (see Minute 2951) by Mr. Prentiss GILBERT.

2952. Appeal from the Chinese Government under Article 11 of the Covenant (continuation).

M. YOSHIKAWA. — As you will remember, I raised the objection the other day from a constitutional point of view to inviting a representative of a non-member State to participate in the deliberations of the Council. I still maintain the legal stand I took on that occasion; but now, with the representative of the United States of America at this table, I am glad to be able to assure him and the members of the Council that it is the traditional policy of my country to promote the relations of friendship and amity with the United States and that both the Government and people of Japan are determined to live in peace and goodwill with that country for all time by pursuing this policy consistently.

Mr. Prentiss GILBERT. — The conditions of my association with the Council and the limitation with respect to my speaking here are, of course, understood. In this instance I wish, however, to beg the indulgence of the President of the Council, that I may be permitted to respond to the words of the representative of Japan.

I have heard with deep gratification what the representative of Japan has said and I wish to assure him that I heartily appreciate the spirit in which he has spoken. I have never had any thought of attributing his position in this matter to other than juridical considerations; but it gives me great pleasure, nevertheless, to be able to hear him say this and to reassure him that on my part he may have no fear of my interpreting his attitude in any other light.

The sentiments which he has expressed as to the relations between our countries are cordially reciprocated. We look upon the long record of peace and friendship between our people and the people of Japan as among the happiest pages in our history, and the thought is furthest from our minds that that record should ever be broken.

The PRESIDENT. — I wish to inform the Council that, most of the Governments represented on the Council having thought it desirable, as signatories of the General Pact for the Renunciation of War, to send on October 17th, by telegram and through their diplomatic representatives, an identical note to the Governments of China and Japan calling their attention to the provisions of the pact in question, and more especially to the terms of Article 2 thereof, I was requested to inform the other signatory Governments by telegram of this fact.

This communication has been duly made through the representatives of the French Government to the Government of the United States, and also to all the other Governments concerned. Copies of the identical note sent by the Members of the Council have been handed to those Governments.

On receipt of the French Government's communication, the United States Government, through the agency of its diplomatic representatives, sent, by telegram, an identical note to the Governments of China and Japan.



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I am not yet in a position to inform the Council as to the action taken as a result of my communication by the other Governments concerned.

As regards the reception by the parties to the case of the identical note, I have myself received this morning the following communication from the Chinese representative:

"In accordance with instructions received from the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, I have the honour to deliver to you from him the following message:

"The Chinese Government has received from the French Government the communication in which the French Government invites the attention of the Chinese Government to the provisions of the Treaty for the Renunciation of War of August 27th, 1928, and expresses the hope that both the Chinese and Japanese Governments will refrain from taking any steps that might endanger the success of the efforts already in progress to secure a peaceful settlement of the present situation in China.

"The Chinese Government feels thankful to the French Government for the deep concern shown in the development of events in the north-eastern provinces of China since September 18th, when Japanese troops, in defiance of international law, the Treaty for the Renunciation of War and other international agreements, began their unprovoked attack on Shenyang (Mukden) and other cities. Being desirous of strictly adhering to the undertakings assumed under international treaties, particularly the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Treaty for the Renunciation of War, China has judiciously refrained from employing force to meet the military aggressions of Japan and has been seeking, from the very beginning, a just and adequate settlement by pacific means. We have therefore entrusted our case unreservedly to the League of Nations. We absolutely rely on the solemn engagements contained in the Treaty for the Renunciation of War, the Covenant of the League of Nations and other international agreements designed for the maintenance of peace, in the belief that Japan will be awakened to her legal as well as moral duty to human civilisation.

"The Chinese Government sincerely hopes that the active efforts now in progress in Geneva to arrive at a settlement of the present case in the interests of justice and peace, will soon be crowned with success which will be conducive to the well-being, not only of China, but of the whole world. The Chinese Government will persist in its own efforts to seek the settlement of all questions of whatever nature by peaceful means, and will give the Council of the League of Nations every assistance in devising a permanent system ensuring the effective observance of this policy in the future in the Far East."

"I beg leave also to state that a copy of the above message has been handed to Mr. Wilden by my Government."

"(Signed) Sao-ke Alfred Sze."

Since the last public meeting of the Council its activity has not for one moment relaxed. The members have had many discussions with a view to finding a satisfactory solution of the dispute before us. I myself, in my capacity as President, have had frequent interviews and conversations with the Chinese and Japanese representatives. We have all, in a spirit of complete goodwill, sought the best means of rapidly putting an end to the regrettable situation with which we are now confronted.

So far as the attitude of mind of the two parties is concerned, the situation (I am glad to say) shows no change for the worse. It is now certain that the dispute is, and will remain to the end, circumscribed within its present limits. We cannot for a single moment admit the possibility of the present conflict leading to general hostilities.

This is important; but it is not enough. It is urgently necessary to arrive at a settlement.

Under the conditions which I have indicated, we have tried to find the terms of a draft resolution which would allow of the parties coming to an agreement with the Council and putting an end to these protracted discussions, which have gone on far too long for us and for many others. It is true that, in the present instance, the Council of the League is faced with an altogether exceptional case which, arising as it does in connection with a very peculiar situation, is extremely difficult of solution for the reason that the conflict is a long way off, that the representatives of the parties to the dispute receive their instructions from distant Governments, and that the instructions may take time to arrive.

As I said at a previous meeting, the parties most concerned must assist the Council by the display of somewhat prolonged patience. Their patience has already been tried not a little. Of our own I will not speak: we are Members of the Council, and as such our patience should be inexhaustible. But for all that, we must wish to make an end of this matter, which has already lasted so long. Accordingly, we have endeavoured in a number of interviews to find a text which would embody the goodwill of both parties.

On the one hand, we have the Japanese Government protesting that it has no desire to encroach on the territorial integrity of China. It is prepared to evacuate the territories into which it has introduced its troops. It is only anxious as to the security of its nationals and their property. As soon as guarantees are received in this respect, it asserts its readiness to withdraw the troops. That is the Japanese contention. I believe I do not misrepresent it.

On the other hand, the Chinese representative says: "We quite understand that guarantees should be required for persons and property, and we are prepared to give these guarantees. We



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have studied and will continue to study the best means of doing so, and we place ourselves entirely at the Council's disposal for the purpose. We are even anxious to take advantage of its benevolent authority to facilitate matters."

That is how the position stands. I have said and I repeat that I cannot believe, with this attitude on either side, that we can fail to arrive at a satisfactory result, but a formula has to be found; and, in public life, the search for formulas often gives rise to some of the most formidable obstacles with which statesmen have to contend. We have not been discouraged. We have searched and, in the end, we have drawn up unanimously—apart from the two colleagues who are parties to the case—the text of a resolution which will now be read. I repeat that it has not yet been accepted by the parties concerned. It was submitted to them to-day at (I must admit) a somewhat late hour. They have considered it and will no doubt desire to let us have their observations and reflections thereon. It is not an immutable draft. It is open to improvement and will, I hope, be improved as the result of our discussion of the text.

In other circumstances in the past, the Council has discussed draft resolutions and, as a result of efforts of goodwill on both sides, has succeeded in agreeing on a wording which has been adopted unanimously. I trust that will be the case here.

The resolution is as follows:

" The Council,

" In pursuance of the resolution passed on September 30th;

" Noting that in addition to the invocation by the Government of China, of Article 11 of the Covenant, Article 2 of the Pact of Paris has also been invoked by a number of Governments;

" (1) Recalls the undertakings given to the Council by the Governments of China and Japan in that resolution, and in particular the statement of the Japanese representative that the Japanese Government would continue as rapidly as possible the withdrawal of its troops into the railway zone in proportion as the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals is effectively assured, and the statement of the Chinese representative that his Government will assume the responsibility for the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals outside that zone—a pledge which implies the effective protection of Japanese subjects residing in Manchuria;

" (2) Recalls further that both Governments have given the assurance that they would refrain from any measures which might aggravate the existing situation, and are therefore bound not to resort to any aggressive policy or action and to take measures to suppress hostile agitation;

" (3) Recalls the Japanese statement that Japan has no territorial designs in Manchuria, and notes that this statement is in accordance with the terms of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and of the Nine-Power Treaty, the signatories of which are pledged ' to respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China ';

" (4) Being convinced that the fulfilment of these assurances and undertakings is essential for the restoration of normal relations between the two parties;

" (a) Calls upon the Japanese Government to begin immediately and to proceed progressively with the withdrawal of its troops into the railway zone, so that the total withdrawal may be effected before the date fixed for the next meeting of the Council;

" (b) Calls upon the Chinese Government, in execution of its general pledge to assume the responsibility for the safety of the lives and property of all Japanese subjects resident in Manchuria, to make such arrangements for taking over the territory thus evacuated as will ensure the safety of the lives and property of Japanese subjects there, and requests the Chinese Government to associate with the Chinese authorities designated for the above purpose representatives of other Powers in order that such representatives may follow the execution of the arrangements;

" (5) Recommends that the Chinese and Japanese Governments should immediately appoint representatives to arrange the details of the execution of all points relating to the evacuation and the taking over of the evacuated territory so that they may proceed smoothly and without delay;

" (6) Recommends the Chinese and Japanese Governments, as soon as the evacuation is completed, to begin direct negotiations on questions outstanding between them, and in particular those arising out of recent incidents as well as those relating to existing difficulties due to the railway situation in Manchuria. For this purpose, the Council suggests that the two parties should set up a conciliation committee, or some such permanent machinery;

" (7) Decides to adjourn till November 16th, at which date it will again examine the situation, but authorises its President to convoke a meeting at any earlier date should it in his opinion be desirable".<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Document C.746.1931.VII.



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M. SZE. — The resolution before us raises weighty and far-reaching issues, no less than the outcome of the Council's deliberations on this matter since September 22nd. It does not, indeed, purport to be a final solution; for I note that the text before us provides for a period of roughly three weeks during which evacuation must be completed, and makes it clear that the Council is only adjourned and will meet again in any case on November 16th, or earlier if the President so desires.

I will not conceal from the Council that this resolution at the first glance appears to fall far short of what the Chinese Government considers the situation demands and what it is entitled to ask. But it does, such as it is, represent the fruits of the Council's labours during more than a month to safeguard peace and secure justice. It must therefore be treated with the care, deliberation and close attention which its importance merits. I first saw this text at 12.30 this afternoon, and have barely had the time to telegraph it to my Government, with an urgent request for their comment as soon as possible. Therefore, I feel myself obliged to appeal to the indulgence of the Council to grant me a short delay in order to obtain instructions from my Government. I do this with the greater confidence in that you have already twice, Mr. President, with the willing consent of us all, extended this privilege to my colleague, the representative of Japan, and in that this represents the climax of the second stage in the League's attempt to grapple with what admittedly is the most serious problem that has come before it since its foundation.

M. YOSHIZAWA. — The Council suspended its meetings for several days, which may have seemed very long and a waste of time. Nevertheless that is not the case. At Geneva, under M. Briand's wise guidance, conversations have been taking place at which views were exchanged and facts ascertained, and gradually solutions of the present problem took shape. For my part, I have forwarded all the proposals made here to my Government for consideration, and have put before it all the views which the accomplishment of my mission has dictated.

You are all aware of the vital importance of the question of Manchuria to Japanese public opinion. I have attempted to put before you the main points of the problem, and I do not doubt that you will have realised not only its complexity but the profound differences which exist between the conditions prevailing in these distant lands and those with which you have frequently to deal in this part of the world.

I would first assure you of one thing: the Japanese Government has in no way modified its intentions with regard to Manchuria, which I have already announced to you. Japan has no territorial designs in Manchuria. She is determined to withdraw into the railway zone the troops (their number decreases from day to day), which are at present outside that zone.

Seeing that she is responsible for the safety of her nationals and the protection of their property, she can only do so when that safety and protection are effectively assured. She earnestly hopes that that day will come as soon as possible. She cannot, however, immediately fix the precise date on which circumstances will permit her, without anxiety for the life and property which she must protect, to withdraw the last of these men into the South Manchurian railway zone. The exact moment of this withdrawal does not depend only on the Japanese Government, nor on its goodwill. It depends on the effective display of peaceable intentions and goodwill on the part of the Chinese Government.

The causes of the tension in Manchuria date back further than September 18th. The Japanese delegation drew attention, in a communication to the Press, to the series of violations of engagements and vexatious and provocative measures which led in Manchuria to the state of mind we deplore to-day. The Japanese railways, a factor in the present development of these territories, are threatened; the guards are attacked. Our nationals, engaged in peaceable occupations, see the Chinese authorities place innumerable obstacles in the way of their legitimate efforts. Not only are they subjected to vexatious legal or administrative action, they are themselves the object of arbitrary measures and of attacks on their property, and often on their lives. The anti-Japanese agitation, carried on with the assistance of the Chinese authorities themselves, simply pours oil on the flames, and by increasing the open hostility of the Chinese, increases enormously the anxiety of our nationals.

The first step is to change this state of mind and to restore calm, to create an atmosphere in which useful co-operation is possible. The Japanese Government, on the basis of long and bitter experience, has laid down several fundamental points in regard to which it considers an understanding indispensable before such an atmosphere of calm can be restored and before the police measures and measures of safety, which, in the circumstances, the Japanese troops are at present obliged to take, can be withdrawn without fear of bloodshed. It earnestly desires China to give proof of her sincerity by expressing willingness to enter into negotiations with a view to agreement on this matter.

The opinion has been expressed that the withdrawal of the troops into the railway zone and the taking over by the Chinese authorities of the maintenance of order could easily be achieved. Attention has been called to measures adopted in the past in connection with European disputes. We must, however, recognise facts, and the evidence shows not only that things are not so simple, but that conditions differ fundamentally. What is the present situation? In Manchuria a considerable number of Japanese and Koreans have been forced to abandon their property and hurriedly take refuge in the railway zone, or have even been compelled to leave Manchuria. In China, the anti-Japanese agitation, led by the Nationalist Party, has compelled the Japanese Government,



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anxious to avoid using force, to remove its nationals to places of safety, and even to evacuate several of its consulates. The safety of the life and property of one and a-half million Japanese nationals, established in areas as vast as Europe itself, is in question at this moment. The events which occurred in 1927 at Shanghai offer a means of comparison. At Shanghai, there are about 30,000 European and American residents, nearly 10,000 of whom are British. At the time of the agitation against foreigners, the Powers were obliged to land a considerable number of effectives at Shanghai—about 15,000 British, 5,600 Americans, 2,000 French, 300 Italians, about 100 Portuguese and 100 Spaniards, and about 1,600 Japanese. Great Britain withdrew its troops in three stages: in February and October 1928 and March 1929. The situation at Shanghai cannot, however, be compared with that of Manchuria, as regards the extent of the area to be protected, the number of nationals, or the amount of capital invested. In a territory of the size of France and Germany together, there are more than a million Japanese nationals, about 120,000 of whom live in the railway zone. Their property and investments represent more than five milliard Swiss francs. In Manchuria itself, the situation is rendered particularly dangerous by the presence of many gangs of bandits and troops of fugitive soldiers, whose activities are a very great danger to the civil population and even to our troops.

That is the position. That is what prevents us from fixing a definite date for the complete withdrawal of our troops. That, however, in no way prejudices the desire and intention of the Japanese Government to withdraw as soon as possible—finally, it is to be hoped—the few effectives still outside the zone. It trusts that, with goodwill on the part of the Chinese, this withdrawal may be effected within a very short time.

I would add that I reserve my right to submit observations on the details contained in the draft resolution, after examining it thoroughly.

The PRESIDENT. — The representative of China, desiring to give the serious attention which it merits to the document handed to him only to-day, and desiring also—in order to perform his duty with a clear conscience—to receive from his Government instructions with regard to the points submitted to it, has expressed a wish that the general discussion on this resolution should be adjourned until to-morrow.

The representative of Japan has also reserved his right to discuss the details of the draft resolution, and has made the same observation as his Chinese colleague—namely, that he has had very little time to study the text.

The Council, in accordance with its traditions of courtesy and justice, would certainly not desire to refuse the adjournment which has been requested for such comprehensible and honourable reasons. I think, therefore, that our colleagues' request will raise no difficulty.

M. SZE. — I thank you for your courtesy in granting my request, and beg to assure you that, as soon as I receive a reply from my Government, I shall not fail to inform you and consult you about the next meeting.

The representative of Japan has made once again a very interesting statement, and has repeated some of the assurances he had already given us. He laboured hard to impress upon you that Manchuria is different from other parts of the world. As we find when we travel in different parts of the world, there are inevitable points of difference in the various countries; none the less, irrespective of these differences, any country which assumes obligations voluntarily entered into without any reservation under the League Covenant, under the Paris Pact, under the Nine-Power Treaty, or any other treaty, is expected to carry them out without any excuses for violating them.

As regards the present situation, to which the Japanese representative has referred, I repeat what I said on a previous occasion: the situation is the result of the actions of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria; in the case of other foreign troops in China, however, while I regret they are still on Chinese soil, they are not troops which are objectionable in that they antagonise the people—in other words, they do not create a situation that none of us desire to see.

I am not going to deal with any of the other points, but I can assure the Japanese representative that I shall make a careful study of his statement, and shall, if necessary, make an appropriate reply on a subsequent occasion.

M. YOSHIKAWA. — The representative of China has reserved the right to submit observations with regard to my statement. I make the same reservation with regard to his own statement.

The PRESIDENT. — As the time of the next meeting depends on how soon the representatives of the two parties receive instructions, we should be grateful if the arrival of those instructions could be hastened, in order that we may reach a solution as rapidly as possible.



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AMERICAN CONSULATE  
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND  
  
NOV 3 1931  
  
POLITICAL SECTION

C./75th Session/P.V.14(1).

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

SIXTY-FIFTH SESSION OF THE COUNCIL

MINUTES

FOURTEENTH MEETING (PUBLIC)

*Held on Friday, October 23rd, 1931, at 6.15 p.m.*

Present: All the representatives of the Members of the Council, and the Secretary-General. The British Empire was represented by Viscount CECIL OF CHELWOOD and Italy by M. SCIALOJA. The United States of America was represented (Minute 2951) by Mr. Prentiss GILBERT.

2953. **Appeal from the Chinese Government under Article 11 of the Covenant** (continuation).

The PRESIDENT. — The Council has received a reply to the identical telegram sent to the Japanese Government by the signatories of the Pact of Paris. That reply is as follows:<sup>1</sup>

"1. The Japanese Government realise as fully as any other signatories of the Pact of Paris of 1928 the responsibility incurred under the provisions of that solemn Pact. They have made it clear on various occasions that the Japanese railway guards, in taking military measures in Manchuria since the night of September 18th last, have been actuated solely by the necessity of defending themselves as well as of protecting the South Manchuria Railway and the lives and property of Japanese subjects against wanton attacks by Chinese troops and armed bands. Nothing is farther from the thought of the Japanese Government than to have recourse to war for the solution of their outstanding differences with China.

"2. It is their settled aim to compose those differences by all pacific means. In the note of the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Chinese Minister at Tokio, dated October 9th, the Japanese Government have already declared their readiness to enter into negotiations with the responsible representatives of China for an adjustment of the present difficulties. They still hold to the same view. So far as they are concerned, they have no intention whatever of proceeding to any steps that might hamper any efforts intended to assure the pacific settlement of the conflict between Japan and China.

"3. On the other hand, they have repeatedly called the attention of the Chinese Government to the organised hostile agitation against Japan now in progress in various parts of China. The suspension of all commercial intercourse with Japanese at present practised in China is in no sense a spontaneous act of individual Chinese. It is enforced by the anti-Japanese organisations that have taken the law into their own hands and are heavily penalising, even with the threat of capital punishment, any Chinese who may be found disobeying their arbitrary decrees. Acts of violence directed against Japanese residents also continue unabated in many places under the jurisdiction of the Government of Nanking. It will be manifest to all fair observers of the actual situation that those activities of the anti-Japanese organisations are acquiesced in by the Chinese Government as a means to attain the national ends of China. The Japanese Government desire to point out that such acquiescence by the Chinese Government in the lawless proceedings of their own nationals cannot be regarded as being in harmony with the letter or the spirit of the stipulations contained in Article 2 of the Pact of Paris."

<sup>1</sup> Document C.751.M.350.1931.VII.



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GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

NOV 3 1931

POLITICAL SECTION

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<sup>1</sup> Document C.751.M.350.1931.VII.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Yesterday I communicated to the Council the text of a draft resolution which, after numerous conversations and negotiations, had been discussed, drafted and adopted unanimously by the Members of the Council, with the exception, of course, of the two parties concerned. I suggested that, in accordance with its usual custom, the Council should discuss the text of this draft resolution. The representatives of China and Japan then pointed out, very rightly, that they had only received it about midday, that they had not had time to examine it, that in addition they had not received the necessary instructions from their Governments, and that, in these circumstances, they would be glad if the discussion were adjourned until the following day. That course was taken. We now meet for a second time with this draft resolution before us.

I would ask the representative of China and the representative of Japan whether they are now in possession of instructions from their Governments and are in a position to discuss the text.

M. SZE. — The Chinese Government had hoped that, by this time, the Council would have found it possible to settle the question of the withdrawal of the Japanese troops from Chinese territory speedily and completely. To-day it is more than a month since large areas of Manchuria were occupied, and these areas are still occupied in spite of the Council's continuous deliberations on this matter from September 22nd to September 30th and again from October 13th to this day, in spite of the co-operation of the United States, as symbolised in the presence here of a representative of the United States Government, and expressed in the note of that Government to the Council, in which it urged the League "in no way to relax its vigilance and in no way to fail to assert all the pressure and authority in its competence", and for its part promised to act independently through its diplomatic channels "to try to reinforce League action" and to "make it evident that it has not lost interest in the question and is not oblivious to the obligations which China and Japan have assumed to other signatories of the Pact of Paris as well as the Nine-Power Treaty".

Public opinion is often unfortunately impatient and ill-informed, and I cannot conceal from my colleagues here my fear lest public opinion may be tempted to draw the conclusion from the events of the last five weeks and the position reached to-day that, if the joint efforts of the United States and Members of the League do not, after five weeks, suffice to free the territory of one Member of the League and signatory of the Pact of Paris from an unlawful invasion of the army of a second Member of the League and fellow-signatory of the Pact of Paris, there may be some hitherto unsuspected flaw in the machinery of peace or lack of determination on the part of the civilised nations to make that machinery work effectively. I need not point out that, if such a suspicion were to take root, it would have consequences for the prospects of disarmament and American co-operation with the League that we should all deplore.

That is why I wish to make it perfectly clear that, in my view, these delays and this appearance of hesitation, which I join with my colleagues on the Council in regretting, seem perfectly intelligible, even natural, precisely because this is admittedly the gravest issue that has confronted the League since its foundation, precisely because it may ultimately involve stretching and testing to the utmost the authority and confidence of the League, the willingness of the United States to reinforce its action and the readiness of world public opinion to support any wise and effectual action to safeguard the peace of nations. Precisely for these reasons it is inevitable that our proceedings should be tentative and groping and proceed step by step. The peace machinery of the world is slow and cumbrous; some of its parts are yet untried, but it is powerful and comprehensive and its effects are cumulative.

For this reason, although I regret the further delay, I bow to the Council's view of its necessity. For this reason too—and to show its unswerving conciliatory spirit—the Chinese Government is authorising me to accept the resolution before us, although it appears to my Government to fail to grapple with some of the most urgent necessities and pressing dangers of the present situation. We accept it as a bare minimum, as marking merely the present stage in the League of Nations' handling of this problem and as a proposal which, because it is put before us publicly by all the Members of the Council, except the parties, as the outcome of their prolonged discussions, must be regarded as fixed in its main lines and subject to amendment only on minor details.

I will now lay before you a little more fully the understandings on which my Government accepts the resolution.

In the view of the Chinese Government, the heart of the proposal is contained in the provision that the Council should meet again on November 16th, that it calls upon the Japanese Government to begin its withdrawal immediately, to proceed progressively with that withdrawal, and to complete it before the above date, and requests the Chinese Government to associate with the Chinese authorities designated to make arrangements for taking over the territory thus evacuated and ensuring the safety of the lives and property of Japanese subjects there, representatives of other Powers, in order that such representatives may follow the execution of these arrangements.

The delay provided in this proposal appears to the Chinese Government very long—the present abnormal situation has already lasted five weeks and the resolution contemplates that it should last nearly a month longer—and yet every day that the situation lasts is playing with fire. Only this morning I had to report to the Secretary-General that my Government had received information that Japanese aeroplanes had again been dropping bombs on no fewer than three separate occasions during the last two days. Every hour that passes is fraught with grave danger of some

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incident or outburst that may seriously compromise the prospects of a speedy and peaceful issue from the present situation.

Nevertheless, the Chinese Government accepts this proposal and declares its readiness to carry out to the full all the obligations it lays upon China. Not only does my Government accept, it is willing to go further and to do everything possible to dissipate the apprehensions of the Japanese representative with regard to the safety of Japanese lives and property in the areas re-occupied by the Chinese authorities. I believe these apprehensions to be entirely unfounded. In the view of the Chinese Government, the insecurity and disorder that have arisen within the area occupied by the Japanese troops have their origin precisely in the Japanese occupation, will grow the longer the occupation continues, and will disappear with its termination. But I wish to state that I owe it to courtesy to declare that I am convinced the Japanese Government's anxiety is genuine, and I would ask my Japanese colleague in return to believe that the Chinese Government is sincerely desirous to remove any possible apprehensions on this score.

So strong is this desire, indeed, that, not only do I accept the proposal in the resolution to invite neutral officers, but I am prepared to go further and to assure the Japanese representative and other Members of the Council that the Chinese Government is willing to examine in the most conciliatory spirit here and now any proposals for extending the system of neutral officers or, with the help of the League, devising any other arrangements on the spot to guarantee the safety of Japanese lives and property in the re-occupied territory, in order to dispel any apprehensions the Japanese Government may entertain as to the danger to its subjects that might result from compliance with the Council's resolution.

The terms "evacuation" and "taking over of evacuated territory" in the resolution I understand to include all Japanese forces of a military or quasi-military character, such as gendarmerie, police and aeroplanes of all kinds, the restoration to Chinese possession of all property, real and personal, public and private, which has been seized by the Japanese since the night of September 18th, and the release from all forms of restraint of Chinese authorities and citizens, and banking or other commercial or industrial establishments. In short, that, so far as possible, the *status quo ante* shall be re-established.

I have the honour herewith to request the Members of the Council and the representative of the United States to be good enough to signify their readiness to accept an invitation from the Chinese Government, which will be forthcoming without delay, to designate representatives to be associated with the Chinese authorities, under paragraph 4 (b) of the Council's resolution.

And now I come to one more point, which the Chinese Government regards as crucial. Paragraph 6 of the resolution before us makes it clear that withdrawal is the only subject before the Council at present and that, until withdrawal has been completed, no other issue arises. But I should like to make it quite plain that, in the view of the Chinese Government, the only immediate issue arising out of the present situation besides withdrawal is the question of responsibility and assessing damages for the events that have occurred since September 18th. The Chinese Government is willing, — nay, anxious, and has been from the beginning, — to submit to any form of neutral third-party judgment on this issue, in accordance with the League principles and precedents and in conformity with elementary justice.

Any attempt to make the military invasion of Manchuria the occasion for pressing for the solution of other claims would be contrary to the spirit of the Covenant and a violation of Article 2 of the Pact of Paris. China will not discuss any subject with any Power under the pressure of military occupation of her territory, nor, what amounts to the same thing, under the pressure of accomplished facts resulting from the use of force during such occupation. This point is vital and goes to the root of the whole controversy before the Council; it is, indeed, the basic principle on which the Covenant and the Pact of Paris are founded. It is because, in the view of the Chinese Government, this point is vital and fundamental that I have stressed it, and it is for the same reason I add that the Chinese Government is assured that, in adopting this attitude, it has, as a matter of course, the full and unqualified moral support of every Member of the League and signatory of the Pact of Paris.

It further goes without saying that any discussions between China and any other Power on any other subject must take place on the basis of Chinese rights and obligations under the Covenant and Pact of Paris, and must respect the principles laid down at the Washington Conference of 1922 with regard to relations between China and other Powers.

In this connection, I wish to say very clearly and deliberately that, once this unhappy incident is settled and normal relations restored between China and Japan, the Japanese Government will find us, not only willing, but anxious to discuss every issue between the two countries in the most friendly spirit. China has but one desire—to live at peace with all countries and particularly so with her neighbours, and hopes that the very magnitude of the shock to the relations of the two countries that has brought them before the League will result in the stubborn resolve on both sides to put these relations on a new and better footing and to lay the foundation for permanent peace in the Far East. It is in this spirit that the Chinese Government welcomes the Council's proposal of a permanent conciliation commission, or similar body, and it is in this spirit, too, that I wish to assure the Council that the Chinese Government, for its part, will not only scrupulously observe all its obligations under international law and practice to promote good relations



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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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with Japan, but will do everything in its power to turn the thoughts of its people to peace and amity, forgetfulness of the bitter past, and hope for a better future.

The PRESIDENT. — I have a communication to make to you relating to a conversation which I had this afternoon with the representative of Japan. During that conversation, he informed me of his Government's objections to various articles of the draft resolution which is before us, and he indicated to me, as he was entitled to do, the wording which his Government would have preferred. I have received from him a document containing these modifications.<sup>1</sup> On looking more closely into the document, I see that it constitutes a whole, that it is not only an indication of various amendments, but in reality a counter-project, which I will put before you. We shall have to discuss it immediately and take a decision on it before voting on the Council's draft resolution.

I need not read the first part of this document; Points 1 and 2 are in entire conformity with the text of the Council's draft resolution. In Point 3 there is a slight amendment. Instead of: "is in accordance with the terms of the Covenant of the League of Nations" M. Yoshizawa proposes: "is in accordance, with the spirit of the Covenant of the League of Nations".

Points 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 are as follows:

"(4) Again notes the statement by the representative of Japan made on October 13th to the effect that the Japanese Government would withdraw those of its troops still remaining in a few localities outside the said zone as the present atmosphere of tension clears and the situation improves, by the achievement of a previous understanding between the Chinese and Japanese Governments as regards the fundamental principles governing normal relations—that is to say, affording an assurance for the safety of the lives of Japanese nationals and for the protection of their property;

"(5) Recommends the Chinese and Japanese Governments to confer together at once with a view to arriving at the understanding mentioned in paragraph 4;

"(6) Recommends the Chinese and Japanese Governments to appoint representatives to arrange the details of execution of the evacuation and of taking over the districts evacuated;

"(7) Asks the Chinese and Japanese Governments to be so good as to keep the Council informed of the progress of the negotiations between them and the position as regards the execution of the present resolution;

"(8) Authorises its President to take, after examination of the above communications, all such measures as he may think necessary to ensure the carrying out of the present resolution, and to convene the Council at any time with a view to a fresh examination of the position."

M. YOSHIZAWA. — I now desire to submit to the Council certain observations concerning the draft resolution that was laid before us yesterday. May I first of all express my concurrence in what was said by the Chinese representative when he pointed out that this resolution is the outcome of a month of effort? It is in full sincerity that I thank the members of the Council for their untiring efforts as well as for the great patience, referred to yesterday by M. Briand, which they have shown in removing any danger of a conflict and in upholding the principles and the prestige of the League of Nations, a duty of which the Japanese Government is fully conscious.

The Japanese Government in this matter has never had any intention of disturbing peace. It was led by a series of circumstances which were particularly painful for it and for its nationals to take defensive police and security measures. There is no aggressive or hostile intention behind this action. It did everything from the outset to prevent any aggravation of the situation by not allowing its troops to move outside the zone except in so far as was strictly necessary for them to carry out their duties of protection. As she has several times stated, Japan has no territorial designs in Manchuria, and it is her firm intention to withdraw her troops as soon as circumstances permit her to do so without danger. That withdrawal has already been begun. More than half the troops which were sent outside the zone at the beginning have now been brought back, and there remain outside the zone only some 2,250 men. These latter troops Japan hopes to be able to bring back into the zone within a very short time, if China, by the sincerity of her attitude and by goodwill, is prepared to co-operate with Japan in bringing about a relaxation of the prevailing tension.

In this spirit I am prepared to accept Points 1, 2 and 3 of the draft resolution before us. As regards Point 4, the Japanese Government would like to point out, in the first place to the Council, that, so far as circumstances permit, it has, as I have said, already begun the withdrawal of its troops. Nevertheless, seeing that feeling at present runs high and having in view the conditions of disorder at present prevailing in Manchuria and the manifest powerlessness of the Chinese authorities to prevent disorder in the areas under their control, and bearing in mind the danger which might result from the present state of excited public opinion by the presence of Chinese forces in proximity to our troops, the Japanese Government does not deem it possible to fix a definite date by which the last of its men will have been brought back within the zone. That does not mean to say in any way that it is not the Japanese Government's firm intention to bring them back, nor does it mean that it has any desire to leave them where they are in order

<sup>1</sup> Document C.753.1931.VII.



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to secure from China further concessions or special privileges of whatsoever kind. It is the actual facts of the position which give rise in the mind of the Japanese Government to these feelings of hesitation. In the present state of affairs it confesses that it entertains serious misgivings even as to the real efficacy of the safeguards proposed by the Council in paragraph 4 (b).

The Japanese Government, as it has already stated on several occasions, regards it as absolutely essential that the excitement at present prevailing should subside, and that there should be a calmer frame of mind. It has been led to these conclusions, as I said yesterday, by a long and bitter experience. It has carefully thought out what points are necessary to bring about such a *détente*, and has determined a number of fundamental points upon which normal relations between China and Japan should be based. This agreement the Japanese Government regards as essential. I should like here to dispel any misunderstanding. There is no question for us of going into any details; above all, there is no question of our attempting to wrest concessions or privileges from China. What we desire is to remove the causes of friction. Japan appeals to China to show her sincerity by giving proof of her goodwill and her attachment to the cause of international good understanding.

So far as concerns direct negotiations on questions outstanding between the two Governments (to which reference is made in Point 6 of the draft resolution), the Japanese Government has no objection to such negotiations being begun whenever the Chinese Government desires. It will always be ready to respond to any suggestions made by the Chinese Government on this subject. It considers that the question of the manner in which such future negotiations could be conducted can easily be settled between the two Governments.

It is with the above considerations in mind that I venture to submit to the Council amendments to the draft resolution circulated to us. Among these amendments is one providing that the Council shall be kept informed of the progress made in the negotiations. In making this proposal, the Japanese Government has desired to remove any suspicion that by unduly prolonging the negotiations, it desires in any way to postpone the withdrawal of the troops into the zone, were it only by a single day.

I have already mentioned that it is materially impossible for the Japanese Government to fix an exact date for that withdrawal. I wish to repeat here that the Japanese Government desires and intends to withdraw the troops as quickly as possible. But it considers that, if it were to fix a date for a contingency which does not depend upon its action alone, it would run the risk of finding itself faced with the painful alternative either of shirking its responsibility or of appearing to the world as having failed to keep its promise.

It is in this sense, and in this sense only, that the Japanese Government would like the Council to trust to its goodwill and the loyalty of which it has not ceased to give proof during ten years of close and sincere co-operation with the League of Nations.

I listened to the Chinese representative's very eloquent statement with keen interest; but I regret I cannot share his view.

According to his speech, it would appear that the whole of Manchuria is now under Japanese military occupation. In point of fact, that is not so, as I have already pointed out on several occasions. Our troops are at present stationed only in some three or four towns in Manchuria. The present condition of Manchuria is of such a special kind that one cannot imagine it in Europe.

I have already explained in the statement I made yesterday, as well as in that which I made to-day, the danger which at present exists in Manchuria.

The Chinese representative referred to the fact that a Japanese aeroplane threw a number of hand-grenades. I have just received a telegram from the Consulate-General of Mukden in the following terms:

"Japanese military authorities state that a reconnaissance aeroplane, sent to report on the condition of the railway bridges of the Taonan-Angangchi line, was received by heavy rifle fire near Chiangchiao by the troops of the army of Heilungkiang. The aeroplane dropped a number of hand-grenades on its assailants."

May I say that the railway was built by a Japanese concern. There is now proceeding in this area a struggle between Heilungkiang and the Military Governor of Chiangchiao. However regrettable such incidents may be, they must be considered with calm, and their importance should not be over-estimated.

I desire to draw the attention of the Council to the fact that the atmosphere in Manchuria has not changed very much since the initial incident last month. Our troops are still faced with numerous Chinese soldiers and large groups of bandits. It is obvious that, in these circumstances, our troops are obliged to resort to police and defensive measures. It is in order that this painful position may be cleared up that we want to reach an agreement between ourselves and China.

I would request the Council not to be misled in its judgment by tendentious versions of isolated events which inevitably occur in circumstances such as those which prevail at the present moment.

On the 16th of this month a long telegram appeared in the London *Daily Telegraph* from its special correspondent in Manchuria. The following are extracts from this telegram:

"In the meantime, the first great anti-bandit drive in the history of Manchuria was carried out by the Japanese forces of infantry, cavalry and aeroplanes with complete success yesterday."

"Mr. James Park, who directs the traffic between the Chinwangtao and Sinmintao, and Mr. N. G. Willis left Mukden to-day to supervise the railway engineering works. Both are in constant danger from the bandits beyond the Japanese area."



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" Mr. Willis made his will before leaving Mukden to-day.

" Local Chinese magistrates signed a document for forwarding to General Honjo, the Japanese commander, thanking him for defeating the bandits.

" In my opinion, the whole situation in Manchuria centres upon the bandit issue. Undoubtedly the Japanese have been forced to extend certain areas to protect their communications, their own nationals, and other foreigners. It would be plain suicide to withdraw the Japanese troops from their present outposts. The whole country is in a chaotic state, without any semblance of authority excepting of the Chinese Eastern Railway and that exercised by the Japanese."

There you have the position as it is. This is a report from the national of a third Power. The attitude of the Japanese Government has been approved by a number of foreign observers, including Mr. Woodhead and Mr. George Bronson Rea, who are well known for their wide knowledge of conditions in the Far East.

M. SZE. — I have made my position quite clear with reference to the Council's resolution, and therefore I need not repeat what I have said as to my position on the different issues.

As to the counter-proposal put forward by the Japanese representative, I wish to say now that I cannot accept it. As to the statement made by him, I do not think I need take up the Council's time for very long. I have already answered what he said yesterday and repeated to-day. I notice that, since our meeting on October 13th, he has mentioned again and again the appearance of bandits. How is it that bandits now begin to be so numerous? I have stated the reason; I need not repeat it.

The Japanese representative takes great pleasure in reading to you an account from an English newspaper, which, he says, is given to the world by a writer of a third country. I am glad that he is able to find such an account, because there are also other accounts which very likely he would not care to read. He also mentions, by way of excusing the dropping of bombs on the railway, that the line was built by the Japanese. The British, the French, the Belgians and others in China have built railways, but they have never dropped any bombs.

Lord CECIL. — I think it is impossible for us to enter upon a full debate on this question at this hour, but I have one observation to make and one or two questions to ask.

The British Government has been made extremely uneasy by the bombing incidents that have taken place during this dispute, and finds it extremely difficult to see how those incidents can be justified by any known principle of international law. I do not desire, however, to go into the details of the matter, because I quite recognise the validity of one observation made by our Japanese colleague—namely, that all manner of incidents of this description are bound to occur so long as the state of things to which we are trying to put an end continues to exist. I quite agree that the most essential thing is to try to find a fundamental cure for what is now amiss.

I do not intend to discuss the details of the proposals made by the Japanese representative. That must be done at leisure. I should, however, like to ask for some further explanations on one or two points. As I understand the principle of his resolution, it is that there should be "*une entente préalable entre les Gouvernements chinois et japonais sur les principes fondamentaux régissant les relations normales* . . . ." This he regards as an essential preliminary, but he will forgive me if I say that nothing was said about it at our meeting on September 30th. Further, I should be glad to have more precise explanations of what the Japanese representative understands by "fundamental principles". I am quite aware that, in his very interesting speech, he dealt with this point, but he did not state what those fundamental principles were. All he said was that the Japanese Government "*a déterminé quelques points fondamentaux*". It is clear that he knows what he means by these fundamental points, but it would, I think, be of great advantage to the Council if he would tell us what they are. It is very difficult for us even to consider a resolution pledging us to the proposal that there should be preliminary understanding on fundamental principles unless we know what is meant by those fundamental principles.

I understand that, except for that change, his proposals do not, in substance, go beyond the Council resolution adopted on September 30th. We shall have to consider whether the proposals we then made have been so successful that we can simply repeat them now, but I should be very grateful for the assistance of the Japanese representative on the points I have mentioned.

Again, under the terms of the resolution adopted on September 30th, a definite date was fixed for the next meeting of the Council. As far as I understand it, the Japanese representative, under paragraph 8 of his draft, does not propose to fix any date for a future meeting of the Council. The President, of course, has always the right to call a meeting, but the Japanese representative does not propose to give him any assistance in exercising that authority. He does, however, propose to give the President certain powers, and I should like to know exactly what they are. He proposes to "*autoriser son président à prendre, après l'examen des considérations ci-dessus, toutes mesures qu'il juge nécessaires pour assurer l'exécution de la présente résolution*". What action is contemplated as being within the power of the President to take? Would he be



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able, for instance, to direct a Commission to proceed to Manchuria to examine the situation? I merely take that example at hazard.

It is very important that we should know what the Japanese Government has in mind on these points, and I should be glad if our Japanese colleague would give us further enlightenment.

M. YOSHIKAWA. — To begin with, I repeat that the dropping of bombs is carried out in spite of the Japanese Government's desire not to have to resort to such measures. I admit it is very unfortunate. But, in the light of the present position, our troops are compelled to take action of this kind.

With regard to the question raised by Lord Cecil, the "fundamental points" to which he has referred are the points set forth in our proposal—viz., the means of safeguarding as a first step the lives and security of Japanese nationals and the protection of their property.

The resolution of September 30th provides that the Japanese Government will withdraw its troops in proportion as the security and protection in question are effectively assured. The purpose of the fundamental principles is merely to make that security and that protection effective. Moreover, the Council will have full information, because we desire to keep it informed of the progress of the negotiations.

The third point raised by the British representative refers to Point 8 of the resolution. We have nothing special in view when we state that the Council "authorises its President to take such measures as he may think necessary to ensure the carrying out of the present resolution". I would add that we have no objection to the Council meeting on November 16th, in spite of the fact that we say here that the President may convene the Council at any time.

The PRESIDENT. — There is one point with regard to which I should like to ask our Japanese colleague for further explanation, for I think it is the crucial point.

There are two ways in which the two Governments can engage in conversations; these conversations—or negotiations, if you like to call them negotiations—may bear upon two very different subjects or groups of subjects.

The first group relates to the statements made by the parties and repeated to-day, regarding the conditions of security which must first be established in order to enable the Japanese Government to withdraw its troops in satisfactory circumstances—for example, with the certainty that the Japanese nationals and their property in an evacuated area will not be subject to reprisals after the troops have left. In regard to this kind of discussion, the representative of Japan is entirely at one with the Chinese representative.

On this point I therefore believe agreement should be easy, because it concerns police measures, administrative measures, possibly military measures; these are questions which can rapidly be settled.

The second group includes questions on which, for a long time past, the two countries have been unable to agree. If, before evacuation, matters which have not been settled for months and even for years must be discussed between the two Governments, obviously the time-limit contemplated by the Council is far too short to enable results to be achieved. On this point there is complete disagreement between the two parties. The Chinese view is that negotiations of this nature must be postponed to a date when military pressure no longer exists. They are rejected as a condition of evacuation.

That is the problem, and I think that agreement depends on the solution of that problem.

When reference is made to "fundamental principles" in Point 4 of the Japanese text, is there any idea of bringing under this term any of the questions which are to form the subject of the fundamental negotiations, as constituting an element of security? If so, the whole problem, with all its difficulties, is again before us.

If, on the contrary, the text relates only to questions of security, I note that we would be much nearer agreement and I should be greatly satisfied. That is a point which must be elucidated.

At this late hour, I think it would be advisable to discontinue the discussion and adjourn until to-morrow morning, say at 10 a.m., when we could resume with the resolve to clear up the situation completely and to reach agreement.

I must add—I address this to the representative of China—that I fully understand his position and readily admit that he is entitled to be a little more sensitive than we, and that more regard must be had for his patience than for ours. But, as President of the Council, I feel it incumbent upon me to defend the League of Nations against any kind of impatience; there must be no unfair criticism. I should like our colleague to realise that the League of Nations desires scrupulously to fulfil its duty; it has proved this by taking up a problem so formidable, so complicated and so difficult to solve.

I am sure that, when the representative of China sent in his request to the Secretariat, he himself realised that the League of Nations would be faced with enormous difficulties. It has taken three weeks to reach the point at which we have now arrived. This has caused astonishment. I do not think it fair, for when a dispute arises between two great and distant nations, between whom are difficulties which have existed for months and years, which it has never been possible to settle and which have often brought them into opposition, it would be somewhat unreasonable to be surprised and to ask an organisation like ours to settle so difficult a dispute in a few weeks.

Under the Covenant of the League of Nations, it is our duty to deal with such cases. Why? To prevent them from degenerating into war. We have given the parties an opportunity to explain their views to each other. We have already been able to modify the character of the dispute and to keep it within narrower limits. Thereby the League of Nations has rendered



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a service to mankind. If you will remember that, in order to reach a final and satisfactory result in a question like this, the Council must, itself, when the dispute is submitted to it under Article 11 of the Covenant, obtain unanimity among its members, including the parties concerned, you will realise what difficulties stand in our way. We must not be impatient. We must, on the contrary, remember that, in this matter, the League of Nations has done its duty as it has done it in the past, and that it has already rendered a service to mankind by showing that it is more difficult to begin a war than is sometimes believed.



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GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

NOV 3 1931

POLITICAL SECTION

C./65th Session/P.V.15(1).

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

SIXTY-FIFTH SESSION OF THE COUNCIL

MINUTES

FIFTEENTH MEETING (PUBLIC).

*Held on Saturday, October 24th, 1931, at 10 a.m.*

Present: All the representatives of the Members of the Council, and the Secretary-General. The British Empire was represented by Viscount Cecil of CHELWOOD and Italy by M. SCIALOJA. The United States of America were represented (Minute 2951) by Mr. Prentiss GILBERT.

2954. Appeal from the Chinese Government under Article 11 of the Covenant (continuation).

The PRESIDENT. — We have to continue the discussion begun at yesterday's meeting. The essential subject of discussion is the draft resolution of the Council; incidentally, we have to consider a counter-proposal submitted to the Council by the Japanese representative. I have read to you the provisions of the counter-proposal which do not correspond to the provisions of the Council's draft resolution. We stopped yesterday after questions were asked by the British representative and replies given by the Japanese representative. I propose that the discussion should be resumed at the point where we left off.

M. YOSHIKAWA. — With regard to the fundamental principles mentioned in our draft resolution, I offered a few explanations to the British representative yesterday.

Our President, in his speech at the close of yesterday's meeting, drew a distinction between two categories of questions which may be regarded as forming the substance of the fundamental principles. In order to dispel any misunderstanding on this point, I wish to repeat that the substance of the fundamental principles relates, in my Government's opinion, only to questions coming within the first category as described by our President, in regard to which an agreement can easily be reached before the troops are withdrawn. These fundamental principles are only intended to ease the situation and to facilitate the re-establishment of normal relations between the two countries.

There are admittedly many questions in dispute between my Government and the Chinese Government which have remained unsettled for years. The settlement of these questions will take some time, but it will be pursued in the course of subsequent negotiations between the two Governments after the withdrawal of the troops. These questions do not form the substance of the fundamental principles referred to. Consequently, the fundamental principles on which we desire that an agreement should be concluded beforehand only relate to the questions coming within the first category defined by our President at the close of yesterday's meeting.

I would add that I have no objection to Point 8 of my resolution being omitted and being replaced by the text of Point 7 of the original draft submitted by the President.

Lord CECIL. — It seems to me that the most fundamental rule in all international negotiations is to avoid, as far as possible, anything in the nature of ambiguity or misunderstanding. It was in order to avoid anything of this kind that I ventured to put a question to my Japanese colleague yesterday which he was good enough to answer. This morning he has further given an additional explanation as to what his answer meant, and on the face of it—if I understand his answer rightly—he does not really desire anything different from the proposals contained in paragraph 4 (b) and paragraph 5 of the resolution which the President put before us yesterday—that is to say, he really desires only a preliminary discussion as to the details of the execution of all points relating



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to the evacuation and the taking over of the evacuated territory so that this may proceed smoothly and without delay.

If this is really what my Japanese colleague means, then I venture to ask him why he feels it difficult to accept the wording proposed by the President, which seems to me, and I think to all my colleagues, extremely clear and definite.

In addition, my Japanese colleague's proposal speaks of this mysterious entity "fundamental principles". I would very respectfully point out to him how impossible it is for the Council to consider whether it will or will not accept a phrase of this kind unless it knows exactly what that phrase means. I am sure he will realise this.

He says it means no more than what the President means. If that is so, why will he not accept the President's words? If he does mean more than what the President means—more, that is to say, than a discussion upon the executive and administrative details of evacuation—if he means discussion of some political questions, then I do beg him with all the strength at my command to say so quite plainly and clearly in order that we may know exactly where we are.

I am not making the slightest accusation or criticism of my Japanese colleague. He will be well aware of all the statements which are being made in the Press, both here and in Tokio, as to what Japan really desires. I see in the *Journal de Genève* a statement in italics that what the Japanese really desire is something in the nature of an acceptance by China of existing treaty provisions. May I ask my Japanese colleague clearly and definitely whether this statement in the *Journal de Genève* is accurate or inaccurate? Does Japan desire to enter into a discussion of treaty obligations with China concerning Manchuria before evacuation? If this is what Japan wishes, I would beg my Japanese colleague to state the fact plainly. If he will allow me to say so, it really is not treating the Council quite fairly to ask it to accept such a phrase as "fundamental principles" without stating exactly what is meant. I am quite sure the matter has not struck him in that way, and I am equally sure that, when the point is put to him, he will realise that the Council must be in a position to know what it is discussing before it discusses it.

I therefore very respectfully beg my Japanese colleague to enlighten us still further as to why the Japanese delegation desires the phrase "fundamental principles" to be added to the resolution and why, if those words only mean the same as those of the President, the Japanese delegation cannot accept the President's text.

M. YOSHIKAWA. — I have seen statements in the Press similar to those which have been quoted, but I can accept no responsibility for what is published in the newspapers.

As regards the fundamental principles, my Government holds certain views, but I cannot communicate these views officially to the Council until my Government has authorised me to do so.

It is quite natural that my Government should wish to enter into negotiations with China in order to reach agreement on a number of questions with a view to ensuring the security of the life and property of Japanese nationals in Manchuria. My Government intends to conclude an agreement with China as a measure previous to evacuation. Failing such steps, my Government is convinced that Japanese nationals in Manchuria will immediately be exposed to danger.

I am sure that, in the statement I made a moment ago on the fundamental principles, I furnished sufficient explanations on the subject, and I hope that the representative of Great Britain will be satisfied with my explanation.

M. DE MADARIAGA. — I wish to support the suggestion made by the representative of Great Britain in regard to Point 4 of the proposal submitted to us as a draft resolution by the Japanese representative. But, before defining my views on this matter, I wish to go back for a moment to the questions raised at our last meeting.

We have all realised that the case before us is a serious one. It has even been described as the most serious which has ever come before the League. I am not sure that I can wholly subscribe to this opinion, first, because all international disputes are serious. They may seem at first sight not to be very serious, but no one can tell whither they will lead. I therefore feel that, whatever the gravity of the cases submitted to the Council may be, they can and must be solved if the Council is—as no one has the right to doubt—firmly decided to settle them as far as possible (and I am sure that it is possible) unanimously.

In addition, this is a special, I might even say a very special, case. On this point I can only repeat with far less authority the serious words of our President at yesterday's meeting. We must not forget, however, that disputes are, by their very nature, unexpected occurrences. When all is said and done, only the rule is normal. We must make up our minds that, in future, disputes laid before the Council will be quite as unexpected as the present one. That is all the more reason why we should take every care that the rule is not forgotten, although we shall obviously be obliged to modify its application in such special cases as may arise.

I desire, however, to emphasise one point which has perhaps escaped the notice both of the Chinese and Japanese representatives. The outlook for them is not the same as it is for us. For them the problem is mainly one of settling a dispute which unfortunately separates them at



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present. We, however, have a two-fold duty. We have first to endeavour to settle a local conflict to the best interests of the two Powers concerned. We have, however, another duty which is perhaps not so urgent, but which is possibly more serious—that of maintaining intact, and, if possible, of strengthening, by a practice established by us, this League of Nations, on which the peace of the world depends. We should not therefore forget the consequences which any decision, or indeed any words spoken at this table, may have for the League of Nations.

I would very respectfully point out to the Japanese representative that the present case is an extremely dangerous one. The League of Nations is based on respect for the territorial integrity and political independence of its Members.

I would state that Article 10 is one of the most important articles of the Covenant. I should like to ask the Japanese representative to be good enough to tell us what importance, if any, he attaches to the fact that in Point 3 of his proposal he says: "Recalls the statement of the Japanese representative that Japan has no territorial designs in Manchuria, and notes that this statement is in accordance with the spirit of the Covenant of the League of Nations . . ."; whereas the proposal submitted by the President of the Council contains exactly the same words except for the following: "This statement is in accordance with the terms of the Covenant".

I now come to the central point of our task—namely, the value which we ought to attach to security.

This idea of security is at the very centre of the life of the League of Nations. We must ascertain exactly what the term means. I have the good fortune to represent here one of the countries which enjoy the greatest security. Spain is surrounded by friends. She has nothing to fear from these friends and consequently does not speak of security from the standpoint of those who feel insecurity. But she speaks of it from the standpoint of those who may be called upon to defend the security of others when it is menaced. My country requires therefore to know exactly what is meant by security. Spain wishes it to be made clear that security is not a term which can be enlarged or restricted at the will of the country which says that its security is threatened.

What is the situation? It is true that we are faced, as I said just now, by a very special case? It is a case, so to speak, of symbiosis. We are concerned with a region of the world as large as France and Germany together, formerly inhabited by some three million souls and now perhaps by ten times that number, in which there live side by side a very energetic, constructive and civilising Japanese element and a very large Chinese element which has also, in recent times, become animated by a new creative and civilising spirit. In this state of symbiosis, the definition of security naturally becomes more difficult. Obviously, however, we are at least entitled to say that, on the day on which the Japanese troops went outside the zone in which they had a right to remain, supposing that security did not exist at that time—a point on which I express no opinion—security was certainly not increased. Consequently, we can affirm that the initial fact which brought the Council together, the fact that the Japanese troops had gone outside the railway zone, has tended to increase rather than decrease insecurity. In other words, security has been, if not totally, at least seriously, compromised by the very fact that the Japanese troops are no longer within the territory rightfully reserved for them.

As representative of a European State, of a State which has to watch over the possibility of disputes, I see a danger in allowing anyone to claim the right to remain on the spot when that party has invaded a territory in which it has no right to be, by stating that there is no security, particularly as in certain respects at least the party is partially responsible for the state of insecurity.

That is a first point to which I wish very respectfully but very firmly to draw the attention of my Japanese colleague.

There is a second point which seems to me still more dangerous and which obliges me to support very strongly the attitude adopted here by the British representative. Do the famous fundamental points really derive from security and nothing but security, from evacuation and nothing but evacuation? If there is anything else, what we really have is a linking up of concepts, a line of reasoning which would allow the conception of security to be extended *ad infinitum*. On this point, I hope the Japanese representative will forgive me if I say that, while I am not sure whether Lord Cecil will be satisfied with the explanation of the Japanese ambassador, I am very sorry for my part to have to state that I am not satisfied.

I have before me the statement made by the Japanese representative when he courteously replied to Lord Cecil's question. I shall read this statement.<sup>1</sup>

For the sake of clearness, I wish to remind the Council of the Japanese representative's own words on October 13th:

"If the Chinese Government were to make serious efforts to check the anti-Japanese agitation and to arrive in common accord with us at a preliminary basis for the re-establishment of normal relations between the two countries, it would do much (I am convinced) to promote the relaxation and pacification which is so eminently desirable, thus removing the most serious obstacle to the withdrawal of our troops. The withdrawal of our troops is not conditional on the realisation of such an understanding. It is, I repeat, conditional on the security and protection of our nationals. That would, in practice, be assured by the procedure which my Government has not ceased to advocate. By all these measures and arguments

<sup>1</sup> See Minutes of this meeting, page 2.



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taken together, we can give effect to the principles of the Council's resolution by establishing a good understanding between the two nations, as Article II of the Covenant says."

I will try and explain briefly the perplexity which these texts cause me. I take them to mean that evacuation depends on security, security depends on pacification, and pacification depends on the settlement of a number of questions which have nothing to do either with security or with evacuation.

That is a serious matter. It is so serious, it would so extend the idea of security, that I am sure M. Yoshizawa, who represents a State which is a permanent Member of the Council and who will probably have in the future—though I hope not—to decide similar cases in circumstances different from the present (he being in the position in which we are now), will realise that it is in his own interest to define exactly the terms of his statements so that there can be no doubt that, in the opinion of his Government, the idea of security means nothing more than security in the strict sense of the term, and does not contain other ideas of pacification and the settlement of questions alien to the occupation and evacuation, so that the Council's duty may be quite clear and definite and that we need have no fear of an amplification of this concept of security which would lead to a considerable amplification of our own duties.

I am afraid I have been rather long, but that was perhaps unavoidable in defining a conception which might perhaps enable us to see the possibility of a solution of the present dispute.

What, in point of fact, is the difficulty? It seems to be that the Japanese Government has a desire which is not only natural and legitimate but praiseworthy, a desire which we should all accept with gratitude, to secure more peaceful relations between the two countries and to create a calmer atmosphere by negotiating on points which have no direct connection with the idea of evacuation. This desire exists in relation to the security of Japanese nationals in the zone. I think there is a solution for this problem, a solution which could satisfy both the rule of the League—which is to separate the nations so as to enable them to discuss peacefully—and the interests of Japan and of China. The solution, I think, is very simple. Let us decide that the Japanese troops shall evacuate the territory—I do not for the moment suggest within what time-limit; that can be discussed later. Let us decide that immediately after the Japanese troops have been withdrawn, on the very day they are withdrawn, direct negotiations will be begun in accordance with a formal promise given solemnly before the Council by each of the two Powers. There would then be a moral, solemn and consequently unbreakable link between the two questions; but we would not have allowed the idea of negotiations to trespass on the idea of evacuation, this, in my opinion, being quite incompatible with the grave duty of the Council in this matter.

Lord CECIL. — I do not propose to follow the very interesting observations which have been made by my Spanish colleague. They will no doubt be considered very carefully by all the members of the Council; but I want to say a word in reply to what my Japanese colleague said just now. I called his attention to the fact that, in a paper published at Geneva, it was definitely stated that the main fundamental point which the Japanese desire to discuss before the evacuation was the question of the treaties which exist between Japan and China. My Japanese colleague said he was not responsible in any way for what appeared in the Press. Neither am I. But there is a fact which has given rise to a public statement, and it would be foolish for the Council not to consider it as one of the points which may be examined.

I may add that, by the courtesy of the representative of Reuter's Agency, I have been shown a telegram from London from their representative in Tokio, which I propose to read.

"If the League refuses to handle the question of the sacredness of treaties, the League should refrain from attempting to force Japan to change its stand . . ."

"This appears to sum up the attitude of Japanese official circles, which are clearly disappointed and resentful as a result of the League's apparent intention to override Japan's insistence on Chinese recognition of treaty commitments as a *sine qua non*. Whilst emphasising that Japan recognises seriousness of such a step, official circles intimate that Japan intends to stand firm on the Treaty question . . ."

I am sure my Japanese colleague will recognise that the Council has not been presented by Japan with any demand whatever with reference to treaties. Yet we are informed by a news agency of high standing that, in official circles in Japan, it is being freely stated that the League declines to recognise the sacredness of treaties, and it is because of the League's refusal to recognise the sacredness of treaties that Japan is unable to change her attitude.

That is a grave misunderstanding. No such proposal has been put before the League. Neither the Council nor any Member of the Council has suggested that there was any question at all as to the sacredness of treaty obligations. The Covenant sets out as one of the main purposes of the League the "maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organised peoples with one another". There can therefore be no question of the League desiring to override the sacredness of treaties. Of course, it is quite possible that there may be a dispute between the parties to treaties as to the validity of a treaty or as to the interpretation of a treaty. Fortunately, any such dispute as that can now be settled authoritatively by an appeal to the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague, over which, as it happens, a Japanese national at the moment presides. It is certain that any such question would be discussed with absolute fairness and impartiality at The Hague. The League could,



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at any moment, obviously express the view that all treaties ought to be carried out; but that is not the question before us. The treaties hold; but to discuss up to what point they bind the contracting parties would seem to me to be definitely reversing the order of things. Evacuation must take place first. Discussion of the treaties may follow. It is an important matter, but is not one which directly affects the safety of the nationals of Japan, and therefore is not one which ought to be discussed before the Japanese troops retire from the territory which they occupy.

M. YOSHIKAWA. — I will reply to the questions that have been raised by the Spanish and British representatives. The Spanish representative asked a number of questions, some of which I will now answer.

His first question was why the word "terms" in paragraph 3 of the resolution had been replaced by the word "spirit". Our draft resolution conforms with the wording of Article 10 of the Covenant. We have accordingly no objection to reverting to the original drafting—that is to say, replacing the word "spirit" by the word "terms".

Secondly, the Spanish representative said that the situation would be very serious if our troops remained outside the railway zone beyond a prescribed period. As I have said on several occasions, my Government is fully prepared to withdraw its troops within the railway zone as soon as it is convinced that the lives and property of Japanese nationals are adequately safeguarded. It is because of the conditions which prevail in Manchuria that my Government has been compelled to take action. I am convinced that jurists will find my Government's attitude in this matter justified.

The third point raised by the Spanish representative was that of the fundamental principles, which (he says) have nothing to do either with security or evacuation. As I have already stated, it is the view of my Government that it is absolutely necessary for it to reach an agreement in order to ensure security. Once this agreement is concluded, our troops will be withdrawn immediately.

In the course of his speech, the British representative read a Reuter telegram. I, too, regret that such a message should have been sent to Europe. I must say that I have never sent any telegram to the Japanese Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the effect that the Council rejected the Japanese view as regards the maintenance of the sacredness of treaties. It is my duty to report day by day the details of the Council discussions; but I can assure you that I have never sent any telegram in the sense of the Reuter message quoted. I also deplore a misunderstanding of this kind. I entirely agree with Lord Cecil, and I shall at once cable to Tokio in this sense after the meeting.

The PRESIDENT. — We must reach a conclusion. The Council has two texts before it—the draft resolution prepared and adopted by all the Members of the Council except the two parties to the case, and the counter-proposal submitted by the representative of Japan, which we have already discussed at great length.

The fundamental point on which the two texts differ is the measures proposed with a view to ensuring the safety of property and persons, as has been promised by China to enable Japan to withdraw her troops.

I must say—and I am sure the representative of Japan will agree with me—that the Council's text at any rate possesses the merit of being absolutely clear. No part of it has been discussed on the grounds that it might be interpreted in several ways.

The Japanese representative has on several occasions explained his text in reply to questions put by Lord Cecil, M. de Madariaga and myself. He has given a large number of explanations, which prove that there is some uncertainty regarding the text—a sort of misunderstanding. I therefore appeal to the Japanese representative's goodwill. His country, as he reminded us and as I myself am personally aware, has for ten years been one of the most ardent and faithful supporters of the League. It may be said that, whenever the League has had to settle a difficult case, Japan has always been more than anxious to ensure respect for international undertakings and obligations. She would never, therefore, attempt to shield herself behind a misconception, and the tenacity with which M. Yoshizawa has endeavoured to make us understand his Government's views is proof of this. Nevertheless, uncertainty does exist; that fact alone obliges us to consider another text. We cannot allow the result of these discussions to be a document which public opinion, in so delicate a case as the present one, might regard as rather ambiguous.

The text adopted by the Council is based on a desire to ensure respect for treaty obligations, on the undertakings already entered into by the parties, and, in particular, on the statement by the Japanese representative, accepted in the resolution of September 30th—that is to say, before the dispute had become heated, and when therefore matters could be viewed more calmly. This is the declaration made at the time by the Japanese representative:

"The Japanese Government will continue, as rapidly as possible, the withdrawal of its troops, which has already been begun, into the railway zone in proportion as the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals is effectively assured, and it hopes to carry out this intention in full as speedily as may be."

This declaration refers, in the matter of safety, to steps which cannot fail to be taken rapidly; otherwise, the Japanese Government would not at that date have commenced evacuation and have



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promised to complete that evacuation at an early date. When negotiations have to be conducted between Governments regarding the interpretation of treaties and railway questions, it is impossible to be sure that a conclusion will be reached in a short space of time. The Japanese representative, with his long diplomatic experience, knows how difficult it is, when a political case arises between two Governments, to reach a conclusion; how slow the negotiations are, and what patience is required to achieve a result. The Japanese Government therefore intended to refer to precautions for assuring safety, decided upon jointly and with the least possible delay in order to allow rapid evacuation.

Article 10 of the Covenant does not call for any commentary. It says that all Members of the League must undertake to respect the territorial integrity of the other Members and refrain from any act which might prejudice the political independence of others.

Article 2 of the Paris Pact, which has been invoked here, is also very clear:

"The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be which may arise among them shall never be sought except by pacific means."

This is a dispute which has been laid before the Council. There can be no question of dealing with it by other than pacific means. Japan, who always so scrupulously honours her obligations, could not dream of adopting any other means.

I do not wish to dwell unduly on this point; but public opinion would not readily admit that a military occupation under these circumstances could be regarded as coming under the heading of pacific means. To prolong this situation would be to perpetuate a state of anxiety which has already lasted too long.

I am glad the parties have shown such goodwill in very difficult circumstances, that they have restrained the free public opinion in their countries and have made it possible for the Council to fulfil its task by preventing the conflict from becoming more serious. But how great has been the danger during the past month! How much anxiety has been felt! Personally, I do not think it desirable to quote outside documents in League discussions, such as newspaper articles, Press items and controversies. In most cases we rely on our own documentation. But, in this instance, the feverish attention paid to outside views was due to a very anxious feeling that things were getting worse:

The Japanese representative also felt such anxiety. I therefore say to him: We have often followed difficult paths together and often, in the most awkward phases, the good sense and eminently peaceful intentions of Japan have been of great value to the Council. I need not refer to various cases in which serious disputes were solved thanks to the supple firmness which characterises Japanese action. I should be very grateful if, in present circumstances, our colleague made an exceptional effort to be conciliatory. We are very, very near agreement. It seemed to me that the Japanese Government intended to begin negotiations concerning the substance of certain delicate problems which have long existed. That intention caused me uneasiness. But our colleague has told us: "That is not the case. We quite admit that negotiations should be begun with regard to these great problems after the evacuation". I wish to endorse the observation of the Spanish representative that, as clear evidence of the goodwill of both countries, these negotiations should be begun on the very day on which evacuation is completed. But the Japanese representative states that the terms of his counter-proposal do not refer to questions of a general nature, but only to security. Nevertheless, on this point there has been a hesitancy which it has been impossible to overcome in spite of the goodwill displayed on every side this morning. The mere fact that such hesitancy exists shows that it would be better to have a clearer text.

What is the essential point? The representative of Japan states: "We are prepared to go; but we do not want our nationals to be the victims of reprisals immediately we have left. We wish to be sure that they will be protected". The Chinese Government recognises that this desire is a natural one and states that it is ready to enter into immediate negotiations in order to regulate the conditions of evacuation and provide the guarantees of safety which Japan desires.

That can be done very rapidly. There are precedents. Troops are about to leave a territory which they have administered, in which they have organised municipal services, police and various administrative departments. These various bodies have to be replaced. But that can be settled after a few hours, or at most a few days', discussion.

That is the procedure which seems to be foreshadowed in the declaration made by the Japanese Government on September 30th. As a matter of fact, Japan will not evacuate until she feels she is able to do so, until she has noted, in the interests of the safety of her nationals, that certain conditions she has laid down for evacuation have been fulfilled. That is a question of degree, and also a question that depends on local circumstances; the anxiety may be greater or less, according to whether one part or another of Manchuria is to be evacuated. Our Japanese colleague might say (and, in fact has said): "My Government does not wish to accept an obligation which it could not carry out; it wishes to be sure when it enters into an undertaking—for instance, with regard to a time-limit—that it will be able to honour its word". That is a very legitimate argument; no one is expected to do what is impossible, and I should quite understand a reservation on the part of the Japanese representative to the effect that, should he fall in with our views, the evacuation could only be completed within the period contemplated if the Chinese Government also showed perfect goodwill and really carried out the proposed measures.

Having said this, I think we ought to get down to the clear considerations contained in the resolution presented by the majority of the Council. I am convinced that, owing to the mere fact that the military pressure exercised on one of the two parties is about to terminate, relations will once more become normal, and that China will loyally endeavour to settle her difficulties with Japan. The situation will become less acute. That will be to the advantage of



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the two countries and to all mankind, because we are living at a time when men's nerves, already strained to near breaking point, can stand little more.

The world is in such a state that, if the present situation is prolonged, very serious troubles may occur. The situation is bad enough without its being complicated by military operations.

If really we are ever to reach agreement on a text after further explanation (if doubts still exist on certain points), we must endeavour to do so. By so doing we shall have rendered another service to the League and shall once again have upheld the cause of humanity by fulfilling our essential duty, which is to prevent a dispute like this from degenerating into general warfare.

I would therefore request my colleagues to be good enough, if the Japanese representative agrees, to express their opinions first on his counter-proposal according to the usual procedure. If the counter-proposal is not adopted, we shall have to discuss further the draft resolution proposed by the Council and take a vote on that proposal, unless the Japanese and Chinese representatives have some other procedure to suggest.

I trust you will forgive me for speaking at such length. I felt, however, that it was my duty as President and Rapporteur to explain the situation as completely as possible so that the Council might take a decision with a full knowledge of the facts.

M. YOSHIZAWA. — To my great regret, I am unable to accept the draft resolution which has been submitted by the President, because, as I have already explained more than once, it does not, in the Japanese Government's view, adequately safeguard the lives and property of Japanese nationals for which the Japanese Government is responsible.

May I be allowed to say once more, as representative of Japan, that the Japanese Government has no intention of settling the present difference by military forces? Its only desire is to ensure effectively the security of its nationals.

M. DE MADARIAGA. — My reason for speaking again is to submit an amendment to the procedure which the President has suggested to us, in the hope of arriving at a unanimous result. That of course depends on the Japanese representative's acceptance of my amendment.

M. Yoshizawa has stated that he cannot accept the Council's draft resolution because it does not guarantee the security of Japanese nationals in Manchuria, for which his Government is responsible. I may say that I myself have grave doubts as to his view that a Government is responsible for the security of its nationals in a foreign country. This view raises a theory of such importance that I do not propose to say more on the subject here and now.

If I understand the Japanese representative's objections to the Council's draft resolution, they are based mainly on the fact that it makes no mention of the "fundamental principles" to which the Japanese counterproposal refers in paragraph 4. The discussion of yesterday and of this morning has been made peculiarly difficult by the fact that these fundamental principles have not been explained or laid before us, or, indeed, indicated in any way.

The President has referred to the wording of certain treaties, the sacredness of which concerns not only Japan but all the countries here represented. I should therefore like to read some lines from the Preamble of the Covenant of the League. They are to the following effect:

"In order to promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security;

"By the prescription of open, just and honourable relations between nations . . ."

As regards honour, it would be difficult indeed to find anywhere in the world a people more attached to honour than Japan. As for justice, the President has reminded us of the indispensable co-operation of certain Japanese ambassadors such as M. Ishii and M. Hayashi and the distinguished President of the Permanent Court of International Justice, M. Adatci. It is sufficient to mention their names.

But I am sorry to have to say that I am, for my part, greatly disappointed, as regards the publicity of international relations, at the Japanese Government's attitude in the matter which is before us. I do not desire to say anything further on the point except that I could do so if I so desired.

I reserve my attitude as to the "fundamental principles", on which I know nothing at all. I would merely note that the Japanese Government's difficulty consists in the fact that it is—quite rightly—anxious to safeguard the security of its nationals in Manchuria and believes their security to be bound up with questions which are not, perhaps, connected with evacuation as such, but are nevertheless indirectly connected with it by the question of pacification.

"We cannot withdraw", the Japanese representative says, "because of the prevailing insecurity. The insecurity is due to the fact that there is no pacification of public opinion. To solve this question of pacification, it is necessary to solve the question of the fundamental principles which we are not in a position at the moment to specify."

That is the whole situation. That is what lies behind the veil of mystery to which the President referred.

I should like to ask the Japanese representative, before I am faced with the painful necessity of voting against his proposal, whether he would be prepared to withdraw his proposal if we were



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prepared to amend our proposal in such a way as to bind the two parties to the case by a solemn and formal undertaking to begin negotiations on all the questions at issue on the very day the evacuation is concluded.

A declaration to that effect, if made immediately, would be so effective in relieving tension and pacifying public opinion as to safeguard the security of Japanese nationals in Manchuria and allow of the evacuation.

M. YOSHIZAWA. — My Government thinks it preferable not to enumerate the fundamental principles in the resolution, nor to discuss the details of these principles at the Council table. It believes that these principles could usefully be discussed between the two countries.

The Spanish representative said that these principles do not appear to be connected directly either with evacuation or security. That view, unfortunately, is not the view of my Government, which regards it as absolutely necessary to reach an agreement beforehand embodying these fundamental principles.


I therefore regret that I am unable to withdraw the words "fundamental principles" in our counter-proposal.

The PRESIDENT. — I think we should now adjourn until this afternoon. At this afternoon's meeting we shall vote on the resolutions.

Before concluding, may I draw the Japanese representative's attention to the fact that it would be a difficult matter—indeed, an impossibility—for the members of the Council to accept the inclusion in a draft resolution, in a spirit of conciliation, of a reference to fundamental principles, without knowing what they are and without having the right to formulate and discuss them. That would be asking Members to make too great a sacrifice. No member of the Council would agree to insert in a text a fundamental principle if he is ignorant of its precise meaning. I quite understand our colleague's reservation; but he for his part must understand how difficult it is for us to entertain the solution he is putting before us.



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C./65th Session/P.V.16(1).

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

SIXTY-FIFTH SESSION OF THE COUNCIL

MINUTES

SIXTEENTH MEETING (PUBLIC).

*Held on Saturday, October 24th, 1931, at 5 p.m.*

Present: All the representatives of the Members of the Council, and the Secretary-General. The United States of America was represented (Minute 2951) by Mr. Prentiss GILBERT.

2955. **Appeal from the Chinese Government under Article 11 of the Covenant** (continuation).

The PRESIDENT. — Since this morning's meeting further conversations have taken place in the hope that we might be able to devise a solution of this difficulty in accordance with our unanimous desire. At one moment, I had some hope that the parties had been brought sufficiently close together for that to be possible. In that case, I should have had the pleasure of submitting to the Council a draft resolution which would certainly have been accepted unanimously. Unfortunately I am unable to do so, and I deeply regret it. It must not be inferred, however, that, during our conversations, we have found that the situation has become worse. Far from it. A new desire has been apparent on the part of the Japanese delegation to join us in the view which we have adopted. The Japanese representative is, however, far away from his country, and is not entitled to interpret his instructions otherwise than he has done and, for reasons of conscience, he has felt he could not go as far as we had contemplated.

We are therefore left with the two texts before us which have been under discussion. Following the ordinary practice, I shall first submit the counter-proposal of the Japanese delegation to the Council for consideration.

M. YOSHIZAWA. — The Japanese delegation has joined the Council in its efforts to try to find a satisfactory solution for the serious question before it. Unfortunately, it has to note that there is still a difference of view as between the opinion of the Council set forth in the resolution and the opinion of the Japanese Government.

I desire to repeat one or two statements I have already made on several occasions. This matter was brought before the Council with the object of averting the threat of war. The Japanese Government has no intention of waging war on China, and it even considers that, at the present moment, there is no longer any threat of war.

I would repeat once more that Japan has no territorial designs in Manchuria, and that the Japanese Government is determined to bring its troops back into the railway zone as soon as it is satisfied that the safety of its nationals and the protection of their property are effectively safeguarded. It felt it necessary, in order that these conditions might be fulfilled, that a more peaceful frame of mind should prevail, and as a means to that end it proposed a preliminary agreement with China. Once again it expresses its readiness to enter into negotiations with China for that purpose at any time.

I desire to tell the Council how much I have appreciated the earnest and patient efforts it has made in examining this question, and its action will be for me an unforgettable memory.

The problems raised in the Council are problems affecting the very life of Japan. Such a situation cannot be judged merely from the standpoint of ideas. It would also be a grave mistake to judge it solely from the standpoint of facts. My Government, as regards the position it has taken up, has desired to have regard both to ideas and to facts. While not wishing to depart



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for a single moment from the spirit or the letter of its undertakings, the Japanese Government must assume its responsibilities to its nationals.

The draft resolution submitted to us does not, in its opinion, lay down the conditions which it regards as essential for effectively safeguarding the lives and property of its nationals. It is for that reason that, to my great regret, I cannot accept the draft resolution submitted by the President.

The PRESIDENT. — It now remains for us to take a decision on the counter-proposal submitted by the Japanese representative. I put it to the vote.

*The counter-proposal submitted by the Japanese representative was rejected by thirteen votes to one, the Japanese representative voting for.*

The PRESIDENT. — We will now take a vote by roll-call on the draft resolution which my colleagues have asked me to lay before the Council.

*There voted for:* British Empire, China, France, Germany, Guatemala, Irish Free State, Italy, Norway, Panama, Peru, Poland, Spain, and Yugoslavia.

*There voted against:* Japan.

*The draft resolution of the Council was adopted by thirteen votes to one.*

The PRESIDENT. — The draft resolution is therefore adopted unanimously, except for one vote—that of our colleague, the Japanese representative, who had indeed clearly intimated to us beforehand that he could not agree.

We have not been able to achieve unanimity on this draft resolution. Once again, I desire to express my keen regret that this should be so. But it cannot be said that our efforts have been without result in this serious, intricate, delicate and exceptional dispute. I particularly wish public opinion to realise the exceptional character of this dispute which, owing to the fact that the parties are so far distant from us here, the difficulty of communications and the impossibility of securing a rapid solution, has compelled the Council for its part to adopt an exceptional procedure and to allow exceptional limits of time which must not under any circumstances be regarded as precedents. Our efforts, I repeat, have not been without result.

We have come very near to our goal. That goal has, in fact, been attained in that we, being bound under the Covenant to prevent a conflict from being aggravated and degenerating into war, have been able to circumscribe it, acting in conjunction with the parties to the case. It is serious enough that the conflict should remain, even within its present limits; but the fact that it no longer amounts to a threat of war is, I think, a result for which the Council is entitled to take credit.

I am bound to say how greatly we have appreciated the valuable assistance which has throughout been afforded us in this delicate matter by the Government of the United States of America. From the very outset, it associated itself with our efforts and told us that it did so. From the outset it exchanged communications with us and, when we requested the United States Government, it even gave us its co-operation within the limits which it assigned to itself and with a special object in view—that is to say, it based its action on the Pact of Paris, of which it was the initiator and the application of which it is entitled to safeguard. I should like to ask the representative of the United States to convey to his Government our warm and sincere thanks and to tell him that, in our opinion, the assistance which has thus been given us has undoubtedly produced a moral effect which, together with our own efforts, has contributed greatly to circumscribing the conflict.

What, then, is the present position? We shall adjourn until November 16th. The draft resolution which has been adopted after a very long discussion is now on the Council table. It is in the hands of our colleague the Japanese representative, and of his Government. Moreover, our colleague has just made certain declarations which we have all noted with real satisfaction.

At this solemn moment, realising the whole weight of his responsibilities and appealing to his conscience, the Japanese representative felt called upon to affirm once more on behalf of his Government that, in this affair, the Japanese Government is not seeking in any way to achieve aggrandisement at the expense of a neighbouring country; that it has no secret intention to encroach in any way upon the territorial integrity of a country which, like Japan, is a Member of the League. He has been able to assure us that his Government will take every care to keep the conflict within limits, so that it may not lead to a new catastrophe.

These declarations, coming from a country like Japan, are of importance. Moreover, since the sole anxiety of the Japanese Government is to ensure the necessary safeguards for Japanese nationals and their property, I still venture to hope that, between now and November 16th, the evacuation, already begun, will be continued, the Japanese Government thereby proving by its acts that it is straining every effort to end the conflict. At the next meeting, the Japanese representative may be able to come forward and say: "The dispute no longer exists. All the hopes and desires expressed by my colleagues have now been fulfilled." I trust I shall have the great pleasure of placing such a statement upon record.

We have now come to the end of this journey, which has been rather long and has taken us over unaccustomed ground. We have not always worked upon the geometrical principle that a straight line is the shortest distance between two points; we have been obliged by considerations of procedure to wander rather far from our goal. But now we behold that goal very clearly.

Between now and the date of the next meeting of the Council I hope the President will receive good news to convey to you. Perhaps the best news of all would be that there is no absolute



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need for a further meeting. But even so, I may be selfish enough to convene you here again in order to tell you the good news in person. You will forgive me for that, if you think of my reasons.

There is no need for me to add that the resolution of September 30th, to the effect that the parties shall furnish the Council with frequent information regarding the course of events, and that all Members of the Council may also send in information, is maintained. That procedure will continue; in other words, the co-operation which has existed up to the present session will continue as before.

M. SCIALOJA. — I feel sure I am voicing the feelings of all my colleagues when I tender to you, Mr. President, the expression of our gratitude for your wise, able and experienced guidance of our labours. You have brought us to a point which, if it cannot be regarded as our harbour, is so near that we may hope ultimately to reach it. No one could have so ably steered our ship, I will not say through the storms, but through the obscurity which has at times impeded our course.

M. Briand knows that I have long been an admirer of his. I cannot say I have admired all that he has done, because on occasion I have had to vote against him. But I have always admired the manner in which he has done it. Whenever you hear a speech of his, you are always sure that you know the question thoroughly, and that nothing important or decisive has been omitted. That is, after all, what we should ask of those who pilot us in our political navigation.

I therefore ask M. Briand to pursue his wise and valuable work for the peace of the world. We shall always follow him, even those of us who may on occasion vote against him, for I feel sure the Japanese representative admires him as much as the other members of the Council.

I would ask him to accept this expression of our feelings, which explains why we have never despaired of achieving that end of justice assigned to us by the Covenant of the League, the fortress that defends the peace of the world.

Lord CECIL.—I only wish to say in a few words how heartily I agree with what has fallen from my colleague, the representative of Italy. I have no pretence to imitate the characteristic grace and subtlety with which he expressed the sentiments of us all; I would only say in our rude tongue that I also am one of the most devoted admirers of our President—on previous occasions, and particularly on this one. He has shown to a degree which is really little short of marvellous an ingenuity, a resource, a dignity, and above all a patience in conducting our deliberations, without which we certainly could not have attained the very considerable measure of success which, in my judgment, we have reached.

Let me just weigh for a moment on the word "patience". Let us remember always that the chief and by far the most important weapon at the command of the League of Nations is the support of the public opinion of the world. If the Council of the League were to go too fast, were to outstrip that opinion, it would not have its support. It is of the utmost importance that our deliberations—conducted with all the speed that is possible, no doubt—should yet be rather behind than in front of the opinion of the world. In that way, we shall be sure of receiving that support without which our actions cannot be effective. It is for that reason that I would, if I may, single out our President's patience in these discussions as perhaps the most valuable of all the qualities he has displayed.

I entirely agree with everything that has fallen from the mouth of M. Scialoja.

M. VON MUTIUS.—The President has voiced the regret we all feel that, in view of the special difficulties of the case before us, the Council of the League of Nations has been unable up to the present to find a solution acceptable to the two parties. The whole world has followed our debates with an attention which has not been free from anxiety and scepticism. Doubts have been expressed as to the effectiveness of the Geneva institution when dealing with the difficulties of this case. We can, however, say that notwithstanding these very special difficulties, the Council has been able to reduce the gravity of the conflict, to circumscribe its scope and to bring the parties closer together.

Although the difference between China and Japan is far from being settled, we have reason to hope that the relaxation in the tension will make possible an agreement which, I trust, will be based on the draft resolution adopted by a majority vote of the Council. If the two Governments concerned show a generous spirit of conciliation, there are good grounds for believing that final success will be achieved.

In conclusion, I desire to associate myself warmly with the eloquent tribute paid by the previous speakers to our President.

M. YOSHIZAWA.—I too would like to say that I wholeheartedly share the feelings expressed by the representative of Italy. I, too, have admired the manner in which you have conducted our difficult discussions, with wisdom and absolute impartiality, and I desire to take this opportunity of tendering to you my most sincere thanks for the very touching words in which you referred to myself.

M. BRAADLAND.—I desire warmly to associate myself with the tribute paid to the President for the work he has done, work which we have all—and not least the parties concerned—endeavoured



- 4 -

to facilitate by every means in our power. I desire also to associate myself very warmly with what he said regarding the assistance of the United States of America.

In view of the extreme intricacy of the question before us, we have not yet been able to reach a formal and definitive solution, in conformity with the simple and imperative principles which, without taking sides in any question, we must apply in any work undertaken with a view to safeguarding peace. But that does not justify excessive pessimism. I am fully convinced that the Council's draft resolution, which undoubtedly has the public opinion of the world behind it, will prove effective and that the parties concerned, whose firm wish for peace we appreciate, will adopt the main lines it lays down for settling the dispute, so that at the next meeting of the Council we shall have the pleasure of recording the fact that this question has been finally disposed of.

M. SZE.— I have the fear, which I hope will not prove justified, that there is little likelihood of an improvement in the situation in Manchuria, because Japan insists on negotiations between China and Japan, which China will not enter upon until the evacuation of Japanese troops has been completed and satisfactory arrangements made for the determination, under the League's auspices, of the responsibilities and damages arising out of events in Manchuria since September 18th.

I therefore think that the period of adjournment to November 16th is too long, and China reserves the right to request the calling of an earlier meeting, should the process of evacuation not proceed in accordance with the hopes expressed by the President.

Before the Council adjourns, I wish to express my Government's gratitude to you, Mr. President, for your distinguished conduct of our labours, and its sense of how much the Council owes to your tireless persistence in the cause of peace, your skill and ripe experience in guiding our deliberations and the prestige of your name as one of the pillars of the League of Nations.

It is a curious but happy stroke of fate that has associated M. Briand's name with the Council's solution of the most arduous conflicts which have arisen in recent years, and I see in this fact a good omen for the League's success in the present conflict.

The PRESIDENT. — I am indeed overwhelmed by what has been said, and cannot find words to express my thanks to those of my colleagues who have spoken of me so kindly. I will try to show myself worthy and assure them that my experience, together with what modesty remains at my age after a long public life, will enable me to sift the compliments that have been addressed to me and only retain what remains after friendship's tributes have been discounted. My neighbour on my right has a friendship for me which leads him to overrate my merits. If I had known before what he was going to say I might really have departed for once from the President's impartiality and have arbitrarily refused him the right to speak.

I shall only remember what I may call the constructive part of these compliments—that is to say, the words in which all my colleagues recalled my long services of co-operation in the cause of peace and adjured me to persevere in that course. They may rely on me. I shall persevere to the end. Though public life may at times involve bitterness, vexations and disappointments for those who have held office, especially over long periods of time and in positions of responsibility, it nevertheless knows moments of pleasurable exaltation at the thought that one is able to render service to mankind. The work which we have carried on so often together in delicate circumstances has not only created bonds of friendship between us which I greatly prize: it also entitles us to feel that we are doing something of which we may all be proud. Rest assured that your appeal to my perseverance will not be in vain.

It would be unfair to take to myself all the compliments which have been paid to me for the manner in which the work of the Council has been conducted in this complicated task. I was not present at the beginning. My predecessor and friend, M. Lerroux, had, under most difficult conditions, directed the action which led up to the resolution of September 30th, a resolution upon which—let it not be forgotten—all our subsequent work has been based. That is the foundation on which I have been able to rely, so that we are able to record some satisfactory results which we hope will be completed by November 16th.

I must also, in this connection, pay my tribute—and I do so with very great satisfaction—to the Secretary-General, Sir Eric Drummond, and to those who work with him. Their energy and devotion deserve the fullest recognition of the Council and of its President.

At this, the end of our discussions, I should like to say a word to the Japanese and Chinese representatives, to whose good will I bear my testimony. I would say to them that a satisfactory solution will certainly be found if the Governments endeavour to make a calmer frame of mind prevail, and if they forbid any move or any action which could complicate or embitter the situation.

I am sure that I express the feelings of all my colleagues on the Council.

M. DE MADARIAGA. — Though in wholehearted agreement with everything that has been said concerning the way in which you, Mr. President, have conducted our proceedings, I did not venture to add any tribute of my own, because I did not think I could speak with sufficient authority. Apart from this feeling of modesty, I was also somewhat embarrassed by the circumstance to which the Chinese representative referred when he said that a curious stroke of fate had associated your name with the presidency of the Council on the occasion of very serious emergencies and by



— 5 —

the fact that, in this matter, I believe that I have, in a sense, been the collaborator of fate. I should, however, like to say, seeing that you have mentioned the Minister for Foreign Affairs of my country, that I have received a message from him in which he asks me to express to you the great admiration with which he has followed your work as President of the Council.

May I also venture to say a word to my Japanese and Chinese colleagues in my capacity as representative of the country which, I believe, can claim the longest intercourse with their nations. As far back as the beginning of the sixteenth century Spain established with these two countries excellent relations, which continue to the present day. I believe, indeed—the Japanese representative will correct me if I am wrong—that it was the Spanish language that gave the Japanese language the word for “bread”. In view of these memories of the past, I venture to express the hope that by the next meeting complete unanimity will have been reached.

In conclusion, I wish to associate myself with what the President has said in regard to the greatly valued co-operation of the United States of America, and to express the hope that if unfortunately the debates of the Council on this matter have to be continued, this co-operation will also be continued.

Mr. Prentiss GILBERT. — I take this occasion to thank the President of the Council for the words he was kind enough to address to me earlier this afternoon, and also for those spoken by the representative of Norway. These I shall have the honour of transmitting immediately to my Government.

M. SZE. — May I also join with the representative of Norway in expressing our deep gratification at having the co-operation of the representative of the United States of America at this Council.



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM


GRAY

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Tientsin via N. R.

Dated December 1, 1931

Rec'd 7:35 a. m.



793-94  
note  
793-102

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

December 1, 4 p. m.

The following telegram has been sent to the Legation:

"December 1, 3 p. m. Approximately 450 Japanese  
infantry troops arrived this morning landing on the British  
bund and proceeding to the Japanese barracks.

There was no firing during the night and situation  
is apparently improving since withdrawal of Chinese armed  
police to Hopei. Many of barricades in Chinese city have  
been removed but none removed in Japanese concession thus  
far,

A well known American exhibited to me this morning  
a collection of empty rifle shells of Japanese manufacture  
picked up by him on Saturday morning immediately outside  
the compound of the Methodist Episcopal Mission. He also  
brought two small unsealed boxes of rifle cartridges of  
Japanese

F/DEW 793.94/2973

FILED

DEC 21 1931



REP

2- from Tientsin, Dec. 1, 4 p. m.

Japanese manufacture picked up on the ground immediately outside the compound gate about 300 yards from the Japanese barricade and also a handful of shrapnel picked up in the compound. He reports that three shells landed in the compound and exploded on Thursday and Friday nights doing damage to window panes but causing no injuries. I called the attention of the Japanese consular and military authorities last Friday quite emphatically to the fact that American lives and property were being seriously jeopardized by fire apparently from the concession and they agreed to avoid firing in the direction of the American property if possible but stated that if attacked from that direction they would return the fire. On Friday night many bullets hit the compound buildings and one shrapnel shell dropped within the compound. Some of the mission occupants believe the Japanese responsible for this firing but it is not yet conclusively proved. It is clear, however, that Chinese police were not immediately outside the mission gate.


Repeated to the Department and Nanking."

LOCKHART

WSB



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



25 November 1931

NOV 30 1931

THE UNDER SECRETARY

NOV 28 1931

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Honorable William R. Castle  
Undersecretary of State  
Department of State  
Washington, D. C.

*Letter drafted to As. Secy. of the Navy, Nov. 30, 1931*

Dear Bill:

This is a personal friend of mine. I do not know what it is all about, but I am wondering if you would be good enough to suggest some answer I might give him.

Please return enclosures.

Best regards.

Sincerely yours

Ernest Lee Jahncke  
The Assistant Secretary of the Navy

Enc. 2  
J:S:G

F/DEW

793.94/2974

FILED

DEC 2 1931



1386  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY

NEAL M. LEACH  
GENERAL SHIPPING AGENCY  
AMERICAN BANK BUILDING  
NEW ORLEANS, LA.

November 23, 1931.

PRIVATE. (VIA AIRMAIL)

Com. Ernest Lee Jahncke,  
Assistant Secretary,  
United States Navy,  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Commodore:

Referring to the enclosed. I am assuming there would be some commensurate compensation connected with the service referred to, as I could not afford to serve without it. I imagine this will be, if created, a rather large organization, and there would probably be room for me some place.

I am now connected with the Gulf Pacific Line in an advisory capacity, retaining the title of Vice-President, having embarked in the General Steamship Agency work on my own account, and could arrange for leave at any time.

My health is excellent. I am sixty-two years old, but in splendid physical condition.

If there is no room for me on the Manchurian Committee, probably something else may turn up in the future where my services could be of some benefit.

With kindest personal regards, I am,

Very sincerely yours,

NEAL

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Encl.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY

NEAL M. LEACH  
GENERAL SHIPPING AGENCY  
AMERICAN BANK BUILDING  
NEW ORLEANS, LA.

November 23, 1931.

VIA AIRMAIL

Hon. Ernest Lee Jahncke,  
Assistant Secretary,  
United States Navy,  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Ernest:

From present indications, it would appear that the President may soon be called upon to select an Investigation Committee in connection with the Manchurian affair. I believe I could serve on such a Committee or Commission creditable, and to the benefit of the Government.

You know I have had many years contact with the Japanese, and understand their psychology more than the average American. I have many Japanese acquaintances, many of them in high places, such as Prince Tokugawa, President of the House of Peers. I have been a constant student of everything pertaining to the Far East, both economically and socially. I am at present, and have been for the past three years, President of the Japan Society of New Orleans, organized for the purpose of promoting friendly relations between the United States and Japan.

My thirty-five years' railroad and steamship experience should also be of benefit.

As you know, I have a wide acquaintance thruout the South and West, and I believe that my appointment would be a popular one.

If you think the same way I do about it, would greatly appreciate your suggesting my name if the opportunity presents itself, and in case a Committee or Commission is to be appointed.

With best personal regards, I am,

Very truly yours,

N. M. LEACH

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AG



1388

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

November 30, 1931.

Dear Ernest:

In reply to your personal letter of November 25, 1931, in regard to the request of Mr. Neal M. Leach for assistance in obtaining his appointment to the proposed commission of investigation into Manchurian affairs, I suggest that you call Mr. Leach's attention to the fact that the creation of any such commission is now a matter of discussion by the Council of the League of Nations and that it appears that the Council itself, in the event that such a commission is finally decided upon, will appoint the members thereof.

In accordance with your request, the two letters from Mr. Leach are returned herewith.

Sincerely yours,

Enclosures:

Two letters from  
Neal M. Leach, dated  
September 23, 1931.

W. R. Castle, Jr.

The Honorable

Ernest Lee Jahncke,


Assistant Secretary of the Navy,

Washington, D. C.

FE:ROM/VDM

FE

11/30/31



F.W. 793.94/2974



1385

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

FROM

Paris

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Dated December 1, 1931

Rec'd 12:40 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

DOUBLE PRIORITY.

824, December 1, 4

FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES.

Matsudaira has just called and I have been discussing with him one of the last remaining points of difference, to wit, the manner in which the declaration and resolution of the League shall cover the point of protection of Japanese nationals against bandits.

Personally I appreciate the desire of the Council to avoid making a precedent which seems inconsistent with existing international law by inferentially justifying occasional bandit chasing outside the railway zone but with the recollection of the Pershing expedition into Mexico after the bandit Villa in mind, I realize also that the condition in Manchuria is actual and not theoretical. If the Japanese Government would announce that it had agreed in advance not to send a detachment

to

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEC 2 1931

DIVISION OF

WESTERN AFFAIRS

Division of

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DEC 1 1931

Department of State

F/DEW

793.94/2975

FILED

DEC 9 1931

793.94



MET

2-#824, from Paris, December  
1, 1931

to prevent an expected massacre of Japanese nationals  
in any particular locality by a group of Chinese bandits,  
the Japanese government would probably fall.

In continuing to deal with the Manchurian situa-  
tion, instead of throwing overboard the effort to get  
a peaceful settlement before this time the Council  
has already overlooked such expeditions in its desire  
to avert a war. However, the Council has already inti-  
mated although reluctantly that in the declaration which  
accompanies the resolution they will endeavor by some  
reference to it to satisfy the Japanese on this point.

While there is some opposition on the Council  
I think Briand can bring this about. Matsudaira has  
agreed with me that so far as he can accomplish it  
the Japanese will withdraw their present demand to  
have the reference to bandits made in the resolution  
itself and will be content with Briand's reference to  
it in the declaration. Unless therefore there are  
unexpected happenings around Chinchow contrary to the

wishes



1391  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

3-#824, from Paris, December  
1, 1931.

wishes and orders of the Japanese government daylight  
seems to be in the offing.

Matsudaira is pleased with the Chinese announce-  
ment which, as I suggested to them, was made public  
last night.

SHAW

WSB



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By *Milton O. Lustig* NARS, Date *12-18-75*

1-138  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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## TELEGRAM SENT

### Department of State

Washington,

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED

CONFIDENTIAL CODE

NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE

PLAIN

TELEGRAPH OFFICE

December 1, 1931.

DEC 1 31

AmEmbassy,

Paris.

FOR AMBASSADOR DAWES.

Your ~~281~~ <sup>824/2975</sup> December 1, 4 p. m. Whatever

may be included, either in the Resolution of the Council or in the statement of the President of the Council, on the subject of bandits, I hope that the reference may be confined to the protection of Japanese nationals. The suggestion as to such a statement in previous telegrams have seemed rather to refer to the indiscriminate chasing of bandits apparently in territory outside the railway zone and this would be a most dangerous admission.

We should <sup>much</sup> prefer, if there is to be any reference to the putting down of banditry, that it should be included in the statement of the President rather than in the Resolution.

U WRC/AB

*Stimson*

Enciphered by *Stimson*

Sent by operator *M.*, *1931*

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-138

793.94/2975

793.94/2975

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DEC 1



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone.

FROM

Secretary of State,

Washington

825, December 1, 5 p.m.

FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES.

Your 609, November 30, 6 p.m.


Scialoja called on me this noon with reference to  
an Italian delegate on Committee and I informed him in  
the words of Mr. Castle that our Government would of  
course not object to an Italian member of the Committee  
since the appointment of the Committee is entirely a  
matter for the League.

SHAW

KLP

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DEC 2 1931  
Paris Division  
WEST HALL  
Dated December 1, 1931

Rec'd 1:40 p.m.



F/DEW 793.94/2976

DEC 10 1931

FILED

793.94



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## DOCUMENT FILE

### NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R.Chefoo/48 FOR Despatch # to Legation  
FROM Chefoo (Webber) DATED Oct.31,1931.  
TO ----- NAME ----- 1-1127 o p o

REGARDING: Opinion of the Educational Class concerning the  
Manchurian controversy: Gives opinions of the different  
schools of thought on this subject.  
(Copy attached)

fpg

793.94/2977



OPINION OF INSTITUTIONAL CLASS.

793.94  
Apart from the military and the student class, the public appear to be indifferent to the Manchurian situation. The student and teaching class, as well as part of the military, seem to be divided in their opinion as regards the proper foreign policy for China. One school, strange to say, favors rapprochement and full cooperation with Japan with the view to having the Orient dominate the world; this is apparently being pushed by the Cantonese in the Tangpu; the other believes in a strong, united and independent China leaning towards and assisted by American power and finance in the development of their country; the third favors linking up with Russia and having a Sovietized form of Government.

Which of the three will eventually predominate is probably contingent on the prominence and the part that the radical wing of the Cantonese party will play in the new Government; the outcome of the Manchurian situation, as well as many other factors, entering into the political relations of China.

CONFIDENTIAL



1394

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 894.00 P.R./47 FOR Despatch #379

FROM Japan ( Forbes ) DATED Nov. 6, 1931.  
---TO--- NAME 1-1127 070

REGARDING: Situation in Manchuria: Controversy between  
Japan and China. Attitude of the general  
public.  
(Copy attached)

fpg

793.94/2978

3A18



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (Z)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

II. POLITICAL RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES.

Manchuria:

793.94

During October the Japanese forces continued in the positions in Manchuria that they had occupied during the latter part of September, with the exception of Tunhua, from which troops were withdrawn on October 5th. There was no indication of intention to withdraw from other places until the Chinese had agreed to the "basic principles" outlined in the statement of the Japanese Government issued on October 26, 1931. The movement of troops against bands of Chinese bandits and ex-soldiers continued intermittently, while the principal military action was the bombing of Chinchow, where General Chang Hsueh-liang was attempting to reorganize his government. The Japanese

- 2 -

have been so affected, for the military had directed propaganda to this end, the Council of the League had, with the exception of Japan's delegate, approved a resolution regarded as detrimental to Japan's interests, and certain acts of British officials had convinced the country that Britain was using the League for selfish ends against Japan."



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## II. POLITICAL RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES.

### Manchuria:

79394  
During October the Japanese forces continued in the positions in Manchuria that they had occupied during the latter part of September, with the exception of Tunhua, from which troops were withdrawn on October 5th. There was no indication of intention to withdraw from other places until the Chinese had agreed to the "basic principles" outlined in the statement of the Japanese Government issued on October 26, 1931. The movement of troops against bands of Chinese bandits and ex-soldiers continued intermittently, while the principal military action was the bombing of Chinchow, where General Chang Hsueh-liang was attempting to reorganize his government. The Japanese insisted that the bombing was necessary because the Chinese had fired on their planes while reconnoitering.

The civilian government continued, unable apparently to control the policy or acts of the military, while the tenor of an important part of the public became more militant.\* It was not unnatural that the public should have

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\* Despatch No. 383 of November 7, 1931.



0396  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R.Tsingtao/43 FOR Despatch #677

FROM Tsingtao ( Chase ) DATED Nov. 4, 1931.  
-TO----- NAME 1-1127 ope

REGARDING: Controversy between China and Japan: Local Chinese  
Public Opinion: Reports regarding -- General situation.  
(Copy attached)

fpg

793.94 / 2979

2979



State of Local Chinese Public Opinion.

79394  
Local Chinese public opinion with respect to the present international crisis still appears somewhat less aroused and less organized than in most of the large ports. As far as ascertained, feeling towards the League of Nations and the United States is about as follows. The better educated Chinese continue to hope that a solution of the crisis may still be reached through action by the League, and, that means failing, regard the United States as the only alternative recourse. They are impatient of the League's failure to get quicker results, and have misgivings regarding the ability of either the League or the United States to achieve the hoped for success. The illiterate classes, having a vague if any conception of the League, instinctively look to America alone for help. Outside of radicals, only a relatively few persons think seriously of inviting the aid of Soviet Russia, and, even of these, most regard such a move only in the nature of a last desperate resort.

Such.....



1401

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

Such agitation for anti-Japanese demonstrations as has been reported to date appears to have been chiefly among the middle school students. It has worked for the staging of parades, so far without success. That student demonstrations have not occurred here may be attributed to the energy and intelligence of the Chief of the Bureau of Education, the relatively small number of older students in Tsingtao, and the fact that disastrous effects which anti-Japanese outbreaks could have on the economic life of the port are so clearly obvious.

While a few of its agents have been discovered endeavoring to create disturbances here, there seems to have been surprisingly little inclination on the part of the communist party to take advantage of the situation.

The Tangpu is apparently restraining its efforts to encouragement of anti-Japanese activities of non-violent nature and the dissemination of false or misleading local news items through the medium of the Kuo Min press. An instance of such deliberate falsification of news is the report, absolutely without foundation, contained in the Kuo Min News Agency press sheet of October 18th to the effect that Japanese marines had on that day torn down anti-Japanese posters along the streets of Tsingtao.

The arrival in Tsingtao of agitators said to have been sent from Canton to work for Japanese occupation of the port was commented on in the Consulate's despatch  
of.....



- 5 -

of October 14th. While the real truth of this matter is very obscure, it would seem that the basis for the report is in some way connected with a violent dissension as to policy known to have taken place recently between members of the local Tangpu.

Continuance of Japanese Laissez Faire Policy.

From all indications here, the Japanese Government still remains entirely committed to a policy of non-interference with respect to Shantung. The local Japanese Consular authorities, by word and deed, give evidence of their sincere desire to cooperate in maintaining peace in the Tsingtao area.

No additional Japanese warships have called at Tsingtao since the arrival, previously reported, on October 12th of the Destroyers, ASAGAO, FUYO and KARU-KAYA. These three vessels departed on the 18th, thereby bearing out the Consulate's original conclusion that their visit was merely a perfunctory one. Since their departure, the Cruiser, KUMA, has been the only representative of the Japanese Navy in port.

While its men ashore have conducted themselves with commendable discipline, the Japanese Navy has nevertheless taken care to see that the fact of its representation at Tsingtao is well impressed on the populace. Large unarmed patrols are daily sent into the city and the sight of as many as two hundred marines parading the streets in close marching order is a common one.

On October 17th a body of about 600 Japanese marines landed under arms, but "without cartridges",

marched.....



- 6 -

marched through the city to the Japanese shrine where they performed a ceremony of worship to fallen Japanese warriors and then returned to their ships. On the 23rd a similarly armed but smaller pilgrimage was made to the local Japanese War Monument. Each of these ceremonies was in accordance with an annual custom, however; prior "permission" had been obtained from the Municipality in each instance; and the paraders conducted themselves perfectly, attracting surprisingly little interest among the Chinese population.

Difficult Position of Hu Jo-yu.

Unless strong indications fail to materialize, the end of Mayor Hu Jo-yu's municipal administration is a matter of weeks, if not of days. He is regarded suspiciously by the Japanese on account of his very close affiliation with Chang Hsueh-liang and fairly good relations with Chiang Kai-shih; and although the Japanese authorities concerned have cooperated with him so far, it is understood they have done so only on the distinct understanding that he would be on good behaviour and that cooperation would be withdrawn at the first sign that his administration was failing properly to safeguard Japanese interests. Japan would probably prefer a mayor friendly to if not appointed by Han Fu-chu- such a person as Ke Kuang-t'ing ( 葛光庭 ) for example- who would undertake to purchase the allegiance of the Northeast Squadron by assurance of regular payment of its expenses from the city revenues.

With his patron and support, Chang Hsueh-liang, in

no.....



- 7 -

no position to back him effectively, mistrusted by the Japanese, and with nothing to look forward to except trouble, Hu would probably welcome a chance to withdraw from the scene in a graceful manner.

Hu's embarrassing situation readily explains the extreme nervousness, commented on elsewhere, with which his administration viewed the recent Japanese mass meeting held at Tsingtao and the aggressive resolutions passed by the meeting which may well be construed as increasing the chances of disturbing Sino-Japanese incidents taking place in the city. The administration's role, indeed, would now seem reduced to that of ignominious toleration pending outbreak of trouble for which it is bound to be the scapegoat.

In this connection, it may be added that another incident, occurring almost simultaneously with the mass meeting, undoubtedly contributed much to the alarm of the Municipality. This was the threat made by Han Fuchu to take over the two local National Government tax collecting offices- i.e., stamp, tobacco and wine- which, while a gesture against Nanking rather than the local Government, is known to have occasioned great anxiety to Hu and his lieutenants.

Northeast Squadron an Important Factor.

It is clear that the Northeast Squadron, in spite of the present dubious situation of its master, Chang Hsueh-liang, is playing a very significant- if somewhat incongruous- role in the local political drama, and its continued representation at Tsingtao in the shape of  
the.....



- 8 -

the Cruisers, HAI CHI, HAI SHEN and CHAO HO, would seem to constitute to some extent an augury for the maintenance of the status quo in this area.

Such a policy on the part of Japan seems a thoroughly sound one from the Japanese point of view. If compelled to leave northern waters, the Squadron would very likely proceed to Hanking and volunteer its services to the further strengthening of Chiang Kai-shih. In the second place, by supporting the Squadron here, Japan secures some assurance of order in the port, a fair guarantee against entrance into the area of Chinese military forces, and at the same time, without effort or embarrassment, holds- in case of emergency- the sea terminus of the railway just as effectively as it would were its own forces in actual occupation of the city. Finally, the presence of the Squadron in the north is of considerable financial benefit to the Japanese Navy, since the Port Arthur Repair Base, it is understood, is largely if not entirely supported by the Squadron, which employs the base's facilities exclusively for all major repairs.

Admiral Shen Hung-lieh continues to be much embarrassed by the problem of obtaining funds for his navy. Even since the ruin of his North Manchurian river shipping interests as a result of Soviet Russian aggressions in 1929 forced him to turn to Chang Hsueh-liang for financial support, the Squadron's monthly Yuan \$300,000 budgets have been met with irregularity and apparent reluctance by the Young Marshal. With Mukden's fortune at its present low ebb, Admiral Shen has only with the  
greatest.....



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 9 -

greatest difficulty found the wherewithal to assure the Squadron's bare existence and has been compelled to half his budget by drastic cuts and economies which greatly diminish the effectiveness of his vessels. According to a reliable report, he has just succeeded in getting Yuan \$160,000 from Chang Hsueh-liang, which sum is stated to cover one of the several months arrears of pay and the outstanding coal bills. In addition to this, he has, it appears, obtained from Mayor Hu Jo-yu the promise of a \$50,000 monthly subsidy- first instalment of which has been paid- and a similar undertaking for twice that amount from Chang. Faced with the necessity of subsisting on this total \$150,000 monthly income, pledged from sources which are anything but sure, the Squadron is in such a plight that its vessels now at Tsingtao have not even been able to afford the purchase of coal.

It is understood that Admiral Shen has been recently in Peiping for the purpose of consulting further with Chang regarding the future disposition of the Squadron. The Squadron's fate in case of the total elimination of Chang or change in the Tsingtao municipal government is an interesting matter for conjecture.



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RADIOGRAM

Code Cablegram

BFS

November 25, 1931. *W* Division  
FAR EASTERN  
NOV 27 1931  
Department of State  
#

9:40 A.M.

From Tokio

To The Adjutant General

CONFIDENTIAL

Number 198. November 25th.

793.94  
✓ General Staff denies any troop movements towards southward  
and states no intention operating against Chinchow, but admits  
Japanese troops are operating against bandits along the railroad  
Peking Mukden; number of troops not given. 170 replacements from  
Sendai passed through Tokyo November 20th en route to Manchuria.  
✓ 1150 recruits for railway guards leave Kobe soon so as to reach  
Manchuria by December 1st, replacing time expired men. Casualties  
✓ last engagements Nonni River and Tsitsihar; killed officers 3,  
enlisted 33, total 36. Wounded officers 6, enlisted 120. Total  
casualties 162. Chinese casualties unknown. November 24th 150  
men from Signal Corps and 80 automobile mechanics left Tokyo for  
✓ Manchuria. Last mentioned requested to be kept confidential.  
✓ General Staff states no intention increasing garrison in Tientsin.  
Split in cabinet seems more serious, rumors of an early downfall.

Cranford


F/DEW

793.94/2980

NOV 30 1931



1408  
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



Lately Japanese have been intensely circulating news

793.94

that the Chinese troops at Chinchow will attack the  
Japanese troops and Chang Hsueh-Liang will declare war.  
Japan's intention is to launch immediate attack upon  
Chinchow. According to railway reports Japanese gunboat  
Kuoa arrived 23rd declaring to protect wireless station  
but evidently to help attack Chinchow.

F7DEW 793.94, 2981

Chinese Legation,

Washington, November 25, 1931.

DEC 1 1931



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
November 27, 1931.

The First Secretary of the  
Chinese Legation left this with me  
this afternoon.

Tsiang Tso-ping is the  
Chinese Minister to Japan.

BY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AT NANKING  
1. 27, 1931.

orted that at an extraordinary  
abinet today it was decided to  
i brigade to Tientsin and one  
eady been ordered to start  
reported that the Japanese  
ting of sending the aircraft  
in case the troops do not

MMH/REK

Chinese Legation,  
Washington, November 27, 1931.

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Chinese Legation

XI - 27-31

DCR

F/DEW

793.94/2982

793.  
no  
693.0146



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DIVISION OF EAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

*Left by first sec 7  
Chinese Legation*

*XI - 27-31*

TELEGRAM FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AT NANKING  
DATED Nov. 27, 1931.

*DCR*

Tsiang Tso-ping reported that at an extraordinary meeting of the Japanese Cabinet today it was decided to send from Japan one mixed brigade to Tientsin and one large detachment had already been ordered to start immediately. It is also reported that the Japanese Government was contemplating of sending the aircraft carrier Kaga to Tientsin in case the troops do not arrive in time.

F/DEW

793.94/2982

*793.94  
no  
892.0146  
✓*

Chinese Legation,

Washington, November 27, 1931.



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

RECEIVED

NOV 30 1931

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
RECEIVED NOV 25 1931

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

1 1931 Department of State

DIVISION OF

Handed by Mr. Gu To  
Mr. Lusk  
Nov. 25, 1931  
Rec.  
SECRETARY OF STATE  
NOV. 30 1931

THE UNDER SECRETARY

DEC 1 1931

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TRANSMITTANCE OF TELEGRAM FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
AT NANKING, DATED NOV. 24, 1931.

793.94  
The Manchurian situation is becoming more critical and grave every day. According to reports from Minister Tsiang at Tokyo, Japanese troops after having occupied Tsitsihar now plan to march northward to take Manchouli and southward to take Jehol. The apparent conciliatory attitude of Japanese diplomacy is to gain time for Japan's military operation. The Fourth Congress of the Kuomintang has adopted a Resolution containing the following points:  
(1) To call the attention of every nation to its obligations to international agreements, especially with the anticipation that the United States will assume the principal rôle in invoking the Briand-Kellogg Anti-War Pact and the Nine Power Treaty (2) to reorganize the Government and to delegate to it the full and unqualified power so as to expose the ulterior motive of Japan in spreading false propaganda that the Chinese Government does not command the confidence of the Chinese people.

793.94/2983

Chinese Legation,

Washington, November 25, 1931.

DEC 1 1931



141  
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lutz NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

December 3, 1931.

The confidential memorandum prepared by E. E. Barnett of the National Staff of the Y. M. C. A.'s of China is a report of Mr. Barnett's visit to Manchuria, October 9-23. The memorandum contains much information of interest in regard to the occupation of strategic centers in Manchuria by the Japanese. Most of this information the Department has already had. However, I call particular attention to pages 8-10, giving the substance of an interview had by Mr. Barnett with Mr. Yuen Chin Kai; also to pages 19-20, giving a translation of a leaflet signed by General Honjo and dropped by Japanese planes flying over Harbin; also to pages 22-23, reporting Mr. Barnett's interview with Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang.

DEC 9 1931

MMH/VDM  
MML



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

December 1, 1931

RECEIVED  
DEC 1 1931  
DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS

Division of  
EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 1 1931

*Letter drafted  
to Senator Watson,  
Dec 4, 1931*

*FE*  
*1-10*  
F/DEW

My dear

By direction of the President, I am  
sending you the enclosed letter from Senator  
James E. Watson transmitting a copy of a letter  
from Mr. William W. Lockwood and a memorandum  
prepared by Mr. Eugene E. Barnett.

793.94

793.94/2984

Sincerely yours,

*Lawrence Richey*

LAWRENCE RICHEY  
Secretary to the President

Honorable Henry L. Stimson  
Secretary of State  
Washington, D. C.

Enclosures

SECRETARY OF STATE  
DEC 9 1931

DEC 10 1931  
FBI-PD




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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JAMES E. WATSON  
CHAIRMAN

United States Senate

CONFERENCE OF THE MAJORITY

November 30,  
1931.



*7 - copy to*

RECEIVED

NOV 1 - 1931

Hon. Herbert Hoover,  
President of the United States,  
The White House.

Dear Mr. President:

Col. George B. Lockwood of Muncie, Indiana,  
has requested that I hand you this memorandum  
and I am passing it on to you for your con-  
sideration.

Very sincerely,

*James E. Watson*

on.



1415

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

NATIONAL COMMITTEE Y.M.C.A.  
20 Museum Road, Shanghai  
China.

November 3, 1931.

Mr. George B. Lockwood,  
The Muncie Press,  
Muncie, Indiana, U. S. A.

Dear George:

By this mail I am sending you four copies of a confidential document prepared by E. E. Barnett, my colleague on the National Staff of the Y. M. C. A.'s of China.

Mr. Barnett went to Manchuria soon after the upset there in order to be of service to our Y.M.C.A.'s of that region which at that time needed assistance, and in order to get the fullest facts necessary to guide the National Committee in its policy toward the Associations in the region affected.

I think you will find the documents of unusual interest. Barnett is a trustworthy witness and is not given to overstatement. He is one of the ablest men of the entire Association movement, has been in China for twenty years during which time he has travelled extensively. He knows the Chinese language and people. His connections and personal acquaintance among both Chinese and foreigners in Manchuria have made it possible for him to secure confidential information such as is not available to the casual traveller or even to the official investigator. For these reasons his report has special significance.

I am sending you the three additional copies of the report and of this letter in order that you may send a copy each to President Hoover, Senator Watson and Senator Borah. It now seems likely that the Manchurian question will drag on for some time. Our anxiety is that the friends of influence in Washington who are shaping America's foreign policy may have trustworthy information.

Living in China we may exaggerate the importance of Japan's invasion of Manchuria and its significance as a world issue. It seems clear to us that the Japanese militarists have violated the foundation principles of American diplomatic policy in the Far East and that America should not allow this violation to pass without vigorous action. These historic policies of America have been vindicated in the past by their results. In our opinion they should be upheld in the future even at considerable cost not only in the interests of China and of America but also, in the long run, of Japan itself.

Your brother,

WFL/p

William E. Lockwood.



7.  
Not for Publication.

Confidential

Report of Visit to Manchuria, October 9-23, 1931

Eugene E. Barnett

I.

On my arrival from America in Shanghai on September 15 I found the attention of the country absorbed in the flood disaster which, during the summer, had inundated an area larger than England, and in measures for relief of the 30 or 40 million people in the affected territory. Three days later, however, "the Manchurian incident" was precipitated in Mukden and immediately the attention of the country was deflected almost entirely to the situation in the northeast. Communications between Manchuria and that part of China which lies south of the Great Wall were so seriously interrupted that the national staff requested me, in company with Hubert Liang, to make a hurried visit to the area, calling on as many of the Y.M.C.A.'s in it as possible. In view of the grave possibilities wrapped up in the situation, I was glad to accept this commission.

We left Shanghai Friday morning, October 9, reaching Tientsin early Sunday morning, October 11. During the day we had occasion to confer at length with Sherwood Eddy and to hear his account of happenings as he had observed them at the time of the incident itself and in a subsequent visit to Mukden following a visit in Korea. During the day Eddy prepared a number of cablegrams giving his testimony as an eye witness of events which were transmitted that night to Washington, New York, London and Geneva. We had the privilege of a visit of an hour and a half with Dr. Chang Po-ling at Nankai University, and of conference with other Chinese leaders who were deeply concerned over the situation. We left at midnight on the Peking-Mukden Line for our journey into the northeast.

II.

Early next morning, at 6:30, I awoke to find that we were in Shanhaikwan, where the Japanese maintain a small garrison. A detachment of 38 Japanese soldiers, fully armed, and wearing steel helmets got off the train taking with them four machine guns, 40 cases of ammunition and large quantities of army biscuits. The chief of the railway police on the train informed us that 20 other Japanese got off at the same time dressed in Chinese clothes.

In addition to the 38 Japanese soldiers who disembarked at Shanhaikwan there was a second detachment of 40 men on board as far as Kao Chia Chwang.

III.

A little after noon we reached Chinchow, for centuries an important military post, and at present the seat of the provisional



- 2 -

government for Fengtien Province, driven out at the time of the occupation of Mukden by Japanese troops. We had telegraphed the local staff of the Y.M.C.A., asking them to meet us at the station. It happened that Dr. Robert E. Lewis, American Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Nanking, accompanied by Colonel J. L. Huang, was also on board our train. Word of their coming had been communicated to the Provisional Government headquarters. Delegations from the Y.M.C.A. and from the Provisional Government were therefore on the station platform on our arrival. The train was held up long enough for us to visit the headquarters located in the buildings of the Railway College nearby, where we saw the evidences of the aerial attack of October 8 and received first-hand accounts of the events of that day. These accounts were later confirmed by the testimony of various people, including a local missionary, and other visitors who had made special investigations following the bombing.

In brief, twelve Japanese planes had visited Chinchow between 2 and 3 o'clock on October 8, coming from the direction of Yingkou. The planes flew for 30 or 35 minutes over the city dropping 48 bombs. Several of these bombs were directed at the Provisional headquarters where there were also indications of what appeared to us, as non-technical observers, to be machine gun fire from the low flying planes. Two men, including a Russian professor, were killed in the Provisional headquarters. This Russian, we later learned in Harbin, had been a secretary of the Russian Y.M.C.A. in that city and had moved to Chinchow within the preceding two months for his new work there. In all, 19 persons were reported to us as having been killed in this unprovoked aerial attack upon Chinchow. The fact that the bombs were directed at the Provisional Government headquarters, the railroad yards, and upon the city itself rather than upon any military establishments in the vicinity, inevitably suggests that the attack was intended to disorganize and disperse the last remnant of the existing Chinese government of the three eastern provinces remaining in the area.

I was informed by Mr. Yoh, a secretary of the Chinchow Y.M.C.A., and later by others, that upon the outbreak of the trouble in Mukden the Chinchow magistrate had called a meeting of representative leaders of the city, in which it was agreed that full protection should be extended to the more than 100 Japanese residents in the city. When later the Japanese authorities decided to evacuate these nationals from Chinchow, the transaction was accomplished in the best of spirits and the Japanese authorities wrote thanking the magistrate for his cooperation in the whole affair. This evacuation of Japanese subjects from Chinchow occurred thirteen days before the bombing took place.

On October 10 a Japanese plane, flying over Chinchow, dropped propaganda leaflets upon the city, a copy of which I secured. The substance of this leaflet was as follows: "The old militarists of the Northeastern Provinces, full of wild ambitions, are now in hiding at Chinchow. Their presence is a menace to peace and order. They are gathered together to conspire to fleece the people and to stir up the bandits against them. They are assembling the scattered remnants of defeated troops in order to attack Japanese troops. Their effort in this direction may be compared to an attempt to stop the progress of a wheeled cart with the arm of a grasshopper. It is



- 3 -

necessary for Japan to uproot these troublous elements. We shall in no wise injure the people but seek only to secure protection both for Japanese residents and for the Chinese population."

On leaving Chinchow, Dr. Lewis, Colonel Huang, Hubert Liang and I went into the diner for lunch. As we neared the end of the meal my attention for some reason was caught by a man sitting across the aisle from us dressed in a long Chinese gown and a small silk jacket (or ma kwar) over it. Something in his appearance and manner convinced me that he was a Japanese plain clothes man. After observing him carefully, we all agreed that he was a Japanese, and our surmise was confirmed when Mr. Liang stepped over and exchanged a few words with him. He was by no means the last gentleman of this fraternity whom we were to meet.

At Ta Hu Shan we passed the southbound train from Mukden which we learned later was divided at this point into two sections. Ta Hu Shan is situated about half way between Chinchow and Mukden. Shortly after we passed by, the first section of the southbound train proceeding southward was held up by bandits who relieved the passengers of whatever possessions they desired. Fortunately, or unfortunately, the first section consisted entirely of third-class coaches. The second section, which followed 20 minutes later, would have contained much more booty but the bandits evidently did not know of its coming.

T. Z. Koo was a passenger on the second section. In the adjoining compartment he tells me was a Mongolian prince who, with his large family and retinue of dependents, was fleeing from the occupied area. This prince has a residence in Mukden which on the morning of September 19 was placed under guard by Japanese soldiers. The Japanese, he stated, tried to coerce him into signing away his rights to large holdings in Inner Mongolia. On being refused, they doubled and then trebled the guard placed over his house. Later he was able to escape in the garb of a coolie and to make his way to the home of a missionary. As stated above, he was on his way to safety when his section of the train so narrowly escaped being rifled by bandits.

This may be as appropriate a point as any to record the fact told me by a British employe of the Peking-Mukden Line two days later in Mukden, that this hold-up, which took place on October 12, was the fifth which had taken place on the line between Mukden and Peiping since the occupation of Mukden by the Japanese on September 18-19. Moreover, one train filled to overflowing with refugees fleeing from Mukden had been bombed from the air by a Japanese plane. A well-known Scotch missionary was on the train when this took place and has described the incident to his friends in Mukden, one of whom, an Irish missionary, related the story to me.

About nightfall we passed through the city of Hsin Min Tun, one the railhead of a railway line connecting with Mukden, held, following the Russo-Japanese war by Japan, but later transferred to China and incorporated as part of the Peking-Mukden Line, a section of the Chinese Government Railways. A few miles northeast of the city is a Japanese garrison located at a place called Gyu Liu Ho.



- 4 -

Here the train stopped and was boarded by Japanese soldiers who passed through the coaches from one end of the train to the other. The impression grew that we were in "occupied territory".

On leaving Tientsin we had been informed that the Peking-Mukden trains were not entering the city of Mukden. Following the outbreak of trouble the Japanese military had removed that section of the track which passes under the South Manchurian Railway Line at Mukden. Northbound trains, therefore, stopped at the station called Huang Ku Tun, 18 li (6 miles) from Mukden. We reached this lonely station at 10 p.m. The station was deserted except by men employed in the station and in the nearby roundhouse and by a detachment of Japanese soldiers who occupied one end of the station. The station master came on board and handed me a note from Mr. D. F. Myers, whom I had wired in advance of my coming. In this note Mr. Myers warned me that it would be quite unsafe to enter the city at night on account of unruly elements which were abroad and armed clashes between them and the police which were nightly occurrences. The road from Huang Ku Tun into the city he regarded as particularly unsafe because it passed through a large colony of Korean residents.

Fortunately we were able to arrange with the trainmen to have our beds made up for another night and at 10:30 we turned in. An hour later I was awakened by a bang on my door and a husky voice which demanded that we open up the compartment. I peeped through the curtain and the figure I saw was by no means reassuring. I decided, however, that I would not satisfy the curiosity of this unwelcome visitor until I had to. Some minutes later I was considerably relieved on going to the opposite side of the compartment and looking out the window to find that we were surrounded by long strings of cars. After we had fallen asleep, it was evident that we had been switched into the roundhouse and locked up for the night. My burly visitor was a mechanic who wished to examine the plumbing on our car before starting the train back south on its next trip.

#### IV.

Next morning Mr. D. F. Myers drove out to meet me and took me into the city. He did not seem at all abashed when he found there were four of us instead of one. We were soon to find that ever since the explosion on September 18-19 his home had been a place of refuge for many Chinese friends and a place of rendezvous for a number of important conferences between leading Chinese of the city and foreign visitors. Mr. Myers has been engaged in the establishment of a factory in what is known as the "Trench Mortar Arsenal" for the construction of automobile trucks. The enterprise was under the government of Liao Ning Province. He had already installed costly equipment from America and had turned out his first twelve completed trucks. His equipment and organization were complete, however, for securing an annual production of 265 trucks.

Mr. Myers I found had been a close observer of events from the beginning of the outbreak on the morning of September 19 and was very well informed of what was taking place. At my request he wrote an account of some of the most significant of these happenings. At this point it may be in order to quote from his statement one paragraph which relates a typical instance with which he was directly and intimately concerned. This was the manner in which the establish-



- 5 -

ment in which he was employed was taken over by Japanese troops on the night of September 18-19.

"Soon after daylight (on Sept. 19) reports began to come to us of the 'occupation'. First from the trench mortar arsenal which was attacked soon after 1 a.m. From there came one of the two members of the staff who were 'on duty' that night. He reported that the place had been bombed with hand-grenades and a number of the men killed. There were several soldier guards in the guardhouse but they did not fire a shot. Those who were awake endeavored to escape and were shot down at the gate. Later the other man who was on duty came in and reported more fully. He told of the bombing of the dormitory where about 100 of the workmen were sleeping. 30 or more of these were killed either by the bombs or by the bayonets of the Japanese soldiers who rushed in after the bombing. Many of these were killed in their beds. It has not even yet been possible to determine the actual number who were killed because a third wave of soldiers who entered the place carried shovels and buried many of the civilians."

Arriving at the home of Mr. Myers (who is now occupying the International Committee Y.M.C.A. residence), we found Mr. C. F. Wang, head of the Fengtien Mining Administration Bureau and president for many years of the Mukden Y.M.C.A., living with his wife and five children as refugees with the Myers family. When the Japanese occupied the city they proceeded at once to take over all the vital public organs and agencies in the city. Mr. Wang had moved out of his own home, taking with him vital documents, papers, and seals of the Mining Administration so as to escape coercive pressure from the Japanese military authorities and if possible to keep work going at the three centers in Fengtien Province, in which his mines are located.

From Mr. Wang we learned much about the general situation and trend of events. A word at this point, however, concerning his own personal experience must suffice. On entering the city the Japanese had taken over the important banking institutions of the city, particularly the provincial banks. From September 19 until October 15 these banks were sealed while the Japanese military made arrangements for re-opening them under their own control. Mr. Wang had been making desperate efforts to draw out funds belonging to the Mining Administration with which to pay wages to his 10,000 workers in the three mines. He had failed in this endeavor and so on the day of our arrival in Mukden, October 13, he had found it necessary to close down one mine in Southern Manchuria, at Fuchow, turning off 4,000 men. Mr. Wang's estimate was that the closing down of this mine involved loss of employment for not less than 10,000 working men employed by the mines and auxiliary enterprises. A far more serious situation of course exists in Mukden itself, where in the government arsenals alone not less than 20,000 wage earners have been suddenly turned out of work.

On the second day of our visit in Mukden, October 14, Mr. C. F. Wang started to his office in company with Hubert Liang. Before getting there he was met by a member of his staff who told him that a Japanese deputation had just visited the office. After asking in vain for the manager and vice-manager of the administration, they had proceeded to seal the doors of the establishment. Fearing



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more serious molestation and pressure from the Japanese military, Mr. Wang returned to Mr. Myers' house, made hurried arrangements with his wife and members of his staff, and left at 8:30 p.m. under an assumed name for Peiping via Dairen. Mrs. Wang remained for five days longer, completing as best she could various arrangements, and then she too left for Peiping with her five children, two servants and 35 trunks!

In Mukden we were busy from morning until night meeting various people, including D. F. Myers, and C. F. Wang mentioned above, K. P. Liu (Manager of the Manufacturers Bank of China), secretaries of the local Y.M.C.A., Yuen Chin Kai, chairman of the Emergency Committee set up to preserve order in the city, Mr. Shaw, Commissioner of Customs, U. S. Consul-General Meyers, U.S. Trade Commissioner Christoffsen, J. B. Powell, Chicago Tribune correspondent, Hunter, Consolidated Press correspondent, Chester Rowell, and other correspondents, Colonel Watari, official spokesman in giving the daily communiques issued by the Japanese military authorities, Japanese Vice-Consul Murai, and others.

The general facts regarding the precipitation of the present situation in Manchuria are now fairly well known to the world. On the night of September 18 at 10:30 o'clock - shortly after the south-bound train for Dairen had passed a bomb explosion occurred on the South Manchuria Railway Line about 2½ miles north of the South Manchuria station of Mukden. The explosion took place at a point almost directly opposite and within rifle shot range of the Pei Ta Yin or northern barracks where northeastern army troops are incamped. The Japanese claim that Chinese soldiers from these barracks set the bomb, destroying one sleeper (or cross tie, to use American terminology) and badly twisting one rail. Comment on the Chinese and Japanese versions of this story will not be discussed at this point. Suffice it to say that almost immediately after the bomb is alleged to have gone off Japanese soldiers were in action. The northern barracks and the city were bombarded with 6 inch guns and gun fire was in progress during most of the night.

By the following morning Mukden was in the hands of an army of occupation and so were four other cities in strategic points in South Manchuria - Yinkou, Liao Yang, Changchun and Antung. In Mukden Japanese flags flew from various government buildings, the telephone, telegraph and radio stations were in Japanese hands, Japanese proclamations were everywhere, and Japanese soldiers guarded the city gates and other vital points.

Numerous stories are in circulation as to killings, at the hands of Japanese soldiers, and as a result of clashes between Chinese police and Japanese gendarmes on the one hand and disorderly elements on the other. I had no means of checking up on these stories or on the figures given as to the number of persons killed.

It was easily seen, however, that normal life in the city had been brought to a standstill. Streets which on my visit one year earlier had been crowded with vehicles and pedestrians were almost deserted. Large numbers of shops - some estimated as many as 2/3 of all in the city - were closed. Some of them I was informed by Myers and others had not been re-opened since September 19. Im-



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portant government banks were closed as they had been for nearly a month. The Chinese army had withdrawn from their positions in and about the city and were cut off from their supplies in Mukden and (I was told) without their winter uniforms. The Chinese officials, as far as they were able to do so, had escaped to the south. The chairman of the Provincial Government, the Commissioner of Education and the Commissioner of Industries, however, had been caught by Japanese troops and were being held in the city. The Commissioner of Industries, according to report, had been brought from Yinkou in chains. The Chinese with whom I talked were uncertain as to whether he was dead or alive at the time I was there. The city's population was drained under a regime of decisive military action by alien troops of most of its responsible citizenry. One heard it estimated on all sides that not less than 1/3 of the entire population of more than 400,000 people, had left. Railway officials stated that during the first five days after the occupation of the city by Japanese 80,000 people had left by the Peking-Mukden Line for safety within the Great Wall.

The Chinese schools and colleges of Mukden are all closed except for one or two schools conducted by missionary institutions. While this interruption of the normal educational activities of the city is costly, the dispersion of the students and teachers doubtless makes further untoward incidents much less likely to occur during the period of occupation.

In passing back and forth several times through the city I was interested to see workmen feverishly engaged in planting new telephone poles throughout the city and stringing them with fresh wires. I was told by several absolutely reliable witnesses that this extension of Japanese telephone lines into the Chinese city began on September 19, the day after "the incident". In Changchun I found a similar activity going on. No one there seemed quite to understand what the significance of the move was, but at any rate new telephone poles and wires were being put up by the Japanese in the Chinese section.

The Assistant Postal Commissioner informed me of the presence at the Chinese Postoffice of a detachment of Japanese troops who censored all Chinese mail passing through the office. Letters are censored and no Chinese newspapers, I was told, from outside the occupied area are allowed to enter. The Assistant Postal Commissioner related one incident in which two letters addressed to a foreign country had been opened by the Japanese censors. The Chinese Postoffice authorities thereupon requested the Japanese military to stamp these letters indicating that they had censored them. Upon being refused by the Military, they took the matter to the Japanese Consulate, who referred it back to the military. It is impossible to say to what extent foreign mail matter is being censored. A telegram sent by me from Tientsin to the Mukden Y.M.C.A. on October 11 had not been delivered as late as October 14, and several letters sent to me from Shanghai, care of the Mukden Y.M.C.A. likewise failed to reach me before my departure, although there was ample time for them to do so.

On reaching Mukden we began to hear at once of the feverish efforts of the Japanese military, while trying completely to disorganize the existing government, to set up a puppet government or



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governments in its stead. Evidence seems to indicate that the Japanese military desired to set up an all-Manchurian independence government under Japanese protection. When, after some days, this effort proved unavailing, a modified program was undertaken in which local independence governments were stimulated in different cities. Chinese and neutral observers in Manchuria have no doubt that the intention of the Japanese military is to follow in Manchuria the procedure employed in absorbing Korea as part of the Japanese Empire. This procedure would call (1) for the establishment of an independent government detached from China, (2) the establishment of a Japanese protectorate over this "independent" government, and in due course (3) the annexation of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia as part of the Japanese Empire.

In company with one American and two Chinese friends, we had an interview lasting for an hour and a half with Mr. Yuen Chin Kai, one of the men whom the Japanese military have been trying to set up as independent ruler of Manchuria. Mr. C. F. Wang accompanied us in this interview (which took place in the home of a Danish missionary), and acted as our interpreter. Mr. Yuen is a Chinese scholar, 62 years of age. At one time he was governor of Hei Lung Kiang, and for a time he served as Commissioner of Finance of Feng-tien Province. At the time of the outbreak on September 18-19 he served under Marshal Chang Hsueh Liang as vice-chairman of the North-eastern Political Committee.

In the course of our interview Mr. Yuen said in substance:

"The Japanese have urged me many times to head up a new government. I have told them I have no such wild ambitions, neither am I a traitor to my country.

"They have raised the question of whether Chang Chung Chang would not be acceptable as ruler of Manchuria. I have told them that Chang Chung Chang is my friend, but that the people of Manchuria will never accept him. They will utterly reject Japanese professions of friendship for China if Japan sets up as their ruler a man whom the Chinese hate as they do Chang Chung Chang.

"The Japanese also have asked whether I thought General Kan Tsao Hsi would be acceptable. I have told them that I do not know whether Kan Tsao Hsi could undertake the responsibility or whether he would be willing to attempt it.

"Meanwhile they came back to me again and again, urging me to accept the headship of the new government. I have consented simply to serve on this emergency committee, trying in the interests of the people to hold things together and preserve the peace. I am in the position of a family teacher in a home from which the master has gone away. I am taking only temporary charge of things until the master returns.

"I have suggested Chang Hsueh Liang, Chang Hsih Yi and Chang Tsoh Hsiang as the men from whom the head of the Manchurian government should be secured. They stated that they will never accept Chang Hsueh Liang or anyone belonging to his group.



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"Under no circumstances will I accept the headship of a Manchurian government. (Asked if a Nanking appointee approved by Chang Hsueh Liang, would be acceptable, Mr. Yuen continued) No, the Japanese declare that they will accept no one either from Nanking or from Chang Hsueh Liang's group. They feel that they cannot handle either one of these parties. They object to the young Marshal because of his desire to cooperate with Nanking, because he knows how to play with Russia, and because they fear his desire for revenge because of the death of his father at their hands three years ago.

"Japan is unwilling to treat with Nanking on any questions pertaining to Manchuria.

"The Japanese are now urging me to help them restore immediately the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Industries to a condition of normal functioning.

"I have told the Japanese, 'You may execute me but I will never set up an independent government.' They say, 'Of course you may refuse to organize a government and you can continue to carry on as head of the temporary maintenance committee. Consider, however, how much more freely you could carry on your work as head of an organized government.' They say, 'When you have a new government we can withdraw. The situation in Manchuria is arousing all China. China will be driven to war, we will defeat your armies easily and then Manchuria will be lost completely to China.'

"Because of their failure to set up an all-Manchurian government the Japanese are now setting up local governments, using Chinese job seekers to head them up.

"The Japanese are informed that Mukden is full of secret service men sent here by Chang Hsueh Liang.

"The Japanese are bringing their continued pressure to bear upon me through journalists, members of the staff of the mayor (a Japanese) and leaders of the Japanese gendarmerie now in the city. Their approaches are indirect rather than through the direct overtures of the Consul or higher military authorities.

"It is already late for Nanking to send anyone here to organize a government. If, however, Nanking could reach a full understanding with Chang Hsueh Liang it would be well for them to send a man here for this purpose.

"Japan will keep on looking for a man to form a Manchurian government. If possible they will put up a government for the three eastern provinces. If this is impossible, they will establish a Fengtien government. Their purpose is to establish a new independent government. Their first step is to set up an independent government which will be followed by a Japanese protectorate. They want therefore a weak man at its head. They will accept no strong man sent by Nanking.



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"The Japanese here have no respect whatever for the League of Nations. They are paying no attention to it. They do not think that the League has anything to do with the situation in Manchuria.

"I told the Japanese that if I had wanted to be a high official I would have striven for this ambition long ago. I have no wild ambition to head a new government. I am no traitor. They have said, 'We will not treat you as we did Li Yuen Yung (the puppet king set up by the Japanese in Korea at the time Japan secured the "independence" of that country from China). Korea has been a loss to Japan.' I have told them, 'I am a scholar. You can defeat an army but you cannot win the heart of this scholar. They say, 'You are not a hero.' I have told them, 'I have no ambition to be one. I am a devout follower of Confucius and I shall follow his teachings to the end.'

"Japan is not afraid of China. They are not afraid of world opinion. Only foreign military intervention will check them. The Japanese military in Manchuria is independent of public opinion back at home."

I have summarized rather fully Mr. Yuen's part of our interview even at the cost of repeating some of the same ideas several times, so that something of the atmosphere of the interview and its emphases might be recorded.

Another indication of the strenuous efforts the Japanese military are making to disorganize existing governments in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia and to replace them with puppet governments of their own, is found in a incident which occurred in Mukden the day before our arrival. A Mongolian princess who, with her husband, has extensive holdings in Inner Mongolia, was in Mukden. She received a message saying that a certain Chinese friend was ill and wished to see her. On arriving at the place where this "friend" was supposed to be she found herself in the presence of a company of Japanese who sought to coerce her into signing papers transferring authority over this territory in Inner Mongolia to Japan. In spite of continued pressure, she insisted that she had no authority in the matter, being a mere woman (although it was well known that she rather than her husband is the dominant figure in the combination), and eventually she succeeded in making her escape from guards placed over her to the home of a foreign missionary in the city.

This story is only typical of numerous reports including stories of Japanese activity in arming Mongol forces to overthrow Chinese authority, in seeking to secure independent commitments from Mongolian princes, and in every way possible to extend during this time of disorder Japanese influence and if possible sovereignty in Inner Mongolia as well as in Southern Manchuria.

The turnover in Manchuria of September 18-19 found the Y.M. C.A. with \$30 in cash, \$60 in a bank from which it has been impossible to withdraw it, and \$1700 in debt. Contributions in kind had been received from a number of firms and a big fair was announced to take place within a few days, with the proceeds of which it was hoped



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to secure \$3,000 or \$4,000, an amount sufficient to close the fiscal year. Under the new conditions, this fair of course became impossible. The General Secretary of the Y.M.C.A., Paul Yen, an influential leader in many civic enterprises and an intimate friend and adviser of Marshal Chang Hsueh Liang, found it necessary to leave the city without delay. After a few days Japanese soldiers visited the Y.M.C.A. building and conducted a thoroughgoing inspection of its books, files and so on. Without funds or staff leadership and with the stamp of Japanese suspicion upon it, the Y.M.C.A. has seen its work brought to a standstill. Japanese controlled newspapers have mentioned the Y.M.C.A. along with the Chamber of Commerce, Northeastern University and other institutions which had received support from Marshal Chang Hsueh Liang as suspect institutions.

One effort of the Y.M.C.A. to render service in the disturbed situation following the Japanese occupation of the city is worth recording. Tens of thousands of workmen were abruptly thrown out of employment and large numbers of small tradesmen found themselves in sudden and dire need. The Y.M.C.A. got together a Sino-Japanese Christian group which busied itself with setting up relief measures. Going to the Japanese military authorities in control of the city they asked for food supplies which they themselves would undertake to distribute. The Japanese military authorities thereupon contributed a considerable quantity of army biscuits, suggesting that after the biscuits had been distributed the cases might be sold and the proceeds turned into a relief fund. They stated that truckage for the carrying of these supplies to points of distribution would have to be paid for by the relief committee. Relief measures undertaken on this basis were shortly brought to an abrupt standstill by two considerations. (1) On receiving the supplies furnished by the Japanese military, it was found that they were army biscuits taken from the stores of the Chinese army! (2) Moreover, the Japanese military sought to make capital of the relief work by preparing huge posters showing relief workers in front of the Y.M.C.A. building handing out to needy Chinese food supplies provided by the Japanese authorities.

V.

On Wednesday, October 14, at 9:30 p.m. Mr. Liang and I left Mukden for Changchun. We were fortunate in having as a traveling companion Mr. McWhirter of Kirin, an Irish Presbyterian Missionary who has lived in Kirin since 1908. Reaching Changchun on the following morning at 7:30 o'clock, we remained in the city until 2:30 in the afternoon. During this time we walked about the city both in the Japanese concession and in the Chinese section, received firsthand accounts from local missionaries of recent events and conditions, and had an extended conversation with the leading Chinese doctor of the city - a graduate of the Peking Union Medical College and president of the provisional board of the Changchun Y.M.C.A.

Changchun, connecting center for the South Manchuria Railway, the Chinese Eastern Railway and the Kirin-Changchun Railway, is one of the five strategic centers forceably occupied by Japanese troops on the night of September 18-19. I purchased in the Japanese concession pictures showing the destruction of Nanlin, barracks of



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the Chinese army by Japanese troops on that night. It appears that the Chinese troops there encamped offered some resistance before retiring with their arms toward the southeast, killing between 60 and 70 Japanese soldiers, including several officers.

An engagement between Chinese and Japanese troops was also described to us which took place on the following day at the first station north of Changchun on the Chinese Eastern Railway, Er Tao Kou. Here it was said that a detachment of Japanese troops ordered the Chinese guard near the railway station to lay down their arms. Fifteen minutes, and then 30 minutes more were allowed for them to do this. The Chinese guard refused to the end to comply and in the engagement which followed several were killed.

As stated above, one of the first activities of the Japanese upon occupying Changchun was to extend their telephone system throughout the Chinese city. We saw the fresh poles in place and linesmen at work stretching the wires upon them while we were in the city.

The following day in Kirin I was informed by the building superintendent in charge of the construction of our new Y.M.C.A. building in that city (A Changchun contractor) that the Japanese were already at work rebuilding the barracks formerly occupied by Chinese troops at Nanlin. (The same informant told me that the Japanese were installing heating systems in their military headquarters at Kirin, established in the old Provincial Assembly and the Governor's Yamen buildings.)

The Chinese magistrate at Changchun was displaced soon after the Japanese occupation of the city by a Japanese speaking Chinese, with intimate Japanese connections, brought up from Dairen. This new puppet head of the city government traveled from Changchun to Kirin on the same train and in the same coach with us. A large company of cowed looking Chinese officials and a considerable number of smiling Japanese officers were at the station to give him a send-off as he started on his three hours' journey to the provincial capital at Kirin.

Irish missionaries told us that Chinese Christians in Changchun had expected for months something to happen. They did not know of course when, where or how the Japanese military would strike, but there was a prevailing feeling that Japan was about to make a decisive move of some kind. Similar statements were made to us by neutrals, as well as Chinese, in other cities.

Dr. Gordon, an Irish missionary who has lived in Changchun for 38 years, described vividly the situation in Changchun under Japanese occupation. He had no doubt that the present occupation in Manchuria is simply a step in the Japanese program of putting the Twenty-One Demands of 1915 into effect. He spoke of the effort made by the Japanese in connection with the Wan Pao Shan affair to precipitate the incident. He described the Japanese planes which were flying above the city every day dropping propaganda leaflets. He said that the people were "scared stiff". He hoped that the complacency of the people might be aroused by the present crisis.



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Our interview with the Chinese doctor mentioned above was interesting. After discussing at length the plans of the local Y.M.C.A., we asked if he would mind telling us about recent happenings in the city. Before replying he left the room and inspected adjoining rooms in the hospital to see whether any undesirable evesdroppers were in the vicinity. Returning to the room he paused again before proceeding with the conversation and left the room returning with a curtain with which he covered the window of the room in which we sat. These precautions told a tale of their own even before the doctor related his story.

The doctor's story was in harmony with that which we had already secured from the Irish missionaries. He told us, however, in addition of certain acts of terrorism. Since he had been an eye witness to none of them we had no means of determining their authenticity. The fact that such stories, however, are commonly related and believed has the same effect in cowing and inflaming the Chinese population whether they are authentic or not.

One of these unconfirmed stories told of a small group of railway workers meeting near the railway station at Ka Lun near Changchun and addressed by one of their number. The story was that a Japanese plane seeing this gathering (proscribed of course under the military regime), dropped a bomb into the group killing several men.

Another unconfirmed story related by the doctor told of a Chinese who pulled down a Japanese proclamation from a wall in the city and was bayoneted by a Japanese soldier who happened to be at hand.

The doctor painted a picture of helpless bitterness on the part of the Chinese population. Utterly cut off from all communication with the outside world, without leadership and without the privilege of organized effort of any sort, they find themselves helpless in the hands of an army of occupation. Asked whether the people would, in his opinion, submit to a Japanese government once it had been set up, he spoke (as others in the northeast with whom I talked did) of the Japanese rule in Korea and of the sufferings and humiliation of that unhappy people as subjects of Japan.

#### VI.

At 2:30 we left Changchun for Kirin, arriving in the latter city at 5 o'clock. Just before crossing the Sungari River and entering the city our attention was called to a large tract of land (3000 square feet in area we were later informed) which the Japanese were having cleared off and put in order as a military air field. The Japanese began work on this project on October 3. Already they had cleared off the trees and vegetable gardens on the tract and had dug up a number of Chinese graves, serving notice upon the families to which these ancestral graves belonged to come and carry away the bones. It was reported in the city that those coming to claim the bones were charged for the labor expended in digging them up! I did not confirm this, however, by the first-hand testimony of any of those immediately concerned.



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In Kirin we interviewed W. W. Cline, American secretary of the Y.M.C.A., Dr. W. R. Sloane, an Irish physician who has followed events very closely, Mr. McWhirter, previously mentioned, other missionaries and several Chinese whose competence as observers and integrity I trust completely. One of the Chinese interviewed, a scientifically trained returned student from America and head of an important institution in Kirin, has collaborated from the beginning of the present trouble with a small group of six men who have made careful observations day by day of just what has happened and have preserved a record of their observations. I have copies of statements based upon their report, one 2½ typewritten pages and the other 14 pages in length. I shall limit myself, however, to oral (and on the whole supplementary) reports given us by this friend and others interviewed.

En route to Kirin and back again, and while in the city, we were constantly reminded of the fact that we were surrounded by an army of occupation. The Japanese forces employed are limited in number but they are to be seen at practically every station with their sand bag redoubts, and in Kirin itself Japanese military planes overhead, Japanese military units stationed here and there, daily gun practice on the banks of the Sungari River, a large number of field guns in front of the Japanese Consulate, Japanese military officers and men moving about the city on foot, horseback and motor-cycle - these are some of the evidences of occupation referred to.

Kirin is under the nominal control of a puppet Chinese (or rather Manchu) head. This puppet ruler is Hsi Chia, formerly chief of staff under Chang Tsoh Hsiang, military governor of Kirin. Competent Chinese informants believe that Hsi Chia was pressed rather reluctantly at the outset into his present position, but that now he is cooperating more than willingly with Japan in an effort to establish an independence government.

Hsi Chia, I learned, was some years ago employed by General Chang Tsoh Hsiang as a personal teacher (Chang Tsoh Hsiang, several told me, is a very uneducated man). A warm personal friendship grew out of this relationship so that when Chang Tsoh Hsiang became the governor of Kirin Province he appointed Hsi Chia as chief of staff in his army. Both in Kirin and in other centers in Manchuria Hsi Chia was described to me as a man of no personal character or integrity at all. The fact that he is a Manchurian makes him a likely tool in the hands of the Japanese military who have shown their inclination to establish independence governments, in some cases under the cry of Manchuria for the Manchus.

The story told in Kirin is that Hsi Chia was forced to accept his present position as head of an independence government at the point of Japanese guns. I talked with one eye witness who was present at his formal inauguration. On that occasion all of the Chinese officials of all ranks were brought together and a goodly company of Japanese military men were also present. Before taking up the seal of office from the table before him, Hsi Chia made a brief address in which he said, "I am taking this step under pressure." Three photographs were then taken, one of the Chinese military band, one of Hsi Chia, standing with a Japanese colonel on one side and a



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Japanese general on the other, and the third of Hsi Chia and his two Japanese attendants with a large company of Chinese officials in the background.

We were told that Hsi Chia is never allowed out of the presence of Japanese attendants either in his office, or at his home, or in his movements about the city. For several days, when he travelled between his home and office, Japanese guards stood on the running boards of his automobile with pistols in hand.

A deputation sent by the British Minister in Peiping and consisting of Mr. C. N. Stirling (Secretary of H. B. M. Legation), Mr. R. H. Scott (Of H.B.M. Consular service) and Captain F.H.A. Stables, were in Kirin on the day preceding my arrival. On reaching Kirin they were met by representatives of the local Japanese military regime who offered them the use of a Japanese motorcar, accommodations in the Yamato Hotel and the services of a Japanese escort. The commission politely declined all three proffers. In the course of their visit they called on Hsi Chia. On arriving at his headquarters they found a half dozen or so Japanese attendants in the room. Mr. Scott stated bluntly that they wished to have a private interview with Hsi Chia. Thereupon all of the Japanese present withdrew - except two. These two remained throughout the interview, careful notes of which were taken as it proceeded.

Dr. Sloane told of the visit of these three men at the Irish Presbyterian compound. They remained there for several hours, including the noon hour. During the entire time a Japanese dressed in Chinese clothes passed and repassed the main entrance of the compound in a ricksha.

Kirin was taken over by the Japanese on September 21, two days after the occupation of the first five cities taken. The report carefully prepared by the group of local residents mentioned above gives a full account of happenings up until October 10. The Japanese military authorities issued proclamations stating that from October 11 to October 17 there would be gun practice and army maneuvers from 9 to 12 each morning and from 1 to 3 each afternoon. This practice took place on the north bank of the Sungari River with the old arsenal on the south bank as its target, and was still in progress on October 16 when we were in the city. Dr. Sloane visited the place a day or so before we got there and described to us what he saw. Several platoons of Japanese troops were drawn up in order, with a company of perhaps 150 Japanese school children drawn up nearby, all of them watching squads of soldiers nearer the bank of the river practicing the throwing of hand grenades. Later in the day Dr. Sloane visited the new arsenal (Chinese of course). Passing the Japanese sentries at the entrance he went inside, where he found companies of Chinese children being shown the sights. These two incidents might be supplemented by others showing the "war spirit" among Japanese residents of Manchuria and deliberate efforts on the part of the Japanese military to work up such a spirit.

Japanese squads had been making frequent visits to the schools of the city. The principal of a school having an enrollment



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of 1000 students told of these visits upon his own and other schools. All schools were required to turn over all books dealing with Manchurian questions or related in any way to the teachings of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. My informant had been told by the squad visiting his school to turn over all such books. He refused to do so, telling them they might take whatever books they thought fell under their ban. They spotted only 10 books of this character which they carried away. In Kirin University he said they had carried off 100 books.

According to this same informant the Japanese military authorities had also sealed up all bookstores in the city until they could find time to go through the shelves and see what books were on sale.

My informant stated that the principal of the girls' normal school had told him that his school had been visited often by Japanese squads and that on Saturday October 10 at 8 p.m. Japanese soldiers had entered the girls' dormitory, had lain down on the beds and in various ways acted in such a manner as to give a bad fright to the girls. The principal of the school was away at the time. Servants went out and found him and he hurried back, remonstrating in Japanese, which he himself speaks, with the soldiers and asking them to leave. Next day all of the girls in the dormitory left.

During the day that we were in Kirin Japanese military planes zoomed above the city. This we were told was a daily occurrence. From time to time these planes drop propaganda leaflets from the sky assuring the people that the army is occupying the city for the good of the people, declaring undying opposition to the corrupt officials who have brought suffering to Japanese and Chinese residents alike, and declaring that anyone opposing the Japanese army of occupation would be appropriately dealt with. One of these posters purported to be a statement issued by the Educational Association, the Agricultural Association, the Lawyers Association and the Merchants Association of Mukden, in which these organizations are represented as expressing satisfaction with conditions in Mukden under the protection of the Japanese military.

Department heads in the independence government at Kirin are being displaced by new men. I took pains to find out something about some of the new appointees. It would appear that they are appointed because of previous affiliations with the Japanese and in some, if not all, cases because of their willingness to serve as tools of Japan in order to satisfy their own personal ambition and cupidity.

Several instances of outrages suffered by Chinese at the hands of the Japanese military were related to me. For example, on October 14 a Chinese policeman was reported to have saluted two Japanese soldiers, failing, however to step aside for them to pass. He was promptly reported to the branch police office (No. 3) as having obstructed military action. Other Japanese soldiers came and took away his gun. When he tried to take it back the soldiers went to his police station, asking the man in charge why his subordinates were not better trained. The unfortunate policeman was brought before his chief and forced to sign a paper confessing his fault in the mat-



- 17 -

ter and promising not to do it again. This story was told by the head of the police station to one of the six men in the group referred to above as gathering information of happenings day by day.

Two other incidents were reported to me as follows. On Saturday-Sunday night October 10-11 Japanese troops made a thoroughgoing search of inns and kindred establishments throughout the city. In the course of this investigation two men were killed. In one case a man, proprietor of a restaurant, was awakened in his home by the inspection party. While dressing he reached for his shoes and the Japanese soldiers apparently thinking that he was reaching for a weapon, shot and killed him. The second case was very similar. A man in a hotel was awakened, in bed. While dressing he reached behind for his belt and the Japanese soldiers thinking he was reaching for a weapon, shot and killed him.

In connection with this all-night search the Y.M.C.A. building was entered and certain papers taken away. Cline, the American secretary, went at once to see Vice-Consul Toda, who conducted him in to see the Consul, Mr. Ishii. Consul Ishii claimed not to know anything about the matter and promised to inquire. He stated, however, that a general search had been made during the night in question of all inns and similar establishments. From the Y.M.C.A. there were taken away a picture of a boys' department group, a statement issued by the Peiping Y.M.C.A. and Y.W.C.A. concerning the present Manchurian crisis, and a copy of a mimeographed letter from the Kirin Y.M.C.A. to other Y.M.C.A.'s in China, telling of happenings in connection with the Japanese occupation of the city. Cline was later called back by Consul Ishii, who expressed regret that the Y.M.C.A. had been troubled, stating that he did not know that an American secretary was related to the institution, urging that care be taken not to allow the Y.M.C.A. to become a center for anti-Japanese activity, and reserving still the right of entrance and search in the Y.M.C.A. building as occasion might arise for it. Upon receiving a notice from the Japanese Consulate requesting all foreign institutions to exhibit for purpose of identification and protection their respective national flags, the Y.M.C.A. (a purely Chinese organization) replied by stating that the Y.M.C.A. would thenceforth fly the Red Triangle, the Y.M.C.A. flag in international use.

On October 15, the day before my arrival in Kirin, a party of six Japanese visited the Irish Presbyterian hospital. They expressed great interest in the institution and made a very thorough visit on its various departments. After getting out of the front door the Chinese doctors and nurses, together with an Irish lady doctor and nurse (Dr. Irwin and Miss Calvert) stood for a few moments chatting with several of the Japanese visitors. Suddenly they realized that a member of the Japanese party with kodak in hand had stepped into the yard and was clicking their picture. They are now wondering what use will be made of this photograph for purposes of propaganda in Japan.

One of the main reasons given by the Japanese for their present occupation of Kirin and other centers in Manchuria is the necessity of furnishing protection to Koreans, subjects of the Japan-



- 16 -

ese Empire. The Koreans are thus being made convenient use of by the Japanese military in their present Manchurian adventure. At the same time, Koreans of known unfriendliness to Japanese rule in their own country are terrified within an inch of their lives. Dr. Sloane told us of several cases, one of which will suffice. A well known Korean of the city, an educator, came with his wife to the Irish Presbyterian compound for safety. They were badly frightened and lay very low. After several days the wife went back home to look things over. Her landlord, who shares the premises with her, told her that after she and her husband left Japanese investigators had come to ask concerning them. On learning that they had fled the Japanese exacted of the landlord a promise that he would inform the military authorities if and when they returned. The landlord thereupon informed the wife that in order to insure his own safety she would have to remain in the house rather than return to her husband. The husband, dressed in Chinese coolie clothes, fled by boat on the Sungari River to Harbin in order to escape unknown but greatly feared difficulties at the hands of the Japanese military.

On the other hand, in Kirin, as in Changchun and Mukden, we found the Chinese population in great fear of the Koreans themselves. While several Koreans of revolutionary connections were reported to have been killed by the Japanese upon their occupation of Kirin, it was also stated that 200 Koreans in the local prison had been liberated. Further reports were to the effect that hundreds of Koreans in the city were being armed with daggers. Just as we were leaving for the train to take our departure one foreign and one Chinese informant (both of them doctors) hurried in to tell us the latest rumor. This was to the effect that the Japanese were planning to withdraw a short distance from the city, turning the place over to the mercy of these armed Koreans so that an incident might be created which would make it "necessary" for the Japanese troops to return and protect the city.

#### VII.

At 6 p.m. on October 16 we left Kirin for Changchun. In our second-class coach were 11 Japanese soldiers, 2 Japanese runners of the Yamato Hotel, 3 Japanese men in civilian clothes, one Japanese woman, one Chinese man (apparently an official), 4 Chinese women and 3 Chinese men of an unrecognizable category. The impression deepened that we were in Japanese territory and that the Chinese population was not travelling any more than necessary. (The above ratio between Chinese and Japanese on the coach might well be compared with that of the entire population of Manchuria in which there are 28 million Chinese and not more than 250,000 Japanese).

The following morning, October 17, found us in Harbin. After breakfast we went at once to the Russian Y.M.C.A. and sought out the American general secretary, H. L. Haag. The first thing he told me was that he had known for some days of my coming. I asked if he had heard from the national office in Shanghai. He had not, but four days earlier in the "Zarya", a White Russian newspaper, he had read that "Mr. Barnett, secretary of the National Committee of the Y.M.C.A. in Shanghai, was visiting Manchuria gathering information."



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On inquiring of the newspaper editor as to the source of this information he was told that it had come from the Japanese Consul-General. Haag called up the Consul-General, whom he knew, and was informed not only of my presence in the province but also of the cities I was visiting. I am quite at a loss to know where the Japanese Consul could have secured this information.

Haag reported that for days previous to the incident in Mukden his Chinese friends were expressing the feeling that Japan would soon be on the move. One of them had said to him about September 12 that "all is over but the shouting." By this he meant that Japan was all ready to come in to take over South Manchuria.

I talked with two or three prominent foreigners resident for years in Harbin. They were quite critical of the Chinese government but shared the general conviction I found throughout Manchuria that the present military occupation of the area by Japan was a carefully premeditated and planned movement.

About September 27 the Japanese started a propaganda newspaper in Harbin - The Harbinski Vramia. Chinese newspaper sellers refuse to handle it.

Aerial Japanese propaganda was carried on over Harbin daily until September 27 or 28. On September 22 and 23, for example, Japanese air planes flying over Harbin dropped leaflets in Chinese and Russian containing an address to the population, signed by General Hongjo. A translation of this leaflet is as follows:

"On the 18th of September at 10:30 p.m. the troops of the Chinese North-Eastern Army, did some damage to the line of the South Manchuria Railway near Pei Ta Yin north of Mukden, and tried to attack the Japanese border regiments.

"Thus the hostile actions were begun by the Chinese. The South Manchuria Railway is the possession of the Japanese Empire, which allows no one to interfere with it. But the North-Eastern Chinese Army not only destroyed the line but also opened fire against the Japanese army, obviously trying to start hostile actions against the Japanese Army.

"In view of the fact that lately Japanese interests and rights are often interfered with by the Chinese, I think that these vile deeds are happening not because of a temporary quarrel but are nothing else than premeditated actions of the North-Eastern government which is accustomed to unbecoming actions toward Japanese, thus breaking the international agreements.

"If the Japanese had not paid attention to such actions God knows what would have happened in the future. I know that these vile deeds are not planned by the whole Chinese nation but by a number of military men who are dreaming of attaining all power for themselves.

"Because of the importance of guarding the South Manchuria Railway I shall take decided measures for guarding and making safe our interests and the authority of the Imperial Army.

"I want to punish only the North-Eastern military authorities and I am taking care of the population that is suffering under the



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oppression of this military rule; so I want the Chinese people with God's help to attend to their own affairs. I take decided steps in case there be planned a hostile attack upon the Japanese command.

"Commander of the Forces of the Kuantung Military District."

Two days after the initial incident in Mukden, on September 20 at 11 p.m., the night watchman at the Russian Y.M.C.A. in Harbin saw a car draw up at the front gate of the Japanese Consulate next door and its occupants step out long enough to throw a bomb into the front yard of the Consulate. The bomb did not explode. About September 23 a second bomb was exploded on the front doorstep of a Japanese civilian club at 8:30 in the morning. The same night a third bomb was dropped in front of another Japanese club in Prieston, one of the business sections of Harbin. Two other bomb incidents, equally innocent in their results have been directed at Japanese institutions. Whether these bombs represent actual attacks on Japanese institutions or "plants" engineered by the Japanese themselves was a matter of discussion among neutrals in the city.

Undoubtedly a pall of impending disaster broods over Harbin. Business conditions in the city were already bad, and the military operations throughout the area have completed, at least for the time being, the stoppage of business of all kinds.

A Chinese government remains in Harbin, thanks to the Russian affiliations of the city. So completely insulated, however, from the rest of the country are these Chinese authorities that they are able to do little more than pursue a policy of watchful waiting.

As stated above, one found foreign opinion somewhat in sympathy with Japan in its efforts to "punish" the Chinese officials of Manchuria. They seem to feel that Japan may be checking on behalf of all the powers what they themselves regard as China's premature demands for the abolition of extraterritoriality. These same men, however, were cynical as to the genuineness of Japan's professed provocation and aims in the present situation. One man, head of a leading British firm, who has lived in Harbin since 1917, said, in reply to a question, that if Japan should take over permanent control of Southern Manchuria, it would probably mean greater freedom from banditry and similar dangers, but it would also spell the beginning of the end of foreign trade in the region, other than that between China and Japan.

Mr. Liang met several important leaders in the Chinese community and both of us had visits with Messrs. Wu Peh Hsiang and Chao Sen Tang, manufacturers and department store proprietors of Harbin, Mr. Hoh, president of the Y.M.C.A., Messrs. Jen and Keh, secretaries of the Y.M.C.A. and Mr. S. M. Doong, a former secretary of the Y.M.C.A. now in business.

From these men we learned that the city had organized itself early in September for flood relief in connection with the stricken area in Central China. The merchants had assessed themselves \$800,000 as a start and various organizations were raising volun-



- 21 -

tary contributions in addition. The Japanese occupation of Manchuria has side-tracked this effort almost entirely. One of the most painful results of the Manchurian crisis is the fact that it has deflected the help which otherwise would have been poured out from all quarters on behalf of the 30 to 50 million flood sufferers who now approach the hard winter months with no resources of their own.

Mr. Wu explained to us the difficulty of enforcing a Japanese boycott in Manchuria. (1) The Japanese are so near that they can easily retaliate in measures directed against the Chinese government. (2) The Japanese likewise are able to obstruct and delay the import into the territory of any goods other than those of Japanese origin. Mr. Wu and Mr. Chao, both expressed themselves as feeling that a Japanese suzerainty in Manchuria would be intolerable. They would greatly prefer seeing China go Communist rather than submit to Japanese rule, and they believed this represented the general attitude of sober Chinese opinion in the area.

As in other cities visited, these Chinese leaders were profoundly pessimistic about the outlook. They felt that the League of Nations would prove futile in its efforts at friendly intervention. They were bitterly critical of the Chinese government in what they spoke of as its gross mismanagement of affairs. While feeling that internal conditions in China had invited Japanese cupidity, they were strong in their conviction that a Japanese over-lordship would be intolerable. They expressed themselves frankly as favoring military preparedness and if necessary an alliance with Russia even at the cost of China's going Communist.

#### VIII.

After spending the day in Harbin, we returned to Mukden and after another half day there made our way to Dairen.

At Dairen we caught only a glimpse of local conditions. The city of course being under Japanese administration is outwardly quiet. (There is much suppressed feeling on the part of the large Chinese population which has no way of rising to the surface.)

In Dairen we met Kaj Petersen, who had just reached the city after making a visit to Antung. From him we got a second-hand report on some of the main events which have taken place in that city.

It seems that at 6 a.m. on September 19 the Chinese magistrate at Antung was asked to capitulate. He called in a Danish missionary, a woman of long residence in the city, who tried on his behalf to establish contact with governmental authorities in Peiping or Nanking. All lines of communication were cut, however, and her efforts were unavailing. Between 11 and 12 o'clock the city was therefore taken over by the Japanese military.

Shortly after occupying the city the Japanese authorities in Antung cut off the Chinese electric light and power supply from a section of the city across the South Manchuria Railway. Paul Baagoe, Danish secretary of the Antung Y.M.C.A., called on the Japan-



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ese military authorities and remonstrated. He was told by them that Chang Hsueh Liang had money in the plant and for this reason they could not heed his remonstrances on behalf of the Chinese community affected.

On October 10 two Japanese soldiers went to the Antung Y.M.C.A. building and ordered those in charge to take down the Chinese flag which had been put up in honor of independence day. The order was refused, whereupon the soldiers tore the flag down. Baagoe went on the following day to see the Japanese Consul about this matter and was told by the Consul that he would telephone the military concerning it. The Chinese flag now flies again over the Chinese Y.M.C.A. in Antung.

On October 14 the Commissioner of Education was arrested as a strong member of the Kuomintang. On being asked if he were anti-Japanese he replied, "Of course I am, I am a Chinese."

The schools of Antung were closed for a time but were reopened on October 15. Petersen states that there was current a report that all books found by the Japanese military bearing on the Three Peoples Principles had been collected and burned. He reported this, however, as hearsay, rather than authenticated fact.

Baagoe remains in solitary charge of the Y.M.C.A. in Antung as the last Chinese secretary has left the city. The president of the Association (when Petersen was in the city) was in a hospital - for fear of his safety.

#### IX.

On October 19 we left Dairen on the Saitsu Maru, arriving next day in Tientsin, where we spent a few hours before proceeding to Peiping, where we arrived in the evening of October 20. Here we spent 24 hours in consultation with local leaders regarding various Y.M.C.A. problems and in conversation with a number of men, including Marshal Chang Hsueh Liang.

In our 45 minute interview with the Young Marshal we gathered further significant background information regarding events in Manchuria. Most important perhaps were his statements concerning information which had reached him considerably in advance of September 18 of an impending movement by Japan.

For example, the Young Marshal showed us a copy of a telegram which he sent from Peiping on September 5 to Chang Shih Yi, chairman of the Provincial Government in Mukden, which read as follows: "Recent events indicate that the Japanese are planning to find an occasion to make trouble. During this period we should be very careful and considerate in all our dealings with them. In case of provocation we must by no means resist lest grave consequences follow. It is important and urgent that you instruct all of the forces and organizations under your jurisdiction accordingly." This message the Marshal requested us not to release for publication.



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Chang Hsueh Liang spoke of General Hongjo, Commander in charge of Japanese operations in Manchuria, who, he said, was "really a very good friend" of his. Hongjo, it seems was a colonel during the Russo-Japanese war. For expressing approval of Russian policy in certain respects he was deprived of his commission. Later, upon marrying the daughter of an influential personage in Japan, he was restored to the army. During the lifetime of Chang Tso Lin General Hongjo served him as adviser. When the Young General was sent to Japan it was under the care of General Hongjo that he made the trip.

Marshal Chang Hsueh Liang told us of a recent exchange of communications between Hongjo and himself (which also he enjoined us not to release for publication). In Hongjo's letter addressed to a junior military officer, he asked that intermediary to convey word to the Young Marshal as follows: (1) We have been good friends in the past but our friendship must now be terminated, (2) I was a good friend of your father and will take good care of his coffin (now in Mukden) and will deliver it wherever you wish. (3) Do not come back to Manchuria. Both the Chinese and foreigners agree that you "are no good". (4) I shall take care of your personal property and will deliver it wherever you want it. (5) You have pushed Japan too hard during the past few years. (6) If you attempt to return to Mukden the people will rise up against you. I think that they would be right in doing so.

To this message the Young Marshal sent back a reply containing the following points: (1) For the time being we will set aside all questions of personal friendship. (2) I have not pushed Japan, I have only served China. If you say that I have pushed Japan, I can say that you have pushed China. (3) Thanks for taking care of my father's coffin. (4) Thanks for taking care of my personal belongings. They are of no consequence. (5) As to my return to Mukden, I shall come when I get ready. You have no right to say anything about it.

I asked the Young Marshal particularly regarding two matters. (1) To what extent is he maintaining an efficient intelligence service in Manchuria capable of getting the facts which he should have concerning conditions and events in the area. I stated that what I had in mind was facts needed not for publicity use either in China or abroad, but for guidance in policy and planning. (2) What plan did he have for the effective reoccupation of Manchuria upon the withdrawal of Japan.

In reply, the Young Marshal stated: (1) When the Japanese move out we have a sufficient police force with which to maintain order; (2) we can also cope with the bandits provided the Japanese do not stir them up and really leave us free to act; (3) we are ready to send civil officers in promptly to resume civil administration of the area.

On October 23 we reached Shanghai, after an absence of just two weeks.

October 25, 1931.



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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

In reply refer to  
FE 793.94/2984

The Honorable

James E. Watson,

United States Senate.

Sir:

The President has referred to me your letter of November 30, 1931, enclosing a copy of a letter dated November 3, 1931, written by Mr. William W. Lockwood of Shanghai, China, to Mr. George B. Lockwood of Muncie, Indiana, and a confidential memorandum prepared by Mr. Eugene E. Barnett in reference to his trip to Manchuria in October of this year.

Mr. Barnett's memorandum has been read with care and interest by officers of this Department. It contains information with regard to certain phases of the early developments in the present dispute between China and Japan and I am glad to have it.

Very truly yours,

HENRY D. STANSON

*WJ*  
CR  
Dec 4, 1931.

FE:MMH/VDM  
*MMH*


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



CONFIDENTIAL  
Division of State  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY  
DEC 2 1931  
Department of State  
November 30, 1931.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON  
AND THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR, MR. KATSUJI DEBUCHI.

Manchuria.

The Japanese Ambassador came to tell me the following points:

One. That Tsitsihar was being systematically evacuated, and that at present there were left there only two battalions of Japanese troops aggregating less than 1,000 men, which were to be gradually withdrawn;

Two. That the troops which had moved toward Chinchow were now coming back and would not be moved west of the Liao River unless some unexpected danger to Japanese nationals should come up;

Three. That all firing in Tientsin had ceased since the afternoon of November 29th, and that the armed police who were responsible for it had been removed.

Then turning to the negotiations in Paris, the Ambassador said that there really should be no question of a neutral zone, because the Foreign Minister of China had asked the foreign observers to communicate to the Japanese Government China's willingness to withdraw her troops from Chinchow in case the Japanese troops do not penetrate

F/DEW

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 2 -

penetrate into the zone of Chinchow. He reminded me that this was the statement in the French text that he communicated to me the other day, and he said that on receiving this word the Japanese Government had at once replied that Japan was ready to agree not to penetrate the Chinchow zone in case China withdrew her troops west of the Wall and out of the zone. The Ambassador reminded me that he had shown me this offer and answer the other day and said he thought that that settled it. I told him that I was not authorized to make any offer or enter into any negotiations but that I had reason to believe that if Japan was willing to permit neutral observers on the spot to definitely verify the fact that the Japanese troops had moved east of the Liao River, China would be willing to leave out of the resolution now being discussed at Paris, the time limit for evacuation, and I said if this was so it would greatly facilitate an agreement upon that resolution of the League Council.

The Ambassador then reverted to the Commission of Inquiry and said that Japan had originally suggested that there be representatives of Great Britain, France and America, but now that they had heard that Italy

would



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 3 -

would like to have a representative and they had no objections to that. He then asked me whether we would consent to an American going on the Commission. I replied that if, and only if, Japan and China consented that an American should go, we would favorably consider having one go. He said he hoped that the Commission would be of high class. I told him we certainly would not try to send a second-class man and I said that I had considered the neutral commission as the most important part of the League Plan and, therefore, if an American was on that commission I should certainly try to get as good a one as possible.

The Ambassador then referred again to the negotiations going on in Paris and said that they were having a very ticklish time in Japan in their issue between the military and the civil authorities and that Baron Shidehara was obliged to make some suggestions of amendments to satisfy the military people, and he hoped we would understand that and if necessary that General Dawes would back up such amendments. I told him I was not conducting the negotiations but I thought they were being very well handled by M. Briand.

HLS.

S HLS:HHR



JS

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*FE*

PEIPING  
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Dated December 2, 1931

Secretary of State,  
Washington, D.C.

FROM

Rec'd 1:20 a.m.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 2 1931  
Department of State

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

1029, December 2, 9 a.m.

Legation's 1025, November 30, 3 p.m.

Following from Reuter, Peiping, November 30th:

"Marshal Chang Hsues Liang issued the following  
statement this evening:

'In view of misrepresentations concerning the  
interview Mr. Yano sought with me on Saturday night,  
necessary  
it is/definitely to clarify the situation. Mr. Yano  
informally asked my opinion with regards to the  
proposed neutral zone. It is entirely contrary to  
fact for anyone to say that there was any negotiation  
or that any agreement was signed or that any under-  
standing was arrived at'

Mr. Yano, Charge d'Affaires of the Japanese  
Legation called on Marshal Chang Hsues Liang on  
Saturday evening and in addition to discussing the  
safety of Japanese residents here and the position in  
Tientsin mentioned the Chinchow situation. According  
to a statement by a Japanese official spokesman the  
discussion on this matter was somewhat informal as  
Mr. Yano has to submit any proposals to the Japanese  
Minister, Mr. Shigemitsu, and Marshal Chang has to  
submit

F/DEW

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FILED

DEC 7 1931



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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-  
From Peiping, Dec. 2, #1029

submit matters to the Central Government at Nanking. However it is believed that subject to the approval of their governments they were both willing to agree to a neutral zone being established between Mukden and Shanhaikuan the Japanese withdrawing to ~~the~~ Mukden and Chinese troops to Shanhaikuan. The Japanese troops as mentioned above were already then withdrawing but it is not clear yet whether any withdrawals from that area has been made by the Chinese forces. Apparently they are still awaiting instructions from Nanking."

For the Minister

PEKINS

JS




DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM



GREEN

Paris

Dated December 1, 1931

Rec'd 3:05 p. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

826, December 1, 6 p. m.


FROM AMBASSADOR DAVES.

Following is report from Sweetser:

"The drafting Committee completed this morning for submission to the 12 tonight the final text of the resolution taking account to the greatest possible degree of changes suggested by both the Chinese and the Japanese. Two points only need be emphasized before this final text is approved and forwarded tonight. First, there is no mention in it of Japan's demand for the right to take police measures against bandits. Second, the number of members of the commission as recommended to the twelve is five.

The committee also considered both the policy and the actual text of the declaration to be made by the President. After some discussion it was felt best to recommend dividing this

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DEC 10 1931

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2- #826, from Paris, Dec.1, 6.p.m.

ing this declaration into two parts. The first part would be a somewhat formal statement on certain points either included in or excluded from the resolution. This declaration would at least in substance be explained to the parties in advance and certain sections of it especially that inserted for the Japanese regarding police measures before

(END SECTION ONE).

SHAW

WSB



## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM GREEN

Paris

Dated December 1, 1931

Rec'd 3:45 p. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

826, December 1, 6 p. m. (SECTION TWO).

evacuation and that for the Chinese regarding observers might even be given to the Chinese Government in full for advance transmission to their governments. Having been thus negotiated and presented before the adoption of the resolution this declaration would have a decidedly formal character.

The second declaration would be very much less formal and would be made after the passage of the resolution. It would cover certain broad aspects involved in this dispute such as the use of force in diplomatic negotiations, the general philosophy of peaceful settlement, and possibly specific relation to the three great documents involved in the Covenant, the Kellogg Pact and Nine Power Treaty. The text is now in process of being drafted.

Returning to the first declaration, the most important paragraph is that regarding police measures. It is not yet



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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

Section Two,  
2- #826, from Paris, Dec. 1, 1931,  
6 p.m.

yet known whether this will be satisfactory to the Japanese either in being relegated to the declaration or in its actual drafting. That drafting as it stands at present and as it has been informally transmitted to the Japanese is as follows:

'There is, however, one point which requires elucidation. In the special conditions prevailing at present in Manchuria the administrative machinery of government is seriously compromised. There are districts in which many bandits and lawless bands endanger the lives and property of the inhabitants some of whom are Japanese subjects. In these (END SECTION TWO)

SHAW

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## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAIL

FROM

GREEN

PARIS

Dated December 1, 1931

Rec'd 4:42 p.m.

Secretary of State  
Washington

826, December 1, 6 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

circumstances it has been strongly pressed upon the Council that it may prove necessary as an exceptional measure for the Japanese Government during the period before evacuation is completed to take, if such a danger renders it necessary, police measures sufficient to provide directly for the safety of its subjects. In the very exceptional conditions that prevail, the Council could not take upon itself to rule out altogether action of that kind. Nevertheless, and even assuming that such action is confined strictly to police purposes, it is liable to lead to grave misconception and the increase of tension between the two countries concerned. I am glad, therefore, to learn that both governments are ready to give an opportunity to neutral observers to accompany any operation of the kind. This is really only the special application to this case of the general invitation given to neutral observers by both governments. The next most important point was the paragraph aiming to give satisfaction to the



1451  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

TO

FROM

GREEN

PARIS

Dated December 1, 1931

Rec'd 4:42 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

826, December 1, 6 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

circumstances it has been strongly pressed upon the Council that it may prove necessary as an exceptional measure for the Japanese Government during the period before evacuation is completed to take, if such a danger renders it necessary, police measures sufficient to provide directly for the safety of its subjects. In the very exceptional conditions that prevail, the Council could not take upon itself to rule out altogether action of that kind. Nevertheless, and even assuming that such action is confined strictly to police purposes, it is liable to lead to grave misconception and the increase of tension between the two countries concerned. I am glad, therefore, to learn that both governments are ready to give an opportunity to neutral observers to accompany any operation of the kind. This is really only the special application to this case of the general invitation given to neutral observers by both governments. The next most important point was the paragraph aiming to give satisfaction to the  
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145  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NAIK

2- #926, from Paris, December 1,  
1931

the Chinese that the system of observers as already instituted would be really effective in case of emergency. As the Council resolution requested only its own members to send in information or inferentially to cooperate in this work it was suggested that the declaration might go further and invite other governments to do the same. There was some discussion as to whether it would be wise in this connection to specify by name the United States

(END SECTION THREE)

SHAW

CSB



## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GREEN

Paris

Dated December 1, 1931

Rec'd 3:35 p. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

826, December 1, 6 p. m. (SECTION FOUR)

in view of the fact that its observer was already collaborating fully on the spot. On being asked my personal opinion in the matter I expressed the view that, while this cooperation was in fact effective it might be appreciated if it were not specifically mentioned by name. Drummond also thought it might be better from the Japanese viewpoint to be vague.

Other important provisions are being drafted for this declaration, leading off with a paragraph on evacuation and concluding with a section on the duties and organization of the commission. The drafting committee is completing this text at 3:30 for submission to the twelve at 6, with the hope of sending the final resolution and parts of the declaration to the parties tonight for transmission to their governments.



MET

2-#826 from Paris, December 1,  
1931

governments.

Meanwhile the text of the aide memoire presented by Yoshizawa to Sze last night on the evacuation of Chinchow and the creation of a neutral zone has been made privately accessible. The aide memoire begins by recalling that Yoshizawa had on November 29th requested the President of the Council 'to be good enough to employ all his efforts in order that an accord may be rapidly concluded'; recalls the discussions of Shidehara with Martel on the basis of Koo proposal; and cites Japan's four conditions as follows:

One. Retreat of Chinese forces behind the great wall; (END SECTION FOUR)

SHAW

WSB



## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GREEN

Paris

Dated December 1, 1931

Rec'd 4 p. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

826, December 1, 6 p. m. (SECTION FIVE).

Two. Maintenance of Chinese administration in the  
evacuated zone;

Three. Abstention of the use of all irregular or  
disorderly elements;

Four. Entering into immediate negotiations between  
the Chinese and Japanese authorities as regards (A)  
determination of the zone from which the troops are to  
be withdrawn; (B) fixation of the number of Chinese  
troops necessary for order, particularly against bandits;  
and (C) other details.

In these conditions Japan would be ready to take an  
engagement that her troops would not enter the evacuated  
zone except in the unforeseen case of serious and urgent  
circumstances threatening the security of Japanese subjects  
and property in the north of China as well as the security  
of Japanese



4 5  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2- #826, from Paris, Dec. 1, 6 p. m.

of Japanese troops stationed there. The note concludes:  
'The Japanese Government believing that the rapid  
conclusion of such an agreement is of the highest  
importance, given the gravity of the present situation,  
the representative of Japan urgently begs the President  
of the Council to be good enough to make every effort for  
the prompt realization of this project!'

(END MESSAGE).

SHAW

WSB



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAH

FROM

GREEN

PARIS

Dated December 1, 1931

Rec'd 8:50 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

827, December 1, 11 p.m.

FROM AMBASSADOR DATES

Following is Sweetser's report

"The twelve members of the Council other than the Chinese and Japanese representatives tonight formally approved and transmitted to the two parties the draft resolution as presented by the draft committee. The text is as follows: 'The Council,

One. Reaffirms the resolution passed unanimously by it on September 30th 1931 by which the two parties declare that they are solemnly <sup>bound</sup> It therefore calls upon the Chinese and Japanese Governments to take all steps necessary to assure its execution, so that the withdrawal of the Japanese troops within the railway zone may be effected as speedily as possible under the conditions set forth in the said resolution.

Two. Considering that events have assumed an even more serious aspect since the Council meeting of October 24th, notes that the two parties undertake to adopt all


F/DEW

793.94/2988

FILED

DEC 1 0 1931

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mts  
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793.94117





DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MAH

2- #827, from Paris, December 1,  
1931

all measures necessary to avoid any further aggravation  
of the situation and to refrain from any initiative which  
may lead to further fighting and loss of life.

(END SECTION ONE)

SHAW

(\*) apparent omission, serviced.

OX



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WP

FROM GREEN

Paris

Dated December 1, 1931

Rec'd 10:30 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

827, December 1, 11 p. m. (SECTION TWO).

Three. Invites the two parties to continue to keep the Council informed as to the developments of the situation.

Four. Invites the other members of the Council to furnish the Council with any information received from their representatives on the spot.

Five. Without prejudice to the carrying out of the above mentioned measures,

Desiring, in view of the special circumstances of the case, to contribute towards a final and fundamental solution by the two governments of the questions at issue between them,

Decides to appoint a commission of five members to study on the spot and to report to the Council on any circumstances which, affecting international relations, threatens



146  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 - No. 827 from Paris - section two -

threatens to disturb peace between China and Japan, or the good understanding between them, upon which peace depends.

The governments of China and of Japan will each have the right to nominate one assessor to assist the commission.

The two governments will afford the commission all facilities to obtain on the spot whatever information it may require.

It is understood that should the two parties initiate any negotiations these would not fall within the scope of the terms of the commission, nor would it be within the competence of the commission to interfere with the military arrangements of either party.

(END SECTION TWO).

SHAW

JS



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WP

FROM GRAY

Paris

Dated December 1, 1931

Rec'd 10:40 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

827, December 1, 11 p. m. (SECTION THREE).

The appointment and deliberations of the commission shall not prejudice in any way the undertaking given by the Japanese Government in the resolution of September 30th as regards the withdrawal of the Japanese troops within the railway zone.

Should the engagements taken by the two parties according to the resolution of September 30th not have been carried out by the time of the arrival of the commission, the commission shall as speedily as possible report to the Council on the situation with such recommendation as it may think fit.

Six. Between now and its next ordinary session which will be held on January 25, 1932, the Council which remains seized of the question, inviting its President to to follow the question and to summon it afresh if necessary.

Paris,



146  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 - No. 827 from Paris - section three-

Paris, December 1, 1931,

The twelve also approved the principal parts of the President's declaration regarding evacuation, police measures pending evacuation, military information, and the sections on the Commission of Inquiry other than constitution. The only change in the text previously transmitted on police measures was the addition in the third line after Manchuria of the phrase 'as a result of recent events'. It was felt best to transmit the text as so far

(END SECTION THREE)

SHAW

JS



## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WP

FROM GRAY  
Paris

Dated December 1, 1931

Rec'd 10:50 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

827, December 1, 11 p. m. (SECTION FOUR).

drafted, to the parties 'for information' in order to  
avoid the danger of a possible incident.

A general exchange of views then followed to serve  
as guidance to the drafting committee tomorrow in its  
preparation of the part of the declaration regarding the  
membership of the commission. The Peruvian representative  
raised the question as to the countries from which the  
members were to come and urged that the general world-wide  
nature of the League be borne in mind. Colban felt that  
the almost exclusive consideration should (\*) the qualifi-  
cations of the members regardless of nationality though  
certain nations were clearly indicated by knowledge and  
experience as the most likely to provide capable men.  
Madariaga agreed with this with the urgent hope however,  
that, if five members were decided upon, one should be  
from a neutral country without direct interests, which he  
disclaimed



1464  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 - No. 827 from Paris - section four -

disclaimed any intention of saying should be his own.

Scialoja said the first consideration must be ability

but that the weight and power of the country from which

the members came would also have a great importance.

Cecil then made an earnest plea for the highest type of

membership possible to attain. The task would be a very

difficult and responsible one. It centered about a

dispute involving two great nations, one of sixty million

people and the other of nearly four hundred millions, who

had had long years of bitter hostility which had now

become very acute.

(END SECTION FOUR).

SHAW

(\*) apparent omission.

JS



WP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Paris

FROM Dated December 1, 1931

Rec'd 10:55 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

827, December 1, 11 p. m. (SECTION FIVE).

The peace of the Far East was certainly at stake and perhaps that of the World. It was estimated to have a personnel of the very highest type and desirable to have nationals carrying the weight of countries known and interested in the East. He begged his colleagues not to go above five; the more men there were, the more differences of opinion there would be. He agreed that experts as such should not be included; he thought it possible however to secure big men with expert knowledge. In this connection there is a great deal of private discussion as to a possible American choice and as to whether or not the United States Government would care to make a recommendation or be consulted unofficially on the subject.

The Drafting Committee meets tomorrow morning to finish the President's declaration and the twelve tomorrow afternoon."

(END MESSAGE).

SHAW

JS



146

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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
FROM

GRAY

Tokio

Dated December 2, 1931

Rec'd 6:24 a. m.



F/DEW

795.94/2989

793.94  
mt  
894.00

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

249, December 2, 5 p. m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY ONLY.

Minister for Foreign Affairs lunched informally with me today, the only other guest being Governor Davis. The Minister says political attacks are still continuing against him; that the Chinese seem to have stiffened their attitude; that the Chinese Minister here sent a telegram following the publication of Associated Press of November 28 informing his people that the Secretary of State had come out definitely on the side of the Chinese; and that reenforcements reported going to Tsitsihar are merely replacements of men incapacitated by the cold. He says the situation in general has quieted down.

FOREES

HPD

RECEIVED  
CONFIDENTIAL  
Confidential File.



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GRAY

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Peiping via N. R.

Dated December 2, 1931

Rec'd 2:40 a. m.

793.94  
note  
893.0146  
Secretary of State,  
Washington.

1031, December 2, 11 a. m.

Legation's 1028, December 1, 1 p. m.

Following from American Consul General at Mukden:

"December 1, 1 a. m.

Referring to my telegram of November 30, 6 p. m.,  
movement of Chinese troops on Tsitsihar from Hailun  
officially confirmed. Because of the threat to the safety  
of 500 Japanese troops remaining in Tsitsihar, headquarters  
despatched two battalions of reinforcements from Mukden  
this morning.

Two. Referring to my telegram of November 30, 2 p. m.,  
Japanese headquarters reports continued heavy movement of  
Chinese troops north of the wall, two troop trains leaving  
Koupangtza yesterday.

Three. Officially announced all Japanese forces  
except usual consular guard at Hsinmin have been withdrawn  
east of



F/LS  
793.94/2990  
FILED  
DEC 7 1931  
Telegram drafted to Paris.  
Dec 2, 1931  
Emk



1468  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2- #1031, from Peiping, Dec. 2, 11 am

east of the Liao River.

Four. Peiping-Mukden Railway traffic still  
suspended. Bridge at Pei(?)pu blown up by Chinese  
rebels.

For the Minister

PERKINS


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
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Stutzman NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY



November 28, 1931.



*Telegram sent 11/28/31 file a m.a.*

Doctor Hornbeck:

It seems to me that there should be sent to Forbes at once a cable covering what the Secretary said at the press conference yesterday. In substance it was this:

Press despatches were brought to his attention to the effect that General Honjo's army had moved south from Mukden and was now encamped 35 miles north of Chinchow and that Japanese bombing planes were operating there. The Secretary said: "I will simply say I am at a loss to understand that, in view of very definite assurances that have been given to me on that subject. We have no confirmation of them and I am speaking therefore solely from the press despatches but not for quotation but for attribution. On the 23 of November, I asked my ambassador in Tokyo to tell Baron Shidehara, the Foreign Minister of Japan, that I had seen with great apprehension press reports giving the impression that the Army Commanders of Japan were planning military expeditions against the forces of China in the neighborhood of Chinchow and that I sincerely trusted that there was no basis for that report. The following day, November 24, I was assured by Baron Shidehara, the Foreign Minister of Japan, through Ambassador Forbes that he and the

F/DEW

793.94/2991

FILED

NOV 29 1931



14  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS. Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff were all of them agreed that there should be no hostile operations toward Chinchow and that military orders to that effect had been issued. In the light of that it is difficult for me to understand the report about General Honjo." *auto T*

Nothing else was said by the Secretary on this subject.

SA ATK:MA



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF SECRETARY  
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
DEC 1 1931  
RECEIVED 30  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
NOV 30 1931

DIODRAM

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 2 1931

November 30, 1931

9:30 A.M.

RECEIVED

NOV 30 1931

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

SECRETARY OF STATE  
NOV 30 1931

F/DEW

793.94/2992

*This is from the  
Office of the  
Military Attaché, Tokyo.*

SECRETARY OF STATE  
NOV 30 1931

Nov. 30th

at the instructions of November 27th

Tung Army; that the advance toward  
oops were withdrawn to the east side  
November 28th and that there troops  
endits south of Mukden. Also states  
apan to Tientsin but that between 300

and 400 Infantry were sent from Mukden on November 30th via Dairen ex-  
pecting to arrive Tangku not later than this evening. My request to  
assign officer(s) to these troops disapproved. Military Attache left  
Mukden November 30th going north, returning to Mukden December 4th.

Cranford

JUN 4 1932



FILED

793.94



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RADIOGRAM



November 30, 1931


9:30 A.M.

RECEIVED

From Tokyo  
To The Adjutant General

NOV 30 1931

SECRETARY'S OFFICE



F/DEW

CONFIDENTIAL

Number 200

Nov. 30th

General Staff states that the instructions of November 27th had been complied with by the Kwan Tung Army; that the advance toward Chinchow has ceased; that those troops were withdrawn to the east side of the Liao River on the night of November 28th and that there troops will continue to operate against bandits south of Mukden. Also states that no troops will be sent from Japan to Tientsin but that between 300 and 400 Infantry were sent from Mukden on November 30th via Dairen expecting to arrive Tangku not later than this evening. My request to assign officer(s) to these troops disapproved. Military Attache left Mukden November 30th going north, returning to Mukden December 4th.

Cranford

793.94/2992

JUN 4 1932

RECORDED

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1473  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GRAY

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.  
*mt*

Peiping via N. R.

Dated December 2, 1931

Rec'd 7 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

1030, December 2, 10 a. m.

Legation's 1027, December 2, noon.

Following two telegrams from the Military Attache  
at Chinchow:

"Chinese commander reports that Japanese forces with-  
drawn to Liao River. Railway between Tahushan and Hsinmin  
broken. Liaison with Japanese commander from this side  
impossible. No increase in or movement of Chinese troops.  
Am prepared to cooperate with colleagues but threats to  
this area removed ~~although apprehensive~~ *and all awaiting instructions.* War Department  
funds available not sufficient permit me remain much longer."

"December 2, 2 a. m. In effort to carry out sugges-  
tion of Department forwarded by American Minister through  
you we are trying to get an observer through to Liao River  
from here in attempting to obtain actual facts of with-  
drawal. As all communications are cut off to Hsinmin  
observer

F/DEW

793.94/2995

793.94  
note  
893 23

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 2 1931  
*2968*



1474  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2- #1030, from Peiping, Dec. 2, 10 am

observer will probably fail to get through. Suggest that  
you might ask Mukden Consulate General to ascertain facts  
withdrawal from Mukden."

Repeated to Nanking.

For the Minister

PERKINS




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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State



1-138  
TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

Washington,

December 2 1931

*5 pm*

AMEMBASSY

DEC 2 31

PARIS (France).

*616* CONFIDENTIAL FOR AMBASSADOR DAWES.

*793.94/*  
*242*  
One. The American Legation at Peiping transmits under date December 2, two telegrams from the American Military Attaché at Chinchow as follows:

QUOTE Chinese commander reports that Japanese forces withdrawn to Liao River. Railway between Tahushan and Hsinmin broken. Liaison with Japanese commander from this side impossible. No increase in or movement of Chinese troops. Am prepared to cooperate with colleagues but threats to this area removed although apprehensive. . . . .

QUOTE . . . . . We are trying to get an observer through to Liao River from here in attempting to obtain actual facts of withdrawal. As all communications are cut off to Hsinmin observer will probably fail to get through. ~~Suggest that you might ask Mukden Consulate General to ascertain facts withdrawal from Mukden.~~

UNQUOTE.

**UNRECEIVED**

TWO.

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ....., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1925 1-138

793.94/2993



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR

Charge to  
\$

## TELEGRAM SENT

### Department of State

1-128

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

Washington,

- 2 -

Two. The Consul General at Mukden reports under  
date December 1 that traffic on the Peiping-Mukden  
Railway is still suspended.

*Sturton*  
*Sturton*

✓ 5  
12/20

FE:MMH/VDM FE

*MMH*

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1955 1-128



147  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

NOV 17 1931

1861 21 AON

Department of State  
STATEMENT OF THE FOURTH NATIONAL CONGRESS  
OF THE KUOMINTANG PARTY  
CONCERNING JAPANESE AGGRESSIONS IN CHINA

Handled by Mr. Yu, Secretary  
of the Chinese Legation, to Mr. Miller,  
November 17, 1931  
Rem.

RECEIVED THE UNDER SECRETARY  
NOV 21 1931 NOV 23 1931

793.94  
SECRETARY  
The Fourth National Congress of the Kuomintang Party of  
China views the grave situation produced by acts of deliberate  
aggression on the part of Japan not only as a matter affecting  
her national existence but also as of great concern to the  
safety of humanity. Japan's conduct is clearly a violation  
of international law, the Covenant of the League of Nations,  
the Anti-War Pact and the Nine Power Treaty and an infringe-  
ment of Chinese territorial sovereignty and administrative  
integrity as well as constitutes a menace to the peace of  
nations. The Congress therefore decides to issue the follow-  
ing statement as an expression of the determined will of the  
whole Kuomintang as well as of the entire Chinese nation:

On the eighteenth of September Japanese troops attacked  
and took Shenyang (Mukden) and successively occupied nearly  
all the other important cities in the Liaoning and Kirin  
provinces.

At the very beginning China submitted this extraordinary  
case of military aggression to the League of Nations in the  
belief that the instruments designed for the preservation of  
international peace would prove effective and that justice  
in the end would prevail.

On September thirtieth the Council of the League of  
Nations unanimously passed a resolution calling upon Japan  
to withdraw her troops, such withdrawal to be completed  
before the fourteenth of October when the League Council was  
to meet again in case of necessity. This Resolution was  
officially accepted by the Japanese Delegate in a formal  
declaration. While the Chinese Government exerted its utmost  
during

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during this period to carry out the Council Resolution by scrupulously adhering to a policy of peace and by giving full protection to Japanese nationals so that no unfortunate incidents would happen to them, Japanese troops on the other hand not only did not show any sign of withdrawal, but on the contrary bombarded Chinchow by air, wrecked part of the Peking-Mukden Railway, extended their military occupation and threatened Chinese coast and inland waters with a large number of vessels. In order to cope with this unusually grave situation the Council called the emergency meeting of October thirteenth. On October twenty-fourth a Resolution was adopted by all the members of the Council except Japan providing in unmistakable terms that Japan should complete withdrawal of her troops before November sixteenth and that China should take over all territory unlawfully occupied by Japanese troops. The Chinese Government respects the Resolution. Conformably with its provisions China has appointed a committee to take over areas to be evacuated and has notified the Japanese Government of this appointment. Meanwhile she is making every effort to perform all her other obligations arising from the Resolution. Besides neutral observers are understood to have already been selected by the powers.

Japan, however, again remains oblivious to the Council Resolution and perpetuates all kinds of acts of destruction and obstruction with the result that the peace which China and the powers are exerting their concerted efforts to promote cannot be fully realized. Mr. Briand, President of the League Council, has however called her attention to the fact that while the Council Resolution of October twenty-fourth had all the moral effect that of September thirtieth had a fully executory force and that Japan, in agreeing to the

Resolution



- 3 -

Resolution of September thirtieth, had not stated that the Treaty Rights of Japan in Manchuria were in any way connected with the safety of lives and property of Japanese nationals. He called upon Japan to fulfill its undertaking "solemnly contracted under the Resolution of September thirtieth and repeatedly confirmed by declarations during the last session of the Council" and to continue as rapidly as possible the withdrawal of her troops to the Railway Zone.

Japan, however, has not only failed to withdraw her troops, but has constantly increased their number. They have occupied Taonan and other places, repeatedly attempted to invade Tungliao and attacked Chinese troops in the Nonni Bridge District with the declared intention of seizing Tsitsihar, Capital of the Heilungkang Province. They have made use of bandits and monarchists in the Liaoning and Kirin provinces for organizing unlawful administrations and furthering so-called independence movements, thereby complicating the task of China when she comes to take over occupied territories. Moreover Japanese military authorities by appropriating salt revenue in Yinkow and Changchun directly interfered with the fiscal system of China and indirectly prejudices China's ability to meet her international financial obligations.

On November eighth and succeeding days organized mobs were supplied with arms in the Japanese concession at Tientsin and permitted to sally forth from the concession to attack police stations and other Chinese administrative offices. A great number of gun shots were fired from Japanese barracks into the territory under Chinese control. These are facts known to all foreign nationals in Tientsin and can be proven by exploded shells, seized arms and other evidences.

Such acts of undeclared war are singularly vicious and  
seldom



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seldom witnessed elsewhere in the world. They not only violate international law and international treaties but constitute in particular a direct challenge to civilization and humanity as well as to the sanctity of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Treaty for the Renunciation of War and the Nine Power Treaty signed at Washington in 1922.

Under these circumstances Japan, putting forward the five so-called fundamental principles, insists that China should agree to enter into direct negotiations with Japan before the withdrawal of troops is effected. It is evident that Japan desires through pressure of military occupation to coerce China into accepting her demands. Moreover as regards the so-called Treaty Rights which Japan has been advocating before the League of Nations with specious arguments, the people of China in the light of Japan's conduct since September eighteenth cannot but entertain profound doubts on the following five points:

1. Does the Covenant of the League of Nations possess any valid force? Should Japan be allowed to defy openly the Resolutions of the Council in disregard to the provisions of the Covenant? Should not the League by virtue of Articles fifteen and sixteen of the Covenant check effectively the acts of Japan?
2. Is the Treaty for Renunciation of War valid at all? Why do the Japanese troops publicly attack the Chinese troops without cause and why is Japan with impunity permitted by the flagrant use of force to prosecute her national policy of aggression? Should not steps be taken immediately to rectify her course?
3. Is the Nine Power Treaty still valid? Why is Japan allowed to impair the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China

and



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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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and should not concerted action be taken to remedy the situation?

4. Are not the privileges of concessions within Chinese territory enjoyed by Japan in China by virtue of treaties limited to peaceful trade and residence of her nationals? Is Japan permitted by treaties to abuse the position of her concession at Tientsin by making it a base of operations for intriguing against the safety of China?

5. Does not Japan's seizure of Chinese salt revenue upon which many of China's foreign loans are secured at once constitute a direct impairment of the financial system of the Chinese Government and a serious impediment to China's meeting her financial obligations to other powers?

In thus demanding of China unilateral observance of Japan's so-called Treaty Rights and herself disregarding treaties as witnessed in her repeated acts of breach, Japan must bear responsibility for disturbing the international peace and undermining the sanctity of treaties. Now that the Council of the League of Nations is going to meet again the Congress in view of the above-mentioned questions earnestly invites the attention of the members of the League of Nations and the signatory powers of the Anti-War Pact and of the Washington Nine Power Treaty to the fact that Japan has since September eighteenth long looked upon these international agreements as mere scraps of paper. She has actually violated the territorial sovereignty of China and resorted to the use of force without any justification. The Congress holds resolutely that the National Government of China shall employ every resource of the nation to preserve China's territory and sovereignty intact. At the same time the Congress fervently hopes



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hopes and is confident that at its forthcoming meeting the Council of the League of Nations will act upon the provisions of Articles fifteen and sixteen of the League Covenant so as to put an effective and immediate stop to Japan's aggressive activities and that all the signatory powers of the Anti-War Pact and the Nine Power Treaty of Washington will fulfill their solemn obligations arising therefrom so that the peace of the world in general and that in the Far East in particular will not be further menaced, that righteousness and humanity will not be trampled down by the militarist and that the dignity of the League of Nations as well as the sanctity of international treaties will not be violated.

Japan has for nearly two months occupied the three Northeastern Provinces by military force. China's patience has already been taxed to the limit. Should Japan persist in defying the just and righteous opinion of the League of Nations and should the League of Nations as well as the various friendly powers find themselves unable to carry out their sacred treaty obligations, the Chinese people, in order to maintain the sanctity of the League Covenant, the Anti-War Pact and the Nine Power Treaty of Washington, in defence of its national existence, will do their best to perform their duty whatever sacrifice may be involved. For self-defence is not only a natural right of every independent nation but also a legal right to which China is entitled under international law. The Congress therefore feels in duty bound to lead the whole nation forward to struggle to the very last, in order to safeguard the cause of justice rather than yield to force, and thus to fulfill our sacred duty as a signatory power of the above-mentioned international treaties.

Chinese Legation,

Washington, November 17, 1931.



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 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

GRAY


FROM

Tientsin via N. R.

Dated December 2, 1931

Rec'd 10:45 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
 Washington.



December 2, 3 p. m.

Notwithstanding the anti-Japanese boycott now seems to be without Chinese support at Tientsin, it appears that recent events at Tientsin have crystalized the sentiments of the Chinese masses into an intense anti-Japanese feeling. The success of the anti-Japanese boycott in this part of China during 1928-29 may be attributed almost solely to the active official support it received, as was the case with the present boycott until the recent Sino-Japanese trouble at Tientsin, but the boycott at present is much more intense and effective than in 1928-29. The Chinese dealers, as well as the masses, appear to be carrying on the boycott voluntarily, thereby giving pronounced evidence of a growing spirit of nationalism. Japanese foodstuffs, such as flour, sugar and other commodities, the identity of which is readily lost in normal trading, are thus far

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

2- from Tientsin, Dec. 2, 3 p. m.

FROM

thus far little affected however; but the boycott is being rigidly applied against other manufactured articles principally cotton piece-goods, electrical equipment and machinery of all kinds. While Japanese firms report almost no forward business in imports, American, British and German firms state that they are receiving constantly increasing inquiries and orders for commodities which were formerly considered as almost Japanese market monopolies. To date Japanese steamers have experienced no difficulties in the handling of the same cargoes by Chinese stevedores, but Chinese shippers quietly refuse to ship export cargo over Japanese lines thereby giving American and non-Japanese steamers a large increase in their portion of the trans-Pacific and via Suez traffic. There is every reason to believe that the boycott is growing in intensity and that it will continue for an extended period even though it may receive no official or even organized support.

Legation informed.

LOCKHART

WSB  
CSB



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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

COPY

RADIOGRAM

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BFS E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

Code Cablegram

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

Received at the War Department

NARS Date 3/1/77

November 28, 1931

WAA 1

9:30 A. M. NOV 28 1931

From Tokyo,

To The Adjutant General.

CONFIDENTIAL

Number 199. November 28th.

McIlroy reports Japanese military in Manchuria desires Chinese Government free of Nanking with Japanese advisers and soldiers. Also reports 13th Battalion being used against new objective. Presumably Chinchow. Korea Brigade and Hirosaki Brigade, hereafter referred to as 4th Mixed Brigade, and railway guards sent south from Mukden November 24th against bandits, but believed real object preliminary operations on Chinchow which is now confirmed. General Staff states that 4th Mixed Brigade took Tahu Shan afternoon November 27th and troops are advancing towards Chinchow; Korea Brigade and railway guards are in same direction; 2d Division moving south and concentrating in Mukden. This places main body Japanese troops within range of Chinchow. General Staff also states orders issued November 27th not to advance beyond Ta Liang River near Chinchow but cavalry and advance troops have already today crossed the river. Press reports 10 bombs dropped on Chinchow by Japanese on November 27th. Not confirmed. It is expected that major engagement will take place within a few days though General Staff still states that they have no intention of war unless Chinese advance towards them. We have repeated assurance from General Staff and foreign office no general attack against Chinchow will take place. However, the above shows that Tokyo does not control situation in Manchuria. Details Tientsin fight meager but General Staff states that Chinese Army commenced firing on Japanese noon November 26th and

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fighting still in progress morning November 27th. Also states situation there has appearances of war. Press reports one division going from Japan to Tientsin. Not confirmed. McIlroy suggests sending language student with this division. What do you think? Special cabinet meeting this afternoon.

Cranford.

On Tientsin situation,  
see telegram from  
Tientsin, attached.  
SKH



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

~~SA - FE~~  
M.I. Report on  
Bombing of Chinchow

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION  
WAR DEPARTMENT

Nov. 21, 1931

Secretary of War  
Assistant Secretary of War  
Assistant Secretary of War (Air)  
G-1  
G-3  
G-4  
War Plans Division  
Statistics Branch  
Adjutant General's Dept.  
Army Industrial College  
Army War College  
Air Corps (Liaison Officer)  
Cavalry  
Chemical Warfare Service  
Coast Artillery Corps  
Corps of Engineers  
Command & General Staff School  
Field Artillery  
Finance  
Infantry  
Inspector General's Dept.  
Insular Affairs  
Judge Advocate General's Dept.  
Militia Bureau  
Office of Naval Intelligence  
Ordnance Dept.  
Quartermaster General's Dept.  
Signal Corps  
Surgeon General's Office

State Dept.:  
Eastern Europe  
Western Europe  
Near East  
Latin America  
Far East  
Mexican Affairs

Commerce Dept.:  
Foreign & Domestic Commerce  
Aeronautics

For your information and file  
Note and return  
Note and send to

Photographs and propaganda  
in Chinese to  
→ MID (F.E.)



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

SP

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 8125

Subject: Report of Bombing of Chinchow.

To: The A. C. of S., G-2, War Department, Washington, D.C.

1. Attached hereto are four copies of a report of investigation of the bombing of Chinchow by Japanese airplanes on October 8, 1931

2. This investigation was conducted upon the request of the Minister following instructions from the Secretary of State, who stated it was an unusually urgent matter. The State Department may desire to see the attached photographs.

3. This report should be considered confidential.

Nelson A. Margetta  
Lieutenant-Colonel, Field Artillery  
Military Attache

Encs:

- 1/ Report in quadruplicate
- 2/ Photographs
- 3/ Original and translation of proclamation

elh

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OSD letter, May 3, 1972  
By jk NARS Date 3/19/73

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JUN 4 1932



Subject Report of Bombing of Chinchow, October 8, 1931.

The American Minister, American Legation, Peking, China.

1. In accordance with your verbal instructions I left Peking on the 8:15 train, October 12th, accompanied by Lieutenant Ryan. I arrived at Chinchow at 1:00 p.m. October 13th, where we were met by a representative of the Provincial Chairman and other high officials. We were taken at once to the University of Communications where the Provincial Headquarters is now located. Upon arrival I stated to the officials present my mission and proceeded at once to interview eye witnesses of the bombardment. The names of witnesses are given herewith:

Mr. Chen Chi-chun, of the Ministry of Construction of the old Mukden Government.

Mr. Huang, ex-Chief of Mukden Police.

General Jung Chen, Chief of Staff to the Provisional Chairman.

General Liu Yuan-fen, commander of the local garrison.

Major Yuan Tso-tang, representative of General Jung during his absence.

Mr. Lu Chin-sheng, Mayor of the city.

Mr. F. A. Fulton, of the Irish Presbyterian Mission.

Mr. Prosper Gordon, of the French Catholic Mission.

Mr. Fulton and Mr. Gordon were the only two foreigners in the city during the bombardment.

In addition to the above, many subordinate officials and civilians were questioned at random.

All these witnesses gave practically the same testimony, a resume of which is given below.

#### The Incident.

At about 2:00 p.m. October 8, 1931, without any previous warning, twelve Japanese airplanes appeared from the east and flew over the city of Chinchow at an altitude estimated to be about 2,000 ft. The planes were flying in formation of flights of 3-3-3-1. They circled the city once and then headed for the radio station where they began dropping bombs. The flight continued over the northeast suburbs and bombs were dropped in the vicinity of the Irish Presbyterian Mission compound and the French Catholic Mission. Bombing was very promiscuous in the northeast city. The flight then continued toward the railroad station and the University of Communications. This area seemed to be the main objective of the bombers. The bombing continued for one-half hour when the planes withdrew. During this time between thirty and thirty-six bombs had exploded.

At the time of the raid there were in and about the city 1,000 infantry troops and one regiment of field artillery. There was no anti-aircraft artillery located in the vicinity. All witnesses were emphatic in stating that no fire of any kind was directed against the airplanes.

The casualties resulting from the bombardment were 16 killed, 18 seriously wounded and an unknown number, estimated at about 30, slightly wounded. Of the seriously wounded three have since died, including among them a Russian, Mr. V. V. Golubtsov, who was a professor employed in the University of Communications. Of the total casualties there was only one soldier killed and two wounded.



Property loss was slight, consisting only of broken windows and scorched walls.

Mr. Fulton stated that a number of Japanese residing in Chinchow left for Mukden several days before the bombardment. When asked whether or not the report that Chinese troops were terrorizing the countryside was true, he replied, "Well, that is always so."

About noon on the 11th of October, one Japanese plane appeared over the city, apparently reconnoitering, after which two more planes appeared. These planes dropped proclamations into the city, a copy of which is enclosed herewith.

It might be of interest to note that while we were interviewing the witnesses at 2:25 p.m., a telephone message came in stating that five Japanese planes had just passed over Kaopangtsu and were headed toward Chinchow. This might have been false information specially prepared for our benefit. However, the officials present showed considerable nervousness. They sent our horse transportation away to find cover and showed considerable diffidence about leaving the building until the destination of the planes could be determined. At 3:15 p.m. another message came stating that the planes had dropped two bombs at Nan Ta Ying, just south of Kaopangtsu and had then flown northward.

Following the interview with the eye witnesses of the "incident", additional evidence in the form of photographs taken after the bombardment were presented. Accompanied by Lieut. Ryan, I then went to the places at which these pictures had been taken in order to verify their accuracy. The photographs attached, marked X, have been identified as having been taken at the scene of the explosion and they are believed to be correct. The photographs marked XX were not verified but there is no reason to believe that they are false evidence.

We visited points where twenty bombs had fallen. The crater in no case was more than one and one-half feet deep or more than five feet in diameter, which would indicate that instantaneous fuses were used. From fragments examined it is believed the bombs were of forty or fifty pounds weight. A very powerful explosive charge was used which was indicated by the deep penetration of fragments at distances of from thirty to forty yards from the point of burst.

No bombs were dropped within the walls of the Chinese city. The attack was centered about the railroad station and the University of Communications, which are within 500 yards of each other. The fact that the Provincial Government Headquarters is in the University buildings causes one to believe that this was the principal objective of the attack. This Headquarters was in the center of a circle about one-half mile in radius in which we saw fourteen bomb craters.

A second objective was probably the military camp, Tung Ta Ying, which is located about three miles from the center of town. Here twelve bombs had found their mark but the bursts had caused little damage as the troops were not in camp in large numbers.

It was surprising to note how little actual property damage had been accomplished. The havoc wrought by the detonating bombs blazed a trail that could easily be followed from the radio station southeast of the town, past the barracks of the garrison, through the northeast suburbs



outside the wall, past the railroad hospital, over the railroad station and on to the University, all north of the town, then back to the camp at Tung Ta Ying.

Either by the grace of God or due to the poor aim of the Japanese fliers the bombs in the majority of cases landed in open plots of ground where the possibility of damage was greatly lessened. There were only six instances of direct hits being made on residences. These resulted in the death of eleven people, one family suffering especially in that a father, son and son's son were all killed by the same bomb. The material damage to these dwelling places was not as great as would be expected because complete and immediate fragmentation occurred at the moment of detonation.

A few bombs landed in the streets where four people were killed, including an old woman. One landed in a wheat field where another old woman was killed.

We visited the railroad hospital and saw five men wounded during the raid. Of these wounded, four of them had amputated legs. We asked only a few questions of those capable of talking and the replies were sufficient to give us a lasting impression of the ghastliness of an air raid on a civilian population. The Chinese doctor in charge of the hospital stated that he had treated thirty slightly injured people.

Though the raiders may have had a military mission it was evident that little attention had been given to the modern conventions of ordinary humanity or to the protection of personal property. It was through no fault of the fliers that the two foreign missions and the railroad hospital which flew two red cross flags were not hit directly by the bombs. As it was, burns were so close to these places that fragments were found in all three of the compounds and only good fortune saved the inmates from harm.

From the testimony of eye witnesses to the bombardment, from evidence in the form of photographs taken where the bombs exploded, from evidence produced in the shape of bomb fragments, from actual visits to points where twenty bombs exploded, and from a visit to the hospital where victims of the bombing are being cared for, it is found

1) That at 2:00 p.m., October 8, 1931, twelve Japanese planes flew over Chinchow and during a period of one-half hour dropped thirty bombs more or less;

2) That as a result of the bombing the casualties number: killed, 16; seriously wounded, 12. The number of the slightly wounded can only be estimated but of the badly wounded three have since died including a Russian professor;

3) That the killed and wounded included civilians - men, women and children;

4) That the Chinese city inside the wall was not bombed;

5) That the objectives of the bombers as determined by the track and number of bombs dropped were:

a. The buildings of the University of Communications which were occupied by the Provincial Government, and the railroad station.



b. The military camp located three miles north-east of the city.

c. The wireless station located in the south-eastern suburbs of the city.

6) That property damage was slight, this fact being due to bombs not landing on valuable property;

7) That from evidence available it is not believed fire was directed from the ground against the planes;

8) That on October 11, 1931, three more planes flew over Shingow, one observing while two dropped proclamations, a copy of which is attached hereto;

9) That there appears no explanation for the dropping of bombs on the populated area between the wireless station and the railroad station, which resulted in the killing of one woman and three men

Nelson L. Fargette  
Lieutenant-Colonel, Field Artillery  
Military Attache

encls. as stated.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

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2657-H-3773  
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DEPARTMENT  
(Reprinted Handbills distributed by Japanese planes)

NOTICE

Those ambitious and selfish men who are very anxious to dictate military powers in the Northeast are now hidden in Chinchow. They are taking treacherous and injurious plots against us within our jurisdictions. Further, they despatch plain-clothes men to embarrass gentry and people and to agitate outlaws. With these disturbances, it creates a great panic among Japanese and Chinese. Recently they are concentrating a number of troops at Chinchow and are gathering remnants, who are coming to join them from different directions, with a view to attack our troops in the east and west of the Manchurian Railway. In order to eradicate this evil, our army is adopting a self-defense action. The public is hereby notified that this army is expelling the oppressors and pacifying the people and is not endangering innocent persons.

October, 6th Year....

(Translated by S.H.Liu,  
Office of Military Attache)







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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893. 00 P.R Hankow/52 FOR #43

FROM Hankow (Adams) DATED Oct 13, 1931  
TO NAME 1-1127 \*\*\*

REGARDING:

Manchurian Dispute. Resume of situation

793.94/2999

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972

By Milton O. Lutz NARS, Date 12-18-75

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h. Manchurian Situation. On September 21, 1931, Hankow was greeted by the news that Japanese troops in Manchuria had assumed control of Mukden and other cities in Manchuria over a considerable area. Newspapers reported that the immediate cause for this action was the alleged cutting of south Manchurian Railway tracks near Mukden by Chinese soldiers.

793.94  
The general impression amongst the well informed people at Hankow appeared to be that the Japanese military move in Manchuria was too smooth, well-timed, and prompt to have been the result of an unforeseen emergency. The Japanese action rather gave the impression of carefully laid plans efficiently executed.

The attitude of the general Chinese public at Hankow toward the Manchurian situation appeared at first to be apathetic. The student bodies and local Kuomintang organizations were, however, energetic and persistent in their efforts to excite public indignation. Several prominent Chinese officials related to the writer stories of atrocities committed by Japanese in Manchuria upon Chinese women and children. Gradually indignation amongst the Chinese appeared to become aroused.

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Immediately after the receipt of news of the Japanese occupation of Manchurian towns, the local Tangpu issued the following "Ten Commandments" to the inhabitants of Wuhan:

1. Do not purchase Japanese goods.
2. Do not use Japanese goods.
3. Do not ship Japanese goods.
4. Do not use Japanese money.
5. Do not take Japanese steamers.



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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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6. Do not have any communication with Japanese.
7. Do not work for Japanese and employ Japanese.
8. Do not deposit money with Japanese banks.
9. Do not supply Japanese with foodstuffs.
10. Do not study or trade in Japan.

On September 28 a mass meeting in Wuchang, attended by representatives of government and party organizations and representatives of military units and schools, and <sup>over</sup>presided by a member of the Kuomintang, passed the following resolutions:

1. To request the National Government by telegraph to declare war with Japan and to telegraph General Chang Hsueh-liang to prepare for military operations.
2. To circularize the whole country promptly to cease all internal strife and to support the Central Government in the distress of the country.
3. To request all the people in Hupeh voluntarily to organize anti-Japanese and Country Salvation Corps, and to circularize the whole country to start similar organizations.
4. To circularize the whole country urging that the country take back all Japanese Concessions in China.
5. To circularize the whole country to sever all financial relations with Japan.
6. To request by telegraph that the Central Government sever diplomatic relations with Japan at once.
7. To request by telegraph that the Central Government order all the members of the Party throughout the country to take strict military training, and to adopt the conscription system so that all the country may be militant toward Japan.
8. To request by telegraph the Central Government to remove and punish Wang Cheng-t'ing (王正廷) and to adopt revolutionary diplomacy.

At the end of the month the boycott of Japanese goods was becoming increasingly effective. Nowhere in the



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the Hankow consular district, however, was there any disturbance or rioting directed against the Japanese. The Chinese authorities at Hankow gave strict orders that any violence against Japanese would be severely punished. Both the officials and the public seemed to realize that any violence to the Japanese would only tend to strengthen the position of the Japanese in further aggressive measures.

Reports indicate that the Japanese were taking all precautions at the various ports in the Hankow consular district. The Japanese Concession at Hankow was barricaded and placed under the control of the Japanese Navy. Ordinarily the concession is under control of the Japanese municipal council. By the end of September practically all the Japanese in Hankow had withdrawn to the Japanese concession. They were permitted by the Japanese authorities to leave the concession only for adequate business reasons. All except a very few Japanese had left Kiukiang and Ichang early in October. At Changsha, Kiukiang, and Shasi the Japanese communities were concentrated on hulks along the water fronts. A little later in October the Japanese community at Chungking was reported to be staying on steamers. These steamers were ready, upon short notice, to sail down river in company with a Japanese gunboat.

At about the same time there began a pronounced troop movement from Hankow north along the Ping-Han Railway. The objective of this movement was stated to be Chengchow, Honan. The troops who were moved  
northward



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northward through Hankow were procured by a regrettable drain upon troops in Hunan, Hupeh, and Kiangsi. The garrison troops of the Wuhan area were, however, not reduced.

The cause of the movement is unknown at Hankow. Usually well informed Chinese persist in linking this troop movement up with the situation in Manchuria. One of them characterized it as "preparedness measure".

On the morning of October 13 the Hankow newspapers carried a telegram dated October 12, at Nanking, to the effect that Chiang Kai-shih had on that date made the following statement (translated from Chinese) at the National Government office in Nanking:

"I hereby declare that the National Government's patience has been tested to the last degree. If the League fails China will take the matter into her own hands. China respects the League Covenant and the Anti-War (Kellogg) Pact, but if the League and the signatory powers to the Kellogg Pact fail to uphold their sacred duties China will not hesitate to make the supreme sacrifice of bankrupting the country for half a century to go to war for the upholding of the dignity and the sacred rights of international agreements and to safeguard world peace."\*

Out of all the volume of rumors and speculation current in Hankow, it may be accepted as definitely true that Japan has made preparations to evacuate her people from Kiukiang, Changsha, Shasi, Ichang, and Chungking and that she has not made any preparations to evacuate her people from Hankow. The Japanese concession here is barricaded and in a state of defense.

### 3. Flood:

NOTE: \*The accuracy of this translation was later denied by the Chinese Ministry



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## DOCUMENT FILE

### NOTE

SEE 641.003/262 FOR memorandum

FROM Secretary ( Stimson ) DATED Nov. 23, 1931  
TO NAME 1-1172 ...

**REGARDING: Manchurian dispute:**

Minister Johnson's alleged statement that the United States would go further on behalf of China than the League of Nations. Conversation with the British Ambassador in which the Secretary stated that Johnson had made no such statement.

793.94/3000



1501  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94  
SEE 741.93/57 FOR Rpt. #31310

FROM Military attache ( Parker ) DATED Nov. 27, 1931  
TO Great Britain NAME 1-1127 070

REGARDING:

Japanese Uneasiness on British Attitude.

793.94/3001

rc



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GREEN

Paris

Dated December 2, 1931



Rec'd 3:02 p. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

833, December 2, 8 p. m.  
FROM AMBASSADOR DAVES.

Following is report from Sweetser:

"Massigli outlined to the Drafting Committee today Briand's intentions regarding his final declaration after the adoption of the resolution. He planned to stress that the League's first duty had been to preserve peace and that it was operating under article eleven requiring the consent of both contesting parties. The result therefore should not be taken as a model settlement but as a wholly exceptional one due to exceptional circumstances. He planned also to mention the other treaties involved in the Kellogg Pact and the Nine Power Treaty and to stress the general doctrine of the League for peaceful settlement in contradistinction to the use of force. Cecil submitted some notes to meet the Japanese contention that they had not broken the Covenant



F/DEW 793.94/3002

DEC 14 1931

FILED

793.94



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REF

2- #833, from Paris, Dec. 2, 8 p. m.

Covenant because they had not resorted to war. He felt they had committed acts of war which certainly constituted a violation of the whole spirit of the Covenant as the acts put the question of war and peace entirely out of the control of the initiating state.

(END SECTION ONE).

SHAW

WSB



FE  
WE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HSM

FROM


GREEN

Paris

Dated December 2, 1931

Rec'd 7:27 p. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.



833, December 2, 8 p. m. (SECTION TWO)

A sharp <sup>divine</sup> ~~divers~~ view then developed as to the nationality of the members of the commission. Madariaga said he had just been informed that the Germans who had hitherto not asked to have a national on the committee now said that if the other four great powers Britain, France, America and Italy were to be included it would hardly be fair to leave Germany out. Whatever the decision on this point Madariaga felt it would not be right to make the commission exclusively of great powers nationals without any national from a small power without special interest in Asia. He urged that some one without direct material interests be included to represent the purely general and disinterested point of view and felt himself under obligations to press this view in the light of the general interests of the League even if it had to go to a public meeting.

Drummond

A/L.S  
793.94/3002 (Section 2)



1504  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

#833, December 2, 8 p. m., from Paris (Section Two)

Drummond pointed out that the Japanese were willing to have a small power especially interested either Holland or Belgium but felt that in a matter of vital importance to themselves they could not look with favor on the choice of a national from a small power having purely theoretical interests. Cecil strongly contested Madariaga's view saying there was no reason to assume that nationals of the great powers would not represent the general League viewpoint and that to argue for a representative of the small powers was equally to argue a special political affiliation. He urged that men be chosen regardless of nationality. (END SECTION TWO).

SHAW



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

### TELEGRAM RECEIVED

BC

Green

~~Paris~~

FROM

Dated December 2, 1931

Received 4 pm

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

833 December 2, 8 PM (section <sup>three</sup>~~two~~)

After many different suggestions for turning this difficulty, for instance, by appointing three members plus a president, or by automatically choosing nationals engaged from the other seven powers in the Nine Power Treaty, a temporary compromise suddenly developed by which the committee decided that, as the commission was of such vital concern to both Japan and China the wisest and the fairest course would be to sound out the representatives of the two countries concerned and see if they had any suggestions which might help the committee in its difficulty.

The only other development of the morning was the submission to Briand by the Japanese of a revised aide memoire on the situation at Chinchow, which is interesting as adding the two following conciliatory paragraphs.

'The



150  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lutz NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#833 from Paris, December 2,  
(section ~~two~~ *three*) 1931

'The Japanese Government, in making the above reservation (on possible police measures) does not do so with the thought of any probable eventuality. It has in mind only the possibility, in its eyes extremely improbable, of events of such gravity and urgency that in view of its responsibility for the security of its nationals and soldiers, it might find itself in the absolute obligation of having recourse to measures of an imperious and exceptional character. Should such an eventuality arise the Japanese Government would wish not to see itself placed before the alternative either of failing in the responsibility incumbent upon it or of violating an engagement contracted by it.

It is well understood that the withdrawal of Chinese troops foreseen herein constitutes only a temporary measure while awaiting the general settlement of the Manchurian question".  
(END MESSAGE)

SHAW

WSB



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N.R.

Dated December 3, 1931

Secretary of State,

Washington

DOUBLE PRIORITY.

1037, December 3, noon.

Department's 443, November 30, 11 a.m. Following

telephone message from Colonel Margetts this morning:

"Lieutenant Aldrich reached Liao River yesterday and reports all Japanese forces have been transferred East of the river except 300 for guard duty at Hsinmin and to patrol railway between Hsinmin and Paikipu. It is expected that the railway between Tahushan and Hsinmin will be repaired by the Chinese today or tomorrow. Aldrich returns to Chinchow today."

(JS) Repeated to Nanking.

For the Minister, PERKINS





1509

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect  
Charge Department  
OR  
Charge to  
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

Washington,

December 3, 1931.

AMERICAN EMBASSY

PARIS (FRANCE).

FOR AMBASSADOR DAWES.

Telegram from American Legation, Peiping, dated  
December 3, noon, reports following telephone message  
from Colonel Margetts same morning as follows:

QUOTE Lieutenant Aldrich reached Liao River  
yesterday and reports all Japanese forces have been  
transferred East of the river except 300 for guard  
duty at Hsinmin and to patrol railway between Hsinmin  
and Paikipu. It is expected that the railway between  
Tahushan and Hsinmin will be repaired by the Chinese  
today or tomorrow. Aldrich returns to Chinchow today.  
UNQUOTE

Stinson

Skiff

Dec 5 1931

FE:RSM:EJL

FE

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

793.94/3003

793.94/3003  
620

DEC 3 31

6pm



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WP

GREEN

RECEIVED  
DEC - 3 1931  
DIVISION OF

FROM Paris

Dated December 2, 1931

Rec'd 10:30 p.m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DEC 4 1931  
DIVISION OF  
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 3 1931  
Department of State

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

834, December 2, midnight.

From Ambassador Dawes. Following is report from

Sweetser:

"Cecil reported to the twelve this afternoon that the Drafting Committee had decided that if the commission were to have the confidence of both parties it must know their views especially as to its membership. It had accordingly asked the Secretary General to get in touch with the two delegations. The latter reported that he had tried to do so but had found neither party ready to go into this question until the more immediate question of the Chinchow zone were settled. Both felt this to be the principal issue because only on the solution of which all else depended.

A discussion accordingly took place amongst the twelve upon the Japanese aide memoir and Briand's further verbal explanations. The latter pointed out that the

chief

A/LS

793.94/3004

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 - No. 834 from Paris

chief Chinese difficulty seemed to be in conjunction with their demand for the inclusion of the system of observers which Japan had not been willing formally to grant. Briand had asked Yoshizawa if he could give some other guarantee before the Council which could not be represented as a third party, given the fact that Japan was a permanent member.

(END SECTION ONE)

SHAW

JS



1 5 1  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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RECEIVED

DEC 3 1931

DIVISION OF

FROM

GRAY

Paris

Dated December 2, 1931

Recd 10:25 p.m.

Secretary of State  
Washington.

834, December 2, midnight. (SECTION TWO)

Yoshizawa had cabled to Tokyo in this regard and finally received affirmative instructions. The Chinese seemed still to fear however that the proposal as represented would in effect take away from them the administrative control of the region. Drummond who had previously had a long conversation with Sze said that the Chinese pre-occupation arose from the fear that if they were left alone face to face with the Japanese without neutral assistance, the terms would become constantly harder.

Madariaga was preoccupied lest the Council appear to give its sanction to a proposal which would destroy the last vestige of real Chinese authority in Manchuria. Whatever the origin of the present proposal, he felt its effect would be contrary to what the Council had attempted throughout to do. What it seemed to him to say was that the Japanese would agree not to advance into Chinese territory if the Chinese themselves withdrew from their own cities.  
One of



151  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustofson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- #834, from Paris, December 2,  
midnight (SECTION TWO)

One of its provisions seemed to do the very thing the  
Council had aimed not to do namely to legitimize the  
occupation until a final settlement was reached.

Neither Briand nor Cecil shared this view. The  
former stated that the Japanese proposal had been (END  
SECTION TWO)

SHAW.

JS



## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

cib

FROM

GRAY

RECEIVED

Paris

DEC - 3 1931

DIVISION OF

Dated December 2, 1931

COMMUNICATIONS

Recd December 3, 2:35 am.

Secretary of State

Washington.

834, December 2, midnight (SECTION THREE).

based on the Council's action to prevent contact between the forces and establish a neutral zone, a proposal further amplified by Koo. The Japanese text spoke of the 'maintenance of the Chinese administration in the evacuated zone' which obviously could not be done if Chinese control were extinguished. Cecil pointed out that for ten days the Council had been trying to organize a method for preventing hostilities and that during that time Koo had voluntarily offered as a representative of a sovereign government to withdraw his troops behind the Great Wall on condition of certain guarantees. The Japanese had liked this suggestion and offered a definite plan which seemed to Cecil satisfactory except for the one point that it did not fix a limit to the zone on the Japanese side. He thought it would help a great deal if the Japanese could fix a definite line, say the Liao, beyond which they would not penetrate.

The twelve decided that, as the situation was both so important and so uncertain, the best course would be to ask



0515  
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- #834, from Paris, December 2, midnight.  
(SECTION THREE)

ask Sze to appear before them at once. The latter in reply to a request for his opinion, at once put a series of questions to clarify the exact meaning of proposal. He noted that the Japanese accepted 'the principle' of the project; was that adequate? Briand thought that phrase did not diminish the importance of the agreement; the Japanese had accepted the principle because the details had not then been specified. He thought however those details had now been put forward in the Japanese aide memoire.

Sze then asked who was to decide if the circumstances mentioned by the Japanese were sufficiently serious to justify their entering the zone? Briand admitted that this last resort was one that had been faced throughout but pointed out (END SECTION THREE)

SHAW

JS



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WP

GREEN

Paris

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FROM Dated December 2, 1931

DEC - 3 1931

DIVISION OF

Rec'd 3:00 a. m. 3rd.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

834, December 2, 12 midnight. (SECTION FOUR)  
that the possibility would exist only during the occupa-  
tion, that it could eventuate only under the most unusual  
circumstances, that it would be controlled by the observers  
and that in these circumstances arbitrary action would  
hardly be possible.

Sze then read his instructions on what apparently  
was his principal point that the neutral observers must  
be maintained at all costs. Indeed the proposal could be  
carried out only with their presence. They must be on  
hand to survey the situation; the policing of the zone  
could be entrusted to a special corps directed by them.  
China was willing to go very far to avoid a conflict; if  
however Japan failed to accept some such basis as this  
and proceeded to attack, the Chinese troops would resist  
and the responsibility would be Japan's.

Briand however urged that the Japanese proposal

was



1517  
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 - No. 834 from Paris - section four-

was even more advantageous to the Chinese; it provided for evacuation on the conditions China habitually urged, namely, maintenance of Chinese authority and direct negotiations on security. He pointed out that when the Japanese had refused the intervention of observers the Council had tried to meet China's difficulty and secure adequate guarantees for her in another way which had taken the form of an engagement before that Council. Such an engagement would have a very great value to China for though the observers would not appear in the agreement they would still in fact remain on the spot. Cecil agreed that the guarantees offered were very substantial and that the Chinese might feel entirely secure unless of course wholly unforeseen circumstances arose.

(END SECTION FOUR)

SHAW

JS



1518  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

cib

TELEGRAM RECEIVED  
GREEN

RECEIVED

Paris

DECEMBER 2, 1931

FROM

Dated December 2, 1931

DIVISION OF

Recd December 3, 3:15 am

Secretary of State

Washington.

834, December 2, midnight. (SECTION FIVE)

Sze raised the question as to the exact delimitation of the zone which Briand agreed must be settled. He asked what was meant by the 'other details' which were to be included and welcomed Briand's suggestion that he would secure precision thereon. He also wanted to know exactly what the undertaking to be given by Japan would be and was assured by both Briand and Cecil that it would take the form given in the Japanese aide memoire. He asked if in case the agreement were adjudged violated the Japanese would go to the Council before acting on their own initiative and was informed by both Briand and Cecil that in such an event, the circumstances would certainly be so highly exceptional that Japan could hardly be expected to await an arbitration. The Council however would be the depository of the agreement; if it were ever called into question the Council would certainly act at once. Sze also asked if the security mentioned meant security in the limited sense and was assured that it did.

Finally in connection with the issue in reference to  
North



1515  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- #834, from Paris, December 2,  
midnight (SECTION FIVE)

North China Sze offered a new and interesting suggestion.  
In order to assume tranquility at Tsientsin he said he  
had been instructed to request the creation there of an  
international council at whose disposal China would place  
a (END SECTION FIVE)

SHAW

JS



152  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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FROM  
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DEC 3 1931  
DIVISION OF  
RELATIONS

GRAY

Paris

Dated December 2, 1931

Recd December 3, 3:28 am.

Secretary of State

Washington.

834, December 2, midnight (SECTION SIX AND LAST)  
battalion of highly trained treasury guards to be directed  
by foreign officers appointed by the Council but serving  
at China's expense. This arrangement would cover the whole  
urban area and would again demonstrate China's desire to  
do everything in its power to prevent an aggravation of the  
situation. Briand thought this suggestion very interesting  
but somewhat outside the immediate question of Chinchow. He  
considered it might best be handled directly by representa-  
tives on the spot.

Sze stated at the end of the meeting that he would  
refer all these points to his government. Briand made a  
plea to him to give the project his personal support and  
attempt to secure the agreement of Nanking. The constant  
appearance of new problems and the unavoidable delay in  
seeking instructions from Nanking and Tokyo are however  
destroying the expectation of finishing the Council session  
this week." (END MESSAGE)

SHAW.

JS



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SECRETARY  
THE DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

AUG 1 - 1933

July 24, 1933.

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Phillips:

I think that this memorandum,  
submitted during the early stages  
of our effort with regard to the  
Sino-Japanese controversy over  
Manchuria, will interest you;  
especially page 6.

SKH

FE:SKH/ZMK

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 24, 1931.

Mr. Secretary:

This relates to the subject  
which I discussed with Mr. Klots  
and he with you: the difference  
in the state of development be-  
tween Oriental conceptions and  
Occidental conceptions with regard  
to the question of the sacredness  
of treaties and the morality of  
use of force.

SKH

SKH/ZMF



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 21, 1931.

MANCHURIA SITUATION  
"RESPECT FOR TREATIES"  
Ideals and Facts

AK  
DOR  
FE  
F/LS

793.74  
I. We have been hearing a great deal about "respect for treaty obligations", the "sanctity of treaties", "sacred obligations", etc.

Japan demands that China show respect for treaty obligations. China replies that she shows respect for her treaty obligations but that what Japan says are "treaties" are not "treaties". Japan replies that treaties are treaties and treaty obligations are sacred.

At the same time, Japan pursues a course which in the eyes of other powers is indicative of little respect on Japan's part for treaty obligations.

Are Chinese conceptions different in this connection from Japanese? Are the conceptions of either or both different from those of various other nations, especially those of the American people?

There is warrant for the belief that, with the exception of a comparative few who have studied international law, almost no Oriental considers that he is under any obligation, either moral or legal, in relation to a pledge which he has made under duress, -- and his definition of duress is widely comprehensive.

There

793.94/3005



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

There is warrant also for the belief that, with regard to the "sanctity of treaties", the vast majority of Orientals consider that the degree of sanctity is in direct proportion to the physical rather than the moral force which lies behind.

As indicative of Japanese conceptions, I would invoke the record of the treaties which she concluded with Korea and with other countries in regard to Korea; also their apparent present attitude toward obligations under the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Kellogg Pact and the Nine-Powers Treaty.

As for the Chinese, the nation as a whole has never shown any respect for treaty obligations inconvenient to themselves; and incidentally, one of the reasons has been that they regard most of these obligations as having been imposed under duress.

The simple fact is that the conception which a few highly educated, high-minded and enlightened statesmen in Oriental countries have with regard to treaties, international obligations, etc., is very remote from and utterly different from the conception of the rank and file.

II. Public opinion in a few of the most enlightened of Occidental states has demanded that there be devised ways and means to prevent war and to ensure peace. Generally speaking



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

speaking, this opinion has been strongest in states which are most "well off" in terms of national possessions, natural resources, "wealth", and so forth. These are the states which, by virtue of being "rich", are naturally conservative and wish to maintain the status quo. A few of the statesmen of these states decided that there should be treaties which would forbid war and enjoin the use of none but peaceful means for the settling of international disputes. Thus, it has come about that there have been adopted "peace treaties". These were strongly supported by some countries, but various of the less strong states have subscribed to these treaties with reluctance. Not a few of the weak states have adhered to them with neither reluctance nor enthusiasm but simply because they stood to lose nothing and possibly to gain by so doing. Japan, especially, has been very reluctant to enter into such treaties. She was induced against her will to take part in the Washington Treaty and to sign some of the agreements concluded there. She was not at all eager to subscribe to the Kellogg-Briand Pact. All this, for the reason that she is poor but ambitious and that these treaties place obstacles in her way. She has subscribed to these treaties, upon the decision of a very few of her most enlightened leaders, because these leaders have felt that she could not afford to make herself conspicuous by standing out against them. But popular opinion among the Japanese people has not approved of the treaties

and



- 4 -

and it may be said that Japan has subscribed with definite and distinct mental reservations. China, on the other hand, has naturally been enthusiastic for these treaties. Though a weak state from a political point of view, she falls in the class of the well-to-do and naturally conservative nations. Her principal problem in international relations is one of conservation, i.e., of the preservation and maintenance of her present status. These treaties have held out to her great possibilities in the realm of protection and potential security. She subscribes not on the basis of any high idealism but from the point of view of self-interest.

These peace treaties represent an idealism which is considerably in advance of the thought of the great majority of the human race. The ideal of "law not war" is <sup>as</sup> yet that of the minority. International law (and the machinery for its enforcement) has not yet been developed to the point where it may reasonably be expected that nations will be able to settle all of their disputes by "peaceful means". The means do not yet to sufficient extent exist. The habit has not yet been sufficiently developed. The conceptions of many peoples and of many states have not yet attained the lofty heights which are represented in the thought of those nations which have been primarily responsible for the conclusion of these treaties.

Thus,



- 5 -

Thus, for practical purposes, the ideal of "peace" is an ideal of a few Occidental states. The governments of other states have committed their states, by agreement, to this ideal. But the peoples as such are not mentally committed thereto.

Hence, there is warrant for asking whether, in case of breach of these treaties by states which took no initiative in their fabrication, any moral judgment should be passed. It would seem that attention should be focused on their legal rather than on their moral delinquency.

Nations which have broken treaties should unquestionably be treated as law breakers. But the breaking of a law or of a contract whether by a nation or by an individual, does not necessarily imply or establish moral delinquency.

It is believed that, in the present case, where Japan has unquestionably violated her treaties, Japan should be dealt with as a law breaker. Justice should be done, from the point of view of international law, as between the other nations and Japan and between Japan and China. But it is not necessary, and it would not serve a useful purpose -- but the contrary -- publicly to brand Japan a moral culprit and place her on exhibition as such before a world which is divided in opinion with regard to principles of morality and of guilt in relation to law breaking of the type in which Japan has indulged. On behalf of this view, there  
might



- 6 -

might also be invoked the spirit of the parable of the woman who "was taken in adultery".

The other nations should not throughout this controversy lose sight at any time of the fact that Japan has violated her treaties. Coincidentally, they should deal with the problem of preventing her from profiting by what she has done, they should invoke against her such remedies as the treaties provide, they should attempt to protect China in the enjoyment of her lawful rights, and they should insist that their own rights under the treaties shall suffer no permanent impairment. The whole matter should be dealt with from the point of view of law and justice rather than from the point of view of morality.

In terms of action, this view, if adopted, would mean that, if and when the time comes for the American and other Governments most concerned to give notice that they will not recognize any treaty or treaties which may be concluded between Japan and China under the compulsion of Japan's military occupation of Manchuria, the attempt should be made, in such explanation as may be made of that action, to restrict the statement to points of evidence and points of law without attempting to pass or to suggest a moral judgment.

*SKH*

FE:SKH/ZMF



528  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GRAY

Tientsin via N. R.

Dated December 3, 1931

Rec'd 5:30 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

December 3, 1 p. m.

The following message has been sent to the Legation:

"December 3, noon.

Local situation continues to improve although large movement of refugees from Chinese city and Japanese concession to foreign areas is continuing. There has been no gun fire during last three nights. The two hundred Japanese marines referred to in my November 28, 5 p. m., returned to Tangku yesterday. Martial law restrictions have been substantially reduced and the tension of the last week considerably relaxed. Further improvement may be expected especially when Japanese remove their concession barricades and Chinese finally complete the removal of barricades and other defenses in their area.

Repeated to Department and Nanking."

LOCKHART

KLP



F/LS

793.94/3006

DEC 21 1931

FILED



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HS

FROM

GRAY

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Peiping via N.R.

Dated December 3, 1931

Secretary of State

Washington

1035, December 3, 11 a.m.

Following from American Consul General at Harbin.

"December 2, 11 a.m.

One. Group of Tokyo foreign military attaches in uniform, including American arrived at Harbin at 8 a. m. and left for Tsitsihar at 3 p. m. yesterday escorted by Japanese military.

Two. Local Chinese authorities disappointed that they were given no opportunity by the Japanese escort to expound their views to attaches."

For the Minister

PERKINS

HPD

F/LS

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FILED

DEC 9 1931

5:20 a.m.  
Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 3 1931  
Department of State  
Rel to Paris  
Dec 3, 1931

793.94  
note  
121.5194

as usual



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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TELEGRAM SENECD

Department of State



December 3, 1931.

1-138  
TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

793.94/3007 AMEMBASSY,

PARIS (France).

DEC 3 31

FOR AMBASSADOR DAWES.

For your information.

~~Referring to Department's telegram No. 567, November 18,~~

~~5 p.m.~~ The American Consul General at Harbin telegraphs  
under date December 2 as follows:

QUOTE ~~and~~ Group of Tokyo foreign military attaches in  
uniform, including American, arrived at Harbin at 8 a. m. and  
left for Tsitsihar at 3 p. m. yesterday escorted by Japanese  
military.

Local Chinese authorities disappointed that they  
were given no opportunity by the Japanese escort to expound  
their views to attaches UNQUOTE.

FE:MMH:REK

FE

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

Index Bu.—No. 00.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-128



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 25, 1931

NOV 27 1931

MANCHURIA SITUATION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

A Surgical Operation.

793.94  
Tokyo's 234, November 24, 10 p.m., states that Shidehara stated that he and the Minister of War and the Chief of Staff were "agreed that there shall be no hostile operations towards Chinchow and orders to that effect had been issued".

Paris' 795, November 24, 7 p.m., states that the three Japanese Ambassadors at Paris had asked Tokyo whether there was any truth in the reports that the Japanese intended to take Chinchow; and that Shidehara had replied that "he had consulted with Minister of War and the Chief of Staff and that they had said they had no such intention. They reserved the right, however, to take what measures of defense might be necessary."

The news in this morning's paper makes it appear that armed encounters between Chinese and Japanese forces have occurred southwest of Mukden in the direction of Chinchow. One account says that a Japanese force on a "four-mile practice march" encountered Chinese forces and hostilities ensued. Another account states that Japanese forces encountered 12,000 Chinese bandits and dispersed them.

Whatever

793.94/3008

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~~S~~  
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JCR  
file



- 2 -

Whatever may be the fact with regard to yesterday's events in Manchuria, and whatever may be the "intention" of the high Japanese officials, it should be noted that the promise or implied promise that there "shall be no hostile operations towards Chinchow" has already been impaired; and that, both from Tokyo direct and from Tokyo via Paris, we are informed that they "reserve the right to take what measures of defense may be necessary". It should be kept in mind that the Japanese army has maintained that every step which it has taken in Manchuria has been a "measure of defense".

Once hostilities have been begun, any army can with warrant claim that its every offensive movement is a measure of defense.

With regard to Manchuria, is not the situation this: The Japanese army set out to destroy the Chinese armed forces and the Chinese administration in South Manchuria. It set out to substitute Japanese authority (control) for Chinese. Its task therefore became that of destroying Chinese armed forces and eradicating Chinese civilian opposition to or competition with Japanese authority -- wherever these might exist or be found. It undertook to perform a surgical operation; and it is performing that operation. Its work may be compared to that of a surgeon operating for cancer. The operation fails completely if the work of elimination stops short of complete elimination. It is therefore the surgeon's  
objective



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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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objective to remove the condemned growth, every trace of it, wherever he finds it. It is the task of the Japanese army completely to destroy Chinese authority, military and civilian, wherever it finds it -- in all of South Manchuria.

Therefore, objection by the powers to the continuation of Japanese military operations amounts to objection by on-lookers to the surgeon's completing his task. A conscientious and determined surgeon will complete his task regardless of the protests of on-lookers. Nothing but force will prevent his doing so. He knows that, having once begun the operation and gone far with it, he cannot stop short of completeness without rendering all that he has done futile.

The Japanese activities in Manchuria should be regarded in their entirety and should either be objected to in their entirety or not be objected to at all. After an armed force has occupied, say, eleven out of twelve strategic points, the question whether they take the twelfth such point is comparatively unimportant. The right or wrong of what they have done relates to the right or wrong of taking any point, not that of taking the last point.

So long as organized Chinese armed forces or civilian administration remain in South Manchuria, there will be an aggravated situation.

Inasmuch as neither the powers nor China can put the Japanese forces out, <sup>would it not</sup> ~~it would~~ be best for China completely to withdraw her forces and for the powers and China to deal

on the south

with



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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with the question of Japanese unlawful occupation of South  
Manchuria in its entirety?

SKH

FE:SKH/ZMF



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

*Handwritten initials*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED *Office of Economic Affairs*

*Handwritten signature*  
DEC 24 1931

REP

FROM GRAY

DIVISION OF

Amoy via N. R.

Dated December 3, 1931

Rec'd 5:30 a. m.

793.94  
note  
693.94/2

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 3 1931  
Department of State

F/LS

December 3, 9 a. m.

Following telegram has been received from Foochow  
for transmission to Department of State by naval radio:

"December 2, 1 p. m.

With reference to my despatch number 70 of November  
30, 1931, I have the honor to report that the Kuomintang  
Party controls the anti-Japanese boycott. The Provincial  
Government takes an active part in enforcing the boycott  
and the methods used are warlike. Should penalties for  
dealing in Japanese goods be removed, official pressure  
withdrawn and the party headquarters be shorn of its  
power, the boycott would soon cease to exist. However,  
the boycott is more effective and popular than formerly.

DEC 24 1931

Burke."

FRANKLIN


KLP

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gutzfom NARS, Date 12-18-75



793.94

It would appear from yesterday's telegrams or news despatches that the (Japanese) Rengo News Agency and the "spokesman" of the Japanese Foreign Office were deliberately trying to make trouble.

It may be that the latter is trying to play the well-known game of psychological "intimidation" and in connection therewith to "draw", in the course of denials, some statement which might later have the effect of placing an obstacle in the way of the making by the American and other Governments of statements in the sense of those which at this moment have been falsely attributed to them. It would seem that he did not consult Baron Shidehara. If so, it would further seem either that he was negligent or that he deliberately chose to avoid doing so. In that connection, it is well to have in mind the fact that there is reported to be a cleavage in views among officers of the Japanese Foreign Service, some of those officers concurring with Shidehara that the "conciliatory policy" is the one which should be followed in reference to China, and some holding the views of the military faction that the policy of "blood and iron" should be followed. Thus, for instance, Yoshizawa is alleged to be of the latter view. † Ambassador Forbes'

statement

793.94/3010  
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NOV 2 1931



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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statement (in Tokyo's 240, November 29, noon) that  
"as the Minister of War and I believe also the Chief of  
Staff report directly to the Emperor, the Minister of  
Foreign Affairs is not authorized to speak for them"  
throws light on the difficulty of coming to grips with  
the real authority in Japan.

SKH

FE:SKH/ZMF



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 30, 1931.

MANCHURIA SITUATION

Reference Paris' 818, November 29, midnight, and  
819, November 30, 2 a.m.

We may congratulate ourselves that there exists and  
is functioning a Council which can struggle with this  
question. If this question had to be handled by the  
ordinary processes of communication between governments  
at long range, arrival at a solution would be infinitely  
difficult if at all possible.

The efforts of Mr. Yoshizawa and Mr. Ito make it  
perfectly clear that the Japanese Government, regardless  
of the question of where the authority in that Government  
is located, has no intention to give undertakings or enter  
into new agreements which would preclude the consummation  
by Japan of an effective Japanese control in and through-  
out South Manchuria.

Sooner or later the other members of the Council will  
see this situation in perspective. With assumption of  
control there goes assumption of responsibility. It is  
Japan's intention to make South Manchuria economically  
profitable to Japan. It is her conception that in order  
to do this she must exercise administrative control. To  
that end she has destroyed the Chinese agencies of administra-  
tion

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tion and she does not intend to permit them speedily to be reconstituted. She has herself assumed control. With authority there goes responsibility. He who exercises authority must endeavor to establish and to maintain order. He who does that must be free to suppress disorder where he finds it and to distribute, maintain and employ his agencies for the maintenance of order. <sup>The power cannot just go on out.</sup> They must and they will permit her armed forces to remain there -- for some time at least. To allow these forces to remain there and at the same time try to impose upon them restraint in the form of pledges that they will refrain from further military operations is to attempt the impracticable. The Japanese will not assent. If they did, their doing so would further complicate the situation.

*SKH*

FE:SKH/ZMF



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

December 1, 1931.

MANCHURIA SITUATION

"Bandits"

There have always been "bandits" in Manchuria.

793.94  
893/108  
There are now "bandits" in all parts of China. The number of "bandits" and the effectiveness of "bandit" operations in South Manchuria have been greatly increased by the action which has been taken by the Japanese military on and since September 18. The Japanese have dispersed and caused to be discontinued the Chinese payment of Chinese armed forces in considerable numbers. The Chinese soldier, severed from his army status and deprived of his pay, readily becomes a "bandit". Thus, in a sense, the operations of the Japanese military forces against "bandits" are simply a projection and extension of their operations against the Chinese armies in Manchuria which began on September 18.

We can hardly blame the ex-soldier now "bandit" Chinese for trying to live. Nor can we blame large Chinese armed forces, whether operating as armies or as organizations of "bandits", from harassing the Japanese when and where they are in position to do so -- for that is what the Japanese are doing to them.

There

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

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There is really no solution for this problem. The Japanese will not agree to refrain from exterminating "bandits". So long as they are in occupation of South Manchuria, they must put down any forces which oppose their occupation or which contribute to general disorder. The foreign powers, on the other hand, cannot authorize the Japanese to do this, for in so doing they would be authorizing a continuance of Japan's military operations, to which operations they have consistently objected and should object.

The only thing to do with this is to let it alone. It is impossible for us to assent; and it would be futile for us to object.

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


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS



November 29 1931



MANCHURIA AND MONGOLIA

Wang Ching-wei's explanation of the difference in the Chinese reaction to the Soviet Russian occupation of Mongolia and to the present Japanese occupation of Manchuria is good as far as it goes.

Toward making clear, however, the difference between the two occupations, much more might be said.

Mongolia, although it has an area of more than 1,000,000 square miles, has a population of only about 2,000,000 people, nearly all Mongols -- nomadic in habits, not given to political thinking, very little organized, possessing little wealth. It is not rich in natural resources and can be of no great value to any country. The Russian "occupation" of Mongolia has been achieved by gradual political and economic penetration, has not been attended by outstanding acts of violence, has been achieved with little or no objection -- in fact with the appearance, at least, of assent -- on the part of the Mongol population; and, as an event in world history, it is of comparative unimportance.

In those respects it is in substantial contrast with the facts and factors involved in the Japanese occupation of South Manchuria.

SKH

FE:SKH/ZMF



AM

PLAIN

Peiping via N. R.

Dated November 26, 1931

Rec'd 7:23 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

1009, November 26.

Kuo Wen reports from Shanghai twenty fourth interview with WangChing Wei: "Touching on Manchurian crisis Wang said that China had never faced a graver foreign problem than present Sino-Japanese conflict. If he should go to Nanking he would not shirk his responsibility but would do his best to assist the Government in solving the crisis.

Asked why China should raise so much opposition to occupation of Manchuria by Japan, whereas there was much less agitation when Soviet Russia invaded and occupied outer Mongolia, Wang explained that Japanese occupation of Manchuria is different from Mongolian question in three respects. First, Mongolian trouble arose during the regime of Marshall Tuan Chi Jui as a result of which the Tuan Government fell. Secondly, outer Mongolia is inhabited by Mongolians, whereas in Manchuria there are Chinese

Mongolians



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AM

2-#1009, from Peiping, Nov. 26

Mongolians and Moslems in addition to the Manchus. At the First National Congress of the Koumintang in 1924 a declaration was made to effect that China must secure unity of all five races which make up this Republic. Thirdly, Russians have not gone so far as the Japanese who have killed many innocent people, injured Pu Yi to a restoration plot, seized salt revenues and committed other outrages."

For the Minister.

ENGERT


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
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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS



November 20, 1931



MANCHURIA SITUATION

793.94

The Chinchow question, while it may serve as a test point in the effort of the powers to cause the authorities in Japan to place restraint upon the Japanese army in the field, is but a secondary issue and should not be allowed to obscure the main issue as between the powers and Japan.

The Japanese military plan, which has already been 75 per cent plus executed, calls for the complete elimination of Chinese military and administrative authority in South Manchuria. It is altogether possible -- and it now seems likely -- that, thanks to the efforts of the powers, a battle at Chinchow will be averted. Nevertheless, it will remain the objective and intention of the Japanese authorities to effect the clearing out of Chinese armed forces and administration from that area, in order to round out Japan's control of all of South Manchuria.

The real issue between the powers and Japan has been, is, and will continue to be that of the use which Japan has made of force -- in disregard of treaty provisions. The real issue between China and Japan has been, is, and will

be

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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be that of the ultimate fate of the principle of "the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China". At present, Chinese territory has been invaded and China's administrative integrity has been impaired. Next, will Manchuria be "made" -- as was Korea -- "independent", thereby destroying to that extent China's territorial integrity? And thereafter, will Japanese sovereignty finally be substituted for China's sovereignty, thus completing a process of conquest?

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FE:SKH/ZMF



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE


DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 23, 1931.

An interview with Colonel Watari  
of the Japanese General Staff  
has convinced the Military Attache  
that the bombing of Chinchow was  
planned in advance, for the purpose  
of interfering with the Chinese  
concentration of troops at that  
point.

*W*  
EBT





JAPAN.

Bombing of Chinchow

1. Attached hereto are the following:

- a. Explanation by the Japanese General Staff of the bombing of Chinchow. In conversation with Colonel Katari, I asked him if the Japanese would not have been disappointed if their planes had not been fired on. He laughed and began an explanation why the concentration had to be broken up. It would seem to this office that all planes are a rather large number to send on one reconnaissance. I have no doubt the bombing was deliberately planned.
- b. Map of region of Chinchow gives an idea of the concentration of troops in and near there on October 8th.
- c. The map of Chinchow is intended to show that the two places bombed, that is the barracks and university used as headquarters, are out of the city. It is interesting to note that this material all arrived the day following the day I sent a secret code cable, stating I believed the bombing to be deliberate.

Source: the Japanese General Staff.

793.94

J. P. Molloy,  
Lieut. Colonel, U. S. A.,  
Military Attache.

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
By OSD letter, May 3, 1972  
NARS Date 2/9/77

793.94

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AA/Toxzo

Report No. 5925

Oct. 15, 1931.

State 1-6



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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

5-2

Encl

Received on October 13, 1931. at 2:30 P.M. 2657-H-377  
 3/

#### Detailed Report about Chinchow Bombing

The military authorities of General Chang Tao-hsiang in Chinchow plotted to concentrate the troops of General Kang I-che to co-operate with the troops who were remaining inactive to the south of Hailung, and watch for an opportunity to hem in the Japanese troops. Moreover, they sent plain clothes soldiers and assassination parties to the region along the . . . R. to plot against the life of Japanese high officials and bomb Japanese Government Offices and railways, disturb the peace and order, and check our military movements. Since the 5th of this month military men were secretly collected by the order of the authorities in Chinchow at Hsinmin and other places, and the warlike preparations against Japan were progressing. Thereupon, the Japanese army sent for self-defense 11 airplanes to reconnoitre the base of operation in Chinchow. These planes were fired on by the Chinese troops, and Japanese planes responded to this by dropping bombs on the Chinese barracks and military offices.


Note: The Communication College is the office for the Commanding General of Frontiers.

General Staff Office.



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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Dunstons NARS, Date 12-18-75


DISTRIBUTION OF CHINESE TROOPS NEAR CHINCHOW.  
 (Oct. 8th)



From Japanese General Staff 2:3 p. m. October 14, 1931.



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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



From Japanese General Staff Oct. 14, 1931.



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



AM 1000

LEGATION OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
Riga, Latvia.

November 20, 1931.

DEC 5 1931

761.94  
THE UNDER SECRETARY  
DEC 5 1931  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

W  
Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 4 1931  
Department of State

file  
COPY IN  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY  
DEC 5 1931  
MR. KLOTS

No. 3240

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit herewith a translation  
1/ of the statement made at Moscow to the Japanese Ambassador  
by the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs on November 14.

Respectfully yours,

*Felix Cole*  
Felix Cole,  
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

F/LS

793.94/3016

DEC 18 1931

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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✓  
Enclosure:

- 1/ On the Japanese-Chinese Conflict  
in Manchuria.  
(Moscow IZVESTIA, No. 314, November  
15, 1931, page 1.)

(In triplicate.)

Copy to E.I.C., Paris.

Copy to E.I.C., Paris, for Peiping.

Copy to American Consul General, Harbin, direct.

800 R

DBM/fk



1554  
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

3240  
Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. of NOV 20 1931  
from the Legation at Riga, Latvia.

SOURCE: Moscow IZVESTIA,  
No. 314,  
November 15, 1931.  
Page 1.

ON THE JAPANESE-CHINESE CONFLICT IN  
MANCHURIA.

(Translation.)

Yesterday, on November 14, the People's Commissar  
for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., Comrade M. M.  
Litvinov, invited the Japanese Envoy, Mr. Hirota, and  
made to him the following statement for communication  
to the Japanese Government.

Comrade Litvinov's statement.

In the statement which was handed to you by the  
People's Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Karakhan,  
on October 29, 1931, the Soviet Government has already  
pointed out the absolute senselessness and falsehood  
of the various inventions and rumors emanating from  
irresponsible circles which, in the prevailing circum-  
stances in Manchuria, are for some reason or other  
interested in the spreading of provocative rumors.

The Government of the U.S.S.R. has declared with  
utmost clarity that it adheres to a policy of strict  
non-interference, which policy is the outcome of its  
traditional unswerving policy of peace, of its respect  
for the international treaties concluded with China,  
and of its respect for the sovereign rights and the

independence



-2-

independence of other states.

The Soviet Government was warranted in expecting that so clear a statement, which left no room for any doubts or misunderstandings, and which, according to the information given by yourself to the Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Karakhan, was received with satisfaction by the Japanese Government — would put an end to the provocative anti-Soviet campaign as well as to the inventions about the aid alleged to have been rendered by the Government of the U.S.S.R. to Chinese troops in Manchuria.

The Soviet Government deeply regrets to note that interested Japanese military circles continue indulging in the invention and the spreading, through the Japanese press and Japanese telegraph agencies, of absolutely unfounded rumors alleging that the U.S.S.R. renders assistance to one or another of the Chinese generals.

That these rumors are of an official character, and emanate from an official source, is borne out, apart from other sources, by the official statement made on November 12 by the representative of the Japanese authorities in Mukden, which statement is a direct confirmation of the fact that reinforcements from Blagoveshchensk, being "Chinese and Korean Communists," have been despatched.

The Soviet Government cannot leave unnoticed also the fact that a similar assumption was expressed on the same date, i.e., on November 12, by the Japanese Vice Consul in Harbin, Mr. Nakano, in his interview with the

Acting



1554

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



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



LEGATION OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Riga, Latvia.

November 20, 1931.

761.94

761.94



No. 3240

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Sir:

1/ I have the honor to transmit herewith a translation  
of the statement made at Moscow to the Japanese Ambassador  
by the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs on November 14.

Respectfully yours,

*Felix Cole*  
Felix Cole,  
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

F/LS

793.94/3016

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DEC 18 1931



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

✓  
Enclosure:

- 1/ On the Japanese-Chinese Conflict  
in Manchuria.  
(Moscow IZVESTIA, No. 314, November  
15, 1931, page 1.)

(In triplicate.)

Copy to E.I.C., Paris.

Copy to E.I.C., Paris, for Peiping.

Copy to American Consul General, Harbin, direct.

800 R

DBM/fk



8240  
Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. of NOV 20 1931  
from the Legation at Riga, Latvia.

SOURCE: Moscow IZVESTIA,  
No. 314,  
November 15, 1931.  
Page 1.

ON THE JAPANESE-CHINESE CONFLICT IN  
MANCHURIA.

(Translation.)

Yesterday, on November 14, the People's Commissar  
for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., Comrade M. M.  
Litvinov, invited the Japanese Envoy, Mr. Hirota, and  
made to him the following statement for communication  
to the Japanese Government.

Comrade Litvinov's statement.

In the statement which was handed to you by the  
People's Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Karakhan,  
on October 29, 1931, the Soviet Government has already  
pointed out the absolute senselessness and falsehood  
of the various inventions and rumors emanating from  
irresponsible circles which, in the prevailing circum-  
stances in Manchuria, are for some reason or other  
interested in the spreading of provocative rumors.

The Government of the U.S.S.R. has declared with  
utmost clarity that it adheres to a policy of strict  
non-interference, which policy is the outcome of its  
traditional unswerving policy of peace, of its respect  
for the international treaties concluded with China,  
and of its respect for the sovereign rights and the

independence



-2-

independence of other states.

The Soviet Government was warranted in expecting that so clear a statement, which left no room for any doubts or misunderstandings, and which, according to the information given by yourself to the Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Karakhan, was received with satisfaction by the Japanese Government — would put an end to the provocative anti-Soviet campaign as well as to the inventions about the aid alleged to have been rendered by the Government of the U.S.S.R. to Chinese troops in Manchuria.

The Soviet Government deeply regrets to note that interested Japanese military circles continue indulging in the invention and the spreading, through the Japanese press and Japanese telegraph agencies, of absolutely unfounded rumors alleging that the U.S.S.R. renders assistance to one or another of the Chinese generals.

That these rumors are of an official character, and emanate from an official source, is borne out, apart from other sources, by the official statement made on November 12 by the representative of the Japanese authorities in Mukden, which statement is a direct confirmation of the fact that reinforcements from Blagoveshchensk, being "Chinese and Korean Communists," have been despatched.

The Soviet Government cannot leave unnoticed also the fact that a similar assumption was expressed on the same date, i.e., on November 12, by the Japanese Vice Consul in Harbin, Mr. Nakano, in his interview with the

Acting



-3-

Acting Consul General of the U.S.S.R. in Harbin.

The Soviet Government directs the attention of the Japanese Government to that malicious anti-Soviet campaign which is systematically carried on by some military circles in Manchuria for the purpose of complicating the relations between Japan and the U.S.S.R.

At the same time, the Government of the U.S.S.R. considers that the time has come to call back to mind the assurances of the Japanese Envoy, given to myself, to the effect that the events in Manchuria will not be detrimental to the interests of the U.S.S.R. I am all the more compelled to refer to this, since information has come to hand to the effect that the Japanese command is making ready to cut off the Chinese Eastern Railway in the Tsitsikar district, thereby paralyzing the functioning of the said railway, which would cause material losses to the U.S.S.R. The Soviet Government believes that the assurances given by the Japanese Government retain their force, and will not be violated.  
(TASS.)

js/hs



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




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EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Paris, November 21, 1931

DEC - 3 31  
CONFIDENTIAL REPORT  
No. W. D. 972.



F/LS  
793.94/3017

793.94  
To the Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.

The American Chargé d'Affaires ad interim  
forwards herewith Mr. Warrington Dawson's Con-  
fidential Report No. W. D. 972, dated November  
21, 1931.

Encl

WD/DRS

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DEC 5 - 1931

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
Paris, November 21, 1931.

Serial No. W. D. 972.

CONFIDENTIAL REPORT,

By Warrington Dawson,  
Special Assistant.

SUBJECT: The Far Eastern Situation As Seen By  
Monsieur Jules Lefaivre

Former Minister Plenipotentiary Jules Lefaivre, who keeps in close touch with the political situation as viewed in well-informed circles in Paris, tells me that he does not expect the Japanese ever to evacuate Tsitsikhar, now that they have entered. Under one pretext or another, they will make a permanent occupation.

893.001 He also expects the Manchurian throne to be restored in favor of the young ex-Emperor, and Mongolia will soon after be joined to the monarchy. It will then be only a question of time for the Imperial rule to regain its authority over the whole of China. He considers that this will be an excellent thing, since

it



-2-

it will bring the only hope for China to avoid domination by the Soviets who are now supporting her against Japan.

Monsieur Lefaivre's sympathies are entirely with Japan in the present conflict, if only because Japan stands for law and order in the Far East, and he feels that Bolshevism is the gravest menace threatening the world today.

Very respectfully,

*Warrington Dawson*

Warrington Dawson,  
Special Assistant.

JM

In quintuplicate


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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


LEGATION OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The Hague, Netherlands,  
November 18, 1931.

DEC - 3 31

No. 193



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DISTRIBUTION - CHECK	
To the Field	
In U. S. A.	

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that in a conversation with Jhr. A. M. Snouck Hurgronje, the Secretary General of the Foreign Office, today he informed me that the only communications which the Foreign Office had made regarding the Sino-Japanese conflict in Manchuria were those to you and Mr. Briand through the Netherlands Legations at Washington and Paris expressing the view that persuasion would be more effective than a commanding or warning tone in dealing with Japan. The Foreign Office had based its action...

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- 2 -

action on a report from the Netherlands Minister in Tokyo, who evidently, according to the Secretary General, considered Mr. Briand's second Note to the Japanese Government "too sharp". It had caused a strong reaction in Japan.

✓ The Minister for Foreign Affairs has expressed to me concern at the strained relations that have arisen between Japan and the League of Nations. He is not sure but that the Council got away on the wrong foot and that its handling of the matter has not had sufficient regard to the susceptibilities of the Japanese, who are a proud race and must be given every opportunity to save their face in a situation like the present. He is inclined to believe that Japan cannot immediately withdraw her troops from the territory in question without leaving her nationals and property at the mercy of the Chinese bandits.

✓ He feels that the League of Nations is being put to the test as at no previous time and fears that its prestige may be reduced greatly if it forces the issue instead of evolving some compromise that will prevent the present conflict of arms from continuing and assuming the character of a regular war between the two powers involved, and make some real contribution towards the resumption of normal relations.

✓ The cautious attitude of the Netherlands Government may be explained partly by its foreign policy of playing a lone hand, as far as possible, and to a greater extent by its desire to keep on friendly terms with Japan on account...



- 3 -

account of the Dutch East Indies. In its issue of the seventeenth instant the HANDELSBLAD (Liberal) publishes the following cable from Batavia:

"The Java press as well as the native newspapers and those published in Medan evince great interest regarding the attitude that ought to be shown by the Dutch East Indies in the conflict between China and Japan. The utmost endeavors towards maintaining neutrality are urged."

The LOCOMOTIEF expresses the view that the modest influence of the Netherlands must be exerted entirely on behalf of its East Indian interests.

The PEWARTA DELI considers Holland's position in the East Indies as exposed, owing to its oil ports and strategic positions. The increased demand for Dutch East Indian coal in Singapore is due to the mutual boycott of Chinese and Japanese merchants at Singapore and the Straits Settlements.

Respectfully yours,



Laurits S. Swenson.

File No. 710

In quintuplicate

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1567  
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 25, 1931.

Naval Attache, Tokyo, October 23, No. 98.

Wakatsuki has been unusually busy advising with members of the Privy Council and with high and influential statesmen of other parties, who are in favor of a stronger policy, and has stated that there is no longer any difference of opinion between the Army and the Foreign Office. While there is popular doubt that the present government, long committed to a conciliatory foreign policy, can carry out the national wishes at this time, there is even greater distrust of the Seiyukai, who came to grief through attempting to force through too strong a policy. A super-party cabinet looms as a possibility.

Chinese residents are leaving Japan in large numbers.

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BBT  
*[Signature]*

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ISSUED BY OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, NAVY DEPARTMENT

## ATTACHÉ'S REPORT BLANK

the Agency for  
Project matter.

Serial No. 98

(Commence new series  
each January first.)

(Select proper numbers  
from O. N. I. index.)

**FROM 1960-1964**

Division of

2/19/79

~~XX~~ **INVENTORY**  
The contents are listed below:

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Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

Department of State  
20. FEB 1951

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793.94/3019

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4-5292



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

N. N. I. 96  
Revised Nov. 1-21.

ISSUED BY OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, NAVY DEPARTMENT.

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From ..... Date ....., 19..... Serial No. .... File No. ....  
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Source of information .....

Subject .....  
(Nation reported on.) (Index title as per index sheet.) (Subtitle.)

Reference .....

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Prefectural elections

The prefectural elections which have been held at different dates for the past month have come to a close. Out of 39 prefectures the Minseito has secured an absolute majority in 23, whereas its absolute majority before the election was only in 8 prefectures. The elections have reduced the number of prefectural assemblies in which the Seiyukai is predominant from 14 to 7. The numerical strength of the various parties before and after the elections is as follows:-

Party	before	after
Minseito	588	832
Seiyukai	797	635
Shakai Minshuto (labor)	17	3
Rono Taishuto (labor)	-	13
Local labor party	-	1
Independents	63	70
Total	1465	1524

Effect of Manchurian situation on finance

The uncertainty of the Manchurian situation, combined with the Chinese boycott has resulted in a sharp falling off of Japanese bonds abroad, in increased idleness of shipping and great decrease of exports to China. The seriousness of the financial situation is increased by gold shipments by the Yokohama Specie Bank which are likely to total ¥190,000,000 by the end of the year. Many individual concerns, doubly hit, may have to declare bankruptcy and small banks with frozen funds and deposits declining may be placed in a grave condition.

To meet the situation the Minister of Finance has decided to mobilize such semi-government banks as the Bank of Japan, the Japan Industrial Bank and the Japan Hypothec Bank to meet the financial crisis by taking over loans by commercial banks to industrial concerns which are in a shaky condition and by sufficient purchase of bonds to check any considerable fall. Considerable leniency is to be shown toward a bank's statement of assets.

Exodus of Chinese from Japan.

Chinese ~~addents~~, from various reasons no doubt, but all inspired by a common hatred of Japan, continue to return to China in large numbers. The Dollar Steamship Line has a waiting list of 600 which they are unable to accomodate due to the passenger lists being filled by Chinese refugees from Mexico.

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Inventions	Oil	Commander in Chief	Atlantic	Pacific	Asiatic	Commander	S.S.S.	European	Attaché at	State	Justice	Inter.	Com.	Labor	Ship Board	Return to Room No.		

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

N. N. I. 96  
Revised Nov. 1-21.

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Sheet No. 3.

### Manchurian situation.

The Foreign Office and the War Department having reached an understanding it may be anticipated that every reasonable effort will be made by the Japanese Commanders in Manchuria to avoid hostilities while the case is being considered by the League of Nations. To this end General Shirakawa, a Supreme War Councillor, has been sent by the War Ministry to Manchuria for the purpose of establishing a close coordination between the War Department and the garrison force.

On the 14th the Chief of the Naval General Staff and the Chief of the Army General Staff held a conference in connection with a report received that 30,000 regular Chinese troops stationed at Chinchow are moving gradually toward Shanhaikuan on the Peiping Mukden line. This railroad, under the terms of the Boxer Treaty, is guarded south of the great wall by French, British and Japanese garrisons, there being a detail of about 90 Japanese troops at Shanhaikuan. Forseeing serious international complications in case of a clash, strict instructions are reported to have been sent to the Commander of the garrison forces to avoid taking any action that might incite the hostility of the Chinese soldiers. The Chief of the Naval General Staff discussing a joint Army and Navy operation in case of trouble promised to hold ships in readiness for duty at Chingwantao in case of trouble.

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Inventions	Oil	Commander in Chief	Commander	Attaché at	State	Justice	Inter.	Com.	Labor	Ship Board	Return to Room No.							
		Atlantic	Pacific	Asiatic	S. S. S.	European												

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EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA


No. 2006.

Paris, November 24, 1931.

*Handwritten initials: JF, WF*

*Handwritten: 793.94*

DEC - 3 31



F/LS  
793.94/3020

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

In compliance with the Department's instruction No. 293 of August 19, 1930, I have the honor to transmit herewith clippings from the French press, on the subject of the Sino-Japanese conflict, covering the period from November 20 to November 24, 1931, inclusive.

Respectfully yours,

For the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim:

*Handwritten signature of Williamson S. Howell, Jr.*

Williamson S. Howell, Jr.,  
First Secretary of Embassy.

Enclosures.....



- 2 -

Enclosures: (single copy).

Clippings from the following newspapers:

November 20, 1931.

- No. 1 - EXCELSIOR  
2 - FIGARO  
3 - L'HUMANITE  
4 - L'INFORMATION  
5 - LE JOURNAL  
6 - JOURNAL DES DEBATS  
7 - LA JOURNEE INDUSTRIELLE  
8 - LE MATIN  
9 - L'OEUVRE  
10 - LE PETIT PARISIEN  
11 - LE QUOTIDIEN  
12 - LA REPUBLIQUE  
13 - LE TEMPS

November 21, 1931.

- No. 14 - L'ACTION FRANCAISE  
15 - L'AMI DU PEUPLE  
16 - L'ECHO DE PARIS  
17 - EXCELSIOR  
18 - FIGARO  
19 - L'HUMANITE  
20 - LE JOURNAL  
21 - LE MATIN  
22 - L'OEUVRE  
23 - LE PETIT PARISIEN  
24 - LE POPULAIRE  
25 - LE QUOTIDIEN  
26 - LA REPUBLIQUE  
27 - LE TEMPS

November 22, 1931.

- No. 28 - L'AMI DU PEUPLE  
29 - L'ECHO DE PARIS  
30 - FIGARO  
31 - L'HUMANITE  
32 - L'INFORMATION  
33 - LE MATIN

November 23, 1931.

- No. 34 - L'ECHO DE PARIS  
35 - L'ERE NOUVELLE  
36 - L'HUMANITE  
37 - LES INFORMATIONS POLITIQUES ET FINANCIERES  
38 - LE JOURNAL  
39 - JOURNAL DES DEBATS  
40 - LE PETIT PARISIEN  
41 - LA REPUBLIQUE

November 24, 1931.

- No. 42 - L'ECHO DE PARIS  
43 - EXCELSIOR  
44 - L'HUMANITE  
45 - LE JOURNAL

46.....



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

No. 46 - L'OEUVRE  
47 - LE PETIT PARISIEN  
48 - LE POPULAIRE  
49 - LE TEMPS

In quintuplicate.  
710.  
RS/jdk



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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Page 20

Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 2006  
 of November 24, 1931.  
 From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from EXCELSIOR, November 20, 1931.

## LE CONSEIL DE LA S. D. N. POURSUIT SES EFFORTS POUR RÉGLER PACIFIQUEMENT LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS DE MANDCHOURIE

IL TIENDRA CET APRÈS-MIDI  
 UNE NOUVELLE SÉANCE PRIVÉE.  
 M. BRIAND VERRA AU PRÉALABLE  
 L'AMBASSADEUR AMÉRICAIN  
 A LONDRES, LE GÉNÉRAL DAWES

Tokio décide d'accepter  
 l'envoi d'une commission  
 d'enquête de la S. D. N.  
 en Mandchourie.

Les hauts fonctionnaires de la Société des nations donnaient hier soir une note de détente et d'optimisme. Cependant, on avait l'impression que l'on était arrivé à une impasse. Dans la matinée, le conseil avait, hors de la présence des délégués japonais et chinois, longuement examiné la situation et M. Briand avait fait un exposé complet des négociations de la veille avec le docteur Alfred Szé et M. Yoshizawa. On vit alors deux tendances très nettes se dessiner parmi les membres du conseil, dont la plus grande partie désirait agir plus énergiquement dans le but d'arrêter le conflit qui s'étend tous les jours en Mandchourie. Lord Cecil, qui remplaçait sir John Simon, — rentré pour quelques jours en Angleterre, — soutenu par plusieurs de ses collègues, émit l'opinion qu'il était temps, dans le cas où une entente n'interviendrait pas, d'évoquer l'article 15 du pacte de la S. D. N., qui autorise le conseil d'ordonner une enquête sur les lieux du conflit, sans demander le consentement des parties intéressées et à laquelle ils sont dans l'obligation de se soumettre. Mais, avant d'en venir à ces mesures extrêmes, qui pourraient être suivies par une déclaration de blocus, le conseil voulut d'abord savoir jusqu'à quel point les Etats-Unis étaient décidés à le suivre dans cette voie, et M. Briand fut chargé de s'entretenir avec le général Dawes. Cette entrevue a été reportée à aujourd'hui. Puis il fut décidé de demander au Japon de remplir par écrit le texte exact de ses propositions, quant à l'acceptation « en bloc » des traités existant avec la Chine et quant à cette fameuse commission d'observateurs militaires qui serait envoyée en Mandchourie.

A 13 heures, la séance fut levée sans que l'on eût pris d'autre décision ferme que de charger le président de continuer dans l'après-midi les négociations. L'après-midi, M. Briand reçut tour à tour l'ambassadeur du Japon à Londres, M. Natondaira et M. Yoshizawa, puis le docteur Szé.

Le ministre français devait ensuite recevoir la visite du général Dawes. Mais l'homme d'Etat américain, empêché au dernier moment, le pria de bien vouloir reporter leur entrevue à ce matin. En raison de ce fait M. Briand décida d'ajourner à 16 heures, cet après-midi, la séance privée du conseil primitivement fixée pour ce matin à 11 heures.

### Une importante communication du gouvernement de Tokio

Dans la soirée, l'ambassade du Japon a fait remettre au Quai d'Orsay une communication dont le caractère particulièrement encourageant pourrait être de nature à améliorer sensiblement la situation et à faciliter un accord. D'après les indications qu'il nous a été possible de recueillir, malgré l'heure tardive, l'attitude adoptée par le gouvernement de Tokio serait désormais beaucoup plus conciliante. S'il persiste à considérer le cinquième de ses « points fondamentaux », qui a été jusqu'ici le grand obstacle à une entente, comme présentant une importance capitale, il paraît reconnaître maintenant que ce point englobe des questions de fond et constitue, par suite, un sujet de négociations directes entre le Japon et la Chine.

Il n'estimerait donc plus indispensable une acceptation immédiate et sans réserve de ce cinquième point.

En ce qui concerne l'envoi sur place par la S. D. N. d'une commission d'enquête, dont M. Briand s'informait hier après-midi s'il était accepté par Tokio, le gouvernement japonais y souscrit enfin, en demandant toutefois que les membres de cette commission soient impartialement choisis, que l'enquête ne porte pas seulement sur les événements de Mandchourie, mais aussi sur l'agitation antijaponaise, le boycottage des marchandises japonaises, etc., dans le reste de la Chine, ainsi que sur les agissements des soldats chinois débandés et l'activité intolérable des bandits.

Enfin, en raison de l'envoi de cette commission d'enquête sur place, le cabinet de Tokio consentirait provisoirement, pour faciliter un accord, à retirer sa demande de reconnaissance immédiate, par le gouvernement de Nankin, des cinq points fondamentaux.

En retour, il souhaiterait que le conseil de la S. D. N. reprît, en ce qui concerne l'évacuation, les termes de sa résolution du 30 septembre, qui avait été adoptée à l'unanimité, c'est-à-dire les voix de la Chine et du Japon comprises, et d'après laquelle le Japon s'engagerait à évacuer non pas à une date déterminée, mais dans le plus bref délai, le territoire occupé par ses troupes en dehors de la zone du chemin de fer, sous la seule condition que la sécurité des biens et des ressortissants japonais serait assurée par la Chine. — MAURICE RAYMONDE.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Fig. 20

Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 2006  
 of November 24, 1931.  
 From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from FIGARO, November 20, 1931.

## La S. D. N. veut sauver la face

Jamais on n'a vu négociation plus confuse. Le Conseil de la Ligue, ayant perdu tout espoir de mettre d'accord les gouvernements de Tokio et de Nankin, n'a plus qu'un désir : sauver la face. Il faut, à tout prix, maintenir « l'autorité morale » de la respectable institution. Tâche difficile. Il semble cependant qu'on soit près d'élaborer un de ces compromis qui laissent chaque partie sur ses positions, mais permettent de dire qu'on ne se sépare pas sur un échec. C'est un bluff diplomatique.

Ce compromis consisterait en l'envoi en Mandchourie d'une commission de la Société des nations, chargée de constater si la Chine est en mesure d'assurer la sécurité des ressortissants japonais, la protection de leurs biens et de leur activité. Le gouvernement de Nankin peut difficilement repousser une telle procédure, puisqu'il a toujours demandé une intervention de la Ligue. Le gouvernement de Tokio n'y semble pas opposé, bien qu'il ait déclaré depuis longtemps qu'il entendait régler lui-même le conflit qui l'oppose à la Chine.

Cette enquête pourrait être utile. Elle permettrait à certains fonctionnaires de Genève de faire un voyage qui les formerait, leur apprendrait à ne plus confondre généraux et fleuves chinois, à ne plus prendre le Pirée pour un nom d'homme. Elle permettrait aussi au monde entier — si les résultats de l'enquête n'étaient pas secrets, comme les délibérations du Conseil — de constater que la Chine n'est une que sur les cartes, mais qu'elle est divisible et divisée. Comment pourrait-elle garantir la sécurité des ressortissants nippons en Mandchourie, lorsqu'elle ne sait pas assurer la vie de ses propres enfants, qu'elle envoie périodiquement s'entretuer ? On ne comprendrait pas que le gouvernement de Tokio empêchât de si belles révélations. Mais on comprend très bien que les Chinois aient ri jaune à l'annonce du petit tour qu'on leur jouait. Ils déclarent que le Japon suscite des troubles en divers points de Mandchourie, en dehors du théâtre des hostilités. Dans une note que le docteur Szé a publiée hier, il menace de révéler en séance publique le changement d'attitude de certains membres du Conseil. M. Brland ne se sent pas à l'aise.

Toutes les enquêtes du monde ne changeront rien au fait que les troupes japonaises poursuivent leur avance et que la Chine se refuse à reconnaître les traités. Or, la mission essentielle du Conseil est de faire respecter les pactes et l'intégrité territoriale des Etats. Mais on s'occupera de cela plus tard, lorsque les fonctionnaires de la Société des Nations seront revenus de Mandchourie, dans le cas où ils iraient. Ainsi, on recule pour mieux sauter. Si l'enquête était défavorable à la Chine, le Japon ne retirerait pas ses troupes et le gouvernement de Nankin quitterait peut-être la Ligue. Si elle était favorable à ce dernier, le Japon n'évacuerait pas avant d'avoir obtenu l'assurance que la Chine respectera tous les traités signés et ratifiés par elle. C'est là qu'est le problème. Il ne sera pas résolu de sitôt.

Lorsque le Conseil se réunira, pour la quatrième fois, en décembre ou en janvier prochain, il peut se trouver devant une situation autrement grave. Les Soviets voient de mauvais œil les Japonais entrer en contact avec le chemin de fer de l'Est chinois, qui est sous leur contrôle. Des bruits ont couru selon lesquels ils songeraient à envoyer des troupes dans cette région. Le gouvernement de Tokio a fait aussitôt une démarche à Moscou, pour prévenir les intéressés que ce serait la source de nouvelles complications. Mais les Soviets ne voudront-ils pas prêter main-forte à leurs protégés chinois ? Que ferait alors le Conseil de la Ligue ?...

James Donnadiou.



Inclousure No. 1 to Despatch No. 2006  
of November 24, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'UNION, November 20, 1931.

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Depuis quelques semaines, la presse française se livre aux attaques les plus violentes contre l'U. R. S. S. Elle claironne les mots d'ordre donnés par le gouvernement.

Une telle attitude, l'appui ouvert que celui-ci n'a cessé de donner aux bandits japonais, montrent que l'impérialisme français recherche les solutions les plus violentes à la crise qui commence à l'étreindre.

Se partager la Chine, après avoir réduit la partie soviétique, ouvrir au marché capitaliste l'Union soviétique en brisant par les armes les conquêtes de la révolution prolétarienne, apparaît désormais aux Etats capitalistes comme une solution urgente.

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
Briand joue dans l'affaire un rôle de premier plan. Pendant des années, il s'est efforcé d'obtenir une auréole « pacifiste ». Le parti socialiste lui a décerné le brevet de « grand ouvrier de la paix ». C'est sous ces oripeaux « pacifistes » destinés à tromper les masses que Briand s'avère comme l'artisan le plus sûr de la guerre.

Que les prolétaires de France ne se laissent bercer par aucune illusion. Lorsque la bourgeoisie prépare la guerre, elle entoure ses préparatifs de multiples précautions, elle cherche à brouiller les cartes, elle utilise à fond tous ses hommes et ses partis. Briand et le parti socialiste sont ses auxiliaires les plus précieux.

Notre parti communiste a, dans cette affaire, une lourde responsabilité. Il ne s'agit plus pour lui de la propagande et de l'agitation contre la guerre, en général, et pour la défense de l'Union soviétique. Il faut agir et entraîner les masses à l'action contre notre propre impérialisme.

Que nous affirmions notre confiance dans la volonté des ouvriers et des paysans russes, notre foi dans l'armée rouge pour défendre la conquête de la révolution, c'est bien ! Mais l'Union soviétique a le droit de compter sur notre effort à nous. Se réjouir des succès de l'armée rouge chinoise et du développement du mouvement soviétique en Chine est chose normale, mais ce qui ne le serait pas, ce serait d'observer sans agir contre notre propre bourgeoisie qui veut détruire les soviets chinois.

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C'est la politique de l'impérialisme français qui a permis et rendu possible la foudroyante offensive du Japon. C'est la France qui a été l'organisatrice véritable de l'expédition qui, à cette heure, fait courir à la patrie des travailleurs les plus grands dangers.

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Hier matin, M. Grumbach, collaborateur direct du Quai d'Orsay — et qui, pour les besoins de la cause, remplace M. Rosenfeld et substitue à l'attaque grossière, l'insinuation venimeuse contre les Soviets et l'apologie délirante de l'impérialisme français, eut le front d'expliquer que le plus grand malheur qui puisse advenir à la paix du monde serait que M. Briand... tombât malade !

Gardons-nous de prendre à la légère des affirmations de ce genre. Elles sont l'expression exacte de la politique social-impérialiste. Les opérations qui se déroulent sur les rives de la Nonni ont leurs inspirateurs directs parmi ceux qui délibèrent sur les rives de la Seine.

Gabriel PERI.



Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 1006  
of November 24, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'UNION, November 20, 1931.

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
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Nos régions maritimes doivent comprendre l'importance qu'il y a à organiser cette lutte et combien la défense des salaires des inscrits est liée à notre action contre les transports de troupes et de munitions.

Chez les cheminots se développe un grand courant de mécontentement. Déjà dans de nombreux endroits, des comités d'unité pour la lutte ont été constitués. Le développement de ce mouvement, l'élargissement du réseau des comités d'unité, tout ce qui nous permet de mobiliser les masses, renforce nos possibilités d'action contre notre impérialisme.

Chacune de nos organisations, chacun de nos adhérents doit comprendre que la situation est sérieuse et qu'elle exige de tous un effort immédiat et soutenu en même temps qu'une grande initiative, précisément dans la réalisation des tâches fixées par le Congrès de la C.G.T.U.

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Incluse No. 5 to despatch No. 2006  
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
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B. FRACHON.



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Enfin depuis lundi, date de l'ouverture de la session, M. Briand a fait écarter complètement le débat précédemment institué pour la forme sur l'évacuation de la Mandchourie. Cet acte du conseil avait un sens très précis. Il signifiait que la voie

de l'offensive japonaise était libre ! Et c'est ainsi que les Japonais l'ont entendu.

Hier matin, M. Grumbach, collaborateur direct du Quai d'Orsay — et qui, pour les besoins de la cause, remplace M. Rosenfeld et substitue à l'attaque grossière, l'insinuation venimeuse contre les Soviets et l'apologie délirante de l'impérialisme français, eut le front d'expliquer que le plus grand malheur qui puisse advenir à la paix du monde serait que M. Briand... tombât malade !

Garçons-nous de prendre à la légère des affirmations de ce genre. Elles sont l'expression exacte de la politique social-impérialiste. Les opérations qui se déroulent sur les rives de la Nonni ont leurs inspirateurs directs parmi ceux qui délibèrent sur les rives de la Seine.

Gabriel PERI.



## Une note et une démarche insolentes de l'impérialisme japonais

Après la prise de Tsitsikar, l'avance des troupes japonaises se poursuit au nord de cette ville.

L'agence officielle *Reugo* annonce que l'Etat-Major japonais a décidé « d'écraser complètement l'armée du général Ma ». L'armée nipponne a repris, hier matin, sa marche en avant, se dirigeant sur Koku-Schanchen, où le général Ma aurait établi sa résidence.

On évalue, du côté japonais, à 300 tués et blessés, les pertes japonaises dans la bataille d'avant-hier pour l'occupation d'Anganchi et de Tsitsikar; celles des chinois seraient de 3 à 4.000.

Cependant, un autre télégramme signale que les meilleures troupes du général Ma n'ont pas été détruites car elles ont été retirées quand la situation est devenue critique.

L'Etat-Major japonais s'est établi à Anganchi. Ce fait est de la plus grande importance, quand on sait qu'Anganchi commande la partie occidentale de l'Est chinois. L'impérialisme nippon peut ainsi quand la situation le permettra, couper toutes les communications sur le chemin de fer et porter ainsi atteinte au trafic de l'U.R.S.S., avec le reste de la Mandchourie et Vladivostock.

### L'ambassadeur japonais remet une note à Litvinov

Le danger menaçant que nous signalons hier, grandit donc à chaque moment. D'ailleurs les impérialistes de Tokio continuent leurs manœuvres de provocation à l'égard de l'Union soviétique.

On connaît maintenant officiellement le texte de la réponse du Japon à la note adressée samedi à Tokio par notre camarade Litvinov.

Niant des faits connus de tous, cette réponse dément effrontément que des officiers japonais aient fait circuler des bruits relatifs à de prétendus secours apportés par l'U.R.S.S. au général Ma. Alors que l'on sait la furieuse campagne antisoviétique de la presse nipponne, le gouvernement de Tokio accuse... les chinois d'avoir répandu ces mensonges.

Allant plus loin encore dans l'insolence, les impérialistes japonais osent prétendre que les Soviétiques n'ont publié aucune déclaration affirmant qu'ils ne fournissaient pas d'armes aux Chinois. Cela, quand les déclarations de Karakhan à l'ambassade Hiroto et la note même de Litvinov insistent sur la politique de stricte non-immixtion de l'U.R.S.S.

La provocation apparaît clairement dans cette réponse et laisse prévoir une atteinte à brève échéance contre le chemin de fer de l'Est chinois. Tokio déclare :

« L'administration du chemin de fer de l'Est-Chinois a autorisé le transport des troupes chinoises à Tsitsikar et à Anganchi et doit porter aussi la responsabilité de toute rencontre qui pourrait avoir lieu entre les Japonais et les Chinois dans le Nord de la Mandchourie ».

Qu'est-ce à dire ? L'administration de l'Est chinois est mixte, les représentants de l'U.R.S.S. et de la Chine y sont à égalité. Ce passage de la note japonaise tend à faire porter à l'U.R.S.S. la responsabilité des déplacements des troupes chinoises qui ont pu avoir lieu entre Kharbine et Anganchi, sur une ligne libre à gestion mi-chinoise.

L'état-major japonais est installé à Anganchi. L'impérialisme japonais, fort de l'appui de la France et des autres puissances, dévoile ouvertement ses buts de provocation contre l'U.R.S.S. et sa volonté d'annexion de la Mandchourie. Le plan du baron Tanaka est réalisé par les généraux du mikado dans tous ses détails.

C'est Paris qui est le centre de la conjuration. Paris, c'est-à-dire la capitale d'une grande puissance asiatique, maîtresse en fait du Yunnan, en guerre ouverte avec le peuple indochinois et qui n'a cessé de jouer le rôle le plus actif en Extrême-Orient, en 1919 à Vladivostok, en 1926-27 contre la Révolution nationale chinoise, aux côtés de l'Angleterre; en 1929 derrière les généraux mandchous; en 1930 dans le Kiangsi contre les Soviétiques chinois.

A cette heure même, le conseil, sur les injonctions de M. Briand, et avec l'approbation du délégué du Kuomintang, se dispose à dépêcher une commission d'enquête en Chine. Que fera cette commission ? M. Pertinax a soin de nous l'annoncer dans l'*Echo de Paris* : La Chine, écrit-il en substance, n'est pas une puissance. Dès lors, le seul régime qui lui soit applicable, c'est le dépeçement sous la haute direction française.

En Chine même, le danger antisoviétique s'aggrave d'heure en heure. Fort de l'appui français, le Japon procède à l'égard de l'U.R.S.S. par voie de provocation ouverte. Il exécute méthodiquement chaque article du memorandum Tanaka — que nous citâmes hier.

A cette heure, il s'efforce de déclencher une attaque soviétique qui serait le signal de l'invasion du territoire soviétique par les armées nipponnes.

La réponse japonaise à la démarche récente de Litvinov n'a pas d'autre signification. Le Japon ne réfute aucun des arguments du commissaire du peuple concernant l'activité des gardes blancs. Par contre, sur le ton d'un ultimatum, il déclare qu'il décline toute responsabilité pour « toute rencontre qui pourrait avoir lieu entre Japonais et Chinois dans le Nord de la Mandchourie ».

Et comme si cela ne suffisait pas, une dépêche Reuter annonce que l'ambassadeur japonais à Moscou a averti Litvinov des graves complications que pourrait entraîner l'envoi par l'U.R.S.S. de troupes dans le Nord de la Mandchourie.

Les voleurs crient au voleur, les provocateurs crient à la provocation. Tout est prêt pour l'invasion !

Mais qui inspire ces démarches criminelles ?

Qui ? Le Temps d'hier a soin d'avertir ses lecteurs que les Soviétiques « encouragent secrètement les Chinois » et qu'« ils essaient d'exploiter les difficultés actuelles, leur politique étant toujours et partout de profiter du désordre et de l'anarchie ».

Nous voilà fixés. Dans son agression ouverte contre l'U.R.S.S., l'impérialisme japonais reçoit des impulsions directes de Paris.

Le fait est évident. Il ne saurait échapper à aucun prolétaire.

Or, il ne suffit point de dire et de répéter que les ouvriers soviétiques ne laisseront pas toucher aux conquêtes de la Révolution d'Octobre.

Les conquêtes de la Révolution sont notre patrimoine commun. La maison socialiste est notre maison commune. C'est nous qui devons la défendre. C'est nous tous et nous d'abord, prolétaires français, qui devons exiger d'abord dans les manifestations auxquelles le Parti nous convie, le rappel des forces militaires et navales françaises d'Extrême-Orient. C'est nous qui devons jeter l'alarme dans les usines.

Il y a huit jours, s'achevait à Paris le magnifique congrès de la C.G.T.U. Il donnait aux prolétaires de France une arme solide dans la lutte contre la bourgeoisie. Il faut se servir de cette arme. Les directives pratiques qu'ont lancées dans ce domaine comme dans tous les autres les assises confédérales, doivent entrer dans la vie.

Il y va de notre combat pour la défense de l'U.R.S.S. pour la défense de la paix.

Gabriel PERI.



1 1586

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

**Que signifie cette démarche ?**

La réponse japonaise se termine par l'assurance hypocrite que le Japon « s'est attaché à ne nuire en aucune façon aux intérêts de l'Union Soviétique ».

Mais en même temps qu'était envoyée cette note, le gouvernement japonais chargeait son ambassadeur à Moscou, M. Hiroto, « d'avertir amicalement » Litvinov des graves complications que pourrait entraîner l'envoi par l'Union des Soviets de troupes (?) dans le Nord de la Mandchourie ».

Que signifie cette démarche plus qu'insolente, mais nettement provocatrice ? De quelles complications s'agit-il, sinon d'une menace d'action militaire contre l'U.R.S.S. ?

Le but est clair, Maîtres de Tsitsikar, ayant *en fait* coupé l'Est chinois, les Japonais s'appêtent à en arrêter le fonctionnement.

Il est clair que ce serait là une atteinte aux intérêts de l'U.R.S.S. que nos camarades ne pourraient laisser sans réplique, tout en poursuivant avec persévérance leur politique ferme de consécration de la paix. Mais il faut s'attendre à ce que les impérialistes fassent tout pour provoquer un conflit armé, allant jusqu'à des raids de gardes blancs contre l'administration et les fonctionnaires soviétiques de l'Est chinois où, comme en 1929, contre le consulat soviétique de Kharbine. Une violation de la frontière soviétique, dans l'état de tension actuel n'est même pas exclue quand on connaît les désirs d'agression antisoviétique qui animent les canailles de Tokio, de Paris, de Londres et de Washington. La démarche de l'ambassadeur semble alors préparer le terrain pour ce crime concerté.

La situation est donc des plus inquiétantes et le danger de guerre antisoviétique imminent. — M.M.



1 581

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

48-20

Enclosure No. 4 to Despatch No. 2006  
of November 24, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'INFORMATION, November 20, 1931.

Les troupes du Japon continuent en Mandchourie leur marche en avant sans qu'on puisse apercevoir jusqu'où les événements conduiront cette manœuvre « de protection » et le Conseil de la Société des Nations, organe de la diplomatie publique, continue, sans qu'on puisse en découvrir le terme, ses efforts d'apaisement. Cependant, il y a quelques progrès dans les esprits sinon dans les faits. On est revenu d'illusions. On ne s'attarde plus à mettre sur pied l'impossible. On a admis que les affaires de Chine ne peuvent pas être traitées selon les principes que l'on souhaiterait appliquer à l'Europe. On comprend qu'il y faut des précautions spéciales et des méthodes particulières. On reconnaît enfin que les troupes japonaises qui ont la charge, de par les traités, de garder le chemin de fer, n'aient fait, en sortant de cette zone, que suivre une pratique constante, celle qui veut que les navires de guerre étrangers qui remontent les fleuves chinois, les marins et soldats étrangers qui sont débarqués sur le sol chinois agissent, non en vertu de droits formels, mais en vertu d'une pratique imposée par le chaos qui règne en Chine. Cette considération permettra peut-être au Conseil de la S. D. N. de proposer l'organisation d'une enquête sérieuse portant sur les conditions dans lesquelles s'exerce l'autorité gouvernementale en Chine et subsidiairement sur les plaintes du Japon. Il semble qu'aucune des parties ne pourrait refuser cette procédure raisonnable. Il conviendrait seulement d'en décider promptement avant que les querelles, les exagérations et les fausses nouvelles n'aient à envenimer davantage encore un différend qui s'est trop étendu.



Enclosure No. 5 to Despatch No. 2006  
of November 24, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE JOURNAL, November 20, 1931.

## Est-ce la solution du conflit de Mandchourie ?

**Le Japon accepte  
l'enquête de la S.D.N.  
en ajournant  
les points fondamentaux**

Les fidèles du culte de Genève doivent en prendre leur parti. Si on peut entrevoir aujourd'hui une solution du conflit sino-japonais, ce n'est pas par la multiplication des séances confidentielles du conseil, et c'est encore moins



L'arrivée au Quai d'Orsay de sir ERIC DRUMMOND (à gauche), secrétaire général de la S. D. N.

par les palabres de caractère juridique et théorique. Le succès qui paraît maintenant presque assuré viendra uniquement du large effort de conciliation sur le plan politique dont les auteurs ont été le général Dawes, sir John Simon et M. Matsudaira, auxquels on doit ajouter aujourd'hui M. Aristide Briand.

Cela a été peut-être, en effet, le trait le plus intéressant de la journée que le ministre des affaires étrangères français a su comprendre le parti à tirer de l'évolution japonaise que nous indiquions hier. Ce serait déjà quelque chose que de constater ainsi que l'espérance ne s'est pas évanouie en quelques heures.

Mais on peut pousser l'optimisme plus loin encore. Hier, en effet, le projet de collaboration du Japon et de la Société des nations n'était qu'une esquisse, tracée à Paris sous réserve de l'adhésion de Tokio. Il s'agissait seulement de former un comité d'observation envoyé sur place. La formation même de ce comité était subordonnée à l'adhésion formelle de la Chine aux cinq points fondamentaux entraînant la confirmation des traités existants.

Aujourd'hui, le Japon, certes, n'abandonne rien de ses droits. Il maintient intégralement les cinq points et ne dissimule pas la volonté formelle de les faire accepter par la Chine, mais il consent à laisser la chose en suspens jusqu'à ce qu'une véritable commission d'enquête constituée par la Société des nations ait formulé ses conclusions sur la situation non seulement dans les régions occupées de la Mandchourie, mais dans tout l'ensemble du territoire chinois.

Dès le début de la soirée d'hier, des informations reçues de Tokio laissaient prévoir une adhésion des dirigeants japonais aux initiatives hardies prises par leurs délégués de Paris à la suite des conversations de M. Matsudaira avec sir John Simon et le général Dawes. Les instructions officielles du gouvernement japonais, qui confirment l'impression favorable, sont arrivées à minuit.

Ainsi, non seulement le Japon accepte de collaborer avec la Société des nations, mais il lui laisse la direction du jeu dans des conditions telles que l'on ne voit guère comment la Chine pourra refuser. N'est-ce pas un renversement complet de la situation ?

Depuis deux mois, c'est la Chine qui s'abritait derrière la Ligue de Genève. Elle avait obtenu presque la fixation d'un délai d'évacuation, en tout cas, la constatation que le seul fait de l'adhésion chinoise à la charte de la Société des nations était une garantie suffisante de correction internationale. Ainsi, devant les demandes de confirmation des traités présentées par le Japon à la Chine, la Société des nations se trouvait exactement dans la situation de gens du meilleur monde qui seraient obligés de demander des garanties de bonne éducation à un intrus fourvoyé dans une société choisie.

Quel a été le résultat ? La Chine en est arrivée à déclarer qu'elle refuse de reconnaître les traités parfaitement réguliers signés et ratifiés en bonne et due forme, et à menacer les membres du conseil de provoquer des éclats si on s'avisait de l'inviter à confirmer ses engagements.

En attendant, les provocations se multiplient. Quelle meilleure occasion pour le Japon de venir dire à la Société des nations : « Allez donc voir ce qui se passe là-bas. Vous jugerez s'il est possible de trouver d'autres garanties de sécurité que la discipline des troupes japonaises. Vous verrez s'il est possible de fonder un régime d'ordre sur autre chose que les garanties inscrites dans les traités que la Chine prétend considérer comme de simples chiffons de papier. »

Est-il si surprenant que le Japon ait saisi la balle au bond ? A la veille même de l'ouverture du conseil, nous envisagions la possibilité de cette enquête de la Société des nations en Mandchourie. Nous aurions même pu ajouter que la combinaison avait, dès ce moment, l'assentiment du commandant des troupes d'occupation nippones, le général Hienjo, et du consul général japonais à Moukden, M. Hayashi.

C'est que la situation a bien changé depuis le début du conflit. A ce moment, le Japon s'opposait catégoriquement à l'enquête que la Société des nations avait toujours désirée, parce que l'investigation semblait dirigée contre son intervention. Aujourd'hui, l'enquête doit porter sur l'état de fait actuel. Le Japon a le droit de penser que le geste n'est pas seulement très habile, puisqu'il ouvre une issue à l'impasse en donnant une grande satisfaction à la Société des nations, mais qu'il est aussi avantageux, puisqu'il rejette sur la Chine la responsabilité de prouver sa sagesse.

La Chine peut prouver sa sagesse d'abord en acceptant la combinaison, bien qu'elle implique la négociation ultérieure sur les cinq points fondamentaux. Elle peut aussi prouver sa sagesse en mettant la commission d'enquête en face de l'ordre rétabli. C'est pour le coup que la solution serait satisfaisante.

Si vraiment les choses tournaient ainsi, la Société des nations pourrait être fière du succès que lui aurait ménagé le Japon. Mais l'évolution peut ne pas être tout à fait aussi favorable.

En somme, après les instructions que le délégué japonais a reçues à minuit, on peut espérer que la journée qui commence marquera une évolution décisive. On prévoit une réunion du conseil dans l'après-midi. Elle sera précédée, dans la matinée, d'une conversation de M. Briand avec le général Dawes.



L'entrevue devait avoir lieu hier soir. Son ajournement a été assez commenté et pourtant il s'explique de la manière la plus naturelle. Le général Dawes avait à répondre aux demandes d'information téléphoniques de son ministre des affaires étrangères. Il n'avait aucune raison de presser son entretien avec M. Briand puisqu'il fallait attendre la réponse du gouvernement de Tokio.

Nous avons pu dans cette étude négliger presque complètement les événements de la journée : une petite réunion du conseil, des conversations de M. Briand avec M. Matsudaira, M. Ioshizawa et le D<sup>r</sup> Sze, même une note incendiaire de la Chine, tout cela n'a fait qu'occuper la scène. Le véritable intérêt était ailleurs. — S.-E.

## LES TRAITÉS que la Chine conteste

C'est peut-être le moment de se rappeler que les traités avec le Japon ne sont pas les seuls dont les Chinois cherchent à se dégager. La Chine traite avec la même désinvolture les traités qui ont accordé aux étrangers des garanties d'exterritorialité. N'a-t-elle pas émis la prétention de fixer elle-même l'échéance du 1<sup>er</sup> janvier 1932 pour le retour au droit commun, sans se préoccuper de savoir si, à cette date, elle aura réalisé des accords avec les puissances dont les droits sont consacrés par les fameux traités dits « inégaux » ? Le cas est d'autant plus intéressant que l'affaire évolue autour des décisions de la conférence de Washington de 1922, dont les Chinois cherchent à se prévaloir pour mettre le Japon en accusation devant les grandes puissances.

La conférence de Washington, tout comme la Société des nations, est allée au-devant de l'évolution de la Chine. Elle a tenu à montrer que le monde civilisé s'empresserait de supprimer le régime d'exterritorialité dès que la Chine offrirait aux étrangers le minimum de garanties nécessaires que ceux-ci sont en droit d'attendre d'un Etat organisé. Quand il s'est agi de passer à l'exécution, on a dû constater que la condition n'était pas remplie. La situation n'a pas sensiblement changé depuis que la commission internationale de 1926 a recommandé l'expectative.

Il ne faudrait tout de même pas oublier que tous les pays qui sont arrivés à se dégager de l'exterritorialité ont dû procéder par étapes. Le Japon lui-même a attendu dix ans après avoir adopté tout le mécanisme occidental et la direction d'un gouvernement parfaitement effectif. L'Egypte en est encore au régime des tribunaux mixtes.

L'erreur des Chinois a toujours été de vouloir marcher plus vite que les violons, de prétendre supprimer les garanties des étrangers avant d'avoir pu prouver qu'ils sont capables de se gouverner eux-mêmes et de respecter la vie et les biens de ces étrangers.

Ce qui se passe est à cet égard une démonstration fort significative. C'est pourquoi les principales puissances européennes ont encore en Chine des concessions et des soldats, tout comme le Japon. La seule différence est que, pour le moment, les Chinois les laissent tranquilles. N'empêche que le jour où les traités japonais seraient mis en pièces, les autres auraient vite fait de subir le même sort.



Debut 20

Enclosure No. 6 to Despatch No. 2006  
of November 24, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from JOURNAL DES DEBATS, November 20, 1931.

La journée d'hier n'a amené aucun changement dans la situation. Le Conseil de la S. D. N., qui avait tenu une séance secrète le matin (les délégués des deux Etats en conflit n'étaient pas présents), s'est de nouveau réuni l'après-midi de 17 h. 30 à 20 heures. Il a entendu successivement M. Yoshizawa et M. Sze, qui ont, une fois de plus, exposé longuement mais d'une façon peu claire, les thèses contradictoires du Japon et de la Chine. Le Japon veut toujours faire reconnaître ses droits avant toute évacuation. La Chine continue à contester certains des traités qu'elle a conclus avec le Japon, particulièrement celui de 1915. Elle allègue que ce dernier a été imposé par la force. Cette argumentation ne paraît pas avoir été bien accueillie par tous les assistants, car, si elle était admise, aucun des grands traités qui fixent le statut actuel du monde ne serait valide; ce serait le chaos complet. D'autre part, en sens contraire, l'occupation de la région de Tsitsikar par les Japonais n'a pas produit une très bonne impression parce que le développement des opérations ne favorise évidemment pas les efforts de conciliation. Toutefois, il est assez difficile de se faire une idée exacte de la situation locale en raison de l'anarchie qui règne en Mandchourie; on ne sait jamais dans quelle mesure les généraux chinois dépendent réellement du gouvernement de Nankin. M. Sze invoqua à un moment donné le traité de Washington (dit des neuf puissances) et à un autre moment les articles 15 et 16 du pacte de la S. D. N., articles qui prévoient le recours à des sanctions. Mais ses déclarations assez vagues tombèrent dans un silence gêné et glacial; le délégué chinois ne paraît pas avoir insisté et l'on ne sut pas s'il s'agissait d'une simple suggestion ou d'une proposition officielle.

Aujourd'hui, le Conseil reprendra ses pourparlers secrets. La confusion est grande et toute prévision serait imprudente. Cependant, le Japon se montre maintenant disposé à accepter l'envoi en Mandchourie, par la S. D. N., d'une commission d'enquête ou d'observation, étant entendu qu'il exige toujours de la Chine la reconnaissance de ses fameux cinq points fondamentaux. Il y a peut-être là les éléments d'une solution. Attendons.

PIERRE BERNUS.



Inclosure No. 7 to Despatch No. 2006  
of November 24, 1931.

From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LA JOURNÉE INDUSTRIELLE, November 20, 1931.

## La Société des Nations devant le casse-tête chinois

Tandis que la S. D. N. continue à essayer de mettre d'accord les quatre points chinois avec les cinq points japonais, l'armée du général Honjo continue à poursuivre celle du général Ma autour de Tsitsikar. Si le sujet se prêtait à la plaisanterie, on pourrait collectionner les périphrases officielles employées depuis un mois pour ne pas appeler « guerre » cette guerre.

Mais le sujet, hélas ! est sérieux. Qu'il ait révélé le manque de moyens véritables de la Société des Nations est déjà grave en soi. Qu'il ait fait éclore des initiatives préconçues et des projets insoutenables n'est pas non plus pour arranger les choses. Qu'il présente des possibilités de complications redoutables achève enfin d'en marquer le caractère.

La Mandchourie est loin et la Chine est habituée à être le théâtre de conflits qui furent autant de rébus proposés aux deux douzaines d'Européens qui voulurent s'y intéresser. Ce sont des circonstances peu favorables à une conception saine du conflit actuel. On a donc raisonné à son sujet avec une négligence générale de ses véritables facteurs.

Il est curieux de constater à quel point nos réactions sentimentales, qui motivent naturellement nos opinions en politique intérieure, motivent aussi nos choix pour des questions extérieures lointaines qui mériteraient cependant, avant toute appréciation, une étude objective. C'est ainsi que nous assistons ces jours-ci, à propos de cet importun et insoluble conflit, à ce fait que les gens de gauche sont d'instinct avec la Chine et les gens de droite d'instinct avec le Japon.

Hors ces réactions instinctives et, par tant, d'une valeur très incertaine, il faut bien reconnaître que la définition du « droit » dans ce litige est infiniment difficile. La Chine peut se dire « chez elle ». Mais jusqu'à quel point est-elle vraiment en Mandchourie depuis la conclusion des traités auxquels le Japon se réfère ? Jusqu'à quel point, même, le général Ma dépend-il du gouvernement central chinois et exécute-t-il ses ordres ? Peut-on établir une différence formelle entre cette guerre et certaines autres qui furent dites « coloniales » ? La situation du Japon en Mandchourie est-elle très distincte de celle de l'Angleterre en Egypte, pour ne prendre qu'un des exemples qui nous viennent à l'esprit ?

Rien ne montre mieux, en tout cas, combien difficile à établir sera, demain comme hier, le poids exact et la répartition exacte des responsabilités dans tout conflit qui viendra à surgir. Le monde est trop vieux et son agencement trop compliqué pour qu'une loi formelle puisse régir toutes les causes, apparemment du même ordre, en Europe comme en Chine. Il faudrait pouvoir établir le degré exact d'évolution, d'indépendance, d'unité, d'ordre politique et social de chaque nation et l'équation à résoudre aurait chaque fois quelques inconnues nouvelles... La Société des Nations est une anticipation généreuse et c'est en la tenant prudemment pour telle qu'il faut travailler avec ardeur à lui donner, dans un avenir aussi rapproché que possible, les moyens d'accomplir effectivement son complexe labeur.

Jean PUPPER.



Enclosure No. 8 to Despatch No. 2006  
of November 24, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE MATIN, November 20, 1931.

## Le général Dawes mène la négociation en plein accord avec M. Briand

**On attend pour aujourd'hui  
de nouveaux développements**

C'est un fait bien connu : le général Dawes, l'« observateur » des Etats-Unis, tout en restant à l'écart des délibérations publiques et privées de la S.D.N., a pris la procédure en aversion. Homme d'action, le général Dawes se soucie davantage de la réalité immédiate que de l'interprétation à retardement de textes signés et, par surcroît, exécutés depuis vingt ou quinze ans.

Vivement ému par les perspectives vraiment décourageantes qui s'offraient à la négociation de Paris à l'issue des deux pénibles séances de mercredi, le représentant de l'Amérique a cru devoir se rendre tout de suite auprès de M. Matsudeira, de la délégation japonaise.

Et voici un bref résumé de la conversation qui se serait alors engagée entre les deux diplomates :

— En ce qui concerne les traités, dont la Chine conteste actuellement la portée, la validité, après les avoir, d'ailleurs, elle-même appliqués des années durant, aucun compromis, aurait dit le général Dawes, ne me paraît possible pour le moment.

» Ce serait vouer nos efforts de conciliation à l'insuccès que de continuer de les faire dépendre d'une décision définitive sur le point de savoir si telle ou telle convention relève de la « sécurité » ou non. Réservez donc ce débat juridique pour plus tard et cherchons une formule pratique d'accord qui puisse permettre au conseil d'accomplir sa mission.

» Sa mission ? Elle n'est pas, en effet, d'aller au fond des problèmes, mais plutôt aux termes de l'article 11, de barrer la route à toute menace de guerre.

» Reprenons donc, en les améliorant, les propositions que vous et moi, nous avons réussi, l'autre jour, à mettre

sur pied, et que votre gouvernement a, par la suite, refusé d'accepter. »

Ces propositions, il importe de les rappeler succinctement :

Le général Dawes et M. Matsudeira avaient donc décidé en principe :

1° De provoquer des pourparlers avec Nankin sur les cinq points fondamentaux de la thèse japonaise, les traités n'ayant pas un lien évident avec la « sécurité » et étant exclus de ce débat préliminaire ;

2° D'engager des négociations parallèles au sujet de l'évacuation ;

3° De négocier ensuite sur le fond avec l'assistance de délégués des puissances neutres.

Aux suggestions du général Dawes, M. Matsudeira a dû répondre ainsi :

— Le Japon comprend parfaitement la situation difficile dans laquelle se trouve la S. D. N. Après avoir pensé à lui, il veut aussi songer à elle. Mais mon gouvernement ne procédera à un nouvel examen de nos récentes propositions qu'à ces deux conditions : 1° D'abord, il faut que nous obtenions, nous Japonais, l'assurance que Nankin, aussi longtemps que se prolongeront les discussions ultérieures, soit à même de faire régner l'ordre en Mandchourie et de briser la campagne pour le boycottage de nos produits ; 2° La Chine, ainsi que M. Yoshizawa l'a indiqué avant-hier à M. Briand, devra ratifier *théoriquement* mais en bloc les contrats qu'elle veut inconsidérément répudier. Dans ces conditions, pourquoi la S.D.N., revenant à ses premières intentions, n'enverrait-elle pas en Mandchourie une commission qui contrôlerait la mise en application des mesures de protection ?

Cependant, le parallélisme entre les négociations sur l'évacuation et les échanges de vues relatifs à l'interprétation « formelle » des textes pourrait être établi.

Et le général Dawes de demander à M. Matsudeira, sans s'engager lui-même, de soumettre ce projet amélioré à Tokio.


Tard, dans la nuit d'hier, Tokio a répondu. Il a répondu, d'ailleurs, qu'il approuvait et les grandes lignes du plan et surtout les deux conditions qui lui servent de préface : 1° commission d'enquête ; 2° reconnaissance théorique de tous les traités avec la Chine.

Reste à faire adopter ce compromis par le délégué de Nankin. Ce ne sera pas la chose facile, si l'on en juge par ses récentes déclarations incendiaires.

Le docteur Sze a, en effet, la prétention de contraindre la S. D. N. à passer de l'article 11 à l'article 15, lequel autorise le conseil d'agir en dehors des parties et, par conséquent, sans que l'unanimité ait été obtenue, sur une motion quelconque. En outre, le délégué chinois se refuse toujours — il l'a affirmé hier encore à M. Briand — à payer l'évacuation par la ratification des traités « suspects ».

Peut-être, le docteur Sze sera-t-il prochainement dans l'obligation de se faire une raison car il est certain que nul ne veut plus le suivre dans l'expertise, la discrimination des contrats.

Voici la situation. Elle sera plus claire aujourd'hui, lorsque M. Briand aura vu le général Dawes, qui n'a pas pu se rendre hier soir au Quai d'Orsay, son gouvernement l'ayant longuement retenu au bout du fil



LE GENERAL DAWES

ambassadeur des Etats-Unis en Grande-Bretagne, vu par le président de l'American Club, M. Théodore Rousseau, au déjeuner donné en son honneur, mercredi dernier, par l'Association de la presse anglo-américaine de Paris.



Enclosure No. 9 to Despatch No. 2006  
of November 24, 1931.

From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ŒUVRE, November 20, 1931.

## Le document est-il authentique?

Qu'importe, au reste,  
si tout se passe comme si...

Est-il vraiment apocryphe, ce *Mémoire* présenté à l'Empereur du Japon le 25 juillet 1927 par le premier ministre Tanaka, exposant les grandes lignes d'une politique énergique en Mandchourie et en Mongolie, et dont le *Morning Post* de Londres et le *Journal de Genève* ont publié récemment des extraits? Malgré le démenti opposé, par la délégation japonaise à la S.D.N., à l'authenticité de ce document, le *Morning Post*, après enquête, s'affirmait convaincu de cette authenticité. Quant au *Journal de Genève*, après avoir enregistré le démenti japonais, il faisait les réflexions que voici :

1° Comme le reconnaît la délégation japonaise elle-même, le *mémoire* en question, publié non seulement en langue chinoise mais en anglais par le *China Critic*, a pu circuler fort longtemps sans être l'objet d'un démenti japonais, ce qui a semblé lui donner un brevet d'authenticité ;

2° Plusieurs Japonais, interrogés au sujet de ce *mémoire*, ont répondu, non pas qu'il était faux, mais que le baron Tanaka était fou.

3° Quant à la vraisemblance du *mémoire* Tanaka, nous dirons que si certains passages, comme celui où il est question de la conquête de l'Inde et de la domination du monde, nous ont paru assez surprenants, tous ceux, par contre, qui concernent la politique pratique du Japon en Mandchourie et en Mongolie se trouvent confirmés par ce qui s'est passé dans ces régions depuis 1927. Il y a là des détails qu'il eût été difficile de prévoir, plus difficile encore d'inventer.

Aussi notre sentiment est-il que ce *mémoire* ne doit pas avoir été « inventé de toutes pièces ». Ce qui est possible, par contre, c'est qu'il ait été un peu truqué et déformé par les gens qui l'ont traduit, à l'usage du public européen. En tout cas, le *Journal de Genève* a rendu service en le publiant, puisqu'il a amené par là la délégation japonaise à opposer un démenti à une politique qui ressemble beaucoup à celle que les militaires japonais font en Mandchourie.

Eh oui ! que le *Mémoire* du premier ministre Tanaka soit authentique, mal traduit ou apocryphe, tout se passe en Mandchourie comme s'il était authentique. Et c'est pourquoi nous croyons devoir en donner, à notre tour, des extraits qu'on trouvera plus loin.

Qu'on le veuille ou non, ce dont il s'agit en Mandchourie, c'est de bien autre chose que d'ordre local, de circulation de trains et de respect de traités contestables.

Il s'agit pour le Japon de s'arroger un droit d'intervention étendue qui, s'il était admis, constituerait un précédent — précédent que l'on pourrait, à la première occasion, invoquer en Europe même, en vertu de traités analogues à ceux sur lesquels le Japon prétend s'appuyer.

Comment, ce qui serait valable aujourd'hui sur les côtes du Pacifique ne le deviendrait-il pas demain sur tels rivages méditerranéens ?

Jean Plot.

## LES PROJETS DU JAPON d'après le « Mémoire Tanaka »

Après les considérations générales sur la situation politique et économique du Japon depuis la guerre européenne, l'auteur du *mémoire* écrit :

Les trois provinces de l'Est (la Mandchourie) sont un pays politiquement imparfait de l'Extrême-Orient. Pour notre protection propre et pour celle d'autrui, le Japon ne saurait écarter les difficultés en Asie orientale, à moins qu'il ne prenne une politique de sang et de fer. Mais, en mettant en œuvre cette politique, il nous faudra faire face aux Etats-Unis, que la Chine, dont la politique est de combattre le poison par le poison, va tourner contre nous. A l'avenir, si nous voulons contrôler la Chine, il nous faudra avant tout écraser les Etats-Unis, comme nous avons fait de la Russie dans le passé. Mais, pour conquérir la Chine, il nous faudra conquérir d'abord la Mandchourie et la Mongolie. Pour conquérir le monde tout entier, la conquête de la Chine est une condition préalable. Si nous parvenons à conquérir la Chine, les autres pays en Asie et ceux de la mer du Sud nous craindront et se rendront à nous. A ce moment-là, le monde verra que l'Asie orientale nous appartiendra et n'osera plus violer nos droits. Ceci est le projet que l'empereur Meiji nous a légué, dont la réalisation est essentielle à notre existence nationale.

.....  
Considérant les conditions actuelles et les possibilités de notre pays, notre meilleure politique est de prendre les mesures positives pour obtenir des droits et des privilèges en Mandchourie et en Mongolie. Elles nous mettront en état de développer notre commerce. Cela arrêtera non seulement le développement industriel de la Chine, mais aussi la pénétration des puissances européennes. C'est la meilleure politique possible.



Le moyen d'acquiescer de véritables droits en Mandchourie et en Mongolie est de se servir de ces régions comme base pour la pénétration dans le reste de la Chine sous prétexte de commerce. Armes des droits déjà acquis, nous nous emparerons de toutes les ressources du pays. Ayant les ressources de toute la Chine à notre disposition, nous procéderons à la conquête de l'Inde, des archipels des mers du Sud, de l'Asie Mineure, de l'Asie Centrale et même de l'Europe. Si la race de Yamato veut se distinguer en Asie continentale, la saisie du contrôle de la Mandchourie et de la Mongolie est la première démarche qui s'impose. Le succès final est pour le pays qui est maître du ravitaillement : la prospérité industrielle est pour le pays qui possède les matières premières, et le plein développement de la puissance nationale est pour le pays qui occupe un grand territoire. Si nous poursuivons une politique positive pour élargir nos droits en Mandchourie et en Chine, toutes ces conditions d'une nation puissante ne nous feront plus défaut. De plus, le surplus annuel de 700.000 individus de notre population sera pris aussi en considération. Si nous voulons inaugurer une nouvelle politique et assurer la prospérité permanente de notre empire, une politique positive envers la Mandchourie et la Mongolie est le seul moyen.

Après avoir exposé, au moyen d'arguments « historiques », que la Mandchourie et la Mongolie ne sont pas territoires chinois, l'auteur dit quelles doivent être les exigences du Japon « pour sauvegarder la jouissance des droits qu'il a acquis jusqu'à présent ». Suit l'exposé de moyens à employer pour mettre la main sur la Mandchourie en s'appuyant sur « les princes d'autrefois » que le Japon doit « reconnaître comme souverains et soutenir ». Un autre moyen indiqué est la protection de l'immigration coréenne en Mandchourie.

L'auteur du mémoire aborde ensuite le sujet qui est, aujourd'hui, devenu d'actualité, celui des chemins de fer :

La communication est la mère de la défense nationale, la garantie de la victoire est la forteresse du développement économique. La Chine ne possède que 7.200 à 7.300 milles de voie ferrée, dont 3.000 milles sont en Mandchourie et en Mongolie, constituant les deux cinquièmes de la totalité. En tenant compte de la grandeur de la Mandchourie et de la Mongolie et de l'abondance des produits naturels, il doit y avoir au moins cinq à six milles de plus. C'est dommage que nos chemins de fer sont en grande partie dans la Mandchourie du Sud, qui ne peuvent atteindre les sources de richesses dans les parties septentrionales. D'ailleurs, il y a trop d'habitants chinois en Mandchourie du Sud qui entravent nos projets militaires et économiques. Si nous désirons développer les ressources naturelles et renforcer notre défense nationale, il nous convient de construire des chemins de fer dans la Mandchourie du Nord. Avec la construction des voies ferrées, nous pourrions envoyer plus de Japonais dans la Mandchourie du Nord. De ce terrain favorisé, nous pourrions diriger les développements économiques et politiques en Mandchourie du Sud, aussi bien que renforcer notre défense nationale dans l'intérêt de la paix en Extrême-Orient. De plus, le chemin de fer Sud-Mandchourien était construit principalement pour des buts économiques. Il lui manque des lignes circulaires nécessaires pour la mobilisation militaire et le transport. Dorénavant il nous faut prendre les buts militaires comme notre objectif et construire des lignes circulaires, pour envelopper le cœur de la Mandchourie et de la Mongolie, de façon que nous n'entravions les développements militaires, politiques et économiques de la Chine. D'un côté, il arrête la pénétration de l'influence de la Russie, de l'autre voilà la clef de notre politique continentale.

Enfin, avant d'aborder l'examen détaillé des différentes lignes dont

le Japon devrait s'assurer le contrôle ou le monopole de la construction, et d'entrer dans le détail des avantages économiques afférant, selon les régions, à ces lignes, l'auteur du mémoire conclut ainsi la première partie — sorte « d'exposé des motifs » — de son travail :

D'autre part, le chemin de fer Sud-Mandchourien n'est pas suffisant pour notre usage. En considérant nos besoins actuels et nos activités futures, il nous faut avoir le contrôle des chemins de fer à la fois de la Mandchourie du Nord et de la Mongolie du Sud, surtout du fait que les ressources de la Mandchourie du Nord et de la Mongolie orientale donneront lieu à une expansion et à des gains matériels plus considérables encore. Dans la Mandchourie du Sud, le nombre des Chinois augmente dans des proportions telles que cela portera préjudice certainement à nos intérêts économiques et politiques. Dans de telles circonstances, nous sommes obligés de prendre des mesures agressives dans la Mandchourie du Nord afin d'assurer notre prospérité future. Mais, si le chemin de fer de l'Est chinois de la Russie soviétique veut s'étendre dans ce territoire, notre nouvelle politique continentale sera condamnée à un temps d'arrêt. Il en résultera inévitablement un conflit avec la Russie, dans un avenir rapproché. Dans ce cas-là, on assistera à une répétition de la guerre russo-japonaise. Comme le chemin de fer Sud-Mandchourien pendant la dernière guerre, le chemin de fer de l'Est chinois tombera entre nos mains et aussi nous saisissons Kirin comme nous avons fait jadis de Delrin. Dans le programme de notre agrandissement national, une autre guerre avec la Russie en Mandchourie pour obtenir les ressources de la Mandchourie du Nord semble une mesure nécessaire. A moins que cet écueil ne soit détruit, notre navire d'Etat ne peut avancer tranquillement. Il nous faut exiger de la Chine le droit de construire toutes les lignes militaires d'importance. Lorsque ces chemins de fer seront achevés, nous déverserons nos forces dans la Mandchourie du Nord aussi loin que possible. Quand la Russie soviétique interviendra comme elle le fera certainement, ce sera une occasion pour ouvrir un conflit.



Inclusive No. 10 to Despatch No. 1006  
of November 24, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE MONDE, November 20, 1931.

## LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS

### Les échanges de vues prennent une tournure favorable

M. Briand a eu hier d'importants entretiens avec MM. Matsudeira et Yoshizawa ainsi qu'avec M. Sze et il a reçu, dans la soirée, une communication encourageante émanant de Tokio

Les membres du conseil de la S. D. N. ont tenu, hier matin encore, à 11 heures, une nouvelle séance privée. Cette séance, à laquelle n'avaient été convoqués ni le délégué du Japon ni celui de la Chine, avait pour but de procéder à un examen complet de la situation, à la lumière à la fois des événements militaires de Mandchourie — occupation d'Anganki et de Tsitsikar — des déclarations faites mercredi après-midi, au conseil, par M. Yoshizawa et par le D<sup>r</sup> Sze, et enfin d'un projet de règlement élaboré par la délégation japonaise et dont les grandes lignes avaient été exposées à M. Briand...


Les conclusions auxquelles est arrivé le conseil, où sir John Simon, parti pour vingt-quatre heures à Londres, était remplacé par lord Robert Cecil, furent, comme celles de la veille, assez peu encourageantes. L'avance japonaise, en plaçant la S. D. N. devant un fait accompli, complique, de l'avis général, un état de choses déjà très difficile à débrouiller. Les explications fournies aussi bien par le représentant du Japon que par celui de la Chine ont été, d'autre part, si peu satisfaisantes qu'au lieu de présenter des bases de rapprochement, comme on l'espérait, elles ont plutôt souligné les points de désaccord entre les deux parties.

Quant au projet de règlement suggéré par les Japonais, dont nous avons annoncé l'existence hier matin et qui est, en somme, conforme, dans ses parties essentielles, au plan d'accord esquissé ici même la semaine dernière, il venait évidemment un peu tard et on était en droit de se demander si, après les événements d'Anganki et de Tsitsikar, il serait jugé acceptable par la Chine. Quelles propositions, en effet, la délégation japonaise avait-elle soumises à l'adhésion du gouvernement de Tokio ?

#### Le projet japonais

Son projet, qui est la résultante de multiples conversations entre M. Matsudeira, le général Dawes et sir John Simon, laisserait de côté, pour sortir de l'impasse actuelle, toutes les questions techniques de sécurité et de droits économiques. La Chine serait appelée à reconnaître en bloc les traités existant entre elle et le Japon, sans discrimination entre ces traités, dont nous avons signalé que trois seulement présentaient une grande importance. En retour de cette reconnaissance théorique, garantissant la vie et les biens de ses ressortissants, et qui constituerait une satisfaction donnée à Tokio, le gouvernement japonais, de son côté, accorderait à la S. D. N. son entière et complète collaboration, en vue du maintien de l'ordre en Mandchourie.

Sous quelle forme ? En acceptant enfin — ce à quoi il avait, jusqu'à présent, refusé de souscrire — l'envoi sur place d'une commission d'enquête par la S. D. N., commission composée d'attachés militaires et qui contrôlerait à la fois l'évacuation par les trou-



M. Sze

M. Matsudeira

pes japonaises des territoires occupés par elles en dehors de la zone du chemin de fer soumise à leur surveillance et les mesures de protection prises par les autorités chinoises pour garantir, dans les régions ainsi abandonnées, la vie et les biens des ressortissants japonais. De cette façon, dans l'esprit des représentants du gouvernement de Tokio, l'autorité de la S. D. N., d'une part, et les susceptibilités du gouvernement de Nankin, d'autre part, qui, depuis le début, n'ont cessé de réclamer la constitution de cette commission, seraient également sauvegardées. Enfin, aussitôt l'évacuation terminée, les négociations directes entre Chine et Japon sur les questions de fond pourraient s'engager, ce qui donnerait, sur ce point encore, satisfaction au conseil, qui réclame, pour que ces pourparlers s'engagent, le rétablissement du statu quo ante.

#### Les visites de M. Briand

Telle était l'économie de ce projet, auquel l'adhésion de Tokio n'était pas encore parvenue à Paris, mais dont les derniers événements de Mandchourie restreignaient énormément les chances de succès. Il est clair que le délégué chinois, qui y eût peut-être souscrit il y a quelques jours, était susceptible, maintenant, non seulement de se montrer plus exigeant, mais de demander au conseil, non plus l'application de l'article 11, mais celle de l'article 15 du pacte. En présence de cette situation particulièrement embrouillée, le conseil, sur la proposition de M. Briand, a estimé nécessaire de poursuivre, dans la coulisse, la série des entretiens particuliers, et il a chargé son président de recevoir à nouveau les représentants des deux parties. En conséquence, M. Briand a reçu successivement, hier après-midi, au Quai d'Orsay, séparément MM. Matsudeira, Yoshizawa et le D<sup>r</sup> Sze, qui avait eu lui-même, dans la matinée, une longue conversation avec le général Dawes.

L'entrevue entre M. Matsudeira et le ministre français fut assez brève. Elle avait été sollicitée par l'ambassadeur du Japon à Londres et elle eut, dans une certaine mesure, le caractère d'une visite de courtoisie. M. Yoshizawa étant le chef de la délégation japonaise à Paris, son collègue de Londres, qui est, on le sait, le beau-père du prince Chichibu, frère de l'empereur du Japon, était forcément tenu à une certaine réserve. Il l'a naturellement observée, ce qui n'a pas dû l'empêcher, cependant, de donner à M. Briand, à titre purement privé, certaines indications utiles sur les dispositions de son pays.

Albert JULLIEN.



Ce fut M. Yoshizawa lui-même qui lui succéda, dans le cabinet du ministre des Affaires étrangères. La conversation entre les deux hommes d'Etat paraît avoir porté sur deux points : la note résumant les revendications du Japon demandée hier à l'ambassadeur lors de son audition par le conseil, d'une part, et, d'autre part, le projet de règlement du différend sino-japonais dont il est question plus haut et qui prévoit l'acceptation par Tokio de l'envoi sur place d'une commission d'enquête constituée par la S.D.N.

Sur le premier point, M. Yoshizawa s'excusa de ne pas avoir apporté le document mais annonça qu'on y mettrait la dernière main et qu'il serait remis le soir même au Quai d'Orsay. Sur le second, il déclara n'avoir pas encore reçu l'adhésion de Tokio, mais être en possession d'un premier télégramme signalant l'expédition des instructions définitives de son gouvernement. Ces instructions étaient donc en route et M. Yoshizawa offrit même à M. Briand de lui en téléphoner, dans la soirée, les parties essentielles si, comme il l'espérait, elles lui parvenaient assez tôt. En attendant, il ne put naturellement que communiquer au président ses impressions personnelles — impressions assez encourageantes, d'ailleurs, et dont, ainsi qu'on le verra plus loin, le caractère plutôt satisfaisant allait, un peu plus tard, se trouver confirmé.

Après M. Yoshizawa, ce fut le tour du Dr Sze, avec qui, en raison de l'indécision où l'avait laissé son entretien avec le délégué japonais, M. Briand ne put avoir la conversation prévue. Comme bien on pense, le représentant du gouvernement de Nankin protesta contre le développement des opérations militaires japonaises en Mandchourie et manifesta l'intention de saisir le conseil en vertu des articles 15 et 16 du pacte, c'est-à-dire en invoquant l'état de guerre et en réclamant des sanctions. A ce propos, il est vraisemblable que M. Briand — qui, le matin même, à la séance privée du conseil, lorsque la question avait été soulevée, s'était opposé à ce que le débat fût, jusqu'à nouvel ordre, élargi à ce point — s'employa de son mieux à calmer son interlocuteur et à lui recommander la patience et la conciliation. Ne convenait-il pas, en effet, d'attendre de connaître les intentions japonaises ?

Le ministre français devait, d'ailleurs, quelques instants plus tard, recevoir la visite du général Dawes dont nous avons, à plusieurs reprises déjà, signalé la grande activité et les efforts conciliateurs, et il tenait à échanger ses impressions avec lui. Mais l'homme d'Etat américain, empêché au dernier moment, le pria de bien vouloir reporter leur entrevue à ce matin même. En raison de ce fait et, aussi, en raison du retard apporté à la communication japonaise, M. Briand décida d'ajourner à 16 heures, cet après-midi, la séance privée du conseil primitivement fixée pour ce matin 11 heures.

### Une importante communication du Japon

*Cet ajournement inattendu va, semble-t-il, avoir d'heureuses conséquences.*

Nous apprenons, en effet, qu'à 21 heures l'ambassade du Japon a fait remettre au Quai d'Orsay une communication dont le caractère particulièrement encourageant pourrait être de nature à améliorer sensiblement la situation et, avec de la bonne volonté de part et d'autre, à faciliter un accord. D'après les indications qu'il nous a été possible de recueillir malgré l'heure tardive, l'attitude adoptée par le gouvernement de Tokio serait désormais beaucoup plus conciliante. S'il persiste notamment à considérer le cinquième de ses « points fondamentaux », qui a été jusqu'ici le grand obstacle à une entente, comme présentant une importance capitale, il paraît reconnaître maintenant que ce point englobe des questions de fond et constitue, par suite, un sujet de négociations directes entre le Japon et la Chine.

Il n'estimerait donc plus indispensable une acceptation immédiate et sans réserve de ce cinquième point.

En ce qui concerne l'envoi sur place par la S. D. N. d'une commission d'enquête, dont M. Briand s'informait hier après-midi s'il était accepté par Tokio, le gouvernement japonais y souscrit enfin en demandant toutefois que les membres de cette commission soient impartialement choisis — ce qui va de soi, — que l'enquête ne porte pas seulement sur les événements de Mandchourie, mais aussi sur l'agitation antijaponaise, le boycottage des marchandises japonaises, etc., dans le reste de la Chine, ainsi que sur les agissements des soldats chinois débandés et l'activité intolérable des bandits.

Enfin, en raison de l'envoi de cette commission d'enquête sur place, commission dont le conseil de la S. D. N. devra forcément attendre le rapport pour se faire une opinion et émettre un avis motivé, le cabinet de Tokio consentirait provisoirement, pour faciliter un accord, à retirer sa demande de reconnaissance immédiate, par le gouvernement de Nankin, des cinq points fondamentaux.

En retour, il souhaiterait que le conseil de la S. D. N. reprit, en ce qui concerne l'évacuation, les termes de sa résolution du 30 septembre, résolution qui avait été adoptée à l'unanimité, c'est-à-dire les vœux de la Chine et du Japon comprises, et d'après laquelle le Japon s'engageait à évacuer non pas à une date déterminée, mais dans le plus bref délai, le territoire occupé par ses troupes en dehors de la zone du chemin de fer, sous la seule condition que la sécurité des biens et des ressortissants japonais serait assurée par la Chine.

Si on rapproche ces indications de celles que nous donnons plus haut concernant le projet de règlement soumis à Tokio par la délégation japonaise de Paris, on ne peut que constater le très notable progrès accompli depuis vingt-quatre heures du côté japonais et y voir enfin un acheminement très net vers une solution satisfaisante du présent conflit.

A. J.



Enclosure No. 11 to Despatch No. 2006  
of November 24, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE QUOTIDIEN, November 20, 1931.

### M. Briand et le général Dawes s'efforcent de rapprocher les points de vue divergents de la Chine et du Japon

Le Conseil de la S. D. N. languissait, depuis quatre jours, dans une impasse ténébreuse. Un lumignon est apparu qui devait, semblait-il, lui permettre d'y voir plus clair et de s'en tirer. On a deviné qu'il s'agit d'une commission d'enquête.

On se souvient que, dès le début du conflit mandchou, la Chine demandait l'envoi sur place d'une commission neutre. Le Japon, d'abord réticent, a fini ces temps derniers par annoncer qu'il ne s'opposerait pas à cette procédure.

En désespoir de cause et devant une situation de plus en plus difficile et tendue, c'est à une solution de ce genre que s'est rallié le Conseil, d'accord avec le général Dawes. Tokio a donc été saisi d'une proposition officielle de la S. D. N. tendant à l'envoi en Mandchourie d'une commission d'enquête.

Entendons-nous bien. Ce dont il s'agit dans ce projet de compromis, ce n'est point d'engager une enquête comme celle dont il fut question mercredi soir et qui aurait eu pour but de rechercher si la Chine est en condition de se gouverner.

Il s'agit seulement de l'envoi en Mandchourie, d'une commission de la S. D. N. qui, après avoir établi son rapport, devra le communiquer au Conseil, auquel il appartiendra alors de se prononcer.

— Ceci est bien vague, bien incertain, objectent quelques-uns.

— Et si l'une des parties en cause refuse, en définitive, d'obtempérer, même alors, aux suggestions du Conseil ?...

Ces difficultés n'échappent à personne. Mais, quoi, il faut aller au plus pressé, « détendre », — c'est l'expression dont on se sert — une situation déjà trop tendue.

En résumé : gagner du temps.

En attendant que cette solution — qui n'en est pas une — vienne tirer d'affaire le Conseil, les conversations continuent autour des exigences — toujours les mêmes — de Tokio, décidé à faire accepter en bloc, par la Chine, les trois traités dont nous parlions hier.

Or, de ces trois traités, il en est un surtout — celui de 1905 — que la Chine pour des motifs déjà exposés, considère comme nul et ne la liant pas. Les deux autres sont sujets à diverses interprétations et le gouvernement de Nankin propose précisément de s'en remettre à la Cour de La Haye du soin de les interpréter.

En soi, cette procédure est inattaquable. Mais le Japon a refusé jusqu'à présent de s'y laisser engager. C'est d'ailleurs son droit strict, puisque Tokio n'a jamais signé la clause facultative d'arbitrage prévue dans le Pacte.

Les négociations et conversations particulières d'hier, à Paris, ont porté sur les différentes questions que nous venons succinctement d'exposer.

En attendant, une note chinoise remise au secrétariat de la S. D. N., précise que le gouvernement national n'acceptera jamais d'engager et de poursuivre avec Tokio des pourparlers directs sous la pression de l'occupation militaire. C'est exactement le contre-pied de la position prise par Tokio et qui consiste à poursuivre, d'abord, avec Nankin des entretiens directs et à n'évacuer la Mandchourie qu'une fois terminées ces conversations.

Là, on ne sort pas de l'impasse. Les positions restent les mêmes. Mais enfin, il semble que le Japon soit maintenant décidé à accepter l'envoi en Mandchourie d'une commission d'enquête. Si faible que soit cette concession, si limitée qu'en doive être vraisemblablement le résultat, au moins est-ce une première mesure d'apaisement.

Dans la situation actuelle du conflit, le Conseil n'a pas à rechercher de grandes victoires diplomatiques, de solutions retentissantes.

Aussi annonce-t-on une séance privée pour ce matin. Il est probable que la séance publique du Conseil n'aura pas lieu avant demain.

Et la commission d'enquête sortira, nouvelle née, de ces journées laborieuses et décevantes...

Après... on verra. — T.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 12 to Despatch No. 2006  
of November 24, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LA REPUBLIQUE, November 20, 1931.

### **L'immense effort de M. Briand pour maintenir la paix en Asie**

M. Aristide Briand a mis, hier matin, le Conseil des ministres au courant de la négociation conduite par le Conseil de la S. D. N.

Le ministre des Affaires étrangères s'est montré extrêmement net dans son exposé. Il a convaincu ses collègues de la nécessité de mettre au service de la cause de la paix asiatique toutes les ressources de la politique française.

Le Conseil des ministres a chargé M. Briand de négocier avec l'ambassadeur du Japon à Londres, le général Dawes et le représentant de la Chine.

Toute la journée a été occupée par ces diverses entrevues.

Il n'est pas encore, à l'heure actuelle, permis de dire que le résultat souhaité est atteint.

Il faut songer qu'on négocie avec des hommes d'Orient, subtils et lointains, mal préparés aux jeux des arbitrages occidentaux.

Nos lecteurs savent que la tâche qui incombe à M. Briand est des plus délicates et que, depuis bien longtemps, l'expérience d'un grand ministre n'a pas été mise à aussi rude épreuve.

Est-il besoin de souligner qu'un tel effort n'a pu être fourni que par un homme en pleine possession de ses moyens physiques et en complète euphorie intellectuelle ?

Tous ceux qui veulent à la fois le succès de notre diplomatie et le maintien de la paix en Asie souhaitent que M. Aristide Briand persévère dans son effort et gagne la partie.

**Gabriel CUDENET.**



TEMPS 20

Enclosure No. 13 to Despatch No. 2006  
of November 24, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE TEMPS, November 20, 1931.

#### LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS

Les efforts déployés pour régler pacifiquement le différend sino-japonais n'ont pas permis hier de réaliser des progrès bien appréciables. Les séances privées du conseil de la Société des nations et les conversations particulières qui eurent lieu entre les principaux membres du conseil, le général Dawes, « observateur » américain, et les représentants de la Chine et du Japon n'ont fait découvrir aucune perspective d'accord prochain. On annonce bien une suggestion japonaise pouvant fournir une nouvelle base de discussion, mais il faudrait en connaître les termes exacts pour juger de sa portée pratique. En attendant, la situation se modifie rapidement sur le terrain en Mandchourie. Les Japonais, menacés d'encerclement par les troupes du général Ma Tchang Chan, ont pris l'offensive. Avec des forces très réduites — moins de 3,000 hommes, assure-t-on — ils ont culbuté l'armée du général chinois forte d'environ 25,000 hommes et ils ont atteint dans leur marche en avant Angangki et Tsitsikar.

Il n'y a pas, à proprement parler, état de guerre déclarée entre la Chine et le Japon; mais on se trouve néanmoins en présence d'opérations militaires d'une certaine envergure qui changent du tout au tout l'aspect de la situation. Les fautes de tactique commises par les Chinois risquent ainsi de faire dégénérer en conflit ouvert ce qui n'était au début qu'un différend de caractère local. Les Japonais ont agi contre le droit international en prenant des mesures militaires en dehors de la zone du chemin de fer Sud-Mandchourien placée sous leur contrôle, mais les Chinois ont provoqué cette action, ou du moins ont fourni un prétexte pour l'entreprendre, en commettant trop d'imprudences et en encourageant le général Ma Tchang Chan à concentrer une armée improvisée dans la région de la rivière Nonni pour attaquer les Japonais et les rejeter vers le sud. Exposés à être encerclés et anéantis, les Nippons ont réagi vigoureusement et ont mis en déroute l'armée du général Ma Tchang Chan que sa grande supériorité numérique ne semble pas avoir sauvée d'une défaite. Toujours est-il que les Japonais sont à Angangki et à Tsitsikar qu'ils avaient promis de ne pas occuper mais où, expliquent-ils, ils furent forcés d'aller pour se soustraire à la menace que les forces du général Ma Tchang Chan faisaient peser sur eux.

On semble assez préoccupé dans certains milieux des réactions que l'avance japonaise sur Tsitsikar, donc sur le chemin de fer de l'Est-Chinois qui est sous contrôle russe, peut provoquer à Moscou. Tout porte à penser qu'il n'en résultera pas de complications russo-japonaises, le gouvernement de Tokio n'ayant certainement pas l'intention d'aller délibérément à un conflit avec les Soviets et d'enfreindre systématiquement les stipulations du traité de 1925 par lequel le Japon et l'Union soviétique se garantissent mutuellement leurs droits en Mandchourie. Quant aux Soviets, s'ils encouragent secrètement les Chinois à la résistance et s'ils essaient d'exploiter les difficultés actuelles, leur politique étant toujours et partout de profiter du désordre et de l'anarchie pour développer l'influence révolutionnaire, rien ne permet de supposer qu'ils envisagent une aventure qui les mènerait à coup sûr à un désastre et achèverait d'ébranler le régime communiste. Les craintes qui se manifestent au sujet de complications russo-japonaises possibles sont donc pour le moins prématurées et c'est le seul différend sino-japonais qui donne pour l'instant un aspect inquiétant à la situation et qui rend si difficile la tâche du conseil de la Société des nations.

Les explications fournies hier par M. Yoshizawa, représentant du Japon, et par M. Sze, représentant de la Chine, aux membres du conseil, au cours de deux séances privées, n'ont pas eu pour effet de dissiper la confusion dans laquelle le débat s'est déroulé jusqu'ici. En somme, ce qu'on peut en dégager, c'est que le Japon persiste à exiger la confirmation par la Chine des traités — surtout du traité de 1915 — dont il tient des droits spéciaux en Mandchourie et qui se rapportent à la protection de la vie et des biens de ses ressortissants, c'est-à-dire à la défense de tous les intérêts qu'il a réussi à se créer dans la zone mandchoue placée sous son contrôle. Par contre, la Chine s'obstine à refuser la confirmation de ces traités, sous prétexte que celui de 1915 lui fut imposé par la force, et elle cherche à faire soumettre à l'arbitrage la question de la validité de ces traités. C'est une thèse que le gouvernement de Tokio n'admettra en aucun cas, car cela équivaldrait pour lui à renoncer à ses droits, et, au surplus, cette thèse est des plus dangereuses à un point de vue général, car, si on peut bien s'en remettre à l'arbitrage pour l'interprétation des stipulations des traités, il n'est guère admissible qu'on ait recours à cette procédure pour décider de la validité même d'un traité régulièrement signé et ratifié par deux ou plusieurs puissances, quelles que soient les circonstances dans lesquelles eurent lieu cette signature et cette ratification. A ce compte, la validité de tous les traités pourrait être remise en question.

Ce qui complique si dangereusement le problème sino-japonais et la tâche du conseil de la Société des nations, c'est l'état d'anarchie

qui existe en Chine et qui ne permet à aucun pouvoir établi de prendre effectivement ses responsabilités, de maintenir l'ordre et la paix publique, d'assurer efficacement la protection des ressortissants étrangers dans le cadre des accords en vigueur qui doivent être respectés. Il n'y a aucune surprise, dès lors, à voir le Japon exiger des garanties précises pour ses nationaux et se charger lui-même de les protéger jusqu'à ce qu'il ait tous apaisements sous ce rapport. Ceci peut être gênant pour l'application sincère des principes qui régissent les relations entre Etats sur la base des traités et des conventions conclus de bonne foi, mais c'est une situation de fait dont on est bien obligé de tenir compte et qu'il n'est au pouvoir de personne de supprimer. Aussi le problème soumis au conseil de la Société des nations ne peut-il être pratiquement résolu que par un compromis qui, tout en sauvegardant les droits de chacun, ne méconnaisse point les réalités auxquelles on se heurte sur place en Mandchourie même. Si des suggestions tendant à donner aux Japonais la confirmation des garanties qu'ils tiennent des traités et à préparer des négociations directes entre Tokio et Nankin, en rétablissant l'ordre en Mandchourie sous le contrôle d'une commission de la Société des nations ayant une mission d'enquête et d'observation, offrent une perspective d'accord, il sera prudent de ne pas laisser se refermer la seule porte qui demeure entr'ouverte pour une solution rapide et durable.



A.F.21

Enclosure No. 14 to Despatch No. 2006  
of November 24, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ACTION FRANCAISE, November 21, 1931.

## Pratique de la force

Le Conseil de la Société des Nations, quand il était intervenu dans l'affaire de Mandchourie, avait oublié les traités. Il a trouvé le Japon plus que ferme sur le respect dû à la chose jugée et aux conventions conclues. Dans l'intervalle, le général chinois qui avait surgi comme les généraux surgissent, c'est-à-dire on ne sait d'où, a reçu une correction sévère, ce qui a permis de tout arranger. Le Japon, sur les traités, a gain de cause. Il accepte une enquête de la Ligue sur les lieux, étant entendu que les commissaires porteront aussi leur curiosité du côté du banditisme chinois. Enfin tout le monde respire et la face de chacun est sauvée.

Il n'en est pas moins vrai que les Japonais ont fait leur politique avec la Société des Nations, de même qu'ils l'ont faite avec les Soviets et les Etats-Unis qui sont en dehors de la Ligue, en se montrant très résolus pour pouvoir être conciliants. C'est l'application du célèbre principe : « Montrer la force pour éviter d'avoir à s'en servir. »

Et le recours à la force n'a pas encore épuisé son rôle dans le monde. Peut-être seulement est-il plus facile à régler entre les peuples qu'à l'intérieur des nations.

Le spectacle que donne l'Allemagne en ce moment est celui d'un pays qui est à deux doigts de la guerre civile. On continue de se tuer tous les jours. Les communistes et les hitlériens, qui mélaient leurs bulletins de vote au plébiscite de Prusse il y a trois mois, échangent des coups souvent mortels. C'est une situation qui ressemble assez à celle où se trouvait l'Italie à la veille de la marche sur Rome.

Ce qui est curieux, c'est que, dans ces batailles de rues, les hitlériens ne semblent pas avoir l'avantage. Hitler se plaint même au chancelier Brüning et au général Græner (qui cumule les fonctions de ministre de la Reichswehr et de ministre de l'Intérieur) que ses hommes ne soient pas assez protégés. Le chancelier et le général Græner accueillent ses plaintes, ce qui donne l'impression qu'on aimerait assez à proclamer quelque état de siège dont profiteraient les nazis.

Cependant, les communistes déclarent bien haut qu'ils sont résolus à la lutte contre le « fascismus » et à la lutte par la violence. Ils ont rejeté dédaigneusement l'offre de front commun que leur avait faite Breitscheid au nom de la social-démocratie. En effet, les social-démocrates veulent résister au fascisme par les moyens légaux, c'est-à-dire par la confiance à Brüning et à Græner qui, répondent les communistes, sont complices des hitlériens.

Voilà où en est l'Allemagne dans son joli ménage intérieur. De quelque façon qu'il tourne, une chose est certaine. C'était folie de prêter des milliards à ces gens-là. Ce serait folie de leur prêter aujourd'hui vingt sous. — J. B.



Enclosure No. 15 to Despatch No. 2006  
of November 24, 1931.

From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'AMI DU PEUPLE, November 21, 1931.

**LA GUERRE EN MANDCHOURIE  
ON SEMBLE CROIRE  
A LA S. D. N.  
QUE LE FAIT D'OUVRIR  
UNE ENQUÊTE SUFFIRAIT  
A METTRE FIN AU CONFLIT**

*Ce serait, en tout cas, le moyen  
de gagner du temps  
et de masquer pendant un mois  
l'impuissance du Conseil*

Un seul fait nouveau s'est produit au cours de la journée d'hier : M. Yoshizawa, premier délégué du Japon, a confirmé à M. Briand que son gouvernement acceptait la nomination d'une commission d'enquête et qu'il réservait, sans y renoncer, les cinq « points fondamentaux » posés récemment.

Ce geste de conciliation a fait subitement naître de grandes espérances. On le présentait, hier soir, dans les coulisses du Conseil, comme une étape importante vers la solution du conflit. Reste à savoir, toutefois, si la Chine consent toujours à laisser une enquête s'ouvrir en Mandchourie et si, dans l'affirmative, il s'ensuivrait nécessairement un armistice. Il ne faudrait tout de même pas perdre de vue que le rôle de la S. D. N. est, avant tout, d'éviter la guerre.

La journée a commencé par une visite du général Dawes à M. Briand. En sortant du cabinet du président, l'observateur américain a expliqué aux journalistes de son pays que le rôle des Etats-Unis dans cette affaire était assez particulier. Le gouvernement américain ne faisant pas partie de la S. D. N., ne peut invoquer que le pacte Briand-Kellogg et le « Traité des neuf puissances » qui garantit l'intégrité territoriale de la Chine, mais cela ne l'empêche pas de s'associer aux efforts de la S. D. N. pour ramener la paix en Mandchourie. « En tout cas, a conclu le général Dawes, les Etats-Unis doivent réserver leur entière liberté de jugement. » Ces paroles, prononcées au lendemain de longues conversations téléphoniques avec Washington et venant après la menace chinoise de faire appel à l'arbitrage américain, ont dû faire entrevoir aux membres du Conseil ce qu'un échec des négociations aurait de dangereux pour le prestige de la S. D. N.

M. Briand a donc, au début de l'après-midi, repris ses conversations avec les délégués du Japon et de la Chine.

Il a d'abord reçu M. Yoshizawa qui lui a communiqué verbalement les nouvelles propositions japonaises : le gouvernement de Tokio accepte qu'une commission d'enquête soit constituée sous les auspices de la S. D. N. pour rechercher sur place les causes du conflit et déterminer celui des deux adversaires qui est responsable des événements de Mandchourie.

Il consent, en outre, à réserver ses cinq points fondamentaux. Mais il ne les abandonne pas et, pour que personne ne s'y trompe, M. Yoshizawa a remis au secrétaire général une note précisant la position du Japon à cet égard. Il y est dit que la volonté du gouvernement japonais « reste inchangée et persistante d'entamer des négociations avec le gouvernement chinois touchant les principes fondamentaux relatifs aux relations normales entre le Japon et la Chine et touchant le retrait des troupes japonaises dans la zone du Sud Mandchourien ». Et la note rappelle que les cinq points maintenus par le Japon sont comme précédemment :

1° La répudiation mutuelle de toute politique et action agressives ;

2° Le respect de l'intégrité territoriale de la Chine ;

3° La suppression complète de tout mouvement organisé entravant la liberté du commerce et suscitant la haine internationale ;

4° La protection effective dans toute la Mandchourie de toutes les occupations pacifiques des sujets japonais ;

5° Le respect des droits du Japon en Mandchourie découlant des traités.

Après M. Yoshizawa, M. Briand a reçu M. Sze. Il ne semble pas que le représentant du gouvernement de Nankin ait accepté, lui aussi, l'ouverture d'une enquête, car les « Douze », c'est-à-dire les membres du Conseil moins les délégués chinois et japonais, se sont réunis à 4 heures et demi en séance secrète pour examiner si la proposition de M. Yoshizawa était acceptable par la Chine. La délibération s'est prolongée jusqu'à six heures. M. Briand a reçu immédiatement après M. Sze.

Nous saurons aujourd'hui si le gouvernement de Nankin se rallie à la proposition japonaise. Les « Douze » se réuniront encore ce matin et l'on prévoit pour cet après-midi une séance publique. — L. B.



Enclosure No. 16 to Despatch No. 2006  
of November 24, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ECHO DE PARIS, November 21, 1931.

## Le Conseil de la S.D.N. aux prises avec l'affaire mandchourienne

Les membres du Conseil n'aperçoivent d'issue que dans l'adoption du plan japonais de commission d'enquête qui leur permettra d'ajourner leurs travaux. Mais quelle sera aujourd'hui l'attitude de la Chine ?

De plus en plus, les membres du Conseil de la Société des Nations n'aperçoivent d'issue que dans l'adoption du projet japonais d'une commission d'enquête allant étudier sur place, en Mandchourie, les causes véritables du conflit. De ce projet M. Briand s'est entretenu avec M. Yoshizawa et M. Szé, les représentants du Japon et de la Chine.

M. Yoshizawa a pu lui déclarer qu'il avait enfin reçu une réponse favorable de Tokio, ce qui n'est pas surprenant puisque le projet est sorti, à l'origine des réflexions de la délégation japonaise. Quant à M. Szé, il ne semble pas avoir été très net. Sa réponse définitive ne sera remise que demain. Il voudrait naturellement qu'à la nomination de la commission d'enquête correspondît aussitôt le retrait des troupes japonaises dans la zone du Sud mandchourien, prétention inadmissible pour le Japon qui doit rester seul juge du moment où la sécurité de ses troupes et de ses nationaux étant certaine, il peut faire évacuer par ses soldats les positions qu'ils occupent aujourd'hui.

Il est vrai que, hier soir, dans la réunion officielle des membres du Conseil (hors de la présence des représentants japonais et chinois) lord Cecil a élevé la voix en faveur de la thèse chinoise. Il n'a pas insisté. Il est peu probable du reste que ces instructions le lui eussent permis.

En attendant, les nouvelles de Nankin sont mauvaises. Là-bas, quelques esprits surchauffés veulent continuer le chantage à la Société des Nations et parlent même de déclarer la guerre au Japon. Que dira exactement M. Szé dans la séance publique du Conseil qu'il a bien fallu lui concéder pour aujourd'hui après-midi ? Nul ne le sait.

Dans la réunion officielle dont nous avons déjà parlé, les membres du Conseil ont examiné de quelle manière le projet japonais peut être adopté le plus vite possible et avec le moins de difficultés. Ils ont reconnu que la meilleure procédure serait de ne point encombrer le projet japonais de commission d'enquête de détails additionnels. On a opiné que la suspension d'armes (on évite d'employer le mot d'armistice signifiant qu'il y a eu guerre régulière) devrait elle-même être agencée s'il était possible, par un arrangement séparé. Quant aux autres questions (négociations directes avec la Chine réclamées par le Japon, respect des traités, sécurité des Japonais, etc.) le projet de résolution éventuel n'y fera allusion que dans les termes de l'inefficace

résolution votée le 30 septembre par le Conseil qui, juridiquement, lie encore les parties et aussi, dans les termes des déclarations officielles faites depuis le 24 octobre par les gouvernements japonais et chinois.

Dans la pensée de la délégation japonaise, la commission d'enquête devrait être composée d'hommes éminents, militaires et civils, appartenant aux puissances ayant en Chine les intérêts les plus étendus. Le Japon aurait même désigné que la commission d'enquête étendit ses investigations à la Chine entière et sur le sort qui est réservé aux étrangers. Mais M. Briand semble avoir repoussé cette possibilité de complications.

Contrairement aux informations publiées, le général Dawes ne semble point avoir joué un rôle très actif dans les derniers jours. Il s'est surtout occupé de définir sa position vis-à-vis du Conseil. On lira par ailleurs la déclaration publiée à cet effet. Amère pilule pour le secrétaire de la Société des Nations qui, en octobre, avait réellement cru que les Etats-Unis faisaient, en fait, partie de l'établissement.



Incluse No. 17 to Despatch No. 2006  
of November 24, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from EXCHLSTOR, November 21, 1931.

## LE JAPON ACCEPTE EN PRINCIPE L'ENVOI EN MANDCHOURIE D'UNE COMMISSION D'ENQUÊTE NOMMÉE PAR LA S. D. N.

*Au cours de la séance qu'il tiendra cet après-midi, avec la participation des représentants de Nankin et de Tokio, le conseil de la S.D.N. s'efforcera de mettre les deux parties d'accord sur ce projet.*

### LA COMMISSION SERAIT PRÉSIDIÉE PAR UN AMÉRICAIN

Après une longue séance, à laquelle ne participaient ni le représentant du Japon ni celui de la Chine, le conseil a décidé hier de convoquer aujourd'hui, à 16 heures, une séance plénière au cours de laquelle on essaiera de se mettre d'accord sur les modalités et les pouvoirs de la commission d'enquête que, au cours de l'entrevue qu'il eut avec M. Briand, le représentant du Japon, M. Yoshizawa, a acceptée « en principe ».

En fait, si le Japon n'a remis aucune nouvelle note, les nouvelles instructions reçues par la délégation japonaise lui permirent d'accepter, ainsi que nous l'avons annoncé hier matin, l'envoi par la Société des nations de cette fameuse commission d'enquête que, jusqu'à ce jour, il avait toujours refusée.

Ceci fait espérer un règlement à l'amiable sans qu'on ait recours, ainsi que le voulaient certains membres du conseil, à l'application de l'article 15 du pacte, qui autorise la Société des nations à prendre toutes mesures utiles en l'absence des deux parties et qui peut mener à l'application de l'article 16 qui, lui, prévoit des sanctions économiques allant jusqu'au boycottage et au blocus.

Heureusement, nous n'en sommes pas là, mais il paraît certain que cet après-midi, l'on arrivera difficilement à mettre d'accord Chinois et Japonais qui, il ne faut pas l'oublier, ont le droit de vote et peuvent par leur refus rendre inopérante une décision qui doit être prise à l'unanimité.

Ad cours de l'entrevue qu'il eut avec M. Briand après le conseil, le docteur Sze très certainement exprima à notre ministre des Affaires étrangères les craintes de son pays tout comme il l'avait fait auparavant à de nombreux journalistes.

— La Chine, dit-il, accepte la commission d'enquête, mais elle désire savoir exactement quelle est la liaison entre cette commission et le commencement d'évacuation des troupes japonaises.

Le Japon, au contraire, qui n'a jamais parlé de commission d'enquête mais de commission d'experts, voudrait que celle-ci fût composée plutôt d'archivistes que d'hommes politiques. Or, au cours de la séance d'hier après-midi et pendant deux heures d'horloge, le conseil jeta les bases de cette commission, mais décida, avant de communiquer ses vues, d'entendre publiquement les explications de M. Yoshizawa et du docteur Alfred Sze.

On veut amener les deux adversaires à préciser exactement leur point de vue et l'on espère également les obliger à accepter des mesures qui ramèneraient petit à petit la paix en Mandchourie.

L'opinion générale du conseil est de nommer une commission ayant une autorité réelle et qui serait présidée par « un grand Américain » du type du général Pershing.

caine, après avoir été un des plus puissants banquiers d'Amérique, sans compter son rang actuel d'ambassadeur, ainsi que celui de créateur du plan qui porte son nom.

Telle est la situation à la veille d'une des plus importantes réunions que le conseil ait tenues jusqu'à ce jour. — MAURICE-RAYMONDE.

### DECLARATIONS DU GÉNÉRAL DAWES SUR L'ATTITUDE DES ÉTATS-UNIS

En rentrant à son hôtel, après avoir été reçu par M. Briand au Quai d'Orsay, le général Dawes a fait à la presse américaine les déclarations suivantes :

— J'ai été chargé de venir à Paris pour collaborer avec les représentants des différentes nations assemblées ici pour résoudre la crise qui s'est produite en Mandchourie. En tant que signataire du pacte de Paris et du traité dit des « Neuf puis-



LE GÉNÉRAL DAWES  
sortant hier du Quai d'Orsay

sances », les Etats-Unis sont vivement intéressés, ainsi que les autres signataires, à ce que soient réalisés les buts élevés visés par ce traité.

Mon gouvernement a espéré qu'un règlement, en accord avec les principes de ces traités, pourrait se faire par une méthode de discussion et de conciliation pendant la conférence de Paris, et que la présence, à cette conférence, d'un représentant des Etats-Unis contribuerait à obtenir une solution par cette méthode.

Les Etats-Unis ne sont pas évidemment membres de la Société des nations et, en conséquence, ils ne peuvent pas prendre part à une discussion portant sur l'application du statut de la Société. Etant donné que, dans la crise actuelle, les discussions de cet ordre peuvent surgir, il est évident que ma présence aux réunions du conseil est non-seulement injustifiée, mais pourrait, de plus, embarrasser le conseil lui-même. Cependant, cette position que doivent assumer ainsi nécessairement les Etats-Unis n'implique aucunement qu'ils ne sympathisent pas entièrement avec les efforts faits par la Société des nations pour ramener la paix en Mandchourie.

Les Etats-Unis doivent, en tout cas, réserver leur complète liberté de jugement.

LES CHEMINS DE FER ANGLAIS  
ET LE RAPPORT  
DE LA COMMISSION WEIR



Enclosure No. 17 to Despatch No. 2006  
of November 24, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from EXONLSIOR, November 21, 1931.

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L'opinion générale du conseil est de nommer une commission ayant une autorité réelle et qui serait présidée par « un grand Américain » du type du général Pershing, du général Dawes ou du juge Charles Evans Hughes, qui préside aujourd'hui la Cour suprême des Etats-Unis.

On lira d'autre part la déclaration que le général Dawes a remise à la presse après son entrevue de deux heures avec M. Briand.

L'ancien vice-président des Etats-Unis a dit à M. Briand le désir des Etats-Unis de collaborer utilement avec la Société des nations.

Nous ne serions donc nullement étonnés de voir la commission d'enquête présidée par un homme qui a déjà été vice-président des Etats-Unis, président du Sénat, général de l'armée améri-

caine, après avoir été un des plus puissants banquiers d'Amérique, sans compter son rang actuel d'ambassadeur, ainsi que celui de créateur du plan qui porte son nom.

Telle est la situation à la veille d'une des plus importantes réunions que le conseil ait tenues jusqu'à ce jour. — MAURICE-RAYMONDE.

### DÉCLARATIONS DU GÉNÉRAL DAWES SUR L'ATTITUDE DES ÉTATS-UNIS

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FIG. 21

Enclosure No. 18 to Despatch No. 2006  
of November 24, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from FIGARO, November 21, 1931.

**AU CONSEIL DE LA S. D. N.**

**Voyage chez les Célestes**

La journée d'hier, qui devait être décisive pour le règlement du conflit sino-japonais, ne l'a pas été. On assure que celle d'aujourd'hui le sera. Acceptons-en l'augure. Il s'agit, on le sait, de faire admettre par les deux parties l'envoi en Chine d'une commission d'enquête de la Société des nations. Le gouvernement de Tokio en a accepté le principe, bien qu'il n'ait fait à cet égard aucune communication officielle. Mais on ignore tout de l'attitude que compte adopter le gouvernement de Nankin. Cela provient surtout de ce que l'on hésite sur l'étendue des pouvoirs à octroyer à cette commission.

Autant qu'on puisse le savoir, le Japon voudrait que l'enquête portât sur les causes profondes du conflit actuel. Il souhaiterait que la Société des nations se rendit compte, non seulement en Mandchourie, mais dans toute la Chine, de la façon dont est garantie la sécurité des étrangers et l'exercice de leurs droits. Il s'agirait en somme d'une vaste enquête internationale, qui révélerait certainement que la Chine ne respecte pas les traités. On a prétendu que, si cette procédure était suivie, le Japon n'insisterait plus pour la reconnaissance par Nankin des cinq « points fondamentaux » que nous avons signalés. Ce n'est pas exact. Il n'exigerait peut-être pas, en effet, que cette reconnaissance ait lieu dès maintenant. Mais on a des raisons de croire qu'il n'évacuera pas les régions occupées de Mandchourie avant d'avoir reçu toutes garanties pour l'avenir. Peut-être serait-il disposé à renouveler sa promesse de retirer ses troupes, mais sans qu'un délai lui soit imparti, et à la condition expresse que la sécurité de ses ressortissants soit assurée. Or, elle ne le sera pas aussi longtemps que la Chine ne respectera pas les traités. Le Japon peut être ainsi amené à occuper longtemps encore Tsitsikar...

Quant au gouvernement de Nankin, il se trouve dans un cruel embarras. Du temps où le Conseil se rangeait à ses thèses, il se déclarait prêt à s'incliner devant les décisions de Genève, à accepter toute sorte d'enquêtes. Aujourd'hui que certaines puissances, éclairées sur la véritable situation en Mandchourie et les droits du Japon, ont changé d'attitude, la Chine serait tentée d'en faire autant et d'interdire aux puissances de se livrer à une enquête qui pourrait être suivie de révélations désagréables. Mais, sans doute, sera-t-elle forcée de céder, si elle n'est pas encouragée dans sa résistance. Les Soviets joueraient gros jeu en agissant ainsi. Il semble bien d'ailleurs que les membres du Conseil et les Etats-Unis soient décidés à envoyer une commission dans le Céleste Empire, aujourd'hui République qui n'a plus rien de céleste.

L'intérêt général pourra y gagner, mais le conflit sino-japonais ne sera pas réglé. La Société des nations, on ne saurait trop le redire, se sera révélée une fois de plus impuissante à remplir la haute mission qui lui avait été confiée.

James Donnadien.

**Les chinoiseries  
de la S. D. N.**



Parce que, dans la région de Tsitsikar, les canons japonais et chinois (ceux-ci fournis avec la garantie de Genève) font un accompagnement discordant pour ses ritournelles pacifistes sous la direction de M. Briand, premier violon promu chef d'orchestre, on n'est vraiment pas juste pour la S. D. N. Aussi croyons-nous devoir plaider sa cause contre ses meilleurs amis qui lui reprochent trop légèrement son immixtion dans ce qu'ils nomment improprement la guerre d'Extrême-Orient. Ce n'est pas une guerre, car, en ce cas, la S. D. N. aurait sans aucun doute rempli sa fonction en la conjurant. Ce n'est donc qu'un différend qui se règle par la force.

Sous cette réserve, nous estimons que jamais l'intervention de l'institut genevois n'a été plus justifiée et qu'il y trouve, pour la première fois, l'occasion de rendre un éminent service à l'humanité.

Jamais il n'y eut entre lui et un de ses clients harmonie mieux préétablie. Identité plutôt qu'harmonie, la S. D. N., par un phénomène de mimétisme où il entre beaucoup d'amour, reproduisant les traits les plus caractéristiques de l'Empire du Milieu avec lequel elle traite actuellement d'impuissance à impuissance.

D'abord, tout comme la Chine, la S. D. N. est incapable de remplir ses engagements internationaux. Fondée pour empêcher la guerre par le jeu de l'article 16 du Pacte, qui prévoit des sanctions contre l'agresseur, elle a depuis longtemps renoncé à organiser ces sanctions et même à définir l'agresseur. Elle y a renoncé dès sa naissance, c'est-à-dire depuis que la carence des Etats-Unis a entraîné pratiquement celle de l'Angleterre. Très loyalement, en effet, le gouvernement de Londres, après avoir accepté de participer éventuellement à des sanctions collectives, a déclaré ne pouvoir plus prêter un concours qui l'exposerait à un conflit avec l'oncle Sam.

Celui-ci ayant abandonné l'institut genevois après l'avoir mis au monde, l'enfant, comme presque toujours les enfants abandonnés, a été mal élevé et, livré à des soins mercenaires, a mal tourné. Cependant, il n'aurait pas été dangereux pour la Société, cette Société des Nations dont il a usurpé le nom pour mieux l'exploiter, si ses mauvais maîtres ne l'avaient jeté dans les bras du Reich dont l'idéal est la destruction des Traités que Genève a pour mission de maintenir.

Le Reich est entré dans le temple de la paix comme un obus. Il en a démolé le sanctuaire, cette autorité morale qui aurait pu survivre à un pouvoir matériel ruiné par la défection formelle des Etats-Unis et par la défection consécutive de la Grande-Bretagne. Le Reich ne s'est pas contenté de décliner toutes les obligations du Pacte, il a proclamé qu'il s'opposerait à ceux qui, pour les remplir, voudraient, conformément aux stipulations catégoriques de l'art. 16, § 3, utiliser son territoire pour secourir la victime d'une agression. Le jour où la S. D. N. s'est inclinée devant cette attitude destinée à isoler la Pologne et à légitimer la guerre



contre ceux qui, fidèles à son principe fondamental, feraient la guerre à la guerre, elle s'est reniée elle-même et s'est asservie à la Puissance dont les aspirations contredisent le plus brutalement ses obligations. C'est ce qu'oublie, ou affectent d'oublier, tous les thuriféraires de Genève.

Cette première ressemblance avec la Chine, l'incapacité à tenir ses engagements, entraîne toutes les autres. Comme la Chine, au point de vue national, la S. D. N. est une fiction au point de vue international. Comme elle, elle ignore ses limites. Nous ne parlons pas de celles de son pouvoir, le réant n'étant pas susceptible d'être délimité. Mais elle ignore jusqu'où vont ses droits, sa compétence et même ses prétentions. Prétend-elle annexer les Etats-Unis ou seulement les utiliser contre le Japon ? Comme la Chine, elle n'a d'autre souci que de se sauver la face, fût-ce au prix des plus audacieuses palinodies. Comme la Chine, elle abuse des stupéfiants, mais plus dangereusement pour les autres, car elle ne les administre qu'à ceux dont le sommeil risque d'être mortel. Elle n'est plus qu'une fabrique de morphine pour peuples pacifiques.

En faisant pour la première fois à Paris, et à la veille de la Conférence du désarmement, cette démonstration nécessaire, M. Briand et la S. D. N. ont enfin apporté une précieuse contribution à l'établissement de la vraie paix.



Hanna 21

Enclosure No. 19 to Despatch No. 2006  
of November 24, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'HUMANITE, November 21, 1931.

## LE QUAI D'ORSAY VEUT IMPOSER LA CREATION D'UNE COMMISSION CHARGÉE «D'ÉPURER» LA CHINE...

### ... C'EST-A-DIRE D'ORGANISER LA BASE D'OPÉRATIONS MILITAIRES CONTRE LES SOVIETS

Deux faits ont marqué pendant la journée d'hier la grande opération guerrière qui se poursuit simultanément à Paris et en Extrême-Orient, Paris étant le centre moteur, la capitale de la conjuration, le foyer d'où partent les directives et les inspirations.

D'une part, le Conseil de la Société des Nations se dispose à mettre la dernière main à la résolution qui doit consacrer la conquête de la Mandchourie par le Japon. Quand nous parlons du Conseil de la Société des Nations, nous commettons d'ailleurs une inexactitude de langage. Le Conseil s'est en effet réduit comme la peau de chagrin fameuse.

Après avoir décidé de délibérer dans le secret, il a exclu de ses débats les deux intéressés. Puis il a confié toute l'affaire à un aréopage plus restreint encore que composent exclusivement MM. Briand, Dawes et Lord Cecil. Ces noms sont ceux des puissances qui président à l'exécution du programme annexionniste de l'impérialisme nippon.

Quant à la proposition qu'élaboreront ces personnages, elle consiste essentiellement dans la nomination d'une Commission d'enquête en Mandchourie. Or, il est remarquable que le Japon qui ces temps derniers repoussait cette suggestion l'accepte aujourd'hui d'enthousiasme. Pourquoi ce changement d'attitude ? Parce que de toute évidence, la désignation d'un tel organisme chargé d'enquêter dans une région dont le Japon tient tous les points vitaux, ne présente que des avantages pour le Cabinet de Tokio.

Il est certain, désormais, que la Commission d'enquête sera la meilleure auxiliaire des visées japonaises en Extrême-Orient. Son rôle très précis — et M. Briand a donné à cet égard des assurances formelles à M. Yokishava — est de préparer un plan de contrôle étranger sur la Mandchourie. La Commission d'enquête, c'est la Commission de la conquête, c'est l'organe du dépècement de la Chine.

M. Henri de Korab n'en fait point mystère dans le *Matin*. Voyez en quels termes il définit la mission de la Commission :

En somme, la Commission de la S. D. N., qui s'en ira enquêter sur place aura, avant tout, à répondre à cette question essentielle : la Chine doit-elle être ouverte et fermée ? Après quoi, il lui faudra juger si l'intervention japonaise est favorable aux échanges internationaux et si elle constitue un remède partiel à la crise dans un important secteur du globe. Tout porte à croire qu'elle sera rapidement édifiée et l'on imagine aisément que rien ne serait plus désagréable à ladite commission, durant son séjour en Mandchourie, que le départ des troupes japonaises.

D'ores et déjà, il est certain que le délégué du Kuomintang contre-révolutionnaire souscrira à cette suggestion monstrueuse.

Tel est le premier fait de la journée d'hier. Voici le second : il se rapporte à ce qui se passe sur le théâtre des opérations. Nous avons écrit hier que tout était prêt pour l'agression antisoviétique. Nous pourrions aujourd'hui reproduire cette affirmation avec plus de force encore.

La prise de Tsitsikar a été saluée par toute la contre-révolution mondiale comme un encouragement à l'action, comme un appel à la lutte contre le prolétariat victorieux en U. R. S. S. La presse française félicite ouvertement les conquérants japonais. La *Morning Post* de Londres écrit : « Le monde entier doit être reconnaissant au Japon pour sa lutte contre le bolchevisme en Extrême-Orient ».

Les fascistes polonais, alliés de la France, écrivent que la Pologne doit profiter des événements asiatiques pour se délivrer du cauchemar soviétique.

Les journaux des Russes blancs de Paris exultent.

Nous avons vu que ces excitations avaient déjà favorisé l'envoi par le Japon à l'U. R. S. S. d'une note dont le caractère provocateur saute aux yeux. Hier, cependant, les journaux japonais protestaient de leurs intentions pacifiques à l'endroit des Soviétiques ; ils déclarent même qu'ils envisagent l'évacuation de Tsitsikar. Attendons-nous dans la période qui vient à voir le Japon user et abuser de cette tactique de la douche écossaise.

Il en est toujours ainsi dans les jours qui précèdent immédiatement la guerre et où tous les moyens sont mis en œuvre pour désorienter les esprits et désarmer la riposte populaire. Nous voilà donc prévenus. Sachons éventer le piège et déjouer la manœuvre.

La vérité est que la prise de Tsitsikar n'a point arrêté tant s'en faut les opérations militaires. Le Japon est résolu à poursuivre son avance vers le Nord, c'est-à-dire dans la direction des confins soviétiques et que le déclenchement de la conflagration sanglante est dès lors à la merci d'un incident de frontière. Dans le même temps, au Sud-Ouest, l'aviation japonaise vient d'écraser, au dire des agences, 3.000 Chinois.

Ici une observation s'impose. L'armée nippone est encadrée de gardes blancs résolus à déclencher la guerre contre les Soviétiques par tous les moyens. Parmi ces gardes blancs figurent certainement des contingents recrutés en France sous le haut patronage du général Weygand et de son ami Miller.

Mais quel est le sort des ouvriers, des paysans enrôlés dans cette armée ? Quel est le sort des paysans chinois que les officiers japonais ont embrigadés de force dans leurs formations ? Nous croyons bon de mettre sous les yeux de nos camarades le récit que publie à ce sujet le correspondant de l'*Intransigeant* en Extrême-Orient. Les soldats, explique ce reporter, sont équipés à la moderne, « mais gelés, affamés ». Et voici l'épisode que relate le correspondant du journal à Bailly :



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Beaucoup ont la fièvre, dans les wagons, parce qu'on les a vaccinés contre le choléra. Les cris deviennent de plus en plus violents, et finalement on ouvre les portes. Des sentinelles se tiennent auprès, baïonnette au canon... « Sui-sui »... Le cri pour demander de l'eau couvre tous les autres bruits... Lorsque les premiers arrivent près de la fontaine, le médecin explique les dangers qu'ils courent... La fontaine n'a pas encore été vérifiée... Au moyen de mégaphones, les officiers hurlent leurs « Schoengkoathse ! » le commandement de « Retournez dans vos wagons ! » Quelques-uns obéissent en faisant des difficultés. Mais des centaines restent près de la fontaine, se bousculant avec leurs gobelets. Ils n'entendent pas le bruit d'une automobile qui possède une mitrailleuse et qui prend position en face de la fontaine. Pleins d'effroi, quelques-uns se précipitent sur eux... Un nouveau commandement... Puis, voici le crépitement de la « chotzephau », la « machine qui envoie du feu » ; quelques-uns parmi ceux qui avaient pris la fuite tombent sur les rails, plusieurs s'écroulent en même temps ; une brève série de coups de feu... Mais les morts s'amoncellent en tas tout autour.

Les chevaliers servants de M. Briand en Extrême-Orient sont des affameurs et des fusilleurs d'ouvriers.

Faites connaître ces détails autour de vous, camarades.

Lisez aussi ce passage écrit d'une caserne rouge de Swertowsk : « Le haut-parleur de cette caserne militaire de Swertowsk donne en même temps une information du Schansi. Le « congrès soviétique panchinois » siège là-bas. La province chinoise du Schansi est tout à fait communiste ; 50 millions d'êtres humains, en Chine, vivent sous le régime soviétique ! »

Mais surtout organisez la riposte au mauvais coup qui se prépare, qui est déjà en voie d'exécution.

A ce sujet, notons avec satisfaction les manifestations dont la nouvelle nous est arrivée hier. A Paris, plusieurs réunions ont été consacrées avec succès aux événements d'Extrême-Orient. Des cellules se mobilisent pour alerter les travailleurs, comme le fait s'est produit à Saint-Ouen.

Plus importante encore est la manifestation signalée hier des gars de chez Renault, à la sortie de l'usine. Bel exemple, qui doit être suivi.

De bonnes nouvelles aussi nous parviennent de nos meetings de province.

Mais ce n'est là qu'un début. Avant-hier, à la Grange-aux-Belles, André Marty indiquait aux travailleurs la passion attentive avec laquelle nos frères soviétiques suivent les efforts des prolétaires français. Que vont faire les ouvriers de France ? Telle est la question que posaient à notre camarade des centaines de prolétaires de Moscou !

Il faut répondre et répondre sans tarder à leur interrogation pathétique qui est en même temps un appel à l'action, à l'organisation, à la lutte.

Gabriel PERI.



Enclosure No. 20 to Despatch No. 2006  
of November 24, 1931.

From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE JOURNAL, November 21, 1931.

## LA PROPOSITION

japonaise  
d'enquête de la S.D.N.  
s'est précisée hier  
et affrontera aujourd'hui  
le débat public du Conseil

Est-ce pour restituer à la Société des nations, en partie au moins, la direction du règlement du conflit sino-japonais ? Est-ce pour ne pas achever une grande semaine de session sous le signe de la diplomatie secrète, que l'on a décidé de tenir, cet après-midi, une séance publique du conseil ? Encore fallait-il pouvoir tenter l'épreuve sans risque d'éclat.

Quand le conseil s'est réuni, il y a quelques jours, on a dû se hâter de fermer les portes à peine entr'ouvertes. Aujourd'hui on croit à la possibilité d'établir le contact sans provoquer l'explosion des électricités contraires. Cela aurait-il été possible si l'on n'avait pas eu une amorce de solution ou, tout au moins, un élément de discussion pratique ? C'est là que l'on peut mesurer toute la portée de la proposition japonaise, qui est vraiment le pivot de la négociation.

Cette proposition n'a cessé de se préciser en évoluant. Il y a deux jours, quand nous en avons parlé pour la première fois, il était question seulement



M. MATSUDAIRA

d'envoyer des observateurs de la Société des nations tout en maintenant les autres conditions japonaises.

Hier, le comité d'observation devenait une véritable commission d'enquête de la Société des nations, et le Japon se contentait d'une reconnaissance théorique globale des points fondamentaux. Aujourd'hui, il semble que le Japon soit prêt à aller jusqu'à suspendre la négociation directe avec la Chine. Cela ne veut pas dire, certes, qu'il renonce à ses revendications.

Cela signifie que le Japon considère que l'enquête internationale doit conduire à la constatation de l'inexécution des traités par la Chine et des risques que cette inexécution entraîne pour la sécurité des vies et des biens des étrangers.

Dans la pensée des dirigeants japonais, l'enquête doit porter sur tout l'état actuel de la Chine ; elle doit rechercher dans quelle mesure il existe des garanties réelles des personnes et des biens. N'est-ce pas, en somme, le cas de tous les étrangers qui est en cause ? En Chine, la sécurité des étrangers ne repose pas sur les principes généraux du droit des gens, mais sur les clauses de traités particuliers qui établissent le régime d'extraterritorialité. Certaines puissances ont fait de grands efforts pour tâcher de dégager la Chine de ses servitudes. Aucune n'a réussi. Les Anglais eux-mêmes qui ont été les plus ardents et les plus empressés à faire des concessions, ont radicalement échoué.

En somme, pour la première fois depuis le début du conflit, la Société des nations a été invitée à cesser de considérer uniquement les effets du mal, mais à en chercher les causes pour tâcher de les supprimer. Or, quand on recherche les causes des déboires des étrangers en Chine, on retrouve toujours l'inexécution des traités.

Commence-t-on à saisir l'astuce profonde de la proposition japonaise ? Beaucoup l'ont accueillie avec surprise. Certains ont voulu y voir une retraite inexplicable, une véritable défaillance. Il ne s'agit de rien de tel. Le Japon ne songe aucunement à s'effacer de la Société des nations, ni à admettre un contrôle de la Ligue sur les rapports sino-japonais. Ce qu'il entrevoit, c'est la possibilité de se servir de sa collaboration avec la S.D.N. pour démontrer la logique de sa thèse et la légitimité de ses revendications.

Le Japon se flatte de ne pas soutenir seulement sa cause, mais aussi celle de tous les étrangers dont les intérêts se heurtent en Chine aux mêmes résistances et aux mêmes faiblesses ; il se flatte aussi de servir la cause de la paix en permettant d'étouffer dans l'oeuf le germe de luttes qui pourraient finir par une véritable guerre sino-japonaise ; il se flatte enfin de rehausser l'autorité de la Société des nations dont il est membre.

Voilà comment le gouvernement de Tokio a été amené à accepter l'idée d'une enquête. Voilà pourquoi il souhaite que cette enquête prenne toute l'ampleur possible. L'opération devrait être conduite par des personnalités jouissant d'une grande autorité, donnant des garanties absolues d'impartialité. Naturellement ces personnalités devraient être choisies parmi les puissances qui jouent un rôle de premier plan dans les affaires chinoises : il faut toutes les garanties de compétence et d'intérêt pour réaliser l'objectif recherché.

Voilà la thèse dont M. Yoshizawa a développé les traits essentiels à M. Briand, au cours de la conversation de trois quarts d'heure qu'il a eue avant la réunion du conseil à 16 h. 15. Auparavant M. Briand avait eu dans la matinée une conversation d'une heure avec le général Dawes, celle-là même qui devait avoir lieu la veille et qui avait été ajournée pour permettre au délégué américain de recevoir les dernières instructions de son gouvernement. Le général Dawes n'a pu manquer de témoigner à M. Briand l'intérêt que les Américains portent à des espoirs de solution auxquels ils ne sont pas étrangers. Il n'a pu manquer de dire aussi que, tout en souhaitant le succès des initiatives de la Société des nations et en désirant les faciliter, les Etats-Unis entendent réserver toute leur liberté d'action. Cet exposé n'a évidemment pas diminué l'importance de la proposition japonaise, surtout quand on se rappelle les nombreux contacts entre le général Dawes et M. Matsudaira.



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

M. Yoshizawa avait à peine quitté le Quai d'Orsay que M. Briand ouvrait une séance confidentielle des Douze, qui a duré deux heures. Au cours de ces délibérations, on a examiné la proposition japonaise avec un très vif intérêt. C'est en considération de ce projet que la séance publique a été jugée possible et que M. Briand a reçu mandat de tâcher de préparer les Chinois.

Il saute aux yeux, en effet, que c'est de la Chine seule que dépend maintenant la solution. Les autres puissances peuvent discuter les conditions de l'enquête, chercher des éclaircissements. Aucune ne peut méconnaître l'importance du geste de conciliation du Japon. Par contre, on peut toujours se demander quelle attitude va prendre la Chine.

C'est, évidemment, ce que M. Briand a demandé au docteur Sze au cours d'un entretien qui a duré trois quarts d'heure, de 18 h. 30 à 19 h. 15. M. Briand n'a pas manqué de poser au délégué chinois la même question qu'il avait posée à M. Yoshizawa : « Etes-vous disposé à arrêter immédiatement les hostilités si on décide la commission d'enquête ? » Le délégué japonais a fait une réponse nettement affirmative. Peut-on en dire autant du Chinois ?

Nous avons vu M. Sze, au moment où il sortait du cabinet de M. Briand. Il nous a donné deux indications précises. La Chine fait toutes réserves sur l'enquête dont elle ne discerne pas exactement la portée ni le caractère. Même avec l'enquête, la Chine considère comme condition première le retrait immédiat des troupes japonaises.

Nous n'en avons pas fini, on le voit, avec les difficultés. Nous entendrons encore parler du retrait des troupes, et aussi des conditions de l'enquête. Cependant, sur le terrain diplomatique, il est difficile que l'on n'arrive pas à s'entendre. Il y a malheureusement dans le conflit sino-japonais des éléments plus difficiles à maîtriser. Ce sont ceux qui se trouvent déchaînés sur le terrain même, en Mandchourie et en Chine. — S.-B.



Enclosure No. 21 to Despatch No. 2006  
of November 24, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE LUTIN, November 21, 1931.

## La Chine doit-elle être ouverte ou fermée?

La commission de la S. D. N., après son enquête sur place  
devra répondre à cette question et juger si la police japonaise  
a là-bas un rôle à remplir

« On semble s'acheminer vers une solution satisfaisante ». Voilà, avec quelques variantes, l'opinion de ceux qui ont suivi le développement des négociations de Paris au sujet de l'affaire de Mandchourie. Cet optimisme est justifié et il dépasse même, dans le temps et l'espace, la formule, plus ou moins ingénieuse, que l'on a trouvée pour défendre l'utile prestige de la Société des nations et pour ne point la mettre en mortel conflit avec les intérêts bien compris, pratiques, réels de la pacification et de la solidarité économique mondiales.

Ce n'est pas, à proprement parler, un revirement mais un effort raisonné des gouvernements membres du conseil pour sortir du cercle enchanté des considérations juridiques et pour trouver une solution sur le plan de la crise universelle, dont d'autres pays avant la France, et notamment les Etats-Unis et l'Angleterre, supportent depuis longtemps les effets.

Or, s'il y a bien des théories économiques qui se sont avérées fausses, il y en a une, pour le moins, que l'on ne discute plus : à savoir celle qui dénonce, comme une des causes essentielles de la crise, la mévente, conséquence de la fermeture de certains vastes marchés.

Et il n'est pas question ici des entraves habituelles au commerce, de l'élévation des tarifs douaniers. Ces mesures légales ne sont pas toujours prohibitives et, bien souvent, du moment que l'on connaît la hauteur d'un mur douanier, il est possible de calculer son prix de revient et son élan pour le franchir.

Par contre, quels que soient l'effort et la bonne gestion du producteur, il ne saurait songer à pratiquer un libre négoce en Russie. Un voyageur de commerce qui risquerait une promenade à travers les étendues soviétiques s'exposerait bien vite à la confiscation de ses marchandises et lui-même à l'arrestation, voire — les exemples sont fréquents — à une exécution sommaire.

Le même boycottage du commerce étranger, couvert en U. R. S. S. par un système prétendument légal, s'est étendu depuis quelque temps à la Chine, en raison de l'anarchie qui rend aléatoires tous les échanges, anarchie fomentée, pour une grande part, par des agents soviétiques, lesquels se sont de surcroît assurés la complicité des autorités locales.

On comprend dès lors le sens exact des paroles de M. Matsudeira, ambassadeur du Japon à Londres, qui a déclaré :

— Nos opérations en Mandchourie ne sont pas un acte de guerre mais un ensemble de mesures d'épuration et de protection destinées à assurer la libre circulation des marchandises et la sécurité des voyageurs.

Comme cette protection s'étend aux marchandises et aux voyageurs de toute provenance, l'argument ne manque pas de vigueur. Depuis quelque temps déjà, d'ailleurs, l'opinion américaine et anglaise a cessé de se préoccuper des conséquences politiques de l'affaire de Mandchourie pour envisager, avant tout, les répercussions immédiates économiques, commerciales de la présence ou de la carence des forces policières nippones.

En somme, la commission de la S. D. N. qui s'en ira enquêter sur place aura avant tout à répondre à cette question essentielle :

head, une bande de jeunes voyous, se disant membres du Comité antijaponais, a mis l'embarco, en gare de Kashing, sur un chargement de 171 douzaines de mouchoirs expédiés par une maison britannique, la *China Handkerchief and Weaving Co*, et fabriqués en Chine par des ouvriers chinois. En dépit de l'origine manifeste du transport, les marchandises furent confisquées et les convoyeurs « condamnés » à payer une amende immédiate de 3.000 dollars, soit dix fois la valeur de la cargaison.

La police, sollicitée d'intervenir, se refusa.

C'est là un exemple entre cent car le comité de Kashing a couché sur sa liste noire la presque totalité des produits et des maisons étrangères connus en Chine. Cette classification arbitraire est parfaitement admise par les autorités et suffisante à leurs yeux pour donner une apparence de légalité à des actes d'agression à main armée.

Les particuliers qui résistent, assure M. Woodhead, sont mis en état d'arrestation et ce dans les conditions les plus étranges, sans que les pouvoirs publics s'inquiètent le moins du monde de leur sort. C'est ainsi que le temple protestant chinois de Changhai a été transformé en prison par les organisateurs du boycottage. C'est au temple que l'on enferme les marchands récalcitrants. Pressée d'agir, la police répond qu'il lui est interdit de pénétrer dans un sanctuaire qui jouit d'une certaine immunité territoriale. Il va sans dire que cette immunité avait pour but à l'origine d'assurer la tranquillité des fidèles et non point de permettre à des brigands de séquestrer impunément des otages.

Je passe sur d'autres détails, telle la création sur plusieurs points du territoire de tribunaux entièrement illégaux qui prononcent des verdicts et, qui plus est, font exécuter leurs sentences à la barbe des autorités.

Voilà les faits qui ne manqueront pas d'être portés à la connaissance d'une commission d'enquête. Sur place, elle pourra pleinement apprécier le danger de supprimer une force de police dans une région de la Chine qui fut la plus prospère et la plus perméable à une utile activité du commerce mondial.

Henry de Korab-



Enclosure No. 21 to Despatch No. 2006  
of November 24, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE LATIN, November 21, 1931.

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« On semble s'acheminer vers une solution satisfaisante ». Voilà, avec quelques variantes, l'opinion de ceux qui ont suivi le développement des négociations de Paris au sujet de l'affaire de Mandchourie. Cet optimisme est justifié et il dépasse même, dans le temps et l'espace, la formule, plus ou moins ingénieuse, que l'on a trouvée pour défendre l'utile prestige de la Société des nations et pour ne point la mettre en mortel conflit avec les intérêts bien compris, pratiques, réels de la pacification et de la solidarité économique mondiales.

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Par contre, quels que soient l'effort et la somme, la commission de la S. D. N. qui s'en ira enquêter sur place aura avant tout à répondre à cette question essentielle : la Chine doit-elle être ouverte ou fermée ? Après quoi, il lui faudra juger si l'intervention japonaise est favorable aux échanges internationaux et si elle constitue un remède partiel à la crise dans un important secteur du globe. Tout porte à croire qu'elle sera rapidement édiflée et l'on imagine aisément que rien ne serait plus désagréable à ladite commission, durant son séjour en Mandchourie, que le départ des troupes japonaises.

Les témoignages les plus divers et les plus impartiaux indiquent, en effet, que le boycottage des marchandises japonaises est devenu, en réalité, en Chine, du pillage par des bandes sans mandat de toutes les marchandises étrangères. Le commerce, quel qu'il soit, est terrorisé, rançonné et les marchands arrêtés et molestés par des brigands bien armés qui agissent pour leur propre compte en se donnant des allures de justiciers.

J'ai sous les yeux un article d'un Américain, M. H. G. W. Woodhead, paru dans le *Shanghai Evening Post* et qui énumère avec une irréfutable précision un certain nombre de ces actes de banditisme quasi officiel, car protégé par la police chinoise et dont eurent à souffrir des maisons étrangères n'ayant rien de commun, de près ou de loin, avec le Japon. Récemment, raconte M. Wood-

head, une bande de jeunes voyous, se disant membres du Comité antijaponais, a mis l'embarco, en gare de Kashing, sur un chargement de 171 douzaines de mouchoirs expédiés par une maison britannique, la *China Handkerchief and Weaving Co*, et fabriqués en Chine par des ouvriers chinois. En dépit de l'origine manifeste du transport, les marchandises furent confisquées et les convoyeurs « condamnés » à payer une amende immédiate de 3.000 dollars, soit dix fois la valeur de la cargaison.

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Henry de Korab



## LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS

*Le conseil de la S. D. N. et le général Dawes discutent  
sur les pouvoirs de la « commission d'enquête »*

*Matin 11/21*

Donc, toutes les dépêches officielles de Tokio reçues à Paris dans la soirée de jeudi annonçaient que le gouvernement japonais, se ralliant aux suggestions du général Dawes, de M. Matsudaira, avait brusquement décidé d'accepter sans aucune condition préalable le principe de l'envoi ou l'organisation sur place d'une commission d'enquête en Mandchourie. Sans aucune condition préalable ? Certes, puisque ces mêmes informations ajoutaient qu'au cours des prochains débats du conseil, il ne devait plus être question de l'examen immédiat des cinq points fondamentaux invoqués par M. Yoshizawa dans les circonstances que l'on connaît. Bref, la voie paraissait ouverte à une solution rapide, raisonnable et efficace du conflit.

Vingt-quatre heures se sont écoulées depuis que la délégation nipponne a eu connaissance de la réponse du baron Shidehara. Or, nous sommes obligés de constater : 1° que la note japonaise, communiquée, c'est certain, à M. Briand, malgré de nombreux démentis, a subitement disparu dans un tiroir secret. Tout le monde en parle, car elle existe, mais, officiellement, personne ne l'a vue ; 2° que le général Dawes, si disposé fût-il à tenir compte de la réalité, ne se serait pas déclaré complètement satisfait des nouvelles directives de Tokio.

Faut-il entendre par là que le projet de commission d'enquête est devenu lettre morte ? Non pas, étant donné qu'il est des portes de sortie que l'on ne peut pas « condamner » à la légère. Toutefois, le sûr est que certaines divergences de vues se sont immédiatement manifestées entre le conseil, le général Dawes, d'une part, et la délégation japonaise, d'autre part, en ce qui concerne l'action, la délimitation des « pouvoirs » de la future commission d'enquête.

Nous l'avons dit et nous le répétons : le général Dawes et son gouvernement, visiblement inquiets de l'évolution dangereuse des opérations militaires en Mandchourie, n'ont qu'une seule préoccupation : provoquer la fin des hostilités.

Ainsi que l'« observateur » américain l'a déclaré, hier matin, à M. Briand, les Etats-Unis, signataires du pacte Kellogg, veulent sincèrement barrer la route à toute menace de guerre.

Le projet japonais répond-il entièrement à ce louable souci ? C'est à voir franchement et amicalement de près, estime le général Dawes.

Quel serait donc le rôle de la commission d'enquête d'après Tokio ? Voici, à ce sujet, ce que nous a exposé une personnalité influente de l'entourage de M. Yoshizawa : « La commission d'enquête, a souligné notre éminent interlocuteur, devrait avoir pour tâche de rassembler les éléments essentiels d'un rapport à l'usage du conseil, non seulement sur la situation en Mandchourie, mais encore sur la situation dans la Chine entière. Il faut que l'Europe sache si les arguments que nous opposons aux revendications chinoises sont fondés ou non, s'il est vrai que nos ressortissants, nos commerçants ont eu, en Mandchourie, comme dans les provinces centrales, méridionales, à souffrir des campagnes incessantes d'agitation révolutionnaire contre l'« étranger », des mesures inadmissibles de boycottage vis à vis de nos produits.

Telle est notre pensée. La commission n'aura pas à agir, à prendre elle-même des décisions, mais plutôt à regarder soigneusement autour d'elle, qu'elle se trouve à Nankin, à Moukder ou à Canton.

— Quant à l'évacuation des territoires chinois...

— Là-dessus notre attitude n'a pas varié : nous évacuons quand « nous » aurons obtenu les garanties normales de sécurité. Nous restons, par conséquent fidèles à la « résolution » du 30 septembre, que les deux parties ont adoptée.

Alors les difficultés réapparaissent. Le conseil et le général Dawes jugent qu'entre le projet japonais et les nécessités de la sécurité le lien est par trop fragile. Et c'est à le consolider que chacun s'emploie présentement.

Il n'en reste pas moins que les intentions du Japon méritent d'être appuyées.

Le besoin de connaître *impartialement* ce qui se passe en Chine, se fait sentir chaque jour davantage.

Evidemment la délégation de Nankin repousse énergiquement toute hypothèse d'enquête en Chine. Mais c'est au conseil qu'il appartiendra de se prononcer.

On peut préciser que, dès hier soir, on s'est inquiété de la composition de la commission d'enquête.

Il est probable que de cet organisme l'Amérique, la France et l'Angleterre feront partie. Aux Etats-Unis, on demandera même d'assumer la présidence.

Aujourd'hui, le conseil, sauf avis contraire, tiendra une séance publique. Ce ne sera pas la dernière, car le sujet est loin encore d'être épuisé.



Enclosure No. 22 to Despatch No. 2006  
of November 24, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ŒUVRE, November 21, 1931.

#### LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS

### Le Conseil de la S. D. N. s'est réuni hier en séance secrète

M. Briand a eu des entretiens  
avec le général Dawes,  
puis avec M. Yoshizawa  
et le docteur Sze

Il y a quelque jours, on nous déclare que la Société des Nations est impuissante, que Briand perd son temps, et nous fait perdre le nôtre, que le conflit sino-japonais ne regarde que la Chine et le Japon. D'ailleurs on peut affirmer, les yeux fermés, que le Japon, « qui représente la civilisation », a raison : il n'y a qu'à lui laisser la paix, c'est-à-dire à le laisser, si ça lui chante, faire la guerre...

Aujourd'hui, on donne à entendre que le Japon serait disposé à accepter sans conditions l'envoi d'une commission d'enquête de la Société des Nations en Mandchourie, et qu'il envisagerait le très proche retrait de ses troupes de Tsitsikar.

Alors, la Société des Nations sert donc à quelque chose et Briand n'a pas perdu son temps ?

— N'assure-t-on pas cependant que la dernière décision serait prise par le gouvernement de Tokio, non sous une pression étrangère quelconque — même celle de la Société des Nations — mais de sa propre initiative, et en raison des progrès que la constitution de « comités chinois de sécurité » va faire faire au rétablissement de l'ordre en Mandchourie ?

— Laissons à l'amour-propre japonais toutes les satisfactions qu'il faudra !... Mais s'il est naïf de croire à la S.D.N., n'est-il pas beaucoup plus naïf encore de s'imaginer que le Japon eût évacué quoi que ce soit sans qu'on le lui demandât ?

— En tout cas, le revirement japonais serait dû surtout à l'intervention de l'observateur américain, le général Dawes.

— De cet observateur que la S. D. N., Briand en tête, avait commis la faute, nous disait-on en octobre d'inviter à collaborer avec elle, et dont on nous assurait ces jours-ci encore qu'il « observerait » en se gardant bien d'intervenir ? Tout ce la n'était donc ni si mal mené, ni si inopérant ?

Plaisantant l'idée émise par M. J. Hadamard, notre confrère Louis Marsolleau, dans le journal de Bureau, prétend « mettre le doigt sur l'impossibilité de constituer cette fameuse gendarmerie internationale chère à Léon Bourgeois », et à quel ques autres bons esprits. Mais il a beau conclure :

« On voit que la Société des Nations n'est pas près d'avoir sa gendarmerie. Et sans gendarmerie, la Société des Nations n'est qu'une plaisanterie coûteuse, ridicule et néfaste. »

Il se trompe, car, même sans gendarmerie, la S.D.N. est déjà une force avec laquelle il faut compter.

Et d'abord, si elle n'était pas gênante — oh ! pas pour lui... lui demanderait-on de la combattre ?

Jean Plot.



Enclosure No. 23 to Despatch No. 2006  
of November 24, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE PETIT PARISIEN, November 21, 1931.

#### LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS

### Les suggestions de Tokio concernant l'envoi d'une commission en Mandchourie

Les Douze les ont étudiées hier  
après-midi et M. Briand a eu au  
cours de la journée d'importants  
entretiens particuliers avec le  
général Dawes, M. Yoshizawa  
et M. Sze



Le général Dawes sortant du Quai d'Orsay

A mesure que les jours passent, les entretiens tendant à résoudre le conflit sino-japonais deviennent de plus en plus importants. La journée d'hier, en particulier, fut très chargée et estimée-on généralement, féconde en résultats favorables.

Dès 11 heures, M. Briand recevait au Quai d'Orsay la visite du général Dawes et conférait avec lui jusqu'à midi. La veille, le général Dawes avait eu une longue conversation téléphonique avec le département d'Etat à Washington et l'observateur américain fut ainsi en mesure de faire part au président du conseil de la S. D. N. des vues précises de son gouvernement.

Cette conversation se déroula dans une atmosphère sensiblement améliorée par les dernières nouvelles venues de Tokio et, bien que de part et d'autre on en ait tenu les détails soigneusement cachés, l'impression se dégage qu'elle fut profondément utile.

On lira ci-dessous la déclaration faite aux journalistes américains par le général Dawes, qui, depuis bientôt une semaine, a fait preuve, à Paris, de la plus remarquable activité. Il en ressort que s'il estime ne pas pouvoir s'asseoir à la table du conseil et formule certaines réserves, il n'en travaille pas moins en complète communion d'idées avec lui au règlement pacifique du conflit.

— J'ai été chargé de venir à Paris, a-t-il dit, pour collaborer avec les représentants des différentes nations assemblées ici pour résoudre la crise qui s'est produite en Mandchourie. En tant que signataires du pacte de Paris et du traité dit des « Neuf Puissances », les Etats-Unis sont vivement intéressés, ainsi que les autres signataires, à ce que soient réalisés les buts élevés visés par ce traité.

Mon gouvernement a espéré qu'un règlement en accord avec les principes de ces traités pourrait se faire par une méthode de discussion et de conciliation, pendant la conférence de Paris et que la présence à cette conférence d'un représentant des Etats-Unis contribuerait à obtenir une solution par cette méthode.

Les Etats-Unis ne sont pas, évidemment, membres de la Société des Nations et, en conséquence, ils ne peuvent pas prendre part à une discussion portant sur l'application du statut de la Société; étant donné que, dans la crise actuelle, les discussions de cet ordre peuvent surgir, il est évident que ma présence aux réunions du conseil est non seulement injustifiée, mais pourrait, de plus, embarrasser le conseil lui-même. Cependant, cette position que doivent assumer ainsi, nécessairement, les Etats-Unis, n'indique aucunement qu'ils ne sympathisent pas entièrement avec les efforts faits par la Société des Nations pour ramener la paix en Mandchourie.

Les Etats-Unis doivent, en tout cas, réserver leur complète liberté de jugement.

A 15 heures, M. Yoshizawa venait, à son tour, s'entretenir avec M. Briand. Au cours d'une conversation qui ne dura pas moins de cinquante minutes, le délégué du Japon mit notre ministre des Affaires étrangères au courant des suggestions du cabinet de Tokio. L'exposé fut, cette fois, très complet et confirma les intentions conciliantes qui s'étaient déjà manifestées dans la journée de jeudi.

M. Yoshizawa insista notamment sur le désir de son gouvernement de collaborer activement avec le conseil et de voir attribuer à la commission d'enquête de la S.D.N. en Mandchourie des pouvoirs étendus et de nature à lui permettre une étude approfondie non seulement sur l'état actuel des rapports sino-japonais, mais sur les causes qui ont provoqué la tension et les moyens pour en prévenir le retour.

La position japonaise se trouvait ainsi pleinement éclaircie. Aussi, dans la séance privée des Douze qui suivit la visite de l'ambassadeur nippon, M. Briand put-il exposer à ses collègues du conseil les propositions de Tokio avec toute la netteté désirable et les mettre en discussion.

Cette séance, commencée à 16 heures, ne se termina qu'à 18 h. 15. Il y fut surtout question des conditions dans lesquelles pourrait s'effectuer l'enquête envisagée. Les enquêteurs de la S. D. N., afin d'avoir un aperçu impartial et complet de la situation, devront probablement se rendre non seulement en Mandchourie, sur le terrain du conflit, mais également à Nankin et à Tokio.



Quel sera le mandat de cette commission et quelles seront ses attributions exactes ? Tels furent les problèmes principaux examinés par les Douze.

Il importe, en effet, de les bien spécifier pour le cas dont il s'agit, qui est pour ainsi dire unique en son genre, en vue d'éviter que cette procédure ne puisse plus tard être invoquée comme précédent pour des pays où fonctionne normalement le droit des gens et où la sécurité des ressortissants étrangers n'a pas besoin d'être garantie par des traités spéciaux.

La question des personnalités qui composeront la commission ne fut pas encore touchée, mais on pense dans les milieux approchant le conseil que la commission, pour réussir, devra être investie d'une grande autorité morale et par conséquent être formée de personnages de qualité en nombre restreint.

La participation d'un membre américain, encore que les Etats-Unis ne fassent pas partie de la Ligue, est, bien entendu, vivement souhaitée.

A l'issue de la réunion des Douze, M. Briand reçut encore dans son cabinet M. Sze, qu'il informa des suggestions japonaises, et à qui il fit valoir les avantages certains qui résulteraient de la procédure envisagée pour la sauvegarde des intérêts de la Chine.

Le projet ayant, semble-t-il, suffisamment mûri dans les conversations particulières et les délibérations secrètes, il est probable que le conseil tiendra cet après-midi sa seconde séance publique. — L. B.

## PERSPECTIVES PLUS RASSURANTES

Les instructions plus conciliantes reçues de Tokio dans la nuit de jeudi à vendredi par la délégation japonaise, et dont le *Petit Parisien* a pu donner, dès hier matin, les points essentiels, n'ont pas seulement créé, dans les milieux officiels, un certain sentiment de détente : elles sont de nature à modifier sensiblement l'orientation des travaux du conseil et à accroître leurs chances de succès.

En souscrivant presque sans réserves à l'envoi sur place d'une commission d'enquête désignée par la S. D. N., le gouvernement japonais indique nettement son intention de régler, désormais, avec la collaboration complète de l'organisme de Genève, le fond même de l'affaire. On a enfin compris à Tokio qu'un grand pays comme le Japon, qui occupe un siège permanent au conseil et qui s'est toujours montré attaché au maintien de la paix, ne pouvait pas persister dans une attitude qui lui donnait figure d'agresseur et risquait de lui aliéner les sympathies de l'opinion publique mondiale.

C'est pour cette raison qu'on semble maintenant décidé, au Japon, non seulement à liquider les incidents actuels de Mandchourie avec le concours de la S. D. N., mais à suppri-

mer, également avec sa collaboration, les causes mêmes qui pourraient ultérieurement provoquer un nouveau et plus grave conflit entre les deux pays. C'est dans ce désir qu'il faut chercher l'explication de la demande japonaise d'élargissement des pouvoirs et du champ d'action de la commission d'enquête. L'autorité du conseil et de la Ligue elle-même, qui paraissait un moment compromise et qu'il aurait fallu, coûte que coûte, affirmer, se trouve ainsi heureusement mise hors de question, ce qui ne peut qu'améliorer notablement la situation.

Mais il y a plus. Un des principaux sujets d'inquiétude, non seulement chez certains membres du conseil, mais aux Etats-Unis, tient à ce fait qu'on a attribué aux Japonais l'intention de ne procéder à l'évacuation, des régions occupées par leurs troupes, en dehors de la zone du chemin de fer — et notamment d'Anganki et de Tsitsikar, — que lorsque la commission d'enquête aura remis son rapport et que le conseil aura statué, c'est-à-dire dans plusieurs mois. Nous avons tout lieu de croire que cette impression n'est pas fondée et que le gouvernement japonais serait, au contraire, décidé à procéder très prochainement à une évacuation spontanée des points où l'ont mené les récentes opérations.

M. Debuchi, l'ambassadeur du Japon à Washington, a déjà donné des assurances de ce genre au département d'Etat. Il est vraisemblable qu'on ne tardera pas, si cela n'a pas été déjà fait hier par M. Yoshizawa lors de son entretien avec M. Briand, à en donner de semblables à Paris. Il semble, en effet, que des comités chinois pour le maintien de l'ordre se soient déjà constitués dans ces régions qui y rendent la présence des troupes japonaises désormais inutile. S'il en est ainsi, le dernier sujet de malaise, à savoir la question de la reconnaissance préalable des cinq points fondamentaux japonais, disparaîtrait. C'est ce que nous laissons prévoir hier matin en signalant qu'on ne considérerait plus comme indispensable, à Tokio, une acceptation immédiate de ces points fondamentaux.

Si toutes ces dispositions se précisent et s'affirment, il est évident que les négociations vont pouvoir se poursuivre — nous ne dirons pas sans incident ni sans difficulté — mais néanmoins avec d'indiscutables chances d'aboutir.

Albert JULLIEN.



Enclosure No. 24 to Despatch No. 2006  
of November 24, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE PETIT PARISIEN, November 21, 1931.

## L'OCCUPATION DE LA MANDCHOURIE

### **Après avoir placé la S. D. N. devant le fait accompli le Japon accepte l'envoi d'une commission d'enquête**

#### ***Le Conseil tiendra aujourd'hui une séance publique***

Hier encore, rien de décisif n'a été fait au Conseil de la S.D.N. Les conversations — considérées naturellement toutes comme « importantes » — ont continué entre le président du Conseil, M. Aristide Briand et les parties intéressées. Le général Dawes qui, la veille, a eu de longs entretiens téléphoniques avec le gouvernement de Washington, ne paraît pas avoir dit très clairement ce que les Etats-Unis pensent pratiquement faire.

Revenant de sa conversation avec M. Briand, le général Dawes a déclaré à la presse américaine que sa présence au Conseil, les Etats-Unis ne faisant pas partie de la S.D.N., ne paraissait pas seulement injustifiée « mais pourrait embarrasser le Conseil même » et que les Etats-Unis devaient, « en tout cas, réserver leur complète liberté de jugement ».

D'autre part, le Japon fait savoir qu'il ne s'opposait pas, en principe, à la présence du général Dawes aux séances du Conseil, mais qu'il se réservait

le droit de d'évoquer ultérieurement la question de la légalité de sa participation ».

On est donc en pleine équivoque et en pleine incertitude.

L'idée de l'envoi d'une commission d'enquête a cependant fait des progrès. Le Japon qui, avant la fin des opérations militaires qui l'ont rendu maître de Tsitsikar, n'en voulait rien savoir, est maintenant disposé à l'accepter.

Et puisque la Chine l'avait demandé dès le commencement, elle ne pourra pas le refuser. Quoique la question ne soit plus du tout la même qu'il y a quelques semaines.

Dans la première phase du conflit, l'envoi d'une commission d'enquête au nom de la S.D.N., accepté par les deux parties, aurait été l'expression d'une discipline de paix internationale sans laquelle la S.D.N. ne peut pas fonctionner.

L'envoi d'une commission d'enquête, en présence du fait accompli, peut certes encore toujours avoir des avantages — et en aura certainement — si, par ce moyen, on parvenait à obtenir une cessation immédiate des hostilités: mais son sens est faussé, son autorité diminuée.

*Espérer qu'on pût, en même temps, obtenir un retrait des troupes japonaises serait sans doute téméraire, quoi qu'il en soit la seule solution conforme aux règles fondamentales de la S.D.N., aux textes et à l'esprit du pacte Briand-Kellogg.*

#### **Le Conseil se réunira cet après-midi**

Le Conseil se réunira cet après-midi, en séance publique, après avoir presque perdu l'espoir de pouvoir encore le faire. On verra dans quelles conditions la commission d'enquête sera nommée. En attendant, on peut craindre que le Japon désire surtout voir cette commission faire son enquête sur les « manœuvres anti-japonaises » en Chine, tandis que la Chine doit avoir le désir naturel de la voir opérer pour se rendre compte des manœuvres anti-chinoises en Mandchourie, sur le champ de bataille.

Si le Conseil négligeait de fixer d'une façon absolument claire la mission et les compétences de la commission d'enquête, celle-ci risquerait de devenir une source de nouvelles difficultés.

La Chine avait annoncé que si le Conseil demandait au gouvernement de Nankin d'entamer des négociations directes avec le Japon avant l'évacuation des zones occupées, elle n'hésiterait pas de faire appel aux articles 15 et 16 du pacte de la S.D.N., qui autoriseraient le Conseil de prendre ses décisions sans que la règle de l'unanimité fût appliquée.

Peut-être que la commission d'enquête fournira l'instrument de rapprochement entre les deux pays. En tout cas, il n'y a aucune raison de juger — du point de vue de la S.D.N. — la situation d'une façon optimiste. Et les espoirs que pourrait éveiller la convocation d'une séance publique du Conseil, méritent d'être fort modérés.

Ni le conflit entre la Chine et le Japon, ni le conflit, en réalité plus grave, entre le Japon et la S.D.N., ne sont près de recevoir une solution favorable aux principes qui se trouvent à la base de l'institution de Genève.

S. G.



U.S. 21

Enclosure No. 25 to Despatch No. 2006  
of November 24, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE QUOTIDIEN, November 21, 1931.

## Les Japonais acceptent l'enquête proposée par le Conseil de la S. D. N.

Quand le calme sera rétabli en Mandchourie,  
les territoires occupés pourront être évacués  
sans qu'il soit engagé de négociations directes




PHOTO MEURISSE

Cliché Quotidien

A Tsitsikar, avant l'entrée des Japonais : Soldats chinois gardant  
les voies de communication.

Lentement, péniblement, le Conseil de la S. D. N. s'achemine vers la conclusion de ses travaux. Ce qui ne veut point dire que l'affaire mandchoue soit — ou doive être prochainement — réglée de façon définitive.

La délégation japonaise, qui avait reçu, dans la nuit de jeudi à vendredi, des instructions de son gouvernement, s'est occupée dans la matinée d'hier de chercher la meilleure façon de les présenter à M. Briand.

Bien qu'il ne s'agisse, semble-t-il, jusqu'à présent, que de suggestions et non de propositions japonaises officielles.

La situation se présentait, hier, de la manière suivante :

Il ressort de l'analyse desdites propositions qu'on peut les envisager sous deux aspects : local et général.

En ce qui concerne le problème mandchou (aspect local) un point intéressant paraît acquis : le Japon n'insiste plus sur la nécessité de négociations directes avec la Chine. On sait d'ailleurs que le gouvernement de Nankin s'y refusait énergiquement. Le Japon accepte, en outre, la résolution du 30 septembre du Conseil de la S. D. N., qui prévoit l'évacuation, par les troupes nippones, des points occupés en Mandchourie, hors de la zone du chemin de fer sud-mandchou, mais subordonne cette évacuation aux mesures prises par la Chine pour assurer la sécurité de la vie et des biens des ressortissants japonais.

Il y a évidemment progrès. Mais on doit écouter l'autre partie. Or la Chine entend, de son côté, que le Japon accepte la résolution du 24 octobre de la S. D. N. Cette résolution, plus précise que la première, demande que le Japon fixe une date à son évacuation des régions occupées.

Les efforts de M. Briand et de ses

répondit, sans autre précision, que le gouvernement de Tokio exécuterait la résolution du 30 septembre, à moins que de nouveaux événements ne rendissent cette exécution impossible.

En attendant, on annonçait hier soir, après la séance des « Douze », que le Conseil se réunirait aujourd'hui à seize heures en séance publique, ce qui semble indiquer que le ciel s'est légèrement éclairci. — T.





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


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Il ressort de l'analyse desdites propositions qu'on peut se

répondre, sans autre précision, que le gouvernement de Tokio exécuterait la résolution du 30 septembre, à moins que de nouveaux événements ne rendissent cette exécution impossible.

En attendant, on annonçait hier soir, après la séance des « Douze », que le Conseil se réunirait aujourd'hui à seize heures en séance publique, ce qui semble indiquer que le ciel s'est légèrement éclairci. — T.



Cliché Quotidien.

### LE GENERAL DAWES

qui s'est entretenu hier avec  
M. Briand.

collègues du Conseil — complètement d'accord avec le général Dawes — ont consisté à trouver le moyen de concilier ces deux points de vue opposés.

Mais, ainsi que nous le disions au début, le problème s'élargit et prend un caractère plus général lorsque l'on aborde la question de la commission d'enquête que le Conseil propose d'envoyer sur place.

Le Japon voudrait, en effet, relier la question de l'examen de la situation mandchoue à l'ensemble de la situation politique en Chine. « La sécurité des ressortissants étrangers, dit-il en substance, est assurée en Chine par un ensemble des traités. Il faut voir dans quelle mesure la Chine exécute — ou est capable d'exécuter — ces traités. Et c'est pourquoi l'enquête de la S. D. N. devrait, selon Tokio, s'étendre à l'ensemble du territoire chinois. »

Nous avons, à maintes reprises, signalé ici les inconvénients — juridiques et pratiques — de cette thèse. Il va sans dire que le gouvernement national de Nankin — soutenu en l'espèce par le Kuomintang — répugne à se rallier à cette manière de voir qu'il estime porter atteinte à sa souveraineté.

Et c'est encore le rôle du Conseil et de ses principaux négociateurs de s'efforcer de trouver une formule de compromis qui, tout en donnant dans une certaine mesure satisfaction à Tokio, ne se heurte pas à un refus de Nankin. Cette importante question a fait également l'objet des délibérations des « Douze », hier, au Quai d'Orsay, entre seize et dix-huit heures.

Nous aurions désiré savoir, quant à nous, si le Japon serait disposé à procéder au retrait immédiat de ses troupes avant la fin de l'année. Il nous a été



Ref. 21

Enclosure No. 26 to Despatch No. 2006  
of November 24, 1931.

From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LA REPUBLIQUE, November 21, 1931.

## Pour éviter un 1914 asiatique

Il est évidemment d'un paradoxe dangereux que les diplomates chinois et japonais négocient pendant que les soldats chinois et japonais s'entretiennent.

Les détracteurs de la S. D. N. ne manquent pas de proclamer que ce paradoxe constitue la plus décisive condamnation de la formule de Genève.

Conclusion hâtive et fautive : a-t-on jamais osé déclarer que le fait d'enfreindre le code condamnait l'existence des tribunaux ?...

Les Japonais, en occupant Tsitsikar, ont enfreint la loi internationale. Ils ont pris l'éternel prétexte des agresseurs : « Nous avons tenu à devancer ceux qui s'apprêtaient à nous encercler. »

La vérité est que le gouvernement de Tokio prétend imposer le traité de 1915 à une Chine qui n'est plus la Chine de 1915. Sa thèse est toujours la thèse meurtrière de la souveraineté... La S. D. N. peut connaître de l'interprétation des traités, non de leur principe.

Question délicate, surtout quand elle se pose pour des pays dont le sens contractuel est faible, qui restent encore asservis à la superstition de la force et pour qui Paris est bien loin... pour ne pas dire trop loin.

Ceux qui ne veulent pas de la Fédération européenne, sous prétexte qu'elle fausse le caractère d'universalité qui doit être celui de la S. D. N., se rendent peut-être compte que l'universalité a ses inconvénients.

Quoi qu'il en soit, nos négociateurs ont parfaitement raison de vouloir jusqu'au bout le maintien de la paix asiatique.

Il y aurait beaucoup d'imprudence à lancer aux Chinois et aux Japonais le « *Allez, messieurs* » et à prendre vis-à-vis des belligérants l'attitude de Ponce-Pilate.

Nous verrons bien si le Japon, qui a « *renoncé à la guerre comme instrument de politique nationale* » en signant le Pacte de Paris, reniera sa signature et se mettra de lui-même hors du Pacte.

Ignorer les contrats est déjà peu sage, mais ignorer Washington et Moscou est spécialement périlleux.

La torche qui porterait le feu aux steppes de Mandchourie déchaînerait peut-être un incendie plus terrible qu'on ne l'imagine à Tokio.

M. Briand ne travaille pas en ce moment pour son propre prestige, ni pour celui de notre pays, il travaille à mettre des millions d'hommes à l'abri d'un « 1914 » asiatique.

Gabriel CUDENET.



TEMPS 21

Enclosure No. 27 to Despatch No. 2006  
of November 24, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE TEMPS, November 21, 1931.

LE DIFFÉREND SINO-JAPONAIS  
M. GRANDI A WASHINGTON

Est-ce l'éclaircie, en ce qui concerne le règlement pacifique du différend sino-japonais ? Certains indices permettent de supposer qu'on discerne enfin la possibilité de trouver une issue à la situation dans laquelle se trouve placé le conseil de la Société des nations par un compromis raisonnable, sauvegardant les principes et les intérêts essentiels en cause.

Nous avons indiqué qu'à la suite des conversations particulières très actives menées par M. Briand, sir John Simon et le général Dawes, des suggestions étaient faites de nature à fournir une base de discussion. La communication faite hier par le représentant du Japon, et complétée par de nouvelles instructions de Tokio qui ont permis aux porte-parole de cette puissance de préciser les choses dans une deuxième note que le conseil examinera aujourd'hui avec toute l'attention que commandent les circonstances, entr'ouvre en réalité une porte qu'il y aura le plus grand intérêt à ne plus se laisser refermer, même si l'accord ne peut se faire tout de suite sur le texte d'un compromis. Il s'agit, on le sait, d'obtenir avant tout qu'il soit mis fin à des opérations militaires qui constituent de véritables hostilités et de faire admettre un règlement immédiat sur le terrain en attendant que le fond du débat puisse être pratiquement abordé au cours de négociations directes à engager entre Tokio et Nankin. Pour cela, il importe d'amener le Japon à ne pas insister sur la confirmation immédiate par la Chine des traités dont il tient ses droits spéciaux en Mandchourie — traités qui subsistent entièrement, qui sont appliqués en fait et dont la validité devra être confirmée au cours des négociations ultérieures parce que cette question tient au fond du règlement qui doit intervenir entre la Chine et le Japon directement — et d'amener la Chine à admettre que le retrait des troupes nippones n'ait pas lieu entièrement à une date fixée d'avance, mais aussi rapidement que le permettra la garantie du maintien de l'ordre par les autorités chinoises.

Pour autant qu'on puisse en juger par les informations que l'on possède à cette heure, le Japon serait disposé à céder sur le premier point si la Chine cède sur le second. On en reviendrait ainsi à l'esprit de la résolution adoptée à Genève et qui ne fixait pas de délai pour le retour des troupes nippones dans la zone du chemin de fer Sud-Mandchourien, sous réserve que la vie et les biens des ressortissants japonais seront efficacement protégés. Mais le Japon — et c'est là le point important qui peut déterminer un accord — admettrait également l'envoi sur place d'une commission dont les membres seraient désignés par le conseil de la Société des nations et qui aurait une mission d'enquête et d'observation suffisamment large pour qu'elle puisse préciser dans son rapport tous les aspects de la situation. Les deux parties sont intéressées à l'envoi d'une telle commission, la Chine parce que, si elle est sincère dans les accusations qu'elle a portées contre les Nippons, elle peut attendre des constatations de la commission d'enquête la confirmation de ses thèses, le Japon parce qu'il désire naturellement qu'une enquête approfondie établisse le véritable état des choses en Mandchourie et en Chine et dise si les autorités chinoises, telles qu'elles sont constituées et avec les moyens dont elles disposent pour faire face au brigandage et à l'anarchie, peuvent réellement garantir l'ordre et la sécurité sur la base des traités existants.

De toute manière, il y a maintenant un effort de conciliation dont on peut raisonnablement attendre un résultat, à la condition que les deux parties en cause fassent preuve de toute la bonne volonté nécessaire et qu'à Nankin on ne s'obstine pas à attendre de l'intervention du conseil de la Société des nations des effets qu'elle ne peut avoir. Le conseil ne saurait céder à la pression que d'aucuns cherchent à exercer pour l'entraîner sur le terrain des articles 15 et 16 du pacte, qui ne furent pas invoqués lorsqu'il fut saisi du différend, ce qui l'exposerait maintenant à ouvrir un débat des plus délicats entre la Société des nations et le Japon, éventualité que personne ne peut envisager sérieusement. L'envoi d'une commission d'enquête dans les conditions prévues par le Japon permettrait d'espérer un règlement de bonne foi et il sauvegarderait l'autorité morale de la grande institution internationale, ce qui, dans les circonstances présentes, n'est pas moins important, à un point de vue général, que le retour à l'ordre en Mandchourie. Il faut souhaiter que le gouvernement chinois tienne compte à son tour des conseils de prudence et de conciliation dictés par la seule raison que ne peuvent manquer de lui prodiguer ceux-là mêmes qui à Genève ont accueilli avec intérêt son recours à la Société des nations.



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of November 24, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'AMI DU PEUPLE, November 22, 1931.

# Le conflit sino-japonais

## L'IMBROGLIO MANDCHOU

Ami 11/22  
Il est très difficile, sinon impossible, à nos lecteurs de se reconnaître dans l'avalanche de dépêches et de fausses nouvelles que lancent journellement dans les journaux d'Europe, outre les belligérants d'Extrême-Asie, certaines agences de Berlin, Moscou ou New-York. On peut dire, qu'avec la T. S. F., l'air vibre de mensonges !

Publiées avec des titres sensationnels : « Batailles qui font rage » et totalisent, en fin de compte, 3 tués et 6 blessés ; « Armées qui se heurtent » et que l'on dénombre à 2.500 hommes ; « Déclaration de guerre » d'un chef subalterne quelconque, démenties le lendemain, toutes ces nouvelles, compliquées de noms barbares et inconnus, mettent le désarroi dans tous les esprits. Ceux de la S. D. N. compris.

En fait, la situation est la suivante :

Toute la Mandchourie du Sud, celle que les traités avec la Russie, avec la Chine, avec les Soviets (1906-1925) placent sous l'influence japonaise est aux mains des Nippons. Ils tiennent tout le pays, de Niou-Chouang à Kirin.

L'armée chinoise de Tchang Sueh Liang, le vice-roi de Moukden, ayant reçu de son chef l'ordre de ne pas combattre, a battu en retraite sur le Pe-Tchi-Li par Sin-Min-Ting et le long de la Grande-Muraille. Toutes les unités retardataires que les Japonais ont pu atteindre ont été désarmées et licenciées, se transformant ainsi, en un clin d'œil, en bandes de pillards affamés. Ce fut un fort élément de désordre contre lequel les Japonais ont dû, par la suite, intervenir à coups de fusil.

Le « Maréchal » Tchang Sueh Liang n'était pas à Moukden, sa résidence habituelle, lors du coup de main japonais. Il achevait de soigner dans un hôpital de Kin-Tchéou (ville à mi-chemin entre Moukden et Tien-Tsin) une maladie que l'on dit être la fièvre typhoïde. Maladie diplomatique ? Autour de lui, descendant par le chemin de fer, vinrent se grouper son état-major et quelques troupes. D'autres renforts montèrent de Tien-Tsin. Des trains de soldats circulèrent, bref, il se forma autour de Kin-Tchéou un noyau armé assez important pour constituer une menace. C'est la raison pour laquelle les avions japonais bombardèrent, au début, les trains d'abord, et Kin-Tchéou ensuite.

Dès les premières bombes, le maréchal évacua Kin-Tchéou et descendit à Pé-King.

Dans la partie nord de la Mandchourie — partie septentrionale de la province de Ghi-Rin et province de Hei-Loung-Kiang — qui constituent la zone d'influence soviétique — se trouvent deux groupes de forces chinoises. Dans le territoire de Ghi-Rin une dizaine de mille hommes, commandés par le général Ma Kai Pieng, rallié à la cause japonaise et prêt à combattre son collègue Ma Chang Chan qui réunit un même nombre d'hommes vers Tsitsikar, capitale du Hei-Loung-Kiang, et est resté fidèle à Tchang Sueh Liang, donc à la cause chinoise.

Fidèles observateurs des Traités passés avec les Soviets, les Japonais se sont abstenus d'avancer vers Kharbine. La limite d'influence russo-nippone est le parallèle passant par la station de Kouang-Tchen-Ze, point de jonction des chemins de fer Est-Chinois et Sud-Mandchourien. Mais, le général Ma Chang Chan ayant fait sauter le pont de la voie ferrée sur la rivière Nonni, immobilisa le trafic de la ligne japonaise au nord de Kouang-Tchen-Ze.

Les Japonais voulant rétablir la circulation poussèrent alors au delà de la limite qu'ils s'étaient fixée, un détachement mixte d'environ 2.000 hommes pour escorter les compagnies du génie char-

gées de réparer le pont. Ils annonçaient leur intention de se retirer dès le travail achevé.

Attaqués par le général Ma, ils ont dû livrer quelques combats pour protéger leurs travailleurs. Cet incident assez banal a permis à Nan-King d'envoyer dans le monde et surtout à la S. D. N., une série de télégrammes affolés amplifiés encore par une émeute de 2 à 3.000 Chinois à Tien-Tsin. Chinois et Japonais s'accusent réciproquement de payer ces émeutiers que la police chinoise décapite en pleine rue sans autre forme de procès, et que les Japonais fusillent et bombardent. Si les uns et les autres cherchaient bien, ils trouveraient très sûrement quelques meneurs communistes, cherchant, selon la méthode classique, « à créer le désordre » — et à piller ! Pour appuyer leur détachement du pont de la Nonni, les Japonais ont prescrit au général Ma Kai Pieng de marcher contre son collègue Ma Chang Chan dont la base est à Tsitsikar.

Les Soviets ne bougent pas devant les Japonais et gardent, en apparence, la neutralité. Mais des cadavres de Russes soviétiques ont été trouvés sur le terrain parmi les morts chinois. Les Japonais affirment avoir la preuve que Ma Chang Chan est ravitaillé en armes, munitions, camions et, sans doute, argent, par les Soviets. Par ailleurs, des conférences d'officiers russes et chinois sont signalées en Mongolie. Moscou ne perd pas de vue son plan d'extension du communisme en Chine et il fait, en secret, des avances à Nan-King.

Dès la première heure, le général Honjo organisa l'administration indigène. Des chefs favorables à la cause japonaise prirent en main police et direction de la population. Un mouvement séparatiste s'ébaucha dès le début et se développa peu à peu.

Harcelés par la Société des Nations mais fermement décidés à atteindre, envers et contre tous, le but qu'ils se sont assigné, les diplomates japonais se sont souvenus que dans la concession japonaise de Tien-Tsin vit, obscurément, le dernier descendant authentique de la dynastie Mandchoue, Pou Y.

Former des trois provinces Mandchoues un Empire séparé — en vertu de la théorie occidentale du droit des Peuples de disposer d'eux-mêmes. Mettre Pou Y sur ce trône qui est celui même de sa race — n'avoir plus à traiter avec la Chine, mais avec lui. Ce serait terminer élégamment le conflit dont s'occupe la S. D. N. Celle-ci éberluée, ne peut que reconnaître son impuissance à panser les blessures d'une Chine qui, pacifiste, fidèle aux Covenants et Pactes, refusant de se battre, se trouve « sans guerre » amputée de trois de ses plus belles provinces.

Les diplomates d'Europe ne sont pas de taille à lutter avec leurs collègues d'Asie et M. Briand peut s'instruire à leur Ecole. L'empereur de Mandchourie ne faisant pas partie de la S. D. N. pourrait, s'il est utile, combattre la République chinoise sans que Genève y ait rien à voir... sous la direction et avec l'aide du Japon restant dans la coulisse.

Nos amis japonais donnent à l'Europe deux belles leçons très opportunes : D'abord que le respect des traités est une nécessité absolue pour le maintien de la paix. C'est pour les avoir dénoncés et violés vis-à-vis du Japon que la Chine est punie.

Et ensuite que la sécurité repose sur la force, une nation désarmée — ou refusant de se battre — pouvant être dépouillée, sans scrupule, par un voisin turbulent.

C'est pourtant le délégué de la Chine qui a dit un jour à Genève : Une nation désarmée n'est pas un exemple, mais une tentation !



Enclosure No. 29 to Despatch No. 2006  
of November 24, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ECHO DE PARIS, November 22, 1931.

## La proposition de commission d'enquête formulée par le Japon

### On ne sait encore ce qu'il en adviendra

Nous avons expliqué, dans les deux derniers jours, que le conseil de la Société des Nations, incapable de soutenir plus longtemps l'attitude autoritaire prise à la session d'octobre (il avait prétendu contraindre le Japon à rappeler ses troupes dans la zone du chemin de fer sud-mandchourien, à la date du 16 novembre), se résignait maintenant à ce que l'on appelle, en Extrême-Orient, « sauver la face ». En d'autres termes, il n'a plus qu'une espérance : se tirer du mauvais pas où il s'est engagé, avec le moindre dommage. Il a encouragé la délégation japonaise à saisir le conseil d'un projet de commission d'enquête qui aurait tout au moins le mérite de clore une session pénible.

En séance publique, hier après-midi, M. Yoshizawa a donc proposé, au nom de son gouvernement, la constitution de cette commission. Dans la pensée de Tokio, elle sera chargée « d'étudier la situation dans son ensemble ». Elle n'aura « mandat ni d'intervenir dans les pourparlers qui pourront être entamés entre les deux parties, ni de surveiller les mouvements des forces militaires. » Elle ne ressemblera point à l'organisme plus ou moins impératif que l'on conçoit d'ordinaire comme propre à assurer l'application de l'article 11 du *Covenant* (action du conseil pour arrêter les menaces de guerre) et dont il fut parlé en septembre. La commission aura des yeux et des pieds ou, si l'on veut, des automobiles. Elle n'aura pas de bras. Bien entendu, l'entrée en scène des enquêteurs n'entraînera pas le rappel des troupes japonaises dans la zone du chemin de fer. Les soldats du gouvernement de Tokio n'évacueront les positions occupées actuellement qu'une fois la sécurité des biens et des personnes assurée effectivement, ce qui — d'après M. Yoshizawa — n'est pas encore le cas. Enfin, dernier trait notable : le Japon demande que la commission n'opère pas seulement en Mandchourie, mais que la Chine tout entière soit de sa compétence. Vendredi, M. Briand avait repoussé cette prétention. Hier, sur des instructions reçues de Tokio, l'ambassadeur du Japon l'a rétablie. Evidemment, le Japon désire qu'il soit démontré, sur place, combien les méthodes employées en Mandchourie sont analogues aux méthodes employées en d'autres lieux, par les puissances étrangères. Il voudrait que le problème mandchourien et le problème de Shanghai fussent soudés. Entre temps, son représentant déclara que la Mandchourie, c'est pour lui, « la possibilité de vivre. »

Après cet exposé, la réponse du délégué chinois, M. Szé, était attendue avec curiosité. Bien qu'il s'y soit repris à trois fois, elle ne laisse pas d'être légèrement ambiguë. « Aucune disposition qui ne prévoirait pas la cessation immédiate de toutes les opérations militaires et la retraite des forces japonaises, — retraite qui devrait commencer immédiatement et être poursuivie progressivement au cours d'un laps de temps aussi bref que possible, — ne saurait prétendre constituer une solution du problème. » Ce principe posé, M. Szé ne se refuse pas à la discussion. Il se contente de sauvegarder son droit d'amendement. Il ajoute pourtant « qu'il ne discutera pas toute proposition qui se présenterait sur une autre base que l'évacuation ». Et, de nouveau, il menace d'invoquer, devant le Conseil, les articles 15 et 16 du *Covenant*, ce qui pourrait orienter

Chine étant une anarchie où nul ne peut répondre de l'attitude des corps de troupes (ou de brigands).

Tel est l'état des négociations. Le Conseil est encore loin du but. Tout au plus croit-il l'apercevoir dans le lointain. Quelle prudence louable ! Ces diplomates, si hardis il y a un mois, marchent aujourd'hui sur des œufs. Cinq ou six d'entre eux ont parlé. Ils n'ont pas exprimé d'avis sur le fond de l'affaire, tout en approuvant la proposition japonaise. M. Scialoja s'est tu ou peu s'en faut. La grande conscience de lord Cecil elle-même est demeurée muette : il est vrai que vendredi, elle avait parlé assez haut pour justifier le retour précipité de sir John Simon, annoncé pour la nuit de samedi.

M. de Mutius, le délégué allemand, n'a pas hésité à dire : « Le destin de la S. D. N. est en train de se jouer ! » Phrase qui lui permettra de constater, éventuellement, la faillite de Genève et de revendiquer, pour son pays, une plus grande liberté de mouvement. Qu'on la désire ou qu'on la redoute, cette faillite est déjà flagrante. A notre point de vue, le malheur n'est pas grand, Genève n'étant qu'une illusion. Cependant, les pays de l'Europe centrale dont toute la sécurité serait fondée, le cas échéant, sur l'article 16 du pacte (sanctions), ne voient pas sans inquiétude le grand système international menacer ruine. Aussi MM. Zalewski et Folich ainsi que M. Lerroux (Espagne) ont-ils eu soin de déclarer que la faible, l'inefficace conduite du conseil devrait être considérée comme due à des circonstances exceptionnelles (l'éloignement de la Mandchourie, la complexité des relations internationales de la Chine) et que ce qui se passe en ce moment ne saurait avoir la valeur d'un précédent.

Réserves ingénieuses et qui parlent d'un bon sentiment. Mais ceux qui les formulent se disent, à part eux, qu'il faudra bien, quelque jour, trouver autre chose.

PERTINAX.



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Le point relativement favorable des discours de M. Szé, c'est que, pour l'évacuation, il ne fixe pas de moment bien déterminé. Il la laisse flotter quelque peu dans le temps. Là reposent les espérances du règlement dont le Conseil et le secrétariat se berçaient ce soir. Aujourd'hui, dimanche, le secrétariat de l'établissement genevois rédigera un premier projet définissant le statut, la composition, les pouvoirs de la commission et les conditions de l'enquête. Les conversations sérieuses ne commenceront pas avant lundi. On peut dire, sans plus attendre, que les investigations seront confinées à la Mandchourie.

Mais une question préalable se pose: l'arrêt des hostilités — Il ne faut pas dire armistice, puisque la guerre n'a jamais été formellement déclarée ni par le Japon ni par la Chine. M. Briand l'a souligné dans son second discours: il serait contraire à la dignité du Conseil que la commission fût lancée dans un pays encore livré aux mouvements des armées, qu'elle fût à la merci d'un incident. Vendredi, M. Briand a déjà représenté à M. Yoshizawa la nécessité d'arrêter les opérations. Celui-ci s'est contenté de répondre que, d'après la résolution du Conseil du 30 septembre (5<sup>e</sup> paragraphe), le Japon et la Chine étaient tenus à ne pas « élargir l'incident », à ne pas « aggraver la situation ». En conséquence, le Japon n'attaquera que s'il est provoqué par la partie adverse. Mais de telles paroles ne suffisent pas à résoudre le problème, la

Chine étant une anarchie où nul ne peut répondre de l'attitude des corps de troupes (ou de brigands).

Tel est l'état des négociations. Le Conseil est encore loin du but. Tout au plus croit-il l'apercevoir dans le lointain. Quelle prudence louable ! Ces diplomates, si hardis il y a un mois, marchent aujourd'hui sur des œufs. Cinq ou six d'entre eux ont parlé. Ils n'ont pas exprimé d'avis sur le fond de l'affaire, tout en approuvant la proposition japonaise. M. Scialoja s'est tu ou peu s'en faut. La grande conscience de lord Cecil elle-même est demeurée muette : il est vrai que vendredi, elle avait parlé assez haut pour justifier le retour précipité de sir John Simon, annoncé pour la nuit de samedi.

M. de Mutius, le délégué allemand, n'a pas hésité à dire : « Le destin de la S. D. N. est en train de se jouer ! » Phrase qui lui permettra de constater, éventuellement, la faillite de Genève et de revendiquer, pour son pays, une plus grande liberté de mouvement. Qu'on la désire ou qu'on la redoute, cette faillite est déjà flagrante. A notre point de vue, le malheur n'est pas grand, Genève n'étant qu'une illusion. Cependant, les pays de l'Europe centrale dont toute la sécurité serait fondée, le cas échéant, sur l'article 16 du pacte (sanctions), ne voient pas sans inquiétude le grand système international menacer ruine. Aussi MM. Zaleski et Folich ainsi que M. Lerroux (Espagne) ont-ils eu soin de déclarer que la faible, l'inefficace conduite du conseil devrait être considérée comme due à des circonstances exceptionnelles (l'éloignement de la Mandchourie, la complexité des relations internationales de la Chine) et que ce qui se passe en ce moment ne saurait avoir la valeur d'un précédent.

Reserves ingénieuses et qui partent d'un bon sentiment. Mais ceux qui les formulent se disent, à part eux, qu'il faudra bien, quelque jour, trouver autre chose.

PERTINAX.



FIG. 22

Enclosure No. 30 to Despatch No. 2006  
of November 24, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from FIGARO, November 22, 1931.

## LE CHANTAGE DE NANKIN

Figaro

par A. LEGENDRE.

La Société des Nations nous montre aujourd'hui dans quel embarras elle se trouve : en raison de son ignorance de la complexité du problème en jeu et aussi de sa partialité réelle, elle s'est enfoncée chaque jour davantage. Il est surtout regrettable que le secrétariat de la S.D.N. se soit compromis avec la faction de Nankin et que Sir Drummond avec MM. Rachman et Walters aient si légèrement pris parti pour cette faction. Le secrétariat s'est laissé duper par Nankin, et duper sans excuse : car il ne peut ignorer certains faits, de terribles réalités par trop éloquentes. L'erreur de la S.D.N. a été d'envoyer en Chine des hommes à elle qui n'y ont jamais vécu. Seul, celui qui a séjourné longtemps à l'intérieur de ce pays, en contact avec toutes les classes sociales, et ainsi connaît leurs caractéristiques mentales, peut *efficacement* faire une enquête, mais *celui-là seul*, car si complexe est le milieu et si différent du nôtre ! Le tort des agents de la S.D.N., c'est de faire penser comme eux un Chinois ou un Malais, de leur prêter nos concepts, notre conscience et notre moralité. Aussi l'enquête de ses envoyés est-elle plus que stérile : elle est malfaisante. Car joués effrontément par les politiciens de Nankin, les conclusions de ces envoyés sont fatalement erronées, et, par suite, aggravent le conflit.

Celui en cours entre Chine et Japon serait terminé si la S. D. N. ne s'en était mêlée. Tchang Kaï Chek aurait compris la leçon, lui qui ne manquera pas, pour une question de face, de se jeter sur le Japonais, de déclencher une grande guerre, s'il avait l'armée nécessaire. La S.D.N. pourrait lever les bras : le chef de la masse principale des reîtres chinois lui rirait au nez. Comment a-t-elle pu prendre au sérieux, ainsi que nos gouvernants, ces petits tyrans du Kouo Ming Tang et des Tang Pou (comités dits de salut public, si exécrés) ? Demandez au pauvre peuple chinois ce qu'il en pense, lui, de ses bergers actuels, demandez-le à la masse paysanne qui meurt de faim, qu'on massacre trop souvent, et qui, de ce chef, s'enfuit vers la Mandchourie ou vers les colonies étrangères du Sud. Des millions d'hommes ont ainsi fui, ces dernières années, abandonnant, la mort dans l'âme, le village natal où reposent les ancêtres vénérés.

Rien n'a éclairé la S.D.N. : depuis 1928 elle n'a cessé de soutenir le loup « kouo ming tang » contre le troupeau, ce loup si grossièrement camouflé en démocrate et pacifiste. Bien mieux, ces temps derniers, elle a subi, sans s'en douter, un *vrai chantage* de la part de Nankin qui ose menacer le monde d'une grande guerre et d'une ruine du marché chinois.

Chantage, pur chantage : la faction de Nankin est enlisée dans la guerre civile, paralysée par la jacquerie communiste ; et, surtout, la masse du peuple et les meilleures classes sociales, dressées contre elle, ne la suivront dans aucune aventure militaire contre le Japon, aventure où la Chine serait écrasée, ruinée à fond. D'ailleurs, Nankin ne menace de mettre flamberge au vent que pour la galerie, pour la « face », et surtout pour effrayer les augures de Genève, qui n'ont aucune conception de la mentalité chinoise. Et ce qui est non moins sérieux, c'est que le secrétariat de la S.D.N. n'est pas moins ignorant, lui qui devrait pouvoir renseigner pleinement les politiciens d'occasion appelés à Genève, ministres et autres, dont la plupart n'ont que la plus vague idée du problème mandchourien.

J'en reviens à la faction de Nankin, à ses étranges procédés d'intimidation à l'égard de la S.D.N. Ces jours derniers, il a été beaucoup question de troubles à Tientsin, où le Japonais, dénoncé une fois de plus par Nankin pour ses maléfices, aurait canonné la ville chinoise. A Paris même on s'est ému de cette « aggravation du conflit », comme a dit la presse. Voici la vérité. On ne sait guère qu'il existe en cette Chine du Kouo Ming Tang plus de 10 millions de la population qui vivent *en marge* de la société. Cette haute et basse pègre se tient surtout dans les grandes cités, toujours prête pour un beau pillage. A Tientsin par exemple, très grande cité, on peut évaluer à 150.000 le chiffre de la populace, de la tourbe que le gouvernement de Nankin a jetée contre la concession japonaise peuplée de 40.000 âmes. Oui, c'est ce gouvernement de Nankin si soucieux d'entente, de paix, ainsi qu'il le clame à Genève, qui a monté ce scénario, lancé cette tourbe contre une population étrangère inoffensive. Ce n'est pas la première fois que pareille manœuvre est tentée à Shanghai et Hankéou en particulier, la faction de Nankin ayant si bien profité des leçons du bolchevik qui a été longtemps son éducateur. Sans la riposte armée du Japon, qui était sur ses gardes, c'eût été le pillage, un affreux massacre de femmes et d'enfants, car une tourbe chinoise n'épargne personne.

Le Japonais, dit-on, s'est défendu à coups de canon. Sans doute : il a tiré à blanc quelques coups. C'est là le procédé habituel en Chine pour arrêter net une tourbe de pillards et de massacreurs, aussi lâches que cruels. Ce sont des coups de canon bienfaisants : dans sa panique la racaille ne trouve pas assez de trous pour se cacher.

Coups de canon à blanc de la flottille de guerre internationale qui patrouille le Yangtze : combien d'existences de Chinois n'ont-ils pas sauvées ? Des centaines de mille. Combien de cités le long du grand fleuve n'ont-elles pas ainsi échappé au pillage, au massacre ?

C'est donc l'étranger le vrai protecteur du pauvre peuple chinois depuis que le Kouo Ming Tang l'a mis sous le talon de 5 millions de reîtres et de bandits.

Qui donc trouble l'ordre en Chine ? Mais la faction de Nankin, elle seule. Il n'est que temps pour la S.D.N. de lui déclarer que sa comédie du pacifisme, si étrangement démentie par les faits des réalités tragiques, doit finir sans plus tarder. Il n'est que temps pour elle de comprendre, et de laisser le gendarme, le gardien de la paix japonais continuer de maintenir l'ordre en Mandchourie, ainsi que le fait à Shanghai et Tientsin le gendarme français, anglais ou américain.

Qu'elle prenne garde, la S.D.N. ! C'est à une nouvelle mêlée générale que nous allons si, poussant à bout le Japon, elle le jette, malgré lui, dans certaines ententes qu'il est inutile de préciser. La S.D.N. joue un jeu dangereux par sa partialité à l'égard d'une faction politique que renie le peuple chinois.

D' A. Legendre.



Huma. 22

Enclosure No. 31 to Despatch No. 2006  
of November 24, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.


Extract from L'HUMANITE, November 22, 1931.

**NOUS NE LAISSERONS PAS TOUCHER A LA PATRIE PROLETARIENNE !**

## Litvinov répond à la provocation nippone

**Le gouvernement de Tokio continue à faire avancer ses troupes  
dans la direction de la frontière de l'U.R.S.S.**

**Le prolétariat doit renforcer sa lutte contre l'impérialisme français**



Des soldats japonais pillent les meubles du maréchal Tchang Hsue Lang, à Moukden

Nous publions ci-dessous le *texte* communiqué par l'agence Tass — de la vigoureuse réponse de notre camarade Litvinov à la note insolente du gouvernement japonais que nous avons commentée avant-hier. Cette déclaration fut faite hier à M. Mirot, ambassadeur du Japon à Moscou :

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« Le gouvernement soviétique prend acte avec satisfaction de votre déclaration selon laquelle le gouvernement japonais ne croit pas aux bruits qui ont couru sur la violation du principe de non-immixtion et sur l'aide soviétique aux généraux chinois ; il prend acte également que le gouvernement japonais ne veut pas prendre la responsabilité des déclarations faites par des personnalités officielles japonaises, déclarations qui n'ont pas été sanctionnées par leur gouvernement. Le gouvernement soviétique ne pouvait pas attendre d'autre attitude de la part du gouvernement japonais à l'égard de ces bruits, après la déclaration de Karakhan faite sur l'ordre du gouvernement soviétique en ce qui concerne la non-immixtion des Soviétiques dans le conflit sino-japonais, qui n'ont prêté assistance à aucune des parties.

**1929 : défense**

**1931 : agression**

« Comme votre déclaration établit une certaine analogie entre les événements qui se déroulent actuellement en Chine et le conflit soviéto-chinois de 1929, je suis forcé de remarquer l'inexactitude de cette analogie, a dit Litvinov.

« Malgré la violation grossière, et absolument évidente pour tous, par les autorités chinoises des droits de l'U. R. S. S. reconnus par un traité, le gouvernement soviétique n'a pas envahi et n'a jamais pensé à envahir la Mandchourie. C'est seulement après les agressions répétées des détachements chinois et blancgardistes sur le territoire soviétique, que les troupes soviétiques ont franchi la frontière mandchoue pour repousser une agression, désarmer les assaillants et empêcher des agressions ultérieures. Jamais il n'a été question d'une possibilité d'occupation, même temporaire, du territoire chinois par les troupes soviétiques, et du changement des autorités existantes pour l'établissement de nouvelles autorités. Toute possibilité, même la plus éloignée, d'une violation des droits légaux et des intérêts du Japon était également absente. Dès que les troupes soviétiques eurent accompli leur tâche restreinte, elles furent ramenées de nouveau sur le territoire soviétique.

Le gouvernement soviétique n'a pas profité de la supériorité militaire ni de la faiblesse de la Chine pour imposer à celle-ci des conditions nouvelles quelconques ou pour résoudre des problèmes non directement liés à l'origine du conflit.

**Réplique à une insolence**

Si, en rappelant le refus du gouvernement japonais de transporter les troupes chinoises pendant le conflit de 1929, vous aviez en vue le chemin de fer sud-mandchourien et opposiez ainsi le transport des trou-



## ENCOURAGÉ PAR LE GOUVERNEMENT DE PARIS, LE JAPON FAIT AVANCER SES TROUPES DANS LA DIRECTION DE LA FRONTIÈRE SOVIÉTIQUE

pes chinoises ayant prétendument eu lieu sur le chemin de fer de l'Est-Chinois, pendant le conflit sino-japonais actuel, je dois vous donner l'explication suivante :

Le chemin de fer de la Mandchourie du Sud est placé sous la direction et le contrôle complet du Japon ; il est gardé par les troupes japonaises, tandis que le chemin de fer chinois oriental se trouve sous une direction mixte soviéto-chinoise, est gardé par des troupes chinoises et relève exclusivement des autorités chinoises.

Vous savez sans doute que le gouvernement soviétique a renoncé volontairement aux privilèges du gouvernement tsariste de maintenir ses troupes en Chine, particulièrement sur le chemin de fer chinois oriental, et il ne le regrette nullement, car il est convaincu d'avoir bien agi en renonçant aux privilèges du gouvernement tsariste. Il en résulte qu'on ne saurait considérer comme identiques les conditions concernant le chemin de fer mandchou du sud avec les conditions concernant le chemin de fer de l'Est chinois.

Le gouvernement soviétique ignore si les troupes chinoises qui gardent le chemin de fer de l'est chinois ont été transportées par le chemin de fer de l'est chinois pour des opérations militaires. Ceci n'était pas nécessaire tant que la zone du conflit sino-japonais est restée limitée au rayon de la Mandchourie méridionale. Ce danger ne pouvait surgir qu'au moment de l'avance des troupes japonaises vers la ligne du chemin de fer de l'est chinois.

Lorsque ce danger devint réel, le gouvernement soviétique tint compte de cette circonstance et donna le 12 novembre, à la partie soviétique de la direction du chemin de fer oriental chinois, des directives pour continuer l'application du principe de la neutralité. Effectivement, malgré toutes les difficultés créées par la proximité du front du chemin de fer de l'est chinois, il a su, dans l'ensemble, conserver un régime de neutralité. L'estime nécessaire de faire cette déclaration pour souligner que je ne puis être d'accord avec vous au sujet de la responsabilité du chemin de fer de l'Est chinois.

### La politique de paix et l'inquiétude de l'U. R. S. S.

Le gouvernement soviétique prend acte avec satisfaction des assurances réitérées du gouvernement japonais qu'il s'efforcera d'éviter tout dommage aux intérêts du chemin de fer de l'Est chinois et de l'U. R. S. S.

Cependant il convient de remarquer que, malgré la communication initiale que vous m'avez faite par ordre de votre gouvernement, qui avait donné l'ordre de réduire le plus possible les opérations militaires en Mandchourie, ces opérations se sont considérablement élargies depuis lors, elles sont sorties loin en dehors des limites de leur zone initiale.

Cette circonstance, qui élargit la possibilité de léser les intérêts de l'U. R. S. S., ne peut pas ne pas inspirer au gouvernement soviétique une sérieuse inquiétude. Le gouvernement soviétique applique une stricte politique de paix et de relations pacifiques dans tous ses rapports avec les autres Etats. Il attache une grande importance au maintien et à la consolidation des rapports existant avec le Japon. Il observe une politique de non immixtion dans les conflits entre divers pays.

Il compte que le gouvernement japonais maintiendra les rapports existants entre les deux pays et que dans toutes ses actions, il prendra en considération l'inviolabilité des intérêts de l'U. R. S. S.

Voici en quels termes le Provincial du Temps commente les événements d'Extrême-Orient : « Une chance merveilleuse de salut est offerte à la civilisation. »

Cette chance merveilleuse qu'il faut saisir par les cheveux, c'est, vous l'avez deviné, la guerre pour le dépècement de la Chine et contre l'Union Soviétique.

Le Provincial précise sa pensée :

Le Japon, nation civilisée, notre allié loyal de la guerre, qui, seul, représente et défend à l'Orient du monde l'ordre social et la paix contre une sauvage anarchie, qui, seul, pour le moment, a le pouvoir de barrer la route à la vague sanglante de bolchevisme, est, pour nous Français, un des invincibles remparts de notre Indochine.

Et quand, en Asie, comme en Russie, la chance s'offre pour l'Europe, et spécialement pour la France, une chance inespérée, d'être préservées d'un des plus redoutables dangers de mort qui les menacent, préféreront-elles, non seulement la laisser échapper, mais encore la détruire elles-mêmes ?

Ce ne sont pas là propos en l'air. On n'écrit dans le Temps qu'en service commandé.

Les lignes plus haut reproduites expriment avec une grande fidélité la préoccupation politique de l'impérialisme français, et l'on comprend mieux, quand on les a lues, certaines démarches comme celle-ci que nous relate un *Rabcor* : vendredi dernier, aux usines d'aviation Salmson, à Billancourt, une délégation de techniciens japonais a été reçue par la direction et a procédé à une visite minutieuse de l'entreprise.

Un fait analogue nous l'avons signalé, s'est produit à Saint-Chamond.

Cette activité va de pair avec les excitations journalistiques de la presse française et avec les efforts de M. Briand au Conseil de la Société des Nations.

### Le rôle de la S. D. N.

Le ministre français des Affaires étrangères a prononcé hier à la fin de la séance publique de l'aréopage un petit discours assez habilement tourné à l'usage des dévôts de l'Établissement. Il s'est plaint que de mauvais esprits tournassent en dérision les travaux de la Ligue. Il a exalté la grandeur de l'Institution. Nous ne savons à quels mauvais esprits M. Briand faisait allusion. En ce qui nous concerne, ce n'est point la dérision que nous entendons susciter à l'égard de la S. D. N., mais l'action résolue du prolétariat. La S. D. N. ne nous paraît pas ridicule. Nous la trouvons au contraire nuisible et redoutable au plus haut point. Le rôle qu'elle joue pour créer le mystère autour de la préparation de la guerre nous paraît au suprême degré dangereux et nous ne cessons de dresser le monde du travail contre ce comité exécutif de brigandage et de rapine.

Aussi bien ce qui s'est passé à la séance d'hier est-il bien de nature à nous confirmer dans notre attitude. Donc depuis hier, la proposition dont nous vous avons entretenus depuis quelques jours déjà a reçu une sanction publique. Cette proposition consiste, comme vous savez, dans la nomination d'une commission chargée d'aller enquêter en Chine. Nous avons dit ce que signifiait la création d'un semblable organisme. Un comité international reçoit la mission d'« épurer » la Chine, c'est-à-dire de préparer dans ses moindres détails un plan de lutte contre la Révolution, contre les Soviétiques chinois d'une part, contre l'Union Soviétique de l'autre. « Ce que le Japon entrevoit », écrit M. Saint-Brice dans le Journal, c'est la possibilité de se servir de la collaboration de la S. D. N. pour démontrer la logique de sa thèse et la légitimité de ses revendications ».

### La proposition japonaise

Ainsi procédèrent en d'autres temps les Polonais pour s'emparer de Vilna ! ou pour dépecer la Haute-Silésie.

L'idée est de M. Briand, mais la proposition a été formulée par M. Yoshizawa dans les termes suivants :

Le gouvernement japonais estime que la condition essentielle d'une solution fondamentale de la question est la connaissance réelle de la situation dans son ensemble, tant en Mandchourie qu'en Chine même. C'est dans cet esprit qu'il propose que la Société des Nations envoie sur place une commission d'études. Je pense que cette proposition ne saurait qu'obtenir l'assentiment de tous les membres du Conseil. Bien entendu...

connaître la composition et les attributions du comité d'enquête, et encore qu'il convenait avant toute chose de procéder à l'évacuation du territoire occupé.

Sur ce point, le Japonais a été particulièrement catégorique : Son gouvernement entend conserver les mains libres et ne procéder à tel ou tel mouvement de troupes que « dans la mesure où seront réalisés les éléments de sécurité qu'il juge indispensable. »

Quant à M. Briand, il s'est bien gardé dans son discours final de faire la moindre allusion à ce sujet. Il s'est borné à dire que l'envoi de la commission d'enquête causerait une « réelle détente. »

La vérité, c'est qu'en fin de cette semaine :

1° La Société des Nations sous la direction de l'impérialisme français met entre les mains du Japon une organisation internationale d'inspiration française et chargée d'organiser la lutte contre les Soviétiques dans toute la Chine ;

2° Le Japon est maître de Tsitsikar, la S. D. N. consacre l'occupation militaire de la Mandchourie. Et les troupes japonaises continuent leur avance dans la direction de la frontière soviétique. Le correspondant des *Dernières Nouvelles* à Kharbine écrit au journal du blanc Mikoukov :

« De Tsitsikar part un réseau ferroviaire sur le Nord, jusqu'à Kochan, en direction de Blagovitchensk, Kochan, point stratégique important, se trouvant à mi-chemin de Blagovitchensk, sera occupé par les Japonais. »

En général, nous vivons ici sous l'impression des événements qui vont se dérouler. Un conflit entre le Japon et l'U. R. S. S., voilà la phrase qui retentit le plus souvent et de plus en plus fort.

En d'autres termes, chaque jour qui passe aggrave le danger et précise l'urgence de nos devoirs.

A cet égard, il convient d'observer que la semaine qui s'achève a vu s'organiser déjà à Paris et en province le début de la riposte prolétarienne. Hier soir encore, une série de meetings du Parti et des Amis de l'U. R. S. S. ont obtenu un plein succès.

Aujourd'hui dimanche, plusieurs assemblées d'organisation ont mis à leur ordre du jour la guerre antisoviétique d'Extrême-Orient.

Dans dix jours enfin, le peuple de Paris sera convié par le Parti et les Jeunesses à une assemblée monstre à Bullier.

Le 1<sup>er</sup> décembre ! Camarades, retenir cette date ! Préparez-vous pour cette importante manifestation !

Gabriel PERI.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Cette est de M. Briand, mais la proposition a été formulée par M. Yoshizawa dans les termes suivants :

Le gouvernement japonais estime que la condition essentielle d'une solution fondamentale de la question est la connaissance réelle de la situation dans son ensemble, tant en Mandchourie qu'en Chine même. C'est dans cet esprit qu'il propose que la Société des Nations envoie sur place une commission d'études. Je pense que cette proposition ne saurait qu'obtenir l'assentiment de tous les membres du Conseil. Bien entendu, cette commission n'aurait pas mandat d'intervenir dans les négociations qui pourront être entamées entre les deux parties ni de surveiller les mouvements des forces militaires de l'une ou de l'autre.

Cette suggestion, il convient d'insister sur ce point, a recueilli hier l'assentiment de tous les membres du conseil.

Tous, depuis le délégué de l'Allemagne jusqu'à celui du Guatemala ont donné leur adhésion et juré qu'ils aideraient la commission dans ces travaux d'investigation.

Le délégué du gouvernement chinois lui-même prit bien garde de ne point combattre de front le projet. Le docteur Sze représente au conseil le Kuomintang contre-révolutionnaire, qui extermine les révolutionnaires et qui depuis le début de la guerre ne cesse de réclamer l'intervention étrangère. Il a dû néanmoins tenir compte de la colère grandissante des masses populaires contre la politique de trahison du Kuomintang et il formulé quelques réserves de forme. Il a dit, par exemple, qu'il ne pouvait se prononcer avant de



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of November 24, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'INFORMATION, November 22, 1931.

## Vers le règlement des affaires de Mandchourie?

Le Conseil de la S. D. N. découvrira-t-il aujourd'hui les moyens de sortir d'une impuissance déplorable? On peut l'espérer puisqu'une séance publique a été prévue pour cet après-midi. Les membres du Conseil ne s'exposent pas d'ordinaire aux risques d'étaler les difficultés. Pour ne pas donner le spectacle de leurs divergences et pour éviter les éclats, ils opèrent sur un terrain soigneusement reconnu et préparé. Ce devrait être, par conséquent, un signe favorable qu'ils aient décidé hier soir de tenir leur deuxième réunion publique. En fait, il semble, en effet, que l'on s'oriente vers la constitution d'une commission d'enquête chargée non seulement d'examiner les griefs de la Chine et les conditions de l'opération de protection entreprise par les troupes japonaises, mais encore — et surtout peut-être — les conditions dans lesquelles s'exerce la souveraineté chinoise avec les garanties qu'elle offre aux intérêts étrangers. C'est la solution que nous indiquons avant-hier ici comme la seule capable de sortir l'imposant équipage de la Société des Nations de l'impasse où il s'engagea trop précipitamment à la fin du mois d'octobre. L'imprudence dont la responsabilité appartient moins aux membres du Conseil qu'à ceux qui devaient les renseigner est si manifeste que personne ne songe plus à insister sur le retard des forces japonaises à sortir de territoires qui devaient être évacués obligatoirement le 16 novembre, ni à fixer une date prochaine pour cette retraite. Désormais, l'on s'accommode des événements et on adapte aux circonstances des principes qu'il est trop malaisé d'appliquer exactement.

Le différend sino-japonais va-t-il s'éteindre pour cela? Gardons-nous de le soutenir. D'abord, la séance qui se tient cet après-midi, si arrangée qu'elle soit, n'est point complètement sans péril. Nous savons que les Japonais, afin de ne pas irriter le débat, sont disposés à passer sous silence certaines de leurs revendications sans les abandonner tout à fait. Mais nous ignorons si la Chine est disposée à accepter la procédure qui lui sera fortement conseillée ce matin même. Enfin, la question principale est celle de

la rédaction de la résolution à faire prendre au Conseil, de la composition de la commission et principalement du mandat à lui donner. Pour ne pas éveiller les susceptibilités, on voudrait que ses pouvoirs fussent définis assez vaguement et que les limites de ses investigations demeurent un peu incertaines. Aucun des deux adversaires n'est prêt à s'engager dans un compromis de ce genre. Les représentants de la Chine mettent en avant la souveraineté et le sentiment national, ceux du Japon les intérêts et l'opinion publique. A entendre les uns et les autres, les chances de conciliation seraient minces. Pourtant le Secrétariat de la Société des Nations a toujours été jusqu'ici assez riche en formules et assez ingénieux pour les faire accepter par ceux qui étaient aux prises devant lui.

Ni la transaction ni la formule ne régleront le conflit. Elles donneront seulement aux juges de la Société des Nations, à bon droit préoccupés de limiter dans cette affaire leurs propres avantages, un apaisement momentané. Certes, c'est quelque chose, car il est bon de maintenir un prestige nécessaire. Mais c'est le fond de l'affaire de Mandchourie; ce sont ses suites qui demeurent préoccupantes. Là-dessus, nous n'avons encore aucun progrès substantiel à enregistrer. Pourtant la notion du danger rend souvent plus clairvoyant. Or, il n'est pas douteux que le danger existe et qu'on est averti. Les Etats-Unis qui, ostensiblement, n'ont rien voulu faire pour s'associer aux mesures de contrainte dont avaient rêvé quelques personnes qui, tout en se réclamant de la paix, se plaisent à jouer avec le feu, ne sont, en effet, nullement décidés à assister indifférents à certaines entreprises. C'est pourquoi la Chine devrait donner les garanties qu'on lui demande. Mais le Japon qui a remporté un succès ne devra pas chercher à pousser trop loin ses avantages. L'annexion déguisée de la Mandchourie, après une occupation quasi totale, reste une opération dangereuse. Un gouvernement sage se doit de comprendre et d'arrêter.

FERNAND DE BRINON.



Enclosure No. 33 to Despatch No. 2006  
of November 24, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE MATIN, November 22, 1931.

## LE SENS DE L'HONNEUR

— Naturellement les Japonais prince Fasi, sur le visage duquel ont sévèrement châtié le général, on lisait plus de joie que de nervosité. Ma du guet-apens grâce auquel ce digne chef chinois a fait massacrer quelques soldats du mikado. Malgré toutes les dépêches contradictoires, malgré toutes les rumeurs d'apaisement, j'en étais certain. Les Japonais ne laissent jamais passer impunément une insulte. Ils ont trop le sens de l'honneur...

Mon interlocuteur rêva quelques instants. Ses yeux noirs, durs et fixes, semblèrent considérer des images qui venaient du fond de l'espace, du fond du temps et ajouta :

— Le sens de l'honneur pour eux comme pour leurs ennemis.

Celui qui parlait ainsi avait un aspect étrange et saisissant. Sa taille dépassait de beaucoup celle du commun des hommes. Il avait des épaules d'une largeur herculéenne, une taille mince de danseuse. Son visage, au crâne tondu, portait les marques de l'âge, d'une vie rude et cruelle, mais respirait une vigueur, une ardeur invincibles.

Il était vêtu de la tunique noire et des bottes étroites des guerriers du Caucase qui l'habillaient, en plein Paris, en hiver et en été. Ce prince tcherkesse, qui, maintenant, était réduit au rôle de figurant aux portes des restaurants de nuit de Montmartre, avait eu l'existence la plus pathétique que puissent nourrir trente années d'aventures, de jeu, de luxe, de misère et de combats.

Il avait fait campagne pour la première fois en Chine contre les Boxers. Il avait été laissé pour mort sur les champs de Mandchourie, il avait mené un escadron de la division sauvage dans toutes les charges de la grande guerre, avait sabré les gardes rouges dans le nord et dans le sud de l'immense Russie.

Ces vicissitudes lui avaient forgé des traits impassibles. Il s'anima pourtant un peu en évoquant la guerre mystérieuse et lointaine que se livrent deux peuples jaunes dans cette Mandchourie où, voici plus d'un quart de siècle, il avait versé son sang. Et le vieil aventurier à la tunique noire, bardée de cartouches, poursuivit :

— Oui, ce sont de rudes soldats que les Japonais. Je n'en connais pas d'autres qui les vaillent pour le moral et, s'ils sont restés les mêmes que de mon temps, je ne donnerais pas cher de ceux qui oseront s'attaquer à eux.

» Je venais d'arriver au 10<sup>e</sup> corps d'armée russe lorsqu'une patrouille à cheval fit prisonniers quatre cavaliers japonais. Petits et trapus, les hommes qu'avaient ramenés nos cosaques étaient fort bien vêtus. Ils portaient des pèlerines doublées de fourrure, et des bérets avec des protège-oreilles en peau de rat. Leur équipement était d'un ordre et d'une commodité extraordinaires. En outre, chacun d'eux avait dans sa sacoche des cartes d'état-major, des crayons, du papier, un compas, une boussole et, à la stupeur générale, du papier hygiénique.

» Après les avoir interrogés, on emmena les prisonniers dans une pièce située près de ma chambre et séparée d'elle par une porte vitrée. Il était déjà tard. Ils s'endormirent sans bruit. Le matin, mon lit de camp se trouvant juste en face de la porte, je me mis à les surveiller. Ils dormaient encore quand on leur apporta du thé. Ils se levèrent tout de suite et commencèrent leur toilette. Ils se lavèrent, nettoyèrent leurs uniformes, puis il se passa une chose vraiment stupéfiante. Ils se placèrent en rang et commencèrent à faire des mouvements de bras, de jambes, des flexions, des assouplissements, bref toute une série d'exercices.

» Une sorte d'inquiétude se glissa en moi. Quatre prisonniers, le premier jour de leur captivité, faisaient à leur réveil de la gymnastique comme si rien au monde ne pouvait changer leurs habitudes consacrées !

prince Fasi, sur le visage duquel on lisait plus de joie que de nervosité.

» Il mit sabre au clair et la charge s'ébranla au grand galop.

» — Allah ! Allah ! hurlèrent les montagnards, courant furieusement à l'ennemi.

» A ma grande surprise, la batterie resta muette. Sept cent mètres, au plus, nous séparaient des canons ennemis quand des mitrailleuses se démasquèrent et se mirent à tirer. Par groupes denses, hommes et chevaux tombèrent, fauchés. Mais les montagnards n'arrêtèrent pas leur galop. Sous un feu d'enfer, ils continuèrent leur charge. A cent cinquante mètres de la batterie nous n'étions plus qu'une poignée d'hommes autour du prince Fasi et de son insigne de commandant.

» Soudain, et alors que je me préparais à mourir, les Japonais cessèrent le feu.

» Je vis le prince Fasi étendu à terre, un peu devant moi. Près de sa tête gisait son fanion de commandement et deux de ses cavaliers étaient penchés sur lui pour le relever.

» Les Japonais avaient arrêté le feu pour permettre à la poignée d'hommes qui restait après cette attaque de reprendre leur drapeau et d'emporter leur chef blessé. Ils ne tirèrent plus un seul coup de fusil... C'étaient des hommes d'honneur. »

J. Kessel.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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» Une sorte d'inquiétude se glissa en moi. Quatre prisonniers, le premier jour de leur captivité, faisaient à leur réveil de la gymnastique comme si rien au monde ne pouvait changer leurs habitudes consacrées !

» J'étais bien jeune, mais je sentis qu'une attitude pareille valait bien des mitrailleuses et des canons.

» Un mois plus tard de grands combats se livrèrent. Notre corps d'armée y fut décimé. On nous envoya de nouveaux renforts. Parmi ces troupes se trouvaient des régiments de cavalerie indigènes de la fameuse division sauvage. C'étaient des volontaires montagnards du Caucase. Ces hommes étaient des soldats par le sang, par l'hérédité, par toute leur vie, enfin. J'avais grande envie de les voir en action. Mon désir fut bientôt exaucé.

» Une batterie japonaise nous ennuyait beaucoup. Le prince Fasi Mirza, qui était de mes amis et qui commandait un régiment de la division sauvage, reçut l'ordre de la charger. Il me permit de l'accompagner.

» — A cheval ! commande le



ECHO 23

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of November 24, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ECHO DE PARIS, November 23, 1931.

### Les conséquences européennes de la procédure suivie dans le conflit mandchourien

Nombre d'Etats représentés au conseil de la *Société des Nations* s'intéressent surtout à la procédure suivie vis-à-vis des affaires mandchouriennes en raison des précédents, valables pour l'Europe, qui, chemin faisant, sont ou peuvent être constitués. Tout le monde sait que, dans la lointaine province chinoise, l'action de l'établissement genevois sera médiocre à tout mettre au mieux, qu'elle n'affectera pas sensiblement le cours des événements. Le pire serait que, dans son désir d'arrêter les mêlées de Japonais et de Chinois, le Conseil, se laissant aller à professer des opinions, à prendre des décisions dont, par la suite, ceux qui veulent troubler la paix de notre continent pourraient se réclamer. Il convient d'examiner sous cet angle ce qui se passe devant le Conseil.

M. Fotich, délégué de la Yougoslavie, a manifesté une certaine inquiétude lorsque, en séance officielle du Conseil, voici peu de jours, le délégué de la Chine, M. Szé, déclara sans détours que son pays n'achèterait point la retraite des troupes japonaises de Mandchourie en reconnaissant le bien fondé du traité sino-japonais de 1915. « Ce traité a-t-il été ratifié ? » interrogea le représentant de Belgrade. M. Szé dut admettre que les instruments de ratification avaient été échangés mais qu'à l'origine violence avait été faite au gouvernement chinois de l'époque. Pour l'instant nous n'avons pas à déterminer l'exactitude des détails historiques donnés par M. Szé et qui furent contredits par M. Yoshizawa. Il suffit d'enregistrer la théorie d'après laquelle des traités qui ne sont pas librement acceptés par l'un des signataires n'ont pas de validité. Qui ne voit que la plupart des traités pourraient, à ce compte, être remis en question ?

Un second point a été soulevé par les délégués polonais, yougoslave et espagnol, à la séance publique de samedi. Devant le conflit mandchourien, l'impuissance du conseil est déjà notoire. Le spectacle qui se déroule en ce moment ne risque-t-il pas d'encourager, en Europe même, les fauteurs de trouble ? MM. Zalewski, Lerroux et Fotich ont essayé de parer au danger en déclarant que la paralysie actuelle de l'établissement genevois était due au « caractère exceptionnel » de la crise présente, — tous trois ont, à l'envi, répété cette expression. « Caractère exceptionnel » à cause de l'éloignement de la Mandchourie et de la complexité singulière

de des relations internationales de la Chine. Sans doute estiment-ils que le conseil sauvegarderait son autorité en faisant l'aveu de sa faiblesse et en expliquant les raisons de cette faiblesse plutôt qu'en s'efforçant de créer des apparences sur lesquelles nul ne se méprendra. Le malheur est que beaucoup de gens soupçonnent le conseil d'anémie organique grave dans toutes les affaires graves dont il sera saisi, qu'elles soient d'Europe ou d'Asie. Si le conseil entrerait dans la voie que lui indiquent les trois délégués, où sa démission morale s'arrêterait-elle ?

Il existe une troisième question, la plus sérieuse en l'occurrence, car elle se rapporte à la naissance même du conflit mandchourien : un Etat, membre de la *Société des Nations*, est-il autorisé à se prévaloir, pour agir, des droits de la légitime défense ? Peut-il exercer des représailles et, sans consulter Genève, jusqu'où peut-il les pousser ?

Pour ce qui est de la légitime défense, elle est, d'ordinaire, reconnue comme compatible avec le *Covenant*, et il en a été fait état, formellement, à propos du pacte Kellogg. Elle est inscrite, implicitement, en toutes lettres même, dans le pacte rhénan de Locarno. Si le statut de la zone démilitarisée du Rhin est violé, la France (ou l'Allemagne), ainsi que les deux puissances garantes, peuvent à leur choix aller de l'avant ou se tourner vers le conseil. Quant aux représailles, le conseil, sollicité, en 1925, d'intervenir dans le conflit gréco-italien de Corfou, chargea un comité de juristes de se prononcer. La réponse du comité fut évasive, encore qu'il ait déclaré les mesures coercitives les plus rudes incompatibles avec le pacte. Mais la doctrine est loin d'être fixée. Certains auteurs considèrent encore que le pacte ne supprime pas les représailles territoriales ou économiques. Quand elle aura recouvré son calme et son sang-froid, la *Société des Nations* s'exercera peut-être sur ces sujets épineux. Mais il ne sera pas aisé de s'entendre.

PERTINAX.



### Une démarche japonaise auprès du Conseil de la S.D.N.

Donnant suite à des instructions reçues de Tokio, M. Yoshizawa, ambassadeur du Japon à Paris et représentant du Japon au Conseil de la Société des Nations, s'est rendu hier après-midi chez M. Briand et lui a déclaré que son gouvernement n'accepterait pas la constitution d'une commission d'enquête si la compétence de cette commission ne s'étendait pas à la Chine tout entière et était réduite aux limites de la Mandchourie.

En prescrivant cette démarche, le gouvernement japonais n'a pas essayé de lier les intérêts japonais en Mandchourie aux intérêts généraux des étrangers en Chine mais simplement d'obtenir que la commission d'enquête qui sera éventuellement nommée fasse porter ses investigations sur les mauvais traitements infligés aux nationaux et au commerce japonais dans toute l'étendue du pays.

Le Gouvernement japonais désire également que la commission soit en mesure de tirer au clair si le gouvernement de Nankin est vraiment en état d'accomplir ses obligations internationales. Pour y parvenir une enquête poursuivie en Mandchourie ne serait pas suffisante.

Il n'y a rien de nouveau dans cette demande japonaise. Samedi après-midi, à la séance publique, M. Yoshizawa l'avait formulée, la qualifiant même « d'essentielle ». Mais on pensait généralement que le gouvernement de Tokio n'en ferait pas une condition *sine qua non* de son acceptation de la commission d'enquête.

Le secrétaire général de la Société des Nations, sir Eric Drummond, et ses collaborateurs du secrétariat ont passé la journée d'hier à mettre au point une première ébauche du document qui définira le statut, la composition, le mandat et les pouvoirs de la commission d'enquête. Au sujet des idées principales que ce document traduira, M. Briand et sir John Simon ont eu un entretien,



Enclosure No. 35 to Despatch No. 2006  
of November 24, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ERE NOUVELLE, November 23, 1931.

## LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS

### Les difficultés de la S. D. N.

Le Conseil de la Société des Nations a décidé de constituer une commission chargée d'enquêter sur la situation en Mandchourie. Le Japon et la Chine ont accepté cette décision. Mais il y a un mais, il y en a même deux. D'une part la Chine continue de réclamer le retrait préalable des troupes japonaises, et d'autre part le Japon exige que l'enquête décidée par le Conseil de la S. D. N. s'étende à toute la Chine.

Toutefois si les points de vue en présence s'opposent encore ils s'expriment aujourd'hui dans une forme moins agressive et il est permis de penser que la bonne volonté, le désir de paix des deux parties, peut achever rapidement maintenant l'œuvre d'apaisement entreprise il y a quelques semaines par la S. D. N., sous l'impulsion de M. Aristide Briand, alors qu'un véritable conflit pouvait être redouté.

Le gouvernement chinois vient, en effet, d'adresser une nouvelle note au gouvernement de Tokio affirmant sa volonté d'assurer aux ressortissants japonais le respect dû à leurs personnes et de leur accorder une liberté commerciale correspondant au droit commun.

Le gouvernement de Pékin demande en conséquence au Japon que des négociations directes soient ouvertes entre les deux pays en vue du retrait des troupes japonaises, comme mesure préliminaire à l'établissement de la paix.

Le conseil de la S. D. N. ne manquera pas de prendre acte de ces déclarations et autorisera certainement ces négociations directes. Dès que celles-ci auront été ouvertes, on ne voit pas bien en vertu de quels arguments le Japon pourrait persister à refuser un retrait progressif de ses troupes. Il va de soi que la Chine, de son côté, devra être ferme et nette dans les garanties d'application du droit commun et de respect des traités qu'elle doit donner au Japon.

Reste le désir exprimé à Tokio de voir s'étendre à la Chine tout entière l'enquête décidée par le Conseil.

Sur ce point la difficulté nous paraît moins sérieuse, exactement parce que la prétention formulée ne nous le paraît pas du tout. Le conflit sino-japonais a été provoqué par la situation dans le nord de la Mandchourie, et c'est bien suffisant. Il est difficile de concevoir les raisons pour lesquelles il ne pourrait être résolu qu'après une enquête englobant toute la Chine et peut-être aussi ses quatre cents millions d'habitants pris individuellement.

Autant dire que chaque fois qu'un différend de détail sera soumis à la S. D. N., celle-ci se trouvera dans la cruelle nécessité d'envoyer des représentants dans toute l'Europe et peut-être même d'ouvrir une enquête dans le monde entier.

En vérité, nous ne voulons point croire à une telle difficulté. Pour l'écarter, il suffit du bon sens.




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NOUS NE LAISSERONS PAS TOUCHER A LA PATRIE SOCIALISTE

## Les Japonais menacent Kharbine

LES BLANCS S'AGITENT DANS LA VILLE ET LE JAPON ANNONCE QU'IL INTERVIENDRA SI LE MOINDRE TROUBLE SURVIENT

Pendant la semaine qui s'ouvre l'agitation ouvrière doit redoubler contre l'impérialisme français, pour la défense de l'U. R. S. S.



La guerre en Mandchourie : les blessés à l'hôpital militaire japonais de Moukden

Il y a en hier deux mois, jour pour jour, qu'arrivaient à Paris les premières nouvelles, un peu circonstanciées, sur le bombardement de Moukden et la prise de la capitale mandchoue par les Japonais.

Soixante jours à peine se sont écoulés et le Japon, maître de la Mandchourie, prétend, par le truchement de la Société des Nations et de sa Commission d'enquête internationale, épuiser son pouvoir dans la Chine entière.

Peut-être n'est-il pas inutile de récapituler les événements qui se sont déroulés au cours de cette période, en essayant de marquer le rôle tenu par les grandes puissances dans la guerre d'Extrême-Orient.

Le Japon, d'abord. Depuis le 18 septembre, date de l'occupation de Moukden, il a de jour en jour étendu sa zone d'occupation. Son expédition punitive avait été présentée à l'origine comme une opération de police destinée à régler un conflit local. On disait même, au lendemain de l'affaire de Moukden, que le gouvernement de Tokio était étranger au coup de force perpétré par ses officiers. Mensonge odieux dont l'objet très précis visait à jeter la confusion dans l'esprit des peuples. En fait, l'acte du 18 septembre avait été préparé de longue date. Il fait partie d'un programme de guerre minutieusement décrit en 1927 par le baron Tanaka et longuement élaboré, depuis cette date, par la bourgeoisie nipponne.

Mais, très habilement, le Japon n'abat pas ses cartes du premier coup. Il lui faut mesurer la nature des appuis sur lesquels il compte apprécier les complications qui lui furent

certains 50.000 hommes à Chinchow, réclame à la S. D. N. qu'elle aide les Nippons à dépecer la Chine et à organiser la lutte contre le bolchevisme. ET, A L'HEURE OU CES LEVRES SONT ECARTÉES, MENACE BRUTALEMENT D'OCCUPER KHARBINE !

L'étude de cette évolution ne manque pas d'intérêt. Mais il est bien



Le délégué anglais au Conseil de la S.D.N., lord Robert Cecil, quitte le Quai d'Orsay

certain que la conquête de la Mandchourie n'eût pas été possible si le Japon n'avait pas agi avec l'appui d'une grande puissance, dont il était le mandataire en Extrême-Orient. Cette puissance c'est l'impérialisme français.

La France, pas plus que son lieutenant extrême-oriental, n'a révélé son jeu du premier coup. Elle fait mine, au début, de ne pas s'intéresser au conflit qui vient de surgir.



Le gouverneur de Corée, M. Minoru Sato, qui a réclamé l'annexion par le Japon, de la Mandchourie.

promises. Le 25 septembre encore, alors que ses contingents ont reçu l'ordre de pousser leur avance, le gouvernement de Tokio n'hésite point à proclamer qu'il évacuera dans le plus proche délai.

Mais, comme par hasard, quelques jours après, il suscite les troubles de Tientsin, tient la ville pendant 24 heures sous le feu de son bombardement et installe de nouveaux jalons en pays conquis. Au début d'octobre, il est plus précis dans l'énoncé de sa requête. Il ne consent plus à souscrire à la demande d'évacuation qu'on



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Quinze jours s'écoulent. Le caractère de l'opération japonaise se précise. Les blancs de Seménoff, qui jouèrent un rôle si actif dès le début de l'aventure, s'affichent maintenant de la façon la plus ouverte. Le cabinet de Tokio adresse une première note brutale aux Soviets, il accuse l'U. R. S. S. de soutenir les généraux mandchous. Il s'attire un démenti irréfutable. Mais à Tokio, la campagne antisoviétique redouble de violence. Du coup, ce n'est plus seulement la France inspiratrice véritable de la guerre, c'est l'Angleterre, ce sont les Etats-Unis qui, lorsqu'ils n'encouragent pas les Nippons, les gratifient de leur bienveillant silence. Dès lors, la voie est libre. Quand la S. D. N. s'ouvre, le Japon est, dans toutes les capitales, sacré champion de l'ordre. Il n'a plus besoin de plaider son dossier. Le jury d'avance l'approuve, le félicite. Il n'a plus qu'à énoncer sa requête. Il prend Tchaïkoff, ren-  
dant le commandement de Moukden, con-

er au conflit qui vient de surgir.



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Et pourtant, la *Revue Militaire* du général Weygand, le 1<sup>er</sup> septembre, a justifié d'avance le coup de force japonais, et pourtant M. Reynaud voyage en Extrême-Orient, et pourtant des inspecteurs japonais visitent les grandes usines françaises, et pourtant, dès la fin août, le Quai d'Orsay a réorganisé ses services de propagande en Extrême-Orient !

*Mais c'est le souci de la bonne préparation politique de la guerre qui commande à l'impérialisme français de ne point se découvrir trop tôt.*

Complice et inspirateur depuis de longs mois, et cela en raison de la solidarité qui l'unit à une grande puissance coloniale et antisoviétique, en raison aussi de son rôle de puissance asiatique maîtresse de l'Indochine et qui fut en Chine au premier rang de toutes les entreprises contre-révolutionnaires, l'impérialisme français se manifeste publiquement au début d'octobre lorsque déjà les troupes japonaises tiennent les points de commande de la Mandchourie. Encore procède-t-il avec une prudence et une hypocrisie consommées, ainsi que l'exige la bonne conduite de la guerre. Alors M. Briand, président du conseil, rédige cette résolution du 15 octobre qui doit sauver la face de la Ligue, mettre un voile pudique sur le rôle de l'impérialisme français et permettre au Japon de poursuivre sa conquête. En même temps, M. Laval ménage l'appui du président Hoover à l'agression japonaise. C'est à l'aris que mi-octobre est préparée la première note provocatrice du Japon aux Soviétiques. La campagne d'excitation antisoviétique de la presse française va crescendo. Les journaux gouvernementaux écrivent que le sort de la civilisation se joue sur les steppes de Sibérie, les feuilles de Bourse affirment que la guerre est une affaire lucrative, le *Temps* trouve que la prise de Tsitsikar est une « merveilleuse occasion ». Et quand le 16 novembre M. Briand convoque à nouveau le Conseil, c'est pour offrir aux Nippons l'arme la plus redoutable qui ait été jamais mise au service de dépeceurs de peuples et de fauteurs de guerre antisoviétique.

Remarquez que pendant toute la période que nous évoquons ici, le Kuomintang n'a cessé de se prostituer aux impérialistes. Quelques semaines avant l'affaire de Moukden, Chang Kai Shek entreprenait contre les Soviétiques chinois une expédition qui se solda d'ailleurs par un cuisant échec. Peu après, ses tribunaux condamnaient à mort notre camarade Ruegg que lui avait livré la police anglo-française. Depuis le 18 septembre, le gouvernement de la contre-révolution chinoise s'est fait en pratique l'auxiliaire du brigandage impérialiste en Extrême-Orient.

En face de ces forces de guerre, l'Etat prolétarien a été — la chose apparaît encore plus clairement aujourd'hui avec le recul des faits — la seule force agissante de Paix. Il sait que le Japon a tout mis en œuvre pour déclencher la guerre. Il sait que la France multiplie les excitations antisoviétiques. Il sait que jouant en l'occurrence le rôle très précis d'agents provocateurs, les chefs socialistes veulent que la guerre se déclenche dans les conditions les plus défavorables à l'Etat Soviétique et au prolétariat mondial.

L'U. R. S. S. ne tombe pas dans le piège. Au nom des travailleurs de l'Union, Karakhan, Molotov, Vorochilov affirment leur volonté de paix et condamnent la politique d'occupation militaire. Mais cette volonté pacifique est une volonté révolutionnaire. L'U. R. S. S. ne laissera pas toucher aux conquêtes de la Révolution : Litvinov dénonce les menées des blancs, il réplique aux déclarations insolentes du Japon.

Et ces déclarations sont autant d'appels à la vigilance des prolétaires de tous les pays.

Cette récapitulation des événements serait incomplète si nous n'indiquions pas qu'à l'appel du P. C. de la C. G. T. U., des Amis de l'U. R. S. S., la riposte des prolétaires français s'organise avec une ardeur chaque jour accrue. Déjà toutes nos organisations ont mis le problème de la guerre à leur ordre du jour. Il faut que dans la semaine qui vient, notre travail dans ce domaine franchisse une nouvelle étape. Il faut que l'action s'extériorise davantage, surtout pour la préparation du meeting monstre de Bullier le 1<sup>er</sup> décembre. C'est la masse ouvrière qu'il faut alerter aux portes des usines, dans les réunions de quartiers, c'est aux chômeurs, c'est aux grévistes qu'il faut parler.

C'est par l'action de masse qu'on porte les coups efficaces à l'impérialisme.

Gabriel PERI.



Enclosure No. 37 to Despatch No. 2006  
of November 24, 1931.

From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LES INFORMATIONS POLITIQUES ET FINANCIERES,  
November 23, 1931.

## **Les Etats-Unis et le Japon en Chine**

Une personnalité américaine, dont nous avons déjà pu apprécier la sûreté d'information, nous a fait la déclaration suivante, que nous reproduisons sans observation :

« Contrairement aux commentaires  
« publiés par la généralité de la presse  
« de l'Europe Occidentale, les déclara-  
« tions de MM. Castle, Stimson et du  
« général Dawes, à propos de la situa-  
« tion des Etats-Unis vis-à-vis du con-  
« flit sino-japonais, n'ont jamais impli-  
« qué, soit une indifférence du gouver-  
« nement de Washington, soit un senti-  
« ment plutôt favorable au Japon.

« Si les Etats-Unis ont manifesté leur  
« intention de rester en dehors des sanc-  
« tions économiques, et même diplomati-  
« ques, qui avaient été envisagées par le  
« Conseil de la S.D.N. à l'égard du  
« Japon, c'est exclusivement dans le but  
« de conserver LEUR ENTIERE LIBERTÉ  
« D'ACTION VIS-A-VIS DU JAPON, JUS-  
« QUES ET Y COMPRIS UNE INTERVEN-  
« TION MILITAIRE, le gouvernement de  
« la Maison-Blanche considérant que  
« Tokio a déchiré lui-même le traité de  
« garantie existant entre le Japon et  
« l'Amérique, en développant son action  
« en Mandchourie, alors qu'une telle  
« extension avait été exclue, sauf en cas  
« d'éventualités qui ne s'étaient pas réa-  
« lisées préalablement. »

(Politikāl.)



Jour 23

Enclosure No. 38 to Despatch No. 2006  
of November 24, 1931.

From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE JOURNAL, November 23, 1931.

## Autour du conflit sino-japonais

### , Le Japon va-t-il changer de gouvernement pour contenir les militaires et renforcer sa monnaie?

Allons-nous assister à une véritable révolution de la politique intérieure japonaise ? Il suffit de poser la question, dans les circonstances dramatiques que traverse l'Extrême-Orient, pour montrer l'importance du mouvement que l'on annonce, bien qu'il se présente sous les apparences anodines d'un effort d'union sacrée, évitant jusqu'à la sensation d'une crise ministérielle, pour se dissimuler derrière ce qu'on appelle un simple remaniement.

Tels sont les euphémismes des télégrammes. Le projet de former un gouvernement national aurait été lancé par le ministre de l'intérieur, M. Adachi. Le premier ministre, M. Wakatsuki, aurait donné son approbation. Déjà même, on désigne le chef du gouvernement de demain, le général Ugaki, gouverneur général de Corée.

Voilà qui suffirait à attirer l'attention, même de ceux qui ne savent pas combien le mot d'union nationale peut avoir de sens différents. En Angleterre, l'union nationale est une coalition bourgeoise contre le socialisme. Au Japon, l'union nationale se ferait pour prévenir un mouvement ultra-nationaliste qui risquerait d'entraîner l'armée.

Le Japon est gouverné actuellement par le parti libéral, le Minseitō. L'union nationale signifierait que le pouvoir serait partagé entre les libéraux et les conservateurs du Seiyūkai. Mais cela n'impliquerait pas l'élimination des modérés, ni un changement de la politique étrangère. Le changement aurait plutôt pour but de faire contenir les militaires par une main ferme, et en même temps par un chef populaire.

Le général Ugaki, dont on parle comme chef du gouvernement, est un ancien ministre de la guerre du cabinet Hamaguchi. C'est un général de gauche. Tous les partis le réclament pour leur chef. Il pourrait barrer la route au mouvement national-socialiste, qui se développe au Japon, sous le patronage du baron Hiranuma.

Le changement aurait un autre but. Il permettrait de revenir sur la mesure de libre sortie de l'or, prise au début de 1930, par le gouvernement libéral, dont le ministre des finances, M. Ka Ino, pourrait difficilement se déjuger. Et pourtant, il est urgent d'arrêter les sorties d'or, qui ont atteint 200 millions de yens dans ces derniers temps.



7000-23

## Où en est la préparation de la commission d'étude de la S.D.N. dans l'affaire sino-japonaise ?

Le conseil de la Société des nations a ignoré la trêve dominicale et il a eu mille fois raison de le faire. Il n'y a pas de temps à perdre, si on ne veut pas s'exposer à être débordé par les événements. Il faut tirer le plus rapidement possible parti de la proposition japonaise.

Le travail se ramène, en somme, à la rédaction d'un projet de résolution assez souple pour satisfaire tout le monde.

C'est à cette tâche que le secrétariat s'est appliqué et c'est autour d'elle que se groupent les nombreuses palabres de la journée d'hier.

L'attention a été attirée tout particulièrement sur la rencontre de M. Yoshizawa et de M. Briand qui a eu lieu au Quai d'Orsay entre 18 h. 15 et 18 h. 45. Quand le rendez-vous s'est ébruité, dans la matinée, on a appris, en même temps, que M. Briand s'était rendu à Cocherel et devait brusquer son retour pour recevoir l'ambassadeur du Japon. En réalité, les deux hommes avaient décidé, dès samedi soir, de se retrouver afin d'accélérer la préparation de la résolution. De fait, M. Briand a donné une approbation globale aux propositions japonaises.

Le secrétaire général, sir Eric Drummond, a communiqué à M. Briand les premiers projets de rédaction. Ce fonctionnaire a vu également sir John Simon et le général Dawes. Le chef du Foreign Office a eu, de son côté, une entrevue avec l'ambassadeur du Japon à Londres, M. Matsudaira, et avec le général Dawes. Enfin, ce dernier a reçu le docteur Sze. En somme, le contact a été étroit entre tous les facteurs essentiels de l'opération.

Dès maintenant, il est entendu que la commission s'appellera, en français « Commission d'étude », en anglais « Commission of Inquiry ». On ne doit pas traduire *inquiry* par enquête, car le mot anglais n'a pas le sens péjoratif du mot français enquête. C'est pour éviter précisément ce caractère péjoratif que l'on a cherché une expression de nature à ménager les susceptibilités de la Chine.

Tout de suite, il est apparu que la commission doit être aussi peu nombreuse que possible, pour pouvoir opérer rapidement. Même dans les conditions les plus favorables, on prévoit au moins quatre mois de travaux. Que serait-ce s'il fallait mobiliser un nombreux état-major ? Comme l'examen doit porter avant tout sur les conditions particulières des étrangers en Chine et sur le respect des traités, auxquels la Chine reproche leur caractère unilatéral, il convient de choisir les délégués parmi les nations principalement intéressées aux questions d'exterritorialité. Il faut veiller aussi aux entraînements possibles des campagnes de revision.

On envisage trois membres : un Anglais juriste, un Américain économiste et un Français militaire.

Deux écueils sont apparus dans la séance publique : la définition du champ d'action géographique de la commission ; la prétention chinoise de n'admettre la constitution de la commission qu'après le début du retrait des troupes japonaises. Ces écueils sont-ils si difficiles à éviter ?

Le Japon a demandé de faire porter l'étude sur les menaces contre la vie et les biens de ses nationaux, en Chine comme en Mandchourie. C'est lord Robert Cecil qui a parlé de restreindre

l'enquête à la Mandchourie. Le Dr Sze a déclaré que son pays ne craignait pas la lumière. Il semble que sir John Simon partage l'avis de lord Robert Cecil. Pourtant, il a promis à M. Matsudaira de réfléchir.

On invoque l'immensité du territoire chinois. Est-ce une raison suffisante pour ne pas constater une organisation systématique du boycottage ? Il est vrai que les concurrents commerciaux du Japon prennent peut-être assez bien leur parti de ce boycottage. En tout cas, la question de la compétence géographique peut être laissée à la discrétion des commissaires par une formule élastique, leur permettant d'opérer partout où « sur place », ils le jugeront convenable. L'expression « sur place » a été approuvée par M. Briand.

Reste la question du début du retrait des troupes. Elle n'est pas insoluble si seulement on daigne faire un petit effort d'apaisement. M. Yoshizawa n'a-t-il pas dit que son gouvernement ne demande qu'à rappeler ses soldats dès que les conditions de sécurité le permettront et qu'il travaille précisément à les réaliser ? Peut-être verra-t-on bientôt le résultat de ce travail. — SAINT-ERICE.



1636

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

Debats 23

Enclosure No. 59 to Despatch No. 2006  
of November 24, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from JOURNAL DES DEBATS, November 23, 1931.

La séance qu'a tenue hier après-midi le Conseil de la S. D. N. a marqué un progrès dans la voie du compromis qui, seul, pourra mettre fin au conflit. La Ligue n'ayant pas été en mesure d'intervenir efficacement dès le début, il n'y a pas d'autre issue aujourd'hui. Le Conseil l'a discrètement reconnu en abandonnant sa résolution du 24 octobre, qui avait sommé le Japon de retirer ses soldats avant le 16 novembre, et en revenant à celle du 30 septembre, qui enregistrait la déclaration faite par le représentant du Japon que les troupes seraient ramenées dans la zone du chemin de fer dès que la vie et les biens des ressortissants japonais seraient suffisamment protégés. M. Briand a formellement indiqué que cette résolution seule, qui avait été adoptée à l'unanimité (ce qui ne fut pas le cas pour celle du 24 octobre), conservait sa « force exécutive ».

Le Japon a facilité cette évolution en proposant l'envoi en Extrême-Orient d'une commission d'étude. Au même moment il donne à entendre que la région de Tsitsikar, qu'il n'a peut-être occupée que pour avoir l'occasion de faire cette concession, va être évacuée. Tout le monde a accepté en principe la suggestion japonaise. La difficulté sera de la mettre en pratique. Le Japon demande que l'enquête de la commission ne soit pas limitée à la Mandchourie, mais qu'elle s'étende à la Chine. D'autre part, il ne prend aucun engagement en ce qui concerne la date de l'évacuation, celle-ci demeurant subordonnée au rétablissement de l'ordre, ce qui lui assure une grande liberté de mouvements. La Chine, au contraire, ne paraît pas jusqu'ici disposée à admettre l'extension de l'enquête. Son délégué, M. Sze, a maintenu que le retrait des troupes japonaises devait être au préalable commencé. Il a fait allusion à l'éventualité d'un recours aux articles 15 et 16 du Pacte de la S. D. N. (on n'a envisagé jusqu'ici que l'article 11, où il n'est pas question de sanctions).

Il reste donc de grosses difficultés à surmonter. On doit aussi tenir compte de la possibilité de nouveaux incidents militaires qui compliqueraient la situation. L'annonce d'un règlement serait donc prématurée. Avant qu'un accord se réalise, des pourparlers délicats seront encore nécessaires. Cependant les probabilités sont dans le sens d'un compromis. Les conversations confidentielles vont reprendre. Souhaitons qu'elles aboutissent au résultat désiré.

PIERRE BERNUS.



Enclosure No. 40 to Despatch No. 2006  
of November 24, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE PETIT PARISIEN, November 25, 1931.

## LA COMMISSION DE LA S.D.N. POUR LA MANDCHOURIE

La journée dominicale n'a pas été, pour les principaux membres du conseil et du secrétariat, une journée de repos. Elle a été marquée, en effet, par de nombreux entretiens, par des confrontations et des discussions de textes, et enfin par certaines démarches qui, en dépit des bruits pessimistes, prouvent qu'on progresse, encore que lentement, vers une solution. Parmi ces conversations, citons notamment celles de M. Sugimura et de sir Eric Drummond; de sir John Simon, de retour de Londres, avec M. Matsudaira, avec le général Dawes, puis avec le secrétaire général de la S. D. N.; de M. Briand, enfin, avec M. Yoshizawa, entrevue qui se prolongea cinquante minutes durant et fut, nous assure-t-on, suivie de deux autres, la première avec sir Eric, la seconde avec le Dr Sze.

Le sujet de tous ces entretiens ? L'examen du projet de résolution élaboré, la nuit dernière, par la délégation japonaise, avec le concours de M. Sugimura, le sous-secrétaire général de la Société des nations, et le rapprochement de ce texte avec celui préparé, d'autre part, par le secrétariat. On voit qu'on ne perd pas de temps et que les échanges de vues auxquels nous faisons allusion hier matin ont déjà porté leurs fruits.

Dès maintenant — et c'est le grand résultat de la journée — trois points essentiels paraissent acquis :

1° On revient, comme nous l'avons dit, à la phraséologie de la résolution du 30 septembre, en ce qui concerne les opérations d'évacuation et leur parallélisme avec les mesures de sécurité prises par les autorités chinoises pour la protection des biens et des ressortissants japonais. Cela ressortait déjà assez nettement des déclarations faites samedi, à la séance publique, par M. Briand et par M. Yoshizawa, sans que le délégué chinois ait protesté et réclamé la fixation d'une date déterminée pour le retrait complet des troupes japonaises.

2° En ce qui a trait à la commission, on paraît d'accord, aussi bien du côté japonais que du côté du secrétariat, pour la dénommer *commission d'études* au lieu de *commission d'enquête*. Comme il est question d'élargir son mandat, on ménage ainsi les susceptibilités des deux parties. C'est la même préoccupation qui a fait abandonner par les Japonais leur première intention qui était d'indiquer que cette commission n'opérerait pas seulement en Mandchourie mais en Chine. On se contentera de l'expression vague : « commission d'études sur place ». On concilie de la sorte les deux tendances : celle du Japon, formulée samedi par M. Yoshizawa, et celle de lord Cecil et du secrétariat favorable seulement à une enquête en Mandchourie. Quoi qu'il en soit, il demeure bien entendu que, dans la pratique, les commissaires auront toute liberté d'appréciation. Il est vraisemblable d'ailleurs qu'ils commenceront leur voyage en se rendant à Nankin, où ils prendront contact avec le gouvernement chinois.

3° Enfin, il ne semble pas qu'il y ait de divergences de vues quant à la composition de cette commission. Le Japon propose qu'elle ne comprenne que trois membres — trois personnalités éminentes et universellement respectées — un Français et un Anglais qui seraient désignés après entente avec leurs gouvernements et un Américain qui serait désigné au seul titre de citoyen des Etats-Unis, ces derniers ne faisant pas partie de la S. D. N. et le gouvernement de Washington ne pouvant pas intervenir officiellement.

Certains avaient songé à constituer une commission de cinq ou même de neuf membres — représentant les Etats signataires du « Traité des neuf puissances » de 1922. On n'a vu que des avantages à réduire ce nombre à trois. Non seulement on réalisera de la sorte une plus grande rapidité de

travail, mais on évitera que se posent, au sein de la commission, certaines questions qui ne pourraient que l'embarrasser. Il ne faut pas oublier, en effet, que l'Allemagne, par exemple, a accepté après la guerre l'abolition sans condition du droit d'exterritorialité en faveur de ses nationaux en Chine. Elle se trouve donc, à cet égard, dans une situation particulière. D'autre part, elle a adopté, touchant les traités dits « unilatéraux », une attitude qui ne manquerait pas de mettre son représentant dans une position assez gênante, lorsqu'il s'agirait d'apprécier si les traités invoqués par le Japon et proclamés nuls par Nankin ont été ou non violés. On en pourrait dire presque autant de l'Italie, dont le gouvernement s'est posé maintes fois en champion de la revision des traités... Les Etats-Unis, la France et la Grande-Bretagne, au contraire, qui, tous, ont en Chine des intérêts considérables et n'ont pas renoncé au droit d'exterritorialité — ils sont même, depuis des années, en négociations avec Nankin sur cette délicate question — se trouvent dans une situation analogue qui leur permettra de se prononcer dans le minimum de temps, ce qui est essentiel.

Il va de soi qu'à cette commission d'études, seraient adjoints, non seulement un représentant du gouvernement chinois et un du cabinet de Tokio, mais un grand nombre d'experts — militaires, juridiques, économiques — de façon à ce que soient examinés tous les côtés du problème. On songerait d'ailleurs à composer la commission elle-même d'un général (français), d'un juriste (anglais) et d'un homme d'Etat familiarisé avec les affaires (américain). Pour le général, on avait, paraît-il, sérieusement pensé au général Weygand, mais le bruit court qu'il se serait récusé en raison de sa situation de vice-président du conseil supérieur de la guerre et de la nécessité qu'il y aura pour lui à se trouver en Europe au moment de la réunion de la conférence pour la limitation et la réduction des armements dont l'ouverture est fixée au 2 février prochain. On s'attend, en effet, à ce que la durée de l'enquête soit de trois à quatre mois...

Tel est, rapidement exposé, le bilan de cette journée. Il va de soi qu'il ne s'agit encore là que de suggestions à propos desquelles, non seulement le Dr Sze, à qui elles ont été communiquées hier soir, mais les autres membres du conseil ont leur mot à dire. Le représentant de Nankin a formellement réservé, samedi après-midi, son droit d'amendement et il faut s'attendre à ce qu'il en use largement, ne fut-ce que pour ne pas s'attirer les foudres de son gouvernement. Il y aura encore des moments difficiles avant qu'on ne parvienne à un accord.

Il est indéniable, cependant, que si les dernières opérations militaires ont pu faire suspecter les intentions du Japon, le projet de résolution communiqué hier soir à M. Briand par M. Yoshizawa témoigne à la fois d'une sincère volonté d'entente et du désir de ménager les justes susceptibilités de la Chine.

Il est donc exact de dire qu'il y a progrès. Il n'en reste pas moins que de grands efforts restent à accomplir et qu'il faut se hâter. Les dépêches reçues dans la soirée de Tokio, où il est question de la constitution d'un cabinet d'union nationale sous la présidence du général Ugaki, dont on connaît les liens avec le parti militaire, ne sont pas autrement rassurantes. D'autre part, le général chinois Tchang Sue Liang masse, paraît-il, d'importants effectifs à Kingtchéou pour s'élancer sur Sinnen-Fou et Moukden.

L'intérêt bien compris des deux parties en présence comme de la S. D. N. est de faire vite. Le problème à résoudre est suffisamment malaisé pour ne pas attendre que surgissent de nouvelles complications...

Albert JULLIEN.



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Enclosure No. 41 to Despatch No. 2006  
of November 24, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LA REPUBLIQUE, November 23, 1931.

## Une campagne écœurante

*En faisant admettre le principe d'une commission d'enquête chargée de se rendre en Mandchourie, la Société des Nations a marqué un point.*

*Avec une joie mal dissimulée, les journaux de droite insistent sur le fait que c'est là un succès insuffisant. Peut-être devraient-ils réfléchir qu'à l'heure même où s'étale cette joie inconvenante des êtres vivants râlent et meurent. Mais enfin, sur le fond, ils n'ont pas tort : cette première victoire de l'esprit de paix demeure encore humble et précaire.*

*Pour ma part, je la salue pourtant avec émotion, avec espérance. Je songe à tout ce qu'il a fallu d'efforts souples, tenaces, pour l'obtenir. Je songe aussi, non sans fierté, que dans cette grande œuvre humaine, c'est le représentant de la France qui, depuis le premier jour, est au premier rang sur la brèche.*

*Or, au moment même où M. Briand donne l'exemple d'une activité que rien ne décourage, au moment où il lutte pied à pied pour défendre la paix menacée, la campagne menée contre lui par le nationalisme en bataille devient de plus en plus ignoble.*

*Hier, on le représentait comme un bandit qu'il fallait abattre comme on a abattu Jaurès. Aujourd'hui, arguant du fait qu'après des jours et des nuits de bataille il a eu un instant de défaillance physique, on essaie de le représenter comme un « homme fini ».*

*Ainsi, durant la guerre, les beaux messieurs de l'arrière traitaient vaillamment de « propre à rien » le malheureux combattant qui, après des jours de combat, tombait écrasé, son fusil à la main.*

*Je ne sais laquelle est la plus écœurante, de la campagne d'hier ou de celle d'aujourd'hui. Mais ce que je sais bien, c'est qu'aujourd'hui comme hier, tous les républicains, tout le peuple, sont derrière Briand.*

*Libre aux nationalistes d'essayer d'atteindre en lui la politique de paix ! Libre aux marchands d'obus de le faire insulter ! Nos paysans, nos ouvriers, tous les travailleurs, tous les anciens combattants, saluent en lui le combattant de la paix. Puisse-t-elle, par lui, triompher !*

Albert BAYET.



Echo 24

Enclosure No. 42 to Despatch No. 2006  
of November 24, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ECHO DE PARIS, November 24, 1931.

### LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS DEVANT LE CONSEIL DE LA S.D.N.

On ne voit pas comment le projet de résolution  
nommant une commission d'études pourra  
prévaloir contre l'opposition du délégué chinois

Hier matin, réunis en séance privée, en dehors des représentants japonais et chinois, les douze membres du Conseil ont pris connaissance du projet de résolution préparé par sir Eric Drummond et ses collaborateurs du secrétariat. Ils en ont approuvé le sens général, se contentant de demander des changements de forme, notamment dans le préambule où, à leur jugement, les engagements pris par le Japon et la Chine, quand ils acceptèrent la résolution du 30 septembre, n'avaient pas suffisamment été mis en relief.

Tel qu'il a dû être amendé par sir Eric Drummond, le préambule énumère donc avec une certaine insistance les promesses faites par Tokio et Nankin, il y a près de deux mois. D'une part, le Japon est tenu de rappeler ses soldats dans la zone du sud-mandchourien aussitôt que la sécurité de ses nationaux et de leurs biens est effectivement assurée. D'autre part, la Chine est obligée de prendre toutes les mesures propres à protéger les personnes et les propriétés. Enfin, les deux gouvernements doivent s'abstenir de tout ce qui pourrait « élargir l'incident et aggraver la situation ». Pour trouver une « solution fondamentale et définitive », une commission sera nommée qui aura mandat d'étudier, sur place, « toute circonstance de nature à affecter les relations internationales et qui menace par suite de troubler la paix ou la bonne entente entre le Japon et la Chine ». La tâche confiée à la commission n'a pas de rapport avec les négociations qui auront lieu entre le Japon et la Chine et la commission ne portera pas de jugement sur les actes militaires des deux parties.

En substance, tel est le document. De toute évidence, il tient compte largement du point de vue japonais. L'évacuation n'est pas mentionnée. Le Japon demeure libre de répondre aux provocations des bandes régulières et irrégulières qui infestent la Mandchourie. La commission ne s'enfermera pas dans cette région. On déclare déjà, du côté français, que Nankin, Tokio et Moukden seront ses principales étapes. Des changements de détail peuvent encore intervenir : par exemple, il est possible qu'aux commissaires français, anglais et américain, soit adjoint un commissaire nommé par l'un des petits Etats signataire du traité des neuf puissances relatif à la Chine — soit la Hollande ou le Portugal. Il est également possible que la France appelle un civil (et non point, comme on le répète partout, un général) à siéger, auprès du juriste anglais et de l'homme d'affaires américain, ce qui rendrait l'association moins étrange. Mais le fond paraît être définitivement fixé.

La combinaison n'a qu'un défaut : M. Sze, le représentant de la Chine au conseil, ne semble pas disposé à s'y rallier. Dans un memorandum daté du 22 novembre, il déclare inacceptable pour Nankin toute commission dont la constitution ne serait pas concomitante d'une première mesure d'évacuation. Reçu par M. Briand, vers la fin de l'après-midi, il n'a pu que répéter la même exigence. Aussi M. Briand qui devait recevoir le délégué du Japon après celui de la Chine, a-t-il ajourné sa conversation avec M. Yoshizawa. Il est possible que ce matin, en séance privée, les « Douze » se retrouvent gros Jean comme devant. Alors que tenteront-ils ? Prendront-ils le parti de se désarmer eux-mêmes et de dire que le « Covenant » est inapplicable à la Chine comme le souhaitent ceux qui redoutent, pour l'avenir, la répercussion européenne des précédents créés depuis septembre par l'impuissance du Conseil ? Il serait vain de vouloir prophétiser.

PERTINAX.



Enclosure No. 43 to Despatch No. 2006  
of November 24, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.


Extract from REUNION, November 24, 1931.

## Le conflit sino-japonais en Mandchourie

### LE CONSEIL DE LA SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS EST A LA RECHERCHE D'UNE FORMULE SUSCEPTIBLE DE FAIRE ACCEPTER LA COMMISSION D'ENQUÊTE PAR LA CHINE COMME PAR LE JAPON

*Mais il n'est pas encore parvenu à l'accord : la grosse  
difficulté est d'obtenir la cessation préalable des hostilités,  
point sur lequel le délégué chinois se montre irréductible.*

LA COMMISSION PROJETÉE, QU'ON SONGERAIT A DÉDOUBLER,  
COMPRENDRAIT UN FRANÇAIS, UN ANGLAIS, UN AMÉRICAIN



Chinois capturés par les troupes nippones pendant leur marche sur Moukden. Les prisonniers sont liés, les mains derrière le dos, et placés sous la garde de soldats de l'infanterie japonaise baïonnette au canon.

**L**es membres du conseil et les hauts fonctionnaires de la Société des nations ont travaillé toute la journée d'hier à la recherche d'un compromis qui permit le vote à l'unanimité d'une résolution du conseil créant la commission d'études du conflit sino-japonais, acceptée, en principe seulement, par les deux parties au cours de la séance plénière de samedi dernier.

Nous devons ajouter que, malgré tous les efforts de M. Aristide Briand, secondé dans cette lourde tâche par sir John Simon, le général Dawes et sir Eric Drummond, secrétaire général de la Société des nations, aucune entente n'est encore intervenue. Hier, tard dans la soirée, la Chine, par l'intermédiaire du Dr Alfred Sze, remettait au secrétariat général, après en avoir donné connaissance à M. Aristide Briand, une note où, une fois de plus, son gouvernement précisait son point de vue.

Dans la matinée, le conseil des Douze — lisez les membres du conseil en l'absence des deux parties intéressées — s'était longuement réuni et avait envisagé la rédaction d'un projet de résolution qui pouvait être acceptable par la Chine et le Japon. Mais de nombreuses objections s'élevèrent quant à la rédaction de cette résolution et la thèse chinoise trouva, en la personne des représentants de plusieurs puissances représentées au conseil, des alliés utiles. Ce fut tout d'abord le délégué de l'Espagne, M. de Madariaga, qui soutint l'impossibilité d'accepter la thèse japonaise et de ne pas lier l'évacuation des territoires occupés par les Japonais à la constitution de la commission.

Très appuyé par M. Fotitch, représentant de la Yougoslavie au conseil, puis par le délégué norvégien, M. Colban, il développa l'idée qu'il serait dangereux pour la Société des nations de laisser se créer un précédent qui, en quelque sorte, l'empêcherait de mettre fin à des hostilités. Il souligna que, dans leurs propositions, les Japonais ne reconnaissaient pas à la commission d'enquête le droit de s'occuper des mouvements de troupes et ne parlaient ni d'évacuation ni de cessation des hostilités.

On se sépara donc à 12 h. 30, ajournant la séance à ce matin.

M. Briand et sir John Simon étaient seulement priés de continuer leurs négociations dans le dessein de trouver une solution mixte acceptable par les deux parties.

Fort de ces interventions en sa faveur, le délégué chinois communiqua dans la soirée une note au secrétaire général de la Société des nations le priant de la communiquer aux autres membres du conseil.

Dans ce memorandum écrit, et tout en faisant remarquer que la Chine n'opposait aucune objection à ce qu'une commission constituée de manière appropriée procédât à une enquête sur la situation en Mandchourie et rédigeât un rapport à ce sujet, il était également stipulé que cette mesure aurait pu être prise il y a deux mois, si le Japon ne l'avait refusée.

Le paragraphe 2 de la note fait ressortir qu'une commission de ce genre, quelle que soit la manière dont elle serait constituée et quel que soit son champ d'action, demeurerait illusoire si elle ne répondait pas aux besoins

immédiats auxquels il semble nécessaire à la Chine d'aviser sans plus tarder.

Et la note continue, réclamant « une enquête non accompagnée des mesures assurant en même temps la cessation immédiate des hostilités et le retrait des forces japonaises — retrait qui devrait commencer dès maintenant et se poursuivre progressivement ».

Dans le troisième paragraphe, le Dr Sze déclare que si ce retrait n'était pas effectué, et ainsi qu'il a essayé de le faire comprendre à la séance du conseil de samedi, il lui serait tout à fait impossible d'examiner la proposition en question et de prendre part à la détermination des modalités qui s'y rapportent tant que les bases, suggérées par la Chine, n'auraient pas été établies de façon appropriée.

La situation, hier soir, on le voit, était donc assez embrouillée. Nous croyons savoir, par ailleurs, que les membres du conseil s'orientent vers une solution qui permettrait de créer deux commissions, dont l'une effectuerait son travail d'étude sur tout le territoire chinois, tandis que l'autre s'occuperait particulièrement de la Mandchourie, en prenant « toutes mesures utiles » pour faire cesser les hostilités.

Un point sur lequel on est d'accord est, comme nous l'annoncions hier, que la commission ne comprendrait que trois membres : un Français, un Américain et un Anglais auxquels on adjoindrait un représentant japonais et un représentant chinois.



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Déjà l'on cite des noms. C'est ainsi que l'on voudrait voir, comme délégué français, le maréchal Pétain ou le général Weygand. Du côté américain on cite toujours le nom du général Dawes ou du général Pershing ou encore de l'ancien chef de l'état-major général de l'armée américaine : le général Somerol.

Enfin, du côté anglais on tenterait d'obtenir l'adhésion du fameux juriste sir Cecil Hurst, actuellement juge à la Cour internationale de justice permanente de La Haye. — MAURICE-RAYMONDE.




Inclosure No. 14 to Despatch No. 2006  
of November 24, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Despatch from L'UNION, November 24, 1931.

RENFORÇONS LA LUTTE CONTRE L'IMPERIALISME FRANÇAIS

**Les impérialistes, au conseil de la S. D. N.  
s'accordent sur un compromis  
pour le dépècement de la Chine  
et pour l'agression contre l'Union soviétique**

*En Mandchourie, les troupes japonaises continuent  
leur avance sur Kharbine et la frontière de l'U. R. S. S.*



Une assemblée de tous les gouverneurs du Japon étudie les mesures à prendre en vue de la guerre

Hier matin, le comité des douze du conseil de la S.D.N., s'est réuni en séance privée pour discuter de l'«*analyse*» du projet japonais relatif à la nomination de la commission internationale qui sera chargée d'étudier les données du «*conflit sino-japonais*».

Le but contre-révolutionnaire et antisoviétique de cette commission a déjà été dénoncé dans ces colonnes. Mais il nous faut insister sur le fait que la S.D.N., institution de brigandage et de rapine impérialiste, en adoptant dans son fond le point de vue du Japon vient de faire un pas de plus pour la réalisation de la politique des impérialistes pour le partage de la Chine.

En effet, le projet de Tokio stipule une enquête non seulement en Mandchourie, mais en Chine même. Dans quel but ? Pour «*examiner la situation générale de la Chine, relativement au «*maintien de l'ordre*», au respect des traités politiques et commerciaux, au mouvement antiméridionaliste*». On voit nettement, par cette brève énumération, que le rôle des commissions sera de trouver la solution du désordre chinois, autrement dit de préparer le dépècement de ce pays.

En ce qui concerne la Mandchourie, le projet de Tokio stipule que la commission n'aura pas mandat d'intervenir dans les

negotiations qui pourront être entamées entre la Chine et le Japon, *ni de surveiller les mouvements des forces militaires de Japon*. Yoshizawa a bien précisé que l'état-major japonais «*peut avoir, sur n'importe quel point de la Mandchourie, les mesures défensives qu'il lui prendra*». Nous sommes donc obligés de conserver au «*comité*» l'acte d'union, a ajouté le représentant de l'impérialisme nippon. La S.D.N., en adoptant ce point de vue, légalise donc l'occupation de la Mandchourie et sanctionne, une fois de plus, l'annexion de fait de ce pays par le Japon.

L'organisation et la composition de la commission, appelée hypocritement «*commission d'études sur place*», montre aussi lumineusement les buts antisoviétiques qu'elle poursuivra. Elle ne sera composée que de trois membres : un général français, un juriste anglais et un homme d'affaires américain. La présence d'un général français à la tête de ce comité impérialiste souligne le rôle dirigeant de l'impérialisme français dans la préparation de l'attaque contre l'Union Soviétique, dont l'invasion de la Mandchourie est une première phase à l'extrême-Orient.

M. MAGNIEN.



La Bourse de Paris a salué la session du conseil de la S.D.N. par l'augmentation des cours des actions des forges et de la sidérurgie en prévision de l'extension de la guerre. Et les impérialistes attendent de la session de Paris non la consolidation de la paix — ils ne sont pas si naïfs — mais la création d'une « conjoncture de guerre ».

La tâche de la S.D.N. consiste maintenant à légaliser la séparation de la Mandchourie de la Chine.

L'Humanité a déjà souligné le fait que la prise de Tsitsikar avait été opérée avec le soutien de la S.D.N. et que la dernière note de Briand au Japon avait uniquement pour but de soutenir l'état-major du Mikado dans ses opérations vers le Nord de la Mandchourie, vers les frontières de l'U.R.S.S.

A l'heure présente, sous la direction de la France, les colonisateurs cherchent un compromis qui, tout en satisfaisant les convoitises des puissances intéressées, sauverait la face à la S.D.N. Ce compromis sera signé avec le sang du peuple chinois.

Ce n'est pas par hasard que le représentant des Etats-Unis, Dawes, participe si activement à toutes les discussions de Paris. Dawes est, d'après l'avis de la presse de Paris et de New-York, un des auteurs du compromis qui doit former la base pour « la solution » de la question mandchourienne. Il doit veiller à Paris à ce que l'impérialisme des Etats-Unis reçoive la plus grande partie du butin. Il a en outre la tâche de laisser les mains libres à la diplomatie américaine pour l'avenir. Car il est entendu qu'aucune « solution » du problème de Mandchourie n'écartera les contradictions impérialistes.

Au contraire, le compromis sera une étape importante dans la préparation de la guerre impérialiste pour un nouveau partage du monde.

Les oppresseurs réunis à Paris exploiteront le conflit mandchourien pour la création d'un réseau militaire et provocateur contre l'Union soviétique. Sur cette base, les impérialistes sont capables, bien entendu, de parler un langage commun avec l'impérialisme nippon.

### La menace contre l'U. R. S. S. grandit

Une partie du plan contre l'Union soviétique, c'est la tentative de la S.D.N. de dissimuler sa politique de partage de la Chine par des palabres sur « l'anarchie » qui règne en Chine, tandis que le Japon est le gardien de l'« ordre ».

Mais que faut-il entendre sous la violation de l'« ordre » si ces procédés des envahisseurs signifient l'ordre. Et qui a mandaté les envahisseurs japonais de rétablir l'ordre en Mandchourie ? L'impérialisme français ! Les articles de la Vie Militaire, du Temps, l'immonde campagne de la presse française, les intrigues et les plans connus du gouvernement français contre l'U.R.S.S. ne laissent aucun doute à ce sujet.

Et au moment où, à Paris, les impérialistes recherchent le compromis favorisant leurs visées et préparant plus en détail l'agression contre notre patrie socialiste, en Mandchourie, les troupes japonaises continuent leurs mouvements stratégiques le long du chemin de fer de l'Est chinois, vers Kharbine et vers le Nord, en direction de Kochan et de Blagovietchtchensk. Cependant qu'au sud une concentration de forces nippones laisse prévoir une offensive contre King-tchéou. Ainsi donc, bientôt toute la Mandchourie sera aux mains des Japonais. A Tsitsikar, le Japon va installer ses hommes de paille qui dirigeront la province de Heilungkiang et auront pleins pouvoirs pour préparer toute provocation nécessaire sur l'Est chinois.

D'autre part, une nouvelle campagne antisoviétique sévit actuellement dans la presse française. Il s'agit de calomnies répétées sur la solvabilité de l'U.R.S.S. Dans le but de nuire aux opérations commerciales de l'Union soviétique, des fausses nouvelles sont lancées sur un prétendu moratoire de paiements que voudrait demander le gouvernement soviétique. Il serait superflu de répéter que l'U.R.S.S. est le seul pays faisant honneur à ses traites, est le seul client sérieux sur le marché mondial, si cette campagne ne s'insérait pas dans les préparatifs généraux de l'agression antisoviétique. Tous les moyens sont bons pour préparer l'opinion publique, pour discréditer le pays construisant le socialisme en face du monde capitaliste qui s'effondre.

Et il est caractéristique qu'à l'heure où se poursuit cette ignoble campagne d'excitations antisoviétiques, Jouhaux aille saluer la dépouille mortelle de Loucheur, traître de guerre, ami des gens du Torgprom.

Le danger de guerre contre l'Etat ouvrier loin de s'amoindrir, devient de plus en plus menaçant. L'impérialisme français, flanqué de ses meilleurs agents réformistes et socialistes, déploie une activité fébrile pour hâter la perpétration du crime.

Notre devoir urgent est de renforcer la lutte contre les fauteurs de guerre. Notre devoir est d'extérioriser parmi les larges masses notre action pour la défense de l'U.R.S.S. menacée. Les organisations ouvrières, les cellules ne doivent pas se contenter du vote d'ordre du jour d'aide à la révolution chinoise et de lutte contre la guerre antisoviétique.

Il faut, partout, à toute heure, que nos camarades, se considérant comme mobilisés, fassent pénétrer nos mots d'ordre de combat contre l'impérialisme français, pour la défense de l'U.R.S.S., pour la paix, dans la masse des ouvriers sans parti et socialistes. Les camarades de la C.G.T.U. ont pour tâche d'appliquer au plus vite et d'extérioriser les résolutions de lutte du congrès de Magic-City. Sur tous les terrains de la lutte de classe, il faut mener avec acharnement la bataille contre notre propre impérialisme, exiger le retrait des troupes de Chine.

La sécurité menacée de notre patrie socialiste l'exige impérieusement.

M. MAGNIEN.



Enclosure No. 45 to Despatch No. 2006  
of November 24, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE JOURNAL, November 24, 1931.

## LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS devant la S.D.N.

*Journal  
11/24*  
La Chine menace  
de refuser l'enquête  
si elle n'a pas satisfaction  
pour l'évacuation

La Chine se cabre. Voilà l'événement de la journée d'hier. Ce n'est pas précisément une surprise. Qui aurait pu croire qu'après s'être abrités depuis deux mois derrière la Société des Nations, après avoir entraîné la ligue à fermer les yeux sur les violations des traités et l'avoir presque amenée, en octobre, à fixer un délai d'évacuation au Japon, les Chinois permettraient à la Société de se laisser manœuvrer par les Japonais sans tenter de réagir? Malgré leur modération de forme, les déclarations du Dr Sze, à la séance publique de samedi, annonçaient la résistance. Celle-ci s'est précisée dans un memorandum publié au début de l'après-midi d'hier.

Une remarque s'impose. Si le memorandum chinois a été publié seulement après l'entrevue que le Dr Sze a eue dans la matinée avec le général Dawes, le document est antérieur, puisqu'il porte la date du dimanche 22 novembre. On ne doit donc pas conclure que l'éclat n'a pas été retenu par les conseils du diplomate américain.

En réalité, le manifeste est le choc en retour de la consécration de principe donnée par la séance publique de samedi à la proposition japonaise. Les Chinois ont parfaitement compris toute l'importance de ce premier pas et ils ont recouru au grand jeu d'intimidation pour tâcher de revenir en arrière.

Si on s'en tenait à la lettre du memorandum, il n'y aurait pas beaucoup de chances d'aboutir. Le document est très catégorique dans son passage essentiel que voici :

Une enquête, non accompagnée de mesures assurant en même temps la cessation immédiate des hostilités et le retrait des forces japonaises (retrait qui doit commencer dès maintenant et se poursuivre progressivement en vue d'un achèvement rapide) ne constituerait autre chose qu'un simple expédient permettant de tolérer et de perpétuer pendant une période plus ou moins indéfinie l'occupation injustifiable du territoire de la Chine par un agresseur qui a déjà virtuellement atteint son objectif illégal pendant que ces discussions avaient lieu. Dans ces circonstances, il vous sera facile de constater qu'il me sera tout à fait impossible d'examiner la proposition en question ou de prendre part à la détermination des modalités qui s'y rapportent, aussi longtemps que les bases sus-indiquées n'auront pas été posées de façon appropriée.

La conclusion est stricte. Non seulement la Chine n'accepterait pas l'enquête, mais elle refuserait même d'en discuter les modalités, si on ne lui donnait pas d'abord satisfaction.

C'est clair. C'est même trop clair, car la rigueur est dès maintenant contredite par les faits. Le Dr Sze n'est pas rentré sous sa tente et a gardé le contact avec le conseil, bien que celui-ci ait passé outre aux critiques de la Chine. Il a tenu dans la matinée une séance privée, au cours de laquelle on a précisé les termes du projet de résolution préparé par le secrétariat d'après la proposition japonaise. La discussion a porté principalement sur la question du commencement du retrait des troupes japonaises. Le texte qui a été envisagé ne paraît pas lier forcément la constitution de la commission au début de l'évacuation. On s'en tient au principe de la résolution du 20 septembre.

Les Anglais, qui avaient manifesté une très grande réticence à l'égard de l'extension possible de l'enquête hors de la Mandchourie, ont sensiblement évolué depuis la rentrée en scène de sir John Simon. Il ne faut d'ailleurs pas oublier que cet homme d'Etat a participé étroitement avec le général Dawes, M. Briand et M. Matsudaira, à la préparation de la proposition japonaise. Autant lord Robert Cecil s'est montré, dans cette affaire, théoricien passionné, autant le juriste libéral, qui dirige actuellement le Foreign Office, a montré le sens des réalités.

Est-ce à dire que toute difficulté soit écartée du côté des autres membres du conseil que la Chine? C'est le secret de demain. Il y a eu tant de malentendus dans cette affaire, en raison des risques que comporte la transposition éventuelle des précédents asiatiques sur la scène européenne! Sans doute, la consécration de l'autorité des traités, même de ceux résultant de la contrainte, même de ceux qui comportent des inégalités ou des garanties de sécurité, est d'une importance primordiale pour les signataires du traité de Versailles, pour la France, pour la Petite-Entente, pour la Pologne. Et, cependant, le précédent d'une occupation militaire pourrait être gros de conséquences en Europe.

Déjà les déclarations de la séance publique déconvenaient la préoccupation des analogies dangereuses. Cette préoccupation s'est confirmée dans la séance privée d'hier et aussi dans la conversation que M. Zaleski a eue avec M. Briand. Il a été convenu que le texte de la résolution devrait rassurer les inquiétudes. Ce texte devrait constater le caractère exceptionnel de l'affaire de Mandchourie. Il devrait indiquer que l'intervention du conseil dans le conflit sino-japonais ne doit pas être considérée comme créant un précédent en ce qui concerne les autres pays, notamment les Etats européens. Elle devrait condamner théoriquement toute occupation militaire, quelle qu'elle fût.

Ces réserves ne pouvaient avoir la prétention de satisfaire la Chine. Les deux longs entretiens que le Dr Sze a eus, dans la soirée d'hier, avec sir Eric Drummond et avec M. Briand, ont laissé le fossé profondément creusé entre le point de vue chinois et celui adopté par le conseil. Le délégué chinois a beaucoup insisté auprès de M. Briand pour que le président du conseil trouve une solution favorable à la Chine.

M. Briand n'a pas reçu M. Yoshizawa en raison de l'heure tardive. Mais il a tenu à lui communiquer, dès hier soir, l'avant-projet de résolution. Le texte n'a pas surpris la délégation japonaise. Cependant, la rédaction du passage relatif à l'occupation militaire réclame une consultation de Tokio. Etant donné les délais de transmission, il n'y a pas de décision à attendre du Japon pour aujourd'hui.

SAINT-BRICE.



Enclosure No. 46 to Despatch No. 2006  
of November 24, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'OEUVRE, November 24, 1931.

## La vraie diplomatie

Où en sont les négociations autour du conflit sino-japonais — négociations dont M. Aristide Briand, avec la confiance de tous (sauf de quelques Français), guide la marche délicate ?

Le principe d'une commission d'enquête est arrêté, accepté par les deux parties en présence.

Où l'on n'est pas encore d'accord, c'est sur les pouvoirs de la commission et l'objet de l'enquête.

La Chine voudrait que cet objet fût l'étude de la situation en Mandchourie : recherche des responsabilités immédiates du conflit, critique des motifs invoqués par le Japon pour justifier sa progression hors de la zone de protection du chemin de fer sud-mandchourien.

Le Japon voudrait que la commission procédât à une enquête... sur la situation intérieure de la Chine. Quant à ce qui se passe en Mandchourie même, il serait entendu qu'on s'en occuperait le moins possible.

Les deux thèses, en leur forme absolue, sont inadmissibles.

La Société des Nations ne peut prendre de décisions, qui engageront aussi bien la Chine que le Japon, sans être certaine que la Chine est en état de faire respecter ces décisions. Elle ne peut pas non plus, pour essayer d'arbitrer un conflit local, attendre les résultats d'une enquête sur la situation intérieure de la Chine — enquête qu'on peut prolonger à loisir...

Mais en somme, il ne s'agit plus que de trouver une formule qui justifie, sans blesser personne, l'intervention sur place de la Société des Nations.

— Que de diplomatie !

— J'aime à entendre ce reproche sur les lèvres de ceux qui, chaque jour, opposent la diplomatie aux méthodes démagogiques, à les en croire, de la Société des Nations. Le vrai est que celle-ci tend à remplacer par la « diplomatie » — c'est-à-dire, selon la définition, par l'étude attentive des rapports internationaux — les « combines » que, jusqu'à présent, on baptisait ainsi.

Et c'est bien là ce que beaucoup lui reprochent, qui espéraient qu'on assommerait enfin, d'un bon coup de casse-tête chinois, cette empêcheuse de se battre à la ronde.

Jean Plot.



Enclosure No. 47 to Despatch No. 2006  
of November 24, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE PETIT PARISIEN, November 24, 1931.

## LE PROJET DE RÉSOLUTION POUR L'ENVOI DE LA COMMISSION EN MANDCHOURIE

Le conseil de la S. D. N. a tenu hier une séance privée pour l'examiner et ce projet a aussi fait l'objet de nombreux entretiens particuliers

Le conseil de la S. D. N. a repris hier matin, à 10 h. 30, la série de ses séances privées, hors de la présence des deux représentants de la Chine et du Japon. Cette réunion s'est prolongée jusqu'à midi et a été marquée, à l'occasion de la mort de M. Loucheur, par une manifestation de sympathie dont nous rendons compte par ailleurs. Cet hommage rendu à l'une des personnalités les plus connues et les plus estimées dans les milieux de la S.D.N., le conseil a procédé à l'examen du projet de résolution japonaise « sur l'envoi d'une commission d'étude sur place », remis dimanche soir à M. Briand par M. Yoshizawa, et que le ministre français a éclairé de toutes les explications à lui fournies par l'ambassadeur du Japon.

Une très importante discussion s'est ainsi engagée, à laquelle ont pris part non seulement le président et le secrétaire général, qui ont émis, conformément à leur propre projet, un certain nombre de suggestions, mais presque tous les membres du conseil. La question principalement débattue a été celle de l'évacuation des territoires occupés par les troupes nippones en dehors de la zone du chemin de fer soumise à leur surveillance. On se rappelle que, dans sa déclaration de sa-



M. Sze

medi, le Dr Sze a souligné que c'était là, en ce qui concerne la Chine, « le point névralgique » de la situation. Aucune disposition qui ne prévoirait pas la cessation immédiate des opérations et le retrait des forces japonaises — retrait qui devrait commencer immédiatement et être poursuivi progressivement au cours d'un laps de temps aussi bref que possible — ne saurait, a-t-il dit, constituer une solution du problème.

### Un mémorandum chinois

Dans un mémorandum daté du 22 novembre et distribué hier, le représentant de la Chine revient sur cette question et définit plus nettement encore sa position sur ce point :

« Une enquête, écrit-il, non accompagnée de mesures assurant en même temps la cessation immédiate des hostilités et le retrait des forces japonaises (retrait qui doit commencer dès maintenant et se poursuivre progressivement en vue d'un achèvement rapide) ne constituerait autre chose qu'un simple expédient permettant de tolérer et de perpétuer, pendant une période plus ou moins indéfinie, l'occupation injustifiable du territoire de la Chine par un agresseur qui a déjà virtuellement atteint son objectif illégal pendant que ces discussions avaient lieu.

En conséquence, ajoute-t-il, il me sera tout à fait impossible, comme j'ai cherché à le faire comprendre au cours de la séance d'hier du conseil, d'examiner la proposition de la commission d'enquête ou de prendre part à la détermination des modalités qui s'y rapportent aussi longtemps que les bases sus-indiquées n'auront pas été posées de façon appropriée. »

Voilà qui est clair. Cette difficulté, toutefois, M. Briand l'avait prévue et, dès dimanche soir, au cours de son entretien avec M. Yoshizawa, il avait demandé au porte-parole de Tokio d'apporter à son projet certaines modifications de texte, dont les principales avaient justement trait à cette question d'évacuation. M. Yoshizawa ayant notamment repris cette idée, déjà formulée par lui en séance publique, que « la commission n'aurait pas mandat de surveiller les mouvements des forces militaires », le ministre français lui avait suggéré de remplacer ces derniers mots par l'expression plus vague de « mesures militaires », afin de laisser ainsi la porte ouverte à une entente ultérieure quant au « retrait des troupes » et à la cessation des hostilités, des instructions supplémentaires devant être, à ce sujet, réclamées à Tokio.

### Pas de précédent

En raison du gros obstacle auquel on se heurtait sur ce point, il était donc tout naturel que le conseil y donnât toute son attention. Il avait cependant un autre motif pour discuter le point à fond. Il était essentiel, en effet, qu'en revenant à la phraséologie à peine modifiée de la résolution du 30 septembre, il ne parût pas sanctionner, d'une façon générale, l'occupation militaire d'un territoire étranger ni lier, en principe, l'évacuation soit à des conditions de sécurité, soit aux travaux de la commission d'études. Déjà, à la dernière séance publique, MM. Lerroix, Fotitch, Zaleski et Colban avaient successivement tenu à marquer nettement qu'ils ne souscrivaient à la procédure préconisée qu'en raison de « la situation toute spéciale de la Mandchourie » et du « caractère exceptionnel » du présent conflit. Ils ont tous, hier matin, insisté à nouveau de la façon la plus pressante pour que le texte même de la résolution souligne ce caractère exceptionnel et de la situation et de la solution envisagée, afin qu'il n'y ait pas d'équivoque possible et qu'on ne puisse pas, plus tard, invoquer ce précédent pour créer en Europe un état de choses semblable.



#### La communication du D<sup>r</sup> Sze

Il a été entendu qu'il serait tenu compte de ces observations et que le projet ainsi amendé serait, dans le courant de l'après-midi, soumis au représentant de la Chine d'abord, puis au chef de la délégation japonaise, à qui seraient, en même temps, communiquées, le cas échéant, les objections du D<sup>r</sup> Sze. En conséquence, ce dernier a eu, à 16 h. 30, une entrevue prolongée avec sir Eric Drummond, entrevue qui a été suivie, à 19 heures, d'une nouvelle conversation avec M. Briand, conversation à laquelle assistaient le secrétaire général et M. Vigier, de la section politique de la S. D. N. Quant à l'entretien prévu avec M. Yoshizawa, M. Briand — qui, dans le courant de la journée, avait déjà reçu le comte Manzoni, M. Zaleski et sir John Simon — a dû, en raison de l'heure tardive, le remettre à ce matin avant la nouvelle séance privée du conseil, fixée pour 11 heures.

Bien qu'on se soit montré d'une discrétion absolue quant à la réaction chinoise, il est bien évident, étant donné l'attitude prise par M. Sze, que la principale difficulté à vaincre a trait à ce qu'il a appelé « la cessation des hostilités » c'est-à-dire à l'engagement à prendre de part et d'autre de s'abstenir de tout nouvel acte d'hostilité. Il semble, en effet, qu'à Tokio on hésite à accepter à cet égard une formule par trop rigide. Non pas qu'on

ait l'intention de se livrer à une nouvelle avance en dehors de la zone du chemin de fer — le cabinet japonais a dès hier donné une preuve éclatante de bonne volonté en procédant spontanément au retrait des troupes qui ont occupé Anganki et Tsitsikar et en les faisant diriger vers Taonan — mais parce qu'on craint, par suite de l'infériorité numérique des forces nippones par rapport aux troupes chinoises, de ne pouvoir aliéner sans danger une certaine liberté tactique et stratégique et, en conséquence, de ne pouvoir tenir à la lettre la parole donnée. Il y a là évidemment un scrupule de conscience particulièrement louable, mais qui ne saurait entrer en ligne de compte si on veut vraiment mettre fin au déplorable conflit actuel. Encore que Tokio n'ait pas encore fait connaître sa réponse définitive, on veut espérer, étant donné l'esprit de conciliation dont témoigne son projet concernant la commission d'étude et la décision militaire que nous signalons plus haut, que cette réponse sera favorable.

#### Le projet de résolution

S'il en était ainsi, le projet de résolution préparé par le secrétariat et la délégation japonais et amendé suivant les observations du conseil pourrait être assez rapidement adopté. Ce projet comprendrait, d'après nos informations, cinq paragraphes.

Les quatre premiers reproduiraient en somme, ainsi que nous l'avons dit, en le modifiant un peu, le texte des paragraphes correspondants de la résolution du 30 septembre. Ils prendraient acte notamment : 1° des réponses des gouvernements chinois et japonais et en particulier de la déclaration du Japon aux termes de laquelle il n'a aucune visée territoriale en Mandchourie.

2° De l'engagement pris par les représentants des deux pays non seulement que toutes les mesures nécessaires seront prises pour que le conflit ne s'aggrave mais de s'abstenir de tout nouvel acte d'hostilité.

3° de l'engagement pris par le représentant du Japon de poursuivre aussi rapidement que possible le retrait, déjà commencé, de ses troupes, pour les ramener dans la zone du chemin de fer dans la mesure où la sécurité de la vie des ressortissants japonais et la protection de leurs biens seront effectivement assurés — étant bien entendu qu'il s'agit là d'une procédure exceptionnelle due à la situation toute spéciale régnant en Mandchourie.

4° de la déclaration correspondante du représentant de la Chine d'assurer cette sécurité au fur et à mesure que se poursuivra le retrait des troupes et que s'effectuera le rétablissement des autorités locales et des forces de police chinoises.

Le cinquième paragraphe, enfin, reprendrait à peu près complètement le projet japonais concernant l'envoi sur place, la composition et le mandat de la commission d'étude dans les limites que le *Petit Parisien* a déjà précisées hier.

Signalons, en terminant, que, jusqu'à présent, aucune décision n'a été prise quant à la désignation des trois personnalités, française, anglaise et américaine, qui composeront cette commission.

En ce qui concerne le commissaire français, on aurait abandonné, dit-on, l'idée de choisir un général et on parle comme représentant possible de la France d'un haut fonctionnaire qui a fait une partie de sa carrière en Chine et qui a suivi de très près le développement du conflit actuel.

A. J.



Enclosure No. 48 to Despatch No. 2006  
of November 24, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE POPULAIRE, November 24, 1931.

## LES NEGOCIATIONS DE PARIS CONTINUENT PENIBLEMENT

### *Le Japon aura-t-il un gouvernement militaire ?*

Le Comité des Douze, c'est-à-dire le Conseil, à l'exception des parties intéressées, s'est réuni hier pour discuter une sorte de contre-projet, en vue de régler la constitution de la commission d'enquête — ou d'études — qui doit être envoyée en Mandchourie.

Les représentants du Japon et de la Chine ont eu plusieurs conversations avec le général Dawes et avec le président du Conseil, M. Aristide Briand. On est encore loin de l'accord nécessaire pour donner au texte du projet sa forme définitive. Et personne ne peut dire à quel moment pourra avoir lieu la prochaine séance publique du Conseil.

M. Yoshizawa a reçu de nouvelles instructions de Tokio et on peut craindre qu'elles ne portent la marque de l'évolution qui se manifeste actuellement dans la politique intérieure du Japon.

*Certains télégrammes avaient annoncé qu'on préparait à Tokio l'avènement d'un cabinet dit national. EN REALITE, IL PARAÎT QUE C'EST PLUTÔT UN CABINET MILITAIRE QUI ESSAYE DE SE FRAYER LE CHEMIN.*

A partir du moment où l'Etat-major de l'armée japonaise serait installé au pouvoir, les négociations qui se poursuivent à Paris, au sein de la S.

qu'aurait, dans le domaine de la politique mondiale, une défaite infligée par le Japon non seulement à la Chine, mais à la S.D.N.

Est-ce que sir John Simon, le ministre des affaires étrangères de la Grande-Bretagne et M. Stimson, le secrétaire d'Etat du gouvernement de Washington, vont se décider de sortir de leur attitude étonnamment passive ?

*A Paris, au cours des jours prochains, il s'agira pour le Conseil ou de s'incliner devant les mesures de force du Japon ou de faire accepter au moins, par le gouvernement de Tokio, un compromis qui assurerait le commencement du retrait des troupes japonaises.*

Dans les conversations qui ont lieu pour préparer la constitution de la commission d'enquête, ces questions se trouvent forcément soulevées. Il n'est pas étonnant que le représentant de la Chine, le Dr Alfred Sze, voudrait être sûr que dans le texte, qu'on soumettra finalement à la séance plénière du Conseil, le principe de l'évacuation soit maintenu clairement.

*..Pourra-t-il obtenir la fixation d'une date pour l'évacuation ? Dans la phase actuelle des événements, cela paraît difficile. C'est ce que M. Aristide Briand qui, hier soir, a eu une nouvelle et longue conversation avec le Dr Sze, a dû dire au représentant de la Chine qui, lui, doit tenir compte de l'état d'esprit régnant à Nankin, où les membres du Congrès du Kuomintang ne paraissent nullement disposés à accepter l'ouverture de négociations directes avec le Japon aussi longtemps que le retrait des troupes japonaises n'aura pas commencé. Et en ce qui concerne les intentions de l'Etat-major japonais à ce sujet, le gouvernement actuel de Tokio n'est peut-être lui-même pas très bien renseigné...*

*Donc, situation générale équivoque en Mandchourie, négociations pénibles à Paris, attitude hésitante des Etats-Unis, réveil lent de l'opinion publique mondiale, efforts persévérants du président du Conseil, M. Aristide Briand, et du secrétariat de la S. D. N. tendent à rapprocher les points de vue japonais et chinois et à assurer aux principes fondamentaux de la S.D.N. un maximum de respect qui, finalement, ne pourrait bien ressembler qu'à un minimum...*

S. G.



M. YOSHIKAWA  
ambassadeur du Japon à Paris.

D.N., ne deviendraient sans doute pas plus faciles...

En Amérique et en Angleterre l'opinion publique, qui, jusqu'ici, n'avait pas prêté une grande attention aux événements qui se déroulent en Asie, paraît commencer à s'éveiller. Des journaux, comme le *New Chronicle* de Londres, la *New York Tribune*, le *Baltimore Sun*, dans leur édition d'hier, font ressortir toutes les conséquences



TEMPS

Enclosure No. 49 to Despatch No. 2006  
of November 24, 1931.  
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L. TEMPS, November 24, 1931.

#### LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS ET LA SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS

Les pourparlers en marge du conseil de la Société des nations en vue de hâter un règlement pacifique du différend sino-japonais se poursuivent activement, et l'impression de détente constatée samedi paraît devoir se préciser si aucun nouvel incident en Mandchourie même ne vient compliquer derechef la situation. Le représentant du Japon, M. Yoshizawa, a conféré longuement hier soir avec M. Briand, lequel a reçu ensuite le secrétaire général de la Société des nations, sir Eric Drummond. De son côté, le ministre des affaires étrangères de Brande-Bretagne, sir John Simon, s'est entretenu avec M. Matsudeira, ambassadeur du Japon à Londres, qui joue un rôle important dans les négociations actuelles, et le général Dawes. Tout cela crée le sentiment qu'on fait de part et d'autre un gros effort pour aboutir le plus vite possible à une résolution acceptable pour les deux parties.

On semble s'orienter franchement vers l'envoi sur place d'une commission qui serait chargée de faire rapport sur la situation. La nomination d'une telle commission est admise en principe. Elle serait composée de cinq membres : un Français, un Anglais, un Américain, un Japonais et un Chinois; mais où les avis diffèrent encore sensiblement, c'est lorsqu'il s'agit de définir les pouvoirs de cette commission et l'étendue de ses investigations. Le Japon désire, on le sait, qu'il soit procédé à une véritable enquête, en Chine comme en Mandchourie, sur la situation de fait qui existe là où le boycottage, l'agitation nationaliste, le défaut d'autorité rendent difficiles des relations normales avec un pays en somme très incomplètement organisé. La Chine, par contre, n'admet la nomination d'une commission que pour autant qu'il s'agisse de procéder à des investigations en Mandchourie et d'établir les responsabilités qui sont à l'origine du conflit actuel. Les Chinois ne se soucient pas, on le conçoit, de faire constater officiellement le désordre et l'anarchie qui règnent chez eux et qui, trop souvent, peuvent expliquer les difficultés au milieu desquelles ils se débattent. Ils n'entendent point que la Société des nations puisse être saisie officiellement, sous la forme de conclusions d'une commission d'enquête, de la question toujours délicate de leur organisation intérieure, qui ne concerne qu'eux-mêmes, constatations pouvant avoir la valeur d'un argument décisif contre leur politique d'émancipation totale.

Est-il possible de concilier ces deux manières de voir, sinon quant au fond, du moins dans les termes d'une résolution qui doit être adoptée à l'unanimité pour prendre toute sa valeur? On ne désespère pas d'y réussir, en définissant la commission et en limitant ses pouvoirs avec suffisamment de souplesse pour qu'aucune des deux parties ne puisse y voir une humiliation ou un échec pour ses thèses particulières. La commission d'enquête pourrait être qualifiée « commission d'études », suggère-t-on, et on se garderait de limiter trop strictement ses investigations à la Mandchourie, tout en s'abstenant de les faire porter sur l'ensemble de la situation en Chine. C'est une question de mesure et de doigté; mais, en raison de l'extrême susceptibilité des uns et des autres et de toutes les méfiances en éveil, il est difficile d'arriver à un complet accord. Pourtant, une voie est maintenant ouverte, et il faut y persévérer, car c'est la seule qui puisse conduire à une solution dans le cadre de ce que peut réellement tenter le conseil de la Société

des nations. Ceux qui voudraient pousser le conseil à adopter des formules absolues, dont il serait bien en peine, ensuite, d'imposer le respect et l'exécution, ne servent pas la cause de l'institution internationale de Genève. La pire des choses qui puisse arriver serait d'acculer le conseil à la nécessité de devoir constater son impuissance à faciliter le règlement d'un différend qui n'aurait jamais dû perdre son caractère d'incident local et qui, de toute façon, devra être liquidé par des pourparlers directs entre les deux parties, puisque le conseil, uniquement préoccupé de mettre

fin aux hostilités et de faire obstacle à une guerre déclarée, n'a pas à se prononcer sur la valeur des traités que le Japon invoque pour la défense de ses droits et dont la Chine conteste la validité.

Les Japonais, maîtres de la situation en Mandchourie même, ont fait une concession importante en renonçant au principal des cinq points fondamentaux qu'ils posaient d'abord à la base de toute négociation directe avec la Chine, c'est-à-dire en n'insistant pas pour obtenir la reconnaissance immédiate et sans réserve par la Chine des traités dont ils tiennent leurs droits en Mandchourie, notamment de celui de 1915. Cette question reste entière et sera reprise ultérieurement, au cours des pourparlers prévus entre Tokio et Nankin, mais le fait que le Japon consent à la réserver pour l'instant n'en constitue pas moins un geste de bonne volonté qui devrait avoir logiquement pour effet de disposer la Chine à se montrer, elle aussi, plus conciliante. Elle est intéressée plus que quiconque à sortir de l'impasse au fond de laquelle on se trouve acculé : elle n'est pas en situation de soutenir contre le Japon une guerre dans laquelle personne, pas même la Russie soviétique — et pour cause — ne lui viendrait en aide, et elle ne peut raisonnablement attendre une intervention de la Société des nations plus efficace que celle prévue par l'article 11 du pacte et dont on peut constater depuis deux mois les effets. L'heure des manœuvres obliques, des démarches diplomatiques, des pressions directes et indirectes est passée; le moment est venu d'aller sincèrement à un arrangement qui aura du moins pour résultat d'arrêter les hostilités et de faire gagner le temps nécessaire — quelques semaines ou quelques mois — devant permettre de préparer un règlement durable des relations sino-japonaises.


Est-ce dans le sens d'une détente qu'il faut interpréter le changement ministériel qu'on annonce comme prochain à Tokio? On se propose d'y confier le pouvoir à un cabinet d'union qui serait présidé par le général Ugaki et dans lequel le Minseito, c'est-à-dire le parti libéral, et le Seyukaï, c'est-à-dire le parti conservateur, seraient également représentés. D'autre part, on annonce la nomination de M. Wellington Koo comme ministre des affaires étrangères de Chine, ce qui est peut-être de nature à déterminer un changement d'attitude de la part du gouvernement chinois. Sans en tirer des conclusions formelles, on peut penser qu'un changement du haut personnel politique à Tokio et à Nankin ne serait pas indifférent dans les circonstances actuelles.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




No. 1140.



EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Rome, November 19, 1931.

DEC 3 31



DISTRIBUTION - CHECK

To the

In U. S.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington, D.C.

Sir:

With reference to my despatch No. 1130 of November 10, 1931, regarding Italian press comment on the Sino-Japanese difficulties in Manchuria, I have the honor to inform the Department that the newspapers have confined their recent editorials on the subject to hypothetical discussions as to what may take place should Japan continue to neglect the admonitions of the League Council.

In a lengthy article in the CORRIERE DELLA SERA, signed A.D.M. (presumably, that is General Alberto di Marinis, who has been a member of the Italian delegation to the League of Nations and a frequent contributor to the press), Japan's position vis-à-vis the League is sketched. The article points out that although Japan is within her legal rights

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in declining to accept a decision of the Council which is not unanimous, her continued negative attitude to the Council makes the latter's course difficult to forecast. One solution, the article says, would be the application of Article 15 of the Covenant, which may be accomplished without the participation of the two parties in cause. The writer, however, doubts whether the wise and cautious methods of the Council could ever lead it to such extreme measures as the application of Article 16 calls for in the rupture of commercial and financial relations with Japan should she offend against Article 15.

The TEVERE frankly questions whether the present meeting of the League Council in Paris can bring any results, since Geneva's measures of conciliation seem nearly exhausted, and ridicules the reported talk of withdrawal of diplomatic missions from Tokio. Even such a step, this newspaper continues, will probably never be taken, as the real solution of the difficulty lies elsewhere, in a field where concrete interests and not ideals dominate. The POPOLO DI ROMA calls attention to the lukewarm attitude of France, while M. Briand is calling on Japan and China to lay down their guns, and professes to see French pleasure in any action of Japan which might hurt Soviet interests. The newspaper, sneering at the League's lack of a secular arm to enforce its decisions, wonders whether it could not make use of the two non-member states, Russia and the United States, the countries chiefly interested in Manchuria, to take action on the League's behalf. In this connection the article in the CORRIERE DELLA SERA referred to above states:

"However important the interests now in conflict in Manchuria may be, the protection thereof would not justify the maintenance of a rigidly uncompro-

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missing position which might have serious repercussions throughout the Orient and which could not be regarded with indifference by the powers most interested therein. It is therefore to be hoped that the Council will be able to achieve its aims."

Copies are enclosed of the two latest official communiques on the Nonni River situation issued by the Japanese Embassy in Rome to the Italian press. It is assumed that these communiques are identical with those issued by the various Japanese Embassies in other countries. There are also enclosed a copy and a translation of a letter addressed by the Japanese Military Attaché in Rome to the editor of the *GIORNALE D'ITALIA*, which appeared in that newspaper on the evening of November 19. I may add that the Japanese Ambassador in Rome, Mr. Yoshida, left for Paris a few days previous to the meeting of the League Council in that city.

Respectfully yours,

*Alexander Kirk*  
Alexander Kirk,  
Charge d'Affaires ad interim.

✓  
Enclosures: Two communiques.  
Letter.  
Clippings.

Copies to E.I.C.

SC/ajl

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Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 1140 of November 19, 1931,  
from the Embassy at Rome.

IL POPOLO D'ITALIA, Milan.  
November 17, 1931. page 4

Despatch No. 1140

**Un comunicato dell'Ambasciata nipponica**

ROMA, 16 notte.

L'Ufficio Stampa dell'Ambasciata  
del Giappone comunica:

«La situazione nella zona del fiume Nonni s'aggrava sempre più ed è a temere che qualche conflitto avvenga da un momento all'altro tra le truppe giapponesi e cinesi. Oltre a ciò se le truppe nipponiche, dopo il completamento dei lavori alla riparazione dei ponti distrutti dai cinesi, iniziassero a sgomberare la zona senza ottenere prima nessuna garanzia da parte della Cina, le truppe cinesi non solo ridiscenderebbero verso sud e distruggerebbero di nuovo i ponti, ma certissimamente attaccherebbero le truppe giapponesi.

«Data questa situazione preoccupante il Comando centrale dell'Esercito di Tokio, allo scopo di evitare un eventuale conflitto, in data 13 corrente ha impartito istruzione al comando delle truppe di Kwantung ordinando di sollecitare le trattative con la Cina alle seguenti condizioni: 1) le truppe cinesi del gen. Mah-Chang-Shang dovranno essere ritirate a nord di Tsi-tsi-har mentre le altre truppe concentrate ultimamente nei pressi di Tsi-tsi-har e di Angang-ki dovranno rientrare alle loro rispettive precedenti sedi; 2) le truppe del gen. Mah non dovranno avanzare al sud della linea di ferrovia della Cina orientale; 3) la ferrovia Taho Nan-Ang-ang-ki ricomincerà il servizio sotto la direzione cinese della ferrovia di Taho Nan; le truppe del gen. Mah non dovranno ostacolare in alcun modo il servizio ferroviario su tale detta linea. Se il servizio riattivato verrà ostacolato le truppe nipponiche prenderanno immediatamente i provvedimenti opportuni; 4) il generale Mah dovrà eseguire le suesposte condizioni entro dieci giorni dal quindici novembre; 5) dopo avere constatato l'esecuzione delle suindicate condizioni il distaccamento giapponese che si trova sul Nonni si ritirerà immediatamente a sud di Taho Nan oppure a sud di Ciang-cheng-hain-tun».



Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 1140 of November 19, 1931,  
from the Embassy at Rome.

LA TRIBUNA, Rome,  
November 20, 1931, p.2.

Japanese Embassy  
Communique of  
November 19, 1931.

### Come si è giunti al conflitto

*L'Ambasciata giapponese comunica:*

La Ferrovia Taonan-Angangchi è stata costruita dalla Società delle Ferrovie Sud-Manciuriane (Giapponese) in seguito ad un contratto tra questa e le autorità cinesi; ma le richieste ripetutamente rivolte alla Cina per il pagamento delle spese sono rimaste inevase ed è perfino stata respinta la proposta di convertire tale credito in prestito. Per questa situazione di fatto, la suddetta ferrovia può essere considerata, se non legalmente, sostanzialmente di proprietà della Società delle Ferrovie Sud-Manciuriane. Ne consegue che questa ha un grande interesse a che sia integralmente conservato tutto il patrimonio della suddetta ferrovia e non ne sia interrotto il traffico.

Nell'ottobre scorso le truppe della provincia di Heilung-Kiang distrussero il ponte di quella ferrovia sul fiume Nonni, commettendo sopruso degli interessi della Società Sud-Manciuriana. Inoltre una squadra di ingegneri ed operai di quella ferrovia che si era recata sul posto per ricostruire il ponte distrutto fu accolta da colpi di fucile tirati dalle truppe cinesi e costretta a tornarsene indietro senza aver compiuto la loro opera di ricostruzione.

D'altra parte le autorità giapponesi residenti a Tsitsikar avevano durante l'ottobre scorso ripetutamente chiesto al Governo provinciale di Heilung-Kiang di essere autorizzate ad incaricarsi direttamente della ricostruzione del ponte, ma la suddetta autorità cinese adottò una politica di temporeggiamento sforzandosi sempre di dilazionare la sua risposta con qualche pretesto.

Avvicinandosi rapidamente la stagione del gelo nella quale ogni lavoro di riparazione diventa impossibile, l'Amministrazione delle ferrovie Taonan-Angangchi rivolse una urgente richiesta alla Società Sud-Manciuriana di portarle la sua assistenza nei lavori da eseguirsi. Nell'accedere a tale richiesta ed allo scopo di evitare ogni incidente con le truppe cinesi, la Sud-Manciuriana chiese una protezione armata al comandante delle truppe giapponesi, il quale domandò che le truppe della ferrovia di Heilung-Kiang e quelle del generale Chiang Hai-Feng che si trovavano di fronte le une alle altre sulle opposte rive del Nonni si ritraessero dalle loro posizioni ad una distanza di dieci chilometri. Era una mossa oltretutto opportuna anche amichevole dal momento che non aveva altro scopo se non quello d'impedire che potesse nascere qualche conflitto fra le truppe cinesi regolari e quelle giapponesi di protezione ai lavori o quelle di Cheng-Hai-Feng.

La domanda fu trasmessa al generale Mah-chan-shan dal console giapponese di Tsitsikar e da quegli accettata. Ciò malgrado, il 4 corrente, le truppe della provincia che si trovavano sul Non-Ni rifiutarono di eseguire gli ordini ricevuti ed aprirono il fuoco sopra il piccolo distaccamento di truppe giapponesi che arrivava nei pressi del ponte da riparare, per proteggere gli ingegneri ed operai ivi tornati, cagionandogli numerose perdite.

Questi soldati giapponesi avevano l'ordine tassativo di tornare indietro non appena le riparazioni del ponte fossero state compiute. E' quindi stato assai increscioso che — in contrasto con l'accordo raggiunto in precedenza tra il generale Mah ed il console giapponese Tsitsikar — le suddette truppe cinesi li abbiano attaccati costringendoli a ricorrere alla loro volta ad un contrattacco, essendo questo l'unico mezzo che avevano di provvedere alla propria difesa, e che si sia creata così una situazione per la quale le truppe giapponesi si trovano di fronte alle truppe cinesi nei pressi di Tah-shing. Da parte cinese si sono affrettati a chiamare truppe dalle località viciniori per concentrarle in quel punto, riuscendo ad ammassarvi circa 20.000 uomini in una formazione che minaccia di accerchiamento il distaccamento giapponese forte di poco più di un migliaio di uomini.

In tali circostanze e specialmente in considerazione del fatto che sono stati scambiati dei colpi di

combattimenti, il Governo giapponese inviò, a suo tempo, al comandante delle forze giapponesi in Manciuria delle istruzioni il cui contenuto era il seguente:

Entrare in trattative con il comando delle truppe cinesi allo scopo di stabilire i seguenti patti:

1) le truppe del generale Mah-chan-shan si ritireranno a nord di Tsitsikar; le altre truppe cinesi concentrate a Tsitsikar ed Angangchi rientreranno nelle loro sedi di provenienza;

2) le truppe del generale Mah-chan-shan non dovranno oltrepassare a sud la linea della ferrovia della Cina orientale;

3) i servizi della ferrovia Taonan-Angangchi saranno riattivati sotto la direzione dell'amministrazione cinese della ferrovia stessa. Le truppe del generale Mah-chan-shan non dovranno ostacolare od impedire in alcun modo tali servizi. Qualora esse lo facessero, le truppe giapponesi prenderanno immediatamente i provvedimenti che esse riterranno opportuni, provvedimenti adatti dovendosi in tal caso considerare come necessari;

4) le truppe del generale Mah-chan-shan dovranno adempiere i patti che precedono entro dieci giorni dal 15 novembre;

5) constatato l'adempimento dei patti che precedono, il distaccamento di truppe giapponesi che si trova sul Non-Ni si ritirerà immediatamente a sud di Taonan oppure a sud di Cheng-chia-tun. Qualora i cinesi non accettassero tale nostra equa proposta e continuassero a concentrare le loro truppe minacciando la posizione delle nostre, è ovvio che queste sarebbero costrette a provvedere alla propria difesa per mezzo di qualche contrattacco, non potendosi umanamente concepire che esse rimangano immobili ad aspettare di essere distrutte.



Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 1140 of November 19, 1931,  
from the Embassy at Rome.

LA TRIBUNA, Rome,  
November 20, 1931, p.2.

Japanese Embassy  
Communique of  
November 19, 1931.

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Nell'ottobre scorso le truppe della provincia di Heilung-Kiang distrussero il ponte di quella ferrovia sul fiume Nonni, commettendo sopruso degli interessi della Società Sud-Manciuriana. Inoltre una squadra di ingegneri ed operai di quella ferrovia che si era recata sul posto per ricostruire il ponte distrutto fu accolta da colpi di fucile tirati dalle truppe cinesi e costretta a tornarsene indietro senza aver compiuto la loro opera di ricostruzione.

D'altra parte le autorità giapponesi residenti a Tsitsikar avevano durante l'ottobre scorso ripetutamente chiesto al Governo provinciale di Heilung-Kiang di essere autorizzate ad incaricarsi direttamente della ricostruzione del ponte, ma la suddetta autorità cinese adottò una politica di temporeggiamento sforzandosi sempre di dilazionare la sua risposta con qualche pretesto.

Avvicinandosi rapidamente la stagione del gelo nella quale ogni lavoro di riparazione diventa impossibile, l'Amministrazione delle ferrovie Taonan-Angangchi rivolse una urgente richiesta alla Società Sud-Manciuriana di portarle la sua assistenza nei lavori da eseguirsi. Nell'accedere a tale richiesta ed allo scopo di evitare ogni incidente con le truppe cinesi, la Sud-Manciuriana chiese una protezione armata al comandante delle truppe giapponesi, il quale domandò che le truppe della ferrovia di Heilung-Kiang e quelle del generale Chiang Hai-Feng che si trovavano di fronte le une alle altre sulle opposte rive del Nonni si ritraessero dalle loro posizioni ad una distanza di dieci chilometri. Era una mossa oltretutto opportuna anche amichevole dal momento che non aveva altro scopo se non quello d'impedire che potesse nascere qualche conflitto fra le truppe cinesi regolari e quelle giapponesi di protezione ai lavori o quelle di Cheng-Hai-Feng.

La domanda fu trasmessa al generale Mah-chan-shan dal console giapponese di Tsitsikar e da quegli accettata. Ciò malgrado, il 4 corrente, le truppe della provincia che si trovavano sul Non-Ni rifiutarono di eseguire gli ordini ricevuti ed aprirono il fuoco sopra il piccolo distaccamento di truppe giapponesi che arrivava nei pressi del ponte da riparare, per proteggere gli ingegneri ed operai ivi tornati, cagionandogli numerose perdite.

Quei soldati giapponesi avevano l'ordine tassativo di tornare indietro non appena le riparazioni del ponte fossero state compiute. E' quindi stato assai increscioso che — in contrasto con l'accordo raggiunto in precedenza tra il generale Mah ed il console giapponese Tsitsikar — le suddette truppe cinesi li abbiano attaccati costringendoli a ricorrere alla loro volta ad un contrattacco, essendo questo l'unico mezzo che avevano di provvedere alla propria difesa, e che si sia creata così una situazione per la quale le truppe giapponesi si trovano di fronte alle truppe cinesi nei pressi di Tah-shing. Da parte cinese si sono affrettati a chiamare truppe dalle località viciniori per concentrarle in quel punto, riuscendo ad ammassarvi circa 20.000 uomini in una formazione che minaccia di accerchiamento il distaccamento giapponese forte di poco più di un migliaio di uomini.

In tali circostanze e specialmente in considerazione del fatto che sono stati scambiati dei colpi di fuoco, è impossibile, si afferma in questi ambienti, che le truppe giapponesi siano ritirate senza che siano presi provvedimenti del caso. Tale ritiro sarebbe intollerabile per la dignità e la reputazione dell'Esercito giapponese, perchè darebbe l'impressione che le truppe nipponiche in Manciuria abbiano ceduto alla superiorità numerica delle forze cinesi.

Intanto allo scopo di evitare



Enclosure No. 3 to Despatch No. 1140 of November 19, 1931,  
from the Embassy at Rome.

(Translation)

Letter from Japanese Military Attache in  
Rome to Editor of GIORNALE D'ITALIA,  
published in edition of November 20.

I should be very grateful if you would kindly publish the following telegram which I received this morning from the Ministry of War in Tokio:

The War Ministry's statement with regard to the Sino-Japanese battle near the Nonni river was published on the afternoon of the 18th. We have verified with deep regret that these deplorable incidents occurred near Anganchi and were provoked by Mah's army, in spite of our efforts not to aggravate the situation further.

On November 4th, because of General Mah's treachery, a battle occurred near the Nonni bridge, in which we suffered heavy losses. After this victory, however, we could have destroyed the Chinese army at one blow and our troops were eager to follow up the Chinese; but since our action is based upon a defensive policy, we gave the command to desist. However, as soon as the Chinese saw that the attack was being continued (sic), they halted only a few kilometers distant from our lines and gathered together the troops which had remained at Harbin, Manchuli, and a number of other places. This took place between November 13th and 15th.

The actual number of soldiers mobilized by Mah is

estimated



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estimated at approximately 20,000. They first threatened out troops by sending a detachment toward our wings which numbered approximately 1700 men, and subsequently provoked our wings which had held back. They even planned to destroy the Nonni river bridge again. If the situation remains at this point conflict can certainly not be avoided henceforth between China and Japan.

In the face of this situation, the Japanese troops have still had the patience not to aggravate it; in fact, they have made several fair proposals to General Jah with a view to persuading him to separate the two enemy lines. General Mah has circulated the rumor that he would accept these conditions. However, he has not done so.

Having perceived the weakness of our present forces, General Mah's front lines have often attempted to provoke local conflicts. Finally on November 17th, the entire Chinese army opened a general attack; we were therefore forced to make a counter attack. The latest battle occurred in that way. The Japanese operations were solely for the purpose of legitimate defense. It is only natural, therefore, that our troops will strike a decisive blow at Mah's troops which have a number of times attacked our army. Nevertheless, the Japanese have no intention of continuing to occupy this region once their purpose has been attained. They will withdraw from the territory as soon as possible and will gather up the majority of their

forces



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

forces south of Taonan or Liaoyuan. During this operation  
our army will do no damage to the East Chinese railway  
unless Mah's army should use it for military purposes.

COLONEL Y.SAKOI.



ENCLOSURE No. 4, to Despatch No. 1140 of November 19, 1931,  
from the Embassy at Rome.

GIORNALE D'ITALIA, Rome,  
November 20, 1931.

### Una lettera dell'Addetto militare giapponese a Roma

Egregio signor Direttore,  
Sarei ben lieto se volesse pubblicare questo telegramma che ho ricevuto stamane dal Ministero della Guerra di Tokio:

Nel pomeriggio del 18 è stata pubblicata la dichiarazione del Ministero della Guerra circa la battaglia cino-giapponese che ha avuto luogo presso il fiume Nonni. Con vivo dispiacere dobbiamo constatare gli avvenimenti incescibili che si sono verificati presso Anganchi, avvenimenti dovuti alla provocazione dell'esercito di Mah, malgrado i nostri sforzi per non fare aggravare maggiormente la situazione.

Il 4 novembre presso il ponte Nonni ha avuto luogo una battaglia dovuta a un tradimento del generale Mah che ci ha fatto subire delle perdite considerevoli.

Tuttavia dopo questa vittoria avremmo potuto distruggere in un colpo l'esercito Cinese tanto più che il nostro esercito desiderava ardentemente proseguire l'inseguimento, ma gli abbiamo dato l'ordine di fermarsi poichè ci basiamo su una politica difensiva. Tuttavia, l'esercito Cinese appena si avvide che si proseguiva l'attacco si fermò solo a qualche chilometro dalle nostre linee e raccolse i soldati che eran rimasti a Harbin, Manchuli ed in parecchi altri luoghi. Ciò avvenne tra il 13 e il 15 di questo mese.

Il numero effettivo dei soldati radunati da Mah è valutato a circa 20 mila. Essi hanno incominciato col minacciare il nostro esercito inviando una parte delle loro truppe presso le nostre ali che contavano circa 1700 uomini e provocando in seguito le nostre ali che eran dietro. Hanno perfino progettato di distruggere di nuovo il ponte che è sul fiume Nonni. Se le cose rimangono a questo punto non si potrà certamente da ora in poi evitare dei conflitti tra Cina e Giappone.

Data questa situazione, l'esercito Giapponese ha ancora avuto la pazienza di non aggravarla, anzi esso ha fatto parecchie proposte giuste al generale Mah allo scopo fargli separare le due linee nemiche. Il gen. Mah ha fatto correre la voce che egli avrebbe accettato queste condizioni. Ma ciò, invece, non fece.

Le prime linee di questi vedendo la debolezza delle nostre forze effettive hanno spesso tentato delle azioni provocatrici locali.

Infine il 17 novembre l'esercito Cinese al suo completo ha iniziato l'attacco generale; siamo dunque stati costretti a fare il contrattacco. Ecco in qual modo si produsse l'ultima battaglia. Le operazioni dell'esercito Giapponese son dovute soltanto ad una legittima difesa. E' dunque naturale che il nostro esercito porterà un colpo decisivo su quello di Mah il quale più volte ha attaccato le nostre truppe. Tuttavia i giapponesi non hanno alcuna intenzione, appena saranno giunti allo scopo, di occupare per molto tempo questi luoghi. Essi sgombreranno al più presto il territorio per raccogliere il grosso delle loro forze al sud di Taonan o di Liaoyuan. Durante quest'operazione il nostro esercito non recherà alcun danno alla linea ferroviaria Cinese dell'est, a meno che l'esercito di Mah non ne tragga profitto dal punto di vista militare.

Colonnello Y. Sakoj, Addetto  
militare presso l'Ambasciata  
del Giappone a Roma.



IL CORRIERE DELLA SERA, Milan.  
November 15, 1931. — page 1.

Despatch No. 1170

## IL CONFLITTO NIPPO-CINESE

# Il Consiglio della Lega convocato a Parigi

Domani si riunirà a Parigi in sessione straordinaria il Consiglio della Società delle Nazioni presieduto da Briand per esaminare la situazione creatasi in Manciuria con l'aggravarsi del conflitto cino-giapponese. E' la terza volta che tale questione è portata innanzi alla Lega. La prima fu il 22 settembre, in seguito a richiesta fattane dalla Cina, che invocò l'articolo 11 del Covenant nell'intento di raggiungere un'amichevole soluzione della vertenza. Il Consiglio nella seduta finale del 30 settembre decise allora di prendere atto della dichiarazione fatta dal Giappone, di non avere alcuna mira territoriale in Manciuria, e di voler procedere all'immediato ritiro delle sue truppe nella zona delle comunicazioni ferroviarie da esso gestite, ripristinando così la situazione preesistente; prese pure atto dell'impegno del Governo cinese di assicurare con mezzi propri la protezione dei sudditi e dei beni giapponesi nei territori manciuriani non compresi nella detta zona, e decise di aggiornarsi al 14 ottobre, facendo obbligo alle due parti di tenerlo nel frattempo informato dello svolgimento degli avvenimenti.

I fatti però non corrisposero alle promesse, perché le truppe giapponesi continuarono a presidiare i territori che avrebbero dovuto sgombrare, e gravi incidenti locali concorsero ad acuire anziché appianare il conflitto. In seguito a ciò la Cina rivolse un secondo appello al Consiglio, richiamandosi ancora all'articolo 11 del Covenant, appello appoggiato da alcuni Governi che affermarono la necessità di rendersi conto se i fatti avvenuti in Manciuria non costituissero una violazione del Patto Kellogg. E il Consiglio della Lega con l'anticipo di un giorno su quello prestabilito, si riunì nuovamente a Ginevra il 13 ottobre. Durante questa seconda sessione il suo compito fu quanto mai arduo e delicato per l'intransigenza di cui fece prova il delegato del Giappone. La sua resistenza a non aderire agli accordi proposti fu tale che non fu possibile adottare una decisione unanime; sicché il Consiglio si separò il 22 ottobre prendendo una risoluzione alla quale mancò il voto del Giappone. Con tale risoluzione furono richiamati i due Governi all'adempimento degli obblighi da essi contratti in forza della precedente risoluzione cui avevano aderito, e fu richiesto al Giappone di dare sollecito corso al promesso ritiro delle truppe, in modo da poterlo completare prima della nuova convocazione del Consiglio, fissata per il 16 novembre. A facilitargliene il compito fu fatto invito al Governo cinese di associare alle autorità cinesi della Manciuria, incaricate di ristabilire l'ordine dopo l'esodo delle truppe giapponesi, rappresentanti residenti in Cina di Potenze neutre mettendoli in grado di presenziare l'effettiva esecuzione delle disposizioni di tutela dei sudditi e dei beni giapponesi. Infine fu stabilito che il Giappone e la Cina designassero propri delegati per fissare insieme le modalità del ritiro delle forze nipponiche e l'entrata in vigore dei provvedimenti d'ordine da prendersi dal Governo cinese.

Ma si può oggi constatare che di tutto questo nulla fu fatto. Il Giappone che, come si è detto, non votò la risoluzione del Consiglio, non è obbligato ad applicarla. Essa conserva indubbiamente il suo grande valore morale, ma giuridicamente non impegna il Giappone, il quale non ha aderito alla richiesta della Cina di nominare i delegati che dovrebbero mettersi d'accordo coi delegati già designati dalla Cina, né ha ritirato le sue truppe. Non solo, ma in una dichiarazione fatta il 26 ottobre dal Governo di Tokio, e comunicata dalla Delegazione giapponese al Consiglio, si dice che, pur dovendo escludersi in modo assoluto l'intenzione del Giappone di voler esercitare una pressione armata sulla Cina, si deve ritenere che il divisato completo ritiro delle sue truppe nella zona delle ferrovie creerebbe una situazione intollerabile, perché esporrebbe i Giapponesi ai più gravi pericoli.

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chino al Consiglio l'8 novembre, denuncia l'occupazione del ponte ferroviario sul fiume Nonni compiuta da truppe giapponesi, che attaccarono le cinesi, obbligandole a ritirarsi.

I Giapponesi, chiamati per questo in causa, affermano che la ferrovia che attraversa il Nonni, sebbene gestita da Cinesi e in territorio cinese, fu costruita dal Giappone a sue spese, per le quali i Cinesi non hanno ancora versato alcuna quota di ammortamento; che, poiché il ponte sul Nonni è guasto e minaccia di far arrestare il traffico su quell'importante linea ferroviaria, e le autorità cinesi non hanno provveduto a ripararlo, fu loro richiesto di far arretrare le truppe della Repubblica a dieci chilometri dal fiume per permettere ai Giapponesi di eseguire le riparazioni necessarie. Ciò non essendo stato fatto, le truppe giapponesi hanno proceduto all'occupazione del fiume. Nella nota dell'8 novembre sopraricordata, la Cina fa per la terza volta appello alla Società delle Nazioni perché voglia mettere in azione tutti i mezzi consentiti dal Covenant al fine di arrestare l'aggressione del Giappone e assicurare il mantenimento della pace in Oriente.

E' questa la situazione nella quale il Consiglio è chiamato a intervenire. E così stando le cose, ci si può chiedere entro quali limiti e con quale probabilità di buona riuscita esso possa agire. Finora la sua azione si è basata sull'applicazione dell'articolo 11 del Patto della Società delle Nazioni, invocato dalla Cina; ma questa volta la Cina, quale membro della Società, ha allargato la sua richiesta, estendendola a tutti i mezzi che il Patto contempla per impedire agli associati di ricorrere alla guerra. In casi analoghi al presente, per il componimento di vertenze internazionali, come per la controversia sorta fra la Svezia e la Finlandia a proposito delle isole Aland, per la questione degli optanti ungheresi, per il conflitto greco-bulgaro nel 1925, il Consiglio si attenne sempre alla procedura prevista dall'articolo 11, che gli affida il mandato di assicurare con la sua azione conciliatrice il mantenimento della pace, arrestando le crisi che potrebbero condurre alla guerra. Perché però questo sforzo di conciliazione possa riuscire, si richiede il concorso delle parti in causa, le quali devono partecipare al voto col quale il Consiglio adotta le sue risoluzioni. Se una delle parti si rifiuta di dare la sua approvazione a tali conclusioni, queste non costituiscono per essa alcun impegno, pur conservando indubbiamente una forza morale che nessuna Potenza può illudersi di trascurare senza risentirne qualche danno. Se, dunque, il Giappone manterrà il suo atteggiamento negativo di fronte alle decisioni del Consiglio, è difficile prevedere che cosa possa avvenire. Il Consiglio, ove fallissero quei nuovi tentativi di conciliazione che indubbiamente saranno sperimentati, potrebbe essere indotto ad avvalersi dell'articolo 15, che gli consente di decidere anche senza la partecipazione al voto delle parti in causa.

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La procedura per l'applicazione dell'articolo 15 e di altri che sono con esso connessi, è sommariamente la seguente. Fallito ogni tentativo per risolvere per vie pacifiche il conflitto, il Consiglio redige e pubblica un rapporto a conclusione del quale raccomanda le soluzioni che ritiene più eque. Questo rapporto ha effetti diversi, a seconda che sia adottato all'unanimità o a maggioranza, escluso sempre il voto dei rappresentanti delle parti. Nel primo caso, comporta l'obbligo generale, tanto per le parti in lite quanto per gli altri membri della Società delle Nazioni, di non ricorrere alla guerra contro la parte che si conforma alle conclusioni del rapporto. Nel secondo, i membri hanno il diritto di agire come meglio crederanno per il mantenimento del diritto e della giustizia. In ogni caso la portata pratica più importante dell'articolo in parola è che esso impone alle parti di non ricorrere alla guerra se prima non sia trascorso un determinato termine. Questo guada-

## Controffensiva diplomatica a Ginevra

Ginevra, 14 novembre, notte.

Alla vigilia della riunione a Parigi del Consiglio in cui si discuterà del conflitto mancese, la delegazione giapponese cerca di neutralizzare gli effetti dell'abilissima azione diplomatica svolta dai Cinesi, affermando che le note da questi ultimi trasmesse a Ginevra non si possono considerare come una documentazione diplomatica seria, ma unicamente come un materiale di campagna propagandistica, fatta soltanto allo scopo di travisare l'opinione pubblica.

« Queste comunicazioni sensazionali, — dichiara Joseisava, — della delegazione cinese, a cui la pubblicazione da parte del Segretariato della Lega ha accordato una grande diffusione, hanno profondamente turbato l'opinione pubblica, creando uno stato di spirito estremamente penoso che è lungi dall'essere quello cui tende la Società delle Nazioni. »

Dopo aver esposto quali sarebbero le asserzioni più tipicamente tendenziose della delegazione cinese (aiuti al capo ribelle Chiang-Hai-Peng, ultimatum al generale Mah governatore della provincia dell'Hei-lung-kiang, tentativi per favorire il movimento comunista a Mukden e a Kirin), il signor Joseisava

Anna Palumbo, di Sarav...



tutto questo nulla fa fatto. Il Giappone che, come si è detto, non votò la risoluzione del Consiglio, non è obbligato ad applicarla. Essa conserva indubbiamente il suo grande valore morale, ma giuridicamente non impegna il Giappone, il quale non ha aderito alla richiesta della Cina di nominare i delegati che dovrebbero mettersi d'accordo coi delegati già designati dalla Cina, né ha ritirato le sue truppe. Non solo, ma in una dichiarazione fatta il 26 ottobre dal Governo di Tokio, e comunicata dalla Delegazione giapponese al Consiglio, si dice che, pur dovendo escludersi in modo assoluto l'intenzione del Giappone di voler esercitare una pressione armata sulla Cina, si deve ritenere che il divisato completo ritiro delle sue truppe nella zona delle ferrovie creerebbe una situazione intollerabile, perché esporrebbe i Giapponesi ai più gravi pericoli.

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Il Governo di Tokio persiste nel suo primitivo concetto, che occorran negoziati diretti fra i due Paesi per stabilire alcuni principi fondamentali, concernenti i diritti contrattuali del Giappone in Manciuria, sui quali dovranno basarsi le reciproche relazioni. Questa dichiarazione ha dato occasione a Briand di inviare, nella sua qualità di Presidente del Consiglio, una nota al primo delegato giapponese a Ginevra nella quale fra l'altro è detto che, se la risoluzione del 22 ottobre non è obbligatoria per il Giappone, lo è però quella precedente del 30 settembre votata dal Giappone, che si impegnò di ritirare le truppe di invasione. Il Giappone, aggiunge Briand, non dichiara affatto allora che la sicurezza dei suoi sudditi potesse dipendere dal regolamento dei suoi diritti contrattuali in Manciuria. E in quanto a questi Briand rammenta che il delegato cinese affermò di volerli lealmente rispettare dichiarandosi pronto, ove sorgessero dubbi d'interpretazione, a farli risolvere per via giudiziaria o di arbitrato.

Altre osservazioni alla dichiarazione giapponese furono formulate in un memorandum inviato il 31 ottobre dalla Delegazione cinese al Consiglio, memorandum che fu poi seguito dopo tre giorni da un'altra nota della stessa Delegazione, contenente gravi accuse contro il Giappone: estensione della sua occupazione militare, appropriazione con la forza di armi e munizioni cinesi, incameramento di entrate fiscali, sequestro di persone e di cose, ecc. Finalmente una ulteriore nota cinese, l'ultima, inviata dal Governo di Nan-

seguito. Fallito ogni tentativo per risolvere per vie pacifiche il conflitto, il Consiglio redige e pubblica un rapporto a conclusione del quale raccomanda le soluzioni che ritiene più eque. Questo rapporto ha effetti diversi, a seconda che sia adottato all'unanimità o a maggioranza, escluso sempre il voto dei rappresentanti delle parti. Nel primo caso, comporta l'obbligo generale, tanto per le parti in lite quanto per gli altri membri della Società delle Nazioni, di non ricorrere alla guerra contro la parte che si conforma alle conclusioni del rapporto. Nel secondo, i membri hanno il diritto di agire come meglio crederanno per il mantenimento del diritto e della giustizia. In ogni caso la portata pratica più importante dell'articolo in parola è che esso impone alle parti di non ricorrere alla guerra se prima non sia trascorso un determinato termine. Questo guadagno di tempo può riuscire molto utile nell'interesse della pace, perché può dare agio alle parti in litigio di trovare una via di reciproco accomodamento. Infatti l'articolo 12 dichiara che il Consiglio deve redigere il rapporto nel termine di sei mesi a decorrere dal giorno in cui è stato investito del conflitto, e che i membri della Società delle Nazioni non possono fare ricorso alla guerra prima che sia spirato il termine di tre mesi dalla pubblicazione del rapporto. Vi è dunque in totale un periodo di nove mesi, durante il quale non si può fare ricorso alla guerra.

Ogni disobbedienza a queste disposizioni esporrebbe lo Stato recalcitrante a cadere sotto le sanzioni previste dall'articolo 16, fra le quali è da ricordare la rottura con esso, da parte di tutti gli Stati appartenenti alla Società delle Nazioni, delle relazioni commerciali-finanziarie (blocco, eventuale impiego della forza, ecc.).

La savia ponderatezza di cui ha fatto sempre testimonianza la condotta del Consiglio, può far escludere che si giunga agli estremi indicati. Ma le difficoltà del caso in esame non hanno riscontro in tutta la sua azione passata.

Per quanto considerevoli sieno gli interessi che sono in conflitto nella Manciuria, la loro tutela non giustificherebbe un irrigidimento in posizioni di intransigenza, che potrebbe avere ripercussioni gravi nel mondo orientale, e potrebbe non lasciare indifferenti le Potenze che vi sono maggiormente interessate. E' pertanto a fare voti che il Consiglio possa conseguire i suoi fini.

A. D. M.



IL TEVERE, Rome.  
November 12-13, 1951. page 1.

Despatch No. 1140

## Interessi e ideologie

Per il sedici di novembre, lunedì prossimo, è convocato a Parigi il Consiglio della S. d. N. allo scopo di riesaminare la situazione creata in Estremo Oriente dal conflitto cino-giapponese. La situazione in Manciuria non è molto lieta. In questi giorni il Giappone ha cominciato a far la statistica delle violenze subite da giapponesi in Manciuria, evidentemente per giustificare a priori qualunque operazione militare. D'altro canto i cinesi bombardano la S. d. N. di note e di comunicazioni, tutte redatte in forma patetica, ed allarmante. Intanto le notizie da Tien-Tsin, ove oltre alla concessione giapponese vi sono molte altre concessioni di potenze europee, sono assai drammatiche. Infine, la risposta giapponese all'ultimo passo americano non è per niente affatto rassicurante anche se afferma la volontà di non progredire verso il nord dalla testa di ponte del fiume Non-Ni ove le truppe giapponesi sono «fortemente stabilite».

Questa è la situazione — che potrà, da qui al sedici prossimo, aggravarsi —; e il Consiglio della S. d. N. ha disgraziatamente esaurito i suoi mezzi persuasivi. Non si capisce che cosa possa nascere dalla nuova convocazione. Giorni fa si diceva ch'era allo studio, negli uffici ginevrini, una specie di «dimostrazione diplomatica» sul genere delle classiche dimostrazioni navali in uso alcun tempo fa come mezzo di pressione politica. Invece di inviare delle navi, la S. d. N. ordinerebbe il ritiro degli ambasciatori da Tokio; il che potrebbe essere grave e potrebbe non esserlo affatto. Tutto dipenderà, se pur a tanto si vorrà arrivare — e noi abbiamo i nostri fondatissimi dubbi — tutto dipenderà dal sangue freddo dei giapponesi. E' accaduto altra volta che dalla rottura diplomatica fra due paesi non sia nato assolutamente nulla, fuor che la ripresa dei rapporti diplomatici, dopo un certo periodo più o meno lungo. Se i giapponesi non perderanno la testa, potranno accompagnare con fiori alla stazione gli ambasciatori partenti.



IL TEVERE, Rome.  
November 12-13, 1951. page 1.

Despatch No. 1140

## Interessi e ideologie

Per il sedici di novembre, lunedì prossimo, è convocato a Parigi il Consiglio della S. d. N. allo scopo di riesaminare la situazione creata in Estremo Oriente dal conflitto cino-giapponese. La situazione in Manciuria non è molto lieta. In questi giorni il Giappone ha cominciato a far la statistica delle violenze subite da giapponesi in Manciuria, evidentemente per giustificare a priori qualunque operazione militare. D'altro canto i cinesi bombardano la S. d. N. di note e di comunicazioni, tutte redatte in forma patetica, ed allarmante. Intanto le notizie da Tien-Tsin, ove oltre alla concessione giapponese vi sono molte altre concessioni di potenze europee, sono assai drammatiche. Infine, la risposta giapponese all'ultimo passo americano non è per niente affatto rassicurante anche se afferma la volontà di non progredire verso il nord dalla testa di ponte del fiume Non-Ni ove le truppe giapponesi sono «fortemente stabilite».

Questa è la situazione — che potrà, da qui al sedici prossimo, aggravarsi —; e il Consiglio della S. d. N. ha disgraziatamente esaurito i suoi mezzi persuasivi. Non si capisce che cosa possa nascere dalla nuova convocazione. Giorni fa si diceva ch'era allo studio, negli uffici ginevrini, una specie di «dimostrazione diplomatica» sul genere delle classiche dimostrazioni navali in uso alcun tempo fa come mezzo di pressione politica. Invece di inviare delle navi, la S. d. N. ordinerebbe il ritiro degli ambasciatori da Tokio; il che potrebbe essere grave e potrebbe non esserlo affatto. Tutto dipenderà, se pur a tanto si vorrà arrivare — e noi abbiamo i nostri fondatissimi dubbi — tutto dipenderà dal sangue freddo dei giapponesi. E' accaduto altra volta che dalla rottura diplomatica fra due paesi non sia nato assolutamente nulla, fuor che la ripresa dei rapporti diplomatici, dopo un certo periodo più o meno lungo. Se i giapponesi non perderanno la testa, potranno accompagnare con fiori alla stazione gli ambasciatori partenti.

Ma di certo non si arriverà alla dimostrazione diplomatica. Il Consiglio non ha interesse a precipitare le cose. Le complicazioni nasceranno al di fuori del campo d'azione ginevrino, là dove interessi concreti e non ideologie si troveranno a conflitto. Vogliamo dire che per intendere quale sarà lo sbocco del conflitto cino-giapponese non c'è assolutamente bisogno d'interrogare i bene informati della S. d. N.

\* \* \*

Alcuni si meravigliano che le azioni belliche svolgentisi in Manciuria non siano ancora la guerra vera e propria. Una guerra — a stretto rigore — presuppone una dichiarazione di guerra. Ora è nella tradizione dei conflitti cino-giapponesi l'arrivo lentissimo e — diremo così — posticipato della dichiarazione di guerra. Il 23 giugno 1894 il Giappone occupava la capitale della Corea. L'imperatore cinese inviava i suoi reggimenti contro l'invasore, ma non la dichiarazione di guerra. Una battaglia navale si svolgeva nel luglio seguente, sempre senza dichiarazione di guerra; la quale fu pronunciata soltanto il primo di agosto successivo. La storia ama ripetersi; e i popoli gialli sono rispettosissimi delle tradizioni.



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November 11, 1931.

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page.    .

## Fatti e commenti

**Il giorno 16 e l'articolo 16 - Il Cancelliere lavora, i partiti parlano - Dal banchetto di Babilonia a quello di Londra**

Una notte d'inferno a Tien Tsin ha fatto vigilare le Concessioni straniere. In quella specie di mondo in miniatura, ove le varie nazioni han confini ridotti su scale di metri quadrati, s'è attesa e temuta per qualche ora, una specie di prova generale di guerra mondiale.

Il sole ridendo nuovamente sulle cose ritrovò tutto tranquillo. Le ansiose scotte notturne, avean finito anch'esse per andarsene a letto, mentre coloro che aveano ascoltato, tappati in casa, il crepitare della fucileria e il rombo delle artiglierie si adunavan, al solito, per le vie ad almanaccare sulle responsabilità.

I duemila cinesi che aggredirono il posto di polizia, dando luogo alla nottata infernale erano o non erano agenti giapponesi? E se erano, come dicono i cosiddetti « circoli ufficiali » cinesi, se erano agenti giapponesi, come mai la sola Concessione giapponese aprì il fuoco e un fuoco micidiale? — Inguenil, si ripete d'altra parte, partita combinata. — Anche per i morti? E comunque se ci si pone sulla strada della furberia, i cinesi, agenti giapponesi, non potrebbero essere agenti cinesi in veste di agenti giapponesi?

Un labirinto a Tien Tsin si apre come si vede, in quello più vasto della Mancuria, dove, quasi che la situazione non fosse abbastanza intricata e inestricabile, si aggiunge ora la minaccia di una guerra civile. Contro il maresciallo Ciang-Sueh-Liang muoverebbe il generale Ciang-Hai-Feng. La nuova... emergenza potrebbe influire sul conflitto generale in quanto al maresciallo risale la protezione della tormentatissima ferrovia orientale, affidata al suo amico, generale Ting-Chwo.

Gli « osservatori » tuttavia osservano che la tendenza ad un armistizio di fatto in questa guerra di fatto, si fa d'ora in ora più evidente. Nell'avvicinarsi del 16 novembre e della conseguente adunata del Consiglio della Società delle Nazioni, la battaglia va facendo sulle sponde del fiume Nonni per trasportarsi su quelle, non si sa bene ancora, se della Senna o del Lemano.

Perché sia a Parigi, sia a Ginevra sembra che si voglia prendere, come si suol dire, il coraggio a due mani e salvare definitivamente il prestigio societario. Come paciere fin'ora il Consiglio ha avuto la peggio. E' il destino di tutti i pacieri. Ma non è detto che la Società delle Nazioni ci si debba acconciare. Appesa al suo olivo è pure la bilancia della giustizia e qualcuno dice persino la spada dell'articolo 16 del Patto. Esso giunge al blocco economico e al boicottaggio. A questi chiari di luna, più che una spada sarebbe addirittura un siluro. Ma senza venire a simili estremi c'è pur sempre la denuncia, anzitutto, della violazione giapponese del « Covenant », poi il richiamo dei rappresentanti diplomatici delle Nazioni strette al Patto: insomma quella sanzione morale che dovrebbe colpire in faccia al mondo pacifista una nazione guerrafoondaia.

Però, a quanto dicono ancora gli « osservatori », il Giappone attende impassibile: se per il 16 non avrà sgomberato la Mancuria, dimostrerà che la Cina non garantisce ancora il rispetto dei trattati, condizione necessaria e sufficiente al ritiro delle sue truppe. Sosterrà che la pace non può essere in frode al diritto perché non sarebbe « pace », quella almeno che suole baciarsi con la giustizia. In quanto all'art. 16, blocco, boicottaggio? Son armi a due tagli. Proprio a questi chiari di luna possono ferire anche chi le adopera. Denuncia del « Covenant »? A chi? Al mondo pacifista? Il Giappone dall'atto della berlina

parte propria: discutono e polemizzano. Sul fronte nazionalista d'opposizione si segnala qualche incertezza, qualche strattura. Taluno la vorrebbe attribuire alla intravista eventualità di una futura intesa fra il Centro e gli Hitleriani.

Donde venga, donde sorga, come e dove prenda forma anche di evanescente fantasma questa eventualità, quale spiraglio di luce la lasci intravedere non è detto, non è dato di comprendere.

L'unione giurata a Bad Harzburg da un lato, le dichiarazioni del Cancelliere e quella della stampa del Centro dall'altro che irrigidiscono le due opposte posizioni, costituiscono due linee troppo chiare e marcate, per poterle in qualche modo attenuare con dei richiami d'almanacco. Se Hugenberg non è Hitler: cioè se Hitler è il nazional-socialismo, se l'altro è il nazionalismo più borghesemente inteso, non intercorre, tuttavia fra i due, *rebus sic stantibus*, un tale spazio differenziale, per cui possa incunearsi il movimento del Centro. Infatti a chi andava ipotizzando d'avvicinamenti fra cattolici ed hitleriani come condizione di vita o di morte — nientemeno! — per il Centro, Hugenberg l'altro ieri ad Assia, rispondeva: « Ma alla conservazione del Centro cattolico, alla sua esistenza, al suo avvenire nessuno di noi tedeschi nazionalisti ha interesse e tanto meno i seguaci di Hitler. Questo è il nostro fine comune e rimarrà ».

Della qual cosa si può prender nota anche fra le postille di certe discussioni nostrane.

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Sempre a tale proposito il signor Mac Donald ha dimostrato, secondo i giornali, di avere una visione complessa e compiuta della situazione.

Ciò che egli ha detto dell'Inghilterra, al banchetto di ieri per l'insediamento del Lord Mayor di Londra, vale per la Germania, come per ogni altra Nazione, navigante nel gurgite vasto della crisi europea.

« Noi abbiamo l'intenzione, — egli ha detto — appena la cosa sarà attuabile, di prendere dei provvedimenti che tenderanno a stabilizzare nel modo più sicuro la divisa inglese su una base definitiva

rendendola indipendente dai movimenti speculativi e dalle transazioni giornalieri. Ma il nostro problema monetario è stato creato dalla situazione mondiale e noi non possiamo affrontare questo problema con successo fino a che la situazione del mondo non sia migliorata ».

E infatti ha soggiunto che, anche per la Germania, la sua condizione merita dal mondo, nel suo e nel proprio interesse, « un esame approfondito » per giungere ad « accordi definitivi che siano tollerabili e pratici, che non conducano nella loro applicazione a difficoltà finanziarie e commerciali destinate ad accrescere le attuali ».

Di qua a salire alla visione, come dicevamo complessa e compiuta della situazione europea, fu cosa facile e logica per lo statista inglese.

« Il 29 febbraio — ricordò ancora — finisce l'accordo dei crediti a breve scadenza concessi alla Germania. Potrebbe darsi allora che si fosse sull'orlo della zona dell'uragano. Il Governo inglese ha fatto e farà del suo meglio, ma spetta soprattutto ai Governi interessati, Francia e Germania, studiare obiettivamente l'arduo problema e tendere ad una intesa per ora e per la fine della moratoria del Presidente Hoover. « Non bisogna perdere tempo per questo — incalzò Mac Donald —. Una serie di compromessi parziali ed effimeri di carattere puramente temporaneo non riporterà la situazione. Un regolamento continuo e permanente è ora necessario. Tutti gli Stati devono fare concessioni perché altrimenti la situazione del mondo peggiorerà fino al crollo e alla rivoluzione ».

E su questa coscienza della gravità dell'ora e dell'urgenza del pericolo l'oratore insistette anche per tutti gli altri problemi economici e politici, dalle barriere doganali alla sicurezza e al disarmo. « L'Europa — concluse — ha bisogno di un periodo di pace politica che le permetta di riassetare la sua vita economica e metter fine agli obblighi che le sono imposti e che non possono essere soddisfatti senza causare danni a tutte le Nazioni interessate. Il Governo inglese coopererà con tutte le sue forze a questo fine ».

Anche al banchetto di Babilonia, s'era press'a poco sull'orlo della zona dell'uragano preannunciato da tre parole minacciose e misteriose. Ma i invitati, nonchè a parlare, non riuscivano a leggere. A Londra almeno di fronte alla minaccia e al mistero delle cose, non si potevan dire, *inter pocula*, parole più assennate e limpide.



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delle sue truppe. Sosterrà che la pace non può essere in frode al diritto perchè non sarebbe «pace», quella almeno che suole baciarsi con la giustizia. In quanto all'art. 16, blocco, boicottaggio? Son armi a due tagli. Proprio a questi chiari di luna possono ferire anche chi le adopera. Denuncia del «Covenant»? A chi? Al mondo pacifista? Il Giappone dall'atto della berlina ove sarebbe issato, griderebbe probabilmente: chi è senza peccato scagli la prima pietra...

Ma insomma, la conclusione? Questa: stare a vedere..

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Nella... Mancinuria europea, qualche segno di tregua, qualche preannuncio d'intesa.

L'arresto procedurale delle trattative franco-tedesche a Parigi, non ha riflessi troppo sinistri nell'opinione pubblica. Anzi si ha l'impressione ch'esso preluda a qualche concessione. Il Comitato della Banca Internazionale dei pagamenti sta per riunirsi. A qualsiasi punto sia la questione, non è possibile che, di fatto, il Comitato non la veda, la esamini, si pronunci e sulle possibilità di pagamento della Germania e sulla precedenza dei crediti privati di fronte a quelli pubblici.

D'altra parte il problema è così connesso con la situazione interna che non gli è dato prescindere da questa. E questa ha due aspetti molto importanti: l'evidente turbamento che l'incognita invernale aggrava; l'opera poderosa a cui dà mano il Cancelliere per fronteggiarlo. Ogni atteggiamento, ogni deliberazione nei rapporti economici fra la Germania e gli altri Stati, può decidere sulla possibilità che la grave situazione si regga o no, che gli sforzi di Bruening abbiano probabilità o meno di riuscita.

E mentre egli lavora, i partiti fanno la



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Il Consiglio della Società delle Nazioni si riunisce a Parigi per occuparsi ancora una volta del conflitto nippo-cinese. Muta la sede: è qualche cosa.

Circa due mesi sono trascorsi da quando le truppe nipponiche iniziarono le operazioni in Manciuria; nel frattempo, il Consiglio ha fatto quel che ha potuto; e cioè delle note. Non è un motto di spirito: è una constatazione. Un destino crudele ed ironico ha fatto sì che ad ogni nota pacifera di Ginevra corrispondesse una ripresa di ostilità in Manciuria; ed anche ora, mentre il Consiglio si raduna, la lotta riarde più vemente che mai. Se due paesi, in questo basso mondo, così carico di odi, hanno voglia di farsi la guerra o, meglio, se uno dei due ha voglia di far la guerra all'altro, — che, di solito, uno ha voglia di farla e l'altro di non farla — la Società delle Nazioni, per dissuaderlo, non ha altro modo che quello di cui, in questi giorni, si è largamente valsa: far delle note, ossia degli inviti, più o meno gentili e più o meno eloquenti, al male intenzionato a desistere dai suoi rii propositi. Ricorrere alle armi non può, perchè non ha armi. Tutto ciò sembra lapalissiano, tanto è semplice; eppure costituisce la sostanza del problema.

Ora un paese, che si decide a un passo così pericoloso, quale è quello di iniziare delle operazioni militari, lo fa sempre per delle ragioni ben gravi e non si arresta dinanzi al tenue ostacolo di un foglio di carta. In un solo caso le note di Ginevra potrebbero essere efficaci: e cioè quando dietro ad esse fossero i cannoni o le corazzate delle Potenze sociatarie. L'articolo 16 del Covenant prevede che gli Stati appartenenti alla S. d. N. debbano rompere le relazioni commerciali e finanziarie e persino ricorrere alla forza contro lo Stato recalcitrante. Ma queste sono cose che si scrivono nei Covenanti. Naturalmente, si può essere societari quanto si vuole, si può esser pervasi fino alla midolla dello spirito di Ginevra, nessuno, a questo mondo, prende le armi a difesa di un paese e contro un altro solo perchè la S. d. N. ha decretato che il primo è l'aggressore e l'altro è l'aggressore. Le prenderà — o, meglio, sarà disposto a prenderle, che quasi sempre bastano le buone intenzioni — solo se ha ragioni sue, strettamente sue per prenderle, o se ha interessi suoi da difendere. Il braccio secolare — ci si consenta di applicare una fraseologia medievale a casi e a idee del secolo nostro — è a servizio di Ginevra solo quando abbia da difendere non l'idea della pace, ma suoi interessi temporali contro altri interessi temporali. Delle potenze sociatarie nessuna è disposta a inviare neppure una vecchia cannoniera in Estremo Oriente per farvi rispettare la causa della pace: sintomi, alquanto sospetti, fanno supporre che la Francia e l'Inghilterra abbiano un mal celato interesse a che scandala eventant.

Infatti, mentre il sig. Briand proclamava da Ginevra: « Indietro i cannoni! », la stampa del suo paese lo sconsigliava. Se il Giappone invade la Manciuria, che ci importa? ha dichiarato con borghese buon senso qualche giornale francese; e qualche altro, senza tanti sottintesi, ha affermato che il Giappone è « una ventosa nel dorso dei Soviet », una freccia confitta nel fianco dell'abborrito nemico rosso, e che perciò era stata una « demenza » fare intervenire l'America, la quale è in conflitto col Giappone ed ha, del resto, trattato il Messico come il Giappone tratta la Cina.

Non meno esplicita è stata la stampa inglese. *The Morning Post*, dopo avere esposto quanto impor-

ta alla Russia di « collaborare » al regolamento della vertenza cino-giapponese, sono sintomi eloquenti di nuove complicazioni, che il Governo nipponico non potrà tenere nello stesso conto in cui ha mostrato di tenere le note ginevrine. L'America e la Russia, cioè i soli paesi che abbiano interessi gravi e vitali da difendere in Manciuria, potranno, benchè non gravitino nell'orbita della Lega, offrirle il braccio secolare, di cui essa ha bisogno, per arrestare la marcia delle truppe giapponesi. E se ciò accadrà — se, cioè, il Giappone si fermerà davanti alla minaccia di quell'« azione più diretta », cui Briand ha accennato — risulterà ancora una volta dimostrato che la causa della pace si difende solo se si è pronti alla guerra.

A. 1/16



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Non meno esplicita è stata la stampa inglese. *The Morning Post*, dopo avere esposto quanto importanti siano gli interessi nipponici in Manciuria, ha affermato che « i fatti rendono assurda l'aspettativa di vedere il Giappone evacuare la Manciuria » e che « la Gran Bretagna non ha interesse a sollecitare il Giappone ad abbandonare la sua posizione in quel paese ».

Qualche giornale ha anche accennato al fatto che fra il Giappone e alcune potenze esistono degli accordi segreti che risalgono a prima della guerra e hanno per scopo di proteggere indirettamente l'Indocina, dirigendo verso la Manciuria l'espansione giapponese.

Si spiega, quindi, l'atteggiamento che l'opinione pubblica ha assunto nei due paesi, che hanno, se così si può dire, in collaborazione col Presidente Wilson, inventato la S. d. N.

In queste condizioni alla Cina non resterebbe che confortarsi con la eloquenza veramente ristoratrice del sig. Briand. « Indietro i cannoni!, indietro i fucili! »: ma i cannoni e i fucili hanno l'abitudine di non andare indietro se altri cannoni e altri fucili non si fanno avanti.

E, per sua buona fortuna, la Cina ha altri protettori, oltre l'eloquente signor Briand e la S. d. N. Il lungo colloquio del generale Daves con Briand, l'accenno fatto da quest'ultimo alla possibilità di « un'azione più diretta » degli Stati Uniti, i passi fatti dall'ambasciatore sovietico a Parigi e l'intenzione che si attribui-

sce alla Russia di « collaborare » al regolamento della vertenza cino-giapponese, sono sintomi eloquenti di nuove complicazioni, che il Governo nipponico non potrà tenere nello stesso conto in cui ha mostrato di tenere le note ginevrine. L'America e la Russia, cioè i soli paesi che abbiano interessi gravi e vitali da difendere in Manciuria, potranno, benchè non gravitino nell'orbita della Lega, offrire il braccio secolare, di cui essa ha bisogno, per arrestare la marcia delle truppe giapponesi. E se ciò accadrà — se, cioè, il Giappone si fermerà davanti alla minaccia di quell'« azione più diretta », cui Briand ha accennato — risulterà ancora una volta dimostrato che la causa della pace si difende solo se si è pronti alla guerra.

A. B.



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAM

GREEN

PARIS

FROM Dated December 3, 1931

Rec'd 7:20 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

838, December 3, 9 p.m.

From Ambassador Dawes.

Following is report from Sweetser

"Today for the first time since the extraordinary session of the Council opened two and a half weeks ago no meeting was held either of the twelve or of the drafting committee nor so far as can be ascertained were there any important private discussions. Every one was marking time waiting for the replies from Tokyo and Nanking to the Council's draft resolution, the parts of the President's declaration submitted to the two governments and the newer proposals of last night on Chinchow. In the late afternoon the Japanese reply began to be received at the delegation but no indication of its tenor was given. Press despatches indicated that Japan would request amendment of the resolution in so far as it connected evacuation with the commission, which was said to be a form of time limit and coercion, and omission in the declaration of the provision for neutral observers to accompany any military

Division of  
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Department of State

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

mam

2- #838, from Paris, December 3,  
1931

military movements against bandits. Sze was reported as discouraged after his meeting with the Council last night on Chinchow, while private despatches from Nanking indicated that the Chinese would demand the demarcation and observance of the neutral zone by neutral observers

(END SECTION ONE)

SHAW

OX



## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAM.

FROM GREEN

PARIS

Dated December 3, 1931

Rec'd 8:33 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

838, December 3, 9 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

Three statements of military information were distributed. The Chinese reported a Japanese air plane reconnaissance over Tahouchan on November 30th and over Chinchow on December first, the arrival on November 30th of three war ships at Chinhoangtao, and three hundred additional Japanese soldiers at Tientsin on December first. The British reported from Mukden on November 30th the imminent departure of Chang Ching Hui from Harbin to Tsi-tsihar, and noticeable Japanese activity at Harbin, with the arrival of four hundred Japanese officially described as volunteers; from Chinchow, a Japanese air plane reconnaissance and Japanese withdrawal to Chuliuho; and from Tientsin quiet with the Japanese planning to return their naval landing party to Tangku. The French observers gave a detailed memorandum on the disposition of the Chinese forces east of the Great Wall on the Peking-Mukden railroad showing exactly how many men and what types were stationed at eight different points. In all there were stated to be  
27,600



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
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mam

2- #838, section two, from Paris,  
December 3, 1931

27,600 men of whom about 17,000 were combatant troops.  
These arrangements were said to correspond practically  
to the disposition of the Chinese garrisons before Sep-  
tember 18th with conditions normal and no special in-  
structions received by the commanders"

SHAW

OX

*End of Message*



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Undated

Rec'd December 4, 1931  
5:40 a. m.

Secretary of State, DEC 4 1931  
Washington

THE UNDER SECRETARY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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1039.

Following from the Minister at Nanking:


"December 3, noon.

Military Attache now at Chinchow informs me that War Department funds insufficient to keep him and his assistants in that area. It is urgently necessary that we have available for purposes of observation in Manchuria members of Military and Naval Attache's offices. I hope that the Department will find it possible to obtain from those departments sufficient funds to enable us to use Military and Naval Attache staffs freely."

For the Minister

PERKINS

HPD



F/DEW

793.94/3024

FILED

JAN 7 1932

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1215593



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

PLAIN

FROM

Peiping via N. R.

Dated December 4, 1931

Rec'd 7:40 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.


1042, December 4, 11 a. m.

Editorial in PEIPING LEADER today contains following passages:

We lack as yet a consistent official explanation of why the Japanese forces advancing on Chinchow along the Peiping-Mukden line stopped their drive last Saturday and turned back to Hsinmintun.

On Friday there was a report that Shidehara, Japanese Foreign Minister had declared that he would resign if Chinchow was attacked. This unexpected offer to abandon a lucrative position was apparently connected with something which Japan takes much more seriously than it does the League - the American Government. We do not know if Shidehara's threat to resign was made before or after Stimson's pointed statement. Both were on the same day. In addition to what Stimson actually said there was something clearly implied and a wire from Washington the same night stated that the news received tonight of the

Japanese



F/DEW

793.94/3025

FILED

DEC 3 1931



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

GRAY

FROM

Peiping via N.R.

Dated December 4, 1931

Secretary of State,

Washington

1040, December 4, 2 p.m.

Following from Military Attache at Chinchow:

"December 3, 4 p.m.

One of our observers, in attempt to verify withdrawal Japanese troops, left Chinchow, December 1, 11 p.m. From Tahushan, where line was broken, he proceeded by walking, by use of hamper cars and locomotive, arriving at Hsinmin and Liao River December 2, returning Chinchow reporting three hundred Japanese troops west of Liao River at Hsinmin and Chuliuho and detachment patrolling west to a Japanese line near Paichipu. Troop train sufficient to evacuate Japanese personnel is held up at Hsinmin. It is believed Japanese have force west of river at bridge head to control crossing. General Jung in conference with observers today stated that he had no instructions relative to establishing neutral zone".

"December 3,

Rec'd Div. 24 of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 4 1931  
Department of State

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

F/DEW

793.94/3026

FILED

DEC 11 1931

793.94  
note  
793.94/118



MET

2-#1040, Peiping via N.R.,  
December 4, 1931.

"December 3, 7 p.m.

Referring to your telegram of December 3, 11 a.m., state that our observers passed three times between here and Tahushan December 2, 11 a.m., in special trains reporting absolutely no troop concentration or other movement by the Chinese. Repairs had not been started on three bridges, between Tahushan and Lichiaowopu. According to a report of our observer returning from Hsinmin also no bridge. at Paichipu. Any troop concentration or other movement by the Chinese will immediately be reported by me".

Repeated to Nanking.

For the Minister,

PERKINS

HPD



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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Charge Department

OR

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\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED

CONFIDENTIAL CODE

NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE

PLAIN

Washington,

December 4, 1931.

AMERICAN EMBASSY

DEC 4 31

PARIS (FRANCE).

624 FOR AMBASSADOR DAWES.

Department's No. 620, December 3, 6 p.m.

Military Attaché at Chinchow under date December 3,

~~4 p.m.~~ reports further as follows:

QUOTE three hundred Japanese troops west of Liao River at Hsinmin and Chuliuho and detachment patrolling west to a Japanese line near Paichipu. Troop train sufficient to evacuate Japanese personnel is held ~~at~~ at Hsinmin. It is believed Japanese have force west of river at bridge head to control crossing. General Jung in conference with observers today stated that he had no instructions relative to establishing neutral zone. . . . . our observers passed three times between here and Tahushan December 2, 11 a.m., in special trains reporting absolutely no troop concentration or other movement by the Chinese. UNQUOTE

DEC 4 1931 P.M.  
793.94/3026

793.94/3026

Enciphered by RAH

FE:RSM:EJL

FE

Sent by operator M., 19

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-128



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

CORRECTED COPY  
FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated December 4, 1931

Rec'd 5:40 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

1041, December 4, 3 p.m.

Following from the American Consul at Mukden

"December 3, 2 p.m.

Referring to my telegram of December 1, noon,  
paragraph one, headquarters reports continued activity  
of Chinese forces around Tsitsihar, forcible (?) having  
been inaugurated. Minor clashes have occurred near  
Angangchi. However General Ma has disassociated himself  
from the above mentioned action.

Two. Referring to paragraph two, the same telegram,  
no movements of Chinese forces in Chihnsien area is  
reported by headquarters. Jehol troops have arrived at  
Kowpangtza and anti-aircraft gun mountings are constructed  
there. Armored trains are moving east of Talingho. The  
walled City of Shanhaikwan has been looted by Chinese  
troops.

Three.

F/DEW

793.94/3027

FILED

DEC 11 1931

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND A.I.S.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 4 1931  
Department of State



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#1041, from Peiping, December  
4, 3 p.m.

Three. Headquarters considers the Hailar and Taonan districts quiet and has withdrawn the majority of Japanese forces stationed in that area into the South Manchuria Railway zone.

Four. Peiping-Mukden Railway traffic will not be resumed for some days as four bridges, between Hsinmin and Tahushan, have been blown up by Chinese.

Repeated to Nanking and Department.

For the Minister,

PERKINS

KLP-HPD



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated December 4, 1931

Rec'd 5:40 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

1041, December 4, 3 p. m.


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walled City of Shanhaikwan has been looted by Chinese  
troops.

Three.



F/DEW 793.94/3027

FILED

DEC 10 1931

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REP

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Four. Peiping-Mukden Railway traffic <sup>will not</sup> be resumed for some days as four bridges, between Hsinmin and Tahushan, have been blown up by Chinese.

Repeated to Nanking and Department.

For the Minister



Perkins

klp

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



FE  
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MET

FROM

Rio de Janeiro

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.


Dated December 4, 1931

Rec'd 10:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

98, December 4, noon.



F/DEW

793.94/3028

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. The press reports that my Italian colleague Cerrutti may be appointed a member of the Manchurian investigation committee. Considerable personal knowledge convinces me that by preparation through experience in the Far East and Russia and temperamental equipment he is particularly fitted for membership.

MORGAN

HPD

DEC 9 1931

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
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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




REC'D



No. 2356

DEC 3 1931



F/DEM 793.94/3029

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Sir:

1 - I have the honor to forward herewith an excerpt  
from the news account telephoned on November 17, 1931  
from Paris by William Martin to the JOURNAL DE GENEVE,  
regarding United States participation in the League  
Council Meetings in which the Sino-Japanese matter  
has been discussed.

Respectfully yours,  
*Winthrop S. Greene*  
Winthrop S. Greene  
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

Enclosure:  
1. Translation, November 17, 1931.

711:891  
WSG:MET

793.94  
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DEC 14 1931  
F/DEM



Article telephoned by William Martin from Paris to

JOURNAL DE GENEVE

November 17, 1931.

All interest centers this morning in the conversations which General Dawes, the new representative of the United States at the League of Nations, held immediately upon his arrival from London. He had long interviews with Mr. Sze and with Mr. Matsudeira, who came from London to assist and possibly keep an eye on his colleague, Mr. Yoshizawa. General Dawes has not yet seen M. Briand himself, but M. Massigli has made several trips back and forth between them, which amounts to the same thing, as General Dawes does not speak French and M. Briand knows no English.

At the present moment General Dawes is in conversation with Sir Eric Drummond, who is explaining to him the mechanism of the League of Nations and the history of this affair.

The presence in Paris of General Dawes means at the same time a gain and a loss for the League of Nations: a gain, because the General, formerly Vice President of the United States, has a considerable influence in the Senate; he is able to speak in the name of his country; he can in doing so assume heavy responsibilities, which by nature he is inclined to do; if the Council must take grave decisions, General Dawes will be on hand to share the burden; the unfortunate misunderstandings which occurred many times in September and October following certain telephone conversations between Geneva and Washington as to the intentions of the American Government, will not be repeated. In sending General Dawes to Paris, the

American



- 2 -

American Government has shown the active interest which it has in the work of the Council and the importance which it attributes thereto.

Unfortunately, the gain is at the same time a loss. General Dawes is known to be too great a personage to sit at the Council table and to keep silent. Possibly it was also believed that if the Council, in its present session, were obliged to enter into a discussion of the question of sanctions, it would be better for the United States to be able to maintain the appearance of action independent of the decisions of the League of Nations. General Dawes remains behind the scenes. Not only will he not sit at the table of the Council, but it is doubtful whether he will consent to be present at its public meetings.

This situation is somewhat unusual. It took three days in September and a week in October for the Council to assure itself of the active collaboration of the American Government. The representative of the United States at the Council was greeted by an avalanche of speeches of welcome and now, three weeks later, we find ourselves "in the same hole" as before.

It may be possible to explain that, from a diplomatic point of view, this is progress. If the United States retires halfway, it is in order that it may act more energetically and because it believes that such procedure is necessary. But it is unfortunate, nevertheless, because of the interpretations which may be placed upon it either by the Japanese or by the ill-willed observers who are not lacking in the world.

This



- 3 -

This, however, is only a question of form and of procedure, but there is also reason for uneasiness in respect to the fundamental questions at issue. The American delegation is very strong, and General Dawes is accompanied by gentlemen of the highest ability, but not one of them is conversant with what the League of Nations has been doing. They look at the whole question from the diplomatic angle, and the effect which the decision of the Council will have upon the Disarmament Conference, upon the security of nations, and upon the pacification of Europe, is beyond their range of vision.

The first thing which General Dawes did was to express the hope that the meeting of the Council would not be held on Monday, and if it were, that it would be a purely formal meeting. He fears the publicity, which in this affair, is the only safeguard of justice.

He is credited with the intention of carrying through a compromise which can only be obtained by giving way to the Japanese and by bringing pressure to bear on the Chinese. This compromise is believed to involve an agreement that direct negotiations be carried on simultaneously in regard to the evacuation and in regard to the questions of principle at issue.

If this rumor is correct, the Council is about to meet with grave difficulties, and the question arises whether it will not be necessary to lose another week



- 4 -

week in giving instructions to the Americans.

The only hopeful feature in the whole situation is the divergence of opinion which is supposed to have arisen within the Japanese delegation, of which a part seems to understand the impossible situation in which Japan has placed herself.

But will not the violent spirits triumph, as they so often do?

W.M.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




RECO  
LEGATION OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Berne, November 20, 1931

No. 2357

DEC 3 31



Copy in FZ

F/DEW

793.94/3030

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Sir:

- 1 - I have the honor to forward herewith translations
- 2 - of two editorials by William Martin, appearing in the JOURNAL DE GENEVE of November 17 and 19, respectively. Both refer to the Sino-Japanese conflict in Manchuria, and the second especially to the Treaties of 1905 and 1915.

Respectfully yours,

*Winthrop S. Greene*  
Winthrop S. Greene  
Charge d'Affaires a.i.

Enclosures:

1 and 2. Translations.

711:891

WSG:MET

DEC 16 1931

FILED

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

JOURNAL DE GENEVE

November 17, 1931

The telegraph brings us, from time to time, the news that Japan is considering withdrawing from the League of Nations. The other day the Seyukai--the nationalist and military party--declared that if the Council did not fall into line with the opinions of the Japanese Government, Japan ought to leave the League. As there are persons whom this may frighten, it is worthwhile to explain why it is the lesser of two dangers.

The Japanese may brandish their proposal to resign, like a scarecrow; they will not execute it. They know that the articles of the Covenant in regard to the threat of war apply to States which are not members of the League as fully as to those which are members. Furthermore, the resignation of a State has no juridical effect for two years. Consequently, any decision which Japan might take in this matter would have no consequences as far as the present affair is concerned.

The Japanese Government is too well informed and too careful of its international reputation to risk compromising, by an impetuous action, the results of its long efforts to play the role of a great Power among the nations. It can never have seriously considered doing so; still less can it consider it at the moment when the example of Brazil has just given proof that  
the



- 2 -

the League of Nations can without difficulty weather certain secessions, and when the example of Spain has shown that those who are dissatisfied always end by coming back.

One can with difficulty imagine Japan allowing herself to cease to be heard at Geneva and leaving the field free for the Chinese at the very moment when the United States are coming into closer contact with the League of Nations. The Japanese Government understands this so well that it has abstained from formulating any threat. However, it is of some consequence that certain Japanese, who are not entirely irresponsible, believe that they can do this and can thus make an impression upon their own people and upon uninformed persons elsewhere.

The Council will not be obliged to take into consideration the non-existent risk of a resignation on the part of Japan. It should, on the other hand, be very attentive to another danger--that which would result from a failure of the League of Nations in the face of such a plain case of aggression.

In spite of the fact that great and varied forces contribute to obscure in the eyes of the nations the true character of the Sino-Japanese conflict, some rays of truth begin to pierce the fog. It is known, for example, that on the day of the famous attack upon the South Manchurian Railroad near Mukden, which has served as the pretext for this whole affair, the first trainloads of Japanese reserves coming from

Korea



- 3 -

Korea arrived on the spot two hours after the attack. This is a rapidity of mobilization and of transportation hitherto unknown in the annals of military history.

Japanese and anti-Chinese propaganda has succeeded in spreading in Europe the idea that the Japanese represent order, authority and the conservation of society in the Far East. This is exactly what was said with no less reason of Germany in 1914. Nothing gives such a powerful impression of order as a military regime. However, we must look at the result. We do not wish for Japan what happened to Germany, but the triumph of the aggressors would be for the world a thousand times worse.

The triumph of Japan does not necessarily imply military success, since the Chinese are not resisting. But the generals prefer not to make war if they can obtain their end otherwise. The Germans in 1914 would have preferred that Serbia should give way. In order that one may speak of the triumph of Japan, it is not necessary, therefore, that there should be a hundred thousand casualties in Manchuria. It will be sufficient if the aggression attains its object.

What is this object? It is possible at last, through the fumes of the declarations of M. Yoshizawa, to make it out. It consists in obliging the Chinese, threatened by bayonets, to recognize "the sanctity of treaties"--that is to say, the validity of the accords of 1905 and 1915. We shall explain at another

time



- 4 -

time the grounds on which the Chinese believe that they can contest the juridical validity of these treaties. Are they in the right? We do not know, and it matters little. There are judges at The Hague. What cannot be tolerated is the process which the Japanese are employing to obtain their ends. Is this international order? Is this the conservation of society? Bah! This is anarchy, which takes us back twenty years!

That is why the Council cannot tolerate it. On this point there is no possible going backwards. It may be possible to save the face of Japan. It may be possible to go far to meet her demands. It may be possible to consider general compromises on the fundamental issues. But it is not possible to accept the solution that the Chinese be obliged to negotiate before their national territory has been entirely evacuated. The triumph for the Japanese would not be less great if they succeeded, under the protection of their cannon, to set up in Manchuria new authorities which they would recognize and which would come to an understanding with them. Such action would be a manoeuver--the manoeuver of the Council of Flanders, for the procedure of imperialists is everywhere the same. It could only deceive those who were voluntarily blind. The Council cannot be deceived, even though certain of its members desire this. The Japanese have the trumps in their hands. They have secret understandings. Whether these understandings date from before the

the



- 5 -

the war and had for their object the indirect protection of Indo-China by directing Japanese expansion toward Manchuria; or whether they date from 1927 or from the Conference of London in 1930, it appears to be certain that these secret understandings exist. It is these understandings which explain the lurking attitude, the hesitating action, of all the great Powers; the vague differences, not to put it more clearly, which exist between the action of M. Briand and that of the Quai d'Orsay; between Lord Cecil and the Foreign Office; between Mr. Stimson and Mr. Castle.

This divorce between the statesmen and the diplomats only serves to increase the importance of this dramatic affair. The statesmen see that on the playing of this card depends the future of the League of Nations and the fate of the Disarmament Conference. They know that all the Chancelleries of the world are awaiting the result of the deliberations of the Council, in order to know whether the League of Nations is or is not in a position to make the security of weak states respected, whether the Covenant is made up of words or realities, whether secret understandings are stronger than the most solemn treaties.

The statesmen see that, but the diplomats see the promises which they have made and the combinations which they have built up. The manufacturers of arms see the markets which may be taken away from them.

Such is the stake of this struggle. If the forces of the past triumph, the Japanese militarists, the secret treaties, the occult influences--woe to us! But

if



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 6 -

if the Council shows the energy which one expects  
of it, if the Japanese armies withdraw, if law is  
put into effect, then the moral success of the  
League of Nations will be enhanced by the difficulty  
with which it was obtained.

W.M.

JCG:MET



Journal de Genève, November 19, 1931

CHINA AND THE RESPECT FOR TREATIES

It is fashionable in Tokyo to say that Europe understands nothing of the Sino-Japanese conflict and that that is not surprising, in view of the extraordinary talent which the Chinese are supposed to have for propaganda, a practice concerning which the poor Japanese, it seems, understand nothing. In Paris we find this difficult to believe, and it appears that the Japanese people do scant justice to the very real abilities of their diplomats.

However this may be, one of the ideas spread throughout the world by that which a respect for truth obliges us to term Japanese propaganda, and one which has made the greatest impression on the European public, is the idea that the Chinese are a faithless people who have violated all their international engagements and that Japan sent an army to Manchuria solely to assure the respect of rights to which she is entitled by treaty. And it is whispered into the ears of the French: In short, it is just as though you were obliged to send an army to Germany, to maintain the Treaty of Versailles.

If this argument carries any weight, it is because most of the European countries have indeed had reason to complain of the Chinese on this ground. The protest of nationalist China against the so-called unequal treaties has not always been expressed with a sufficient respect for form, and this lack of formality has estranged a large number of European diplomats who

today



- 2 -

today can be numbered among the friends of Japan.

The Honorable Mr. Sze, who has shown talent of a high order throughout this affair, well understands this: that is why he has written an official letter to the President of the Council in which he states that the Chinese Government is "determined to execute loyally" and to "respect scrupulously all treaty obligations."

The Chinese delegate has tacitly renounced, as far as Japan is concerned, the official policy of his Government concerning the so-called unequal treaties. He has thus given the Japanese Government a satisfaction so complete on the basis of the fifth of its fundamental points that if the Japanese Government had had complete good faith in the affair, there would be nothing further to do than to rejoice over it and to withdraw the troops from Manchuria with the same very remarkable rapidity with which it has sent them there.

That is what M. Briand said in a very strong letter dated October 29th to the Japanese delegate. After having recalled the Chinese commitment, M. Briand wrote:

"It therefore seems to me (and the other members of the Council, including, I dare hope, Your Excellency, will be unanimous in sharing this point of view) that the Chinese Government has taken before the Council, on which Japan occupies a permanent seat, commitments in conformity with the fundamental principles to which  
the



- 3 -

the Japanese Government has referred."

We do not know whether the delegate of Japan has appreciated the truth of M. Briand's letter, but if so, he did not give any indication that he did, for in reply he confined himself to stating that the undertaking of Mr. Sze did not seem sufficient to him and that he still held to his five points.

We will say outright that we understand the Japanese attitude perfectly. If, in insisting upon the respect for international treaties, they wished to have recognized the sanctity of really valid and juridically enforceable treaties, Mr. Sze's declaration would be quite sufficient for them. It does away with all anxiety as to the so-called unequal treaties, which the Chinese have undertaken not to attack on the sole ground that they are unequal. The international law, to which Mr. Sze refers in his note, the judicial and arbitral bodies to which he proposes the submission of any dispute which may arise as regards the interpretation of the treaties, have never recognized inequality as a valid reason for invalidity. On this point the Japanese may rest quite assured.

But this is not sufficient for them--and it is here that Japanese policy gives us a glimpse of the cloven hoof. What Japan wants to obtain from the Chinese, under the pressure of military occupation, is not the execution of juridically valid treaties, but the recognition of contested treaties.

It is known that the Japanese in their private and



- 4 -

and official conversations are invoking in particular two treaties for which they wish to obtain confirmation from the Chinese--the Treaty of 1905 and the Treaty of 1915. By the Treaty of December 22, 1905, on which are founded the Japanese rights in the zone of the Southern Manchurian Railway, the Chinese recognized the Treaty of Portsmouth which put an end to the Russo-Japanese war. However, the Treaty of 1905 contains an annex which the Japanese seldom mention, and this accord contains an article in the following terms:

"By virtue of the desire expressed by the Chinese Government that the troops and the guards of the Railway, Russian as well as Japanese, should be withdrawn as soon as possible and in order to take account of this desire, the Imperial Government of Japan undertakes, in case Russia should agree to withdraw her troops and her guards, or in case any other arrangement should be entered into between Russia and China, to act in the same manner."

It is well known that Russia withdrew her troops from Manchuria after the revolution and it is well understood that since then the Japanese, who have not kept their promise, are not particularly anxious to submit the 1905 treaty to arbitration.

It would not be very difficult to find analogies in the 1915 treaty. On January 18, 1915, Japan, taking advantage of Europe's preoccupations--the methods have not changed--addressed a note to the

Chinese



- 5 -

Chinese Government containing the "Twenty-one Demands" and enjoining her to maintain secrecy. As the news leaked to the American press, the twenty-one demands were officially denied by the Japanese Government, just as is the case at present. Negotiations were entered into (direct negotiations of a character which the Japanese again wish to impose on the Chinese) and as those did not result in an agreement speedily enough to please them, on May 7th they put an end to the negotiations by an ultimatum: in the space of forty-eight hours the Chinese were summoned to accept, not the twenty-one demands, but fourteen demands which would have resulted in the establishment of a Japanese hegemony in Manchuria. China, abandoned by the world, gave in; the result was the Treaty of May 25, 1915,--the peace of Versailles minus the war. But the question as to whether the Treaty of Washington of 1922 did not tacitly abrogate certain provisions of the Treaty of 1915 is a very difficult one from the juridical point of view. Such are the treaties to which Japan invokes respect. She is right if these treaties are valid; but if so, why does she not bring her contention before a court? If they are not valid, the substance of the fifth fundamental point is not respect for treaties, but extortion. To extortion the League of Nations must not and cannot agree.

In addition to respect for treaties, Japanese propaganda uses two other arguments of which we would like in conclusion to say a few words. The first is the Russian argument: the Chinese are accused of being enfeoffed



- 6 -

enfeoffed to the Bolshevists. If this is so, how is it that the Russians remain so remarkably quiet throughout this entire affair, and that they have proclaimed their neutrality? The reason is simple; it is that the Russians are bound by agreements to both parties; this is a point which the Japanese do not willingly stress.

The Japanese say also that they must remain in Manchuria because they are the guardians of order there. We have previously stated what we think of this frightful variety of order. But today the question is not that. We wish simply to call attention to two small facts.

At Washington in 1922 when the Americans asked the Japanese when they intended to evacuate Siberia, the Japanese replied that they were not able to leave it due to the anarchy which prevailed in the country. Mr. Hughes, then Secretary of State, replied to them in words which Mr. Sze repeated, in substance, before the Council, when he explained that it was precisely the presence of a foreign army which was the cause of anarchy in Manchuria. This is so true that a quite reliable newspaper, the Japanese Chronicle, was able to state, in its number of October 22nd last: "It is not possible to demand that propaganda be logical, but it ought at least to have a little memory." Recently the Japan Times published a long article explaining that Manchuria was the only part of China where order and prosperity prevailed. The Chinese, it said, were rushing by millions into Manchuria from other provinces less well governed. And why that? Because for so long as Japan occupied its present position in Manchuria, peace was assured



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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with all its blessings.



How does it happen that this gold should become transformed into such vile lead?

W.M.



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE



DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

December 1, 1931.

MANCHURIA SITUATION

The Military Intelligence Division of our War Department estimates that the Japanese have between 20,000 and 25,000 troops in Manchuria now. They estimate that there were 10,000 troops in the expedition which moved from Mukden toward Chinchow last week.

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
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE



Herewith a memorandum setting forth a part of my thought with regard to the inadvisability of there emanating from this Government a suggestion that China appoint a "viceroy" for Manchuria.

I might add that I feel equally that we should not, at least until such time as our views may have been sought by both disputants or may be offered on the basis of an agreement which entitles us to advance them, proffer gratuitously any suggestions with regard to the setting up of a new administration in Manchuria. That question is one either of domestic politics as regards China or of "family relationships" as between China and Japan. The time and the warrant for intrusion by us in that connection have not yet come and may not come.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

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DIVISION OF

NOMINATION OF A CHINESE "VICEROY" FOR MANCHURIA.

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The proposal that the Nanking Government should be induced to name a new Chinese governor or "viceroy", acceptable to Japan, whose function it should be to create a new Chinese administration in Manchuria is one which, whatever its merits, should not be initiated by the American Government.

This, for the following reasons:

Governments in China are governments of men rather than of laws. The organization and processes depend to large extent on personal relationships and the psychology of the people. In Manchuria, old Chang Tso-lin built up from the bottom a government which was essentially feudal, in which he and the officers of the army (which he created) were the "administration". The method and processes were feudal. On Chang's death, the people recognized his son as the natural and rightful ruler.

That old organization has now been smashed. Any appointee, from no matter what source, to the position of chief executive in Manchuria will have to build from the top down. The Chinese have few, if any, men capable of

accomplishing

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accomplishing that task. None could accomplish it unless he makes himself amenable to dictation from the Japanese and depends for his position on Japanese support. Thus, if the idea is adopted, the appointee will either become a tool of Japan or (in all probability) fail. The Japanese do not intend that a Chinese administration in Manchuria shall, as a Chinese administration, be successful; and they can prevent its being so.

Thus, a suggestion by any foreign government that this course be adopted would amount to an intrusion into the Japanese-Chinese controversy. The suggestion, if adopted, would probably result in the creation of a situation advantageous in the long run to Japan. Then, the originator would be accused by the Chinese of having either aided Japan or played into Japan's hands.

In view of our desire not to get ourselves involved in the issues as between China and Japan and to maintain an attitude impartial both in fact and in appearance, we should avoid the risk involved in making ourselves the proponents of this idea. If this idea is put forward, it should be put forward either by the League or by one of the disputants and, if adopted, it should be adopted by the disputants without any evidence of pressure from outside.

SKH/ZMF



AM 1800  
NO. 182 Political.

AMERICAN CONSULATE,

Geneve, Switzerland, November 20, 1931.

CONFIDENTIAL.



F/DEW

SUBJECT: Sino-Japanese Conflict. Two Statements Respecting  
the Situation in Manchuria by Eugene E. Barnett,  
of the National Committee, Young Men's Christian  
Association of China.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to inform the Department that  
W.W. Gethman, General Secretary of the World's Alliance of  
Young Men's Christian Associations, which has its head-  
quarters in Geneva, called on me today and left with me  
copies of two statements respecting the situation in Man-  
churia prepared by Mr. Eugene E. Barnett, of the National  
Committee of the Young Men's Christian Association of China,  
20 Museum Road, Shanghai. These statements are entitled


- 1/ "A Few Generalisations regarding the Manchuria Crisis"  
(based on visits in the area and conversations with many  
competent first-hand observers of recent events there,  
October 9 to 23, 1931) and "Report of Visit to Manchuria,  
October 9 to 23, 1931". These are transmitted in two  
copies designated as Annex I and Annex II respectively of  
this despatch. (One of these copies will, however, be at-  
tached to the copy of this despatch transmitted to E.I.C.,  
Paris, with the suggestion that it be made available to the

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American Embassy, Paris.)

In transmitting this material, I naturally do so without any knowledge of its interest or value to the Department. I assume, of course, that the Department is in receipt of a great deal of information of this character direct from sources in Japan and China which are at its disposal. At the same time, I do not feel justified in withholding this data and am sending it forward for what it may be worth. I may add that in handing this to me, Mr. Gethman made the request that it be regarded as confidential as to source.

In his conversation with me, Dr. Gethman stated that the World's Alliance of Young Men's Christian Associations of which Dr. John R. Mott is President, had at its command through its branch in Japan the means of creating wide publicity in Japan for what he described as the "attitude of the Western nations toward the present policy of Japan respecting Manchuria". He asked me if in my view it would serve a useful purpose should his organization endeavor to employ the means at its disposal to bring about publicity in Japan of that character. I naturally informed him that I had no opinion to give in such a matter.

Respectfully yours,

*Prentiss B. Gilbert*  
Prentiss B. Gilbert,  
American Consul.

4 Carbon Copies  
Received *L. J. N.*

Enclosures:  
Annexes I and II, as above.

Original and 5 copies to Department of State.  
1 copy to E.I.C., Paris.  
1 copy to Legation, Berne, Switzerland.



ANNEX I

Strictly Confidential.  
Not For Publication.

A Few Generalisations Regarding the Manchurian Crisis.

(Based on visits in the area and conversations with many competent first-hand observers of recent events there, October 9 - 23, 1931).

Eugene E. Barnett.

1. Japanese "Grievances".

The Japanese hold the alleged blowing up on September 18 of a section of the South Manchuria Railway Line, north of Mukden, to be the immediate cause of their recent military operations in the area. They declare however, that preceding this incident was a long list of irritations which they had suffered at the hands of the Chinese authorities. Official lists compiled by the Japanese contain more than 500 such "cases", of which, they say, 368 occurred in 1929 (the last year for which complete statistics exist). Critics of this formidable list declare that the "cases" referred to range all the way from bandit hold-ups to petty thieving of wire within the South Manchurian Railway zone.

Non-cooperation of the Chinese authorities in dealing with these "cases"; the unfriendly attitude of the Mukden government in its relations with Japan; the failure of China to abide by "treaty agreements" under which China is alleged to have bound herself not to build railroads paralleling the South Manchuria Railway Line; the failure of the Chinese authorities to provide adequate protection for Japanese subjects (mainly Korean farmers, as in Wan Pao Shan); the killing of Nakamura, allegedly by Chinese army officers on the border of Inner Mongolia; and finally the "bombing outrage" on the South Manchuria Railway Line on the night of September 18 - these represent the main counts of Japan in her present effort to bring China to time through military force.

2. Japanese Designs in Manchuria.

It is, I think, generally agreed that back of the present military occupation by Japan of strategic points in South Manchuria, is Japan's long cherished ambition to establish an economic, if not political, hegemony in South Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. One might go back to the Shimonoseki Treaty in 1895 following the Sino-Japanese War, to the Portsmouth Treaty following the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 and to the Peking Treaty between China and Japan of 1905, to the notorious Twenty-One Demands served on China by Japan in 1915, and to the Tanaka Memorandum to the Emperor of Japan (published in English translation in 1929) for concrete evidence of Japan's deep-seated conviction of her imperial destiny in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia.

The Chinese believe that just as Japan sought to enforce the Twenty-One Demands upon China in 1915, when Europe was terribly preoccupied with the Great War, just so now Japan seizes this hour as an opportune time for forcing through her policy in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. Unprecedented floods inun-



- 2 -

date large areas in Central China, rendering vast multitudes of people homeless, civil conflict rends the country in twain, and Communist forces in Central China menace the Central Government. Meanwhile Europe and America struggle beneath the worst economic burdens and anxieties they have ever known. Common Chinese opinion is that the Japanese military have designedly chosen this hour of unusual weakness in China and of unusual preoccupation of foreign nations as a time in which to entrench themselves finally and permanently in Manchuria.

3. Japanese "Efforts" to Provoke Incidents.

Many neutral residents in Manchuria share the opinion of Chinese in that area that the Japanese military have been exerting themselves for some time to create a pretext for occupying Southern Manchuria. They tell of provocative army manoeuvres and target practice in various parts of the country which have been greatly intensified during recent months. They point to the long string of fortifications, large and small, along the course of the South Manchuria Railway. They refer to the Wan Pao Shan incident in the summer, in which Japanese gendarmes intervened on behalf of the Koreans in a Sino-Korean dispute. They point out that during this Wan Pao Shan conflict (in which apparently no one was killed on either side) Japanese reports sent back to Korea claimed that Koreans had been slaughtered and that within 24 hours of the receipt of these false reports in Korea, mobs of Koreans arose in Seoul and Peking in assault upon their Chinese neighbours, killing 200 of them before the efficient Japanese police restored order. They also recount the whole story of the Nakamura case in connection with which Japanese sentiment both in Manchuria and in Japan was inflamed. Finally, they point out that on September 17 Colonel Kwan and other officers in the Chinese army who were alleged to have put Nakamura to death, were brought into Mukden for trial; that the Chinese authorities promised that they would be appropriately dealt with if found guilty; and that the Japanese Consul-General in Mukden expressed gratification that the incident was about to be satisfactorily solved. When the Nakamura case failed to furnish the needed pretext, a bomb conveniently exploded on the South Manchuria Railway and on the following morning five strategic centres in South Manchuria were in the hands of a Japanese army of occupation.

4. The Incident of September 18-19.

It is not necessary at this point to recount in detail the incident of September 18 when a bomb is alleged to have exploded on the South Manchuria Railway Line  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles north of the South Manchuria Railway station of Mukden and opposite the Pei Ta Yin barracks of Chinese troops belonging to the Army of the Northeast. Suffice it to say that foreign newspaper correspondents in Mukden with whom I talked, stated that no neutrals or Chinese in Mukden accept the Japanese version of what happened in connection with the incident. Whatever provocation Japan may have had for her present activities in Manchuria, there is general agreement that the alleged occasion for beginning operations was a flimsy and transparent pretext.

5. A State of War.

One is not long in centres like Mukden, Changchun or Kirin without acutely realising that he is in occupied territory. A state of war exists in



- 3 -

Manchuria without the formality of a declaration of war having been made. One interesting evidence that this represents the view of Japanese military leaders in the occupied area is worth mentioning. When the Japanese military took Mukden they commandeered large quantities of military equipment and supplies, including a number of army airplanes. Among these planes were several which had been bought from a Czechoslovakian firm but not yet paid for. The agent of this firm went at once to Mukden to recover the planes. He was told by the military officer in charge that under Article 53 of the Hague Convention the planes belong to Japan. The significant fact is that the Hague Convention referred to is entitled "Articles of War". It is also worth mentioning that Article I of this Convention states that no nation shall wage war upon another without a due declaration of war.

One cannot escape a sense of admiration, however mixed, for the thoroughness with which Japan acted when once she moved. Events were precipitated, presumably unexpectedly, at 10.30 p.m. of September 18. By the following morning Japan was in military occupation of five vital points - Mukden, Yinkou, Liaoyang, Changchun and Antung. Kirin and other centres were taken later.

When occupying Mukden, for example, all government organs were taken over. All communications - radio, telegraph and telephone - were likewise placed under Japanese operation. After a few days a Japanese censorship was placed upon the Postoffice. No Chinese newspapers from outside the area are allowed to reach subscribers within the city. Banks were closed and re-opened only on October 15 and then under severe regulations drawn up by the Japanese military authorities.

Reliable witnesses informed me that on September 18, the day following the alleged bombing, new telephone poles nicely cut and tarred, all ready for use, were being erected within the Chinese city of Mukden and lines brought in presumably for an extension of the Japanese telephone system from the Japanese concession into the Chinese city. Japan's desire thus to extend her system into the city and the unwillingness of the Chinese authorities to permit it has long been a bone of contention.

#### 6. Japanese Propaganda.

A newspaper correspondent of international reputation read to me in Mukden an article which he had prepared on Japanese propaganda, which he regarded as extraordinarily inept. In his view this propaganda was worse than mendacious; it failed completely to measure up to minimum standards of intelligence. The only English newspaper published in Southern Manchuria is the Manchuria Daily News, a violently propagandist Japanese organ which mixes news and editorial comment in a manner violating all common canons of newspaper procedure.

Mention is made above of the exclusion of Chinese newspapers from outside the area into the occupied territory. All outgoing news is censored. There is reason to believe that outgoing as well as incoming news has been distorted. A well known American correspondent, for example, told me of a message which he sent out to the effect that the Japanese military planes which bombed Chinchow directed their aim at the civil government headquarters and



- 4 -

not at any military establishment. By the time this news got through the Japanese censors at Mukden and was published outside it was made to state just the reverse of what it originally said.

In cities all over the province airplanes are being used to drop down propaganda posters upon the population below. The main purport of these aerial leaflets seems to be (1) to execrate the Chinese officials, and (2) to assure the populace that the Japanese army has come for the good of the people, both Japanese and Chinese.

7. Japanese Strategy.

(1) To the World Japan tried at the outset to say that the Manchurian situation was purely a Sino-Japanese affair. Neither the League of Nations nor the Kellogg Pact signatories had anything to do with it.

(2) To Nanking Japan said that the Manchurian affair was a "purely local incident"; Nanking had nothing whatever to do with it. (3) To the people in Manchuria the Japanese military authorities have declared that under no circumstances would they treat either with Marshal Chang Hsueh Liang or with any other person who has been connected with the recent government of the three eastern provinces.

In the regulations published in connection with the reopening of the provincial banks on October 15 it was stated in one regulation that government funds in these banks would be kept sealed under the custody of the Japanese authorities until a new political "entity" has been established in the territory.

In this context it is easier to understand why on the afternoon of October 8, twelve Japanese military planes should visit Chinchow and drop 48 bombs upon the city. The meaning of this action is further clarified when the fact already mentioned is noted, that the attack was directed not at any military establishment but at the provisional headquarters of the Fengtien government. It is impossible to doubt that the intention of the Japanese military was to terrify and disorganize the last vestige of the old Fengtien government which had set itself up in the Railway College and Chinchow when flight from Mukden became necessary because of the Japanese occupation of that city.

It is, of course, a matter of common conjecture, both in Manchuria and abroad, that Japan's programme in Manchuria calls for steps analogous to those which she took in the absorption of Korea. (1) The first step is to set up a puppet government. (2) Over this government Japan will extend a protectorate. (3) The final step will come when Japan finds it "necessary in order to maintain peace and order to annex the whole territory as part of the Japanese Empire."

Japanese military leaders are trying feverishly to find someone of sufficient respectability to make him acceptable to the people as bogus ruler. Hsien Tung, the Manchu boy emperor, Chang Shung Chang, the ex-bandit-governor of Shantung, Mr. Yuan Chin Kai, the General Kan Tsao Hsi are among those whom the Japanese have either considered or have actually tried to bring forward as candidates.



- 5 -

Failing to find a man competent to serve their purposes as puppet ruler of the whole of Southern Manchuria, the Japanese military leaders next turned to a compromise programme of setting up a number of local independence governments with heads chosen by the Japanese themselves. This process was going on during the time that we were in the northeast.

Meanwhile reports indicated that efforts were being made by the Japanese military to alienate Chinese authority from Inner Mongolia preparatory to the placing of that territory also under Japanese suzerainty.

Unfortunately there are, we were told, a considerable number of unscrupulous Chinese and Manchu adventurers who are quite willing to play into the hands of the Japanese military. Japan, however, is slow to put up a man who does not have some semblance of respectability with which to commend him to the public.

It seems quite likely that, unless checked in their programme of setting up puppet governments, the Japanese military will raise a cry of Manchuria for the Manchus. Since there is no sentiment whatever among the population to support this cry, it would be put forth for purposes of consumption abroad rather than in Manchuria itself.

8. What if Japan withdraws?

One found it difficult to escape an impression that the Japanese military are doing their utmost to create a situation in which it would be unsafe for the Japanese army of occupation suddenly to withdraw. Civil organs of administration have been completely disorganised, large numbers of Chinese troops have been sent roaming over the country side, armed but unfed and without their winter clothing. The responsible citizenry of the territory under a reign of fear has been drained off to other parts of China within the Great Wall.

I found neutral observers who said something like this: "Yes, Japan wrongfully precipitated the present situation. However true that may be, we now face a situation in which it would be quite unsafe for Japanese troops suddenly to withdraw."

I was impressed by the thoroughness with which Japan made ready to occupy Manchuria when the time came for her to move. It seems to me extremely important that the Chinese authorities in Peiping or Nanking, or in both places, exert themselves at once to make the completest possible preparations for the re-occupation of Manchuria upon the withdrawal of the Japanese troops. These preparations should include provision not only for the policing of the cities, but for the suppression of bandits in the country, the restoration of civil organs of administration, the resumption of communications, and the maintenance of the currency which already is on a very unstable and insecure basis.

9. Japanese Attitude toward the League of Nations and America.

The tone of all Japanese propaganda with which we came in contact in Manchuria was nothing short of belligerent in its attitude toward the League of Nations and toward America.



- 6 -

The propagandists seem to be particularly on their guard against America. The Portsmouth Treaty, the John Hay Open Door Policy, the Knox Proposals for the Neutralisation of Railways in Manchuria, and the Washington Conference which checked Japan's assault on Chinese sovereignty as contained in the Twenty-One Demands of 1915 -- these are doubtless some of the factors in the background of Japan's attitude toward America in the present crisis.

10. Conflicting Assumptions.

In appealing to world <sup>such</sup> opinion in connection with the Manchurian crisis China bases her case upon documents as the Open Door Policy (embodied in various international agreements), the League of Nations Pact, the Washington Conference Pact and the Kellogg Pact. Japan on the other hand, makes her appeal on the basis of what she euphoniously calls the Treaty of 1915 (denounced by the Chinese as the infamous Twenty-One demands, forced by duress on a corrupt and promptly repudiated Chinese government), and on such ambiguous understandings as that contained in the Lansing-Ishii Agreement. References are also made to Japan's "Monroe Doctrine" and its application to the present crisis in Manchuria.

11. Reactions of Foreigners.

Neutrals whom I met in Manchuria and in North China were in general sympathetic with China so far as the present crisis is concerned. This does not mean that some of them do not feel that Japan has real grievances against China. A few indeed seemed to have hoped at the outset that Japan might "spank" China and thus check China's insistence upon the early revision of the unequal treaties. Even these felt, however, that Japan's punishment was already far in excess of the provocation, and that the Japanese military had gotten dangerously out of hand.

The fact that Manchuria has been recognised over and over again as Chinese territory, that its population is and always will be overwhelmingly Chinese, that a Japanese over-lordship in Manchuria would doubtless result in a closed door against legitimate economic competition with other countries than Japan -- these are probably some of the elements which enter into the attitude of the resident neutrals toward the present situation.

12. The Spirit of Japanese Residents.

It is difficult to define so intangible a thing as the spirit of people. However, in railway coaches and stations, in such places of assembly as the Yamato in Mukden, and wherever one met Japanese in the occupied area, one seemed to sense a spirit of elation and high adventure. This was undoubtedly being worked up by those in authority. ✓

Excursions of Japanese school children in Kirin were being taken to witness target practice and army manoeuvres and to visit the arsenal taken over by the Japanese.

In Changchun one could buy any number of photographs portraying Japanese "victories" and military activities both in Changchun and in nearby cities.



- 7 -

Our second visit to Mukden fell on October 18, just one month after the incident of September 18. We were told that extra busses had been brought into the city from Dairen to accommodate excursion parties taken out to see the place where the whole trouble had "started". I saw one of these busses crowded with excursionists leaving the Yamato Hotel. (Non-Japanese were still being allowed on the spot only under very careful guidance and surveillance). In the army headquarters in Mukden there was an exhibit showing the injured sleeper and rail alleged to have been damaged by the explosion of September 18 and large quantities of books, pamphlets and posters alleged to be anti-Japanese Chinese propaganda.

13. Reactions of Chinese.

a. Militarism.

One unmistakable reaction of China toward the Manchurian crisis has been the militarisation of the minds of the people. I have found this true among sober mature Chinese - educators, merchants, bankers and Christian workers - as well as among members of the younger student element. The feeling is that after all might is the only voice which can make itself heard in international misunderstandings and conflicts. If the League of Nations and the Kellogg Pact signatories fail to check Japanese military aggression in Manchuria in connection with the present crisis, one is convinced that this militarisation of Chinese sentiment will be intensified and made permanent.

In my conversations with Chinese I have taken a position somewhat as follows:

(a) China is by no means prepared to risk a military contest with Japan. Military preparedness is a matter not less of financial, political and educational organisation and of communications than of enlisting, training and equipping an army and navy. Eventually China with its vast resources can build up a military machine, but for some time to come it will be impossible for her to overtake Japan in military preparedness.

(b) Even if China were prepared to meet Japan in a military contest, it is not likely that the Manchurian <sup>issue</sup> could be satisfactorily settled by force. The machine age has rendered war so utterly destructive that both victors and vanquished are sure to lose in any armed conflict. The present economic consequences of the Great War bear evidence that this is true. Moreover, there are indubitably conflicting interests inherent in the Manchurian situation. Patient negotiation, the establishment of organs for peaceable consultation, and the use of intelligence as well as of Good-will are the things most needed in dealing with the Manchurian situation. Military action on either side represents a negation of these indispensable conditions for a progressive and permanent solution of Manchurian problems.

(c) China has two resources in connection with the Manchurian crisis. One is the mobilisation of the moral judgment of the world. Thanks to the League of Nations and to friendly powers, considerable progress in this direction has already been made. If sanctions are required to supplement the force of world opinion there remains the economic weapon. This weapon may now be regarded as the weapon of the weak, but China may help to prove that under present world conditions it is also the weapon of the wise.



- 8 -

In spite of repeated conversations in which the above point of view was presented, I found that I made little progress in getting this position accepted by Chinese with whom I talked. One feels that a decisive victory of the League of Nations in the present crisis is necessary if this militarisation of the minds of a people constituting one-fourth of the world's population is not checked.

b. Penitence.

I found in Manchuria and in North China a spirit which can be described in the language of religion as a spirit of national and in many cases personal repentance. This does not mean that there is not deep resentment and hatred for Japan. I believe that the feelings of China in so far as I have sensed them go deeper in this regard than they have at any time of national crisis through which I have passed during the past 21 years. At the same time, there has appeared an unmistakable disposition to acknowledge the responsibility of China herself both on the part of her officials and of the people.

"Our problem", said Dr. Cheng Po-ling, "is internal, not external. Our officials are corrupt and selfish. We are spending millions on killing ourselves. Our future is greater than that of Japan. We can afford to be patient and to take our medicine. We must face reality. We must depend upon ourselves. We must build up our industries and our army not to fight each other but to defend ourselves. I remind myself and my students continually of two guiding principles: (1) We must not allow ourselves to become decadent, corrupt, easy-going or lazy; (2) We must not allow ourselves to be selfish".

Dr. Chang is one of many who have spoken to us in this vein, saying that if the present extreme crisis in Manchuria can stab China awake, we may some day thank the Japanese military for their unwarranted aggression upon us at this time.

c. Turn toward Russia and Communism.

Another unmistakable reaction to the present crisis in Manchuria has been a turning toward a new alliance with Russia and if necessary to Communism as well.

14. The Turning toward Russia and Communism.

Within a few days after the outbreak in Manchuria one sensed in Shanghai a spontaneous and growing sentiment in favour of a Russian alliance even at the cost of Communism. I am now prepared to say that this development is to be found from Shanghai to Harbin and that bankers, merchants and responsible educators are included among those who are thinking in these terms. One naturally asks why this should be in view of China's recent misadventures with Soviet Russia (in 1924-28 and in connection with the Chinese Eastern Railway incident in 1929). I would summarize the situation somewhat as follows:

- a. An Alliance with Russia would represent for many a measure of desperation. Some would put it as follows: We are unable to cope with Japan ourselves. For various reasons we cannot reply upon the League of Nations or upon



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friendly power: like America. Our only recourse is to join forces with Soviet Russia.

One banker in Mukden said to me, "We would prefer an alliance with Soviet Russia rather than to be subjects of Japan". "Perhaps", I suggested, "that is not the alternative. The alternative may be that of becoming subjects of Japan or subjects of Russia". Quick as a flash he replied, "We would prefer being subjects of Russia rather than of Japan". He then added that China would eventually find it easier to work out a relationship with Russia upon a basis of self-respect than with Japan. "When a man becomes desperate", he said, (quoting a Chinese proverb) "he is willing to go to any kind of a doctor". Quoting another proverb, he said, "A man will drink poison rather than die of thirst".

A similar point of view was expressed to me by two business men in Harbin nationally known for their large and successful enterprises in the northeast. "When a dog is being chased", one of them said (quoting a Chinese proverb), "he will jump over the wall regardless of unseen dangers which may lurk on the other side. When a man is desperate, he will even hang himself".

In this psychology of desperation one senses on the part of some a feeling like this: Even if Communism produces chaos, we prefer chaos to Japanese rule. If the Japanese come in and take over our territory we shall see to it that the territory they take is made as unprofitable to them as possible. The point of view is somewhat like that of Moscow when Napoleon was about to enter the city, when the people destroyed it by fire so that the conqueror would have no spoils to reward him for his conquest.

- b. There is also a more constructive view. There is a good deal of talk in which the constructive elements in the Russian revolution are recognised. Admiration is particularly expressed for the personal lives of stern simplicity and of hard work manifested by the leaders in Soviet Russia. The thoroughgoing measures employed by the Soviet government to revolutionise the whole life of the people is also discussed in contrast with the more compromising and ineffective measure so far employed by any of the government of China.
- c. One hears the conviction expressed that China after all should be able to accept the strong points in Soviet Russia without taking on their evil concomitants. I have heard it vigorously contended that China will be able to adopt such features of the Russian revolution as the employment of simple-living and hard-working officials, the development of concrete plans for the transformation of the life of the nation, and the development of the resources of the country in the interests of the people as a whole rather than of the favoured few, without also adopting the ruthless methods of violence, suppression and tyranny with which Soviet Russia has furthered these ends. One hears suggestions of the desirability of China's bringing over from Russia men like Borodin who, out of the experiences through which Russia has already passed, will be able to help China organise and put into effect her own revolutionary programme.



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On the other hand, I have heard within the past few weeks the opinion expressed that the Chinese government should invite men of outstanding ability and experience, not from Russia but from a number of other more modernised countries, and should give them a considerable measure of executive freedom in organising the basic enterprises in the life of China. If the League of Nations and internal pressure in Japan succeed in checking the Japanese military in their present adventure in Manchuria, it seems to me quite possible that the calling and employment of such men (nominated perhaps by the League of Nations) will be undertaken. If, on the other hand, China's hopes in the League and the Kellogg Pact signatories are defeated, it is altogether likely that China will turn at once to Moscow for her "experts" and their particular kinds of technique.

15. What next?

I have tried in the above paragraphs to be as objective and fairminded as possible. It must be evident, however, that my own conviction is that in the interest of justice and of the present and future peace of the world, the League of Nations and America should exert themselves to the utmost in bringing moral and if necessary economic pressure to bear upon Japan to desist from her present military occupation of Manchuria.

At the same time I come back sharing the conviction which I have heard expressed by very many Chinese, that the hour has struck for China to take far more decisive measures than she has ever done to set her own house in order.

1. One hopes sincerely that a truly national government can be welded at this time into effective unity. This would seem to involve the formation of what might be termed a coalition government. Surely all of the talents and experience available in China should be mobilised. One welcomes therefore indications that not only Nanking and Canton may be reunited, but that such leaders as Feng Yu-hsiang, Wu Pei-fu, the Kwangsi group and others may be utilised.

2. Somehow the intelligent and responsible public opinion of the country should be mobilised to support and also to supervise the government that is set up. One wonders whether the outstanding non-political intellectuals of the country in cooperation with such responsible bodies as chambers of commerce, bankers associations and educational associations, cannot unite in presenting concrete proposals to their government and at the same time afford more continuous and effective means of holding them to account for all their actions.

Such a group or groups (and it seems to me that they should head up in some sort of national organisation) would have to be either free of censorship or fearless of a censorship should the government try to impose it. In other lands men have gladly gone to prison in times of less crisis than that which now confronts China rather than remain silent on issues which they have regarded as crucial. If the intellectuals can work in close cooperation with such bodies as those mentioned above, it would also be possible for this organ (or these organs) of public opinion to employ economic pressure when necessary upon the government itself.



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There would be values which can by no means be dispensed with in having unfettered organs of public opinion thus supervising and directing the government until such time as a constitution can be adopted and an electorate set up. The strength of such a body or bodies would lie largely in the fact that their members are free from any desire for holding office themselves.

3. So far as the Manchurian crisis is concerned, one feels that a well-organised and efficient intelligence service should be conducted so as to keep accurate and complete records of events and conditions in the occupied area. Facts gathered should be primarily regarded as facts for guidance in rational policies and programme making rather than facts for publicity purposes either at home or abroad. This does not mean, of course, that the facts could not be used in part for such publicity ends.

4. One feels finally that it is highly important that the Chinese government prepare immediately thoroughgoing plans for the reoccupation of Manchuria upon the withdrawal of the Japanese army of occupation. China may well follow in this respect Japan's example in her occupation of Manchuria. When Japan acted at 10.30 p.m. on September 18 she was ready to move on a wide scale and in a most efficient manner. Plans approximating those of Japan in thoroughness should be in readiness for the reoccupation of the territory on or before November 16. These plans, of course, would have to include provision for the resumption of normal civil administration, for the policing of cities and railways, for dispersing the bandits now loose in the territory, for stabilising the currency and for re-starting as far as possible all of the agencies and activities of normal existence.

October 25, 1931.



Not for Publication

ANNEX II.

Confidential.

Report of Visit to Manchuria, October 9-23, 1931.

Eugene E. Barnett  
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I.

On my arrival from America in Shanghai on September 15th I found the attention of the country absorbed in the flood disaster which, during the summer, had inundated an area larger than England, and in measures for relief of the 30 or 40 million people in the affected territory. Three days later, however, "the Manchurian incident" was precipitated in Mukden and immediately the attention of the country was deflected almost entirely to the situation in the northeast. Communications between Manchuria and that part of China which lies south of the Great Wall were so seriously interrupted that the national staff requested me, in company with Hubert Liang, to make a hurried visit to the area, calling on as many of the Y.M.C.A.'s in it as possible. In view of the grave possibilities wrapped up in the situation, I was glad to accept this commission.

We left Shanghai Friday morning, October 9th, reaching Tientsin early Sunday morning, October 11th. During the day we had occasion to confer at length with Sherwood Eddy and to hear his account of happenings as he had observed them at the time of the incident itself and in a subsequent visit to Mukden following a visit in Korea. During the day Eddy prepared a number of cablegram giving his testimony as an eye witness of events which were transmitted that night to Washington, New York, London and Geneva. We had the privilege of a visit of an hour and a half with Dr. Chang Po-ling at Nankai University, and of conference with other Chinese leaders who were deeply concerned over the situation. We left at midnight on the Peking-Mukden Line for our journey into the northeast.

II.

Early next morning, at 6:30, I awoke to find that we were in Shan-haikwan, where the Japanese maintain a small garrison. A detachment of 38 Japanese soldiers, fully armed and wearing steel helmets, got off the train, taking with them four machine guns, 40 cases of ammunition and large quantities of army biscuits. The chief of the railway police on the train informed us that 20 other Japanese got off at the same time dressed in Chinese clothes.

In addition to the 38 Japanese soldiers who disembarked at Shan-haikwan there was a second detachment of 40 men on board as far as Kao Chia Chwang.

III.

A little after noon we reached Chinchow, for centuries an important military post, and at present the seat of the provisional government



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for Fengtien Province, driven out at the time of the occupation of Mukden by Japanese troops. We had telegraphed to the local staff of the Y.M.C.A., asking them to meet us at the station. It happened that Dr. Robert E. Lewis, American Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Nanking, accompanied by Colonel J.L. Huang, was also on board our train. Word of their coming had been communicated to the Provisional Government headquarters. Delegations from the Y.M.C.A. and from the Provisional Government were therefore on the station platform on our arrival. The train was held up long enough for us to visit the headquarters located in the buildings of the Railway College nearby, where we saw the evidences of the aerial attack of October 8th and received first-hand accounts of the events of that day. These accounts were later confirmed by the testimony of various people, including a local missionary, and other visitors who had made special investigations following the bombing.

In brief, twelve Japanese planes had visited Chinchow between 2 and 3 o'clock on October 8th, coming from the direction of Yingkou. The planes flew for 30 or 35 minutes over the city dropping 48 bombs. Several of these bombs were directed at the Provisional headquarters where there were also indications of what appeared to us, as non-technical observers, to be machine gun fire from the low flying planes. Two men, including a Russian Professor, were killed in the Provisional headquarters. This Russian, we later learned in Harbin, had been a secretary of the Russian Y.M.C.A. in that city and had moved to Chinchow within the preceding two months for his new work there. In all, 19 persons were reported to us as having been killed in this unprovoked aerial attack upon Chinchow. The fact that the bombs were directed at the Provisional Government headquarters, the railroad yards, and upon the city itself rather than upon any military establishments in the vicinity, inevitably suggests that the attack was intended to disorganize and disperse the last remnant of the existing Chinese government of the three eastern provinces remaining in the area.

I was informed by Mr. Yoh, a secretary of the Chinchow Y.M.C.A. and later by others, that upon the outbreak of the trouble in Mukden the Chinchow magistrate had called a meeting of representative leaders of the city, in which it was agreed that full protection should be extended to the more than 100 Japanese residents in the city. When later the Japanese authorities decided to evacuate these nationals from Chinchow, the transaction was accomplished in the best of spirits and the Japanese authorities wrote thanking the magistrate for his cooperation in the whole affair. This evacuation of Japanese subjects from Chinchow occurred thirteen days before the bombing took place.

On October 10th a Japanese plane, flying over Chinchow, dropped propaganda leaflets upon the city, a copy of which I secured. The substance of this leaflet was as follows: "The old militarists of the North-eastern Provinces, full of wild ambitions, are now hiding at Chinchow. Their presence is a menace to peace and order. They are gathered together to conspire to fleece the people and to stir up the bandits against them. They are assembling the scattered remnants of defeated troops in order to attack Japanese troops. Their effort in this direction may be compared to an attempt to stop the progress of a wheeled cart with the arm of a grasshopper. It is



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necessary for Japan to uproot these troublous elements. We shall in no wise injure the people but seek only to secure protection both for Japanese residents and for the Chinese population".

On leaving Chinchow, Dr. Lewis, Colonel Huang, Hubert Liang and I went into the diner for lunch. As we neared the end of the meal my attention for some reason was caught by a man sitting across the aisle from us dressed in a long Chinese gown and a small silk jacket (or ma kwar) over it. Something in his appearance and manner convinced me that he was a Japanese plain clothes man. After observing him carefully, we all agreed that he was a Japanese, and our surmise was confirmed when Mr. Liang stepped over and exchanged a few words with him. He was by no means the last gentleman of this fraternity whom we were to meet.

At Ta Hu Shan we passed the southbound train for Mukden which we learned later was divided at this point into two sections. Ta Hu Shan is situated about half way between Chinchow and Mukden. Shortly after we passed by, the first section of the southbound train proceeding southward was held up by bandits who relieved the passengers of whatever possessions they desired. Fortunately, or unfortunately, the first section consisted entirely of third-class coaches. The second section, which followed 20 minutes later, would have contained much more booty but the bandits evidently did not know of its coming.

T.Z. Koo was a passenger on the second section. In the adjoining compartment he tells me was a Mongolian prince who, with his large family and retinue of dependents, was fleeing from the occupied area. This prince has a residence in Mukden which on the morning of September 19th was placed under guard by Japanese soldiers. The Japanese, he stated, tried to coerce him into signing away his rights to large holdings in Inner Mongolia. On being refused, they doubled and then trebled the guard placed over his house. Later he was able to escape in the garb of a coolie and had to make his way to the home of a missionary. As stated above, he was on his way to safety when his section of the train so narrowly escaped being rifled by bandits.

This may be as appropriate a point as any to record the fact told me by a British employe of the Peking-Mukden Line two days later in Mukden, that this hold-up, which took place on October 12th, was the fifth which had taken place on the line between Mukden and Peiping since the occupation of Mukden by the Japanese on September 18-19. Moreover, one train filled to overflowing with refugees fleeing from Mukden had been bombed from the air by a Japanese plane. A well-known Scottish missionary was on the train when this took place and has described the incident to his friends in Mukden, one of whom, an Irish missionary, related the story to me.

About nightfall we passed through the city of Hsin Min Tun, once the railhead of a railway line connecting with Mukden, held, following the Russo-Japanese war by Japan, but later transferred to China and incorporated as part of the Peking-Mukden line, a section of the Chinese Government Railways. A few miles northeast of the city is a Japanese garrison located at a place called Gyi Liu Ho. Here the train stopped and was boarded by



Japanese soldiers who passed through the coaches from one end of the train to the other. The impression grew that we were in "occupied territory".

On leaving Tientsin we had been informed that the Peking-Mukden trains were not entering the city of Mukden. Following the outbreak of trouble the Japanese military had removed that section of the track which passes under the South Manchurian Railway Line at Mukden. Northbound trains, therefore, stopped at the station called Huang Ku Tun, 13 li (6 miles) from Mukden. We reached this lonely station at 10 p.m. The station was deserted except by men employed in the station and in the nearby roundhouse and by a detachment of Japanese soldiers who occupied one end of the station. The station master came on board and handed me a note from Mr. D.F. Myers, whom I had wired in advance of my coming. In this note Mr. Myers warned me that it would be quite unsafe to enter the city at night on account of unruly elements which were abroad and armed clashed between them and the police which were nightly occurrences. The road from Huang Ku Tun into the city he regarded as particularly unsafe because it passed through a large colony of Korean residents.

Fortunately we were able to arrange with the trainmen to have our beds made up for another night and at 10:30 we turned in. An hour later I was awakened by a bang on my door and a husky voice which demanded that we open up the compartment. I peeped through the curtain and the figure I saw was by no means reassuring. I decided, however, that I would not satisfy the curiosity of this unwelcome visitor until I had to. Some minutes later I was considerably relieved on going to the opposite side of the compartment and looking out the window to find that we were surrounded by long strings of cars. After we had fallen asleep, it was evident that we had been switched into the roundhouse and locked up for the night. My burly visitor was a mechanic who wished to examine the plumbing on our car before starting the train back south on its next trip.

#### IV.

Next morning Mr. D.F. Myers drove out to meet me and took me into the city. He did not seem at all abashed when he found there were four of us instead of one. We were soon to find that ever since the explosion on September 18-19 his home had been a place of refuge for many Chinese friends and a place of rendezvous for a number of important conferences between leading Chinese of the city and foreign visitors. Mr. Myers has been engaged in the establishment of a factory in what is known as the "Trench Mortar Arsenal" for the construction of automobile trucks. The enterprise was under the government of Liao Ning Province. He had already installed costly equipment from America and had turned out his first twelve completed trucks. His equipment and organization were complete, however, for securing an annual production of 265 trucks.

Mr. Myers I found had been a close observer of events from the beginning of the outbreak on the morning of September 19th and was very well informed of what was taking place. At my request he wrote an account of some of the most significant of these happenings. At this point it may be in order to quote from his statement one paragraph which related a typical instance with which he was directly and intimately concerned. This was the manner in which the establishment in which he was employed was taken over



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by Japanese troops on the night of September 18-19.

"Soon after daylight (on Sept. 19th) reports began to come to us of the 'occupation'. First from the trench mortar arsenal which was attacked soon after 1 a.m. From there came one of the two members of the staff who were 'on duty' that night. He reported that the place had been bombed with hand-grenades and a number of the men killed. There were several soldier guards in the guardhouse but they did not fire a shot. Those who were awake endeavoured to escape and were shot down at the gate. Later the other man who was on duty came in and reported more fully. He told of the bombing of the dormitory where about 100 of the workmen were sleeping. 30 or more of these were killed either by the bombs or by the bayonets of the Japanese soldiers who rushed in after the bombing. Many of these were killed in their beds. It has not even yet been possible to determine the actual number who were killed because a third wave of soldiers who entered the place carried shovels and buried many of the civilians."

Arriving at the home of Mr. Myers (who is now occupying the International Committee Y.M.C.A. residence), we found Mr. C.F. Wang, head of the Fengtien Mining Administration Bureau and president for many years of the Mukden Y.M.C.A., living with his wife and five children as refugees with the Myers family. When the Japanese occupied the city they proceeded at once to take over all the vital public organs and agencies in the city. Mr. Wang had moved out of his own home, taking with him vital documents, papers, and seals of the Mining Administration so as to escape coercive pressure from the Japanese military authorities and if possible to keep work going at the three centers in Fengtien Province, in which his mines are located.

From Mr. Wang we learned much about the general situation and trend of events. A word at this point, however, concerning his own personal experience must suffice. On entering the city the Japanese had taken over the important banking institutions of the city, particularly the provincial banks. From September 19th until October 15th these banks were sealed while the Japanese military made arrangements for re-opening them under their own control. Mr. Wang had been making desperate efforts to draw out funds belonging to the Mining Administration with which to pay wages to his 10,000 workers in the three mines. He had failed in this endeavour and so on the day of our arrival in Mukden, October 13th, he had found it necessary to close down one mine in Southern Manchuria, at Fuchow, turning off 4,000 men. Mr. Wang's estimate was that the closing down of this mine involved loss of employment for not less than 10,000 working men employed by the mine and auxiliary enterprises. A far more serious situation of course exists in Mukden itself, where in the Government arsenals alone not less than 20,000 wage earners have been suddenly turned out of work.

On the second day of our visit in Mukden, October 14th, Mr. C.F. Wang started to his office in company with Hubert Liang. Before getting there he was met by a member of his staff who told him that a Japanese deputation had just visited the office. After asking in vain for the manager and vice-manager of the administration they had proceeded to seal the doors of the establishment. Fearing more serious molestation and pressure



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from the Japanese military, Mr. Wang returned to Mr. Myers' house, made hurried arrangements with his wife and members of his staff, and left at 8:30 p.m. under an assumed name for Peiping via Dairen. Mrs. Wang remained for five days longer, completing as best she could various arrangements, and then she too left for Peiping with her five children, two servants and 35 trunks!

In Mukden we were busy from morning until night meeting various people, including D.F. Myers, and C.F. Wang mentioned above, K.P. Liu (Manager of the Manufacturers Bank of China), secretaries of the local Y.M.C.A., Yuen Chin Kai, chairman of the Emergency Committee set up to preserve order in the city, Mr. Shaw, Commissioner of Customs, U.S. Consul-General Meyers, U.S. Trade Commissioner Christoffsen, J.B. Powell, Chicago Tribune correspondent, Hunter, Consolidated Press correspondent, Chester Rowell, and other correspondents, Colonel Watari, official spokesman in giving the daily communiqués issued by the Japanese military authorities, Japanese Vice-Consul Murai, and others.

The general facts regarding the precipitation of the present situation in Manchuria are now fairly well known to the world. On the night of September 18th at 10:30 o'clock - shortly after the southbound train for Dairen had passed a bomb explosion occurred on the South Manchuria Railway line about 2 1/2 miles north of the South Manchuria station of Mukden. The explosion took place at a point almost directly opposite and within rifle shot range of the Pei Ta Yin or northern barracks where north-eastern army troops are incamped. The Japanese claim that Chinese soldiers from these barracks set the bomb, destroying one sleeper, (or cross tie, to use American terminology) and badly twisting one rail. Comment on the Chinese and Japanese versions of this story will not be discussed at this point. Suffice it to say that almost immediately after the bomb is alleged to have gone off Japanese soldiers were in action. The northern barracks and the city were bombarded with 6 inch guns and gun fire was in progress during most of the night.

By the following morning Mukden was in the hands of an army of occupation and so were four other cities in strategic points in South Manchuria: Yinkou, Liao Yang, Changchun and Antung. In Mukden Japanese flags flew from various government buildings, the telephone, telegraph and radio stations were in Japanese hands, Japanese proclamations were everywhere, and Japanese soldiers guarded the city gates and other vital points.

Numerous stories are in circulation as to killings, at the hands of Japanese soldiers, and as a result of clashes between Chinese police and Japanese gendarmes on the one hand and disorderly elements on the other. I had no means of checking up on these stories or on the figures given as to the number of persons killed.

It was easily seen, however, that normal life in the city had been brought to a standstill. Streets which on my visit one year earlier had been crowded with vehicles and pedestrians were almost deserted. Large numbers of shops - some estimated as many as 2/3 of all in the city - were closed. Some of them I was informed by Myers and others had not been reopened since September 19th. Important government banks were closed as



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they had been for nearly a month. The Chinese army had withdrawn from their positions in and about the city and were cut off from their supplies in Mukden and (I was told) without their winter uniforms. The Chinese officials, as far as they were able to do so, had escaped to the South. The chairman of the Provincial Government, the Commissioner of Education and the Commissioner of Industries, however, had been caught by Japanese troops and were being held in the city. The Commissioner of Industries, according to report, had been brought from Yinkou in chains. The Chinese with whom I talked were uncertain as to whether he was dead or alive at the time I was there. The city's population was drained under a regime of decisive military action by alien troops of most of its responsible citizenry. One heard it estimated on all sides that no less than 1/3 of the entire population of more than 400,000 people, had left. Railway officials stated that during the first five days after the occupation of the city by Japanese 80,000 people had left by the Peking-Mukden Line for safety within the Great Wall. ✓

The Chinese schools and colleges of Mukden are all closed except for one or two schools conducted by missionary institutions. While this interruption of the normal educational activities of the city is costly, the dispersion of the students and teachers doubtless makes further untoward incident less likely to occur during the period of occupation.

In passing back and forth several times through the city I was interested to see workmen feverishly engaged in planting new telephone poles throughout the city and stringing them with fresh wires. I was told by several absolutely reliable witnesses that this extension of Japanese telephone lines into the Chinese city began on September 19th, the day after "the Incident". In Changchun I found a similar activity going on. No one there seemed quite to understand what the significance of the move was, but at any rate new telephone poles and wires were being put up by the Japanese in the Chinese section.

The Assistant Postal Commissioner informed me of the presence at the Chinese Postoffice of a detachment of Japanese troops who censored all Chinese mail passing through the office. Letters are censored and no Chinese newspapers, I was told, from outside the occupied area are allowed to enter. The Assistant Postal Commissioner related one incident in which two letters addressed to a foreign country had been opened by the Japanese censors. The Chinese Postoffice authorities thereupon requested the Japanese military to stamp these letters indicating that they had censored them. Upon being refused by the Military, they took the matter to the Japanese Consulate, who referred it back to the military. It is impossible to say to what extent foreign mail matter is being censored. A telegram sent by me from Tientsin to the Mukden Y.M.C.A. on October 11th had not been delivered as late as October 14th, and several letters sent to me from Shanghai, care of the Mukden Y.M.C.A. likewise failed to reach me before my departure, although there was ample time for them to do so. ✓

On reaching Mukden we began to hear at once of the feverish efforts of the Japanese military, while trying completely to disorganize the existing government, to set up a puppet government or governments in its



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stead. Evidence seems to indicate that the Japanese military desired to set up an all-Manchurian independence government under Japanese protection. When, after some days, this effort proved unavailing, a modified program was undertaken in which local independence governments were stimulated in different cities. Chinese and neutral observers in Manchuria have no doubt that the intention of the Japanese military is to follow in Manchuria the procedure employed in absorbing Korea as part of the Japanese Empire. This procedure would call (1) for the establishment of an independent government detached from China, (2) the establishment of a Japanese protectorate over this "independent" government, and in due course (3) the annexation of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia as part of the Japanese Empire.

In company with one American and two Chinese friends, we had an interview lasting for an hour and a half with Mr. Yuen Chin Kai, one of the men whom the Japanese military have been trying to set up as independent ruler of Manchuria. Mr. C.F. Wang accompanied us in this interview (which took place in the home of a Danish missionary), and acted as out interpreter. Mr. Yuen is a Chinese scholar, 62 years of age. At one time he was governor of Hei Lung Kiang, and for a time he served as Commissioner of Finance of Fengtien Province. At the time of the outbreak on September 18-19 he served under Marshal Chang Hsueh Liang as vice-chairman of the Northeastern Political Committee.

In the course of our interview Mr. Yuen said in substance:

"The Japanese have urged me many times to head up a new government. I have told them I have no such wild ambitions, neither am I a traitor to my country.

"They have raised the question of whether Chang Chung Chang would not be acceptable as ruler of Manchuria. I have told them that Chang Chung Chang is my friend, but that the people of Manchuria will never accept him. They will utterly reject Japanese professions of friendship for China if Japan sets up as their ruler a man whom the Chinese hate as they do Chang Chung Chang.

"The Japanese have also asked whether I thought General Kan Tsao Hsi would be acceptable. I have told them that I do not know whether Kan Tsao Hsi could undertake the responsibility or whether he would be willing to attempt it.

"Meanwhile they came back to me again and again, urging me to accept the headship of the new government. I have consented simply to serve on this emergency committee, trying in the interests of the people to hold things together and preserve the peace. I am in the position of a family teacher in a home from which the master has gone away. I am taking only temporary charge of things until the master returns.

"I have suggested Chang Hsueh Liang, Chang Hsi Yi, and Chang Tsoh Hsiang as the men from whom the head of the Manchurian government should be secured. They stated that they will never accept Chang Hsueh Liang or anyone belonging to his group.



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"Under no circumstances will I accept the headship of a Manchurian government. (Asked if a Nanking appointee approved by Chang Hsueh Liang, would be acceptable, Mr. Yuen continued) No, the Japanese declare that they will accept no one either from Nanking or from Chang Hsueh Liang's group. They feel that they cannot handle either one of these parties. They object to the young Marshal because of his desire to cooperate with Nanking, because he knows how to play with Russia, and because they fear his desire for revenge because of the death of his father at their hands three years ago.

"Japan is unwilling to treat with Nanking on any questions pertaining to Manchuria.

"The Japanese are now urging me to help them restore immediately the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Industries to a condition of normal functioning.

"I have told the Japanese, 'You may execute me but I will never set up an independent government'. They say, 'Of course you may refuse to organize a government and you can continue to carry on as head of the temporary maintenance committee. Consider, however, how much more freely you could carry on your work as head of an organized government'. They say 'When you have a new government we can withdraw. The situation in Manchuria is arousing all China. China will be driven to war, we will defeat your armies easily and then Manchuria will be lost completely to China'.

"Because of their failure to set up an all-Manchurian government the Japanese are now setting up local governments, using Chinese job seekers to head them up.

"The Japanese are informed that Mukden is full of secret service men sent here by Chang Hsueh Liang.

"The Japanese are bringing their continued pressure to bear upon me through journalists, members of the staff of the mayor (a Japanese) and leaders of the Japanese gendarmerie now in the city. Their approaches are indirect rather than through the direct overtures of the Consul or higher military authorities.

"It is already late for Nanking to send anyone here to organize a government. If, however, Nanking could reach a full understanding with Chang Hsueh Liang it would be well for them to send a man here for this purpose.

"Japan will keep on looking for a man to form a Manchurian government. If possible they will put up a government for the three eastern provinces. If this is impossible, they will establish a Fengtien government. Their purpose is to establish a new independent government. Their first step is to set up an independent government which will be followed by a Japanese protectorate. They want therefore a weak man at its head. They will accept no strong man sent by Nanking.



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"The Japanese here have no respect whatever for the League of Nations. They are paying no attention to it. They do not think that the League has anything to do with the situation in Manchuria.

"I told the Japanese that If I had wanted to be a high official I would have striven for this ambition long ago, I have no wild ambition to head a new government. I am no traitor. They have said, 'We will not treat you as we did Li Yuen Yung (the puppet king set up by the Japanese in Korea at the time Japan secured the "independence" of that country from China). Korea has been a loss to Japan'. I have told them, 'I am a scholar. You can defeat an army but you cannot win the heart of this scholar! They say, 'You are not a hero'. I have told them, 'I have no ambition to be one. I am a devout follower of Confucius and I shall follow his teachings to the end.'

"Japan is not afraid of China. They are not afraid of world opinion. Only foreign military intervention will check them. The Japanese military in Manchuria is independent of public opinion back at home."

I have summarized rather fully Mr. Yuen's part of our interview even at the cost of repeating some of the same ideas several times, so that something of the atmosphere of the interview and its emphases might be recorded.

Another indication of the strenuous efforts the Japanese military are making to disorganize existing governments in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia and to replace them with puppet governments of their own, is found in an incident which occurred in Mukden the day before our arrival. A Mongolian princess who, with her husband, has extensive holdings in Inner Mongolia, was in Mukden. She received a message saying that a certain Chinese friend was ill and wished to see her. On arriving at the place where this "friend" was supposed to be she found herself in the presence of a company of Japanese who sought to coerce her into signing papers transferring authority over this territory in Inner Mongolia to Japan. In spite of continued pressure, she insisted that she had no authority in the matter, being a mere woman (although it was well known that she rather than her husband is the dominant figure in the combination), and eventually she succeeded in making her escape from guards placed over her to the home of a foreign missionary in the city.

This story is only typical of numerous reports including stories of Japanese activity in arming Mongol forces to overthrow Chinese authority, in seeking to secure independent commitments from Mongolian princes, and in every way possible to extend during this time of disorder Japanese influence and if possible sovereignty in Inner Mongolia as well as in Southern Manchuria.

The turnover in Manchuria of September 18-19 found the Y.M.C.A. with \$30 in cash, \$60 in a bank from which it has been impossible to withdraw it, and \$700 in debt. Contributions in kind had been received from a number of firms and a big fair was announced to take place within a few days, with the proceeds of which it was hoped to secure \$3,000 or \$4,000, an amount sufficient



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to close the fiscal year. Under the new conditions, this fair of course became impossible. The General Secretary of the Y.M.C.A., Paul Yen, an influential leader in many civic enterprises and an intimate friend and adviser of Marshal Chang Hsueh Liang, found it necessary to leave the city without delay. After a few days Japanese soldiers visited the Y.M.C.A. building and conducted a thoroughgoing inspection of its books, files and so on. Without funds or staff leadership and with the stamp of Japanese suspicion upon it, the Y.M.C.A. has seen its work brought to a standstill. Japanese controlled newspapers have mentioned the Y.M.C.A. along with the Chamber of Commerce, Northeastern University and other institutions which had received support from Marshal Hsueh Liang as suspect institutions.

One effort of the Y.M.C.A. to render service in the disturbed situation following the Japanese occupation of the city is worth recording. Tens of thousands of workmen were abruptly thrown out of employment and large numbers of small tradesmen found themselves in sudden and dire need. The Y.M.C.A. got together a Sino-Japanese Christian group which busied itself with setting up relief measures. Going to the Japanese military authorities in control of the city they asked for food supplies which they themselves would undertake to distribute. The Japanese military authorities thereupon contributed a considerable quantity of army biscuits, suggesting that after the biscuits had been distributed the cases might be sold and the proceeds turned into a relief fund. They stated that truckage for the carrying of these supplies to points of distribution would have to be paid for by the relief committee. Relief measures undertaken on this basis were shortly brought to an abrupt standstill by two considerations. (1) On receiving the supplies furnished by the Japanese military, it was found that they were army biscuits taken from the stores of the Chinese army! (2) Moreover, the Japanese military sought to make capital of the relief work by preparing huge posters showing relief workers in front of the Y.M.C.A. building handing out to needy Chinese food supplies provided by the Japanese authorities.

V.

On Wednesday, October 14, at 9.30 p.m. Mr. Liang and I left Mukden for Changchun. We were fortunate in having as a travelling companion Mr. McWhirter of Kirin, an Irish Presbyterian Missionary who has lived in Kirin since 1908. Reaching Changchun on the following morning at 7.30 o'clock, we remained in the city until 2.30 in the afternoon. During this time we walked about the city both in the Japanese concession and in the Chinese section, received firsthand accounts from local missionaries of recent events and conditions, and had an extended conversation with the leading Chinese doctor of the city - a graduate of the Peking Union Medical College and president of the provisional board of the Changchun Y.M.C.A.

Changchun, connecting center for the South Manchuria Railway, the Chinese Eastern Railway and the Kirin-Changchun Railway, is one of the five strategic centers forceably occupied by Japanese troops on the night of September 18 - 19. I purchased in the Japanese concession pictures showing the destruction of Nanlin barracks of



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the Chinese army by Japanese troops on that night. It appears that the Chinese troops there encamped offered some resistance before retiring with their arms toward the southeast, killing between 40 and 70 Japanese soldiers, including several officers.

An engagement between Chinese and Japanese troops was also described to us which took place on the following day at the first station north of Changchun on the Chinese Eastern Railway, Er Tao Kou. Here it was said that a detachment of Japanese troops ordered the Chinese guard near the railway station to lay down their arms. Fifteen minutes, and then 30 minutes more were allowed for them to do this. The Chinese guard refused to the end to comply and in the engagement which followed several were killed.

As stated above, one of the first activities of the Japanese upon occupying Changchun was to extend their telephone system throughout the Chinese City. We saw the fresh poles in place and linesmen at work stretching the wires upon them while we were in the city.

The following day in Kirin I was informed by the building superintendent in charge of the construction of our new Y.M.C.A. building in that city (A Changchun contractor) that the Japanese were already at work rebuilding the barracks formerly occupied by Chinese troops at Nanlin. (The same informant told me that the Japanese were installing heating systems in their military headquarters at Kirin, established in the old Provincial Assembly and the Governor's Yamen buildings.)

The Chinese magistrate at Changchun was displaced soon after the Japanese occupation of the city by a Japanese speaking Chinese, with intimate Japanese connections, brought up from Dairen. This new puppet head of the city government travelled from Changchun to Kirin on the same train and in the same coach with us. A large company of cowed looking Chinese officials and a considerable number of smiling Japanese officers were at the station to give him a send-off as he started on his three hours' journey to the provincial capital at Kirin.

Irish missionaries told us that Chinese Christians in Changchun had expected for months something to happen. They did not know of course when, where or how the Japanese military would strike, but there was a prevailing feeling that Japan was about to make a decisive move of some kind. Similar statements were made to us by neutrals, as well as Chinese, in other cities.

Dr. Gordon, an Irish missionary who has lived in Changchun for 38 years, described vividly the situation in Changchun under Japanese occupation. He had no doubt that the present occupation in Manchuria is simply a step in the Japanese program of putting the Twenty-One Demands of 1915 into effect. He spoke of the effort made by the Japanese in connection with the Wan Pao Shan affair to precipitate the incident. He described the Japanese planes which were flying above the city every day dropping propaganda leaflets. He said that the people were "scared stiff". He hoped that the complacency of the people might be aroused by the present crisis.



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Our interview with the Chinese doctor mentioned above was interesting. After discussing at length the plans of the local Y.M.C.A., we asked if he would mind telling us about recent happenings in the city. Before replying he left the room and inspected adjoining rooms in the hospital to see whether any undesirable eavesdroppers were in the vicinity. Returning to the room he paused again before proceeding with the conversation and left the room returning with a curtain with which he covered the window of the room in which we sat. These precautions told a tale of their own even before the doctor related his story.

The doctor's story was in harmony with that which we had already secured from the Irish missionaries. He told us, however, in addition of certain acts of terrorism. Since he had been an eye witness to none of them we had no means of determining their authenticity. The fact that such stories, however, are commonly related and believed has the same effect in cowing and inflaming the Chinese population whether they are authentic or not.

One of these unconfirmed stories told of a small group of railway workers meeting near the railway station at Ka Lun near Changchun and addressed by one of their number. The story was that a Japanese plane seeing this gathering (proscribed of course under the military regime), dropped a bomb into the group killing several men.

Another unconfirmed story related by the doctor told of a Chinese who pulled down a Japanese proclamation from a wall in the city and was bayoneted by a Japanese soldier who happened to be at hand.

The doctor painted a picture of helpless bitterness on the part of the Chinese population. Utterly cut off from all communication with the outside world, without leadership and without the privilege of organized effort of any sort, they find themselves helpless in the hands of an army of occupation. Asked whether the people would, in his opinion, submit to a Japanese government once it had been set up, he spoke (as others in the northeast with whom I talked did) of the Japanese rule in Korea and of the sufferings and humiliation of that unhappy people as subjects of Japan.

#### VI.

At 2.30 we left Changchun for Kirin, arriving in the latter city at 5 o'clock. Just before crossing the Sungari River and entering the city our attention was called to a large tract of land (3000 square feet in area we were later informed) which the Japanese were having cleared off and put in order as a military air field. The Japanese began work on this project on October 3. Already they had cleared off the trees and vegetable gardens on the tract and had dug up a number of Chinese graves, serving notice upon the families to which these ancestral graves belonged to come and carry away the bones. It was reported in the city that those coming to claim the bones were charged for the labor expended in digging them up! I did not confirm this, however, by the first-hand testimony of any of those immediately concerned.



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In Kirin we interviewed W. W. Cline, American secretary of the Y.M.C.A., Dr. W. R. Sloane, an Irish physician who has followed events very closely, Mr. McWhirter, previously mentioned, other missionaries and several Chinese whose competence as observers and <sup>whose</sup> integrity I trust completely. One of the Chinese interviewed, a scientifically trained returned student from America and head of an important institution in Kirin, has collaborated from the beginning of the present trouble with a small group of six men who have made careful observations day by day of just what has happened and have preserved a record of their observations. I have copies of statements based upon their report, one 2 1/2 typewritten pages and the other 14 pages in length. I shall limit myself, however, to oral (and on the whole supplementary) reports given us by this friend and others interviewed.

En route to Kirin and back again, and while in the city, we were constantly reminded of the fact that we were surrounded by an army of occupation. The Japanese forces employed are limited in number but they are to be seen at practically every station with their sand bag redoubts, and in Kirin itself Japanese military planes overhead, Japanese military units stationed here and there, daily gun practice on the banks of the Sungari River, a large number of field guns in front of the Japanese Consulate, Japanese military officers and men moving about the city on foot, horseback and motorcycle - these are some of the evidences of occupation referred to.

Kirin is under the nominal control of a puppet Chinese (or rather Manchu) head. This puppet ruler is Hsi Chia, formerly chief of staff under Chang Tsoh Hsiang, military governor of Kirin. Competent Chinese informants believe that Hsi Chia was pressed rather reluctantly at the outset into his present position, but that now he is cooperating more than willingly with Japan in an effort to establish an independence government.

Hsi Chia, I learned, was some years ago employed by General Chang Tsoh Hsiang as a personal teacher (Chang Tsoh Hsiang, several told me, is a very uneducated man). A warm personal friendship grew out of this relationship so that when Chang Tsoh Hsiang became the governor of Kirin Province he appointed Hsi Chia as chief of staff in his army. Both in Kirin and in other centers in Manchuria Hsi Chia was described to me as a man of no personal character or integrity at all. The fact that he is a Manchurian makes him a likely tool in the hands of the Japanese military who have shown their inclination to establish independence governments, in some cases under the cry of Manchuria for the Manchus.

The story told in Kirin is that Hsi Chia was forced to accept his present position as head of an independence government at the point of Japanese guns. I talked with one eye witness who was present at his formal inauguration. On that occasion all of the Chinese officials of all ranks were brought together and a goodly company of Japanese military men were also present. Before taking up the seal of office from the table before him, Hsi Chia made a brief address in which he said. "I am taking this step under pressure". Three photographs were then taken, one of the Chinese military band, one of Hsi Chia, standing with a Japanese colonel on one side and a



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Japanese general on the other, and the third of Hsi Chia and his two Japanese attendants with a large company of Chinese officials in the background.

We were told that Hsi Chia is never allowed out of the presence of Japanese attendants either in his office, or at his home, or in his movements about the city. For several days, when he travelled between his home and office, Japanese guards stood on the running boards of his automobile with pistols in hand.

A deputation sent by the British Minister in Peiping and consisting of Mr. C.N. Stirling (Secretary of H.B.M. Legation), Mr. R.H. Scott (of H.B.M. Consular Service) and Captain F.H.A. Stables, were in Kirin on the day preceding my arrival. On reaching Kirin they were met by representatives of the local Japanese military regime who offered them the use of a Japanese motorcar, accommodations in the Yamato Hotel and the services of a Japanese escort. The commission politely declined all three proffers. In the course of their visit they called on Hsi Chia. On arriving at his headquarters they found a half dozen or so Japanese attendants in the room. Mr. Scott stated bluntly that they wished to have a private interview with Hsi Chia. Thereupon all of the Japanese present withdrew - except two. These two remained throughout the interview, careful notes of which were taken as it proceeded.

Dr. Sloane told of the visit of these three men at the Irish Presbyterian compound. They remained there for several hours, including the noon hour. During the entire time a Japanese dressed in Chinese clothes passed and repassed the main entrance of the compound in a ricksha.

Kirin was taken over by the Japanese on September 21, two days after the occupation of the first five cities taken. The report carefully prepared by the group of local residents mentioned above gives a full account of happenings until October 10. The Japanese military authorities issued proclamations stating that from October 11 to October 17 there would be gun practice and army manoeuvres from 9 to 12 each morning and from 1 to 3 each afternoon. This practice took place on the north bank of the Sungari River with the old arsenal on the south bank as its target, and was still in progress on October 16 when we were in the city. Dr Sloane visited the place a day or so before we got there and described to us what he saw. Several platoons of Japanese troops were drawn up in order, with a company of perhaps 150 Japanese school children drawn up nearby, all of them watching squads of soldiers nearer the bank of the river practicing the throwing of hand grenades. Later in the day Dr. Sloane visited the new arsenal (Chinese of course). Passing the Japanese sentries at the entrance he went inside, where he found companies of Chinese children being shown the sights. These two incidents might be supplemented by others showing the "war spirit" among Japanese residents of Manchuria and deliberate efforts on the part of the Japanese military to work up such a spirit.

Japanese squads had been making frequent visits to the schools of the city. The principal of a school having an enrolment



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of 1000 students told of these visits upon his own and other schools. All schools were required to turn over all books dealing with Manchurian questions or related in any way to the teachings of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. My informant had been told by the squad visiting his school to turn over all such books. He refused to do so, telling them they might take whatever books they thought fell under their ban. They spotted only 10 books of this character which they carried away. In Kirin University he said they had carried off 100 books.

According to this same informant the Japanese military authorities had also sealed up all bookstores in the city until they could find time to go through the shelves and see what books were on sale.

My informant stated that the principal of the girls' normal school had told him that his school had been visited often by Japanese squads and that on Saturday, October 10 at 8 p.m. Japanese soldiers had entered the girls' dormitory, had lain down on the beds and in various ways acted in such a manner as to give a bad fright to the girls. The principal of the school was away at the time. Servants went out and found him and he hurried back, remonstrating in Japanese, which he himself speaks, with the soldiers and asking them to leave. Next day all of the girls in the dormitory left.

During the day that we were in Kirin Japanese military planes zoomed above the city. This we were told was a daily occurrence. From time to time these planes drop propaganda leaflets from the sky assuring the people that the army is occupying the city for the good of the people, declaring undying opposition to the corrupt officials who have brought suffering to Japanese and Chinese residents alike, and declaring that anyone opposing the Japanese army of occupation would be appropriately dealt with. One of these posters purported to be a statement issued by the Educational Association, the Agricultural Association, the Lawyers Association and the Merchants Association of Mukden, in which these organizations are represented as expressing satisfaction with conditions in Mukden under the protection of the Japanese military.

Department heads in the independence government at Kirin are being displaced by new men. I took pains to find out something about some of the new appointees. It would appear that they are appointed because of previous affiliations with the Japanese and in some, if not all, cases because of their willingness to serve as tools of Japan in order to satisfy their own personal ambition and cupidity.

Several instances of outrages suffered by Chinese at the hands of the Japanese military were related to me. For example, on October 14 a Chinese policeman was reported to have saluted two Japanese soldiers, failing however to step aside for them to pass. He was promptly reported to the branch police office (No. 3) as having obstructed military action. Other Japanese soldiers came and took away his gun. When he tried to take it back the soldiers went to his police station, asking the man in charge why his subordinates were not better trained. The unfortunate policeman was brought before his chief and forced to sign a paper confessing his fault in the mat-



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ter and promising not to do it again. This story was told by the head of the police station to one of the six men in the group referred to above as gathering information of happenings day by day.

Two other incidents were reported to me as follows. On Saturday-Sunday night October 10-11 Japanese troops made a thorough-going search of inns and kindred establishments throughout the city. In the course of this investigation two men were killed. In one case a man, proprietor of a restaurant, was awakened in his home by the inspection party. While dressing he reached for his shoes and the Japanese soldiers apparently thinking that he was reaching for a weapon, shot and killed him. The second case was very similar. A man in a hotel was awakened, in bed. While dressing he reached behind for his belt and the Japanese soldiers thinking he was reaching for a weapon, shot and killed him.

In connection with this all-night search the Y.M.C.A. building was entered and certain papers taken away. Cline, the American secretary, went at once to see Vice-Consul Toda, who conducted him in to see the Consul, Mr. Ishii. Consul Ishii claimed not to know anything about the matter and promised to inquire. He stated, however, that a general search had been made during the night in question of all inns and similar establishments. From the Y.M.C.A. there were taken away a picture of a boys' department group, a statement issued by the Peiping Y.M.C.A. and Y.W.C.A. concerning the present Manchurian crisis, and a copy of a mimeographed letter from the Kirin Y.M.C.A. to other Y.M.C.A.'s in China, telling of happenings in connection with the Japanese occupation of the city. Cline was later called back by Consul Ishii, who expressed regret that the Y.M.C.A. had been troubled, stating that he did not know that an American secretary was related to the institution, urging that care be taken not to allow the Y.M.C.A. to become a center for anti-Japanese activity, and reserving still the right of entrance and search in the Y.M.C.A. building as occasion might arise for it. Upon receiving a notice from the Japanese Consulate requesting all foreign institutions to exhibit for purpose of identification and protection their respective national flags, the Y.M.C.A. (a purely Chinese organization) replied by stating that the Y.M.C.A. would thenceforth fly the Red Triangle, the Y.M.C.A. flag in international use.

On October 15, the day before my arrival in Kirin, a party of six Japanese visited the Irish Presbyterian hospital. They expressed great interest in the institution and made a very thorough visit of its various departments. After getting out of the front door the Chinese doctor and nurses, together with an Irish lady doctor and nurse (Dr. Irwin and Miss Calvert) stood for a few moments chatting with several of the Japanese visitors. Suddenly they realized that a member of the Japanese party with kodak in hand had stepped into the yard and was clicking their picture. They are now wondering what use will be made of this photograph for purposes of propaganda in Japan.



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One of the main reasons given by the Japanese for their present occupation of Kirin and other centers in Manchuria is the necessity of furnishing protection to Koreans, subjects of the Japanese Empire. The Koreans are thus being made convenient use of by the Japanese military in their present Manchurian adventure. At the same time, Koreans of known unfriendliness to Japanese rule in their own country are terrified within an inch of their lives. Dr. Sloane told us of several cases, one of which will suffice. A well known Korean of the city, an educator, came with his wife to the Irish Presbyterian compound for safety. They were badly frightened and lay very low. After several days the wife went back home to look things over. Her landlord, who shares the premises with her, told her that after she and her husband left Japanese investigators had come to ask concerning them. On learning that they had fled the Japanese exacted of the landlord a promise that he would inform the military authorities if and when they returned. The landlord thereupon informed the wife that in order to insure his own safety she would have to remain in the house rather than return to her husband. The husband, dressed in Chinese coolie clothes, fled by boat on the Sungari River to Harbin in order to escape unknown but greatly feared difficulties at the hands of the Japanese military.

On the other hand, in Kirin, as in Changchun and Mukden, we found the Chinese population in great fear of the Koreans themselves. While several Koreans of revolutionary connections were reported to have been killed by the Japanese upon their occupation of Kirin, it was also stated that 200 Koreans in the local prison had been liberated. Further reports were to the effect that hundreds of Koreans in the city were being armed with daggers. Just as we were leaving for the train to take our departure one foreign and one Chinese informant (both of them doctors) hurried in to tell us the latest rumor. This was to the effect that the Japanese were planning to withdraw a short distance from the city, turning the place over to the mercy of these armed Koreans so that an incident might be created which would make it "necessary" for the Japanese troops to return and protect the city.

#### VII.C

At 6 p.m. on October 16 we left Kirin for Changchun. In our second-class coach were 11 Japanese soldiers, 2 Japanese runners of the Yamato Hotel, 6 Japanese men in civilian clothes, one Japanese woman, one Chinese man (apparently an official), 4 Chinese women and 3 Chinese men of an unrecognizable category. The impression deepened that we were in Japanese territory and the Chinese population was not travelling any more than necessary (The above ratio be - that of the entire population of Manchuria in which there are 28 million Chinese and not more than 250 Japanese).

The following morning, October 17, found us in Harbin. After breakfast we went at once to the Russian Y.M.C.A. and sought out the American general secretary, H. L. Haag. The first thing he told me was that he had known for some days of my coming. I asked if he had heard from the national office in Shanghai. He had not, but four days earlier in the "Zarya", a White Russian newspaper, he had read that "Mr. Barnett, secretary of the National Committee of the Y.M.C.A. in Shanghai, was visiting Manchuria gathering information." On inquiring of the newspaper



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editor as to the source of this information he was told that it had come from the Japanese Consul-General. Haag called up the Consul-General, whom he knew, and was informed not only of my presence in the province but also of the cities I was visiting. I am quite at a loss to know where the Japanese Consul could have secured this information.

Haag reported that for days previous to the incident in Mukden his Chinese friends were expressing the feeling that Japan would soon be on the move. One of them had said to him about September 12 that "all is over but the shouting". By this he meant that Japan was all ready to come in to take over South Manchuria.

I talked with two or three prominent foreigners resident for years in Harbin. They were quite critical of the Chinese government but shared the general conviction I found throughout Manchuria that the present military occupation of the area by Japan was a carefully premeditated and planned movement.

About September 27 the Japanese started a propaganda newspaper in Harbin - The Harbinski Vramia. Chinese newspaper sellers refuse to handle it.

Aerial Japanese propaganda was carried on over Harbin daily until September 27 or 28. On September 22 and 23, for example Japanese air planes flying over Harbin dropped leaflets in Chinese and Russian containing an address to the population, signed by General Hongjo. A translation of this leaflet is at follows:

"On the 18th of September at 10:30 p.m. the troops of the Chinese North-Eastern Army, did some damage to the line of the South Manchuria Railway near Pei Ta Yin north of Mukden, and tried to attack the Japanese border regiments.

"Thus the hostile actions were begun by the Chinese. The South Manchuria Railway is the possession of the Japanese Empire, which allows no one to interfere with it. But the North-Eastern Chinese Army not only destroyed the line but also opened fire against the Japanese army, obviously trying to start hostile actions against the Japanese army.

"In view of the fact that lately Japanese interests and rights are often interfered with by the Chinese, I think that these vile deeds are happening not because of a temporary quarrel but are nothing else than premeditated actions of the North-Eastern government which is accustomed to unbecoming actions toward Japanese, thus breaking the international agreements.

"If the Japanese had not paid attention to such actions God knows what would have happened in the future. I know that these vile deeds are not planned by the whole Chinese nation but by a number of military men who are dreaming of attaining all power for themselves.

"Because of the importance of guarding the South Manchuria Railway I shall take decided measures for guarding and making safe our interests and the authority of the Imperial Army.

"I want to punish only the North-Eastern military authorities and I am taking care of the population that is suffering under the



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oppression of this military rule; so I want the Chinese people with God's help to attend to their own affairs. I take decided steps in case there be planned a hostile attack upon the Japanese command.  
"Commander of the Forces of the Kuantung Military District."

Two days after the initial incident in Mukden, on September 20 at 11 p.m., the night watchman at the Russian Y.M.C.A. in Harbin saw a car draw up at the front gate of the Japanese Consulate next door and its occupants step out long enough to throw a bomb into the frontyard of the Consulate. The bomb did not explode. About September 23 a second bomb was exploded on the front doorstep of a Japanese civilian club at 8:30 in the morning. The same night a third bomb was dropped in front of another Japanese club in Prieston, one of the business sections of Harbin. Two other bomb incidents, equally innocent in their results have been directed at Japanese institutions. Whether these bombs represent actual attacks on Japanese institutions or "plants" engineered by the Japanese themselves was a matter of discussion among neutrals in the city.

Undoubtedly a pall of impending disaster broods over Harbin. Business conditions in the city were already bad, and the military operations throughout the area have completed, at least for the time being, the stoppage of business of all kinds.

A Chinese government remains in Harbin, thanks to the Russian affiliations of the city. So completely insulated, however, from the rest of the country are these Chinese authorities that they are able to do little more than pursue a policy of watchful waiting.

As stated above, one found foreign opinion somewhat in sympathy with Japan in its efforts to "punish" the Chinese officials of Manchuria. They seem to feel that Japan may be checking on behalf of all the powers what they themselves regard as China's premature demands for the abolition of extraterritoriality. These same men, however, were cynical as to the genuineness of Japan's professed provocation and aims in the present situation. One man, head of a leading British firm, who has lived in Harbin since 1917, said, in reply to a question, that if Japan should take over permanent control of Southern Manchuria, it would probably mean greater freedom from banditry and similar dangers, but it would also spell the beginning of the end of foreign trade in the region, other than that between China and Japan.

Mr. Liang met several important leaders in the Chinese community and both of us had visits with Messrs. Wu Peh Hsiang and Chao Sen Tung, manufacturers and department store proprietors of Harbin, Mr. Hoh, president of the Y.M.C.A., Messrs. Jen and Keh, secretaries of the Y.M.C.A. and Mr. S.M. Doong, a former secretary of the Y.M.C.A. now in business.

From these men we learned that the city had organized itself early in September for flood relief in connection with the stricken area in Central China. The merchants had assessed themselves \$800,000 as a start and various organizations were raising voluntary contributions in



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addition. The Japanese occupation of Manchuria has side-tracked this effort almost entirely. One of the most painful results of the Manchurian crisis is the fact that it has deflected the help which otherwise would have been poured out from all quarters on behalf of the 30 to 50 million flood sufferers who now approach the hard winter months with no resources of their own.

Mr. Wu explained to us the difficulty of enforcing a Japanese boycott in Manchuria. (1) The Japanese are so near that they can easily retaliate in measures directed against the Chinese government. (2) The Japanese likewise are able to obstruct and delay the import into the territory of any goods other than those of Japanese origin. Mr. Wu and Mr. Chao, both expressed themselves as feeling that a Japanese suzerainty in Manchuria would be intolerable. They would greatly prefer seeing China go Communist rather than submit to Japanese rule, and they believed this represented the general attitude of sober Chinese opinion in the area.

As in other cities visited, these Chinese leaders were profoundly pessimistic about the outlook. They felt that the League of Nations would prove futile in its efforts at friendly intervention. They were bitterly critical of the Chinese government in what they spoke of as its gross mismanagement of affairs. While feeling that internal conditions in China had invited Japanese cupidity, they were strong in their conviction that a Japanese overlordship would be intolerable. They expressed themselves frankly as favoring military preparedness and if necessary an alliance with Russia even at the cost of China's going Communist.

#### VIII.

After spending the day in Harbin, we returned to Mukden and after another half day there made our way to Dairen.

At Dairen we caught only a glimpse of local conditions. The city of course being under Japanese administration is outwardly quiet. (There is much suppressed feeling on the part of the large Chinese population which has no way of rising to the surface).

In Dairen we met Kaj Petersen, who had just reached the city after making a visit to Antung. From him we got a second-hand report on some of the main events which have taken place in that city.

It seems that at 6 a.m. on September 19 the Chinese magistrate at Antung was asked to capitulate. He called in a Danish missionary, a woman of long residence in the city, who tried on his behalf to establish contact with governmental authorities in Peiping or Nanking. All lines of communication were cut, however, and her efforts were unavailing. Between 11 and 12 o'clock the city was therefore taken over by the Japanese military.

Shortly after occupying the city the Japanese authorities in Antung cut off the Chinese electric light and power supply from a section of the city across the South Manchuria Railway. Paul Bergoe, Danish Secretary of the Antung Y.M.C.A., called on the Japanese military authorities



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and remonstrated. He was told by them that Chang Hsueh Liang had money in the plant and for this reason they could not heed his remonstrances on behalf of the Chinese community affected.

On October 10 two Japanese soldiers went to the Antung Y.M.C.A. building and ordered those in charge to take down the Chinese flag which had been put up in honor of independence day. The order was refused, whereupon the soldiers tore the flag down. Baagoe went on the following day to see the Japanese Consul about this matter and was told by the Consul that he would telephone the military concerning it. The Chinese flag now flies again over the Chinese Y.M.C.A. in Antung.

On October 14 the Commissioner of Education was arrested as a strong member of the Kuomintang. On being asked if he were anti-Japanese he replied, "Of course I am, I am a Chinese".

The schools of Antung were closed for a time but were reopened on October 15. Petersen states that there was current a report that all books found by the Japanese military bearing on the Three Peoples Principles had been collected and burned. He reported this, however, as hearsay, rather than authenticated fact.

Baagoe remains in solitary charge of the Y.M.C.A. in Antung as the last Chinese secretary has left the city. The president of the Association (when Petersen was in the city) was in a hospital - for fear of his safety.

#### IX.

On October 19 we left Dairer on the Saitsu Maru, arriving next day in Tientsin, where we spent a few hours before proceeding to Peiping, where we arrived in the evening of October 20. Here we spent 24 hours in consultation with local leaders regarding various Y.M.C.A. problems and in conversation with a number of men, including Marshal Chang Hsueh Liang.

In our 45 minute interview with the Young Marshal we gathered further significant background information regarding events in Manchuria. Most important perhaps were his statements concerning information which had reached him considerably in advance of September 18 of an impending movement by Japan.

For example, the Young Marshal showed us a copy of a telegram which he sent from Peiping on September 5 to Chang Shih Yi, chairman of the Provincial Government in Mukden, which read as follows: "Recent events indicate that the Japanese are planning to find an occasion to make trouble. During this period we should be very careful and considerate in all our dealings with them. In case of provocation we must by no means resist lest grave consequences follow. It is important and urgent that you instruct all of the forces and organizations under your jurisdiction accordingly." This message the Marshal requested us not to release for publication.



- 23 -

Chang Hsueh Liang spoke of General Hongjo, Commander in charge of Japanese operations in Manchuria, who, he said, was "really a very good friend" of his. Hongjo, it seems was a colonel during the Russo-Japanese war. For expressing approval of Russian policy in certain respects he was deprived of his commission. Later, upon marrying the daughter of an influential personage in Japan, he was restored to the army. During the lifetime of Chang Tso Lin General Hongjo served him as adviser. When the Young General was sent to Japan it was under the care of General Hongjo that he made the trip.

Marshal Chang Hsueh Liang told us of a recent exchange of communications between Hongjo and himself (which also he enjoined us not to release for publication). In Hongjo's letter addressed to a junior military officer, he asked that intermediary to convey word to the Young Marshal as follows: (1) We have been good friends in the past but our friendship must now be terminated. (2) I was a good friend of your father and will take good care of his coffin (now in Mukden) and will deliver it wherever you wish. (3) Do not come back to Manchuria. Both the Chinese and foreigners agree that you "are no good". (4) I shall take care of your personal property and will deliver it wherever you want it. (5) You have pushed Japan too hard during the past few years. (6) If you attempt to return to Mukden the people will rise up against you. I think that they would be right in doing so.

To this message the Young Marshal sent back a reply containing the following points: (1) For the time being we will set aside all questions of personal friendship. (2) I have not pushed Japan, I have only served China. If you say that I have pushed Japan, I can say that you have pushed China. (3) Thanks for taking care of my father's coffin. (4) Thanks for taking care of my personal belongings. They are of no consequence. (5) As to my return to Mukden, I shall come when I get ready. You have no right to say anything about it.

I asked the Young Marshal particularly regarding two matters. (1) To what extent is he maintaining an efficient intelligence service in Manchuria capable of getting the facts which he should have concerning conditions and events in the area. I stated that what I had in mind was facts needed not for publicity use either in China or abroad, but for guidance in policy and planning. (2) What plan did he have for the effective reoccupation of Manchuria upon the withdrawal of Japan.

In reply, the Young Marshal stated: (1) When the Japanese move out we have a sufficient police force with which to maintain order; (2) we can also cope with the bandits provided the Japanese do not stir them up and really leave us free to act; (3) we are ready to send civil officers in promptly to resume civil administration of the area.

On October 23 we reached Shanghai, after an absence of just two weeks.

October 25, 1931.



174

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. N.I Reports/85 FOR report

FROM Naval Attache(China) ( ) DATED Oct 30, 1931  
TO NAME 1-1127

REGARDING:

Military distribution by Chinese and Japanese at a standstill but there is evidence that the Japanese supported Chang Hai-peng in his attempt to capture Tsitsihar. This carried the conflict into Russian territory and there are well founded rumors that the Soviets are concentrating troops on the border with the avowed purpose of protecting their interests in the Chinese Eastern Railway.

The Japanese military are preparing to stay for the winter as is evidenced by the building of billets for winter usage and appear to be frank in their intention of remaining in Manchuria until the questions are settled through direct negotiations.

ek

793.94/3034



MET

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone.

Dated December 4, 1931

Rec'd 3:30 p.m.

Secretary of State, DEC 4 1931

Washington, DIVISION OF


839, December 4, 5 p.m.

FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES.

Drummond called this afternoon to outline remaining  
points of difference between Chinese and Japanese in  
process of being ironed out and to be further discussed  
at meeting of the Twelve late this afternoon. He  
our cooperation in their proper adjustment in our personal  
interviews with Sze and Matsudaira. Olds, representing  
Sze, then called. I think Sze has been granted sufficient  
to enable him to acquiesce in a settlement  
discretion/of neutral observers question. The observers  
are already there and whatever arises they will continue  
to discharge faithfully the duties incident to observation.

The discussion of a proposal to make these an executive  
and administrative body in addition would seem at the  
present juncture not only unwise but unnecessary. I  
think I am safe in saying that Sze accepts this view.

As to the bandit proposition the Council is somewhat  
embarrassed and undecided but as it looks at present will  
probably



793.94  
note  
793.94/118

F/DEW

793.94/3035

FILED

DEC 10 1931



174  
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#839 from Paris, December 4,  
1931.

probably meet the situation by saying nothing about it  
while the Japanese will get out a statement of their  
own on this subject after the resolution is passed.

SHAW

WSB




TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WP

GREEN  
FROM  
Paris

RECEIVED  
DEC 5 1931  
DIVISION OF

Dated December 4, 1931  
Rec'd 9:25 p. m.



Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.

841, December 4, 12 midnight  
From Ambassador Dawes.

Following is report from Sweetser:

"The Chinese and Japanese replies to the draft Council resolution were received here today. Sze informed Drummond that China would accept the resolution as it stood without amendment provided of course Japan did the same. The Japanese delegation asked that Ito might appear before the drafting committee tomorrow morning to discuss the Japanese reply rather than that the Council follow the procedure originally arranged of having Yoshizawa meet with the twelve at noon.

The twelve members of the Council held their first meeting in the last two <sup>hours</sup> from six o'clock to eight discussing exclusively the Chinchow situation. Briand reported that certain soundings with the Chinese as to the Japanese memorandum on that subject showed the greatest misgivings.

F/DEW

793.94/3036

DEC 10 1931

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174 =

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 - No. 841 from Paris -

misgivings. There had been strong opposition in China  
to <sup>its terms</sup> ~~hinder to~~ including street manifestations. The  
Chinese had now presented a counter aide memoire giving  
the text of Koo's

(END SECTION ONE)

SHAW

(\*) ~~omission~~

OX



1 7 4 E  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WP

GREEN

RECEIVED

FROM Paris

DEC 5 1931

Dated December 4, 1931

DIVISION OF

Rec'd 9:36 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

841, December 4, midnight. (SECTION TWO).  
proposals to the three powers, stating that one govern-  
ment had replied unfavorably and the other two not at  
all and that therefore no definite proposal had been  
made, as the three ministers in question understood.  
Koo was stated to have informed the Japanese Minister  
at Nanking yesterday, in reply to his request that  
Chinese troops be withdrawn to Shanhaikwan in view of  
the withdrawal of Japanese troops, that China had already  
accepted the Council's plan of having neutral observers  
serve as liaison between the Chinese and Japanese forces  
and that the matter was now in the hands of those observ-  
ers. Koo was said to have added that if Japan were really  
apprehensive of the intentions of the Chinese troops  
China would give assurance to the Council that her troops  
at Chinchow would not move forward towards the Japanese  
and would accept the recommendations of the neutral  
observers



174  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 - No. 841 from Paris - section two -

observers to make this assurance effective. In these circumstances, he had observed, if the Japanese troops do not leave the railway zone again there can be no possibility of a clash.

Briand added that the Chinese seemed to think the situation at Chinchow is now regulated and the proposed action of the Council met. He himself felt that through the presence of the observers a considerable neutral territory had been disengaged where peace and order prevail. The observers he said are active and effective; his last telegram today showed the existence of a real neutral zone. He felt there was no danger at the moment of a grave conflict.

(END SECTION TWO)

SHAW

OX



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WP

FROM GRAY

Paris

DEF 5 1931

Dated December 4, 1931

DIVISION OF

Rec'd 10:45 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

841, December 4, midnight. (SECTION THREE).

He also reported a conversation this afternoon with Yoshizawa who begged the Council to intervene to urge China to accept direct negotiations and to withdraw to the Great Wall. He replied that it would be a delicate matter for the Council to press the Chinese to evacuate their own territory and pointed out that the danger of a clash no longer existed. He would urge the two parties to let the situation at Chinchow rest and get ahead with the resolution. Yoshizawa however replied that he had no instructions in this connection.

Briand then asked his colleagues which course they wished to follow, to consider Chinchow as settled by the observers and thus get on with the resolution, or to continue with the purpose of further clarifying the

Chinchow



- 2 - No. 841 from Paris - section three-

Chinchow situation. In other words, should the Council take the position that the neutral zone was satisfactorily settled and that there was no danger of conflict or should it attempt to bring pressure on the Chinese to evacuate entirely? He seemed to incline to the former.

Cecil approached the problem somewhat differently. He had told Matsudaira that there seemed to him two aspects of the question: first the neutral zone itself, the details of which could be arranged in direct negotiations with the Chinese; and second the guarantee that Japan would give to the Council as to penetrating that zone. The first point that must be cleared up he thought was the actual demarcation of that zone; the Chinese side was to be the Great

(END SECTION THREE)

SHAW



## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WP

RECEIVED

Dec 5 1931

DIVISION OF

FROM GREEN

Paris

Dated December 4, 1931

Rec'd 10:20 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

841, December 4, midnight. (SECTION FOUR).

Wall but what would the Japanese side be? Obviously to be a real zone there must be a limit somewhere, whether the Liao River or otherwise, beyond which the Japanese would not go. The creation of such a zone would be of the greatest value both to the Chinese and the Council. Without it China would be at the mercy of the Japanese as she had only 17,000 combatant troops around Chinchow who would be quite unable to withstand the Japanese. Any understanding therefore would be to her advantage. The predominating consideration which the Council must have in mind was that the Japanese military were still pressing to march to Chinchow and were being restricted only by the greatest effort. If the Council could get a real guarantee that the Japanese would undertake no further invasion of Chinese territory it would be a real accomplishment



- 2 - No. 841 from Paris - section four -

accomplishment. On the other hand if the Council did not secure this guarantee but passed a general resolution and the Japanese moved forward a few days afterwards the situation would be disastrous.

Potitch favored considering the neutral zone as in fact established. He thought that if the Council asked new guarantees it would meet the same old difficulties. Also he doubted if the Council should take on itself the delicate task of asking China to evacuate its own territory.

Drummond pointed out that the Japanese aide memoire had offered the definite condition that Japan troops would not go into the neutral zone to do police work but only in case her subjects or troops in north China were endangered.

(END SECTION FOUR)

SHAW



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM GRAY  
Paris

RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF

Dated December 4, 1931

Rec'd 11:50 p. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

841, December 4, midnight. (SECTION FIVE).

Briand had previously remarked that this condition had greatly disturbed the Chinese; they could not understand what seemed to them a wholly new policy of Japan's going to the protection of her nationals by a long overland route rather than by the usual way by sea. Drummond also stressed that if the Council did not find a solution for the Chinchow matter the Japanese would certainly march in.

Briand continued to express disquietude regarding the lack of clarity as to Japan's intention. He had kept trying he said to get some kind of definition from Yoshizawa as to the limits of the zone but had not been able to get any satisfaction. Also he was not quite certain how real a zone the Japanese had in mind to create, for, though they spoke of not entering it except to go to the aid of their nationals in north China, they seemed to have



REP

2- #841, from Paris, Dec. 4, midnight,  
(Section Five).

to have certain reserves. Finally he was disturbed at their reluctance to keep the Council informed in case they should enter into direct negotiations. He thought the Council could not afford to have any possibility of misunderstanding.

Madariaga had been greatly impressed by Cecil's argument that a clash now might negate three whole weeks of effort. In view of the Japanese memorandum, he thought the Council could recommend direct negotiations to the Chinese provided the essential points were cleared up. He thereupon presented a definite proposal to this effect, which  
(END SECTION FIVE).

SHAW

CIB

WSB



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

cib

FROM GREEN

Paris

DEC 5 1931  
DIVISION OF

Dated December 4, 1931

Recd 11:30 p.m.

Secretary of State  
Washington.

841, December 4, midnight (SECTION SIX)

Cecil thought the Japanese might be willing to accept provided it involved a direct agreement with the League and not an agreement with the Chinese under the League, which seemed to be very distasteful to the Japanese.

A discussion then followed on procedure. Cecil urged that the Council must get on with its work, that its members had now been here three weeks, and that the time had come to hasten matters somewhat without this endless reference to Tokyo and Nanking. He urged a public meeting very shortly, saying the League had always succeeded where it had used publicity and often failed where it had not. After Briand had pointed out that it would be most unfortunate if, after all this time the Council held a public meeting only to hasten matters the parties say they had no instructions, the twelve decided that the best course would be to send an immediate letter to Yoshizawa tonight saying that they would be prepared



1 075  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2- #841, from Paris, December 4,  
midnight (SECTION SIX)

prepared to comply with the Japanese request that they urge direct negotiations upon China provided they had certain clarifications as to the scope of the negotiations intended.

A communication was accordingly drafted and despatched immediately afterwards. After stating the Council's willingness to take this action and its understanding that nothing in these negotiations would affect the engagements undertaken in the September 30th resolution the communication welcomed the proposal in paragraph six of the Japanese memorandum that Japan was willing to make a declaration before the Council that in future troops would not enter the neutral zone and requested a more exact definition of the limits of that zone. The Council understood from the memorandum that during these negotiations Japanese troops would not enter the zone except for temporary emergency." (END MESSAGE)


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CIB  
CSB



175  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS



December 5, 1931.

SA:

Ambassador Dawes' 841, December 4, 12 midnight.

M. Briand feels that there is "no danger at the moment of a grave conflict". Lord Cecil recalls the fact that "the Japanese military were still pressing to march to Chinchow and would be restricted only by the greatest effort".

There are still some "seventeen thousand (Chinese) combatant troops around Chinchow"; there are also probably from five to ten thousand irregular Chinese troops in that vicinity. Mr. Koo states that inasmuch as "the matter was now in the hands of those (neutral) observers", the Chinese proposed to do nothing more about the withdrawal of their troops to Shanhaikwan.

The reports in morning papers indicate that Lord Cecil's appreciation of the situation is more accurate than M. Briand's. The Japanese forces which were advancing on Chinchow received a signal check and were withdrawn to the east of the Liao river. Their understanding, whether well-founded or not, was that there would be a similar withdrawal on the part of the Chinese troops in the Chinchow area. The press reports indicate that Japanese forces, disappointed in this anticipation, are threatening to move again; and if they do, as stated by Lord Cecil, "the situation would be disastrous".

Our

F.W. 793.94/3036

FILED

DEC 10 1931



175  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lutz NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

Our main objective has been that the issues between China and Japan be settled by direct negotiations. It is understood that direct negotiations relating to the withdrawal from Chinchow were already under way when they were halted by China's proposals concerning the part which neutrals were to have in the evacuation. Is there not grave danger that the objects which had been almost attained may be lost and the situation which we have been strenuously trying to avoid be precipitated if too much insistence is placed on the part which neutrals are to take in the evacuation of Chinchow?

Section 6 of the above telegram, which has just come in, indicates that the Council had reached a similar conclusion.

*RMM*  
FE:RSM/ZMF



DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 841.00 P.R./206 FOR desp. #2402

FROM Great Britain ( Atherton ) DATED Nov. 16, 1931  
TO NAME 1-1127 o.p.o.

REGARDING: Manchurian dispute.

British press - attitude of - toward-.

The British press is following closely the Council of the League of Nations' attempt to solve the Manchurian crisis. Sympathy is fairly well divided between Japan and China. England's strongest interest at the moment appears to be that the League of Nations should not jeopardize its prestige in attempting to impose a settlement in the Far East which it will not be able to enforce if not accepted by China and Japan.

793.94/3037



DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 841.00 P.R./206 FOR desp. #2402  
FROM Great Britain ( Atherton ) DATED Nov. 16, 1931  
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793.94/3037



TELEGRAM RECEIVED  
CORRECTED COPY

MET

GRAY

FROM

Tientsin via N.R.

Dated December 5, 1931

Rec'd 5



Secretary of State,  
Washington

December 5, 2 p.m.

The following telegram has been sent to the Legation:

"December 5, 3 p.m. This morning at nine o'clock  
the Japanese sent an armored car and a machine gun,  
with fifteen or twenty men, to Nankai University which  
is much over a mile from the Japanese concession and an  
area heretofore entirely free of any disturbance. The  
above named detachment stayed in vicinity about one  
hour and then returned to concession. The reason for  
the move is not known but it shows a complete lack of  
conciliation, or at least of appreciation of the present  
strained relations. Repeated to the Department and  
Nanking".

793.94/3038

LOCKHART


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FW 793.94/3038

FILED  
DEC 21 1931



TELEGRAM RECEIVED



MET

GRAY

FROM

Tientsin via N.R.

Dated December 5, 1931

Rec'd 5 a.m.

RECEIVED  
DEPT. OF STATE  
DIVISION OF

Secretary of State,  
Washington

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.L. AND O.L.D.  
*mf*

December 5, 2 p.m.

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strained relations. Repeated to the Department and  
Nanking".

LOCKHART

WSB

F/DEW

793.94/3038

*793.94*  
*note*  
*894.23.*  
*593.102-T.*



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

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closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone.


PEIPING

Dated December 5, 1931

Rec'd 2:27 a. m.

DIVISION OF

Secretary of State,  
Washington..



1044, December 5, 11 a. m.

Following from American Consul General at Mukden:

"December 4, 3 p. m. Confidentially informed by  
railway management that confirmation of Japanese reports of  
recent movement of troop trains northward from Shanhaikwan  
is unobtainable; in fact trustworthy information indicates  
that only the usual supply of empty cars is at present  
along the line.

Information from reliable source indicates that  
supporters of Manchu restoration movement are again  
active."

For the Minister  
PERKINS

JHR

WSB



F/LS  
793.94/3039

REC 10 1931  
RECEIVED

793.94



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER


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OR  
Charge to  
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE, X  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

Department of State



Washington,

December 5, 1931.

4 PM

AMEMBASSY,

DEC 5 31

PARIS (France).

628  
CONFIDENTIAL FOR AMBASSADOR DAWES.

94/2039  
The American Consul General at Mukden telegraphs  
under date December 4 as follows:

QUOTE Confidentially informed by railway management  
that confirmation of Japanese reports of recent movement  
of troop trains northward from Shanhaikwan is unobtainable;  
in fact trustworthy information indicates that only the  
usual supply of empty cars is at present along the line.

Information from reliable source indicates that  
supporters of Manchu restoration movement are again active  
UNQUOTE.

793.94/3039

Stinson

SECRET

FE:MMH:REK

FE

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

Index Bu.—No. 80.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-138



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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
FROM

GRAY

Tokio

Dated December 5, 1931

Rec'd 9:10 a. m.



RECEIVED  
DEC 5 1931  
DIVISION OF

793.94  
Secretary of State,  
Washington.

253, December 5, 4 p. m.

The following telegram has been received today from  
Mukden from the Military Attache:

"Since withdrawal of Japanese forces east of Liao  
River and Chinese forces are advancing to west side of  
Liao River from Chenchiatun to Yingkou, and banditry is  
increasing; it appears it will be dangerous for the South  
Manchuria Railway, and perhaps to Mukden; should either  
be threat<sup>ened</sup> / Japanese troops must take offensive action  
they fear reports of Military Attaches from Chinchow are  
incorrect concerning disposition of Chinese troops; no  
Chinese forces have withdrawn south of the wall. The  
Military Attaches have not been east of Chinchow, in my  
opinion the situation is dangerous. I leave for Chinchow  
tomorrow."

The Assistant Military Attache immediately called on  
the office

F/DEW

793.94/3040

RECEIVED  
DEC 10 1931



REP

2- #253, from Tokio, Dec. 5, 4 p. m.

the office of the Chief of Staff in Tokyo. Following is memorandum of his conversation with an officer of the general staff:

"In a conversation with Major Hamada this morning at 11 o'clock he stated that at present the situation south of Mukden is not serious, but that it is getting serious due to Chinese activities in Chinchow. Troops are concentrated at Chinchow and they are fortifying the place as if they expect to offer a strong resistance there. He also said that the troops between there and Mukden are not very active but that the bandits in that area are causing trouble and that from tactical standpoint it is necessary to drive these bandits, who are in close cooperation with the Chinese Government troops, back from a position where they can not threaten the Japanese troops and Mukden; however, he added that he did not know the Kwangtung army and intentions as to how they would handle the bandit situation. From his statement I also gathered that the bulk of the Japanese troops in Manchuria are in and near Mukden.

He said that the situation at Tsitsihar is quiet and that Ma has become pro-Japanese at least temporarily and that the presence of the thousand men from the fourth mixed <sup>Brigade</sup> ~~division~~ in



REP

3- #253, from Tokio, Dec. 5, 4 p.m.

*Brigade*  
mixed ~~brigade~~ in Tsitsihar has relieved anxiety from that quarter."

The Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs told the Counselor of Embassy today that matters in Manchuria appeared quiet for the moment but that it might be necessary to take protective action if the Chinese troops in the region west of the Liao River began any offensive movement, that the bandit situation was very troublesome, that no agreement had been concluded in regard to a neutral zone so that Chinese troop movement between Chinchow and Hsinmin were not necessarily provocative in themselves but the Japanese were somewhat apprehensive because the idea of a neutral zone had been proposed by the Chinese and the Chinese now appeared to be closing in on the Japanese who had retired back of the Liao; Yoshizawa had received instructions in regard to the proposed League resolution. He did not say what the instructions were.

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December 5, 1931.

AMEMBASSY

PARIS (France).

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FOR AMBASSADOR DAWES.

Under date December 5, the American Ambassador at Tokyo reports the receipt that day of a telegram from Mukden from Military Attaché McIlroy which appears to be based on information given out by Japanese Headquarters at Mukden and is along the lines of press dispatches from Tokyo. It contains statement that if South Manchuria Railway or Mukden are threatened Japanese troops must take the offensive. McIlroy says QUOTE in my opinion the situation is dangerous. I leave for Chinchow tomorrow. END QUOTE

Ambassador reports that Assistant Military Attaché immediately called on the office of the Chief of Staff in Tokyo, where an officer of the general staff said in part as follows (~~paraphrase~~):

*Paraphrase*  
At present the situation south of Mukden is not serious, but is getting serious due to Chinese activities in Chinchow. Chinese troops are concentrated at Chinchow and are fortifying the place as if they expect to offer

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Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19 \_\_\_\_\_

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## Department of State

Washington,

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a strong resistance there. Troops between there and Mukden are not very active but bandits in that area are causing trouble and from tactical standpoint it is necessary to drive these bandits, who are in close cooperation with the Chinese Government troops, back from a position where they can ~~not~~ threaten the Japanese troops and Mukden; The situation at Tsitsihar is quiet and General Ma has become pro-Japanese at least temporarily and the presence of the thousand men from the fourth mixed brigade in Tsitsihar has relieved anxiety from that quarter. End paraphrase. Skip

Ambassador also reports that Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs told Counselor of Embassy same day that matters in Manchuria appeared quiet for the moment but it might be necessary to take protective action if the Chinese troops in the region west of the Liao River began any offensive movement; that the bandit situation was very troublesome; that no agreement had been concluded in regard to a neutral zone, so that Chinese troop movements between Chinchow and Hsinmin were not necessarily provocative in themselves but the Japanese were somewhat apprehensive because the idea of a neutral zone

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Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_\_



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

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## Department of State

Washington,

- 3 -

zone had been proposed by the Chinese and the Chinese  
now appeared to be closing in on the Japanese who had  
retired back of the Liao; and that Yoshizawa had  
received instructions in regard to the proposed League  
resolution. Vice Minister did not say what the instructions  
were.

*A Department suggests that you inform  
Drummond for SkH.  
confidential use.*

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*RAM  
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S. K. H.*

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Index Bu.—No. 60.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1949 1-138



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF CURRENT INFORMATION  
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Department of State  
Division of Current Information

MEMORANDUM OF PRESS CONFERENCE AT WOODLEY AT 6 P. M. WEDNES-  
DAY, NOVEMBER 25, 1931

At the special press conference called at the Secretary's home at Woodley at 6 p. m. today, the Secretary said he thought the correspondents would be interested in some BACKGROUND information on the Manchurian situation.

Mr. Stimson said he had what he believed to be a fairly accurate draft of the proposed Resolution which is pending before the Council of the League of Nations in Paris. The Resolution has been amended from day to day and the copy in our possession is not the final draft but it is believed to be substantially correct. Secretary Stimson then read the Resolution quoted below:

"1. The council recalls and reaffirms the resolution passed unanimously by it on September 30 by which the two parties declare that they are solemnly bound. It therefore calls upon the Chinese and Japanese Governments to take all steps necessary to assure its execution so that the withdrawal of the Japanese troops within the railway zone - a point to which the Council attaches the utmost importance - may be effected as speedily as possible.

"2. Considering that events in Manchuria have assumed an even more serious aspect since the Council meeting of October 24 calls upon the two Governments:

"(a) To give the strictest orders to the commanders of their respective forces to refrain from any initiative which may lead to further fighting and loss of life.

"(b) To take all measures necessary to avoid any further aggravation of the situation.

"3. Invites the two parties to continue to keep the Council informed as to the development of the situation.

"4. Invites the other members of the Council to furnish the Council with information received from their representatives on the spot.

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"5. Without prejudice to the execution of the above mentioned measures, desiring on the other hand in view of the special circumstances of the case to contribute towards a definitive and fundamental solution of the questions at issue between the two governments,

"Decides to appoint a commission of three members to study on the spot and to report to the Council on any circumstance which, affecting international relations, threatens to disturb peace between China and Japan, or the good understanding between them upon which peace depends."

The above shows the essence of the powers of the Investigating Commission. It is an important statement, is very broad and gives them power to study on the spot and to report to the Council on any circumstances which may affect international relations or threatens to disturb the peace between China and Japan or the good understanding between them on which peace depends.

The Secretary then read the next paragraph of the League Resolution, which is as follows:

"The Governments of China and of Japan will each have the right to nominate one assessor to assist the commission. It is understood that should the two parties initiate any negotiations these would not fall within the scope of the terms of reference of the Commission nor would the Commission interfere with military measures taken by either party."

Debates have shown that the Commission may make reports on the military situation but not to give commands to military men. There was some discussion in the Council by one or two members who were afraid that the Commission's not interfering with military measures might prevent that Commission from making a report of its views on the military situation. The debates show that such is not intended. The Commission has a right to study, make reports, and criticize but not give orders to military commanders.

The next paragraph of the League Resolution is as follows:



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"It is further understood that the appointment and deliberations of the Commission are not to be regarded as any ground for delaying the withdrawal by the Japanese troops within the railway zone as laid down in paragraph one of this resolution."

Another point discussed before the Council was that the appointment of this Commission will not in any way affect or delay the withdrawal of the Japanese troops.

The concluding paragraphs of the League Resolution are as follows:

"N.B. The President after the adoption of the resolution will state

"(a) That each of the two governments will have the right to indicate to the chairman of the commission any question the examination of which it particularly desires

"(b) That the commission may should it so desire furnish the Council with interim reports."

The Secretary said that the above was the text of the League Resolution according to the best information available in Washington tonight but that it is NOT TO BE ATTRIBUTED to any specific source.

As the press has reported from Paris, General Dawes has announced that this Government approves the general plan of settlement embodied in the proposed Resolution and has so informed both China and Japan and has urged upon them acquiescence in the general plan embodied in the Resolution.

The Secretary then said he desired to call the attention of the correspondents to the reason why this Government feels that the above Resolution is a long step forward in these difficult negotiations. In the first place, this proposal is along the lines of the general methods and principles which have gained currency and acquiescence among the people of the world in the form of what we generally call conciliation agreements and it represents in this difficult and tangled



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problem for the first time a bringing into the situation of methods which have received the approval of a great number of the countries of the world. Referring to a list of the conciliation treaties to which this country has been a party, Mr. Stimson said he found that nineteen of the so-called Bryan Treaties were made in 1913 and 1914. In 1928, 1929 and 1930 there were sixteen of the Treaties made between this country and thirty-five other nations. A number of those Treaties have been signed during the present administration and we have been going right along with them. The names of the thirty-five countries are as follows: Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Denmark, Ecuador, France, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Uruguay and Venezuela. The above were signatories of the Bryan Treaties. The other sixteen countries which signed these conciliation treaties are: Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Rumania and Yugoslavia. A sked if Japan was a signatory to those treaties, the Secretary replied that he had not found the name of that country on the list.

Secretary Stimson then said he wanted to point out that in the matter of conciliation treaties the East has been slowest of all parts of the world in following Western methods, that is, by having neutral investigations and reports. The Orient has not had any experience with courts or judicial processes in the way that the Western nations have, particularly the English speaking nations, and, consequently, they are slower in adopting what is essentially a judicial or impartial method. The Oriental mind tends to negotiation rather than to conciliation through an umpire. Asked if Japan belongs to the World Court, the Secretary replied that in fact the Chief Judge of that Court is now a Japanese. However, as between the Orientals themselves they have not, speaking



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in the most general terms, gained the Occidental habit of mind in such matters and, consequently, it has been very difficult in the present situation to get China and Japan to settle their controversy according to Occidental methods. In addition to the individual conciliation treaties, a number of multilateral treaties have also been made. These treaties are adhered to by a number of states, particularly the American states. There is the so-called treaty to prevent conflicts between American states, concluded in 1923, to which seventeen countries are parties. There is another general convention of American conciliation made in 1929 with six adherents, and there is, in addition thereto, a general conciliation treaty which was recommended by a Committee of the League of Nations for the pacific settlement of international disputes to which the members of the League of Nations have been invited to join and which a great many of them have joined. This is called the General Statute or General Act which has one chapter relating to conciliation which follows these same principles. These treaties were cited in order that the correspondents might understand what the Secretary meant this morning when he said in effect that the League Resolution in general followed the form of settlement of a dispute which has become almost universal. This is one of the good points of the League Resolution.

In the second place, it provides for the cessation of hostilities. That has been difficult because at present, and even before this trouble arose, banditry was very common in Manchuria and there is likely to be difficulty in differentiating between sporadic attacks of bandits, which were customary and are now particularly frequent since the act of Japan destroyed a great many of the Chinese forces which formerly preserved order. A certain amount of military action



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will be necessary for protection against banditry, but this Resolution as now proposed calls on the two Governments to give the strictest orders to the commanders of their respective forces to refrain from any initiative which may lead to further fighting or loss of life and to take all measures to avoid any further aggravation of the situation.

In the third place, one of the great benefits of the League Resolution is that it provides time for full consideration of the problem and it does so under the auspices of a neutral commission. It has been very evident during the last two months in the meetings of the League Council that the reaching of an agreement of this kind has been a troublesome matter. The League Council, however, is made up of very busy statesmen and they have been called upon to give up a great deal of their time during the last two months to the consideration of this single question. It has been very evident that the pressure of other business on them has been one of the difficult features of the situation and has led to great pressure in the way they had to handle this situation.

In the next place, this Resolution repeats the solemn pledge of Japan, contained in the Resolution of September 30, to withdraw her troops as speedily as possible. This Resolution does not take the place of or supersede that promise and that promise is still in effect and is repeated in the proposed League Resolution.

Finally, we have felt that it was a matter of great importance that when the problem of Manchuria is settled it must be by negotiation between China and Japan, because no group of neutrals is going to make a settlement which will actually settle the problem; nothing but the act of the two Governments involved by direct negotiation can accomplish that.



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We have been working in order that, when that time of negotiation comes, Japan shall not be able, by her occupation of Manchuria, to wring out of China forced-by-military-pressure concessions to which she was not entitled. The presence in Manchuria at that time of the neutral Commission, making an impartial investigation under the full powers which are enumerated above, appears to be about the surest guarantee that if any unfairness is attempted it will at least be recognized and spotted. The best hope we previously had of preventing such a course by Japan was by having neutral observers sit in the Conference. The present remedy is much more effective, however, because here is a Commission free, not only to sit and observe, but to go around and study and make reports and make them public to the world, which is indeed a long step forward. This Resolution, in other words, contains within it the machinery for insuring, so far as human beings can insure anything, that the ultimate solution of this problem which must be negotiated will be reached under circumstances where at least the parties concerned and the world will know the facts and the justice of the situation.

The above is a hasty summary of the things which led the Secretary to feel that the Council had worked out, not without assistance, a proposition which has a fair chance of working out a permanent and good solution of about the most difficult kind of a problem which could ever be thrown on a poor world or the Department of State.

Asked if there was any indication that Japan would agree to this latest proposition of the League, the Secretary said, also FOR BACKGROUND, that he would not be talking with the correspondents in this press conference if he did not think there was. A correspondent asked if matters had reached a point where the Secretary could say whether it was probable that the United States would have a member on that Commission



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in Manchuria. Mr. Stimson, in reply, said we would consider it very carefully. The Commission is to be appointed by the League and there are many precedents or similar situations where the League has chosen an eminent American to perform such service and if they should feel that an American could perform a service of value in this situation it would be a pretty grave responsibility to object to it and, frankly, the Secretary said he did not think we should object. Asked if he recalled any other League bodies on which well-known Americans were asked to serve, Mr. Stimson said there was a Commission appointed by the League last year for service in Liberia on which an American served. The correspondent then asked if the Young and Dawes Commissions were not League bodies. He was informed in reply that they were not directly appointed by the League, but the Secretary could not recall how much the League had to do with the initiation of the Commissions but they were appointed by the Governments that formed it. A correspondent asked if an American so appointed would be an official representative of this Government or if he would serve in a private capacity. The Secretary, in reply, said he desired to straighten that point out for the correspondents. The League in reaching this Resolution is acting under Article 11 of the Covenant, which is the conciliation article. It is the one concerning which there must be unanimous consent. It is the article in the Covenant which most nearly resembles a conciliation treaty. This action is not taken under article 15 or 16 where the consent of the disputants is not necessarily required. This is purely a conciliatory body appointed under an article which provides for the consent of the two disputants themselves. A correspondent asked if this means that troops withdrawals should start before the Commission is appointed. Mr. Stimson, in reply, referred the correspondent to the other provisions of



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the Resolution. The appointment of and the deliberations of the Commission are not to be used as any ground for delay of withdrawal. It means that they should start as quickly as they can be withdrawn with reference to what the Resolution of September 30 provided, so as not to strip any particular place needing protection against bandits. A correspondent observed that it was quite possible that Japanese troops could readily offer, not as an excuse but as a contention, that the troops in various places could not be withdrawn because protection could not be otherwise afforded and that the troops might, therefore, still be in various places outside of the Railway Zone when the Commission arrives. Mr. Stimson, in reply, said that from the information before us and before the Council such a contention would be well-founded in some places. There are places now where the danger of banditry is serious and probably it would be some time before it would be possible to organize local police forces adequate to meet the various situations. A correspondent said he presumed then that the two most important points in the Resolution covered the cessation of hostilities and the appointment of the Commission. The correspondent then asked if the possible contention by the Japanese could refer to the main body of the Japanese troops, as the main body of the troops apparently would not be necessary to maintain order. In reply, the Secretary said that the question concerned a matter about which he could not speak in the absence of detailed information. The Secretary added that he meant to make clear to the correspondents that this Resolution does not in any way relax the pressure which the Council of the League has been putting on since September 30 for the troop withdrawals when Japan promised they would be made. The Resolution,

...and for



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however, does not fix a time limit. Mr. Stimson added that he thought it impossible to fix a time limit, from information now available. It may be Japan's fault that the police forces in many places were destroyed but the fact remains that there are now a great many places where police forces must be built up from the ground. A correspondent asked if there was any reason to believe that the unanimous approval required may be given at the meeting of the Council scheduled for tomorrow. Mr. Stimson, in reply, said that he did not have enough information to enable him to forecast the happenings in the League tomorrow. It is quite possible that the whole thing may blow up and we cannot tell from one day to another what may happen. The Secretary said that all he could say is, as the man who fell out of the top story window said as he passed the next one below, "I am all right so far." Referring to questions which have been asked at many press conferences during the past few weeks as to whether he was hopeful of favorable results, Mr. Stimson said he was more hopeful tonight than at any time since September. The Secretary added, however, that he did not want the above statement quoted or attributed to him in any way. A correspondent then asked if he might, without quoting or attributing say that the Secretary felt that way about the situation. In reply, the Secretary said he preferred that the correspondent not use that statement of optimism in any way.

Referring to the fact that the League Resolution provides that the two Governments shall instruct their military commanders to refrain from hostile acts, a correspondent asked what Government in China would carry this out. The correspondent added that sovereignty in China was purely nominal. Mr. Stimson in reply said that Manchuria had been recognized as part of the Nanking Government and that the



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Nanking Government is sovereign to Manchuria. Everyone knows, however,, that all China is in a state of unrest and this state is one of the elements of this particular problem. Mr. Stimson added that he did not think the correspondent could rightfully say that the sovereignty of the Nanking Government was purely nominal. The Nanking Government is the only Government which the League of Nations or anyone else has been dealing with and the Nanking Government, furthermore, is the only Government of China recognized by any nations of the world.

A correspondent here asked if he could quote the text of the League Resolution as shown above. The Secretary, in reply, said that the correspondent might use the text, which is believed to be correct, but that he should state that the text was correct according to best information available in Washington tonight and that it should not be attributed to any definite source. It must yet be formally approved in a League meeting. All approval given so far has been in private discussion, submitted informally of course, and not binding until it is finally brought up in the public meeting and adopted. The method which they have used is one very common in international conferences where they do a great deal of discussion separately and apart and find out what will meet general approval, because they must have unanimous consent.

A correspondent asked if the Secretary would refresh his memory as to Japan's promise of Septer or 30. Mr. Stimson, in reply, said that was the original Resolution of the League of Nations which Japan accepted and voted for. The Secretary then said that part of Article III of the Resolution of September 30 reads as follows:



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"The Council notes the Japanese representative's statement that his Government will continue as rapidly as possible the withdrawal of its troops, which has already begun, into the Railway Zone as the proportion of lives and safety of Japanese nationals is effectively insured."

Also in Article IV the Council notes the Chinese representative's statement that his Government will assume responsibility for the safety of Japanese lives and property outside that Zone if the withdrawal of Japanese troops continues and the Chinese police forces are reestablished. A correspondent asked if the Secretary could say for guidance what type of men he anticipated would serve on that Commission. Mr. Stimson, in reply, said he preferred to let the correspondents speculate on that question. The correspondent then said that everybody from Chief Justice Hughes down had been mentioned - some mentioned Mr. Fletcher, others General Summerall, and others General Pershing. In reply, Mr. Stimson said he preferred not to speculate on that question tonight.

Speaking in STRICT CONFIDENCE, the Secretary added that the correspondents must realize that this has been a trying, long, hard, complicated negotiation. It is, in fact, easier to negotiate a treaty and to execute it, and even to get it through the Senate, than it is to enforce it in such strange conditions and in such distant places as are involved in the Sino-Japanese dispute. It is the first great test on these various peace treaties and it is the first major test of these treaties under these most difficult circumstances. Mr. Stimson added that he was not surprised that we have met with great difficulties and great discouragement and that the progress has been slow. He added, furthermore, that it no doubt seemed slower to the correspondents than it did to the Department. Mr. Stimson said, furthermore, that the gentlemen of the press have been very patient and that all he could say was that he felt that so far as this country is concerned we have gotten on as well as we could expect. If this League plan goes



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through, and the Secretary has hopes that it will go through in substantially the form shown above, he will feel that we have accomplished a very great step over what could have been done if there had not been available this peace machinery. The Secretary added that he wanted the correspondents to remember that when this trouble broke out, it broke out on the other side of the world and that it broke out at a time when all the nations of the world were at the lowest ebb of their personal fortunes and when some of them were on the verge of bankruptcy. It occurred at a time when under normal circumstances and without any peace machinery available everybody would have been tempted to look the other way, like the Pharisee who passed on the other side of the street. Instead of that, however, within two days after the first move of this alleged breach of peace it was taken up before a meeting of the great powers of the world who happened to be assembled in Geneva. Since that time it has met the unanimous effort of the leading statesmen representing every large country in the world to endeavor to stop this prairie fire which broke out on the opposite side of the globe and a time when strength, plans and efforts of the most self-sacrificing character have been given to check that fire and to prevent it from running, as prairie fires normally do, into great destruction. It is easy to sit in the editorial room and wonder why the Government of the United States does not do something and why secret messages are being sent and why they are not published on the front page of the newspapers. That is not the way in which the wisest kind of pressure can be brought in a situation like this, where national pride is involved and local antipathies have been excited and where mutual jealousies occur and where the best you can do is to try to work out the best gradual solution which will put it in the course of being properly adjusted.

Referring to the Secretary's statement above that these



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treaties are undergoing the first great test, a correspondent asked if the Secretary would specify what treaties were involved. Mr. Stimson, in reply, said that one is the Covenant of the League of Nations which happened to be in operation. The meeting was there and China brought the question up. The Kellogg Pact has been invoked and the Nine-Power Treaty has been mentioned to China and Japan. These are the three treaties which cover this situation and which have been involved in these discussions.

In conclusion, the Secretary said he preferred that the correspondents attribute to him on the fact that he approved of this Resolution. The correspondents may then use the reasons for his approval by way of BACKGROUND only.

M. J. McDermott.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75





EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Warsaw, November 25, 1931.

No. 120

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The Honorable

The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Sir:

Supplementing despatches No. 1006 of October 9, 1931, and No. 1026 of October 20, 1931, on the Sino-Japanese conflict, I have the honor to report that the press has contained full news accounts of events in Manchuria, and has also watched with interest developments at the recent session of the League's Council in Paris. The GAZETA POLSKA (official) of November 22, 1931, contained a declaration of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Poland's delegate to the Council's meeting, wherein he stated:

"Poland

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- 2 -

"Poland has participated in the efforts of the League of Nations to clear up the Sino-Japanese conflict and clearly understands the difficulties that exist, owing to the special character of this region. The League of Nations must find a solution but has not on hand sufficient data and information. For this reason Poland supports the project of appointing a commission to the Far East and is hopeful that this measure will relieve the situation."

Poland's attitude to any problem being considered by the League of Nations which does not directly affect its interests combines aloofness with fear of precedents. On several noted occasions Poland has run counter to the League or the Council of Ambassadors on territorial or minority questions. In the Sino-Japanese conflict, Poland while not believing that the League can force a solution, perceives an academic menace: rulings which might some day be applied to a Polish problem. For this reason, its attitude, while seemingly one only of lip service, is not entirely negative.

Local observers see in M. Zaleski's vagueness at Paris a desire to avoid commitment; to keep his hands free in view of the pending non-aggression pact negotiations with the U.S.S.R. Theoretically, the non-revisionist policy of Poland would align M. Zaleski on the side of the strict observance of the treaty status-quo ante in Manchuria. It is understood that the Soviet Government would be gratified if Poland were to avoid publicly advocating the Japanese thesis that China had in fact been guilty of violating treaty obligations.

The Japanese Military Attaché has furnished news items on the present military operations in Manchuria

to



- 3 -

to the Polish press. The Japanese Minister is shortly giving a luncheon for principal representatives of the Polish press in Warsaw. It is believed that he is very active in his endeavor to lay before the Polish public the Japanese side of the present dispute. There have been negotiations for the past few months on the opening of a Chinese Legation in Warsaw, and it is understood that a Chinese Minister to Poland will be appointed shortly.

Respectfully yours,

*John C. Wiley*

John C. Wiley,  
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

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Copy to E. I. C.

711.

JCW:GAA:BJD

4 Carbon Copies

Received *J. C. Wiley*



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Dated December 5, 1931

Rec'd 10:25 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.


843, December 5, 1 p. m.

FROM AMBASSADOR DAVES.

793.94

Koo has cabled Sze stating in effect that China has not agreed to withdraw its troops below the Chinese Wall thus upsetting the status of neutral zone discussion. His accompanying statement to Sze of conditions of public feeling in China and the statement he desires Sze to make to the Council indicate that the Chinese Government cannot control its policy and is at present in about the situation of the Japanese Government before Shidehara and the military element reached the understanding which led to partial Japanese troop withdrawal.

The Japanese representatives here have received long instructions from their Government which they have not yet communicated to anybody but expect to make known their position today. Further procedure depends of course what that position is. Apparently the best which can be expected from the



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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2- #843, from Paris, Dec. 5, 1 p. m.

from the Chinese is acquiescence in the status quo of troop locations both of their own and Japanese troops. On the other hand Drummond believes that the Japanese are about to maintain that they withdrew their troops east of the Liao River in consideration of the Chinese promise to withdraw their troops below the Chinese Wall which the latter now denied.

In view of the above matters here today should probably move rapidly.

SHAW

WSB



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM


GRAY

Amoy via N. R.


Dated December 5, 1931

Rec'd 10:15 a. m.

RECEIVED  
DEC 7 1931  
DIVISION OF



Secretary of State,  
Washington.



December 5, noon.

Referring to my telegram of November 27, 2 p. m.,  
and my despatch to the Legation of December 1, 1931,  
I am reliably informed that Chinese authorities in Amoy  
have been instructed by both the Chinese Government  
at Nanking and that Provincial Government at Foochow to  
restrain any over-energetic actions against Japan. The  
local anti-Japanese society established by certain  
members of Amoy Chamber of Commerce formerly seemed  
strongest boycott organization but it has now been  
amalgamated with the anti-Japanese boycott society  
under official control. No recent threats have been made  
by Japanese gunboats to land marines. Japanese boycott  
at Amoy believed to be well enforced and little or no  
official pressure needed to make it so, as it apparently  
meets with whole hearted support of Chinese people who  
would have it more strictly enforced than authorities allow.

Repeated to Legation.

FRANKLIN

WSB

793.94  
note  
693.9412

F/LS

793.94/3044

FILED



REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

GREEN

Paris

Dated December 5, 1931

Rec'd 12:20 p. m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEC 7 1931

DIVISION OF

WESTERN

AFRICA

ASIA

AMERICA

EUROPE

GENERAL

ADMINISTRATIVE

LEGATION

CONSUL

ATTACHÉ

CHIEF OF BUREAU

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RECEIVED

DEC 5 1931

DIVISION OF

FAIR EASTERN AFFAIRS

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DEC 5 1931

DIVISION OF

FAIR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

844, December 5, 3 p. m.  
FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES.

The Japanese have taken a position before the Drafting Committee this morning, first, that Tokyo is definitely opposed to linking up the Commission with evacuation but after strong pressure from the Committee Ito agreed to consult with his delegation as to whether any possible formula could be found;

Second, that Tokyo also insists on a clear recognition of Japan's right to take police measures against bandits. Again, however, he agreed to present to his delegation Cecil's suggestion that the whole matter of bandits be dropped out of the resolution or declaration and covered in a statement by the Japanese delegation to accompany the resolution to which the other members of the Council maintained liberty to reply as they may deem necessary.

HPD

SHAW

F/LS

793.94/3045

FE  
WE  
FE

DEC 10 1931



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WP

FROM GREEN

Paris

Dated December 6, 1931

Rec'd 10:10 p. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.


848, December 6, 8 p. m.

FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES.

Following report is from Sweetser:

"Ito informed the drafting committee this afternoon of the action taken by its delegation following yesterday's meeting on the two points outstanding with the Japanese. As regards the first involving Japan's right to take police action against bandits he stated the delegation had cabled Tokyo recommending the dropping of any such provision from either the resolution or declaration and substituting in its place a unilateral declaration by the Japanese delegate. Should Tokyo agree the Japanese delegation would give the members of the Council an advance copy.

The second point involving the relationship of  
/ the commission to evacuation showed a decided difference  
of



F/DEW 793.94/3046

FILED

DEC 14 1931



- 2 - No. 848 from Paris -

of conception of the Commission as between the Japanese and the other Council members. Ito explained that his government feared that the mandate of the Commission would be modified by the last paragraph of Article 5. That mandate he said was very wide and would cover 'all circumstances' while if at the end a special power were added the nature of the Commission would thereby be changed.

(END SECTION ONE)

SHAW

CIB



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WP

GREEN

Paris

FROM Dated December 6, 1931

Rec'd 10:20 p. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

848, December 6, 8 p. m. (SECTION TWO).

In this case Japan would have a fundamental objection and would have to reconsider the whole idea of the Commission of Inquiry. His government had at the outset not been able to agree to a special committee of inquiry in the Manchurian incident because it felt that that incident was but one element developing out of a long background. It had now proposed a general commission however to study the whole relationship between China and Japan recognizing of course that one of the elements in the situation was the present Manchurian situation. To meet the difficulty he proposed a personal text which he had already cabled to Tokyo as follows: 'within the scope of the above mandate, the Commission can, after its arrival in China, be charged by the Council to furnish it information on the execution of the resolution of September 30th.'

Cecil had accepted this draft yesterday for himself; the other members of the Committee seemed inclined  
at first



- 3 - No. 848 from Paris - section two-

at first to do likewise. But difficulties soon developed. Would this mean that the Council would have to meet especially to give this authority which would seem both unnecessary and cumbersome or could the President be authorized to do it on his own? Would such action by the Council require unanimity which would reduce the provision to nothing? Would not the phraseology limit the Commission and withhold what should be a normal power until that power was

(END SECTION TWO).

SHAW

CIB



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WP

GREEN  
FROM  
Paris

Dated December 6, 1931

10:35 p. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

848, December 6, 8 p. m. (SECTION THREE).  
specifically granted? Finally, what hope would there  
be of getting the Chinese, who clung so tenaciously to  
this last remnant of a time limit for the evacuation,  
to accept substitutions?

Ito was impressed by these difficulties, particu-  
larly as to unanimity and agreed to re-consult his  
delegation. After his departure Cecil said he had sug-  
gested yesterday to Ito that it might be best to drop this  
from the resolution and include it in the declaration  
which Ito seemed to accept. If that were done Cecil  
pointed out the Council's ideas could be put in clear  
direct terms, which would satisfy the Chinese more fully  
and save the Japanese from their obvious embarrassment  
that the Commission was going further than they had  
anticipated.

Two. Military reports were circulated today and  
particularly



- 2 - No. 848 from Paris - section three -

particularly commented in view of Tokyo press despatches that Honjo had warned Chang to withdraw from Chinchow. The French observers in that district report that there has been no appreciable change since November 27th the number of troops remain the same; the trains are running regularly; and no requisition of wagons for the transport of Chinese troops has been reported on the Tientsin line. The British saw no evidence of the banditry alleged at Paichipu and stated there had been no movement of Chinese troops north of the wall."

(END MESSAGE).

SHAW

CIB



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

M M

GREEN

PARIS

FROM

Dated December 5, 1931

Rec'd 1:11 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

845, December 5, 4 p.m.

FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES

Following is text Chinese memorandum handed to committee of twelve this morning:

"The special diplomatic commission as the result of careful deliberation has formulated the conclusions and observations indicated below:

One. China cannot accept the Japanese proposal for a neutral zone at Chinchow.

Two. The action of the Council on November 26 leaving to neutral observers the task of avoiding a clash between the Japanese and Chinese forces is deemed to have settled the Chinchow question.

Three. It is again pointed out that Great Britain, France and the United States not being favorably disposed to the idea of their taking a guarantee from Japan the conversation with the ministers of these powers in Peiping did not result in any proposal along this line by China.

Four. Assuming the sincerity of Japan's declaration that

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 5 1931  
Department of State

F/DEW

793.94/3047

DEC 14 1931

FILED



LAM

2- #845, from Paris, December 5,  
1931

that she has no intention of attacking Chinchow and assuming that Japan keeps her forces which have now been withdrawn from the neighborhood of Chinchow within the railway zone obviously the possibility of a clash is eliminated. Furthermore, an advance by Chinese troops in Chinchow in the direction of the Japanese stations is no part of Chinese policy.

(END SECTION ONE)

SHAW

WSB



## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

KAM

GREEN

FROM PARIS

Dated December 5, 1931

Rec'd 2 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

845, December 5, 4 p.m. (SECTION TWO AND LAST)

Five. The people of China would view with surprise any yielding at this time by the Council to Japan's request for a withdrawal of Chinese forces from China's own territory.

Six. The reservations embodied in the Japanese proposal are so broad as to permit complete occupation of Manchuria by Japan. Clause four, for example, contains a reservation which makes the entire scheme worthless from China's point of view. Furthermore, the conditions may be regarded by Japan as relating to local district administration rather than provincial government or to some type of administration subservient to Japan; and Japan might claim the right to exclude certain classes of troops.

Seven. As already cabled the laying out of a buffer zone cannot under the decision of the Central Political Council be acquiesced in by China unless some effective arrangement is concluded whereby the guarantees of organized units of foreign powers are provided. It must be understood that if Japan attacks Chinchow and Council is ineffective  
appropriate



WAM

2- #845, from Paris, December 5  
1931, section two.

appropriate measures of self-defense by China are inevitable.

Eight. This so-called question of Chinchow ought to be disassociated from the plan contemplated by the Council's resolution because it is evidently raised by Japan for the purpose of side-tracking the real issue of evacuation.

Nine. The neutral zone conception not only has no support in China but public feeling is running high against it. Both the government and informed opinion generally considers the withdrawal of Chinese forces from Chinchow within the Great Wall is nothing short of an abandonment of China's last position in Manchuria.

Ten. The foregoing statement of China's position should be at once conveyed to the Secretary General of the League for circulation to the members of the committee of twelve. Chinese delegation Paris December 5, 1931".

WSB

SHAW



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAIA

GRAY

FROM

NANKING

Dated December 5, 1931

Rec'd 5 p.m. 7

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DEC 5 1931

Department of State

Secretary of State

Washington

117, December 5, 12 midnight.

Reuter's agent here informs me that Alfred Sze and Wellington Koo have both handed in their resignations.

Telegram from Sze arrived December 5, 8 a.m. and stated that a deputation of Chinese in Europe had presented to him a demand that he cease immediately to attend Council meetings and that he institute proceedings for China's withdrawal from the League. Sze informed President Chiang that he regretted the failure of his efforts and he asked that some one be appointed to take his place. The President has telegraphed urging Sze to continue at his post. Resignation of Koo handed to the President today states that he has been working twenty hours a day and seems to have achieved nothing and that he will cease from his duties beginning December 6. The President has urged him also to remain at his post. Student deputations have harrassed the Foreign Office the last few days and I infer that Koo either is profoundly discouraged or desires an indication of confidence from the Government.

American Minister and Legation informed signed "for the Minister".

PECK

CV

F/DEW

793.94/3048

FILED

DEC 10 1931

773.94  
893.002  
5001.0112



MP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

Nanking via N.R.

Dated December 6, 1931

FROM

Rec'd 11:50 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

118, December 6, 2 p.m.

My December 5, 12 midnight.

793.94  
793.94  
One. Called on Dr. Koo this morning, ascertained that his resignation had been prompted by the constant student demonstrations directed against the Chinese Foreign Office. He stated, however, that last night the Government issued a mandate ordering that students be prevented from coming to the capitol and also an order declaring martial law in Nanking and while Koo would make no positive statement regarding withdrawal of his resignation, I strongly inferred that with these measures he will remain in office. He would express no opinion regarding the probability that Alfred Sze would likewise reconsider his resignation.

Two. Koo said that the four points on which the students and a portion of the general public are insisting is that,

One. There shall be no neutral zone declared in the Chinchow area.

Two. That a time limit shall be set for Japanese evacuation.

Three



F/DEW

793.94/3049

REC 10 1931

FILED



MP

2-#118 from Nanking, Dec.6, 1931

893.52 T  
Three. That there shall be no international supervision in Tientsin and,

Four. That there shall be no direct negotiation with Japan prior to evacuation of the occupied areas. He said there was violent opposition to a retreat by China from the last corner of Manchuria still under Chinese administration and that the students and their sympathizers were clamoring for war with Japan in order to recover Chinese lost position in Manchuria.

893.51  
Three. I inquired regarding the financial position of Chinese Government and Koo said that the continued uncertainty in regard to the Manchurian negotiations seemed to make the Chinese bankers reluctant to advance funds. This remark seems to bear out the current impression that the National Government is in serious financial straits and is seeking to subsist largely on loans.

Four. In regard to the departure of General Chiang Kai Shek to the Northwest sometime ago Koo intimated that this journey had been indefinitely postponed. Legation informed.

PECK

KLP



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

PM REGU TELEGRAM SENT

1-138  
PREPARING OFFICE  
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Charge Department

OR  
Charge to  
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Department of State

1-138  
TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

Washington,  
December 8, 1931.

793.94/3049

AMEMBASSY **DEC 8 31**

PARIS (France).

637

FOR AMBASSADOR DAWES.

The American Consul General at Nanking telegraphed,  
under date December 6, <sup>3049</sup> that in an interview with  
Wellington Koo, ~~Koo said that the four points on~~  
~~which the students and a portion of the general~~  
~~public are insisting are that there shall be no~~  
~~neutral zone declared in the Chinchow area; that a~~  
~~time limit shall be set for Japanese evacuation; that~~  
~~there shall be no international supervision in~~  
~~Tientsin; and that there shall be no direct negotiation~~  
~~with Japan prior to evacuation of the occupied areas.~~  
Koo said that there was violent opposition to a retreat  
by China from the last corner of Manchuria still under  
Chinese administration and that the students and  
their sympathizers were clamoring for war with Japan  
in order to recover the position lost by the Chinese  
in Manchuria.

793.94/3049

FE:MMH/VDM

FE

Enciphered by MMH

Sent by operator M., 1931

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138



MP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Peiping via N.R.

Dated December 6, 1931

Rec'd 3:03 a.m.

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D. FROM

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

1046, December 6, 1 p.m.

Following from American Consul General at Mukden:

"December 5, 1 p.m.


Please refer to my recent telegrams concerning Chinese troop movements. The Japanese spokesman stated last night "the infiltration of Chinese troops into the Faku district continues."

Two. A careful study of reliable sources of information indicates that about five brigades of Chinese forces with cavalry and artillery now occupy the west side of the Liao River Valley, the Tahushan, Changwu and Faku districts.

Three. It is believed this north and eastward move is an effort by the Chinese troops, relying upon the protection of the neutral zone, to regain their earlier positions and to provide themselves with winter quarters, rather than an offensive movement against the Japanese.

Four. This occupation of an area infested by bandits is expected to result in increased bandit activity east of the Liao, thus endangering the South

Manchuria



F/DEW

793.94/3050

FILED

DEC 11 1931



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MP

2-#1046 From Peiping, Dec.5, 1931

Manchuria Railway, which, according to all private  
advices, will force the Japanese troops to take the  
offensive."

FOR THE MINISTER

PERKINS

KLP



JS

Gray

PARIS

Dated December 5, 1931


Rec'd 10:00p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington, D.C.

847, December 5, 11 p.m.  
FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES.

Following is report from Sweetser:

"Cecil reported to the twelve this afternoon regarding this morning's meeting of the Drafting Committee with Ito. He said he thought the committee had been completely unsuccessful in meeting the Japanese view and had indeed been handicapped by the fact that Ito seemed to agree throughout with the Committee rather than with his government. There still remained two questions, first as to police action, which he hoped might be omitted entirely from either resolution or declaration and left to a unilateral declaration by the Japanese, and second, what he called the pitiful remnants of the attempt to fix a time limit for evacuation, which again he thought might better be put in the form of a strong statement in the declaration rather than in an  
anomalous



F/DEM

793.94/3051

DEC 14 1931

FILED



-2-

From Paris, December 5, #847, Sec. 1.

anomalistic phrase accepted by the Japanese for  
the resolution.

A general discussion then followed. Cecil said  
he thought the Council ought to face the fact that  
it had secured

(End Section one)

SHAW

OX



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JS

Green

PARIS  
FROM

Dated December 5, 1931

Rec'd 10:15 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D.C.

847, Section two. December 5, 11 p.m.

secured very little result under the mediatory provisions which are alone possible under Article Eleven which requires unanimity as the <sup>parties</sup> ~~proposal~~ seemed willing to do everything except agree on the same thing. The Council had however secured the commission which was of very substantial value. He himself was very discouraged by the Chinese attitude on Chinchow and was afraid China was sealing her own doom. She would either go to pieces or fall victim to the Japanese or Chinese.

Colban was not so pessimistic. This affair was not only a startling crisis in itself but also one of the most difficult fundamental problems in the World. The Council had already prevented conflict maintained contact and offered a way out. Briand took much the same view. Article Eleven permitted only modest results at best; it could not



-2-

From Paris December 5, #847, Sect. 2.

not lead to a great transformation. The Council was in the presence of two countries very firmly standing their ground; one had decided upon stern action to discipline the other. He confessed to great disquietude when the observers had been sent; now at last after much difficulty the Council had arrived at a general resolution. Acts of war had not become war; the commission would provide real information; the two peoples would accustom themselves to fraternal conciliation. He thought the time had come to complete the resolution.

The twelve accordingly agreed to rush the resolution to completion while the situation still permitted. Accordingly

(End Section Two).

SHAW

OX



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JS

Green

PARIS  
FROM  
Dated December 5, 1931  
Rec'd 10:30 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington, D.C.

847, Section Three, December 5, 11 p.m.

it decided not to take the Chinese memorandum on Chinchow as applying to the present situation but as having been directed to the original proposals which were now out of date to enhance hope of a better arrangement for the neutral zone. It was agreed that there would be private negotiations tomorrow on the resolution with both parties; that the Drafting Committee would meet separately with first the Chinese and then the Japanese tomorrow afternoon; and that an effort would be made to bring an agreed resolution before a final public meeting Monday afternoon or Tuesday. All this is of course conditional on no explosion occurring at Chinchow and is indeed being rushed in order to forestall such an explosion.

During the discussion Mutius, the German representative asked what the situation was as to the cooperation of the United States. Briand replied in



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JS

Green

PARIS  
FROM  
Dated December 5, 1931  
Rec'd 10:30 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington, D.C.

847, Section Three, December 5, 11 p.m.

it decided not to take the Chinese memorandum on Chinchow as applying to the present situation but as having been directed to the original proposals which were now out of date to enhance hope of a better arrangement for the neutral zone. It was agreed that there would be private negotiations tomorrow on the resolution with both parties; that the Drafting Committee would meet separately with first the Chinese and then the Japanese tomorrow afternoon; and that an effort would be made to bring an agreed resolution before a final public meeting Monday afternoon or Tuesday. All this is of course conditional on no explosion occurring at Chinchow and is indeed being rushed in order to forestall such an explosion.

During the discussion Mutius, the German representative asked what the situation was as to the cooperation of the United States. Briand replied in



-2-  
From Paris, Dec. 5, #847; Sect. 3

in a single sentence that on several occasions  
that government had intervened along the same  
lines as the Council.

Considerable press agitation centering on  
Sze's alleged resignation which equally caused  
interest in official circles was dispelled by  
fuller information that Sze had in effect offered  
his resignation according to the conventional  
Chinese practice following a violent denunciation  
by Kuomintang headquarters in Europe but that his  
action was not expected to become effective."

End message.

SHAW

JS



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


TELEGRAM RECEIVED  
CORRECTED COPY

REP

FROM GREEN  
Paris

Dated December 5, 1931

Rec'd 4:20 p. m.



Secretary of State,  
Washington.

846, December 5, 6 p. m. (SECTIONS 1 to 7)

FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES

Following is report from Sweetser:

"Ito appeared before the drafting committee this morning with the suggestions from Tokyo as to the resolution and the President's declaration which he frankly stated did not constitute good news.

The only amendment suggested to the resolution was the omission of that part of the fifth paragraph establishing a link between the commission and evacuation. Ito explained at length the spirit in which his government had proposed the commission which it felt to be a very constructive idea. Japan, he said, had cooperated with the League most faithfully ever since its inception but that had naturally applied to matters predominantly in Europe. Japan felt however that the League's work should be extended outside Europe but necessarily adapted to a somewhat

793.94/3052

DEC 11 1931

FILED



REP

2- #846, from Paris, Dec. 5, 6 p. m.  
(Sections 1 to 7)

somewhat different basis. Last year when the technical collaboration with China was suggested Japan had welcomed the proposal in this spirit. Her government felt that the League should begin in this way and little by little gain ground until it could enter the political field.

Now however the League was face to face with a problem of the utmost complexity. Japan regretted that it had come so quickly but felt that the best way to initiate this political cooperation was to make 'a vast inquiry' to bring out the whole situation in the Far East. His government wished consequently a commission not of technicians or experts but of statesmen commanding the confidence of the whole world. In this way the double objective would be secured of effecting a better understanding of the Far East and of initiating a wide cooperation between the League and that part of the world. Approaching the question in that spirit the government had found it very difficult to accept any modifications in the text. Especially was this so in connection with the provision in question which was taken to mean a final date for withdrawal. It seemed also to contradict the previous provision that the commission should have nothing to do with military movements. If the commission were  
put



REP

3- 1 #846, from Paris, Dec. 5, 6 p.m.  
(Sections 1 to 7)

put in these terms his government would have to reconsider the whole question of its desirability.

Cecil immediately replied that he did not understand the difficulty at all. If evacuation were completed by the time the commission arrived as Japan has constantly seemed to promise the question would not arise. If evacuation were not completed the Council would want to know the facts. Japan had constantly recognized that evacuation was desirable at the earliest possible moment and had herself agreed that the commission should have very wide powers. Consequently he could not see wherein the difficulty lies. Leger urged that Japan should not worry about the time element; evacuation was definitely stated to depend upon the fulfillment of certain conditions. Ito said he understood this; that his delegation had cabled his government exactly these reasons which he found excellent; but that his government maintained its view.

Madariaga pointed out that the Council also had to consider Chinese susceptibilities. They had also taken out the phrase as to the point to which the Council attaches great importance and had inserted this as a balance. Colban felt it was so evident that the commission

would



REP

4- #846, from Paris, Dec. 5, 6 p.m.  
(Sections 1 to 7)

would have to consider evacuation that, even if the Chinese had not requested this paragraph, it would have been the Council's duty to insert it as the question of evacuation was primordial. Ito said again however that his delegation had not been able to make the government understand this viewpoint.

Drummond thought possibly the government feared the commission's right to make recommendations and interpreted this right as being direct to the parties. In that case the recommendations could be definitely stated as to the Council. Cecil offers a redraft to the effect that, as it had not yet been possible to carry out the engagements taken on September 30th, it would be a first duty for the commission to succumb and report to the Council. He asked if it were a question of putting the matter in a way to meet difficulties which do not really exist or if the whole discussion were really useless. If the Council could meet the Japanese difficulties by redrafting all right; if not he thought it best to have a public meeting and thresh the whole matter out.

Ito stated quite frankly that his government interpreted this phrase as constituting an obligation to withdraw on a fixed date and as anticipated evacuation by the time the commission arrived. Cecil reacted very strongly to this.



REP

5- #846, from Paris, Dec. 5, 6 p. m.  
(Sections 1 to 7)

to this. Surely he said the Japanese Government could not think the commission would not investigate that question. It would be almost fantastic not to inquire into this central point and would be treating the commission as children to prevent them from doing so. He could not see what Japan's object was; it would appear to the world that Japan despite all her promises did not intend to evacuate and Ito agreed as to this danger but his government's view was very strong.

Colban pointed out that on September 30 Japan had agreed that evacuation was so urgent that the Council could meet on October 14. Now the Council only asked that the commission report on evacuation when it arrived. This was infinitely less than Japan had already accepted. Ito agreed that that viewpoint was reasonable but his government considered the matter as vital and this view had penetrated to the spirit of the people. There are a million Koreans in Manchuria; if Japan cannot protect them the situation between Japan and Korea would be very bad. What people are saying privately in Japan, he added, is that 36 years ago Japan had come to a good settlement with China when the three powers intervened and forced them to give up all they wanted; now again they feared the entry



REP

6- #846, from Paris, Dec. 5, 6 p.m.  
(Sections 1 to 7).

entry of foreign intervention.

Cecil concluded this part of the discussion with the request to Ito to know if the Japanese delegation had either any other drafting or any other proposal to meet the ~~the~~ <sup>difficulty</sup> The committee of twelve he said had fixed this principle and would not abandon it. Ito would have to give the commission this power and was not ready to agree to its omission. Ito promised to reply today.

As regards the President's declaration Ito submitted a new draft, the most important part of which concerned Japan's rights to take police measures. The whole last part of the declaration after the word 'subjects' would be replaced by the following paragraph 'in these, it is well understood that the resolution is not intended to preclude the Japanese forces from taking such action as may be rendered necessary to provide directly for the protection of the lives and property of the Japanese subjects against the dangers of bandits and lawless elements. Such action is admittedly an exceptional measure, pending the restoration of normal conditions in Manchuria'.

Cecil expressed the opinion straight away that the Council would not be prepared to accept this wording and  
that it



REP

7- #846, from Paris, Dec. 5, 6 p.m.  
(Sections 1 to 7)

that it would be better therefore to leave out the whole paragraph. Ito then pointed out that police action against bandits was a wholly normal and usual procedure which had been necessary for many years and which was even in the interests of the Chinese. No one had ever seen any inconvenience about it; since the trouble it was even more necessary and frequent. He did not understand the Council's preoccupation in the matter nor was it materially possible for Japan to attach observers to these police movements.

Cecil said the Council's fears were obvious in that the pursuit of bandits had led to the occupation of large parts of China. He understood the abnormal conditions prevailing in Manchuria and the necessity of certain police work, not least of all, in the interest of the Chinese themselves. The Japanese phraseology however would allow the establishment of a military protectorate over any part of Manchuria desired. To this of course the Council could not in any way agree. He therefore suggested leaving out the provision altogether with the Japanese making whatever declaration they wished. This would protect the good faith of the Japanese and save the Council from accepting a formula contrary to the Covenant  
and to



REP

8- #846, from Paris, Dec. 5, 6 p. m.  
(Sections 1 to 7).

and to international law.

Ito explained that there were two types of police action the first that which had been done for years for the sole protection of the railway zone and the second, which was purely temporary, for the protection of Japanese in certain centers now occupied. He had tried to avoid police measures from in any way assuming a military form. Also he personally would have preferred not to include this provision in the declaration and his delegation had so telegraphed Tokyo, but Tokyo attached great importance to it. Cecil said it was hopeless to ask the Council to agree to this draft; some members had even doubted if they had not gone too far in their own draft. He again urged that Ito request the delegation to consider the advisability of dropping the whole matter out of the declaration, which Ito agreed to do.

Ito also suggested certain other minor changes which probably will be accepted in part."  
(END MESSAGE).

SHAW

OX



LAM

GREEN

PARIS

Dated December 5, 1931

Rec'd 4:20 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

793.94  
846, December 5, 6 p.m.

FROM AMBASSADOR DAVES

Following is report from Sweetser

"Ito appeared before the drafting committee this morning with the suggestions from Tokyo as to the resolution and the President's declaration which he frankly stated did not constitute good news.

The only amendment suggested to the resolution was the omission of that particular to fifth paragraph establishing a link between the commission and evacuation. Ito explained at length the spirit in which his government had proposed the commission which it felt to be a very constructive idea. Japan, he said, had cooperated with the League most faithfully ever since its inception but that had naturally applied to matters predominantly in Europe. Japan felt however that the League's work should be extended outside Europe but necessarily adapted to a somewhat different basis. Last year when the technical collaboration with China was suggested Japan had welcomed the proposal in this

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 5 1931  
Department of State

F/DEW

793.94/3052

DEC 14 1931

FID



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

mam

2- #846, from Paris, December 5,  
1931

this spirit. Her government felt that the League should  
begin in this way and little by little gain ground until  
it could enter the political field.

(END SECTION ONE)

SHAW

OX



MEM

GREEN

PARIS

Dated December 5, 1931

Rec'd 5:14 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

846, December 5, 6 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

Now however the League was face to face with a problem of the utmost complexity. Japan regretted that it had come so quickly but felt that the best way to (?) this political cooperation was to make 'a vast inquiry' to bring out the whole situation in the Far East. His government wished consequently a commission not of technicians or experts but of statesmen commanding the confidence of the whole world. In this way the double objective would be secured of effecting a better understanding of the Far East and of initiating a wide cooperation between the League and that part of the world. Approaching the question in that spirit the government had found it very difficult to accept any modifications in the text. Especially was this so in connection with the provision in question which was taken to mean a final date for withdrawal. It seemed also to contradict the previous provision that the commission should have nothing to do with military mobbing. If the commission were put in these terms his government would have to



mam

2- #846, section two, from Paris,  
December 5, 1931

to reconsider the whole question of its desirability.

Cecil immediately replied that he did not understand the difficulty at all. If evacuation were completed by the time the commission arrived as Japan has constantly seemed to promise the question would not arise. If evacuation were not completed the Council would want to know the facts. Japan had constantly recognized that evacuation was desirable at the earliest possible moment and had

(END SECTION TWO)

SHAW

OX



## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LAM

FROM

GRAY

PARIS

Dated December 5, 1931

Rec'd 5:30 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

846, December 5, 6 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

herself agreed that the commission should have very wide powers. Consequently he could not see wherein the difficulty lies. Leger urged that Japan should not worry about the time element; evacuation was definitely stated to depend upon the fulfillment of certain conditions. Ito said he understood this; that his delegation had cabled his government exactly these reasons which he found excellent; but that his government maintained its view.

Madariaga pointed out that the Council also had to consider Chinese susceptibilities. They had also taken out the phrase as to the point to which the Council attaches great importance and had inserted this as a balance. Colban felt it was so evident that the commission would have to consider evacuation that, even if the Chinese had not requested this paragraph, it would have been the Council's duty to insert it as the question of evacuation was primordial. Ito said again however that his delegation had no control to make the government understand this viewpoint.

Drummond thought possibly the government feared the commission's



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

mam

2- #846, section three, from Paris  
December 5, 1951

commission's right to make recommendations and interpreted this right as being direct to the parties. In that case the recommendations could be definitely stated as to the Council. Cecil offers a redraft to the effect that, as it had not yet been possible to carry out the engagements taken on September 30th, it would be a first duty for the commission to succumb and report to the Council. He asked if it were a question of putting the matter in a way to meet difficulties which do not

(END SECTION THREE)

SHAW

OX



## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAM

FROM

GREEN

PARIS

Dated December 5, 1931

Rec'd 5:40 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

846, December 5, 6 p.m. (SECTION FOUR)

not really exist or if the whole discussion were really useless. If the Council could meet the Japanese difficulties by redrafting all right; if not he thought it best to have a public meeting and thresh the whole matter out.

Ito stated quite frankly that his government interpreted this phrase as constituting an obligation to withdraw on a fixed date and as anticipated evacuation by the time the commission arrived. Cecil reacted very strongly to this. Surely he said the Japanese Government could not think the commission would not investigate that question. It would be almost fantastic but his government's view was very strong.

Colban pointing out that on September 30 Japan had agreed that evacuation was so urgent that the Council could meet on October 14. Now the Council only asked that the commission report on evacuation when it arrived. This was inferentially not to inquire into this central point and would be treating the commission as children to prevent them



mam

2- #846, section four, from Paris,  
December 5, 1931

them from doing so. He could not see what Japan's object was; it would appear to the world that Japan despite all her promises did not intend to evacuate and Ito agreed as to this danger less than Japan had already accepted. Ito agreed that that viewpoint was reasonable but his government considered the matter as vital and this view had penetrated to the spirit of the people. There are a million Koreans in Manchuria; if Japan cannot protect them the situation

(END SECTION FOUR)

SHAW

OX



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PC

GREEN

FROM PARIS

Dated December 5, 1931.

Rec'd 10:44 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

846. December 5, 6 p.m. (SECTION FIVE).

between Japan and Korea would be very bad. What people are saying privately in Japan, he added, is that 36 years ago Japan had come to a good settlement with China when the three powers intervened and forced them to give up all they wanted; now again they feared the entry of foreign intervention.

Cecil concluded this part of the discussion with the request to Ito to know if the Japanese delegation had either any other drafting or any other proposal to meet the (#). The committee of twelve he said had fixed this principle and would not abandon it. Ito would have to give the commission this power and was not ready to agree to its omission. Ito promised to reply today.

As regards the President's declaration Ito submitted a new draft, the most important part of which concerned Japan's rights to take police measures. The whole last part of the declaration after the word 'subjects' would be replaced by the following paragraph 'in these, it is well



1331  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3- #846 Dec. 5, 6 p.m. from Paris.  
(SECTION FIVE)

it is well understood that the resolution is not intended to preclude the Japanese forces from taking such action as may be rendered necessary to provide directly for the protection of the lives and property of the Japanese subjects against the dangers of bandits and lawless elements. Such action is admittedly an exceptional measure, pending the restoration of normal conditions in Manchuria'.

Oecil expressed the opinion straight away that the (END SECTION FIVE).

# omission.

SHAW

OX



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAM

FROM

GREEN

PARIS

Dated December 5, 1931

Rec'd 7:45 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

846, December 5, 6 p.m. (SECTION SIX)

Council would not be prepared to accept this wording and that it would be better there to leave out the whole paragraph. Ito then pointed out that police action against bandits was a wholly normal and usual procedure which had been necessary for many years and which was even in the interests of the Chinese. No one had ever seen any inconvenience about it; since the trouble it was even more necessary and frequent. He did not understand the Council's preoccupation in the matter nor was it materially possible for Japan to attach observers to these police movements.

Cecil said the Council's fears were obvious in that the pursuit of bandits had led to the occupation of large parts of China. He understood the abnormal conditions prevailing in Manchuria and the necessity of certain police work, not least of all, in the interest of the Chinese themselves. The Japanese phraseology however would allow the establishment of a military protectorate over any part of Manchuria desired. To this of course the Council could not  
in



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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

mam

2- #846, section six, from Paris,  
December 5, 1931

in any way agree. He therefore suggested leaving out the provision altogether with the Japanese making whatever declaration they wished. This would protect the good faith of the Japanese and save the Council from accepting a formula contrary to the Covenant and to international law.

Ito explained that there were two types of police action the first that which had been done for years for the sole protection of the railway zone and the second,

(END SECTION SIX)

SHAW

OX



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAK

FROM

GREEN

PARIS

Dated December 5, 1931

Rec'd 7:55 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

846, December 5, 6 p.m. (SECTION SEVEN)

which was purely temporary, for the protection of Japanese in certain centers now occupied. He had tried to avoid police measures from in any way assuming a military form. also he personally would have preferred not to include this provision in the declaration and his delegation had so telegraphed Tokyo, but Tokyo attached great importance to it. Cecil said it was hopeless to ask the Council to agree to this draft; some members had even doubted if they had not gone too far in their own draft. He again urged that Ito request the delegation to consider the advisability of dropping the whole matter out of the declaration, which Ito agreed to do.

Ito also suggested certain other minor changes which probably will be accepted in part." (END MESSAGE)

SHAW

OX



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GRAY


Tokio

Dated December 7, 1931

Rec'd 5:43 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

*Telegram to  
Paris.*



254, December 7, 3 p. m.

Will Rogers has canceled his engagements and is flying today to Korea with Floyd Gibbons having been "tipped off" that something is about to happen in the next two or three days. He was told by some Japanese military officer that in spite of the Foreign Office policies the army were about to start an offensive movement.

Indications are that the Japanese will shortly take some action at least against advanced Chinese forces.

FORBES

CIB

F/DEW

793.94/3053

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DEC 10 1931

*793.94  
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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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## TELEGRAM SENT

### Department of State

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

Washington,  
December 7, 1931.

AMEMBASSY

PARIS (France).

FOR AMBASSADOR DAWES.

The American Ambassador at Tokyo telegraphs, under  
date December 7, <sup>3053</sup> as follows:

QUOTE Will Rogers has canceled his engagements and  
is flying today to Korea with Floyd Gibbons having been  
SUBQUOTE tipped off END SUBQUOTE that something is about  
to happen in the next two or three days. He was told by  
some Japanese military officer that in spite of the  
Foreign Office policies the army were about to start  
an offensive movement.

Indications are that the Japanese will shortly take  
some action at least against advanced Chinese forces.  
UNQUOTE.

FE:MMH/VDM

FE

Enciphered by MMH

Sent by operator M., 19

Index Bu.—No. 80.

OR ✓  
Dec 7 1931



U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1931

793.94/3053



1837

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM


GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

Dated December 7, 1931

Rec'd 5:40 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington



1049, December 7, 10 a. m.

Following from American Consul General at Mukden:

"December 6, 8 p. m. Japanese headquarters report two companies despatched this morning to attack irregulars occupying Changtu, six miles west of South Manchuria Railway. Movement necessitated by activities of Chinese 20th brigade at Faku.

Two. Detachment of troops were sent short distance north from Hsinmin this morning to district west of Liao where bandits are causing disturbance.

Three. Yesterday 300 Chinese soldiers began retreating to railway near Yingkow. Japanese aeroplanes which were sent out this morning caused the Chinese to retreat to Tienchuangtai. No bombs were used according to the report. Headquarters explained that the Chinese action endangered two companies of Japanese troops at Yingkow."

Repeated to Nanking.

For the Minister

PERKINS

F/DEW 793.94/3054 FILED



1838

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM PLAIN

Peiping via N. R.

Dated December 7, 1931

Rec'd 5:15 a. m.



793.94  
note  
793.94118

Secretary of State,  
Washington

COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

F/LS

1048, December 7, 9 a. m.

Following United Press report dated December 4, at  
Chinchow:

"The group of International military and consular  
observers here had apparently reached the conclusion that  
the proposal for establishment of a neutral zone in the  
Chinchow area is unfeasible and feeling that the situation  
has reached a stalemate are awaiting further instructions  
from their home governments.

While none of the group would permit himself to be  
quoted the general feeling appeared to be that it is futile  
attempt to organize a neutral zone under League or any  
other international auspices because the observers here  
are unable to maintain liaison with both sides because the  
Japanese military have declined to recognize any official  
status for the group and have made it clear that they  
will refuse to admit any interference whatever by an  
outside party.

Traffic

DEC 11 1931

793.94/3055

FILED



REP

2- #1048, from Peiping, Dec. 7, 9 a.m.

Traffic has now been restored on the Peiping-Mukden Railway and a number of foreign observers arrived from Mukden Friday.

The group counted five Chinese military trains between Takushan and Chinchow and a moderate number of troops chiefly concentrated at Koupangtze. The military observers here after twelve days of thorough examination report that the Chinese troops number about 20,000 mostly at Chinchow and Talingho with a considerable force at Koupangtze.

They state that the Chinese commanders while admittedly anxious that they cannot remain in undisturbed possession are not planning any aggressive action against the Japanese. Chinchow is well policed and the Government is apparently organized for a permanent stay.

The observers besides the American and British Military Attaches from Peiping and their assistants include 3 French consular officials, 1 Spanish, and 1 Italian."

For the Minister

PERKINS

KLP



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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DEC 7 1931  
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*EJR*

MBT

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated December 7, 1931

Rec'd 5:40 a.m.

793.94  
not  
793.94118

Secretary of State,

*Telegram to*  
*Paris.*

Washington

CONFIDENTIAL  
O.N. LANDMAN

1047, December 7, 8 a.m.

Following telegrams from Military Attache at  
Chinchow:

"Train service of the P.M. Railway resumed when  
arrived here from Mukden December 4, 9 p.m. British  
observer on train stated Japanese authorities  
declare they do not intend advance on Chinchow. No  
movements Chinese forces in this area. Japanese  
aircraft circles Chinchow each morning."

"December 6, 6 p.m. There has been no change  
in the disposition of the Chinese troops this area  
since withdrawal of Japanese troops to Hsinmin and  
Liao River. Third cavalry brigade continues to  
guard Takuashan-Tungliao Line. Had long interview  
with General Jung this morning. He states positively  
there have been no movements his troops since withdrawal

Japanese

F/LS 793.94/3056

DEC 11 1931  
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184  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#1047 from Peiping via N.R.,  
December 7, 1931.

Japanese troops and that there will be no movements other than to resist Japanese in case they should advance on Chinchow. Observers have traveled to Changwu, Hsinmin, Yingkow and to Shan<sup>2</sup>haikuan between December 2nd and 5th seeing no evidence Chinese troops movement. Daily report given out by Japanese headquarters Mukden believed to be form of propaganda intended to justify further offensive action on part of Japanese".

Repeated Nanking.

For the Minister,

PERKINS

WSB




DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138  
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Department of State



1-138  
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NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

December 7, 1931.

AMEMBASSY,

DEC 7 31

PARIS (FRANCE).

632 For Ambassador Dawes.

One. The American Consul General at Mukden reports, under date December 6, <sup>3054</sup> that Japanese headquarters state that there have been small Japanese troop movements in the vicinities of Changtu and Hsinmin against Chinese bandits and irregulars; that on December 5 three hundred Chinese soldiers began retreating to the railway near Yingkow; that Japanese airplanes sent out on December 6 caused the Chinese to retreat to Tienchuangtai; and that Japanese headquarters explained that the Chinese action endangered two companies of Japanese troops at Yingkow.

Two. On December 7, <sup>3056</sup> the American Legation at Peiping transmitted telegrams from Military Attache Margetts from Chinchow reporting that train service on the Peiping-Mukden Railway has been resumed; that there are no movements of Chinese forces in the Chinchow area; that, since the withdrawal of Japanese troops to Hsinmin and the Liao River, there has been no change in the disposition of Chinese

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-138

793.94/3056



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128  
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or  
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## TELEGRAM SENT

1-138  
TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PLAIN

## Department of State

Washington,

- 2 -

*Chinchow*  
troops in the ~~Chinese~~ area; that Japanese aircraft  
circles Chinchow each morning; that observers, between  
December 2 and December 5, have traveled to Changwu,  
Hsinmin, Yingkow and Shanhaikuan and have seen no  
evidence of Chinese troop movements; and that the daily  
report given out by Japanese headquarters at Mukden is  
believed to be a form of propaganda intended to justify  
further offensive action on the part of the Japanese.

FE:MMH:LM  
*mmh*

*Stinson*  
*OK*

*1931.PM*

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M., \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1959 1-138



1845  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DCR file  
m.m.h.  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

December 9, 1931.

Referring to the attached telegram, No. 123, December 7, 4 p. m., from Hankow, it is my understanding, after discussing the matter with Mr. Shantz, Mr. Jacobs and Mr. Thomas, that Japanese consular officers in various parts of the Far East make it a practice to ask their American colleagues for information as to the number of Americans residing in the respective consular districts or the portions thereof. It appears that the Japanese Consular ~~officer~~ at Hankow is now inaugurating that practice at Hankow and I see no reason for the Department to take any action in the matter.

Mr. Adams evidently thinks that there is something significant about the present request and it seems to me that the Legation should inform him that there is nothing unusual in the present case.

In case Mr. Adams telegraphs again on this subject, it might be well for the Department to reply that it is the Department's understanding that in various parts of the Far East it is customary for Japanese consular officers to exchange with their American colleagues information covering the number of their respective nationals residing in the particular consular districts.

Please note Mr. Shantz's memorandum of December 7.

MMH/REK  
m.m.h.



TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

GRAY

Hankow via N. R.

Dated December 7, 1931

Rec'd 9:25 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

123, December 7, 4 p. m.  
793.94/2946  
My No. 119, November 29, noon.


The Japanese Consul General here has officially asked me for the number and sex of Americans residing in each of the separate designated sections of Hankow and in Hanyang, Wuchang and nearby cities in Hupeh Province.

The Japanese Consul has not during past years requested such information.

Legation and Nanking informed.

JHR  
KLP

ADLS



F/LS

793.94/3057

FILED  
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793.94  
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393.11



4  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF CURRENT INFORMATION

December 7, 1931

re

793.94/3057 ?

With reference to telegram No. 123 of December 7 from Hankow, you may be interested to know that the Japanese Consul General at Hongkong has requested annually for several years past that our office there supply him with the number and sex of Americans residing in that district. I believe that the Japanese have endeavored to compile accurate records of the number of foreigners in China for many years. The Japanese Consul General always offered to reciprocate with similar information concerning Japanese residents.

CI:HS:AB

DCR  
file



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R.Chefoo/ 49 FOR Despatch #- to Legation

FROM Chefoo ( Webber ) DATED Nov.9,1931.  
TO NAME 1-1127 020

REGARDING: Anti-Japanese Activities:Orders issued to police  
authorities that -, were to cease.However, the  
anti-Japanese movement goes on more strongly than  
ever. Further - .  
(Copy attached)

fig

793.94/3058



793.94  
ANTI-JAPANESE ACTIVITIES.

General Liu Chen-nien (officer commanding this area), following the Nanjing Government's instructions, issued orders a few days ago to the police authorities throughout the district that anti-Japanese activities were to cease, and the authorities were instructed not to permit any anti-Japanese meetings or the distribution or display of anti-Japanese posters. However, the anti-Japanese movement goes on, seemingly more strongly than ever and no Chinese firm in this district would now dare to import or handle Japanese merchandise. The Chinese authorities are fully cognizant of what is going on and are making no attempt to stop this silent but effective boycott, which has already paralyzed Japanese trade in Eastern Kwantung. To those it is known, the new anti-Japanese boycott methods would  
would indicate nothing more than a silent acquiescence on the part of the Chinese authorities.



793.94  
ANTI-JAPANESE ACTIVITIES.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

RECEIVED

DEC 19 1931

Tokyo,


793.94  
SECRETARY'S OFFICE

Dear Mr. Secretary,

I am naturally greatly distressed that my error in not telegraphing fully enough should have led to bringing about the very embarrassing position in which you find yourself in giving the statement to the press and which they garbled so atrociously.

I telegraphed you later - locking the door after the horse was stolen - the details of the conversation.

Baron Shidehara had as a matter of fact gone into quite extensive details of his various conversations with the Minister of War and the Chief of Staff, cautioning me that they must not be quoted, as I cabled you. When I turned and asked if I could send you a message which summarized these, without detailing, he raised no objection. And I was left frankly with the feeling that this summary as I sent it was not included in the things which he had expressed as wholly between him and me, or I would have



DEC 21 1931

793.94/3058-1/7

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

FEB 24 1933

FILED



-2-

said something about sending it along to you. This accounts for my action in including it under the general head of "Confidential" matters, instead of putting in a special word of caution.

He did not say that the fact that the Japanese were not planning to move on Chinchow was confidential and that publication might upset the negotiations then going on; and he came to a realizing sense of this fact when the Army began to shoot at him for having announced it.


I am accustomed from a business point of view to boil down things to the fewest words in cabling, and I try to do it in writing, and in public speaking. In business I have made more or less of a study of it. And I am sorry if this habit, which has become almost second nature to me, has resulted in my cutting down my cablegrams and making them too brief. Your telegram No. 251 which arrived yesterday is ample proof that I would have saved a great deal in the situation if I had amplified my earlier telegrams and inserted in No. 234 the details I put in No. 239.



-3-

I certainly hope Doctor Teusler is right and that no real harm will come of it, and perhaps that it may work out with some results that will be helpful. Anything that will curb the rather untamed younger military element and get them under better discipline and that will make for a single-headed instead of a hydra-headed government here, cannot fail to be helpful.

Respectfully yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Cameron Forbes".

Ambassador.

The Honorable,

The Secretary of State,

Washington, D.C.




DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

# United Press Associations

INCORPORATED IN NEW YORK  
GENERAL OFFICES  
NEWS BUILDING NEW YORK CITY

KARL A. BICKEL  
PRESIDENT



December 7, 1931

My dear Mr. Secretary, -

In our talk on Friday you mentioned an understanding that you had secured from your conversation with Mr. Noyes to the general effect that the United Press method of serving clients abroad -- and particularly in Japan -- was operated on the same basis as that of the Associated Press and if you will remember I checked on that with you rather briefly.

It occurred to me afterwards that in fairness to yourself and to the United Press I ought to make that distinction a little bit clearer and that perhaps the best way to do it would be to drop you a personal note.

For your confidential information, the United Press directly serves slightly over 1300 newspapers around the world. In addition to that we serve Nippon Dempo Tsushin Sha, the Australian Press Association, the Exchange Telegraph in London, Agence Radio of France and the Kuo Min in Shanghai.

The distinguishing difference between the United Press service to its newspapers and client press associations abroad and that of the Associated Press is this: First, the Associated Press is connected with and, I think, a member of the so called Allied agencies of Europe which is the organization of the old "official" agency crowd dominated by Havas, Reuters, Rengo, Tass, etc., all of which agencies in one way or another receive subsidies from their governments and are more or less directly responsible to the foreign office of their various countries for the tone and attitude of their dispatches in regard to foreign matters. Some of these agencies, as you know, such as Havas and Rengo, receive direct and very large subsidies from their governments and work very closely with the foreign office.

793.94/3053-2/7

Confidential File

FEB 24 1933



- 2 -

Reuters does not receive any direct money subsidy from the British government but receives very marked concessions in rates through the British imperial and international cables. In some cases they go so far as to carry Reuter stuff at no charge, except an understanding that they will participate in the profits of any sale. For instance, they fix a per word charge for us as high as a shilling a word on our material directed to the Far East and take Reuters on a partnership basis. They are doing the same now for Reuters in South America. Other services, such as Tass and Stefani, are practically parts of the foreign office. Tass, in fact, in its foreign news activities is in many ways a part of the Soviet foreign office. Their activities are entirely legitimate, but all of their dispatches go immediately to the foreign office and all dispatches that they send out to their press association connections, such as Reuter, Havas, Rengo, etc., certainly reflect the attitude of the Soviet foreign office. They are subsidized by the Soviet government and make no bones about it.

The Associated Press is in direct operating connection with all of the Allied agencies and none of the Allied agencies, according to their agreement with each other, operate with the United Press which has the position of being the leading independent agency. In other words, our position is that we have no connection with any of the Allied agencies.

Now in the case of Japan where we serve the Nippon Dempo Tsushin Sha, our San Francisco office files our report to Miles W. Vaughn, who is our chief of staff in the Far East and whose office is in the Nippon Dempo Tsushin Sha building. Vaughn takes the material and edits it and gives them the completed text ready for translation. This prevents any misunderstanding of text such as occurred in the handling of the Rengo message.

We handle our dispatches to the Kuo Min agency in Shanghai the same way, the text originally going to our bureau in Shanghai from New York or San Francisco where Mr. Ekins rehandles it for Kuo Min which in turn dispatches it to the Yangste River Valley district papers. We handle the north - Peiping and Teintsin - directly from our bureau in Peiping and we handle the English language papers in Shanghai directly.



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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

In reference to the Exchange Telegraph and the Agence Radio, we file our stuff to them directly from New York through our bureaus in London and Paris.

Kuo Min maintains a Chinese correspondent in our New York office but he does not file anything from the United Press report but only handles special matters of particular Chinese interest which we do not normally handle.

In addition to Nippon Dempo Tsushin Sha in Japan we directly serve the newspapers of the famous Osaka Mainichi and the Tokio Nichi Nichi group. These papers have a circulation of over a million a day and are the best in Japan. You will note from the enclosed cables that neither Nippon Dempo nor the Nichi Nichi used the Rengo dispatch which created the incident of ten days ago.

In South America we serve all of our newspapers -- practically all the important newspapers on that continent -- directly from the United Press bureaus in the various South American capitals. This is also true of Mexico, Cuba and Central America. On the Continent of Europe we serve most of the important newspapers on the continent with the exception of Russia. We maintain bureaus in Lisbon, Madrid, Rome, Berlin, London, Paris, etc., simply to take care of the material for European papers entirely aside from the duties of other men whose business it is to collect news material for export to the United States.

In Great Britain we serve all the important London newspapers with the exception of the Morning Post and we serve the principal newspapers in the larger cities in Great Britain through the British United Press. The British United Press is a British agency and has a contract with the United Press by which it handles our report for the newspapers in Great Britain and in the British dominions. Its president is Mr. Charles Crandall of Montreal. It receives its report directly from us in New York or from our London bureau and a part of its agreement is to no wise change the text of any copy that we send it or deliver to it in London.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

Nippon Dempo Tsushin Sha serves between 250 and 300 clients which is more than four times as many clients as Rengo serves. The last report I had on Rengo showed that they had about 38 clients. Nippon Dempo Tsushin Sha, as you know, is regarded as the distinctly non-governmental agency in that country.

I saw Roy Howard late last week and I told him a little of our conversation and that you had expressed an interest in talking the thing over with him. He told me that he expected to be in Washington the latter part of this week and would get in touch with you.

Cordially yours,

Hon. Henry L. Stimson,  
Washington, D.C.

*Karl A. Bial*

KAB:DM



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

(COPY)

UNIPRESS NEW YORK

SINCERE CONGRATULATIONS ON UNITEDPRESS ACCURATE REPORT OF  
STIMSONS REMARKS ABOUT MANCHURIA IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE  
FRIDAY AND SUBSEQUENT CLARIFICATION OF SITUATION WHICH  
CAUSED OPPOSITION NEWSAGENCY GRAVELY MISREPRESENT AMERICAN  
ATTITUDE STOP YOUR ACCURATE CONSERVATIVE DISPATCHES  
CORRECTLY REFLECTING AMERICAN VIEWPOINT HAVE BEEN INVALUABLE  
THROUGHOUT CONTROVERSY

MITSUMAGA  
NIPPON DEMPO TSUSHIN SHA

908AMNOV 30

TOKIO 340PM. DEC 1 1931

LCD UNIPRESS NEWYORK

BICKEL MANY THANKS FOR YOUR CORRECT REPORT ON STIMSONS  
INTERCHANGES WITH SHIDEHARA STOP MAINICHI NICHINICHI  
NEWSPAPERS REJECTED OTHER NEWSAGENCY INCORRECT AND SENSATIONAL  
REPORT AND AS USUAL OUR CONFIDENCE IN YOU WAS ENTIRELY JUSTIFIED

HIKOICHI MOTOYAMA



1858  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

December 14, 1931.

Dear Mr. Bickel:

I appreciate your taking the time and trouble to write me as fully as you did in your letter of December 7. I read it with great interest.

With many thanks, I am

Very sincerely yours,

HENRY L. STIMSON


Karl A. Bickel, Esquire,  
President, United Press Associations,  
News Building,  
New York, New York.

S:GHK:VGN

795.94/3053-2/7  
Confidential File  
A true copy of  
the signed original  
R



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75



*No distribution*

December 22, 1931.  
4:45 P.M.

*file*

TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY  
OF STATE STIMSON AND GENERAL DAWES AT LONDON.

94, 94

SECRETARY: Hello General. The NEW YORK TRIBUNE yesterday made an assertion about you on which I want a denial, if possible. The NEW YORK TRIBUNE said that in speaking about the advance on Chinchow, that you had gotten from Alfred Sze and had given to the Japanese, an assurance that the Chinese garrison would withdraw from the Chinchow area.

DAWES: That is an untruth.

SECRETARY: You had nothing to do with it?

DAWES: Nothing whatever.

SECRETARY: In the next place they say that you persuaded Matsudaira to be content with a reading of the reservation of the Japanese -

DAWES: What was that?

SECRETARY: They say that you persuaded Matsudaira to simply take a reservation to the Japanese right of action in this matter in exchange for this assurance of a withdrawal by the Chinese from Chinchow.

DAWES: That is not true.

SECRETARY: You had nothing to do with that.

DAWES: No.

SECRETARY: I am going to do battle on the subject and I just wanted to be sure first that there was nothing in it.

DAWES: Absolutely nothing.

SECRETARY: You see they have gotten the story of what the French Ambassador did in Tokyo and they have you mixed up in it.

FTL:HEB  
EB 2 1933  
DAWES:

793.94/3058-3/7

Confidential File



-2-

DAWES: I knew nothing about it at all. I knew nothing about it until about two or three days afterwards. I had nothing to do with it.

SECRETARY: I see. That is all right. The TRIBUNE has been acting very badly and they have been making a number of assertions like this about me and about other things and I am going to try to catch them up and I wanted to be absolutely sure there was no basis for it.

DAWES: There is absolutely no basis.

SECRETARY: All right.


S: VGN



1861

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

*Very Confidential*



*No distribution*

December 22, 1931.  
 5:10 p.m.

TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON AND  
 WALTER LIPPMANN.

793.94

Manchuria. *JB*

LIPPMANN: This is a copy of a telegram sent to you by  
 Mr. Jeffrey Parsons today:

"Following your conversation with Walter Lippmann  
 this afternoon we cabled our Paris Bureau and have just  
 received message stating that our Paris despatch of  
 December 10, printed in Herald Tribune of December 11,  
 was based on information from League officials, supported  
 by Chinese and confirmed today from French sources. Our  
 editorial was based on this news despatch. If you feel  
 that our news despatch and editorial contained any  
 inaccuracy, we shall be glad to accept any correction  
 that you have to offer."

That is the end of the telegram.

SECRETARY: Thank you very much. Of course, that is not  
 much of a retraction - what they say there. What I wanted  
 them to do was to take those three statements in the  
 editorial and admit they were absolutely untrue, because  
 that is what they are, and as I told you I have telephoned  
 to General Dawes just for ultimate certainty. Just as I  
 spoke to you, he had nothing to do with that. He did  
 not even know about the alleged promise as to the Chinchow  
 area until long after the thing had broken up and the  
 Chinese asserted that the promise had been broken. No one  
 representing us had anything to do with it. The first  
 information that we had here came in the shape of

telegram

FEB 4 1933

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Confidential File



- 2 -

telegram from Peiping which was conveyed also to the French. The French evidently did it and I catch from that little telegram that the French have not hesitated to smear over this situation so as to protect their man. LIPPMANN: Of course I cannot say, because I do not know what kind of a retraction you will get.

SECRETARY: I shall say nothing today, but my press conference comes tomorrow, and if it is not satisfactory I will make a statement tomorrow. But you can assure Mr. Jeffrey Parsons that he was never wider away from the truth in his life than he has been on this fact.

LIPPMANN: They have been on the left foot all along.

SECRETARY: Yes, there has been trouble there all along. You might let them know that any time that they conceive a new idea, it might be advisable to confer with their own government on a matter of this sort, instead of taking information from every Tom, Dick and Harry from all over the world. The information of this Government will be given to them so far as is possible.

LIPPMANN: Why don't you have a talk in Washington tomorrow with Wallen, the Chief of the Bureau.

SECRETARY: Perhaps I will, but he is in a much worse situation than you. He tells me quite often that he is fighting my battle against his own editorials.

LIPPMANN: I can take those sentences you dictated to Parson right away, tell him the three statements are untrue and you confirmed their untruth by communicating with General Dawes today.

SECRETARY: Thank you very much. Goodbye.

S HHR



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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

11 wu n 83

TB NewYork NY Dec 22 31

The Hon Henry L Stimson


Secy of State Washington DC

Following your conversation with Walter Lippmann this noon we cabled our Paris Bureau and have just received message stating that our Paris dispatch of December Tenth printed in Herald Tribune of December Eleventh was based on information from League Officials supported by Chinese and confirmed today from French sources our editorial was based on this news dispatch stop If you feel that our news dispatch and editorial contained any inaccuracy we shall be glad to accept any correction that you have to offer.

Goeffrey Parsons

N.Y. Herald Tribune.

520PM.



793.94/3058-5/7

Confidential File

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FEB 24 1933



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Luttsen NARS, Date 12-18-75

FREDERIC C. WALCOTT  
CONNECTICUT

W. H. SAULT  
SECRETARY

## United States Senate


WASHINGTON, D. C.

December 23, 1931.

793.94

Personal and confidential

Honorable Henry L. Stimson,  
Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.



My dear Harry:

Thomas F. Millard, who has recently published a book on extraterritoriality, a student of international affairs and political economy, who has been quite intimate with the Far Eastern situation for many years, writes me a letter from Shanghai which may contain some slightly new information for you. I think he is an accurate observer. I do not know him intimately, but he writes me occasionally when he thinks he has anything of interest to me. It occurs to me that a hurried perusal of this letter might be of interest. It requires no acknowledgment.

I congratulate you upon the fact that the sixty-eight senators who replied favorably by wire last June on the subject of the moratorium voted last night as they telegraphed, sixty-nine to twelve. That ought to give the vituperative Johnson something to think about. If he had not slipped in under the President's wing in 1928, he would not have another look in.

I think the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Bill, which I am sponsoring for the Senate, will pass promptly and with practically no opposition in the Senate, soon after we convene January 4th and I am assured by John Garner that it will have the right of way over everything else and pass promptly in the House.

We ought not to be away so long, but the leaders promised it, the House ran out on us and there

793.94/3058-6/7

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1865  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Honorable Henry L. Stimson - 2 - 12/23/31

was no way to rescind the agreement yesterday.

Please accept the season's greetings and all  
best wishes for the New Year.

Sincerely yours,



W/ES.

Enclosure.



COPY

THOMAS F. MILLARD

Shanghai November 28.

Hon. F. C. Walcott  
Washington, D C

Dear Sir:

I have received your letter of October 26 and am glad the copy of my book on Extrality reached you. It is a question with which our Government must deal sooner or later.

In regard to the present situation in Manchuria, I went to that region immediately after the Japanese military action of Sept. 18 and made an investigation of the circumstances and conditions. Without going into details which would be too lengthy for a letter, I will summarize the main points as follows:

1. The Japanese war department took action without consulting the civil branches of the Japanese Government. A primary factor of this action is an effort of the old-time military clans in Japan to regain their rapidly diminishing power in the Government from the growing Liberal party.

2. The Japanese official military report of the incident at Mukden on September 18 said that at 10:30 PM of that date some Chinese soldiers bombed the tracks of the South Manchuria Railway just north of the Mukden station, and the Japanese military action resulted therefrom. A careful analysis of the elements of time, places, and distances, and findings based on investigations and evidence of neutral foreigners, establishes that no such bombing of the railway took place. Trains are known to have passed over the tracks at that point soon after the alleged explosion is supposed to have occurred, and hour by hour thereafter. Japanese troops from several points were entrained and en route to Mukden at least 24 hours before the alleged explosion. Japanese news reports giving details of the bombing etc were filed at Mukden at approximately the time of the alleged bombing and were printed in newspapers throughout the world on the morning of Sept. 19. The Japanese General commanding at Port Arthur and his staff, with heavy artillery and armored cars, left Port Arthur for Mukden before 9 O'C PM on the evening of Sept. 18, before the alleged bombing occurred. Eleven trains loaded with Japanese troops from Korea

passed



- 2 -

passed Antung during the night of Sept. 18 en route to Mukden. Heavy Japanese artillery trained on the Chinese barracks and arsenals at Mukden had been secretly placed on concrete bases in the Mukden Japanese concession weeks before Sept. 18 and commenced firing about 11 PM on the night of Sept. 18. Within 12 hours from the time of the alleged bombing at Mukden the Japanese military had occupied widely separated points in Manchuria as far north as Changchun and as far East as Kirin, positively showing a carefully premeditated and timed plan. At Mukden alone the Japanese siezed Chinese and foreign property costing close to \$100,000,000. dollars Chinese currency, which they still hold, including about thirty millions bullion in the Chinese banks. Acting under orders previously given, the Chinese troops at Mukden did not offer any serious resistance, altho there was a little sporadic fighting there and at other points. So much for the beginning of the trouble.

In the ensuing weeks, and until now, the Japanese military in Manchuria have acted on this plan: They announce that Chinese troops are assembling here or there, menacing the security of the Japanese troops, or residents, or property, and that they must for security attack and disperse those troops. Acting on that plan they have bombed Chinese towns from the air, and have bit by bit extended their control over almost the whole of Manchuria, to more than 300 miles from the extreme northern limit of the South Manchuria Railway zone. As I write this the Japanese seem ready to attack Chinchow, where, after being evicted from Mukden, the Chinese Manchuria government established temporary headquarters. There is little doubt that the attacks on the regular Chinese government buildings at Tientsin were engineered from the Japanese concession, and it is known that the Japanese are arming and using disaffected Chinese and Mongol elements in Western Manchuria. In short, the Japanese military crowd have taken the reins away from the Tokyo civil government and have started and are instigating a reign of terror in China which, unless somehow checked, will throw this country into a state of chaos and must inevitably pull in other nations.

I am sure that the private reports to their governments of the American and other foreign military observers and consular officers in Manchuria will confirm what I have stated previously; indeed I have been permitted in confidence to read some of those reports and when I was in Manchuria I was in almost hourly touch with those persons. As you may know, I have thirty years contact with, and background on, the Manchuria question.

What



- 3 -

What is to be done to stop the ruthless policy of the Japanese military party I do not know. I do not think the League of Nations can accomplish anything positive. It looks as if we will have a Japanese military occupation of Manchuria for some time, perhaps several years.

My opinion is that only action of the American Government, under terms of the Washington treaty of 1922, can check Japan's designs, which undoubtedly look to the annexation of Manchuria. Our Government can, a little later, call a conference of the signatories of the Washington treaty, to reconsider the whole situation in China and the Pacific. The tri-party naval agreement between the US, Great Britain and Japan, expires next January and we ought to reconsider the whole position in the light of Japan's recent acts before we extend or renew those arrangements. We are now confronted with a nation under the control of a military crowd who take direct military action first and then talk it over afterward, and that gives our government something to think seriously about for many reasons.

I have been expecting to come to America at any time, but events have held me here. If I do come to Washington this winter I will call on you.

I remain etc

Yours truly

THOMAS F. MILLARD



January 2, 1932.

*Fred*  
My dear Senator:

It was very thoughtful of you to send on to me with your letter of December twenty-third a letter which you have received from Mr. Millard in Shanghai. I am always glad to get the impressions of intelligent observers of the situation in the Far East and I am grateful to you for sending on Mr. Millard's letter. I have read it over with interest and return it herewith.

Very sincerely yours,

Enclosure:  
Letter from  
Mr. Millard.

HENRY L. STIMSON

The Honorable

Frederic C. Walcott,

United States Senate.

S CHY:CB3

A true copy of  
the signed orig-  
inal *L*

793.94/3058-6/7



793.94  
(NOT FOR THE PRESS)  
~~FOR~~ DEPARTMENTAL USE ONLY  
Department of State  
Division of Current Information

MEMORANDUM OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE, FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 1931

SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT

At the press conference this afternoon Secretary Stimson announced the release of a message from Consul General Lockhart at Tientsin reporting a fresh outbreak of firing between plain clothes men and Chinese police in the space near the Nankai School this afternoon at 1:00 o'clock (Chinese time), in which no Japanese were involved, but which resulted in the restoration of strict martial law in Chinese areas. The Secretary added that that was all he had from the Far East.

A correspondent asked if there was any light from the Department's angle on the Manchurian situation that the Secretary might give the press. The Secretary replied in the negative. He added that so far as any details he might give out were concerned the situation remained the same. He is hard at work and is keeping very close track of the situation, but he could not discuss what was being done at the present time. He said he understood that press despatches carried part of an interview which General Dawes gave out this morning in Paris, and, since the Department had received the full text of the statement from Ambassador Dawes, the Secretary said it would be made available to the press through the Division of Current Information. A correspondent said he understood it was merely a reiteration of what had been repeatedly said here. In reply, the Secretary said apparently it was repeatedly said here, but it seemed to be repeatedly needed. The Secretary had been informed that the press wires carried only a single sentence of the statement, which did not really give a fair impression of the whole, so he placed the entire text at the disposal of the

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correspondents.

A correspondent said there seemed to be some confusion in the press reports as to just when the Council of the League would meet again. Some reports said this afternoon, in a public session, while others said there would be a public session tomorrow. The correspondent asked if the Secretary could straighten the reports out. The Secretary replied that he had not heard when the next meeting would take place.

A correspondent enquired whether our representatives would join in the international court of enquiry which the League is going to send to the Far East. In reply, the Secretary said that, since that court had not been constituted, he thought he would not cross that bridge until he came to it.

A correspondent said there was a story from Peiping that the American, British, French and Polish military attaches were starting for a Manchurian investigation and enquired whether the Secretary had any confirmation of the report. The Secretary replied that he had no confirmation of the report as the correspondent stated it. The American Attaché has been under a standing commission to go and may have gone. The Secretary did not know what the other attaches had done. A correspondent enquired if such an investigation would not come within the line of the attaché's military duties. The Secretary agreed that this was the regular duty of an attaché and not a special mission. It is part of his military duty to keep in touch with the situations such as have existed in Manchuria. Such action is not as part of a commission of enquiry, but entirely independent. The correspondent remarked that the action was apparently taken in collaboration with the attaches of the other countries. The Secretary replied that if any despatch gave the impression that our at-



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tache's going was part of a movement of other people to go together with him as a commission, it was not so. The correspondent observed that they might travel together for personal convenience. The Secretary said that the Japanese Government sometime ago issued a general invitation to all attaches to observe the situation, and our attache was authorized to go under that invitation if he wished. A correspondent said that observers had informed him that ordinarily military attaches did not go as observers except in the case of war. The Secretary said he did not know who the correspondent's observer was, but he referred the correspondent to that observer for any further information.

A correspondent remarked that there was the greatest speculation, whereupon the Secretary interrupted him to say there was no doubt of that. The correspondent concluded by saying that there was one big question mark at the present time as to just what was meant by saying we would back the League. The Secretary replied that those things could always be interpreted better by action than by words, and if our action during the past two months has not been sufficient elucidation of that statement, it would be difficult to explain it.

A correspondent enquired whether, if the Secretary found it possible later in the day to discuss the situation, he would see the press again. The Secretary replied that he was ready to talk to the correspondents whenever anything came up that he could talk with them about and that today was no exception to that, but that frankly he did not expect any such change today. The Secretary explained that he did not want the correspondents to have to sit around chewing the ends of their pencils waiting for him when he did not expect to have occasion to talk to them. He assured the correspondents, however, that whenever there was any news he could give out he would do so.

M. J. McDermott.



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Department of State  
Division of Current Information

MEMORANDUM OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE, SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 1931

At the press conference this morning Secretary Stimson announced the release of the Foreign Service changes and a list of the foreign Consular officers in the United States to whom recognition has been accorded recently and to whom ex-equators had been issued.

The Secretary also announced the issuance of a press release in respect to a communication to the Secretary General of the League of Nations, correcting some of the statements in the previous information sent the League concerning the forthcoming Disarmament Conference.

The Secretary announced the release of a warning against a certain Mr. M. LaCoste, La Plata, Argentina, who is active in his endeavors to enmesh residents of this country in a scheme for obtaining money.

The Secretary also announced a press release concerning publication of Volume Two of the new treaty edition, entitled "Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States," and also a preliminary print of Volume One of that edition.

SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT

In response to a request for information concerning the Manchurian situation, the Secretary said there was nothing more he could say that would be of any assistance to the press. QUITE CONFIDENTIALLY, he added that the correspondents were learning some of the peculiarities of Oriental negotiations which he had to learn when he was in the Philippines. A correspondent referred to the Secretary's statement that he had nothing more he could say and asked if the press had received anything so far. The Secretary, in reply, said the press had received all they ought to have, because the

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Department of State  
Division of Current Information

MEMORANDUM OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE, SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 1931

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Department of State  
Division of Current Information

MEMORANDUM OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE, SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 1931

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Manchurian situation is one of those cases where the less said during the course of the negotiations, the better.

A correspondent asked if the League of Nations had had the consent of China and Japan before the announcement of an agreement was made. The Secretary replied that he had heard nothing official about the whole thing, so the correspondents knew as much about it as he did. Everything the Secretary heard came from press despatches. The press despatch handed to the Secretary last night indicated that the League did have the consent of China and Japan. A correspondent asked if the Secretary had heard from Ambassador Dawes this morning. The Secretary replied in the negative. The correspondent observed that it would seem natural, if there had been any agreement or approximate agreement, that Ambassador Dawes would have communicated with the Secretary. The Secretary remarked that that was speculation.

A correspondent recalled that the Secretary told the press in confidence that the position of the United States was that no peace should be forced upon China with the Japanese sword at her throat, so to speak. The correspondent asked the Secretary to tell the press, also in confidence, whether that was still the position of the United States. In reply, the Secretary stated that he had said constantly that there had been no change of position by this government.

A correspondent said that press despatches from Tokyo were to the effect that the United States warned the Japanese Government, through the Ambassador here, that occupation of Tsitsihar was dangerous and enquired if that was correct. The Secretary refused to discuss the reports and added that he would repeat his admonition against rumors as he thought those reports would come well within that boundary. He asked



the correspondents to remember that rumors fly so thick that he cannot even discuss them without building up new rumors.

#### WAR DEBTS AND REPARATIONS

A correspondent enquired whether the Department had any confirmation of the note that Germany presented to the Bank for International Settlements, asking for an investigation of Germany's capacity to pay. The Secretary replied that it had been confirmed officially.

#### ARMAMENTS

A correspondent asked if the Secretary would comment on the press report that Mr. Fletcher will head the American delegation to the Disarmament Conference at Geneva in February. The Secretary replied in the negative and referred the correspondents to the White House.



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SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT

*file* Press release  
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The Secretary said that he wished he could tell the correspondents more about the situation in Manchuria, but he could not, except to say that he was in constant touch with General Dawes, who is reporting to the Secretary every little while. Everyone is making the greatest efforts possible to stabilize chance or peace.

A correspondent asked if the Secretary could say what the general outlook was, without disclosing any secret. In reply, the Secretary said, FOR BACKGROUND, that the fact that a suggestion is now being seriously discussed for a neutral commission to go to Manchuria is a step which could not have happened a short time ago. Neither country, up to this point, has been willing to come far enough toward Western methods of investigating and adjusting such matters to make even such a suggestion possible. The Secretary said that might answer the correspondent's question in one way. He did not mean to say that the whole thing might not blow up at any minute, but it indicates that even if it should seem to blow up the plan might eventually be carried out. The Secretary recalled what he told the correspondents the other day about the difference between Oriental and Western negotiations. The Secretary said the correspondents had shown a great deal of patience and asked them to be patient a little longer, as he could not tell the press the different points being brought up for discussion, for if he did and they were published all over the world it might throw a monkey wrench into the whole business. The Secretary reiterated that his statements were all FOR BACKGROUND AND NOT FOR QUOTATION OR ATTRIBUTION.

When a correspondent referred to Dr. Alfred Sze's action, the Secretary interrupted to say that he would not discuss any single proposition. The correspondent explained that he was speaking of a new development which he thought the Secretary possibly did not know. The Secretary, in reply, said he was well informed concerning the situation. He continued by saying

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the situation and produce peace, but what we are saying and what other people are saying and suggesting cannot be made public and printed through the world without upsetting the chance of peace.

A correspondent asked if the Secretary could say what the general outlook was, without disclosing any secret. In reply, the Secretary said, FOR BACKGROUND, that the fact that a suggestion is now being seriously discussed for a neutral commission to go to Manchuria is a step which could not have happened a short time ago. Neither country, up to this point, has been willing to come far enough toward Western methods of investigating and adjusting such matters to make even such a suggestion possible. The Secretary said that might answer the correspondent's question in one way. He did not mean to say that the whole thing might not blow up at any minute, but it indicates that even if it should seem to blow up the plan might eventually be carried out. The Secretary recalled what he told the correspondents the other day about the difference between Oriental and Western negotiations. The Secretary said the correspondents had shown a great deal of patience and asked them to be patient a little longer, as he could not tell the press the different points being brought up for discussion, for if he did and they were published all over the world it might throw a monkey wrench into the whole business. The Secretary reiterated that his statements were all FOR BACKGROUND AND NOT FOR QUOTATION OR ATTRIBUTION.

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that the correspondent could make a speech, but warned him not to put a question on the end of it. He added that he did not intend to stop free speech. The Secretary explained that to discuss single propositions would be contrary to what he had just tried to point out. He cannot go into details on the different steps in the negotiations.

#### MEXICO

A correspondent referred to the case of the two Mexican boys, one related to the President of Mexico, who were shot at Ardmore, Oklahoma. The sheriff and his assistant were definitely cleared of the charge of murder and, according to the correspondent, there has been speculation whether, as a result of that, Mexico might not bring up the subject again. The Secretary replied that the subject had not been re-opened so far as he knew.

#### CHEMICAL FOUNDATION

Referring to a pamphlet, consisting of two articles of a very categorical character published in the Saturday Evening Post by Mr. Garrett Garet, which has been issued by the Chemical Foundation, Incorporated, a correspondent asked if the State Department had yet seen the pamphlet. The Secretary replied in the negative.

Walter A. Foote.



(NOT FOR THE PRESS)  
(FOR DEPARTMENTAL USE ONLY)

Department of State  
Division of Current Information

MEMORANDUM OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE, WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 25, 1931

SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT

At the press conference this afternoon Secretary Stimson said he had no news to give out. He explained that the situation in respect to the possibility of giving out any items of news on the situation in Manchuria was still unchanged.

FOR BACKGROUND, the Secretary said he thought it was becoming clearer every day, judging from the articles in the press, that the Council of the League of Nations in its negotiations at Paris seems to be working along toward a proposition, the general outlines of which the Secretary gave as follows: One, it will involve a cessation of hostilities; and two, a neutral investigation of the situation. The Secretary continued by saying, FOR BACKGROUND, that that is the general line which the consensus of mankind follows and has embodied in practically all the treaties of conciliation entered into as one of the ways of dealing with a difficult situation like the Manchurian situation; and, if that is the course which the Council is following, they are proceeding along well tested and well agreed upon lines. It has many advantages. It provides for a cooling off period, stops the danger of further provocation, and, at the same time, it provides the basis for getting at the facts upon which the ultimate solution may be predicated and affords an opportunity for the public opinion of the world to get behind an intelligent solution. Also FOR BACKGROUND, the Secretary said, in a situation so long continued where such restraint was imposed upon the organs of the press and the organs of the various governments, he was not at all surprised, because it was inevitable, at the criticisms which he had noticed and which were apparently

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emanating on the other side to the effect that we have not been helpful in the solution the Secretary mentioned above. The Secretary added that the only thing he could say was that these criticisms were not true in any sense. The Secretary explained that he said this FOR BACKGROUND AND NOT FOR ATTRIBUTION because he did not want to enter directly into any controversy at the time.

A correspondent asked whether the Secretary could say that he was hopeful of an accord along the lines he had mentioned. The Secretary reminded the correspondents of the answer he has had to make all along when asked to make prophecies. A man who makes prophecies does not make very great progress, but the Secretary said he thought the correspondents might judge by his demeanor in the matter. He explained IN CONFIDENCE, that he was not discouraged, but rather encouraged.

A correspondent asked if the Secretary could say whether there were indications that the Council is now more seriously considering the proposition of sanctions than it was two or three weeks ago. He pointed out that there had been a great deal more about sanctions in the press recently than formerly. The Secretary, in reply, called the attention of the correspondents to the fact that the proposition he had alluded to did not include anything of sanctions. The correspondent said that was what prompted his question. The Secretary declined to comment further.

A correspondent observed that the Secretary's statements would indicate that the solution reposes more or less in international legal precedent. The Secretary, in reply, said it had nothing to do with international law, but has to do with the practice of nations in their treaties and solutions



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of similar situations. The Secretary continued by saying that if the correspondents would look over the treaties this country has made, they would find a class of treaty known as conciliation treaties, which are made to cover a situation where two nations have become involved in a dispute or controversy, causing bad feeling and possibly leading to open hostilities, and which are not covered by arbitration agreements or anything of that sort. They will find that we, because we have done it many times with many other nations, and a great majority of the other countries of the world have been making a similar kind of treaty, known as a conciliation treaty, where it is agreed, in a situation like the Manchurian situation where two nations are involved in a controversy, that they shall stop all hostilities and then have appointed a neutral, impartial commission to investigate the facts and report on them. In some cases a standing commission is agreed on before any trouble arises. A correspondent enquired if that was what had been done in the present case. The Secretary replied in the negative and explained that he was speaking from the press reports which seemed to indicate, so far as he could judge, that that was the line along which the people in Paris were working.

A correspondent said that he gathered from what the Secretary had just said that there was nothing to one report emanating from Paris last night to the effect that the United States was bringing pressure to bear on the Council to adjourn because of the approaching session of the United States Congress. In reply, the Secretary said there was absolutely no basis for the report. The correspondent observed that there had been variations of that report in the afternoon despatches. The Secretary remarked that they were variations



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of imagination. The correspondent said he did not think so, but thought that they were more or less inspired from underlings. The Secretary then said that in that event, the underlings were inspired by imagination.

A correspondent remarked that all reports were to the effect that the United States was stiffening its attitude toward Japan. The Secretary declined to comment.

#### MEXICO

A correspondent enquired whether the Secretary had personally seen the note from Mexico regarding the situation in Ardmore, Oklahoma, in the case of the death of the two Mexican boys who were shot and killed by the deputy sheriff there. The Secretary replied in the affirmative and added that a press release would be issued on the subject.

M. J. McDermott.



793.94  
November 25, 1931.

NOTICE: Following is the text of one of the last drafts of the Resolution which is being considered by the Council of the League of Nations. It is believed to be accurate but may have been changed today in some slight respects.

PLEASE DO NOT ATTRIBUTE IT TO ANY SOURCE  
BUT AS FOLLOWS:

LEAGUE RESOLUTION,  
According to best information available  
in Washington tonight.

1. The Council recalls and reaffirms the resolution passed unanimously by it on September 30 by which the two parties declare that they are solemnly bound. It therefore calls upon the Chinese and Japanese Governments to take all steps necessary to assure its execution so that the withdrawal of the Japanese troops within the railway zone - a point to which the Council attaches the utmost importance - may be effected as speedily as possible.

2. Considering that events in Manchuria have assumed an even more serious aspect since the Council meeting of October 24 calls upon the two Governments:

(a) To give the strictest orders to the commanders of their respective forces to refrain from any initiative which may lead to further fighting and loss of life.

(b) To take all measures necessary to avoid any further aggravation of the situation.

3. Invites the two parties to continue to keep the Council informed as to the development of the situation.

4. Invites the other members of the Council to furnish the Council with information received from their representatives on the spot.

5. Without prejudice to the execution of the above mentioned measures, desiring on the other hand in view of the special circumstances of the case to contribute towards a definitive and fundamental solution of the questions at issue between the two governments,

Decides to appoint a commission of three members to study on the spot and to report to the Council on any circumstance which, affecting international relations, threatens to disturb peace between China and Japan, or the good understanding between them, upon which peace depends.

The Governments of China and of Japan will each have the right to nominate one assessor to assist the commission. It is understood that should the two parties initiate any negotiations these would not fall within the

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

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scope of the terms of reference of the Commission nor would the Commission interfere with military measures taken by either party.

It is further understood that the appointment and deliberations of the Commission are not to be regarded as any ground for delaying the withdrawal by the Japanese troops within the railway zone as laid down in paragraph one of this resolution.

N:B. The President after the adoption of the resolution will state

(a) That each of the two governments will have the right to indicate to the chairman of the commission any question the examination of which it particularly desires

(b) That the commission may should it so desire furnish the Council with interim reports.

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(NOT FOR THE PRESS)  
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793.94  
Department of State  
Division of Current Information

MEMORANDUM OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE, FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 27, 1931

At the press conference this afternoon Secretary Stimson announced the release of the texts of telegrams exchanged by him and Signor Grandi on the occasion of the latter's departure for Italy.

The Secretary also announced the release of information received from Consul General Lockhart concerning the situation at Tientsin.

The release of the text of a proclamation by President Moncada of Nicaragua regarding the recent recrudescence of banditry there was also announced by the Secretary.

SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT

A correspondent observed that the Manchurian situation seemed very confused. He pointed out that despatches from Tokyo say Japan has agreed not to occupy Chinchow, while despatches from Mukden say General Honjo's army moved south and is now encamped thirty-five miles north of there and that Japanese bombing planes are operating. The Secretary said that those press despatches had been brought to his notice just five minutes before and that he was late coming in to the conference because he was reading them. FOR ATTRIBUTION BUT NOT FOR QUOTATION, the Secretary said he was at a loss to understand them, in view of the very definite assurances that had been given to him on that subject. We have had no confirmation of the reports that General Honjo's army is now encamped thirty-five miles north of Chinchow and that Japanese bombers are operating, and, speaking solely on the strength of the press despatches, FOR ATTRIBUTION BUT NOT FOR QUOTATION, the Secretary said that on November 23 he asked the Ambassador in Tokyo to tell Baron Shidehara, the Foreign Minister of Japan, that the Secretary had

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seen with great apprehension press reports giving the impression that the Army commanders of Japan were planning military expeditions against the forces of China in the neighborhood of Chinchow and that he sincerely trusted that there was no basis for that report. The following day, November 24, the Secretary was assured by Baron Shidehara, the Foreign Minister of Japan, through Ambassador Forbes, that he and the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff were all of them agreed that there should be no hostile operations toward Chinchow and that military orders to that effect had been issued. In view of that, the Secretary said it was difficult for him to understand the press reports about the advance of General Honjo's Army.

The correspondent then observed that the situation in Paris was also rather confused. Reports this morning out of Paris mentioned a discussion, not an agreement, regarding the establishment of an international neutral zone around Chinchow. The reports also said that the Chinese had asked the United States to take part in that movement. The correspondent asked if the Secretary knew anything about such a neutral zone. The Secretary said he did not in the sense in which the correspondent put the question. He had read suggestions of it in the press, but, so far as he knew, no further step had been taken than the discussions in Paris. For clarification, a correspondent asked if the Western Powers had not discussed the establishment of a neutral zone to be maintained by the military forces of the Western Powers. The Secretary said the matter had not been discussed with him. He did not know what they had done between themselves. The Secretary said he thought the correspondent stated the matter erroneously. FOR BACKGROUND, the Secretary explained that the question of having the different nations send neutral observers into the neighborhood of Chinchow had been discussed but the proposition had not been



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put forward in the shape of a proposal that they should establish a neutral zone there. A correspondent asked if this country had stated a position on sending an observer. The Secretary, in reply, said that Lt. Col. Margetts had gone to Chinchow from Peiping.

A correspondent asked if there was anything the Secretary could say regarding the situation in the League Council and what they intended to do. In reply, the Secretary said he had not received a message today, but, so far as he knew, they were going on with the program of putting through the proposal which the Secretary placed before the correspondents Wednesday night. A correspondent asked whether, if the proposal was approved, a copy would be sent to Ambassador Dawes and the Japanese and Chinese. The Secretary said he had received no word today and that yesterday, judging from the press despatches, they seemed to be making progress.

A correspondent referred to the action taken by the Secretary on November 23 on the basis of press reports and pointed out that the reports continued to be serious. When he asked if the Secretary anticipated further action, the Secretary interrupted him to remind him that he was not given to making prophecies in the press. The correspondent said he thought the Secretary had been willing to have his statements attributed to him for a definite purpose and that he might add something more concrete. In reply, the Secretary said he thought he had told the correspondents something concrete and they might stand on that.

A correspondent asked if the Secretary knew anything about the Chinese attitude on the proposed plan of settlement. The Secretary replied that, since the matter is under consideration in the League and will be given to the press in due time, he would rather not say anything definite on it. The correspondent



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said he understood that Japan stated their approval, but the Chinese attitude had not been clarified. In reply, the Secretary said he was not prepared to answer definitely one way or the other.

CUBA

A correspondent referred to a report which appeared in the Wednesday morning newspapers to the effect that three Cubans had escaped after their arrest for organizing a revolt and enquired whether there had been any change in the American policy toward Cuba. The Secretary said he had not seen the report and, therefore, could not intelligently comment on it. He stated that there had been no change in our policy toward Cuba.



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NOV 7 1931  
DIVISION OF

Department of State  
Division of Current Information

MEMORANDUM OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE, SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 28, 1931

At the press conference this morning Secretary Stimson announced the release of the Foreign Service changes during the week and also the release of information in regard to the Opium Conference at Bangkok.

SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT

773-74 A correspondent enquired whether the Secretary's attention had been called to the Japanese Foreign Office statement. The Secretary replied in the affirmative and added FOR QUOTATION:

"All I have to say about that is that you gentlemen have the record of what I said yesterday. From that you can see for yourselves that the Foreign Office has been entirely misinformed of something I not only did not say yesterday, but never said."

A correspondent said that in order to clarify things he believed it would be to the State Department's advantage to give the press permission to quote the exact text of what the Secretary said at the press conference yesterday. The Secretary agreed and it is herewith quoted:

"On the 23d of November I asked my Ambassador in Tokyo to tell Baron Shidehara, the Foreign Minister of Japan, that I had seen with great apprehension press reports giving the impression that the Army commanders of Japan were planning military expeditions against the forces of China in the neighborhood of Chinchow and that I sincerely trusted that there was no basis for that report. The following day, November 24, I was assured by Baron Shidehara, the Foreign Minister of Japan, through Ambassador Forbes that he and the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff were all of them agreed that there should be no hostile operations toward Chinchow and that military orders to that effect had been issued. In view of that, it is difficult for me to understand the press reports about the advance of General Honjo's Army."

A correspondent enquired whether the Secretary had any information about the progress of the League's plan. The Secretary replied that he had nothing further than what the cor-

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respondents already had, as he had not received the day's despatches yet.

For clarification, a correspondent asked if the Secretary felt that the report which apparently provoked Tokyo misquoted him or went further than he had gone. In reply, the Secretary said the correspondents had only to read the report of the Foreign Office statement to see that something was put in that he not only did not state yesterday, but never stated. The correspondent agreed that the reports of the Japanese statement mentioned promise after promise, which of course was not true, except in the case of the assurances given that Chinchow would not be attacked. The Secretary said he thought the correspondents who had heard him talk realized that he had been most careful. In fact, most of them complained that he did not talk enough.

M. J. McDermott.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

NOVEMBER 28, 1931

Sino-Japanese

When asked by representatives of the press to comment on press reports of a statement issued by the Japanese Foreign Office today, the Secretary of State said:

"All I have to say about that is that you gentlemen have the record of what I said at my press conference yesterday. From that record you can see for yourselves that the Foreign Office has been entirely misinformed of something I not only did not say yesterday, but never said."

The record of the press conference of Friday, November 27, shows that the Secretary of State spoke to the correspondents as follows:

"On the 23d of November I asked my Ambassador in Tokyo to tell Baron Shidehara, the Foreign Minister of Japan, that I had seen with great apprehension press reports giving the impression that the Army commanders of Japan were planning military expeditions against the forces of China in the neighborhood of Chinchow and that I sincerely trusted that there was no basis for that report. The following day, November 24, I was assured by Baron Shidehara, the Foreign Minister of Japan, through Ambassador Forbes that he and the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff were all of them agreed that there should be no hostile operations toward Chinchow and that military orders to that effect had been issued. In view of that, it is difficult for me to understand the press reports about the advance of General Honjo's Army."

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793.94/3066

DEC 7 1931

FILED



793.94  
(NOT FOR THE PRESS)  
(FOR DEPARTMENTAL USE ONLY)

Department of State  
Division of Current Information

MEMORANDUM OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE, MONDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 1931.

At the press conference this morning Secretary Stimson announced the release of information received from the American Charge d'Affaires at Managua, Mr. Willard L. Beaulac, concerning the outbreak of banditry in the Department of Chinandega. The Department of State was also informed that the Nicaraguan Government is taking additional steps to reenforce the strength of the Guardia to meet this recent recrudescence of banditry.

The Secretary also announced that Consul General Lockhart at Tientsin reported that the remaining American members of the Methodist Mission were brought from the native city to the foreign concessions.

SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT

In reply to an enquiry concerning the situation in Manchuria, the Secretary said he had no comment to make today. A correspondent asked if there was anything the Secretary would say about the Japanese Foreign Office statement. The Secretary replied in the negative. When a correspondent attempted to make further enquiries on the subject of Manchuria, the Secretary said there was no use asking questions, as he thought enough had been said on that subject.

A correspondent enquired whether the Secretary had been notified that Japan had rejected the League's suggestion for a neutral zone around Chinchow. The Secretary declined to discuss the matter. A correspondent asked if the ban on the discussion of the Manchurian situation applied to Paris as well as the Far East. The Secretary, in reply, said he had nothing regarding the developments in Paris that was not contained in press despatches. Discussions are continuing and the people

793.94/3067

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

there are apparently working on the preparation of the commission which was talked of last week. The Secretary added that the discussions were actively going on in the usual way, that is, informally with both sides, as was reported by the press. The Secretary had nothing to add to that. A correspondent remarked that the press despatches from Paris seemed gloomy this morning. The Secretary observed that they are sometimes temperamental.



SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT

793.94

File Press  
release  
12/4/31

Returning to a familiar subject, a correspondent asked for news on Manchuria. The Secretary said he had a familiar answer. He did not think any comment by him on it would help the press at this time. He added that it seemed to be going on all right. A correspondent asked how things were going in Paris. The Secretary replied that the correspondents knew the situation as well as he. The general impression of the newspapers is the same as the Secretary's--not so badly.

A correspondent asked if the Secretary had heard from Ambassador Dawes during the morning. The Secretary said he did not think so.

A correspondent observed that it had been agreed during the morning that an American, a British and a French delegate should be named on the neutral commission. The Secretary said he had not heard the report and declined to comment further on the Manchurian situation.

Aside from the general situation, a correspondent asked if there was anything the Secretary cared to add to what he said the other day on the question of American participation. The Secretary replied in the negative.

793.94/3068

DEC 7 1931

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A correspondent enquired whether there was any special reason why Mr. Will Rogers was in Manchuria now. The Secretary said he was very grateful to Mr. Rogers for his trip to Nicaragua and added that perhaps he would be very grateful for his trip to Manchuria.

CHILE

A correspondent asked if the Secretary had had time to interest himself at all in the question of the entrance of Patagonian mutton into the United States. In reply, the Secretary said he thought that emphasized something he had been turning over in his mind--the importance of having the correspondents convey beforehand what they intended to "spring" on him at conference. He added that at present he was wholly unprepared to answer the question.

M. J. McDermott



773.94  
(NOT FOR THE PRESS)  
(FOR DEPARTMENTAL USE ONLY)

Department of State  
Division of Current Information

MEMORANDUM OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE, THURSDAY, DECEMBER 3, 1931

SINO-JAPANESE CONTROVERSY

At the press conference this morning Under Secretary Castle said that so far as Manchuria was concerned everything seemed to be moving calmly and comfortably. We are receiving very calm reports from Paris which indicate that the negotiations are progressing. There are numerous delays, for the reason that whatever questions come up, generally questions of very minor importance, the Chinese and Japanese delegates have to cable home for instructions; so it looks as though the Council might have to continue its work until the early part of next week. They may get through sooner, but there is nothing to worry about in the Paris negotiations at present.

Mr. Castle told the correspondents that the Department had received a telegram during the morning from China which said that one of our military officers in Chinchow had been up to the Liao River yesterday and reported that all Japanese forces had been transferred east of the river, except a force of three hundred retained at Hsinmin for guard duty and to patrol the railway, a small section of which had apparently been torn up. A correspondent enquired from whom the report had been received. In reply, Mr. Castle said that Colonel Margetts, our military attache, was ordered to Chinchow.

A correspondent enquired if a report had been received on the situation at Tsitsihar. Mr. Castle replied in the negative.

A correspondent said that he gathered from Mr. Castle's statements that Ambassador Dawes did not consider seriously the objections Tokyo made last night to the latest proposal of

793.94/3069

DEC 7 1931

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-2-

the League Council. Mr. Castle said we had received no information to that effect. He added that the reports received in the Department are a good deal calmer and less worried in tone than some of the press reports.

A correspondent asked if Mr. Castle would discuss the American attitude toward the commission of inquiry and what part we might be able to take in it. The Under Secretary replied in the negative and added that he thought the Secretary had already discussed it. When the commission of inquiry is decided on, we do not know, of course, whom the League will name on it. A correspondent observed that it would apparently be a League commission. Mr. Castle agreed. The correspondent then asked if that meant that we could not serve on it. Mr. Castle reminded the correspondents that Americans have often served on League commissions. He continued by saying that there was no reason that he could see why the League should not appoint an American this time. A correspondent enquired whether the Department, in considering who might serve, felt that a military man or a civilian should be appointed. NOT FOR ATTRIBUTION, the Under Secretary replied that we had no feeling about it one way or the other. It would undoubtedly be a League nomination. A correspondent asked if Mr. Castle had any idea how many nations would be represented on the commission. Mr. Castle replied in the negative and added that, so far as we know, the question has not yet been decided. The correspondent observed that reports this morning indicate they have decided on five and that the list of nations to be represented on the commission should be submitted to the Japanese and Chinese delegates. Mr. Castle, in reply, said we had not received that information from Paris.



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

ARMAMENTS

A correspondent referred to the appointment of the British delegation to the General Disarmament Conference at Geneva and asked if there was any comment Mr. Castle cared to make concerning the American delegation. The Under Secretary replied in the negative and added that any announcements concerning our delegation would be made at the White House.

M. J. McDermott.



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94

SEE 851.9111/24 FOR Desp. #2020

FROM France ( Howell ) DATED Nov. 27, 1931  
TO NAME 1-1127 o.p.o.

REGARDING: Newspaper clippings - France.

Daily summaries of press comment. Encloses - during  
period November 21-27, 1931 relating to Franco-German  
negotiations, the Sino-Japanese conflict, disarmament  
and the Chamber interpellations.

793.94/3070

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 500. A 15 a 4/606 ..... FORMemo

FROM State Dept. S ..... ( Stimson ) DATED Dec. 3, 1931  
TO ..... NAME ..... 1-1127 ..... are

REGARDING: Conversation with Czechoslovakian Minister who asked  
about the Manchurian situation. He believes the Manchurian  
trouble itself might do good to the cause of disarmament; that  
when people had arms they were likely to use them.

ja

793.94/3071



DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 500. A 15 a 4/605 ~~Confidential File~~ FOR Memo

FROM State Dept. S (Stimson) DATED Dec. 3, 1931  
TO NAME 1-1127 etc.

REGARDING: Conversation with Italian Ambassador who asked about the news in respect to Manchuria and whether the situation was getting better or worse. The Secretary said that it was getting better and he was hopeful that the League would successfully pass its Resolution which it is considering.

ja

793. 94/ 3072



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 500. A.15 a.4/602 FOR #529

FROM Finland ( Brodie ) DATED Oct. 22, 1931  
TO NAME 1-1127 \*\*\*

REGARDING: Copy of interview with Dr. Rudolf Holsti, Finland's  
permanent delegate to League of Nations, appearing  
in the HELSINGIN SANOMAT No. 286 of Oct. 22. Dr.  
Holsti's views on Sino-Japanese entanglement.

ja

793. 94/3073



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 500. A 15 a 4/604 Continental File FOR Memo

FROM State Dept. S (Stimson) DATED Dec. 3, 1931  
TO NAME 1-1127 o.p.

REGARDING: Conversation with German Ambassador who asked about the situation in Manchuria. The Secretary said that he thought things were progressing as satisfactorily as could be expected; that the League was making progress at Paris.

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793.94/3074



1904

## NOTE

793.94/3075



1907

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

AGITATION AGAINST JAPAN:

793.94  
During September, repercussions of the Manchurian imbroglio absorbed the attention of the local population and overshadowed in political importance all other events.

Throughout the month, mass meetings were held under the auspices of both official and private organizations in an effort to awaken the masses to a fuller realization of the seriousness of the Japanese menace. Many fiery speeches were made by members of students' organizations and a number of impassioned articles appeared in the

vernacular

vernacular press. Numerous, and often very insistent, charges were made against the Japanese in handbills and pamphlets distributed to the public.



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lutefson NARS, Date 12-18-75

## DOCUMENT FILE

### NOTE

SEE 352.00 P. R./216 FOR Despatch #545

FROM Spain ( Benton ) DATED Nov. 23, 1931  
TO NAME 1-1127 oyo

REGARDING: Sino-Japanese question. Spain's attitude toward,-.

\* \* \* \* \*

#### Spain's Attitude toward the Sino-Japanese question.

The Madrid newspapers are reporting in detail the progress of events in Manchuria, as well as the proceedings of the Council of the League of Nations in Paris relative to the solution of the Sino-Japanese difficulties. Beyond an occasional<sup>d</sup> expression of hope that these difficulties will soon be satisfactorily solved, no comments or editorial articles on the subject have appeared in the press.

793.94/3076



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

December 14, 1931.

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The status of the Radio Station at Mukden as of November 8, 1931.

1. Closed and guarded by Japanese troops.
2. Apparently the equipment had not been tampered with but we learn that some of the tubes of the American built station were not working properly even before the Japanese took over control.
3. Apparently the Japanese do not intend to permit reopening under Chinese control with Japanese advisers as they have done in the case of some other Chinese public utilities.

TREATY DIVISION

DEC 18 1931

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

JES



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. -----

AMERICAN CONSULATE.

Mukden, China, November 4, 1931.

DEC 5 31

SUBJECT: The Mukden Radio Station.

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note  
843/74  
✓  
THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of  
my despatch No. 477, to the Legation, Peking, China,  
dated November 3, 1931, on the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

*M. S. Myers*  
M. S. Myers  
American Consul General.

✓  
Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 477.



MSM:HTW  
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RECD



LEGAL ADVISER  
DEC 19 1931  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

(G)



F/DEW

793.94/3077

FILED

DEC 23 1931



No. 477

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, China.

November 3, 1931.

SUBJECT: The Mukden Radio Station.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping, China.

Sir:

I have the honor to request the Legation to refer to my telegram of today's date, 2 p.m., and to my despatches of October 11, and October 12, 1931, concerning the Mukden radio station and the Radio Corporation of America's interest therein.

Yesterday afternoon an officer of this Consulate General was informed by the Japanese Consulate General that the Kuantung Army Headquarters had completed preparations for the reopening of the Mukden short wave radio station and wished to be advised concerning exact wave lengths, receiving and transmitting schedules, and other details of operation in order that service between Mukden and San Francisco might be resumed at an early date. Japanese radio experts had been sent to Mukden from Dairen to effect the necessary repairs to the station and put it in a condition for operation. A German engineer, Mr.

Friese,



- 2 -

Friese, who is employed by the Northeastern Communication Administration in the capacity of advisor on radio matters, was approached by the Japanese with the request that he assist in the work of reconditioning the plant. He refused to do this fearing that compliance might jeopardize his position with the Chinese.

Today Mr. Vincent, in company with Mr. Friese made an inspection of the various sections of the radio plant with a view to ascertaining whether the Japanese claims relative to the preparedness of the plant to resume service were based on fact. At the receiving station Japanese soldiers were found occupying the main building and a new barbed wire fence had been placed around the station. No technical men were in evidence. Mr. Friese examined the equipment and stated that although it was not then in a condition for use three or four days work by a man thoroughly familiar with radio would suffice to put it in condition for operation.

At the transmitting plant Japanese soldiers were also the only occupants of the buildings. The German equipment which is used primarily for communication with Berlin but which is also used at times in communicating with San Francisco, had not been restored to usefulness and Mr. Friese stated that it would take a long time to put it in condition. The American equipment was in good condition but this condition was due to the fact that it had not been disturbed since the Japanese occupation rather than to any work done by the Japanese engineers.

A



- 3 -

A detachment of Japanese soldiers was also occupying the central control office and permission to visit the control rooms was refused.

Although not entirely related to the subject matter of this despatch, it may be stated that the long wave station used for interprovincial communication was completely destroyed by fire on November 1st. The equipment had been irreparably damaged just prior to or at the time of the Japanese occupation on September 18-19. As neither Japanese nor Chinese guards were at the station, the cause of the fire is unknown.

At the conclusion of the tour of inspection, Mr. Friese stated that it was possible but not probable that the Japanese would be able to resume a satisfactory service with San Francisco at an early date. The station was operating on three wave lengths at the time it was closed. These lengths were, in approximate figures, 15, 27, and 38 meters. The American equipment was adjusted to only two of these wave lengths, 15 and 27 meters. The German (Telefunken) equipment was used for 38 meter transmission which, according to Mr. Friese, was frequently necessary during cold weather. Furthermore, the K.V.A. tubes in the American equipment were not giving satisfaction at the time the plant was closed and new ones were being obtained. It was noticed today that the old ones were still in place. With the German equipment out of commission and the American equipment not in a thoroughly satisfactory condition, Mr.

Friese



1914

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

Friese stated that service could not be maintained for more than two or three hours a day.

With respect to the reopening of the radio station, it is observed that the Japanese have made no move to restore Chinese control even nominally under Japanese advisors as has been the case with a number of other public utility concerns. It is evident that they intend to operate the station, if it is to be operated at all, under exclusive Japanese management. In this connection it is instructive to refer to a remark made some days ago by an officer of the Japanese Consulate General to the effect that the short wave radio station was erected in Mukden in the face of Japanese protests.


The Legation will be promptly informed of future developments.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers.  
American Consul General.

Original and one copy to Legation.  
Five copies to Department.  
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.

JCV:AAB  
340/800.





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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RECD

No. -----

AMERICAN CONSULATE.

Mukden, China, November 5, 1931.

DEC 5 31

SUBJECT: Seizure of Salt Administration Funds.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON.

SIREC/29/1931

A-C/C

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 7 1931  
Department of State

F/DEM

793.94/3078

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy  
of my despatch No. 478, to the Legation, Peiping, China,  
dated November 4, 1931 on the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers  
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 478.

MSM:HTW  
800

JAN 5 - 1932

FILED



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REC'D

No. -----

AMERICAN CONSULATE.

Mukden, China, November 5, 1931.

DEC 5 31

SUBJECT: Seizure of Salt Administration Funds.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SIR

A-C/C

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON.

Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DEC 7 1931

Department of State

F/DEW

793.94/3078

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy  
of my despatch No. 478, to the Legation, Peking, China,  
dated November 4, 1931 on the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers

American Consul General.

Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 478.

MoM:HTW  
800

FILED  
JAN 5 - 1932



No. 498

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, China.

November 4, 1931.

SUBJECT: Seizure of Salt Administration Funds.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Legation,

Peiping, China.

Sir:

793.94/2418  
Referring to my telegram of October 31, 1 p.m.,  
in regard to the removal of the Salt Administration funds  
by a Japanese armed guard from the Bank of China at New-  
chwang to the Provincial Bank at the same place, I have  
the honor to report further particulars in regard to this  
matter received from a reliable source.

Some weeks ago the Kirin authorities threatened to  
seize the Salt Administration funds at Changchun, amounting  
to approximately \$2,000,000, which represent tax collec-  
tions and the revolving fund for the purchase of salt.  
The seizure was prevented by the Japanese military who  
interdicted the use of this money in any way and at the  
same time put an embargo on the removal of the salt funds  
at Newchwang amounting to about \$720,000. The local Peace  
Maintenance Committee endeavored without success to secure  
the transfer of these funds in the Bank of China at Newchwang

to



- 2 -

to their account.

In the meantime the Chief Inspectors of the Salt Administration sent a Special Deputy (Mr. Pearson) to secure the release of both the Changchun and Newchwang funds and while negotiations with the Japanese Consulate General at Mukden in regard to this matter were taking place the forcible transfer, as reported in my telegram, was made. It is interesting to note in this connection that the Salt Inspector at Newchwang, who is a Japanese, was in Mukden assisting the Special Deputy when he suddenly returned to Newchwang without the knowledge of his superior. It is surmised that he was told to leave Mukden by Japanese Headquarters.

The Special Deputy saw Yuan Chin-k'ai on Saturday morning last in regard to this seizure. It is understood that the Salt Administration is making a special effort to maintain its organization in this territory even though it may be unable to secure a part of the tax collections.


Heretofore Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang received the whole salt collection of Manchuria (less organization expenses) and it is interesting to note that Yuan Chin-k'ai and his colleagues desire to continue this arrangement. They state that it is needed for administration expenses.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers.  
American Consul General.

Original and one copy to Legation.  
Five copies to Department.  
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.

MSM:AAB  
340/800.





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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RECD

No. -----



COPIES SENT TO  
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

*Handwritten initials and signature*

AMERICAN CONSULATE,

Mukden, China, November 6, 1931.

DEC 5 31

SUBJECT: Recent Political Developments.

*Handwritten circled 'G'*

*1931.94  
7.00*

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

*Handwritten signature*

*Handwritten signature*  
Division of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
DEC 7 1931  
Department of State  
*Handwritten signature*

F / DEW

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of  
my despatch No. 479, to the Legation, Peiping, China;  
dated November 6, 1931, on the above subject.

793.94/3079

Respectfully yours,

*Handwritten signature*

M. S. Myers  
American Consul General.

DEC 8 1931

FILED

Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 479.

MSM:HTW  
800



No. 479

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, China.

November 5, 1931.

SUBJECT: Recent Political Developments.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Legation,

Peiping, China.

Sir:

Referring to my despatch No. 476 of November 2, 1931, in regard to the efforts of the Japanese to induce Yuan Chin-k'ai to organize a provincial government for this province, I have the honor to state that inquiries in appropriate quarters have elicited further information on this subject which is believed to be trustworthy.

It has been learned that on November 2 the Peace Maintenance Committee submitted in writing the following four points to the Japanese military authorities for approval: (1) That a police force similar to the one at Mukden shall be organized in each district occupied by Japanese troops and be placed under the control of this Committee; (2) That all independence movements of individual districts shall be cancelled and that such districts shall be placed under the control of this Committee;

(3)



- 2 -

(3) That the restrictions on the Bureau of Finance shall be withdrawn so that it may be able to collect taxes and make disbursements without Japanese interference; (4) That all Japanese advisors to the different governmental organs shall be withdrawn and that a single Chief Advisor shall be engaged by the Committee. A reply from Japanese headquarters has been received to these proposals to the effect that the first three points are approved in principle but that it is not the time to give consideration to the fourth point. As significant of the conditions under which the Chinese government organs at Mukden are functioning it may be stated that both the heads of the Bureaux of Finance and industry recently tendered their resignations to the Committee which, however, were not accepted.

It will be seen from the above that the Committee desires to control the Chinese police in all occupied districts as well as to gain control over districts which have organized independent governments with the assistance of, in every case it is believed, Japanese. It is the creation of a provincial police force that is contemplated under point one, the intention being that local taxation shall supply the cost of the upkeep of the police assigned to each district.

According to all available information it is believed that the Committee has no intention whatsoever of organizing a provincial government but is ready to carry on the necessary functions of government until such time as Chinese administration is reestablished in the occupied districts. There is no doubt that the Japanese have repeatedly urged Mr. Yuan

to



- 3 -

to form a provincial government and to occupy the provincial government offices but he has consistently refused to do so. It is apparent that under existing conditions a provincial government would be subjected to great pressure for the furtherance of Japanese interests of one kind or another. One of the questions that might be expected to be raised were a provincial government functioning is the matter of the transfer of land in the Mukden Settlement which under the regulations can only be legalized by the act and seal of the Chairman or Governor of the province. It is reported that there has been a number of Japanese inquiries in regard to this matter.

It has been ascertained that the pay of the police force at Mukden is not in arrears and that the necessary funds are being secured by an overdraft on the local provincial bank. This police force (自衛警察局) was at least nominally independent of the Mayor's office but since the duties of that office were assumed by Dr. Chao Hsin-po the Japanese headquarters have obliged the Chinese to place this force under the control of the Mayor's office, for which a special bureau has been created. A small incident wherein a Chinese policeman showed disrespect for a Japanese officer was given in press reports as the reason for this change, but in my opinion it had nothing to do with it. It seems to be the policy of the Japanese military authorities to extend the power of Dr. Chao Hsin-po wherever possible, due no doubt to his being a man upon whom they can fully rely. A responsible Chinese is said to have described him as 90% Japanese.

Respectfully



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


- 4 -

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers.  
American Consul General.

Original and one copy to Legation.  
Five copies to Department.  
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.  
Copy to Consulate, Dairen.  
Copy to Consulate General, Harbin.

MSM:AAB  
600.





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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. \_\_\_\_\_

AMERICAN CONSULATE.

Mukden, China, November 7, 1931

SUBJECT: Japanese Action Against Chinese Electric  
Light and Power Plants.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of  
my despatch No. 480, to the Legation, Peiping, China,  
dated November 5, 1931, on the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers  
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 480.

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No. 480

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, China.

November 5, 1931.

SUBJECT: Japanese Action Against Chinese Electric  
Light and Power Plants.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Legation,

Peiping, China.

Sir:

I have the honor to request the Legation to refer to  
this Consulate General's despatch No. 474 of October 31,  
1931, and telegram of November 2, 5 p.m. relative to Japa-  
nese action against Chinese electric light and power plants  
in South Manchuria.

The four principal cities of south Manchuria adjacent  
to the South Manchuria Railway zone are Antung, Mukden,  
Changchun, and Newchwang. The Antung (Chinese) electric  
light plant was closed by order of the Japanese military  
authorities on September 22nd. The Mukden Electric Light  
Company is completely controlled by the Japanese and one of  
the Company's two plants is to be closed during the present  
month. The Changchun (Chinese) electric light plant was  
closed by the Japanese last week according to a thoroughly  
reliable report made to the Consulate on November 2nd.  
The electric light plant at Newchwang is a Sino-Japanese

enterprise



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enterprise and consequently has suffered no interference at the hands of the Japanese.

With particular reference to the Chinese plant at Antung, in which Andersen, Meyer & Company has a very large financial interest, I beg to report that the Japanese Consulate General has orally informed a member of my staff of the Japanese attitude towards this plant. The substance of the statement made by Mr. Morishima, executive consul at the Japanese Consulate General, to Mr. Vincent is as follows: For twenty years the Japanese plant had a natural monopoly on furnishing electric light and power to Antung. At the beginning of this year the Chinese plant at Antung was opened. In order to secure customers, residents of the Chinese city were forbidden to continue using Japanese current. The Japanese plant was refused permission to put in new poles in the Chinese city and obstructionist tactics of other kinds were employed. The Japanese plant reduced charges to meet the new competition with the result that the Chinese plant was operating at a loss at the time it was closed. The Japanese had made proposals to the Chinese for a joint Sino-Japanese enterprise for servicing Antung but these proposals were ignored by the Chinese. The Chinese plant was closed after the Japanese military occupation of south Manchuria in accord with the desires of the Chinese residents of Antung who wished to take advantage of the reduced rates offered by the Japanese plant. The present situation is only temporary. A scheme will be formulated for Sino-Japanese cooperation

which



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which will be mutually beneficial to both parties and will insure satisfactory service to the public. American interests in the Chinese plant will be given full consideration.

Regarding the above, Andersen, Meyer and Company states that the usual Chinese propaganda was used to induce Chinese to use Chinese rather than Japanese current but that resort to force was not made as witness the fact that some Chinese in the Chinese town continued to use Japanese current. The Chinese plant, according to Andersen, Meyer and Company which is in a position to know, not only was not operating at <sup>a</sup> loss at the time it was closed but was actually showing a profit. When the Chinese plant opened its charges were 18 Chinese cents as opposed to the Japanese charges of 25 sen. Later the Japanese reduced its charges to 15 sen, an amount still considerably in excess of the Chinese charge.

Mr. Morishima, in his complaint against the Chinese refusal to cooperate with the Japanese, conveniently ignores the fact that the Chinese plant at Antung, or any other place along the Japanese railway zone, would under no circumstances be allowed to furnish power and light, in competition with the Japanese plant, to the Japanese railway settlement. A dispute which occurred last summer at Antung is illustrative of this situation. A suburb of the Chinese settlement at Antung is separated from the main city by the South Manchuria Railway. The Chinese company requested permission to run its wires over the railway track in order to serve the suburb. The request was ignored. The Chinese then placed poles on either side of the track outside of the

railway



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railway right of way and attempted to run wires across. Japanese railway guards removed the poles forthwith.

The Mukden Electric Light Company is the only Chinese power company in Mukden. It has two plants, an old and a new one, which operate as one system, having a single management and using the same power and light lines. After the Japanese occupation, a Japanese manager, accountant, traffic chief, chief engineer, business manager, and two Japanese general assistants, all from the South Manchuria Electric Company, took charge of the Company. Although there are still Chinese connected with the Company (the principal officials fled after the occupation) all business is managed by the Japanese or under their strict supervision.

For the past week there have been reports that a contract had been signed with the Fushun (Japanese) power plant providing for the use of Fushun power in the Chinese city and settlement. The Fushun power plant now supplies light and power to the Japanese railway town at Mukden and to other railway towns nearby. The Japanese Consulate General has now confirmed the reports relative to the contract. Mr. Morishima, Japanese executive consul, stated that in 1921<sup>er</sup> the Chinese Commission<sup>er</sup> of Foreign Affairs entered into a "joint enterprise" agreement with officials of the South Manchuria Railway Company. One clause of this agreement provided for "Mukden-Fushun" cooperation in the supply of light and power to Chinese Mukden. The Fushun power plant agreed to furnish light at the same rates charged consumers in the Japanese railway town. The contract which has recently been signed between the Mukden Municipal Administration

(controlled



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(controlled by Japanese) and officials of the Fushun power plant is simply a fulfillment, stated Mr. Morishima, of the 1921 agreement. The request for Fushun power was made by the Municipal Administration.

Pursuant to this contract four 1000 K.V.A. transformers are being installed in the new Chinese power plant and transmission wires are being run from Fushun to the Chinese plant. The old Chinese plant is to be closed about November 20th, or when the arrangements are completed for using Fushun power. Prior to the Japanese occupation the new Chinese plant furnished about 70% and the old plant 30% of the maximum plant load of 7000 kilowatts. The Japanese state that for the time being Fushun will be able to contribute only about 1200 kilowatts but that later its share will be increased. It is believed that the Mukden Electric Light Company's new plant will continue to operate in cooperation with the Fushun power plant. It is interesting to note in connection with the above that the present maximum power load required in the Chinese city and settlement is 3700 kilowatts as compared with 7000 kilowatts prior to the Japanese occupation. This decrease is due to the general exodus of Chinese from Mukden and to the closing down of many industrial enterprises.

The Consulate General has been unable to obtain further information concerning the closing of the Changchun (Chinese) electric light plant. It is known to have been closed by the Japanese sometime during the past week and it is further known that the Japanese plant is now supplying light and power to the Chinese city of Changchun.

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As stated early in this despatch, the Newchwang electric light plant, being a Sino-Japanese enterprise, has suffered no interference at the hands of the Japanese.

It is quite evident that the Japanese mean to utilize the present unsettled situation to secure joint participation in, and control over, the Chinese power plants operating in cities adjacent to the South Manchuria Railway zone. The power company at Newchwang is no doubt being used as an example for the other cities and this plant, although nominally a joint Sino-Japanese enterprise, is virtually under the control of the Japanese. A contract has already been signed providing for Sino-Japanese cooperation in Mukden. The Japanese now have complete control of the Chinese company and it is extremely doubtful that they will relinquish this control unless circumstances compel them to. The Japanese Consulate General states that similar plans are being made for Antung, and it is expected that the system will be extended to Changchun.

The advantages from a military viewpoint of having light and power from Japanese plants in Chinese cities are obvious. In the event of future military operations the Japanese will be able to keep light and power in the Chinese cities independent of Chinese power plants.

Furthermore, if Newchwang is to be taken as a model, Japanese manufacturers of electrical machinery will benefit greatly from the establishment of joint Sino-Japanese power plants in Mukden, Antung and Changchun. Heretofore, the

Chinese



1931  
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972  
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Chinese plants in these cities have been large purchasers of American equipment whereas the Newchwang plant makes its purchases in Japan. If the Japanese succeed in their plans it is feared that the south Manchurian market for American and European electrical equipment will all but cease to exist.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers.  
American Consul General.

Original and one copy to Legation.  
Five copies to Department.  
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.

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A true copy of  
the signed original.  
*[Signature]*



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