

MICROCOPY

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

Microfilm Publication M976

RECORDS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RELATING TO POLITICAL RELATIONS
BETWEEN CHINA AND JAPAN, 1930-1944

Roll 7

1930-39

793.94/3081-3250
Nov.-Dec. 1931



**THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION**

WASHINGTON: 1975

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

INTRODUCTION

On the 96 rolls of this microfilm publication are reproduced the records from the decimal file of the Department of State, 1930-44, that relate to political relations between China and Japan. The records are mostly instructions to and despatches from diplomatic and consular officials; the despatches are often accompanied by enclosures. Also included in these records are notes between the Department of State and foreign diplomatic representatives in the United States, memorandums prepared by officials of the Department, and correspondence with officials of other Government departments and with private firms and persons. The State Department divided the decimal file into chronological segments to retire inactive records. This division has been maintained in this microfilm publication. The records for the period 1930-39 are filmed on rolls 1-88 and those for 1940-44 on rolls 89-96.

The Lists of Documents or "purport lists" filmed on rolls 345 and 346 (1930-39), roll 532 (1940-June 1944), and roll 628 (July-Dec. 1944) of M973 give brief abstracts of the documents reproduced in this microfilm publication and serve as a finding aid to the documents themselves. The arrangement of the entries on these lists generally corresponds to the arrangement of the documents in the file.

From 1910 to 1963 the State Department used a decimal system for its central files, assembling and arranging individual documents according to subject and assigning decimal file numbers. The decimal file consists of nine primary classes numbered 0 through 8, each covering a broad subject area. The records reproduced in this microfilm publication are in Class 7, political relations of states. Each country had been assigned a two-digit number. The country numbers assigned to China and to Japan, for example, are 93 and 94, respectively. Thus, documents bearing the file number 793.94 concern political relations between China and Japan.

When one or more digits follow the second country number, they represent a specific subject. This number, in turn, may be followed by a slant mark (/). In such cases the numbers after the slant mark were assigned to individual documents as they were accumulated on a specific subject. For example, a decimal file number taken from a document reproduced in this microfilm publication is 793.943/5. The number 3 following the country number for Japan (94) signifies that the subject is extraterritoriality, and the number after the slant mark indicates the number of documents on this subject.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

The documents under one subject classification are generally in chronological order, coinciding with the assigned document number, which follows the slant mark. There are instances, however, when a document file number was not assigned until a date considerably later than the one on which the document was received.

In July 1944 the number after the slant mark began to reflect the date of the document instead of the number of documents; for example, a document dated November 20, 1944, would be numbered /11-2044. Documents dated as early as 1939 but not indexed until after July 1, 1944, also have been assigned date numbers.

Cross-reference sheets referring to related records under other subject classifications in the decimal file have been reproduced as they occur, and appropriate cross-reference notations appear in the Lists of Documents.

The file contains documents that were security classified by the State Department, as well as those received from and classified by foreign governments and other Federal agencies. Documents that have not been declassified are not available as part of this microfilm publication. The National Archives and Records Service (NARS) does not have authority to make reproductions of such documents available to searchers. Documents that remain classified have been removed from the file and replaced by a withdrawal notice that identifies the document and indicates the reason for its removal.

The records reproduced in this microfilm publication are part of General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, and are a continuation of the records concerning political relations between China and other states, 1910-29, which have been microfilmed as NARS M341.

In the same record group are several diplomatic correspondence series containing documents on relations between China and the United States. They are copies of instructions from the State Department to U.S. Ministers to China, 1843-1906 (rolls 38-43 of M77); notes to the Chinese Legation in the United States from the Department, 1868-1906 (rolls 13 and 14 of M99); despatches from U.S. Ministers to China to the Department, 1843-1906 (M92); and notes from the Chinese Legation in the United States to the Department, 1868-1906 (M98). Also related to matters concerning China are communications to special agents of the United States from the Department, 1852-86 (roll 154 of M77).

Several series of volumes contain material on relations between Japan and the United States. There are copies of instructions from the State Department to U.S. Ministers to

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

Japan, 1855-1906 (rolls 104-108 of M77); despatches from U.S. Ministers to Japan to the Department, 1855-1906 (M133); notes to the Japanese Legation in the United States from the Department, 1860-1906 (rolls 66 and 67 of M99); and notes from the Japanese Legation in the United States to the Department, 1858-1906 (M163). Also related to matters concerning Japan are communications to special agents of the United States from the Department, 1823-86 (rolls 152 and 154 of M77); and despatches from special agents to the Department, 1794-1837 (roll 10 of M37).

Despatches from U.S. consular officials in China and Japan before 1906 are available as separate microfilm publications for each post. Complementary to the despatches from consuls are instructions to consuls.

The method of arranging the diplomatic and consular series cited above was discontinued in 1906, when the State Department adopted the practice of filing incoming and outgoing correspondence, memorandums, and other documents by subject in a single numerical series. Information on documents relating to China and Japan for the 1906-10 period may be found through the use of card indexes and Lists of Documents in the National Archives of the United States. The Numerical File is available as microfilm publication M862.

Several series in the State Department decimal file, 1910-29, that relate to Chinese and Japanese affairs are available as microfilm publications. In Class 7 there are two series regarding Chinese affairs: one concerning political relations between the United States and China (M339) and the other concerning political relations between China and other states (including Japan) (M341); and two series regarding Japanese affairs: one concerning political relations between the United States and Japan (M423) and the other concerning political relations between Japan and other states (M424). Class 8, internal affairs of states, has records concerning internal affairs of China (M329) and internal affairs of Japan (M422). Additional documents are in the remaining classes of the State Department decimal file:

- Class 0. General. Miscellaneous.
- Class 1. Administration, Government of the United States.
- Class 2. Extradition.
- Class 3. Protection of Interests.
- Class 4. Claims.
- Class 5. International Congresses and Conferences. Multi-lateral Treaties. League of Nations.
- Class 6. Commerce. Customs Administration. Commercial Relations, Treaties and Conventions. Commercial and Trade Agreements.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES MICROFILM PUBLICATIONS

In Records of Boundary and Claims Commissions and Arbitrations, Record Group 76, there are records relating to the Claims Commissions of 1858 and 1901 between the United States and China.

In Records of International Conferences, Commissions, and Expositions, Record Group 43, are records of several conferences in which the United States and Japan participated. There are records of the Washington Conference on Limitation of Armament, 1921-22, which met to consider the limitation of armaments and certain questions relating to Pacific and Far Eastern problems. There are also records of the Commission To Represent the United States at the Grand Exhibition of Japan, 1917. The exhibition was planned for 1912 but had been postponed, and the records relate mainly to the visit of U.S. Commissioners to Japan in 1908 and to their conferences with Japanese officials. Other relevant records in Record Group 43 are those concerning the Sino-Japanese Dispute, 1930-32 (documents gathered by Gen. Frank McCoy, U.S. representative on the Lytton Commission), those of the U.S. Element, Allied Council for Japan, 1946-52, and those of the Far Eastern Commission, 1945-51.

In Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Record Group 84, are records originally kept at U.S. diplomatic and consular posts. Among these are records of the U.S. Legation (later Embassy) in China, 1843-1945, and of the U.S. Legation (later Embassy) in Japan, 1855-1936, as well as those of various consular posts in those countries.

The records reproduced in this microfilm publication were prepared for filming by Ralph E. Huss, who also wrote these introductory remarks.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REC'D

No. _____

AMERICAN CONSULATE.

Mukden, China. November 9, 1931.

DEC 5 31

SUBJECT: Japanese Army Order to National City
Bank of New York.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DEC 7 1931

Department of State

F/DEW

793.94/3081

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of
my despatch No. 481, to the Legation, Peiping, China,
dated November 7, 1931, on the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 481.

MSM:HTW
800

No. 481

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Hakden, China.

November 7, 1931.

SUBJECT: Japanese Army Order to National City
Bank of New York.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping, China.

Sir:

I have the honor to request the Legation to refer
793.74/2832
to my despatch No. 472 of October 31, 1931, regarding
an order received by the National City Bank of New York
from the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army. Believing
that the Legation will be interested, I am enclosing a
1/ copy of the Japanese Consul General's reply to my protest
of October 29, 1931 (enclosure to despatch No. 472). The
Chief of Staff's letter to the Manager of the Bank was
definitely an order forbidding the Manager to make certain
remittances but since the Japanese wish the letter to be
interpreted as an expression of desire and disavow any
right to interfere with the Bank, the case may be con-
sidered closed and the hope entertained that there will
be no further misunderstandings of the kind.

Respectfully

- 2 -


Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers.
American Consul General.

1/ Enclosure: Copy of despatch from Japanese Consul
General dated November 6, 1931.

Original and one copy to Legation.
Five copies to Department.
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.

JCV:RAB
340/800



CONSULATE-GENERAL OF JAPAN.

MUKDEN.

November 6th, 1931.

Sir and dear Colleague,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of October 29th, 1931.

In reply, I beg leave to communicate to you that, in their letter addressed to the National City Bank of New York, the Japanese Military Authorities intended to notify the American Bank their desire that remittances of public funds deposited before the outset of the present trouble should not be made to the Liaoning Provincial Government officials to present in North China, and that the Army was interested in the report as if the Purchase Commission of the ex-Provincial Government were removing its purchasing funds to North China.

I have the honour to add that there are no law or regulations which authorize the Chief Staff of the Kwantung Army to issue orders to the National City Bank.

I have the honour to be,

Sir and dear Colleague,


Your obedient servant,

K. Hayashi.
Consul-General of Japan.

M. S. Myers, Esquire,

American Consul-General,

M u k d e n.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REC'D

No. -----

AMERICAN CONSULATE

Munden, COME, November 10, 1931.

DEC 5 31

SUBJECT: Municipal Office at Munden.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON, D.C.

SIR:

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of
my despatch No. 482, to the Legation, Peking, China,
dated November 9, 1931, on the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 482.

MSM:HTW
800

F/DEM

793.94/3082

FILED

JAN 5 - 1932

No. 482

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, China.

November 9, 1931.

SUBJECT: Municipal Office at Mukden.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Legation,
Peking, China.

Sir:

1/ I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of a despatch from the Municipal Office of Mukden dated October 22, 1931, announcing that the local Peace Maintenance Committee had taken over control from the Japanese of the Mukden Municipal Office and that Chao Hsin-po who had been appointed Mayor assumed the duties of that office on October 20th.

The provisional regulations governing the Municipal office, as published in the local press, are briefly summarized below. They provide that the Chinese city and suburbs including the Mukden Settlement comprise the area under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Office and that the Mayor who shall be commissioned by the local Peace Maintenance Committee shall have charge of the administration of the affairs of the office. Provision

- * -

is made for a Secretariat and the following departments: General Affairs Department, Finance Department, Executive Department, Works Department, Police Department, Educational Department, Electrical Department and Sanitary Department. It is also provided that the Municipal Office shall control the following government organs: Peace Preservation Corps, Self Protection Police, Telegraph Office, Telephone Office, Electric Light works, Tractor Service, Public Motor Bus Service, Libraries, Slaughter Houses, Public Parks and Relief Institutions.

Although not mentioned in the regulations, there are at least two Japanese advisers associated with the Municipal Office, one to the office and the other to the Mayor. It is worthy of note that the scope of the functions of the Municipal Office is much broader than formerly. For instance, the police are now placed directly under the control of the Mayor's office as is also the telegraph, telephone and electric light works. Formerly these administrations were either under the control of the Provincial Chairman's Office or directly under the office of the Commander-in-Chief.

The police force is now being increased to 4000. Ch'i En-ming (齊恩銘) who was the head of the Mukden gendarmerie at the time of the death of Chang Tso-lin has recently assumed the duties of Chief of Police, vice Feng Ching-yi resigned. Mr. Feng, it will be remembered, organized this force shortly after the occupation of Mukden by the Japanese.

- 3 -

I have been unsuccessful in obtaining a biographical sketch of Dr. Chao Hsin-ao. As previously reported, he was graduated from the Tokyo Imperial University and was latterly one of the advisers to Chang Tso-lin. He has resided at Mukden for several years and organized a law research society at Mukden, of which he has been the head. During the past two years he was one of the many advisers of Chang Hsueh-liang. Dr. Chao is understood to be a very strong Japanese sympathizer. He is also the chief of the local Supreme Court.


Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers.
American Consul General.

1/ Enclosure: Copy of despatch from Municipal Office of Mukden dated October 22, 1931.

Original and one copy to Legation.
Five copies to Department.

MEM:AAB
800.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TRANSLATION.

Despatch No. 1 from Mr. Chao Hsin-po, Mayor at Mukden, to
Mr. M. B. Myers, American Consul General, Mukden.

Dated: October 22, 1931.
Received: October 23, 1931.


Sir:

I have the honor to inform you that the Local Peace
Maintenance Committee has arranged with the army office
of the friendly power that the Committee shall take over
the Mukden Municipal Office and conduct its affairs. I,
Hsin-po, have been elected as Commissioner for taking over
the office and have also been appointed Mayor. On October
20th, I assumed office.

Apart from informing others, I have the honor to
inform you thereof with the request that you will please
take note.

MUNICIPAL OFFICE, SHENYANG

(SEAL).



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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No. —




AMERICAN CONSULATE

Mukden, China, November 10, 1931.


DEC 5 31

SUBJECT: Anti-American Pamphlet Issued by the Japanese
Patriotic Association, Mukden.

793.94
711/94
500/C



COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.



SIR:

WASHINGTON.

1/ I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of
my despatch No. 483, to the Legation, Peiping, dated
November 9, 1931, on the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers
M. S. Myers
American Consul General.

1/ Enclosure: Copy of despatch to Legation, Peiping,
dated November 9, 1931.

Original and four copies to Department.

MSM:AAB
800.

DEC 9 1931

FILED

F/DEW

793.94/3083

a-c/c

in

copy in FE

file

No. 483

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, China.

November 9, 1931.

SUBJECT: Anti-American Pamphlet Issued by the
Japanese Patriotic Association, Mukden.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Legation,
Peiping, China.

Sir:

1/ I have the honor to enclose herewith a translation of a pamphlet issued by the Japanese Patriotic Association of Mukden. A copy of the pamphlet was recently brought to my attention and believing that it would interest the Legation I had the enclosed translation made.

In connection with local Japanese civilian feeling with respect to the present situation, it was interesting to observe that large numbers of Japanese reservists met in Mukden on November 8th. The day's activities included a meeting for the purpose of discussing the present situation and passing resolutions and a parade through the streets of Mukden, lead by Japanese uniformed officers. The spokesman for Japanese military headquarters stated that the meeting was held for the purpose of strengthening the Government's hands and preventing any weakening of Japanese policy at this time.

Respectfully

- 2 -


Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers.
American Consul General.

- 1/ Enclosure: Translation of pamphlet issued by Japanese
Patriotic Association of Mukden.

Original and one copy to Legation.
Five copies to Department.
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.

JCV:AAB
800.



TO CERTAIN NATION.

Japan to Withdraw from the League of Nations
To Uphold the Righteousness of the World

In connection with the Manchurian crisis, Mr. Yoshizawa, Japanese chief delegate to the League of Nations, explained that Japan's claim of special interests in Manchuria and Mongolia is based on righteousness and justice. Despite this clear explanation, the League of Nations, being ignorant of the real situation in Manchuria and perplexed by the Chinese groundless propaganda, permitted the participation of the United States in the League of Nations in contradiction of the honorable regulations of the institution, for the purpose of oppressing the Japanese side. Indeed, it is not necessary to state that Japan should not hesitate to withdraw from the institution which is going to place Japanese life and property in danger in Manchuria by compelling Japanese soldiers to withdraw from Manchuria before November 16th. On this occasion, Japan, for the purpose of making the League of Nations realize this fact and reflect, must decisively withdraw from the League of Nations, and protect Japanese rights, lives, and property, and maintain peace in the Far East as well as in the world. Now Britain is going to obtain commercial rights in the region of the Yangtze River through directing Mr. Briand at Geneva, and at the same time America is striving to plant her power in China for the future through restraining the activity of Japanese soldiers and causing trouble by firing anti-Japanese feeling among Chinese. Their ambition is really beyond description. Despite the fact that the League of Nations was originated by an American, President Wilson, America separated from the League of Nations. In 1926, when the Chinese mobs were raging in South China, and Britain, France and other countries sent troops there to oppress China, America made no objection, but now that Japan sends soldiers to protect her nationals in Manchuria, she insultingly and tyrannically participates in the League of Nations and plans to oppress Japan and further restrain Japan's military action through the useless pact. It is no other than an action of hostility towards Japan. Indeed America holds firmly to the Monroe Doctrine and prohibits interference of other powers in the matters of North and South America, but on the other hand, she is always ready to interfere in other nations' affairs. Especially when America sees Japan in difficulties with China she always acts with hatred to restrict Japanese


activity

- 2 -

activity in China. Above all, (name untranslatable) proposed the neutrality of the South Manchuria Railway in the past when Japan gained rights in Manchuria with a high price in the war with giant Russia. Furthermore she (America) refused to allow Japanese in her territory. She proposed the (name untranslatable) four articles and cancelled the Anglo-Japanese alliance under the auspices of the Washington Treaty. She compelled Japan to return Shantung to China. She restrained Japan from taking military action in China by establishing the Nine Powers Treaty. Really America takes every opportunity to place restrictions upon Japan's policies in China. Under these circumstances should Japan persevere any longer? Japan can find no reason for further perseverance with this country. Moreover, a reporter named Powell (J. B. Powell) of a certain nation has concocted many groundless rumors harmful to Japanese military action in Manchuria. He has sent these groundless rumors to his home government with the intention of disturbing peace and order in the Far East, and of fostering anti-Japanese feelings among the nations of the League. His action is hateful beyond description. The certain country and the League of Nations should be ruthlessly condemned by both God and man. They are an enemy of the public. Rise up! Japanese, who are inflamed by patriotic feeling. Rise up! country men, who are anxious to have peace and order in the Far East and in the world. All Japanese are required to avoid national opinion in favor of Japanese withdrawal from the League of Nations, positive action with respect to Chinese matters, and chastisement to the certain nation which is the GREAT HYPOCRITE of the world. That things may be well done in this crisis, rise up, country men!

BY: PATRIOTIC ASSOCIATION
No. 8, Yameda-dori, Mukden, China.

Printed: October 29, 1931.
Issued: October 31, 1931.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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
DEC 5 31

SUBJECT: Translation of Pamphlet Issued by Japanese Soldiers.


COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,



WASHINGTON.



F/DEW

795.94/3084

I have the honor to enclose herewith a translation of a pamphlet sent to this office by an American residing in Kirin. The pamphlet was issued by the Japanese Army in Kirin and distributed throughout the city.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers
M. S. Myers
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

As stated.

JOV:HTW
800

JAN 5 - 1932

FILED

DETERMINATION OF THE JAPANESE ARMY

We soldiers deeply regret the present crisis in Manchuria. But as it has come to such a state we understand that it is necessary that steps should be taken to turn the calamity into a blessing. We firmly believe that it is possible to avail ourselves of the present situation to release the 30,000,000 people of the Northeast. Henceforth they shall live in a paradise for Japanese, Koreans, Manchurians, Mongolians and Chinese, the construction of which will be continued until it is completed. We soldiers shall make every effort to carry on the work so that the 30,000,000 people of the Northeast may live in a land of complete blessing. In the past there was the Sino-Japanese war and the Russo-Japanese war, and now there is the present crisis. These are the three great developments which indicate the establishment of the Japanese right of self-protection and self-preservation and the establishment of peace in the Far East. The mission of our Japanese soldiers is great and just. Naturally this is understood by all people. To obtain blessings for the 30,000,000 people of the Northeast and to complete this great achievement, we soldiers feel that it will require a period of two or three years. During this period, we shall go forward with great valour giving no regard to any other object, with a fresh spirit for removing all difficulties, and with steady steps to develop the paradise which is to be our achievement. Taking righteous principle as a basis, a good and princely administration shall be established. However, those who are hostile to our soldiers shall be considered our enemies no matter who they are. Troops shall be sent to conquer them. We will not be afraid of them even if they are a league of many powers.

800

JCV:WYP

In duplicate to the Legation, Peiping.

In quintuplicate to the Department.

Copy to the Embassy, Tokyo.

A true copy of
the signed original.
[Signature]


RECU

No. _____



Mukden, China, November 13, 1931.

SUBJECT: Political conditions.
DEC 5 31



THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy
of my despatch No.484, to the Legation, Peiping, China,
dated November 12, 1931, on the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers
M. S. Myers
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

As stated.

MSM:HTW
800

F/DEW

793.94/3085

FILED

JAN 6 1932

No. 484

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,
Mukden, China, November 12, 1931.

SUBJECT: Political Conditions.

Strictly Confidential.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister,
Peiping, China.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose herewith an interesting memorandum, prepared by Consul Vincent, regarding his call this morning at the Japanese Consulate General when he had separate conversations with Consul General Hayashi and Vice Consul Miura.

A few observations may not be out of place. The two phases of the situation in Manchuria now uppermost are the military activities in the northwest along the Tao-ang Railway and the serious efforts being made to establish an independent government of Manchuria and Mongolia (Eastern). Although Japanese inspiration and assistance to this movement are ascribed to "Ronin" it is quite evident that their activities could not prosper were they under the ban of the Japanese military. Far from being banned, the Japanese military seem to be encouraging and facilitating this movement in every way possible in spite of the declared opposition of the

Japanese

-2-

Japanese government thereto.

The military expedition for the alleged purpose of repairing bridges on the Tao-Ang Railway, near its northern terminus Angangshi, may be another phase of the same movement although military control of the railway seems to be of more immediate importance. In order to give the movement a semblance of success, Taitsihar, like Kirin and Mandsch, must be amenable to Japanese dictation. Taking advantage of Soviet Russia's apparent extreme anxiety for peace at the present time, the Japanese military have seized upon the weak pretext of repairing bridges on a relatively unimportant railway so that their puppet, Chang Hsi-p'eng, may be able to occupy Taitsihar, the capital city of Heilungkiang, and thus establish Japanese influence in that province. The Japanese military seem to have the bit between their teeth and although it is impossible to forecast how far they will go, they show every indication of having as their irreducible minimum the reduction of Manchuria to the status of a protectorate of Japan in fact, although probably not in name.


Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myarsi
American Consul General.

1/ Enclosure: memorandum of Consul John Carter Vincent.

Original and one copy to Legation.
Five copies to Department.
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.

MEM:HTW
800.



Enclosure No. 1, to despatch No. 484, of M. S. Myers, American Consul General, Mukden, China, to the Legation, Peiping, dated November 12, 1931, on the subject "Political Conditions".

MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN MR. HAYASHI,
JAPANESE CONSUL GENERAL, AND JOHN CARTER VINCENT.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

The following is a report of the undersigned's conversation with Mr. Hayashi at the Japanese Consulate General on the morning of November 12th.

Mr. Hayashi was asked for an opinion concerning the persistent reports of a movement to make Pu Yi (deposed Manchu Emperor of China) monarchial ruler in Liaoning within the next few days. The fact that imperial dragon flags are being made in Mukden and reports that Pu Yi has departed from Tientsin were mentioned. Mr. Hayashi stated that he and his Government were opposed to the movement; that it was being fostered by unofficial elements (probably the Renin and Prince Kung's party). He admitted the possibility of the movement succeeding temporarily but stated that it was the opinion of his Government that it would end in failure. (It may be inferred from the above that the Japanese Government does not intend to recognize Pu Yi as ruler in Liaoning if he should assume such a position). With reference to the imperial dragon flags, Mr. Hayashi stated that the "five bar" flag of the early republic were also being made and that he did not know who was responsible for their manufacture but that he was certain that Japanese authorities were as free from connection with the manufacture of the flags as they were with entire monarchial movement. He believed that Pu Yi had been taken

away

- 2 -

away from Tientsin during the disturbances of several days ago. The Japanese Consul General in Tientsin had instructions not to permit his removal and in carrying out his instructions had kept a close watch on outgoing steamship passenger lists. Puyi was probably taken out as a "parcel", a very uncomfortable means of travel, Mr. Hayashi said, and added that he was ignorant of his present whereabouts but admitted the probability of his being in Pairen. Mr. Hayashi stated that it was extremely difficult to control the activities of unofficial Japanese societies in China. During the course of this discussion he mentioned the unsuccessful attempt to restore Puyi as Emperor in 1918 and concluded that the present movement would meet with the same fate if carried through to actual accomplishment.

The conversation then turned to the question of the withdrawal of the Japanese troops from areas under Chinese administration before the 15th of November. Mr. Hayashi stated without hesitation that the troops would not be withdrawn by November 15th. He did not attempt to explain his reasons for making this categorical statement. Regarding the attitude and possible action of the League of Nations, he stated (requesting that his statement be treated as strictly confidential) that he had urged his Government to invite the League to send a committee of investigation to Manchuria. Mr. Hayashi said that there was to be a monster anti-League demonstration in Mukden on November 15th by local Japanese residents. The Japanese authorities will not interfere with the demonstration unless it is necessary to do so to maintain order.


Concerning

- 3 -

Concerning the situation on the Nonni River, Mr. Hayashi stated that his Government had instructed the Japanese troops not to advance any farther northward. With the opposing Japanese and Chinese forces facing each other at such close quarters, he admitted the danger of irresponsible Japanese or Chinese parties instigating a renewal of hostilities. The Japanese troops, if attacked, would not be satisfied with simply defending themselves, but might be expected to take the offensive. With this idea in mind, the Japanese Consul General at Tsitsihar had requested General Ma Chen-shan to withdraw his line of defence to the north of the Chinese Eastern Railway. By so doing, a renewal of hostilities might be avoided. Mr. Hayashi concluded the conversation with the significant statement that he was considering advising the Japanese Consul General in Tsitsihar to order the withdrawal of the remaining Japanese subjects in Tsitsihar. Many of the Japanese were evacuated from that city last month.

John Carter Vincent.
American Consul.

American Consulate General,
Mukden, China,
November 12, 1931.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.515/229 FOR Tel 122 2pm

FROM Hankow (Adams) DATED Dec. 5, 1931
TO NAME 1-1127 070

REGARDING:

Silver shortage and embargo in China which has resulted from the Manchurian situation. The Boycott on Japanese goods has embarrassed most of the banks in China as it has resulted in frozen assets.

ek

793.94/3086

MET

GRAY

Hankow via N.R.

Dated December 5, 1931

Rec'd 10:08 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

122, December 5, 2 p.m.

There is a pronounced species shortage here amongst Chinese banks due to the transfer of silver by Chinese to foreign banks. Hunan has declared embargo on silver exports and the transfer of credits from Changsha to Hankow is approximately eight per cent.

Best information available is that this situation is due to panic[^] uncertainty over Sino-Japanese relations.

Most Chinese banks here are also embarrassed by having large outstanding credits frozen in unsalable Japanese goods in the hands of Chinese merchants.

Nanking and Peiping informed.

ADAMS

0 2
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

THE UNDER SECRETARY

NOV 18 1931

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SECRETARY OF STATE

NOV 20 1931

November 18, 1931.

RECEIVED

NOV 19 1931

I find this interesting item in a speech made by
Mr. Taft at a banquet in Tokyo in September or October,
1907:

793.94
"The capacity of certain members of the
modern press by headlines and sensational
dispatches to give rise to unfounded reports
has grown with the improvement in communica-
tion between different parts of the world.
The desire to sell their papers, the desire
for political reasons to embarrass an exist-
ing government, and other even less justifi-
able motives have led to misstatements, mis-
constructions, unfounded guesses all worked
into terrifying headlines that have no
foundation whatever."

(See 609 Numerical File 1906-1910 Cases.)

SKH:EJL

DEC 4 1931

FILED


F/DEW

793.94/3087

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated FROM
to anyone.




Secretary of State,

Washington

852
TRIPLE PRIORITY. / December 7, 5 p.m.

FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES.



F / DEW

793.94/3088

793.94

Immediately after your telephone Sweetser brought
in the report of the meeting of the drafting committee
held this morning which I am transmitting. At this
moment Yoshizawa is in conference with Briand and
will probably state the Japanese position. A meeting
of the Twelve will be held at 5 P.M. this evening.
Briand and the Council are desirous of getting the
resolution matter closed by Wednesday at the latest.
I have sent word to Briand of your desire in either
the event of the passage of the resolution or its
failure, to make such a statement as would be helpful
in the circumstances and that I would be glad to call
on him tomorrow morning to get his views in this
connection.

DEC 14 1931

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Later. A telephone message from the Council says

that

MET

2-from Paris, December 7, 1931

that Yoshizawa proposed to Briand a neutral zone the
northern boundary of which would be a small river
immediately north of Chinchow and the southern boundary
would be Shanhaikwan on the Great Wall.

SHAW


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
AM 1:30

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Shanghai, China, November 9, 1931.



SUBJECT: ANTI-JAPANESE MOVEMENT



F/DEW

793.94/3089

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to transmit mimeographed copies

1/- of the "Outline of anti-Japanese Movement in Shanghai"

2/- and "Some Representative Types of Chinese Violations of Japanese Rights and Interests in Manchuria", both of which have been received "with the compliments of the Japanese Legation." The latter pertains to other consular districts and it is being transmitted without comment.

With reference to the "Outline of anti-Japanese Movement in Shanghai," it is evident that this is intended to be an official statement by the Japanese Government and while it may appear, and possibly is regarded, as propaganda, it is a marvelous inditement, in many instances supported by facts, of the treatment of Japanese at this port. "The anti-Japanese Movement in Shanghai" is treated under three headings: Anti-Japanese Organizations in Shanghai and their Resolutions, Anti-Japanese Persecution and Severance of Economic Relations. The Anti-Japanese Organizations in Shanghai are correctly enumerated and

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
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
AM 1000

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Shanghai, China, November 9, 1931.



SUBJECT: ANTI-JAPANESE MOVEMENT



F/DEW

793.94/3089

THE HONORABLE

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and Severance of Economic Relations. The Anti-Japanese
Organizations in Shanghai are correctly enumerated and

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DEC 15 1931

-2-

it is believed that the resolutions presented are all authentic. To this list of anti-Japanese Organizations, when considering the Severance of Economic Relations, local Kuomintang chapters and probably some other patriotic organizations--those especially having for their object the creation of anti-Japanese movement--should be added to the list enumerated in the outline.

Under the heading of "anti-Japanese Persecution", this office has no trustworthy information. There is no reason to question the accuracy of the statement under this heading. It is likely that the occurrences enumerated under A.B.C. & D. of this heading are all founded on fact. The Section devoted to the "Severance of Economic Relations" contains a mild statement of actual conditions in Shanghai as regarded by the Police authorities of the foreign administered municipalities. It is not believed that there is any exaggeration of any of the statements under this heading but all of the sub-sections of A.B.C.D.E.F. & G. are but statements of conditions as they exist. "The Severance of Economic Relations" has been a severe blow to Japan and the conditions as they exist in Shanghai in this respect are not very much short of those conditions which would exist if war existed. The effect is as detrimental to Japan as the bombardment of one of the Japanese ports would be. "The Severance of Economic Relations" has meant practically the creation of a policy of non-intercourse. It is not believed that under this heading there has been any exaggeration whatsoever.

In the third Section C. under the heading of the so-called "traitor merchants" is set forth a condition which is regarded as disgraceful in times of peace. All of the

-3-

prisoners have been released due largely to the intervention of the International Settlement authorities with the Chinese Municipal authorities of Greater Shanghai. The place of confinement, that is the Temple of Heaven, was within the territorial limits but outside the jurisdiction of the International Settlement and for this reason, if for none other, the International Settlement authorities interested themselves in the securing of the release of these prisoners. An unconfirmed, but nonetheless believed to be a reliable, report states that two days ago other prisoners were confined in the Temple of Heaven because they were termed "traitors."

According to the Police Report the Japanese goods actually seized and confiscated by the anti-Japanese and National Salvation Committees during the month of October were valued at Mex dollars Forty-one thousand six hundred.

One must not conclude that the Japanese have done nothing in retaliation, for such is not the case. Towards the end of September the Japanese military were particularly conspicuous and were provocative in their display of force. There has been a great reduction in their conduct in this respect during recent weeks.

The International Settlement police have been inclined to prohibit the display of objectionable cartoons against the Japanese but due to the fact that all charges must be brought before a Chinese court it was not believed that it was practical to attempt criminal prosecution under this heading. It is rather remarkable that on the 5th instant Reuter carried the following information:

"An important development in the present Sino-Japanese situation was indicated today by the issue of

-4-

a Government order for the police authorities in Nanking to tear down all anti-Japanese posters and strictly to prohibit the examination of Japanese goods by anti-Japanese societies.

The order further states that no one shall be permitted to interfere with merchants who buy or sell Japanese goods.

The order becomes effective as from today. The entire police force here were out this afternoon removing anti-Japanese posters."

If this is correct, its extension to the foreign administered areas will be greatly simplified if the Chinese court will make an honest effort to enforce the foregoing order. It is feared however that even if the resolution is passed as quoted by the Reuter Report, it is intended for over-seas consumption and in so far as practical results are concerned it will be a dead letter in China.

Respectfully yours,

Edwin S. Cunningham
Edwin S. Cunningham,
American Consul General.

Enclosures:

- 1/-"Outline of anti-Japanese Movement in Shanghai"
(In Triplicate to the Department and in duplicate to Legation.)
- 2/-"Some Representative Types of Chinese Violations of Japanese Rights and Interests in Manchuria."
(same number as above.)

ESC JQ
800

IN QUINTUPLICATE TO THE DEPARTMENT

In Triplicate to the Legation.

Copy to the Minister.(without enclosure No.1--only enclosure No.2)

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE OUTLINE OF ANTI-JAPANESE
 MOVEMENT IN SHANGHAI.

I. Anti-Japanese organizations in Shanghai and their anti-Japanese resolutions.

II. Anti-Japanese persecution.

- A. Annoying of Japanese school-children.
- B. Provocative and oppressive actions towards the Japanese and their residences.
- C. Interference of mail and telephones.
- D. Offensive rudity.

III. Severance of economic relations.

- A. Concrete means of severance of economic relations.
- B. The methods of the execution of the above measures.
- C. The punishment of the so-called "traitor merchants".
- D. The inspection of Japanese parcel-post goods.
- E. The forcible persuasion of Chinese, within the settlement, to boycott Japanese goods.
- F. Obstruction of dealing in, and the seizure of Japanese goods by the National Salvation Associations.
- G. Illegal pressure of the National Salvation Associations upon the dealers in Japanese goods and the employees and compradores of Japanese establishments.

I. Anti-Japanese organizations in Shanghai and their resolutions.

The principal organizations in Shanghai are as follows:-

A. The anti-Japanese and National Salvation Committees (organized on September 22nd; formerly, Anti-Japanese and Overseas Chinese Aid Committee) of the settlement and concession in Shanghai.

B. Shanghai Students' Anti-Japanese and National Salvation

- 2 -

Association. (organized on September 23rd; composed of students of technical schools and colleges.)

C. Shanghai Middle School Students' Anti-Japanese and National Salvation Association. (organized on September 24th.)

D. Shanghai Women's Anti-Japanese and National Salvation Association. (organized on October 2nd.)

In addition there are other anti-Japanese organizations bearing the name of National Salvation Associations among the postal service employees' organizations and labour organizations, which are engaged in anti-Japanese propaganda.

The items that are given publicity as the resolutions of anti-Japanese organizations, are roughly as follows:-

1. The recovery of the territory from the Japanese expeditionary forces into the three eastern provinces.
2. To face foreign foes by uniting and speedily compromising with the Canton faction.
3. The thorough severance of general and permanent economic relations with Japan.
4. To force to resign the Chinese employees and compradores in the service of Japanese firms.
5. The impeachment of Dr. C. T. Wang and Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, and the revolutionization of diplomacy.
6. The organization of Anti-Japanese National Salvation Volunteer Corps and Students' Corps.
7. To introduce military drill in schools.
8. To undertake an international propaganda indicating the violences of the Japanese Army and to give anti-Japanese lectures to the masses.

- 3 -

9. To refuse the acceptance of the Japanese flood-relief goods.

In addition it is reported that the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce, Shanghai City Kuomintang and National Chamber of Commerce, (having their head-quarters in Shanghai) Shanghai City Federation of Educational Associations have all sent circular telegrams.

II. Anti-Japanese persecution.

A. The mischievous nuisance to the Japanese children, on their way to and from schools, such as, throwing of stones, spitting at them, making insulting and provocative remarks and the like, are reported by tens of cases every day. (These annoyances have always been in existence heretofore, due to the abusive attitude of the Chinese masses they indicate a sudden increase in number, though not always necessarily reflecting the present situation. According to the reports of children, there are very few cases of personal injury.)

B. Violent and oppressive actions towards the Japanese and their residences.

The cases reported to the Japanese Consulate General covering a period of ten days, from September 20th to October 5th, are:-

Assault	8	cases.
Throwing of stones	5	"
The same to Japanese residences	3	"
And others	9	"

To point out a few violent cases:

- (a) On September 27th, a Japanese cleaning establishment (Kyoaisha), 654 Robinson Road, near the Number 6, Factory of the Naigai Cotton Mill, was stoned by a student mob of about one hundred and fifty.
- (b) Two Japanese policemen of the Shanghai Municipal Council, attached to the Pootoo Road Police Station, were stormed by a Chinese

- 4 -

mob of about a hundred, who threw stones and spat at them when they were removing some anti-Japanese posters, on Robinson Road. One of the policemen was injured.

(c) A small Japanese fishing boat (Toshi Maru) met with a disaster at sea, off the coast of Chekiang. Its captain was rescued by a light-house keeper and was brought over to the Whanpoo Wharf No. 16, Shanghai. In spite of the fact that he was seriously injured at the time and could hardly walk, he was assaulted at the wharf by several Chinese rickshaw men and coolies.

C. Interference of mail and telephones.

(a) The local Postal Service Employees Association, composed of those in the actual postal service of Shanghai, was the first to circularize anti-Japanese messages. Recently some cases are reported where the mail addressed to Japanese, frequently have not been delivered. (This happened in the previous anti-Japanese agitations when the postmen purposely did not deliver Japanese mail.)

(b) On September 29th, an employee of Kokwando, Chapoo Road, went to the post office in order to send a package of medicine to a customer (Chinese) in Anhwei, but the postal clerks refused to accept the package.

(c) The Japanese postal inspectors here, are being made almost impossible to engage in their profession, due to the insulting and resentful attitude of the Chinese employees. (For instance, the moment an inspector leaves his seat, they place obstacles before he returns.)

(d) The Chinese women and girl students organized on October 2nd, the Women's Anti-Japanese and National Salvation Association, among whom are found some telephone operators. The telephone service, to and from the Consulate General, Japanese establishments as well as

- 5 -

private houses, have become decidedly worse.

D. Offensive rudity.

An offensive rudity to the likeness of the Japanese sovereign. On hearing the report to the effect that a photograph of their Imperial Majesties, was being suspended upside down at 268 Seward Road, in the International Settlement, the police officer of this Consulate at once proceeded to the place and removed it. The culprit is now being sought. (The photograph must have been a pictorial supplement of a Japanese newspaper,)

III. Severance of economic relations.

(a) The anti-Japanese boycott movement, having its origin in the Korean and Wanpaoshan incidents, had been somewhat moderated immediately before the Mukden trouble. Due to the out-break of the latter since September 21st and 22nd with the expulsion of certain special commodities, business dealings between the Japanese and Chinese have either been suspended or entirely stopped. (Needless to say that the present Sino-Japanese trade depression is partly due to the flood situation and the exchange fluctuation due to the modification in England of its gold standard.)

(b) The present anti-Japanese boycott movement is strongly supported by the City Kuomintang and District Kuomintangs, as well as the Students' National Salvation Association. (The participation of students in anti-Japanese movement was put a stop in order to

- 6 -

suppress the communistic movement, since the anti-Japanese movement of 1913 for the purpose of the rendition of Dairen and Port Arthur. Whatever may be the situation within, among various trade and business organizations, inasmuch as they are in no position to oppose it openly, the agitation is daily becoming from bad to worse.

(In the case of the anti-Japanese movement in connection with the Korean and Wanpaoshan incidents, there were some business organizations such as customs brokers and banking and financial organs, which intimated their disapproval). In view of the results of previous anti-Japanese movements the leaders are determined this time to undertake rationally and systematically, until they accomplish a thorough severance of economic ties with Japan. The Anti-Japanese National Salvation Association and the Chinese Chamber of Commerce have frequently conferred upon the matter, and on October 3rd, at the meeting of the executive committee of the Anti-Japanese National Salvation Association, the following concrete plan was brought forth in the form of resolutions.

A. Concrete means of severance of economic relations.

- (a) The non-selling, non-buying, and non-transportation of Japanese goods.
- (b) Not to furnish any raw materials or any other goods to the Japanese.
- (c) Not to patronize Japanese ships for freight or passengers.
- (d) Refusal to use Japanese currency. Estoppage of dealings with Japanese banking concerns and withdrawal of deposit from them.
- (e) Not to do any work for Japanese nor to be employed by them.
- (f) Not to advertise in Japanese papers.
- (g) Not to keep up contacts with Japanese.

B. The methods of execution of the above measures:

- 7 -

- (a) To undertake rigid examinations of the goods, that are being transported, by the examiners despatched stations and wharfs.
(These inspectors are to be sent by the trade associations) Those who posses "transportation-permits" furnished by the previous Anti-Japanese and Over-Seas Chinese Aid Committee, are exempted from the exmmination.
- (b) Various shops and stores are to be notified to dispose of their Japanese goods within seven days and investigation to be conducted, thereafter to ascertain whether they are still in possession of the goods.
- (c) The complete conversion of Japanese currency into the Chinese, and withdrawal of deposits from Japanese banks and discontinuance of dealings with them within three days.
- (d) To notify shops and financial concerns to refuse to accept Japanese liens and securities.
- (e) To cause to retire, within three days, those in connection with Japanese firms and factories.

C. The punishment of the so-called "traitor merchants".

1. The traitor merchants shall be punished appropriately, in accordance with the circumstances. Those committing serious offences shall be subjected to the most severe punishment as a traitor.
2. The punishment will be meted in accordance with the degree of offence as follows:-
 - (a) Confiscation of goods.
 - (b) Open warning.
 - (c) Confiscation of a part or whole of their property.
 - (d) Subjection of merchants to pillory and public exhibition.
 - (e) Parading of them on the street.

- 8 -

(f) Public display of their photographs in a traitor's robe.

D. The inspection of Japanese parcel-post goods.

(a) To negotiate with the post-office, with the view to detaching the member inspectors of the Anti-Japanese and National Salvation Association for the purpose of examining Japanese goods that are sent by parcel-post.

(b) To ask Chinese Customs officials detailed at the post-office, to notify the members of the Anti-Japanese National Salvation Association, in case there is any Japanese parcel-post goods, or give hints to that effect.

The National Salvation Association, should install a special motor car at the post office, for the purpose of carrying off, of the aforesaid seized goods.

(c) The scouting corps of the National Salvation Association, should ascertain the recipient parties of Japanese goods by parcel-post and report to the National Salvation Association.

(d) The National Salvation Association is first to give warning, by letter to the recipient party of the parcel-post; if he pays no heed he is to be punished through the resolutions of the mass meeting of the representatives of various districts organizations.

E. The forcible persuasion to boycott Japanese goods to Chinese within the settlement.

(a) To persuade the principal Chinese merchants within the settlements to boycott Japanese goods.

(b) Should a "traitor merchant" continue to deal in Japanese goods even after the receipt of a recommendation, he will be arrested and punished when he goes out of the settlements.

(c) The goods manufactured with Japanese raw materials will be dealt with as Japanese goods.

- 9 -

F. Obstruction of dealing in, and the seizure of Japanese goods by the National Salvation Associations.

(a) The forcible seizure of Japanese goods by the inspectors' corps of the Anti-Japanese Over-seas Aid Association became almost nil, toward the end of August. Due to the reorganization of the anti-Japanese associations and the control by the Bureau of Public Safety and decrease of movement of Japanese goods and the accompanying damages became extremely limited. However, on September 24th, about 4 p.m. there was a case where some people, (among whom were found those who appeared to be students) claiming themselves to be members of the National Salvation Association, who were about to seize the cargo of wheat bran belonging to the Mitsui Company and one other Japanese concern which was being loaded at the Soochow Creek (opposite shore being the Chinese territory) in the north-eastern section of the International Settlement. Upon hearing the report the Japanese landing force (two detachments) who happened to be prepared to proceed to the Naigai Cotton Spinning Mill nearby, dashed to the scene in question with armoured cars. The members of the National Salvation Association escaped with a truck load of about one hundred and twenty bags of bran belonging to the Mitsui firm. The majority of the cargo was shipped the next morning without any further molestation under the protection of the police of the International Settlement and the Bureau of Public Safety. As to the portion that was forcibly taken away, negotiations are now being conducted with the Chinese authorities.

(b) On September 29th, about 4 p.m. a Japanese merchant was having a Chinese carry five-wicker-baskets-full of cotton goods, on East Broadway of the International Settlement, some ruffians (though they did not claim to be the members of the scouting corp) tried

- 10 -

to seize forcibly the above mentioned goods. However, as soon as the Japanese appeared on the spot, the marauders escaped without taking the goods with them.

(c) On September 28th, about 8 p.m. a Formosan by the name of Lian Yu-chin, procured a porcelain at the Hibino Company, on Nanking Road. As soon as he got out to the street, four or five Chinese broke it claiming that was a Japanese ware.

G. Illegal pressure of the National Salvation Associations upon the dealers in Japanese goods and the employees and compradores of Japanese establishments.

(a) The National Salvation Association and the Students' National Salvation Associations have been forcing the compradores of Japanese mercantile concerns and others to leave their employers. As a result those connected with the Yokohama Specie, the Mitsui, the Mitsubishi and the Sumitomo Banks as also with the Bank of Taiwan and the Bank of Chosen, have sent in their resignation concurrently on September 25th. They advertised in Chinese papers that they will be engaged for a little while longer in order to close up their business. The compradores of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha, the Osaka Shosen Kaisha and the Dairen Kisen Kaisha were also compelled to meet a similar fate by resigning on October 1st; and on October 3rd they advertised the fact that they were staying on their jobs to close up their business.

(b) The Anti-Japanese and National Salvation Association at its executive committee meeting on October 5th, declared, (according to the report of "Shinwanpao") that all the Chinese merchants dealing in Japanese goods are pro-Japanese traitor merchants and hence, they are to be punished. (In accordance with the regulations already mentioned)

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(i) A Chinese woolen goods merchant by the name of Chen Ping-Chang had \$3,00 confiscated out of his own funds because he dealt in Japanese goods. The seized goods were applied toward the expenses of the above association.

(ii) A Chinese, by the name of Li Chia-poo, a provision merchant because it was claimed he sold Japanese goods, was compelled to forfeit \$5,000 out of his property. Not only were his seized goods applied to the expenses of the National Salvation Association, but he was compelled to take in a traitor-merchant's gown to take a photograph which was placed on exhibition .

(iii) A Chinese fruit merchant, Ou Yang-he, because he imported Japanese goods privately, had \$2,000 of his property confiscated, and his photograph with the traitor merchant's garment was put on exhibition as in the former case.

(iv) A cotton goods merchant, by the name of Lee Jen-pu, because he imported Japanese goods by himself and refused the inspection by the Anti-Japanese National Salvation Association, was confiscated of \$10,000.

Some Representative Types of Chinese
Violations of Japanese Rights
and Interests in Manchuria.

1. Construction of the Takushan-Tungliang and the Hsi-An lines (two parallel lines):

(a) The authorities of Three Eastern Provinces commenced, in August 1926, the construction of the Takusahn-Tungliang railway; and in spite of Japanese protests, proceeded with the work and inaugurated its traffic on November 15th, 1928.

(b) The authorities of Three Eastern Provinces commenced on the work of construction of the branch line of the Mukden-Hailung line, for a distance of about forty miles, from Peishan-Cheng-Tsu to Tong-Feng. Utterly ignoring the frequent protests from Japan, they completed its construction by the end of the same year.

2. Disregard of the agreement relating to the extension of the Peiping-Mukden line:

In violation of Article 6 of the agreement relating to the extension of the Peiping-Mukden line, the Peining Line through Trains to the South Manchuria Railway, have been made to stop first at the Mukden Station of the Peiping-Mukden Line and then to proceed to the Mukden Station of the South Manchuria Railway.

3. Construction of the Hailung-Kirin Line:

By disregarding unilaterally preliminary agreement of four railway lines relating to Manchuria and Mongolia, the authorities of Three Eastern Provinces proceeded freely to construct the Kirin-Hailung Line and completed it in May 1929.

- 2 -

4. Disregard of the agreement to construct the Changchung-Talai Line and the Kirin-Hwai-ring Line:

Although the South Manchuria Railway hoped to commence on the construction of the Changchung-Talai Line and Tung-Hwai Line, which was provided for in the agreement between it and the Minister of Communications of May 1929, China obstructed its commencement, claiming that the time had not as yet been ripe for it.

5. The illegal restriction to the rights of the advisor to the Tao-An Line:

In violation of the exchanged notes supplementary to the Tao-An railway loan, the Chinese authorities refused to give the rights stipulated for the advisor of the Tao-An Line, dispatched by the South Manchuria Railway.

6. Non-employment of the Chief Accountant for the Ki-Tung Railway:

Contrary to the stipulation of the construction contract of the Ki-Tung Line, China has refused to employ a Japanese Chief Accountant, and has employed a Chinese in his place.

7. Connection between Ta-Tung and Ssu-Tao Lines, at Tung-Liao.

The Chinese authorities, disregarding Japanese protests, completed the connection facilities between the Ta-Tung and Ssu-Tao Lines.

8. Non-recognition of the Through Traffic Agreement between the South Manchuria Railway and the Ssu-Tao Lines:

The Through Traffic Agreement was concluded in September 1929 between the South Manchuria Railway and the Ssu-Tao Railway Bureau.

- 3 -

However, the Committee of Communications refusing to give sanction to the amendment of the Through Traffic Agreement, via South Manchuria Line, Korea and Ssu-Tao Lines, which is inseparable from the aforesaid agreement, neither the agreement nor the amendment is at present being executed.

9. Objection to the statement of the construction expenses of the Ki-Tung and Taiwan Lines:

The Chinese authorities, by placing obstructions to the construction expenses amounting to twenty-four million yen for the construction of the Ki-Tung Line which was completed in October 1929, and 12,920,000 yen for the construction of the Tao-An Line which was completed in June 1928, have made it impossible to come to a final settlement on the amount of construction expenses.

10. Traffic obstructions by Chinese to the South Manchuria Railway:

Following are the damages, done by Chinese, within the railway zone of the South Manchuria Railway.

<u>Kind of Cases.</u>	<u>Year</u>	
	1929	1930
The obstructions to the operation	87	84
Robbery during the operation of the trains	114	75
Robbery of the railway equipments	17	75
Robbery of the telegraph lines	13	13

11. Illegal levy upon the materials of the South Manchuria Railway:

In violation of Article 8 of the agreement supplementary to the Treaty Relating to Five Renting Cases in Manchuria, the Chinese authorities are exacting since February 1st, 1927, from Chinese merchants the half of the lumber tax to the sleepers for the use

- 4 -

of the South Manchuria Railway. Since the burden of incidence is shifted to the sleepers, the South Manchuria Railway is suffering a loss of about 60,000 yen annually.

12. Illegal restrictions to the purchase of railway materials by the South Manchuria Railway:

No sooner than the number of the sleepers purchased by the South Manchuria Railway reached one million pieces in 1928, had the Chinese authorities contended that the number was excessive and they did not furnish the necessary and agreed permits for the exemption of the taxes. It took the whole year before they were issued for the entire number.

13. Obstruction to the quarrying of stone materials by the South Manchuria Railway:

Pursuant to the treaty provisions the South Manchuria Railway enjoys the right of quarrying stone materials to be used for the railway purposes, and enables them to freely lease such quarries. Recently the Chinese authorities have been exhausting all means in order to obstruct the operation. The obstruction, just mentioned, has been carried out in the following places:

Telissukou; Tsuchiutun; Tangwangshan; Chichiapao; Nanshan, Maitzushan; Kuohiatzu; Changtu; Chiangyangpao; Shahomantou-shan; Chutushan.

14. Obstruction of the operation of mines along the South Manchuria Railway:

In spite of the agreement between Japan and China to the effect that all mines along the Antung-Mukden Lines, should be operated by their joint enterprise, China by disregarding the above agreement, refused to operate the mines on that basis in Tsinchangtsu; Nenhsin-

- 5 -

tai; Tientsihfu and other places.

15. Non-recognition of the purchase of land for the use of the Fushun Mine.

Although the South Manchuria Railway bought private land for the Fushun Mine through the intermediary of the head of a Chinese Sien, in accordance with the regulations of Fushun mine, the Chinese authorities have, since 1924, refused to recognize the transaction. Recently, they have resorted to all sorts of means to obstruct any land transactions.

16. Obstruction of the purchase of land for the South Manchuria Railway:

In spite of the stipulation of Article 6 (of the agreement relating to the construction and operation of the Chinese Eastern Railway, which right Japan inherited) through which the South Manchuria Railway could lease land along its railroad necessary for the protection and operation of the line, from 1929 and 1930 the Chinese authorities have determinedly obstructed the purchase of such land by the Railway. There are no less than 59 cases now pending, of that sort.

17. Obstruction of the construction of railway for the transportation of mining products from Kunchangling Mines:

In spite of the official recognition given for the construction of railways by the joint Sino-Japanese agreement between the Liaoning Provincial Government and Yentaro Ida, for the purpose of transporting mining products by the Kunchangling Mining Corporation when applied last year for the commencement of the work, the Committee on Communications of the Liaoning Province questioned the

- 6 -

wisdom of the new construction and endeavoured to reject the acquired rights.

18. Non-recognition of the right to purchase clay at Foochow:

In May 1930, the Foochow Minig Corporation concluded a contract to buy, under a regular official permission, from the Bureau of Agriculture and Mining of the Liaoning Province, the clay of the Foochow Bay region, from the Foochow Bay Clay Product Corporation, which possesses the controlling interest. In July 1929, the authorities suddenly revoked the permit, without any regular procedure.

19. Confiscation of the permit of the Magnesite Ore and Felspar Mining district:

In August 1930, the Chen Hsing Corporation, being a Sino-Japanese joint enterprise, presented a written permit for the Magnesite Ore and Felspar mines in Aushan at the request of the Chinese authorities, who refused to return it, under various pretexts. As they demanded taxes for the above mining district, which was complied with by the company, they claimed that the taxes were not necessary inasmuch as the permit for magnesite mines was already rescinded, but they most arbitrarily added that the amount was applied toward the iron taxes.

20. Operation of the Hsi-An Joint Mining Enterprise:

The Chinese authorities at Hsian Hsien, by dispatching the Chinese police force to the exit of the coal mine of the Hsian Coal Company, which is a Sino-Japanese Joint Enterprise, and by threatening the local inhabitants, obstructed their patronage of the coal.

21. Rescinding of the Fencheng Hsien Lead Mining rights:

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The authorities of Fencheng Hsien notified illegally, in August, 1929, rescinding the mining rights by the Sino-Japanese concern known as the Chinchengtzu Mine, although the Japanese representative protested frequently. While continuing its operation the Chinese authorities demanded the withdrawal of Japanese and arrested their drivers and confiscated their horses, making it impossible for Japanese to continue their operation.

22. Iron taxes by Chonhsing Corporation:

In September 1930, the Chinese authorities demanded the payment of forty cents per ton as taxes from the Chonhsing Corporation at Anshan. This is an illegal tax which the company, heretofore, has never paid.

23. forcible recovery of the Penhsifu Coal Mine:

In spite of the fact that Japanese have, heretofore, conducted peacefully and openly lime mines at Penhsifu, through the agreement with the Chinese people, the Chinese authorities have convicted the Chinese parties in question as "Traitor Landlords". And not only did they confiscate the property of the Chinese lessors, but also in August 1929 they dispatched troops in order to forcibly recover the mining property.

24. Pressure to the Penhsifu Iron Mining Corporation:

As the lease to the reservoir of Penhsifu, expired on November 1st, 1927, the South Manchuria Railway approached several times for its renewal, without any result.

25. Prohibition of the transportation and consumption of Fushun Coal.

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From about 1929 onward, the Chinese authorities placed restrictions upon the transportation of Fushun coal by the Shen-Hai Railway. During 1930, Liu Hōling, chief of the Department of Agriculture and Mining of the Liaoning Province, obtained permission of the North-East Administration Commission to issue an order of prohibition of the use of foreign coal to firms, factories, and other institutions under his control.

26. Match Monopoly.

Since 1931, the Four North-Eastern Provinces are enforcing the monopoly of matches for the purpose of bringing pressure upon the manufacture and importation of matches of Japanese subjects.

27. Discriminative Railway Rates.

In spite of the repeated protests of Japan and other foreign countries, the Chinese railways in Manchuria are giving discriminative treatment to Japanese as well as foreign goods by applying lower rates to the goods of Chinese origin.

28. Double Taxation at Dairen.

With regard to goods imported to an open port being transported to another Chinese port, double imposition of import duty has hitherto been avoided by means of drawback. After the drawback was abolished in May, 1931, Exemption Certificates were issued at the ports of exportation for goods re-exported to Chinese ports (Dairen not included among them), and thereby double taxation was avoided. But no Exemption Certificate is now issued for goods shipped to Dairen, and in spite of the Japanese Government's repeated protests the Chinese Government has taken no steps to remedy the double taxation

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on such goods.

29. Undue increase of export duty on Fushun coal.

By the Agreement concerning the Fushun and Yentai coal, the export duty on the same coal is prescribed as \$0.01 per ton, and the same agreement is in force for 60 years from 1911. The Chinese Government put a higher rate of export duty on the 1st June, 1931, and the Japanese Government have been negotiating with them pointing out that the new rate of export duty is in contravention of treaties but no final settlement has yet been reached.

30. Imposition of consumption tax within the South Manchuria Railway Zone.

The Chinese authorities are collecting consumption tax within the railway zone at Hsintaitzu, Ssupingkai, Aushan, and Chienshan in violation of treaty provisions.

31. Collection of business tax within the railway zone.

The Chinese authorities proceeded to impose business tax on Chinese citizens in the railway zone, and in spite of protests made by the Japanese authorities they are forcing, in violation of treaties, the collection of the tax by all possible means such as pressure brought to bear upon the Chinese people, imposition of fines, and posting guards on the boundary of the railway zone.

32. Pressure upon the North Manchuria Electric Co. of Harbin.

In order to bring pressure to bear upon the North Manchuria Electric Co. which was established in Harbin in 1918, the Harbin municipality made the supply of electricity a concession, and established a semi-official company called the Harbin Electric Co.,

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to which was given the concession in disregard of the already acquired privilege of the Japanese company. In May, 1930, the Chinese authorities turned the Harbin Electric Co. into an official enterprise and are since bringing all possible pressure upon the North Manchuria Electric Co. alleging the same company to be an infringement of the monopoly.

33. Pressure upon the South Manchuria Electric Co. of Antung.

The South Manchuria Electric Co. has been supplying Chinese citizens with electric light for over 20 years upon an understanding reached between them and the Chinese authorities. In March, 1930, the municipality of Antung established an electric lighting company for the purpose of competing with the Japanese company.

34. Illegal deal in a tender for railway material.

In a public tender for ten locomotives in August, 1929, the Shen-Hai Railway awarded the contract to the Scoda Company in spite of the fact that the lowest offer was made for the same specified material by the South Manchuria Railway Co. and the second lowest by the Mitsubishi Company.

35. Interference with the Japanese wood transportation in the Kirin Province.

In 1930, the Kirin Province authorities suddenly prohibited the felling of trees along the Kirin-Tunhua Railway, for the purpose of giving a blow to the same railway (which was built with a loan from Japan) and the Japanese exporters of wood.

36. Pressure upon the Chamien Kungssu.

The South Manchuria Railway Company invested a large sum of money in the Chamien Kungssu, which have lumber camps in Hsinanlin,

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Heilungchiang. The Chinese authorities attempted to deny this fact and asked for another large investment from the South Manchuria Railway Co. They not only failed to perform the agreement on the Chamien Forestry concluded between the South Manchuria Railway Company and the Heilung Province authorities in 1925 but also obstructed with force the putting of the agreement into operation.

37. Non-performance of the loan contract relating to the mines and forests in Kirin and Heilungchiang.

China is in default of performance of obligations arising from a contract for the loan of Yen 30,000,000 concluded between the Finance Department of the Peking Government and the Chunghua Huiyieh Bank on August 2, 1918, on the security of gold mines and state forests in the Kirin and Heilungchiang Provinces and the revenue therefrom.

38. Appropriation of Yen 10,000,000 advanced in accordance with the loan contract relating to Ki-Hui Railway.

In accordance with the Agreement of April 15, 1907, regarding the Hsin-Feng and Ki-Chan Railways and the Agreement of September 4, 1909, regarding Chientao, a preliminary loan contract relating to Ki-Hui Railway was signed between three Japanese banks and the Ministry of Communications of the Chinese Government on June 18, 1918, and the three Japanese Banks advanced Yen 10,000,000 to the Chinese Government. The Chinese Government attempted not only to evade the construction of the Ki-Hui Railway but also to deny the loan itself.

39. Evasion of contract regarding the purchase money of
rails

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for the Ki-Tung Railway.

China refused to sign a formal contract for about Yen 900,000 which the South Manchuria Railway Company advanced as purchase money for rails in accordance with an agreement with the Ki-Tung Railway Administration.

40. Forcible construction of a railway across the Sakakibara Farm.

In 1925 China constructed a railway from Huangkutun Station to the aerodrome across the Peiling Farm without first obtaining the approval of Mr. Sakakibara who had leased the land. The Japanese Consulate-General in Mukden demanded the payment of compensation for the use of the land. But the Chinese authorities alleged the lease to be invalid, and Mr. Sakakibara was compelled to remove the railway on June 27, 1929.

41. Pressure upon the Japanese residents in the Walled City of Mukden:

In spite of the fact that Mukden was open to trade and residence by the Sino-American Treaty of Commerce of 1903, the Mukden Chinese authorities designated a certain restricted area outside of the Walled City of Mukden as an international mart, for the purpose of trade and residence by foreigners. At this moment, by applying pressure upon the Chinese landlords of Japanese residents within the walled city, and in disregard of the protests of Japan as well as other interested countries, the Chinese authorities compelled the Japanese as well as foreigners to withdraw from the Chinese native city where there remain at present only forty-four Japanese householders.

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42. Pressure upon the Japanese residents residing within the Walled City of Sanshing:

In spite of the fact that Sanshing, in the Kirin Province, was opened to trade and residence by an annex to the Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1895, the Chinese authorities resort to the same unreasonable excuses as in the case of Mukden. And by bringing about direct or indirect pressure upon the Japanese within the Walled City of Sanshing they have made it impossible for them to reside or carry on trade there. As a result there are only five or six Japanese residents remaining, and establishing of new residences or shops by Japanese is absolutely impossible.

43. Pressure upon the Japanese Telegraph Convention within the Walled City of Mukden:

According to the Sino-Japanese Convention of 1898, Japan possesses the right to install telegraph lines between the Mukden Railway Zone and the Walled City of Mukden. About two years ago the Chinese authorities requested the moving of telegraph poles, due to the replanning of the walled city. Thereupon negotiations took place which finally arranged to change the pole into the cable system in order to minimise the number of the poles. Towards the end of last year the work was started on the entire system. About August this year, the Mukden telegraph administration upon a trifle technical pretext, obstructed the work of effecting the connection at the international mart(Shangfu Tze) causing considerable damages to the Japanese enterprise.

44. A. Regulations for punishing circumvent land sellers:

The Liaoning Provincial Government, in disregard of the treaty

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provinces with a view to obstructing the leaving of land for the purpose of commercial industrial and agricultural purposes by Japanese, adopted in July 1929 the "Transitory measures for punishing the circumvent land sellers", and gave out secret order to local governments to prohibit the mortgaging of land to foreigners. According to this order those who violate the measures were made liable to death sentence, life sentence or heavy fine. In June 1931 the above mentioned measures were somewhat amended, and are now known as the "regulations for punishing the circumvent land sellers." As a result of the above regulations, within the last year or two, some of the following illegal acts have been perpetrated:

(1) At Shininhsien, a land-owner at Chikugdai happened to sell his property to a Japanese, and the chief of the Hsien imprisoned the said Chinese.

(2) In Linho Hsien, a Chinese, by the name of Chiao Hsu-po, sold land to the East Asiatic Industrial Corporation (Japanese). The authorities confiscated the above property and drove away the Japanese therefrom. (The so-called Tongshan Farm Incident)

(3) At Penhsisien, a Chinese leased land to a Japanese for lime-mining. The former was imprisoned, and the seizure of the mines was attempted.

(4) At Eiansien, a Chinese was imprisoned on the excuse that he rented a house for a Japanese police post.

(5) In Liaoning Province the authorities refused to give permission for the leasing of land by Koreans. At present they are endeavouring to change the tenancy into an employment contract.

B. The Kirin Provincial Government in violation of the

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Chientao agreement which entitles Koreans to various rights to land has also issued the regulations for punishing the so-called circumvent land sellers. Not only have the Chinese authorities of various parts of the Kirin Province, made it impossible for Koreans to buy land, but they are interfering even in matters of land tenure or the terms of tenancy.

45. Oppression of Koreans:

Recently the Chinese authorities are oppressing Koreans, directly or indirectly, as regards their residence and agriculture. The driving out of new Korean settlers, prohibition of leaving houses to them, obstruction to their carrying on of enterprises, at times the authorities characteristically forced the Chinese landlords to compel the Koreans to move out, and in extreme cases they have even employed force for the purpose.

(1) In July 1931, the authorities of the Kirin Province, in order to drive out the Korean Farmers of Wampaoshan, illegally interfered with tenantry and the Koreans were finally forced out which lead to the so-called Wampaoshan incident.

(2) In July of the same year, at Taolaishao in the Kirin Province, under the pretext of controlling the communistic element, the authorities drove away many new Korean settlers.

46. Illegal arrests and conviction of Koreans:

Recently the Chinese authorities in Three Eastern Provinces in disregard of the treaty rights, arrested and imprisoned Koreans promiscuously, and confined them to prisons for several months, even over a year, without any process of law. It has been discovered, actually, since the present Mukden Incident took place,

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there were sixty such prisoners in the Mukden penitentiary, one hundred and forty in the Tungkwa, two hundred and thirty at the Kirin and about forty in the Harbin.

47. The universal use of anti-Japanese text-books:

Recently the Chinese Government has inserted many anti-Japanese materials in the books of public schools throughout the country nursing, thereby, the spirit of revenge in the minds of the coming generation of China.

48. The North-eastern Cultural Association's anti-Japanese propaganda:

The Association is the official organ of the Mukden administration. It has been constantly broad-casting anti-Japanese atrocities, for instance:

When in February of this year, there was a natural combustion in the Oyama Pit of the Fushun Mines, (which can hardly be said to be an explosion) although there was not one casualty, the above association announced far and wide that three thousand miners were buried alive by the explosion in the Japanese mines.

49. The anti-Japanese movement by the Liaoning People's Diplomacy Association:

The above association was organized in June 1930, chiefly for the purpose of conducting anti-Japanese propaganda. Recently it issued an official publication and conducted frequent meetings. By utilizing the press it tries to conduct anti-Japanese propaganda to the detriment of the Sino-Japanese friendship.

50. The oppression of the Shangking Shihpao (Seykyojiho):

This Chinese language newspaper in Mukden is a Japanese enter-

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This Chinese language newspaper in Mukden is a Japanese enterprise. By applying pressure, the Chinese authorities undertook to obstruct thoroughly the Chinese patronage between 1928 and 29 for a period of about ten months and made it impossible for the management to carry on business. Again, from June 1930 to August of the same year, by persecuting the Chinese sales agents of the paper, they made its distribution impossible; and from July to August this year, the Chief of the Bureau of Public Safety, secretly allied with the Liaoning People's Diplomacy Association, imprisoned the important Chinese distributors of the paper in Mukden, in the above named bureau and persecuted them.

51. Discriminatory treatment of the visa of the Japanese traveller in the interior.

With a view to obstructing, within the last ten years, Japanese journey in Taonan and its Western districts or the Northern section of the Kirin Province, the Mukden and Liaoyuan Commissioners of Foreign Affairs and in order to regulate the Japanese sojourn to Fuluotao which is being planned to compete with Dairen, they have invariably placed an allonge to a Japanese passport for the purpose of restricting Japanese movements. This is an open discrimination against Japanese nationals as compared with other foreigners. In spite of the frequent Japanese protests, recently the similar instructions, to place a restrictive allonge, were given to the Commissioners of Foreign Affairs of Tiehling, Liaoyang, Antung, Yingkow, Tunghwa and Kailung.

52. The Captain Nakamura Incident:

Captain Nakamura, accompanied by Y. Isugi, one Mongolian and one Russian, while travelling through Kungantung Reclamation dis-

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trict, on July 26th, was arrested by the 3rd Regiment of the Reclamation Army, stationed at the above named district, and was later murdered with his party, by the Commander of the said Regiment.

53. Obstructions at the Tungliang Farm:

When the East Asiatic Industrial Corporation was constructing a dyke, in the spring of 1931, at Tungliang, the Chief of the Bureau of Public Safety of the Hsien accompanied by a number of Chinese policemen, set fire on the coolies' huts and drove away the workers.

(Jungliang Farm Incident)


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Peiping, November 12, 1931.

No. 1259

DEC-731



793.94

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Sir:

1/5

In continuation of the Legation's despatch No. 1245 of October 29, 1931, I have the honor to transmit herewith five further editorials which have appeared in THE LEADER of Peiping between October 31st to November 11th, all relating to the events in Manchuria.

Editorials from other papers, as well as articles and news items, regarding the manchurian situation will be found among the press clippings going forward in tomorrow's pouch.

Respectfully yours,

For the Minister:

C. Van H. Engel
C. Van H. Engel
First Secretary of Legation

Enclosures:

Five:

Editorials from THE LEADER,
Peiping, of October 31,
November 4, 7, 10, and 11,
1931.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Dunstons NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1-5
 Document No. 1254

THE LEADER, Saturday, October 31, 1931

JAPAN THREATENS RUSSIA

Japan's presentation to Russia of a strongly-worded memorandum asking her to lay her hands off Manchuria has brought a new complication to the already complicated Sino-Japanese tangle. The Japanese note, which came as a complete surprise to the whole world, accuses Soviet Russia of helping the Chinese troops in north Manchuria with military supplies and military instructors and states that should Soviet troops be sent to the Chinese Eastern Railway, "the Japanese Government would be compelled to take necessary measures to protect the residents in those regions, and also the Taonan-Tsitsihar Railway, which was built with Japanese money so that "the sphere of conflict would be broadened."

M. Karakhan, the Assistant Foreign Commissar of the Soviet Union, expressed amazement at this unwarranted threat, and replied to the effect that the Japanese government bases its contentions on unfounded rumors emanating from irresponsible sources and that "the Japanese Government cannot but know that there is no Soviet instructors among Tsitsihar troops or in the army of any other Manchurian Province, that no arms or ammunition have been or are being received by these troops from the U.S.S.R. and that the U.S.S.R. is not giving assistance to any of the struggling sides in Manchuria."

It must be remembered that a few weeks ago the war-mad Japanese troops entered the C.E.R. Station of Koukwangtze, just north of Changchun, when they were marching victoriously northward in their seizure of territory from non-resisting Chinese troops, but as a result of Karakhan's protest, the advance on Harbin was arrested. The latest threat to the Soviet Government is most surprising, and it is a matter of speculation as to whether Japan is really looking for more trouble. It is quite possible that having suffered a severe diplomatic defeat at the League of Nations, the militarists in Japan are seeking a scapegoat to show the people at home that the stationing of troops in Manchuria is justified and cite alleged Soviet assistance to the Chinese as proof that Japanese troops cannot be withdrawal before November 16, since the world cannot be shaken from the belief that the Japanese allegation of danger to Japanese lives and property after the withdrawn of Japanese troops is but a flimsy pretext to occupy the territory as long as possible. In view of the fact that more than two weeks will elapse before the date set by the League for the complete withdrawal of Japanese troops from Chinese soil, it is quite logical to assume that Japan is endeavouring to make the best of the present opportunity to provide an excuse to retain her troops in Manchuria and hit upon the idea of circulating rumors all over the world of Soviet assistance to China in the effort to discredit China in the eyes of the Powers. Again, it may be possible that Japan plans to seize Tsitsihar and uses the report of alleged Soviet assistance to the Chinese authorities as a pretext, hoping at

the same time, to swing world opinion in favor of herself by conducting a campaign of falsehood and propaganda against Soviet Russia. This is, of course, only an assumption.

The report from Japanese sources that the Japanese consul at Tsitsihar has sent a note to the Heilungkiang army to the effect that the army of the Island Empire intends to rebuild the bridge leading to Tsitsihar, which was blown up to prevent Chang Hai-peng's Japanese-supported forces from taking the city, can only be interpreted as an indication that the Japanese militarists plan to take the city either themselves or provide better facilities for Chang Hai-peng to make the attempt.

In view of the fact that Japanese troops invaded Liaoning and Kirin without previous warning, there is no telling what the short-sighted and war-mad Japanese militarists may do, since the note to Russia states that "the sphere of conflict may be broadened" if Soviet troops are sent to the Chinese Eastern Railway zone. It must be observed that the note does not specifically accuse Soviet Russia of already sending troops but threatens to take drastic measures if Soviet troops are sent to the Chinese Eastern Railway zone, and it is not impossible that Japan may occupy more territory in north Manchuria on the strength of the "if".

There are no reports from any reliable source that Soviet Russia has sent military supplies or military instructors to the Chinese troops in North Manchuria, but the report is widely circulated that the Japanese have been supporting General Seminoff with arms and munitions to recruit white Russian guards so that he may stir up trouble in Manchuria.

Reuter's latest report from Tokyo last night that "while the Foreign Office has all along expressed a certain amount of scepticism regarding reports of alleged Soviet military movements and of a Sino-Soviet agreement, there appears to be a sense of relief at Mr. Karakhan's assurances that the reports are devoid of foundations" shows, if the *Reuter* report is absolutely accurate, that those who are directing Japan's foreign policy are either still suffering from a mental daze from which they have not fully recovered as result of the loss of face at Geneva or that they look upon accusations of a serious character presented in the form of a threatening note tantamount to an ultimatum as mere child's play. It is difficult to understand why the Japanese Government presented a provocative note to the Soviet Government making unfounded charges which may precipitate a conflict, while at the same time, this same government "has all along expressed a certain amount of scepticism" regarding what it has charged Russia with in its formal note. Yet it is not beyond the realms of possibility that the grave charges hurled at Russia is just one of the tricks of these masters of lying propaganda to sound out world opinion. What the Nipponese Vulture's real intentions are in sending a challenging note to the Big Bear still remains to be seen.

E.B.-S.L.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Luitjens NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE LEADER, Wednesday, November 4, 1931.

THE LEAGUE MUST PREPARE TO ACT

When the Council of the League of Nations meets again, a week and a half hence, it must be prepared to act for the preservation of its very existence. The League has powers, and great powers. Much has been said about the limitation of the power of the League through the "unanimity" rule, but in the case of a serious dispute between two members this unanimity is necessary only of the non-disputant parties. China has been very patient, Dr. Sze has been very patient, but there is a limit. The time has come when China, as a member of the League, must demand action by the members of the League against Japan under Articles 15 and 16 of the Covenant.

We have suggested this before. We wish to make it more emphatic. There is no other way. Japan apparently has no intention whatsoever of evacuating, either before November 16 or at any other time. Her response to the resolution of the League Council, calling on her to evacuate the occupied Manchurian territory immediately, was simply to send more troops, and to declare, through the War Minister who is apparently the most powerful person in the Japanese Government, that the League was a "powerless and incapable body." Will the League accept this slap in the face?

Perhaps what General Minami says is right. Perhaps the League is an utterly "incapable body." We must find out. And we must find out as soon as the League Council meets on November 16. There must be no more talk about Articles 10 and 11. These have been evoked, and Japanese imperialism sneers its contempt. It is necessary to turn to Articles 15 and 16. The League can only say "yes" or "no." We must not let it say anything else.

Article 15, Section 1, provides that "any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, which is not submitted to arbitration or judicial settlement in accordance with Article 13," must be submitted to the Council. This has been done, and the Council has endeavored to "effect a settlement of the dispute" as provided in Section 3 of the same Article. No settlement has been reached, and Section 6 of this Article provides:

6. If a report by the Council is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof other than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the Members of the League agree that they will not go to war with any party to the dispute which complies with the recommendations of the report.

Unanimity, it is clear, is required in such cases only of the members not parties to the dispute. The above section is only negative, providing merely that no member of the League will take action against China now. But in Article 16 we see what can be done in the way of positive action:

1. Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles 12, 13 or 15, it shall *ipso facto* be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not.

2. It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the several Governments concerned what effective military, naval or air force the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League.

3. The Members of the League agree, further, that they will mutually support one another in the financial and economic measures which are taken under this Article, in order to minimise the loss and inconvenience resulting from the above measures, and that they will mutually support one another in resisting any special measures aimed at one of their number by the covenant-breaking State, and that they will take the necessary steps to afford passage through their territory to the forces of any of the Members of the League which are co-operating to protect the covenants of the League.

4. Any Member of the League which has violated any covenant of the League may be declared to be no longer a Member of the League by a vote of the Council concurred in by the Representatives of all the other Members of the League represented thereon.

It is time to act. Everything possible has been done to effect a peaceful settlement, and Japan has spat in the face of the League. It is up to China, if Japan does not withdraw her troops by November 16, to demand (under Section 1) that her fellow-members join her in the severance of all economic relations with outlaw Japan, to demand that her fellow-members give her every assistance (under Section 3) in the maintenance and strengthening of the boycott of outlaw Japan, and to demand (under Section 4) that Japan be expelled from the League and branded as not fit for membership in the society of nations, not worthy of the trust upon which every international agreement must be based.

It is up to the League. But it must be put up to the League by China, and in no timid or uncertain tone.

F. G.

THE LEADER, Saturday, November 7, 1931.

JAPAN ATTACKS BRITAIN AND TSITSIHAR

A new angle has now developed over the already complicated Sino-Japanese situation. After making unfounded charges against Soviet Russia for alleged assistance to the Heilungkiang forces of General Ma Chan-shan in the way of advisers and munitions,—charges which were strongly refuted by Mr. Karakhan—Japan has now brought the machinery of propaganda to bear upon John Bull.

Japanese resentment was supposed to have developed over suggestions which Sir Miles Lampson was alleged to have made to Mr. Shigemitsu to the effect that troops of the Island Empire should be withdrawn before conducting negotiations direct with China and that Japan should permit Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang to return to Mukden. This was seized upon by Japanese rumor-mongers as the sign of an understanding between Great Britain and China for the protection of British economic interests in the Yangtze in exchange for British support at Geneva at the expense of Japan. The *Asahi* goes so far as to say that "the 'unaccountable' behaviour of the British Minister in China is reflected in the League of Nations and the action of the British delegate in the Council of the League gives as much ground for suspicion." The *Mainichi* says that "in view of the unfriendly attitude adopted by Britain toward Japan in connection with the Manchurian affair, the Foreign Office is beginning to realize the necessity of altering Japan's policy toward that country." The *London Times*, a paper traditionally friendly to Japan, states in a leading article that as regards the Japanese charges that Britain is adopting an anti-Japanese policy "nothing is farther from the truth." The same paper appeals to the Japanese Government to realize "the extremely embarrassment in which she places her friends by forcing them to choose between the maintenance of traditional friendship in all its cordiality and the defence of principles which they have most solemnly undertaken to maintain," and adds that to seize territory of another country and to announce that it will not be evacuated until that country has negotiated certain fundamental questions is to return to methods of diplomacy that it was hoped were obsolete and to methods quite out of harmony with the spirit of the Pact forbidding war as an instrument of national policy.

To make the position of Britain clear in the matter, the British Ambassador in Tokyo communicated a verbal note to the Japanese Foreign Office denying the persistent rumors that the British Government was trying to bargain with China at the expense of Japan.

Having just suffered a diplomatic defeat at the hands of the League of Nations, Japan is faced with two alternatives—either to get out of Chinese territory or stay in the occupied zone in defiance of the whole civilized world. Judging by reports of statements issued by ambitious war-mad Japanese militarists who cherish dreams of world conquest, there seems little likelihood of Japanese troops withdrawing by November 16. To delay the withdrawal as long as possible and to play for time so as to entrench themselves more firmly in Manchuria, these masters of lying propaganda have been busily at work devising means to throw dust in the eyes of the world public. It seems that Japan's note delivered to Moscow last week charging Soviet Russia with assisting Chinese troops

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

in north Manchuria with arms and munition was merely a feeler to sound out world opinion, and the fact that Russia's sharp denial satisfied Tokyo indicates that the world is taking these accusations with a grain of salt. Finding that the anti-Soviet note did not produce the desired result, Japan has now directed its attacks upon Great Britain, her former ally. Furthermore, there is the traditional feeling in Japan that the United States is a stumbling block to the policy of "blood and iron." This prevalent impression of Japanese militarists is expressed by former Premier Tanaka's memorial to the throne in 1928 pointing out that "in carrying out this policy we have to face the United States which has been turned against us by China's policy of fighting poison with poison. In the future if we want to control China, we must first crush the United States, just as in the past we had to fight Russia in the Russo-Japanese War."

The confused reports from Geneva stating that the Secretariat of the League has received official reports of the capture of Tsitsihar while we in this city hear no reports from north Manchuria that the Heilungkiang Capital has been captured—and we believe that the city is still in Chinese hands at the moment of writing—leads us to suspect very strongly that this is another move on the part of Japanese propagandists to sound out world opinion on the possibility of a clash with Soviet Russia, since Tsitsihar is located on the Chinese Eastern Railway which is a joint Russo-Chinese concern.

Some time last week the Japanese High Command issued a reassuring report to the effect that the "tired" soldiers stationed in Kirin were to be replaced by smaller detachments, but it was later discovered that instead of moving this body of over 1,000 southward, they were ordered to advance toward Tsitsihar. Added to this, is the information we received yesterday that 2,000 troops left Mukden in the direction of Tsitsihar. The fact that Japan threatened to take drastic measures along the Taonan-Angangchi line in her note to Soviet Russia, together with preparations to guard her rear by seizing Tungliao and stationing troops and armored trains there, seems to indicate her determination to take Tsitsihar—a determination self-evident by the hurried rebuilding of the bridge leading to the Heilungkiang capital which was blown up to prevent the Japanese-supported renegade Chang Hai-peng from crossing over the river. The feverish repairing of this bridge by Japanese soldiers is, according to Ambassador Debuchi at Washington, for the purpose of "facilitating the movement of soya beans."

Just what is going to happen is a matter of concern not only to China, but to the whole world. November 16, the date set by the League for the complete evacuation of Japanese troops from Chinese soil, is fast approaching, and not only is there no sign of withdrawal but the Japanese High Command has ordered a general advance of all Japanese troops on the Taonan-Tsitsihar line to "annihilate Heilungkiang troops." It must be observed that this time, the Chinese soldiers are resisting. What will be the outcome? Imperialistic Japan has not only trampled Manchuria underfoot, but has slapped Russia in the face, thrown stones at her old friend Britain, turned a deaf ear to the entreaties of the United States, and openly defied and is still defying the League of Nations. Will the Japanese tiger fight the world alone, or will it be induced finally to enter its cage?

E.B.-S.L.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

THE LEAFER, Tuesday November 10, 1931.

SETTLING DOWN IN MANCHURIA

Reports from Manchuria make it clear that the Japanese military are settling down for a permanent stay. The promise to evacuate, made by the specious Mr. Yoshizawa at Geneva a month and a half ago, has now been almost forgotten, and the world has settled down to the understanding that Japanese official assurances of this nature are simply mendacious, and that there is not the slightest sincerity or honesty behind any of them. Mr. Yoshizawa, it should be remembered, assured Geneva not only that troops would be withdrawn, but that withdrawal was already under way, and had in part been effected—this six weeks ago.

These assurances, it is evident, were simply attempts to gain time while Japan consolidated her position in Manchuria. The League Council held a couple of hectic meetings since then, and at the last meeting decided, by the unanimous vote of all nations except Japan, that Japan should withdraw her troops at once as a preliminary to negotiations with China upon outstanding questions. No sooner was this resolution passed and the Council adjourned than Japan dispatched new forces to Manchuria, and sent troops out to occupy the railway running from Ssupingkai, on the South Manchurian Railway, to Taonan to the west. In the meantime, they informed the League that the withdrawal of troops would involve grave dangers to Japanese residents, and furthermore that they desired recognition of the sanctity of all treaties, subsequently making it clear, when forced to say just what they meant by this, that they referred specifically to the 1915 Treaty, the "Twenty-One Demands" which had been presented to China as an ultimatum sixteen years ago, signed by the then Chinese Government under threat of military action, and abandoned by the Japanese Government when western governments made it clear that however busy they were with the war, the West would not tolerate Japan establishing control over this enormous Chinese territory. For the Twenty-One Demands provided for nothing less than joint military and financial control, between China and Japan, of this country. And "joint" control of this kind, with one "partner" far superior in military strength and economic organization to the other, means Japanese rule. The world knew it, and would not permit it. So China never acceded to these demands, on the absolutely valid legal principle that an agreement made under duress is not binding.

This principle, indeed, might raise questions of the validity of other treaties. But other treaties are not in question. This is an agreement which was only nominally accepted and never enforced. As for the legality of it, China is prepared to bring it up before the Court of International Justice at the Hague, and has expressed its desire to do so. Japan is willing to do nothing of the kind, but insists upon the enforcement, here and now, of an agreement which was signed under duress and which Japan lacked the force to compel China and the world to accept.

The one thing the League has done has been to compel Japan to show her hand. Japan aims to control China—no less. And the western world does

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

not look with a friendly eye upon Japan's attempt to control a population and a territory as great as Europe.

But while discussions have been going on between governments, the Japanese have been steadily consolidating themselves and extending their power in Manchuria. In Mukden, their first center, they established, the week after the occupation, a local administration under Japanese control, with a Japanese colonel, Doihara, as mayor. They obtained Chinese clerks and underlings, and brought some Chinese police, trained to obey Japanese orders, up from Dairen, to supplement those of the Mukden police who had returned to work for the Japanese administration. The police staff so created was well armed and equipped, and consisted of men upon whom (to quote the statement from the Japanese Legation here) the Japanese could rely absolutely. As the administration got under way, and the work became more routine, the Japanese gradually retired into the background, becoming "advisers," and relegating more of the work to their Chinese underlings. These underlings included a few Chinese who had at times held minor government posts.

It is this body which has now expanded into a "provisional government," has seized the Salt Gabelle, and under Japanese protection and control is carrying on. And in the meantime the Japanese have extended their power to the west as far as Tungliao, and into North Manchuria as far as the Chinese Eastern Railway area. In this time the League of Nations looks on, and passes resolutions, and expostulates. Japan answers, and discusses, and promises,—and keeps on consolidating her power in the occupied territory and steadily invading new territory.

F. G.

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F. G.

THE LEADER Wednesday, November 11, 1931.

NOVEMBER SIXTEENTH APPROACHES

The three weeks allowed to Japan by the League to withdraw troops from Chinese territory is drawing to a close. The Council's statement to the Japanese Government was absolutely definite and unequivocal. Japan was to start withdrawing her troops from occupied territory at once and complete it within three weeks. If a document of this kind was sent out by a government it might be regarded as an ultimatum. But Japan apparently looks upon the League as a dog with a soft bark and no bite, and so far the League has not taken up the challenge thrown in its face by the Japanese warlords.

These three weeks, indeed, have been busy ones. Japan's municipal administration in Mukden, first organized with a Japanese mayor and Japanese higher officials and then gradually turned over to Chinese underlings upon whom the Japanese could rely absolutely to serve them, seized the Salt Gabelle funds at Newchwang. Japan's mendacious statement to the League a couple of days ago that this was a "purely Chinese affair" was simply an insult to the intelligence of the Secretariat and Council of the League. Everyone knows what sort of an administration exists in Mukden, and who controls it.

The latest news of this administration is that it has been developed up to the stage of a provincial government for Fengtien (Liaoning), and has moved into the provincial government building. Perhaps this development means that in the name of this "government" Japanese troops will occupy the rest of Fengtien,—the territory to the west and southwest of the South Manchuria Railway. One ticklish point here, however, is the Peiping-Mukden Railway, in which British capital is invested and which the Japanese are wary about seizing, as seizure would mean complications of a new variety. Japan has not the slightest desire to fight anyone who she considers capable of fighting.

While the Mukden administration is being expanded to a government for as much of Fengtien as Japanese troops have occupied, activities have been extended elsewhere. In Kirin province, indeed, they had already consolidated themselves, a Chinese general (with whom negotiations had in all probability been under way before the occupation) having been bought over soon after the seizure of Mukden, Changchun, and other points. At the time of the League demand three weeks ago, therefore, practically all the territory of South Manchuria lying between the S. M. R. and the Korean border was under the rule either of Japanese troops direct or of Chinese forces upon which the Japanese could rely.

To the west of the S. M. R., and in North Manchuria, there had been no definite occupation, excepting for a couple of stations immediately to the

west of Mukden, though there had been a reign of terror along the line for weeks created by bombing of cities and passenger trains by Japanese airmen, and bandit activities under Japanese auspices. But two weeks ago, as soon as the League Council, unanimously (except for one party to the dispute), issued its statement to Japan and adjourned, Japan began shifting additional troops into Manchuria and to the west of the railway. First they extended the occupation west to Taonan, following this moved further west to Tung-liao, and with this accomplished moved north from Taonan along the line to Tsitsihar. It is not certain at this writing whether they intend to attack Tsitsihar themselves or try to force Chang Hai-peng's poor dupes to do it for them. They have demanded that General Ma of Heilungkiang turn over provincial authority to the Japanese employee Chang Hai-peng, but Ma has refused this, and Chang's mercenaries and bandits, even with Japanese equipment, money, and support, are no match for the Heilungkiang army. Perhaps the notorious bandit leader Semenoff, who has been busy for weeks organizing his old Russian bandits into a new force for the Japanese, will be brought in with the hope that these Russian brigands with Japanese equipment will turn the tide. But in any case the Heilungkiang soldiers have fought back, and fought well. If the Japanese are going further north they will need reinforcements, and plenty of them.

And now comes the plot in Tientsin. The uprising was not only planned, but organized and mobilized, in the Japanese Concession there. Whether Japanese participation in this was great or small, whether they led it or merely gave organizing place for it, there is no doubt about their responsibility.

In any case, the three weeks are almost up. Japan has utilized them to consolidate her power and extend her occupation, and to intrigue with Russian bandits, Mongol bandits, Chinese bandits, Manchu monarchists, Chinese renegades, and ordinary criminals and journalistic prostitutes of all nationalities to create all the riot and disorder and chaos and terror they can in Chinese territory.

Japan is settling down to a good long stay. Is the League to act? Or will Europe and America do nothing until Japan, with Manchuria in her hands, has become a Great Power of the same rank as Britain or America, and reaches out for the hegemony of Asia and of the world?

F. G.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

CORRECTED COPY

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

FROM

Peiping

Dated December 8, 1931

Secretary of State,

Washington

1052, December 8, 10 a.m.


Confidential. Yesterday member of Military

Attache's office was shown telegram from T. V. Soong to Marshal Chang stating that negotiations for neutral zone seemed likely to fail and that any attack on Chinchow should be resisted to the utmost.

For the Minister

PERKINS

JS



FW 793.94/3091

DEC 11 1931

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WP

FROM

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone.

Peiping

Dated December 8, 1931

Rec'd 12:43 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1052, December 8, 10 a. m.

Confidential. Yesterday member of Military

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to Marshal Chang stating that negotiations for neutral
zone seemed likely to fall and that any attack on Chin-
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PERKINS

JS



F/DEW

793.94/3091

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1075

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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PREPARING OFFICE
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TELEGRAM SENT

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE ☒
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Department of State



Washington,
December 8, 1931.

AMEMBASSY

PARIS (France).

DEC 8 31

5 pm

634

FOR AMBASSADOR DAWES.

The American Legation at Peiping reports under
date December 8/³⁰⁹¹ that on December 7 a member of the
Military Attaché's office was shown a telegram from
~~the~~ Chinese Minister of Finance Soong to Marshal
Chang Hsueh-liang stating that negotiations for
a neutral zone seemed likely to fail and that any
attack on Chinchow should be resisted to the utmost.

793.94/3091

793.94/3091

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GR ✓
DEC 8 1931
M. O. Gustafson

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Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

GREEN

FROM Paris

Dated December 7, 1931

Rec'd 2:55 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

853, December 7, 6 p.m.

FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES.

Following is report from Sweetser:

"The Drafting Committee met this morning with Sze to acquaint him with the changes suggested for the resolution and declaration as a result of the conference with the Japanese.

The principal question, Cecil stated, was as regards the relationship between the Commission and the evacuation which the Japanese seemed to feel completely changed the character of the Commission. All the other members of the Council, Cecil stated, were anxious that the Commission should report on Manchuria first of all. If, however, they attempted to put the original phase into the resolution the Japanese would

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEC 7 1931

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
DEC 7 1931

Department of State

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2-#853 from Paris, December 7,
1931.

would vote against it. Similarly if, in order to obtain unanimity, they agreed on the modification the Japanese would demand the result would be so anaemic as not to meet either the Council's views or the Chinese. It had therefore occurred to him that it would be better to put the phrase into the declaration as most convenient.

Sze explained that his instructions permitted him to accept the resolution and the declaration in their present form. His Government attached great importance to the (END SECTION ONE)

SHAW

WSB-HPD

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

GREEN

FROM

Paris

Dated December 7, 1931

Rec'd 3:25 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

853, December 7, 6 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

particular paragraph of the resolution in question.

He must therefore give serious thought as to whether he could accept the transfer to the declaration without reference to Nanking. He was very anxious for an early settlement but must keep within his instructions. Just what practical difference, he asked Cecil, would the change make.

Cecil thought the change would make no real difference in practice. The choice seemed to be between a weak phrase in the resolution ~~or a strong~~ phrase in the declaration. Juridically perhaps an order to the ~~commission~~ would be changed into a recommendation but in point of actual practice the result would come to the same.

As regards police measures Cecil explained that
the

MET

2-#853 from Paris, December 7,
1931 (Section two)

the Japanese had proposed an alternative text which the Council could not accept. This text would have given some confirmation to the theory that one country could go into the territory of another to do the police work. As the Council had not in any case liked becoming involved in this matter it had suggested dropping the phrase entirely from the declaration and allowing the Japanese to make their own declaration which of course any other member of the Council would be free to answer as he thought fit. He thought this suggestion would be in China's favor though Sze did not comment in one way or the other.

Oecil then explained that the Council was extremely anxious to have the final meeting at the latest on Wednesday. The resolution was now complete as regards the Japanese.

SHAW

WSB

MET

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Paris

FROM

Dated December 7, 1931

Rec'd 3:45 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

853, December 7, 6 p.m. (SECTION THREE AND LAST)
except for the police clause. He had not formally
proposed to the Japanese putting this clause into
the declaration instead of the resolution until he
had seen the Chinese nor would he ask the Chinese to
give a final answer until he had a firm offer to make,
Sze promised, however, to let the committee know
tonight what his view was.

In reply to Olds' question as to the situation
concerning Chinchow Cecil said he was not at the
moment very happy about it. The Council had asked
Japan what would be the delimitation of the zone on
their side and expected to have a reply today. He
pointed out that the two negotiations, that is, on
the resolution and declaration and on Chinchow were
quite distinct. The Japanese had not connected the
Chinchow matter with the resolution. Cecil regarded
the Chinchow zone as an additional precaution to avoid

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2-#853 from Paris, December 7,
1931 (SECTION THREE AND LAST)

a clash; the resolution and the declaration would be just the same whether the Chinchow matter was settled or not.

Sze then gave his latest information on Chinese troops in that region. He said it was materially impossible for them to have gone as far towards Mukden as Japanese reports indicated if for no other reason than that the railroad is out of operation. The Chinese commanding officers had ordered not to attack but only to stay quite within the zone".

SHAW

WSB

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAN

FROM

GREEN

PARIS

Dated December 7, 1931

Rec'd 7:30 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

URGENT

854, December 7, 10 p.m.

FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES


The reply submitted by the Japanese to Briand this afternoon is as follows:

"The representative of Japan, in answer to the request which has been made to him by the President of the Council, hastens to furnish to him for his confidential information the following explanations.

One. The limit of the zone to be evacuated would, on the Japanese side, be established on the Hsiaoling-Ho.

This limit has been determined on the basis of Mr. Wellington Koo's original proposition in accordance with which the Chinese forces would retire from the Chinchow region to Shanhaikwan, and the Japanese forces would not enter the zone so evacuated.

Two. The conversations to be undertaken with China could be very rapidly terminated. It goes without saying that during the course of these conversations our forces have no intention of entering the zone to be evacuated



F/DEW 793.94/3093

DEC 14 1931

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mam

2- #854, from Paris, December 7,
1931

evacuated unless the Chinese should wilfully delay things
in order to carry on hostile acts of provocation: that
is a question of good sense and sincerity".

(END SECTION ONE)

SHAW

OX

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAM

FROM

A portion of this telegram
must be closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated to
anyone.

PARIS

Dated December 7, 1931

Rec'd 8:15 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

URGENT

854, December 7, 10 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

This was not acceptable to the Council on the ground that it meant in effect practically the complete evacuation of Manchuria by China and would be wholly unacceptable to that government. The opinion was strongly expressed by Cecil that there was some reason to think that it had been put in such severe terms in order to invite rejection by the Chinese and justify aggressive measures by the Japanese. The members of the Council thereupon decided it to be a matter of urgency to take two actions, first, for Briand, in their name, to write Yoshizawa for transmission to Shidehara as quoted below; and second, to request their individual diplomatic representatives in Tokyo to make strong representations against any measures which would further aggravate the Chinchow situation. These representations will probably follow the lines of M. Briand's letter quoted below. (END GREEN)

After the meeting Briand particularly requested that the text of this letter be transmitted to me with the

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After the meeting Briand particularly requested that the text of this letter be transmitted to me with the

mam

2- #854, section two, from Paris,
December 7, 1931

the suggestion that if the Government of the United States felt it possible to do so he would greatly appreciate its taking some similar action. Cecil made the same suggestion.

(GREEN) The drafting committee tomorrow morning sees Sze and a closed meeting of the Council will be held at twelve o'clock. A public meeting has been announced for Wednesday afternoon. I am to see Briand tomorrow afternoon and will wait until six o'clock Paris time which is one p.m. Washington time,

(END SECTION TWO)

SHAW

OX

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAM

GREEN

FROM

PARIS

Dated December 7, 1931

Rec'd 8:25 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

URGENT

854, December 7, 10 p.m. (SECTION THREE AND LAST)
in the hope of receiving an answer to this despatch by
telephone.

The following is Briand's communication through
Yoshizawa to Shidehara. "I regret that after communi-
cating with my colleagues with the exception of the
representatives of the two parties, we do not feel it
possible, in view of the information given to me con-
fidentially by Your Excellency, particularly with re-
gard to the limits of the zone, to make the recommen-
dation to the Chinese Government mentioned in the memo-
randum which Your Excellency left with me on December
first, though if the Japanese Government found it pos-
sible to make other proposals with regard to these lim-
its, my colleagues and I would of course be prepared
to reconsider their present attitude.

My colleagues and I are in any case convinced that
the Japanese Government will respect fully the resolu-
tion of September 30th particularly so as to prevent say,
aggravation

mam

2- #854, from Paris, section three,
December 7, 1931

aggravation of the situation. It would be deplorable if, at a moment when an agreement is well in sight which we believe will be acceptable to both parties, the situation should be embittered and even endangered by fresh outbursts of fighting. In this connection I would draw Your Excellency's attention to the proposal set out in my letter of November 29th and Your Excellency's reply thereto in which it is stated that if a danger of contact between the Chinese and Japanese troops arose, the Japanese Government would be disposed to examine attentively the suggestions made to avoid such a contact".
(END MESSAGE)

SHAW

OX

1091

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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PREPARING OFFICE
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TELEGRAM SENT *cmf*

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
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Department of State

Washington,

December 8, 1931.

2P

DEC 8 31

AMERICAN EMBASSY

PARIS (FRANCE).

CONFIDENTIAL.

FROM STIMSON TO DAWES.

Reference your 854. I have telegraphed Ambassador

Forbes, Tokyo, as follows:

QUOTE

(Telegraph Room: Repeat text of telegram of December 8, to the American Embassy at Tokyo, as attached, omitting quotation of text of Briand's note, pages 1-2 as indicated, and inserting "(Text omitted)".)

UNQUOTE

Stimson

5144

FE: RSM: EJJ FE

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 60.

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-128

793.94/3093


TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WP

FROM GREEN
Paris

Dated December 7, 1931

Rec'd 9:25 p. m.




Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

855, December 7, midnight.

FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES.

Following is report from Sweetser:

"Briand reported to the twelve today that Yoshizawa had brought him a reply as to the Chinchow zone (see my 854, December 7, 10 p. m.) He felt it would be very difficult to accept this reply; the situation created by it would be very different from that actually prevailing. The Japanese line would not be on the Liao as at present but very close to Chinchow. Drummond added first that the Japanese had confirmed by cable that it was Tokyo's intention that China should be in control of the neutral zone and second, that Japan did not propose that her troops should occupy the whole territory between the two rivers or be quartered beyond where they now are but that they should have the right to pursue bandits in that territory



F/DEW

793.94/3094

DEC 14 1931

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- 2 - No. 855 from Paris -

territory if necessary.

Oecil said that the line suggested by Japan passed very close to Chinchow. He did not see how Council could possibly suggest to China establishing a zone between the Great Wall and just beyond Chinchow. He thought the Council should reply to the Japanese that this would not be in accord with

(END SECTION ONE).

SHAW

JS

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WP

GREEN
FROM
Paris

Dated December 7, 1931

Rec'd 10:09 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

855, December 7, midnight. (SECTION TWO).

what was fair and just. More than that however he thought
'the most vehement observations' should be made by the
diplomatic representatives at Tokyo; that the Council was
satisfied through neutral observers and otherwise that
the number of Chinese troops around Chinchow was insignif-
icant, that there was no advanced movement by them, and
consequently no danger from Japan. However diplomatically
it might be put, he thought it should be brought home to
the Japanese Government that an attack on Chinchow could
only be considered as an aggression pure and simple.

Briand agreed that a communication be made stating
what the observers had reported as to the lack of move-
ment of Chinese troops and the lack of danger to the
Japanese troops. The Council could then express the
hope that the de facto zone which had been maintained so
far with much success should continue. That zone had
indeed

- 2 - No. 855 from Paris - section two -

indeed made it possible to prevent hostilities; there was every reason for its maintenance.

Mutius remarked he had understood there was an immediate danger; was there any change? Cecil said he thought not; he was himself convinced that the Japanese military authorities were preparing an advance on Chin-chow.

Madariaga reported a conversation with the President who presented two difficulties: first, as to the designation of neutral zone, with other territory which was Chinese; and second as to the emphasis on direct negotiations. He

(END SECTION TWO)

SHAW

JS

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WP

GREEN

Paris

FROM

Dated December 7, 1931

Rec'd 11:02 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

855, December 7, midnight. (SECTION THREE)
would be glad to see the present situation continue but
not under that designation. He would like to see the
Council go ahead with the resolution which was broad
enough to cover Chinchow and have both China and Japan
make declaration before the Council that each would
rest on its present lines with whatever reserve regard-
ing bandits were necessary and with a strengthening of
the system of observers. He endorsed the idea of a
strong note to Japan but suggested adding a constructive
proposal.

Briand reiterated that in the present situation
it was impossible to recommend the neutral zone as fore-
seen but the Council could recommend the maintenance of
the present arrangement. Cecil agreed with this but
thought it did not go far enough. He felt the Council
could not neglect the warnings that had been given that
a new advance was in contemplation. He could not help
thinking

- 2 - No. 855 from Paris - section three -

thinking that in proposing this line Japan meant to have it rejected. She could not have expected the Chinese to accept it. In his opinion the military intended to advance on Chinchow. There was no justification, military or otherwise, for such an act. He thought the governments on the Council should urge their representatives at Tokyo to protest, in however diplomatic terms, against such action. What he feared was that the Japanese military do not think favorable of the resolution and think that a big incident at Chinchow would kill it. He felt

(END SECTION THREE)

SHAW

JS

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WP

GREEN

Paris

FROM
Dated December 7, 1931

Rec'd 10:14 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

855, December 7, 12 midnight. (SECTION FOUR).
it would be an outrage if Chinchow were attacked when
the Council was at the point of success in its mediation.
Briand added that it was clear what the Japanese reply
meant, namely, the occupation of the whole of Manchuria.

A discussion then followed as to the exact form
of procedure. Drummond had meantime prepared a draft
which was accepted in general lines, rephrased somewhat
in a subsequent meeting of the Drafting Committee and
despatched to Yoshizawa tonight (see my 854, December
7, 10 p. m.)

The twelve then agreed to announce a public
meeting for Wednesday afternoon with the hope of final
action on the resolution. Before then the Drafting
Committee would meet with Sze tomorrow morning at eleven
and the twelve at twelve".

(END MESSAGE)

SHAW

JS

1095

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
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
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Department of State

Washington,



AMEMBASSY,

December 7, 1931.

PARIS, (FRANCE) DEC 7:31

noon

630

SPECIAL FOR DAWES FROM STIMSON.

Referring to my telephone conversation with you this morning, another reason why it is important that we should receive notice of the final action upon the Resolution now pending before the Council is that the President is planning to send a special message to Congress covering American foreign relations in which he will necessarily refer to the Manchurian situation. That message is planned for Thursday but could possibly be held back for a day or two provided timely notice were given us. In that message he can treat helpfully the future steps to be taken if we are advised early enough of the final result of these negotiations before the League.

793.94/3094A

STIMSON.

DEC 7 350

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
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Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.



DEC 7 350

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AM 1000
LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Peiping, November 12, 1931.

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Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
DEC 11 1931
Department of State

Division of
EASTERN AFFAIRS
DEC 11 1931
Department of State

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

- Referring to previous communications concerning
- 1/ the Manchurian situation, I have the honor to enclose copies of "A MANIFESTO TO THE WORLD BY THE BRANCH HEADQUARTERS OF THE CHINESE KUOMINTANG OF HOPEI PROVINCE, REGARDING THE JAPANESE INVASION OF MANCHURIA".
 - 2/ There is likewise transmitted herewith a copy, in translation, of an editorial appearing in the "Peking Jih Pao" of October 10, 1931, advocating an alliance between the United States and China rather than one between China and Soviet Russia. The writer points out that a Sino-Soviet alliance might adversely affect the present property system in China and would probably interrupt the suppression of the communist bandits in the Yangtze Valley.

The third

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FILED

DEC 17 1931

- 2 -

- 3/ The third enclosure to this despatch consists of a translation of a mimeographed circular addressed by the "Anti-Japanese and National Salvation Society of the Northeastern People" to the Nanking government, requesting the immediate resumption of diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia as a defensive measure against the invasion of Manchuria by Japanese troops.

Respectfully yours,

For the Minister:


U. van P. Engel,
First Secretary of Legation.

✓
Enclosures:

- 1/ "A Manifesto to the World by the Branch Headquarters of the Chinese Kuomintang of Hopei Province, regarding the Japanese Invasion of Manchuria".
- 2/ Translation of editorial in "Peking Jih Pao" of October 10, 1931.
- 3/ Translation of circular from the "Anti-Japanese and National Salvation Society of the Northeastern People".

800

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11 J
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

**A MANIFESTO TO THE WORLD BY THE BRANCH
HEADQUARTER OF THE CHINESE KUOMINTANG
OF HOPEI PROVINCE, REGARDING THE
JAPANESE INVASION OF MANCHURIA.**

The Kuomintang, the Nationalist Party of China, acting in accordance with the will of the late Dr. Sun Yat Sen, founder of the Party, launched the Northern Expedition in 1926, and succeeded within two years in uniting the whole country through the faith and bravery of our comrades and the determined resolution of our people. During the last four years, in spite of the repeated resistance of the reactionary forces against the San-Min-Chu-Yi, our Party has grown stronger and stronger. While we are working toward democracy and world peace, the atrocious Japanese imperialists, fearing that a unified and an awakened China would obstruct their policy of aggression, employ the most inhuman means to destroy the unity of China, so that they can maintain the position as the leading power in the Pacific.

In 1928 when our revolutionary forces made the second Northern Expedition, Japan despatched troops to Tsinan for no reason whatsoever but to prevent *their* advance. If we were not peace-loving people, the tragedy would have spread all over the country, and would have also endangered the world peace. During the past three years, the Japanese created many tragedies in China, for instance the deliberate killing of Chinese civilians at Tsingtao, Fengtien, Kirin, Tientsin, Hankow and Shanghai by their soldiers. In spite of all these barbarous actions on the part of Japanese soldiers, our government and people remained calm, thinking that the Japanese would repent. But they turned in the opposite direction, and are getting even more ferocious.

They thought that our attitude of Non-resistance was an invitation to further aggression!

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

When two nations make war on each other, there must be a serious cause for it, and they must not resort to force unless they cannot settle the dispute by diplomatic means. In the present case, the Japanese created a groundless rumour that the Chinese soldiers destroyed a portion of the South Manchurian Railway and used that as a pretext to resort to force!

Since the so-called Nakamura murder case happened, our local authorities, realizing the bad intention of the Japanese, have been very cautious and strictly instructed our soldiers and police forces not to create any trouble with the Japanese, in order to avoid any further complications. So there was no reason to believe that the tracks of the South Manchurian Railway were destroyed by the Chinese soldiers. The Japanese forces occupied Antung on September 18, and the tracks of the South Manchurian Railway were destroyed on the following day. Japan neither made any negotiation with, nor sent an ultimatum to, our government, but directly moved their forces to Fengtien as a measure of war. This is certainly a violation of the general principles of International law and Article 12 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, of which Japan is a member, which provides:

"The members of the League agree that if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture they will submit the matter either to arbitration or judicial settlement or to enquiry by the Council, and they agree in no case to resort to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators or the judicial decision or the report by the Council." It is also a violation of the Kellogg Pact to which Japan is a signatory state.

Indeed the barbarous acts of the Japanese will add a dark page to the history of world civilization. The Japanese imperialists are the enemy of humanity and disturber of world peace. The light-houses of the world have been darkened by Japanese atrocity.

When two nations make war on each other, there must be a serious cause for it, and they must not resort to force unless they cannot settle the dispute by diplomatic means. In the present case, the Japanese created a groundless rumour that the Chinese soldiers destroyed a portion of the South Manchurian Railway and used that as a pretext to resort to force!

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

While our government is making protest to the Japanese government and demanding reparations, we shall remain quiet and wait for the satisfactory results. But if we fail in the negotiation, we would sacrifice everything to fight for justice, for humanity and for world peace. We hope that the world will give an impartial judgment on this case and help us with their sympathy in order to maintain international justice and world peace.

Sept. 22, 1931.

Translation of an editorial appearing in the
PEKING JIH PAO of October 10, 1931.

(Trans. EFS)

ALLIANCE WITH THE UNITED STATES IS BETTER
THAN WITH SOVIET RUSSIA.

-An alliance with Soviet Russia may induce
Russia to despatch troops to North
Manchuria-

-Japan and the United States really hate each
other along the Pacific-

-In short, the people should immediately adopt
self-defensive measures and make the
decision themselves-

It has recently been learned that in respect of
the plans protesting against Japan, some favor an
alliance with Russia chiefly because China and Russia
are adjacent countries. While Japan has gained influence
in South Manchuria, Russia is losing her influence in
North Manchuria. Russia, being an interested party,
will certainly struggle with Japan to the death. China
may avail herself of this opportunity to join hands
with Russia, and should employ evil to attack evil.
This may possibly move the center of diplomatic
complications, and China may gain an advantageous
settlement of the Sino-Japanese issue. For instance,
Turkey accomplished her unification due to the aid
rendered by Russia, and Germany has threatened the
Powers by virtue of Russian assistance.

However, from a careful examination many questions
have occurred to us. Supposing that China became an
allied state of Russia, would the system of property
in China be adversely affected? Would the work for
the suppression of the Reds be interrupted? These
serious questions should be carefully considered in

advance.

-2-

advance. Since the polity in Russia is different from China, and as her system of property is particularly characteristic, Russia will be induced to send forces to North Manchuria if China suddenly joined hands with her before the settlement of the dispute arising from the despatch of Japanese troops to South Manchuria. How can the situation be remedied by replacing a wolf with a tiger? Furthermore, inasmuch as the Sino-Russian hostilities of 1930 have not yet ceased and as the Chinese Eastern Railway issue has not yet been settled, no assistance may be obtained without offering terms. Accordingly, the proposal for alliance with Russia should by no means be adopted by China.

In view of the above, the so-called calm diplomacy has proved ineffective, and the intervention of the League of Nations has become hopeless. China has exhausted all means using the policy of non-resistance. Alliance with Russia is practically not permissible. Should Chinese people be subjugated and await the extinction of their country? Should they offer resistance and struggle to death? That the people should take measures for self-defense is accordingly discussed in this editorial. What should we decide upon? The severance of economic relations should be strictly enforced. At the same time the people should elect delegates to form popular machinery for the handling of foreign affairs, which should assist the Government. What is self-defense? All troops should be mobilized in China, and war declared with Japan. Meantime, measures shall be actively taken to establish alliance with the United States for help.

Let

-3-

Let us discuss these questions separately. Everybody knows that the boycott of Japanese goods can adversely affect national economic conditions in Japan and will put the Japanese to death. However, it is necessary for the various factions to sink their differences and to render cooperation consistent throughout. All affairs shall be regulated and strictly supervised by the wishes of the people, so that a firm stand may be established forever. The various anti-Japanese organizations established today are not steady. Treacherous merchants are still in existence. The people should form a powerful organization themselves to support the Government. The Government should devise means to abolish the difference of boundary and should establish a united front with foreigners. Then the north and the south will be unified, and diplomatic victory gained.

When one has suddenly heard of my proposal for declaration of war with Japan, he would deem that it cannot be realized. He does not know that Chinese territory chiefly consists of land and that communication facilities are inconvenient. While Japan has despatched naval forces to blockade seaports, large seaports in the north and the south of China bear relations to the treaties of foreign Powers who will by no means permit her to blockade. Furthermore, Eastern Asia concerns the economic markets in other countries. Should the hostilities take place, foreign Powers would by no means assume onlooker's attitude and would protect their own interests. They should of course render energetic mediation. It is now known that they may force Japan to comply with judgment of a majority of nations.

-4-

Moreover, the feeling between Japan and the United States has hitherto been bad. For instance, the question of Japanese immigration along the Pacific Coast has constantly caused serious objection. Accordingly, certain regulations governing Japanese immigrants have been enacted to control the matter. It has not been permitted that the self-governing power of the Hawaii Islands be turned over to the people on the Islands. The tonnage of naval vessels for the Pacific Ocean is in excess of that for the Atlantic Ocean annually. The defense against Japan can thus be seen. The proposition for "open door" policy and the convocation of the Washington Conference by the United States were all intended to curb the movement of Japan and to hinder her activities in China. If Manchuria and Mongolia be permanently occupied by the Japanese, there would come into existence a question of increase or decrease in the power of the United States and Japan on the Pacific. For this reason, upon declaration of war between China and Japan, the United States will certainly help China in the Pacific War against Japan.

In a word, China should avail herself of this opportunity to establish an alliance with the United States. A right man should be sent to the United States as a representative. A temporary result will certainly be obtained. The Leader in the "none-to-fear" spirit and by virtue of revolution for forty years invented the Three Principles of the People, the first of which is nationalism. The nationalism takes the determination by the people themselves as essential. His principal intent can be seen. Alas! The Leader is dead! As the man is dead, the country becomes distressed. Although
the

-5-

the Leader is dead, his posthumous instructions still exist. Should we fail to take active measures to struggle for the existence of the nation, how can we look the Leader and the Nation in face? While internal sorrow has not yet been exterminated, external trouble is approaching. The Chinese people should encourage themselves. - - - - - -Ch'êng Hsü.

EFS:T

Translation of a mimeographed circular addressed by the Anti-Japanese and National Salvation Society of the Northeastern People, c/o the Fengtien Native Guild, Hsitan P'ailou, Peiping, to the American Legation, Peiping.

(Trans. EFS)

(Dated: October 11, 1931.)

(Recd.: October 13, 1931.)

To

The Central Party Headquarters and Commander-in-Chief Chiang Kai-shek at Nanking, Vice-Commander-in-Chief Chang Hsueh-liang at Peiping, Directors of the various Yüan, Heads of the various Ministries, the various Provincial Party Offices, Municipal Party Offices, Chairmen of Provincial Governments, Mayors, Commandants of Army, Divisional Commanders, popular organizations, and newspaper agencies.

Sirs:

We have just addressed a telegram to the National Government, stating:

"The National Government,
Nanking.

"Sirs:

"With regard to the cruel incident in Liaoning and Kirin Provinces, Japan has destroyed international law and exterminated justice. A most unfortunate incident among nations may possibly be brought about. The northeastern people deeply regret this matter.

"Since China has entered into negotiations with the Union Soviet Socialist Republics, the question concerning the resumption of relations has not been settled. As enemy troops are menacing Chinese territory and as the State and people have now been insulted, it appears to be urgently necessary for us to be friendly with our northern neighbor. We venture to request by telegraph that you immediately wire Mr. Mo Te-hui, Delegate Plenipotentiary in Russia, to resume relations between China and Russia with the utmost sincerity and within the shortest possible period of time. An alliance between these two large nations will accelerate the brightness of the world.

"In

-2-

"In compliance with the principle of universalization promoted by the late Leader, we, the northeastern people, have the honor to make the above unanimous appeal. As you are fully aware of the international situation, the above proposal will certainly be acceptable to you and will be realized at once.

"We have the honor to address this telegram for your information. Your kind instructions are awaited."


We have the honor to express the hope that you will take due note of the above.

-SEAL OF THE ANTI-JAPANESE AND NATIONAL
SALVATION SOCIETY OF THE NORTHEASTERN PEOPLE-

The Merchant Federation, Labor Federation,
and Educational Federation of the Three
Eastern Provinces, the Agricultural Union
and Journalist Union of Liaoning Province,
and the Anti-Japanese and National Salvation
Society of the Northeastern People.

the 11th.

EFG:T



December 7, 1931.

TELEPHONIC TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY
STIMSON AND GENERAL DAWES AT PARIS, 10:15.

SECRETARY: Hello, is that you General? We are rather anxious to know what the news is and what the prospects are for the passage of that resolution.

DAWES: I have not wired anything because they have been waiting for word from China and Japan but as it stands now the Japanese wired to their Government the other night asking them to accept the proposition that was made, which I wired you last night. It was in Sweetser's report in which Briand suggests that they simply make no reference to the neutral zone in the resolution but make the statement in the declaration.

SECRETARY: What I want to get to you is this -

DAWES: They asked about this and the reply is now here but they have not yet announced it. They are to see Briand at 3:30 this afternoon and give that answer and some of the second men of the Japanese delegation suggest that it is going to be satisfactory although that is just a rumor. China on the other hand has Sze is talking about the League letting him down and all that sort of thing, but Olds, who is his adviser, tells me that he thinks that China will accept that but Sze - when this Japanese position is - when they take their position if they agree to this proposition of the League putting it in the declaration instead of the resolution - Sze wants to instruct his Government again. Japan is all ready now but there will be another delay until Sze hears from the Chinese Government. The difference is on all that. Supposed to drop out of the neutral zone.

SECRETARY: Let

793.94/3095 1/2

Confidential File

-2-

SECRETARY: Let me speak to you about that. What I want to say about that is, so far as it seems to us here that clause, the part which was objected to by Japan, is of such small importance to any substantial work under the whole resolution, that we would much rather see it dropped out than to see any long delay about it.

DAWES: Mr. Secretary that is exactly what I have told them already that that proposition they are talking about in the declaration or in the resolution is a small point. The thing is to get the resolution passed. My suggestion has been to them that this matter of the neutral zone business had just better be dropped. I think that is the idea without any question that the League will not stand on that - or on the question of a neutral zone - and if the Japanese are satisfied in other ways and I think they are, then it will be only to get China to agree.

SECRETARY: I understand that but we think it is very important that the League should pass that resolution as quickly as possible because the impression is given that the longer they delay, the more futile it is.

DAWES:Manchuria. It would be a very serious thing and they realize that and they want to get that passed and then get away. I want to ask you something. It is very possible that that will come tomorrow. They will agree on something and it is possible that they will have the resolution so that they can decide upon it tomorrow. Now you want me to cable that over to you?

SECRETARY: I want it cabled over in its final form as quickly as possible even if you have to cable it in the clear. Just as soon as it is announced there - as soon as it is public - you can telegraph it to us in the clear

without

-3-

without the code and that gets through very much more quickly.

DAWES: Then the point would be that I think you should announce the position of the United States as soon as possible.

SECRETARY: That is why I want it.

DAWES: Just as quickly as they agree on it, I will send it to you in the clear.

SECRETARY: I understand that the resolution is substantially unchanged from your cable.

DAWES: It is just the same as I wired to you last night.

SECRETARY: Have you wired the form of it?

DAWES: In Sweetser's telegram.

SECRETARY: That did not contain the present form of the cable. Some days ago you sent me a copy of the resolution and I understand that that form is still in existence. I understand that the cable was just the same except that the last part of clause five has been struck off. I just want to be sure. Sometime ago you telegraphed the resolution when it was first formulated by the Council. It is in your cable No. 827 of December 1, 11 p.m.

DAWES: I have it here now.

SECRETARY: I understand that the resolution remains unchanged except the last sentence in paragraph five.

DAWES: That is right.

SECRETARY: That is the only change?

DAWES: That is all.

SECRETARY: Well all right. That last sentence is going to be omitted or there will be a substitution in the form suggested by the drafting committee yesterday.

DAWES: That is the only thing - that is, the last part of paragraph

-4-

paragraph five and as to how that will be changed, it is the thing they are discussing now. Japan will make its own suggestion in place of that probably and I will wire that to you just as soon as I get it.

SECRETARY: Let me say something further. I do not want you to be too backward about talking with the different members of the Council that are there. There is no criticism here of you whatever.

DAWES: I have just talked with those who come to see me.

SECRETARY: You are perfectly free to go around and see them if you want to. Let me make this clear to you.

DAWES: I have talked with Briand; I have talked with Simon; with Sze; with Matsudaira and, of course, been in touch with Drummond but I have not talked with Norway or some of those other fellows.

SECRETARY: All I want you to know is that there has been absolutely no criticism against you for doing too much. The only criticism that has been made at all has been by very zealous advocates of the League that you have been too much of a hermit.

DAWES: If I run around making a spectacle of myself, I won't do any good. I think I had just better go along and do only what is proper to do instead of going to see people and making a show of it. The people watch me all the time.

SECRETARY: Let me say again, I have no criticism of you whatever. I am one hundred per cent satisfied but I wanted you to know that in case it becomes necessary in your opinion to fly around a little more, do not hesitate to do it.

-5-

DAWES: The Japanese and Chinese come here first before they go to the League and I have to stay in my room because I get telephone calls from them and they come right up here before they go to the League. I hate to leave here to see some of the other fellows because I might miss something that is really important. By being here, once or twice in that way, we have kept China from throwing the whole thing over.

SECRETARY: I would like very much to know if there is any criticism on the part of Briand as to what we have done or not done. You can talk with him as freely as you like on that subject and invite any criticism.

DAWES: He is very much satisfied. He sent Massigli over last night to talk of what pressure you could bring on China to get them into this thing but Massigli decided that we had better not put it up to you until we get the Japanese answer and then we will know whether or not to ask you to bring pressure on China to come in but I did not want to put it up to you until we get an answer from Japan. I am in touch with Briand just the same and I think that is better. I am much closer to him than I could be if I ran around with the other fellows.

SECRETARY: I am perfectly satisfied but I want you to know that there was no danger of criticism for doing too much.

DAWES: I should rather be criticized for doing too little. After all it is you not me, it is the United States Government and not me and I want to do everything in the best way as I see it here.

SECRETARY: The President and I are perfectly satisfied and we think you have done a very good job.

DAWES: They

-6-

DAWES: They keep asking me whether or not I am going to make any statement when I go away.

SECRETARY: We are getting ready to make a statement here so I do not think that will be necessary. We shall have to make a statement here in any event.

DAWES: That is what I told them. I will not make any. Things are a little more hopeful today but up until this morning it looked awfully bad.

SECRETARY: The only other thing that I could have any possible reason for asking you now is this: If the resolution should get into a desperate condition and be likely to fail, I should like you to find out what the League is likely to do about it. At present I think it is going to pass but if it should not pass and if the whole thing should go on the rocks, then I should like to know as early as possible what the ideas are of the gentlemen who are carrying on those negotiations.

DAWES: That is just what we will do and before it is announced, we will let you know so you will know just what they think you ought to do and you can suggest whatever you think ought to be done.

SECRETARY: I do not want anything to occur in the break-up of these negotiations which will act as an estrangement between the United States and the other nations.

DAWES: I do not think that is going to occur.

SECRETARY: I should like you to keep us posted as much as you can of their views of what they think they can do and what they think we can do.

DAWES: Drummond comes over here himself and I have told him that you have said that you wanted to know what we are
to

-7-

to do.

SECRETARY: You can talk without any commitments perfectly freely.

DAWES: Before anything is decided Drummond comes over here first. He will come over and tell us what he wants to do. In case it looks as though the resolution is going to fail, he will come here first just as Massigli came last night. If China hangs out, he will want you to take up the matter with China in case Japan fails to come in.

SECRETARY: I think that is all right. Very well I will say goodbye to you now.

S: VGN HHR

CONFIDENTIAL

December 8, 1931.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RECEIVED
TRANSATLANTIC TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY
STIMSON AND DAWES AT PARIS. 12:00.
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

SECRETARY: Hello, is that you General. You asked me to call you. I have your cable and I have sent a telegram to Tokyo similar to the one which was suggested by Briand but, in addition to that, yesterday afternoon the Japanese Ambassador came to see me here and in the talk he indicated that the Japanese were likely to make another move on Chinchow and I made very strong representations to him then as to what would be the effect of such a movement on American public opinion. I am sending you a copy of my aide memoire of that interview. I talked a great deal more strongly to him than Briand's proposed telegram. I concur in the inference as to what the Japanese will probably do next. It looks very serious. It looks as though they had made up their mind to drive out the Chinese forces and that will make a very difficult situation. Frankly, it is hard for me to see how the Council can with any dignity go on with their procedure if they do that.

DAWES: What is in our mind to do is this; that we feel just as you do about the intent of Japan and Sze has a new resolution over there which they are going to agree to in the meeting which they are holding now. It is just exactly what I wired to you on December 1, except the last sentence of paragraph five is transferred to the declaration. They will put something about it in the resolution. I have it here and can read it to you.

SECRETARY: I doubt if that is necessary. What I want to know is what the resolution is. I understand

793.94/3095 3/4

Confidential File

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DAWES: The last sentence of paragraph five goes into the declaration. Sze thinks they are going to have a meeting tomorrow afternoon and at that time they will present this resolution and at that time the Japanese may or may not agree and China may or may not, but China will probably agree. Matsudaira will probably agree to the resolution and the declaration.

SECRETARY: Do you think China will?

DAWES: That is the present program. I am going to see Briand at 6:45 tonight and will know exactly what they are going to do then. But about this Chinchow business, so far as the League is concerned they are satisfied to do as you have done and have each Government do so individually through its representatives with Japan, but they want to get this resolution out and probably it will be presented tomorrow even if Japan does not agree but Japan will probably agree. I saw Matsudaira just a short time ago and in fact it was only twenty minutes before you telephoned me so I told him that I would see him at a quarter of six, but I had time to ask him whether or not they were going to agree to that resolution that will be presented tomorrow afternoon and he said we are going to agree to it with reservations. I suppose that is with some unilateral reservation. I didn't have time to get back to the telephone before your call but I am going to see him an hour before I see Briand and I will give you that as soon as I talk with Matsudaira.

SECRETARY: Do you think that the Chinese will agree to it?

DAWES: I think the Chinese will agree to it from what Sze says.

-3-

SECRETARY: Do you think the resolution is likely to pass?

DAWES: I am inclined to think from what Matsudaira says that they will agree to the resolution with some reservations. Then the resolution will go forward as the attitude of the League with the exception of Japan. Then they will go away.

SECRETARY: That is good so far as it goes. Now I think when you see Matsudaira you ought to speak very seriously to him about the effect this will have on American opinion. When you see Matsudaira you ought to speak very seriously as to the effect which a move on Chinchow will have upon American opinion.

DAWES: I will do so.

SECRETARY: It will crystalize American opinion into the belief that the whole effort of Japan from the beginning has been to drive the Chinese out of Manchuria and the effect will be extremely serious. You will see from the telegram which I have sent to you about my talk with the Ambassador yesterday how we feel about it here and that is the serious part of the whole thing. The press has been holding back but has been getting ready to explode just as soon as the Japanese make that move and I can not hold them any more and we shall very soon make our statement - as soon as the resolution is passed. You need not tell him that. But very soon we shall have to come out with a statement of the entire negotiations from our standpoint which will not make any favorable impression toward Japan.

DAWES: Sweetser's report I think is very good. I sent
you

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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you a telegram about the discussions of the Council this afternoon about their position. You ought to get it before night. It is merely what I have said except that it is a little more informative as to how their minds are running. It is the intent of Japan to move forward but the League will get out its position as a sort of basis for the rallying of the moral strength of the work.

SECRETARY: I think it is very important, if possible, to get that resolution passed with Japan's consent because I think Japan is trying to get out of that resolution so far as the neutral commission is concerned and if they give her any chance by delay, she will get out of the whole thing.

DAWES: They are going to bring it to a head tomorrow afternoon. I had hoped that they would do it this afternoon but Sze objected to that because he said he wanted to hear something more from his government. I think he has enough discretion to really join in with the thing and the Japanese have committed themselves so far to to it now that it would be hard for them to withdraw but anything could happen over night. The resolution will be presented tomorrow as the attitude of all the members with the exception of Japan and China and that would have some general effect. That other statement which they propose to put in by the twelve is a statement of their position with Briand's statement and everything and China probably will acquiesce. That would leave Japan alone but it is a good thing to cause public opinion to focus on the situation. With the twelve, of course, it becomes
 the

-5-

the attitude of the League with the exception of Japan.

SECRETARY: If they fail to have a vote on it or fail to get a unanimous vote, I hope they will make clear that the original proposition for a neutral commission came from Japan.

DAWES: Yes, that is a good point.

SECRETARY: I would like that made very clear.

DAWES: I will speak to Briand about it.

SECRETARY: In case she finally goes back on it, that ought to be made clear.

DAWES: Exactly.

SECRETARY: The thing that you should make clear to Matsudaira is that this march on Chinchow will be regarded as crystalizing the whole issue against Japan. It will make clear the whole issue in a way it has not been made clear thus far.

DAWES: Another thing. Do you want me to speak to Briand tonight about that naval business. You sent me a short telegram saying that when I said goodbye to him to speak to him about the Italian naval matter. Shall I speak to him about that tonight.

SECRETARY: Won't you see him again? I don't want that. Frankly that is a matter that is not germane to this. I want you to use your own judgment about that.

DAWES: My judgment is not to do it. I talked with Massigli last night and asked him how he was getting along with the Italian matter and he was quite evasive about it. They will decide something within a week. I had a telegram from Margett, the observer at Chinchow, sending me information. Following the ordinary custom of limiting what Margett gave us of the objections of Japan, I gave it to the Council over there to go along
with

-6-

with the reports of their observer with information which was on the status quo. He called me up and I told him that I could not make that public as coming from the United States and then Drummond wanted to know whether you could not give out that information in Washington, that is, the essence of the reports of your military observers, because he thinks that is something that will exert pressure both upon China and Japan to come into the resolution. He wants the reports of the observers around Chinchow without expressions of opinion as to what Japan intends to do.

SECRETARY: I will consider that and very possibly.....

DAWES: I don't want to print it here because of the reservations I made.

SECRETARY: The whole question is that I do not want to make any side issue with Japan until we get them right on the whole thing. I will do the best I can with that but I will reserve judgment on whether I will do it before the meeting of the Council. I do not want to break in on that.

DAWES: That is your telegram No. 632. It has nothing to do with the Council here but just information as to what your military observer has said.

SECRETARY: Sooner or later I will make that public but I do not want to do it when it will make Japan angry enough not to vote for the resolution.

DAWES: I see, all right. I will keep you advised. You will find these telegrams that come to you today all informative. I suppose you keep up with them.

SECRETARY: I keep up with them personally. You will find the telegram about my talk with Debuchi yesterday

also

-7-

also informative.

DAWES: What time will that arrive here?

SECRETARY: It has gone now. It went about half an hour ago. You will get it tonight.

DAWES: I can tell Briand the subject of it.

SECRETARY: The main thing is that I want you to get the substance of it to Matsudaira too.

DAWES: Yes, I will. I will do that.

SECRETARY: It is a very serious situation with public opinion. Public opinion is tending so strong against Japan that this will crystalize it.

DAWES: All right, Mr. Secretary, that is all.

SECRETARY: Yes, goodbye.

S: VGN HHR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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
GREEN

Paris

FROM

Dated December 7, 1931

Rec'd 11:50 p. m.




Secretary of State,
Washington.

856, December 8, 1 a. m.

FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES.

Following is report from Sweetser:



"Ito reported to the Drafting Committee at a late meeting tonight the reply he had received from Tokyo on the two outstanding points.

First. Tokyo accepted his redraft on the last paragraph of Article 5 linking the Commission with evacuation. The various members of the committee however maintained the objections previously reported to this formula and continued their preference for a full statement in the declaration. Colban especially stressed that it would be impossible to send the Commission and begin by saying that it could not do the main thing in mind unless especially authorized. Cecil felt the best solution was to put the Council's original phraseology into the declaration.

Second.

F/DEW

793.94/3096

FILED

DEC 14 1931

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no 72
793.94/3096

- 2 - No. 856 from Paris

Second. Regarding police measures Ito pointed out that Japan had first wanted this provision in the resolution and then in the declaration but was finally willing to accept the third alternative of a unilateral declaration by itself provided however there were no speeches in opposition made by the other members of the Council. Cecil pointed out that that would depend upon what the

(END SECTION ONE)

SHAW

JS

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

cib

FROM GREEN

Paris

Dated December 8, 1931

Recd 12:27 a.m.

Secretary of State
Washington.

856, December 8, 1 a.m. (SECTION TWO)

Japanese delegates said, whereupon Ito presented the following draft:

'With regard to paragraph two of the draft resolution now before the Council, I am happy to accept it on behalf of the Japanese Government, on the understanding that this paragraph is not intended to preclude the Japanese forces from taking such action as may be rendered necessary to provide directly for the protection of the lives and property of Japanese subjects against the activities of bandits and lawless elements rampant in various parts of Manchuria. Such action is admittedly an exceptional measure called for by the special situation prevailing in Manchuria, and its necessity will naturally be obviated when normal conditions shall have been restored in that region.

The Committee felt it would be impossible for the members of the Council not to be free to comment on this
text

cib

-2- #856, from Paris, December 8, lam.,
(SECTION TWO)

text. Cecil felt Japan might ask that there should not be an outcry against it but he did not think she could object if they explained their understanding of it.

Drummond pointed out that the Japanese statement if passed without comment, would mean that the other members of the Council accepted it. Madariaga added that, if the Japanese made a declaration of this nature, he would have to comment at length. Cecil concluded that it would be impossible to ask twelve reasonable men not to make some sort of statement.

With this opposition, the committee returned
(END SECTION TWO)

SHAW

JS

MET TELEGRAM RECEIVED GREEN

Paris

FROM Dated December 8, 1931

Rec'd 1:03 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington

856, December 8, 1 a.m. (SECTION THREE)

to the idea of including this matter in the declaration.
The following text was presented and is now under discussion.

'The Japanese Government has called the Council's attention to the situation which exists in Manchuria. Following recent events banditry has increased in certain districts and constitutes a danger to the lives and property of the inhabitants. Under these circumstances the Japanese Government considers that its troops must be able to repel the incursions of bandits not only as they have done in the past when these incursions took place in the zone of the South Manchurian Railway but also in the event that attacks are made against localities outside the said zone temporarily occupied by Japanese troops. It goes without saying that as soon as these localities shall
cease

MET

2-#856 from Paris, December 8, 1931 (SECTION THREE)

cease to be so occupied, the responsibility for their defense against bandits shall cease to be incumbent upon Japanese troops and shall once more be assumed by the Chinese authorities'.

Ito also presented certain further changes which the Committee did not feel able to accept. Most important was that to have the phrase 'as speedily as possible' stricken out from the first paragraph of the declaration relating to the withdrawal of the Japanese troops. This phrase, he said, was already included in the resolution and was hence unnecessary. Cecil, however, felt it impossible to agree to this; the Council had been asked to retreat step by step but could not go this far. Madariaga felt the suggestion would be very ^{suspect} ~~that~~ by the other party; Leger felt that Ito's objection made the phrase all the more necessary. The Committee therefore refused to accede to the suggestion".

HPD

End of Message

SHAW

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

Peiping via N. R.

FROM Dated December 8, 1931

Rec'd 7:08 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington..

1057, December 8, 3 p. m.

Bess, Peiping correspondent of the United Press who
has just returned from a month's observation at Mukden,
is of the opinion that the Japanese military are
determined either by force or otherwise to clear the
area between Mukden and Shanhaikwan both of Chinese
troops and of the remnants of Marshal Chang's civil
Government at Chinchow; also that they desire to
undermine the position of Chang south of the Wall and
see a more amenable government come into power in this
area. He states that the recent disturbances at Tientsin w
were highly exaggerated by the Japanese military at
Mukden with a view to justifying the advance on Chinchow
which was subsequently so abruptly abandoned.

Two. Bess is an experienced correspondent having
been here several years. I do ^{not} regard him however as
altogether unbiased in his views.

For the Minister

PERKINS



F/DEW

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FILED

DEC 16 1931

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sec. 12/13/31

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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
PLAIN

FROM Peiping via N. R.

Dated December 8, 1931

Rec'd 6:35 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.



1054, December eighth, twelve noon.

Following from United Press report dated Chinchow
December sixth:

"The Commander of the Chinese troops here General Yung Chin today told a group of American and British correspondents that he expects at any time now a renewal of the Japanese attack upon the remnants of the Manchuria army and on Chinchow the last base for Marshal Chang Hsueh Liang's forces in Manchuria.

General Yung denied emphatically the reports from Japanese headquarters in Mukden of Chinese troops concentrations north of Chinchow. He expressed the view that such reports are indications of a renewal of hostilities by the Japanese.

General Yung admitted that there are about thirty thousand Chinese troops in the region between Shanhaikuan and Tahushan concentrated chiefly around Chinchow adding that they were remaining purely for defensive purposes.

The Chinese

F/CEW

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FILED

DEC 11 1931

REP

2- #1054, from Peiping, Dec. 8, noon.

3. The Chinese Commander confirmed the breakdown of the
proposal for a neutral zone between Chinchow and
Shanhaikuan and said he regards such a scheme as
practicable."

For the Minister

PERKINS

JS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/3099

CANCELLED.

SEE 123 H 194

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated December 8, 1931

Rec'd 6:35 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

1053, December 8, 11 a.m.

Legation's 1042, December 4, 11 a.m.

Editorial in the LEADER was reported to the

Department in order to indicate extreme desire of the

Chinese to embroil third parties in present issues.

To achieve this objective there is in some quarters

a willingness to permit temporary impairment of

Chinese sovereignty as indicated in the suggestion

for a certain degree of international police control

at Tientsin. Reports indicate, however, violent

opposition on the part of students to measures of

/ this character.

For the Minister,

PERKINS.

KLP-HPD

F/DEW

793.94/3100

DEC 12 1931

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RECEIVED

DEC 5 - 1931

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

December 4, 1931

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
DEC 7 1931

Department of State

The Secretary:


If it is true that Baron Shidehara has made the point that the Government of Chang Hsues Liang must be removed from Chinchow, which is the only place where he still has any authority, we must remember that this is not solely an attempt to get rid of any real Chinese control, but is an expression of Japanese unwillingness any longer to deal with the young Marshal, who has never properly controlled the situation. Their claim is, of course, that all these troubles were brought on through incitement to disorder on the part of Chang Hsues Liang. This makes me wonder whether the suggestion made by the President two or three weeks ago might not well be revived, that Nanking send to Manchuria its own Governor General. It would be very difficult for Japan to refuse to recognize him and it would immediately assert the authority of Nanking in Manchuria. Of course, Nanking could not nominate for that position the young Marshal and might not be willing to nominate

DEC 8 1931
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE UNDERSECRETARY

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any one else for fear of internal political trouble, but such a move would certainly put things up to the Japanese in a manner which they would find it exceedingly difficult to sidestep. It might be worth while, therefore, to make this suggestion rather definitely to General Dawes if we find that the reported statement of Baron Shidehara is correct.

W. R. Castle, Jr.



U WRC/AB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

FROM

GRAY

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Peiping via N.R.

Dated December 8, 1931

Rec'd 6:35 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

1055, December 8, 1 p.m.

The following telegram has been received from
Colonel McIlroy at Chinchow:

"December 7, 5 p.m.

Japanese military reports claim recent reported move-
ments Chinese regular troops wholly incorrect; American
and other attaches from Peiping are continually checking
units and I immediately upon arrival personally checked
and counted men of many units. Chinchow and vicinity
absolutely quiet. I am going Tientsin tomorrow".

Repeated to Department, Tokyo and Minister.

(KLP)

For the Minister, PERKINS.

F/DEW

793.94/3102

FILED

DEC 16 1931

793.94
121.5493

no correction made

MET

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone.

Dated December 15, 1931

FROM

Rec'd 9:45 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1081, December 15, 7 p.m.

Legation's 1077, December 13, 4 p.m.

One. General opinion of military observers at

Chinchow is that Japan will find means to compel the
withdrawal of Chinese troops within the Wall and the
dissolution of the Chinese Government at Chinchow.

Colonel McIlroy who recently left here for Tokio is
of the opinion that nothing short of very considerable
pressure will restrain the Japanese military from this
action. The strengthening of the Japanese garrison at
Shanhaikwan would indicate an intention to render the
Chinese position at Chinchow untenable.

Two. While it is possible that those on the ground
may the more easily come to share the apprehension of the
Chinese with whom they are in contact it is nevertheless
incontentable that the existence of any "legitimate"
Chinese authority north of the Wall is a great obstacle

to the



F/DEW

793.94/3103

FILED

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793.9411
893.01

MET

2-#1081 from Peiping, December 15,
1931.

to the formation at Mukden of a new Manchurian Government
acceptable to Japan.

Three. Observers at Chinchow report that Chinese
troops are making no offensive movements, that their
commanding General states he has no orders as to any
course to follow but that he will resist if attacked and
that the soldiers themselves have all they can do to
keep warm and alive.

For the Minister,

PERKINS

WSB

MP

(CORRECTED COPY)
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

FROM

Peiping via N.R.

Dated December 8, 1931

Rec'd 9:20 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1056, December 8, 2 p.m.

Following from Margetts, Chinchow:

"December 7, 6 p.m.

Statement of observers, including American
Military Attache from Tokio. Have spent the entire
day personally checking units of 19th, 20th brigades
and 13th artillery regiment reported by Mukden
Japanese headquarters to be Faku. In some in-
stances we counted the soldiers finding absolutely
no discrepancies. Entire 20th brigade is in imme-
diate vicinity Chinchow. Referring to repair rail-
way Yingkow, statement of same was made by Chinese
laborers under the supervision two British railway
engineers and during presence one of our observers
who returned late yesterday afternoon."

Repeated to Department and Nanking.

For the Minister

PERKINS

KLP-CSB



FW 793.94/3103

DEC 14 1931

FILED

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

GRAY

corrected
COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

FROM

Peiping via N.B.

Dated December 8, 1931

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railway Yingkow, statement of same was made by Chinese
laborers under the supervision two British railway
engineers and during presence one of our observers who
returned late yesterday afternoon".

Repeated to Department and Nanking.

KLP-CSB

For the Minister
PERKINS

F/DEW

793.94/3103

FILED

DEC 16 1931

793.94
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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR

Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Washington,

December 8, 1931.

AMEMBASSY,

PARIS (France) DEC 8 31

FOR AMBASSADOR DAWES.

793.94/3103 Military Attaché McIlroy telegraphs, under date
December 7, 3102 from Chinchow, that Japanese military reports
claiming recent reported movements of Chinese regular troops
are wholly incorrect; that American and other Attachés from
Peiping are continually checking units and that he immediately
upon arrival at Chinchow personally checked and counted men
of many units; that Chinchow and vicinity are absolutely
quiet; and that he is going to Tientsin on December 8.

793.94/3103 Military Attaché Margetts telegraphs, under date
December 7, 3103 from Chinchow, a statement of the observers,
including the American Military Attaché from Tokyo, to the
effect that the observers spent all of December 7 personally
checking units of the 19th and 20th brigades and the 13th
artillery regiment reported by Japanese headquarters at Mukden
to be ^{27 Gm} ~~Fake~~; that in some instances the observers counted the
soldiers finding absolutely no discrepancies; and that the
entire 20th brigade is ^{in fact} in the immediate vicinity of Chinchow.

Enciphered by FE:MMH:REK

Sent by operator M.,

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138



REC'D

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Peiping, November 12, 1931.

No. 1260

DEC 7 31



F/DEW

793.94/3104

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to the Legation's No. 793.94/2582 900 of November 10th and to previous telegrams concerning the transmittal to the Department by the New York office of the International News Service of a message sent to the United States on October 30th by the Mukden correspondent of the Service in reference to the seizure of the Mukden wireless stations of the Chinese Government by the Japanese military authorities. It is assumed that the message as received has been duly transmitted to the Department by the New York office of the News Service, and the enclosed copy is transmitted to insure the receipt by the Department of the full text of the message as sent.

Respectfully yours,

For the Minister:

C. Van H. Engel
C. Van H. Engel
First Secretary of Legation

DEC 15 1931

Enclosure:

1. Copy of telegram, as stated.

340
CJS-SC

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1260

Copy of Telegram sent by Mukden Correspondent
of International News Service.


Mukden, October 30th. Japanese soldiers this morning were to be seen digging two military trenches in front of the large American-built wireless receiving station outside Mukden during a tour made by Internews of all Mukden's wireless stations. Barbed wire fencing has been completed during the last few days around the station while the Japanese flag flies over the building. Mukden's overseas as well as the Asiatic wireless are crippled for at least a half year and probably a year according to Willi Friese, German radio expert and engineer in chief in charge of the National Government Radio Administration in the Three Eastern Provinces. Many tubes are missing from both the receiving and transmitting Radio Corporation of America stations while repairs are also necessary thereby preventing the reopening of service between America and Europe. It is possible that after eight days hurried work messages might be sent for two or three hours daily over one short wave. At least three short wave lengths are needed in winter and two in summer. It will be necessary to work many months to restore this. Japanese soldiers were seen sleeping inside the Radio Corporation of America transmitting station. The motor car of Internews was followed during the entire trip a short distance behind by a Japanese car keeping track of all movements. When Internews circled the same block, the following motor car did likewise. The greatest loss has been suffered by the transmitting station constructed by the Germans in 1924 which is close to the arsenal. This plant was used to communicate with Harbin, Shanghai and elsewhere in the Far East. It is thoroughly wrecked, furniture smashed. An expert estimates that it will take at least a year's work and \$100,000 gold for repairs. Retua stations losses are only \$25,000 gold. Half of the Overseas Wireless equipment, which is German built, is unpaid for and vigorous protest against the occupation has been made to the Japanese. As a result the Japanese moved out but stayed in the adjoining American-built wireless station. The Japanese radio corps is working inside the Radio Corporation of America's station endeavoring to find means to restore the service under the so-called reorganization. The Japanese had furnished the former South Manchuria Railway chief operator and formed a new communications bureau as part of the so-called independent government. A fifteen year fight preceded the opening of the Overseas Wireless. The Japanese contended that they had monopoly rights for all China proper and Manchuria. The German Overseas opened five years ago amid a strenuous protest from the Japanese ambassador at Berlin while the Americans were prevented from constructing the station under contract with the Chinese government until recently. The work was finished only two months prior to the Manchurian occupation which resulted in the Japanese seizure.



IN
LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Peking, November 11, 1931.

No. 1262

DEC-7 31



793.94

F/DEW

793.94/3105

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

Referring to previous communications concerning the Sino-Japanese conflict in Manchuria, I have the honor to enclose a copy of a printed circular prepared by the "Anti-Japanese and National Salvation Association of Chinese Students returned from Japan", and entitled "AN APPEAL TO THE CIVILIZED NATIONS".

This document gives a brief summary of Sino-Japanese relations during the past thirty years, as well as a more detailed account of the various incidents leading up to the present crisis in Manchuria. It closes

by

DEC 14 1931

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-2-

by observing that:

"Japanese militarism is a great menace to the whole world. Her outrage in Manchuria is, therefore, not only a vital question to China but the most important issue to all nations. It is the obligation of all civilized nations to suppress the imperialistic ambition of Japan and to overthrow her militarism in order to maintain the peace and justice of the world."

Respectfully yours,

For the Minister:


C. Van H. Engert
First Secretary of Legation.

✓
Enclosure:

1/ as noted above

800.

LHE:MM

1
Enclosure No. 1262
Despatch No. 1262

COPY

AN APPEAL TO THE CIVILIZED NATIONS

By the Anti-Japanese and National
Salvation Association of Chinese
Students returned from Japan.

In regard to Japan's imperialistic outrage in Manchuria, we appreciate the sympathy of the civilized nations towards China's non-resistance and forbearance. Japanese atrocities are too numerous to be mentioned in detail. Her action in short is a violation of international law, of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and of the Nine-Power Treaty of Washington and the Kellogg Pact. It is evident that the Japanese attack on Manchuria was unprovoked although it was premeditated. History of Sino-Japanese relations during the last thirty years is a record of Japan's attempt to conquer China. Alienation of Liaotung Peninsula, besides Formosa, from China to Japan after the Sino-Japanese War, which the latter reluctantly returned later to the owner through the intervention of Russia, France and Germany; the Russo-Japanese War, resulting in the leasing of Port-Arthur and Dairen to Japan; the Twenty-One Demands of 1915; the Tsinan Affair of 1928--all these are some of the most unforgettable landmarks in Japan's endeavor to realize her ambition of imperialism. Taking unfair advantage of the distresses of China, this year, when she is engaged in a hard struggle with the Communists and when two-thirds of her population are afflicted by one of the greatest floods ever seen in the world, Japan has manufactured excuses one after another for launching an attack on China. Firstly, the Wanpaoshan affair where certain Chinese land interests

interests were vitally injured by the resident Koreans. Secondly, a wholesale massacre of Chinese residents in Korea by Korean mobs. Japan was behind all the scenes and tried to incite the Chinese to action, but the latter faced the situation well enough in order to avoid the increase of tension.

Having failed in these attempts and making no atonement for the wrong done to China, Japanese militarists took the advantage of the so-called Nakamura case to attain their ambition. Without resorting to diplomatic reclamation and without waiting for the completion of the investigation by the Chinese Provincial Government, the Japanese troops embarked an attack on Peitaying, south of Mukden, on September 18. The ostensible reason for their action was the alleged destruction of a portion of the South Manchuria Railway by Chinese soldiers, a fabrication which contains not a grain of truth, as the railway having always been guarded by Japanese soldiers and under strict Japanese police and administrative control, no Chinese has ever been allowed to traverse any portion of the line. Ever since the Nakamura case, the Japanese military authorities had openly been threatening to take drastic measure, and Japanese troops had daily been making hostile demonstrations, while Chinese soldiers were ordered to avoid any possible contact with them. It is unimaginable that Chinese soldiers should have challenged the Japanese troops without any preparation before and after the incident. That the Japanese troops occupied so vast an area within such a short interval, without meeting any resistance by Chinese is another proof that

Chinese

Chinese soldiers have not, from the very beginning to the end, taken any hostile action. Even Professor Yokota of the Imperial University of Tokio pointed out that even if it were for self-defence, the Japanese troops should not have trespassed Peitaying where the incident was supposed to be broken out, and that the military authorities should not have sent the troops from Korea into Manchuria to occupy so many cities and districts. Japan's refusal to the proposal of sending a commission of investigation by the League of Nations shows that she was afraid of exposing the real state of conditions.

The League advised Japan to withdraw her troops by October 14 and recover the state of conditions previous to September 18 and had, for sure, Japan's pledge. But the Japanese militarists have been aggravating the situation by making further disturbances in the occupied territory, by bombarding Chin-chu where our Lioining Provincial Government was reestablished after having been removed from Mukden with the open declaration of wiping out the existence of General Chang Hsiuliang's influence, by sending, on large scale, navy force to the coasts and rivers of China, and landing naval brigades on the sea-ports of China. Furthermore, after the outrage they have been constructing themselves the Kirin-Hueining line, one of the several railroads in Manchuria that had long been laid stress by Japan, as it would be the most strategical to her from the point of view of political and economical invasion, and China had been trying, naturally, to prevent her from building. Another remarkable intrigue

of Japanese

militarists is to pull the wires of the movement of independence of Manchuria from China Proper, which had been the sweetest dream cherished by Japan.

Now that Japan, defying the decision of the League of Nations, has broken her pledge by showing no sign of withdrawing her troops and, further, opposed the participation of the United States of America in the Council. This proves that she disregards the friendly efforts of the powers to adjust the affair for the sake of international peace and justice and is ready to be the enemy in common of the civilized nations. The Japanese propaganda contends that Japan's action is to demand China to observe the Japanese vested rights in Manchuria and to stop anti-Japanese campaign. But we invite the attention of the civilized nations that the so-called vested rights mean nothing but the revival of the 21 Demands or the violation of the Nine-Power Treaty of Washington, while the anti-Japanese sentiments in China has only been aroused time and again, by the Japanese aggression, and the boycott of Japanese goods on a large scale at present has been particularly due to the recent outrage. The Japanese propaganda contends further that the stationing of their troops are for the protection of lives and property of Japanese residents who, however, have been well taken care of by Chinese authorities during and after the Japanese outrages. The alleged injuries and antagonism against Japanese residents are nothing but fabrications of Japanese militarists and news agencies.

While Japan claims that she is entitled to maintain fifteen soldiers per kilometre on the South Manchuria Rail-

way

way or a total of 16,500, the actual number of the troops in Manchuria at the present moment has far exceeded that number. In fact the claim itself has no foundation at all. The Additional Articles to the Treaty of Portsmouth of 1905 between Russia and Japan, upon which the Japanese apparently base the assertion of their right to maintain troops in Manchuria have never been recognized by China, and the Additional Agreement of Peking between China and Japan, 1905, provided expressly for the withdrawal of Japanese railway guards in the event of Russia withdrawing her railway guards. It is well known that the Russian guards have for years been withdrawn and that the Chinese Eastern Railway is now completely under Chinese police control. The continuance of Japanese troops in Manchuria is therefore without any legal basis or treaty sanction, and the justification for the increase of troops on this score is a mere sham to cover up the unpardonable chauvinism of the Japanese Government.

The Japanese constitution is unique in the world, particularly in the point that the military power, independent from political and administrative influence, surpasses everything. Such a system or rather such a power is much more dangerous than German militarism prior to the World War and is, therefore, an unspeakable menace to the whole world. The imperialistic policy laid down by the late Emperor Meiji and worshipped by Japanese was firstly to rob Formosa from China, secondly to annex Korea, thirdly to occupy Manchuria in order to conquer China at large and reign supreme in the Far East. In a

secret

memo to the throne, Ex-Premier Tanaka stated four years ago that he and his colleagues were to be blamed being unable to fulfill the third step designed by the late Emperor and that they would try at any cost to carry on the program, adding that China must be conquered in order to conquer the world, and American influence should be chased out from Asia in order to suppress China. Commander Honjo who is responsible for the outrage, declared openly after the occupation of Manchuria that Japan would conquer the world after exploiting Manchuria for some time.


Thus Japanese militarism is a great menace to the whole world. Her outrage in Manchuria is, therefore, not only a vital question to China but the most important issue to all nations. It is the obligation of all the civilized nations to suppress the imperialistic ambition of Japan and to overthrow her militarism in order to maintain the peace and justice of the world

In a word, Japan's action in Manchuria is in direct contravention of the established principles of international law and justice and has set at naught the solemn engagements entered into by the nations of the world. It is a wilful attempt to disturb world peace and to revive the reign of brutal force. Nay, it is a severe blow to civilization and humanity, as one hundred millions of the world's population are cut off from the succor of Manchuria, upon whose surplus grain the victims of the flood rely for their relief. If the law of nations is to retain its binding force, if the sanctity of treaties is to remain intact, if peace of the world is to be preserved, and if civilization and

humanity

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

humanity are to be saved, the nations of the world should
at once call a halt to the savagery and aggression of imper-
ialist Japan!



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

December 10, 1951.

Ottawa, December 4, No. 605. Enclosing copies of circulars entitled "Statement of the Fourth National Congress of the Kuomintang Party concerning Japanese Aggressions in China" and "Resolution of the Fourth Kuomintang Congress, Nanking, November 21, 1951"

Mr. Miller,

These declarations may be sent to us from the Legation or the Consulate General at Nanking, with some comment.


These documents denounce Japan's actions, appeal to the world under treaties and international law, and pledge support to the National Government at any sacrifice. They contain many generalities and no new facts. As a formal statement of the stand of the Congress, they are of interest; but as far as I can see they do not throw new light on this ~~attitude~~ the Chinese attitude.

Shall I make a summary?

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PM RECD





LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Ottawa, Canada.

December 4, 1931.

No. 605. DEC - 7 31



793.94

793.94/3106

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

With reference to the Legation's despatch No. 572 of November 6, 1931, transmitting copies of a circular, relative to the Manchurian situation, which was distributed through the mails by the Chinese Consulate General at Ottawa, I have the honor to enclose herewith copies of circulars entitled "Statement of the Fourth National Congress of the Kuomintang Party concerning Japanese Aggressions in China" and "Resolution of the Fourth Kuomintang Congress, Nanking, November 21, 1931". These circulars were addressed to me personally in an envelope bearing

1/

JAN 11 1932

FILED

- 2 -

bearing the seal of the Chinese Consulate General
here.

Respectfully yours,


Hanford MacNider.

Enclosure:

1. Circulars from
Chinese Consulate
General.

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JCHB/MEH

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch
No. 605 of December 4, 1931,
from the Legation at Ottawa.

STATEMENT OF THE FOURTH NATIONAL CONGRESS
OF THE KUOMINTANG PARTY
CONCERNING JAPANESE AGGRESSIONS IN CHINA.

The Fourth National Congress of the Kuomintang Party of China views the grave situation produced by acts of deliberate aggression on the part of Japan not only as a matter affecting her national existence but also as of great concern to the safety of humanity. Japan's conduct is clearly a violation of international law, the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Anti-War Pact and the Nine-Power Treaty and an infringement of Chinese territorial sovereignty and administrative integrity as well as constitutes a menace to the peace of nations. The Congress therefore decides to issue the following statement as an expression of the determined will of the whole Kuomintang as well as of the entire Chinese nation:

On the eighteenth of September Japanese troops attacked and took Shenyang (Mukden) and successively occupied nearly all the other important cities in the Liaoning and Kirin provinces.

At the very beginning China submitted this extraordinary case of military aggression to the League of Nations in the belief that the instruments designed for the preservation of international peace would prove effective and that justice in the end would prevail.

On September thirtieth the Council of the League of Nations unanimously passed a resolution calling upon Japan to withdraw her troops, such withdrawal to be completed before the fourteenth of October when the League Council was to meet again in case of necessity. This Resolution was officially accepted by the Japanese Delegate in a formal declaration. While the Chinese Government exerted its utmost during this period to carry out the Council Resolution by scrupulously adhering to a policy of peace and by giving full protection to Japanese nationals so that no unfortunate incidents would happen to them, Japanese troops on the other hand not only did not show any sign of withdrawal, but on the contrary bombarded Chinchow by air, wrecked part of the Peking-Mukden Railway extended their military occupation and threatened Chinese coasts and inland waters with a large number of vessels. In order to cope with this unusually grave situation the Council called the emergency meeting of October thirteenth. On October twenty-fourth a Resolution was adopted by all the members of the Council except Japan providing in unmistakable terms that Japan should complete withdrawal of her troops before November sixteenth and that China should take over all territory unlawfully occupied by Japanese troops. The Chinese Government respects the Resolution. Conformably with its provisions China has appointed a committee to take over areas to be evacuated and has notified the Japanese Government of this appointment. Meanwhile she is making every effort to perform all her other obligations arising from the Resolution. Besides neutral observers are understood to have already been selected by the powers.

Japan, However, again remains oblivious to the Council Resolution and perpetuates all kinds of acts of destruction and obstruction with the result that the peace which China and the powers are exerting their concerted efforts to

promote

- 2 -

promote cannot be fully realized. Mr. Briand, President of the League Council, has however called her attention to the fact that while the Council Resolution of October 24th had all the moral effect that of September 30th had a fully executory force and that Japan, in agreeing to the Resolution of September 30th, had not stated that the Treaty Rights of Japan in Manchuria were in any way connected with the safety of lives and property of Japanese nationals. He called upon Japan to fulfill its undertaking "solemnly contracted under the Resolution of September 30th and repeatedly confirmed by declarations during the last session of the Council" and to continue as rapidly as possible the withdrawal of her troops to the Railway Zone.

Japan, however, has not only failed to withdraw her troops, but has constantly increased their number. They have occupied Taonan and other places, repeatedly attempted to invade Tungliao and attacked Chinese troops in the Nonni Bridge District with the declared intention of seizing Tsitsihar, Capital of the Heilungkiang Province.

They have made use of bandits and monarchists in the Liaoning and Kirin provinces for organizing unlawful administrations and furthering so-called independence movements, thereby complicating the task of China when she comes to take over occupied territories. Moreover Japanese military authorities by appropriating salt revenue in Yickow and Changchun directly interfered with the fiscal system of China and indirectly prejudices China's ability to meet her international financial obligations.

On November 8th and succeeding days organized mobs were supplied with arms in the Japanese concession at Tientsin and permitted to sally forth from the concession to attack police stations and other Chinese administrative offices. A great number of gun shots were fired from Japanese barracks into the territory under Chinese control. These are facts known to all foreign nationals in Tientsin and can be proven by exploded shells, seized arms and other evidences.

Such acts of undeclared war are singularly vicious and seldom witnessed elsewhere in the world. They not only violate international law and international treaties but constitute in particular a direct challenge to civilization and humanity as well as to the sanctity of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Treaty for the Renunciation of War and the Nine Power Treaty signed at Washington in 1922.

Under these circumstances Japan, putting forward the five so-called fundamental principles, insists that China should agree to enter into direct negotiations with Japan before the withdrawal of troops is effected. It is evident that Japan desires through pressure of military occupation to coerce China into accepting her demands. Moreover as regards the so-called Treaty Rights which Japan has been advocating before the League of Nations with specious arguments, the People of China in the light of Japan's conduct since September 18th cannot but entertain profound doubts on the following five points:

1. - Does the Covenant of the League of Nations possess any valid force? Should Japan be allowed to defy openly the Resolution of the Council in disregard

to

- 3 -

to the provisions of the Covenant? Should not the League by virtue of Articles 15 and 16 of the Covenant check effectively the acts of Japan?

2. - Is the Treaty for Renunciation of War valid at all? Why do the Japanese troops publicly attack the Chinese troops without cause and why is Japan with impunity permitted by the flagrant use of force to prosecute her national policy of aggression? Should not steps be taken immediately to rectify her course?

3. - Is the Nine Power Treaty still valid? Why is Japan allowed to impair the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China and should not concerted action be taken to remedy the situation?

4. - Are not the privileges of concessions within Chinese territory enjoyed by Japan in China by virtue of treaties limited to peaceful trade and residence of her nationals? Is Japan permitted by treaties to abuse the position of her concession at Tientsin by making it a base of operations for intriguing against the safety of China?

5. - Does not Japan's seizure of Chinese salt revenue upon which many of China's foreign loans are secured at once constitute a direct impairment of the financial system of the Chinese Government and a serious impediment to China's meeting her financial obligations to other powers?

In thus demanding of China unilateral observance of Japan's so-called Treaty Rights and herself disregarding treaties as witnessed in her repeated acts of breach, Japan must bear responsibility for disturbing the international peace and undermining the sanctity of treaties. Now that the Council of the League of Nations is going to meet again the Congress in view of the above-mentioned questions earnestly invites the attention of the members of the League of Nations and the signatory powers of the Anti-War Pact and of the Washington Nine Power Treaty to the fact that Japan has since September eighteenth long looked upon these international agreements as mere scraps of paper.

She has actually violated the territorial sovereignty of China and resorted to the use of force without any justification. The Congress holds resolutely that the National Government of China shall employ every resource of the nation to preserve China's territory and sovereignty intact. At the same time the Congress fervently hopes and is confident that at its forthcoming meeting the Council of the League of Nations will act upon the provisions of Article fifteen and sixteen of the League Covenant so as to put an effective and immediate stop to Japan's aggressive activities and that all the signatory powers of the Anti-War Pact and the Nine Power Treaty of Washington will fulfill their solemn obligations arising therefrom so that the peace of the world in general and that in the Far East in particular will not be trampled down by the militarists and that the dignity of the League of Nations as well as the sanctity of international treaties will not be violated.

Japan has for nearly two months occupied the three Northeastern Provinces by military force. China's patience has already been taxed to the limit. Should Japan persist in defying the just and righteous opinion of the League

of

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

of Nations and should the League of Nations as well as the various friendly powers find themselves unable to carry out their sacred treaty obligations, the Chinese People, in order to maintain the sanctity of the League Covenant, the Anti-War Pact and the Nine Power Treaty of Washington, in defence of its national existence, will do their best to perform their duty whatever sacrifice may be involved. For self-defence is not only a natural right of every independent nation but also a legal right to which China is entitled under international law. The Congress therefore feels in duty bound to lead the whole nation forward to struggle to the very last, in order to safeguard the cause of Justice rather than yield to force, and thus to fulfill our sacred duty as a signatory power of the above mentioned international treaties.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch
No. 605 of December 4, 1931,
from the Legation at Ottawa.

RESOLUTION OF THE FOURTH KUOMINTANG CONGRESS

Nanking, November 21, 1931.

WHEREAS since the military occupation of the various places in the North-Eastern Provinces by Japan, the League of Nations twice adopted resolutions calling for the complete withdrawal of Japanese troops within a stipulated period and under the observation of neutral representatives;

WHEREAS while China has fulfilled every obligation laid down in these resolutions, Japan not only defied world opinion, but even carried further her policy of military aggression, with the result that Chinese troops in Heilungkiang had to resort to measures of self-defence causing the situation more and more critical;

WHEREAS just at a time when the Council of the League was in full session, Japanese troops forcibly occupied Tsitsihar, Capital of the Heilungkiang Province, thus again widening the area of the Japanese invasion;

WHEREAS the recognized authority for the safeguarding of justice is in danger of yielding to sheer force, while all the agreements designed for the preservation of peace among civilized Nations seem destined to complete failure;

In the interests of our national preservation and for the maintenance of international justice and peace, the representatives of the Kuomintang in Congress assembled do therefore solemnly resolve:

1. That the act of self-defence on the part of General Ma Chan-Shan, Chairman of the Heilungkiang Province, against the unlawful advance of Japanese troops is an act not only for the defending of Chinese territory in face of foreign aggression, but also upholding international justice and peace and perpetuating at a sacrifice the Covenant of the League, the Anti-War Pact, the Nine Power Treaty and all the other international agreements and this Congress calls the serious attention of all the members of the League and the signatories of the Anti-War Pact and the Nine Power Treaty to the sacred obligations they have assumed under these instruments;

2. That the National Government, in carrying out all its policies, domestic as well as foreign, and all the measures of expediency in respect to the forcible occupation of the North-Eastern Provinces by Japan, has faithfully performed its duty to the Chinese Nation and is fully empowered, in all matters pertaining to the protection of the country and the safe-guarding of its territorial integrity, to adopt whatever necessary measures for

lawful defence, while this Congress pledges at whatever sacrifice its full support to the National Government.



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



LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Peking, November 12, 1931

No. 1255

DEC 7 31



CONFIDENTIAL

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

1/ I have the honor to enclose copies of a memorandum of a conversation the Minister had at Nanking on October 28, 1931 with Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo concerning the situation in Manchuria.

The Department will note that, among other things, Dr. Koo referred to the so-called "cooling down" of the Council of the League of Nations in the matter of mediation in the Sino-Japanese controversy, thought to have been occasioned by a communication received from the American Government. Dr. Koo said that one explanation which had been given of this change of attitude on the part of the Council was that the Secretary of State had telephoned to Lord Reading on October 21st, and that the chief of the

British

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
- 2 -

British Delegation in Geneva had understood Mr. Stimson to urge that the Council go slowly in the matter.

Dr. Koo observed that another explanation was based upon a promise said to have been given by the United States to Japan during the Naval Conference at London in 1930, to the effect that the United States would always recognize the vested interests of Japan in Manchuria.

Respectfully yours,

For the Minister:


C. Van H. Engert,
First Secretary of Legation.

✓
Enclosure:

1/ as noted above.

800

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2 Carbon Copies
Received F.P.

Enclosure No. 1
Despatch No. 1254

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

October 28, 1921.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Controversy.

Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo.
The American Minister.
Mr. Peck.

Mr. Johnson called upon Dr. Koo at his temporary residence in the Officers' Moral Endeavor Society, to inform Dr. Koo that he was leaving Nanking to go to Shanghai.

In the course of a general conversation Mr. Johnson informed Dr. Koo that a few days before President Chiang Kai-shek had spoken to the American, British and French Ministers and had orally presented the request of the Chinese Government that Civil and Military officers of the three Governments addressed be sent to Manchuria to act as observers during the course of the evacuation of occupied areas in Manchuria by the Japanese troops and the taking over of such areas by the Chinese authorities. Mr. Johnson said that, in his own case, he had telegraphed this request to the Department of State and had on the afternoon of October 28th received a reply to the effect that the Department of State did not wish to take the initiative in this matter, but preferred that

the

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

the initiative should be taken by the nations represented on the Council of the League of Nations, since the request of the Chinese Government seemed to be based upon the resolution passed by the Council on October 24, 1931.

Dr. Koo said that the position taken by the Department of State, as described by Mr. Johnson, was a natural one. He also said that the oral request made to Mr. Johnson and his colleagues by the President would be confirmed, very shortly, by a written communication sent by the Chinese Government through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Dr. Koo referred to remarks exchanged between him and Mr. Johnson a few days before in regard to a reported "cooling down" of the Council in the matter of mediation in the Sino-Japanese Controversy, said to have been occasioned by a communication received from the American Government. Dr. Koo said that one explanation which had been given of this change of attitude on the part of the Council was that Secretary of State Stimson had telephoned to Lord Reading, Chief of the British Delegation at Geneva, on October 21, and that Lord Reading had understood Mr. Stimson to urge that the Council go slow in the matter. The report was that Mr. Stimson was speedily informed of the impression received by the members of the Council and that he speedily corrected the error, which seems to have been owing to the lack of clear transmission over the wireless telephone.

Dr. Koo said that another explanation given at Geneva of the momentary change of attitude by the

League

-3-

League Council was that it was a reaction to advice given by the United States, which advice was, in turn, based upon a promise said to have been given by the United States to Japan during the Naval Conference at London in 1930, to the effect that the United States would always recognize the vested interests of Japan in Manchuria. It was the obvious desire of Dr. Koo to ascertain from Mr. Johnson whether there was any basis for the report that such a promise had been given. Mr. Johnson observed that he did not think that any such undertaking had been given by the American Government and that he thought he would have learned of the undertaking if it had been given. Mr. Johnson observed that, in any case, he did not see that such an undertaking given by the American Government to the Japanese Government would have any effect on the treaty basis of Japan's vested interests in Manchuria.

ACT, J.

WRP:MCL

THE UNDER SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DEC 18 1931
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

December 10, 1931.

Tokyo, November 20, No. 594. Attitude of Japanese toward the League.

This despatch is of considerable interest and might be read in full.

The Japanese feel that the League has departed from its proper sphere in attempting to deal with the Manchurian question. The reasons for this are stated so succinctly on page 2 that they cannot well be condensed.

With regard to the ill-feeling created by the action of the Council on October 24, no modification can be discovered in Japanese unflinching opinion of the League or in the belief that Japan's point of view respecting a solution of the Manchurian situation must be fully met.

Since the League realizes that Japan cannot be coerced, it will try more to save its prestige than to settle the question of Manchuria. But no matter what is done to save face, Japan will not be satisfied until the problem is really solved. It will be very difficult to reconcile the views of the League and of the Japanese Government.

There is criticism in the press concerning the attitude of Britain toward treaties between Japan and China relating to China, in seeking to doubt the validity of some of these treaties.

The

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

The NICHU NICHU states that in this attitude reflects the sentiment of the League, the work of the Council will be wasted.

The press is determined that there shall be no retreat from the "five fundamental principles".

✓ Although press criticism of the part Great Britain is believed to have played has decreased, the League is still regarded as having been used by Great Britain for selfish ends.

Former Parliamentary Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Nagai states in HOCHI that if the League proposes to submit the matter to international arbitration, Article XIII of the Covenant, which provides that in case an international dispute cannot be settled diplomatically is shall be submitted to international settlement, does not apply, since in the present case there is only military action which had its origin in Japan's right of self-defense. He adds that the League's insistence on the withdrawal of troops is tantamount to forcing Japan to do what is impossible, and that the Japanese cannot submit to the sacrifice of their country to save the face of the League.

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
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



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EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA


Tokyo, Japan, November 13, 1931

No. 394



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Copy in FE

793.94/3108

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to comment on the attitude of the Japanese toward the League of Nations with respect to the situation in Manchuria. This attitude, my observations have led me to believe, is that of most thinking Japanese.

Disregarding for the moment the ill-feeling engendered by the action of the League Council in October, it is apparent that the Japanese feel that the League has departed from its proper sphere in attempting to deal with the

Manchurian

DEC 22 1931
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- 2 -

Manchurian question. The reasons for this point of view may be summed up briefly as follows: the League having grown out of the World War and the Versailles Treaty, it should confine itself to problems related to or arising out of them; as the Manchurian question antedates the formation of the League by a number of years, it is not a question for the League to settle; one of the three countries most vitally interested in the solution of the problem, namely, Russia, is not a member of the League; in dealing with European questions the League has to deal with definite political units while in this case it is dealing with China, which is not a political unit but a country in a condition that approaches chaos; the South Manchuria Railway, which is the crux of the situation, is an organization with a peculiar status that is related in no way to the situation which produced the League of Nations; the members of the League Council, with the possible exception of two or three representatives, are incapable of intelligent judgment because of lack of knowledge of Manchuria, which means that any decision of the League must be in essence the decision of Great Britain and France.

With regard to the ill-feeling created in Japan by the action of the League Council on October 24th, as well as by the alleged acts of certain foreign officials already reported in my despatch No. 378 of November 6, 1931, I cannot discover any modification either of Japanese unflattering opinion of the League nor of their belief that Japan's point of view respecting a solution of the Manchurian situation

- 3 -

situation must be fully met. Opinion now seems to be that any action of the League will be not so much an effort to settle the Manchurian question as an attempt to "save the League's face", since the League now realizes that Japan cannot be "coerced" into obedience to the League's wishes as expressed in the resolutions. There is a feeling that, as Japan will not retreat from its position, the League will have two alternatives: either ineffectual "oppression" of Japan or some measure of support of Japan. Three days ago the Osaka ASAHI stated in this connection that "there are rumors of the drafting of a plan to save the face of Japan and the face of the League. But the League has acted in favor of China, which has committed every kind of atrocity and violence. To Japan the main issue is not a mere question of face; it is vital. No matter what is done to save face, Japan will not be satisfied until the problem is really solved." Yesterday morning the Tokyo NICHU NICHU, one of the most influential newspapers, commented editorially as follows: "Leaders of the Council are making efforts to find some formula which will save the face of the Council and at the same time satisfy Japanese claims. We should not be surprised if these efforts end in failure. In the first place, they are attempting the impossible. They are utterly unaware that the views of the Japanese Government and the League conflict and that it would be a miracle if they were reconciled * * *. The question facing the Council is how to correct the wrongs done by the Chinese in violation of treaties."

During

- 4 -

During the past few days the press has apparently been awaiting, without much optimism, definite reports regarding the attitude which the League Council will take toward Japan at the present session. Anticipation of action by the Council favorable to Japan was somewhat dampened by the report published here two days ago that Mr. Briand wished to be more fully informed regarding Sino-Japanese treaties relating to Manchuria. The Tokyo NICHU NICHU stated in this connection: "If the attitude of Mr. Briand reflects the sentiment prevailing in League circles, the work of the Council will be wasted. Mr. Briand would have Japan distinguish between Sino-Japanese treaties relating to the protection of lives and property and those covering rights and interests of an economic character. Evidently Mr. Briand supports China's contention that those Sino-Japanese treaties which cover the economic rights of Japan are of doubtful validity, and his oft-expressed opinions on the subject endorse our supposition. He has been accused of being prejudiced in favor of China. His attitude toward the question of the validity of the existing treaties between Japan and China indicates that he is still unable to understand the Japanese view." As this is the only concrete report regarding the present session of the Council that has as yet reached Japan, there has been no other editorial comment in this regard of especial interest.

The press - and the press I feel confident reflects in this instance public opinion - is still determined that there shall be no retreat from the "five fundamental principles" contained in the statement issued by the Japanese Government on October 26th. The Tokyo JIJI on November 15th remarked as follows: "The Council has been ignorant

of

- 5 -

of certain facts. It made the foolish mistake of thinking that Japan could be coerced into withdrawing her troops into the railway zone. The way to get at the truth is for the Council to admit that its methods were mistaken." The Tokyo NICHU NICHU on the 14th stated; "Thus far the Council has made a glaring mistake in going on record as favoring the speedy withdrawal of Japanese troops. There is reason to believe that when the Council meets on the 16th it will make a further demand for the speedy withdrawal of the Japanese troops. But the members of the Council will be mistaken if they suppose even for a moment that they can force Japan into evacuating Manchuria unconditionally. The policy of the Japanese Government is determined and nothing will deflect the Government from the course it has taken, no matter what pressure may be applied - until China agrees to the five fundamental principles. It would rather break with the League than sacrifice any of these rights."

Although press criticism of the part Great Britain is believed to have played in the last Council session has decreased, I am confident the League Council is still regarded as having been used by Great Britain for selfish ends. The Tokyo JIJI on the 15th stated: "It is said that the deliberations of the Council were largely influenced by a third party bent on consolidating its own position in China at the expense of Japan's interests. The report may not be well-founded, but it is difficult to get away from the fact that members not kindly disposed toward Japan played upon the ignorance of the Council with regard to Manchuria." The NICHU NICHU on the 16th claimed that "Britain is to blame in part for the quandary in which the Council is placed. The Council is now called upon to reconsider its attitude.

- 6 -

attitude. It must admit that the line it has followed is mistaken and must undo what it has done."

Certain statements made by Mr. Ryutaro Nagai, Parliamentary Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs until April of this year, in an article which appeared in the Tokyo HOCHI about the tenth of this month, may be of interest. In this connection, I have been told by two Japanese that, although Mr. Nagai no longer holds office, he probably discussed the article with officials of the Foreign Office before writing it. In part he comments as follows: "It is unreasonable on the part of the League to demand that Japan stand aloof from China's unlawful actions without giving Japan an opportunity to negotiate with China an agreement necessary for the assurance of Japanese rights and safety in Manchuria * * * . If the army does not withdraw by November 16th, the League may adopt some other measure to save its face. For this purpose it may propose to submit the matter to international arbitration or again to demand withdrawal of Japanese troops. In this case the provisions of Article XIII (of the League Covenant) do not apply, because they provide only that, in case an international dispute cannot be settled diplomatically, the dispute shall be submitted to international settlement, while this is simply a military action that had its origin in Japan's right of self-defence. It is not a case of an international dispute as provided for in the League's covenant * * * . Unless China agrees to respect the five fundamental points and to root out thereby all sources of unlawful doings of the Chinese against Japanese and the Japanese nation, there is no hope of restoring

peace

- 7 -

peace and order in Manchuria and of pacifying the uneasy feeling of Japanese, as well as of Chinese, in Manchuria. The League's insistence on withdrawal of troops is tantamount to the League's forcing of Japan to do what is impossible. We Japanese cannot submit to the sacrifice of our country to save the face of the League."

Respectfully yours,


W. Cameron Forbes

Embassy's File No. 800.


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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS



DEC 14 1931

December 14, 1931.

Memoranda from Ambassador Forbes.

(1) Comments of Baron Shidehara on Japanese note in reply to our memorandum of November 5.

(2) Comments of Count Kabayama on the domestic political situation in Japan and the Government's attitude toward the Manchurian situation.

Ambassador Forbes in his mail despatch No. 388 of November 12, 1931, hereunder, encloses a memorandum of his conversation with Baron Shidehara on November 11, the substance of which was reported to the Department in the Embassy's No. 215 of November 12, copy attached. The one important addition to the telegraphic report is the statement attributed to Baron Shidehara on page 4 of the memorandum to the effect that "he had absolute proof that he (Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang) had been sending out orders to the Chinese to provoke, annoy and impede the Japanese in every possible way".

In his conversation with Count Kabayama on November 10 the latter predicted the downfall of the Wakatsuki Cabinet on the ground that it had been characterized by a series of failures in its efforts to effect financial stability and was now, he said, "facing a condition of absolute bankruptcy".

Kabayama

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DEC 23 1931

- 2 -

Kabayama added that "when this Government fell the new Government would be much stronger and less militaristic because it would have power over the Army which the present Army had not got".

Mr. Forbes reports that Kabayama agreed that the Japanese had placed themselves in a very unenviable position on the Manchurian situation but stated that Briand "had not properly sensed the spirit of the Japanese, that pressure brought against them would only serve to confirm them in their position, and that the more pressure they brought the firmer would be their insistence in their position".

The position taken by the United States, according to Kabayama, had greatly pleased the Japanese people, who looked with confidence to the continued friendship of the United States.

Count Kabayama's comments on the domestic political situation are of particular interest in view of the recent formation of a new Cabinet. How far it will be "less militaristic" and "have power over the Army" will require some time to disclose.

RSM
RSM: EJJ



PM RECD



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
November 12, 1931.

No. 388.

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The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my telegram No. 215,
1/. November 12, 1 P.M., and to enclosures herewith (1) a
memorandum of a conversation which I had with Baron
Shidehara on that subject, and (2) a memorandum of
2/. a conversation which I had with Count Kabayama, an
influential and prominent member of the House of Peers.
I wish particularly to emphasize that I have not in
any way attempted to enter into any negotiation, but
merely

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-2-

merely to record what was said to me.

Respectfully yours,



W. Cameron Forbes.

Enclosures:

1. Memorandum of conversation-
Ambassador- Baron Shidehara.
2. Memorandum of conversation-
Ambassador- Count Kabayama.

Embassy's File No. 800- Manchuria.

ELN/SR

JM

Enclosure No. <u>1</u>
Referred to <u>388</u>
From <u>100-100000-1000</u>
Date <u>12-18-75</u>

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW BETWEEN THE AMBASSADOR
AND BARON SHIDEHARA, MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
ON WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 11, 1931. AT 4:30P.M.

Upon receipt of Baron Shidehara's memorandum a copy of which was delivered to us on the night of November 10, with the information that Ambassador Debuchi had handed it in to Washington, Baron Shidehara intimated that he would be glad to see me, and I immediately asked for an appointment which took place at four-thirty on the afternoon of the 11th.

The Baron was suffering from a good deal of a cold and coughed pretty steadily.

I first asked about the seriousness of affairs in Tientsin, where the evening paper says that active fighting is going on, Chinese troops besieging the Japanese garrison. The Baron had little information but made light of the whole thing. He said the Chinese had come nearer than the stipulated three hundred meters to the Japanese garrison and there had been an exchange of shots.

Coming to a discussion of the memorandum, the Baron pointed out that this note was intended to indicate two methods, under either of which Japanese troops would be withdrawn from Manchuria: First, in

case

-2-

case of adequate police protection being assured to the citizens of Japan and their property, including those of Korea. Secondly, the acceptance of the five points outlined in his preceding memorandum.

This seems to me an extraordinary concession, because it means that Japan is insisting now only upon No. 4 of the five points, namely, adequate protection; and that she will then withdraw troops without awaiting the determination of the other four, namely 1,2,3 and 5. It seems to me to clear the way for a prompter withdrawal of troops in either case, unless China were willing to jump down Japan's throat and swallow the five points whole, in which case Japan could still say that under point 4 she could not withdraw until protection satisfactory to her was provided for her nationals.

He then proceeded to develop the degree of protection required; and he said that the defense committees were creating such a police force, that these committees were doing more or less satisfactory service, and that they had a force of four thousand in Mukden and were maintaining order to such a degree that Japan had withdrawn practically all of her troops from that city; also, that other defense committees were in process of organization, and just as soon as they should be able to take over the policing of the region and give adequate protection to Japanese citizens and their property the troops would be withdrawn.

This seems to me to clear the way for a much earlier
improvement

-3-

improvement of the situation.

I tried to develop how far the Chinese National Government recognized these committees and whether it was not an invasion of Chinese sovereignty. He seemed to think the Chinese Government would recognize these committees: at any rate they were necessary to bring about the withdrawal.

I got him talking on the theme of how far Japanese Government exercised control over the civil administration- they have practically driven out the civil officials, as he admitted at an earlier session- and asked what was taking their place. I told him I did not think a committee of Chinese citizens acceptable to Japan would be acceptable to Chinese sovereignty as a permanent thing. He replied that Japan was not interfering with the civil administration at all, that the Chinese local organizations were attending to that, and that the Japanese did not interfere in matters of finance, justice, or executive administration of civil functions, but merely with policing and public order. I asked if they were giving protection to Chinese citizens or only to Japanese citizens. He said Japanese troops were not giving any protection whatever to Chinese citizens; they were there to look after the interests of their own nationals and left the care of Chinese citizens to the Chinese police. Asked how these police were paid, he said they took part of the salt tax and that Nanking was getting the same percentage

-4-

percentage as before but the balance went into the pocket of Chang Hsueh-liang. Speaking of Chang Hsueh-liang, he was very bitter about his activities, stating he had been stirring up trouble. Asked if he actually knew it, he said he had absolute proof that he had been sending out orders to the Chinese to provoke, annoy and impede the Japanese in every way possible. He said a number of business men in Kirin had told the Japanese that they were now less heavily taxed than before as Chang Hsueh-liang had taken large sums of money from them and pocketed a great deal of it. I think what they meant by "pocketing" would be to pay the expenses of his administration and of his troops.

....

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 2
Despatch No. 388
From American Embassy
Tokyo.

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW BETWEEN THE AMBASSADOR

and

COUNT KABAYAMA.

NOVEMBER 10, 1931.

Count Kabayama called at the hotel on the afternoon of November 10th and talked for nearly an hour.

He said that the present situation was due to weakness in the Japanese Government, which he told me in confidence he believed to be rapidly tottering to a fall, and that the present Government was characterized by a series of failures which he specified in detail, involving efforts to stabilize the price of silk, 200,000 bales of which are held in storage, reduction of wages of railway employees, in which they had failed, reduction of military expense, and various other measures looking towards economy, none of which had been carried through. Finally, came the Manchurian situation.

He said the Government was now facing a condition of absolute bankruptcy; he stated that when this Government fell the new Government would be much stronger, and less militaristic because it would have power over the army, which the present Government had not got. He went into the historical background,

telling

-2-

telling how in the early days the soldier was the gentleman and the man engaged in trade was one engaged in one of the inferior callings and looked down upon. He said this historical background had much to do with the present situation as the traditional high rating of the soldier had lent an importance in the structure of the government which had placed him beyond the control of the other civil officials, especially the Prime Minister. He mentioned the days of the old genro, naming the great figures, including among them Saionji as the only survivor.

He told of Saigo who, he said, was the General Grant of Japanese history, and who later headed an insurrection against the government due to the lesser position given to the soldier as the organization of civil government progressed. He also mentioned Okubo as the President Lincoln of Japanese history.

He entirely agreed that the Japanese have placed themselves in a very unenviable position and that they had got in wrong; and when I pointed out to him that the most important thing in international relations was good will and their actions and manner in carrying on the Manchurian affair had aroused such an ill will against them that in China it would be a very long time before it would die down, and that nothing they could gain by their advances could make up for the feeling of distrust and unfriendliness which their actions have engendered, he seemed to feel that this was so. But he said that Brian had not properly sensed the spirit

of

-3-

of the Japanese, that pressure brought against them would only serve to confirm them in their position, and that the more pressure they brought the firmer would be their insistence in their position. As a corollary, I gathered that the only way to reach the Japanese was by persuasion and that any effort at coercion would only confirm them in their position, even though it involved serious loss and a long and protracted struggle.

In talking all of this Count Kabayama did so wholly in the tone of a philosophical observer, not as a partisan. He said it all without heat, and it did not sound as though what he said was a threat. It was merely a candid and apparently impartial and dispassionate exposition of the situation.

He said the position taken by the United States had greatly pleased the Japanese people and that they looked with confidence for the continued friendship of the United States.

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
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LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Beiping, November 12, 1931.

No. 1257

DEC - 7 31



F/DEW

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The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

Referring to the Legation's telegram No. 902
of November 10, 1931, giving the substance, in trans-
lation, of a telegraphic circular issued by Marshal
Chang Hsueh-liang on November 9th, to the National,
Provincial and Municipal governments, Party Head-
quarters, newspapers, etc., concerning the rioting
which took place on the night of November 8th at
1/ Tientsin, I have the honor to enclose a copy, in trans-
lation, of the complete text of this document.

Respectfully yours,

For the Minister:

C. Van H. Engert
C. Van H. Engert
First Secretary of Legation.

Enclosure:

1/ as noted above

800.

LHE:MM

DEC 17 1931

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Reference No. 1257
Document No. 1257

Translation of a news item appearing in the
HUA PEI JIH PAO of November 10, 1931.

(Trans. EFS)

VICE-COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF CHANG ISSUES TELEGRAPHIC
CIRCULAR REPORTING THE HISTORY OF THE SUPPRESSION
OF THE RIOT AT TIENTSIN.

Regarding the history of the disturbance in the
municipality of Tientsin, Vice-Commander-in-Chief Chang
Hsueh-liang issued a special telegraphic circular last
night for the information of the whole country, which
reads as follows:

"November 9, 1931.

"To the Central Party Headquarters, the National
Government, the various Yuan, Ministries,
Boards, Commissions, Provincial Party Offices,
Provincial Governments, Municipal Party Offices,
Municipal Governments, Field Marshals, Directors-
General, Commanders, Divisional and Brigadier
Commandants, and newspaper agencies in China.

"Sirs:

"I have been informed that at 10:30 p.m. on
November 8th over 2,000 armed plain-clothes Chinese
were massed at Haikuangssu in the Japanese Concession
at Tientsin. The persons who have been arrested
after the incident have stated that they were given
rifles, revolvers, pistols, and hand grenades under
the supervision of several Japanese and were also
given forty dollars each. Between 11 o'clock and
12 o'clock over 100 persons rushed out of Haikuangssu
Street and attacked the police station in the Chinese
area. At the same time a considerable number of
plain-clothes persons rushed out of the Japanese
Concession. The Provincial and Municipal Governments
and the Bureau of Public Safety were their objectives
on which they advanced separately. Chinese gendarmes
and police in the municipality of Tientsin immediately
put up a united resistance.

"At 1 a.m. on November 9th Chairman Wang Shu-
eh'ang, in order to enable the foreign Powers to
understand the true circumstances, sent delegates
to inform the foreign Consuls of the facts inviting
their attention to the matter, and also demanded
that the Japanese Consul assume responsibility for
controlling the plain-clothes corps within the

"Japanese

-2-

"Japanese Concession.

"At 4 o'clock the Commander of the Japanese Army at Tientsin verbally demanded of Chairman Wang on telephone that Chinese military units, gendarmes and police be withdrawn 300 meters from the Japanese Concession before 8 a.m. of that day. Chairman Wang asked the reasons for this demand. While the conversation was proceeding, it was reported that another considerable group of plain-clothes men rushed out of the Japanese Concession again. Since the Japanese demand was absolutely unreasonable, Chairman Wang replied that there were no Chinese military units within 300 meters of the Japanese Concession, but only gendarmes and police who were maintaining law and order and were now making every effort to stop the rioters, and that in fact it was very inconvenient to issue an order for withdrawal.

"At half past five o'clock the Japanese again urged Chairman Wang immediately to issue an order for withdrawal to a distance of 300 meters. At that time the Chinese police had succeeded in partially repulsing the plain-clothes corps, some of whom were killed or injured and others fled. In order to prevent a conflict between the police and the Japanese, Chairman Wang issued an order before six o'clock for the withdrawal. At half past six o'clock the situation was quiet. Over thirty shells suddenly fell into the Chinese city and market. From an examination of the direction, they came from the Japanese Garden and the Japanese Barracks at Haikuangssu. Instructions are being issued to the military and police to take stringent united measures.


"I especially address this telegram for your information.

"Chang Hsueh-liang.

the 9th.

Seal."

RFS:T




LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Peking, November 2, 1931.

No. 1249.

DEC - 7 31



F/DEW

793.94/3111

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

Referring to previous communications on the Manchurian situation, I have the honor to enclose

1/ copies of a memorandum of a conversation Mr. Chester H. Royell had with Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang on October 8, 1931, at which time the "Young Marshal" appeared to be concerned over the report that while Japan was contending at Geneva and China denying that the situation in Manchuria was a matter to be settled by direct negotiation between China and Japan alone, President Hoover made a statement identical with the Japanese position; that this statement caused the Council of the League to refrain from sending a commission of inspection to Manchuria, thereby reversing its previous decision.

2/ There is likewise transmitted herewith a copy

of

- 2 -

of a letter dated October 11, 1931, received from Mr. Rowell and written from Mukden, describing what he personally saw of the airplane raid upon the city of Chinchow, which place he visited the day following the bombing. This report, which is fairly lengthy, confirms reports prepared by the Military Attaché and submitted to the Department.

Respectfully yours,

For the Minister:


C. Van H. Engert,
First Secretary of Legation.

Enclosures:

1. Memorandum of conversation between Mr. Rowell and Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, dated October 8th.
2. Copy of letter from Mr. Rowell, October 11th.

800.

LHE:EA

COPY

Peking, October 8, 1931.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE AMERICAN MINISTER

I had a talk last night with the "Young Marshal", Chang Hsueh-liang. The conversation - with two minor exceptions, to which I will return - was mostly pleasant platitudes. But directly afterward came some information, or, rather, misinformation, which I think you should have, for whatever it is not worth.

One of the two Chinese friends with me was Paul Yen, Secretary of the Mukden Y.M.C.A., a person of no great importance except as a long-time close personal acquaintance of Chang's. As we left, the Marshal retained Yen, and we waited in an anteroom for some time. At dinner afterward, Yen said that Marshal Chang had kept him to say two things:

One was to give him the same version of an alleged statement by President Hoover that you already have in Carter's telegram to Chamberlain, which you repeated to Washington. Carter got his information from Nanking sources, which I afterward verified as correctly representing the impression prevailing there. Chang, who in this case of course reflects Nanking, has the same version.

That is that, while Japan was contending at Geneva and China was denying that this was a matter to be settled by direct negotiations between China and Japan alone, President Hoover made a statement at

Washington

MEMORANDUM FOR THE AMERICAN MINISTER

That is that, while Japan was contending at Geneva and China was denying that this was a matter to be settled by direct negotiations between China and Japan alone. President Hoover made a statement at

Washington

- 2 -

Washington identical with the Japanese position. The League Council, according to this report, was about to take action sending a commission of investigation to Manchuria even against Japan's protest, but on hearing of President Hoover's position it reversed that policy and followed the course which we know.

Marshal Chang had not said this to me directly, but he evidently retained Yen with the intention that he should repeat it to me.

I told Yen that I had heard the same story in Shanghai and had undertaken to run it down, but had been unable to find anywhere any evidence that the President ever made such a statement. I had found no one who would say that he had himself seen what purported to be the text or even an abstract of the alleged statement, and had not been able to find it myself. While I could of course not say positively, on this merely negative evidence, that no such statement was made, I would certainly not believe it on mere rumor, even from the highest sources, in the absence of anything even purporting to be the statement itself. Yen will, I take for granted, repeat this to Chang.

I report this to you merely for your information that this impression does prevail, very definitely, in the rumor-ridden administration circles of the Chinese Government, and that all the actions of the American Government are being interpreted on this basis. You will of course know best whether this confirmation of what you already knew adds enough to what you have previously transmitted to be worth repeating to Washington. If you do care to send it, you may use

my

- 3 -

my name or not, as you prefer.

Yen's version of the other thing Chang told him (which I think may not have been intended for me) was that the Young Marshal was just leaving for a meeting, to discuss "secret news" received from Nanking that the government there was preparing to "remove the capital", in anticipation of the probable bombardment of Nanking by the Japanese. It is, of course, a fact that the Japanese are sending cruisers to Chinese waters, one of which, it is announced, is proceeding up the river to Hankow. I do not guarantee the accuracy of Koo's translation of Yen's report of Chang's statement of Nanking's interpretation of this movement of Japanese ships, but, for whatever it is worth, it may be an indication of the present state of mind (or of imagination) in Nanking.

The two things besides mere conversation which Chang said to me directly were these:

He said that, in anticipation of the probability that the Japanese would not have withdrawn their troops on October 14th, the date for the scheduled meeting of the League of Nations to hear the report, the government at Nanking had already prepared additional steps, the nature of which he was not in a position to reveal, to meet that situation.

I of course do not know, either from Chang Hsueh-liang or directly from Nanking, what these proposed "steps" are, but I do know, first hand, from inside Kuomintang circles, what some of the semi-official "advice" is which the government has received. The theory is that if the League will not take jurisdiction

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tion on the situation which Japan has created, China must undertake to produce a situation which will compel it to take jurisdiction. One proposal is to sever diplomatic relations with Japan, to produce a state, not of war, but of "emergency". This would of course not be done while the League is continuing to act, even cautiously, on the situation, but would follow at once if the League threw up its hands or declared no jurisdiction, on the situation produced by Japan's occupation and China's non-resistance alone. The argument is that the experience of severing diplomatic relations with the Soviet government has shown that the "state of emergency" thus produced does not necessarily lead to a state of war, but that it would precipitate a situation of which the League certainly, and the Washington Conference treaties probably, would have to take notice.

The final statement of Chang to me, if anything more than a platitude, is of significance only in the light of what he said to Yen afterward. I said: "What we have been saying is of course among friends. But if there is anything you would like to say, for repetition, to the American people, I would be glad to use it, in such newspaper and other contacts as I have."

"Speaking not as an official", he said, "but simply as a citizen of China, in my personal capacity, I would say that China has always appreciated the long-time friendship and helpfulness of America, and hopes to find this spirit continue. The test will be whether, in the present crisis, America will still be able

to

- 5 -

to use its great influence in the world toward the
restoration of peace and the preservation of the
rights of China under international law."

(Signed) CHESTER H. HOWELL.

Peking, October 8, 1931.

b.a.

1249
COPY

Mukden, October 11, 1931.

Honorable Nelson Johnson,
American Minister,
Peking.

Dear Mr. Johnson:

Excuse this hand-written scrawl, but I brought no typewriter with me and have no secretary here.

As I just telegraphed you, I had the luck personally to see some of the physical situation at Chin-chow, just after the air raid there, and have reported details of what I saw to your Naval Attaché, Mr. Brown, here. I think, however, that I should write you directly this fuller memorandum, even at the risk of making it burdensomely voluminous.

The only foreigners, so far as I know, who have seen for themselves what happened, are Kenneth Cantlie, of the Ministry of Railways, Baron C. Taube, Reuter's Mukden correspondent, and myself. I saw the original of Taube's dispatch as sent. (I do not know what it was when received.) It is correct.

I personally saw and counted only a part of the bomb holes. My independent observations, so far as they went, corresponded exactly to Taube's, and there is no reason for doubting the accuracy of his figures on the rest.

I

- 2 -

I arrived at Chinchow the day after the bombing and went over the railway grounds with Mr. Cantlie. I also interviewed various Chinese, and my interpreter, T. Z. Koo, interviewed others.

The attack took place at 1.30 p.m., October 8th. All reports agree that there were twelve planes, and that they dropped thirty bombs. I saw the bomb holes, the fragments of bombs and the physical damage in the railway yards, and talked to those who had seen the rest. The physical damage was slight. The bomb holes, in the hard railway ground, were not over a foot or a foot and a half deep and three or four feet across. The bombs had four-vaned "fins" of black steel, which would have fitted a cylinder about five inches across and ten inches long. There were no identification marks. The exploded fragments were jagged shrapnel. I saw no projectiles. The damage, except for a few windows, was done by these fragments, and not by concussion. On the railway grounds it consisted of one rail (on a side-track) perforated, a tubular iron fence riddled, and two service cars damaged, besides smashed windows. At the "Communications University", a short distance South and West of the railway yards, one roof was reported penetrated and some damage done to the building. Otherwise the injury there was slight.

Sixteen persons were reported killed, mostly railway employees, and nine wounded, among them a Russian or German professor in the university who, I understand, has since died. Most of the others were railway employees, and a few country people standing

by

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

by the roadside near the East gate. No soldiers were hurt, nor, so far as I can learn, were there any soldiers in or near the part of the town attacked, unless it was a few sentries at the government offices. Certainly there were no barracks nor military posts near.

I inquired whether the planes flew high or low, and was told "low", but by excited persons whose word alone might not be conclusive. However, the aim was so perfect and all the thirty bombs fell in so small a radius that it is clear they cannot have been flying very high.

The aim was clearly not at troops or barracks, but at the "provisional" civil government and at communications. (Since writing this, I have seen a dispatch sent out by Powell which, as he wrote it, quoted me as above. The censor compelled him to change it, and to quote me as saying that it was aimed at the barracks. This was the exact reverse of what I said and of what Powell wrote.) Three bombs fell in the radio station; ten in the university compound, where the provisional government offices are located; and at least five in the very center of the railway yards and alongside its engine houses. Nearly all those killed were here.

There are no military barracks or other military posts in that part of town. The nearest I saw was over a mile away, outside the town. Others, I was told, are clear across the town, on the other side. I heard of no soldiers anywhere in the neighborhood at the time. Japanese official reports here are that reconnoitering

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 By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

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reconnoitering planes had been fired on and this was retaliation. I heard no reports that any such planes had been seen (fired on or otherwise) prior to the actual bombing party of twelve. Official Japanese communiqués here also reported that a first party of three planes had gone to drop leaflets on the town. Nobody in Chinchow reported having seen or heard of any such planes or leaflets, and Major Watari, information officer here, himself expressed doubt the next day, saying the planes had been too high to distribute the leaflets. They must also have been too high to have been seen or heard, in a clear sky.

I saw numerous evidences of Chinese troops, including some armored trains, now concentrating in Chinchow. Troop trains held up our schedule several hours. I saw no soldiers in Chinchow, but the crests of all the hills around showed their silhouettes. They were distributed, not in military formation, to attack other troops or repel attack, but clearly as observation parties, to signal the approach of any more airplanes.

The Japanese official reports are thus wholly at variance with the physical facts, as I saw and heard them, and the facts are also inconsistent with the officially announced purpose. The attack was specifically on the offices of the provisional civil government and its communications, and not at all on the military positions, which would have been clearly visible from the air and easy to hit by any squadron capable of the remarkably accurate aim shown by this attack.

The

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The railway company is digging bomb-proof shelters, covered with dirt and boiler iron, in its yards, to calm the nerves of its employees, who were in danger of demoralization and flight. Chinese guards along the railway outside the town have evidently been recently increased, as shown by the new kaoliang shelters.

My personal interpretation, based more on what I have heard here than on what I saw in Chinchow, was that the bombing was a demonstration against establishing a provisional civil government in Chinchow, or any civil government anywhere in Manchuria under the authority either of Chang Hsueh-liang or of Nanking, and also against the reconcentration of the scattered Chinese army anywhere.

I have talked to Major Watari and seen all his communiqués, and have also talked to the leading Chinese here (some of them in hiding, but I had Chinese friends who arranged for me to see them in private residences).

The perfectly clear policy of the Japanese military authorities is to destroy all vestiges of the old civil government in Manchuria and to prevent by force the setting up of any new civil government by the authority of either Peking or Nanking. It is also to disperse all the Chinese armies in Manchuria, in or out of the railway zone, and to prevent their reassembling anywhere. Of course, unless they can be reassembled somewhere within reach of supplies and under orders, this means simply scattering them over the country as armed bandits.

Having

- 6 -

Having thus destroyed civil government and made wholesale banditry inevitable, they will have produced, not merely an excuse for not withdrawing their troops, but the absolute necessity of their remaining and extending their operations. To withdraw now would precipitate chaos. Then, as the only alternative to permanent military government by a large occupying force all over Manchuria, they will gradually set up local governments, and finally "a" Manchurian government, by Japanese initiative and under Japanese direction, by Chinese persons, and perhaps even elected by the Chinese population, but expressly independent of either Chang Hsueh-liang or the Nanking national government. Any civil authority regarding itself as responsible to the government of China is now refused recognition, and the attack on Chinchow was clearly an attempt to disperse its center, by force.

Since I began to write this, we have had another talk with Major Watari. He gave us (the correspondents) the new regulations for opening the Chinese banks. The last of these regulations was that "In case a new government is established in Manchuria, these regulations will have no effect, after the handing over of the banks to the new Manchurian government." This was the last sentence in a prepared official communiqué, formally given out by the authorized spokesman of the military authorities.

In yesterday's communiqué, one of the three "official" sections was the news of the alleged action of certain chiefs of hsiens in Kirin province denouncing Chang Hsueh-liang and saying that if his authority

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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ever came back again, misgovernment, oppression and corruption would be worse than ever. The Tokyo government, I understand, disclaims any responsibility for these separatist movements. Major Watari gives no such impression: on the contrary, they clearly have his approval; he gives out the news of them as official, and the formal bank regulations, promulgated today, expressly envisage the formation of such a government and the turning over of the banks to them.

The question has become far broader than the mere withdrawal of Japanese troops into the railway zone - though I think that is now a physical impossibility, if there is to be any order or safety at all anywhere in Manchuria. It is the complete and intentional destruction of all civil government under Chinese national authority in Manchuria, and the establishment of a situation in which the undertaking by Nanking, to Geneva, to be responsible for the protection of law and order in Manchuria, is a physical impossibility to carry out. The troops and civil government in Manchuria, prior to September 19th, were able to maintain, and did maintain, a certain amount of order and safety, which the Japanese declared insufficient, but under which life, at any rate, did go on and business was done. The Japanese have now already produced a situation - and in Mukden at least they make no bones of having done it intentionally - in which, if they withdrew, the remnant of those troops and of the civil authority could not now function, and in which the scattered troops themselves, thrown on their own resources and away from organized bases of supplies, will inevitably

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evitably revert to banditry.

Similarly, disorder here in Mukden can now be held down only with the strong arm. Employees of the government and of government-supported industries have been thrown out wholesale, without payment of even the wages due them, and no provisions for their relief, except by private charity, are possible, since all the government and semi-government funds have been sealed up, and are forbidden to be withdrawn even by to-day's regulations which open the banks, to a limited extent, for other business. Such of these destitute people as cannot get away will turn to looting, and so require further strong measures, which only Japanese authority is now capable of enforcing.

The "unofficial" part of Major Watari's communiqués, ostensibly from his own secret-service reports, is full of alarmist stories of the remobilization of the Chinese army for organized war on Japan. My own observation, inside the Chinese lines, is, on the contrary, that the chief ambition of the Chinese soldiers is to get as far as possible from Japanese guns and as near as possible to Chinese food and shelter.

I think the situation is very dangerous. The situation which now makes it physically impossible for the Japanese troops to withdraw, or even to confine themselves within their present lines, has been deliberately produced, for just this purpose, and is successful. The Tokyo government could not now, even if it wished, carry out its original assurances to the League and to the American Government. The League, mistakenly,

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mistakenly, supposed it could get this thing done by going slow and giving Japan time. But war is something which must be stopped instantly or it cannot be stopped at all. This conflagration, I fear, is now beyond the control even of those who set its fires.

This has dragged out to twice the length I intended, but it all seemed important.

Sincerely,

(Signed) CHESTER H. ROWELL.

Yamato Hotel,

Mukden.

I have copy of
the signed copy
9.0.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. _____

AM 1100

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

AMERICAN CONSULATE
GENERAL,
Mukden, Chin., November 17, 1931

LEGAL ADVISER
JAN 5 1932
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUBJECT: Policy of the Japanese Military Authorities in
Reference to Seized Materials.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

DEPARTMENT

DEC 27 1931

A-C/C

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of
my despatch No. 486, to the Legation, Peking, China,
dated November 14, 1931, on the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers
American Consul General.

✓
Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 486.

MSM:HTW
340/800

F/DEW

793.94/3112

FILED

JAN 5 - 1932

No. 486

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Hakden, China.

November 16, 1931.

SUBJECT: Policy of the Japanese Military Authorities
in Reference to Seized Materials.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Legation,

Peiping, China.

Sir:

I have the honor to report to the Legation on the attitude of the Japanese military authorities toward seized materials and outstanding accounts of foreign firms and on the return to the American firms of certain building materials.

At the time of the Japanese occupation of Hakden there were in the possession of the various agencies of the Government at Hakden certain materials and supplies which had been ordered by that government from foreign firms and for which no or only partial payment had been made. These materials came into the possession of the Japanese military forces.

Although foreign creditors of the former government made energetic and repeated efforts to obtain payment or at least a statement of responsibility therefor from the Japanese military headquarters they met in every case with either unequivocal refusal or a complete denial of responsibility. Efforts to obtain possession of unexpended materials met with the same result.

However

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However on October 27th, 1931 Japanese Military Headquarters issued a statement which defined their policy, of which a translation in full is attached hereto, and which is summarized as follows:

1. As the present situation has been occasioned by illegal actions on the part of Chang Hsueh-liang, the Japanese military feels no responsibility in the matter even though they sympathize with the difficulties of many foreign firms.
2. Due to the difficulty of determining proper ownership of certain materials during the existing unsettled conditions, no materials will be returned or accounts paid until the present trouble is settled.
3. There will be no discrimination in the handling of cases.
4. If, since the Japanese occupation of Mukden, any materials have been returned to the alleged owners, it was done so in error and should not be a precedent in the settlement of future cases.

In this connection, it should be pointed out that except for a Beech airplane, belonging to Gale and Company of Shanghai, and which was in the military airbase at the time it was occupied by the Japanese, no American property is among that seized.

Building materials supplied by McDonnell, and German Incorporated of Tientsin, and Andersen, Meyer and Company Ltd. of Shanghai for the construction of the now nearly completed residence and government office of Chang Hsueh-liang, which had been delivered to the compound where construction was under way but had not been expended, were

delivered

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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delivered back to the purveyors by the Japanese authorities as a result of representations made by this office to the Japanese Consulate General. It was stated that such delivery was possible only because Japanese Army Headquarters did not regard these premises to have been officially occupied by Japanese forces, even though Japanese soldiers had been stationed as guards over the compound. However there are outstanding a number of unpaid accounts for material supplied by American firms to agencies of the former provincial government. Apparently no disposition will be made of these for the present.


Yours very respectfully,

M. J. Myers.
American Consul General.

JRS:WIF
340/800

Enclosure: Translation of Japanese Statement.

Original and one copy to Legation.
Five copies to Department.
Copy to the Embassy, Tokyo.



Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 486 of M. S. Myers, American Consul General, Hankow, China, dated November 16, 1931, on the subject "Policy of the Japanese Military Authorities in Reference to Seized Materials."

Declaration of Japanese Military Headquarters at Hankow, stating Japanese policy toward seized materials.

1. "The Japanese Army is making every effort to prevent seized materials from coming into the possession of Chang Hsueh-liang or other former officials of the provincial or Nationalist Governments, and to prevent looting by bandits or others.

2. "As much of this material has been sold by Japanese and other foreign firms, and as no or only partial payment had been received for it, many private firms now find themselves in an embarrassing predicament. While the Japanese Army feels entirely sympathetic toward these firms, it is unable at the present time to take action in the matter as it relates only to Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang and the parties concerned.

3. "Actually, it is impossible for the Japanese Army to dispose of any of this material in accordance with requests from firms and individuals.

4. "And it was due to the unlawful actions of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang's government that present complications have occurred, the Japanese Army hopes that all concerned will understand that it cannot deliver the materials up, even though Chang Hsueh-liang issues orders to that effect.

5. "Until the present dispute is settled, none of the material will be surrendered.

6. "In government compounds and buildings there may be property belonging to private individuals or firms, but due to the difficulty of determining the ownership of various articles, it is deemed impossible to dispose of the property at present.

7. "Japanese Army Headquarters has been the recipient of requests for delivery of the above mentioned materials from persons or firms of various nationalities. The matter is being handled fairly, and without bias and there will be no discrimination.

ACOM

- 2 -

8. "Soon after the Mahan incident, on September 19th, while the situation was still disturbed, in one or two cases* where private firms obtained the return of materials, but this is contrary to the regulations just promulgated and will have no effect on the disposition of future cases."

*Note - two tanks (war machines) were returned to a British firm which was endeavoring to sell them to the Provisional Government.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CONSULAR SERVICE

1214

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

December 17, 1931.

~~S.H.~~
~~B.M.~~
~~C.B.~~

The attached despatch from Mukden dated November 14, 1931, gives a summary of the situation, as of that date, in regard to the dispute between the National City Bank of Mukden and the Japanese authorities in that city in connection with checks drawn by the Peiping-Liaoning Railway in favor of the Netherlands Harbor Works. The railway referred to is the old Peking-Mukden Railway and the Netherlands Harbor Works is the company constructing the Hulutao harbor.

It would appear that the Japanese authorities are willing to permit the Chinese banks under their control to pay certain of these checks in return for the transfer from the National City Bank to these banks of certain funds deposited by the former managements of these banks. No settlement had been reached the Consul General reports and he is still continuing his efforts to obtain a settlement.

There are certain enclosures with this despatch, ~~sent~~ the Consul General at Mukden by the National City Bank, which would indicate that the Peiping-Liaoning Railway and

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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the Netherlands Harbor Works are attempting to have deposited in the National City Bank large sums amounting altogether to almost \$8,000,000. These transactions do not appear to be what might be termed "transactions in the ordinary course of business", but rather an attempt of these organizations to have the National City Bank, with the help of the American Consul General, "pull their chestnuts out of the fire".


JAJ:EMU

No. -----

AM 1100



AMERICAN CONSULATE
GENERAL,
Mukden, China, November 16, 1931.

SUBJECT: Mukden Banks' Refusal to Cash Pei-Ning Railway
Checks Held by National City Bank of New York

LEGAL ADVISER
DEC 11 1936
DEPARTMENT OF STATE


THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

A C/C
RECORDING DESK
FILE - WAB



I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of my
despatch No. 485, to the Legation, Peiping, China, dated
November 14, 1931, on the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers
American Consul General.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF STATE
DEC 12 1936
AC/C

Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 485.

MSM:HTW
340/800

4 Carbon Copies

Received

FILED
DEC 8 - 1936

793.94/3113

793.94
note
811.51693
893.516

No. 485

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, China.

November 14, 1931.

SUBJECT: Mukden Banks' Refusal to Cash Pei-Ning
Railway Checks Held by National City
Bank of New York.

CONFIDENTIAL.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Legation,

Peiping, China.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to the Legation's telegram of November 10, 12 noon (received 9 a.m. the 11th) requesting information concerning the latest developments with respect to the National City Bank's endeavors to secure payment from the Chinese banks in Mukden of checks drawn by the Peiping-Liaoning Railway.

The first check presented by the National City Bank was drawn on the Frontier Bank by the Pei-Ning Railway in favor of the Netherlands Harbor Works and endorsed over to the National City Bank for collection. The Frontier Bank declined to pay the check, stating that the Japanese Army refused to permit withdrawals against funds of the Railway. This Consulate General requested the Japanese Consul General to make arrangements to have

the

- 2 -

the interdiction against payment of the check removed, pointing out that the check covered advances of funds made by the Bank to the Netherlands Harbor Works. On November 6th, the Japanese Consul General replied that the matter had been referred to the Japanese military authorities and that the latter had informed him that the matter was under consideration "with a view to effecting an early settlement". Since that time my office has had daily informal conversations with the Japanese Consulate General concerning the case. On November 9th, Mr. Morishima, Japanese executive consul, in a conversation with Mr. Vincent, referred to the matter of funds of the Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces in the National City Bank (see enclosures 753.74/2832 to my despatch No. 472 of October 31, 1931) and stated that whereas there was no direct connection between this matter and the Pei-Ning Railway check, the authorities of the Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces, and particularly the Japanese advisors, felt that the National City Bank should allow the new authorities of the bank to withdraw the money deposited by the former management of the Bank. Particular reference was made to a withdrawal of silver \$430,000 permitted by the Provincial Bank on the understanding that the National City Bank would permit an equivalent withdrawal of gold yen by the Chinese bank. This the National City Bank had declined to do and the Japanese advisors felt that the National City Bank had not acted fairly. Mr. Morishima suggested that it might be possible to obtain results on the Pei-Ning Railway check case if the National City Bank

would

- 3 -

would agree to allow withdrawal of funds deposited by the old management of the Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces.

The matter was mentioned to the manager of the National City Bank who expressed a willingness to permit withdrawals of gold yen not to exceed the amount in silver paid to his bank by the Chinese bank, provided that all restrictions against Pei-Ning Railway accounts were removed. Neither this Consulate General nor the National City Bank, however, desired to have the two matters confused and the Bank only made its proposition because of Japanese initiation. The Japanese Consulate General was so informed.

The National City Bank was and is anxious to have all restrictions removed concerning Pei-Ning Railway accounts because it now holds checks and endorsed time deposit slips of the Pei-Ning Railway amounting to approximately six million dollars covering funds in the Frontier Bank, the Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces and the Bank of Communications, which the railway wishes to have withdrawn and deposited in the National City Bank. The three banks decline to permit withdrawals for the same reason as given in the case of the check for \$400,000. There is enclosed a copy of a letter from the National City Bank which, with its enclosures, will serve to explain the Bank's position.

Today Mr. Morishima called at the Consulate General and informed Mr. Vincent that he had just come from a discussion of the case with Mr. Suda, Japanese chief advisor to the Chinese banks. Mr. Suda had declined to consider the National City Bank's request that restrictions against

the

- 4 -

the withdrawal of Pei-Ning accounts be removed in return for the National City Bank's agreement to pay out gold yen to the Provincial Bank in an amount equivalent to the silver dollars paid to the National City Bank by the Provincial Bank. Mr. Morishima asked whether there was any possibility of the National City Bank agreeing to a resumption of business with the Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces under its present management as the legal successor to the bank under the old management, and thereby permitting the free withdrawal of all funds deposited by the former bank management if necessary or desirable. He was informed that there was slight possibility of the National City Bank agreeing to such an arrangement under prevailing conditions. Mr. Morishima then stated that Mr. Suda was going to direct that a reply concerning the Pei-Ning Railway accounts be given the Consulate General within a day or so and Mr. Morishima added that he did not think the reply would be favorable.

Unless effective pressure can be brought to bear through other channels than the Japanese Consulate General in Mukden, it is extremely doubtful that a settlement of this case satisfactory to the National City Bank can be obtained. The Japanese consular officials have given evidence of a sincere desire to effect a settlement, admitting that the restrictions placed on Manchurian government accounts should not apply to the accounts of the Pei-Ning Railway, but the attitude of Mr. Suda and the Japanese military authorities render their efforts ineffectual.

This

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

This Consulate General will continue its endeavors to secure a favorable settlement of the matter and will inform the Legation promptly of further developments.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers.
American Consul General.

Enclosure: Copy of letter from National City Bank with enclosures.

Original and one copy to Legation.
Five copies to Department.
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.

JCV:AAB
340/800

A true copy of
the signed original.

1224

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1, to despatch No. 485, of M. S. Myers, American Consul General, Mukden, China, to the Legation, Peiping, dated November 14, 1931, on the subject "Mukden Banks' Refusal to Cash Pei-Ning Railway Checks Held by National City Bank of New York".

THE NATIONAL CITY BANK OF NEW YORK

Moukden, November 13th, 1931.

Mr. M. S. Myers,
American Consul General,
MOUKDEN.

Dear Sir:-

We enclose herewith translation of a letter received from the Bank of Communications dated November 12th, referring to Cheques drawn by the Peiping Liaoning Railway which we have endeavored to collect as per their instructions. We also enclose a copy of the Peiping Liaoning Railway's letter to us dated November 3rd.


You will note that the Bank of Communications is prepared to pay one fixed deposit and all the cheques but are prohibited from doing so by the Japanese Army. With reference to the fixed deposit No. 1366 they refuse payment on the grounds that the fixed deposit is not due, but make no objection on account of the fixed deposit having been lost.

We are unable to obtain replies from the Frontier Bank and the Provincial Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces, but we are certain the situation is the same in those two Banks. We have seen the Peiping Liaoning Railway accounts in their ledgers and they are chopped by the Japanese forbidding payment.

We are anxious to lodge a protest before the Japanese withdraw these funds or have them withdrawn by the local office of the Peiping Liaoning Railway. Please take the necessary action on our behalf.

Yours respectfully,

(SGD) L. M. Cochran
Manager.



DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TRANSLATION

Letter from The Bank of Communications, dated November
12, 1931.

Dear Sirs:

Referring to your letter of date and the
 cheques and deposit receipts which you received for
 collection from the Peiping Liaoning Railway, we beg
 to state that with the exception of the fixed deposit
 receipt No. 1366 which we could not pay until due date,
 we ought to have honored all the rest. But we have
 been instructed by the Head-Quarters of the Japanese
 Army to stop payment temporarily. Therefore, it is
 rather difficult for us to pay you before we receive
 any advice from the Head-Quarters of the Japanese Army,
 and we are obliged to return you per bearer of your letter
 the cheques and fixed deposits referred to.

(Signed)
 The Bank of Communications.

List of Cheques and Fixed Deposits

F/D No. 980	\$ 112,828.39	Due Sept. 21
Cheque No. B297004	500,000.	
297008	500,000.	
297009	125,000.	
F/D No. 1366 (missing)	<u>174,333.79</u>	
	<u>\$1412,162.18</u>	

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CHINESE NATIONAL RAILWAYS
 PEKING LIAONING LINE.

No. BM/4192-H

Tientsin, 35d November, 1931.

Manager,
 The National City Bank of New York,
Moukden.

Dear Sir :

Deposits.

Acting on the request of the Netherlands Harbour Works Co. and fulfilling the terms of the agreement made in January 1930 between this Railway and the said Co. for the construction of Hulutao Harbour, which transactions have hitherto been handled through your bank, I beg to send you herewith three (3) fixed deposit receipts of the following Banks:

Frontier Bank, Moukden	No. 26	\$112,891.98
Bank of Three Eastern Provinces, Moukden	" 19	110,473.40
Bank of Communications, Moukden	" 980	112,828.39
Total		\$336,193.77

There are eight (8) more fixed deposit receipts of the above Banks, which unfortunately are not yet to hand.

Frontier Bank, Moukden	No. 16	\$521,000.00
"	" 20	500,000.00
"	" 1	336,488.79
"	" 9	1,000,000.00
Bank of 3 Eastern Provinces, Moukden	" 32	250,000.00
"	" 33	250,000.00
"	" 64	500,000.00
Bank of Communications, Moukden	" 1366	174,353.79
Total		\$3,531,822.58

We have already advised the above mentioned three Banks to pay the above sums to your Bank to the credit of this railway and to cancel the 8 deposit receipts when the amounts have been paid to your Bank and have also requested the said Banks to pay you all the amounts of interests accrued on these fixed deposits of \$3,868,016.35 to the credit of this Railway.

1227

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

I am also sending you herewith seven (7) cheques drawn on the said three banks on our current account with them. Particulars are as follows:

Frontier Bank, Moukden	A.C.027255	\$ 399,406.11
"	A.054765	279,414.72
Bank of 3 Eastern Provinces, Moukden	A.0012970	500,000.00
"	A.0412995	275,000.00
Bank of Communications, Moukden	B.297004	500,000.00
"	B.297008	500,000.00
"	B.297009	125,000.00
Total		\$ 2,478,830.83

The total amount for above fixed deposits and current account is \$2,440,837.13 which kindly withdraw from the Frontier Bank, Bank of Three Eastern Provinces and Bank of Communications, Moukden, respectively. Out of this amount, please transfer \$5,000,000. - to your Pientsin Bank and the balance may be deposited in your Moukden Bank for payment of construction expenses.

We enclose a statement showing full particulars therefor and shall be obliged if you will kindly arrange and advise at your earliest convenience.

Yours faithfully,
(Signed) Mr. Kao-Chi-Yi
Managing Director.

Encl.
1 Statement
3 Fixed Deposit Receipts
7 Cheques.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R. Shanghai/41 FOR #7954 (7054 to Legn.)
FROM Shanghai (Cunningham) DATED Nov. 10, 1931
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: Anti-Japanese Activities in Shanghai: Report on --
(Copy attached)

fpg

793.94/3114

ANTI-JAPANESE ACTIVITIES IN SHANGHAI:

793.94
During the month of October there was a noticeable increase in various anti-Japanese activities in Shanghai. The number of anti-Japanese associations and committees increased, while each strove to extend its activities as much as possible against the Japanese. There were several minor clashes during the fore part of the month between Chinese and Japanese, and between Chinese engaged in anti-

Japanese

Japanese Primary School after which a mob of Japanese attempted to tear down anti-Japanese posters in shop windows on North Buchanan Road. Several windows were broken and fights occurred between the shopkeepers and the Japanese. There were no injuries of a serious nature but for a time it looked as though a serious riot might take place. The most serious incident during the month occurred on Sunday October 15th, when a mob of several thousand Chinese workmen and students attacked Japanese mills in the western district and stone Japanese stores and residences. About twenty people including several police, received injuries in these disturbances. During one of their attacks the mob broke down the gates of the Daigai Keta Kaisha Mill staff quarters and engaged in a struggle with the Japanese occupants. The latter kept them off until the arrival of the police reserves when five of the rioters were taken prisoners. The prisoners were subsequently brought before the Special District Court and three of them received fines of \$3.00 each or a day's detention. The police were dissatisfied with what they considered an altogether inadequate sentence and gave notice of appeal.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

-7-

Japanese activities and the police. On October 1st a group of soldiers engaged in posting anti-Japanese placards on a police box in Chinese controlled territory. This action was resented by the police concerned, a huge crowd gathered and emergency police were sent for. This aroused the indignation of the crowd, who it seemed were about to smash the police station when the policemen on duty opened fire, killing two Chinese and wounding four others. It is reported in the press that the police officer in charge of the district in which the affair occurred was dismissed by the Commissioner of Public Safety and was held under arrest pending an investigation of the case.

On October 10th a contingent of Japanese marines, numbering about 240, arrived in Shanghai on the Japanese cruiser Yokikawa. The coming of these marines led to the circulation of rumors of a Japanese attack here. It was reported that arrangements had been made by the Japanese forces to occupy Shanghai and large numbers of Chinese from that part of the city began moving into the settlement. Martial law was enforced for a time in the Chinese controlled area and no incidents of a serious nature took place.

On the anniversary of the Chinese Republic, October 10th, several mobs of Chinese students and loafers attempted to precipitate incidents by shouting slogans and trying to stir up disorders in other ways. The police turned out in full force, being supplemented by Japanese marines, and the students were dispersed. On the following Sunday, October 11th, a mass meeting of Japanese was held in the

Japanese

Japanese primary school after which a mob of Japanese attempted to tear down anti-Japanese posters in shop windows on North Buchanan road. Several windows were broken and fights occurred between the sleepers and the Japanese. There were no injuries of a serious nature but for a time it looked as though a serious riot might take place. The most serious incident during the month occurred on Sunday October 15th, when a mob of several thousand Chinese workmen and students attacked Japanese mills in the western district and stoned Japanese stores and residences. About twenty people including several police, received injuries in these disturbances. During one of their attacks the mob broke down the gates of the Waigao Keta Kaisha Mill staff quarters and engaged in a struggle with the Japanese occupants. The latter kept them off until the arrival of the police reserves when five of the rioters were taken prisoners. The prisoners were subsequently brought before the Special District Court and three of them received fines of \$3.00 each or a day's detention. The police were dissatisfied with what they considered an altogether inadequate sentence and gave notice of appeal.

MET

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Paris

FROM

Dated December 8, 1931

Rec'd 11:10 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

DOUBLE PRIORITY.

857, December 8, 3 p.m.

FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES.

Following is text of resolution as it stands this morning. Only change in contemplation would be transfer of paragraph numbered five to declaration:

"The Council first reaffirms the resolution passed unanimously by it on September 30, 1931, by which the two parties declare that they are solemnly bound. It therefore calls the Chinese and Japanese Governments to take all steps necessary to assure its execution so that the withdrawal of the Japanese troops within the railway zone may be effected as speedily as possible under the conditions set forth in the said resolution.

Two. Considering the events have assumed an even more serious aspect since the Council meeting of October 24,

notes that the two parties undertake to adopt all measures

793.94


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see
793.94/3140



F/DEW

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FILED

DEC 14 1931

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#257 from Paris, December 8,
1931

measures to avoid any further aggravation of the situation and to refrain from any initiative which may lead to further fighting and loss of life.

Three. Invites the two parties to continue to keep the Council, which remains seized of the question, informed as (END SECTION ONE)

SHAW

CSB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

GREEN

FROM Paris

Dated December 8, 1931

Rec'd 11:55 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

DOUBLE PRIORITY.

857, December 8, 3 p. m. (SECTION TWO).

to the development of the situation.

Four. Invites the other members of the Council to furnish the Council with any information received from their representatives on the spot.

Five. Without prejudice to the carrying out of the above mentioned measures,

Desiring in view of the special circumstances of the case to contribute towards a final and fundamental solution by the two governments of the questions at issue between them,

Decides to appoint a commission of five members to study on the spot and to report to the Council on any circumstances which affecting international relations threatens to disturb peace between China and Japan or the good understanding between them upon which peace depends.

The Governments of China and of Japan will each have
the right to

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2- #857, from Paris, Dec. 8, 3 p. m.
(Section Two)

the right to nominate one assessor to assist the commission.

The Two Governments will afford the commission all facilities to obtain on the spot whatever information it may require.

It is understood that should the two parties initiate any negotiations these would not fall within the scope of the terms of reference of the commission nor would it be within the competence of the commission to interfere with the military arrangements of either party.

The appointment and deliberations of the commission shall not prejudice in any way the undertaking given by the Japanese.

(END SECTION TWO).

SHAW

WSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

GREEN

FROM

Paris

Dated December 8, 1931

Rec'd 12:35 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

DOUBLE PRIORITY.

857, December 8, 3 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

Japanese Government in the resolution of September 30 as regards the withdrawal of Japanese troops within the railway zone.

Should the undertakings given by the two parties according to the resolution of September 30th not have been carried out by the time of the arrival of the commission the commission shall as speedily as possible report to the Council on the situation with such recommendations as it may think fit.

Six. Between now and its next ordinary session which will be held on January 25, 1932, the Council invites its President to follow the question and to summon it afresh if necessary".

I quote below text of ~~Council~~ ^(declaration?) to be made
 by

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#857, from Paris, December 8,
1931 (SECTION THREE)

by Briand as it stands this morning. Only changes in contemplation are (first) possible transfer of last paragraph of paragraph numbered five of resolution to Council and (second) possible addition of following new text on police measures:

"The Japanese Government has drawn the attention of the Council to the situation at present existing in Manchuria. As a result of recent events banditry has increased in certain districts and constitutes a danger for the safety of the life and property of the inhabitants some of whom are Japanese subjects. In these circumstances the Japanese Government considers that its forces should be entitled to repulse attacks by bandits not only as has been the custom in the past when these attacks occurred in the neighborhood of the South Manchurian Railway zone but also (END SECTION THREE)

SHAW

WSB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM GREEN

Paris

Dated December 8, 1931

Rec'd 11:50 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

857, December 8, 3 p. m. (SECTION FOUR).

if they occur in the neighborhood of places at a certain
~~(#)~~ ^{distance} from the zone where Japanese troops are temporarily
stationed for the purpose of defending the zone. It goes
without saying that when these troops are withdrawn
within the zone the responsibility for defending these
latter places against bandits will cease to fall on the
Japanese forces and will again be assumed by the Chinese
authorities."

Text of the declaration.

"It will be observed that the resolution which is
before you provides for action on two separate lines (one)
to put an end to the immediate threat to peace (two) to
facilitate the final solution of existing causes of
dispute between the two countries.

The Council was glad to find during its present

~~sitting~~
~~situation~~

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

2- #857, from Paris, Dec. 8, 3 p.m.

~~Sitting~~
~~situation~~ that an inquiry into the circumstances which tend to disturb the relations between China and Japan in itself desirable, would be acceptable to the parties. The Council therefore welcomed the proposal to establish a commission which was brought before it on November 21st. The final paragraph of the resolution provides the appointment and functioning of such a commission.

I shall now make certain comments on the resolution paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraph one. This paragraph reaffirms the resolution unanimously adopted by the Council on September 30th laying particular stress on the withdrawal of the Japanese.

SHAW

CSB

(#) Omission

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

GREEN

FROM

Paris

Dated December 8, 1931

Rec'd 12:50 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

857, December 8, 3 p.m. (SECTION FIVE)

troops within the railway zone on the conditions
described therein as speedily as possible.

The Council attaches the utmost importance to
this provision and is persuaded that the two Govern-
ments will set themselves to the complete fulfillment
of the engagements which they assumed on September
30th.

Paragraph two. It is an unfortunate fact that
since the last meeting of the Council events have
occurred which have seriously aggravated the situation
and have given rise to legitimate apprehension. It
is indispensable and urgent to abstain from any
initiative which may lead to further fighting and
from all other action likely to aggravate the situation.

Paragraph four.

MET

2-#857 from Paris, December 8,
1931 (SECTION FIVE)

Paragraph four. Under paragraph four the members of the Council other than the parties are requested to continue to furnish the Council with information received from their representatives on the spot.

Such information having proved of high value in the past, the powers who have the responsibility of sending such representatives to various localities have agreed to do all that is possible to continue and improve the present system.

For this purpose these powers will keep in touch with the two parties, so that the latter may, should they so desire, indicate to them the localities to which they would desire the despatch of such representative.

Paragraph five. Provides for the institution of a commission of inquiry. Subject to its purely advisory character (END SECTION FIVE)

SHAW

WSB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

GREEN

FROM

Paris

Dated December 8, 1931

Rec'd 1:20 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

857, December 8, 3 p.m. (SECTION SIX)

the terms of reference of the commission are wide.
In principle no question which it feels called upon
to study will be excluded provided that the question
relates to any circumstances which affecting inter-
national relations, threaten to disturb peace between
China and Japan or the good understanding between
them upon which peace depends. Each of the two Gov-
ernments will have the right to request the commission
to consider any question the examination of which it
particularly desires. The commission will have full
discretion to determine the questions upon which it
will report to the Council and will have power to make
interim reports when desirable.

It is specially provided that 'should the two

parties

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#857 from Paris, December 8,
1931 (SECTION SIX)

parties initiate any negotiations, these would not fall within the scope of the terms of reference of the commission nor would it be within the competence of the commission to interfere with the military arrangements of either party.¹ This latter provision does not limit in any way its faculty of investigation. It is also clear that the commission will enjoy full liberty of movement in order to obtain the information it may require for its reports."

(END MESSAGE)

SHAW



WSB

124

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS



December 3, 1931.

MANCHURIA SITUATION



DCR

F/DEW

793.94/3116

793.94

Mr. Lippmann's article in the NEW YORK HERALD-TRIBUNE of December 1, makes a strong appeal. However, his analysis is not sufficiently comprehensive. He concentrates on Japan's use of force, the resultant violation by Japan of treaty provisions, and the consequent injury to the world's peace treaty structure.

The first objective of the American Government and of the League has been to prevent "war". In connection therewith, we have sought to restrict the sphere of Japan's military activities and to set in motion agencies which will lead to a settlement by peaceful means.

Up to date, we have accomplished a great deal. "War", that is, a declared state of war between Japan and China, has been averted. Although Japan has continued the process of forceful occupation of Manchuria, both Japan and China, instead of bringing the full force of their military machinery into action, have ^{at least} affirmed their respect for the Covenant of the League and the other peace treaties to which they are parties, and have plead their cases before the Council of the League and before various foreign offices. Far from defying the world, they have demonstrated

DEC 8 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

demonstrated that they stand considerably in awe of world opinion.

Assuming that the resolution now pending at Paris is adopted, China and Japan will have agreed to refrain from further hostilities and to resort to a process of conciliation, which may be regarded as preparatory to negotiations sooner or later to be entered into for a peaceful settlement. They will thereby have admitted that the question of peace or war between them is not of exclusive concern to themselves but is rightfully of concern to the rest of the world. They will have agreed that they will themselves try to cool off and will permit their dispute to be looked into. These things represent definite and distinct victories for the world's peace machinery. Barring future untoward developments, it will be warrantable to affirm that this peace machinery, though it has not prevented Japanese armed forces from occupying South Manchuria, has, nevertheless, put a brake upon the operations of those armed forces and prevented an armed conflict on a large scale between China and Japan.

War having been averted, the next phase of the problem is to provide for the liquidation of the situation which has been created by Japan's forceful occupation of Chinese territory. Up to now, we have been dealing with the problem of Japan's military action since September 18. The alinement has been Japan versus the world. In the
next

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

phase, we are confronted with the problem of a settlement, in relation to which the fact is that long-standing issues between China and Japan are involved and, in relation to those issues, there are faults on the part of each of the disputants. The alinement is that of China versus Japan. In relation thereto, there arises the question: To what extent shall the powers be merely observers and to what extent should they or may they furnish umpires or referees?

It stands to reason that the dispute between China and Japan cannot be left indefinitely open. It may well be doubted whether the Chinese can ever be brought to confirm the treaties and agreements of 1915; equally, whether the Japanese could ever be brought to give up their claim with regard to those treaties. The only way out would be, it appears, a new treaty. The Japanese have declared (Yoshizawa) that they will not withdraw their troops until they have been given satisfaction. The Chinese declare that they will not negotiate until the Japanese have withdrawn. The problem which confronts the powers is that of inducing Japan and China to negotiate. The object of a negotiation would, of course, be an agreement.

We need accept neither the present Japanese affirmations nor the present Chinese affirmations. There is no need to assume that either of them will, for an indefinitely protracted period, adhere absolutely to the positions which
they

- 4 -

they have announced. We may reasonably expect that time and the cooling off process and steady but patient pressure will lead in course of time to direct negotiations.

What we want most just now is insurance against further hostilities, with a consequent period of quiet in which pressure upon both of the disputants may have its effect.

This being the case, it may well be doubted whether, if the Council adopts the resolution now before it, there should, at this time or in the near future, be taken any further formal action. An announcement by the American Government and/or the Council with regard to possible further steps might easily make it more difficult to bring about a period of quiet in Manchuria and might put obstacles in the way of inducing China and Japan to negotiate. It would have a tendency to cause the Chinese Government and people to assume an increasingly recalcitrant attitude; and it would be likely to further inflame the spirit of nationalism with which the Japanese people are almost universally inspired.

Should we not base all our plans on the assumption that, notwithstanding the encouragement to be derived from evidence that the situation is calming down, there is still the possibility that there may be further trouble and one or the other or both of the disputants may become increasingly bellicose, in which event we would need to use pressure in addition to or in forms differing from that which we have already used. We need to have weapons in reserve.

At

- 5 -

At any step in the handling of a situation such as this there is the danger, on the one hand, of doing too little and, on the other hand, of doing too much. As between the two, the latter is more to be feared than the former -- for a fault of omission can often be remedied while a fault of commission is difficult and often impossible of remedy.

With the above considerations in mind, it is my view that the weapon of a possible affirmation or reservation with regard to treaties which may in course of time be negotiated between China and Japan should, for the present, be held in reserve. Just now, we should allow time in which it may be seen whether China and Japan live up to the provisions of the resolution and in which the commission may be brought into being and begin functioning. Later, it may be wise to make a declaration, in case it should become evident that Japan is making use of her military position to force a settlement in violation of treaty provisions and principles of equity.

It would seem that the step most likely to be helpful in the near future would be, as soon as the resolution of the Council has been adopted, a statement by the Secretary of State in favorable comment upon the steps which have been taken and the terms of the resolution, with a brief account of the action which has been taken by the American Government in connection therewith and an affirmation of
our

- 6 -

our intention to continue to maintain a solicitous interest in the situation and in developments looking toward a solution of the issues involved.

In the interval, if it is felt that the present situation calls for some special effort on our part, it is suggested that consideration be given to the possibility of calling attention again and at this time to the desirability of further effort toward inducing the disputants to arrange for direct negotiations to begin at an early date. Mr. Byas, in Tokyo despatch of December 3 which appears in the NEW YORK TIMES of December 4, after indicating difficulties which are being raised by the Japanese Government with regard to the League's resolution, states: "The solution of the question, as the Japanese see it, depends on the Chinese and Japanese commencing direct negotiations." Sooner or later, the inevitability of direct negotiations will, it is believed, be recognized. For the United States to urge this view at this time would require delicate handling, for the reason that, as the Japanese insist upon and the Chinese are fearful of that procedure, pressure with regard to it by an outside power may have the appearance of giving support to Japan; but, if at all times there is coupled with talk regarding "direct negotiations" the qualification "with neutral observers or referees", the reasonableness of the opinion cannot be challenged. To induce the disputants to adopt that procedure should, it is believed, be our constant objective.

SKH

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

RECEIVED

DEC 5 1931

December 5, 1931

MANCHURIA SITUATIONA. Present Problem

1. It looks as though the moment is fast approaching when the Powers will have either to "put up or shut up".

If the League "shuts up", it is altogether likely that it and its friends will affirm that its "failure" has been due to the fact that (a) the United States is not a member and (b) the United States has not adequately cooperated.

2. It is now absolutely clear that the Japanese objective is complete Japanese administrative control of South Manchuria and that Japan does not intend to be deterred by treaty obligations or moral suasion. She has occupied South Manchuria, she intends to round out her position there, and her various spokesmen have sufficiently announced that she does not intend to relax her military grip until there has been concluded with China an agreement satisfactory to Japan. It is all but clear that she will assent to no Resolution of the League the provisions of which would in any way penalize her or impose real restraints upon her.

It is reasonable to believe that the authorities in Japan who are responsible for the course which that

country

FILED
 DEC 8 1931



F/DEM

793.94/3117

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

See
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noted
 [initials]

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

country has followed have at no time taken seriously the obligations of the Covenant of the League and of the Nine Powers Treaty and of the Pact of Paris. At any rate, they have now been willing to disregard them. It appears that they deliberately chose as the moment for doing so a moment when they might assume that the preoccupations and perplexities of the Foreign Governments most likely to take those obligations seriously would prevent those Governments from taking vigorous action. Those Japanese authorities, having launched their drive in Manchuria, thereafter felt their way and have been confirmed in their estimate. They of course knew that the Powers would not use armed force against them. They have assumed that the Powers will not employ "economic sanctions." They have found so far that the Powers do not even seem inclined to charge them formally and publicly with having violated law or treaty. They have found the Powers accepting diplomatic assurances, in general and in particular, and, when confronted with action utterly inconsistent with the latter, going no further than calling attention to the assurances already made or asking for new ones.

3. Japan has throughout this matter waged two campaigns: one against China, military; the other against the Powers, diplomatic. She has won in the former every battle; and she has at no point been defeated in the latter. She has in reference to both taken a position which no other Power concedes

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

cedes, namely, that her conflict with China is hers and China's business only and is of no rightful concern to other Powers. Her diplomacy has been directed to preventing interference. It has been essentially successful.

It may now easily happen that, unless the Powers take more vigorous action than they have at any time so far shown themselves inclined to take their whole effort will be stultified. Can the Powers afford to permit Japan to win a complete diplomatic victory over the whole world? Can they individually contemplate with equanimity and without further effort to prevent it a complete defiance of the League and of the United States by one aggressive Power? Can they afford to leave the settlement of the present issue regarding Manchuria to Japan and China alone -- on the basis of Japan's military occupation?

4. Assuming either a further military movement on Japan's part and/or a deadlock on the Resolution now pending in Paris, what can the Powers do? The question is put in reference to immediate, not to ultimate action.

3. There remain still at least three possible courses:

(a) The Powers could join in a public denunciation of Japan as a law-breaker. This would be painful to Japan, but it would not be likely to cause her to desist from what she is doing or to undo what she has done.

(b) The Powers could join in serving notice that they will
recognize

- 4 -

no treaties which Japan may wring from China under the pressure of military occupation. That would in all probability have no immediate effect in relation to the objective at this moment under consideration, namely that of restraining Japan and causing her to accept the terms of the Resolution the fate of which now hangs in the balance. Its possible effect would lie in the future.

(c) The Powers could arrange among themselves to serve notice of and to prepare to put into effect as from a given date an economic boycott of Japan -- unless before another given date Japan shall have agreed to reasonable provisions drawn up in the interval by the Powers.

— The subject of an economic boycott will be discussed in a separate memorandum.

Sketch

MP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

Paris

Date

FROM

Rec'd 2:50 p.m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEC 14 1931

DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
DEC 9 1931
Department of State

Secretary of State,
Washington.

858, December 8, 4 p.m. (SECTION ONE)
FROM AMBASSADOR DAVES.

Following is report from Sweetser.

"Sze informed drafting committee this morning that he had sent two cables yesterday to Nanking but had not yet had a reply. Cecil then informed him that a public meeting was scheduled for tomorrow afternoon. It was planned to present the resolution as it stands with the possible transfer to the declaration of the last paragraph of paragraph five. Similarly the President's statement would be made as it stood with the possible addition of this paragraph and also of a new and somewhat narrower text on police action. He told Sze that this text on police action would be submitted him in advance so that he would have time to prepare any comment he might wish to make. He also emphasized that the committee must get away from the constant redrafting of details to a final settlement of the substance.

Colban urged Sze not to make any declaration which would force the Japanese to withdraw their agreement
on

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MP

2-#858, From Paris, Dec.8, 1931

on the resolution. Sze replied he would do his utmost to avoid controversy but he had instructions and must protect China's interest. Cecil expressed fullest confidence in Sze (END SECTION ONE)

SHAW

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LAM

A portion of this telegram
 must be closely paraphrased
 before being communicated ^{FROM}
 to anyone.

PARIS

Dated December 8, 1931

Rec'd 4:30 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

852, December 8, 4 p.m. (SECTION TWO)
 whose
 handling of the case so far had been very conciliatory
 and skillful.

After Sze's departure Drummond explained that the
 Japanese were still undecided whether they preferred
 to have the clause on police measures in the declara-
 tion or to make a statement of their own. Cecil thought
 the new draft better than the original, for the very
 important reason that the Council was not obligated by
 it to express an opinion on the matter but simply stated
 what the Japanese had declared. Drummond urged that
 the final text be approved by the twelve this afternoon
 and formally adopted by the Council tomorrow in the hope
 of preventing a catastrophe at Chinchow. (END GRAY)

Then followed an intimate exchange of views on fu-
 ture action. Madariaga asked if it would not be possible
 for the Council to do something more than simply pass
 the resolution and go home trusting to good fortune.
 Cecil stated that the British Ambassador to Tokyo had
 sent

mam

2- #858, section two, from Paris,
December 8, 1931

sent an alarming telegram after a conversation with Shidehara to the effect that he could not escape the conviction that the Japanese had in mind something more serious even than an attack on Chinchow. Drummond equally reported a serious impression which he had gained from the Japanese delegation. He felt that the Japanese Government would settle tomorrow if it had the power but unfortunately it did not. Colban said that Japan did not seem to be any better in this respect than China. Cecil said he did not know

(END SECTION TWO)

SHAW

CSE

MAM

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be _____
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone.

PARIS

Dated December 8, 1931

FROM

Rec'd 4 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

958, December 8, 4 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

that there was much choice as there seemed to be no
government in China and two governments in Japan.

Madariaga again asked if the Council could go
home with a good conscience simply leaving a resolu-
tion behind. Cecil said he was ready to stay till
Christmas if he thought it would help but unfortu-
nately the decision seemed not to be in their hands.
Madariaga wondered if the Council could not create a
sort of permanent committee of the President and two
or three members to follow the situation and keep in
touch with the parties. The others seemed to feel
however that this would not have much effect on Japan
but might even be embarrassing to the Council in case
of an incident. They thought it would be better to ad-
journ on the resolution with an appearance of confidence
that every thing was going to be all right and then if
that confidence were deceived to reconvene in wholly
new circumstances. Cecil thought it might be useful to
consider

mam

2- #858, section three, from Paris
December 8, 1931

consider the issuing of a statement setting out the military position as reported by the neutral observers. This statement could express the opinion that there was no danger of a Chinese attack upon the Japanese and the conference (*) that there was no danger of a Japanese attack on the Chinese. The League after all has only two weapons, first, pressure which the governments did not seem ready to apply and, second, world public opinion which should be fully informed. Cecil thought the Council might consider a statement somewhat on the lines foreseen in article 15 and it was agreed to see if it would be possible to draft something this afternoon which would be informing to public opinion and not offensive to the Japanese. Colban asked what the situation of the United States was at the moment. Cecil said he hoped that that government might take some action regarding Chinchow such as the twelve considered last night but that he did not know whether or not they would".

(END OF MESSAGE)

CSB

SHAW


(*) apparent omission

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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
rh

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. FROM



Dated December 8, 1931

Rec'd. 8:34 pm



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 SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

860, December 8, 10 pm

FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES

Have just returned from my call on Briand. Drummond and Leger were also present. The program which has been agreed upon is that at the public meeting tomorrow afternoon the resolution will be introduced and voted upon unless at that time either Japan or China would ask that the vote be held up until the next day because messages now expected from the governments have not arrived. Whether the vote is taken or not at the open meeting tomorrow afternoon the resolution will be offered and, of course, made public to the world. In case either China or Japan ask for a delay of the vote because its answer has not been received by the time of the meeting tomorrow afternoon the vote will not be delayed longer than the next day. It is expected, however, that both China and Japan will have received their

final

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DEC 18 1931

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

rh #2 of No. 860 from Paris

final instructions before the open meeting tomorrow afternoon.

After the vote the Council will adjourn subject to the call of the chairman.

I explained to Briand the steps you had taken along the line of his letter to Shidehara and in your interview with Debuchi, telling him that I expected to receive an aide memoire of this interview. He expressed appreciation.

It is the expectation to hold the meeting above-mentioned and carry out the above program whether or not there is a military explosion in Manchuria between now and tomorrow afternoon. In answer to my inquiry as to whether he had any suggestions to make to me which I could transmit to you as possibly helpful in a common situation which would call for statements both from us and the League, Briand said that he would wait until after the discussion at the closed meeting of the Council tomorrow morning which to some extent would influence his own views. If after that meeting and before the five o'clock public meeting any suggestions occurred to him of this kind he would let me know.

At a

rh #3 of No. 860 from Paris

At a quarter to six before I called on Briand, Matsudaira^{ai} called again. I made a strong statement of your certainty of the extremely adverse effect to Japan upon public sentiment in America if an advance by the Japanese upon Chinchow was made. He said that he understood this and was striving in every way he could to prevent such an advance. He explained that public sentiment was running very high in his country since the public believes that the Japanese troops were stopped in their advance upon Chinchow because of Wellington Koo's agreement that the Chinese troops would be withdrawn south of the Wall. He said that he personally understood the facts about the alleged Wellington Koo offer but that the Japanese public did not understand them and felt that Japan had been tricked into the troop withdrawal. He also explained that in making the offer of a neutral zone, his Government informed him that it was not their intention, if the Chinese moved south of the Wall, to advance their troops beyond the railway zone. This, however, is water over the dam. I have the impression from my talk with Matsudaira that Japan is going to agree to the resolution. Matsudaira said that direct negotiations

concerning

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

rh # 4 of No. 860 from Paris

concerning the Chinchow situation were now going on between
Japan and China at Peiping.

SHAW

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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FROM GREEN

Paris

Dated December 8, 1931

Rec'd 8:50 p. m.


Secretary of State,
 Washington.

861, December 8, 11 p. m. (SECTION ONE)
 FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES.

Following is report from Sweetser:

"Drummond tonight following General Dawes' interview with Briand transmitted the following suggestion as to possible action which the American Government might helpfully take should it feel so inclined:

One. That it would be very helpful if the Government found it possible to say that it attached particular importance to the proposed commission, that it had noted with sympathy the suggestion that an American citizen be included amongst the members, and that should the Council decide to give effect to this suggestion it would look with favor upon the appointment. Some such statement as this would be useful not only in a general way but also to set at rest certain rumors which only this afternoon were brought



F/DEW 793.94/3120

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- 2 - No. 861 from Paris - section one -

brought forward by a member the Council, Scialoja that the American Government had changed its views in this regard.

Second, that the American Government felt that the appointment of this commission and the launching of a far reaching program of study and conciliation ought to contribute greatly to an appeasement of spirit and especially
(END SECTION ONE)

SHAW

JS

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WP

FROM GREEN

Paris

Dated December 8, 1931

Rec'd 8:55 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

861, December 8, 11 p. m. (SECTION TWO)
to the removal of the danger of more extensive armed
conflict.

Third, that the publication of reports from
American military observers either in Paris or Washington
as is the practice of certain other governments would
contribute greatly to dispelling the many **false** rumors
constantly circulating as to the military situation and
to informing World public opinion of the exact situation.

Drummond particularly stressed that these suggest-
ions were put forth only most tentatively and with full
realization that for one reason or another they might
not be found practicable.

Subsequent also to General Dawes' visit the
Japanese delegation asked if the public meeting scheduled
for tomorrow afternoon could not be postponed because of
their lack of instructions. It was explained to them

that

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



CORRECTED COPY PAGE TWO

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2- #861, section two, from Paris,
December 9, 1931

that while it would be very inconvenient to postpone the meeting entirely and perhaps even unnecessary in view of the fact that their instructions might still arrive, it would be possible to postpone it after the reading of the resolution and the declaration provided they found it necessary at that moment to so request. They agreed to this arrangement.

Previously at a meeting of the twelve it had been agreed that tomorrow's session would begin the reading of the resolution and the declaration. It was hoped that a vote might be taken straight away before a declaration by either party but it was not thought that it would turn out

(END SECTION TWO)

JS

SHAW

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- 2 - No. 861 from Paris - section two -

checked
that while it would be very inconvenient to postpone the meeting entirely and perhaps even unnecessary in view of the fact that their instructions might still arrive, it would be impossible to postpone it after the reading of the resolution and the declaration provided they found it necessary at that moment to so request. They agreed to this arrangement.

Previously at a meeting of the twelve it had been agreed that tomorrow's session would begin the reading of the resolution and the declaration. It was hoped that a vote might be taken straight away before a declaration by either party but it was not thought that it would turn out

(END SECTION TWO)

SHAW

JS

see corrected copy
12/28/31
[Signature]

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WP

GREEN

FROM Paris

Dated December 8, 1931

Rec'd 10:25 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

861, December 8, 11 p. m. (SECTION THREE)
to be possible to do so. If not, the two parties would
make declarations on which the other members of the Council
would comment just as little as possible. The only decla-
ration other than those the parties which is now mentioned
would be that from Latin America members to the effect
that the protection of railway investments and property by
military action, which had been mentioned in one of the
Japanese communications should not be accepted as a principle
of international relations. Thereafter when the specific
affairs of Manchuria had been terminated, the President
would make a broad general declaration as to the advisabil-
ity of necessity for peaceful settlement of international
disputes, the avoidance all sorts of force and the guaran-
tee of treaties.

The twelve also had a final report from Cecil on the
last meetings of the Drafting Committee with Ito and Sze.

The only

- 2 - No. 861 from Paris - section three -

The only comments made were on the new ~~clause~~ regarding police measures, the joint sentence of which both Fotich and Mutius thought committed the Council to an indorsement rather than a mere statement of the Japanese view-point. A slight change was suggested to meet this difficulty. "a further exchange also took place on ^{Madariaga's} ~~Madariaga's~~ efforts to prevent nationals of only the five great powers from being members of the Commission. While it was recognized that the members must be chosen predominantly for their personal capacities and not for their nationality, it was the consensus of opinion that the only practical way to find the best available men and make the best balanced Commission would

(END SECTION THREE)

SHAW

JS

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WP

FROM GRAY

Paris

Dated December 8, 1931

Rec'd 8:03 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

861, December 8, 11 p. m. (SECTION FOUR)
would be to intrust the choice to the President with the
assistance of the Secretary General. The parties would
of course be consulted to be sure that no one wholly
unacceptable to them was appointed and the member of the
Council would be informed of the final choices.

At a previous meeting of the drafting Committee
Cecil stated that Matsudaira had told him that he was
authorized to say that Japan did not intend to occupy
Chinchow. He conveyed the impression to Cecil that
Japanese troops would not go there unless they were
drawn in, that is to say, unless a considerable Chinese
concentration took place and they were obliged in self
defense to attack.

(END MESSAGE).

SHAW

OX

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

D-140

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE

American Consulate General,
Nanking, China.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DEC 23 1931
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
November 11, 1931

Subject: Sino-Japanese Controversy

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of a memorandum of my conversation with the Minister of Finance on October 30, 1931, in the course of which he asked that I suggest to the Department the desirability of holding the next meeting of the Council of the League of Nations at Geneva, instead of at Paris. A copy of this memorandum was sent to the American Minister at Shanghai, and it is my understanding that he telegraphed to the Department on the subject of Mr. T. V. Soong's request. Mr. Johnson has asked me to tell Mr. Soong that Mr. Johnson has sent such a telegram, but that he is doubtful whether the American Government

will

- 2 -

will wish to make a suggestion of this sort in League circles. Owing to Mr. Soong's absence from Nanking, I have been unable to deliver this message to him.


The Department will note that Mr. Soong is apprehensive lest M. Briand may not take in Paris the same position toward the Sino-Japanese controversy which he took in Geneva. As Mr. Soong explained his idea, in Paris M. Briand will be more subject to pressure from the French Government to accomplish the objectives of the French Government, rather than those of the League, and Mr. Soong especially feared the influence of the French Naval authorities, who desire to work in close understanding with Japan. I did not at that time press Mr. Soong for an explanation of his apprehension, but I subsequently concluded that he had been informed that Japanese representatives in the disarmament committee of the Assembly of the League had given open support to the French position in regard to naval limitation. I venture to enclose herewith a copy, in excerpt, of a report to this effect published in THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, of September 28, 1931.

In

- 3 -

In this connection I may observe that in recent days I have heard two Chinese officials on separate occasions refer to a report, apparently credited by them, that the United States is reluctant to oppose Japanese pretensions in Manchuria, because of a promise of some sort made by the American Government to Japan in connection with Japan's participation in the Conference on Naval Limitation in 1930. It is a picturesque concept on the part of the Chinese that the Japanese Navy is fighting Japan's diplomatic battles on the plains of Manchuria.

Respectfully yours,



Willys R. Peck.
American Consul General.

✓
Enclosure:

- 1 - Memorandum, dated October 30, 1931.
- 2 - Excerpt from an article in The Christian Science Monitor, September 18, 1931, "Japan Insists on Conditions in Arms Truce".

In duplicate to the Legation.
In quintuplicate to the Department.

800

WRP:ECH

Memorandum of Conversation

October 30, 1931.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Controversy in Manchuria.

Mr. T. V. Soong, Minister of Finance
Mr. Willys R. Peck.

Mr. Peck called on Mr. T. V. Soong at his residence at twelve noon on a matter of business.

When the business in hand was disposed of Mr. Soong asked Mr. Peck what the United States had done in regard to the resolution passed by the Council of the League of Nations on October 24, 1931. He said that he had heard a report that the American Government had adhered to this resolution.

Mr. Peck said that he had not been given any information regarding any position, or action, taken by the American Government in connection with the resolution in question, but he supposed that the American Government was in sympathy with the resolution, since the American Government had been so closely identified with the activities of the Council of the League relating to the Sino-Japanese Controversy in Manchuria.

Mr. Peck referred, in this connection, to the request made by the Chinese Government two or three days before that certain members of the League and the United States send civil and military officers to Manchuria to observe the handing over by the Japanese troops to the Chinese authorities of areas occupied by the Japanese. Mr. Peck asked Mr. Soong whether any of the other nations had informed the Chinese Government whether they intended to send such observers. Mr. Soong said that no replies had been received from other

governments

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governments and he inquired whether the American Government had made any announcement in this regard. Mr. Peck replied that the State Department had telegraphed to the American Minister, stating that since the request of the Chinese Government was based upon a resolution passed by the Council of the League of Nations, the State Department did not wish to take the initiative in the matter, but preferred that the nations who are members of the League should take such initiative.

Mr. Soong referred to the fact, as reported in the newspapers, that the Council of the League would re-convene on November 16th in Paris, and not in Geneva. He said that this report occasioned him considerable anxiety. Mr. Soong explained this by observing that Monsieur Briand when serving as President of the Council during the recent meetings in Geneva had taken a stand which was not in accordance with the traditional policy of the French Government. Mr. Soong thought that Monsieur Briand might not, in Paris, take the same position toward the Sino-Japanese Controversy which he took in Geneva. He said that, for one thing, the French Naval clique felt that the Japanese navy must be supported. Moreover, Mr. Soong said, he did not like the attitude of the French press. He said that the French press had to be "arranged" and it was not the custom of the Chinese to make such arrangements. He said he was quite satisfied with the attitude of the French Government toward the Sino-Japanese Controversy, but he did not like the attitude of the French press.

Mr. Peck

-3-

Mr. Peck remarked to Mr. Soong that the French Minister was still in Nanking. Mr. Soong confirmed this and said that Monsieur Wilden was very helpful. He repeated this two or three times.

Mr. Soong inquired whether Mr. Peck would be willing to "drop a hint" to the Department of State in regard to holding the next meeting of the Council of the League at Geneva instead of at Paris. Mr. Peck said that he would be very glad to telegraph the point of view of Mr. Soong.

WRP/D/T

The Christian Science Monitor

September 28, 1931.

JAPAN INSISTS ON CONDITIONS IN ARMS TRUCE

Agrees With French Policy on Right to Complete
Present Programs

By Erwin D. Canham

Staff Correspondent

By Cable to The Christian Science Monitor

GENEVA, Sept. 28.--Opposition of France, Japan and their allies today prevented the other powers from passing a recommendation for an armaments truce in the League's Assembly disarmament committee. This truce by progressive dilution has become a mere shadow of the original proposal of Signor Dino Grandi, Italian Foreign Minister.

Instead of specifically limiting new construction and expenditure in air, naval and land categories along the lines urged by Italy, the committee had already capitulated to the big armaments group and recommended merely that the nations "avoid any new scheme likely to increase their annual expenditure on armaments" during the coming year.

But even this was too strict for France, Poland, and Japan. These powers wished a mere pious declaration of an armaments truce, leaving every detail out. Under this declaration it is clear every Government could proceed to multiply its weapons of war just as it chose.

Viscount Cecil of Chelwood, backed by Mr. Hugh R. Wilson of the United States, attempted to define the truce as an undertaking of the governments not to seek

increase

-2-

increase in armaments beyond existing levels "so as to disturb the existing levels "so as to disturb the existing proportion of armaments between the different countries."

But both Mr. Francis Sokal of Poland and Mr. Naotake Sato of Japan found ample arguments to combat the Anglo-American thesis. Mr. Sato in particular urged that governments be permitted not only to complete existing programs, but vote new programs of armament construction. In two passages Mr. Sato definitely defended the French policy while M. René Massigli of France was enabled to remain silent on delicate points.

Mr. Sato insisted the countries must be permitted to complete building of fortifications already started, considered as direct reference to the French line of concrete and steel extending from Flanders to Switzerland and from Switzerland to the Mediterranean.

February Alliance Forecast

Then Mr. Sato defended the French right to replace obsolete ships. In this speech and many times recently it has become clear that France and Japan will be close allies in next February's General Disarmament Conference. Because of their attitude, the committee was forced to refer the holiday proposal back to the drafting committee, from which a mere declaration urging an armaments truce upon nations is expected to merge with all possible "teeth" extracted.

~~By an apt coincidence a memorandum showing the state of Polish armaments recently arrived at Geneva and will be~~

published

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

December 19, 1931.

~~M.H.H.~~
~~S.K.H.~~
~~R.S.M.~~
~~C.H.B.~~

The first enclosure with this despatch is a translation of the reply of the Japanese Government ~~to~~ to two protests of the Chinese Government dated September 20 and September 24, against the Japanese activities in Manchuria. The last part of this translation, which I have marked, is interesting.

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
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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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
AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,
Nanking, China.

November 7, 1931.



The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.



Sir:

I have the honor to enclose with this despatch copies, in quintuplicate, of my despatch No. L-129 dated November 7, 1931, to the American Minister at Shanghai entitled "Sino-Japanese Controversy in Manchuria".

Respectfully yours,

Willys R. Peck,
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

As stated.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gutzfom NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. L-129

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE

American Consulate General,
Nanking, China.

November 7, 1931.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Controversy
in Manchuria.

Honorable Nelson Trusler Johnson,
American Minister,
Shanghai.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose herewith a translation of a telegram dated November 4, 1931, from the Chinese Minister in Tokyo to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

This translation was sent to me by the Chief of the Department of Intelligence and Publicity of the Foreign Office and reached me at 9 p.m. on November 6, 1931.

I have the honor to enclose, also, a copy of a reply addressed by the Chinese Delegate to the League Council, Dr. Alfred Sze, to Sir Eric Drummond on November 4, 1931, commenting on the Japanese Government's reply to the identic telegram of Pact of Paris signatories to China and Japan. This copy was obtained from the same source as the document referred to above, and

reached

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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reached me on November 6, 1931.

Neither document has been telegraphed to the
Department of State.

Respectfully yours,

Willys R. Peck,
American Consul General.

✓
Enclosures:

- 1/ Translation of telegram dated November 4,
1931, from the Chinese Minister in Tokyo
to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- 2/ Copy of reply from Dr. Alfred Sze to Sir
Eric Drummond on November 4, 1931.

Copy to the American Minister, Shanghai.
Copy to the Legation at Peiping.
In quintuplicate to the Department.

800

WRP:MCL

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch to the Legation No. L-129
 of Willys R. Peck, American Consul General at Nanking,
 China, dated November 7, 1931, entitled "Sino-Japanese
 Controversy in Manchuria".

For Private and confidential information

Telegram from Mr. Chiang Tso-ping, Chinese Minister to Tokyo
 (Translation)

Waichiaopu Nanking

Following note dated November 2 received from the Japanese Foreign Office in reply to our three protests of September 20 and September 24. "Regarding the action of Japanese troops in Manchuria, the protest contained in the three notes under reply is without foundation. Your Excellency must have already taken note of the statement of the Japanese Government dated September 24, the memorandum addressed to the Waichiaopu by the Japanese Minister in China on October 9, as well as the note addressed to Your Excellency on the same date. It is not necessary to reiterate their contents. Your Excellency's note of September 20 contains the request that the Japanese Government will assume full responsibility for the safety of Chinese residents in Japan and Korea, and states that the Chinese Government on its part will do everything in its power for the protection of Japanese residents. As regards the protection of Chinese residents, since the beginning of the incident the Japanese authorities concerned have, as it is well known, sought to provide the best and most effective arrangements. On the contrary, Japanese lives, property and interests in China have been subject to various aggressions under a violent anti-Japanese movement. The purpose of Your Excellency's communication does not agree with the situation to which the Japanese Minister in China in the above-mentioned memorandum of October 9 requested the Chinese Government to give its careful attention. The Japanese Government is constrained again to request the Chinese Government to awaken to its obligations. The present Manchurian incident is not merely an accidental phenomenon. There is no questioning the fact that its cause lies in the illegal anti-Japanese movement in China during the recent years.

For the sake of a solution it is necessary to correct the weaknesses of the present situation as mentioned in the various statements of the Japanese Government. The Japanese Government hopes that the Chinese Government will agree to its point of view and effectively cooperate with the Japanese Government to effect a reasonable fundamental adjustment in the spirit of mutual existence and glory, so that the peace of the Far East will be permanently maintained.

(Signed) Chiang Tso-ping

November 4, 1931.

Enclosure No. 2 to despatch to the Legation No. I-129
of Willys R. Peck, American Consul General at Nanking,
China, dated November 7, 1931, entitled "Sino-Japanese
Controversy in Manchuria".

The following is the substance of the reply addressed
yesterday (4th) by Dr. Alfred Sze to Sir Eric Drummond,
commenting on the Japanese Government's reply to the identic
telegram of Paris Pact signatories to China and Japan:

1. The Japanese Government alleges that the occupation of
Chinese territory is a self-defensive measure. The Chinese
Government has repeatedly denied that Japanese soldiers had
been attacked by Chinese soldiers and pointed out that no
Chinese soldiers had been suffered by the Japanese troops
to approach the railway zone. So long as the Japanese Govern-
ment is unwilling to agree to an impartial enquiry - the only
method compatible with the League of Nations principles and
practice of establishing the question of responsibility -
it is difficult for the world opinion to accept the
Japanese version. In any case, seizing strategic points
in the territory of another country on the plea of self-
defense cannot be regarded as a behaviour compatible with
the League of Nations Covenant. The words of Messrs.
Briand, Chamberlain and Ishii at the special Council meeting
in 1925 may be quoted:

"Monsieur Briand had understood the representative of
Greece to indicate that all these incidents would not
have arisen if Greece had not been called upon to take
rapid steps for legitimate defence and protection. It was
essential that such ideas should not take root in
the minds of the nations which were League members and
become a kind of jurisprudence, for it would be extremely

dangerous.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

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dangerous. Under the pretext of legitimate defence, disputes might arise which, though limited in extent, were extremely unfortunate owing to the damage entailed. These disputes, once they had broken out, might assume such proportions that the Government which had started them under the feeling of legitimate defence, would no longer be able to control them. Sir Austen Chamberlain expressed his complete concurrence with all Monsieur Briand had said. Mr. Ishii said that he entirely agreed with Sir Austen's statement endorsing Monsieur Briand's declaration"

If the real intention of the Japanese Government is to make the withdrawal dependent only upon the security of the lives and property of its nationals, the Chinese Government strongly emphasises the desire to give such guarantees in the fullest measure and to accept without limit the Council's help in the devising and carrying out of local arrangements.

2. The Chinese Government is glad to note the Japanese Government's declaration to compose differences by all pacific means. But the Japanese troops are still occupying the Chinese territory. Monsieur Briand's observations on October 24 must be quoted:

"The League indeed is the trustee of obligations assumed by its members and it is obviously its duty to see that those obligations are honored. Article 10 of the Covenant states that all members of the family of nations agree to respect each other's territorial integrity and political independence. Article 2 of the Paris Pact says: 'The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature

or

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Huston NARS, Date 12-18-75

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or origin shall never be settled except by pacific means.' I don't wish to dwell upon it but think that public opinion would find it difficult to admit that military occupation could be assigned to the category of pacific means. I think military occupation falls outside of that class, and therefore the prolongation of occupation also involves the prolongation of the feeling of uneasiness which has already lasted too long."

3. The Chinese Government is surprised at the Japanese Government's contention that the boycott movement is contrary to Article 2 of the Paris Pact, for if the Paris Pact could be held to condemn the refusal of private Chinese to buy Japanese goods, it must a fortiori condemn a Government keeping its armies in the territory of a fellow-signatory to the Paris Pact. The anti-Japanese feeling is a direct, natural, inevitable result of the Japanese army in Manchuria and, as soon as the cause of hostility is removed, will die down. The Chinese Government is determined to protect the lives and property of the Japanese subjects and do everything to promote the good relations with Japan and to lay a foundation for permanent peace in the Far East. The Chinese Government is anxious at the earliest possible moment to conclude a treaty with Japan providing conciliation and arbitration of all disputes.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE

American Consulate General,
Nanking, China.

EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS.

DEC 22 1931

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

November 11, 1931

Subject: Sino-Japanese Controversy

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose herewith a
Memorandum of a conversation held by me with
Dr. Chinglun Frank W. Lee, Acting Minister for
Foreign Affairs on November 9, 1931, in regard
to various aspects of the Sino-Japanese controversy
in Manchuria.

The particular occasion for the interview was
my desire to ascertain the truth or falsity of a
news report that the Chinese Government had issued
instructions to the Chinese troops in Manchuria to
resist the advance of Japanese troops. Dr. Lee
subsequently informed me that he could not discover
that there was any truth in this report.

In regard to the possible embroilment of the
Soviet Union in the present controversy in Manchuria,
Dr. Lee said that Karakhan, Vice Commissar for Foreign
Affairs, had, in speaking to the Chinese Delegate in

MOSCOW

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Moscow recently, urged that normal diplomatic relations be restored between the Soviet Government and the Chinese Government, and Dr. Lee added that as Japanese inroads might become more extensive, without any effective opposition by the League, the popular demand in China for the resumption of full, friendly relations with the Soviet Government might easily become irresistible. Dr. Lee thought that Japan, in carrying its military activities into the region of the Chinese Eastern Railway, might possibly be actuated by a desire to involve the Soviet Government in the quarrel, in order to provide a specious excuse for the non-withdrawal of Japanese troops, as required by the League Council.

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In regard to the request made by the Chinese Government of the American Government on November 2, 1931, that American observers be appointed to proceed to Manchuria in connection with the handing over of occupied regions by the Japanese forces, Dr. Lee said that Great Britain and France had orally indicated to the Foreign Office their readiness to appoint observers, but he had heard from no other Government in regard to the matter,

although

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although he had received information that
the Spanish and German Governments were
prepared to appoint observers.

Respectfully yours,

Paul W. Meyer
Willys R. Peck.
American Consul General.

✓
Enclosure:

1 - Memorandum of Conversation, dated
November 9, 1931.

In quintuplicate to the Department.
In duplicate to the Legation.
One copy to the American Minister at Nanking.

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WRP:ECH

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

November 9, 1931.

Subject: General Political Situation.

Dr. Frank W. Lee, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Mr. Peck.

Mr. Peck called upon Dr. Lee about noon and told him that he had no message to convey, but merely wished to make one or two inquiries regarding the latest developments in the situation.

Mr. Peck showed Dr. Lee a Yuo Min News Agency report dated Nanking, November 8 as follows:

"Regarding the Japanese invasion of Heilungkiang, instructions have already been telegraphed by the Central Authorities to Vice-Commander-in-Chief Chang Hsueh-liang that the Heilungkiang troops be ordered to defend their territory from attacks and preserve order in the province."

Mr. Peck observed that if it were true that the Chinese Government had issued instructions to the Chinese forces in Heilungkiang to resist the advance of the Japanese forces, this would be interesting as indicating a possible departure from the policy of "non-resistance" hitherto adopted by the Chinese Government. Mr. Peck asked Dr. Lee to take note that his inquiry was not made in any spirit of criticism, since resistance by the Chinese troops would be natural

under

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

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under the circumstances, but merely with a desire to ascertain the facts.

Dr. Lee said that he knew nothing about what lay behind the report in question, but he would investigate and inform Mr. Peck.

The conversation then turned on the recent settlement arrived at between the Delegations from Canton and from Hanking, as reported by the Kuo Min Hwa Agency under date line of Shanghai, November 8. Dr. Lee added nothing to the published account, but said that the details of the actual arrangements whereby the identic resolutions will be passed by the 4th National Kuomintang Congresses to be held in Canton and in Hanking would be carried into effect were probably known only to the Central Executive Committee of the Party, and as he was not a member of the Central Executive Committee he could not give Mr. Peck any more details.

Mr. Peck inquired whether there had been any further discussion of who should be appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs to succeed Dr. Alfred Sze, the latter having refused the post. Dr. Lee said that officially Dr. Sze is now Minister for Foreign Affairs, although he would be unable to return to China for the time being. Mr. Peck asked whether Mr. Eugene Chen stood any chance of obtaining the appointment and Dr. Lee said that possibly Mr. Eugene Chen might be demanded by a certain element in the country, who desired a more "revolutionary" diplomatic policy to be adopted by the Chinese Government. Dr. Lee said

that

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that Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo was being prominently proposed for the post of Chinese Minister to France, which rather eliminated him as candidate for the post of Minister for Foreign Affairs. He did not seem to think that Dr. C. C. Wu would be likely to receive another appointment in the near future and, in regard to himself, replying to Mr. Peck's question, he said that possibly he might be appointed Chinese Minister to Italy, but probably he would not be sent abroad until matters had been more completely adjusted in China.

Mr. Peck inquired whether it was true, as recently reported in the Press, that the Chinese delegate in Moscow, Mr. Moh Teh-hui had telegraphed to the Chinese Government strongly urging that normal diplomatic relations be restored between China and the Soviet Government. Dr. Lee replied that that report was not exactly correct. What had occurred was that the Vice Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Karakhan, in conversation with Mr. Moh Teh-hui had himself urged that normal diplomatic relations be restored. Dr. Frank Lee pointed out that as the Japanese inroads in Manchuria became more extensive, the popular demand for the resumption of normal diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia, now being made by certain factions in China, became more insistent. Dr. Lee said that some persons held the opinion that Japan was deliberately encroaching in the sphere of the Chinese Eastern Railway, in the hope that this

might

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might provoke retaliatory action by the Soviet authorities, and thus enable Japan to claim exemption from the requirements of the League Council resolution of October 24th, on the ground either that there was a war between Japan and the Soviet Republic, or that the situation was so different from what it had been that the resolution no longer applied.

Dr. Lee said that the persons who held this view also took the position that the Soviet Government would not be averse to becoming embroiled with Japan, since this would enable the Soviet Government to come out openly on behalf of China. Dr. Lee said that if things came to this pass, the demand for a resumption of normal diplomatic relations between China and the Soviet Government would probably be irresistible, for the argument then would be that whereas the League of Nations and the Signatories of the Pact of Paris had done nothing for China in its difficulties, the Soviet Government had come out openly on China's side. Dr. Lee remarked that he did not think that the Soviet Government wanted a real war with Japan, but what the Soviet Government actually desired was the resumption of normal diplomatic relations with China, so that it might have a more favorable opportunity to conduct Communist propaganda in China. Dr. Lee reminded Mr. Peck of the forecast given to Mr. Peck by Dr. Tan Shao-hua, of the Foreign Office, of possible developments in the Russian aspect of the Manchurian incident (see Mr. Peck's Telegram to the American Minister, September 23, 1931.)

Dr. Lee

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Dr. Lee inquired whether the American Minister planned to return to Nanking before November 16th. He said that it seemed now possible that the Council of the League would meet again before November 16th and that President Chiang Kai-shek would like to have the Ministers of important countries again in Nanking by, if possible, November 11th. He said that the British minister would probably be in Nanking on the 11th.

Mr. Peck said he did not know whether Mr. Johnson intended to come back to Nanking before November 16th or not. He said that after Dr. Lee had spoken to him on November 7th he had written to Mr. Johnson conveying the request that Mr. Johnson return at an earlier date than planned, but Mr. Peck said in view of the fact that the President had conveyed a special request to the British Minister, through the British Counselor, he rather inferred that it was the British Minister especially, whom the President desired to see. Dr. Lee, apparently as an after-thought, said that the President had sent for the British Counselor, Mr. Ingram, because he, the President, wished to offer to the British Minister the use of the President's airplane, in which to come from Peiping to Nanking. Dr. Lee did not say positively whether the request that Mr. Johnson return to Nanking at an earlier date was a formal request from the President, but he did recall the fact that when Mr. Johnson left Nanking he said that he would be glad to return to Nanking whenever his presence should be desired. Mr. Peck said that he would write again to Mr. Johnson in regard to this subject.

Mr. Peck

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Mr. Peek asked Dr. Lee whether he had heard from any other nation, besides Great Britain, in regard to the appointment of observers to function in Manchuria in connection with the handing back of occupied territories by the Japanese. Dr. Lee said that the French Minister had informed him orally on the night of November 6th, just before he left Nanking for Shanghai, that he, the French Minister, was prepared to appoint French observers. Moreover, Dr. Lee said, he was informed that the Spanish and German Governments were ready to appoint observers, but he had not actually heard from them on the subject.

WRP:MCL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Stutzman NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. D-144

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE

American Consulate General
Nanking, China.

November 14, 1931.

Subject: Sino-Japanese Controversy in Manchuria -
Foreign Office News Releases.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my despatch No. D-126
of October 21, 1931, transmitting translations of news
releases issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in
regard to the Sino-Japanese controversy in Manchuria.

There are enclosed herewith translations of twenty
additional news releases, issued between October 20 and
November, inclusive. While few of these releases contain
actual information which has not been received from other
sources, this office feels that they may be of interest to
the Department, and to the Legation in Peiping, as showing
the picture of the present controversy which is being
painted by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs for its
own people day by day.

Respectfully yours,

For the Consul General,

Paul W. Meyer
Paul W. Meyer
American Consul.

Enclosures:

As described.

5 copies to the Department
2 copies to the Legation
1 copy to the American Minister, Nanking.

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F/DEW 793.94/5124

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No.D-144 of Willys R. Peck,
American Consul General at Nanking, China, dated November
14, 1931, on the subject "Sino-Japanese Controversy
in Manchuria - Foreign Office News Releases".

Press Release Issued by the
Chinese Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Unofficial (Translation) October 20, 1931.

JAPAN'S DECEPTIVE ARGUMENTS ANSWERED

Japanese troops responsible for banditry,
if any, in Manchuria.

On October 19, the Chinese Government telegraphed Geneva,
refuting Japan's statements regarding the attack on Chin-
chow and other places by the native bandits and runaway
soldiers. The telegram briefly stated:

"The Japanese planes reconnoitered and bombarded
Chinchow and other places without any reason. Their
pretext that the Chinese were unable to suppress
bandits and runaway soldiers is absolutely without
ground. It can be easily proved by facts that the
places which the Japanese pointed out as those of
banditry, really had no banditry, but only peace
before September 18. Now, they say certain terri-
tories have bandits. Even if some of those points
do have bandits, they are under the occupation and
control of the Japanese army. Thus, (1) the bandits
exist under the protection of the Japanese army, and
(2) they cannot be put out by the Chinese, for they
are beyond the control of the latter. Basing on these
two grounds, the responsibility for the existence of
bandits at certain places should rest upon the Japanese.

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As to the runaway soldiers alleged by the Japanese, the Chinese troops that originally stayed at the places now occupied by the Japanese army, have all been compelled to withdraw therefrom in order to avoid a clash with the Japanese soldiers. If the Japanese mean the Chinese troops at Tahushan, Koupangtze, Chihhsien, Yihchow, Pung-woo and Hailung, those troops have always been there to patrol the frontier and are not runaways.

"Also, the places where the Japanese dropped bombs were within the city borders, and were business as well as residential districts. They have flung bombs at the populace. The statement that they did not bombard cities and residents is certainly untrue, etc."

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure

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Press Release Issued by the
Chinese Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Unofficial

(Translation)

October 20, 1931.

RUSSIAN PRESS STATES THAT JAPAN'S
INVASION INTO MANCHURIA AND MONGOLIA WOULD
PROVIDE FOR A NEW BASE FOR JAPAN TO OPPOSE SOVIET RUSSIA

Vladivostok, 19.--Russian Press recently stated that Japan will invade Mongolia after having seized Manchuria in order to become the 'World Capitalist' and will use them as a new base to oppose Soviet Russia. The laboring class in Soviet Russia are angry with this, especially those living in the Far East. Besides paying close attention to the development of the Manchurian affair, the resolutions adopted at the meetings of all labor unions have been made public during recent days.

Enclosure

-3-

Press Release Issued by the
Chinese Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Unofficial (Translation) October 21, 1931.

ACTIVITIES OF JAPANESE AT HANKOW.

From Hankow correspondent, Oct. 21.--Since the occurrence of the Manchurian incident, Japanese have been making positive military preparations in Hankow Settlement. Information from reliable sources is to the effect that:

(1) The Japanese Police Office searches residences of Chinese inhabitants under the pretext that they are making a sanitary inspection. It is observed that their so doing is to prevent Chinese residing in the Japanese Settlement from hiding munitions. Recently, they have not allowed Chinese soldiers to enter the Settlement, even when these soldiers are not armed.

(2) In order to facilitate delivery of confidential messages, the Japanese Consulate General has recently received from Japan despatching and receiving telegraph sets which were shipped to Hankow by a Japanese gun boat. The Japanese Government is directly informed of all important news.

(3) Japanese residents at Chungking all came to Hankow on October 15 by S/S YunYang Maru. On October 17, S/S Tang Yang Maru was sent to Chungking to transport Japanese sailors at that port to Hankow. These sailors will be used to garrison the Japanese Settlement.

(4)

-2-

(4) Japanese firms try in every way possible to prevent Chinese employees from tendering resignation or going on strike. Private arrangements are being made to prevent this by force if necessary.

(5) The Administration Commission of Japanese Residents at Hankow very recently decided to despatch the following two telegrams:-

- (a) To the Japanese Government: forcibly rejecting interference by a third party in the Sino-Japanese negotiations concerning Manchuria and Mongolia; accusing Japanese Foreign Minister for his alleged weakness in handling diplomatic negotiations; and giving absolutely no recognition to the participation of the United States in the meeting of the League of Nations Council.
- (b) To Geneva: asking Yoshizawa to insist upon direct negotiations with China; withdrawing troops from Manchuria after safety of Japanese residents has been adequately assured; expressing in difference to the possible necessity of Japan's withdrawing from League membership if the League of Nations does not accept Japan's proposals.

Enclosure

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Press Release Issued by the
Chinese Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Unofficial

(Translation)

October 21, 1931.

JAPAN MAKES CAPITAL OF BANDITS TO
DISTURB THE CHINESE EASTERN RAILWAY

Blagovestchensk, 14.--Russian press stated that a big band of bandits has attacked the railway guards at the Ilikete (?) Station on the western line of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Both sides had losses. It is reported that the bandits establish their strongholds in the Cha Mien Company (?), Siao Ling Tze. Munitions and provisions are supplied to them by the Japanese. Russian Whites and Mogolian outlaws are recruited and are organized in large bands with a view to disturbing the peace of the Chinese Eastern Railway.

Enclosure

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Press Release Issued by the
Chinese Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Unofficial (Translation) October 21, 1931.

ITALY DECIDES TO PUT THROUGH THE RECOM-
MENDATIONS OF THE LEAGUE

Has held negotiations with delegates
of other nations

Rome, October 21.--Italian Foreign Minister returned to Rome on October 20, and made a report to Signor Mussolini on the action taken by the League of Nations Council relating to the Sino-Japanese controversy. Mussolini considered the League's action reasonable. It is heard that the Italian Government will put through the recommendations of the League, and that negotiations have been held with the delegates of other nations in this regard.

Enclosure

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Press Release Issued by the
Chinese Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Unofficial

(Translation)

October 22, 1951.

DR. ALFRED SZE LAYS BEFORE THE LEAGUE CHINA'S
DEMANDS CONCERNING THE SETTLEMENT OF
MANCHURIAN INCIDENT

League considers that Japan should assume the
responsibility of insulting the League
if she opposes its resolutions

Geneva, Oct. 21.--League of Nations Council proposes to
suspend meetings for a period of three weeks. Dr. Alfred
Sze, Chief of the Chinese Delegation, stated that China
cannot promise to hold direct negotiations with Japan
concerning the withdrawal of troops during the period
when the Council is closed. Other members of the Chinese
delegation stated that such arrangement would give up
what China has reasonably hoped from the League, and would
also seriously influence world politics. If the League of
Nations Covenant and the Kellogg-Briand Pact cannot be
relied upon, it is inevitable that Communism will prevail
in the world.

Dr. Sze again informed M. Briand that China's demands
are:

- (1) Withdrawal of Japanese troops before holding
negotiations;
- (2) During and after the withdrawal of Japanese
troops, a neutral investigation commission
should be organized;
- (3) Recognition of indemnity and damages; and
- (4) Organization of a permanent arbitration organ
for handling Sino-Japanese affairs.

The League is attempting to have the Japanese troops
withdrawn within three weeks by the latest. The delegates

of

-2-

of the various small nations stated that failure to withdraw Japanese troops at once would affect the League itself very seriously, especially because the United States has participated in the meeting.

Geneva, Oct. 21--Delegates of the five Powers hold a meeting tonight. It is decided that upon receipt tomorrow morning of new instructions from the Japanese Government as is expected, and if Japan still insists strongly upon her former attitude thus rendering it impossible to make a settlement, the League of Nations Council will adopt a resolution concerning the immediate withdrawal of Japanese troops. If Japan opposes, she should assume the responsibility of insulting the League of Nations.

Enclosure

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Press Release issued by
The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Unofficial (Translation) October 25, 1931.

Public Opinion in Italy Sympathizes with China

Roman, October 24 - In connection with China's unwillingness to hold negotiations before Japan withdraws her troops, public opinion in Italy sympathizes with China, stating that both sides must stand on an equal footing when discussions are being made.

Enclosure

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Press Release issued by
The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Unofficial (translation) October 25, 1931.

TO MEET JAPAN'S OPPOSITION TO THE
LEAGUE'S RESOLUTION

Opinions of the Members of the
League may be divided into two
groups.

Geneva, October 25 - Opinions of the members of
the League concerning the ability of the League completely
to settle the Sino-Japanese dispute may be divided into
the following two groups:

(1) The first group is of the opinion that the
situation in Manchuria is very serious. Japan, by
occupying Manchuria, violates Article 10 of the
Covenant and Article 2 of the Kellogg Pact. She
obviously deceives the League and all the signatories
of the Pact. Her military occupation is to force
China to hold negotiations in order that Japan may
acquire all privileges in Manchuria. Unless Great
Britain, the United States and France intervene, there
is no hope of success in settling the matter. This
meeting is the final attempt of the League to discuss
measures for reaching a settlement by amicable means
and on friendly terms. At the next meeting, the League
should adopt the most effective measures. It is expected

-2-

that China will use the provisions of Articles 15 and 16 of the Covenant.

(2) The second and more conservative group thinks that war is inevitable if the League deals with the case decisively. It is strongly believed that strong resolutions will be more effective than those resolutions which have already been passed unanimously. Future prospects are uncertain because (a) Japanese troops in Manchuria have not been withdrawn, and (b) the purpose of Japan's demanding direct negotiations with China is not clearly known. However, conditions may improve if:

- (a) the United States cooperates with the League;
- (b) the Kellogg-Briand Pact is considered;
- (c) delegates of a third nation participate in negotiations between China and Japan, and in the organization of a Permanent Sino-Japanese Arbitration Committee;
- (d) Japan's attitude becomes more obvious;
- (e) Japan accepts the League's proposals, failing which she will be isolated;
- (f) Japan gradually withdraws her troops now stationed outside of the South Manchuria Railway zone;
- (g) the Member Nations of the League agree that Japanese invaders should be withdrawn completely before November 16; or
- (h) world opinion favors an amicable settlement.

Enclosure

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Press Release Issued by the
Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

(Official)

November 1, 1931.

(Translation)

V. K. WELLINGTON KOO AND OTHERS APPOINTED BY THE
GOVERNMENT AS MEMBERS OF A COMMISSION FOR THE
TAKING OVER OF MANCHURIA.

The National Government has now appointed the following persons as members of a Commission for the Taking Over of Manchuria: V.K. Wellington Koo, Chang Tso-hsiang, Chang Chun, Wu T'ieh-ch'eng, Lo Wen-kan, T'ang Er-ho, Liu Che. The Government has designated V.K. Wellington Koo as Chairman of the Commission.

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Press Release Issued by the
Chinese Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Unofficial (Translation) November 1, 1931.

ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES
REGARDING WITHDRAWAL OF JAPANESE TROOPS

Washington, Nov.1.--The United States, on account of her treaty obligations to ensure the territorial integrity of China, strongly opposes the permanent occupation of Manchuria by Japan. However, since she is not a member of the League of Nations, she is unwilling to make any proposal in regard to the question that Japan should withdraw troops before November 16, 1931.

Enclosure

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Press Release issued by
The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Unofficial (Translation) November 1, 1931.

British Press Stated That Japan Should Withdraw
Her Troops Before November 16 in Order to Protect
Her Own Interests.

London, November 1 - Certain newspaper at London
made the following comment in regard to the Manchurian
affair:

"China wished to have Japan's fundamental principles
considered by arbitration. She has been observing
her treaty obligations. The League also intends to
settle the matter by arbitration. If Japan withdraws
her troops before November 16, all possibilities of
danger that will break the world peace may be avoided.
Nanking representative at Geneva stated that China is
prepared to have neutral nations supervise the with-
drawal of troops. For the benefit of Japan and in
order to protect her treaty privileges, Japan should
withdraw her troops in peaceful and fair ways."

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Press Release issued by
The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Unofficial (Translation) November 1, 1931.

Japan Privately Assists Prince Kung
Tokyo, October 31 -

- (1) Japan privately assists Kung Chin Wang (Prince of the late Manchu regime) to make the Eastern Provinces an independent state in order to strengthen Japan's economic independence. This will enable Japan to meet the possible economic isolation, and to hold direct negotiations with the new state.
- (2) Japan is going to assist Ling Ying-ching (the so-called Traitor general) to attack Chin Chow.
- (3) Since the scheduled date (November 16) for the League to meet again is approaching, Japan has separately instructed her legations abroad to get in touch with the various foreign governments with a view to softening their general attitude.
- (4) Certain Japanese banks have suffered great losses during the present trouble.

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Press Release issued by
The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Unofficial (Translation) November 2, 1931.

Japanese Are Shameless

Criticized by Russian press.

Blagovestchensk, October 31 - Russian press
comments regarding the latest manifesto issued by
Japan are to the effect that the term "self-defence"
as used in the manifesto is entirely Japanese style.
Japan does not know such thing as "shame" in the
world.

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Press Release issued by
The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Unofficial (Translation) November 4, 1931.

Japanese Troops Bombard the Work Shop of the
Tung Liao Railway Station.

Dohara went to Tientsin and tried
to force Pu Yi to go to Manchuria.

Tientsin, October 23 - At 8 o'clock this morning,
Japanese troops fired artillery (2 shells) on the work
shop of Tung Liao Railway Station.

K. Dohara came to Tientsin. There is a report
that he endeavored to force Pu Yi (last emperor of
the late Manchu regime) to go to Manchuria.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure

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Press Release issued by
The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Unofficial (Translation) November 5, 1931.

Mussolini Communicated with Chiang Kai-shek

President Chiang Kai-shek recently telegraphed Premier Mussolini of Italy expressing his gratitude for the latter's proposal that the Manchurian affair should be settled by amicable means. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs received yesterday a telegram from Count de Ciano, Italian Charge d'Affairs to China, transmitting a reply from Mussolini. The reply states briefly as follows:

"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your telegram. I take great pleasure again to make it clear that the Italian Government is no less anxious than other nations to see that the Sino-Japanese dispute be amicably settled in order to ensure the legal privileges of both governments."

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Press Release issued by
The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Unofficial (Translation) November 6, 1931.

Japanese Troops Instigate Bandits to Make Disturbance.

Dr. Sze requests the League
to interfere.

Geneva, November 6 - Minister Sze has again
addressed a note to the Secretary General of the League
at 6:00 p.m., November 5, stating briefly as follows:

"Japanese troops instigated the bandits in the vicinity of Nuen Kiang to besiege Chinese Government forces. Japan also sent airplanes to render assistance. Please immediately inform the Chairman of the Council, requesting him to interfere in the matter. Japan should be held fully responsible for any serious disturbance resulting from her instigation."

The note remarked that several hundred Japanese soldiers had crossed the Nuen Kiang, bringing with them 12 airplanes and many cannon. They had also killed more than one hundred Chinese soldiers.

Enclosure

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Press Release Issued by the
Chinese Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Unofficial (Translation) November 7, 1931.

UNITED STATES STATE DEPARTMENT REQUESTS
IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF JAPANESE TROOPS

American Ambassador at Tokyo addressed a
note to Japanese Foreign Office

Washington, Nov. 7.--The United States State Department has telegraphically instructed the American Ambassador to Japan to address a note to the Japanese Foreign Office requesting immediate cessation of dispute with China and withdrawal of Japanese troops to the South Manchuria Railway zone. It is predicted that the situation in the Three Eastern Provinces will become worse, and that the failure of Japan to observe her obligations under the Kellogg Pact will result in a dangerous state of affairs.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure

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Press Release Issued by the
Chinese Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Unofficial (Translation) November 7, 1931.

STIMSON MADE CLEAR ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES

Reserves the right to decide upon action
which the United States will take .

Washington, Nov.7.--Secretary of State Stimson
stated when the Japanese ambassador was interviewed that
the United States Government has not changed its attitude
concerning the Manchurian affair. The United States will
continue to act independently, and reserves the right to
decide upon such action as she will take in the matter.
She will cooperate with those nations who also aim at the
maintenance of peace in the Three Eastern Provinces.

Enclosure

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Press Release Issued by the
Chinese Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Unofficial

(Translation)

November 8, 1931.

TWOFOLD PURPOSE OF JAPAN'S ASSISTING BANDITS

Peiping, Nov.7.--There is a report that Japan is trying her utmost to get in touch with the bandits. Japan also supplies the bandits with arms and money. The purpose is twofold: (1) to induce the bandits to drive all Chinese troops and government organs east of Shanhaikwan out of Manchuria in order that Japan may take further steps to assist in the independence of Manchuria; and (2) to lead the bandits to Shenyang for a wholesale looting when it is absolutely necessary for the Japanese troops to withdraw in order that all evidences of Japan's illegal occupation of that city may be removed and her responsibility of indemnifying such losses shifted.

Enclosure

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Press Release Issued by the
Chinese Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Unofficial (Translation) November 8, 1931.

LEAGUE WILL ANNOUNCE TO THE WORLD THAT
JAPAN VIOLATES COVENANT AND PACT
Considers Japan's continued occupation
involving other aims.

Geneva, Nov. 7.--Member nations are greatly surprised upon receiving Japan's statement that she cannot withdraw her troops until China accepts the five fundamental principles. The League considers it obvious that Japan will not withdraw her troops. Japan formerly stated that the military occupation of the Eastern Provinces was to protect Japanese nationals. The purpose of occupation has now been changed to force China to recognize the five fundamental principles. This proves that it is possible for Japan to withdraw her troops without endangering the safety of Japanese residents, and that her refusal involves other goals which she desires to attain.

It is predicted that the Council, when it meets again on November 16, will take necessary action on the basis of Article 15 of the Covenant. Activities of the League based on the above-mentioned article do not require agreement of all member nations before actually taking effect. It is also predicted that resolutions adopted at the meeting of November 16 will be as follows:

- (1) The League will announce to the world that Japan violates the Covenant of the League and the Kellogg-Briand Pact.
- (2) International Investigation Commission is useless.
- (3) Withdrawal of all ambassadors in Japan and, when necessary, severance of economic relations with Japan.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

FROM

Peiping

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Dated December 9, 1931

Rec'd 9 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

1061, December 9, 7 p.m.

Following from Minister at Nanking

"Legation informs me that it has received telegrams from Military Attache, now at Chinchow, expressing hope that he will be recalled soon as he sees no advantage in remaining at Chinchow any longer. I am directing Legation to instruct Margetts to remain at Chinchow until further instructions. I feel that situation in and about Chinchow has not yet cleared up and that mere presence of foreign observers there acts as a brake upon activities of Japanese. I therefore hope Department will approve my keeping observers in Chinchow for the time being".

For the Minister,

KLP-HPD

PERKINS

Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 DEC 9 1931
 Department of State

793.94/3125

DEC 14 1931

FILED

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 note
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yes.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


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PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

PM REC'D
TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN



December 11, 1931.

AMLEGATION,

DEC 11 31

PEIPING (China).

458

Your 1061, December 9, 7 p.m. and Department's
454, December 9, 5 p.m.

Inform Military Attaché that Department believes
his continued presence at Chinchow still necessary.

Lyon Minister.

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Dec 11 1931.P

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Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Washington,

December 9, 1931.

AMLEGATION,

PEIPING (China).

454 Your 1061, / 3125 December 9, 7 p.m.

FOR THE MINISTER.

Your action approved. Military Attache should remain
at Chinchow, as his presence there is essential in connection
with action in which Department is engaged.

Department assumes that attaches representing other
governments are likewise being continued at Chinchow.

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Sent by operator M., 19.....

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
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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

CONFIDENTIAL **CONFIDENTIAL**

December 9, 1931.
 7:30 p.m.



SECRETARY: Hello, General Dawes. I am sorry to call you this time of night, but I have received your telegrams in regard to the present negotiations and in regard to my inquiry about the mix-up on the neutral zone. Now I understand, I think, exactly how the thing lies now, and I have been going over the papers and have found some additional considerations which have cleared my mind quite a little of certain prejudices I had against the Japanese proposition, and I thought that as the danger still persists of a new movement by the Japanese Army even after the Resolution is passed, I would let you know a little about it so that tomorrow morning in case I should telegraph you would know what it was. I understand now that the chances are that the Resolution will pass tomorrow.

DAWES: They expect that, yes. Although they have not heard yet -

SECRETARY: Not from the Japanese yet?

DAWES: Expect it tomorrow afternoon.

SECRETARY: This is from Japan? China is all right, is she?

DAWES: Yes, China is going to accept. Have you got my telegram where I say it is understood the Chinese intend to make two general statements. First reserve all their rights under the covenant and other treaties, and second protest the police measures which they felt would not have been necessary except for Japan's own actions.

SECRETARY: I understand. Now, all right, I feel that
 that

793.94/3125 1/2

Confidential File

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Quitsman NARS, Date 12-18-75

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that is a good step and should go on. The Resolution should be passed if possible and what I am speaking now about is only in reference to the Chinchow trouble. You see?

DAWES: Yes.

SECRETARY: Even if that Resolution is passed, there remains the trouble of a misunderstanding about the Chinchow zone and the likelihood that the Japanese Army may again advance. I have some new information on that that I would like to put in your hands simply for such use as you may find for it in case of an emergency tomorrow or in case some chance came for you to go over it with Briand.

DAWES: Yes.

SECRETARY: May I enumerate just gently the nature of it and we can send it so you can get it by cable tomorrow. In the first place I originally had the idea that the Japanese had changed their position and had narrowed down the limits of the zone into a much smaller compass, so that finally it included only the region from the Great Wall to Chinchow, instead of going way out to the Liao River where the Chinese troops have withdrawn. I thought that the Japanese themselves had inched up, so to speak, from the Liao River down to Chinchow. I find on going over the papers that that is not so. The limits of this new smaller zone which the Japanese suggested in their telegram of two days ago were based upon the original offer of Wellington Koo himself. You see?

DAWES: Yes.

SECRETARY: When he made that offer of a neutral zone and that China would retire behind the Great Wall if Japan would keep out of it - the offer which Japan accepted or thinks she accepted - he stated that that zone only ran from the Wall to Chinchow.

DAWES: Well

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DAWES: Well, it ran over to the Liao River just on the other side of Chinchow.

SECRETARY: That is as the Japanese stated it, but Koo stated it so that it would be limited to Chinchow, so that the Japanese only took up what Wellington Koo himself had suggested.

DAWES: I did not understand that.

SECRETARY: Neither did I until I came to look over the papers, and I think it would make a difference with Cecil. I am reading his argument before the Council and he talked as if the Japanese were asking the Council to insist upon this smaller zone at Japan's instance. Instead of that it was merely taking up a suggestion which China herself had made.

DAWES: China. They think if they take their men out of the zone to the Wall that the government will fall.

SECRETARY: I know that is a new political reason that may be a practical reason against it now, but it is not Japan's fault. The next thing is that there is a good reason for that difference for that zone on the west of Chinchow being free from any entry by anybody and the zone to the east of Chinchow towards the Liao River. I have just heard from Tokyo of a talk which Forbes has had with Shidehara, and Shidehara says that the reason why they can undertake to keep absolutely out of the territory on the west side of Chinchow, that is between Chinchow and the Wall, is because of the geographical topography. There are mountains on one side and that can be easily protected against bandits and he thinks Chinese police can be trusted -

DAWES: Chinchow? For what reasons?

SECRETARY: Shidehara says that the country between

Chinchow

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Chinchow and the Great Wall -

DAWES: Chinchow and the Liao River?

SECRETARY: No. The other side, towards the Great Wall, towards Tangshan, towards China. He says that that is of such a nature that it can be easily protected against bandits, even by the Chinese police, and he is willing to have the Japanese withdraw all their subjects from that zone even if bandits should make any trouble, rather than go in and protect them. In case of necessity, he says the Japanese could withdraw their own nationals from that zone anyhow and would be willing to do so. While further on, up towards the Liao River, the country is different and the bandits there are of such a nature that they cannot be handled by the Chinese police and it is only as to that country that he has to be prepared to make protective expeditions.

DAWES: Yes.

SECRETARY: In other words, there is a geographical reason for this.

DAWES: I do not think that Briand understands that.

SECRETARY: I did not know whether he did either, because this has just come to me from Tokyo.

DAWES: Do you think that it would be - don't you think that I had better talk to Sze about that too?

SECRETARY: Oh yes. That is all right to talk to Sze. There is another thing I want you to say to Sze if you talk to him. I think you ought to talk to Sze first before you open up the whole thing anyhow, because the Chinese may not be in a position to renew their offer.

DAWES: So that I had better talk to Sze first because

Sze

Perkins

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Sze thinks that his government will fall if they take the troops back.

SECRETARY: Of course it may be impossible to reopen this at all.

DAWES: As I understand it, well I do not know whether he feels any different about it now. That was several days ago.

SECRETARY: Then, in the third place, I understand, General, from your telegram that the Japanese were ready to give assurance to the League Council that they would accept this offer and keep their troops out of this neutral zone, although they were not ready to do it to the three Powers that Wellington Koo suggested in his offer. It seems to me that that prevented the original proposition from being accepted technically. Yet I think that is a very small difference to split on.

DAWES: The misunderstanding that the League had about the zone itself led them to take that position and with the explanation which you make the League would undoubtedly have accepted it.

SECRETARY: The principal thing of all was that it was not Japan inching up, so to speak, and trying to cut down the zone, but it was Koo's original offer.

DAWES: They did not understand that. I will take it up with Sze in the morning. If he is absolutely certain it would not do to open those negotiations on account of the weakness of his government -

SECRETARY: Then there is no use going any further with it. My whole point in bringing this up to you is that I feel if they could make some sort of an agreement on a neutral zone, it would very greatly protect the whole arrangement from being broken up again by a new advance of the

Japanese

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Japanese Army.

DAWES: Did the Japanese give any assurance at all that they would not advance? They were afraid here they were going to make an advance right away before tomorrow afternoon.

SECRETARY: I know nothing new except what I knew before. They disclaimed any immediate advance but I think Forbes thinks that eventually unless there is some such agreement as to the neutral zone they will advance and drive them out to the Wall. That would be a great misfortune. That would make the situation very much worse than if the Chinese voluntarily withdrew.

DAWES: Mr. Secretary, Drummond is going away after tomorrow's meeting and the rest of the members of the Council. There is no reason why you want me to stay after the Council goes away?

SECRETARY: I think not. We have had such a good connection on the telephone and you understand the situation so completely that perhaps I will not telegraph. I will just leave it in your hands with this statement. You have it?

DAWES: Yes. I can wire you.

SECRETARY: If you want any confirmation about the terms of that original offer you have only got to get Briand to look up the original offer as it was made by the French Ambassador. The original offer made by Wellington Koo through the French Ambassador in Tokyo. That was in French and the Japanese have given me a copy of it which I have here.

DAWES: They will have a copy I suppose in the French Foreign Office.

SECRETARY: Of course, Briand will have a copy of it, so
there

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 7 -

there is no need of my sending you any wire at all.

DAWES: You have received my despatch about the form of the Resolution. You have read my despatches of today?

SECRETARY: I do not think they have all come in.

DAWES: It was the declaration which was read at this afternoon's public meeting.

SECRETARY: I have not seen that yet. It may be in now.

DAWES: The New York Times said the State Department did not want to give it out until they had conferred with me. I suppose the copy was all right. The Times wanted to save telegraphic tolls.

SECRETARY: They have not been to me so far as I know.

DAWES: If you get my last despatch you are perfectly safe in giving it out there, because it has been read out in the meeting.

SECRETARY: There was no change in the Resolution beyond what you told me yesterday?

DAWES: I will read it to you.

SECRETARY: I have it before me now. It has been brought in to me now. That is all right.

DAWES: Then you can give it to the press.

SECRETARY: All I want now is a flash as to whether the Resolution has passed or not tomorrow.

DAWES: The meeting is not until half-past four in the afternoon. In the meantime, if we hear from Japan we will let you know before the meeting.

SECRETARY: Perhaps you had better call me up before you leave Paris after the meeting.

DAWES: Yes, I will. Goodbye.

S HHR.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

GRAY

FROM Peiping via N.R.

Dated December 9, 1931

Rec'd 9:10 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
DEC 9 1931
Department of State

1063, December 9, 9 p.m.

Following from American Consul General at Harbin:

"December 8, noon.

One. Ohashi has informed me that the Japanese are inaugurating an alleged commercial air service between Mukden and Harbin, and planning have first cabin plane arrive tomorrow.

Two. Local Japanese press reports that at Mukden a preliminary agreement was signed by interested Chinese and Japanese parties that mail would be carried by airplane and that a landing field had been hastily (#) by Japanese young men at Machiako, a suburb of Harbin.

Three. Local Commissioner of Posts Smith has informed me that he has no knowledge of any agreement with these parties to transport Chinese mail.

Four. Local Commissioner of Foreign Affairs told

me

F/DEW

793.94/3126

FILED

DEC 18 1931

793.94
note
893.796

MET

2-1063 from Peiping via N.R.,
December 9, 1931.

me that regarding landing field there is no written agreement but that Japanese informed Chang Ching Hui, pro-Japanese civil administrator here, that they would construct the field and he offered no objection. About 500 Chinese coolies were hired and the field was constructed.

Five. It appears that the commercial aspect is a ~~blockade~~ ^{blind} to cover aviation activities of Japanese army which has already constructed landing fields at Changchun and Kirin.

Six. Publicity and financial representatives of the South Manchurian Railway are visiting Harbin and Tsitsihar both of which places are coming more and more under Japanese military occupation.

Seven. General Ma has about 10,000 soldiers in Koshan-Hailun region and is hard up for funds. Generally speaking, conditions at Harbin, Tsitsihar, Hailar and Manchuria station are quiet".

"December 8, 3 p.m.

One. On December 6th one of Honjo's staff officers, accompanied by Secretary Chao, a group of Japanese evidently
body guard

MET

3-1063 from Peiping via N.R.,
December 9, 1931

body guard and some Japanese and foreign correspondents proceeded from Harbin to Hailun for the purpose of meeting General Ma, who was not anxious to meet the staff officer and who tried to delay the trip.

Two. Chinese press states meeting of staffs and Ma was held but Ohashi claims he has no report confirming this.

Three. Japanese are using efforts to induce Ma to take over military affairs and Chang Ching Hui civil affairs of Heilungkiang provinces".

For the Minister.

WSB

PERKINS

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

FROM

GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated December 9, 1931

Rec'd 10 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

1062, December 9, 8 p.m.

Following from Consul General at Mukden:

"December 8, 6 p.m. Headquarters today emphasizes increasing menace of Chinese troops, bandits and irregulars west of the South Manchurian Railway and enumerates incidents occurring during the last few days to support contention. Increased activity of Chi in Tungliao, Chenchiatun area attributed to Chingchow Government. Also reports establishment of Mongolian cavalry headquarters on Mongolian border and at Takakan, 30 miles northwest of Tungchowliao*.

Repeated to Nanking.

For the Minister,

JHR_WSB

PERKINS

F/DEW 793.94/3127

FILED

JUN 28 1933

793.94
note
893.23
893.108

Del. to Paris
Dec 9, 1931
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
DEC 9 1931
Department of State


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State



1-128
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Washington,
December 9, 1931.

AMEMBASSY,

PARIS (France). DEC 9 31

641 FOR AMBASSADOR DAWES.

793.94/3127 American Consul General, Mukden, reports under date
December 8/³¹²⁷ that Japanese headquarters emphasizes increasing
menace of Chinese troops, bandits and irregulars west of
the South Manchuria Railway and attributes responsibility
for various activities to the Chinchow government and af-
firms establishment of Mongolian cavalry headquarters at
Takakan, thirty miles northwest of Tungchowliao.

85.108/123
He reports under date December 9 that QUOTE Peiping-
Mukden southbound train held up December 8, 2 p.m., by
twelve bandits four miles west of Hsinmin. Only first and
second class passengers were molested. Steel, British
Traffic Manager, was robbed of railway's records which he
was taking to Tientsin for safekeeping. Loucs, American
citizen, was robbed.

QUOTE The proximity of the holdup to Hsinmin, which is
under Japanese control and the manner of the robbery indi-
cates that possession of the railway records was the
primary objective UNQUOTE.

Enciphered by FE:SKH/ZMF

FE

Sent by operator M., , 19

Index Bu.—No. 50.

Stinger
Steff


U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-128

793.94/3127

1331

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CONFIDENTIAL




DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY

December 7, 1931.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR,
MR. KATSUJI DEBUCHI.

Manchuria.



F/DEW

793-94

The Japanese Ambassador sent word that he wished to see me. When he came he began talking about the difficulties which had been created by the fact that the Chinese, after they had promised to evacuate the neutral zone in case the Japanese did so (as represented in the French note which he had left with me the other day), now refused to keep their promise, and he told me that this made Baron Shidehara's position very difficult because he was being accused at home of having tricked the army into retreating on this promise and now the promise has not been kept. The Ambassador intimated that it would be very difficult to withhold the army from advancing again. I at once took him up on the situation and talked to him very seriously. I said that if the Honjo army should now advance again on Chinchow, after having been recalled, it would make the matter tenfold more clear to the American public that the advance was not to protect Japanese nationals but to destroy the last fragments of Chinese authority in Manchuria. I pointed out that it would be extremely difficult to ask China (which was evidently

793.94/3128

JAN 21 1932

FILED

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 2 -

evidently what he wanted me to do) to withdraw her own army from her own territory. I pointed out the entire absence of any reports of attacks on Japanese citizens in Chinchow and I said that under these circumstances if the Honjo army moved again on Chinchow a very painful situation here in American public opinion would be created. I told him that even now the press were asking what we would do in such a contingency, and that the demand would be made a great deal more insistently if it happened. I pointed out in detail the long sequence of advances by the Japanese army, accompanied in each case by representations as to their purpose from the Foreign Office which had proved to be without foundation, and I said now this final advance would clinch the opinion of the American people that the whole movement since September 18 had been not to protect Japanese life and property but to attack the Chinese army of Marshal Chang wherever it could be found. I said further that under such circumstances it would be very difficult to persuade anyone that this did not amount to a violation of the Nine-Power Treaty as to the guarantee of the integrity of Chinese territory and of Chinese administration; also that it would be very difficult to deny that the provisions

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

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provisions of the Kellogg-Briand Pact as to settling all disputes by no other than pacific means, had been broken.

The Ambassador said he had no intention of implying that General Honjo would advance at once. I then said that what I wanted to hear was that this Resolution pending before the Council at Paris had been accepted by Japan and had been passed by the Council; that there at least we would have one bit of good news. I reminded him of the importance of that Resolution in its effect on our public opinion, and the importance of an impartial investigation in Manchuria, and of a cessation of hostilities. He said that he thought we would hear good news from that in a very few days. I said that it might better be a matter of a very few hours, and I said further that if that Resolution was passed it would be far easier to reconcile Chinese public opinion to self-control than it would without that Resolution.

The Ambassador said something to me about the political difficulties surrounding Baron Shidehara from the attacks that were being made upon him to the effect that he had yielded to American pressure in causing General Honjo to withdraw. I told him that in my opinion

Baron

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

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Baron Shidehara's difficulties were nothing like as heavy or severe as the difficulties which the Chinese Government were having in explaining why they should withdraw their own troops from their own territory around Chinchow when those troops were not engaged in attacking anybody else but merely were where they had a right to be.

In summary, I asked the Ambassador to urge most seriously upon Baron Shidehara the serious effect which any new advance by the Japanese army would have upon the public opinion of this country, and the serious thought which we were already giving that problem. In the face of it I stressed also the particular importance that surrounded a prompt and successful solution of the action pending before the Council of the League and an immediate passage of the proposed resolution.

HLS.

S HLS:HHR

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R Nanking/45 FOR

FROM Nanking (Peck) DATED Nov 9, 1931
TO NAME 1-1127

REGARDING:
Manchurian Dispute. Resume of situation.

ek

793.94/3129

3129

The Nanking consular district was relatively peaceful. In Nanking, the result of a census taken in September by local police authorities was announced, showing an increase over August of more than ten thousand although almost twenty thousand persons evacuated the Capital during the same month because of the general uneasiness.

2. MANCHURIAN CRISIS

The League of Nations Council met again on October 13. After a series of meetings under the chairmanship of M. Briand, French Foreign Minister, the Council adopted on October 24 a resolution similar to that passed on September 30, namely, Japanese troops must be withdrawn into the zone of the South Manchuria Railway, but the time limit was postponed from October 14 to November 16.

According to local vernacular press reports, the Japanese troops, instead of withdrawing to the South Manchuria Railway zone as had been required by the resolution, engaged in further acts of aggression, occupation and violence following the adjournment of the Council on September 30. In like manner, their military activities after October 24 continued far beyond the area they occupied on that date. The Chinese press emphatically asserted that the notorious "traitor-militarists", Chang Hai-peng, Kuo Tao-pu and others, were instigated by Japanese to attack Heilungkiang, and that Japan supplied them with munitions and assisted them by sending airplanes to drop bombshells on the war fronts. Simultaneously, the so-called "traitors" Chao Hsing-po and Kan Yu-hsi were appointed to certain important civil posts. White Russians were also made use of in disturbing the peace of

-3-

were greatly aggravated, and it was thought that the League of Nations Council would meet again at a date earlier than that which was scheduled, i.e., November 16.

The press also called attention to the fact that Japan had a total naval strength of more than 50 warships of all classes in Chinese waters, including river patrol craft, destroyers and cruisers despatched to China in September and October primarily for the announced purpose of protecting Japanese nationals during the present trouble. Two Japanese warships were stationed in the river off Hanking during the month, the cruiser Tsushima and the destroyer Kashi.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

793, 94

NOTE

SEE 894.00/327 FOR #296

FROM Japan (Forbes) DATED Nov 20, 1931
 TO NAME 1-1127 o p o

793.94/3130

REGARDING:

Cabinet changes rumored in Japan as a result of dissatisfaction
 over the handling of the Manchurian situation and the financial troubles.

ek

8120

No. 396

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor, with reference to my telegram No. 223 of November 18, 1931, to report in greater detail the rumors of an impending Cabinet change.

I must confess that it is as yet impossible to evaluate the various rumors that of late are heard with increasing frequency. To a Western observer there would seem to be no adequate reason for a change of Government, as the present Cabinet has an absolute majority in the Diet and the Diet

is

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

is not in session. Yet neither fact signifies that the Cabinet may not resign. If it does, the reason or reasons may be very obscure. The preceding Cabinet, for example, fell while the Diet was not in session as a result of a series of affairs touching the honor of the Court, including the death of Chang Tso-lin near Lukden and the phrase of the Kellogg Pact - "in the names of their respective peoples", while the Cabinet before that, after successfully surviving a Diet session as a minority party, fell because the Privy Council disapproved of a proposal of the Government regarding financial adjustment. The standards of Western politics cannot, then, be applied to the present instance and the rumors now current must be given more attention than they would receive in an Occidental country.

The principal charge brought against the present Government is that of weakness - weakness with respect to the activities of the Japanese military since September 18th^{and} weakness vis-a-vis the League of Nations. Yet with the array possessed of super-Cabinet powers in a time of crisis, such as the present, (Despatch No. 383 of November 7, 1931), it is very doubtful if any other Cabinet could have done much, if any, better, while the "weakness" of the Government toward the League of Nations has had one result which might be regarded as a diplomatic victory of possibly no small importance. The Powers are apparently confident that the civilian government is blameless in the Manchurian affair. This has perhaps resulted in the bringing of less outside pressure to bear on Japan than might have been the case had a Cabinet as militant as that of the late Baron Tanaka held office at this time.

The charge

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The charge is also brought against the present Cabinet that it has not improved the financial and economic situation of the country as it should have done. Yet it has done more in that direction than any of its predecessors. It removed the gold ban and is maintaining the yen above par. It has reduced expenditures and has partially succeeded in the difficult task of limitation of Japanese armaments. It has faced a situation world-wide in character and has led the country as adequately as any other government, lacking its example, could probably have done. The no-loan policy of the present Cabinet, though it has recently been interrupted, was maintained for more than two years. Incidentally, I might mention that this is regarded by certain thoughtful students of Japanese politics as the first genuine political principle to be announced and maintained by a Japanese political party, political parties in this country being so far scarcely more than groups of followers of certain strong personalities combining for party interests rather than for the sake of principles.

In defending the present Cabinet in the preceding two paragraphs, I have done so, ^{not} to enhance its reputation but to point out that a change at present does not seem necessary and to indicate that a subject discussed confidentially in the latter part of this despatch may gain in significance through the foregoing comment.

In trying to discover a reason for the possible fall of the Cabinet in the near future, it is necessary to recall those factors that decide the destinies of Japanese cabinets. In brief they are: the Emperor's personal and official advisers, the personal relationships within the Government

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Government or the Government party, and what may be termed political realities. One or all of these may come into play at the time of a Cabinet crisis. At present it would seem that political observers feel that the next change of Cabinet will be brought about by either the first or the third factors. Whether or not the conjectures in this despatch may or may not be subsequently confirmed by events, the comments contained herein will at least aid the Department to understand whatever conclusion may be the issue of the present rumored movements. It should be remembered that Japanese politics has a genius for the unexpected. Four years ago, for example, when the Wakatsuki Cabinet was about to fall, few if any political observers realized, until perhaps at the last moment, that the late Baron Tanaka would be called upon to form the succeeding Cabinet, despite the fact that he was the president of the leading opposition party.

Should the rumored change of Cabinet result from what may be referred to as "political realities", it will probably be due to Mr. Adachi, the present Home Minister, entering into an intrigue with Mr. Tokonami, now of the Seiyukai. Either of the two parties, the Minseito and the Seiyukai, are composed, as I have pointed out, of various factions under the leadership of certain political "chiefs". The classic example of such a leader is Mr. Tokonami. To take up only the later peripatations of this politician: he left the Seiyukai in 1924 to assist in the formation of the Seiyu-honto; the Seiyu-honto was amalgamated with the Kenseiikai in 1927 to form the Minseito; this he left in 1928 to establish the Shinto Club; this, in turn, he destroyed in 1929 to return to the Seiyukai, to which party he now belongs. Throughout his wanderings he has been followed faithfully by certain henchmen, for he is a man of an unusually pleasing

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pleasing personality, and with Japanese politicians a personality is regarded generally as more important than political principles.

Mr. Adachi is also an adept in ambiguities. To him the Minseito owes in large measure its political victories of 1929 and of this autumn (Despatch No. 370 of October 24, 1931). Mr. Adachi returns to Tokyo to-morrow from the Autumn Manoeuvres and following his return, the press reports, there will be activities on his and Mr. Tokonami's part aiming toward an orientation of their two groups of followers that will result in formation by them of a so-called coalition cabinet.

A brief description of the alignment behind these two men may not be without interest. Mr. Adachi's followers are at present all within the Minseito. But Mr. Adachi is said to be a disgruntled man because he failed to become premier after the resignation of Mr. Hamaguchi in April of this year. Mr. Tokonami has, of course, the bulk of his followers in the Seiyukai, but some of his former henchmen are in the Minseito, having remained in that party when their leader left it in 1928. These include Messrs. Hara, Kobashi, and Tanaka, all recently Ministers of State in the Minseito Cabinet. There is reason to believe that these former followers now in the Minseito are once more coming under his influence. This was indicated last month by an incident that aroused the interest of politically minded Japanese. Mr. Kobashi, Minister of Education in the Minseito Cabinet until late in 1929, when he was forced to resign because of implication in a bribery scandal, was recently found "not guilty". A congratulation celebration was held at Ueno Park in Tokyo last month. It was attended of course

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course by Minseito men. There was, however, an unexpected guest; namely, Mr. Tokonami, now of the Seiyukai. His attendance is regarded by many as significant support of the persistent rumors that he and Mr. Adachi, with their followers, are drawing together.

It is quite possible that this scheme will not be realized, as such a union would be the result of tactical expediency and would be a denial of the slow progress in this country toward genuine parliamentary government. It is very doubtful whether it would find favor with the Elder Statesmen. Prince Salongi, termed "the only surviving Genro", and Count Makino were called upon by the Emperor in 1927 to select the successor of the fallen prime minister; they indicated Baron Tanaka as the new prime minister, apparently because of their desire to establish parliamentary government. It is doubtful if they would countenance a return to those days- only too recent- when secret pacts between political groups might be the foundation of cabinets.

If the Elder Statesmen are again called upon by the Emperor to choose the man to form the next Cabinet and if they do as they did in 1927, their choice will probably be Mr. Inukai, president of the Seiyukai, the Opposition Party. Mr. Inukai is paired with Mr. Ozaki as one of the leaders of the parliamentary movement in Japan, a man of incorruptible integrity and a rare character in Japanese political life. He was chosen president of the Seiyukai in 1949 chiefly because that party realized that only a man of unblemished character could extricate the party from the disgraceful situation in which the party found itself following the series of scandals that occurred during the regime of the

Tanaka

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Tanaka Cabinet. There would seem to be, however, serious drawbacks to the selection of Mr. Inukai as premier. The Seiyukai's reputation is still very unsavory; the prestige it lost when the scandals became known has not yet been regained; the party has no definite principles, and it could scarcely be expected to deal with the present crises more adequately than the Cabinet now in office. Furthermore, Mr. Inukai is seventy-six years old, and it is problematical whether he has the vigor necessary for the duties of prime minister.

Certain observers, in whom I place some confidence, have told me that these difficulties may be partially circumvented by having Mr. Inukai, as prime minister, form a coalition cabinet of the best men of the two parties and some independent men. Thus the prime minister would come from the opposition party, helping in this way to establish parliamentary government to a certain degree, while the ministers of state would be of a calibre more fit to cope with the present situation than a purely Seiyukai selection.

Although the present prime minister, Baron Wakatsuki, is generally regarded as "weak", he is the head of the majority party and is a man of exceptional intelligence. It is possible that he may be directed, should the present cabinet fall, to form a coalition cabinet of Minseito, Seiyukai, and independent men. This would not be a suspension of parliamentary government nor a retrogression - since his is the majority party, and such a cabinet would insure a continuance of present policies in a perhaps more vigorous form.

Several other men have been mentioned as probable Prime Ministers in case of a cabinet change. Among them are Baron Tatsuo Yamamoto and Baron Kiichiro Hiramasa. Baron Yamamoto is a former Cabinet Minister and at one time was

head

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head of the Hypothec Bank. He is at present an adviser to the Kinseito. Baron Hiranuma is Vice President of the Privy Council.

I have very recently heard a report of great interest, if true, as yet impossible of substantiation. The report is that following the formation of the next Cabinet (in the very near future) the Emperor will issue an Imperial Rescript in which there will be phrases intended to lessen the extra cabinet powers of the military. The rescript would, presumably, be drawn up by the Emperor's personal advisers. There have been rumors that some influential personal advisers of the Emperor have been opposed to the wide military action in Manchuria. It will be recalled that Count Makino, Keeper of the Privy Seal, was one of those high officials said to be marked for assassination in the alleged plot of certain military officers discovered last month (my despatch No. 382 of November 7, 1931). It is not at all impossible that if a change of Cabinet should occur in the near future the real object of the change will be to check the army. A new cabinet, entrenched behind an Imperial Rescript touching upon the subject of army control, could adopt, I should imagine, a much more vigorous attitude toward the military than has hitherto been possible. In considering this matter, it would seem that an Imperial Rescript of this nature, would be a very able first step on the part of the opponents of the military to bring the civilian government into a position where it can control effectively all branches of the Government. The army might be offended and angry, but it would scarcely dare act because of the

sanctity

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
sanctity of the Emperor. I shall, however, go more deeply
into this subject in a later despatch.

Respectfully yours,

W. Cameron Forbes

Embassy's File No. 800.-JAPAN

LES/AA



DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.51/5572 FOR #- (487 to Legn.)

FROM Mukden (Myers) DATED Nov.17,1931.
-TO- NAME 1-1127 gpo

REGARDING: Japanese domination in Tax Revision and the Budget in Liaoning Province - Mukden. A financial readjustment committee, dominated by Japanese was given the duty of revising the taxation system. Japanese efforts at popularizing the government of the Peace Maintenance Committee, or in other words, its own domination of all government functions. Further along this line. (Copy attached).

fpg

793.94/3131

2/31

No.----

AMERICAN CONSULATE

GENERAL,

Mukden, China, November 17, 1931.

SUBJECT: Revised Tax Regulations and Budget for the
Fiscal Year July 1, 1931 to June 30, 1932.

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of
my despatch No. 467, to the Legation, Peking, China,
dated November 16, 1931, on the above subject.

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers
American Consul General.

Enclosure:

Copy of despatch No. 467

MEM:HTW

651.2

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 487

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

Mukden, China.

November 16, 1931.

SUBJECT: Revised Tax Regulations and Budget for
 the fiscal Year July 1, 1931 to June
 30, 1932.

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Legation,

Peiping, China.

Sir:

As of possible interest, I have the honor to en-
 close herewith a translation of the revised tax regula-
 tions and budget of Liaoning Province for the fiscal
 year ending June 30, 1932, recently promulgated. As
 was reported in my despatch No. 467 of October 21, 1931,
 under the subject "Reorganization of the Bureau of Finance
 of Liaoning Province", a financial readjustment committee,
 dominated by Japanese was given the duty of revising the
 taxation system. It is interesting to note in this connec-
 tion that the Finance Bureau in reply to personal inquiries
 from American newspapermen on November 12th stated that the
 bureau had not received the new regulations as the trans-
 lation into Chinese had not been completed. However,
 under the circumstances it was to be expected that Japa-
 nese influence would have great weight in the preparation
 of these regulations.

The

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

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The regulations are divided into general rules and directions for the preparation of estimates of revenue and of expenditures. A list of the taxes to be abolished is given as also of those to be reduced by half, but the lists do not appear to be complete. For instance, the budget shows that the consumption tax, the imposition of which was stoutly opposed by the Japanese in the open courts, has been abolished although it is not included in the above mentioned list. It is worthy of note that the budget gives the receipts of 1930 and 1931 as \$65,043,000 and \$21,059,000 respectively and expenditures for these respective periods at \$65,173,000 (military expenses \$76,000,000) and \$10,200,000. It is probable that these regulations were very hurriedly prepared.

Much publicity has been given to the new tax system in the local press (Japanese controlled). It, no doubt, has a certain amount of propaganda value in connection with the Japanese efforts at popularizing the government of the Peace Maintenance Committee (it now exercises the functions of the provincial government), or in other words, its own domination of all government functions. One of the posters noticed in the streets in connection with yesterday's Japanese demonstration read "The formation of the new government will permit of the reduction in taxes".

Respectfully

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

Respectfully yours,

M. S. Myers.
American Consul General.

Enclosure: Revised Tax Regulations and Budget.

Original and one copy to Legation.
Five copies to Department.
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.
Copy to Consulate General, Harbin.

MSM:AAB
851.2

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1, to despatch No. ⁴⁶⁷~~75~~ of M. S. Myers, American Consul General, Mukden, China, to the Legation, Peiping, dated November 16, 1931, on the subject "Revised Tax Regulations and Budget for the Fiscal Year July 1, 1931 to June 30, 1932".

REVISED TAX REGULATIONS AND BUDGET FOR THE 20th YEAR.

GENERAL RULES.

1. Based on the principles of good administration, an effort shall be made to reduce expenditures. The funds so saved shall be applied to reduce the burden of the people.
2. The revenue of the Provincial Government shall be derived from indirect taxation. The direct taxes shall be turned over to the self-governing districts and cities.
3. All vexatious taxation of the past shall be abolished or decreased.
4. No new taxation shall be introduced.
5. The expenditures for the year shall be restricted to those that are absolutely necessary.
6. In case a deficit is found in the estimates of expenditures of a bureau, the Bureau of Finance shall take appropriate means to adjust them.
7. The Government Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces with its branch offices shall handle operations connected with revenue and expenditures.

DIRECTIONS FOR THE PREPARATION OF NEW TAX ESTIMATES.

1. The distinction between national and provincial taxes shall be abolished.
2. The following taxes shall be abolished:

A. Ginseng	B. Timber
B. Boat Tax	D. Mongolian Salt
E. The 20% military	F. Charges for the
Surcharges on	Tax Receipt paper.
"the Wine and Tobacco	
License Fees"	
3. The following trades shall be reduced by half:

A. Production Tax	B. Bean Tax
C. Oil Seed	D. Silk Tax
4. The following taxes shall be ceded to local self-governing districts and cities:

A. Land Tax	B. Cattle Tax
C. Business Tax	D. Pawn shop license
E. Wine and Tobacco	F. Boat Dues
License	H. Sericulture Tax
G. Cart License	

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 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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5. The taxes collected directly by the Bureau of Finance shall be handled by the tax offices. The taxes turned over to local self governing districts and cities shall be handled by the authorities concerned.

Regarding the salt tax, the salt commissioner shall manage it according to the regulations of the Bureau of Finance.

6. The currency for payment of taxes shall remain as before.
7. The taxes now withdrawn, cancelled or ceded may be revised when necessary.

DIRECTIONS FOR THE PREPARATION OF THE ESTIMATES OF EXPENDITURES.

1. The receipts and expenditures of the communication commission shall be placed under a special accounting office.
2. The general accounting offices shall take care of the following:

- A. Interior Affairs Expenses
- B. Financial " "
- C. Industrial " "
- D. Judicial " "
- E. Military " "
- F. Directorate Expenses

3. Any surplus left over from the year's receipts shall be used for the following purposes:

- A. The welfare of the people
- B. Extraordinary expenses
- C. Readjustment expenses of the Government bank of the Three Eastern Provinces.

DIRECTIONS FOR SELF GOVERNING DISTRICTS AND CITIES IN MATTERS CONCERNING FINANCE.

1. The local self-governing districts and cities shall use their revenue receipts for meeting expenditures.
2. With the object of reducing the burden of the people, the local self-governing districts and cities shall with the approval of the Bureau of Finance, revise their tax system.

In making the aforementioned revision, only those taxes that do not cause suffering to the people shall be kept in effect; others shall be cancelled or reduced in accordance with the taxation policy.

3. New taxes or taxes similar to those of the Provincial Government shall not be introduced.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

ESTIMATES OF RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES

Receipts:	For the Fiscal 19th Year (1930)	For the 20th Year (1931)	For the period from November to June of the next year:
	\$65,643,000	\$22,059,000	\$13,505,000
Expenditures:			
	\$86,172,000	\$10,200,000	\$ 6,800,000
Deficit or Surplus	\$20,529,000	\$11,859,000	\$ 6,705,000

NOTE: Fiscal year begins July 1st and ends June 30th.

TABLE COMPARING THE OLD AND NEW ESTIMATES OF REVENUE.

<u>Items</u>	<u>The 19th Fiscal year (1930)</u>	<u>The 20th Fiscal Year (1931)</u>	<u>Increase or Decrease*</u>
Salt tax	\$ 31,480,000	\$ 10,000,000	\$21,380,000*
Stamp tax	1,140,000	782,000	358,000*
Native Customs	1,350,000	---	1,350,000*
Wine and Tobacco Monopoly fees	640,000	424,000	216,000*
Consolidated tax on cigaret- tes.	3,693,000	4,530,000	837,000
Consolidated tax on cotton yarns, flour and cement	---	1,438,000	1,438,000
Tobacco tax	173,000	122,000	51,000*
Wine tax	1,267,000	875,000	488,000*
Special tax on wine	36,000	---	---
Wine and tobacco license fee	184,000	---	184,000*
Production tax	2,258,000	606,000	1,652,000*
Bean tax	3,187,000	1,255,000	1,932,000*
Oil Seed Tax	207,000	53,000	154,000*
Ginseng	41,000	---	41,000*
Lumber tax	623,000	---	623,000*
Silk tax	321,000	84,000	237,000*
Seale tax on fishery	---	132,000	132,000
Boat dues	8,000	---	8,000*
Mongolian salt tax	2,000	---	2,000*
Grain tax	49,000	---	49,000*
Tax on mining	136,000	86,000	50,000*
Coal tax at Fushun and commission	426,000	348,000	78,000*
Dues on sulphur and nitre	49,000	36,000	13,000*
Land tax	4,052,000	---	4,052,000*
Transfer tax on land deeds	815,000	567,000	248,000*
Cattle tax	1,128,000	---	1,128,000*
Consumption tax	7,272,000	---	7,272,000*
Brokers' license fee	155,000	---	155,000*
Boat tax	16,000	---	16,000*
Cart license	459,000	---	459,000*
Gold smith license	57,000	---	57,000*
Sericulture tax	51,000	---	51,000*
Fees for receipt papers	102,000	---	102,000*
Rents from government land and buildings	99,000	59,000	40,000*
Interest from Yalu River Lum- ber Company	115,000	---	---
Commission from Penhsihu Coal Mining Company	67,000	300,000	---
Receipts from government enterprises	420,000	---	---
Penalty fines	189,000	372,000	3,328,000
Miscellaneous receipts	3,511,000	---	---
Total	165,843,000	222,059,000	143,584,000*

TABLE COMPARING OLD AND NEW ESTIMATES OF EXPENDITURES.

<u>Items</u>	<u>The 19th Fiscal</u>	<u>The 20th Fiscal</u>	<u>Increase or</u>
	<u>Year (1930)</u>	<u>Year (1951)</u>	<u>Decrease</u>
Foreign affairs	\$ 90,000	\$ ---	\$ 90,000*
For Interior affairs	3,151,000	3,480,000	2,345,000
Education affairs	2,674,000	---	---
Financial affairs	2,722,000	2,400,000	322,000*
Industrial affairs	60,000	360,000	300,000
Judicial affairs	200,000	360,000	160,000
Military funds	<u>76,076,000</u>	<u>3,600,000</u>	<u>72,476,000*</u>
Total	\$ 86,173,000	\$ 10,200,000	\$74,973,000*

The standard of the currency is silver dollars.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94

SEE 894.00/328 FOR Memorandum
FROM State Department (Miller) DATED Nov. 30
TO Far Eastern Div. NAME 1-1127 o p o

REGARDING:

Coup d'etat on part of the military to gain control of the Japanese Government and thus to allow their policy in Manchuria to proceed uninterrupted.

ek

793.94/3132

3/32,

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00/11656 FOR Tel. #119-6 pm.
FROM Nanking (Peck) DATED Dec. 8, 1931.
TO -- NAME 1-1127 ope

REGARDING: Manchurian controversy: Views of Soong, Minister of
Finance of China, regarding --
(Copy attached)

fpg

793.94/ 3133

3133

MP

GRAY

Nanking

Dated December 8, 1931

Rec'd 10:55 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

119, December 8, 6 p.m.

On December 7, 4 p.m., I had a lengthy conversation with Soong, Minister of Finance, in which he expressed himself along the same lines as reported to the Department by the Legation about October 7 but with greater despondency. He stated that though crisis which had been threatening the National Government had arrived and he evinced the gravest doubt whether the Government could survive the strain. The National and Provincial Governments are destitute financially, a fact which is temporarily excused and explained by the diplomatic troubles of the Government, but which must lead up to outbreaks soon unless the Government's position is speedily improved. Popular support of the Government is changing to widespread contempt because of refusal to declare war on Japan and only some indication of success in the policy of reliance on international adjudication can save the prestige and authority of the National Government from being seriously if not vitally impaired. He maintained the United States, while disclaiming all responsibility
for

MP

2-#119 From Nanking, Dec.8, 1931

for the League, is nevertheless ranking factor in the League's decisions and that if the United States were to indicate willingness to proceed to the length of economic sanctions against Japan the latter would immediately cease from lawless activities in Manchuria without necessity arising for actually imposing such sanctions. In regard to demand for war, Soong said that military concentration in the North would leave the South a prey to chaos and Communism and is therefore impossible for this if for no other reason. He pointed out the obvious absence of any group which could establish a government if present Government should pass from the scene and predicted chaos in China for a period of years if that should transpire. He said that the League, in framing its resolution, is paying undue deference to Japan in lack of support from the United States for more positive policy and while he seemed to despair of any complete check to Japan's military activities he urged that the United States take some affirmative action in support of China's cause. This might take the form of an indication of willingness to support economic sanctions or the summoning of an International conference, like the Washington Conference. He was positive the League would not object to the latter course. He said
that

MP

3-#119 From Nanking, Dec.8, 1931

that some open support of the National Government's
policy of reliance on international mediation given by
the United States at this juncture might be the means
of saving the National Government from possible downfall.

PECK

KLP

HPD

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER


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Department of State



AMEMBASSY,

DEC 8 31

TOKYO (Japan)

URGENT

CONFIDENTIAL FROM STIMSON TO FORBES.

793.94/3133a
Dawes reports from Paris that the members of the Council of the League are asking their respective diplomatic representatives in Tokyo to make strong representations against any measures which would tend to aggravate further the situation in regard to Chinchow.

Briand gave Dawes the text of Briand's communication through Yoshizawa to Shidehara. It reads as follows:
(copy) QUOTE My colleagues and I are in any case convinced that the Japanese Government will respect fully the resolution of September 30th particularly so as to prevent say, aggravation of the situation. It would be deplorable if, at a moment when an agreement is well in sight which we believe will be acceptable to both parties, the situation should be embittered and even endangered by fresh outbursts of fighting. In this connection I would draw Your Excellency's attention to the proposal set out in my letter of November 29th and Your Excellency's reply thereto in which it is stated that

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

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793.94/3133A

1371

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
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Department of State

Washington,

- 2 -

if a danger of contact between the Chinese and Japanese troops
arose, the Japanese Government would be disposed to examine
attentively the suggestions made to avoid such a contact

UNQUOTE. (and Gray)

immediately

I desire that you communicate with your French and
British colleagues, and, if you find that they are making
representations in this sense, that you cooperate with them
and talk with Shidehara along the same lines.

10/15 Two. For your information and guidance: the Japanese Amba-
sador yesterday ^{called on me and} told me that the Chinese were making difficul-
ties by refusing, after having promised, to evacuate the
neutral zone and that this made Baron Shidehara's position
very difficult. The Ambassador intimated that it would be
very difficult to withhold the Japanese army from advancing
~~again~~ again. I then talked to him very seriously. I said
that if the Japanese army should now advance on Chinchow,
after having been recalled, it would make the matter ten-fold
more clear to the American public that the advance was not for
the purpose of protecting Japanese nationals but to destroy
the last fragment of Chinese authority in Manchuria. I
pointed out that it would be extremely difficult to ask China

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 60.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1955 1-138

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 By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Department of State

Washington,

- 3 -

which was evidently what he wanted us to do, to withdraw her own army from her own territory. I pointed out the entire absence of any reports of attacks on ~~Chinese~~ ^{Japanese} citizens in Chinchow and I said that if the Japanese army moved again on Chinchow a very painful situation in American public opinion would be created. I said that even now the press were asking what we would do in such a contingency. I reviewed in detail the long sequence of advances by the Japanese army, accompanied in each case by representations from the Japanese Foreign Office as to their purpose which had proved to be unfounded, and I said that a final advance would clinch the opinion of the American people that the whole movement since September 18 had been for the purpose not of protecting Japanese life and property but of attacking the Chinese army of Marshal Chang wherever it could be found. I said that it would be very difficult to persuade anyone that this did not amount to a violation of the Nine-Power Treaty as to the guarantee of the integrity of Chinese territory and administration; and that it would be difficult to contend that the provision of the Kellogg-Briand Pact had not been broken.

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
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Department of State

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Washington,

The Ambassador said that he had no intention of implying that General Honjo would advance at once. I then said that what I wanted to hear was that the resolution pending before the Council at Paris had been accepted by Japan and been passed by the Council. I emphasized the importance of that resolution in its effect on our public opinion, the importance of a cessation of hostilities and of an impartial investigation in Manchuria. He said that he thought we would hear good news on that in a very few days. I said it might better be a matter of a very few hours and that if the resolution were passed it would be far easier to reconcile Chinese public opinion to self-control than it would be without the resolution.

The Ambassador again referred to Baron Shidehara's difficulties and I told him that, in my opinion, these were nothing like as heavy as the difficulties which the Chinese Government were having in explaining why they should be asked to withdraw their troops from their own territory when these troops were not engaged in attacking anybody else but merely were where they had a right to be.

In summary, I asked the Ambassador to urge most seriously upon Baron Shidehara the ^{serious} ~~grave~~ effect which any new advance HIS

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19 _____

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
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Department of State

- 5 - Washington,

by the Japanese army would have upon the public opinion of this country, and the serious thought which we were already giving that problem. In the face of it I stressed also the particular importance that surrounded a prompt and successful solution of the action pending before the Council of the League and an immediate passage of the proposed resolution.

Three. I assume that Debuchi will have reported what I said. I wish that you, by seeing Shidehara, signalize the solidarity of view between the American Government and the other governments with regard to the question of Chinchow and that you emphasize on my behalf the points which I ^{secondly} ~~that~~ emphasized to Debuchi yesterday as outlined above. *thus*

Stimson

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1375

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN



December 8, 1931.

DEC 8-31

7 pm

AMEMBASSY,

PARIS (France)

636 *Confidential for Ambassador Davis.*

Please have in mind my suggestion that you endeavor to ascertain what possible action members of the Council have in contemplation in case of failure to get unanimous agreement on the Resolution or in case Japanese military attack Chinchow.

793.94/31338
not
500C112

Stinson

793.94/31338

Dec 8, 1931

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
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Index Bu.—No. 60.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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This telegram must be closely
paraphrased before being FROM
communicated to anyone.



793.94

note

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
SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

TRIPLE PRIORITY

865, December 9, 6 pm

FROM AMBASSADOR DAVES



Answering your telegram 636, December 8, 7 pm,
acquiesce
the Council expects Japanese in the reso-
lution and has not considered any possible action in
the event of Japanese refusal. Drummond thinks that
in case the Japanese do not agree to resolution what will
first occur is a vote upon the resolution and after that
speeches will be made individually by the Council.
Drummond does not anticipate any collective statement of
the members if unexpectedly the Japanese do not agree
to the resolution.

As regards a possible Japanese advance on Chinchow,
the Council has likewise not determined what action it
will take if any.

SHAW

WSB

F/DEW 793.94/3134

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GREEN

FROM

TOKIO

Dated Dec. 9, 1931


Re: 12.25 pm

793.94
note
893.108
SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

256, December 9, 9 pm

Department's 259, December 8, 11 am



F/DEW

793.94/3135

I called first on the French Ambassador who saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs last night having a long session with him and giving him the text of Briand's message. I also saw the British Ambassador who had conferred with the French Ambassador and was sending his Counsellor to see Nagai. They both agreed I had better see Shidehara immediately.

This evening I had a long talk with the Minister for Foreign Affairs who said he was doing his level best to bring about the settlement of the whole situation by peaceful means and without further use of force. He went into all the details at great length illustrating his points on the map. He said that Wellington Koo's original proposition was to the effect that the Chinese troops should be withdrawn to Shankiakwan. He said that the region between that and Chinchow is bounded by

mountains

DEC 15 1931
FILED

rh #2 of No. 256 from Tokio

mountains on one side and would be easily protected against bandits. He feels the Chinese police can handle it adequately. In any case the Japanese could withdraw their subjects and would be prepared to do so in that region if the situation required it.

893.108
East of the river which runs close by Chinchow he said the bandits are active and wholly beyond the power of the Chinese police to handle. The Japanese would be compelled to be ready to issue forth from the railway ^{protective and} zone on / punitive expeditions, not occupying territory but retiring as they have done and are doing now after order had been restored. He repeated what he had said previously: that the number of these bandits and their equipment proves conclusively that they are being supplied and sent out to harass the Japanese and that he is convinced they are supported by the Young Marshal Chang. Moreover, the Chinese have not withdrawn their troops even to Chinchow but are occupying Kowpangtsu and Tahushan; and to make matters worse Koo is now withdrawing his proposition and denying it was definite. The feeling in the Japanese army and among many civilians is that the Chinese have duped the Japanese Government into a withdrawal, have not done their part, and he, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, is being very fiercely criticised

rh # 3 of No. 256 from Tokio

criticised and receiving quantities of telegrams daily very bitterly assailing him for permitting his Government to be deceived and for trusting the Chinese offer.

He spoke of the episode of the Associated Press article and said it was ended and closed but that the attacks, particularly those engineered by the Seiyukai, were continuing and were very bitter, and they had even threatened to bring him into court for revealing military secrets. He had prepared a memorandum of what he said to me in the interview and I have indorsed it as follows: "This statement is in substantial accord with my recollection of the interview in question". I have told him that we wanted to support and assist him in every way in his efforts to bring about a peaceable ^{of} solution/ the problem.

In regard to Tsitsihar he said the policy had not been changed. The evacuation was only delayed due to the menacing position of General Ma with whom negotiations were in process and which he hoped would result in making possible an early withdrawal.

It seems probable that unless the Chinese adhere to Wellington Koo's proposition and withdraw their armies to the line he suggested, it is only a question of time before

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

rh #4 of No. 256 from Tokio

before the Japanese will feel compelled to drive the Chinese armies back. Shidehara did not describe this as asking them to evacuate their own territory except in so far as to make good their own proposition.

FORBES

WSB

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

21. ET. 22


Dear Mr. Salmon

Please have indexed and
place in Confidential Files.

Thank you.

HHC-

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY

file
182
17. XI. 32

Strictly Confidential
No Circulation

December 12, 1931.

TELEPHONE CONVERSATION FOR THE SECRETARY FROM MR. ROY
HOWARD, DECEMBER 11, 1931, 2:20 P.M.

793.94

Mr. Howard telephoned to say that last night (December 10), he had had a two hour conversation with Ambassador Debuchi, which he thought might be of interest to the Secretary.

During the conversation two interesting points were developed:

1. Mr. Howard pressed Debuchi as to whether or not he thought Japan had violated the Nine-Power Pact. Mr. Debuchi said that as Debuchi but not as ambassador, he would admit that Japan had violated the pact, but insisted that this violation was only temporary and that in two or three months it would be rectified.

2. Mr. Howard was interested and rather surprised at what was to him a new angle of the situation, i.e., the great stress which Debuchi and apparently the entire Japanese Government lays upon the fact that the Young Marshal must be eliminated from the political picture in Manchuria. Mr. Howard got the idea that more stress was laid upon this point, and was regarded as more important, than

F/H/S

793.94/3135-1/2

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Confidential File

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

-2-

than the temporary violation of the Pact.

Although Mr. Debuchi acknowledged that in his personal opinion, the Pact had been violated, he stressed the point that the State Department had not accused Japan of such violation.

Mr. Howard stated that if the Secretary desired further details of his conversation, he would be glad to have him telephone to his New York office, Vanderbilt 3-6840.

HAMCB.

S:HAMCB:VGN

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00/11655 FOR Tel.#- 3pm.

FROM Nanking (Johnson) DATED Dec.8,1931.
-TO- NAME 1-1127

REGARDING: Manchurian situation - Full report on situation
at Chinchow.
(Copy attached)

fpg

793.94/3136

FE

REP

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

NANKING 2 N R21

Dated December 8, 1931

Rec'd 11:15 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

December 8, 3 p. m. (SECTION TWO).

Two. CONFIDENTIAL. Situation at Chinchow. Tentative suggestion of Koo regarding Chinchow communicated to the Department in my telegram of November 24, midnight, appears to have been communicated to Japanese Government by French Ambassador and to have been received by Japanese Government as a firm offer by Chinese. Japanese have chosen to take this stand in spite of fact that Koo merely intended to sound out British, French and American Governments, and made offer contingent upon guarantees by Japan given to these Governments. Japanese stoutly now insist that as they have withdrawn their troops east of Liao Chinese will be guilty of breach of faith if they fail to evacuate Chinchow. Chinese maintain that they never made such offer and are therefore under no obligation to evacuate Chinchow, last stand of Nationalist Government in Manchurian area. I understand Japanese contend that their withdrawal was due to Chinese offer and I have been told

REP

2- from Nanking, Dec. 8, 3 p. m.
(Section two)

told that through Shigemitsu Japanese Government has informed Chinese Government that unless Chinese withdraw their troops situation will become difficult. I believe that members of Council of the League may approach the American Government with a view to having it, through me in cooperation with British and French Ministers, urge Chinese to withdraw forces from Chinchow. I hope that American Government will resist any such overtures as I and my British and French colleagues are in agreement that in the present posture of affairs here it would be dangerous for us at this time. The giving of such advice could result only in shifting from the Chinese Government to us any odium attaching to such policy. During the past week the Capitol has been filled with students from all parts of the country who have been agitating against the Government in regard to this matter and feeling is running very high. The Japanese can have but one motive for the elimination of the remnants of Chinese control at Chinchow and that is to make effective Japanese influence throughout Manchuria with a view to encouraging independent government there amenable to Japanese authorities. Having failed to accomplish this by force of arms it is necessary for them to accomplish it through

REP

3- from Nanking, Dec. 8, 3 p.m.
(Section two)

it through the agency of the League or ourselves. I believe that we should not be maneuvered into any such action. I do not believe that Japanese intend to take Chinchow by force, certainly not if they can obtain their results through the agency of others.

JOHNSON

KLP

CSB

1388

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
 PREPARING OFFICE
 WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-128
 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Collect
 Charge Department
 OR
 Charge to
 \$

Department of State

Washington,

December 8, 1931.

AMEMBASSY,

PARIS (France) DEC 8 31

CONFIDENTIAL FOR AMBASSADOR DAWES

On November 24, the American Minister at Nanking
 telegraphed Department as follows:

QUOTE In view of alarming reports current as to
 imminent Japanese action at Chinchow Dr. Wellington Koo,
 Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, has this evening
 told me and my British and French colleagues that his
 Government wished to sound our Governments out and if
 feasible make a formal proposition along following lines:

SUBQUOTE In order to avoid any clash China is pre-
 pared as a temporary measure pending a general settlement
 of the Manchuria question, if Japan insists on withdrawal
 of troops in the Chinchow area to do so up to Shanhaikwan,
 provided/ Japan gives guarantees satisfactory to Great
 Britain, the United States and France, not to go into that
 zone leaving the Chinese civil administration intact
 including police END SUBQUOTE.

QUOTE In view of critical situation we undertook to
 commend this to our respective Governments and to ask for
 a speedy reply UNQUOTE.

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-128

793.94/3136

793.94/3136
 640

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
 PREPARING OFFICE
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Collect
 Charge Department
 OR

Charge to
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TELEGRAM SENT

1-128
 TO BE TRANSMITTED
 CONFIDENTIAL CODE
 NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
 PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

- 2 -

Under date December 8, ^{893.00/11655} the American Minister at
 Nanking telegraphed ⁵¹⁴⁴ as follows:

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 Koo regarding Chinchow communicated to the Department in
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 offer by Chinese. Japanese have chosen to take this stand
 in spite of fact that Koo merely intended to sound out
 British, French and American Governments, and made offer
 contingent upon guarantees by Japan given to those Govern-
 ments. Japanese stoutly now insist that, as they have with-
 drawn their troops east of Liao, Chinese will be guilty of
 breach of faith if they fail to evacuate Chinchow. Chi-
 nese maintain that they never made such offer and are there-
 fore under no obligation to evacuate Chinchow, last stand
 of Nationalist Government in Manchurian area. I understand
 Japanese contend that their withdrawal was due to Chinese
 offer and I have been told that through Shigemitsu Japanese
 Government has informed Chinese Government that unless Chi-
 nese withdraw their troops situation will become difficult
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Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Department of State

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

Washington,

- 3 -

C-1

I desire that you see Briand and call to his attention the discrepancy between the project which Wellington Koo put forward tentatively for consideration and the contention which the Japanese apparently now make that the Chinese made a promise to withdraw their troops from Chinchow, ^{that} in consequence ^{thereof} ~~of which~~ the Japanese withdrew their troops east of the Liao river, and that the Chinese will be guilty of breach of faith if they now fail to evacuate Chinchow. I feel that Briand should ascertain in what form and terms Koo's tentative project was communicated to the Japanese and, if, as I assume, warrant is lacking for the Japanese present contention that they were given to understand that the Chinese had made an outright offer, Briand should strongly combat that contention.

Stinson
9/24

On instruction from the Secretary.
FE:SKH/ZMF *MM* FE

Enciphered by _____
Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER
Collect
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OR
Charge to
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PM TELEGRAM SENT
Department of State
Washington,

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

December 12, 1931.

AMERICAN CONSUL

NANKING (CHINA).

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE MINISTER.

One. Reference your telegrams November 24/ and
December 8/ with regard to the question of alleged
promises of the Chinese to withdraw from Chinchow. The
Embassy at Tokyo has been requested to repeat to you,
for your confidential information, essential portions
of the Department's ^{Telegram 262} ~~instruction~~ of December 11 relating
to the above matter.

Two. For your further information. - From the
cables received from Paris, Tokyo and Nanking the
situation as it appears to the Department is substantially
as follows:


Besides the suggested modification that the guarantees
as regard nonpenetration of Japanese troops in neutral
zone should be given to the Council of the League instead
of the three nations suggested by Koo, Shidehara also
suggested a definite limit for the northern end of the
zone which had been expressed by Koo only in general
terms

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

793.94/3136
135

793.94/31136



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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
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Collect
Charge Department
OR

Department of State

Charge to
\$

Washington,

- 2 -

terms as QUOTE the Chinchow area UNQUOTE. The limit suggested by Shidehara was the Hsiaoliang-ho River. We understand that this river runs just north and east of Chinchow but that the city itself would lie within the neutral zone. It does not seem to us that Shidehara's limits to the zone necessarily involved narrowing the zone much more than might be understood from the Koo proposal. Shidehara ~~also made it clear~~ *apparently stated* in his counter-proposal that Japanese troops would not penetrate for any purpose the proposed neutral zone to be evacuated by the Chinese. He also in a formal note to the Council stated that there was no intention to station Japanese troops east of the zone, namely, in the area between the Liao River and Chinchow, and that no force would be sent there except under exceptional circumstances such as for the necessity of repressing the activity of bandits, and that a small detachment would have to be maintained at Hsinmin. In other words, it seems to us that Shidehara's proposal did not differ substantially from the Chinese proposal except that the Japanese proposed that QUOTE guarantees UNQUOTE should be given

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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 Charge Department
 OR

Department of State

Charge to
 \$

Washington,

- 3 -

given to the Council of the League instead of the three
 nations suggested by Koo. This exception does not seem
 to be an objection which ~~to be an objection which~~
 to me ~~particularly material or one that~~ could not be
 worked out *by a little patient negotiation.*

Three. In view of the fact that further hostilities
 in the Chinchow area would very seriously affect the
 beneficial results which may confidently be expected from
 the League Resolution, I think further effort should be
 made to bring about an understanding on this point. I
 realize that it may now be impossible for Koo to renew
 his proposal or to accept the Japanese proposal, in view
 of the height to which public opinion in China, as in
 Japan, has been aroused. I should like you, however,
 discreetly to sound Koo out on the matter and urge upon
 him, as Forbes has been instructed to urge upon Shidehara,
 the necessity of the utmost self-restraint with regard to
 any further military activities or demonstrations and to
 suggest that it should be possible, now that the Resolution
 of the Council has been adopted, for the Chinese and
 Japanese authorities to come to some agreement which will
 ensure against hostilities at or in relation to Chinchow.

Enciphered by FE:RSM:EJL FE

Sent by operator M., 19

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-138


AM RECD

NO. 184 Political

AMERICAN CONSULATE,

Geneva, Switzerland, November 21, 1931.

DEC 9 31



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
SUBJECT: Transmitting Procès-Verbaux of the Meetings of
the Council held in Geneva from October 13 to
October 24, 1931. - Supplement to Despatch No.
177 Political, November 16, 1931.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:



I have the honor to refer to the Consulate's despatch
No. 177 Political of November 16, 1931, transmitting procès-
verbaux of the meetings of the Council held in Geneva from
October 13 to October 24, 1931, with a set of documents
pertaining to the appeal of the Chinese Government under
Article 11 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

Owing to a delay in delivery from the Secretariat,
several supplementary numbers were received too late for
inclusion with the despatch under reference. These are
being sent herewith in order to make the set complete to
November 16, 1931.

Respectfully yours,

Prentiss B. Gilbert
Prentiss B. Gilbert,
American Consul.

Enclosures:

M. Documents: O.M. 436 to O.M. 439.

Original and 5 copies to Department of State.
1 copy to American Legation, Berne, Switzerland.

F/DEW

793.94/3137

FILED

DEC 22 1931

DEC 22

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

Paris

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be- FROM
fore being communicated
to anyone.

Dated December 9, 1931

Rec'd 1:35 p.m. DEC 15 1931

Secretary of State,

Washington


TRIPLE PRIORITY.
864, December 9, 5 p.m.

FROM DAWES.

Answering your 640, December 8, 11 p.m., Drummond

makes the following statements of the situation:

"As I understand the situation Dr. Koo invited
the Ministers of America, France and Great Britain to
see him when the situation became dangerous as regards
Chinchow and told them he was considering whether he
would suggest that the Chinese troops should be with-
drawn from Chinchow to behind the Great Wall provided
satisfactory guarantees were given by Japan to the three
governments concerned and that arrangements were made
for Chinese administration to continue in the areas
thus evacuated. Dr. Koo stated that if the three govern-
ments were favorable to such a scheme he would then be
prepared to make a definite offer. This proposal of
Koo's was telegraphed by the French Minister at Nanking
to Paris and to Tokyo. Paris thought it was of
considerable



795.94/3138

DEC 14 1931

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#864 from Paris, December 9,
1931 (

considerable interest and though on this point there
is still considerable obscurity, they told their Ambas-
sador at Tokyo that he should take the question up with
Baron Shidehara. The French Ambassador, therefore,
went to see Shidehara and said that by instruction of
his Government he had to bring to his (END SECTION ONE)

SHAW

WSB

ACT

TELEGRAM RECEIVED
This telegram was
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone.

Paris

Dated December 9, 1931

Rec'd 2:45 p.m.

FROM

Secretary of State,

Washington

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

864, December 9, 5 p.m. (SECTIONS TWO AND THREE)

notice before Koo and his British colleague who had
at first said that he had no instructions on the point
when he learned that the French Ambassador was acting
under authority from Paris associated himself in this
demonstration. Baron Shidehara was very much interested
in the statement made by the French Ambassador anent
Koo's proposal and replied that he accepted in principle
but put forward certain counter-proposals. Among these
was one that while Japan was not willing to give guar-
antees to the three powers mentioned above they are
willing to give guarantees to the Council of the League
as regards non-penetration of Japanese troops into the
neutral zone. From the above account it is, I think,
quite clear that Shidehara acted in perfect good faith
in thinking that this was a definite offer from Wellington
Koo and I understand that he utilized this offer with his
military

MET

2-#864 from Paris, December 9,
1931
(SECTIONS TWO AND THREE)

military extremists in order to press them not to
advance further on Chinchow.

I understand that now, however, the position has
been explained to the Japanese Government who appre-
ciate the misunderstanding that arose but the effect
on public opinion is still great and of course it is
almost impossible for Baron Shidehara to give satis-
factory explanations to his military authorities since
they hold that he has been ~~was~~ *incurring*.

Briand did indeed initiate negotiations with the
Japanese to see if it would be possible to secure
guarantee to the Council as offered by them in such
form as to justify the Council in urging the Chinese
to undertake direct negotiations with the Japanese.
It was only after an exchange of notes between Briand
and the Japanese and the suggestion of a northern limit
to the zone which the Council felt it could not (repeat
not) urge upon the Chinese that Briand decided this
morning that it would not be worth while to press the
negotiations further".

It is apparent from the above statement of Sir
Eric Drummond that in view of the circumstances Briand
is

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

3-#864 from Paris, December 9,
1931 (SECTIONS TWO AND THREE)

is in no position to censure the Japanese Government
although the situation has been fully explained to
them.

(END MESSAGE)

SHAW

WSB

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

December 10, 1931.

MANCHURIA SITUATION
Neutral Zone

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
AUG 1 - 1934

My estimate is as follows:

793.94/3138 (a) Dr. Koo's proposal, which involved the making of a pledge by Japan to the United States, Great Britain and France, was one on the basis of which, if accepted at the time (two weeks ago), Dr. Koo might have delivered the goods, namely, the withdrawal of the Chinese forces. Baron Shidehara's proposal, which involved a guarantee by Japan to the League, was not such a proposal as Dr. Koo could have "sold" to his compatriots. (NOTE: This, for the reason that the Chinese would rate a Japanese guarantee to the United States -- plus Great Britain and France -- much higher than a guarantee to the Council.) As soon as the project became known to the public, it became apparent that the Chinese people would not approve it. Therefore, Koo could not persist with it.


(b) It is quite conceivable that, as soon as Koo found himself in an impossible position he appealed to the British to help him out. Cecil's apparent inability to "understand" at various stages may have been real or it may have been feigned. At any rate,

(c) Neither Cecil nor other members of the Council felt it advisable to force the Chinese Government to go on with

793.94/3138

- 2 -

a project which one official of that Government had tentatively put forward, the terms of which project were very different as formulated in the Japanese counter-proposal from the terms of Koo's original tentative project. In bald terms, the proposition amounts to this: that China shall withdraw her troops from the last remaining area in South Manchuria in return for a qualified pledge on Japan's part that Japan's troops will not invade that area. This means a very great concession on China's part in return for no concession except that of refraining from a battle which she has no right to wage on Japan's part. The League had not the face to demand that of China; nor had it the desire thus to aid Japan to round out her military occupation of South Manchuria. The members of the Council well realize that action of this sort on their part might well embarrass them in the future. The problem is one for which there is no satisfactory solution, and they very wisely resolved not to compromise themselves by associating themselves with an unsatisfactory solution.



FE:SKH/ZMF

140
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

D. H. Hornbush

Rush

FATE OF KOO'S SUGGESTION AS TO NEUTRAL ZONE

As I see it, the real reason why the neutral zone suggestion of Koo failed was this: Koo made his suggestion to the three ministers, the ministers transmitted them to the League. The League through the French Minister at Tokyo transmitted it to Shidehara. Shidehara approved it with the modification that the Japanese guarantees should be given to the League and not to the three nations. Shidehara also in his note to the League attempted to define the zone by the Hsiaoliang-ho River. This really was in substantial conformity with the Chinese suggestion. The League failed to realize this and thought the Japanese were inching up. They consequently dropped the matter instead of urging the Chinese to go on with their own suggestion.

It appears to me that the sole and only reason for the breakdown was the League's failure to fully appreciate (1) that the Japanese definition of the zone was practically the same as the Chinese, and (2) that urging the Chinese to go on with the suggestion which originated from them was entirely ~~different~~ different from urging on the League's initiative evacuation by the Chinese of their own

- 2 -

territory.

I do not think that the breakdown was due to the
Japanese mistaking as a definite proposal what was
only a suggestion.

[K 606]

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

Paris

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closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone.

Dated December 9, 1931

Rec'd 1:35 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

TRIPLE PRIORITY.
864, December 9, 5 p.m.

FROM DAWES.

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2-#864 from Paris, December 9,
1931

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Paris

Dated December 9, 1931

Rec'd 2:45 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

864, December 9, 5 p.m. (SECTIONS TWO AND THREE)

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militar.

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2-#864 from Paris, December 9,
1931
(SECTIONS TWO AND THREE)

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3-#864 from Paris, December 9,
1931 (SECTIONS TWO AND THREE)

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(END MESSAGE)

SHAW

WSB

rh

TELEGRAM SENT

This telegram must be closely
paraphrased before being
communicated to anyone.

December 8, 1931.

11 pm

AMEMBASSY

PARIS (FRANCE)

640

CONFIDENTIAL FOR AMBASSADOR DAWES

On November 24, the American Minister at Nanking
telegraphed Department as follows:

QUOTE In view of alarming reports current as to
imminent Japanese action at Chinchow Dr. Wellington Koo,
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, has this evening told
me and my British and French colleagues that his Government
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formal proposition along following lines:

SUBQUOTE In order to avoid any clash China is pre-
pared as a temporary measure pending a general settlement
of the Manchuria question, if Japan insists on withdrawal
of troops in the Chinchow area to do so up to Shanhaikwan,
provided Japan gives guarantees satisfactory to Great
Britain, the United States and France, not to go into that
zone leaving the Chinese civil administration intact
including police END SUBQUOTE.

QUOTE In view of critical situation we undertook to
commend

rh #2 of No. 640 to Paris

commend this to our respective Governments and to ask for a speedy reply UNQUOTE.

Under date December 8, the American Minister at Nanking telegraphs as follows:

QUOTE Situation at Chinchow. Tentative suggestion of Koo regarding Chinchow communicated to the Department in my telegram of November 24, midnight, appears to have been communicated to Japanese Government by French Ambassador and to have been received by Japanese Government as a firm offer by Chinese. Japanese have chosen to take this stand in spite of fact that Koo merely intended to sound out British, French and American Governments, and made offer contingent upon guarantees by Japan given to those Governments. Japanese stoutly now insist that as they have withdrawn their troops east of Liao, Chinese will be guilty of breach of faith if they fail to evacuate Chinchow. Chinese maintain that they never made such offer and are therefore under no obligation to evacuate Chinchow, last stand of Nationalist Government in Manchurian area. I understand Japanese contend that their withdrawal was due to Chinese offer and I have been told that through Shigemitsu Japanese Government has informed Chinese Government that unless Chinese withdraw their troops situation will become difficult

UNQUOTE.

rh #3 of No. 640 to Paris

UNQUOTE.

I desire that you see Briand and call to his attention the discrepancy between the project which Wellington Koo put forward tentatively for consideration and the contention which the Japanese apparently now make that the Chinese made a promise to withdraw their troops from Chinchow, that in consequence thereof the Japanese withdrew their troops east of the Liao river, and that the Chinese will be guilty of breach of faith if they now fail to evacuate Chinchow. I feel that Briand should ascertain in what form and terms Koo's tentative project was communicated to the Japanese and, if, as I assume, warrant is lacking for the Japanese present contention that they were given to understand that the Chinese had made an outright offer, Briand should strongly combat that contention.

STIMSON

FE:SKH/ZMF

FE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

GREEN

FROM

Paris

Dated December 9, 1931

Rec'd 3:30 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

867, December 9, 8 p.m.

FIRST OF FIVE SECTIONS.

FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES.

Following is report from Sweetser:

"Briand today submitted to the Twelve the following letter from Yoshizawa dated December 8th:

"I did not fail to telegraph to Tokyo the contents of your note of yesterday evening and I reserve the right to reply to it eventually.

As I said to you during our meeting Baron Shidehara thought it possible to forestall an immediate danger through an agreement with the Chinese upon the principle proposed by them. The only way of forestalling this danger seemed to have the Chinchow region evacuated by Chinese troops. Apart from the objective in view the question of the exact limit was essentially secondary as moreover I observed to you

yesterday.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
DEC 10 1931

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DEC 15 1931
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

F/DEW

793.94/3139

PT/ED

DEC 10 1931

793.94
note
500.C112

MET

2-867 from Paris, December 9,
1931 (FIRST OF FIVE SECTIONS)

yesterday. The essential thing was to have the Chinese and ourselves begin conversations. Baron Shidehara had hoped that the Council would understand this and would support his efforts to avoid any collision. This was why he had urgently requested your intervention with the Chinese.

I have just received a telegram from Tokyo which informs me that the government has no intention, after the limits (END SECTION ONE)

SHAW

WSB

MET

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GREEN

Paris

Dated December 9, 1931

FROM

Rec'd 4 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

867, December 9, 8 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

of the zone has been fixed, to station troops east of the zone. No force would be sent there except under exceptional circumstances such as the necessity for repressing the activity of bandits. This telegram added that at present we have a small detachment in the Hsin Min region the presence of which is still necessary to preserve order and conditions do not permit their immediate withdrawal.

I wished to inform you of the foregoing thinking that it would perhaps allow you to give some new information to the Council."

Briand also reported a long cable just received from the French Ambassador in Tokyo giving the substance of a talk with Shidehara regarding Chinchow. Shidehara had explained to him the exact location of Japanese

troops

MM

2- 867, section two, from Paris,
December 9, 1931

troops and their desire not to occupy points nearer Chinchow but simply to repress banditry therefrom. He claimed there were many Chinese regulars near by who should be brought back to Chinchow and then to Shanhaikwan. The Ambassador said he had insisted with all possible vehemence against any new military movement at the very moment when a special diplomatic settlement was being reached in Paris and expressed the view that any Japanese military advance would bring the whole laborious effort to naught. Shidehara replied that he had never ceased to endeavor to restrain the military but could not guarantee the non-occupation of Chinchow unless the Chinese troops withdraw.

(END SECTION TWO)

SHAW

WSB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAM

FROM

GRAY

PARIS

Dated December 9, 1931

Rec'd 4:12 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

867, December 9, 8 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

Japanese military leaders felt they had been duped by the Chinese and in view of the menace to the Japanese position, might quite well feel it necessary to take action which probably would not stop before Chinchow. AS regards the Paris negotiations, Shidehara had said that Japan could not admit any discussion of the clause on police measures which would destroy the Japanese position thereon.

A discussion then followed amongst the twelve as to whether the Japanese reply quoted above justified any future effort at negotiations regarding Chinchow. Cecil said that he did not yet understand what it meant; that it seemed to him extremely vague; and that the only definition of 'east of the zone' would seem to mean the ocean. He did not understand whether the Japanese would permit Chinese administration between Chinchow and the Liao River. If not disorder would of course follow and Japanese troops would have to go in. Drummond thought it

mam

2- #867, section three, from Paris,
December 9, 1931

it might be well to transmit this reply to the Chinese;
Cecil thought it would do no good. Mutius thought the
reply only a polite acknowledgment without any opening
for new negotiations. Briand then expressed the general
view that the Council had no choice but to let the matter
rest on the basis of this Japanese answer.

A brief exchange then followed on the plans for this
afternoon's meeting. Drummond anticipated no difficulty
as regards the resolution itself; Briand said he did not
(END SECTION THREE)

SHAW

WSB

KLP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED ^{GREEN}

Paris

FROM

Dated December 9, 1931.

Rec'd. 4:40 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

867, December 9, 8 p.m. (SECTION FOUR)

see how after all these negotiations it would be possible
to raise any difficulty on any point and certainly not
one sufficiently serious to justify a rupture. Up to
lunch time the Japanese had not received their instructions.

One point as to future ^{after} action Council adjourned
was also touched upon. Briand said that in order not to
be left entirely alone with the whole responsibility
for this problem and in order also to avoid even the
slightest impression that the Council had abandoned its
task he is planning to suggest in his final speech after
the adoption of the resolution that the members of the
Drafting Committee who had been of such great help
throughout should remain in touch with him. These
members are Cecil, who could be replaced if necessary by
some one from the British Ministry, Madariaga, newly
appointed Spanish Ambassador in Paris, and Colban,
Norwegian Minister here.

Briand

mam

2- #867, section four, from Paris,
December 9, 1931

Briand also made a brief and cautious report on his interview with General Dawes yesterday. He said that the General had come to see him and had renewed his expression of the American Government and its agreement in the general program laid out. He had said the Government was disposed to aid in any possible way and to reinforce in so far as it could the action taken here. Already Briand recalled it had several times done so notably regarding steps for the prevention of further hostilities. Briand thought the American Government might take some similar action as regards the resolution which would of course be important.

(END SECTION FOUR)

SHAW

KLP

MET

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GREEN

Paris

Dated December 9, 1931

FROM

Rec'd 4:20 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

867. December 9, 8 p.m. (SECTION FIVE)

Cecil said it would be very worth while if General Dawes could come to the Council and state this publicly. Briand seemed hesitant at this suggestion. Cecil added that, after all, the Council members were not dangerous; if Dawes did not want to come personally, he might write a letter. Briand said he himself had been very cautious on this particular point; he had not wanted to go beyond where the General could follow. Scialoja wondered if the Council could not give General Dawes the opportunity to make some kind of declaration. Cecil thought this a possible course; that General Dawes could perhaps come to the meeting, make a declaration, and then depart without, however, actually taking a seat at the table. Such a course would obviously greatly undermine the common efforts for a peaceful solution and dramatically

demonstrate

MET

2-from Paris, December 9, 1931,
(SECTION FIVE)

demonstrate the unity of all agencies endeavoring to prevent further hostilities. Drummond explained that the American Government seemed anxious to do all it possibly could to help the Council particularly in its representations to the two governments but obviously did not wish to be asked to appear at the Council table. The matter was left with Briand stating he would make discreet soundings which would not be pressed to the embarrassment of either side.

(END OF MESSAGE)

SHAW

KLP

OIPHER

TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect

Charge Department

or

Charge to

\$

Department of State

Washington,

December 9, 1931

11 pm

AMEMBASSY

PARIS

SPECIAL FOR DAWES

643. Your 867, December 9, 8 p.m., just received.

I desire to give public impression of cordial support to League resolution if passed tomorrow and am inclined to feel that in addition to our statement here it would be helpful if you made some brief statement in Paris to further the same impression.

Such statement might express appreciation of the long patient labor of the Council resulting in an agreement of the disputants to refrain from future aggression and to support an impartial investigation of the causes of their controversy. This agreement if faithfully observed by both parties may well lead to a final permanent and peaceful

(Nothing but address and text of message to be written within the marginal lines. All stamps and numbers to be placed in space below.)

Initialed for:

W.T.B.

W.T.B.

T.A.

T.A.

T.A.-L.

C.-A.

D.C.

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 191 ,

Index Bu.—No. 50.

793.94/3139

793.94/3139
mt
500 ✓ 9/12

OIPHER

TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

Department of State

Washington,

- 2 -

peaceful solution of this difficult problem. I should have no objection to you in your discretion making such a declaration even in the Council Chamber after the passage of the resolution if you find a strong feeling among the Council members that it would increase the impression of solidarity among all nations in this effort for peace.

STIMSON

Taken over telephone 11 p.m.
PFC

Initialed for:

W.T.B.

W.T.B.

T.A.

T.A.

T.A.-L.

C.-A.

D.C.

[Nothing but address and text of message to be written within the marginal lines. All stamps and numbers to be placed in space below.]

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 191

Index Bu.—No. 50.

1-313

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAIM


CORRECTED COPY GREEN

FROM

PARIS

Dated

Rec'd



Secretary of State

Washington

RUSH

TRIPLE PRIORITY

868, December 9, 9 p.m.

FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES

Briand read text of resolution and declaration at this afternoon's public meeting of the Council.

With the following exceptions the texts as read were the same as those contained in my 857 of December 8, 3 p.m.

One. Last paragraph of paragraph numbered five of the resolution has been transferred to the declaration and is now the second paragraph under "paragraph five" of the declaration. It reads as follows:

"If the undertakings given by the two parties according to the resolution of September 30th have not been carried out by the time of the arrival of the commission the commission should as speedily as possible report to the Council on the situation."

Two. The words "which remains seized of the matter" have been added in paragraph numbered six of the resolution



F/DEW

793.94/3140

FILED

DEC 14 1931

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mam 2- corrected copy of #868, from Paris,
December 9, 1931

resolution after the word "Council".

Three. No mention was made of the matter of bandits since the question of whether this should be included in Briand's declaration or covered by a unilateral Japanese declaration is still under negotiation.

Immediately after Briand had read the text the Japanese representative stated that he had asked for instructions but had as yet no reply. He asked for a delay until tomorrow. It was agreed to hold a public meeting at 4:30 tomorrow afternoon.

If matters go as planned the Council will of course adjourn tomorrow afternoon. Please advise me whether you desire me to remain here after that time. If not I shall leave for London Friday noon.

WSB


SHAW

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAM

FROM




Secretary of State

Washington

869, December 9, 10 p.m.

FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES

Following report is from Sweetser



"Today's public session of the Council went exactly according to plan. Briand read the draft resolution and declaration without any appreciable change except first, that the question of the relationship of the commission to evacuation was definitely settled by inserting a strong paragraph thereon in the declaration and second, the reference to police measures was for the moment omitted pending instructions from Tokyo which are expected tonight as to whether Japan would prefer the Council text which is not entirely satisfactory to her, to be inserted in the declaration, or to make a unilateral declaration of her own which would encounter the other disadvantage of drawing forth statements by other Council members. Yoshizawa immediately requested adjournment until tomorrow afternoon which Briand said it would be ungracious not to grant. Yoshizawa will then state his views; Briand announced

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DEC 14 1931

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

mam

2- #869, from Paris, December 9,
1931

announced he has certain other comments to make.

The only outstanding question now seems to be that
regarding police measures. This is expected to be merely
a matter of adjustment which may call forth certain declar-
ations,

(END SECTION ONE)

SHAW

OX

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAM

GREEN

PARIS

FROM

Dated December 9, 1931

Rec'd 8:47 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

869, December 9, 10 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

but which can hardly lead to a rupture. The program as foreseen now for tomorrow calls for a previous agreement between Yoshizawa and Briand as to the procedure regarding police measures clause, which will mean either a further addition by Briand to his statement or a declaration (*) Yoshizawa. It is hoped to avoid any further comment at this moment and proceed at once to the vote on the resolution and declaration. In this case the two delegations and any other so desiring would then add their explanations. It is understood the Chinese intend to make two general (*): first, reserving all their rights under the Covenant and other treaties; and second, protesting the police measures, which they feel would not have been necessary except for Japan's own actions. Certain comments by other members of the Council may be foreseen as, for instance, the Latin Americans on protecting railroad property and the Spanish on police measures.

After the resolution and declaration are finally out
of

nam

2- #869 section two, from Paris,
December 9, 1961

of the way Briand will make a general statement which it
is understood will be fairly strong. The Council will
then adjourn, leaving Briand to follow developments with
the assistance, if necessary, of the drafting committee.
Drummond is planning to leave for Geneva tomorrow night".

(END MESSAGE)

SHAW

OX

(*) omissions

7 E

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAM

CORRECTED COPY GREEN

FROM

PARIS

Dated December 9, 1931

Rec'd 8:47 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

869, December 9, 10 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

but which can hardly lead to a rupture. The program as foreseen now for tomorrow calls for a previous agreement between Yoshizawa and Briand as to the procedure regarding police measures clause, which will mean either a further addition by Briand to his statement or a declaration by Yoshizawa. It is hoped to avoid any further comment at this moment and proceed at once to the vote on the resolution and declaration. In this case the two delegations and any other so desiring would then add their explanations. It is understood the Chinese intend to make two general statements: first, reserving all their rights under the Covenant and other treaties; and second, protesting the police measures, which they feel would not have been necessary except for Japan's own actions. Certain comments by other members of the Council may be foreseen as, for instance, the Latin Americans on protecting railroad property and the Spanish on police measures.

After the resolution and declaration are finally out
of

FM 793.04/5131

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

mam

2- #869, section two, from Paris,
December 9, 1951

of the way Briand will make a general statement which it
is understood will be fairly strong. The Council will
then adjourn, leaving Briand to follow developments with
the assistance, if necessary, of the drafting committee.
Drummond is planning to leave for Geneva tomorrow night".
(END MESSAGE).

SHAW

OX

7E
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

GRAY

FROM

Paiping via N.R.

Dated December 10, 1931

Secretary of State,

Washington

1064, December 10, 11 a.m.

Following from American Consul General at Mukden:

"December 9, 5 p.m. The Consulate General formally advised "officially" by the local peace maintenance committee that the name of the province has been changed to Fengtien. Local government offices have changed their titles accordingly.

Two. Following is the gist of statement carried in the local Japanese and Chinese press which purports to be the plan of the Kuangtung army respecting Japanese attitude toward the independent Manchuria Mongolia Government:

"Pending complete organization of the independent government the Japanese military to exercise supervisory (#) and to protect the new state from aggression. After organization completed a Japanese Governor is to be appointed

Rec'd 4 a.m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
DEC 10 1931
Department of State

F/DEM

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2-#1064 from Peiping via N.R.,
December 10, 1931.

appointed who will act in an advisory capacity and
assist in formulating the policy of the new nation".

Repeated to Department and Nanking.

For the Minister,

PERKINS

WSB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

FROM

PLAIN

Paris

Dated December 10, 1931

Secretary of State, .

Washington

DOUBLE PRIORITY.

870, December 10, 4 p.m.


FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES.

I shall telephone you at five o'clock this afternoon,
Washington time.

SHAW

HPD

RECEIVED
DEC 11 1931
SECRETARY'S OFFICE



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DEC 19 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

713.94

SEE 893.00 P.R. Tsinan/43 FOR #59

FROM Tsinan (Meinhart) DATED Nov 9, 1931
TO _____ NAME _____ 1-1127 o p o

REGARDING:

Passive, rather than active, resentment against the Japanese. No public demonstrations have been permitted nor is there a boycott in name in existence but popular opinion has resulted in loss of Japanese trade.

793.94/3144

ek

JAPANESE RELATIONS

Fortunately no public demonstrations against the Japanese have been permitted to take place to show the popular resentment against the invasion of Manchuria. Such resentment nevertheless exists, and is quietly manifested by the Chinese political and student population in particular. All the students of the middle schools, the Provincial Normal School and Chee-loo University have been participating in daily military drills in addition to a general review each Sunday morning on the Provincial Athletic Field. 2,500 students have thus been drilling under the direction ...

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lutefsen NARS, Date 12-18-75

the direction of military instructors. In this way the physical exuberance of the students has been allowed to manifest itself under the supervision of their educational and governmental authorities. Many of them have already lost their enthusiasm for becoming soldiers, and find that three hours drill in the early morning tires them, besides taking too much valuable time away from their studies.

General Wan Fu Lin came to Tsinan on the 2nd of October as a special representative of Marshal Chang Hsueh Liang to discuss Manchurian affairs with Han. According to the press he received Han's pledge to follow Marshal Chang in any action he might take against the invaders. Dr. W. W. Yen also made a statement regarding the Manchurian affair when he passed through Tsinan on October 2nd. In the course of his remarks he stated, "Of course we suffer losses, but Japan's loss may be worse than ours, so far as her reputation is concerned."

On the 15th of October General Han made a brief statement about the situation, saying that he would use his best efforts to maintain good order and peace in the province, so as not to let the Japanese have anything to complain about, and that the question would not be hard to settle, if the whole country were united and worked together. A few days later he also issued a proclamation in his capacity as Chairman of the Shantung Government and Commander in Chief of the Third Route Army, warning the people

not to ...

- 11 -

not to hold any mass meetings nor to post any slogans unless permission was first obtained from the Provincial Government and the Provincial Tang Pu.

While it still remains true that no boycott associations have come into existence in Tsinan, and that no campaign has been instituted for seizing, confiscating, or selling by auction any Japanese goods found in the possession of Chinese merchants, nevertheless, a true boycott of a popular nature has become very effective in bringing about a great decrease in Japanese trade.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R Tientsin/41 FOR #35

FROM Tientsin (Lockhart) DATED Nov 7, 1931
TO _____ NAME _____ 1-1127 o.p.

REGARDING:

Relations though cool, between Japanese and Chinese, are still under control and there has been no open warfare between them. Much propaganda has been disseminated on both sides which makes the truth of the situation hard to ascertain.

ek

743.94
793.94/3145

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

et Tientsin, China.

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL,

Tientsin, China, November 7, 1931.

Subject: Political and Military Conditions
 in the Tientsin Consular District
 during October, 1931.

The Honorable Nelson T. Johnson,
 American Minister,
 Peiping, China.

Sir:

I have the honor to report as follows on political
 and military developments in the Tientsin consular district
 during the month of October, 1931:

GENERAL CONDITIONS.

The month of October in the Tientsin consular district,
 as regards political and military developments, was not
 unlike the month of September in that practically all
 interest was centered on Sino-Japanese relations growing
 out of the Manchurian situation. In the early part of
 the month interest in the matter somewhat waned, but the
 bombardment of Chinchow suddenly revived interest and made
 it evident that the question would not be settled as
 expeditiously as it was at first thought might possibly
 be the case. As concerns the maintenance of peaceful
 relations between Chinese and Japanese in the Tientsin
 area, it can be said to the credit of the Chinese that by
 strict measures no incident was allowed to arise in this

regard.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

-2-

regard. While the relations between the two peoples were anything but cordial, there was at least no open conflict between them. The nearest approach to an incident occurred on October 11 when two Japanese gendarmes, in civilian dress, were stopped by the body guard of the Tientsin Defense Commissioner at 10:30 p.m., and were taken into the Chinese Barracks for examination. It is alleged by the Japanese that they were beaten and kicked by the Chinese soldiers. It is also alleged that they were robbed of some of their possessions. An account of the affair, issued by the local Japanese military authorities, is 1/ enclosed herewith as published in the PEKING AND TIENTSIN TIMES (British) of October 12. It is understood that the matter was amicably adjusted a few days later.

Both Chinese and foreigners have watched with interest all developments at Geneva, and have entertained the hope that the League of Nations would find some means of forcing an amicable settlement of the controversy. Local foreign newspapers have devoted much space to the proceedings at Geneva and have also commented freely editorially.

There has been no tangible evidence at hand to indicate that the Japanese have made any effort to create disturbances, although rumors are current that political plotters are being harbored in the Japanese Concession. The Japanese military authorities have, however, taken precautions against any possible attack on the Japanese Concession and on October 15 placed sand bags, barbed wire entanglements and tents near the main road entering the Japanese Concession and East Wall Street bordering the Chinese City. The patrolling

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-4-

patrolling of some of the Japanese Concession streets by fully armed Japanese soldiers created some concern and a number of Chinese residents are understood to have removed from the Concession as a result.

As a means of preventing possible trouble, it is understood that the Chinese authorities at Tientsin, under instructions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Nanking, notified the Japanese consular authorities at Tientsin that no visas will be granted to Japanese subjects to travel in the interior for the time being.

It is scarcely necessary to state that propaganda was widely disseminated both by the Chinese and Japanese throughout the month. The Japanese seem to have indulged in this practice as much as the Chinese. Mimeographed and printed information, much of which is obviously untrue, has been issued by a Japanese information bureau at Tientsin, and at least two foreign consular officers, namely the Italian Consul at Tientsin, and the Spanish Consul at Shanghai, both of whom were sent to Manchuria by their respective Governments to conduct investigations, were so completely misrepresented that they were placed in a position of being compelled officially to deny statements attributed to them to the effect that the actions of the Japanese military authorities in Manchuria were fully warranted, and that it would be foolish to withdraw the Japanese troops to their original positions. One speculates as to how much damage propaganda of this character must do in Geneva and in other distant parts of the world where it is more difficult to place a proper estimate on it.

claims

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Huntzsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

-4-

Claims on the part of Japanese authorities that Japanese residents of Tientsin were being molested by Chinese caused the Hopei Municipal Government to issue an emphatic denial of such reports. The following excerpt from an article in the NORTH CHINA STAR (American) indicates the nature of the charges and action taken by the Hopei Municipal Government:

"Two specific cases were cited. One was that on Wednesday morning a Japanese hotel porter was threatened by a number of Chinese soldiers, who according to his statement, told the Chinese crowd standing by that they 'might kill him and eat his flesh.' The other concerned a young Mukden officer, who, it alleged, kicked a young Japanese woman, who was terrified and ran into a railway carriage for safety.

Investigations have been made, state officials of the municipal government, and the reports have been found to be absolutely untrue. The government officials further state that any case of molestation reported to them will be fully investigated and the offenders severely punished."

While local attention was centered largely on the developments in the Sino-Japanese affair, there was more than the normal interest manifested in developments in connection with the peace negotiations between Canton and Nanking. Customarily there is a certain disinterestedness evident among local Chinese authorities vis-a-vis political and military controversies between Nanking and Canton, but in the present instance the interest has been somewhat intensified by reason of the relation which the peace negotiations may have on a settlement of the Sino-Japanese controversy. This interest has also been somewhat aroused by reason of the visits to Nanking in the course of the month of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, Doctor Wellington Koo, and Doctor W. W. Yen, the newly appointed Chinese Minister

to the

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

to the United States, who resides at Tientsin.

Aside from the two subjects herein commented upon, there were no important developments in the Tientsin consular district during October. Major General John L. Hines, commanding general of the United States troops in the Philippine Islands and in China, spent five days in Tientsin inspecting the 15th United States Infantry. During his stay in the port he was cordially received by Chinese military and civil officials.

For the first time in some months very little attention was devoted to the question of the disposition to be made of Generals Yen Hsi-shan and Feng Yu-hsiang. Reports were current that General Yen would be pardoned by Chiang Kai-shek and that both generals would be invited to join the unification movement against the encroachment of Japan on Chinese territory.

In the course of the month there was a considerable influx of Russians into Tientsin from the North, the movement having been due, it is said, to the economic depression in Harbin, Mukden and other points in Manchuria. There is a possibility, however, that this movement may have been due to political and military developments in that region. Towards the latter part of the month there were persistent reports of a possible conflict between Soviet troops and Japanese soldiers at Tawali, a station on the Chinese Eastern Railway.




DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



No. 2031

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Paris, December 1, 1931.



DISTRIBUTION - CHECK
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F/DEW 793.94/3146

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

In compliance with the Department's instruction No. 293 of August 19, 1930, I have the honor to transmit herewith clippings from the French press, on the subject of the Sino-Japanese conflict, covering the period from November 25 to November 30, 1931, inclusive.

Respectfully yours,

For the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim:

Williamson S. Howell, Jr.,
First Secretary of Embassy.

Enclosures.....

DEC 13 1931

FILED

- 2 -

Enclosures: (single copy).

Clippings from the following newspapers:

November 25, 1931.

- No. 1 - CORRESPONDANCE UNIVERSELLE
- 2 - L'ECHO DE PARIS
- 3 - L'HUMANITE
- 4 - LE JOURNAL
- 5 - LE PETIT PARISIEN
- 6 - LE QUOTIDIEN
- 7 - LA REPUBLIQUE

November 26, 1931.

- No. 8 - ACTUALITES
- 9 - EXCELSIOR
- 10 - L'HUMANITE
- 11 - LE JOURNAL
- 12 - LE MATIN
- 13 - LE PETIT PARISIEN
- 14 - LE QUOTIDIEN
- 15 - LE TEMPS

November 27, 1931.

- No. 16 - L'ECHO DE PARIS
- 17 - EXCELSIOR
- 18 - L'HUMANITE
- 19 - JOURNAL DES DEBATS
- 20 - LE MATIN
- 21 - LE PETIT PARISIEN
- 22 - LE QUOTIDIEN
- 23 - LE TEMPS

November 28, 1931.

- No. 24 - EXCELSIOR
- 25 - L'HUMANITE
- 26 - LE JOURNAL
- 27 - LE PETIT PARISIEN
- 28 - LE POPULAIRE
- 29 - LE QUOTIDIEN

November 29, 1931.

- No. 30 - L'ECHO DE PARIS
- 31 - L'ERE NOUVELLE
- 32 - EXCELSIOR
- 33 - L'HUMANITE
- 34 - LE JOURNAL
- 35 - LE PETIT PARISIEN
- 36 - LE POPULAIRE
- 37 - LE QUOTIDIEN

November 30, 1931.

- No. 38 - L'ECHO DE PARIS
- 39 - L'HUMANITE
- 40 - LE JOURNAL
- 41 - L'OEUVRE
- 42 - LE PETIT PARISIEN
- 43 - LE QUOTIDIEN
- 44 - LE TEMPS

In quintuplicate.

710.

RS/jdk

Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 2031
of December 1, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from CORRESPONDANCE UNIVERSELLE, November 25, 1931.

Les Buts de la S.D.N.

par Maurice ORDINAIRE

Vice Président du Sénat
Vice-Président de la Commission des Affaires Etrangères

Avec l'affaire de Mandchourie, la Société des Nations vient de subir sa première grande épreuve que ses plus chauds partisans reconnaissent avoir été pénible. Il y a bien des circonstances atténuantes pour cette disgrâce. Il s'agissait de pays éloignés, de culture et d'esprit profondément différent des nôtres, et où l'opinion publique du monde, l'un des éléments principaux de l'action de la Société, ne pouvait être mise en jeu. La situation est, au surplus, en Mandchourie, des plus troubles, en raison du partage de cette région en trois zones d'influence, comportant pour le Japon, la Chine et la Russie l'administration de chemins de fer et le droit partiel d'occupation militaire : admirable terrain de rivalités, d'intrigues et de conflits ! Pour mettre le comble à la difficulté, la Chine est, on le sait, depuis sa révolution, dans un état d'anarchie désespérant, les provinces se trouvant en proie au caprice de gouverneurs aux trois quarts indépendants d'un gouvernement central qui ne représente guère que théoriquement au dehors ce grand pays désarticulé !

Aussi bien, en pareille aventure, la Société des Nations aurait pu être tentée de se récuser en invoquant l'« incapacité civile de la Chine », et de laisser se développer les événements en se réservant la faculté d'intervenir au moment favorable. Suggestion intéressante ; mais qu'eût-on pensé de ce déni de justice, alors qu'une des deux parties, membre, comme l'autre, de la Société, appelait au secours et dénonçait à la fois l'infraction au Pacte de la Société et au Pacte Kellog ?

On a reproché aussi au Conseil de la Société d'avoir appliqué au différend mandchou la procédure normale, comme s'il s'agissait d'Etats occidentaux, alors qu'on connaissait mal la véritable situation et qu'on ignorait les limites de l'obéissance des deux Etats aux injonctions de la Société. Il est possible qu'une procédure moins catégorique, telle que l'emploi d'une commission d'enquête, par où l'on en a fini — si tant est qu'on puisse parler de finir — eût évité à la Société de voir le Japon refuser d'arrêter la marche de ses troupes et d'accepter l'arbitrage par les armes, tout en niant l'état de guerre, et prendre en Mandchourie des gages dont il n'est pas certain qu'il se départisse jamais.

De toutes façons, d'ailleurs, et en dépit d'une plus grande habileté manœuvrière, ce conflit, fécond en menaces futures pour la paix, aurait mis en lumière les insuffisances de la Société des Nations. Il est trop évident que l'organisme de Genève, s'il a déjà rendu et peut rendre encore d'appréciables services à la tranquillité du monde, ne peut se flatter de pouvoir arrêter le bras d'un agresseur déterminé. Et peut-être, du moins à l'époque présente, chercherait-on vainement à parer à cette insuffisance. Le conflit actuel a donné beaucoup à penser sur le rêve caressé par Léon Bourgeois, de mettre à la disposition de la Société une force militaire ou, comme on l'a proposé plus récemment, l'armée volante de l'ensemble des flottes aériennes du monde. Les objections, sur lesquelles nous n'appuierons pas ici, se pressent contre la réalisation de ces projets. Si même plus modestement, les adhérents de Genève avaient consenti à organiser le service d'assistance militaire mutuelle, au principe duquel les a engagés leur signature du Pacte, combien de Gouvernements, s'est-on demandé ces jours-ci, auraient osé proposer à leurs Parlements l'envoi de contingents nationaux aux rivages de l'Océan Pacifique ? Même pour les simples décisions de procédure, ne voyons-nous pas les délégués au Conseil retenus par le souci des intérêts présents et futurs des Gouvernements qu'ils représentent bien avant ceux de l'Humanité. Empêchements sans doute naturels, mais bien contraires au trop grand rôle que des esprits généreux ont voulu prescrire à l'assemblée de Genève.

Les amis de la Société doivent donc souhaiter que, par une évolution prudente de sa procédure, elle évite désor-

sous des administrations avantageuses pour leur population, que la Sarre, particulièrement, peut fort bien, quand l'heure du plébiscite sonnera, marquer son désir de continuer, sous la forme plus indépendante que prévoient les traités, l'expérience de ses quinze années d'autonomie.

La preuve est donc faite que les nations peuvent posséder ou contrôler du moins en commun de petits domaines et les gérer au mieux de l'intérêt des populations, soustraites ainsi aux convoitises, aux charges, aux querelles de puissants voisinages. Qui sait si cette formule nouvelle ne pourrait donner la clé des problèmes qui, soit dans l'Est de l'Europe, soit dans le reste du monde, paraissent actuellement insolubles ? Le succès obtenu en cette matière est, du moins pour la Société, un réconfort et un espoir.

ceux de l'humanité. Empêchement sans doute, mais bien contraires au trop grand rôle que des esprits généreux ont voulu prescrire à l'assemblée de Genève.

Les amis de la Société doivent donc souhaiter que, par une évolution prudente de sa procédure, elle évite désormais de s'accuser à des retraites et des indulgences qui compromettent son prestige. Il lui resterait un assez large champ en réduisant, jusqu'à des temps meilleurs, ses ambitions.

Un exemple se présente sous notre plume, d'une partie de ses attributions où la Société des Nations a excellé sans contredit. Nous voulons parler des mandats et des Territoires administrés par ses soins. Le contrôle des mandats, soit asiatiques, soit africains, par la Société, a donné des résultats parfaits sans gêner en rien la gestion du mandataire. Ce contrôle a renforcé ses soins et son zèle pour la protection des populations indigènes, but principal du mandat ; la France n'a qu'à se louer des suggestions et des encouragements donnés par Genève pour l'œuvre qu'elle poursuit en Syrie. Quant aux territoires de la Sarre et de Dantzig, la mission de la Société a été remplie avec un brillant succès. Ces deux petits pays vivent si paisibles et prospères.

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Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 2031
of December 1, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ECHO DE PARIS, November 25, 1931.

La Chine n'accepte pas le projet de résolution rédigé dimanche et lundi

Comment le Conseil peut-il se tirer d'affaire ?

Cette chronique du Conseil de la Société des Nations devient monotone, mais il importe de la poursuivre pour faire ressortir la faiblesse du navire genevois, la mauvaise qualité du gouvernement et la médiocrité des pilotes.

Lundi, les représentants japonais et chinois ont été saisis du projet de résolution instituant une commission chargée de parcourir l'Extrême-Orient et d'étudier « toute circonstance de nature à affecter les relations internationales, qui menace, par suite, de troubler la paix ou la bonne entente entre le Japon et la Chine ».

Ce projet de résolution, nous l'avons déjà expliqué, fait la part belle au Japon. En effet, il interdit à la commission soit de s'immiscer, éventuellement, dans les pourparlers directs qui s'engageront entre Tokio et Nankin, soit d'émettre des avis sur les opérations militaires en cours. En outre, il ne souffle mot du rappel des troupes japonaises dans la zone du mandchourien. Dans le préambule, il est bien fait allusion aux engagements souscrits par le Japon et la Chine, le 30 septembre, notamment à leur promesse de ne point « aggraver la situation » mais les Japonais se sont, jusqu'ici, accommodés de cette phrase en déclarant qu'ils attaquaient seulement dans la mesure où ils étaient provoqués.

Nous rappelons ces détails pour faire comprendre le refus formulé par la Chine. Le 22 novembre, il s'était déjà exprimé dans un memorandum. Hier soir, une sorte de contre-projet était annoncé: le gouvernement de Nankin n'acceptera la commission que si le rappel des troupes japonaises suit de très près sa constitution. Le délai semble même être limité à quinze jours. Evidemment, une telle exigence est inacceptable pour Tokio. On ne tentera même pas de l'approcher là-dessus. M. Briand représente donc à M. Sze que s'il détruit le projet de commission, la Chine risque d'être laissée en tête-à-tête avec le Japon, que mieux vaut pour elle échapper à l'isolement et se contenter de l'assistance d'une commission même imparfaite. Mais le gouvernement de Nankin, exaspéré du revirement du Conseil, ne pouvant oublier les grandes espérances que la session d'octobre lui fit concevoir, fait mine de résister.

Quant à l'acceptation japonaise, elle n'est pas encore intégrale. Jusqu'ici, le gouvernement de Tokio n'a approuvé que la deuxième partie du projet de résolution, celui qui a trait à la constitution et aux pouvoirs de la commission. Il n'a pas encore répondu en ce qui concerne le préambule (rappel de la résolution du 30 septembre et des devoirs qu'elle impose aux deux parties) que sir Eric Drummond et ses fonctionnaires durent remanier, lundi, après la réunion officieuse des « Douze », que Tokio, en conséquence, n'a dû recevoir que tardivement.

S'il n'a pas encore fait connaître son opinion sur le préambule, le gouvernement de Tokio, par contre, a chargé M. Yoshizawa de protester à Paris contre le rassemblement de troupes chinoises autour de Tchen-tchéou, sur le seuil des provinces mandchouriennes. Cette démarche de M. Yoshizawa accomplie hier soir signifie que si la nouvelle menace ne se dissipe pas, le Japon sera peut-être obligé de passer à une nouvelle action militaire. On n'aura pas alors à lui opposer les engagements du 30 septembre.

Tel est le point auquel l'affaire est parvenue. A la fin de la matinée, avant le déjeuner que M. Briand offrait à ses collègues du Conseil, les « Douze » ont délibéré pendant une demi-heure. M. Briand n'avait rien à dire, sinon que les télégrammes de Tokio et de Nankin se faisaient attendre.

Privés de toute illusion, examinant sans cesse les murs de l'impasse pour découvrir une issue, les membres du Conseil s'interrogent les uns les autres dans le privé: « Que ferons-nous demain? Comment, sans perdre la face, nous tirer d'une affaire follement engagée par le secrétariat? » D'ordinaire, un silence embarrassé suit cette interrogation. Signalons pourtant l'avis de M. Zaleski. Que le Conseil se hâte d'appliquer les articles 12 et 15 du Covenant! Ces articles ne le conduiront, il va sans dire, à aucun résultat pratique. Mais, au bout de neuf mois, le Japon ou la Chine pourront légalement reprendre leur liberté, se comporter à leur gré et le Conseil n'aura plus le devoir d'intervenir. Il sera libéré.

PERTINAX.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 0081
of December 1, 1941.

From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'HUMANITE, November 26, 1941.

Les Japonais, au sud de la Mandchourie s'avancent sur King-Tchéou

*La municipalité socialiste de Suresnes refuse toute salle
aux « Amis de l'U.R.S.S. », soulignant ainsi l'appui du
Parti S.F.I.O. à la préparation de la guerre impérialiste
contre l'Etat ouvrier*



La guerre sévit en Mandchourie où les Japonais expédient continuellement des vivres et des munitions. Notre photo représente le chargement, sur un camion, de caisses de ravitaillement à destination des soldats japonais sur le front mandchou.

Pendant qu'à Paris les impérialistes s'attachent à trouver le compromis leur permettant d'effectuer le partage de la Chine et de celer leur front uni pour l'attaque contre l'U. R. S. S., en Mandchourie la guerre continue, le sang coule toujours.

Les Japonais, dès avant-hier, ont commencé leur avance vers le Sud, en direction de King-Tchéou. (On se souvient que cette ville avait déjà été bombardée par les avions japonais au mois d'octobre.)

La circulation des voyageurs sur la ligne Moukden-Pékin est complètement interrompue. Des retranchements japonais ont été établis à Tchou-Li-Hao, sur la rivière Liao. Les lignes télégraphiques et téléphoniques sont coupées. Des troupes et des trains blindés s'avancent vers King-Tchéou et déjà un engagement sanglant avec des forces chinoises a commencé hier matin entre Tchou-Li-Hao et Hsin-Ni.

La position stratégique de l'armée

japonaise est renforcée au Nord de la Mandchourie, en prévision de l'agression contre l'Union soviétique.

L'avance sur Kichan se poursuit, en même temps que les mouvements de troupes en direction de Kharbine se développent.

Et au Sud l'impérialisme nippon veut se rendre maître de King-Tchéou, afin que l'occupation de cette région lui permette éventuellement une action de grande envergure, en liaison avec les forces des autres impérialismes, contre les Soviets chinois, contre le mouvement révolutionnaire anti-impérialiste qui se développe avec impétuosité. Le plan général impérialiste se poursuit, comme on voit, ponctuellement, réglé dans tous ses détails à Paris et à Washington.

La situation est grave. Le danger de guerre contre l'Union soviétique grandit à chaque heure.

Social-impérialistes criminels

C'est dans les conditions menaçantes de cette conjoncture de guerre que les chefs socialistes de France apportent tout leur appui à l'impérialisme français dirigeant de ces plans de guerre et de contre-révolution. L'Humanité a dénoncé le rôle d'agents provocateurs des Blum-Rosenfeld au sujet de la situation en Extrême-Orient. La politique conséquente des agents actifs de l'impérialisme français vient d'être encore illustrée par la municipalité socialiste de Suresnes dont le maire est Henri Sellier.

(SUITE DE LA PREMIERE PAGE)

La section des « Amis de l'U. R. S. S. » de Suresnes avait demandé la salle des Fêtes pour y tenir un meeting de protestation contre l'invasion de la Mandchourie et dénoncer les provocations à la guerre anti-soviétique.

Voici la réponse que Gormand, le secrétaire, a reçu d'Henri Sellier :

Monsieur,

La commission de la salle des Fêtes, après avoir examiné votre demande, a constaté que le calendrier des dates retenues ne lui laissait aucune disponibilité avant le Jour de l'An.

Elle m'a chargé de vous indiquer qu'en tout état de cause, votre demande se heurte à la décision de principe prise antérieurement de n'accorder aucun local municipal aux organisations relevant du Parti communiste et qu'elle n'aurait pu, en conséquence, recevoir satisfaction.

Veuillez agréer, monsieur, l'assurance de ma considération distinguée.

Ainsi donc, Henri Sellier et la municipalité socialiste de Suresnes, ont pris la « décision de principe » de refuser toute salle aux organisations ouvrières défendant l'Union soviétique, soulignant de cette façon, au moment où le sang coule en Mandchourie, où l'attaque se précise contre les ouvriers et les paysans de l'U.R.S.S., l'appui des chefs socialistes donné dans tous les domaines à l'impérialisme français.

Les leaders du parti S.F.I.O., qui se sont solidarisés avec toutes les campagnes antisoviétiques, veulent empêcher que la protestation ouvrière s'affirme contre les plans des impérialistes, que la lutte pour la défense de l'U.R.S.S. se développe dans le pays pour arrêter le bras des criminels.

Il est tout à fait normal d'ailleurs, que Sellier, l'homme de Billiet, l'agent des gros industriels et des affairistes en mal de marchés nouveaux, manifeste ainsi publiquement la participation de son parti à la préparation de la guerre contre le socialisme s'édifiant en U.R.S.S. Il montre sous son vrai jour la politique criminelle de la deuxième Internationale, appendice de l'Internationale des armements.

Il faut démontrer partout, par des faits comme celui de Suresnes, le rôle infame du social-fascisme.

Il faut renforcer notre lutte contre

l'impérialisme français et contre la social-démocratie en montrant le danger qui menace l'U. R. S. S. et la révolution chinoise.

Les ouvriers lyonnais ont manifesté en masse, récemment, leur volonté de défendre la patrie des travailleurs. Le 1^{er} décembre à Bullier, les travailleurs de la région parisienne, par milliers, montreront qu'ils sauront s'opposer à la guerre impérialiste, malgré et contre les Blum et Sellier.

M. MAGNIEN.

Enclosure No. 4 to Despatch No. 2031
of December 1, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE JOURNAL, November 25, 1931.

LA CHINE

accentue la pression sur le conseil de la S.D.N. mais ne sera-t-elle pas prise à son propre piège ?

Les Chinois bluffent. C'est l'opinion la plus modérée et la plus amicale que l'on puisse formuler sur leur tactique. Si on devait la prendre au sérieux, il faudrait déclarer très franchement que c'est un jeu de casse-cou.

Que s'est-il passé hier ? La journée a commencé sur un avant-projet de résolution élaboré par le conseil en vue d'organiser l'enquête proposée par le Japon. Ce projet a été soumis aux deux parties.

M. Yoshizawa a pu dire à M. Briand, au cours de la brève conversation qu'il a eue avec le président du conseil, au Quai d'Orsay, avant le déjeuner offert à l'aéroport international, que la délégation japonaise a recommandé à son gouvernement l'acceptation du texte, qui va évidemment à l'extrême limite de ce que le Japon peut accepter. Les délais de transmission ne permettaient pas d'attendre une réponse avant aujourd'hui. L'ambassadeur a ajouté qu'il avait mission de faire savoir au président du conseil que le régiment japonais qui occupe Tsitsikar se retirera aujourd'hui à Taonan.

Quant aux Chinois, ils ont annoncé des amendements avant même de connaître le texte. Mais ils ne pouvaient pas savoir, eux non plus, comment leur gouvernement a accueilli le projet de résolution.

Ainsi la très courte séance privée que le conseil a tenue avant le déjeuner aurait dû être absolument vide, puisque la revision d'un texte soumis à l'approbation des intéressés, avant que ceux-ci aient eu le temps de répondre, paraît inconcevable.

Le vrai n'est pas toujours vraisemblable. C'est la stricte vérité, que M. de Madariaga, qui double M. Leroux comme représentant de l'Espagne, a proposé de reprendre la rédaction de la formule avant même de savoir comment elle serait accueillie. C'est également une vérité que cette proposition a été fort mal reçue, même par lord Robert Cecil, qui n'aime sans doute pas qu'on cherche à lui enlever le record de la fantaisie.

Comme manifestation d'activité diplomatique, il faut signaler deux conversations du général Dawes avec M. Matsudaira et le docteur Sze.

Si le diplomate américain a prêché la modération au Japonais avec lequel il a toujours été d'accord, ce n'a pu être que pour justifier des recommandations autrement nécessaires en ce qui concerne le représentant de la Chine. Il est vrai que ce n'est pas à Paris seulement que les conseils devraient être donnés.

En effet, on a vu paraître, à la fin de la journée, une dépêche Reuter attribuant à la Chine une attitude nettement intransigeante.

Dans ce télégramme donné comme venant de Nankin via Londres, on assure que le gouvernement chinois a chargé le docteur Sze de proposer au conseil de la Société des nations : 1° d'adopter immédiatement des moyens efficaces pour arrêter les agressions japonaises ; 2° d'exiger le retrait des troupes dans les quinze jours ; 3° d'organiser le contrôle neutre de ce retrait. Faute de recevoir satisfaction, la Chine se réserverait de prendre toutes les mesures de légitime défense.

On imagine l'effet produit par cette bombe, surtout quand on a appris que le docteur Sze avait bien reçu des instructions. Allait-il avoir immédiatement une entrevue avec M. Briand ? Vers 20 heures, on apprenait que la rencontre n'aurait pas lieu avant aujourd'hui, que la réunion du conseil fixée à ce matin serait ajournée à l'après-midi. La seule communication venant du côté chinois était la transcription officielle d'une note publiée il y a deux jours relative aux négociations directes. On est donc resté sous l'impression de la dépêche de Nankin, qui n'en dit peut-être pas autant qu'elle en a l'air.

Il faut bien noter que cette dépêche ne mentionne pas la réponse de la Chine au projet du conseil. Matériellement, les Chinois n'ont pas eu le temps d'en accuser réception. Il s'agit donc d'une nouvelle manœuvre inspirée par l'acceptation de principe du projet japonais et tendant à faire impression sur le conseil pour le déterminer à exiger le départ des troupes nippones.

Les manœuvres de ce genre sont toujours dangereuses, même quand elles ont seulement l'allure d'un bluff, parce qu'elles risquent de couper les ponts de retraite par l'éclat de la publicité. Le renard se trouve pris à son propre piège.

Il est difficile de croire que la Chine puisse soutenir ses prétentions, si elle se trouve en face d'un conseil résolu, si le conseil comprend que le Japon a été à l'extrême limite des concessions et s'il est résolu à faire admettre que la Société des nations ne se laissera pas entraîner dans des négociations indéfinies avec les Chinois.

A en croire des informations précises, dans le cas où la Chine se

un franc.
Parité de consommation : 229, balise
218 V. 4 de janvier, 218,50 A.
Farines. — Courant, 217 V. décembre
Cote officielle du blé disponible : 148
164,50.
162,75 : 4 de janvier, 163,50 ; mars-avril
160-159,75 : janvier-juillet, 162,50
Bière. — Courant, 159,25-158,75 ; décembre
de janvier, 98-92,75 ; mars-avril, 93.
Avoines. — Courant, 93,25-93, décembre
91,75 : janvier-juillet, 92,25-92,50.

Bourse de Commerce

Bulletin commercial du 24 nov.

Enclosure No. 4 to Despatch No. 2031
of December 1, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE JOURNAL, November 25, 1931.

LA CHINE

accentue la pression sur le conseil de la S.D.N. mais ne sera-t-elle pas prise à son propre piège ?

Journal — 11/25

Les Chinois bluffent. C'est l'opinion la plus modérée et la plus amicale que l'on puisse formuler sur leur tactique. Si on devait la prendre au sérieux, il faudrait déclarer très franchement que c'est un jeu de casse-cou.

Que s'est-il passé hier ? La journée a commencé sur un avant-projet de résolution élaboré par le conseil en vue d'organiser l'enquête proposée par le Japon. Ce projet a été soumis aux deux parties.

M. Yoshizawa a pu dire à M. Briand, au cours de la brève conversation qu'il a eue avec le président du conseil, au Quai d'Orsay, avant le déjeuner offert à l'aéroport international, que la délégation japonaise a recommandé à son gouvernement l'acceptation du texte, qui va évidemment à l'extrême limite de ce que le Japon peut accepter. Les délais de transmission ne permettaient pas d'attendre une réponse avant aujourd'hui. L'ambassadeur a ajouté qu'il avait mission de faire savoir au président du conseil que le régiment japonais qui occupe Tsitsikar se retirera aujourd'hui à Taonan.

Quant aux Chinois, ils ont annoncé des amendements avant même de connaître le texte. Mais ils ne pouvaient pas savoir, eux non plus, comment leur gouvernement a accueilli le projet de résolution.

Ainsi la très courte séance privée que le conseil a tenue avant le déjeuner aurait dû être absolument vide, puisque la révision d'un texte soumis à l'approbation des intéressés, avant que ceux-ci aient eu le temps de répondre, paraît inconcevable.

Le vrai n'est pas toujours vraisemblable. C'est la stricte vérité, que M. de Madariaga, qui double M. Leroux comme représentant de l'Espagne, a proposé de reprendre la rédaction de la formule avant même de savoir comment elle serait accueillie. C'est également une vérité que cette proposition a été fort mal reçue, même par lord Robert Cecil, qui n'aime sans doute pas qu'on cherche à lui enlever le record de la fantaisie.

Comme manifestation d'activité diplomatique, il faut signaler deux conversations du général Dawes avec M. Matsudaira et le docteur Sze.

Si le diplomate américain a prêché la modération au Japonais avec lequel il a toujours été d'accord, ce n'a pu être que pour justifier des recommandations autrement nécessaires en ce qui concerne le représentant de la Chine. Il est vrai que ce n'est pas à Paris seulement que les conseils devraient être donnés.

En effet, on a vu paraître, à la fin de la journée, une dépêche Reuter attribuant à la Chine une attitude nettement intransigeante.

Dans ce télégramme donné comme venant de Nankin via Londres, on assure que le gouvernement chinois a chargé le docteur Sze de proposer au conseil de la Société des nations : 1° d'adopter immédiatement des moyens efficaces pour arrêter les agressions japonaises ; 2° d'exiger le retrait des troupes dans les quinze jours ; 3° d'organiser le contrôle neutre de ce retrait. Faute de recevoir satisfaction, la Chine se réserverait de prendre toutes les mesures de légitime défense.

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A en croire des informations précises, dans le cas où la Chine se montrerait intransigeante, le conseil se bornerait à présenter un projet de résolution enregistrant les trois principes que nous signalions hier :

1° La Société des nations considère que les événements de Mandchourie constituent un cas exceptionnel. Cela reviendrait à constater que la Chine ne répond pas à la définition du préambule de la charte de la Société des nations qui prévoit des engagements entre peuples organisés.

2° Le conseil de la S.D.N. constaterait que les mesures prises conformément à l'article 11 dans l'affaire sino-japonaise ne sauraient créer de précédent pour les autres pays, notamment pour l'Europe.

3° Le conseil condamnerait toute occupation militaire.

Nous aimons à penser qu'on y regarderait à deux fois avant d'adopter une formule qui paralyserait d'avance les sanctions prévues par le traité de Versailles. — S.-B.

Enclosure No. 5 to Despatch No. 2031
of December 1, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE PETIT PARISIEN, November 25, 1931.

La Chine résiste au projet d'enquête

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Le ministre français leur a signalé notamment les vives résistances rencontrées de la part du délégué chinois qui, au cours de cette conversation, ne s'est pas départi de l'attitude intransigeante adoptée dans le memorandum dont nous avons publié hier les grandes lignes. M. Briand a ajouté, toutefois, que, sur la demande pressante qui lui avait été adressée par sir Eric Drummond et par lui-même, le Dr Sze avait consenti à télégraphier à Nankin le texte complet du projet de résolution amendé par le conseil et qu'il ferait connaître, dès qu'elle lui serait parvenue, la réponse de son gouvernement.

— Du côté du Japon, a poursuivi le président, la position est analogue. La délégation japonaise, à qui on a fait porter, lundi soir, le même projet de résolution, l'a transmis, elle aussi, télégraphiquement à Tokio et attend l'approbation qu'elle a sollicitée. Tant que les deux parties ne se sont pas prononcées, il est de toute évidence qu'il ne peut être question d'une modification de texte quelconque. Aussi bien n'en a-t-on pas proposé et s'est-on borné à un examen d'ensemble de la situation qui — n'hésitons pas à le dire — n'a pas été trouvée particulièrement brillante et encourageante.

Le mandat de la commission

Au cours de cet examen, on a envisagé diverses hypothèses : celle notamment d'une opposition japonaise en ce qui concerne l'engagement de s'abstenir de tout nouvel acte d'hostilité et de procéder dans le plus bref délai au retrait des troupes. Dans cette éventualité, M. de Madariaga a suggéré que la commission d'études soit chargée d'informer le conseil des mesures prises pour assurer la protection de la vie et des biens des ressortissants japonais. Mais lord Robert Cecil et M. Fotitch ont fait remarquer que toute spécification ne pourrait que restreindre le mandat de la commission et qu'il était préférable, dans ces conditions, de s'en tenir à la formule vague du projet de résolution, formule qui laisse aux commissaires leur liberté d'action et d'appréciation.

A ce propos, il convient de relever, dans le résumé de ce projet de résolution que nous avons publié hier, une omission provoquée par une erreur de numérotage. L'engagement pris par le gouvernement chinois de prendre ces mesures de protection en faveur des ressortissants japonais se combine, dans le paragraphe 3, avec l'engagement correspondant des Japonais d'évacuer rapidement les régions occupées. Quant au paragraphe 4, il prévoit que non seulement les deux parties — Chine et Japon, — mais les gouvernements représentés au conseil communiqueront à ce dernier les informations intéressantes qu'ils posséderont sur la situation. Le conseil sera donc pleinement renseigné sans que la commission ait à intervenir directement.

L'attitude de Tokio

Evidemment, l'éventualité d'une certaine résistance de la part de Tokio n'est pas écartée, pour les raisons que nous avons déjà indiquées. Nous croyons savoir, néanmoins, que les instructions reçues par M. Yoshizawa concernant « la cessation des hostilités » sont très modérées. D'autre part, on nous assure que le chef de la délégation japonaise a profité du bref entretien qu'il a eu hier, quelques minutes avant le déjeuner du Quai d'Orsay, avec M. Briand pour l'informer, suivant un télégramme officiel à peine reçu par lui, qu'un régiment d'infanterie japonaise quitterait Tsi-tsikar aujourd'hui pour se replier sur Taonan. On a enfin l'impression très nette que la délégation — c'est-à-dire non seulement M. Yoshizawa, mais M. Matsudeira — se rend compte des exigences de la situation et fait tous ses efforts pour obtenir l'adhésion de

ner le Japon à aller plus loin dans la voie des concessions, et qu'on recherchait les moyens, pour la Société des nations, de sortir d'une pareille impasse. Il est évident que cette dernière pourrait s'en tirer en déclarant — ce qui est exact — que les événements de Mandchourie sont d'un caractère spécial et vraiment exceptionnel; qu'en agissant comme il l'a fait, à la demande de la Chine en vertu de l'article 11 du pacte, le conseil n'a nullement créé un précédent susceptible d'être invoqué dans les autres parties du monde et notamment en Europe, et, enfin, qu'il condamne le principe de toute occupation militaire quelle qu'elle soit.

C'est là, cependant, un parti auquel on ne s'arrêtera qu'en cas d'impossibilité absolue d'accord. Jusque-là, il est hors de doute qu'on persévéra dans la voie où l'on s'est engagé et qu'on continuera à rechercher patiemment une formule capable de réunir l'unanimité.

Si par extraordinaire on n'y parvenait pas, on prête alors aux Etats-Unis l'intention de reprendre la question et de préconiser la convocation à Washington d'une nouvelle conférence à laquelle participeraient les neuf puissances signataires de l'accord du même nom intervenu en 1922 après la conférence navale, accord d'après lequel, en cas d'événements graves en Chine, lesdites puissances se sont engagées à se consulter sur les mesures que commanderait la situation. Nous n'en sommes heureusement pas encore là... Espérons que la journée d'aujourd'hui, par les réponses qu'elle apportera vraisemblablement de Nankin et de Tokio, réduira à néant toutes ces combinaisons...

Albert JULLIEN.

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La résistance chinoise

En vérité, suivant le jeu de bascule habituel en pareil cas, c'est du côté de la Chine qu'on rencontre maintenant les plus graves difficultés. M. de Madariaga suggérait, hier matin, qu'on prie le Dr Sze de venir s'asseoir à la table du conseil afin, sans doute, de lui faire mieux saisir les véritables intérêts de son pays et les inconvénients que ne manquerait pas d'avoir une attitude intransigeante, dont le contraste avec l'esprit de conciliation montré par lui jusqu'à présent serait par trop frappant. Il est à craindre, malheureusement, que cet effort collectif des membres du conseil pour convaincre leur collègue ne soit pas suffisant. Une dépêche Reuter de Nankin ne donnait-elle pas, hier soir, les grandes lignes d'une proposition télégraphiée au Dr Sze et dont certains passages ont comme une allure d'ultimatum ? Ne demande-t-elle pas, notamment, que les troupes japonaises soient, dans une période de quinze jours, complètement repliées dans la zone du chemin de fer ?...

Quand on lit attentivement ce document, qui suggère par exemple à la S. D. N. de « prendre immédiatement des mesures efficaces pour amener la cessation des actes agressifs de la part des forces japonaises », on a peine à croire que c'est là la réponse au projet de résolution télégraphié hier soir à Nankin par le chef de la délégation chinoise. Il est probable qu'il s'agit

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Cela est si vrai qu'on envisageait déjà, hier, dans certains milieux, l'éventualité où l'on ne pourrait ni vaincre l'opposition de Nankin ni ame-

ner le Japon à aller plus loin dans la voie des concessions, et qu'on recherchait les moyens, pour la Société des nations, de sortir d'une pareille impasse. Il est évident que cette dernière pourrait s'en tirer en déclarant — ce qui est exact — que les événements de Mandchourie sont d'un caractère spécial et vraiment exceptionnel; qu'en agissant comme il l'a fait, à la demande de la Chine en vertu de l'article 11 du pacte, le conseil n'a nullement créé un précédent susceptible d'être invoqué dans les autres parties du monde et notamment en Europe, et, enfin, qu'il condamne le principe de toute occupation militaire quelle qu'elle soit.

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Enclosure No. 6 to Despatch No. 2031
of December 1, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE QUOTIDIEN, November 25, 1931.

Le casse-tête chinois 25

Le débat sur la politique extérieure, dont on avait escompté hier la clôture à la Chambre, sera repris jeudi. Il se déroule dans de médiocres conditions, tandis que siège encore le Conseil de la S. D. N. qui, lui, poursuit vainement la solution du problème sino-japonais.

Loin de s'éclaircir, au cours de la discussion, la situation se complique, à Paris comme en Extrême-Orient.

Là, chaque nation intéressée demeure sur ses positions initiales.

Le Japon, en dépit de toutes les assurances données par ses diplomates, reste fidèle à sa politique traditionnelle; il considère la Mandchourie comme un territoire d'expansion nécessaire à son influence et à son économie nationale.

La Chine, d'abord conciliante, est de nouveau travaillée par des ferments nationalistes; la vieille et tenace xénophobie semble mettre d'accord Nankin et Canton.

Les Américains surveillent jalousement ces vastes territoires pour lesquels ils veulent sauvegarder le grand principe de la « porte ouverte ». Ils sont prêts à intervenir, « pacifiquement » sans doute, en cas d'échec de cette Société des Nations où ils n'ont encore pénétré qu'incidemment.

Les Soviets se réservent. Ils se contentent d'affirmer leur volonté de non-immixtion dans les démêlés de Mandchourie, mais les Japonais les accusent, sinon d'envoyer des renforts à leurs adversaires, tout au moins de les ravitailler en munitions.

Dans cette confusion d'intérêts et de tendances, le Conseil de la S. D. N. se trouve fort empêché de trouver une solution, même inélégante.

Sur les quatre Etats dont nous venons de relever les positions, deux font partie de la Société, le Japon et la Chine, si l'on admet que cette dernière possède un gouvernement responsable. Deux autres sont en dehors: les Etats-Unis et les Soviets.

Mais les Etats-Unis sont déjà sur le pas de la porte, tandis que les Soviets se contentent de regarder par la fenêtre.

Le Conseil discute donc à Paris sans grands moyens, sans grand succès, peut-être même sans grand espoir. Il ne peut dire encore ce que l'on fera d'une commission d'enquête dont la création fut péniblement décidée.

Tokio s'en tient toujours, juridiquement, à la résolution du 30 septembre, qui comporte l'évacuation au fur et à mesure du rétablissement de la sécurité, dont il sera juge en dernier examen.

Nankin demeure ferme sur la résolution du 24 octobre, laquelle stipule qu'une date sera fixée pour l'évacuation définitive.

Hier encore, changement d'attitude. Cette fois, affirmait-on au Quai d'Orsay, c'est le Japon qui invite les Chinois à se retirer en deçà de la Grande Muraille!

Et cependant, il importe que le Conseil de la Société des Nations, au risque de révéler une regrettable carence, parvienne à imposer une solution équitable et à maintenir la paix. Car la guerre se propage comme l'incendie. Dès que le moindre foyer s'allume, il faut tout faire pour l'éteindre.

ST 2

Enclosure No. 6 to Despatch No. 2031
of December 1, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE QUOTIDIEN, November 25, 1931.

Le casse-tête chinois

LE débat sur la politique extérieure, dont on avait escompté hier la clôture à la Chambre, sera repris jeudi. Il se déroule dans de médiocres conditions, tandis que siège encore le Conseil de la S. D. N. qui, lui, poursuit vainement la solution du problème sino-japonais.

Loin de s'éclaircir, au cours de la discussion, la situation se complique, à Paris comme en Extrême-Orient.

Là, chaque nation intéressée demeure sur ses positions initiales.

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Ref 25

Enclosure No. 7 to Despatch No. 2031
of December 1, 1931.

From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LA REPUBLIQUE, November 25, 1931.

Le sort de la Pologne se joue en Mandchourie

Le Japon attaque la Chine en violation du pacte Kellogg. Que vont faire les autres signataires du pacte ? S'ils ne font rien, alors le pacte n'est qu'un chiffon de papier que toute nation belliqueuse peut piétiner à sa guise, alors la renonciation solennelle à la guerre n'était qu'une farce pompeuse, alors la sécurité promise aux peuples n'était qu'un mensonge et un stupéfiant.

Les grandes puissances vont-elles au contraire prendre des sanctions contre le Japon ? Alors il sera prouvé que dans les entreprises de paix on ne peut s'arrêter à mi-chemin, qu'il faut pour prévenir la guerre, promettre à l'avance et accorder à l'occasion l'aide de sa force à la nation victime d'une agression.

En un mot, les événements de Mandchourie mettent à l'épreuve la conception anglo-saxonne du pacte de non-agression et de renonciation à la guerre ne stipulant pas de sanctions... et révèlent la fausseté de cette conception.

Dons, nous avions raison, nous Français de toutes nuances, qui avons toujours prétendu qu'il n'y avait pas de sécurité internationale tant que les puissances voulant assurer cette sécurité ne jetaient pas leur épée dans la balance, et n'affirmaient pas : Qui viole cette paix m'insulte, qui attaque une nation quelconque m'attaque moi-même, qui use des armes contre quiconque sentira le poids de mes armes.

Nous avions raison. Il n'y a pas là de quoi nous réjouir. Il serait certes souhaitable que nous eussions tort, que l'horreur de violer la parole donnée et d'attirer sur soi la réprobation de l'opinion mondiale fût suffisante, comme les Anglais et les Américains le prétendaient, pour prévenir toute agression. Il est humiliant pour l'humanité et pour la civilisation qu'ils aient eu tort. Mais enfin il faut voir les faits. Nos amis anglo-saxons ont joué à la hausse sur la vertu humaine. Il est temps de « se couvrir ».

— Eh bien ! nous disent-ils, admettons ! Nous avons mal calculé. Vous aviez raison. Votre action persévérante depuis l'armistice pour obtenir des promesses d'assistance en cas d'agression était justifiée. Devant l'événement, qu'allons-nous faire ? Cet événement, vous l'aviez prévu, nous ne l'avions pas prévu. C'est donc à vous de suggérer les mesures à prendre. La fortune veut que vous soyez au gouvernail dans cette heure décisive. Vous avez la présidence du

Conseil de la S.D.N. L'article X du pacte de la S.D.N. par lequel les membres de la Société s'engagent à respecter et à maintenir contre toute agression extérieure l'intégrité territoriale et l'indépendance politique présente de tous les membres de la Société, se termine par cette formule : En cas d'agression, de menace ou de danger d'agression, le Conseil avise aux moyens d'assurer l'exécution de cette obligation. Et l'article XVI spécifie : Si un membre de la Société recourt à la guerre, contrairement aux engagements pris... il est ipso facto considéré comme ayant commis un acte de guerre contre tous les autres membres de la Société. Le paragraphe 2 du même article précise : En ce cas, le Conseil a le devoir de recommander aux divers gouvernements intéressés, les effectifs militaires, navals ou aériens par lesquels les membres de la Société contribueront respectivement aux forces armées destinées à faire respecter les engagements de la Société.

Les textes, ajoutent nos amis américains, donnent donc tous pouvoirs à M. Briand pour faire prendre contre le Japon toutes les mesures qu'il a toujours demandé que l'on prit contre l'Allemagne au cas où elle attaquerait la Pologne. L'agression japonaise est bien caractérisée. La commission qui siège à Genève pour définir l'agression, citait parmi les critères : ...d) présence de forces armées de l'une des parties sur le territoire de l'autre ; e) refus des parties de retirer leurs forces armées derrière une ligne ou des lignes indiquées par le Conseil de la S.D.N. ; f) politique agressive nettement établie d'une des parties contre l'autre. Refus de cette partie de soumettre l'objet du différend à l'examen du Conseil ou de la Cour permanente de justice internationale et d'accepter le vœu ou la décision formulés.

La situation est donc absolument nette. En décidant aujourd'hui comment le Japon sera traité, nous décidons comment l'Allemagne serait éventuellement traitée. Si nous voulons être secourus, il faut secourir. Si nous voulons que notre agresseur éventuel soit puni, il faut punir.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Oui, mais... quel gouvernement ira hasarder la vie de soldats français pour défendre des Chinois ! Cela n'est pas notre affaire... Si nous pensons ainsi, pouvons-nous être étonnés que les Etats-Unis aient répondu, quand nous leur avons demandé des promesses d'assistance : Pourquoi irions-nous faire tuer des soldats américains pour le couloir polonais ?

Nous avons dénoncé ce ponce-pilatisme américain. A quand la dénonciation du ponce-pilatisme français. Prenons-y garde, on retourne ici la fameuse formule : l'épée de l'Angleterre à moitié tirée aurait fait rentrer au fourreau beaucoup de grands sabres.

Ce qui se joue aujourd'hui, ce n'est pas le sort de la Mandchourie ; c'est l'idée de *sanctions*. Ou nous prendrons des sanctions contre l'agresseur de la Chine, ou nous ne pourrons en réclamer contre l'agresseur éventuel de la Pologne. A la vérité, une agression contre la Pologne serait peut-être plus justifiée que n'est l'agression contre la Chine. Le Japon n'a pas à se plaindre de traités à lui imposés par la force, ni d'une situation économique et politique diminuée. Il est vrai qu'il a des griefs contre l'Angleterre et les Etats-Unis qui refoulent son immigration et font bouillonner sur place dans quelques îles de sol pauvre, et sans grandes ressources de capitaux, une population surabondante. Le Japon attaque la Chine à cause d'une situation à lui faite par l'Angleterre et les Etats-Unis. Comme l'Allemagne attaquerait la Pologne à cause d'une situation à elle faite par la France. Dans le premier cas, nous n'avons aucun intérêt à faire intervenir. Dans le second cas, l'Angleterre ni les Etats-Unis n'auraient aucun intérêt à intervenir... que l'intérêt de la paix. Nous avons un grand rôle à jouer, créant un grand précédent : demander aux nations anglo-saxonnes de faire au Japon les concessions justes et utiles. Exiger du Japon qu'il s'en contente et le menacer de sanctions, voilà ce que nous voudrions que l'on fit éventuellement pour nous.

Bertrand de JOUVENEL.

Enclosure No. 8 to Despatch No. 2031
of December 1, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from ACTUALITES, November 26, 1931.

En Mandchourie

Par M. le Général FONVILLE

On s'y bat sans s'y battre; on y fait la guerre sans qu'il y ait état de guerre. Confusion et paradoxe. Du côté chinois, des troupes irrégulières, payées on ne sait par qui, obéissant à un chef qui semble ne dépendre que de lui-même, et autour d'elles des bandes de brigands opérant pour leur propre compte. Du côté nippon, une toute petite armée régulière (18.000 hommes), investie d'un mandat contractuel de police, qui est d'assurer la garde d'une voie ferrée et la protection de la zone adjacente, exploitée par des ressortissants japonais. De Chinois à Japonais, on échange de temps à autre des coups de fusil, voire des coups de canon; on se dispute un pont, quelques points stratégiques: les Japonais alléguant qu'ils ont à repousser des incursions malintentionnées, les Chinois soutenant que les Japonais transgressent leurs droits en sortant de la zone dont ils ont la garde. Et cela dure depuis plus de deux mois. Au fond, ni la Chine ni le Japon n'ont envie de se mettre sur les bras une véritable guerre, une guerre déclarée. La Chine, pour la meilleure des raisons: elle est hors d'état de la faire, cette guerre. Epuisée par quinze années de guerre civile, n'ayant pas de gouvernement central, partagée entre deux fantômes de gouvernement qui n'ont ni autorité, ni argent, ni armée réglée, se roulant de désordre en désordre, en proie à un brigandage général, bref, en plein chaos, voire en anarchie, la Chine est dans l'incapacité absolue d'affronter une guerre avec l'étranger, surtout si cet étranger est, comme le Japon, une puissance militaire et navale de premier ordre. Quant au Japon...

Le Japon pourrait être tenté de profiter de cette incapacité pour conquérir par les armes, très vite et sans grand'peine, cette Mandchourie où il a déjà un pied et où il entend étendre son influence. Et cette tentation aurait d'autant plus de raison de le prendre qu'à cette heure il n'aurait sans doute à redouter ni l'intervention des Etats-Unis d'Amérique, ni celle de la Grande-Bretagne, ni celle de la Russie. Car ces grandes puissances, intéressées à divers titres au problème du Pacifique, se trouvent momentanément, toutes les trois, empêchées. A Londres, en effet, on est aux prises avec de gros soucis, de gros embarras: restauration financière à opérer, crise économique à résoudre, questions sociales à régler, et, hors de la Métropole, un Empire colonial où se font entendre des craquements assez préoccupants; toutes raisons pour lesquelles on veuille ne distraire ni son attention, ni son argent, ni ses forces en quelque lointaine aventure. A Washington, on est tout au dollar, au chômage, aux économies, aux affaires de l'Europe où l'on s'est enchevêtré par la force des choses, et l'on ne tient nullement à compliquer une situation déjà

absorbante et difficile par une partie lointaine à jouer en Extrême-Asie et qui coûterait gros en or et en hommes. Enfin, à Moscou, on n'a ni argent, ni soldats. Oui, pas de soldats, malgré toutes les fanfaronnades des Soviets. Car, si l'armée rouge était propre aux douceurs de la guerre civile, elle serait incapable, vu son organisation, son armement, son instruction, son genre de discipline et son état d'esprit, de satisfaire aux obligations d'une campagne extérieure, surtout si cette campagne avait lieu là-bas, au bout du monde, en cette Mandchourie de mauvais renom, où, il y a vingt-cinq ans, l'armée du tzar a sombré sous les coups des Japonais; l'armée des Soviets ne vaut pas celle du tzar, et c'est même à se demander si elle ne refuserait pas de marcher pour renouveler une expérience qui a si mal tourné, — et cela, à propos d'un pays dont, pour finir, le soldat russe se désintéresse absolument.

Le Japon pourrait être tenté. Il s'en garde, lui, sage, et il a bien raison. Il sait qu'une conquête de la Mandchourie par les armes le mettrait tôt ou tard en mauvaise posture. On ne touche pas, sans qu'il en coûte, au problème du Pacifique. Si le Japon s'installait par la force en Mandchourie, il s'ouvrirait pour l'avenir des perspectives bien dangereuses: un jour ou l'autre, il aurait sur les bras la Chine, remise en selle; les Etats-Unis, la Grande-Bretagne, la Russie, peut-être tous les quatre à la fois. On lui demanderait des comptes... Mieux vaut être plus modéré, plus prudent; mieux vaut achever, avec le temps, une conquête pacifique déjà commencée et qui, justement parce qu'elle sera pacifique, sera plus sûre. Le Japon ne demande donc qu'à conserver son chemin de fer; cette base d'influence lui suffit pour rayonner au loin; de là, il fait peu à peu tache d'huile. En Mandchourie, il représente l'ordre, la police, et son attrait y est tel que, dans ce pays deux fois grand comme l'Allemagne et où il y a trente millions de Chinois, les neuf dixièmes de ceux-ci y ont été attirés par l'occupation japonaise, en dégoût du désordre et du brigandage qui sévissent dans le reste de la Chine. Le Japon, pour être maître en Mandchourie, sinon de droit, du moins de fait, n'a qu'à savoir attendre. Il le saura.

Toute la question pour lui est qu'on ne lui conteste rien, ni pour le présent, ni pour l'avenir, des droits que lui confère le bail de son chemin de fer. C'est l'objet de son litige actuel avec la Chine. Le Japon est fin et patient: il saura manœuvrer pour que l'affaire s'arrange au mieux de ses intérêts.

« Actualités. » Général Fonville

Enclosure No. 9 to Despatch No. 2051
of December 1, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from EXCELSIOR, November 26, 1931.

LE CONSEIL DE LA S.D.N. A ÉTABLI HIER UN PROJET SUSCEPTIBLE DE RÉALISER UN ACCORD UNANIME

Il réclame du Japon et de la Chine de prendre des mesures pour éviter une aggravation de la situation et décide la création d'une commission qui procédera à une étude sur place.

LES ATTACHÉS MILITAIRES EN CHINE DE LA FRANCE, DE LA GRANDE-BRETAGNE, DES ÉTATS-UNIS ET DE L'ITALIE VONT SE RENDRE EN AVION A CHINCHOW

Après une matinée d'attente, marquée seulement par une visite de M. Yoshizawa à M. Briand, pour lui faire connaître que le gouvernement de Tokio acceptait, dans son ensemble, le projet de résolution arrêté lundi, l'après-midi a été fertile en événements.

Le Dr Szé a fait connaître d'abord au secrétaire général de la Société des nations la teneur des instructions de son gouvernement. En voici les sept points. Les Chinois exigent : 1° la cessation immédiate des hostilités ; 2° l'évacuation totale de la Mandchourie dans un délai de quinze jours ; 3° la surveillance de l'évacuation par des neutres ; 4° ils s'engagent à fournir aux Japonais toutes les garanties de sécurité ; en cas de contestation, les neutres seront arbitres ; 5° ils proposent, pour fixer le statut de la Mandchourie, la convocation d'une conférence à laquelle seraient appelées les neuf puissances qui participèrent à la conférence de Washington en 1922 (ce point leur a été suggéré par le général Dawes) ; 6° les Chinois et les Japonais devraient s'engager mutuellement à respecter les traités ; 7° en cas de contestation sur ces traités, les différends seraient soumis à l'arbitrage de la Cour de La Haye.

Puis le comité des douze se réunit en séance secrète. Après deux heures de discussion, partagé en deux camps, il a décidé de soumettre la proposition suivante aux deux parties, étant entendu que dans le cas où ce texte ne serait pas accepté par l'un ou l'autre une nouvelle formule d'entente serait recherchée.

Le communiqué officiel

Dans l'espoir d'arriver à une résolution adoptée à l'unanimité, y compris les votes des deux parties, conformément à l'article 11 du pacte, un projet de règlement a été établi qui traite séparément du retrait des troupes japonaises dans la zone du chemin de fer et de la nomination d'une commission internationale.

L'adoption de ce projet, qui a été communiqué aux deux parties, est la suivante : Rappel et réaffirmation de la résolution du 30 septembre par laquelle les deux parties se déclarent solennellement liées. Les deux gouvernements sont invités en conséquence à prendre toutes les mesures nécessaires à assurer l'exécution de ladite résolution, de manière que le retrait des troupes japonaises dans la zone du chemin de fer puisse s'effectuer le plus rapidement possible, retrait auquel le conseil attache la plus grande importance.

Engagement des deux parties : De donner aux commandants de leurs forces respectives les ordres les plus stricts de s'abstenir de toute initiative pouvant entraîner de nouveaux incidents et de nouvelles pertes de vies humaines et de prendre les mesures nécessaires pour empêcher toute aggravation de la situation.

Invitation aux membres du conseil à fournir à celui-ci les informations reçues de leurs représentants sur place.

Création d'une commission chargée de procéder à une étude sur place et de faire rapport au conseil sur toute circonstance qui, de nature à affecter les relations internationales, menace de troubler la paix entre la Chine et le Japon ou la bonne entente entre les deux pays, dont la paix dépend. La Chine et le Japon seraient représentés chacun par un assesseur.

La constitution ainsi que les travaux de la commission ne préjudicieraient pas à l'engagement de retirer les troupes japonaises à l'intérieur de la zone du chemin de fer, qui a été pris par le gouvernement du Japon et qui a été enregistré dans la résolution du 30 septembre.

Une longue discussion

En fait, ce ne fut qu'après une très longue discussion que l'on arriva à cette solution. Plusieurs membres du conseil auraient, en effet, préféré que la Société des nations prit nettement position et fixât une date pour l'évacuation des troupes japonaises. Ce fut alors que lord Cecil, qui penchait lui-même en faveur de cette solution, fit adopter la résolution que l'on a lue ci-dessus. Immédiatement après le général Dawes publiait le communiqué suivant :

Le gouvernement des Etats-Unis approuve le projet général de règlement qui se trouve dans la résolution proposée par le conseil de la Société des nations et il en a avisé la Chine et le Japon.

Le gouvernement américain a insisté auprès de ces pays pour qu'ils se rallient au plan général envisagé par ladite résolution.

Une nouvelle séance privée a été prévue pour cet après-midi 16 heures, la plupart des membres du conseil devant assister ce matin aux obsèques de M. Louis Loucheur.

Les observateurs européens se rendront à Chinchow

Au début de la séance, M. Briand avait informé ses collègues qu'il avait l'intention d'envoyer en leur nom un télégramme à la Chine et au Japon en leur demandant d'éviter tout nouvel incident et de donner des ordres à leurs chefs d'armées, afin de ne pas mettre le conseil dans l'impossibilité de continuer son rôle de négociateur. Lord Cecil, en approuvant le geste de M. Briand, demanda à tous les gouvernements représentés au conseil d'envoyer un télégramme similaire. Il ajouta qu'il serait utile que les gouvernements envoient leurs attachés militaires actuellement en Chine à Chinchow, dans le but d'éviter tout recours aux armes, d'un côté ou de l'autre. Proposition qui fut immédiatement acceptée. Et il est vraisemblable que dès ce matin les attachés militaires des ambassades de France, de Grande-Bretagne, des Etats-Unis et d'Italie quitteront Nankin par la voie des airs pour Chinchow. — MAURICE RAYMONDE.

Une note pressante de la délégation chinoise

La délégation chinoise annonce que le délégué de la Chine a remis hier après-midi, au secrétaire général de la Société des nations, une note où il est dit :

D'après des informations d'extrême urgence que le délégué vient de recevoir de son gouvernement, les Japonais, malgré les assurances qu'ils ont données, envoient des troupes vers Chinchow.

Un conflit sérieux menace d'éclater entre les troupes chinoises et japonaises, conflit que les Chinois désirent éviter. Ce conflit ne pourra être évité que si le conseil de la Société des nations agit immédiatement.

Le gouvernement chinois demande que le conseil prenne toutes les mesures nécessaires pour l'établissement d'une zone neutre entre les forces chinoises et japonaises, dès ce jour.

Cette zone devrait être occupée par des détachements neutres, anglais, français, italiens ou autres, sous l'autorité du conseil.

Ce n'est que dans ce cas que la Chine pourrait éviter un conflit et retirer ses troupes en deçà de la Grande Muraille, si le conseil le lui demande.

Enclosure No. 10 to Despatch No. 2031
of December 1, 1931.

From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'HUMANITE, November 26, 1931.

L'Est-Chinois ouvertement menacé

**L'IMPÉRIALISME NIPPON
ET LES GARDES BLANCS
PRÊTS A SE JETER SUR KHARBINE**

Une firme japonaise fournit des armes à la contre-révolution chinoise

PRÉPARONS ACTIVEMENT LE MEETING MONSTRE DU 1^{er} DÉCEMBRE !

Le conseil de la Société des Nations continue, comme il n'a cessé de le faire depuis le 25 septembre dernier, à encourager de toute l'énergie dont il est capable le développement de la conquête japonaise et l'aventure militaire antisoviétique de l'impérialisme nippon.

N'oublions jamais que l'organisme qui préside à cette heure au dépècement de la Chine et à l'agression armée contre la patrie des travailleurs a, à sa tête, M. Briand, lequel accomplit très scrupuleusement son rôle d'instigateur du coup de force.


Nous avons souvent indiqué ici que la France était à la tête de la croisade extrême-orientale et que sa solidarité avec le Japon reposait sur une base très solide. Qu'on nous permette d'ajouter une raison à celles que nous énonçâmes déjà et d'illustrer ainsi notre démonstration. Hier matin, l'*Avenir*, le grand journal que contrôle l'omnipotent Billiet s'inquiétait des répercussions du tarif douanier britannique sur les exportations françaises. « Où exporter? », se demandait avec angoisse l'*Avenir* et se répondait : « Il nous reste un certain nombre de débouchés non négligeables. C'est sur eux que doit porter tout notre effort ».

Et quels sont ces débouchés non négligeables ? L'auteur énumère les pays scandinaves, les Balkans, la Pologne, la Turquie et la Syrie, la Chine enfin. « En Chine, note-t-il, nos exportations se sont élevées de 123 millions de francs, en 1930, à 125 millions, en 1931 ».

Retenez bien ce chiffre et cette indication qui expliquent, n'est-il pas vrai, bien

convaincre de méditer sur les déclarations du gouvernement japonais de la Corée publiées hier, en première page du *Matin* :

« La situation, dit ce journal, est très



La zone rayée verticalement a été occupée par les Japonais entre les 18 et 30 septembre ; la zone rayée horizontalement l'a été entre le 30 septembre et le 24 octobre ; celle rayée obliquement entre le 24 octobre et le 20 novembre.

grave. Et si nous ne traitons pas la question comme elle doit être traitée, les conséquences seront désastreuses. En vérité, l'avenir du Japon dépend de l'issue de l'affaire. Il y a plus d'un million de Coréens en Mandchourie et en Mongolie, et il leur serait impossible de poursuivre leurs travaux en paix si la Chine refusait de reconnaître nos droits spéciaux dans ces régions.

« Aussi longtemps qu'il n'y a point de sécurité en Mandchourie, le Japon y maintiendra ses troupes ».

On le voit, ce n'est point du tout d'évacuation qu'il s'agit, mais bien de la conquête de la Chine, de l'organisation de la guerre et plus précisément de la guerre antisoviétique.

A cet égard, tard dans la nuit, nous arrivent deux informations dont il est à peine besoin de souligner la gravité.

Les fournitures d'armes

Voici la première. La presse de Dairen a révélé, il y a deux jours, que le bureau de transports japonais *Kokureihui*, qui possède un vaste réseau de voies ferrées et de succursales, fournissait régulièrement des armes aux généraux chinois de la Mandchourie septentrionale. Depuis trois semaines, sur un ton provocant, le cabinet de Tokio a incriminé l'U.R.S.S. de favoriser des transports de troupes au général Ma. Cette accusation ne reposait sur rien. Elle a été réfutée d'ailleurs avec beaucoup d'énergie par les dirigeants soviétiques.

Or, pendant que pour trouver un prétexte à une agression antisoviétique le Japon multipliait ses notes insolentes et accumulait ses mensonges, une grande firme japonaise fournissait des armes et des munitions aux généraux chinois. En fait, le Japon a accompli ses rapines avec la complicité des seigneurs de guerre du Kuomintang à la solde de Tokio. Le correspondant de *l'Intran* en Extrême-Orient a relaté qu'un grand banquier de Tsitsikar avait favorisé l'entrée des Nippons dans cette ville.

La menace sur Kharbine

Voici la seconde information : Un membre de la mission militaire japonaise à Kharbine a informé le gouvernement de Moukden que les gardes blancs, ayant à leur tête le général Kosmine, étaient prêts à s'emparer du chemin de fer de l'Est. Un plan minutieux a été préparé à cet effet : Il comporte l'occupation de la gare et l'arrêt de la circulation, l'occupation des bureaux, le massacre des employés soviétiques.

L'état-major japonais n'a point rejeté, tant s'en faut, ces offres. Il a répondu au contraire que l'occupation de Kharbine faisait partie de son plan d'attaque.

Tels sont les faits. D'un côté, le Japon achète les généraux de la contre-révolution, les fournit d'armes et de matériel de guerre ; de l'autre, il s'apprête à renouveler sur Kharbine, mais dans des conditions combien plus redoutables, l'exploit mandchou de 1929.

Le plan de son agression est fixé jusque dans ses moindres détails. Il se peut que son exécution avec les massacres antisoviétiques qu'elle comporte ne soit plus qu'une question d'heures !

Est-il besoin d'insister beaucoup sur tous ces événements ?

N'oublions pas qu'ils coïncident, en France, avec le renouveau de la campagne d'excitations contre l'Etat prolétarien. Avant-hier, pendant que les Blancs du général Kosmine s'agitaient à Kharbine, M. Rollin prononçait à la Chambre un discours qui est un véritable appel à la guerre économique contre les Soviets.

Ces manifestations sont intimement liées l'une à l'autre. Elles marquent l'orientation agressive de la politique française, elles attestent la gravité du danger qui menace la patrie socialiste. Elles rappellent aux prolétaires le devoir de vigilance et de riposte organisée qui s'impose à eux.

Le 1^{er} décembre, nous l'avons dit déjà, les ouvriers de Paris sont convoqués par le Parti, à un meeting montre à Bullier. Cette démonstration doit faire date et signifier la volonté de lutte des travailleurs de la capitale et de sa banlieue. Nous n'avons plus que quatre jours, camarades, pour assurer son plein succès.

Gabriel PERI.

Enclosure No. 11 to Despatch No. 2031
of December 1, 1931.

From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE JOURNAL, November 26, 1931.

LE CONFLIT sino-japonais

L'attitude du Japon et de la Chine
laisse prévoir
des discussions très laborieuses

La Société des nations a-t-elle adopté la tactique la meilleure pour se tirer honorablement du conflit sino-japonais ? On est bien obligé de poser la question, quand le cours des événements ne paraît pas suivre la logique.

Que recommandait la logique ? Tout simplement que le conseil, ayant adopté un projet de résolution, attendît avec calme la réponse des deux parties, en donnant l'impression d'une volonté inflexible. C'est l'attitude qu'a prise le gouvernement américain. Le général Dawes a communiqué, dans la soirée, une note ainsi conçue :

« Le gouvernement des Etats-Unis approuve le projet général de règlement qui se trouve dans la résolution proposée par le conseil de la Société des nations. Il en a avisé la Chine et le Japon. Il a insisté auprès de ces pays pour qu'ils se rallient au plan général envisagé par ladite résolution. »

Si la Société des nations avait agi de même, la séance privée du conseil aurait dû être brève et se borner à s'occuper de deux communications chinoises. Cette réunion s'est trouvée, en effet, en présence de ce fait essentiel qu'aucune des deux parties n'a donné une réponse officielle au projet de résolution.

La réponse du Japon ne sera remise qu'aujourd'hui. Elle présentera une réserve d'ordre constitutionnel sur le second paragraphe qui comporte l'engagement pour les deux parties de donner aux commandants de leurs forces ordre de s'abstenir de toute initiative pouvant entraîner des incidents. La délégation japonaise doit demander une modification de ce passage et soumettre la nouvelle rédaction à Tokio.

Quant à la réponse de la Chine, elle n'a pas été plus loin que les communications particulières — il serait peut-être plus exact de dire les sondages faits auprès de M. Briand et de sir Eric Drummond. Le conseil n'a pas été officiellement saisi.

Ceci doit être précisé, car les couloirs du Quai d'Orsay ont retenti toute la soirée des échos des sept points que le Dr Sze a été chargé de communiquer au conseil. Les trois conditions d'hier ont fait des petits.

La Chine ne demande plus seulement l'intervention de la Société des nations pour arrêter les hostilités, le retrait des troupes japonaises dans un délai de quinze jours, le contrôle de l'opération par des neutres qui seraient chargés de fixer l'indemnité pour des dommages subis. L'intervention de neutres devrait être prévue pour constater que l'engagement pris par la Chine de faire respecter la vie et les biens des Japonais en Mandchourie est tenu. Le Japon devrait s'engager, comme la Chine, à respecter les traités, notamment la charte de la Société des nations, le pacte Briand-Kellogg, le traité du Pacifique. Les litiges relatifs à l'exécution des trai-

tés devraient être portés devant la cour de La Haye. Enfin, les neuf puissances ayant participé à la conférence de Washington de 1922 devraient, après le retrait des troupes japonaises et le rétablissement de l'ordre normal, tenir une nouvelle conférence pour fixer le sort de la Mandchourie.

Il y a de tout dans ces propositions, même des suggestions qui dépassent de beaucoup le cadre préliminaire de l'enquête. On retrouve l'inspiration américaine. L'idée d'une nouvelle conférence de Washington vient directement du général Dawes. Ce que l'on constate surtout, c'est le moyen d'éterniser les discussions et de rendre la solution impossible.

Le Dr Sze n'a certainement pas été surpris de recevoir de la présidence du conseil et du secrétariat l'avis de laisser ces instructions dans la pénombre, de tâcher de faire comprendre à Nankin l'opportunité de ne pas compliquer la tâche du conseil. Le délégué chinois a-t-il vraiment donné à M. Briand l'impression d'avoir compris que le projet de résolution est loin d'être défavorable à la Chine ? Toujours est-il qu'il a accepté de consulter son gouvernement, puisqu'il est obligé maintenant d'en référer toujours au nouveau ministre des affaires étrangères, M. Wellington Koo.

A défaut d'une réponse de Nankin sur le projet de résolution, le conseil s'est trouvé en présence de deux documents chinois. L'un signale de nouveaux cas d'agressions japonaises. L'autre appelle l'attention sur la situation critique dans la région de Tchén-Tchéou, située sur les confins de la Chine, au sud-ouest de Moukden. Le gouvernement chinois demande au conseil d'intervenir d'urgence pour établir une zone neutre, sous la garde de contingents anglais, français, italiens et neutres. A cette condition, la Chine s'engagerait à retirer ses troupes derrière la Grande Muraille.

L'entrée en scène de la gendarmerie internationale, voilà une tentation troublante offerte aux amateurs d'internationalisme !

Nous aimons à penser que les puissances représentées au conseil auront su se garder soigneusement de mettre le doigt dans le guépier mandchourien. Ce n'est vraiment pas le moment de chercher pareille complication. On veut croire que tout s'est borné à un télégramme adressé par M. Briand aux deux parties, pour les inviter à éviter de nouveaux incidents.

Cet incident n'a été qu'un des éléments des délibérations du conseil qui ont duré deux heures et demie et se sont divisées en deux parties. Dans une première réunion, tout à fait confidentielle, les chefs de délégation seuls ont examiné les conséquences de l'attitude de la Chine. Puis, il y a eu une séance privée ordinaire, au cours de laquelle on a vu se renouveler les scènes de la veille, au sujet de l'occupation militaire. Mardi, c'était M. de Madariaga qui avait parlé de modifier le texte du projet de résolution. Hier, ce sont MM. Zaleski, Fotitch et Colban qui ont manifesté des préoccupations analogues, allant jusqu'à dire que leur adhésion au projet était subordonnée à l'espoir d'un accord unanime comprenant la Chine. Voilà qui n'est pas de nature à décourager les résistances chinoises.

SAINT-BRICE.

Enclosure No. 12 to Despatch No. 2031
of December 1, 1931.

From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE MATIN, November 26, 1931.

Le conflit sino-japonais

Le docteur Sze, représentant de la Chine au conseil de la S. D. N.
demande à Nankin d'apporter certaines retouches à ses premières instructions

**Le général Dawes prend nettement position
en faveur des bases d'accord établies par le conseil
et acceptées en principe par le Japon**

Justement alarmés par la menace, à chaque instant contrôlée, vérifiée, d'un nouveau choc entre les troupes japonaises et les forces chinoises massées aux abords de Tchén-Tchéou, M. Briand et ses collègues du conseil de la S. D. N. ont été unanimes à penser qu'il était vraiment intolérable qu'ils fussent condamnés à toujours délibérer dans une atmosphère de bataille, pour ne pas dire davantage.

Aussi, dès le début de la séance privée qu'ils ont tenue, hier après-midi, ont-ils décidé de rappeler immédiatement par télégramme les gouvernements chinois et japonais au respect de leurs engagements.

En outre, les représentants à Tokio et à Nankin des puissances siégeant au conseil ont été invités à préciser de vive voix le sens de cet avertissement auprès des autorités responsables. Mission, enfin, a été donnée aux attachés militaires de ces mêmes puissances de se rendre d'urgence à Tchén-Tchéou afin d'y examiner impartialement la situation.

Cependant, le docteur Sze communiquait au général Dawes les instructions de son ministre des affaires étrangères concernant l'attitude résolument hostile de la Chine vis-à-vis des bases d'accord provisoirement établies par le conseil et acceptées, en principe, par le Japon.

A ces instructions, à peine modifiées, dans la matinée, par le délégué de Nankin, l'« observateur » des Etats-Unis n'a pas cru devoir réserver un chaleureux accueil. Le général Dawes s'est particulièrement attaché à démontrer à son interlocuteur qu'il est des erreurs que l'on ne peut pas commettre deux fois. Quoi ! la Chine voudrait que le conseil fixât un délai de quinze jours, à partir du vote de sa prochaine résolution, pour la fin de l'occupation ! Mais si le conseil persistait dans la voie où il s'était malencontreusement engagé le 24 octobre dernier ; s'il essayait, par conséquent, d'imposer, une fois de plus, et au mépris des réalités, une échéance, un terme aux modalités ultimes de l'évacuation, ne risquerait-il pas de tout compromettre et, peut-être, aux yeux du monde attentif, de se couvrir de ridicule ?

Une commission va être nommée. Quel que soit son mandat, le sûr est que sa présence en Mandchourie contribuera à elle seule à apaiser les esprits, à provoquer la détente nécessaire au rétablissement définitif de la sécurité. Or, l'évacuation n'est-elle pas tacitement et,

en quelque sorte, progressivement liée à la sécurité ?

D'autre part, la Chine demande que des « neutres » surveillent de près les opérations de repli des forces nippones ainsi que l'exécution loyale des mesures de protection envers les ressortissants japonais par ses représentants locaux.

A ce sujet et, sans jouer sur les mots, on doit raisonnablement affirmer que le gouvernement chinois a toute liberté de faire appel au concours, sinon actif, du moins moral, des attachés militaires et plénipotentiaires, qui sont déjà sur le terrain du conflit.

Nous laisserons volontairement dans l'ombre les autres alinéas du mémorandum de M. Wellington Koo, d'autant que le docteur Sze, visiblement gêné ou plutôt troublé par l'argumentation qui venait de lui être soutenue, a prié Nankin d'apporter certaines retouches à son projet initial.

En tout cas, le général Dawes, afin de renseigner exactement l'opinion publique sur ses intentions, a fait publier, dans la soirée, un communiqué dans lequel il annonce officiellement son adhésion totale au texte d'accord mis au point par le conseil. Un tel geste, dont on doit se féliciter hautement, exercera une salutaire influence non seulement sur les deux gouvernements en cause, mais encore sur l'ensemble du conseil. Car nul n'ignore que, dans un but fort louable et que nous avons, d'ailleurs, expliqué, certains délégués, préoccupés de l'avenir et de leurs intérêts spéciaux, redoutaient les conséquences lointaines du compromis en gestation.

D'ailleurs, M. Briand a jugé opportun de communiquer, hier soir, à la presse un résumé substantiel des bases provisoires d'accord présentement soumises à la Chine et au Japon.

Comme nous avons récemment analysé longuement ce document, nous nous bornerons à rappeler qu'il invoque la « résolution » votée à Genève le 30 septembre et qu'il insiste sur le fait que les travaux de la future commission ne sauraient être une excuse à une prolongation de l'occupation.

Quoi qu'il en soit, ce qu'il faut maintenant souligner, c'est que le conseil et les Etats-Unis ont pris franchement position. Certes, ils sont encore disposés à tenir compte des suggestions que les deux parties pourront leur faire.

Mais la route est tracée au gouvernement de Nankin de répondre à l'esprit de conciliation manifesté à Tokio par d'équitables concessions de principe.

Est-ce beaucoup exiger de M. Wellington Koo ?

Colonel J. J. ...
15 December 1931.
From the Ministry of War.

... November 26, 1931.

Le conflit sino-nippon

LE JAPON ACCEPTE LE PROJET DE RÉSOLUTION DU CONSEIL

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deux parties — Chine et Japon — ont
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le texte intégral du projet de résolu-
tion élaboré dimanche et lundi. Mais,
à l'heure où nous écrivons, aucun
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Cela ne signifie pas que l'un et
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Quant à M. Yoshizawa, qui a vu
M. Briand un peu avant 13 heures,
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tion tous les engagements contenus
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Réserves légères

Il ne fait de réserve légère que sur
les deux alinéas constituant le para-
graphe 2. Le premier alinéa vise les
ordres à donner par les deux gouver-
nements aux commandants en chef des
troupes en présence pour qu'ils évi-
tent tout ce qui pourrait aggraver la
situation. Le cabinet de Tokio émet
à cet égard certains scrupules consti-
tutionnels dus, sans doute, au fait que
l'empereur est le chef des armées de
terre et de mer. Mais, une disposition
analogue figurant dans le paragra-
phe 5 de la résolution du 30 septem-
bre, la difficulté est évidemment facile
à surmonter. Le second alinéa, lui, a
trait à l'engagement par les deux
parties de s'abstenir de tout acte
susceptible d'entraîner une nouvelle
effusion de sang. Ainsi que le Petit
Parisien l'a signalé dès lundi, les auto-
rités militaires craignent d'être para-
lysées par cette clause et de ne pou-
voir prendre les mesures nécessaires
pour la simple protection des troupes,
en cas de menace soit de forces régu-
lières supérieures en nombre, soit de
détachements de bandits. C'est pour
cette raison qu'elles réclamaient cette
« liberté tactique et stratégique »
dont nous avons parlé.

Ce que le cabinet de Tokio demande
maintenant, ce n'est ni un amende-
ment ni une modification de texte :
c'est l'addition à ce deuxième para-
graphe d'une phrase précisant que « ne
sont pas considérées comme actes
d'hostilité les opérations indispensables
pour assurer la défense légitime et
la police ». On estime, dans la capi-
tale japonaise, qu'en acceptant la com-
mission et en n'insistant pas sur la
reconnaissance préalable par la Chine
des cinq points fondamentaux qui
surent pendant longtemps le grand
obstacle à un accord, on est allé à
l'extrême limite des concessions. D'aut-
re part, on ne croit pas, en raison des
événements qui viennent de se dérou-
ler dans le voisinage de Moukden, où
un petit détachement japonais fut sur-
pris et attaqué à l'improviste, que le
conseil puisse rejeter cette addition
purement explicative et, en effet, il
ne doit pas y avoir là non plus d'obs-
tacle insurmontable.

Mesures de précaution

Le conseil, en tout cas, s'est préoc-
upé, dès hier après-midi, au cours de
sa séance privée, de prendre certai-

Enclosure No. 13 to Despatch No. 2051
of December 1, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE PETIT PARISIEN, November 26, 1931.

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graphe 2. Le premier alinéa vise les
ordres à donner par les deux gouver-
nements aux commandants en chef des
troupes en présence pour qu'ils évi-
tent tout ce qui pourrait aggraver la
situation. Le cabinet de Tokio émet
à cet égard certains scrupules consti-
tutionnels dus, sans doute, au fait que
l'empereur est le chef des armées de
terre et de mer. Mais, une disposition
analogue figurant dans le paragra-
phe 5 de la résolution du 30 septem-
bre, la difficulté est évidemment facile
à surmonter. Le second alinéa, lui, a
trait à l'engagement par les deux
parties de s'abstenir de tout acte
susceptible d'entraîner une nouvelle
effusion de sang. Ainsi que le Petit
Parisien l'a signalé dès lundi, les auto-
rités militaires craignent d'être para-
lysées par cette clause et de ne pou-
voir prendre les mesures nécessaires
pour la simple protection des troupes,
en cas de menace soit de forces régu-
lières supérieures en nombre, soit de
détachements de bandits. C'est pour
cette raison qu'elles réclamaient cette
« liberté tactique et stratégique »
dont nous avons parlé.

Ce que le cabinet de Tokio demande
maintenant, ce n'est ni un amende-
ment ni une modification de texte :
c'est l'addition à ce deuxième paragra-
phe d'une phrase précisant que « ne
sont pas considérées comme actes
d'hostilité les opérations indispensables
pour assurer la défense légitime et
la police ». On estime, dans la capi-
tale japonaise, qu'en acceptant la com-
mission et en n'insistant pas sur la
reconnaissance préalable par la Chine
des cinq points fondamentaux qui
furent pendant longtemps le grand
obstacle à un accord, on est allé à
l'extrême limite des concessions. D'au-
tre part, on ne croit pas, en raison des
événements qui viennent de se dérou-
ler dans le voisinage de Moukden, où
un petit détachement japonais fut sur-
pris et attaqué à l'improviste, que le
conseil puisse rejeter cette addition
purement explicative et, en effet, il
ne doit pas y avoir là non plus d'obs-
tacle insurmontable.

Mesures de précaution

Le conseil, en tout cas, s'est préoc-
cupé, dès hier après-midi, au cours de
sa séance privée, de prendre certai-

nes dispositions de nature à faciliter une entente. Nous avons vu que M. Yoshizawa avait attiré l'attention de M. Briand sur les concentrations de forces régulières et de bandits chinois dans le voisinage de King-Tchéou. L'ambassadeur avait même demandé, pour éviter une collision entre ces formations et les contingents japonais, que Tchang Sue Liang fût obligé de se retirer au delà de la « Grande Muraille » qui commence à Chanhaikouan. D'autre part, dans une communication transmise également hier au conseil, le D^r Sze signalait de son côté l'imminence d'un grave conflit armé dans cette région et sollicitait « l'établissement d'une zone neutre entre les emplacements actuels des forces chinoises et japonaises, zone qui serait, écrivait-il, occupée par des détachements britanniques, français, italiens et autres détachements neutres sous l'autorité du conseil ». Il ajoutait que, dans ces conditions, la Chine consentirait à retirer ses troupes à l'intérieur de la « Grande Muraille ».

Ces deux suggestions étant d'une réalisation également difficile, M. Briand, à l'habileté manœuvrière de qui chacun se plaît à rendre hommage, a proposé d'abord d'adresser aux deux parties le plus pressant appel pour qu'elles évitent à tout pris un nouveau choc entre leurs troupes et, ensuite, d'envoyer sur place comme observateurs un certain nombre de représentants du corps diplomatique à Pékin qui peuvent, en raison de la proximité de l'ancienne capitale, être très rapidement dans la zone des armées. Cette double proposition a été naturellement agréée et mise sans retard à exécution. Il y aura donc bientôt, sur les lieux, des observateurs dont les constatations permettront de départager les deux adversaires et d'éclaircir exactement le conseil...

La résistance chinoise

Si la situation, ainsi que nous venons de le voir, est en somme, en ce qui concerne le Japon, plutôt satisfaisante, elle est, en ce qui a trait à la Chine, beaucoup moins encourageante. Hier, on se le rappelle, en commentant un télégramme de Nankin qui avait, par endroits, des allures d'ultimatum, nous disions ne pas pouvoir croire que ce fût là la réponse du gouvernement chinois au projet de résolution du conseil que lui avait transmis le D^r Sze. Si ce n'était pas elle, en effet, puisque le représentant de la Chine ne l'a pas encore remise, il semble bien que la dépêche Reuter lui ressemblait beaucoup. Elle lui ressemblait tellement, nous a-t-on confié, qu'au cours de la réunion ultra-secrète que le conseil a tenue au début de la séance privée d'hier — réunion à laquelle ne furent admis ni M. Avenol ni M. Massigli — ce sont justement les points essentiels de ce télégramme qui ont été examinés, tournés et retournés, pour voir si, malgré tout, on ne pourrait pas, avec de la bonne volonté, arriver à s'entendre...

Quelles étaient, d'après ce document, les principales demandes chinoises ?

1° Que des mesures efficaces fussent prises pour amener la cessation

des actes agressifs de la part des forces japonaises...

L'appel adressé à Tokio, l'envoi sur place des observateurs diplomatiques de Pékin donnent déjà sur ce point une première satisfaction.

2° Que dans une période de quinze jours, à dater de la rédaction de la résolution, les forces japonaises aient regagné la zone du chemin de fer...

Il y a évidemment dans cette fixation de délai une prétention inadmissible. C'est cette prétention d'ailleurs qui a fait échouer déjà l'accord au mois d'octobre.

Il est impossible de persévérer dans cette erreur et il faudra, sans aucun doute, que le cabinet chinois abandonne cette exigence. D'ailleurs, l'affaire devant revenir devant le conseil en janvier, il est clair que le Japon fera le nécessaire pour que l'évacuation des territoires occupés par ses troupes soit à cette époque depuis longtemps terminée...

3° Que ce retrait des troupes soit contrôlé par des observateurs neutres.

Sur ce point encore, le gouvernement de Nankin va avoir, d'ici peu, toute raison d'être satisfait. Non seulement un certain nombre d'attachés militaires et de fonctionnaires consulaires sont déjà dans les régions occupées — M. Briand, lord Robert Cecil et M. Scialoja l'ont successivement affirmé samedi — mais le nombre de ces témoins se trouvera, sous peu de jours, grossi des observateurs qui vont être spécialement envoyés de Pékin vers King-Tchéou.

Cet examen détaillé auquel ont procédé les membres du conseil les a amenés à cette conclusion que la Chine ne saurait, sans risque de perdre complètement l'appui de l'opinion publique mondiale, prolonger sa résistance à refuser de souscrire au projet qui lui a été soumis et auquel adhère presque sans réserve le gouvernement de Tokio.

Il a donc été décidé de faire, hier soir, auprès du D^r Sze une démarche aussi pressante qu'amicale pour qu'il entre à nouveau en communication immédiate avec Nankin et insiste auprès du gouvernement chinois pour qu'il ne compromette pas davantage par une obstination que personne ne comprendrait désormais une satisfaction d'amour-propre que constitue, en fait, pour lui, l'envoi sur place de la commission d'étude et des observateurs neutres.

Déclaration du général Dawes

A cette démarche, qui a été faite dans la soirée par sir Eric Drummond, est venue s'ajouter une déclaration particulièrement nette et importante du représentant des Etats-Unis. Le général Dawes, en effet, a formellement annoncé que son gouvernement approuvait le projet général de règlement qui se trouve dans la résolution proposée par le conseil de la S. D. N. et qu'il en avait avisé la Chine et le Japon.

— Le gouvernement américain, a ajouté le général Dawes, a insisté auprès de ces pays pour qu'ils se rallient

au plan général envisagé par ladite résolution.

On espère, dans les milieux autorisés, que ces efforts combinés du conseil et de l'observateur américain triompheront des hésitations chinoises et que la réponse que doit apporter, demain matin, le D^r Sze sera notablement plus conciliante que celle dont il n'a pas cru devoir, hier, effectuer la remise au Quai d'Orsay.

En somme, sans être franchement optimiste, on se montrait, hier soir, à la sortie du conseil, un peu plus confiant.

Les obsèques de M. Loucheur et la nécessité de laisser au délégué chinois le temps de correspondre avec Nankin ont fait remettre à ce soir 16 heures la prochaine réunion des « douze », et on espère pouvoir dès vendredi matin tenir une nouvelle séance publique.

Est-ce bon signe ? Nous voudrions pouvoir l'affirmer. Albert JULIEN.

0055.26

Enclosure No. 14 to Despatch No. 2031
of December 1, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE QUOTIDIEN, November 26, 1931.

LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS DEVANT LE CONSEIL DE LA S.D.N.

**Le Japon se rallierait
avec quelques réserves
au projet de règlement
élaboré à Paris
mais la Chine présente
des contre-propositions**

Quotidien 11/26
Deux pas en avant, trois pas en arrière!... Telle est à peu près la situation actuelle du Conseil devant l'imbroglio sino-japonais.

Car nous sommes en plein imbroglio, comme on va pouvoir s'en convaincre.

De nombreuses démarches ont encore eu lieu dans la journée de mercredi. M. Yoshizawa, d'ordre de son gouvernement, s'est rendu dans la matinée auprès de M. Briand. Le général Dawes a, de son côté, reçu le docteur Sze et M. Matsudeira. A dix-sept heures, les « Douze » se sont réunis une fois de plus au Quai d'Orsay.

M. Briand a pu alors mettre ses collègues du Conseil au courant des contre-propositions chinoises.

La résistance du gouvernement national de Nankin, aux suggestions du Conseil, n'a fait que s'accroître davantage, en effet. Le docteur Sze a reçu



Photo Keystone. Cliché Quotidien.
Le général japonais Kazunari Ugaki, gouverneur général de la Corée.

des instructions précises et nettes qui englobent sept points.

Il y a d'abord les trois points que nous signalons hier, à savoir : 1° Cessation immédiate des hostilités; 2° Retrait des troupes japonaises deux semaines après; 3° Une commission d'enquête neutre surveillera l'exécution de ces mesures.

Les quatre nouvelles conditions de Nankin, sont les suivantes : 4° La Chine garantira la sécurité de la vie et des biens des ressortissants japonais; 5° Il appartiendra aux enquêteurs neutres de décider, en cas de contestation entre Tokio et Nankin, si les Chinois ont vraiment exécuté les mesures destinées à garantir la sécurité des Japonais; 6° L'une et l'autre parties en cause s'engagent à respecter les traités qu'elles ont signés; 7° Convocation éventuelle d'une conférence à laquelle participeront les signataires du Traité des neuf puissances conclu en 1922 à Washington.

Le sixième point est destiné, dans la pensée chinoise, à faciliter un recours à l'arbitrage éventuel, de La Haye. Mais on sait, par ce que nous en avons déjà dit, que Tokio n'est point disposé à entrer dans cette voie.

Il est à peine besoin de faire observer que la position très ferme prise ainsi par Nankin ne sera pas de nature à faciliter une solution du litige sur le plan juridique et pratique.

En fait, nous avons trouvé, dans les milieux chinois, une fermeté qui pourrait faire douter de l'issue de cette longue négociation.

On n'hésite même pas, dans les mêmes milieux, à avancer que la question telle que l'a posée le Conseil de la S. D. N. dès le début, ne l'a été qu'incomplètement. On y demande l'évacuation japonaise au nom même du Pacte dont l'article 10 interdit l'occupation du territoire d'une puissance étrangère. Et c'est là-dessus que l'on base la demande de retrait immédiat des troupes nippones.

On ajoute que, le cas échéant — et si la S. D. N. s'avérait impuissante à régler le conflit sur ces bases — il y aurait lieu d'invoquer les clauses du traité des neuf puissances, du 21 novembre 1922. D'où la suggestion du recours à une conférence, formulée dans le septième point plus haut énoncé.

Quant à l'attitude de Tokio, elle est demeurée en substance, telle que nous la précisions hier. Le Japon adhère dans l'ensemble au projet de résolution du Conseil, avec quelques réserves — dont on ne peut absolument pas dire qu'elles soient « de détail ». C'est ainsi que sur le point 2 du projet du Conseil (retrait des troupes japonaises et non-aggravation de la situation) le Japon demande une proposition additive pour expliquer que la commission d'enquête projetée n'apportera pas d'entraves aux opérations de l'armée, en cas de légitime défense de la part des Nippons, ou d'opérations de police rendues nécessaires par l'activité des bandits.

Quant à la suggestion à faire aux troupes de Tchang-Sue-Liang de se retirer en-deça de la Grande Muraille, on explique que cette mesure permettra, en créant une zone neutre, d'empêcher des heurts entre les troupes chinoises et japonaises.

On ne saurait se dissimuler que ces attermoiements, ces retards, commencent à fatiguer les membres du Conseil — dont certains, d'ailleurs, ne sont pas nécessairement opposés à la thèse chinoise.

On suggérerait hier, dans certains milieux en marge du Conseil, que celui-ci pourrait être amené à dire que le cas mandchou est exceptionnel et ne crée pas de précédent. Certains se rendent compte en effet qu'un cas analogue pourrait se produire en Europe, et qu'alors le « précédent » de la procédure actuelle pourrait être invoqué pour légitimer une occupation illégitime de territoire par un agresseur quelconque.

Selon certains, on pourrait assimiler l'occupation de la Mandchourie par la Chine au cas prévu par le Traité de Versailles, après un manquement du Reich à ses obligations. C'est ainsi que put être juridiquement occupée la Ruhr...

Mais il est sûr que bien des gens trouvent cette application, d'un cas prévu par le Traité de Versailles, aux affaires sino-japonaises, un peu trop spécieuse et même dangereuse. —

TRENCANEL.

Enclosure No. 15 to Despatch No. 2031
of December 1, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE TEMPS, November 26, 1931.

A LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS

Le conseil de la Société des nations poursuit dans des conditions très ingrates sa tâche en vue du règlement pacifique du différend sino-japonais. Tout se passe en conversations particulières et on ne prévoit pas que le conseil pourra se réunir en séance publique avant la fin de la semaine. L'atmosphère change d'un jour à l'autre et chaque communication des deux gouvernements en cause apporte de nouvelles surprises et multiplie les complications. On peut se demander si le problème, tel qu'il est posé, peut être pratiquement résolu et s'il ne faudra pas en venir à la constatation qu'on se trouve en présence d'un cas exceptionnel auquel on ne peut appliquer les règles ordinaires de la procédure de Genève.

Il devient même difficile de faire le point et de préciser exactement l'état des pourparlers tant est grande l'incertitude où l'on est quant aux véritables intentions de Nankin et de Tokio. On doit se contenter de constater les plus extraordinaires sautes d'humeur et les modifications les plus profondes des positions prises sans qu'on puisse se les expliquer par la nature et la portée de faits nouveaux. Depuis dix jours on tourne autour des mêmes idées, des mêmes principes et des mêmes formules, mais chaque fois qu'on a l'espoir d'aboutir, une note chinoise ou une communication du Japon découvre un nouvel aspect du différend et fait rebondir tout le débat. La diplomatie des Japonais et des Chinois a des ressources et des méthodes que notre mentalité occidentale peut difficilement comprendre, ce qui confirme, une fois de plus, qu'on ne peut raisonnablement appliquer les mêmes principes à toutes les situations ni résoudre les mêmes problèmes, suivant qu'ils se posent en Europe ou en Asie, par des règles communes.

L'élaboration de la résolution que doit adopter le conseil est déjà très délicate en soi, car il s'agit de créer des possibilités d'accord tout en sauvegardant l'autorité du conseil de la Société des nations et en réservant son droit d'être complètement informé sur la situation de fait en Mandchourie. On veut s'en tenir à la nécessité pour le Japon de ramener aussitôt que possible ses troupes dans la zone du chemin de fer Sud-Mandchourien, sans pourtant fixer un délai pour l'évacuation totale et en tenant compte du fait que la sécurité des ressortissants nippons doit être effectivement assurée par les autorités chinoises. Telle est, ramenée à sa plus simple expression, la volonté que l'on entend traduire dans la résolution que le conseil doit adopter. Quant à l'envoi d'une commission internationale pour étudier la situation sur place, les mêmes difficultés subsistent depuis deux jours en ce qui concerne le caractère et les pouvoirs à donner à cette commission.

Le Japon est disposé à admettre le projet de résolution, réserve faite pourtant en ce qui concerne le recours à de nouvelles opérations militaires. Il veut bien s'engager, croit-on comprendre, à ne pas prendre l'offensive, mais il entend réserver à ses troupes le droit de prendre les mesures imposées par les circonstances en cas d'attaque par des soldats chinois ou lorsqu'il s'agit de réprimer les coups de main des bandits qui opèrent en masses compactes dans les différentes régions de la Mandchourie. Ce qui tend à confirmer les dispositions favorables du gouvernement de Tokio, c'est que les Japonais commencent à retirer effectivement leurs forces de Tsitsikar pour les ramener vers le sud. De ce côté, il y a donc des perspectives de détente, encore que certaines réserves japonaises doivent être mises au point avant que l'on puisse considérer l'adhésion du gouvernement de Tokio comme définitivement acquise.

Par contre, du côté chinois, il y a un recul sensible sur ce qu'on paraissait avoir obtenu jusqu'ici. C'est à Nankin maintenant qu'on fait preuve d'une intransigeance qui risque de tout compromettre et de fermer la porte à tout règlement pacifique du conflit. Déjà le mémorandum chinois communiqué avant-hier marquait fortement cette tendance en faisant valoir qu'une enquête non accompagnée de mesures assurant en même temps la cessation immédiate des hostilités et le retrait des forces japonaises ne constituerait qu'un expédient destiné à perpétuer pendant une période indéfinie l'occupation des territoires chinois. Ce qui accentue encore cette attitude nouvelle de la Chine, c'est la proposition transmise hier de Nankin, suivant l'agence Reuter, et aux termes de laquelle la Société des nations serait mise en quelque sorte en demeure de prendre sans retard des mesures pour amener la cessation des attaques de la part du Japon, dont les troupes devraient être ramenées dans la zone du chemin de fer Sud-Mandchourien dans un délai de quinze jours, leur retrait devant être contrôlé par des neutres. Nankin ferait connaître, en outre, que si le Japon continue à ne pas tenir compte des précédentes recommandations du conseil de la Société des nations, et si celui-ci a recours à l'organisation d'une commission neutre dont la nature serait incompatible avec les principes fixés dans ses précédentes résolutions, les forces nippones continuant leur mouvement agressif sans craindre une intervention de l'institution internationale de Genève, le gouvernement chinois sera contraint de prendre des mesures de légitime défense. S'agit-il d'un document nouveau ou d'une répétition, sous une forme plus accentuée, de la note déjà signalée à la date du 21 novembre?

Si cette nouvelle est officiellement confirmée, on ne peut que déplorer le ton nouveau de la Chine dans cette controverse diplomatique que tous les efforts accomplis jusqu'ici pour faciliter un arrangement n'ont pu apaiser. Nankin

en reviendrait, en fait, à exiger le retrait immédiat et sans conditions des troupes japonaises, ce à quoi Tokio ne consentira en aucun cas et ce que, au surplus, les précédentes résolutions du conseil n'impliquent point, puisqu'elles ne fixent aucune date pour l'évacuation totale des localités chinoises occupées et qu'elles subordonnent tout à la garantie de la vie et des biens des ressortissants japonais en Mandchourie. Le fait d'annoncer que des mesures de légitime défense seront prises aurait ici le caractère d'une menace à laquelle on ne saurait demeurer indifférent à Tokio, d'autant plus qu'elle coïnciderait avec la nouvelle que Tchang Sue Liang groupe une armée importante pour marcher contre les Japonais. D'ailleurs, on se bat depuis deux jours à l'ouest de Moukden et de grands mouvements de troupes sont signalés sur la ligne Pékin-Moukden.

Qu'on ne s'étonne point dans ces conditions de l'impression pénible qui se dégage de la situation. Le fait que le conseil de la Société des nations est obligé de délibérer pendant que de véritables opérations militaires sont engagées en Mandchourie n'est pas de nature à faire renaitre la confiance. Pourtant, la Chine n'est pas en état d'entreprendre une véritable guerre et l'attitude qu'on lui prête à cette heure est en si complète disproportion avec les moyens d'agir dont elle dispose qu'on peut se demander si tout ceci ne constituerait pas une suprême tentative pour exercer une pression sur le conseil avant d'en venir à admettre ce que commande la raison. Il faut souhaiter que l'attitude de la Chine soit plus souple dans la réalité des choses que ne le laisse supposer l'interprétation donnée, à tort ou à raison, à la dernière démarche de Nankin.

Enclosure No. 16 to Despatch No. 2031
of December 1, 1931.

From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ECHO DE PARIS, November 27, 1931.

Le conflit mandchourien et la S. D. N.

M. Briand se flatte de faire accepter par la Chine le projet de résolution instituant la commission. Mais que seront les amendements chinois ?

Les membres du Conseil de la Société des Nations respirent un peu. Après avoir désespéré, ils se flattent enfin d'organiser cette commission qui, certes, ne pacifiera pas l'Extrême-Orient, mais leur permettra de fermer les portes.

Aux douze membres du conseil réunis pour délibérer (hors de la présence des délégués japonais et chinois), M. Briand a pu déclarer, hier, son espérance de fléchir enfin le gouvernement de Nankin. D'après M. Briand, ce gouvernement acceptera le principe de la commission, quitte à demander l'amendement sérieux du projet de résolution rédigé dimanche dernier. Il s'agit maintenant d'empêcher que les amendements chinois ne brisent pas la combinaison.

Pour cela diverses précautions et manœuvres sont employées. Hier matin, nous avons indiqué la première en date. Le communiqué publié par les « Douze » et prétendant donner la substance du projet de résolution n'a pas soufflé mot de la phrase essentielle pour les Japonais qui interdit à la commission de se mêler des éventuels pourparlers directs entre les deux pays et d'exprimer la moindre opinion sur les arrangements militaires. Inutile de répéter que, dans le projet de résolution, cette phrase subsiste quand même.

Hier soir, les « Douze » ont constitué un comité de rédaction de trois membres. Sir Eric Drummond a eu bien soin de les choisir parmi les plus chinois du conseil : lord Cecil (président), M. de Madariaga (Espagne) et M. Kolban (Norvège). Ces

deux derniers sont d'anciens fonctionnaires du secrétariat. Ils tirent dans le sens de la Chine autant qu'il leur sera possible, en bons idéologues. Tout point important devra être référé aux « Douze ». Les « trois » sont chargés de discuter les éventuels amendements chinois et les actuels amendements japonais, d'opérer les modifications de texte sur lesquels on pourra s'entendre. Soit dit en passant, les Japonais ne demandent pas seulement quelques changements dans une phrase jugée incompatible avec leur Constitution — celle qui se rapporte aux ordres à donner aux chefs militaires pour qu'ils s'abstiennent d'aggraver la situation. Ils veulent qu'une phrase soit ajoutée, pour signifier qu'ils conservent toujours le droit de défendre les vies et les biens de leurs nationaux contre les attaques des bandits. Ils n'ont jamais interprété autrement la résolution du 30 septembre qui forme le fond du projet de résolution.

Depuis deux jours, les « Douze » s'occupent d'une affaire distincte de l'affaire de Mandchourie : les concentrations de troupes chinoises autour de Tchén-Tchéou. La Chine, se déclarant menacée, a demandé, avant-hier, l'établissement d'une zone neutre dans cette région, voulant même que la France, l'Angleterre, les Etats-Unis, l'Italie y envoient des détachements. Les détachements ont été refusés — après que M. Scialoja, dans un grand geste de dévouement à la S. D. N. eut déclaré le détachement italien prêt à marcher. Aujourd'hui, on se contente de définir une zone où les deux partis promettent de ne pas pénétrer. Et, sur les lieux, on envoie, de Pékin, des observateurs. On leur a télégraphié hier de se concerter dans les recommandations dont ils pourront saisir leurs gouvernements respectifs. Ici, peu de difficulté, le Japon ayant lui-même demandé, avant-hier et hier, que les troupes chinoises de Tchén-Tchéou n'avancent pas vers le nord, c'est-à-dire cherchant à se protéger et non point à attaquer.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 17 to Despatch No. 2031
of December 1, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from EXCELSIOR, November 27, 1931.

L'EFFORT PACIFICATEUR DE LA S. D. N. EN CHINE

On espère que le conseil va bientôt trouver la formule qui mettra fin aux hostilités.

Les négociations qui ont continué hier pendant toute la journée ont apporté peu de modifications à l'état du conflit sino-japonais, le D^r Alfred Sze n'ayant pas encore reçu d'instructions en ce qui concerne l'acceptation ou le refus du projet de résolution qui lui fut soumis mercredi.

On sait d'ailleurs qu'à la suite de la démarche du général Dawes le délégué chinois s'efforce d'obtenir une atténuation aux exigences de Nankin.

On envisage de plus en plus ici, dans le cas d'un échec, la convocation, à Washington, des signataires du traité des neuf puissances qui garantit l'intégrité territoriale et administrative de la Chine, mais l'on espère encore qu'avec quelques légères modifications de style une entente interviendra avant la fin de la semaine, provoquant la cessation immédiate des hostilités et le commencement des négociations qui doivent ramener le calme en Extrême-Orient.

Dans sa courte séance tenue l'après-midi, le conseil a nommé un comité de rédaction présidé par M. Aristide Briand et composé de lord Cecil et de deux anciens fonctionnaires de la Société des nations, qui, tous deux, dirigent la section du désarmement et qui, aujourd'hui, représentent leur pays à la table du conseil: MM. de Madeira, ambassadeur d'Espagne à Washington, et Colban, délégué de la Norvège.

Ce comité se réunira ce matin à 10 h. 30, et si, ce qui semble d'ailleurs peu probable, une entente définitive intervenait, une séance plénière du conseil aurait lieu dans l'après-midi.

Il a également été décidé de prier les puissances ayant des observateurs militaires sur les lieux de leur demander de se tenir en relations avec les commandants des parties en présence et, s'ils le jugeaient nécessaire, d'organiser une zone neutre devant Chin-Chow.

Le comité du conseil a été saisi d'une demande du gouvernement hollandais qui désirerait être représenté dans la commission d'études, vu les gros intérêts néerlandais en Extrême-Orient et le fait que son pays a signé le traité des neuf nations.

Pour le moment, toutefois, on n'envisage pas encore la constitution de la commission, la plupart des personnalités sollicitées s'étant, croyons-nous, refusées. Le conseil attendra d'avoir exactement défini les pouvoirs de cette commission avant d'en nommer les membres. — MAURICE RAYMONDE.


Enclosure No. 13 to Despatch No. 2051
of December 1, 1931.

From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'UNION, November 17, 1931.

UN PLAN D'OCCUPATION DE LA CHINE PAR LES ARMÉES IMPÉRIALISTES!

Accentuons la lutte pour le retrait immédiat
des forces navales et militaires d'Extrême-Orient



L'artillerie japonaise traverse le Nonni

Nous avons souvent mis en lumière, depuis le début de l'affaire de Mandchourie, le rôle très précis dans le concert guerrier par l'Etat-Major socialdémocrate.

Dès le premier jour, M. Vanderwelde a justifié l'agression japonaise dans des termes qui eussent rendu jaloux le général Weygand lui-même. De son côté, M. Renaudel, qui n'y va pas par quatre chemins, accusa tout bonnement l'U. R. S. S. de convoiter la Mandchourie.

Remarquez d'ailleurs que les amis socialistes Japonais de M. Renaudel sont à fond derrière le cabinet de Tokio. Dans une résolution récemment publiée par la presse nipponne, le P. S. japonais a repoussé catégoriquement toute tentative de violer les droits et intérêts japonais assurés par les traités.

Les traités sont ceux de 1905, de 1915 imposés par la victoire des armes. Les socialfascistes les défendent avec autant de frénésie que M. Boncour défendit le traité de Saint-Germain devant la Cour de La Haye.

Quant au Populaire, lorsqu'il se mit de la partie, ce fut pour incriminer la politique pacifique de l'Etat prolétarien. Il est de fait que cette politique si clairement énoncée par Karakhan, par Molotov, par Vorochilov, par Litvinov déjouait toutes les

provocations et démasquait tous les tendeurs de piège. Elle permettait — au grand dam des chefs socialistes serviteurs diligents de la bourgeoisie — le rassemblement des prolétaires autour de la patrie socialiste encore une fois menacée.

Louanges socialistes de l'impérialisme français

La manœuvre du Populaire était à ce point ignominieuse qu'elle souleva l'indignation et la colère des travailleurs socialistes. Depuis dix jours, le journal socialiste, pour apaiser ces irritations si légitimes, a mis une sourdine à ses attaques rageuses contre les Soviets. Sans rien abandonner de leur chanson primitive, les chefs socialistes ont embouché une autre trompette, et chargé Salomon Grumbach, ancien employé du deuxième bureau, d'entonner le los quotidien de M. Briand.

Ainsi c'est dans la mesure où s'est précisé plus nettement le rôle prépondérant de l'impérialisme français dans l'organisation de la guerre que le journal officiel du parti socialiste a pris plus ouvertement parti pour les représentants de l'impérialisme français.

« Le Conseil, écrit M. Grumbach, a le devoir de chercher le compromis qui pourrait, sans leur emploi, mettre fin aux hostilités et rétablir une situation de droit. C'est à quoi M. Briand et le secrétariat s'emploient jour et nuit. »

Ce compromis sur lequel pâlit M. Briand durant ses veilles laborieuses, nous en exposâmes les termes ces jours-ci : il s'agit de mettre à la disposition des puissances, de la France et du Japon en particulier, une commission internationale qui, sur place, dépêcherait la Chine et organiserait l'extermination des communistes.

Un projet d'occupation militaire

Mais voici une suggestion complémentaire. Elle a été formulée avant-hier par M. Sze, représentant du Kuomintang, évidemment inspiré par M. Briand. M. Sze demande au Conseil « de prendre immédiatement toutes les mesures nécessaires en vue de l'établissement d'une zone neutre entre les emplacements actuels des forces chinoises et japonaises, zone qui serait occupée par des détachements britanniques, français, italiens et autres détachements neutres, sous l'autorité du Conseil ».

Appelons les choses par leur nom : ce qu'on réclame, c'est tout bonnement la formation d'un corps expéditionnaire international qui serait envoyé en Chine, se déplacerait à travers le territoire et serait en mesure de lever une armée contre les Soviétiques.

On comprend mieux quand on a lu ce document l'agitation dont font montre depuis plusieurs mois les officiers supérieurs de l'armée française ; nous avons relaté il y a quelques jours — c'est un Rabcor qui nous signala le fait — les propos tenus par un général commandant un régiment à Vannes, aux officiers de sa formation. Ce qu'il faut dire, c'est que tout est prêt depuis plusieurs semaines pour l'envoi de forces militaires françaises en Extrême-Orient.

Ce qu'il faut dire encore c'est que le projet décrit plus haut n'est déjà plus à l'état de projet.

Il a reçu un commencement d'exécution. Les attachés militaires en Chine et au Japon ont reçu des instructions leur enjoignant d'établir une zone internationale dans la région de Chin Chow.

Ils ont commencé, hier, leur inspection sur les préparatifs de l'armée chinoise à Chan Hai Kouan et à Pai Chi Pou.

Le commandant Fiesci attaché français de l'aéronautique, le capitaine Stables, de l'armée indienne, et le lieutenant Aldrich des Etats-Unis sont au nombre des observateurs militaires étrangers.

En d'autres termes un organisme militaire international pratiquement placé sous la direction française fait la loi en Chine. C'est lui qui demain aura la haute direction de toutes les forces armées d'Extrême-Orient et qui décidera des détails de la guerre contre l'U.R.S.S. et contre les Soviétiques chinois.

Aussi bien un événement survenu dans la soirée d'avant-hier vient souligner la gravité de la menace que nous dénonçons ici quotidiennement.

L'adhésion américaine

Le département d'Etat américain a fait connaître qu'il adhérerait sans réserve aux résolutions du Conseil. Cette adhésion n'est pas pour surprendre ceux qui savent le rôle grandissant que joue l'impérialisme américain dans l'organisation de la lutte antisoviétique. Il y a quelques mois à Genève, le commandant américain Holbrough prononçait ces paroles menaçantes :

« Nous devons être prêts à une guerre contre la Russie. Il faut que les anciens ennemis luttent la main dans la main contre l'adversaire commun pour défendre nos familles, nos foyers, notre religion ».

Il reste que la France n'est pas étrangère à l'orientation présente du département d'Etat. Le problème extrême-oriental a tenu une grande place le mois dernier dans les conciliabules de la Maison Blanche et M. Laval s'est évertué à obtenir le ralliement yankee à l'entreprise contre-révolutionnaire de Mandchourie.

Menace d'une expédition armée en Extrême-Orient.

Adhésion américaine au programme de spoliation de la S. D. N., là ne se limitent pas les éléments de la situation en Chine.

Il est indispensable d'avoir présentes à l'esprit les informations publiées hier par nous au sujet du danger qui menace Kharbine.

Le centre international des Blancs est à Paris

D'ores et déjà, les Blancs ont leur plan d'attaque. Ils sont prêts :

- 1° A occuper la ville ;
- 2° A interrompre les communications sur le chemin de fer ;
- 3° A massacrer le personnel soviétique.

Ce plan, ils l'ont exposé dans son détail au commandant en chef des forces militaires japonaises qui l'a naturellement accepté.

Mais où est le centre international des bandits qui s'appêtent à mettre une ville à feu et à sang et à égorger ses habitants par centaines ?

Le centre, ne l'oublions jamais, est à Paris !

Il y a deux ans, le chef des forces blanches en Mandchourie, le collaborateur de Semenov, était un certain Horvut, ancien directeur du chemin de fer de l'Est ; il avait pour auxiliaire Golovatchev et Morasky, de l'Association des « Sibériens autonomes ». Or, ces personnages tenaient leur mandat de Nicolas Nicolaïevitch, mort depuis, mais qui, alors résidait à Paris.

Le plan qui a été soumis à Tokio a été élaboré dans la capitale de la France. Il n'est pas inconnu de Weygand, de l'Etat-Major et du gouvernement français qui ont collaboré à sa confection.

C'est à Paris qu'on prépare le massacre de Kharbine, c'est en France que les anciens généraux du tsar recrutent des mercenaires.

Et s'il est vrai que la protestation du prolétariat contre l'agression de la patrie socialiste doit s'élever dans tous les pays du monde, il est plus vrai encore qu'elle doit être, en France, plus ardente, plus vigoureuse, mieux organisée que partout ailleurs.

Ne nous lassons pas de lancer les mêmes appels, comme on frappe plusieurs fois sur le même clou !

Dans les usines et dans les villages, dans les assemblées d'entreprises et dans les réunions publiques, au cours des campagnes électorales et au cours des batailles économiques, affirmez votre volonté de défendre la paix en menant le bon combat contre l'impérialisme français.

Exigez le retrait immédiat des forces navales et militaires françaises d'Extrême-Orient !

Exigez l'expulsion des blancs ! Préparez le meeting du 1^{er} décembre à Bullier !

Gabriel PERI.

Enclosure No. 19 to Despatch No. 2031
of December 1, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from JOURNAL DES DEBATS, November 27, 1931.

LE CONFLIT DE MANDCHOURIE

Hésitations chinoises et pessimisme américain

Le Japon paraît aujourd'hui se rallier à peu près complètement au projet de résolution élaboré par le Conseil de la S.D.N. Les réserves qu'il formule encore n'ont pas, semble-t-il, une grande importance. Il demande toutefois qu'on ajoute au texte une phrase disant « que ne sont pas considérées comme actes d'hostilité les opérations indispensables pour assurer la défense légitime et la police ». Cette demande pourrait être acceptée pourvu que l'adjonction ne serve pas de prétexte à de nouvelles opérations de grande envergure.

La Chine, par contre, résiste. M. Sze a donné connaissance hier des nouvelles instructions qu'il a reçues. Si le gouvernement de Nankin ne modifiait pas son attitude, il y aurait évidemment peu de chance d'arriver à un accord. C'est pourquoi on a affecté de considérer comme purement officieuse la communication de M. Sze, dans l'espoir qu'il obtiendrait de son gouvernement un changement dans ses résolutions. Après deux mois de tergiversations, le Conseil ne saurait plus envisager, en effet, d'autre solution qu'un compromis. On peut juger de diverses façons, suivant le point de vue auquel on se place, le travail et les méthodes du Conseil de la S. D. N.; mais il est aujourd'hui certain

qu'il ne peut plus se tirer d'affaire que par une cote mal taillée. Cela crève les yeux.

Le gouvernement de Nankin a d'autant moins de chances de faire triompher sa thèse que les Etats-Unis, contrairement à ce qu'avaient pensé ceux qui ont tenu à les faire intervenir, exercent une pression dans le sens du compromis. On lira plus loin la déclaration qu'a faite à ce sujet le général Dawes. Cette volonté américaine d'en finir est confirmée par le télégramme suivant de Washington à l'agence Havas : « Le gouvernement des Etats-Unis est d'avis que la commission d'enquête devrait commencer ses travaux aussitôt que les hostilités cesseront, sans qu'il soit tenu compte de la question du retrait des troupes japonaises en deçà de la zone du chemin de fer. Les informations de source officielle d'Extrême-Orient ont, en effet, convaincu M. Stimson que le retrait des Japonais sur un grand nombre de points provoquerait une grande confusion. » Le fait que la Chine ne peut pas compter sur l'appui américain aura peut-être une influence sur les résolutions de son gouvernement. C'est cette circonstance qui a le plus contribué à répandre hier l'idée qu'un compromis était toujours possible. Le Comité des douze (c'est-à-dire le Conseil, moins les représentants de la Chine et du Japon) se réunit cet après-midi à quatre heures.

PIERRE BERNUS.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 20 to Despatch No. 2031
of December 1, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE MATIN, November 27, 1931.

LE CONFLIT SINO - JAPONAIS

Les négociations au conseil de la S.D.N. semblent prendre une tournure favorable

Donc, le docteur Sze, visiblement influencé par l'attitude fort nette adoptée récemment par le général Dawes, a jugé opportun de transmettre, dès mercredi soir, à Nankin, des conseils de prudence, de circonspection.

En tout cas, le résultat est là : Au cours de l'entretien qu'il a eu, hier après-midi, avec M. Briand, le représentant de la Chine a clairement laissé entendre que les dernières instructions de M. Wellington Koo pouvaient se prêter à une équitable interprétation.

Réuni peu après, en séance privée, le conseil, favorablement impressionné par l'évolution de la négociation, a décidé de constituer immédiatement un comité de rédaction.

Ce comité, dont feront partie M. Briand, en sa qualité de président en exercice du conseil de la S. D. N., puis MM. de Madariaga (Espagne), Colbau (Norvège) et Lord Cecil (Grande-Bretagne), va s'efforcer, ce matin, d'amender, dans la mesure du possible, et en tenant naturellement compte des résultats déjà acquis, les bases provisoires d'accord que l'on connaît.

Tâche encore délicate que celle-là, mais qui, avec de la bonne volonté et une juste compréhension de l'avenir, peut aboutir favorablement.

Présentement, il serait superflu d'en dire plus long.

Ajoutons, cependant, que M. Briand a mis ses collègues au courant des premiers rapports des observateurs des grandes puissances, qui avaient reçu mission, on s'en souvient, de se rendre à Tchén-Tcheou.

P. 127

Enclosure No. 21 to Despatch No. 2031
of December 1, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE PETIT PARISIEN, November 27, 1931.

LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS LE CONSEIL DE LA S. D. N. SEMBLE APPROCHER D'UNE SOLUTION SATISFAISANTE

Au cours d'une nouvelle réunion privée tenue hier après-midi, il a nommé un comité chargé de rédiger définitivement la résolution qui serait adoptée à la séance publique finale de samedi

Depuis vingt-quatre heures, l'espoir renaît dans les milieux de la S. D. N., où l'on désespérait presque, mardi soir, d'arriver à un accord. Cette détente est évidemment due à trois causes : 1° l'adhésion japonaise au



Le général Dawes

projet de résolution, adhésion que la *Petit Parisien* a pu annoncer dès hier matin, bien qu'elle n'ait été officiellement portée à la connaissance de M. Briand par M. Yoshizawa qu'au début de l'après-midi, et communiquée au conseil qu'à la séance privée de 16 heures; 2° la déclaration du général Dawes et les dépêches de Washington qui montrent dans quel esprit d'entente agissent actuellement le gouvernement américain et le conseil; 3° enfin, les dispositions un peu plus conciliantes constatées hier du côté du D^r Sze et qui permettent d'escompter maintenant une réponse favorable de Nankin.

Evidemment, ce ne sont-là que des prévisions qui peuvent toujours être mises en défaut par l'événement. Néanmoins, le fait que le conseil a cru bon de nommer hier un comité de trois membres chargé de donner forme définitive au projet de résolution — comité composé du vicomte Cecil et de MM. de Madariaga et Colban, sous la présidence de M. Briand — prouve que ces prévisions reposent tout de même sur des bases assez solides. Ajoutons enfin — indication qui n'est pas sans valeur — qu'on pense pouvoir tenir samedi la séance publique finale...

Ce qu'il ne faudrait pas, c'est que, d'ici là, des incidents graves viennent à se produire dans le voisinage de Kingtchéou. Au cours de l'entrevue qu'il a eue hier après-midi, à 14 h. 30, avec M. Briand, M. Yoshizawa s'est montré à cet égard assez inquiet. Après avoir annoncé au président du conseil l'adhésion implicite de Tokio au projet de résolution, sous réserve de quelques modifications de mots sur les deux points de détail que nous avons signalés, le chef de la délégation japonaise a remis au ministre français un mémoire de deux pages dactylographiées demandant au conseil « de prévenir dès maintenant toute aggravation de la situation et d'éviter la possibilité d'une collision entre les troupes chinoises et japonaises ». Ce document signale, en effet, « qu'il y a actuellement 20.000 soldats chinois dans les environs de Kingtchéou et que Tchang Hsue Liang dispose, en outre, de 5.000 hommes près de la « Grande Muraille ». Le gouvernement japonais, qui n'a sur place que de faibles contingents, conclut en priant le conseil « d'empêcher que les forces chinoises ne se concentrent à l'ouest de la rivière Liao ».

Une zone neutre

Encore que ce ne soit pas là tâche commode, M. Briand a donné l'assurance à M. Yoshizawa que tout ce qui serait possible serait fait. Il a ajouté que des observateurs étrangers — les attachés militaires — se trouvent déjà dans la région et qu'ils sont chargés d'examiner la possibilité de créer, entre les troupes japonaises et chinoises, une « zone neutre » susceptible d'éviter des contacts et, par suite, des actes d'hostilité. Ils ont même comme instruction d'expédier leur rapport dans le plus bref délai. Nous avons dit hier que la création de cette zone avait été demandée déjà par le représentant de la Chine, mais que la suggestion dont il accompagnait sa demande, à savoir l'établissement dans cette zone de détachements de soldats français, anglais, italiens, etc., nous paraissait irréalisable. En effet, au cours de la discussion qui s'est engagée sur ce point cet après-midi à la séance du conseil — où M. Zaleski, reparti pour Varsovie, était remplacé par M. de Chlapowski, — il n'a été question que des « observateurs » dont l'autorité morale devrait suffire à établir et à maintenir, entre l'armée chinoise et les éléments japonais, une sorte de « no man's land » permettant d'éviter les heurts.

L'entrevue avec le D^r Sze

M. Briand a dû donner au D^r Sze, qu'il a vu également aussitôt après le départ de M. Yoshizawa, des assurances analogues. De la conversation qui s'est déroulée entre le président et le chef de la délégation chinoise, rien ou presque rien n'a transpiré en dehors du conseil. Tout ce qu'on sait, c'est que M. Briand a joint ses efforts à ceux de sir Eric Drummond et du général Dawes pour persuader son interlocuteur de la nécessité d'arriver cette fois, coûte que coûte, à un accord, et de l'obligation dans laquelle se trouve la Chine, après s'être associée à toutes les résolutions déjà adoptées par le conseil — résolutions du 30 septembre et du 24 octobre — de ne pas faire maintenant « cavalier seul ». Que le D^r Sze ait été quelque peu ébranlé par l'argumentation et par la force

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Department of State Letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

de persuasion du ministre français, qui a vraisemblablement repris en détail les points principaux de la note chinoise, personne n'en sera surpris, et la nomination du comité de rédaction, qui a suivi de près cet entretien est, à cet égard, une indication...

Le comité de rédaction

Ce comité se mettra à la besogne dès ce matin à 10 h. 30. Sa tâche, d'ailleurs, n'est pas formidable : la plus grande partie de l'avant-projet devant subsister, il s'agit pour lui de trouver, sur les points où des objections ont été faites, quelques formules susceptibles d'être agréées par les deux parties, qui seront certainement convoquées et appelées à donner leur avis. Ce qui est à craindre, car cela peut être une cause de retard, c'est que chacune d'elles tienne à consulter son gouvernement, d'où nécessité d'attendre les réponses définitives de Tokio et de Nankin. C'est pour cette raison d'ailleurs qu'on n'envisage plus la possibilité d'une séance publique que pour samedi. Cet après-midi, à 16 heures, les « Douze » se réuniront sans doute encore en séance privée, et il est probable que, lorsqu'ils se sépareront, on verra enfin clair dans la situation.

A. J.

Enclosure No. 22 to Despatch No. 2031
of December 1, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE QUOTIDIEN, November 27, 1931.

Le conflit sino-japonais devant la S. D. N.

Les douze ont chargé un comité
composé de MM. Aristide Briand
de lord Cecil et de M. Madariaga
de rédiger le statut
de la commission d'études

Les jours se suivent et, plus ou
moins, se ressemblent. Le clair soleil
qui brilla, hier, un moment, au fond
de la grisaille parisienne, eut-il la va-
leur d'un symbole !... Toujours est-il que
l'on paraissait, dans les alentours du
Conseil, un peu moins pessimiste que
la veille.

Après l'entretien que M. Briand ve-
nait d'avoir, au début de l'après-midi,
avec le docteur Sze, délégué chinois, le
pessimisme s'atténuait.

Après la réunion des « Douze », à
16 heures, au quai d'Orsay, cet opti-
misme relatif ne s'était point dissipé.
Tant mieux !

Pourtant, les Douze n'ont encore rien
résolu, sauf de désigner une commis-
sion composée de MM. Briand, lord Ce-
cil et Madariaga, chargée d'élaborer et
de rédiger le statut — composition,
mandat, attributions — de la « com-
mission d'études sur place » qui ira en-
quêter en Chine.

Procédure... C'est un nouveau pas vers
le règlement.

Mais au fond ?...
Sur le terrain juridique, il y a la
question de l'évacuation de la Mand-
chourie par les Japonais. Le projet de
règlement publié mercredi soir insiste
sur la résolution du 30 septembre qui,
tout en recommandant l'évacuation dans
le plus bref délai, ne fixe pas de date à
cette opération.

Les Chinois continuent à demander
que, conformément à la résolution du
24 octobre, une date soit fixée.

Sur le terrain pratique, il convien-
drait de signaler que le docteur Sze, se
ralliant à une proposition japonaise qui
avait d'abord paru bien audacieuse, ac-
cepte à présent le retrait des troupes
— chinoises, cette fois — en deçà de
la Grande Muraille, à l'extrême ouest
de la Mandchourie et admet, il l'a
dit positivement dans une lettre à
M. Briand — que la région évacuée, de-
venant zone neutre, soit occupée par
des contingents neutres.

Mais il serait puéril de cacher que
le docteur Sze n'est pas, en ceci, ap-
prouvé par tous ses compatriotes. On
nous a même affirmé que, dans la
soirée de mercredi, le docteur Sze a
reçu plusieurs personnalités de la colo-
nie chinoise à Paris venues protester
auprès de lui contre cet abandon par-
tiel de la souveraineté chinoise.

Ce qui est plus grave, c'est que le
« Kuomintang » y serait également
hostile, tout autant d'ailleurs que Can-
ton.

Dès lors, on peut se demander si le
gouvernement national ratifiera la
« concession » de son délégué.

Les choses en sont là. Aujourd'hui,
après-midi, aura lieu une réunion pri-
vée du Conseil.

Enclosure No. 23 to Despatch No. 2031
of December 1, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE TEMPS, November 27, 1931.

BULLETIN DU JOUR

LE PROJET DE RÈGLEMENT SINO-JAPONAIS

On possède maintenant des précisions sur le projet de résolution soumis au conseil de la Société des nations, que le général Dawes approuve entièrement, que le Japon accepte et auquel la Chine seule fait encore des objections qui ne seront sans doute pas maintenues. Il existe donc de nouveau des perspectives d'accord, et l'espoir renaît de voir le conseil de la Société des nations prendre ces jours prochains une décision ferme qui marquera la fin de sa session.

Le communiqué publié hier soir indique que le conseil rappelle la résolution du 30 septembre, liant les deux parties, et que les deux gouvernements intéressés sont invités à prendre toutes les mesures nécessaires pour assurer l'exécution de cette résolution de manière que les troupes japonaises puissent être ramenées le plus rapidement possible dans la zone du chemin de fer; les ordres les plus stricts devront être donnés aux commandants des forces en présence de s'abstenir de toute initiative pouvant entraîner de nouveaux incidents; une commission sera chargée de procéder sur place à une étude de la situation et elle fera rapport au conseil sur toutes les circonstances de nature à affecter les relations internationales et à troubler la paix entre la Chine et le Japon. C'est le règlement qui était prévu — le seul, en fait, auquel puisse s'arrêter le conseil de la Société des nations, en raison des conditions où il se trouve saisi du différend. Le retrait aussi rapide que possible, mais sans fixer un délai ferme pour l'évacuation totale, puisque celle-ci dépendra, en somme, des garanties de sécurité pour les ressortissants japonais, et l'envoi sur place d'une commission chargée de procéder à une large étude, ce sont les deux points essentiels pouvant fournir une base d'accord. Le fait que le Japon admet ce projet de règlement et que le conseil est bien résolu à ne pas élargir son intervention déterminera sans doute le gouvernement de Nankin à modifier les instructions données précédemment à son représentant au conseil et à faire preuve, à son tour, de bonne volonté et d'esprit de conciliation. En tout cas, le conseil de la Société des nations aura rempli sa tâche si difficile en obtenant la fin des hostilités, et c'est de négociations directes entre le Japon et la Chine qu'on devra, ensuite, attendre la liquidation définitive du conflit.

Exe 28

Enclosure No. 24 to Despatch No. 2031
of December 1, 1931.

From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from EXCELSIOR, November 28, 1931.

LE CONSEIL DE LA SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS ESPÈRE AVOIR TROUVÉ DÉFINITIVEMENT LUNDI LA FORMULE METTANT D'ACCORD LES DÉLÉGUÉS DE LA CHINE AVEC LES JAPONAIS

Officiellement, le comité des Douze de la Société des nations a tenu hier après-midi une très courte séance dans le but de mettre définitivement au point le projet de résolution du conseil afin qu'il puisse être accepté par les délégations chinoise et japonaise. Dans la matinée, au cours d'une séance tout aussi brève, le comité de rédaction, composé de MM. Briand, de Madariaga, Colban et lord Cecil, avait changé quelques mots sans modifier en quoi que ce soit le sens de la résolution, mais le délégué chinois, le Dr Sze, n'ayant pas encore reçu les instructions de Nankin, il fut impossible de lui soumettre ce projet de résolution en lui demandant les amendements qu'il prévoyait. Voici pour la partie officielle.

En fait, on tremblait au conseil des conséquences que pourrait avoir une bataille qui paraît menaçante devant Tchén-Tchéou.

La délégation japonaise affirme que son armée n'a nullement l'intention d'occuper cette ville, mais l'on paraissait craindre que, malgré la présence de l'attaché militaire britannique sur les lieux, il ne soit difficile d'éviter une rencontre.

Ceci viendrait fâcheusement paralyser le conseil au moment où il croit avoir bien des chances de réussir. On pense, en effet, que l'accord pourrait être sanctionné lundi dans une ultime séance plénière.

On dit — mais que ne dit-on pas ? — que le gouvernement de Tokio serait débordé et que les véritables maîtres de la situation seraient actuellement les chefs de ses armées en Mandchourie. Au cours d'une de ses dernières entrevues avec M. Briand, M. Yoshizawa lui a déclaré que le gouvernement japonais avait donné des ordres formels pour que Tchén-Tchéou ne soit pas occupé et que si cette ville l'était, il donnerait immédiatement sa démission.

Ce n'est pas une crise politique à Tokio qui résoudrait le problème. Signalons d'ailleurs qu'aux dernières nouvelles le danger d'une bataille devant Tchén-Tchéou paraît provisoirement écarté. — MAURICE-RAYMONDE.

(SUITE DE LA PREMIERE PAGE)

La manœuvre se poursuit d'ailleurs ponctuellement pour créer le prétexte à l'envoi en Chine de nouvelles troupes d'occupation.

On se souvient que récemment des « troubles » avaient éclaté à Tien-Tsin. Nous les avons dénoncés comme une provocation du Japon. Les forces des concessions étrangères ont été mobilisées. Elles sont toujours sur le pied de guerre.

Hier, on apprenait qu'un violent combat s'était déroulé dans ce même Tien-Tsin entre des soldats chinois et les troupes d'occupation japonaises et italiennes.

Les canons, les mitrailleuses et les fusils ont été employés. Les Chinois auraient eu 27 tués ou blessés au cours de la fusillade.

Les forces de la concession internationale sont de nouveau alertées.

Cette nouvelle affaire, se produisant au moment où les troupes japonaises marchent sur King-Tchéou, montre quelles sont les intentions des impérialistes. Ils vont prendre prétexte de l'« insécurité des concessions étrangères » pour engager une opération militaire contre « les bandits ». Les « bandits » ce sont les millions d'ouvriers et de paysans chinois en lutte contre l'impérialisme qu'il faut écraser pour dépecer la Chine et en faire une place d'armes en vue de l'attaque contre l'Union Soviétique.

Vers l'intervention des puissances

Les « troubles » sanglants de Tien-Tsin sont, sans nul doute, encore une provocation impérialiste. Tout est mis en œuvre pour créer les bases de l'intervention. Dans la « zone neutre », dont l'idée a été trouvée à Paris, au conseil de la S. D. N., ne pourront être envoyées toutes les forces d'occupation qui sont casernées dans les diverses villes chinoises. Les impérialistes de Paris, de Londres, de Washington et de Rome sont prêts à envoyer alors un corps expéditionnaire à Tien-Tsin d'abord pour renforcer les forces japonaises après la prise éventuelle de King-Tchéou et sur le Yang-Tsé pour une action militaire contre le pouvoir soviétique instauré dans le centre de la Chine.

Nous avons dénoncé les préparatifs en ce sens hâtivement menés en France par les officiers supérieurs de l'armée française.

A Tien-Tsin, où se trouve le commandement français des forces de terre en Chine, les impérialistes travaillent à la création d'une situation telle que les puissances « se verront obligées de prendre des mesures pour assurer la sécurité des ressortissants étrangers ». Le coup de la Mandchourie sera renouvelé, mais cette fois « ouvertement » pour une expédition sanglante contre les Soviets chinois.

Le danger est grand.

Le commandant japonais à Tien-Tsin a adressé un ultimatum aux autorités chinoises demandant le retrait des troupes à 10 kilomètres de la ville, le désarmement dans les 36 heures de la police chinoise. Et, déjà, des renforts sont envoyés à Tien-Tsin. Le navire-école japonais *Yakumo* a reçu l'ordre d'embarquer un détachement d'infanterie de marine et d'appareiller de Sasabo pour le port desservant Tien-Tsin. On signale également qu'un détachement du train des équipages japonais a déchargé ce matin 480 caisses de munitions et divers matériels de guerre à Tangku, port situé à 45 kilomètres environ de l'embouchure de l'Ho. En outre, 150 soldats de l'infanterie de marine ont été débarqués des na-

vires japonais mouillés devant Tangku et ont été dirigés sur Tien-Tsin sur des canonnières.

Il n'y a pas une minute à perdre pour renforcer l'action de défense des Soviets chinois. La menace se précise à chaque heure contre la révolution chinoise. Le prolétariat international ne doit pas permettre une expédition impérialiste contre les travailleurs chinois qui livrent une lutte à mort pour leur libération.

Dans la défense des Soviets chinois, comme dans la défense de l'Union Soviétique plus que jamais menacée, le rôle principal revient aux ouvriers français. C'est l'impérialisme français qui est à la tête de tous ces plans immondes de guerre et de contre-révolution. C'est à Paris que tout est préparé. C'est à l'impérialisme français qu'il faut porter les coups les plus rudes par le combat acharné sur tous les terrains de la lutte de classe qu'il faut empêcher l'envoi de troupes en Chine, qu'il faut exiger le retrait des troupes d'occupation.

Dans trois jours, les travailleurs parisiens seront en masse à Bullier pour affirmer leur volonté de défendre l'U. R. S. S. et les Soviets chinois par tous les moyens.

Et, dans toute la France, les travailleurs alertés par l'action incessante des communistes montreront que les impérialistes, attaquant l'U. R. S. S. et la Chine révolutionnaire, ne trouveront pas devant eux seulement les armées rouges de l'U. R. S. S. et de Chine, mais le bloc compact des millions de prolétaires.

M. MAGNIEN.

jour 28

Enclosure No. 26 to Despatch No. 2031
of December 1, 1931.

From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE JOURNAL, November 28, 1931.

LES CHINOIS font traîner les négociations à Paris et attaquent les Japonais à Tien-Tsin

Atermoiements : voilà la note du jour dans l'affaire sino-japonaise. La séance publique d'enregistrement de la solution, que certains annonçaient déjà pour aujourd'hui, s'éloigne. Hier, à midi, on ne pouvait la prévoir avant lundi. Dans la soirée, on ne voyait plus de possibilité d'en finir avant le 1^{er} décembre et encore à condition que la Chine ne poursuive pas la tactique de tergiversations. Un délai sera nécessaire, en raison du désir du gouvernement japonais d'avoir communication du texte définitif de la résolution et de pouvoir l'étudier de près avant de donner son approbation.

Pourquoi l'allure s'est-elle ralentie, alors que, hier, on cherchait à donner l'impression de vouloir mener les choses très rapidement, afin d'arriver à un texte réalisant l'unanimité, y compris les deux parties ? N'est-ce pas cette intention qui avait fait fixer à 10 h. 30 la réunion du comité de rédaction ? On lui donnait deux bonnes heures et demie dans la matinée pour travailler, se mettre d'accord avec les représentants des deux parties et préparer la besogne du conseil des Douze.

Au lieu de cela, le comité n'a siégé qu'une petite demi-heure, juste le temps d'étudier quelques petites modifications purement verbales. De même, le conseil des Douze n'a tenu, de 15 h. 30 à 16 h. 15, qu'une très brève séance. Que s'est-il passé ?

Le Dr Sze ne s'est pas présenté devant le comité de rédaction qui a dû ajourner son audition à ce matin, ce qui renvoie la consultation du représentant du Japon à une date indéterminée. Sera-ce cet après-midi, sera-ce dimanche ? Le représentant de la Chine a invoqué la fatigue.

Cette fatigue ne l'a pourtant pas empêché d'avoir, ce matin, une entrevue avec M. Briand. Au cours de cette rencontre, le Dr Sze a dit qu'il n'était pas encore en mesure de présenter les amendements définitivement rédigés que son gouvernement a l'intention de demander, au projet de résolution. Cependant, il n'a pas dissimulé que la Chine maintient formellement la demande de la fixation d'une date limite pour le retrait des troupes japonaises. M. Briand s'est efforcé, une fois de plus, de convaincre le représentant de la Chine de la nécessité de renoncer à cette demande. Le Japon n'acceptera jamais. On l'a bien vu au mois d'octobre. Tout ce que M. Briand a pu faire a été de dire qu'il en référerait au conseil des Douze.

De fait, quand les Douze se sont trouvés réunis, dans l'après-midi, M. Briand a exposé le désir de la Chine. Il a montré que son acceptation conduirait à l'impossibilité d'un accord. Il a fait remarquer également que le gouvernement américain reconnaît l'impossibilité de fixer une date. Plusieurs membres du conseil ont opiné dans le même sens. Deux ou trois ont exprimé l'avis qu'il serait opportun de demander au comité de rédaction de tâcher de donner une satisfaction relative à la Chine, sans aller cependant jusqu'à la fixation d'une date, reconnue par tous impossible.

Le ralentissement de l'affaire a eu une autre conséquence. Un certain nombre de délégués avaient commencé à s'occuper de la proposition de la commission d'enquête. On avait envisagé l'augmentation du nombre des membres. Ce nombre avait été primitivement fixé à trois : un Anglais, un Américain et un Français. On avait considéré l'opportunité de porter le nombre à cinq, ou même davantage. La question s'est trouvée reléguée à l'arrière-plan par d'autres préoccupations.

La principale est celle qui est venue du développement des incidents militaires. Pendant toute la journée, des nouvelles sensationnelles ont été répandues, donnant l'impression que les Japonais poursuivent l'offensive avec la ferme volonté d'occuper Tchin-Tchéou et que le gouvernement de Tokio serait débordé par les éléments militaires. Ces nouvelles sont d'autant plus sujettes à caution que le gouvernement japonais a donné l'impression très nette de ne rien négliger pour prévenir des incidents. M. Yoshizawa apportera ce matin à M. Briand une communication précise sur ce point. Il y a d'ailleurs à Tchin-Tchéou une garantie dans la présence des observateurs militaires étrangers, qui, maintenant, ne sont pas au nombre de moins de neuf : deux Français, deux Anglais, deux Italiens, un Américain, un Allemand et un Espagnol.

En réalité, c'est du côté de Tien-Tsin que la situation est particulièrement sérieuse. Les Chinois ont attaqué une première fois la concession japonaise, obligeant les habitants à construire des barricades. Après une trêve, une seconde attaque s'est déclenchée dans la nuit du 26 au 27, à coups de fusils, de mitrailleuses et de canons. Le commandant de la garde japonaise a demandé des renforts à Tokio. Le ministère, réuni en séance extraordinaire, a refusé d'en envoyer pour le moment, se contentant de dépêcher sur les lieux un vieux croiseur protégé datant de trente ans, le *Yakumo*.

Ainsi, on est bien obligé de se demander ce que cachent les atermoiements de la Chine. S'agit-il simplement de manœuvres pour obtenir des concessions, ou bien cherche-t-on à multiplier les incidents pour tâcher de prendre l'action militaire japonaise en défaut ? — S.-B.

P.P. 28

Enclosure No. 27 to Despatch No. 2031
of December 1, 1931.

From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE PETIT PARISIEN, November 28, 1931.

Le conseil de la S. D. N. ajourne au début de la semaine sa séance publique finale

Le comité de rédaction doit conférer ce matin avec le D^r Sze sur le projet de résolution, après quoi il faudra attendre que Tokio et Nankin en aient approuvé le texte.

L'impression plutôt favorable que nous signalions hier semble persister dans les milieux de la S. D. N. La visite que le D^r Sze a faite, dans la matinée, à M. Briand, et la longue conversation qu'il a eue avec lui en présence de sir Eric Drummond, de M. Léger et de M. Vigier, de la section politique de la S. D. N., ne paraissent pas, en tout cas, avoir sensiblement diminué l'espoir de ces derniers en une solution satisfaisante. Quoi qu'il en soit, on n'entrevoit plus pour aujourd'hui la possibilité de mettre le point final aux travaux du conseil.

Le comité de rédaction nommé jeudi soir pour mettre au point l'avant-projet de résolution, dont l'adoption unanime constituera la conclusion de ces travaux, a eu beau se réunir hier matin, à 10 h. 30, et faire preuve du zèle le plus louable, puisqu'il en avait terminé un peu avant-midi avec les modifications de forme susceptibles de donner satisfaction aux deux parties ; le conseil, réuni à 15 h. 30 pour examiner ce texte à son tour, a eu beau, lui aussi, faire diligence, on se trouve contraint de marquer un temps d'arrêt, car ni M. Yoshizawa ni le D^r Sze ne sont en mesure d'y donner personnellement leur adhésion définitive.

Ils sont, l'un et l'autre, obligés par leurs instructions de télégraphier le nouveau texte à Tokio et à Nankin, d'où nécessité, pour pouvoir tenir l'ultime séance, d'attendre les réponses officielles japonaise et chinoise. Dans ces conditions, en mettant les choses au mieux et en dépit des instructions plus conciliantes reçues hier matin par le D^r Sze, il ne paraît pas possible de se réunir en public avant lundi.

Le chef de la délégation chinoise, qui persiste à demander la fixation d'une date pour la fin du retrait des troupes japonaises dans la zone du chemin de fer, doit d'ailleurs se rencontrer, ce matin encore, avec les membres du comité de rédaction — lord Robert Cecil, M. de Madariaga et M. Colban — auxquels se joindra peut-être M. Briand. Il faut espérer qu'on réussira à le convaincre de l'impossibilité où se trouve le conseil de fixer à nouveau un délai — et surtout un délai aussi bref que celui primitivement réclamé par Nankin — pour des opérations que trop d'éléments imprévus, ne fût-ce que la rigueur de la température, peuvent toujours retarder. Cette exigence a déjà, par deux fois, empêché de réaliser une entente. Insister serait certainement courir à un nouvel échec. On en peut d'autant moins douter — et le D^r Sze ne l'ignore pas — que le gouvernement américain est nettement opposé à une fixation de date qui donnerait fatalement à la résolution un caractère comminatoire et qui, en cas de non-observation — quelque invraisemblable que cela soit, — mettrait tout le monde, conseil et Etats-Unis, dans une situation particulièrement délicate. C'est toute la question des sanctions, en effet, qui se trouverait posée, et on sait quel épouvantail elle constitue pour certains gouvernements...

Tous ces arguments, M. Briand — qui avait promis au D^r Sze d'informer le conseil de son désir et qui a loyalement tenu parole — les a, à nouveau, développés à la séance privée d'hier après-midi. Il a d'ailleurs ajouté qu'à son avis, même si on se bornait, comme le réclame maintenant le représentant de Nankin, à fixer une date quelconque, fût-ce une date lointaine, le gouvernement japonais retirerait son adhésion. Sir Eric Drummond et M. de Madariaga abondèrent dans le même sens. Ils estimèrent, eux aussi, que le fait de demander, comme le spécifie le projet de résolution, que le retrait des troupes japonaises « s'effectue le plus rapidement possible » et d'ajouter que « le conseil y attache la plus grande importance » marquait avec suffisamment d'insistance la volonté de ce dernier. Cependant, certains délégués ayant émis l'opinion qu'on pourrait peut-être, avec le concours du D^r Sze, découvrir une formule qui, sans indiquer de date et sans compromettre l'adhésion japonaise, fût néanmoins susceptible de donner plus complètement satisfaction au représentant de la Chine, celui-ci fut prié de venir au Quai d'Orsay. Son état de fatigue l'en ayant empêché, c'est en vue de cette consultation que le comité de rédaction se réunira de nouveau ce matin.

Nous ne surprendrons personne en disant qu'on n'a qu'une confiance très limitée dans le succès de cette tentative. Elle montrera du moins au délégué chinois qu'on n'a reculé devant aucun effort pour faciliter sa tâche. Quoi qu'il en soit, il faut prévoir, de ce fait, plusieurs échanges de télégrammes entre le D^r Sze et Nankin, ce qui, quelque désir que le conseil ait d'en finir au plus tôt, reporte forcément au début de la semaine pro-

chaîne la liquidation publique de l'affaire.

La situation à Kingtchéou

Hier matin, au cours de son entretien avec M. Briand, le Dr Sze a protesté contre les informations parlant de concentration de troupes chinoises près de Kingtchéou. Cependant, si ces troupes n'existaient pas, on s'expliquerait mal les alarmes de Nankin. En fait, elles existent si bien que la présence dans la région de trois brigades d'infanterie et d'une brigade d'artillerie armée de canons de 77 mm. est reconnue à la fois par un rapport britannique transmis hier au conseil et aussitôt communiqué à la presse et par un télégramme de l'attaché militaire américain. Tous les deux, d'ailleurs, réduisent le péril à ses justes proportions, mais constatent, de part et d'autre, la crainte d'une attaque de l'adversaire. Encore que, en pareil cas, la crainte soit souvent mauvaise conseillère, on veut espérer que les efforts actuellement faits pour constituer une zone neutre entre les forces armées des deux nations — celles des Japonais atteignent à peine, d'après le rapport britannique, 2.000 hommes — et les engagements pris, au nom de Tokio, tant à Paris qu'à Washington, par la délégation et les représentants diplomatiques du Japon de ne pas occuper Kingtchéou empêcheront une nouvelle collision de se produire et de compromettre les négociations en cours.

Nouvelle démarche japonaise

Il n'en reste pas moins que la plus grande prudence, la plus grande circonspection s'imposent. Le conseil ne peut pas s'exposer à voter à l'unanimité une résolution et à apprendre le lendemain l'occupation de Kingtchéou et le déclenchement d'un sérieux combat. On comprend que M. Briand tienne à s'entourer de toutes les précautions. Ce matin, il aura la visite de M. Yoshizawa qui lui apportera la réponse de son gouvernement à l'appel adressé mercredi à Tokio et à Nankin et leur demandant de s'abstenir, spécialement dans la région de Kingtchéou, « de toute initiative pouvant entraîner de nouveaux engagements et de nouvelles pertes de vies humaines ». Il profitera également de cette visite pour informer M. Briand que le cabinet japonais est prêt à accepter la création d'une zone neutre dans cette région, sous le contrôle des observateurs étrangers, à condition toutefois que l'administration de cette zone soit assurée, comme le Japon le réclame toujours, « par les autorités locales sans immixtion de tierces personnes ».

L'élargissement de la commission

Signalons enfin, en terminant, les tentatives faites actuellement de divers côtés pour obtenir l'élargissement de la commission d'études. Au lieu de trois personnalités de premier plan — française, anglaise et américaine — primitivement suggérées, certains voudraient maintenant qu'elle comprenne six à sept membres, notamment un Italien, un Belge et un Hollandais... On sacrifierait volontiers la qualité à la quantité. Il reste à savoir si ce serait là un bon calcul. Nous avons déjà donné quelques-unes des raisons qui nous font penser le contraire. — A. J.

Pop. 28

Enclosure No. 28 to Despatch No. 2031
of December 1, 1931.

From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE POPULAIRE, November 28, 1931.

LES POMPIERS INCENDIAIRES

NOTRE camarade Landsbury a posé au gouvernement anglais une question embarrassante, à laquelle M. MacDonald a répondu avec un parfait jésuitisme.

Il s'agit de savoir, a demandé l'orateur travailliste, si l'Angleterre qui prétend faire à la Société des Nations des efforts pour arrêter le conflit sino-japonais, ne ravitaille pas en armes et en munitions l'un des belligérants ou même les deux ?

La curiosité de Landsbury n'a pas été satisfaite et la grande presse britannique, et la nôtre également, se sont empressées de faire silence et de laisser tomber l'incident.

On comprend leur discrétion et leur gêne.

A noire tour, nous posons la question à notre diplomatie et à M. Aristide Briand en personne.

Est-il vrai qu'au moment où l'on discute de la paix autour des tapis verts du Quai d'Orsay, M. Eugène Schneider livre des canons et autres armes au Japon ?

Si le fait n'est pas immédiatement démenti, et nous défions qu'il le soit, alors nous dénoncerons l'hypocrisie et la vanité de tout ce pacifisme officiel par lequel on endort la vigilance des peuples en même temps qu'on trompe leur confiance.

Qu'on n'objecte pas que le commerce des armes est libre et que les affaires et la politique sont deux choses différentes. Ce sont là des bobards de juristes dont le bon sens populaire aura tôt fait de faire justice.

Si la fabrication privée et le commerce libre des armes sont un obstacle à la paix, qu'on les interdise et que l'Etat monopolise cette industrie de mort en attendant de la supprimer. Ce qu'il a fait pour le tabac ou les allumettes, il doit pouvoir le faire sans inconvénient pour le canon, le tank ou la mitrailleuse.

Mais dire qu'on veut arrêter le conflit entre le Japon et la Chine alors qu'on tolère que l'industrie française envoie de la poudre et des balles aux belligérants, c'est se moquer des gens et jouer une abominable comédie.

PAUL FAURE

Quot 18

Enclosure No. 29 to Despatch No. 2031
of December 1, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE QUOTIDIEN, November 28, 1931.

Les deux aspects actuels du conflit sino-japonais :

Optimisme au Conseil
de la Société des Nations.
Situation aggravée sur
le front de Mandchourie.

L'optimisme croît, du moins officiellement, dans les milieux du Conseil de la S. D. N.

Dès hier matin, le « Comité des trois » s'est mis à l'œuvre et a rédigé un nouveau projet de résolution apportant diverses modifications au précédent projet publié voici trois jours. A seize heures, les « Douze » se sont réunis au Quai d'Orsay et, après avoir pris connaissance du texte élaboré par les « Trois » ont, à leur tour, proposé quelques modifications de forme.

Cette question de rédaction, qui paraît simple au premier abord, ne l'est pas tellement si l'on veut bien considérer que la résolution, dans sa teneur définitive, devra — pour pouvoir être votée à l'unanimité — tenir compte des réserves et amendements des deux puissances intéressées : Chine et Japon.

Or ces deux pays semblent maintenant enclins à la conciliation.

Seulement il faut, une fois de plus, remarquer que, tel le Janus Bifrons des anciens, la question a deux aspects : celui des travaux du Conseil et celui des opérations en Mandchourie.

Côté Conseil, l'optimisme se base d'abord sur les déclarations que le docteur Sze a dû faire hier matin à M. Briand, au nom du gouvernement de Nankin. Celui-ci est disposé à se rallier au plan général contenu dans le projet de résolution du Conseil, tout en suggérant des modifications dont l'esprit permettrait d'obtenir un vote unanime. Cependant la Chine spécifie que ces dispositions pourraient être modifiées si des actes d'hostilité se produisaient dans la région de Kin-Tchéou. On verra que ceci vise des faits assez inquiétants.

Quant au Japon il s'est déjà rallié, à part quelques menus amendements dont la prise en considération ne soulève pas de difficulté, au projet de résolution du Conseil.

De ce côté-là, par conséquent, les choses ont tendance à s'arranger.

Reste l'autre aspect du conflit : côté des opérations en Mandchourie. Le ciel s'assombrit de nouveau.

On vient de voir la réserve du délégué chinois concernant une action japonaise possible dans la région de Kin-Tchéou. On en comprendra mieux la portée dans un instant.

Sur le terrain des faits immédiats, en effet, l'attitude de l'armée japonaise paraît étrange. On dit bien, à Tokio, que rien ne sera entrepris contre Kin-Tchéou ; mais les nouvelles de Mandchourie laissent l'impression que le général japonais Honjo vise cette position, laquelle, en fait, est essentielle à la sauvegarde des intérêts nippons en Mandchourie.

En effet, Kin-Tchéou (orthographiée aussi Tchén-Tchéou) se trouve au sud-ouest mandchou, proche de la frontière de la Chine proprement dite, sur la ligne Moukden-Pékin. Un court embranchement relie cette ville à un port, nommé Hulutag, sur le golfe du Petchili. Or, depuis deux ans, la Chine a effectué dans ce port des travaux d'aménagement destinés à lui permettre de drainer une grande partie des marchandises venant de Mandchourie, par le chemin de fer Moukden-Pékin.

Ceci va constituer une concurrence — chinoise — redoutable aux ports japonais de Dairen et de Port-Arthur, placés à l'extrémité de la voie ferrée du sud-mandchou, et par où, jusqu'à présent, s'écoulait le trafic de la Mandchourie vers la Chine et vers l'Est. Que demain l'armée japonaise prenne Kin-Tchéou, et cette position lui assurera le contrôle du port chinois de Hulutag dont elle pourra immobiliser le trafic.

Il est inutile, croyons-nous, d'insister davantage sur la démonstration des motifs qui feraient craindre à Nankin des complications militaires dans cette région. Auquel cas le travail de la S. D. N. deviendrait singulièrement plus difficile. — T.

Enclosure No. 30 to Despatch No. 2031
of December 1, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ECCHO DE PARIS, November 29, 1931.

Le conflit mandchourien

Les réserves de la Chine à la résolution du Conseil de la S.D.N.

Enfin, le délégué chinois, M. Szé, s'est rendu auprès du comité de rédaction, hier matin, et lui a fait part des amendements au projet de résolution instituant une commission en Extrême-Orient, dont le gouvernement de Nankin demande l'adoption:

1° Le retrait des troupes japonaises dans la zone du Sud-Mandchourien commencera immédiatement ;

2° Si la commission d'études que le Conseil se propose de nommer estime que les mesures prises par le gouvernement chinois, afin de protéger les vies et les biens des sujets japonais sont insuffisantes, cette commission sera autorisée à recommander l'élargissement des susdites mesures de même que l'octroi de garanties supplémentaires.

3° Les gouvernements japonais et chinois nommeront des représentants qui seront chargés de régler tous les détails de l'évacuation et du transfert des territoires évacués aux autorités chinoises. Les gouvernements représentés au Conseil agissant en vertu d'une résolution du Conseil du 22 septembre dernier, nommeront des représentants qui feront une enquête sur le terrain.

Que signifie cette dernière phrase? Jamais, à la date du 22 septembre, le Conseil n'a pris de résolution nommant une commission d'enquête. Il s'agit sans doute d'un projet mis en avant à l'époque par le gouvernement chinois pour tirer au clair les événements du 18 septembre qui donnèrent lieu à l'avance des troupes japonaises. La phrase semble indiquer que le gouvernement de Nankin n'accepte pas la commission envisagée par le Conseil dans son projet de résolution actuellement discuté et qui a en vue une commission d'un genre tout différent.

Le comité de rédaction et, après lui, les douze membres du Conseil qui se sont réunis dans l'après-midi ont discuté les amendements chinois. Ils ont estimé que, seul, l'amendement n° 2 pouvait être retenu en principe, mais que les n°s 1 et 3 étaient en contradiction flagrante avec le projet de commission auquel ils travaillent en ce moment, qu'ils n'avaient, du reste, aucune chance d'être acceptés par Tokio.

Aujourd'hui, un représentant de la délégation japonaise communiquera au comité de rédaction les amendements japonais. Hier soir, pendant que la discussion se poursuivait dans la chambre du Conseil, les esprits étaient surtout occupés par les événements de Chine.

Les Japonais estiment-ils indispensable à leur sécurité de traverser le Liao et de chasser de Kin Tchéou les forces chinoises réunies en cet endroit? Le Japon a accepté avant-hier verbalement, hier par écrit, la constitution d'une zone neutre. Mais tout en réservant son droit éventuel de prendre telles mesures de sécurité qui lui paraîtront convenables. Il y a demain 15 jours que le Conseil délibère.

Enclosure No. 31 to Despatch No. 2031
of December 1, 1931.

From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ERE NOUVELLE, November 29, 1931.

L'effort de M. Briand pour la paix en Mandchourie

Le comité de rédaction du Conseil de la S. D. N. s'est réuni, hier matin et hier après-midi, pour entendre séparément le délégué du Japon et le délégué de la Chine. Le docteur Sze a communiqué les nouvelles instructions qu'il avait reçues de Nankin. Ces instructions paraissent beaucoup plus conciliantes que les précédentes. De son côté, M. Yoshizawa a remis au Conseil la réponse japonaise au télégramme que M. Aristide Briand avait adressé mercredi à Tokio. Dans cette note le gouvernement japonais affirme à nouveau son désir d'éviter le conflit qu'on pouvait redouter dans la région de Tchén-Tchéou. Il ajoute « qu'au cas où les forces chinoises seraient retirées de cette région, ainsi que le gouvernement chinois l'a récemment proposé par l'entremise du gouvernement français, les forces japonaises ne pénétreraient pas dans la zone ainsi évacuée. »

Or on sait que le gouvernement chinois pose comme condition de son adhésion au projet de la S. D. N. que Tchén-Tchéou ne soit pas attaqué.

Une fois de plus, on peut donc être tenté de penser que la nouvelle difficulté surgie dans ces laborieuses négociations pourrait être écartée, comme l'ont été les précédentes, si persistent les dispositions d'esprit qu'on est parvenu à susciter de part et d'autre.

Cependant, hier, on mandait de Moukden que les troupes nipponnes auraient pris Tachouan et la situation à Tien-Tsin continuait à être assez alarmante. Toutefois, on apprenait de Tokio que l'ordre avait bien été donné aux troupes japonaises d'arrêter l'avance sur Tchén-Tchéou.

Il est certes bien difficile en présence de telles informations de se faire une idée exacte de la situation en Mandchourie et de préjuger de l'évolution actuelle du conflit.

Raison de plus pour que nous affirmions une fois encore que nous ne comprenons pas très bien ceux qui ne cessent, en de pareilles conjonctures, de railler les efforts de la Société des Nations pour arbitrer la crise mandchoue.

Il suffit de mesurer les conséquences désastreuses d'une guerre sino-japonaise et de constater, comme une évidence, que le seul espoir qu'on puisse conserver de l'éviter ne peut être placé que dans l'intervention de la S. D. N., pour n'avoir point envie d'ironiser sur la tâche difficile de celle-ci.

Rendons hommage à ses efforts et, particulièrement, à ceux d'Aristide Briand, qui, méprisant le scepticisme des uns, la partialité des autres, consacre toutes ses forces, tout son talent à une entreprise aussi complexe, et souhaitons ardemment qu'il parvienne une fois encore à sauver la paix.

Enclosure No. 31 to Despatch No. 2031
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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Exc 29

Enclosure No. 32 to Despatch No. 2031
 of December 1, 1931.
 From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from EXCELSIOR, November 29, 1931.

LE CONSEIL DE LA S.D.N. ESPERE TROUVER CETTE SEMAINE LA FORMULE DE COMPROMIS SUSCEPTIBLE DE METTRE FIN AU CONFLIT ENTRE LE JAPON ET LA CHINE

*Une séance plénière aurait lieu mercredi
 ou jeudi pour enregistrer l'accord.*

LES JAPONAIS ONT ARRÊTÉ LEUR MARCHE EN AVANT

L'intérêt des négociations n'est plus, depuis vingt-quatre heures, à Paris, mais bien à Tokio et en Mandchourie.

On conserve beaucoup d'espoir car les nouvelles parvenues aujourd'hui à la Société des nations sont beaucoup plus rassurantes et tout porte à croire qu'au début de la semaine prochaine une formule de compromis aura été trouvée que le conseil pourrait adopter à l'unanimité au cours d'une séance plénière qui pourrait avoir lieu mercredi ou jeudi.

Hier encore, le comité des Douze et le comité de rédaction ont longuement examiné, au cours de deux séances, les différents amendements présentés par la délégation chinoise. Les Chinois exigent toujours que la résolution du conseil fixe un délai maximum d'évacuation, mais ils ont abandonné leur première idée de le fixer à deux semaines, laissant au conseil le soin d'établir ce délai.

Les membres du conseil envisagent également favorablement la demande qui leur a été faite d'établir une zone neutre entre les territoires occupés et la grande muraille de Chine, zone neutre qui serait placée sous le contrôle de la commission militaire qui se trouve actuellement sur les lieux. Cette commission comprend à l'heure actuelle neuf officiers d'état-major : deux Français, deux Anglais, deux Italiens, un Allemand, un Américain et un Espagnol.

On voit qu'il sera maintenant facile de rédiger un texte de résolution acceptable pour les deux parties, si aucun nouvel incident ne surgit, et, dans cet espoir, le comité des Douze se réunira de nouveau aujourd'hui matin et soir afin de mettre au point la résolution qu'il espère bien faire accepter.

Toutefois, le D^r Sze a de nouveau spécifié ce matin à M. Briand et aux membres du comité de rédaction qu'il lui serait impossible d'accepter la résolution du conseil si Tchao Tschao était occupé et s'il ne recevait pas l'assurance formelle que l'avance japonaise serait arrêtée. Mais on verra d'autre part que les Japonais ont arrêté leur marche. — MAURICE RAYMONDE.


Milton O. Gustafson

12-18-75

Il faut renforcer la lutte contre l'impérialisme français !

LES MANŒUVRES SE DESSINENT POUR JUSTIFIER L'ENVOI D'UN CORPS EXPÉDITIONNAIRE EN CHINE

**Les gardes blancs de Kharbine se livrent à des provocations
préparant l'occupation de la ville par les Japonais**



Aux manifestations nationalistes chinoises répondent des manifestations bellicistes du Japon. Voici sur notre cliché une démonstration d'étudiants japonais à Tokio

Devant le danger grandissant de l'agression contre l'U.R.S.S. et d'une intervention des puissances contre les Soviétiques chinois, l'action de masse du Parti Communiste n'est encore pas assez puissante.

Il ne faut pas perdre un instant pour lancer l'alerte parmi tous les travailleurs, parmi les syndiqués, les inorganisés, surtout parmi les ouvriers socialistes qui peuvent se laisser tromper encore par les articles fielleux du *Populaire* aidant à la provocation de la guerre contre l'Union Soviétique.

Les camarades du Parti et tous les lecteurs de *l'Humanité* doivent bien se convaincre de la gravité de la situation en Extrême-Orient pour faire autour d'eux toute l'action nécessaire, afin d'entraîner les ouvriers à la lutte effective, sur tous les terrains, contre l'impérialisme français, pour soutenir par tous les moyens nos camarades de l'Union Soviétique construisant le socialisme et nos frères travailleurs de Chine luttant avec les Soviétiques chinois pour la libération de leur pays.

Les nouvelles qui parviennent de Mandchourie et de Chine montrent bien tout le sérieux de cette situation menaçante.

On lira par ailleurs la communication de l'agence *Tass* relative aux provocations des gardes-blancs russes de Kharbine, provocations destinées à préparer l'occupation de cette ville, siège de l'administration de l'Est chinois et du consulat soviétique, par les troupes japonaises.

Nombreux combats autour de King-Tcheou

Les combats continuent dans le Sud de la Mandchourie entre les troupes japonaises et chinoises. Avant-hier matin, un violent engagement a eu lieu à Païtsipou, entre un train blindé japonais, suivi d'un train de troupes japonaises appuyées par des forces d'artillerie, et un train blindé chinois.

A 15 heures, les éléments de l'armée japonaise arrivant à Tankipou, un nouveau combat a eu lieu entre les trains blindés. Les Japonais étaient appuyés par de l'artillerie et de l'aviation.

A minuit, les Japonais ont occupé Païtsipou.

Hier, à 10 heures, une nouvelle reconnaissance a été opérée sur King-Tchéou par cinq avions japonais.

D'autres télégrammes signalent qu'une rencontre a eu lieu hier à 112 kilomètres de Moukden, à l'est de Tahushan, entre un détachement chinois et les éléments de la brigade japonaise qui se trouvent le long du chemin de fer de Pékin à Moukden.

L'impérialisme nippon menace donc toujours King-Tchéou, malgré des nouvelles inspirées annonçant que ce point ne serait pas occupé pour le moment.

En effet, M. Yoshizawa a remis à Briand une note du gouvernement de Tokio disant que les troupes japonaises ne pénétreraient pas dans la « zone neutre » que doivent évacuer les forces chinoises, « sauf dans l'éventualité d'une menace sérieuse et urgente, mettant en danger la sécurité de la vie des ressortissants japonais de la Chine du Nord et de leurs biens, ainsi que la sécurité des troupes japonaises qui y sont stationnées ».

C'est-à-dire que le moindre prétexte servira à faire avancer les soldats japonais dans cette région et même dans la Chine du Nord. C'est là le véritable dessein qui préside à la création de la « zone neutre » dont nous avons ici montré le but véritable : pour la jonction des forces japonaises et celles des puissances afin d'entreprendre une expédition contre les Soviets chinois.

A Tien-Tsin

Ce que l'on apprend de la situation à Tien-Tsin, d'ailleurs, confirme nos appréhensions.

Les dépêches de source japonaise signalent que les combats continuent autour des concessions étrangères dans la ville indigène. Les mitrailleuses crépitent dans les rues de Tien-Tsin, les mortiers de tranchée et les canons de campagne tonnent.

La provocation est évidente et déjà une manœuvre se dessine pour justifier l'envoi de troupes impérialistes à Tien-Tsin pour renforcer les détachements d'occupation qui y sont cantonnés.

De Moukden (donc d'inspiration japonaise), on mande qu'« une certaine inquiétude règne au sujet de la sécurité des étrangers résidant à Tien-Tsin et à Pékin, où les garnisons étrangères sont insuffisantes. La proximité des troupes japonaises représente la seule protection sur laquelle on puisse compter en cas de besoin ».

Dans un journal parisien du soir, on lisait hier que « la S.D.N. est extrêmement inquiète de ce qui se passe à la fois à Tien-Tsin et entre Moukden et King-Tchéou. Les émeutes de Tien-Tsin sont un nouveau témoignage de l'anarchie chinoise. Pour les faire cesser, les troupes internationales n'auraient qu'à se charger de la police de la ville ».

Cela est pour préparer le terrain à l'envoi d'un corps expéditionnaire en Chine sous prétexte de faire cesser l'anarchie en Chine. Les représentants des impérialismes qui siègent au conseil de la S.D.N. ne font autre chose que préparer les voies du dépècement de la Chine par la répression du mouvement révolutionnaire. Il convient d'être vigilant pour empêcher tout envoi de forces métropolitaines ou coloniales en Chine et renforcer la lutte en exigeant le retrait des troupes d'occupation.

La menace grandit donc tant contre l'U.R.S.S. que contre les Soviets chinois. Les impérialistes de Tokio, de Washington, de Londres, de Rome, à l'inspiration de ceux de Paris, se sont ligüés pour une action commune destinée à « combattre le bolchevisme » en Extrême-Orient, malgré les oppositions irréductibles d'intérêts qui les opposent dans le Pacifique.

Et c'est quand le danger grandit que le journal de M. Blum continue sa campagne de diffamation et de provocation à l'égard de l'Union Soviétique. Dans le *Populaire* d'hier, dans un article reprenant les calomnies de Rosenfeld et le rôle d'agent provocateur soviétique, il est écrit ceci :

« Nous l'avons dit ici, dès le commencement de l'affaire de la Mandchourie. Si le conseil de la S.D.N., si les Etats-Unis, si l'U.R.S.S. voulaient vraiment liquider « l'incident » et empêcher une guerre, il fallait agir rapidement. Et plus loin :

« L'U.R.S.S. liée par son attitude de 1929 quand elle n'a pas hésité à recourir aux armes pour « mettre à la raison » la Chine qui voulait se débarrasser de la tutelle russe sur le chemin de fer de l'Est chinois, se confina dans un mutisme suspect ».

C'est l'allusion à la légende criminelle de l'entente entre le Japon et l'U.R.S.S., c'est la répétition de la phrase de Re-

naudet disant que « l'U.R.S.S. veut s'annexer une partie de la Mandchourie ».

Les social-fascistes, toute honte bue, font avec ardeur leur partie dans le concert de la préparation à l'agression contre la patrie des travailleurs où se construit le socialisme. Leurs attaques démontrent l'imminence du danger de guerre antisoviétique. Ce doit être pour nous un stimulant pour mener avec plus de combativité la lutte acharnée contre les chefs du parti socialiste.

Au meeting de Bullier, les travailleurs parisiens montreront qu'ils ont compris leur devoir de classe.

M. MAGNIEN.

jour. 29

Enclosure No. 34 to Despatch No. 2031
of December 1, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE JOURNAL, November 29, 1931.

LE CONSEIL de la Société des Nations espère avoir trouvé une formule d'accord que pourraient accepter Japonais et Chinois

Journal - 11/29

Les débats du conseil de la Société des nations portent plus que jamais sur le seul obstacle réel qui subsiste. Il s'agit de tourner la difficulté provenant du fait que le conseil, d'accord avec le Japon, juge impossible de fixer une date pour le retrait des troupes tandis que la Chine persiste encore à réclamer cette date.

C'est ce qui ressort de la discussion qui a eu lieu dans la matinée d'hier entre le comité de rédaction et le Dr Sze.

Dans l'après-midi, le conseil a consacré toute la séance à rechercher une formule permettant de passer à côté de l'écueil. Il a envisagé une combinaison du deuxième et du cinquième paragraphe du projet de résolution.

Le second paragraphe, on le sait, reproduit le passage de la résolution du 30 septembre constatant que le Japon retirera ses troupes le plus rapidement possible dans la mesure des garanties obtenues pour la sécurité de la vie et des biens de ses nationaux.

Le cinquième définit le mandat de la commission d'études, dont la mission sera de rechercher dans quelle mesure les traités sont exécutés et, par conséquent, dans quelle mesure aussi, sont garantis la vie et les biens des étrangers dont les droits sont fixés par les traités. En somme, si la commission constate que les garanties existent dans certaines régions, il n'y aura pas de difficulté pour le retrait des troupes, même si le Japon ne les a pas retirées spontanément. Car le Japon garde toute sa liberté d'action. Quel commandement responsable de l'ordre, avec 13.000 soldats dans un territoire grand comme la France et l'Allemagne pourrait aliéner cette liberté d'action ?

Cette formule sera présentée ce matin par le comité de rédaction au Japon. Celui-ci sera représenté par un des hommes les plus intelligents de la délégation, M. Ito, sous-directeur du service japonais de la S. D. N.

On peut être certain que ce diplomate demandera seulement que les mots correspondent exactement aux principes.

On prétend faire admettre par la Chine que la formule trouvée porte des assurances telles que la question de la date doit disparaître. Les Chinois se décideront-ils à le reconnaître ? Toute la décision dépend de cela.

L'incident

Un étrange incident, survenu hier entre le Japon et les Etats-Unis à la suite de la déformation de nouvelles de presse, a pu heureusement être rapidement dissipé, mais il a été assez sérieux pour montrer les risques de la prolongation de l'affaire sino-japonaise.

Le 27, le secrétaire d'Etat américain faisait aux journalistes une déclaration dont le texte a été rétabli par M. Stimson lui-même.

Lundi, j'ai prié l'ambassadeur des Etats-Unis à Tokio de faire savoir au baron Shidehara, ministre des affaires étrangères japonais, que j'avais éprouvé une grande inquiétude en lisant une information de presse donnant l'impression que les chefs militaires projetaient de faire des expéditions militaires contre les troupes chinoises dans le voisinage de Tchén-Tchéou et que j'espérais sincèrement que cette nouvelle ne reposait sur aucun fondement.

Le lendemain, le baron Shidehara m'assurait, par l'intermédiaire de M. H. Forbes, que le ministre de la guerre et le chef d'état-major japonais, ainsi que lui-même étaient tous d'avis qu'aucun mouvement hostile ne devrait avoir lieu dans la région de Tchén-Tchéou et que des ordres avaient été donnés par l'autorité militaire à cet effet. En raison de ces faits, il m'est difficile de comprendre la nouvelle publiée dans les journaux chinois annonçant une avance du général Hongo.

Dans quelles conditions ces déclarations ont-elles été transmises à Tokio ? Toujours est-il que le représentant d'une agence anglaise a pu en donner une interprétation qui montre l'effet que la recherche de la sensation peut tirer d'une information qui ne pouvait résister à un effort de contrôle de prudence élémentaire. Voici les passages les plus caractéristiques de cet extraordinaire télégramme :

Les déclarations de M. Stimson ont causé à Tokio un profond ressentiment. Elles sont considérées comme susceptibles de faire le jeu des réactionnaires, qui ne manqueront pas de les qualifier d'insultantes. Au ministère des affaires étrangères même, on partage cette indignation. On déclare que la précipitation de M. Stimson à dévoiler les échanges de vues confidentiels entre M. Forbes, l'ambassadeur à Tokio et le baron Shidehara a causé d'autant plus de surprise que le reproche paraît avoir été lancé avant les dépêches officielles réfutant l'accusation que le Japon aurait violé ses engagements.

Le porte-parole du ministère a dit : « Si un homme d'Etat responsable comme M. Stimson perd la tête dans les circonstances actuelles, les conséquences peuvent être des plus graves. »

Le gouvernement japonais va faire une déclaration publique réfutant les accusations, après avoir demandé confirmation à Washington. En attendant, le porte-parole du ministère des affaires étrangères a personnellement démenti l'assertion que l'on attribue à M. Stimson, à savoir que le Japon exprimait des regrets chaque fois que ses troupes avançaient en promettant de ne plus recommencer.

Ce fonctionnaire a déclaré que M. Stimson devait expliquer sur quoi il s'était basé pour accuser le Japon de vouloir occuper complètement la Mandchourie. Il a particulièrement critiqué la déclaration selon laquelle, paraît-il, M. Stimson aurait dit que « l'armée avait perdu la tête », ce qui impliquerait un manque de respect envers l'empereur, chef de l'armée, etc.

Nous en avons reproduit assez pour montrer combien l'interprétation a faussé les déclarations de M. Stimson. Le démenti du ministre américain est venu très rapidement tirer la situation au clair. L'incident n'en a pas moins eu des suites à Washington, où le sénateur Johnson, doyen de la commission des affaires étrangères, a demandé au département d'Etat de publier toutes les notes envoyées au sujet de la Mandchourie.

L'incident est d'autant plus regrettable qu'il s'est produit au moment même où le Japon donnait des preuves caractéristiques de sa volonté pacifique. Le retrait des troupes japonaises se précipite dans la région de Tsitsikar. A Tien-Tsin, le commandant japonais a cherché un accord avec les Chinois. Pour ce qui est de la région de Tchén-Tchéou, le conseil de la S.D.N. a reçu, hier, les assurances formelles du gouvernement de Tokio.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lutefson NARS, Date 12-18-75

P.P. 49

Enclosure No. 35 to Despatch No. 2031
 of December 1, 1931.

From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE PETIT PARISIEN, November 29, 1931.

La Chine va-t-elle par son intransigeance compromettre les résultats obtenus par le conseil ?

Les amendements demandés par le D' Sze au projet de résolution et examinés hier en séance privée du conseil risquent, à la dernière minute, de réveiller les résistances du Japon

Le général Honjo, commandant les forces japonaises en Mandchourie, a reçu du chef d'état-major général l'ordre de replier ses troupes sur Moukden



Lord Robert Cecil

On avait fondé certaines espérances sur l'arrivée au ministère des Affaires étrangères de Nankin de M. Wellington Koo. On s'était figuré que sa formation intellectuelle dans les universités américaines, ses longs séjours comme ambassadeur à Washington et à Londres et enfin le fait qu'il est familier avec les travaux de Genève lui feraient mieux réaliser qu'à quiconque l'importance des satisfactions obtenues par son pays depuis l'ouverture de la présente session du conseil et l'inciteraient, par suite, à se montrer accommodant sur les détails.

C'est tout le contraire qui s'est produit. A l'abandon par le Japon de sa demande de reconnaissance préalable des « cinq points fondamentaux », à l'acceptation par lui du retrait dans le plus bref délai possible de ses troupes dans la zone du chemin de fer, à son adhésion à la création entre les deux armées d'une zone neutre dans la région de Kingtcheou, où le général Tchang Hsue Liang dispose, entre parenthèses, des meilleures troupes chinoises, le cabinet de Nankin répond depuis quarante-huit heures en ergotant sur les termes de la résolution et réclamant une fixation de date qu'il sait pertinemment non seulement inacceptable pour le Japon, mais repoussée d'avance par les Etats-Unis, par la France, la Grande-Bretagne, l'Italie, etc...

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Par suite de cette attitude que rien ne légitime — personne ne pouvant compter, dans une négociation quelconque, obtenir cent pour cent de ses prétentions, — les travaux du conseil, qui auraient dû normalement prendre fin au plus tard dans la journée d'hier, risquent de se trouver prolongés jusqu'au milieu de la semaine qui commence demain. C'est grâce à elle que le travail accompli vendredi par le comité de rédaction a été remis en question, que la séance privée tenue l'après-midi a été sans résultats pratiques et qu'hier matin il a fallu — cette fois en présence du Dr Sze — remettre sur le métier la partie essentielle du projet déjà élaboré.

Cette réunion, à laquelle participaient, en dehors de lord Cecil, de M. de Madariaga et de M. Colban, MM. Léger et Massigli, s'est séparée à 13 heures, après une heure et quart de palabres, sans qu'aucun progrès sensible ait été réalisé. Qu'on en juge : le représentant de Nankin est arrivé avec deux pages dactylographiées d'amendements, la première concernant le retrait des troupes japonaises et la seconde la commission d'études.

Sur le premier point, le Dr Sze, en dépit des indications amicales que lui avaient données, la veille, M. Briand et sir Eric Drummond, a demandé la fixation d'une date, non seulement pour la fin de l'évacuation japonaise, mais même pour le commencement du mouvement de repli. De plus, il a réclamé la nomination de commissaires chargés de contrôler cette évacuation. Sur le second, c'est-à-dire l'envoi sur place de la commission, le délégué chinois a déclaré que le gouvernement de Nankin ne modifiera pas son attitude et ne donnera pas son adhésion tant qu'il n'aura pas obtenu satisfaction sur la question de l'évacuation.

Quand nous parlons d'intransigeance, on voit que le mot n'est pas trop fort. Aussi bien les membres du comité de rédaction, à l'unanimité — les représentants de M. Briand compris, — ont-ils repoussé toute fixation de date et, l'avis du conseil ne leur paraissant pas douteux, ont-ils conseillé au Dr Sze de demander à Nankin de nouvelles instructions.

La séance des « Douze »

C'est dans ces conditions que s'est ouverte, à 16 h. 30, la séance privée tenue par les « Douze ». Lord Cecil mit ses collègues au courant de ce qui s'était passé le matin et, comme bien l'on pense, l'attitude du comité, quant à la fixation d'une date, fut pleinement approuvée.

Le comité fut même chargé, non seulement de poursuivre, ce matin, les conversations avec le Dr Sze, qui aura, peut-être, reçu dans l'intervalle des instructions plus conciliantes, mais d'entrer en contact avec les Japonais — probablement avec M. Ito, le directeur du service japonais de la S. D. N. — au sujet de leurs propres amendements.

On sait que ces amendements portaient principalement sur les deux alinéas du paragraphe 2 du projet de résolution : ordres à donner au commandant en chef des forces japonaises en Mandchourie et réserves concernant les actes de légitime défense et de police que Tokio ne voulait pas voir assimiler à des actes d'hostilité. Sur ces deux points, nous croyons savoir que, grâce à l'amicale et habile intervention de M. Briand, le gouvernement japonais est prêt à ne plus soulever de difficultés.

Il ne resterait plus à régler que la question du nombre des membres de la commission d'études que Tokio désire voir réduire à trois et que certains gouvernements voudraient, nous l'avons dit hier, voir porter à un chiffre supérieur. On nous assure qu'à cet égard c'est la délégation japonaise qui défendra son point de vue auprès du plus chaud partisan de cette augmentation, M. Scialoja.

La commission d'études

Mais revenons aux « Douze », qui se sont, justement, occupés, hier après-midi, de cette commission d'études sur place. Ils ont, en effet, examiné la possibilité d'introduire dans le paragraphe 5 de la résolution une formule qui charge les commissaires, une fois arrivés sur les lieux, de faire rapport sur « l'aptitude de la Chine à garantir la sécurité de la vie et des biens des ressortissants japonais ». Ces me-

sures de sécurité conditionnant déjà, dans la résolution du 30 septembre, dont on reprend la phraséologie, l'évacuation progressive des territoires occupés, on cherche s'il n'y aurait pas moyen, grâce à ce rapport, de fixer d'une façon indirecte le moment où devra s'effectuer le retrait des troupes japonaises. On pourrait peut-être, ainsi, se tirer d'affaire en ce qui concerne la fixation de date réclamée par les Chinois.

La zone neutre de Kingtchéou

La principale préoccupation du conseil a porté, toutefois, sur la situation dans les environs de Kingtchéou. A ce propos, on a communiqué hier la réponse du cabinet de Tokio à l'appel lancé mercredi par M. Briand pour que les deux parties s'abstiennent, spécialement dans la région de Kingtchéou, de toute initiative pouvant entraîner de nouveaux engagements et de nouvelles pertes de vies humaines. Aux termes de cette note, les troupes japonaises, respectueuses de la politique poursuivie par le gouvernement japonais d'éviter toute aggravation de la situation, n'entreprendront aucun acte d'hostilité si ce n'est pour leur défense ou comme mesure de police.

D'autre part, en ce qui concerne la création d'une zone neutre, le cabinet de Tokio ajoute n'avoir aucune objection, en principe, à déclarer qu'au cas où les forces chinoises seraient retirées de la région de Kingtchéou, à l'ouest de Changhaï-Kouan, ainsi que le gouvernement chinois l'a récemment proposé par l'entremise du gouvernement de la République française, les forces japonaises ne pénétreront pas dans la zone évacuée, sauf dans l'éventualité d'une menace sérieuse et urgente, mettant en danger la sécurité de la vie des ressortissants japonais de la Chine du Nord et de leurs biens, ainsi que la sécurité des troupes japonaises qui y sont stationnées. Le gouvernement japonais est donc prêt à faire prendre, par ses autorités sur place, les arrangements de détail à ce sujet avec les autorités locales chinoises.

La Chine, de son côté, dans une note officielle de Nankin, s'est également déclarée prête hier à la création de cette zone dans les conditions proposées par le conseil.

Néanmoins, bien qu'il y ait déjà sur les lieux onze observateurs étrangers — trois Français, dont le conseiller de l'ambassade de Pékin et deux attachés militaires; trois Anglais, dont un consul général et deux officiers; deux Italiens, un Américain, un Espagnol et un Allemand — les nouvelles reçues des attachés français, anglais et américain étaient telles qu'on n'était pas sans inquiétude.

Ordre de recul

Hier soir, cependant, nous avons appris de la meilleure source que le chef d'état-major général de l'armée japonaise, le général Kanaya, avait, dans la journée, donné l'ordre formel au général Honjo, commandant en chef japonais en Mandchourie, non seulement de suspendre toutes opérations dans la direction de Kingtchéou, mais de se retirer sur Moukden, c'est-à-dire de se replier vers l'est. Tout risque de collision avec les forces chinoises se trouverait ainsi définitivement écarté.

Il n'en reste pas moins que les objections de Nankin au projet de résolution, en prolongeant inutilement les débats et en retardant la détente entre les deux pays, laissent la porte ouverte à de nouveaux incidents graves, non seulement en Mandchourie mais en Chine même, comme le prouvent d'ailleurs les récentes échouffourées de Tien-Tsin.

Il importe que le conseil, qui doit se réunir encore cet après-midi à 16 heures, mette fin au plus tôt par son attitude énergique à une situation dont on n'entrevoit plus l'issue en raison de la nécessité où se trouvent M. Yoshizawa et le docteur Sze de communiquer avec leur gouvernement avant mercredi ou jeudi.

A. J.

Enclosure No. 36 to Despatch No. 2031
of December 1, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE POPULAIRE, November 29, 1931.

Le danger de guerre devient toujours plus grand en Asie

Un incident entre Tokio et Washington

La deuxième semaine de la session extraordinaire du Conseil de la S.D.N. touche à sa fin. Des négociations ininterrompues qui ont eu lieu entre le président du Conseil et les représentants du Japon et de la Chine, aucun accord définitif n'est encore sorti.

Il y a deux jours, un Comité de rédaction, composé de l'Anglais Lord Robert Cecil, de l'Espagnol Salvador de Madariaga et du Norvégien Colhan a été nommé pour mettre le texte de la résolution au point, qui doit, prochainement, être soumise au Conseil et qui fixe les conditions exactes dans lesquelles la Commission d'enquête doit se rendre en Mandchourie.

Il paraît que, hier, au cours des conversations entre les Trois, auquel s'était joint M. Massigli, comme représentant de M. Aristide Briand, le délégué chinois, M. Alfred Sze s'est montré disposé à ne pas insister sur l'indication d'une date précise pour l'évacuation des zones occupées contrairement aux traités et pactes, par les troupes japonaises. Cette nouvelle concession faciliterait le travail du Conseil. Le dimanche d'aujourd'hui sera employé par les Quatre pour essayer d'établir l'accord avec le délégué japonais, M. Yoshizawa.

Donc, du point de vue diplomatique, on pourrait avoir l'impression qu'on se rapproche d'une « solution », d'un « arrangement ». En ce qui concerne l'activité au sein du Conseil de la S.D.N., cette impression répond peut-être à la réalité.

En ce qui concerne l'activité de l'armée japonaise en Mandchourie, elle paraît bien moins justifiée.

Tandis que le Gouvernement de Tokio ne cesse d'affirmer que nulle pensée de domination de la Mandchourie ne l'inspire, IL NE PEUT PLUS Y AVOIR LE MOINDRE DOUTE SUR LA CONTINUATION TRES METHODIQUE DE L'ACTION MILITAIRE JAPONAISE

L'armée japonaise est « indépendante »

Si le Gouvernement de Tokio devait encore être de bonne foi, cela prouverait simplement que l'armée, qui dépend, au Japon — comme ce fut le cas sous l'ancien régime de Guillaume II,

en Allemagne — directement de l'empereur, échappe complètement à son influence.

D'ailleurs, on a le droit de suspecter le Gouvernement japonais de jouer double jeu. Ne trouve-t-on pas, dans sa réponse sur le télégramme de M. Briand, demandant aux Gouvernements de Tokio et de Nankin de s'abstenir de toute initiative militaire dans la région de Tchén-Tchéou, des passages aussi équivoques que le suivant :

« Il (le Gouvernement japonais) n'a donc aucune objection, en principe, à déclarer qu'au cas où les forces chinoises seraient retirées de la région de Tchén-Tchéou, à l'ouest de Shang-Hai-Kouan, ainsi que le gouvernement chinois l'a récemment proposé par l'entremise du Gouvernement de la République française, les forces japonaises ne pénétreront pas dans la zone ainsi évacuée, sauf dans l'éventualité d'une menace sérieuse et urgente, mettant en danger la sécurité de la vie des ressortissants japonais de la Chine du nord et de leurs biens, ainsi que la sécurité des troupes japonaises qui y sont stationnées.

Donc, si le Japon juge « l'éventualité d'une menace sérieuse et urgente », s'il trouve que « la sécurité de ses troupes » l'exige, il se réserve le droit de pénétrer dans la zone de Tchén-Tchéou, même si celle-ci était évacuée par les troupes chinoises...

Le passage de la réponse japonaise, qui date du 27 novembre, que nous venons de citer, ne peut pas avoir et n'a pas d'autre sens. Cet aveu indirect des véritables intentions de Tokio est corroboré par toutes les informations que reçoivent les différents gouvernements représentés au Conseil et que reçoit aussi le Secrétariat de la S.D.N.

...A la manière de la dépêche d'Ems...

Parce que, avant-hier, le secrétaire d'Etat américain, M. Stimson, a exprimé, à Washington, devant la presse, son étonnement de voir les troupes japonaises continuer leurs opérations en Mandchourie, et cela malgré les promesses contraires données par le Gouvernement japonais, l'Agence Rengo (la Havas japonaise) a déclenché une campagne d'excitation chauvine, contre les Etats-Unis qui pourrait bien être la préface d'un conflit plus grave entre le Japon et l'Amérique du Nord.

Donnant explicitement l'Associated Press comme source, l'Agence Rengo a publié, sur toute une colonne, une prétendue interview qu'aurait donnée M. Stimson et au cours de laquelle il aurait caractérisé l'attitude du Japon comme « folle ». Indignation violente de l'Agence Rengo ! Déclarations du ministère des Affaires étrangères nippon ! Protestations dans toute la presse japonaise contre M. Stimson, qui se voit accusé d'avoir insulté la personne du Mikado et le peuple japonais tout entier... MAIS VOILA QUE M. STIMSON FAIT SAVOIR QU'IL N'A JAMAIS PRONONCE LES PAROLES QU'ON LUI PRETE ET QUE L'ASSOCIATED PRESS DECLARE, DE SON COTE, QUE JAMAIS, NI DANS SON SERVICE INTERIEUR EN AMERIQUE, NI DANS SES SERVICES EXTERIEURS, ELLE N'A DONNE L'INTERVIEW QUE L'AGENCE RENGO PRETEND AVOIR TROUVEE DANS SES FEUILLES...

Mystère journalistique ou mystère diplomatique à la manière de la dépêche d'Ems ? En tout cas, en ce qui concerne le côté journalistique, j'ai l'impression que le Tribunal d'honneur, inauguré tout récemment à La Haye, par les grandes associations journalistiques internationales devrait, sans perdre une journée, s'en saisir.

En ce qui concerne le côté diplomatique, les Gouvernements de Washington et de Tokio ne tarderont sans doute pas d'ouvrir une enquête pour éclaircir cet incident, si caractéristique pour la façon dont on commence à surchauffer l'atmosphère au Japon.

Le danger de guerre, en Asie, devient toujours plus imminent. Si les puissances qui adhèrent à la S.D.N., et particulièrement celles qu'on appelle les « grandes puissances », possédant des sièges permanents au Conseil, ne font pas bientôt, d'accord avec les Etats-Unis ou sans eux, comprendre au Japon qu'il s'expose à des sanctions d'ordre financier et économique si son Gouvernement ou son armée le place définitivement en état de rébellion contre la S.D.N., la Commission d'enquête court le risque d'arriver trop tard...

Enclosure No. 37 to Despatch No. 2031
of December 1, 1931.

From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE QUOTIDIEN, November 29, 1931.

La Chine accepte le règlement proposé par le Conseil de la S. D. N.

Quot. 11/29
**Tokio arrête l'avance
de ses troupes vers Kin-Tchéou**

On délibère, et la maison brûle !...
C'est, en deux mots, ce qui se passe
à Paris et en Mandchourie. Et ceci —
ces conciliabules qui se traînent, ces
parlotes dans les coins d'ombre, ces
combinaisons et ce désarroi, pour ap-
peler enfin les choses par leur nom —
ceci donne l'impression de mesures bien
inadéquates pour résoudre le gros pro-
blème qui se pose brutalement aux por-
tes de Kin-Tchéou.

Selon la coutume maintenant acqui-
se, le Comité de rédaction — ou Con-
seil des « Trois » — s'est réuni hier
dans la matinée et s'est remis à éplu-
cher phrase par phrase les termes du
projet de résolution qui, par un pro-
dige « d'équilibrisme », devra donner
satisfaction à la Chine et au Japon.

Autant vouloir résoudre la quadra-
ture du cercle...

En effet, il y a un point — et nous
l'avions fait prévoir ces temps derniers
en y insistant — sur lequel Nankin ré-
pugne à céder : la date précise de l'éva-
cuation de la Mandchourie par les trou-
pes nippones.

— Résolution du 30 septembre, dit le
Conseil, approuvée par le Japon. C'est-
à-dire évacuation dans le plus bref délai
et moyennant la sécurité assurée aux
ressortissants japonais.

— Résolution du 24 octobre, maintient
la Chine. Fixez une date.

Finalement, le docteur Sze a obtenu
que son gouvernement se ralliât à la
formule qui consisterait à fixer une pé-
riode entre telle et telle date.

Obtiendra-t-on davantage ? Si oui, le
Conseil aura eu l'air de finir bien. Sinon
c'est l'échec. Et, en attendant, le Kuo-
mintang pèse de toutes ses forces à
Nankin pour que soit maintenue la
clause de la date fixe.

Juridiquement, la Chine sent sa po-
sition solide. Car enfin la question fut
mal prise au début. Le rôle du Conseil
— qui ne fut point rempli — eût été
de demander au Japon d'évacuer une
région que le Pacte lui interdisait d'oc-
cuper.

Pour n'avoir pas su — ou voulu —
commencer... par le commencement, le
Conseil est condamné à se heurter con-
tre une muraille sans issue. « la grande
muraille ! » si plaisanter n'est point
excessif en des matières aussi graves.

Il y aurait peut-être une « monnaie
d'échange » — car tout cela rappelle
un peu le *hasard oriental* — c'est le sort
de Kin-Tchéou. Les Japonais veulent-ils
s'abstenir d'attaquer la ville. Nankin
ferait-il des concessions sur le point de
la date de l'évacuation nipponne ?

En dernière heure, nous apprenons en
effet que le gouvernement de Tokio a
donné l'ordre d'arrêter l'avance de ses
troupes vers Kin-Tchéou et une auto-
dépêche annonce que le gouvernement
de Nankin a accepté le projet de règle-
ment proposé par le Conseil.

Ces deux décisions sont-elles défini-
tives et sont-elles exemptes de ces résér-
ves subtiles auxquelles nous ont trop ha-
bitué les diplomates orientaux.

Les « Douze » ont, hier après-midi,
examiné ces divers aspects de la ques-
tion. M. Briand, qui avait d'abord con-
féré avec le délégué chinois, a ensuite
vu M. Yoshizawa.

La négociation continue. Jusques
quand ? — T.

29
Enclosure No. 57 to Despatch No. 2031
of December 1, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE QUOTIDIEN, November 29, 1931.

**La Chine accepte
le règlement
proposé par le Conseil
de la S. D. N.**

Quot. 11/30
**Tokio arrête l'avance
de ses troupes vers Kin-Tchéou**

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seil des « Trois » — s'est réuni hier
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cher phrase par phrase les termes du
projet de résolution qui, par un pro-
dige « d'équilibrisme », devra donner
satisfaction à la Chine et au Japon.

Autant vouloir résoudre la quadra-
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à-dire évacuation dans le plus bref délai
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— qui ne fut point rempli — eût été
de demander au Japon d'évacuer une
région que le Pacte lui interdisait d'oc-
cuper.

Pour n'avoir pas su — ou voulu —
commencer... par le commencement, le
Conseil est condamné à se heurter con-
tre une muraille sans issue « la grande
muraille ! » si plaisanter n'est point
excessif en des matières aussi graves.

Il y aurait peut-être une « monnaie
d'échange » — car tout cela rappelle
un peu le *hasard oriental* — c'est le sort
de Kin-Tchéou. Les Japonais veulent-ils
s'abstenir d'attaquer la ville. Nankin
ferait-il des concessions sur le point de
la date de l'évacuation nipponne ?

En dernière heure, nous apprenons en
effet que le gouvernement de Tokio a
donné l'ordre d'arrêter l'avance de ses
troupes vers Kin-Tchéou et une autre
dépêche annonce que le gouvernement
de Nankin a accepté le projet de règle-
ment proposé par le Conseil.

Ces deux décisions sont-elles défini-
tives et sont-elles exemptes de ces résér-
ves subtiles auxquelles nous ont trop ha-
bitué les diplomates orientaux.

Les « Douze » ont, hier, après-midi,
examiné ces divers aspects de la ques-
tion. M. Briand, qui avait d'abord con-
féré avec le délégué chinois, a ensuite
vu M. Yoshizawa.

La négociation continue. Jusques-
quand ? — T.

Enclosure No. 38 to Despatch No. 2031
of December 1, 1931.

From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ECHO DE PARIS, November 30, 1931.

Le conflit mandchourien devant la S. D. N.

Echo 11/30

Hier matin M. Ito, de la délégation japonaise, s'est rendu auprès du comité de rédaction et lui a expliqué longuement les deux amendements que le Japon désire voir introduire dans le texte du projet de résolution constituant la commission d'études.

Tout d'abord, le Japon ne peut accepter la phrase du projet de résolution où il est dit que les deux gouvernements (le Japon et la Chine) s'engagent à donner les ordres les plus stricts à leurs commandants en chef pour qu'ils s'abstiennent de prendre des initiatives, etc... De telles expressions ne sont pas conciliables avec les prérogatives de l'Empereur commandant en chef de l'armée japonaise. En conséquence, la délégation japonaise insiste pour que la phrase du projet de résolution fasse seulement état « de l'ardent espoir » qu'éprouve le Conseil de voir des instructions de cette nature données aux commandants en chef.

En second lieu, le Japon, comme on le sait déjà, tient à insérer une réserve lui permettant de protéger les vies et les biens de ses nationaux et de prendre telles mesures qui lui paraîtront nécessaires pour se défendre contre les bandits.

A la réunion tenue dans l'après-midi par les douze membres du Conseil, les amendements japonais ont été discutés. Certains membres ont fait remarquer au Conseil que si les textes proposés par Tokio étaient adoptés, la liberté de mouvements *de facto* dont le Japon jouit en Mandchourie deviendrait une liberté *de jure*. Les douze membres du Conseil ont ajourné leur décision.

Un autre point assez important a été traité par les douze membres du Conseil. Après s'être congratulés du fait que l'armée japonaise avait interrompu son avance vers Kintchéou, ils examinèrent les arrangements à prendre pour la définition de la zone neutre qui, dans cette région, doit s'étendre entre les deux armées, la japonaise et la chinoise. Mais les Japonais, dans une note écrite envoyée au secrétariat, déclarent que tous les arrangements relatifs à la zone neutre doivent être conclus par les commandants en chef japonais et chinois sans intervention des tiers, c'est-à-dire sans intervention des observateurs envoyés de Pékin dans la région par les puissances représentées au Conseil. Les douze membres du Conseil ont demandé à M. Briand de s'efforcer de persuader le Japon de renoncer à cette demande. Toutefois, après la séance officieuse du Conseil, M. Yoshizawa, ambassadeur du Japon, s'est rendu auprès de M. Briand, justement pour maintenir la requête japonaise.

Ce matin, ce sera le tour du docteur Szé, délégué chinois, de se rendre auprès du comité de rédaction. Il apportera la réponse de Nankin sur les observations faites hier par les douze membres du Conseil qui, on se le rappelle, ont rejeté deux des trois amendements présentés par la Chine. Le gouvernement de Nankin fera-t-il preuve d'obstination ? Il y a aujourd'hui quinze jours que la session du Conseil a commencé. Et, en dépit des formules spécieuses qu'il discute, on peut dire que la question n'a pas avancé d'un pas.

Milton C. Gustafson

12-18-75

Défendons la patrie socialiste menacée


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EN CHINE, A LA VEILLE DE L'OCCUPATION PAR LES TROUPES DES PUISSANCES IMPÉRIALISTES

□□□□□

*Pendant que les blancs de Semenov, alliés du Cabinet de Paris
préparent le coup de force sur Kharbine, les journaux du capitalisme français
multiplient leurs appels à la guerre*

□□□□□



Un soldat japonais, victime de l'impérialisme de Tokio, derrière lequel ne l'oublions jamais, se trouve l'impérialisme français, surveille une affiche du gouverneur de Moukden annonçant à la population chinoise opprimée la nomination d'autorités locales par les vainqueurs.

LA POLITIQUE DE PAIX DE L'U. R. S. S.

En face des provocations japonaises continuelles contre l'Union soviétique, la ligne de l'Est chinois tracée par les troupes japonaises, l'organisation des bandes de gardes blancs sous la protection japonaise, la campagne de calomnies entreprises de la presse, la propagande d'intervention systématique de la part de l'impérialisme français, les ennemis de l'Union soviétique ont esquivé plus d'une fois que l'Union soviétique ne maîtriserait pas ses nerfs et que le grand œuvre poursuivi depuis bientôt quinze ans par les impérialistes, la provocation de l'Union soviétique qui permettrait la guerre d'intervention, allait enfin trouver aujourd'hui son couronnement.

Il est évident, si l'on s'en tenait au critérium des puissances capitalistes, que la millième partie des provocations continuelles des impérialistes contre l'Union soviétique suffirait pour déclencher une guerre sanglante.

Mais ce critérium n'a aucune valeur pour l'Union soviétique. Dans la lutte opiniâtre qu'elle mène dans la dernière étape des menaces d'interventions impérialistes, contre le danger de guerre que représente pour elle l'invasion de l'impérialisme japonais en Mandchourie, la différence fondamentale entre la politique prolétarienne et la politique impérialiste est apparue une fois de plus.



La lutte héroïque du prolétariat de l'Union soviétique en faveur de la paix est quelque chose de vraiment incompréhensible pour les cerveaux des impérialistes et des social-fascistes imprégnés d'idéologie capitaliste. Par tous les moyens ils s'efforcent de discréditer la politique de paix de l'Union soviétique et sont obligés pour cela de développer surtout les deux arguments suivants :

Premièrement, l'Union soviétique a conclu un accord secret avec le Japon sur le partage de la Mandchourie et elle ne veut, par conséquent, pas mettre d'empêchement à la progression japonaise. Tout nouveau pas du

ces troupes japonaises modernes, c'est que le mouvement contre l'impérialisme n'était soutenu que par des partisans paysans, par des sections d'ouvriers qui n'avaient pour buter contre les trains blindés, que leurs propres maîtres.

Aujourd'hui, au bout de douze années, avec une armée rouge qui s'appuie sur un prolétariat composé de dix millions d'ouvriers qu'enthousiasme l'édification du socialisme, sur une paysannerie organisée à 60 % dans les entreprises collectives et avant tout sur la sympathie croissante des travailleurs de tous les pays, l'Union soviétique serait capable d'infliger encore une tout autre leçon aux impérialistes japonais.



Ce n'est ni un accord avec l'impérialisme ni la crainte qui dictent au prolétariat de l'Union soviétique sa lutte pour la paix. C'est que le pays de l'édification socialiste considère toute intervention militaire de l'impérialisme comme le prélude d'une guerre mondiale sanglante qui dépasserait formidablement en horreurs la guerre mondiale passée. Le prolétariat de l'Union soviétique veut empêcher de toutes ses forces cette nouvelle guerre mondiale.

Chaque note du camarade Litvinov aux brigands japonais, chaque déclaration des Commissaires du peuple de l'Union soviétique, dans leur sincérité évidente, dans leur volonté de paix sans équivoque, est en opposition la plus vive non seulement avec les raps militaires du Japon, mais aussi avec les bavardages hypocrites des ministres capitalistes à Genève et à Paris qui s'efforcent de trouver des formules pour faire sanctionner tous ces pillages par la Société des Nations.

L'attitude de l'Union soviétique face aux provocations impérialistes pourrait être présentée partout non seulement aux bavards pacifistes mais aussi aux ouvriers sincères social-démocrates et sans parti qui nourrissent encore des illusions sur l'amour de la paix de la S.D.N., comme le modèle de la politique de paix que même un Etat prolétarien et de la façon dont une armée puissante elle-même peut devenir dans le plein sens du mot un instrument de paix dans les nations d'un Etat prolétarien.

Mais il faut en même temps que la

C'est demain soir qu'à l'appel des organisations révolutionnaires de Paris, les ouvriers de la capitale sont conviés à la grande assemblée de la salle Bulier.

Au cours de ces derniers jours, tant à Paris qu'en province, de nombreuses réunions ont eu lieu : réunions de chômeurs notamment — toutes fréquentées par des auditoires vibrants et enthousiastes. Les mots d'ordre du Parti, en particulier celui du retrait immédiat des forces militaires et navales françaises d'Extrême-Orient, ont reçu partout une adhésion chaleureuse.

Le meeting de Bulier n'a pas pour but de interrompre l'effort accompli pendant les jours passés, mais bien de donner à notre campagne une impulsion nouvelle. Les orateurs ne se contenteront pas d'exposer les origines profondes de la conflagration extrême-orientale, de dénoncer le rôle de l'impérialisme français, l'attitude de la social-démocratie, ils diront comment les prolétaires doivent organiser dans la pratique la lutte contre les fauteurs de guerre.

On conviendra qu'à la veille des padlocks ouvriers imminents dans les grandes corporations comme les marins, les mineurs et, au lendemain de la monstrueuse escroquerie du Congrès pacifiste, c'est là un problème essentiel et qui mérite de haut toutes les préoccupations.

Au surplus, les événements de cette dernière semaine confèrent sa véritable portée à la manifestation de mardi soir.

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
pp. 10, 11 to Appendix 10, 2051
1931.

November 20, 1931.

Défendons la patrie socialiste menacée

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ETANT donné les provocations japonaises continuelles contre l'Union soviétique, la ligne de l'Est chinois franchie par les troupes japonaises, l'organisation des bandes de gardes-blancs sous la protection japonaise, la campagne de calomnies empoisonnées de la presse, la propagation de fausses nouvelles, et tous les moyens ils s'efforcent de discréditer la politique de paix de l'Union soviétique et sont obligés pour cela de développer surtout les deux arguments suivants :

Premièrement, l'Union soviétique a conclu un accord secret avec le Japon sur le partage de la Mandchourie et elle ne veut, par conséquent, pas mettre d'empêchement à la progression japonaise. Tout nouveau pas du rapt de brigandage du Japon en Mandchourie est en même temps un pas dans la provocation contre l'Union soviétique, et toute convention secrète avec l'impérialisme japonais devant ces faits de plus en plus clairs chaque jour, apparaît si absurde que les adversaires les plus acharnés de l'Union soviétique n'osent même par répéter cet argument.

Les impérialistes et social-impérialistes ne mettent que plus de zèle à se jeter sur le deuxième argument pour expliquer à leur façon la volonté résolue de paix de l'U.S. C'est que celle-ci, disent-ils, est beaucoup trop faible pour se mesurer avec le Japon capitaliste.

Cet argument a-t-il de la valeur ? Nullement. L'impérialisme japonais a pu battre en 1905 une armée retrograde d'esclaves tsaristes alors que dans le dos de cette armée le prolétariat russe et les masses paysannes, non seulement refusaient de soutenir le tsar, mais utilisaient chaque défaite de ses troupes pour renforcer le mouvement révolutionnaire contre le joug d'esclavage.

Mais lorsqu'en 1918-19 l'impérialisme japonais, renforcé encore par des corps d'expédition alliés, se risqua sur le territoire de la Sibérie devenue soviétique entre temps, les généraux japonais firent des expériences toutes différentes. Non seulement ils furent repoussés de Sibérie, mais finalement il leur fallut restituer chaque pouce de terrain qu'ils avaient essayé de s'approprier par brigandage. Et cette leçon fut donnée aux excel-

lentes troupes japonaises modernes, alors que le mouvement contre l'impérialisme n'était soutenu que par des partisans paysans, par des sections d'ouvriers qui n'avaient pour lutter contre les trains blindés que leurs propres mains.

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Mais il faut en même temps que le prolétariat de tous les pays escompte la possibilité que, en dépit de tous les efforts, l'intervention impérialiste contre l'Union soviétique ne puisse être empêchée.

Les impérialistes japonais tout comme les impérialistes français et leurs alliés les gardes-blancs veulent de toutes leurs forces pousser à bout la patience de l'Etat prolétarien. Aussi est-il nécessaire dès maintenant que le prolétariat international soutienne à sa manière les efforts des prolétaires soviétiques en pleine édification socialiste. Ceci ne peut être fait que par le renforcement maximum de la lutte contre le danger de guerre et d'intervention et contre la réduction des salaires et l'offensive du capital dans chaque pays.

YOBÉ.

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On conviendra qu'à la veille des batailles ouvrières imminentes dans les grandes corporations comme les marins, les mineurs et, au lendemain de la monstrueuse escroquerie du Congrès pacifiste, c'est là un problème essentiel, et qui domine de haut toutes les préoccupations.

Au surplus, les événements de cette dernière semaine confèrent sa véritable portée à la manifestation de mardi soir.

(SUITE DE LA PREMIERE PAGE)

Ces événements, essayons d'en dresser le bilan. Lundi dernier, quand le Conseil de la Société des nations reprit ses délibérations, il était question, on s'en souvient, de la nomination d'une commission d'investigation internationale qui, sur la proposition du Japon, se rendrait non seulement en Mandchourie, mais bien dans toute la Chine et qui, de l'aveu des grands journaux français, comme le *Matin*, aurait pour tâche précise de lutter contre les Soviétiques chinois et contre l'U. R. S. S.

Qu'est-il advenu de ce projet ? Depuis dix jours, les augures qui siègent au Quai d'Orsay s'évertuent à lui donner corps. Voilà le premier fait.

Mais pendant qu'on palabre à Paris, la guerre s'étend en Extrême-Orient.

Là les Japonais, forts de l'appui des grandes puissances, forts de l'appui de la France en particulier, ont depuis dix jours conquis de nouvelles terres. Non seulement ils entendent ne rien évacuer, mais ils émettent la prétention de faire évacuer la Mandchourie par les formations armées chinoises. Il est certain en outre qu'ils disposent de complices actifs dans les rangs de la contre-révolution chinoise. A preuve les révélations — que seule l'humanité a produites — sur les livraisons d'armes par une grande firme nipponne aux généraux chinois.

Telle est la deuxième série de faits de cette semaine.

De M. Briand à Pataman Seménof

Voici la troisième. Les blancs sont résolus à opérer dans les tous prochains jours un coup de force sur Kharbine. Tout est prêt pour cette expédition. Leur plan a été accepté par le commandant en chef des troupes japonaises. Encore faut-il découvrir un prétexte qui donnera un semblant de justification à cet attentat. Depuis deux jours, le journal blanc de Kharbine annonce qu'un complot communiste (sic) ourdi par les agents du Gépéou (sic) a été découvert à Kharbine. Ficelle usée, archi-usée, filasse misérable, aussi ridicule que les prétendues fournitures d'armes soviétiques au général Ma !

Mais c'est avec ces procédés canaille qu'on légitime toujours les grands massacres !

Notons à nouveau que le projet des blancs n'a pas été élaboré à Moukden, mais très certainement à Paris où Miller est le plus zélé collaborateur de Weygand.

Si l'on avait le moindre doute à cet égard, il suffirait de consulter l'éloge que le *Matin* d'hier — le *Matin* ne publie que sur commande et l'article en question est d'inspiration gouvernementale évidente — a consacré au règne de Pataman Seménof en Transbaikalie, au lendemain de la Révolution d'Octobre.

Semenof s'insurgea contre le bolchevisme. Dans toute la Sibérie régnait alors le plus inextricable chaos. Les ouvriers se ralliaient à Lénine ; les paysans, plus riches et plus pondérés qu'en Russie d'Europe, résistaient. Les socialistes révolutionnaires soulevaient le pays contre Moxcou. Les Tchèques se frayaient un passage vers le Pacifique à coups de fusil et de grenades. L'amiral Koltchak préparait son coup d'Etat. Des bandes rouges tâchaient de couper le transsibérien.

Méditez sur la description que fournit ensuite l'auteur de l'article.

Pendant cet hiver tragique, il y eut, le long d'un chemin qui menait à Tchita, une étrange file de poteaux, plantés à intervalles réguliers, auxquels étaient liés des corps nus. C'étaient des cadavres mutilés de gardes rouges ou de simples moujiks. Tous, tendant les bras tendus par la mort et le gel, indiquaient une même direction que désignait l'écrin surmontant : « Quartier général de Pataman Seménof. »

Voilà les auxiliaires de Briand-la-Paix et de la Société des Nations !

Voilà, à douze ans d'intervalle,

quels exploits sanglants patronne l'impérialisme français.

Un corps expéditionnaire en Chine

Troisième fait qui doit retenir l'attention. M. Briand a suggéré au délégué de la Chine une proposition qui tend à installer en Chine une zone neutre qu'occuperait un organisme militaire international.

Nous avons écrit qu'il s'agissait très exactement d'un plan d'occupation militaire de la Chine. L'expression n'est pas trop forte.

Mais là encore, il faut, pour précipiter les choses, trouver un prétexte. Alors, des troubles éclatent.

Où ? A Tien-Tsin, c'est-à-dire dans la ville où siège le commandement des forces militaires françaises de Chine.

Concluons. Au début de la semaine dernière, les Japonais étaient maîtres de Tsitsikar. Ils se préparent, au début de cette semaine, à occuper Kharbine.

Au début de la semaine dernière, on parlait de la nomination de la Commission d'enquête. Au début de cette semaine, c'est de la formation d'un corps expéditionnaire qu'il s'agit.

Et toutes ces opérations sont dirigées par la Société des nations et par son président, le représentant de l'impérialisme français.

Appels à la guerre

Les excitations antisoviétiques de la France redoublent de violence. Epinglons cet aveu de M. Naudeau dans le *Petit Marseillais* :

« En outre, ne perdons pas de vue que la présence de la grande puissance militaire japonaise à proximité de la Sibérie Orientale constitue pour la turbulence soviétique un élément « d'intimidation ».

Et ajoutons à notre dossier cette pièce de choix, extraite d'une circulaire hebdomadaire du Comptoir d'Escompte de Tulle :

« On peut s'attendre vraisemblablement à ce que des troubles éclatent en Sibérie et que des armes soient fournies par les Japonais aux révolutionnaires antibolcheviks qui opèrent contre les armées russes et en arrière de celles-ci en coupant les ravitaillements, en gênant le trafic de l'unique ligne de chemin de fer dont disposent les bolcheviks.

« Les événements vont certainement se précipiter maintenant.

« Ce qu'il faut avant tout, c'est d'y voir clair, et nous croyons que c'est notre cas, lorsque nous disons que le grand conflit que l'on attendait est né, et qu'il sera probablement appuyé par d'autres conflits, à la suite d'incidents de frontières dans d'autres pays voisins de la Russie (la Lithuanie a un gouvernement antibolchevik) et peut-être pourrions-nous prévoir le moment où l'on profitera des nouvelles qui parviendront pour provoquer une reprise générale.

« Ayons donc un peu d'espoir, mais ne nous emballons pas. De toute façon, répétons QUE LE CONFLIT D'EXTREME-ORIENT AURA UN EFFET FAVORABLE, mais ne sera vraiment pas capable de guérir définitivement le monde du mal dont il souffre. »

Vous avez bien lu : « Le conflit d'Extrême-Orient aura un effet favorable », et encore : « Ayons un peu d'espoir ».

C'est ainsi que s'expriment les milieux bancaires de France dont M. Briand, idole des chefs socialistes, est au Quai d'Orsay l'interprète authentique.

Eh bien, c'est contre cette politique qui est celle de la guerre que le Parti communiste appelle le prolétariat à se dresser.

Tous les coups portés à la bourgeoisie au cours des luttes partielles, des actions revendicatives de la classe ouvrière sont des coups portés à l'impérialisme et aux forces de guerre.

Gabriel PERI.


Enclosure No. 40 to Despatch No. 2031
of December 1, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE JOURNAL, November 30, 1931.

Le travail du Conseil de la S.D.N. n'a pas hâté la solution du conflit mandchou

Lord Robert Cecil rappelait hier « que le Seigneur ne permet de travailler le dimanche que pour retirer la vache du puits. » Le conseil « n'a pas sorti la vache du puits. » Il n'est même pas certain que le travail dominical ait beaucoup accéléré l'opération.

En effet, le résultat final dépend toujours de l'abandon par la Chine de sa prétention de faire fixer une



LORD ROBERT CECIL
(Croquis de KELEN.)

date pour le retrait des troupes japonaises. Prétention qui n'est pas seulement repoussée par le Japon, mais reconnue impossible par tous les membres du conseil et le général Dawes. Prétention insoutenable en droit, puisque la Chine a adhéré à la résolution du 30 septembre, la seule valable, qui écarte la fixation d'une date. On comprend que M. Wellington Koo, en prenant possession du ministère des affaires étrangères à Nankin, n'ait pas voulu inaugurer son ministère par un acte que les nationalistes auraient taxé de faiblesse. Il doit être assez intelligent pour se rendre compte maintenant des inconvénients d'une tactique qui laisserait la Chine en tête-à-tête avec le Japon. Nous verrons ce matin si le docteur Sze apportera enfin une réponse satisfaisante de Nankin.

La journée d'hier au conseil a vu M. Ito conférer dans la matinée avec le comité de rédaction sur le texte du projet de résolution et le conseil des Douze siéger dans l'après-midi.

De la réunion du matin, il y a peu de choses à retenir. Le Japon a insisté pour que le nombre des membres de la commission d'études soit maintenu à trois et que le mandat de cette commission ne soit par élargi. Il a fait reconnaître le point essentiel pour lui, la nécessité de ne pas étendre l'engagement inscrit dans la résolution du 30 septembre. Les divergences qui subsistent du côté japonais ne portent que sur des détails de rédaction.

Le conseil des Douze s'est occupé fort peu de ce qui s'était passé le matin, au comité de rédaction. La discussion a porté surtout sur la création d'une zone neutre dans la région Tchén-Tchéou.

Ce qui est apparu de plus clair dans ce débat, c'est que les informations adressées au conseil par des observateurs militaires étrangers arrivent beaucoup plus lentement que les nouvelles officielles japonaises. Le conseil s'est un peu ému de se trouver en face de communications des observateurs étrangers signalant encore des progressions des troupes japonaises, alors que les nouvelles officielles de Tokio annonçaient un retrait. Pour comprendre la contradiction, il suffit de constater que le rapport reçu le 27, de l'observateur britannique, est daté du 24, tandis que les nouvelles officielles japonaises, signalant l'arrêt de l'offensive, enregistrent des faits du 27.

De plus, l'arrêt et même le mouvement de repli des troupes japonaises se confirme. Ce fait réduit singulièrement l'importance du projet d'établissement d'une zone neutre, puisque les possibilités de contact sont écartées.

Il faut signaler cependant que sur ce point de la création d'une zone neutre, un désaccord sensible s'est manifesté. On se rappelle l'origine de l'affaire. Le gouvernement chinois a fait proposer aux Japonais, par l'ambassadeur de France à Tokio, M. de Martel, la création d'une zone neutre à Tchén-Tchéou, et même le retrait de leurs troupes derrière la Grande Muraille, avec le contrôle de la région évacuée par des détachements internationaux.

Le 26 novembre, M. Briand a proposé de donner aux observateurs militaires étrangers envoyés sur les lieux, et qui sont au nombre de neuf, mandat de se concerter : 1° pour éviter le contact entre Chinois et Japonais, soit par la démarcation d'une zone neutre, soit par tout autre moyen ; 2° pour se tenir en contact avec les commandements japonais et chinois.

La Chine a répondu, le 27, par une acceptation générale. Le Japon a envoyé une communication qui a fourni un des principaux éléments de la discussion d'hier du conseil, discussion qui a été suivie d'un long entretien de M. Briand et de M. Yoshizawa.

Dans sa note, le gouvernement japonais rappelle la proposition faite par la Chine de replier ses troupes derrière la Grande Muraille et déclare que si ce projet est exécuté, le Japon est prêt à s'engager à ne pas envoyer de troupes dans la région évacuée, « sauf dans le cas imprévu de circonstances sérieuses et urgentes menaçant la vie et les biens des Japonais dans la Chine du Nord. »

Mais le gouvernement japonais manifeste la volonté très nette de traiter cette affaire directement avec la Chine. C'est le passage le plus important de la note :

— La politique toujours suivie jusqu'ici par le gouvernement japonais, dans l'intérêt même des bonnes relations sino-japonaises, a été, dans des différends susceptibles d'un règlement direct avec la Chine, de ne pas recourir à l'interposition de tiers et il ne peut que se conformer à cette ligne de conduite dans l'incident actuel.

Le conseil a préparé une réponse à cette communication, que M. Briand a transmise à M. Yoshizawa au cours de la visite qui a suivi. On remarque que la proposition chinoise de repli derrière la Grande Muraille était subordonnée à l'installation de détachements internationaux. Les puissances n'ont pas voulu entrer dans cette voie. Elles se sont contentées d'envoyer des observateurs militaires. On veut espérer que ces observateurs faciliteront les mesures propres à éviter les incidents. Leur tâche sera évidemment vraiment facilitée si le retrait des troupes japonaises se confirme et se maintient. — S.-B.

Enclosure No. 41 to Despatch No. 2051
of December 1, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ŒUVRE, November 30, 1931.

Sur le terrain diplomatique et sur l'autre

En finira-t-on cette semaine avec cet imbroglio sino-japonais qui retient depuis douze jours l'attention du Conseil de la Société des Nations, et autour duquel, depuis ces douze jours, on a déployé tant de diplomatie ?

On sait qu'il ne s'agit pas, pour l'instant, de régler le différend au fond, mais d'obtenir la cessation d'hostilités actives, sinon déclarées, et de permettre ainsi un règlement pacifique. Mais il faut reconnaître que, jusqu'à présent, rien ne fut plus difficile, plus délicat que d'arriver à ce premier point. Ce fut un travail de Pénélope — à cette différence près que Pénélope détruisait elle-même sa tapisserie, tandis que les projets mis sur pied par le Conseil étaient détruits par les prétendants : un jour par le Japon, le lendemain par la Chine.

Nous sommes de ceux — assez rares — qui n'ont pas, dès la première heure et de but en blanc, jugé que le Japon avait raison, et qu'en tirant le canon en Mandchourie, « il défendait la civilisation ». Aujourd'hui qu'il a admis le principe d'une commission d'enquête et d'une évacuation prochaine, il serait regrettable — je l'ai dit à certains amis chinois et je le leur répète ici — que le gouvernement de Nankin prit à son tour le masque de l'intransigeance. Il ne faut pas demander à la Société des Nations plus qu'elle ne peut donner. Certes, on est en droit de regretter — et nous regrettons — qu'elle ne puisse pas donner plus. Mais si l'on veut qu'elle vive et qu'elle se développe, il ne faut pas faire le jeu de ses adversaires en la condamnant à l'inaction par des exigences excessives.

Dans un cas comme le conflit sino-japonais, son rôle, à l'heure actuelle, ne pouvait être que de conciliation. Elle a obtenu du Japon d'incontestables concessions — notamment sur ce qu'il appelait lui-même les cinq points « fondamentaux ». Si la Chine n'en consentait pas à son tour, elle prendrait une lourde part de responsabilités.

— Oui, me dit un Chinois. Mais tandis que les Japonais font, sur le terrain diplomatique, des concessions, ils font, sur le terrain tout court, des progressions. Ils menacent Tchén-Tchéou.

— Il est vrai. Mais le cabinet japonais n'a-t-il pas déclaré qu'il était opposé à cette marche sur Tchén-Tchéou, et laissé entendre que si les militaires nippons la poursuivaient quand même, il démissionnerait ?

— Eh ! je veux bien admettre, me répondit le Céleste, qu'il y a au Japon des hommes qui voient plus loin que les généraux. Je vous concède même, si vous y tenez, que de ces hommes, il s'en trouve au gouvernement de Tokio. Mais si ce gouvernement n'est pas capable de se faire obéir de ses militaires, de quel droit, en ce cas, nous reprocher notre « anarchie » et nos généraux rebelles ?

Ce qui n'est pas, ma foi, mal raisonné.

Il faut donc, pour arriver enfin à un règlement, que la Chine « y mette du sien », comme on dit, et que l'on sache si, oui ou non, le Japon est en mesure de faire respecter par ses chefs militaires les engagements qu'il aura pris.

Car la Société des Nations peut et doit intervenir entre Etats organisés, lorsqu'un conflit les met aux prises. Mais il est clair que d'empêcher des pronunciamientos, ce n'est pas son affaire.

Jean Plot.

PP 30

Enclosure No. 41 to Despatch No. 2031
of December 1, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE PETIT PARISIEN, November 30, 1931.

LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS

LE CONSEIL DE LA S.D.N. A EXAMINE HIER LES AMENDEMENTS PROPOSES PAR LE JAPON

Le comité de rédaction, devant
qui M. Ito les a développés, puis
les « Douze », en séance privée,
en ont reconnu l'esprit
conciliant

Après le Dr Sze, qui attend toujours
des instructions de Nankin, c'est
M. Ito, le sous-directeur du bureau
japonais de la S. D. N., qui avait été
convoqué hier matin par le comité de
rédaction du conseil qui a exposé
devant lui les quelques amendements
demandés par le Japon au texte du
projet de résolution.

En dehors de lord Robert Cecil, qui
présidait, assistaient à cette séance :
MM. de Madariaga et Colban, sir Eric
Drummond, M. Avenol et M. Massigli.
M. Ito, qui était lui-même accompa-
gné de M. Matsumoto, secrétaire de
la délégation japonaise, remit au co-
mité un memorandum où étaient con-
signés tous les points sur lesquels le
gouvernement de Tokio souhaiterait
voir apporter des modifications. Puis,
à la demande de lord Cecil, il fournit
verbalement sur chacun d'eux les
explications les plus détaillées.

Les demandes japonaises

Ces points peuvent, en somme, se
réduire à quatre. En ce qui concerne
d'abord la résolution du 30 septembre
qui a réuni l'unanimité du conseil et
à laquelle — la Chine y ayant souscrit
comme lui — le Japon attache une
valeur contractuelle, le cabinet de
Tokio demande qu'elle soit répétée
dans sa totalité, au lieu de faire l'ob-
jet d'un simple rappel. Si on se sou-
vient que ce texte, par lequel les deux
parties sont solennellement liées, ne
fixe aucune date pour la fin de l'éva-
cuation, on comprendra sans doute la
raison de cette demande.

De même, et c'est là le second point,
dans le paragraphe I, le porte-parole
japonais a exprimé le désir que fus-
sent supprimés, à propos du retrait des
troupes, les mots : « retrait auquel le
conseil attache la plus grande impor-
tance », ce membre de phrase ne figu-
rant pas dans la résolution de sep-
tembre.

Nous avons rappelé, hier, les objec-
tions formulées au paragraphe II du
projet de résolution et qui constituent
le troisième point : ordres au comman-
dant en chef japonais et réserves tou-
chant la faculté, pour les troupes japo-
naises, de réprimer les agissements
des bandits chinois, c'est-à-dire les
actes de légitime défense et les opé-
rations de police. Il va de soi que c'est
là une des réclamations essentielles de
Tokio.

Quant à la quatrième et dernière,
elle porte sur le paragraphe V. En
dehors d'une modification de mots sans
importance, le Japon demande, en
effet, que le nombre des membres de
la commission d'études soit définitive-
ment fixé à trois, comme il l'avait pri-
mitivement suggéré, et cela malgré
une pressante démarche italienne.

M. Ito s'est d'ailleurs longuement
expliqué, devant le comité, sur les rai-
sons de son gouvernement pour main-
tenir ce chiffre, et qui sont, exacte-
ment, celles que nous avons déjà
données.

En revanche, il n'a pas été question
des pouvoirs de la commission, ce qui
laisse supposer qu'il n'y a pas, à cet
égard, de divergences de vues entre le
conseil et Tokio. Au cours des expli-
cations, M. Ito a enfin émis une sug-
gestion qui n'est pas sans intérêt, en-
core qu'elle présente certains dangers :
celle de ne pas faire figurer, dans le
texte même de la résolution, les quel-
ques points secondaires qui sont sus-
ceptibles de rompre l'unanimité, mais
d'en faire l'objet de commentaires
explicatifs du président. Il y a évi-
demment là un moyen de réaliser plus
facilement l'union, mais ce peut être
également la source de graves diffi-
cultés ultérieures. Aussi n'avons-nous
pas été autrement surpris que certains
membres du conseil ne s'en soient mon-
trés que modérément partisans.

La séance des « Douze »

C'est à 16 heures que les « Douze »,
— pour qui il n'y a décidément plus
de dimanches, — se sont réunis, sous la
présidence de M. Briand, pour prendre
connaissance des desiderata japonais.
Toutefois, avant de donner la parole
au vicomte Cecil, le ministre français
tint à signaler un malentendu qui pa-
rait s'être produit au sujet de sa lettre
du 26 novembre aux représentants de
la Chine et du Japon. Dans ce docu-
ment, M. Briand proposait que les
observateurs envoyés dans la région de
Kingtchéou « se concertent pour étu-
dier la possibilité d'établir entre les

troupes chinoises et japonaises, la dé-
marcation d'une zone neutre ou tout
autre régime destiné à éviter la prise
de contact entre ces troupes », et il
ajoutait :

« Lesdits observateurs se concerter-
ont pour établir un mode de liaison
avec les commandants des forces chi-
noises et japonaises, en vue des arran-
gements nécessaires. »

On paraît avoir cru, à Tokio, qu'il
s'agissait là de la création d'une com-
mission de contrôle de la zone neutre.
Aussi bien la réponse du cabinet japo-
nais manque-t-elle d'enthousiasme. Le
conseil a, en conséquence, jugé néces-
saire, comme le lui suggérait son pré-
sident, de corriger sans retard cette
erreur d'interprétation.

M. Yoshizawa au Quai d'Orsay

Une visite de M. Yoshizawa, qui sui-
vit de près la fin de la séance privée
— et par là-même l'exposé de lord
Robert Cecil — permit à M. Briand
de s'acquitter immédiatement de cette
mission. De son côté, le chef de la
délégation japonaise a exprimé le dé-
sir, pour faciliter l'établissement de
la zone neutre proposée et rendre im-
possible toute collision entre les trou-
pes japonaises et chinoises, que ces
dernières abandonnent, elles aussi, la
région de Kingtchéou et se retirent
dans la direction de Suang-Hai-Kouan,
c'est-à-dire vers la « Grande Mu-
raille ». Les forces du Japon regar-
nant Moukden, un vaste « no man's
land » se trouverait ainsi créé entre
les deux armées.

On se rappelle d'ailleurs que le ca-
binet de Nankin lui-même a proposé,
ces jours derniers, ce retrait derrière
la Grande Muraille... Sera-t-il possible
de l'obtenir ? Quoi qu'il en soit, la dé-
tente, depuis vingt-quatre heures, pa-
rait s'accroître sur le terrain mili-
taire. Nous verrons ce matin, lorsque
le Dr Sze se présentera devant le co-
mité de rédaction, et fera connaître
les instructions reçues par lui de Nan-
kin, s'il en est de même sur le terrain
diplomatique. — A. J.

LE RETRAIT DES TROUPES JAPONAISES

Moukden, 29 novembre (dép. Havas.)

Le retrait de la brigade japonaise
qui se dirigeait vendredi sur King-
tchéou a été pour ainsi dire terminé
aujourd'hui. Environ 200 wagons trans-
portant des soldats sont rentrés à
Moukden. En outre, un important déta-
chement est arrivé à Tsitsikar.

Un bataillon japonais est parti pour
Dairen, d'où il se rendra probablement
à destination de Tien-Tsin.

LES DECLARATIONS DE M. STIMSON

Notre correspondant particulier de
Changhai nous signalait, hier, l'émotion
soulignée à Tokio par de prétendues
déclarations de M. Stimson, secrétaire
d'Etat des Etats-Unis, qui aurait con-
damné l'attitude du Japon dans son
conflit avec la Chine. Depuis lors,
M. Stimson a été le premier à démen-
tir les propos qu'on lui prêtait. L'heu-
reux effet de ce démenti est traduit
dans la dépêche suivante :

Londres, 29 novembre (dép. Havas).
On mande de Tokio à l'agence
Reuter :

Les dépêches officielles de Washing-
ton démentant les prétendues accusa-
tions de M. Stimson à l'égard du Japon
ont eu pour effet d'apaiser l'indigna-
tion que la nouvelle avait temporaie-
ment soulevée. Après les regrets mu-
tuels qui ont été échangés de ce qu'un
compte rendu inexact ait donné lieu à
un malentendu, l'incident est mainte-

nant considéré comme clos. En consé-
quence le ministre des Affaires étran-
gères ne fera aucune déclaration pour
répondre aux accusations attribuées à
M. Stimson.

A moins que l'opinion chinoise n'ait
été rendue plus intransigente par ces
faux bruits, les milieux officiels esti-
ment que les perspectives d'une amé-
lioration de la tension sino-japonaise
sont nettement plus encourageantes,
étant donné que le maréchal Tchang
Hsue Liang a déjà accepté, en principe,
le retrait des troupes chinoises der-
rière la Grande Muraille et la création
d'une zone neutre.

MOUKDEN INQUIET

Tokio, 29 novembre (dép. Havas).
On mande de Moukden à l'agence
Rengo :

Une sentinelle japonaise de garde
à l'arsenal a été attaquée à deux re-
prises par un bandit chinois.

Bien que les soldats se fussent mis
immédiatement à sa recherche, l'agres-
seur a réussi à s'enfuir.

L'inquiétude continue à régner dans
la ville ; on entend la fusillade pres-
que toutes les nuits.

UNE BOMBE A PEKIN

Nankin, 29 novembre (dép. Radio).
Une bombe a fait explosion aujourd-
hui dans la résidence de l'attaché na-
val japonais à Pékin. On ne signale
aucune victime.

0007.30

Enclosure No. 43 to Despatch No. 2031
of December 1, 1931.

From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from *L'UNIONDIEN*, November 30, 1931.

LA CHINE insiste pour l'évacuation des troupes japonaises mais accepte la création d'une zone neutre dans la partie sud-ouest de la Mandchourie

Paris valait bien une messe... L'abandon — provisoire ? — de la marche japonaise sur Kin-Tchéou vaut bien l'acceptation par la Chine d'une zone neutre et le retrait des contingents chinois en deçà de la grande muraille.

Cette idée d'une zone neutre nous fut d'abord présentée comme venant de Tokio. On prétendit ensuite — mais cela nous eût bien surpris — qu'elle arrivait de Nankin. Nous apprenons aujourd'hui que c'est M. Brand qui, agissant au nom du Conseil, en a pris, dès le 26 novembre, l'initiative dans une lettre adressée aux représentants des deux puissances.

La réponse de la Chine a mis trois jours à nous parvenir. Le secrétariat de la S. D. N. en a publié hier le texte, daté du 27.

Il y est dit que le gouvernement chinois « donne immédiatement au commandement des forces chinoises à Kin-Tchéou » — en l'espèce le maréchal Tchang-Sue-Liang — « des ordres l'autorisant à se mettre en rapport avec les observateurs » envoyés par les gouvernements qui l'auront pu faire, « en vue de prendre les arrangements nécessaires pour éviter une prise de contact entre les forces chinoises et japonaises ».

Voilà donc un point acquis.

Mais ce n'est pas le principal, puisque, maintenant l'attitude qu'il a observée jusqu'à présent, le gouvernement chinois continue à demander que la résolution finale du conseil fixe une date — ou, dans tous les cas, une période — à l'évacuation des troupes japonaises installées en Mandchourie.

Or, ici, on ne s'entend plus. Le Japon n'acceptera jamais de retirer ses troupes tant que la sécurité de ses ressortissants ne sera pas garantie à sa convenance en Mandchourie. Ce qui, évidemment, lui donne du jeu...

Nankin finira-t-il par céder? Le Dr Sze n'en sait rien encore. Le Conseil non plus, par conséquent. On demeure dans l'attente des nouvelles instructions du gouvernement chinois.

Au surplus, une note de Tokio insiste sur la nécessité de négociation directe pour fixer les modalités d'établissement de la zone neutre.

Et en attendant, les « Trois » suent à la peine. Hier matin, en dépit des cloches dominicales, ils s'essayaient à accommoder leur projet de résolution au goût nippon et M. Ito, le juriste qui assiste M. Yoshizawa, leur suggérait les modifications que, à son avis, il y aurait lieu d'apporter aux paragraphes 1, 2 et 5 du projet.

On s'entendit assez bien sur le deuxième. Pour les autres, les « Trois » voulurent consulter les « Douze » qui, réunis à 16 heures, s'attélèrent à leur tour à la difficile besogne.

Le Japon insiste, de son côté, pour qu'il soit spécifié que le retrait de ses troupes dépend de la sécurité de ses

nationaux et de la suppression du banditisme. Qui ne voit que cela peut s'éterniser?

Ce qui, sur le champ des réalités plus tangibles, commence d'apparaître, c'est que les Chinois, éventuellement déçus du côté du conseil, tournent des regards amicaux vers Moscou. Le Kuomintang épura jadis ses rangs de la présence des communistes. Mais Borodine, répudié de Chine en 1927, pourrait bien, après tout, revenir. Ou, à son défaut, quelque autre envoyé de Moscou...

Et enfin, on oublie un peu trop à Paris que ces retards dans les broussailles de la procédure, même s'ils se terminent par une formule à peu près claire, ne changeront pas grand-chose à l'essence même du conflit.

C'est cela qu'il faut savoir dire...

On annonce d'autre part de Changhaï que la décision japonaise de rappeler les troupes qui marchaient sur Kin-Tchéou serait le résultat de pourparlers directs entre Tchang-Sue-Liang et M. Yano, chargé d'affaires japonais. La date du 15 décembre serait fixée comme date limite à laquelle les mouvements militaires japonais et chinois visés dans cet accord devront être terminés. Ceci se rapporte sans doute à un accord préliminaire de principe. — T.

Tem 5 30

Enclosure No. 44 to Despatch No. 2031
of December 1, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ETEMPS, November 30, 1931.

LA SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS ET LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS

La semaine qui commence verra-t-elle aboutir les efforts du conseil de la Société des nations pour le règlement du différend sino-japonais? On avait espéré en finir hier, même avant-hier, mais l'action du conseil a été constamment paralysée ces jours derniers par la résistance des Chinois dont les objections à certains points de la résolution en préparation révèlent une singulière intransigeance. Le changement d'attitude du gouvernement de Nankin que l'on attendait de la nomination de M. Wellington Koo au poste de ministre des affaires étrangères ne s'est pas produit jusqu'ici, soit que l'influence personnelle de M. Wellington Koo n'ait pas encore pu se faire sentir officiellement, soit que les éléments nationalistes irresponsables exercent sur le gouvernement de Nankin une pression qui l'empêche de se prêter avec plus de bonne volonté à la conciliation.

Toujours est-il que pendant une semaine on a piéliné sur place. Chaque matin on a vu naître quelque espoir qui s'évanouissait chaque soir. Quand un rapprochement paraissait se préciser entre les thèses en présence, des complications sur le terrain, parfois l'interprétation tendancieuse d'incidents non confirmés, venaient remettre tout en question. Jamais négociation ne se développa dans des conditions plus difficiles et ceux qui ont assumé la tâche ingrate de préparer une solution acceptable pour tous par des conversations privées et des interventions personnelles auprès des deux parties ont quelque mérite d'avoir soutenu inlassablement leur effort et de ne pas s'être laissé décourager par les surprises d'une diplomatie particulière dont notre mentalité occidentale peut difficilement comprendre les moyens et apprécier les méthodes. Mais il s'agissait de sauvegarder l'autorité et le prestige de la Société des nations, de maintenir la confiance des peuples dans l'action de la grande institution de Genève et dans les principes qui sont à la base de l'ordre international nouveau. Dès lors, on n'avait pas le droit d'abandonner la tâche entreprise avant qu'elle soit menée à bonne fin. Encore n'est-il pas certain que ce résultat pourra être finalement obtenu dans des conditions pleinement satisfaisantes.

Il ne faut pas se dissimuler que les obstacles auxquels s'est heurté le conseil, les précautions qu'il a dû prendre pour éviter un éclat, son hésitation à se prononcer par crainte de provoquer l'opposition déclarée d'une des parties en cause, ont eu pour effet de troubler profondément l'opinion. De toute manière, l'expérience faite avec le conflit sino-japonais se révèle décevante par les difficultés auxquelles se heurte dans la réalité des choses la procédure de Genève. La faute n'en est pas aux hommes qui, au sein du conseil, ont fait preuve de beaucoup de sens diplomatique en s'ingéniant à adapter aux nécessités politiques du moment les principes tels qu'ils sont fixés par des formules parfois trop rigides. La faute en est aux conditions mêmes dans lesquelles la Société des nations, institution universelle tenue d'appliquer une règle commune à des Etats inégalement évolués, est obligée de poursuivre son action, alors que tous les moyens d'imposer pratiquement ses décisions lui sont refusés.

Du moins est-on en droit de considérer qu'au seuil de cette troisième semaine de la session du conseil des perspectives existent en faveur d'une solution de principe? On sait dans quel sens s'élabore la résolution qui, si elle est adoptée à l'unanimité, devrait avoir logiquement pour effet de mettre fin aux hostilités et de préparer utilement le terrain pour des négociations directes entre le Japon et la Chine : d'une part, retrait des troupes japonaises, sans fixer de date pour la fin de l'évacuation, celle-ci restant subordonnée à la garantie par les autorités chinoises de la sécurité des résidents nippons; d'autre part, nomination d'une commission chargée d'étudier sur place la situation et de faire rapport au conseil. Mais si l'on est d'accord sur cette double base, l'entente n'a pu se faire jusqu'ici sur les modalités qui doivent donner à la résolution son véritable caractère et sa véritable portée. Chaque fois que les « Douze » ont cru trouver la formule définitive, ils ont dû reprendre le texte élaboré pour essayer de concilier de nouvelles exigences japonaises et surtout chinoises.

Le gouvernement de Tokio a renoncé à insister, pour l'instant, sur le principal des cinq « points fondamentaux », c'est-à-dire la reconnaissance officielle par la Chine des traités dont le Japon tient ses droits en Mandchourie; et, de plus, il a commencé par ramener effectivement ses troupes dans la zone du chemin de fer Sud-Mandchourien. Comme il admet, d'autre part, qu'une zone neutre soit créée dans la région de Tchiao-Tchéou de manière à prévenir dans la mesure du possible tout contact direct entre les forces nippones et les forces chinoises, il apparaît bien que le Japon a fait des concessions d'autant plus importantes qu'il est maître de la situation sur le terrain. La Chine, par contre, s'obstine à formuler des réserves, car, n'ayant pas obtenu les avantages politiques qu'elle attendait de l'intervention du conseil de la Société des nations, elle voudrait du moins assurer à son opinion publique sur-excitée la satisfaction de voir fixer un délai précis pour le retrait total des troupes japonaises. Or, c'est là une condition à laquelle le Japon ne souscrit en aucun cas, puisqu'il est admis en principe que, dans les localités occupées, les forces de police nippones ne seront retirées qu'à mesure que les autorités chinoises seront en situation de garantir la sécurité des ressortissants japonais.

C'est en réalité là que réside toute la difficulté. Celle-ci est sérieuse, on le conçoit, aussi longtemps que subsiste le danger de nouvelles hostilités. La menace d'une attaque sur Tchiao-Tchéou est maintenant écartée et, d'autre part, il y a une accalmie à Tien-Tsin, mais il est bien certain que des alertes de cette nature tiennent toutes les méfiances en éveil. Si Nankin doit tenir compte de la pression des éléments nationalistes les plus exaltés, Tokio est obligé de ménager une opinion publique très vigilante qui n'admet pas que le gouvernement pousse l'esprit de conciliation jusqu'au sacrifice des intérêts du Japon et du droit de légitime défense des troupes nippones en Mandchourie. Au point où l'on en est, il n'est pas possible que l'accord ne se fasse pas, et il importe qu'il se fasse le plus vite possible, car il est urgent de mettre fin à la tragique confusion dans laquelle on se débat depuis des semaines. L'incident provoqué par des déclarations du secrétaire d'Etat américain, M. Stimson, déclarations qui furent mal interprétées à Tokio, témoigne du degré de nervosité auquel en sont arrivés les esprits. Ce sont des symptômes qui, à des heures de tension comme celles-ci, ne laissent pas d'être inquiétants.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

GRAY

FROM

Shanghai via N.R.

Dated December 10, 1931

Secretary of State,
Washington

Rec'd 12:55 p.m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
DEC 10 1931
Department of State

December 10, 2 p.m.

The following telegram has been sent to the Legation
and Nanking:

"December 10, 1 p.m. Chinese students yesterday and
last evening damaged Kuomintang headquarters and sur-
rounded Mayor's office demanding inter alia dismissal of
Commissioner of Public Safety. They spent the night
there and were still demonstrating this morning. They
have made no attempts to enter settlement yet and settle-
ment officials declare they are fully prepared to deal
with them if they do. Barbed wire entanglements placed
across some but not all of the bridges along Siccawei
Creek between French concession and Chinese territory and
extra police on duty, but otherwise conditions appear
normal this morning."

GUNNINGHAM

WSB

F/DEW

793.94/3147

REC 15-1931

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

FROM

GREEN

Paris

Dated

Rec'd 2:30 p.m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DEC 14 1931
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Secretary of State,
Washington

RUSH DOUBLE PRIORITY.

873, December 10, 7 p.m.

FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
DEC 10 1931
Department of State

After wiring you the tentative text of my statement
if occurs to me that it might be a basis of a statement
by you later or issued as an individual statement by
me tomorrow, as you may decide. I do think that an
understanding by the public of the situation in which
Japan and China find themselves which apparently has
resulted in the ceasing of further negotiations as to
a neutral zone constitutes the only chance of avoiding
the taking of Chinchow by the Japanese.

SHAW

WWC-WSB

F/LEW 793.94/3143

DEC 14 1931
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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75



TITLE UNDER SECRETARY
JAN 12 1932
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

REGU

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
The Hague, Netherlands

November 28, 1931.

DEC 10 31

DEPARTMENT OF STATE


DEC 18 1931

DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
DEC 11 1931
Department of State

No: 204

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY AND UNDER-SECRETARY



FOR DISTRIBUTION - CHECK
To the Field
In U. S. A.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that at a dinner given for me on the 24th instant by Dr. Joost A. van Hamel, former High Commissioner of the League of Nations at Danzig, and for a number of years connected with the Secretariat of the League as Chief of the Legal Committee, a very interesting conversation took place in the library between the gentlemen of the party, which comprised, the host; the Minister for the

Colonies;

WFE
12-17-31 204

F/DEV 793.94/3149

JAN 3 1932

-2-

Colonies; Sir Cecil Hurst, one of the Judges of the Permanent Court of International Justice; a judge of the Supreme Court of The Netherlands; and myself.

They were all absorbed in the Sino - Japanese conflict in Manchuria and agreed that the interests and nationals of Japan had apparently been jeopardized to such an extent that military operations could not well be avoided.

The Minister for the Colonies was outspoken in expressing his lack of faith in China. He pointed to the chaotic conditions and the state of dissolution that had prevailed there for years and said that as far as the Dutch East Indies were concerned there was nothing to fear from Japan but that China might become a real menace in case the present disintegrating and anarchistic forces were not checked. There was danger that the gradual weakening and decline of the country might eventually lead to Russian penetration. He went so far as to express the hope that Japan would be able to dominate Manchuria, as that would form a bulwark against Russian bolshevism and ~~have a~~ stabilizing influence in China. He admired Japan as a country of law and order and praised the Japanese for their organizing and constructive ability.

Summing up the whole situation in the Far East the Minister said that it would have a very demoralizing effect in the different colonial possessions if the United States should withdraw from the Philippines and give them complete independence. In that event Japan would, in his opinion,

take

8/1/85-01

-3-

take possession of the archipelago and that might lead to complications.

He confessed, however, that the Dutch East Indies had no fault to find with Japan as a neighbor and he did not think that they had anything to fear from that quarter.

At this point in the conversation Sir Cecil Hurst interposed the remark that if the Philippine Islands were given complete independence "it would set the whole East ablaze".

With respect to Manchuria he recommended the reading of an article in the November issue of the Fortnightly Review, entitled "A Danger Signal in the Far East", by O.M. Green, late editor of the North China Daily News, who emphasises the seriousness of the Manchurian situation. Sir Cecil considered the contribution very illuminating and thought that it made out a rather strong case for Japan.

Dr. van Hamel recalled the bombarding of Corfu by an Italian fleet in August, 1923. He was at that time Chief of the Legal Committee of the League of Nations and sought the opinion of Mr. Mineiteiro Adatci, who was the first deputy-delegate of Japan at the First Assembly of the League and the Plenipotentiary of his country at subsequent meetings, and who is now the President of the Permanent Court of International Justice. Dr. van Hamel desired to know what military actions could be considered as not falling within the category of war.

It will be recalled that in connection with the

Corfu

-4-

Corfu incident the Council of the League referred to a committee of jurists the question of legal principle which the case had raised with regard to the competence of the Council, the right of coercive action, and the responsibility of a State for crimes committed on its territory.

It transpired in the conversation under report that Sir Cecil Hurst had been a member of the committee that formulated the question which the Council submitted to the jurists.

In referring to this matter now Dr. van Hamel thought it very interesting and significant that on the occasion mentioned above Mr. Adatci had said that with a view to possible future developments in China it was necessary for Japan to be very careful in the matter of committing herself to a rigid rule.

Dr. van Hamel went on to say that the condition which Mr. Adatci had anticipated was now the cause of serious dispute, and in that connection the Japanese Government demanded that military operations designed to assure the security of its nationals shall not be construed as a hostile act.

I may add that Mr. van Kleffens, the Chief of the Diplomatic Division of the Foreign Office, is of the impression that in the present Sino - Japanese controversy the preponderating sympathy of the man in the street is with China.

Respectfully yours,



3 Carbon Copies -

Received R. P.

Laurits S. Swenson.

In quadruplicate.

LSS:RIM.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

FROM

GREEN

Paris

Dated December 10,

Rec'd 1:45 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

872, December 10, 6 p.m.


FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES.

Following is text of unilateral declaration regarding bandits to be made by Japanese representative at this afternoon's public meeting of Council. This of course is in lieu of corresponding provision in Briand's declaration:

"With regard to paragraph two of the draft resolution now before the Council I am happy to accept it on behalf of the Japanese Government on the understanding that this paragraph is not intended to preclude the Japanese forces (END SECTION ONE)

SHAW

HPD-RR



F/DEW

793.94/3150

DEC 14 1931

FILED

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

GREEN

FROM

Paris

Dated December 10, 1931

Rec'd 2:45 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

TRIPLE PRIORITY

872, December 10, 6 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

from taking such action as may be rendered necessary
to provide directly for the protection of the lives
and property of Japanese subjects against the activities
of bandits and lawless elements rampant in various parts
of Manchuria. Such action is admittedly an exceptional
measure called for by the special situation prevailing
in Manchuria, and its necessity will naturally be
obviated when normal conditions shall have been restored
in that region."

(END MESSAGE)

SHAW

OSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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
FROM

GREEN

PARIS

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Rec'd. 2.50 pm




SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

TRIPLE PRIORITY

December 10, 6 pm

FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES



I am telegraphing two messages numbers 871, December 10 5 pm in three sections, and 873, December 10, 7 pm, one section only, all routed by Western Union which I desire the Secretary of State to have before him when I telephone him at 5 o'clock, Washington time. The two messages were put on Embassy wire shortly before 6:20 pm, Paris time. Please rush deciphering.

SHAW

HPD

DEC 14 1931
FILED

F/DEM 793.94/3151

793.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

rh


FROM

GREEN

PARIS

DEPT.

Rec'd. 2.50 pm




SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

TRIPLE PRIORITY

December 10, 6 pm

FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES



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SHAW

HPD

F/DEW 793.94/3151


DEC 14 1931
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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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FROM



Rec'd 2:40 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

793.94
TRIPLE PRIORITY.

871, December 10, 5 p.m.

FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES.



After our telephone conversation I notified Briand that I would not make the statement which I telephoned to you and which, for your information, is as follows;

"The patient labor of the Council has now resulted in an agreement of China and Japan to refrain from future aggression and for the appointment of a commission. This agreement, if faithfully observed by both parties, may well lead to a final and peaceful solution of this difficult problem.

For the moment, through a misunderstanding alone the discussion of a most promising effort of bringing a cessation of hostilities between China and Japan is in

abeyance

F/DEW 793.94/3152

FILED
DEC 14 1931

MET

2-#871 from Paris, December
10, 1931

abeyance. The misunderstanding arose as follows: Dr. Wellington Koo discussed tentatively with certain foreign ministers at Nanking the cessation of hostilities between the armies and the mutual withdrawal of forces around Chenchow. This suggestion was not intended as a proposal to the Japanese Government but was made merely for the purpose of sounding out on the subject the powers represented by the ministers. This tentative suggestion of Dr. Koo's which he did not intend should be made to the Japanese Government, was conveyed to it in such a way that Japan regarded it as a definite proposition. The Japanese Government then made a definite proposition embodying the idea, agreeing to be responsible to the League for its observance of the arrangements if made and this was a chief factor in causing orders to be given for a retreat of its troops which were already advancing. As matters stand at present therefore the Japanese public have the impression that Japan has been misled into troop withdrawal and China having made its suggestion only for discussions, is in a position where if she orders her troops to withdraw,

MET

3-#871 from Paris, December 10,
1931

withdraw, the public impression in China is created that China has been coerced. The situation is this: China in good faith made a constructive suggestion for discussion which having been presented to Japan as a proposition instead of a suggestion, Japan then in good faith ordered a troop withdrawal.

An understanding of this situation by the public ~~(of)~~ both nations should make possible the further exploration of the original idea of Dr. Wellington Koo and the consequent proposition of Japan for a mutually satisfactory arrangement for a cessation of hostilities around Chinchow and a redistribution of the respective forces to avoid the risk of conflict. The continuance of such a discussion involves no humiliating concessions by either of the nations and will only emphasize the earnest desire of both for honorable peace".


SHAW

~~(*) apparent omission.~~

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



No. 1148.




DEC 10 31

EMBASSY OF THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Rome, November 24, 1931.



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FOR DISTRIBUTION - CHECK	
To the Field	Yes No
In U. S. A.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

With reference to my despatch No. 1140 of November 19, 1931, regarding Sino-Japanese relations, I have the honor to inform the Department that the Italian press continues to follow with interest the development of events in Manchuria and the contemporaneous sessions of the League Council in Paris.

Signor Luigi Barzini, a well known journalist writing in the semi-official POPOLO D'ITALIA, states that while the situation in Manchuria is indeed a grave

crisis

JAN 4 - 1932

FILED

- 2 -

500 C
crisis, its intrinsic importance is small by contrast with that of possible League action which the event may precipitate. In other words, says the writer, what is now taking place is an acid test of the League as an instrument of international conciliation, although unfortunately the Sino-Japanese disagreement has such a special character and is so far removed from the phenomenon of real war between organized nations as known to Europe, that the test is not fair. Signor Barzini, after recounting the history of Japanese interests in Manchuria, points out the political anachronism of a China which, while a full-fledged sovereign state in international gatherings, cannot impose the domestic authority of its central government much beyond the range of its guns defending the capital. The Chinese government, he says, is stronger at Geneva than at Nanking. "Whatever may be the goodwill of the regime in China, it is not able to dominate chaos or assume responsibility toward foreigners." For the proof of this fact, adds the writer, one must look not in diplomatic notes, but in the reports of the missionaries, where one finds that thirty million non-combatants, mostly women and children, have died in the course of fifteen years of revolution as a direct result of disorder. Unfortunately, Signor Barzini continues, the League cannot officially take cognizance of these factors, since they are domestic.

Manchuria, says the writer, has been a safety valve for the dangerously overcharged Japanese boiler, and one which had to be maintained in good condition. To the Japanese notes calling for observance of treaty rights, reparations and simple justice, China, according to Signor Barzini, has

either

- 3 -

either turned a deaf ear or has made insolent reply for reasons of face, organizing a huge anti-Japanese boycott. Japan then, he continues, undertook limited operations of military character in Manchuria similar to those of the United States in Vera Cruz in 1914 and in Nicaragua in 1927, when American commerce was endangered. In his opinion, China's protest to the League tended to give the Japanese measure a warlike appearance, but he doubts whether the League would wish to take steps to perpetuate an "intolerable and apocalyptic disorder" and whether even if it should, Japan might not find that the certain material and moral damage, future and immediate, incident to a withdrawal would not outweigh the problematical effect of any eventual international sanctions. For China, in the throes of "decomposition through decay like that of the great Arab empire", he asks whether the true remedy would not be the application of a system of mandates.

In another article written by the New York correspondent of the STAMPA, dealing with the relations of America and the League, Signor Amerigo Ruggiero discusses the dissatisfaction of the two radical groups, the isolationists and those who support the Covenant, at America's alleged "future entry into the Council on a subterfuge of treaty interpretation." Signor Ruggiero finds the question of future American participation in the League a burning one, but states that

"Japan by consenting, after its original refusals, to have the United States at the Council, has rendered it almost impossible

for

- 4 -

for the latter to remain outside
future controversies without thereby
demonstrating an interested and dis-
loyal partiality."

He concludes with the statement that just as the world
crisis proved to the United States that it could not be
entirely independent economically, the Manchurian crisis
has proved that it cannot be entirely independent politi-
cally.

Respectfully yours,

Alexander Kirk
Alexander Kirk
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim.

✓
Enclosures:

Clippings.

Copy to E.I.C.

SC/ajl
710.

— forzò col minaccioso invio delle flotte il Giappone a ritirarsi dalla Manciuria e la Russia subentrò senza colpo ferire al Giappone, impossessandosi della penisola di Liao-Tung, nella quale fortificò Porto Arturo e costruì Dalny (ora Dairen). Sorse la ferrovia transiberiana per unire l'Impero russo alla sua nuova colonia cinese. Nel 1901 la Russia, approfittando del sommovimento dei Boxers, completò di sorpresa l'occupazione della intera Manciuria, massacrando incidentalmente ventimila cinesi nella sola frontiera settentrionale.

Fortificato dall'Alleanza inglese, nel 1904 il Giappone muoveva guerra alla Russia, vincendo e conquistava per la seconda volta la Manciuria. Senonché, per il trattato di pace di Portsmouth, il Giappone restituì la Manciuria alla Cina meno la penisola di Liao-Tung, e ritenne in diretto possesso la ferrovia meridionale mancinese, con il diritto di mantenere guarnigioni di guardia lungo la zona ferroviaria. Il Giappone ebbe inoltre il riconoscimento di una sfera di influenza sull'intero territorio al sud di Harbin.

La Manciuria dunque, conquistata due volte dal Giappone in dieci anni, divenuta nel frattempo una provincia russa, è tornata alla Cina con specialissime esclusioni e limitazioni. Una striscia di occupazione giapponese, legale, permanente e armata, la percorre come una spina dorsale. E, se una sfera d'influenza non è un protettorato impone tuttavia alla sovranità del paese restrizioni ed obblighi evidenti. Non si possono negare al Giappone eccezionali diritti al mantenimento dell'ordine nella sua sfera d'influenza in Manciuria, dove ha masse di emigrati, interessi commerciali ed industriali enormi e vitali, ed il possesso indiretto di nuove ferrovie costruite con i suoi denari ed affidate all'amministrazione cinese.

Sulla parte settentrionale della provincia, la Russia ha analoghi diritti, ed abbiamo visto due anni fa come essa non abbia esitato a farli valere con la forza armata quando la Cina tentò di rendersi esclusiva padrona della ferrovia orientale (quella che unisce la Siberia al porto di Vladivostok). Il regime della Manciuria dunque, dal punto di vista del diritto internazionale, è molto meno semplice di quello di una provincia che faccia parte integrale di una Nazione e sia soggetta ad una sovranità assoluta, definita, totale, non ammettente controlli e interferenze.

* *

Vi è di più. Il Governo della Cina, che, per essere membro della Società delle Nazioni, possiede una faccia perfettamente legale al tavolo verde delle Conferenze internazionali, dove siede in assoluta eguaglianza con i Governi civili e reclama la loro solidarietà, è di fatto il rappresentante di una tragica impotenza e di una spaventosa anarchia. La sovranità cinese è ridotta ad un assioma diplomatico. La sua autorità effettiva non sorpassa il raggio d'azione di quei cannoni che per il momento si degnano di difendere la capitale. Sballottato da perpetue insurrezioni caotiche che divampano, si spengono e rinascono annientando le ultime vestigia di un ordine antichissimo e di una organizzazione na-

lenta e nobile fatica patriottica per la creazione di una Cina moderna e democratica.

Alla metà del secolo scorso, la Cina già decaduta generò quella terribile rivoluzione dei Tai-Ping che, secondo calcoli ritenuti conservativi, costò la vita a quindici milioni di persone. Ma intervenne allora un famoso generale inglese, Gordon, che doveva poi gloriosamente assumere in Egitto il titolo di Pascià, il quale mise facilmente le cose al posto con qualche reggimento di fucilieri britannici e l'ausilio del genio politico del grande statista cinese Li-Hung-Chang. Adesso Gordon Pascià il pacificatore sarebbe considerato un aggressore pericoloso per la pace nominale del mondo.

* *

La Manciuria, grazie al suo benessere e alle distanze, è rimasta per lungo tempo fuori dell'uragano rivoluzionario, che passa e ripassa da un capo all'altro dell'antico impero divorando i propri avanzi.

La capitale diveniva nomade, esultava da una città all'altra, da una trincea all'altra; quando si trattava con Pechino il Governo vero era a Canton (come avvenne alla Conferenza di Washington); la sede del potere andava alla deriva sulla tempesta, passava per Han-Kow, compariva di nuovo a Pechino, ribattezzata in Peking, sostava a Tien-Tsin, scendeva a Nankino, con un Governo scacciato, sostituito, vincitore, vinto, rifatto e peregrinante. Ma Mukden era in pace, se non assolutamente tranquilla, e la Manciuria, rifugio di tutte le iniziative e le emigrazioni scacciate dal resto della Cina, prosperava con una popolazione quadruplicata in venti anni.

Il potere del Governo della Cina rivoluzionaria non è mai arrivato di fatto alla Manciuria, nemmeno quando vi è arrivato il disordine.

Nankino non può assolutamente niente su quello che avviene al nord del Fiume Giallo, e molto poco su quello che avviene al sud. Finché a Mukden si è mantenuto un dominio praticamente autonomo e forte, tutto è andato bene lassù. Ma da due anni quel dominio si è spezzato in piccole baronie che vivono fuori di ogni controllo. Se il Governo cinese potesse dare ordini ai generali mancesi, lo avrebbe fatto da un pezzo. E del resto è provato che nemmeno i generali mancesi possono dare sempre ordini alle proprie truppe. Il Giappone, che ha bisogno della prosperità mancinese (risorsa di masse emigrate e di commerci senza altri sfoghi), come una caldaia in pressione ha bisogno di una valvola per non scoppiare, ha avuto ben distrutti, traffici paralizzanti, danni di ogni genere, da quando il disordine è penetrato in Manciuria; cioè negli ultimi due anni.

E' una lunga storia, nota a tutti, quella delle proteste del Giappone alla Cina, dei suoi richiami alla osservanza dei trattati, delle sue domande di riparazione e di giustizia, e si sa come le sue note diplomatiche non abbiano ricevuto che risposte evasive e spesso audacemente insolenti — perché l'arroganza è un modo asiatico di «salvare la faccia». — Con lo Statuto della Lega delle Nazioni alla mano, e la scienza giuridica del dottor Szi alla bocca, la Cina è formida-

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November 21, 1931. page 5

Despatch No. 1148

L'America e la Lega

NEW YORK, novembre.

Il conflitto tra Cina e Giappone in Manciuria ha prodotto un avvenimento di primaria importanza. Per la prima volta gli Stati Uniti si sono uniti al Consiglio della Lega delle Nazioni ed hanno preso parte ad un'azione internazionale per allontanare la minaccia di una guerra. Il precedente così stabilito certamente avrà grande peso nel futuro atteggiamento degli Stati Uniti ogni volta che crisi simili sorgessero. Quando nel settembre scorso Mukden fu occupata dai giapponesi, la Cina si appellò immediatamente alla Lega delle Nazioni la quale chiese a Tokio delle spiegazioni, mentre il rappresentante giapponese a Ginevra promise che le truppe sarebbero state richiamate. La Lega chiese pure agli Stati Uniti di unirsi alla protesta da inviarsi alla Cina e al Giappone. Il Dipartimento di Stato americano acconsentì e mandò per conto suo due note assai moderate ai Governi di Nankin e di Tokio domandando loro di rispettare i vari trattati a cui avevano sottoscritto. Non fu fatta specificatamente menzione del Trattato del 1922 con cui il Giappone s'impegnava espressamente ad astenersi da qualsiasi azione intesa a violare l'indipendenza, la sovranità e l'integrità territoriale della Cina. Né fu richiamato il Patto Kellogg col quale ambedue le nazioni acconsentivano a sistemare le loro divergenze solo con mezzi pacifici. Questa mossa, condotta con gran tatto da parte degli Stati Uniti, non portò ad alcuna conclusione. Le truppe giapponesi non solo non furono ritirate dal territorio cinese, ma estesero le loro operazioni. Fu allora che il Consiglio della Lega decise di riunirsi in sessione straordinaria per riconsiderare la situazione. Essa deliberò subito d'invitare un rappresentante americano a prender parte ai lavori, passando sopra all'energica opposizione del Giappone contro l'intrusione di un membro che non faceva parte regolare della Lega. Per non aumentare le difficoltà fino al limite di una rottura pericolosa, il Consiglio di Ginevra girò la situazione e decise d'invocare il Patto Kellogg contro le due Nazioni in conflitto. Il Governo di Washington, indeciso dapprima sul corso da seguire, ritenne di potersi unire alla Lega sulla base del Patto Kellogg. Ma la politica seguita dagli Stati Uniti in questa circostanza ha lasciato insoddisfatta gran parte dell'opinione pubblica americana. La si trova ondeggiante, poco sicura e contraddittoria. Si ritiene che se il Governo americano avesse subito dopo l'occupazione di Mukden avanzata la sua protesta in nome del Patto Kellogg, l'azione avrebbe avuto maggior efficacia. Nella maniera com'è avvenuta, l'invocazione del Patto è apparsa un ripiego e solo deliberata in un secondo tempo. Con la sua indecisione iniziale, Washington dimostrò di non aver una fede incrollabile in detto accordo, dal momento che per esigerne l'osservanza ha dovuto esser chiesto l'aiuto delle altre Potenze. La stessa Lega sembra aver favorito il Patto solo come un mezzo per assicurarsi la cooperazione americana. D'altra parte, la risoluzione del Governo americano di unirsi alla Lega nel compito di sistemare la crisi manciuriana ha avuto l'effetto di suscitare i sospetti di Tokio. Essendo la prima volta che esso ha cooperato col Consiglio

Stati Uniti sarebbero stati strosamente coinvolti, la mossa è stata guardata con profonda diffidenza da parte del Giappone ed ha potentemente rafforzato l'impero orientale nella determinazione di opporsi a qualsiasi intromissione delle Nazioni occidentali in quello che esso considera un problema interessante esclusivamente la Cina e il Giappone. Un'altra conseguenza inaspettata può derivare dall'azione degli Stati Uniti. Se questo Governo avesse invocato il Patto Kellogg di sua propria iniziativa, come avvenne due anni fa nella disputa russo-cinese per la ferrovia orientale della Cina, avrebbe dovuto cooperare col Governo dei Sovieti, il che sarebbe stato in contrasto con l'ostinata politica americana di non riconoscimento della Russia comunista. Per togliersi d'imbarazzo senza venir meno all'atteggiamento assunto, ha preferito scaricarsi del compito di portar in azione il Patto antibellico sul Consiglio ginevrino. Procedimento che esclude la Russia.

seguito dall'Amministrazione di Hoover rende praticamente l'America un membro della Lega delle Nazioni. E vedono il Paese, contro il suo volere ed i suoi espressi desideri, barcollare sull'orlo dell'abisso europeo, dove basta la più leggera spinta da qualsiasi direzione per immergersi fino al collo nello scompiglio tragico che agita l'Europa. Hoover dovrebbe disfarsi della sua mentalità internazionalista e soprattutto liberarsi dall'illusione wilsoniana che egli sia il Presidente di tutto il mondo.

L'esser entrati furtivamente nella Lega, servendosi di un sotterfugio fornito dall'interpretazione di un trattato, non persuade neanche coloro che, in massima, sarebbero favorevoli alla compartecipazione stabile degli Stati Uniti alla Lega. Il modo usato in questa circostanza speciale, offende e umilia quella parte dell'opinione pubblica e della stampa che non son ligi di proposito alla politica dell'Amministrazione. In questi ambienti si ritiene che la Nazione non possa diventare un membro attivo della Lega per un determinato caso e rifiutarsi in altri casi. Il Giappone, acconsentendo dopo le prime resistenze alla partecipazione degli Stati Uniti alla Lega, ha reso loro pressoché impossibile il mantenersene fuori nelle future controversie senza dimostrare una parzialità interessata e sleale. Il sentimento della Nazione è assai mutato dagli anni in cui si credeva necessario d'ignorare perfino le comunicazioni della Lega. Gli Stati Uniti, negli ultimi dieci

anni, hanno fatto l'esperimento di un completo isolamento dall'Europa. Questo Paese s'è tenuto lontano dalla Lega; ha rifiutato di partecipare alla Corte Mondiale; ha innalzato tariffe quasi impassabili ed ha obbligato i Governi esteri a fare gravi pagamenti. Per dieci anni l'America ha agito come se il resto del mondo fosse un posto dove scaricare l'eccedenza dei suoi prodotti e dei suoi capitali. Ma il risultato finale è stato che nel 1931 gli Stati Uniti hanno dovuto chiedere la sospensione dei debiti di guerra, perché era impossibile poterli collettare, qualsiasi cosa facessero per riuscirci. E in ultimo han mandato un rappresentante per prender parte ai lavori della Lega, mentre sperano con grande ansia di trovare una via atta a ristabilire il credito e la fiducia internazionale. La depressione mondiale ha fornito la prova che gli Stati Uniti non sono riusciti a mantenersi economicamente isolati dal mondo. L'incidente giapponese dimostra che essi non hanno potuto conservare l'isolamento politico. Si avvicina sempre più l'ora che questo Paese riveda tutta la sua politica nei riguardi dell'Europa ed assuma le sue responsabilità francamente e a viso aperto. E un primo passo sarebbe l'entrata nella Lega come membro regolare, non fosse altro per metter termine all'assurdo di una Nazione fattasi promotrice di una Lega da cui ha stimato bene tenersi lontana.

AMERIGO RUGGIERO.

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November 21, 1931. page 5

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L'America e la Lega

NEW YORK, novembre.

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anni, hanno fatto l'esperimento di un completo isolamento dall'Europa. Questo Paese s'è tenuto lontano dalla Lega; ha rifiutato di partecipare alla Corte Mondiale; ha innalzato tariffe quasi impassabili ed ha obbligato i Governi esteri a fare gravi pagamenti. Per dieci anni l'America ha agito come se il resto del mondo fosse un posto dove scaricare l'eccedenza dei suoi prodotti e dei suoi capitali. Ma il risultato finale è stato che nel 1931 gli Stati Uniti hanno dovuto chiedere la sospensione dei debiti di guerra, perché era impossibile poterli collettare, qualsiasi cosa facessero per riuscirvi. E in ultimo han mandato un rappresentante per prender parte ai lavori della Lega, mentre sperano con grande ansia di trovare una via atta a ristabilire il credito e la fiducia internazionale. La depressione mondiale ha fornito la prova che gli Stati Uniti non sono riusciti a mantenersi economicamente isolati dal mondo. L'incidente giapponese dimostra che essi non hanno potuto conservare l'isolamento politico. Si avvicina sempre più l'ora che questo Paese riveda tutta la sua politica nei riguardi dell'Europa ed assuma le sue responsabilità francamente e a viso aperto. E' un primo passo sarebbe l'entrata nella Lega come membro regolare, non fosse altro per metter termine all'assurdo di una Nazione fattasi promotrice di una Lega da cui ha stimato bene tenersi lontana.

AMERIGO RUGGIERO.

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LA STAMPA, Torino
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Despatch No.

L'America e la Lega

NEW YORK, novembre.

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AMERIGO RUGGIERO.

LA STAMPA, Turin.
November 19, 1961, page 1

Despatch No. 1148

La vana fatica diplomatica

Parigi, 18 notte.

La Lega delle Nazioni è sempre in cerca di una via di uscita dall'imbroglio mancese. Il cosiddetto Comitato dei dodici ha tenuto stamane una seduta segreta senza la partecipazione dei rappresentanti delle parti in causa, e oggi nel pomeriggio una seduta privata alla presenza di questi ultimi.

Nella seconda di tali riunioni, l'Ambasciatore giapponese Yoshizawa ha fatto la storia degli accordi diplomatici stipulati fra il Giappone e la Cina relativamente alla Manciuria, allo scopo di giustificare le esigenze del loro rispetto da parte del Governo di Nanchino. Questi Trattati sono tre. Il Trattato 22 dicembre 1905 e il Protocollo di Pechino dell'aprile 1906, il primo che trasmette al Giappone i diritti posseduti dalla Russia — prima della sua guerra disgraziata coi giapponesi e la pace di Portsmouth che ne fu la conclusione sulla penisola di Liao-Tung e la ferrovia da Tciang-Tciun a Porto Arturo; il secondo, che regola una serie di questioni relative a quella ferrovia chiamata — come abbiamo detto — del Sud della Manciuria, e vieta in particolare modo alla Cina la costruzione di un'altra grande linea vicina e parallela, suscettibile di nuocere ai suoi interessi. C'è poi il Trattato del 4 settembre 1909, detto Trattato di Cientao, che apriva agli stranieri — e in particolare modo ai giapponesi — la regione attigua alla frontiera coreana, e accordava al Giappone, oltre certi diritti di protezione per i suoi sudditi, il diritto di costruire una ferrovia da Kainei a Kirin. Da ultimo il Giappone invoca il Trattato del 1915, il quale rinnova e porta a 99 anni la durata dell'affitto della penisola di Liao-Tung ove si trovano Porto Arturo e Dairen rinnova per la stessa durata la concessione della ferrovia del sud mancese, e della ferrovia Mukden-Antung, e infine riconosce ai sudditi giapponesi diritti commerciali, agricoli, minerari, industriali e di residenza, non soltanto nella Manciuria meridionale, ma anche nella Mongolia orientale. In linea di diritto la rivendicazione giapponese sembra abbastanza forte, essendo essa appoggiata a testi difficilmente oppugnabili dall'avversario.

Aile allegazioni dei rappresentanti nipponici, la Cina, tuttavia, per bocca del dottor Sze, risponde che dall'epoca in cui i citati strumenti diplomatici vennero stipulati sono avvenuti sul territorio dello Stato molti cambiamenti, e che la situazione attuale non consente più al Governo di Nanchino di rispettare integralmente i cinque punti dell'accordo del 1915.

In sostanza uno dei lati più interessanti della vertenza mancese è per l'appunto questo: che essa riproduce il dissidio fondamentale da cui è politicamente divisa l'Europa di oggi: quello cioè fra il rispetto dei Trattati e la necessità di sottoporli a opportune deroghe e modificazioni. I partigiani della Cina e della Russia, che sottomano la assiste, speravano forse che gli Stati Uniti avrebbero gettato sulla bilancia il peso della loro spada per intimidire Tokio.

Ma Tokio non si lascia intimidire facilmente, e il generale Dawes mantiene finora a Parigi un atteggiamento molto prudente, e diremo quasi indeciso, che qualche giornale francese vuol spiegare col fatto che il Governo di Washington esiterebbe a condannare esplicitamente la penetrazione giapponese in Manciuria per il timore che altri possano rinfiacciare agli Stati Uniti la loro politica imperialistica nell'America Centrale.

In tali condizioni il Consiglio della Lega procede a tentoni, e senza sapere precisamente quali pesci pigliare, nell'unica speranza che gli avversari non vorranno far subire all'istituto ginevrino uno scacco brutale, e che si presteranno gentilmente a trovare un compromesso


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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

IL LAVORO FASCISTA. Rome.
November 20, 1931. page 1.

Despatch No. _____



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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

FROM

Peiping

Dated December 10, 1931

Rec'd 2:50 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington

1065, December 10, 5 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

In the course of a conversation yesterday with

Donald, adviser to Marshal Chang, the following views were expressed by him which were later confirmed by Walter Young, author of recent books on Manchuria, who is cooperating with Donald:

A Japanese attack on Chinchow seems to be impending. Yano, Counsellor of the Japanese Legation, has told the young Marshal that direct negotiations are the only alternative. Yano mentioned no specific terms but implied that Shidehara would be ready to negotiate even with Marshal Chang. The latter is unwilling to do so without authorization from Nanking but favors informal conversations here and keeping Nanking informed. He seems anxious for a settlement on fair terms with due respect for existing treaties and with a view to securing

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FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
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Department of State

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2-1065 from Peiping, December 10,
1931.

securing Japan's economic position in Manchuria. Young Marshal desires to defend area immediately south of Chinchow especially Shanhaikwan as Chinchow itself cannot be defended. In this connection T. V. Soong has promised that some troops from the south would soon be moved towards Tientsin however the Marshal's most pressing immediate problem seems to be the attitude of the old Fengtien generals who want him to resign in order to be able to "sell out to the Japanese". But the young Marshal may disappoint them by fighting for the Chinchow area which would also reassure the students and the general public some of whom are clamoring for military action. The student situation in Peiping is for the present under control due to a program to enlist their energies in defense corps with the assistance of the heads of educational institutions.

Soong now shares Marshal Chang's views regarding necessity of fighting to defend last vestige of authority in the Chinchow area. Nanking's negotiations with the Japanese Minister have failed owing to refusal of Japanese military to withdraw troops. Nanking Government never committed itself to withdrawal of Chinese troops

to

MET

3-1065 from Peiping, December 10,
1931.

to Shanhaikwan. Grave financial embarrassment with which Central Government is now faced invites internal upheavals which are evidently expected by the Japanese military to assist them in their desire to impose severe terms.

Hostility to the League's inaction is now resulting in a serious internal crisis especially as students from Shanghai, Peiping and Nanking are beginning to press the military for war of self-defense or demanding overthrow of the Government. Hope in the League is fast disappearing and although China is grateful for Secretary Stimson's statement on Shidehara's promise regarding Chinchow it is losing confidence in any outside assistance to secure withdrawal of Japanese troops. Chinese authorities here now see only two alternatives left, namely, either to fight or to accept Japanese demands. End of summary.

Repeated to the Minister.


For the Minister,

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CONFIDENTIAL



DEC 11 1931 December 10, 1931.

TRANSATLANTIC TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY
STIMSON AND GENERAL DAWES AT PARIS, 5:00.

SECRETARY: Hello, is that you General?

DAWES: The Council at its meeting passed the resolution and the various speeches were made just according to the plan. Briand in concluding said about the United States, "It is a pleasant duty for me to thank the great Republic of the United States for having taken action in conformity and on parallel lines within the limits and intent and thus cooperate with the Council of the League." That is about all.

SECRETARY: The resolution was passed all right?

DAWES: Yes, the resolution was passed and we have wired you the statement that Japan made which is a short one and also the statement of the reservations of China. I want to leave tomorrow; everybody has gone away. I am going to leave tomorrow for London on the Golden Arrow so I guess we are all through.

SECRETARY: You have made no statement whatever over there?

DAWES: I have made no statement whatever and I am not going to make any statement. However, they expect you to make some general statement about the resolution and declaration and what the League has done.

SECRETARY: I am going to do that as soon as I get through with you.

DAWES: I didn't get that.

SECRETARY: I shall make that statement immediately after
this

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Confidential File

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this talk. I was holding it until I heard from you.

DAWES: You are going to make the statement as soon as you get official notice.

SECRETARY: Yes, and I now have it from you. I shall make it this afternoon right off.

DAWES: Right off? I think that is all right. The sooner the better.

SECRETARY: I have only been waiting to hear from you. Only been waiting to hear from you that the resolution had passed. Now I know.

DAWES: All right, it has passed.

SECRETARY: Now General, I want to say to you that I appreciate very deeply what you have done. I think you have handled this matter in a very skillful and capable way.

DAWES: That is very fine of you to say so.

SECRETARY: It has been a very great relief to me to have you there.

DAWES: I am glad to hear you say that and I appreciate it very much.

SECRETARY: I can assure you that the President feels the same way.

DAWES: Will you thank the President for me.

SECRETARY: I think that under all the difficult circumstances which have confronted you and the members of the Council, I think it is a very satisfactory thing to have had this resolution passed. I can confess to having a great deal of apprehension about any future military advance by Japan but at present I do not see what we can do more than to bring to both China and Japan through the diplomatic channels what I told you yesterday about the

fact

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fact - the substance of what you have said in your statement which you read to me this morning, - what you proposed to say, the statement that you did not make.

DAWES: I didn't get that.

SECRETARY: I don't think that there is anything further that I can do.

DAWES: No I don't think that there is anything we can do further.

SECRETARY: I am sending to China and to Japan the facts which I told you over the telephone last night about the misunderstanding.

DAWES: What?

SECRETARY: I am sending to Tokyo and to Nanking through our Ambassadors what I told you over the telephone about the misunderstanding last night.

DAWES: Yes, I see. I want to thank you for having sent Mr. Shaw here to me. He has been a great help.

SECRETARY: I am very glad to hear that. Will you give him my thanks for what he has done.

DAWES: I want to comment on Sweetser, who has given us such complete records of the Council.


SECRETARY: It has also been very helpful to me.

DAWES: I am glad to hear you say that. I am writing a little telegram commending their assistance to me. Dooman has been fine.

SECRETARY: All right and goodbye and good luck and we will hope for the best.

DAWES: Thank you.

S: VGN CBS



CONFIDENTIAL

December 10, 1931.

TRANSATLANTIC TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY
STIMSON AND GENERAL DAWES AT PARIS, 11:15.

SECRETARY: Hello General. I wanted to give you a suggestion which the President has made. The President has suggested that it might be well for the Council to make a formal offer to Japan before they adjourn.

DAWES: I do not get that.

SECRETARY: I say, the President has suggested that the Council might make a formal offer to Japan. We are afraid that if the matter is left - When is the Council going to adjourn?

DAWES: They are going to adjourn this afternoon.

SECRETARY: I see it is too late to get anything in now.

DAWES: This is what happened. Since the despatch that I sent I have heard the situation in Japan, according to Matsudaira, continues critical and there is a possibility of an advance by the Japanese troops. It seems to me that there was a possibility of delaying this advance and that a statement of the misunderstanding which existed between Japan and China as to the neutral zone negotiations might have a helpful effect upon the public sentiment of both countries and the neutral zone negotiations. I prepared a statement which I submitted to Briand and to Matsudaira and Drummond and which all have approved as something which should be made public as the Chinchow pact. I have agreed to make it before the last meeting of the Council. The statement is based upon the authority contained in your 643 and your attitude in the neutral zone negotiations as conveyed to me by telephone last night. Matsudaira will approve the statement personally


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Confidential File

CONFIDENTIAL

December 10, 1931.



TRANSATLANTIC TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON AND GENERAL DAWES AT PARIS, 11:15.

SECRETARY: Hello General. I wanted to give you a suggestion which the President has made. The President has suggested that it might be well for the Council to make a formal offer to Japan before they adjourn.

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but he does not want this fact made public because of the critical condition in his own Government and he does not know what will happen there.

SECRETARY: What doesn't he want made public?

DAWES: Matsudaira will approve the statement but he does not want this fact made public, because of the political situation of his own government and he does not know what will happen there, or what effect his approval will have.

SECRETARY: His approval of what statement? Who is going to make the statement?

DAWES: I am going to make the statement with the approval of Briand, Sze, Matsudaira and Drummond. It was also submitted to Yoshizawa. I am dictating the statement but I do not know whether it is best to go before the Council.

SECRETARY: That is entirely in your discretion.

DAWES: Let me read you the statement: As now resulting in agreement between Japan and China and for the appointment of a committee. This agreement is faithfully observed by both parties..... For the moment a misunderstanding along the discretion of a more promising effort of both China and Japan for a cessation of hostilities is in abeyance. A misunderstanding arose as follows: Dr. Wellington Koo discussed with Matsudaira the cessation of hostilities by the armies and the mutual withdrawal of forces around Chinchow. This objection was transmitted to the Japanese Government merely for the purpose of sounding them out on the subject. This character was not intended to be made to the Japanese Government but was conveyed to them in such a way.....regarded as a definite proposition. The Japanese Government then made a definite proposition

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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proposition imparting the idea.....they claim responsibility to the League for the performance of the arrangements made and this was aorders to be given for the withdrawal of troops that were already advancing..... The Japanese public has the impression that Japan has been misled in its troop withdrawal. China having made a suggestion in order for discussion, is interested in order for her troops to withdraw. China has been misled. The situation is this: China in good faith.....for discussion which Japan said in good faith they would withdraw. The understanding of this situation by the public of both nations should make possible the further explanation of the original idea of the satisfactory arrangement for a cessation of hostilities around Chinchow, and to avoid the risk of gossip.....and we are only emphasizing the desires of both.

Now I just got a telphone call from Briand and they want me to come over there and make a statement before the Council. Sweetser telephoned me that Briand would not make the statement but they approved positively of it and whether they approve or disapprove, they are agreed that the statement be made but of course it is made on our own responsibility. They want me to come over there and I will not go to the meeting but will just go to Briand's office, and after the resolution is passed, I will make the statement.

SECRETARY: On whose authority is your statement made?

DAWES: It is made on my authority. That is an explanation of the misunderstanding. What Briand is a little afraid of is that a mistake was made by the French Government and he doesn't want the responsibility but they all recognize the importance of having a public statement made of the reasons why that negotiation has been stopped. That is what

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what he said in effect because it is critical to the French Government and that is the reason for the responsibility in the matter. That may do good. It has been approved by all of them.

SECRETARY: That is pretty important and you have got to give me time to think that over. What is the authority for the facts which you state. You say that there has been a misunderstanding between the two governments.

DAWES: Matsudaira and Koo say that it will help both Governments in public opinion in going on with these negotiations for a neutral zone. This thing is between Matsudaira, Sze and myself to get a statement of it.....

SECRETARY: Does the statement involve any criticism on the French for the mistake.

DAWES: It does not. Not at all.

SECRETARY: Read that part again.

DAWES: The misunderstanding arose as follows: Dr. Wellington Koo discussed with the Foreign Ministers at Nanking a cessation of hostilities by the armies and the mutual withdrawal of forces around Chinchow. This suggestion was not intended as a proposal to the Japanese Government but was made merely for the purpose of sounding them out on the subject. This was a suggestion of Dr. Koo.....did not intend to be made to Japanese Government but was conveyed to them in such a way that Japan regarded it as a definite proposition. The Japanese Government then made a definite proposition that this was a true fact.....responsibility to the League for the arrangements as made. This was a true factor in order to be given.....troops already advanced. The Japanese public have the impression that Japan has been misled in its troop withdrawal. China has made.....only for discussion her troop withdrawal that

-5-

China has been..... The situation is this, China in good faith made a proposition for discussion which has been presented to Japan. Japan then in good faith.....public opinion. This situation.....made possible.....original idea of Dr. Koo.....satisfactory arrangement for a cessation of hostilities around Chinchow and adisposition of the to avoid the risk of continued discussion.

SECRETARY: Here is my point. The suggestion would be eminently appropriate to come from the President of the Council.

DAWES: What was that?

SECRETARY: It would be eminently appropriate if it came from Briand, the President of the Council, and I see a number of objections to your making it on the part of this country in the League. I am a little afraid of that. I want the suggestion to be made and I do not see how it can do any harm in the negotiations but those negotiations have been carried on by the League and this thing we brought to the attention of the League as a friendly outsider.

DAWES: When it was presented to them - the explanation of this Chinchow expedition and the reasons why it was stopped - there was no objection to it but they wanted it to be made for the effect it would have upon public sentiment in the two countries - Japan and China. It has nothing to do with the resolution and so far as the League is concerned, the Chinchow matter is left alone by them. They felt that the Japanese of the zone statement made as an explanation of my responsibility. I can personally make this statement and that will cover it.

SECRETARY: You say now that you will be willing to make it personally on your own authority.

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DAWES: On my own authority. The explanation will be made in no other way because the French Government would like the explanation made but they do not want to do it because it would be a concession that an error was made. If I make the statement individually, I can make it after the Council.

SECRETARY: It could go just the same way to the two governments, and give them an opportunity to get their public opinion under control.

DAWES: What?

SECRETARY: If you made it yourself outside. You see General here is the situation. It is a very important and dramatic thing to have this suggestion made and it is really going in to the negotiations which have been carried on entirely by the League in a most important and dramatic way and if this Government should do it in the meeting of the League, I think it would give very strong color to the fact that we had intruded into these negotiations in a most emphatic way and I am a little afraid of that. I think really the best way to do it would be the one I suggested, that Briand as President ought to do it, but if he will not do it, I will consider having you do it personally outside.

DAWES: That is right. I will make this as a personal statement.

SECRETARY: Who would you make the statement to?

DAWES: Probably have no statement to make.

SECRETARY: You do not understand me. How would you get it to have any effect upon the Japanese and Chinese Governments?

DAWES: They both want it done.

SECRETARY: You do not understand. How would it be

delivered

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delivered to them?

DAWES: I will tell you what we had better do, if we are not going to the Council or give anything out.....

SECRETARY: If they are trying to get us to do anything as important as that, they will have to give me time to think that over.

DAWES: It didn't come from them, it originated from me.

SECRETARY: They want us to do it and it is very important and in my opinion it ought to be done in some way. We want to be careful not to lose the opportunity to have that suggestion of misunderstanding made by somebody. I will have to have time to think it over.

DAWES: I will telephone you tonight about five o'clock and not do anything in the meantime.

SECRETARY: By that time the Council will be adjourned.

DAWES: Yes, it will, but I just got this before you telephoned.

SECRETARY: I do not think the Council ought to adjourn finally until after you have had time to consider this and they have had time to consider this. I don't want them to get away from Paris.

DAWES: Sweetser just telephoned that Sze does not approve the statement now. I couldn't give it now if I wanted to.

SECRETARY: Be careful, don't do it without letting me know. Here is what I tried to say to you in the beginning. In the first place I think you ought to urge on Briand to make some such statement as this on his part. He is the man to do it.

DAWES: Drummond came over here and I suggested that the
League

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League make the statement - the Council has twelve fellows over there - and they ran into a long discussion and adjourned without doing anything about it. I suggested that the League make this statement and Matsudaira and Sze agreed and then Drummond took it over to Briand for some other suggestions but now I have Sze's final word that he is not satisfied and they want to close the meeting.

SECRETARY: No it doesn't necessarily. I think they ought to keep up trying to get that statement made in some form. I suggest this -

DAWES: They want to get away. I have tried to get them to agree in meetings but it always ended in long discussions and then I tried my hand this morning and got Sze and Matsudaira to agree and Drummond and Briand, but now Sze just sent word that he doesn't approve.

SECRETARY: You can not do it now, but do not give it up; Sze might change his mind. I want to tell you this, that if you can finally get a statement made to which they all agree, I think that it should be made by Briand. Briand could say that it was something that he had discussed with you.

DAWES: I do not think Briand personally wants to make it.

SECRETARY: He is trying simply to jockey you into doing this. Don't let him do that. He will do it if he can. I think he will come around.

DAWES: The Council is meeting here and is in session now and it would be impossible to do anything with him about it.

SECRETARY: In that respect you will have to let it go.

I think it is a great pity if they will not be willing to
take

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take one more adjournment in order to try out this very important thing. I think representations ought to be made to them. Here they have spent three or four weeks on only half of it and here is the most important half in sight of success and the only possible half in sight of success, and I think they ought to be willing to stay one more day on the chance of fixing it up and I think you ought to make that representation to them now.

DAWES: Chance of fixing it up?

SECRETARY: Get a message to them in some way. Make it pretty strong that you think they ought to hold the meeting over.

DAWES: I will try to do that.

SECRETARY: Then we will have time to find some way of accomplishing this and possibly get the Chinese back again.

DAWES: Sze objected to the proposed statement.

SECRETARY: I think the statement is all right but I do not see how it can be made except by somebody in the meeting and the man who ought to make it is Briand. He could make it as something that he had discussed with you. He could make it as something which had been brought to his attention by you.

DAWES: I will try that. The position of the League is that they believe that the Chinchow matter should be left alone. Just better let the thing stand, that is what the League has decided.

SECRETARY: There is another thing I was going to say when I called you up and that was would not the atmosphere be cleared on the side of the League if they should make a formal offer to Japan to have observers notify them of

any

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any aggressions on the part of China. It is not very clear now - there has been so much discussion - but the President - President Hoover thought that a formal offer to Japan of having military observers report any activities by the Chinese forces in the zone would put it up to Japan if she ever made a move contrary to the information thus obtained. Do you see what I mean?

DAWES: I do not get all that, just say it again.

SECRETARY: At present Japan is threatening to move down into this Zone.

DAWES: I didn't get that.

SECRETARY: At this moment General, General Honjo's army is said to be threatening to make a move toward Chinchow. In order to put them in the wrong if they do that, ought not the League to make a formal offer to put in their possession the information on the part of the observers.

DAWES: They can not get anything on them.

SECRETARY: Stick to your other point, stick to it, you have a good thought there and I hope something will be brought out of it.

DAWES: I will make the suggestion that Briand can make it if he wants to but I do not think he will do it. They will not take it up. We have done our best any way.

SECRETARY: Goodbye.

S: VGN CBS

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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FROM

PARIS

Dated December 10, 1931

Rec'd 9:28 p.m.

Secretary of State



Washington

874, December 10, 11 p.m.

From Ambassador Dawes.

With reference to the Japanese declaration transmitted in my 872, December 10, 6 p.m., Cecil made following reply which had been previously approved by the twelve this morning as satisfying the juridical situation involved and as removing necessity for any further discussion of subject:

"The Council has heard the declaration of the Chinese and Japanese representatives on paragraph two. There can be no doubt that the position in Manchuria is difficult and exceptional. It may well be that circumstances may arise there which will cause danger to Japanese lives and property from elements of the population out of control and if an emergency of that kind should arise it might become inevitable that Japanese forces in the neighborhood should take action against bandits and the like. But I welcome the recognition by the Japanese representative of the exceptional character of the situation



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2- #874, from Paris, December 10,
1931

situation and that the necessity of such exceptional action will come to an end as soon as normal conditions have been restored. In saying this I do not mean to suggest that the Japanese declaration weakens the obligation set out in paragraph two of the resolution to avoid any action which will lead to a recrudescence of fighting between the Chinese and Japanese troops or a further aggravation of the situation".


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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

11AM

FROM



Rec'd 9:40 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

875, December 10, 10 p.m.

From Ambassador Dawes

In accepting resolution at this afternoon's meeting
Sze made following observations and reservations

"One. China reserves all rights to which it is en-
titled under the provisions of the Covenant, under exist-
ing treaties to which China is a party and under the ac-
cepted principles of international law.

Two. The present arrangement evidenced by the reso-
lution and the statement made by the President is regarded
by China as a practical measure embodying four essential
and interdependent elements.


(A) Immediate cessation of hostilities

(B) Liquidation on the Japanese occupation of Man-
churia within the shortest possible time.

(C) Neutral observation and reporting upon all de-
velopments from now on.

(D) A comprehensive inquiry into the entire Man-
churian situation on the spot by a commission appointed
by the Council.

The



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FILED

DEC 14 1931

mam

2- #875, from Paris, December 10,
1931

The failure of any one of the stipulations of the
agreement to materialize would mean the failure of the
whole agreement.

(END SECTION ONE)

SHAW

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HSM

GRAY

Paris

FROM

Dated December 10, 1931

Rec'd 9:48 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

875, December 10, 10 p. m. (SECTION TWO)

Three. China expects that the commission will make its first duty to inquire into and report with its recommendations on the withdrawal of the Japanese forces if such withdrawal has not been completed when the commission arrives on the ground.

Four. China assumes that the said arrangement neither directly nor by implication affects the question of reparations due to China as a result of events in Manchuria.

Five. China considers that the injunction to the parties not to aggravate the situation should not be violated under the pretext of the existence of lawlessness caused by the state of affairs in Manchuria.

The only sure way of restoring peace in Manchuria
is

#875, December 10, 10 p. m. from Paris

-2-

is to hasten the withdrawal of Japanese troops. China can not tolerate the occupation of her territory by foreign troops; far less can she permit these troops to usurp the police functions of the Chinese authorities.

Six. China will from time to time, as occasion requires, indicate the localities to which it seems desirable to despatch neutral observers.

Seven. It should be understood that in agreeing to this resolution, China in no way recedes from the position she has always taken with respect to the maintenance of military forces in the railway zone.

Eight. Chinese Government would regard any attempt by Japan to bring about complications of a political character affecting China's territorial or administrative integrity as an obvious violation of the undertaking to avoid any further aggravation of the situation." (END OF MESSAGE).

SHAW

OX

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HSM

FROM

GREEN

Paris

Dated December 11, 1931

Rec'd 9:52 p. m. - 10th

Secretary of State,

Washington.


876, December 11, 1 a. m.

From Ambassador Dawes.

Resolution unanimously adopted at this afternoon's
meeting of the Council.

SHAW

OX



F/CEW

793.94/3157

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FILED

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAM

GREEN

PARIS

FROM

Dated December 11, 1931

Rec'd 9:58 p.m.,

Secretary of State

Washington

877, December 11, 2 a.m.

From Ambassador Dawes

I wish to express appreciation of the most competent assistance of Mr. G. Howland Shaw and Mr. E. H. Dooman during my assignment here in connection with the Manchurian situation.

I desire also especially to commend the work of the code clerks Hill and Bastianello of Paris, Cullin of the London Embassy and Wylie Borum of the Dublin Legation. They have finished a period of exceedingly laborious work in a most successful manner.

I also wish to express appreciation of the extremely satisfactory work at all hours and continuously of Mr. Hrones of the Paris Embassy.

Finally while he is attached to the Secretariat of the League of Nations I want to commend the extremely able and satisfactory reports made by Mr. Sweetser the excellence and completeness of which I am sure you have noted.

OX


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M. V. D.

M. V. D.



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123 SR 22

123 D 72

123 Hill, Watson

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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
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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington

December 11, 1931.



DEC 11 31

793.94/3158

AmEmbassy,

Paris.

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647

For the Ambassador. 793.94/3158.

Embassy's 877, December 11, 2 a. m.

Please express to the Embassy staff my appreciation for its faithful assistance during the long and difficult negotiations which have recently been brought to a successful conclusion.

I particularly wish that you would felicitate Shaw on my behalf for his highly efficient and competent service.

Stimson

U VC/AB /

Noted on Efficiency Records

7. V. D

Dec. 11 1931.

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 60.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-128

793.94/3158

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gutzkow NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/ 3159

TRANSFERRED TO 793.94 COMMISSION/ 20

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA




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NOV 23 1931

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

Tokyo, Japan,

November 7, 1931.



Dear Mr. Secretary,

793.94
note
033 9411

Yesterday Count Kabayama asked my opinion
December 9 1931 of the advisability of his going to the United
States as a sort of unofficial observer of the
situation, representing the Japan - America
Society of which he is vice-president. I
told him I thought it might be eminently
desirable.

He is very friendly and sympathetic and
asked me if I did not expect that the United
States would find itself in a position of media-
tor between Japan and China in the near future.
I replied that I did not expect any such position
to be thrust upon us, that we hoped Japan and
China would get together themselves and settle
their difficulties, and that our position was
merely that of using all our influence toward

F/DEW 793.94/3160

FILED

NOV 24 1931

-2-

the employment of peaceable means and the avoidance of acts of war.

I am giving the Count a number of letters to prominent people. As he knows the Secretary, I am not giving him letters to the State Department.

I had a very interesting and rather cordial talk with B. W. Fleisher, editor of the Japan Advertiser, yesterday, corroborating the information contained in the despatch going out in today's pouch. He informed us that no less than three bans have been sent in the course of one afternoon to his paper in regard to a conspiracy involving a number of army officers who plan putting some of the other higher officials out of the way. Count Makino was the one most mentioned.

Asked about the temper of the Japanese people and whether the military element was in danger of becoming dominant, he replied that during this period of crisis the cabinet were

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

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unanimous and the public were very generally back of the government and of the army in its activities in Manchuria, but that their manner of conducting the whole affair had caused grave dissatisfaction and the military element were, to quote his exact words "digging their own grave", as he felt the reaction when the critical period had passed and the dispute finally settled would mean a great loss of prestige by the military element responsible for the present unfortunate condition of affairs.

very respectfully,

Walter Forbes

The Honorable,
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C., U.S.A.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE UNDER SECRETARY

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DEC 5 1931

November 30, 1931.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE


Count Kabayama, referred to in this letter, is the son of the late Admiral Count Kabayama, at one time Minister of the Navy. The present Count Kabayama is about 65 years of age, was educated in the United States, is President of the Japan Steel Works at Muroran and a prominent member of the America-Japan Society in Japan. He has been called the "Colonel House of Japan" because of his quiet personality and powerful influence in Japanese official and industrial circles. He has been credited with having successfully "ironed out" the difficulties which stood in the way of the marriage of Prince Chichibu and Miss Matsudaira, daughter of the former Japanese Ambassador in Washington. He has always been a loyal friend and adviser of the American Embassy in Tokyo.

RSM:EJL

1564

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE



EASTERN AFFAIRS

December 7, 1931.

✓
Mr. Castle:

Kabayama's influence seemed to me to lie in his intimate personal relations with men like Count Makino, Viscount Saito and others who, either in active official life or from "behind the scenes", influence official action; and that this was particularly true of his relations with persons belonging to, or affiliated with, the powerful Satsuma clan.

Apart from the position in this respect which Kabayama inherited from his father, I understand that he is one of the trusted advisers of Prince Shimadzu, head of the Satsuma clan; and I was under the impression that Kabayama's opinions were usually listened to with respect even though they might not always be adopted.

RSM
RSM:EJL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

I acknowledge with thanks the receipt of your interesting letter of November 7, 1931, relating to the prospective visit of Count Kabayama to the United States and to your talk with Mr. B. W. Fleisher.

Yours sincerely,

F.W. 793.94/3160

The Honorable

W. Cameron Forbes,

American Ambassador,

Tokyo.

CI

Dec 9, 1931.


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5-4

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA



RECEIVED

NOV 23 1931

Tokyo, Japan,

November 7, 1931.

*Letter drafted to
Mr Forbes, Dec 5, 1931
mf*

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

SECRETARY OF STATE

NOV 24 1931

Dear Mr. Secretary,

Referring to my telegram of yesterday,
I have the honor to enclose a memorandum of
my interview with Baron Shidehara on Novem-
ber 5, 1931.

Very respectfully,

Edwin L. Prentiss

For the Ambassador

The Honorable,

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

FILED

DEC 10 1931

F/DEW 793.94/3161

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

INTERVIEW WITH BARON SHIDEHARA NOV. 5, 1931. OFFICE OF STATE
156

After a few exchanges of greetings I read very carefully and slowly, emphasizing the telling phrases, the whole memorandum of Secretary Stimson of November 3, 1931, to Baron Shidehara, informing him that I was instructed to read it aloud to him and that a copy of it had already been handed to Ambassador Debuchi in Washington. He gave no expression of surprise upon receiving it, but later he asked me whether it had been given to the public or was to be published. I replied that we in Tokyo should certainly not give it to the public, and that I assumed Mr. Debuchi would not, but could not answer for the State Department.

The first point that Baron Shidehara raised was asking exactly what was meant by the words "integrity of government". I told him that in my opinion it involved completeness of the exer-

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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cise of sovereignty, that the integrity of government was impaired where control of the civil administration was discontinued or interfered with. I suggested we look up the exact meaning of the word; which we did. And I found, in the Standard dictionary which he had there in the office, under the second classification, the exact support of what I think it means, and pointed it out. Baron Shidehara then stated the Japanese were not exercising control of the civil administration of the occupied areas - that was being conducted by the Chinese themselves who had organized defense committees and were administering their government locally. He said most of the civil officials of Manchuria had moved out. He commented that many of the civil functions were being performed by men who were also military commanders.

-3-

Baron Shidehara then laid stress upon the attitude of Japan toward China in the days of early treaties (I think probably one by Secretary Hay), in which Japan had opposed the partition of China and had recently stood and continued to stand for the integrity of China. He was very definite about not wanting to do anything that would impair the sovereignty of China in Manchuria or in any other Chinese possessions. Passing on, he said that the position of Japan was that they wanted China to agree to five main points, which he described as being fundamental principles; and when these were agreed upon Japan was perfectly ready to withdraw their troops. He made it very clear that there were several hundred points at issue between Japan and China, questions involving injuries and damages to individuals and property, invasion, violation of treaty rights, etc., etc. Some-

-4-

times several hundred were under one heading, which he intimated it might take years to determine. He said they had not the least idea of retaining their troops there until those points were settled.

The five things that he said should be settled before the withdrawal of troops were as follows, and suggested a mutual agreement binding upon both China and Japan:

- (1) Agreement against any aggression on either side against the other.
- (2) Preservation and guarantee of integrity of the territory pertaining to each one.
- (3) Discontinuance of government sanction of boycotts, discrimination against Japanese merchants, or other economic action injurious to the interests of Japan. (In this connection it was pointed out to him that many of these acts were due to the manner in which the

-5-

Japanese had pressed their claims, the fact that Japan had taken so aggressive a position, and that it was absolutely out of the power of any government to compel people to begin buying again from Japanese merchants, that where it was an act of individuals it was entirely within their rights. He said: "Yes, but this has gone further". People, he said, had been ordered under threat of being killed not to deal with the Japanese. It was pointed out to him that this boycott was widespread and in a sense world-wide. I told him of a bank in Seattle, Japanese owned, that had to close its doors because of the withdrawal of deposits of Chinese, and that no government could make their people buy Japanese goods or from Japanese merchants if they did not want to do so. He said he understood that completely and that he recognized that Japan had to recognize the right of people to express their dis-

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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approval of a course adopted by a country, by declining to deal with its merchants or buying its merchandise. But he said again that this had gone farther, and that societies of Chinese were actually operating, threatening violence and practising violence, undeterred by their government, upon people desirous of trading in Japanese goods or with Japanese citizens. He insisted on protection, so that people in Chinese territory should have freedom of action in this respect.

(4) They demanded protection of lives and property of Japanese and Koreans. He assured me that were Japanese troops withdrawn from Manchuria there would immediately be acts of violence against the lives and property of Japanese and Koreans resident in Manchuria, and that assurance of the protection of these was essential. This seems to me to be the real crux of the entire

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proposition and the one vital thing requiring some sort of adequate assurance. I did not, however, say that to him.

(5) The fifth point he mentioned was the recognition of treaty obligations, which also would be mutually agreed to both by Japan and China. I asked him if he had reference among other things to the Chinese levy duties on coal, contrary to the treaty agreement. He said: "No", and that that had already been settled by adjustment and compromise. He cited a controversy between China and Japan concerning a certain tract of land claimed by Manchuria and Korea which had been settled by compromise, the land being granted as pertaining to Korea, and that the Chinese had agreed to build a certain railroad to the Korean frontier, which would add greatly to the prosperity and value of the Korean territory tributary to this region. Years had gone by, he said, and nothing

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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had been done by the Chinese to complete their share of the bargain, namely, the construction of this railroad, and all that the Japanese had been able to get were evasions.

As I understood him, what the Japanese wanted now was an affirmation of the intention of the Chinese Government to observe these treaties in principle, not that the evacuation should wait for the completion of the works.

I took occasion to inform the Minister, as I had been instructed to do from Washington, that the United States did not desire to intervene in the terms of settlement, did not expect to act as agent in determining to any degree how these various claims, etc., should be adjudicated, but that our interest was in maintaining friendly relations both with Japan and China; that we entered upon this scene in a spirit of entire friendliness, and that we were very earnest in our desire that the matter

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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should be settled by peaceable means and that we proposed to use the influence of the United States to the fullest extent possible to discourage a resort to acts of war or settlement of any of these problems by violence.

The Minister took the document up and began reading it over and advised me that I could inform my government that it would receive his most earnest consideration and that of his government. He then again commented on some of the details, reading over the two questions outlined in the message, and he stated that he did not see how they could withdraw troops until China and Japan had agreed upon these five general principles. I emphasized the fact that the United States felt, as indicated in the memorandum that military pressure should be not employed to force the acceptance by China of these general terms. And that in the present situation it was clear that mili-

-10-

tary force was being employed. He replied that he entirely agreed that military pressure should not be used to bring about a determination of the various points at issue, but that they simply could not withdraw their troops until they were assured of protection of their citizens.

I did not raise the point, but personally I do not see how, with the present disorganized state of government, they have in China any organization capable of giving adequate protection to Japanese and Korean citizens, even if China did agree to settle the five points; and I see no disadvantage to them in accepting them (the five points).

The conversation then moved to the fighting now going on in connection with the bridge at Nonni. I had previously learned that this Chinese railroad had been built assisted by an issue of bonds which had been taken by the South Man-

-11-

77
churian Railway, payment of interest on which was in default. This gives, and with the customary practice prevailing in terms of mortgages - and I do not doubt it is amply provided for in this mortgage, a direct interest and perhaps the right of intervention on the part of the South Manchurian Railway in the affairs of this railroad. The destruction of the bridge in question operates disadvantageously to the South Manchurian Railway from two points of view: First, from the capital point of view, being the destruction of property secured by mortgage held by a Japanese-owned railroad whose interests under the treaty the Chinese are bound to protect. And, secondly, from the operating point of view: that the bridge gives access to a territory that customarily ships a considerable amount of produce out, especially at this harvest time of year, principally, I believe, consisting of soya beans, and which was cut off with the destruction of the bridge, to

-12-

the disadvantage of the South Manchurian Railway, also in contravention to the treaty. The Japanese claim under the treaty the right to enforce the restoration of the bridge. The Chinese have questioned this right and resisted it by force.

7
Speaking of young Marshall Chang, Baron Shidehara said he was very clever but at heart bitterly opposed to the Japanese, and that they had received information that satisfied them that he had directed this operation and had instructed Chinese soldiers to perform a number of provocative acts to bring on fighting, in which he had been apparently successful. (Note by W.C.F.)

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Baron Shidehara, in speaking of the South Manchurian Railway, mentioned the construction of competing lines by the Chinese. I immediately parried by saying that to stop unfavorable construction would paralyze the growth of Manchuria; that I had been a witness of the marvelous growth in the United States of the value of land, and of the increase in productivity in our West, by the construction of railroads; and that if every time the Chinese wished to develop a region the Japanese, on the ground that such railroads might take business away from existing railroads, they would be in a position to absolutely block the proper and normal development of the region. I also said that everybody knew that whenever one of these lines developed a region it had to have termini in the largest cities and ports in order to get a market for the produce of the country developed, and that these lines reaching the termini made it possible for these railroads to get through

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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traffic which would in itself compete, of course. I wondered whether the Japanese idea was to impede the normal and proper development of the country in order to enhance the earnings of their roads.

To this Baron Shidehara replied that they realized all that and were perfectly willing to permit the construction of such railroads, but that for through traffic there should be a pooling arrangement and agreements in regard to rates such as was common in similar situations in the United States, so that there would not be ruinous competition and rate cutting. This seems to offer an opportunity for a reasonable solution of one of the major problems which had troubled them.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

BCP
 [Signature]

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

The memorandum of your interview with Baron Shidehara on November 5, which was transmitted with Mr. Neville's letter of November 7, 1931, has been received and read with much interest.

I want you to know that your account of the conversation between yourself and Baron Shidehara was helpful in enabling me better to understand the situation as it appears in Tokyo and is much appreciated.

Yours sincerely,
 HENRY L. STIMSON


F.W. 793.94/3161

The Honorable

W. Cameron Forbes,

American Ambassador,

Tokyo.



Dec 7 1931.

FE:RSM:EVL

12/4/31

FE

[Signature]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

THE UNDER SECRETARY
NOV 29 1931
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEC 2 1931

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW OF AMBASSADOR FORBES WITH
BARON SHIDEHARA ON NOVEMBER 5, 1931.

December 9 1931.

Ambassador Forbes transmits with his letter of November 7
hereunder, addressed to the Secretary, a memorandum of his
interview with Baron Shidehara on November 5 when he presented
to the latter the Department's memorandum on the Manchuria
situation. The following is a summary of the main points
brought out in the memorandum:

Mr. Forbes remarks that Baron Shidehara expressed no
surprise upon receiving the memorandum. The first point he
raised was as to the meaning of the words "integrity of
government". Baron Shidehara stated that the Japanese were
not exercising control of the civil administration of the
occupied areas - which was being conducted by the Chinese
themselves through defense committees. He remarked on the
fact that many of the civil functions were being performed by
men who were also military commanders.

He then laid stress on the attitude Japan had long taken
in favor of the integrity of China and stated that they still
continued to stand for that. They had no desire to do anything
that would impair the sovereignty of China in Manchuria or
elsewhere but what they wanted was that China should agree to
the five main points which he described as being fundamental
principles;

F/DEW

F.W. 793.94/3161

"Bridges"
Codes ??

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

principles; and that when these were agreed upon Japan was perfectly ready to withdraw her troops. Questions involving damages to individuals and property, violation of treaty rights, etc., he intimated might take years to determine and they had not the least idea of retaining their troops there until these points were settled.

Baron Shidehara then stated the five points substantially as they had been given to the Department by Ambassador Debuchi. Of these he emphasized point four, which demanded protection of lives and property of Japanese and Koreans. He anticipated that if Japanese troops were withdrawn from Manchuria there immediately would be acts of violence against the lives and property of Japanese and Koreans resident in Manchuria and that assurance of the protection of these was essential. Mr. Forbes remarks parenthetically that this "seems to me to be the real crux of the entire proposition and the one vital thing requiring some sort of adequate assurance. I did not, however, say that to him".

Concerning point five, the recognition of treaty obligations, Baron Shidehara stated that he had in mind such things as their rights under treaties relating to Chientao and the building of the Kirin-Kainei Railway to the Korean frontier. As to these what the Japanese wanted now was an affirmation of the intention of the Chinese Government to observe these treaties in principle.

On reading the memorandum, Baron Shidehara reiterated that he did not see how they could withdraw their troops until China
 and

- 3 -

and Japan had agreed upon these five general principles but he stated that "he entirely agreed that military pressure should not be used to bring about a determination of the various points at issue, but that they simply could not withdraw their troops until they were assured of protection of their citizens".

Mr. Forbes again remarks, parenthetically, that he does "not see how, with the present disorganized state of government, they have in China any organization capable of giving adequate protection to Japanese and Korean citizens, even if China did agree to settle the five points; and I see no disadvantage to them in accepting them (the five points)".

Concerning the fighting at that time going on in connection with the bridge at the Nonni River, Mr. Forbes states his understanding that the issues involved in this case arose first from the financial interest which the Japanese had in this railway line through the mortgages which they held and, secondly, because the cutting off of traffic over this railway, particularly at this time of year, worked to the disadvantage of the South Manchuria Railway.

(Mr. Forbes states that Baron Shidehara, speaking of the Young Marshal Chang, had said that he was very clever but bitterly opposed to the Japanese and that he (Baron Shidehara) was satisfied that Marshal Chang had directed the recent operations in the Nonni district.)

? Doubt?
SKH

A discussion of the status of the South Manchuria Railway, and its relation to the competing lines built by the Chinese followed, in which Mr. Forbes reports that he pointed out to

Baron

- 4 -

Baron Shidehara that the Chinese lines referred to might serve a useful purpose in developing the region and that if the Japanese contention that such railways might take business away from existing railroads held good they would be in a position to absolutely block the proper and normal development of the region. To this Baron Shidehara replied that they "were perfectly willing to permit the construction of such railroads, but that for through traffic there should be a pooling arrangement and agreements in regard to rates such as were common in similar situations in the United States, so that there would not be ruinous competition and rate cutting". Mr. Forbes closes his memorandum with the remark that "this seems to offer an opportunity for a reasonable solution of one of the major problems which had troubled them".

RSM
RSM: REK

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00 P.R.Canton/46 FOR #86

FROM Canton (Ballantine) DATED Nov. 2, 1931.
--TO-- NAME 1--1127 o p o

REGARDING: Manchurian situation: Developments in con-
nection with --. Reports regarding --.
(Copy attached)

fp8

793.94/3162

1 - 3

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

Summary

After the beginning of October, as fresh developments arose in the Manchurian situation as a result of organized efforts by local patriotic groups to arouse public opinion, the feeling against Japan became more widespread and gained in intensity. Coupled with the feeling against Japan there was also manifested impatience at the apparent diffidence of the authorities about accepting Nanking's peace overtures.

since

-2-

since reconciliation was deemed essential in order to enable the nation to present a united front to Japan; furthermore there was a certain amount of suspicion that the Government was lacking in purpose to deal resolutely with Japan. The student riots of October 10, which were a manifestation of the public temper, brought about a sanguinary clash with the police, which led to the resignation of the Commissioner of Public Safety, and created a state of high tension. At this juncture radical elements attempted to make capital of the situation, but their efforts to foment unrest failed as a result of the prompt action of the authorities in placing Canton under martial law. (The developments in the situation up to this point have been fully described in the Consulate General's despatches Nos. 80 and 81 of October 12 and October 15.) After a few days martial law was gradually relaxed, until by the end of the month only a vestige of the regime remained.

Although there have been no overt acts against Japanese in the district, feeling is still strong, and Japanese trade is practically at a standstill. On October 27 over one hundred Japanese, chiefly women and children, left Canton to return to Japan.

The

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-3-

The Cantonese delegates to a reunification conference, comprising most of the leading political figures here, left for Shanghai on October 16. There was at first general optimism regarding the prospects of success of the reunification conference, but on October 26 reports were published here questioning Chiang Kai-shek's good faith in the negotiations, which created uneasiness. On October 28, however, peace prospects were brightened again by a report that Chiang had decided not to insist upon remaining at the head of the political administration. On the same day, the death occurred at Canton of Ku Ying-fen, the principal lieutenant here of Ku Han-min. The loss of this leader may weaken the right wing of the Kuomintang and possibly affect the course of the negotiations with Nanking, since the right wing is believed willing to yield more for the sake of reconciliation than is the left wing.

Subsidence of Local Unrest.

During the last few days of October the feeling of public tension, which grew out of the riots of October 10, has largely subsided. This is due largely to the energetic measures of control taken by the authorities through the imposition of martial law,

which

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

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which effectively prevents any organized movement being launched for disturbing public peace and order. Between October 19 and 21, the students, after only a school week of absence on strike, went back to their desks without having achieved any practical results. The Government did, however, issue a somewhat fatuous public manifesto, expressing regret over the clash between the police and the students, promising to deal with the officials responsible for the "escape" of the police who were to have been brought to trial, and offering a liberal reward for their apprehension. Still more farcical from an Occidental point of view was the gesture of Wang Ching-wei in accepting responsibility for the business by tendering his resignation to the Government, which solemnly went through the form of declining to accept it.

The students of Chungshan University have now petitioned the Government to give them military training so that they may be prepared for the national emergency, and girl students have asked for training as Red Cross nurses.

For the first few days after the riots of October 10, martial law took the form of closing the streets to traffic and pedestrians after 9 p. m. except to those armed with special permits. At night troops with fixed

have not

-5-

bayonets were stationed in the principal streets to enforce the emergency measures that had been enacted, and special patrols went about the city seeking agitators. By October 20, the emergency regulations had been relaxed by the cancellation of the order prohibiting night traffic, and the only measure that continued in force was the occasional interception of public vehicles for the purpose of searching for suspicious characters

Departure of Cantonese Peace Delegates for Shanghai.

On October 15 confirmation was received here of Hu Han-min's release and his arrival at Shanghai. Thereupon a meeting was held of the Central Executive and Supervisory Committees of the Kuomintang at which it was decided to send as delegates to the preliminary unification conference at Shanghai, Wang Ching-wei, Sun-fu, Li Wen-fen and U. C. Su. Subsequently Eugene Chen, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Lin Yun-koy, Chairman of the Provincial Council, also went to Shanghai. It was explained in a press bulletin that Chen's presence at Shanghai was considered imperative in connection with the discussion of foreign relations, particularly the Manchurian business. The object of Lin's mission to Shanghai is not quite clear, as he was not appointed a delegate, but it is probable that

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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that it was in connection with some urgent matters which the followers of Hu Han-min here wished to lay before their leader. Chou-Lu, a representative of the Western Hills group, having reached Shanghai on his return from his mission to the Northwestern generals, was ordered to join the Cantonese delegation.

For the first few days after the reported arrival of the Cantonese delegation at Shanghai there was no indication here that matters were not proceeding smoothly. On October 26, however, party bulletins were published in the Cantonese press indicating that doubt was entertained by the Cantonese delegates of Chiang Kai-shek's good faith in the negotiations. It was claimed that only one division instead of both divisions of the Nineteenth Route Army was being permitted by him to leave Nanking for garrisoning Shanghai and Hanking. It was further asserted that on October 22 Chiang paid a flying visit to Shanghai and that without saying anything about the acceptance of the Cantonese proposals he merely asked the delegates to proceed to Hanking to discuss foreign affairs, particularly the Manchurian question. Hu Han-min is then said to have warned the Cantonese delegates not to proceed to Hanking without adequate guarantee for their personal security.

There is a curious story current here to the effect that Wang Ching-wei before leaving for Shanghai

obtained

-7-

obtained from the Nanking delegates a promise that Eugene Chen would be made Minister for Foreign Affairs and Pei Chung-hsi, the Kwangsi military leader, Minister of War. Subsequently, in consequence of the favorable attitude of the League of Nations towards China's case against Japan, Chiang is said to have forgotten about this alleged promise, and to have also withdrawn his word previously given that he would relinquish his power on the ground that the international situation renders his continuance in office imperative.

On October 28 it was announced in the press that the Central Executive and Supervisory Committee of the Kuomintang had sent telegraphic instructions to the Cantonese delegates to insist that (1) the conference be held at Shanghai; that (2) the resignation of Chiang Kai-shek be announced simultaneously with the announcement of the dissolution of the Government at Canton in accordance with the original Cantonese proposal; and that (3) Chiang assume responsibility for the handing over of the administration to the newly constituted government.

On the same day, however, peace prospects were brightened by a report that Chiang had consented to

modify

-8-

modify his views and would not insist upon remaining at the head of the political administration. He had also suggested the formation of four committees to supervise the military, political, party and financial administrations respectively. If this report is true, there would appear to remain only the question of the command of the military forces, which the Cantonese desire to have entrusted to a committee instead of to a generalissimo. The CANTON GAZETTE suggests that if Chiang really desires unification of the country "in order to cope with a ruthless foreign enemy" he should give up his position instead of wasting time haggling.

The Mayor of Canton, who is a strong benchman of Ku an-min, indicated in a conversation with me on October 26 that he was not at all perturbed by these reports of difficulties at Shanghai, and that he fully expected matters to be smoothed out shortly. It is generally conceded, however, that the Ku Han-min group is prepared to go much further in the way of making concessions to Nanking for the purpose of bringing about unification than are Wang Ching-wei and his followers, the latter being more uncompromising in their demands on points which are in the nature of political reforms. Consequently a situation which

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-9-

may appear favorable to one group may be regarded as otherwise to the other. Thus, while the Mayor's attitude may in one sense be reassuring, in another it lends color to a rumor that a fresh alignment of political forces is in process of being formed, this time a combination between Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang right wing against the Kuomintang left wing.

The death on October 28 of Hu Ying-fen, the chief lieutenant of Hu Han-min, may prove a serious blow to the Hu Han-min faction here and upset the balance of power between it and the Wang Ching-wei faction. What its effect will be upon the negotiations for reconciliation remains to be seen.

Attitude in Canton Official Circles Regarding Settlement of Outstanding Questions with Japan.

In the Consulate General's despatch No. 81 of October 15, 1931, the opinion was expressed that the assumption was untenable that the leaders here were pro-Japanese. And yet, there have been echoes here of a report emanating possibly from foreign newspaper correspondents at Shanghai that the Japanese have been bringing pressure to bear upon the Cantonese delegates to bring about the retirement of Chiang Kai-shek and T. V. Soong because they had too many American advisers. In the first place, the Cantonese from the beginning

have

-10-

have been insistent upon the elimination of these statesmen, and it is difficult to understand why they require any outside stimulus to strengthen their resolve on this point. Secondly, to say that the Japanese are applying pressure upon the Cantonese delegates would appear to presuppose some special relationship existing between the Japanese Government and the schismatic government at Canton. No evidence has been found here that such a relationship exists or that Japan has accorded any practical or moral assistance or support to the Cantonese cause.

It is probably true, however, that the Japanese Government would probably prefer to deal with a Chinese government in which the Cantonese faction is represented than with Mr. Chiang Kai-shek, since the Cantonese spokesmen have consistently declared that they believed the Manchurian question to be susceptible of a settlement on a satisfactory basis by direct negotiations. Naturally their public pronouncements on this subject have not included any statement setting forth a concrete basis for settlement, and consequently it is impossible to predict what course the negotiations with Japan would take should the Cantonese faction gain a voice in the

handling

- 1 -

handling of foreign policy. It is not to be supposed, however, judging from the general public temper here, that the Cantonese would be any less firm than have other Chinese administrations in withholding concessions, the granting of which would be prejudicial to the nation's interest.

Baron Shidehara's Message to Eugene Chen.

On October 17 the local press published the reply of Baron Shidehara to the communication addressed to him by Eugene Chen on September 25, the text of which was enclosed in the Consulate General's despatch No. 77 of October 3, 1931. Apparently the Japanese Consul General at Canton was the medium of this correspondence. The text of Baron Shidehara's reply, as quoted by the CANTON GAZETTE is given below:

Mr. Sun has duly transmitted to me your message of September 25 on the Manchurian problem. You have no doubt read the statement of the Japanese Government published on the same day, describing the general atmosphere in the Sino-Japanese relations which had led up to the unfortunate event of September 18, and the actual situation prevailing in Manchuria as well as the line of thought on which we propose to proceed to an adjustment of the existing difficulties. I trust the points raised in your message are sufficiently covered in that official statement. The whole incident is to be most deeply regretted, but it is human nature that after one's patience has been taxed to the utmost, any fresh provocation, however trivial in itself, is liable to give rise

to

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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to a grave repercussion out of proportion to its immediate cause.

The events of the last few days signify in no respect a repudiation of our settled policy for friendly cooperation with China, and for the maintenance of her territorial integrity. On the contrary, they have confirmed my belief in the soundness of that policy. Only by the appreciation in a wide perspective of real and lasting interests of both nations, can the present situation of tension be set at rest. Nothing should be more strongly deprecated at this moment than the lawless activities of irresponsible quarters, stirring up popular passion in such a way as to threaten the safety of harmless foreign residents. True patriotism calls for a saner and more constructive course of action.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

FROM

Peiping

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

Dated December 11, 1931

Rec'd 8:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

1071, December 11, 8 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Danish Minister just returned here, had two hour discussion of the Manchurian situation with Karakhan at Moscow. Latter stated that in no case would Soviet Russia become involved in the present controversy. Danish Minister is of the opinion that whereas there probably does not exist any definite agreement between Russia and Japan, there is at least an understanding that neither will take action prejudicial to the others interests in Manchuria.

For the Minister

PERKINS

KLP-ARL

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793.94/3163

FILED

DEC 17 1931


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DEPARTMENT OF STATE



DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

November 19, 1931.

DA
DCR
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Memorandum on necessity for giving Japan's diplomatic machinery time. - Rushing matters will mean smashing the Kellogg Pact and the League Covenant. - Let the Japanese force that issue; or the Council; not the United States.

793.94
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894.51

SH:

The essential thing at the present juncture is to gain time.

In dealing with Japan just now we are dealing not only with the military element, who have taken the situation in hand and run away with it, but with the whole Japanese nation who appear to be enthusiastically behind the military.

Japan is, in form at least, a parliamentary government with universal male suffrage. The government therefore is largely controlled by public sentiment. As in the British system a government may be thrown out at any time, and the Parliament convenes next month. It is evident that no government could withstand the tide of public opinion running as it is at present.

Doubtless some of the more sober-minded, such as Shidehara, Makino, Ishii, Ozaki and other influential leaders, deplore the means which have been used to assert their rights in Manchuria; but they all alike firmly believe in the essential justice of Japan's claims. The

Emperor

F/DEW 793.94/3164

DEC 11 1931

FILED

- 2 -

Emperor himself is still a young man, only thirty, and is naturally in the hands of his advisers.

894,51
Turning to another side of the picture, Japan is not in a strong financial position. She has great difficulty in balancing her budget and the effects of the Chinese boycott are becoming evident. It is very probable that when the people have to foot the bills for the present military adventure, in the form of increased taxation to be met from diminished resources, the affair will present itself to the people and to the government in a very different light.

Considering what would be involved in a head-on collision between the forces now at work in Japan and the forces at work for the peace of the world, it seems essential that some means should be found to gain time - at least a period of from three to six months - in which to work out the situation by negotiations or by commissions of investigation in some such way as has been suggested by Drummond, by Matsudaira, by the Chinese, by ourselves or by others, and to allow the pinch of the financial results to be felt in Japan.

RAM
RSM:EJL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

RH

This telegram must be closely
 paraphrased before being ^{FROM}
 communicated to anyone.

PEIPING

Dated Dec. 11, 1931

Rec'd. 9.20 am

SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

1067, December 11, 4 pm

Legation's 1064, December 10, 11 am.


Following from American Consul General at Mukden:

"December 10, 2 pm.

Please refer to paragraph two of my December 9.

5 pm. Although it is evident that the statement could
 not have been made officially by Kaungtung headquarters,
 conversations with the Japanese Consul lead me to believe
 that it does represent not only the desires but the
 considered plans of certain military authorities.

Two. The movement for an independent republic of
 Manchuria and Mongolia is daily taking more definite
 form. Frequent meetings of interested Chinese, Mongolians,
 and Japanese; the establishment of self governing bodies
 in most of the cities, the last one being at Yingkou on
 December 7th; and the general attitude of the press and
 officials here, are all evidences of the trend. It is
 believed that this movement has passed so far beyond the
 purely speculative stage that only an expression of
 foreign



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DEC 19 1931

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rh #2 of No. 1067 from Peiping

foreign objection or the early convening of a Sino-Japanese conference can prevent its accomplishment. However, the movement is not spontaneous nor is it being promoted by representative Chinese and Japanese. It would collapse without Japanese military support. Furthermore, it is not supported by a strong united Japanese feeling which would insist upon its fulfillment. in the face of international disapproval. Japanese opinion on the subject, I am advised, is either unformed or divided. The above opinions were derived from conversations with informed Japanese and foreigners in Mukden".

Repeated to Nanking.

For the Minister

PERKINS

KLP

CSB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED
GRAY

MET

Peiping via N.R.

FROM

Dated December 11, 1931

Rec'd 10:25 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

1066, December 11, 3 p.m.


Following from American Consul General at Harbin:

"December 9, 6 p.m. One. Reports of foreign, Chinese and Japanese correspondents who accompanied Japanese mission headed by Colonel Itagaki, Honjo's staff officer which called on General Ma at Hailun at 12 P.M. on December 7th are substantially as follows: "There were present at the interview General Ma, General Hsieh (Ma's chief of staff) Secretary Chao, four Japanese including Itagaki and two interpreters. Itagaki produced a calling card of Honjo and said that he had come as the latter's representative to convey the following information:

One. Peace should be maintained in Eastern Asia.

Two. Complete cooperation is desired between the Chinese and Japanese authorities in the northeast.

The Kuangtung commander expects General Ma to change



FK 793.94/3166

DEC 18 1931

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MET

2-#1066, from Peiping via NR
December 11, 1931

change his anti-Japanese policy and come to an understanding with the former as to the desires of the Japanese military. If General Ma will stop his military operations, he will be left in charge of the military affairs in Heilungkiang province so as to maintain peace in eastern Asia. The Japanese military authorities have made up their mind not to allow any anti-Japanese movement in the north east and have worked out plans for the thorough reconstruction of this country as a whole. It is because of their respect of General Ma's brilliant display of bravery that the Kuangtung military authorities have not yet attacked the Kihai and Tsike Railways.

General Ma replied as follows: The first plan is also much desired by General Ma. He also agrees with the second point raised, but only in so far as China's sovereignty is respected and as united friendship is manifested. The recent movements of the Heilungkiang troops have been taken only in self defense, and General Ma states that he is subject only to the orders of the Nanking Government. It is his sincere hope that the trouble between China and Japan can be solved properly during

rh #3 of No. 1066 from Peiping

during the conversation. Itagaki further referred to the possibility that General Ma might be appointed assistant to the Governor of the civil government at Tsitsihar. To this Ma replied that, as Hailun is not very far from Harbin, he could consult with General Chang Ching Hui over the telephone or pay a call on the latter in person, and that a second trip to Hailun by the Japanese representative would not be necessary."

Two. Ohashi informed me that Japanese military stated that results of interview were fairly satisfactory.

Three. There is no doubt that General Ma objected to this visit and does not wish it repeated.

Four. Correspondents were invited by Ohashi to accompany Itagaki evidently for purposes of publicity and for decreasing danger of possible attack on the party.

Five. First Japanese so-called commercial six-passenger airplane arrived with no passengers and no mail at Harbin at 12:15 p.m. and left with six Japanese passengers for Mukden at 12:40 p.m. today on trial flight."

For the Minister

PERKINS

WWC

CSB

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893.796

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00/11642 FOR Despatch #-
FROM China (Johnson) DATED Mar. 25, 1931.
TO NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: **Manchurian question: Mr. Johnson expresses opinion
that Manchurian question should not embroil U.S.
Japan should be let alone in the East.**

tps

793.94/3167

V ~~FE~~

RH

TELEGRAM RECEIVED GRAY

PEIPING via N.R.

FROM

Dated Dec. 11, 1931

Rec'd. 12.10 pm

SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
DEC 11 1931
Department of State

1069, December 11, 6 pm

Following from Military Attache at Chinchow.

"December 10, 6 pm. Japanese aircraft attempted

destruction section of the railway between Panshan and

Yingkou December 9th. Observer's inspected line today,

found that air torpedoes had been dropped, seventeen of

which exploded. Craters averaged 10 feet wide, 15 deep,

the one dud which was found on track weighed ¹⁵⁰ ~~(#)~~ pounds.

It is not understood why Japanese utilized such a power-
ful means to destroy railway not now open to traffic.

P.M. railroad traffic not on regular schedule owing

unsettled conditions, trains ^{have} ~~(#)~~ when they can get

clearance and because of this observers did not go

Hsinmin today as reported".

Repeated to Department and Nanking.

For the Minister

PERKINS

(#) Omissions

OSB

F/DEW 793.94/3168

DEC 18 1931

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

~~FE~~
~~FA~~

rh

TELEGRAM RECEIVED GRAY

NANKING via N.R.

Dated Dec. 11, 1931

FROM

Rec'd. 12.05 pm

DEC 15 1931

SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

December 11, 3 pm

Has the Department any objection to my returning

to Peiping, leaving here about 19th? Adoption of League resolution and prospect of visit of League Commission to Manchuria in the near future seems to justify my opinion that my presence in the North would be desirable, leaving for Peck to carry on here. However, I would be prepared to return after the first of the year if necessary. My British and French colleagues intend to return immediately if this seems possible. Of course I shall not go if situation here seems to demand my presence.

JOHNSON

WSB

Telegram to
Nanking.



DEC 12 1931

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
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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Riga, Latvia,

November 27, 1931.

DEC 11 31



FOR DISTRIBUTION - GEN. X		Yes	No
To the Field			
In U. S. A.			

No. 0200

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

Continuing to transmit current comment in the Soviet press on the Japanese-Chinese conflict in Manchuria, I have the honor to report that its heaviest batteries are now trained upon the United States, which is charged by the two leading newspapers at Moscow, the IZVESTIA and the PRAVDA, with duplicity; with secretly trying to provoke Japan and the Soviet Union to war, while openly professing concern for peace. The aim of the United States is stated to be to weaken the Soviet Union economically,

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DEC 19 1931

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cally, to close the ring of anti-Soviet states by allowing Japan to take firmer foothold upon the continent of Asia, to enrich itself through war orders, and to weaken Japan as a rival in the Pacific Ocean basin. The Secretary of State of the United States is particularly attacked for the representations which he is said to have made at Tokyo to the effect that the occupation of Tsitsihar, within the sphere of Soviet influence in Northern Manchuria, threatens serious complications, and for refusing either to confirm or to deny that such representations have been made. Against these alleged maneuvers of the American Government the Soviet press summons the toilers of the whole world, especially of the United States, to protest and to act. The official Telegram Agency of the Soviet Union (Moscow IZVESTIA No. 324, of November 25) has been able to announce, in fact, an alleged manifestation of workmen in defense of the Soviet Union at Seattle on November 23, the very day the attacks on the United States were written.

No pains have been taken by the IZVESTIA or the PRAVDA to reconcile the alleged aims of the United States, to allow Japan to take firmer foothold upon the continent of Asia, and to weaken Japan as a rival in the Pacific Ocean basin.

Their comment is very similar and is obviously inspired. It is couched in the most vitriolic language, and suggests that long accumulated animus has been given free expression. The further design to arouse hatred of the United States upon the continent of Europe, and hatred as well as suspicion of the

United

-3-

United States in Japan, seems to be manifest. The United States is charged with having helped to bring on and to prolong the world war, and with the desire to provoke another, for the sake of its own enrichment.

- 3/ It was announced at the same time that no further reply to Litvinov's last note is expected from
- 4/ Tokyo, and that a convention on the exchange of postal parcels between the U.S.S.R. and Japan was signed at Moscow on November 23, 1931, which possibly might be taken as a hint that Japanese-Soviet relations have remained but little ruffled by the events in Manchuria, or that an adjustment of their differences has been, or is being arranged; a hope in any case that it can be arranged. An alternative possibility is that the Soviet Union, having beaten a retreat, finds the United States a useful lightning rod for the discharge of dangerous national sentiment.

While alleged plans for a partition of China and for the organization of an anti-communist front in the Far East have been the subjects of the most recent comment in the Soviet press, nothing had appeared lately to prepare the ground for the excessively intense propaganda against the United States, which has now been begun. This reversion to the attitude taken toward the United States during the Chinese-Soviet conflict had, however, taken place from time to time during the present series of events in Manchuria, but in much milder form.

The main ostensible trigger for the release of the present broadside against the United States was

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a telegram from Shanghai, said to reflect information from Tokyo. An American correspondent at Paris has, however, supplied an additional basis for the insinuations in regard to alleged pressure on the part of American bankers and manufacturers, who are represented to be so greedy for war orders that they would willingly provoke a second world war. The Moscow IZVESTIA No. 323, of November 24, 1931, the same issue that carried the news and comment under reference, had a London telegram dated November 22, quoting the Washington correspondent of the London MORNING POST as stating that the United States is mainly concerned lest the Soviet Union be drawn into the Manchurian conflict. The IZVESTIA, however, made no reference in its comment to this information, which might easily have suggested a delay of its attack, pending the receipt of further information, if the attack were sincere and not a propaganda move.

5/ The last communiqué on the Japanese-Chinese conflict that has been published in the Soviet press contained strong Japanese-Soviet mutual assurances which seem, in the light of the third enclosure, now to be regarded as satisfactory.

6-3/ The Moscow IZVESTIA, PRAVDA, and ECONOMIC LIFE, in their editorial comment on this communiqué, however, did not represent the danger as having been diminished by the Japanese assurances.

9/ If the view herein taken of the latest attack on the United States is correct, little importance is to be attached to the reported plan to seize the Chinese-

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Chinese-Eastern Railway and occupy Harbin, and still
less to the somewhat belated comment on the Manchurian
10-11/ situation which is noticed in enclosures 10 and 11.

Respectfully yours,

Felix Cole

Felix Cole
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

Enclosures:

1. The Anti-Soviet Plans of the Imperialists in Connection with the Manchurian Conflict.
(Moscow IZVESTIA, No. 24, 1931, No. 323).
2. The American Capitalists — Instigators of a New War.
(Moscow PRAVDA, No. 323, November 24, 1931).
3. Statement of the Representative of the Japanese Ministry Concerning Comrade Litvinov's Reply.
(Moscow IZVESTIA, No. 323, November 24, 1931).
4. Signing the Convention Concerning the Exchange of Postal Parcels between the U.S.S.R. and Japan.
(Moscow IZVESTIA, No. 323, November 24, 1931).
5. From the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.
(Moscow IZVESTIA, No. 320, November 21, 1931).
6. Serious Situation in Manchuria.
(Moscow IZVESTIA, No. 321, November 22, 1931).
7. A Policy of War and a Policy of Peace.
(Moscow PRAVDA, No. 321, November 22, 1931).
8. The Game Shown Up.
(Moscow ECONOMIC LIFE, No. 266, November 22, 1931).
9. A Plan for the Seizure of the Chinese Eastern Railway.
(Moscow PRAVDA, No. 324, November 25, 1931).
10. On the Front of Peace.
(Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, No. 317, Nov. 23, 1931)
11. A New Division of China by the Imperialists.
(LENINGRAD PRAVDA, No. 319, November 20, 1931).

(In triplicate)

Copy to Amembassy, Tokyo, via Dept.
" " Amconsulate, Harbin, " "
" " E.I.C., Paris.
" " " " " " , for Peiping.

800R - Japan-China

DBM/lr

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 0266 of NOV 27 1931
from the American Legation at Riga, Latvia.

SOURCE: Moscow IZVESTIA,
Nov. 24, 1931,
No. 323.

THE ANTI-SOVIET PLANS OF THE IMPERIALISTS IN
CONNECTION WITH THE MANCHURIAN CONFLICT.

The American imperialistic circles come out
in the role of instigators of war.*

(Translation of news and edi-
torial comment).

Shanghai, November 22 (TASS). In local informed
circles there has been received news from Tokyo that
the double-faced** attitude of the American Government
toward the Manchurian events is explained by its act-
ive effort to draw Japan into an armed conflict with
the U.S.S.R. It is being impelled into this course
by very influential banking and industrial circles,
who count upon an alleviation of the general economic
crisis through the bringing about of a war situation,
which would help to mop up the accumulated stocks of
raw materials and manufactures.

The interested circles further point out that an
additional result of the success of their efforts
would be, on the one hand, the slow-down or even the
frustration of the accomplishment of the five-year
plan, and on the other hand, the weakening of Japan
as a rival of the United States on the Pacific Ocean.

Nor

*Moscow PRAVDA headlines: The American bourgeoisie
incites Japan against the Soviet Union. The pro-
vokers of war in action.

**or equivocal, ambiguous. Translator's notes.

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Nor, of course, is the possibility of American industry getting Japanese war orders overlooked.

The occupation of Manchuria is a step toward creating an Anti-Soviet front.*

New York, November 22 (TASS). The Paris correspondent of the New York EVENING POST, Raymond Carroll, points out that the United States and other Powers are trying to form in Manchuria a Japanese buffer state as "a bulwark against communism."

"Japan", writes the correspondent, "has won a victory not only in the battles in the Far East, but at Paris, too, for the Occidental Great Powers behind the mask of the League of Nations, and under the cover of diplomatic maneuvers, are in secret endeavoring that Japan shall be strengthened on the Asiatic continent, as a reliable segment of a ring around the Soviet Union."

"As one very prominent participant in the session of the Council of the League of Nations has emphasized, in the event of Japan's being strengthened in Manchuria there will be formed a 'new reliable frontier against bolshevism'."

"The role in Europe of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Rumania, as buffer states, forming an anti-Soviet front, will be played by Japan on the Asiatic continent. Such is the diplomatic background of the military measures of Japan."

Statement

*Moscow PRAVDA headlines: Disclosure of the secret negotiations at Paris.

Manchuria, a Japanese buffer state, a bulwark against communism. Translator's notes.

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Statement of the "Associated Press"
on the position of the United States.*

Washington, November 22 (TASS). The "Associated Press" announces: "The American Government has informed Japan that, in the opinion of the United States, the occupation of Tsitsihar, within the sphere of Soviet influence in Northern Manchuria, threatens serious complications." More detailed information about the declaration of the United States to Japan is not available.

There is news from Tokyo also as to a declaration of the American Government. Secretary of State (Minister for Foreign Affairs) Stimson refuses to confirm or deny all these statements.

Suspicious solicitude of the Japanese
military for Harbin.**

Peiping, November 23 (TASS). The Harbin Japanese newspaper, HARBIN NICHU-NICHU, announces: "The staff of the Japanese Kwantung troops has declared that it takes upon itself the care for the maintenance of law and order in Harbin'".

* * *

During the progress of the Japanese-Chinese conflict there have been found repeatedly in the European press, especially the French, sufficiently definite indications of the anti-Soviet plans of the imperialists, connected with the Japanese military intervention
in

*Moscow PRAVDA headlines: A provocative maneuver of Stimson.

**Moscow PRAVDA omits this item. Translator's notes.

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in Manchuria. At the present moment we have a number of statements, testifying to the further development of these plans and to the role of the American imperialism. The authors of the Kellogg pact "condemning war as an instrument of national policy", proclaiming that they "are solicitous for peace", and tilting in the lists for "disarmament", are coming out as outright instigators of war.

On the one hand, an American agency circulates the very equivocal information that, "in the opinion of the United States, the occupation of Tsitsihar, within the sphere of Soviet influence, threatens serious complications" and at the same time, as if to stress the ambiguity of this declaration, Stimson "refuses" to confirm or deny the information of the most prominent American agency. On the other hand, telegrams from Shanghai and New York disclose the real plans of the American imperialistic circles. The New York bankers and industrialists, like the French stock exchange people, orientate themselves toward the further sharpening of the conflict in the Far East, put their wager on war. The American imperialists regard the advance of the Japanese troops in Manchuria as one of the necessary steps toward the hemming in of the country of the Soviets and the provocation of the Soviet Union to a military collision. They want to close in the imperialistic ring around the U.S.S.R., at the same time preparing the ground for a military provocation. To this end, the American imperialists are endeavoring to push Japan into a conflict with the U.S.S.R., and to drag the U.S.S.R. into the Manchurian conflict.

This

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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This provocative policy of the American imperialists will not be crowned with success. We well understand what are the plans of the instigators of war. We are in the presence of a new attempt of our enemies to deal a blow at socialistic up-building. This attempt, like all the preceding ones, will be unmasked and frustrated with the aid of the labor class and the toilers of the whole world.

DBM/lr

Enclosure No. 2 to despatch No. 5203 of NOV 27 1931
from the Legation at Riga, Latvia.

SOURCE: Moscow PRAVDA,
No. 323,
of November 24, 1931.

THE AMERICAN CAPITALISTS -- INSTIGATORS
OF A NEW WAR.

(Translation of editorial comment on
the TASS telegram from Shanghai.)

The American bourgeoisie suffered least of all from the last imperialistic war, and battered most of all on war orders for the preparation of the instruments of death and destruction for the warring countries. American "prosperity" rested not only on heaps of gold, but on mountains of corpses as well. Upon the bones of millions of toilers, who perished during the four years of the war, rests the so-called greatness of American imperialism. Voltaire once said that the history of England should be written by the public hangman. The traders in human blood are writing the history of the latest American imperialism.

The American bourgeoisie thirsts for new wars, new streams of blood, new mass murders and new profits. The American capitalists -- let the toilers of the whole world know this -- want to fan up a new world wide conflagration. They are fairly crawling out of their skins to bring about in the Far East a situation in which a military collision would become inevitable; to set Japan upon the U.S.S.R. and to cause a war between them.

We are not disposed to underestimate the importance of the facts that are contained in the telegram from

Shanghai

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Shanghai on the position of the Government of the United States in the Manchurian conflict. Nor are we disposed to underrate the role and the influence of the banking and industrial circles in the United States, and their influence on the policy of the Government. The American capitalists, having warmed their hands at the fires of the greatest of imperialistic wars in the history of mankind, and having put forth no small efforts to bring about that war, and to give it a prolonged duration, are now endeavoring anew to bring about a "war conjuncture" by means of a war in the Far East, the purpose of which would be the defeat of the five-year plan in the U.S.S.R. and the enfeeblement of Japan — the greatest rival of the United States in the basin of the Pacific Ocean.

A crisis is shattering the economic organism of American imperialism. Enormous unemployment, ill-omened signs of a gold* crisis, the paralysis of the immense industrial system of the United States — all these irrefutable proofs of the collapse of capitalism beyond the ocean are warning the American bourgeoisie that its reign is passing away. The famous "prosperity" has vanished. And, having lost their heads, the American capitalists intend, or at least hope, to bring it back by means of a new imperialistic war, in which

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* literally: valuta. Translator's note.

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they would gain, just as they did in the first world war.

The American bourgeoisie is setting Japan upon the U.S.S.R. — this explains the awkward manoeuvres of Stimson and the unexpected complaisance of Dawes at Paris. But the American imperialism is simultaneously trying to provoke the Soviet Union as well. To this witnesses the news about Stimson's note to Japan. The inciters to war do not despise provocation, in order to cause a conflict between the U.S.S.R. and Japan and in order that the industrial and financial aces of the United States emerge from the crisis and American imperialism may strengthen its positions on the Pacific ocean at the expense of Japan.

The combination will not work. Mr. Stimson may as well see to it in advance that in the list of his diplomatic defeats during the years last past there shall be set down still another failure of anti-Soviet plans, formed in connection with a Manchurian conflict.

The U.S.S.R. will not abandon its firm policy of peace. This policy of peace is the most powerful of instruments in the struggle against the attempts of the imperialists to start a new war. Our position will again show the toilers of the whole world that the greatest factor in the foreign policy of imperialism, especially of the American imperialism, is the desire for war; Let the toilers of all countries remember that across the ocean there is now going on most intense labor on
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the part of the instigators and provokers of a new war. Let the toilers of the United States above all remember that.

We shall, as before, show up the war plans of the imperialists.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 3 to despatch No. 02008 of NOV 27 1931
from the American Legation at Riga, Latvia.

SOURCE: Moscow IZVESTIA,
No. 323, p.1,
November 24, 1931.

STATEMENT OF THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
JAPANESE MINISTRY CONCERNING COMRADE
LITVINOV'S REPLY.

(Translation).

Tokyo, November 23 (TASS). The representative of
the Ministry for Foreign Affairs stated that Comrade
Litvinov's reply was received on November 22, and he
further said that the Soviet Government apparently
expects no reply.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 4 to despatch No. 8208 of NOV 27 1931
 from the American Legation at Riga, Latvia.

SOURCE: Moscow IZVESTIA,
 No. 323, p.1,
 November 24, 1931.

SIGNING THE CONVENTION CONCERNING THE EXCHANGE
 OF POSTAL PARCELS BETWEEN THE U.S.S.R. AND JAPAN.

(Translation).

On November 23, 1931, at the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, the signing took place of the convention concerning the exchange of postal parcels between the U.S.S.R. and Japan.

On behalf of the U.S.S.R., the convention was signed by the Vice People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Comrade L.M. Karakhan, and on behalf of Japan, by the Japanese Ambassador in the U.S.S.R., Mr. Koki Hirota. At the signing were present: the Chief of the Second Eastern Section of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, Comrade B.I. Kozlovsky; the Chief of the Law Section, Comrade A.V. Sabanin; and other responsible workers of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs; and the Chief of the Administration of International Affairs of the People's Commissariat for Post and Telegraph, Comrade E.V. Hirschfeld. On behalf of the Japanese side were present: Counsellor of Legation Mr. Eidji Amo, and the Second Secretary, Mr. Fuanio Miakava.

Simultaneously with the Convention, Comrade Hirschfeld and Mr. Amo signed the executive regulations attached to the said Convention.

The agreement signed provides for an exchange of postal parcels between the two countries in direct traffic as well as in transit traffic. The latter,
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through Soviet territory, is granted only to countries that have concluded a special parcels agreement with the U.S.S.R. and through Japanese territory — only to countries with which Japan has established an exchange of postal parcels. The exchange of parcels may take place by land, water, and air communication.

Each of the contracting parties has the right to issue restrictions concerning the contents of the postal parcels, according to its domestic regulations.

The executive regulations attached establish the technicalities of the mode of exchange of parcels.

(TASS)

js/lr

Enclosure No. 5 to despatch No. 8208 of NOV 27 1931
from the American Legation at Riga, Latvia.

SOURCE: Moscow IZVESTIA,
No. 320, p.1,
November 21, 1931.

FROM THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

(Translation)

In a call on the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Comrade M.M. Litvinov, on the 19th of this month, the Japanese Ambassador, Mr. Hirota, made to Comrade Litvinov the following statement:

"At the time of the Chinese-Soviet conflict in 1929, the Imperial Government observed a policy of strict non-interference. The Imperial Government refused to carry Chinese troops which were directed to the vicinity of the station of Manchuli on its railways, a fact which in all probability will still be remembered by the Soviet Government. That is why from the very beginning of the present Japanese-Chinese conflict, the Imperial Government expected that the Soviet Government would adhere to a policy of strict non-interference, not rendering any aid to any Chinese troops whatsoever. The Imperial Government expressed its satisfaction in connection with the declaration of the Soviet Government, dated October 29, which confirmed the expectations of the Imperial Government. The Imperial Government does not believe the various rumors which have spread after the said declaration was made. The Imperial Government states categorically that it is absolutely

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absolutely impossible that Japanese Consulates and Japanese military authorities invent rumors, and spread them through the press and through telegraph agencies. As regards the statement made by the Japanese military authorities in Mukden, and the interview of the Japanese Vice Consul in Harbin, which are mentioned in the declaration of the Soviet Government, of November 14, -- the Japanese Government, although it does not know in what form the said statements were communicated, nevertheless believes that the first statement refers merely to utterances of journalists to the effect that such rumors were circulating, (such rumors were spread in Harbin), while in the latter statement the Japanese Vice Consul candidly gave what information he had on the subject. It is a non-permissible mistake to believe that the Japanese authorities are inventing rumors without any foundation. According to information at hand, the Chinese side spreads rumors to the effect that the Chinese troops are receiving assistance of various descriptions from the U.S.S.R. for the purpose of raising the spirits of the Helungkiang troops. The Soviet Government, having professed a policy of non-interference, should have addressed its complaints rather to the Chinese side. In view of the strained relations between the Japanese and Chinese troops, the Japanese Government expects an unmistakable declaration to the effect that the Soviet Government will not render assistance to the troops of General Ma by supplying them with arms and other war stores.

"The Imperial Government, having been compelled to
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take action for the protection of its rights and interests in Manchuria and Mongolia, was careful, of course, that no damage to the interests of the U.S.S.R. should ensue. Contrary to the undertaking given, the Helungkiang troops not only attacked the weak Japanese detachments sent to protect the repair gang on the bridges of the Taonan-Tsitsihar railway, but also concentrated in the vicinity of Tsitsihar many reinforcements from the west and from the east, thereby constituting a menace to our numerically weak troops. The Japanese troops have not the slightest intention of paralyzing the functioning of the Chinese Eastern Railway, but if the Helungkiang troops do not cease provoking the Japanese troops a clash between the troops facing each other will become inevitable, in consequence of which the Anangki district may become disorganized. The Imperial Government is adopting all possible measures in order to avoid such a clash and such encroachment upon the interests of the Chinese Eastern Railway so long as the troops of General Ma do not use that railway for their own ends. However, if, notwithstanding our efforts, some untoward events do take place, the Chinese side will undoubtedly be responsible for it. Responsibility for this will also fall upon the Chinese Eastern Railway which permitted Chinese troops to be concentrated on, and carried by, that railway."

Yesterday, November 20, Comrade Litvinov received the Japanese Ambassador, Mr. Hirota, and made to him the following statement in reply:

"The Soviet Government notes with satisfaction your statement, Mr. Ambassador, to the effect that the

Japanese

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Japanese Government does not believe the rumors about any violation of the principle of non-interference, nor the rumors that Soviet aid has been rendered to Chinese generals, and that the Japanese Government thus disclaims any connection with the irresponsible statements made by Japanese official persons, evidently without the sanction of their Government. The Soviet Government did not expect any other attitude on the part of the Japanese Government to the said rumors after the absolutely clear statement made by Mr. Karakhan, by instruction of the Soviet Government, as to strict non-interference in the Japanese-Chinese conflict, and the obligation not to render any aid whatsoever to one or the other side.

"Since in your declaration, Mr. Ambassador, there is mentioned a certain analogy between the events taking place in China now, and the Chinese-Soviet conflict in 1929, I am compelled to note the incorrectness of that analogy. Notwithstanding the absolutely evident gross violation, by the Chinese authorities, of the rights of the U.S.S.R., fixed by treaties, the Soviet Government did not invade Manchuria with its troops, and did not think even of such invasion. And only after repeated raids by Chinese and Russian white-guard bands upon Soviet territory, the Soviet troops crossed the Manchurian border to beat off these attacks, to disarm the raiders, and to put an end to their further activities. On that occasion no mention was made of the possibility of an occupation, even a temporary one, of Chinese territory by Soviet troops, of deposing the existing authorities and appointing new ones. Nor was there at that time the remotest possibility of violating

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violating the lawful rights and interests of Japan. And as soon as the Soviet troops had accomplished their strictly circumscribed task, they were withdrawn to Soviet territory. The Soviet Government did not in that connection take any advantage of its own military superiority and of China's weakness to force upon the latter any new conditions, or to solve any problems that were not directly connected with the conflict.

"If you, Mr. Ambassador, in mentioning that the Japanese Government refused to carry Chinese troops on the railways at the time of the conflict in 1929, have in view the Southern Manchurian Railway, and if it is with this that you contrast the alleged carrying of Chinese troops on the Chinese Eastern Railway at the time of the present Japanese-Chinese conflict, I am bound to give you the following explanation. The Southern Manchurian Railway is under the full management and control of Japan, and is guarded by Japanese troops, while the Chinese Eastern Railway is under a mixed Chinese-Soviet management, and is guarded by Chinese troops subordinated solely to Chinese authorities. You ought to be aware that the Soviet Government has surrendered of its own free will the prerogatives formerly vested in the Tsarist Government, namely, the right to have its troops in China and more particularly on the Chinese Eastern Railway. And the Soviet Government does not regret this, for it feels convinced that it acted perfectly correctly, in surrendering the prerogatives of the Tsarist Government. But from this it follows that it is impossible to consider the conditions on the Southern
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ern Manchurian Railway as identical with the conditions on the Chinese Eastern Railway. It is not known to the Soviet Government that Chinese troops forming the guard of the Chinese Eastern Railway have been carried on the said railway for the purpose of military operations. And there was no necessity for knowing it, so long as the theater of the Japanese-Chinese conflict was limited to southern Manchuria. Such a danger might have arisen only from the moment of the advance of the Japanese troops towards the Chinese Eastern Railway. And when that danger became actual, the Soviet Government took note of this fact, and gave on November 12 to the Soviet part of the administration of the Chinese Eastern Railway the directive to continue adhering to the principle of neutrality, and not to consent in any case to the carrying, on the Chinese Eastern Railway, of troops of one or the other belligerent party, proceeding to the front. And indeed, notwithstanding all difficulties arising out of the proximity of the front, the Chinese Eastern Railway was able to observe, on the whole, a regime of neutrality. I have considered it necessary, Mr. Ambassador, to give this explanation in order to emphasize that I cannot agree with you as regards the responsibility devolving upon the Chinese Eastern Railway.

"The Soviet Government notes with satisfaction the repeated assurances of the Japanese Government to the effect that it will endeavor not to permit any encroachments upon the interests of the Chinese Eastern Railway and the U.S.S.R., as well as the assurances that the

Japanese

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Japanese troops have no intention of paralyzing the functioning of the Chinese Eastern Railway. It must be stated, however, that, notwithstanding the original information given to me by yourself, Mr. Ambassador, in conformity with instructions from your Government, to the effect that your Government had issued orders that military operations in Manchuria should be limited as much as possible -- that these operations have since then considerably extended, having gone greatly beyond the limits of their original zone. This circumstance, which increases the possibility that interests of the U.S.S.R. may be interfered with, cannot but cause serious alarm to the Soviet Government.

"In all its relations with other states, the Soviet Government consistently pursues a strict policy of peace and pacific mutual relations. The Soviet Government attaches great importance to the maintenance and the consolidation of the existing mutual relations with Japan. It adheres to a policy of strict non-interference in conflicts between sundry other countries. And it expects that the Japanese Government too will be bent upon preserving the at present prevailing relations between the two countries, and that in all its actions and dispositions it will take into consideration the integrity of the interests of the U.S.S.R."

* * *

In Tokyo, on November 19, the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, Mr. Nagai, invited the Charge d'Affaires of the U.S.S.R., to call and in conformity with instructions from the Japanese Government handed
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to him for communication to the Soviet Government a statement concerning the reasons which compelled the Japanese army to cross the Chinese Eastern Railway. Mr. Nagai also stated that the soldiers and officers of the Japanese army had been given the special order not to cause in any case any losses to the Chinese Eastern Railway in crossing that line. In addition to this, the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that as soon as the newly appointed Chinese chief of the troops guarding the railway arrives at Tsitsihar, and reestablishes proper order there, the Japanese troops will immediately leave Tsitsihar, and go south. Mr. Nagai said that he could not name a definite day, but that, in his personal opinion, this would take four or five days. Mr. Nagai asked to convey to the Soviet Government the assurance of the invariably friendly attitude of the Japanese Government to the U.S.S.R., and he particularly emphasized that all possible measures had been adopted to avoid any loss and damages to the Chinese Eastern Railway.

An additional statement to the same effect was made by the Japanese Ambassador, Mr. Hirota, when he was yesterday received by Comrade Litvinov. (TASS)

JS/lr

Enclosure No. 6 to despatch No. 0200 of NOV 27 1931
from the American Legation at Riga, Latvia.

SOURCE: Moscow IZVESTIA,
No. 321,
November 22, 1931.

SERIOUS SITUATION IN MANCHURIA.

(Translation of leading editorial).

The situation in Manchuria is growing more serious from day to day. On the very day when the Council of the League of Nations met in Paris, Japan, in order to demonstrate its attitude to the resolution of the League, calling upon Japan to withdraw her troops from Manchuria, moved these troops still further north, and occupied Tsitsihar.

How did the League of Nations react to this outrage on its decisions? It not only did not adopt any measures against the further strengthening and extending of the Japanese occupation of Manchuria, but, on the contrary, fully met Japan's wishes. The League of Nations has the intention of despatching a commission for investigating the situation in Manchuria. Japan wants to impart to that Commission the character of an entire investigating institute for studying the causes of domestic war in China, the causes of the weakness of the Central Government, China's attitude toward the various treaties, etc., etc. There can be no talk of the Japanese troops being withdrawn. The consent of the Japanese delegate at the League of Nations, Yoshizawa, to an armistice, was disclaimed by his Government. And this is perfectly comprehensible from the
point

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point of view of Japanese imperialism. For Japan denies that war is going on in Manchuria. Japan is only "protecting" its interests against unlawful acts on the part of China. And the League of Nations too cannot firmly profess the point of view that war is taking place in Manchuria, for, if it were to adopt this point of view, the question would arise/^{of} whose fault it was, and it would become necessary to face the consequences arising out of this on the ground of the Constitution of the League of Nations.

But the imperialistic powers which have more than once concluded agreements concerning the dividing-up of China, and which today are operating on Chinese territory as if it were their private property, cannot take action against Japan without coming to loggerheads among themselves. That is why each one of them has only one thought — how to get for itself some sort of compensation for the growth of Japanese influence in China.

Japanese imperialism in the meantime continues its work, without fearing for the time being that the other imperialistic powers might interfere. The Japanese occupation of Manchuria broadens and strengthens. China, as an organized entity, has been reduced by its bourgeoisie and by its militaristic cliques to a condition of absolute impotence. But the policy of Japanese imperialism is apt to call forth resistance on the part of the masses of the Chinese nation, resistance which is likely to lead to the greatest consequences. The evolution of diplomatic negotiations between the capitalistic Powers is not the principal factor that shapes the situation in the Far East. The progress of these negotiations

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tiations shows only the proportion of forces between the various imperialistic Powers. But the attitude of the masses of toilers in China and Japan to the events which are taking place, is apt to create a new situation. That is why it must be held that the situation in the Far East is pregnant with very important events.

At the same time, the situation in Northern Manchuria is pregnant also with dangers. This is proved by the statement made by the Japanese Ambassador, Mr. Hirota, on November 19, to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Comrade Litvinov. The Japanese Ambassador disclaimed any connection with the rumors which are being spread about Soviet interference in Manchurian affairs, declaring that the Japanese Government does not believe these rumors. But this did not prevent him from asking once more for "a clear statement to the effect that the Soviet Government will not render assistance to the troops of General Ma by supplying them with arms and other stores." Naturally the question arises here: if the Japanese Government does not believe the rumors spread by the Japanese military authorities, then on what does it base such a demand? Further, by announcing its intention not to permit anything detrimental to the interests of the Soviet Union and of the Chinese Eastern Railway, the Japanese Government, in the person of its Ambassador, Mr. Hirota, declines responsibility for the conflicts which may take place on the territory of the railway, accusing the Chinese Eastern Railway of carrying Chinese troops. Thereby the Japanese Government leaves for itself a loophole as an excuse for having encroached upon the
interests

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 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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interests of the Soviet Union which is the owner of the Chinese Eastern Railway, and participates in its administration.

The situation is all the more serious as the Japanese military clique has more than once proved that it does not pay sufficient attention to the wishes of its Government, and to the declarations emanating from the Japanese diplomacy. It will suffice to point to the fact that, notwithstanding the statement of the Japanese Government to the effect that it does not believe the rumors about General Ma being supported by Soviet troops,—the Japanese Ministry for War only quite recently handed to the Japanese press a whole communiqué that was to "prove" the fact of such support being given. The Japanese military clique pursues a policy of its own, and it is likely to create thereby a very dangerous situation. This alone suffices to show that the situation is serious, and to prevent an overrating of the pacific declarations of the Japanese diplomacy.

Nor should it be forgotten for a single moment that the agitation carried on by the imperialistic Powers against the Soviet Union suggests to the Japanese military clique, and the imperialistic circles behind it, that it is easier to obtain the consent of the imperialistic Powers to the seizure of the whole of Manchuria, rather than to the seizure of Southern Manchuria alone. The Soviet Union knows perfectly well that obscure forces within the imperialistic cliques are at work to set Japan and the U.S.S.R. by the ears. The Soviet Union will vigilantly watch that provocative policy, and expose it. We do not believe that Japan is interested in allowing
 itself,

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itself, while hunting after the Manchurian prey, to be set against the U.S.S.R. By seizing Manchuria, Japan undergoes a tremendous risk, for only blockheaded military cliques are apt over China's temporary impotence to forget the tremendous power of resistance imminent in the masses of the Chinese nation. Only military blockheadedness is apt to identify the temporary diplomatic conjuncture in the Far East with the real proportion of forces between the imperialistic powers which, being in an equal measure bent upon the exploitation of China, are hostile to one another when it comes to sharing the booty. It is not without reason that after the Washington Conference imperialistic Japan was vociferating about its isolation. Japan is not guarded against the possibility that its imperialistic enemies may support a Chinese movement directed against Japan when Japan will have become embroiled in Manchuria. This alone should be a warning to Japan not to strain the relations with the U.S.S.R. which latter is the only country that in reality carries on a policy of peace, and that pursues no selfish aims whatsoever in the Far East, or in any other parts of the world where it is in contiguity with other states.

In the Far East imperialism has spoken up in the language of guns and rifles. The Far East is a powder barrel which is likely to explode, thanks to the efforts of the imperialists. This should not be forgotten for a moment.

js/lr

Enclosure No. 7 to despatch No. 3200 of NOV 27 1931
from the Legation at Riga, Latvia.

SOURCE: Moscow PRAVDA,
No. 321, p. 1,
November 22, 1931.
Editorial.

A POLICY OF WAR AND A POLICY OF PEACE.

(Translation.)

The Paris Stock Exchange welcomed the session of the Council of the League of Nations by raising the quotations on shares of metallurgical enterprises and by increasing steel prices. The Chicago Stock Exchange observed the gathering of the imperialists at Paris by raising the wheat prices. The financial aces have thereby given expression to a definite attitude toward the present meeting of the Geneva "peace makers" who have chosen Paris as the place for the "solution" of the Japanese-Chinese conflict. From the Paris session the imperialists do not expect a consolidation of peace — they are not as naive as all that — but the creation of a "war situation" which they are awaiting, calling for, and hoping for.

A few days ago we quoted the candid statements of the organ of the Paris Stock Exchange, SITUATION ECONOMIQUE ET FINANCIERE, which, unabashed by any pacifist conventionalities, bluntly stated that war, even though confined to Manchuria only, is now extremely desirable because it will unload the huge stocks of raw material and finished goods, and it will permit the absorption of
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the immense army of the unemployed. The Paris session of the League of Nations Council consequently represents a long step forward toward the preparation for another World War. The Stock Exchange does not waste its sympathies.

The League of Nations has played an immensely important part in the occupation of Manchuria by Japanese imperialism. At the present moment it is its task to legalize the separation of Manchuria from the rest of China. It is immaterial under what cover this will be done.

The time which elapsed between the last Geneva session and that of Paris was utilized by Japanese imperialism to effect the complete seizure of northern Manchuria. The occupation of Tsitsihar was carried out with the direct support of the League of Nations. This Geneva institution is at present engaged in the drafting of a plan for the partition of China. The imperialistic colonizers who are meeting at Geneva are in search of a compromise which might satisfy the appetites of the interested parties and at the same time save the authority of the League of Nations. The resolution of the League of Nations Council on the Manchurian question is written with the blood of the Chinese people. No matter how tightly the doors of the French Foreign Ministry, behind which the Council is meeting might be shut, this fact cannot be concealed from the public opinion of international labor, and particularly from the workers and peasants of China.

Neither

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Neither is it mere accident that the representative of the United States, Dawes, is also taking an important part in everything going on at present in Paris. The CHICAGO TRIBUNE is not far from the truth when it mentions the other League meeting at the reception room of the American Ambassador. Dawes, according to the Paris and New York press, is one of the authors of the compromise which is to serve as a basis for "the solution" of the Manchurian problem. Dawes arrived at Paris as the protector of the interests of American capital, in the capacity of an observer, in order that American imperialism might be assured of the largest share of the spoils in the partition of China. But Dawes has also another instruction -- not to impede the freedom of action of American diplomacy in the future, since it is obvious that no solution whatever of the Manchurian problem at Paris can remove the imperialistic contradictions, and still less do away with the Anglo-American struggle in China.

The history of Japanese-American relationships knows not a few compromises. But where is there one among them which has even in the slightest degree removed Japanese-American contradictions in China and in the basin of the Pacific Ocean? Mr. Dawes, it is to be assumed, has not forgotten the words of American Ambassador Reinisch in China in 1918, on the occasion of the signing of the well-known Lansing-Ishi agreement concerning

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concerning the "special rights" of Japan in China:

"Although the Powers were compelled to grant to Japan freedom of action in China, the day of retribution will undoubtedly come." The Dawes-Matsudaira compromise, as well as the Lansing-Ishi compromise, not only failed to remove the problem of a war for hegemony on the Pacific, but it represents a great advance in the preparation for an imperialistic war for a new partition of the world.

The thing which unites the slave owners who have convened at Paris is their hatred toward the U.S.S.R. and their desire to take advantage of the Manchurian conflict for the creation of a regular system of war provocations against the U.S.S.R. On this ground the imperialists, and especially the United States, may, of course, find a common language with imperialistic Japan. American imperialism would welcome the anti-Soviet intrigues of Japan for many reasons, the principal among which is the wish to make Japan's position worse on the western coasts of the Pacific Ocean, by straining Japanese-Soviet relations.

Anti-Soviet plans undoubtedly occupy a prominent place in the activities of the Paris session of the League of Nations. It is part of the anti-Soviet plan for the League of Nations to attempt to cover the partition of China and its own policy of condoning Japanese imperialism by the excuse that "anarchy" reigns in China and that Japan is the guardian of "order." The French
 press

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press and the reactionary press of other countries have on this occasion not missed the opportunity to concentrate all their efforts upon the hounding of the Soviet Union which, forsooth, is responsible for the "anarchy" which reigns in China! Stephan Lauzanne, the well-paid representative of the Paris literary bandit world, writes in LE MATIN: "Behind the backs of the two parties which, in the opinion of the League of Nations, are awaiting its verdict, there stands a third party which makes every effort to aggravate the anarchy, and that is Soviet Russia. That is the country which has been encouraging China. These fatal machinations should not be ignored. If the Council of the League of Nations wants to apply coercive measures, it is necessary to apply them to the fomentors of disorder and not to the guardians of order." Stephan Lauzanne has let out the whole secret which Briand has been keeping so diligently!

Japanese imperialism, patronized and encouraged by the League of Nations, is conducting a regular war in Manchuria for the sake of — order!

The Japanese military clique is looting Chinese cities, tearing up Chinese railways, and appointing its own henchmen for the sake of — order!

The Japanese imperialists are annexing Chinese territory, confiscating bank deposits, and killing thousands of Chinese for the sake of — order!

The Japanese reactionary press is conducting a furious anti-Soviet campaign of provocation, fabricating absurd rumors,

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rumors, filling the air with provocations, trying to fan the flames of a conflict for the sake of that self-same order!

But what, then, is disorder, if all these acts of the invaders are called "order"? Besides, who has called upon the Japanese invaders to establish any kind of "order" whatsoever in Manchuria? If "anarchy" actually reigns in China, if China has been divided into spheres of influence, if China has for many years served as the arena for the struggle of militaristic cliques among themselves, then it is all because of the imperialistic policy, the policy of colonial robbery, the policy of partitioning China, which has also been the policy of Japanese imperialism.

All references to "anarchy" said to be encouraged by the U.S.S.R., just as all the provocative rumors about aid said to be rendered by the Soviet Union to the Chinese generals, have for their object the attempt to represent the U.S.S.R. as the one responsible for events in Manchuria, and to make it responsible for the outrages of Japanese imperialism in China.

Notwithstanding the exhaustive and absolutely clear statements of Comrades Karakhan and Litvinov, and the numerous refutations of Japanese provocative fabrications even by foreign agencies and military attaches (the latter ones can hardly be suspected of any sympathy with the U.S.S.R.), the campaign of provocation against the Soviet Union in Japan does not cease. Yet it is this

very

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very thing which was demanded in the statement made by Comrade Litvinov to the Japanese Ambassador.

From this point of view the reply of the Japanese Government deserves that we dwell upon it in greater detail. Whether the Japanese Government does or does not believe "various rumors," this does not alter the situation, for these rumors continue to be fabricated and disseminated with the sympathetic participation of the ruling spheres. Moreover, this outrageous provocation is being fabricated with the deliberate object of diverting attention from the imperialistic highway robbery of the Japanese military clique in Manchuria and for the purpose of justifying this highway robbery. The declaration of the Japanese Ambassador does not indicate that a stop has been put to the anti-Soviet campaign of provocation. On the contrary, by demanding new statements, he affords occasion for further provocative fabrications which, in the final reckoning, may only harm Japanese-Soviet relationships.

In particular, such an occasion is afforded by the attempt of the Japanese Ambassador to draw an analogy between the position of the U.S.S.R. and the position of Japan during the Chinese-Soviet conflict in 1929. The Soviet Government adheres to a policy of non-intervention, basing itself upon the substance of its foreign policy, which is founded upon a struggle for peace and upon respect for treaties and for the independence of foreign states; the policy of Japanese imperialism is
based

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based upon the occupation of foreign territory, upon the usurpation of the sovereign rights of the Chinese people, and upon a policy of violence.

During the Chinese-Soviet conflict the Soviet troops did not occupy Chinese territory, did not capture Chinese cities, did not destroy Chinese railways, did not establish in Manchuria a régime of military occupation, did not remove the Chinese authorities. All that the Soviet Union tried to do was merely to restore the previous condition on the Chinese Eastern Railway. The Soviet Union did not take advantage of its absolute military superiority to impose upon China new conditions which would exceed the limits of the treaty on the Chinese-Soviet joint management of the Chinese Eastern Railway. We did not do that because this is contrary to our fundamental line of foreign policy — a peace policy. The object of the action of the U.S.S.R. in 1929 was to restore the normal operations of the Chinese Eastern Railway; the object of Japanese imperialism is to turn Manchuria into its colony.

There is nothing in common between the Chinese-Soviet conflict of 1929 and the Japanese-Chinese conflict, and the reference of the Japanese Ambassador to the position of his Government in 1929 is merely a crude attempt to represent matters as if the Soviet Government were for some reason or other "obliged" to Japanese imperialism.

The declaration of the Japanese Ambassador furnishes occasion to certain spheres to persist in their provocative campaign against the Soviet Union, on one pretext or

another.

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another.

The firm peace policy of the Soviet Government is the essence of our foreign policy, notwithstanding the repeated attempts of the imperialists to provoke the Soviet Union. However, we are fully aware of the fact that the situation in Manchuria remains grave as heretofore. Just because of this, and because the toilers of the U.S.S.R. are excellently acquainted with the character of the Japanese military clique, they cannot rest satisfied with mere assurances. The Japanese Government must with actions confirm its assurances concerning its specific policy with respect to the U.S.S.R., and it must, in the first place, put a stop to the outrageous campaign of provocation against the Soviet Union. It is no secret to anyone that there exist in Japan certain spheres which strive to bring about Japanese-Soviet complications. It is these very circles which are ^snot inclined toward anti-Soviet adventures. Precisely these circles are most receptive to the anti-Soviet plots of world imperialism. It is, of course, well known that these are the spheres which are now active in Manchuria.

The policy of the U.S.S.R. is a policy of peace; but this does not signify that the Soviet Union can leave unpunished the attempts to cause harm to the interests of socialistic upbuilding work. Let not the imperialists in Tokyo, Paris, and Washington forget that!

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Enclosure No. 8 to despatch No. of NOV 27 1931
from the Legation at Riga, Latvia.

SOURCE: Moscow ECONOMIC LIFE,
No. 266,
of November 22, 1931.

THE GAME SHOWN UP.

(Summary of the editorial leading
article.)

The Japanese military, newspaper writers, and "official representatives of the Japanese Government have vied with one another in fabricating the silliest inventions, designed to prove the existence of collaboration between Chinese generals and the Soviet Government." In spite of Karakhan's assurances, the same slanderous reports continue to circulate. The European and American bourgeois newspapers are striving to throw the blame for the Manchurian events upon the Soviet Union, and "bourgeois politicians do not conceal their cherished desire to drag the Soviet Union into the adventure of Japanese imperialism." This would be "a welcome pretext for forming a united anti-Soviet front from the United States to France and Poland." But after all, one thing remains plain: the Soviet Union has not violated its promises and is minded to observe treaties. It is to be observed, however, that the Japanese Government's declaration has not checked the extension of the military operations into the zone adjacent to the borders of the Soviet Union. "The danger that these operations will impair the interests of the Chinese-Eastern Railway and the Soviet

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Soviet Union, and the provocation by the Japanese military, whose actions are not always in consonance with the official declarations of the Japanese Government, have by no means been done away with, and the toiling masses of the Soviet Union will watch with unflagging attention how the Japanese Government actually fulfills the promises that it made in its declaration."

DEM/rk

Enclosure No. 9 to despatch No. 0200 of NOV 27 1931
from the American Legation at Riga, Latvia.

SOURCE: Moscow PRAVDA,
No. 324, p.1,
November 25, 1931.

A PLAN FOR THE SEIZURE OF THE CHINESE EAST-
ERN RAILWAY.

WHITE-GUARDS IN THE SERVICE OF THE JAPANESE
OCCUPATION TROOPS.

A "BUFFER STATE IN THE FAR EAST" IS BEING
CREATED.

(Translation).

Peiping, November 23, (TASS). According to in-
formation from trustworthy sources, Osava, the member
of the Japanese Military Mission in Harbin, has pro-
ceeded to Mukden, to report to the Japanese command
that the Whites agree to seize the Chinese Eastern
Railway.

The plan of the seizure of the Road, as elaborated
by the Whites, is as follows: one detachment of the
Whites is to occupy the Harbin railway station and the
Harbin depot, and to order all traffic to be stopped
immediately. Another detachment is to occupy the work-
shops and the administration offices of the Road; and a
third detachment is to occupy the station Stary Harbin,
the Intendantsky Crossing, and the printing offices.
The employees* of the Chinese Eastern Railway, beginning
with the telegraph operators, are to be beaten** and
replaced

*sluzhashtshiye.

** May mean, also, killed.

Translator's notes.

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replaced by other persons to be kept ready for this purpose.

According to the same source, the representatives of the Japanese Military Mission in Harbin do not deny that Harbin will be occupied by the Japanese, and that after the seizure of Tsitsihar the Japanese will partly seize the Chinese Eastern Railway.

In connection therewith, the representatives of the Japanese Military Mission have started great activities among the Whites, and are busy elaborating the ways and the dimensions in which the Whites are to be utilized in the event of a Japanese-Soviet conflict. The representative of the Japanese Military Mission has told the leader of the white-guard organizations, General Kosmin, that, although it is possible that there will be no war with the U.S.S.R., Japan has the intention of creating a buffer state in the Far East, and that naturally the white-guards are to play an important part in the materialization of this plan.

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Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. of NOV 27 1931
from the Legation at Riga, Latvia.

SOURCE: Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA,
No. 317,
of November 22,
1931.

ON THE FRONT OF PEACE.

(Summary of an editorial article.)

The military operations, begun by Japan under flimsy pretexts, have been extended to the borders of the Helungkiang province, which is contiguous to Soviet territory. For this a pretext has been created by circulating false and absurd stories of Soviet support to General Ma. The Soviet Union is for peace and is observing neutrality, but must keep an eye upon what goes on near its frontier, and Japanese assurances can be convincing only if supported by deeds. "So long as the Japanese military extends the area of occupation in Manchuria, so long as the band of Geneva robbers concocts new plans of a partition of China and instigates Japan to create in Manchuria a place d'armes for new anti-Soviet campaigns, we shall retain the right to judge the conduct of Japan not by words but by facts. The Japanese Government should take action to dissociate itself clearly from anti-Soviet provocators and prove that it does not desire the spreading of the conflict."

DBM/fr

Enclosure No. 11 to despatch No. 0200 of NOV 27 1931
from the Legation at Riga, Latvia.

SOURCE: LENINGRAD PRAVDA,
No. 319,
November 20, 1931,
Page 1.

A NEW DIVISION OF CHINA BY THE IMPERIALISTS.

(Translation of second half of the editorial leading article.)

But while in Paris conferences are going on behind the scenes, at which diplomatic formulas are elaborated that would guarantee to Japanese imperialism an undisturbed consummation of its intervention in Manchuria, the speed with which that intervention is developing continues to increase. Having gained a foothold in Southern Manchuria, Japanese imperialism has begun to seize the northern part of the country. The Japanese troops have started a decided offensive, and after a fight have captured Tsitsihar, which was the last stronghold of an independent Chinese authority in northern Manchuria. The complete rout of general Ma, and the fact that Tsitsihar has fallen into the hands of the Japanese and their creatures, is bound to bring with it a coup d'état in Harbin. Thus, the military operations which were started by the Japanese professedly in self-defense against attacks by Chinese troops upon the Southern Manchurian Railway, have already led to ^{the} capture not only of all important Manchurian

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Manchurian centers, and the districts directly contiguous to the Japanese zone, and not only to the seizure of the whole territory of southern Manchuria, which for a long time already has been regarded by Japan as a sphere of Japan's "sole influence," but have also assumed the shape of an occupation of northern Manchuria, the consummation of which occupation is now the principal task of the Japanese invaders.

It goes without saying that this easily gained military success of Japan does not yet mean a political consolidation of Japan's claims to the thus conquered positions. The complex of the imperialistic conflicts of interest in connection with Manchuria cannot be solved by shell fire or by the bombs dropped from Japanese aeroplanes upon the numerically weak Chinese troops that have remained in that district. On the contrary, the seizure of Manchuria opens up a new phase in the dividing-up of China between the imperialists, it implies a further radical sharpening of those conflicts of interests, and it is pregnant with the serious menace of a new world conflict.

The campaign of lies and slanders, which is going on notwithstanding repeated categorical refutations on the part of the Soviet Government, and the purpose of which is to prove the charge that the U.S.S.R. is rendering assistance to the Chinese troops in Tsitsihar, — shows that Japanese imperialism, in trying still more to strengthen its positions in Manchuria, is more than ever inclined to play on

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the anti-Soviet tendencies of the reactionaries throughout the world.

Now that Japanese troops have already crossed the Chinese Eastern Railway, and that Japanese imperialism persists in playing with the fire, provoking a repulsive anti-Soviet campaign of lies and slander, the events in Manchuria are bound to attract the increased attention of the toilers in the Soviet Union and throughout the whole world.

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NAVAL RADIO

Washington,

December 11, 1931.

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On December 10 the Secretary of State issued a statement to the press as follows:

QUOTE The Government of the United States is gratified at the unanimous adoption by the Council of the League of Nations of the Resolution of December 10. This represents a definite step of progress in a long and difficult negotiation which M. Briand and his associates have conducted with great patience. *Quia*

The Council of the League of Nations was in session on September 18 when the present situation in Manchuria first developed. China at once appealed to the Council under Article 11 of the League Covenant. The Council took immediate cognizance of this appeal, and China and Japan participated in the discussions before it in accordance with their obligations as parties to the Covenant. This Government has from the beginning endeavored to cooperate with and support these efforts of the Council by representations through the diplomatic channels to both Japan and China. Not only are the American people interested in the same objective sought by the League of preventing a disastrous war and securing a

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peaceful

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peaceful solution of the Manchurian controversy, but as a fellow signatory with Japan and China in the Kellogg-Briand Pact and in the so-called Nine Power Treaty of February 6, 1922, this government has a direct interest in and obligation under the undertakings of those treaties. *Para.*

The present Resolution provides for the immediate cessation of hostilities. It reaffirms the solemn pledge of Japan to withdraw her troops within the railway zone as speedily as possible. It provides for the appointment of a commission of five members to study on the spot and report to the Council on any circumstance which disturbs the peace or affects the good understandings between China and Japan. Such a provision for a neutral commission is in itself an important and constructive step towards an ultimate and fair solution of the intricate problem presented in Manchuria. It means the application with the consent of both China and Japan of modern and enlightened methods of conciliation to the solution of this problem. The principle which underlies it exists in many treaties of conciliation to which the United States is a party and which have played in recent years a prominent part in the constructive peace machinery of the world. The operation of such a commission gives time for the heat of

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controversy to subside and makes possible a careful study
of the underlying problem. *Para*

The ultimate solution of the Manchurian problem must be worked out by some process of agreement between China and Japan themselves. This country is concerned that the methods employed in this settlement shall, in harmony with the obligations of the treaties to which we are parties, be made in a way which shall not endanger the peace of the world and that the result shall not be the result of military pressure. These are the essential principles for which the United States and the nations represented on the Council have been striving and it is in itself a signal accomplishment that there has been arrayed behind these principles in a harmonious cooperation such a solid alignment of the nations of the world. *Para*

On the other hand the adoption of this Resolution in no way constitutes an endorsement of any action hitherto taken in Manchuria. This government, as one of the signatories of the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the Nine Power Treaty, cannot disguise its concern over the events which have there transpired. The future efficacy of the Resolution depends upon the good faith with which the pledge against renewed

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hostilities is carried out by both parties and the spirit in which its provisions directed toward an ultimate solution are availed of. The American Government will continue to follow with solicitous interest all developments in this situation in the light of the obligations involved in the treaties to which this country is a party UNQUOTE.

Repeat to Nanking and to Tokyo.

Stinson
SKH

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Enciphered by *24.7.11*

Sent by operator *M.*, *19*

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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FROM

Paris

Dated December 11, 1931

Rec'd 12:40 PM
DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Secretary of State, December 24 1931.

Washington

879, December 11, 10 a.m.

FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES.

Following report is from Sweetser:

"The Council separated today after twenty-five days of continuous conferences, including Sundays, during the third session, specially devoted to Manchuria.

Briand is left in charge, in case of eventuality, assisted, if need be, by the members of the Drafting Committee, Madariaga and Colban, who remain in Paris and Cecil or an alternate from the British Embassy. The detail work will remain with the Secretariat whose special staff of thirty people return to Geneva today.

No one wishes to prognosticate the future. All are tired from the long session and only hopeful that in some way a further crisis may be averted. Regarding the immediate emergency of Chinchow opinions differ as to whether or not the Japanese will advance or allow the situation to remain as it is. In any case the Council feels

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2-879 from Paris, December 11,
1931.

feels it has done what lay in its power, having established an effective system of observers, made its best efforts to create a neutral zone, informed both parties and world opinion through Briand yesterday that military action was not necessary for either side and covered the special situation around Chinchow into the General Resolution. It did not attempt more regarding Chinchow, first, because it could not bring itself to urge the Chinese to direct negotiations on the terms suggested by Japan for complete withdrawal from Manchuria without the counterprise of a real zone and, second, because it wanted to get the Resolution through as a real alternative to further hostilities about which world public opinion could rally.

(END SECTION ONE)

SHAW

KLP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

FROM

GRAY

Paris

Dated December 11, 1931

Rec'd 1:35 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

879, December 11, 10 a.m. (SECTION TWO AND LAST)

Plans for the commission are the next immediate step. Names are now being suggested from different sources. The Italians have recommended Schanzer, the Germans Solf, Seeckt, or Sohnee; Debrouckere has been suggested as a small power possibility. The British, French and American possibilities are not yet clear. It is expected, however, they will be known shortly by the Secretariat approved by Briand submitted to the two parties to assure that no one not acceptable to either is included and then finally approved by correspondence by the rest of the Council.

Should meanwhile an explosion occur at Chinchow it is impossible to say what would happen. The Chinese might of course ask for a reconvening of the Council as the present session stands adjourned and not concluded.

The

106-

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#879 from Paris, December 11,
1931.

The Council members would certainly be loath to meet again at once however as in the midst of their own national crisis they have devoted 12 days to Manchuria in September, 10 in October and another 25 now. The expenditure of time and effort has been very great not to mention the financial cost to the delegations and the League which in case of the latter has amounted to about \$25,000 for this last session alone. Efforts will certainly be made therefore for Briand, the drafting committee and the Secretariat to carry the situation till the next regular meeting of the Council on January 25 but another special session would not be excluded if the situation becomes desperate enough to necessitate".

(END MESSAGE)

SHAW

WSB

1664

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

December 11, 1931.

DEC 11 1931

MR. KLOTS

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

AUG 1 - 1934

Department of State

Mr. Klots:

I am looking over your draft of proposed telegram to Nanking on "neutral zone".

793.94/3171

However, in view of the fact that the Japanese Cabinet has fallen ~~from which we may assume that Baron Shidehara is not at this moment in office~~ and in view of various considerations to which I have on recent occasions directed attention, I am more than ever of the view that we should not inject ourselves into the Chinchow problem.

I would call attention to the attached telegram. You will note that, in addition to the Council and our own people, the League Secretariat has had a special staff of thirty people at Paris. Dawes had with him Dooman. Alfred Sze had with him Willoughby. I cannot for one moment believe that none of those people was aware of the essential facts with regard both to the major substance and the details of both Wellington Koo's original proposal and Baron Shidehara's counter-proposal in reference to the various features of the neutral zone proposal. At least three of the half-dozen persons most concerned with this problem here knew the details. ¶ That large group of people at Paris have spent twenty-five

793.94/3171

FE: SAN/ LMF

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

twenty-five days working intensively and almost exclusively on the Manchuria problem; they have decided that the best thing to do with regard to the neutral zone problem is to consider it covered within the terms of the Resolution and otherwise let it alone. I think that we would be well advised to let ourselves be guided by their conclusions.

SKH

FE:SKH/ZMF

MET

GREEN

Paris

Dated December 11, 1931

Rec'd 12:40 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington

879, December 11, 10 a.m.

FROM AMBASSADOR DAWES.

Following report is from Sweetser:

"The Council separated today after twenty-five
days of continuous conferences, including Sundays,
during the third session, specially devoted to Manchuria.

Briand is left in charge, in case of eventuality,
assisted, if need be, by the members of the Drafting
Committee, Madariaga and Colban, who remain in Paris
and Cecil or an alternate from the British Embassy.
The detail work will remain with the Secretariat whose
special staff of thirty people return to Geneva today.

No one wishes to prognosticate the future. All
are tired from the long session and only hopeful that
in some way a further crisis may be averted. Regarding
the immediate emergency of Ohinchow opinions differ as
to whether or not the Japanese will advance or allow the
situation to remain as it is. In any case the Council
feels

MET

2-879 from Paris, December 11,
1931.

feels it has done what lay in its power, having estab-
lished an effective system of observers, made its best
efforts to create a neutral zone, informed both parties
and world opinion through Briand yesterday that mili-
tary action was not necessary for either side and
covered the special situation around Chinchow into the
General Resolution. It did not attempt more regarding
Chinchow, first, because it could not bring itself to
urge the Chinese to direct negotiations on the terms
suggested by Japan for complete withdrawal from Man-
churia without the counterprise of a real zone and,
second, because it wanted to get the Resolution through
as a real alternative to further hostilities about
which world public opinion could rally.


(END SECTION ONE)

SHAW

KLP

Foreign Office meaning that a qualified,
promise would be no real
assurance

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



December 10, 1931.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON
AND THE SWEDISH MINISTER, MR. W. BOSTROM.

Presentation of Military Attaché.

The Swedish Minister called to present his Military
Attaché, Count G. F. von Rosen.

The Manchurian question came up and I told the
Minister that it was the last day of the sessions
in Paris and apologized for my preoccupation. He asked
whether there was any chance of the Resolution passing.
I told him that I thought it probably would pass, although
the danger of a future crisis was not yet eliminated.

HLS.

8 HLS:HHR

DEC 15 1931

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
793.94/3172

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70/5811

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS



Mr. Edward C. Carter,
Mr. Hornbeck.

Subject: Manchuria situation.

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

Mr. Carter is the secretary of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations. He attended the recent meeting of the Institute at Shanghai. He went to China via Russia. He returned to this country via Japan.

Among other things, Mr. Carter stated that, on September 8, in Moscow, M. Karakahn asked him when he would reach Mukden. Mr. Carter replied that it would be about ten days hence. Mr. Karakahn stated that Mr. Carter would probably find when he arrived in Mukden that the Japanese had made some movement of "intervention". Mr. Carter arrived at Harbin on the morning of the 19th and was there greeted with news of what had occurred in South Manchuria the night before.

F/DEW 793.94/3173

FILED

DEC 1 9 1931

SKH/ZMF

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton C. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00/11660 FOR Tel.#1070- 7 pm.

FROM China (Perkins) DATED Dec.11,1931.
--TO-- NAME 1-1127 ***

REGARDING: Parade of Chinese students, in Nanking, with banners
and slogans deriding Japan and Japanese leaders.
(Copy attached)

fpg

793.94/3174

MET

PLAIN

Peiping via N.R.

Dated: December 11, 1931

Rec'd 9:10 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

1070, December 11, 7 p.m.

Following from Reuter, Nanking, December eighth.

For the third day in succession the Foreign Office is deserted owing to the continued student troubles in the capital. However, this afternoon Dr. Wellington Koo, Foreign Minister, called on President Chiang Kai Sheik and as a result of their conference it is expected that Dr. Koo will attend office tomorrow morning. Dr. Koo in a statement in the newspapers declared that it was not because of the student trouble that he resigned but merely because of the great pressure of work.

Nanking has been nervous all day expecting trouble as a result of student activities but so far no untoward incident has occurred. The students are successfully keeping their plans secret. They have a regular organization and their meeting places are strictly guarded by

sentries

MET

2-#1070 from Peiping via N.R.,
December 11, 1931.

sentries who refuse to admit anyone who has not the requisite pass. Yesterday several police agents who attempted to gain entrance to a meeting were arrested by the students and only the counsel of more moderate students prevented them from being lynched.

This afternoon there was a parade of students through the streets they carried banners and shouted slogans deriding Japan and leaders in the Japanese Government.

The method of avoiding students to keep away from office. Employees immediately deserted any office that the students threatened to attack. The students for five hours surrounded the garrison headquarters today. Nothing happened, they grew suspicious and took down a gate and entered only to find the place completely deserted".

For the Minister,

PERKINS

WSB

1 1675
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1 138
PREPARING OFFICE
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

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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,



December 11, 1931.

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5 of C

American Consul,
Geneva, Switzerland.

793.94/3174A

Please convey to Sweetser my personal appreciation for the full reports which he made during the period of the negotiations in Paris. These reports assisted materially in keeping me thoroughly informed of the situation.

Stinson

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U VC/AB

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Dec. 11 1931.

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State



Washington,
December 11, 1931.

1-128
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

AMEMBASSY

DEC 11 31

PARIS (France).

793.94
646
If you do not repeat not, have, available, the following statements, on the Manchuria situation, the Department will, upon request, therefor, telegraph you, the texts: (a) the statements, included in the, President's, messages, of December 8 and December 10 to Congress; (b) the statement issued, on December 10, by the Secretary of State, in particular, reference, to the, resolution, adopted by the, Council, on that date.

793.94/3174B

Stinson

SKH

FE:MMH/VDM

FE

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

DEC 11 1931.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-128

1 1677

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

December 11, 1931.

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TO BE TRANSMITTED
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Naval Radio

AMERICAN CONSUL,

DEC 11 31

NANKING (China).

132

FOR THE MINISTER.

793.94
500 C 112

If you have not texts of all of the following documents and will specify which you need, Department will telegraph texts: resolution of Council of League; declaration of President of Council; Japanese statement; Chinese statement; and Cecil's statement, all read at public meeting of Council December 9.

793.94/3174C

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Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-128

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

December 11, 1931.

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DEC 11 31

AMEMBASSY

TOKYO (Japan).

269
FOR THE AMBASSADOR.

If you have not texts of all of the following documents and will specify which you need, Department will telegraph texts: resolution of Council of League; declaration of President of Council; Japanese statement; Chinese statement; and Cecil's statement, all read at public meeting of Council/December/9.

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Same to Hanking as No 132

FE:SKH/ZMF

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Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

793.94/3174D

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

FROM

GREEN

Paris

Dated December 11, 1931

Rec'd 8:50 a.m., 12th

Secretary of State,

Washington

884, December 11, 10 a.m.



— Department's 646, December 11, 2 p.m.

I should be glad to receive by telegraph the three
texts mentioned.

EDGE

RR-WTC

President's and Secretary's statements on Manchurian
situation.



F/L S
793.94/3175

DEC 16 1931


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1 168

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
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Washington,
December 12, 1931.

AMEMBASSY

DEC 12 31

PARIS (France).

793.94/3175 650 Kneiff 793.94/3175
Your 884, December 11, 2 p.m.

(Telegraph Room: Repeat texts of messages as
indicated in attached copies of Department's
793.94/3178a, 3178a
telegrams to Peiping, Nos. 456, 455, of December 11,
1931.)

793.94/3175

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Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____, _____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1922 1-128

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED
PLAIN

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Peiping via N.R.

FROM
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Dated December 12, 1931
DEC 16 1931 Rec'd 5:46 a.m.
DIVISION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
DEC 12 1931
Department of State

Secretary of State
Washington

1074, December 12, noon.

Following from Reuter, Nanking, December 11th:

"It is frankly admitted in Chinese official and public circles that the Resolution passed by the Council of the League of Nations is quite unsatisfactory to China but the National Government has accepted it, firstly, to prove its sincerity by adhering to its originally declared intention to abide by the League's decision, trusting to the ability of the League to arrive at a just and satisfactory solution of the problems, and, secondly, because the Government leaders are convinced that the only alternative is war with Japan for which China is not in a fit state.

Furthermore, well informed quarters feel that the Japanese victory is a pyrrhic one, as the large expenditure involved in Japan's recent operations and the huge drop in her exports to China, as well as the probable necessity

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793.94/3176

DEC 17 1931

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2-#1074 from Peiping via NR.
December 12, 1931.

necessity of permanently increasing the Japanese forces
in Manchuria to meet the potential Russian menace may
prove the last straw bringing down with a crush her
already overburdened finances.

For the Minister,

PERKINS

KLP

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

SINO-JAPANESE CONTROVERSY

Mr. Castle stated that, so far as Manchuria is concerned, we are just waiting to see whether the resolution of the League, published this morning, is agreed to by all of the delegates this afternoon. If it should be, Mr. Castle said he thought it likely that Secretary Stimson would want to discuss the matter with the American correspondents. Mr. Castle added that he

RECEIVED

DEC 12 1975

Press Release
12/10/31

-3-

understood the meeting of the League Council was to be held at 4:30 this afternoon, Paris time.

A correspondent asked if this Government still expected that a commission of enquiry would be appointed. Mr. Castle referred the correspondent to the final draft of the League resolution which was given out yesterday at the public session and appeared in the press this morning. Mr. Castle added that he understood the Japanese representatives said they had not yet received instructions from their Government and asked that the vote be postponed until today. The correspondent said that what he understood to be the final draft of the resolution indicated that the United States might participate in the investigating commission. Mr. Castle recalled that the Secretary had always said that such a commission would be one appointed by the League. It is a League commission just like many other League commissions, and on some occasions Americans have been appointed to serve. It would not be a Government appointment.


M. J. McDermott.

793.94/3177


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No. 2044.



DEC 12 31



FOR DISTRIBUTION - CHECK

	Yes	No
To the Field		
In U. S. A.		

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

In compliance with the Department's instruction No. 293 of August 19, 1930, I have the honor to transmit herewith clippings from the French newspapers, on the subject of the Sino-Japanese conflict, covering the period from December 1 to December 4, 1931, inclusive.

Respectfully yours,

For the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim:

Williamson S. Howell, Jr.,
First Secretary of Embassy.

Enclosures.....

F/LS 793.94/3178

DEC 18 1931

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- 2 -

✓
Enclosures: (single copy).

Clippings from the following newspapers:

December 1, 1931.

No. 1 - EXCELSIOR
2 - L'HUMANITE
3 - LE JOURNAL
4 - LE PETIT PARISIEN

December 2, 1931.

No. 5 - L'ECHO DE PARIS
6 - EXCELSIOR
7 - L'HUMANITE
8 - LE JOURNAL
9 - LE MATIN
10 - L'OEUVRE
11 - LE PETIT PARISIEN
12 - LE TEMPS

December 3, 1931.

No. 13 - L'ECHO DE PARIS
14 - EXCELSIOR
15 - FIGARO
16 - L'HUMANITE
17 - LE JOURNAL
18 - LE MATIN
19 - L'OEUVRE
20 - LE PETIT PARISIEN
21 - LE POPULAIRE

December 4, 1931.

No. 22 - L'ECHO DE PARIS
23 - L'HUMANITE
24 - LE JOURNAL
25 - L'OEUVRE
26 - LE PETIT PARISIEN

In quintuplicate.
RS/jdk
710.

Milton O. Gustafson

12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 2044
of December 4, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from EXCELSIOR, December 1, 1931.

LES POURPARLERS ENGAGÉS SOUS LES AUSPICES DE LA S.D.N. ENTRE NANKIN ET TOKIO NE FONT GUÈRE DE PROGRÈS



Lors de cette manifestation, qui s'est déroulée à Tokio sous la présidence de l'empereur, vingt mille personnes ont acclamé les orateurs patriotes.

LES DEUX PARTIES EN PRÉSENCE
N'ARRIVENT PAS A S'ENTENDRE
SUR L'ÉTABLISSEMENT D'UNE ZONE
NEUTRE EN MANDCHOURIE
CHINE ET JAPON DEMEURANT
SUR LEURS POSITIONS

LES MOUVEMENTS DESTROUPES CHINOISES ET NIPPONES DANS LA RÉGION DE TSITSIKAR

Les négociations du conseil de la Société des nations marquent de nouveau un temps d'arrêt, et bien que le comité de rédaction et le comité des Douze se soient réunis deux fois dans la journée et aient entendu tour à tour le Dr Sze et M. Ito, représentant la délégation japonaise, on continue à piétiner. Le point névralgique des négociations, c'est l'établissement de la zone neutre, la Chine ne l'acceptant que si les officiers observateurs neutres, actuellement sur place, servent de médiateurs, et le Japon continuant à la refuser, car il ne veut pas de la médiation d'un tiers. Le cabinet de Tokio ajoute que si ses troupes n'étaient pas chargées de la police de cette zone, celle-ci deviendrait immédiatement un véritable repaire de bandits.

En ce qui concerne la constitution de la commission d'enquête, la situation est toujours la même, chacune des deux parties restant sur ses positions. Si aucune modification ne se produit dans leur attitude, les négociations peuvent durer encore de nombreux jours, sans d'ailleurs grandes chances de succès.

A la fin de la séance du comité des Douze, on annonça toutefois que le conseil avait été heureux de constater une légère amélioration dans la situation à Kin-Tchéou, mais que de nombreuses difficultés existent encore en ce qui concerne la répression du brigandage dans la zone neutre.

Aucune réunion du comité des Douze ni du conseil n'est prévue pour aujourd'hui, mais le comité de rédaction continuera son travail et entendra à nouveau les représentants chinois et japonais. — MAURICE RAYMOND.

Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 2044
of December 4, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'HUMANITE, December 1, 1931.

Pour la défense de la Patrie prolétarienne!

C'EST dans quelques heures que les travailleurs de Paris et de sa banlieue doivent se rendre en masse à la salle Bullier, où les convoque le Parti communiste.

Nous avons dit depuis près de quinze jours les raisons qui font que la réunion de ce soir doit être une imposante manifestation politique du prolétariat.

L'Union des Républiques soviétiques qui, il y a trois semaines, célébrait son 14^e anniversaire, est aujourd'hui menacée comme aux jours les plus graves de son histoire.

La bourgeoisie a pensé qu'en s'attaquant à l'Etat prolétarien dans les lointaines contrées d'Extrême-Orient, elle pourrait plus aisément paralyser la résistance du prolétariat mondial.

Manœuvre criminelle, calcul odieux qu'il s'agit pour nous de déjouer.

L'U.R.S.S. est menacée. Nous sommes aux côtés de la patrie du travail contre l'impérialisme.

Contre l'impérialisme français en particulier. C'est la France de Briand-Laval qui est l'instigatrice véritable du coup de force japonais en Mandchourie. C'est elle qui, avant le 18 septembre, a encouragé à la lutte les dépeceurs nippons. C'est elle qui, depuis le 18 septembre, a permis aux armées de Tokio d'étendre leur conquête au point de menacer aujourd'hui Kharbine et la frontière soviétique.

Ce sont ses journaux qui ont écrit que le sort de la civilisation allait se jouer sur les steppes sibériennes.

Ce sont ses requins de finances qui affirment que la guerre aura un effet favorable sur la reprise des affaires.

L'impérialisme français a été aidé

dans sa besogne par la Société des nations, organisme essentiel dans la préparation de la guerre.

Il a été secondé par les chefs de la social-démocratie qui, depuis le début du conflit, ont multiplié leurs attaques, contre la patrie commune des travailleurs.

L'impérialisme français est en tête de la conjuration contre-révolutionnaire.

Le prolétariat de France doit être en tête de la classe ouvrière mondiale qui monte la garde autour de la révolution d'Octobre.

Lutter, oui, mais comment ? C'est ce qu'expliqueront les orateurs mandatés par les organisations révolutionnaires.

Ils diront comment au cours des luttes partielles, comment au cours des grands conflits qui se préparent chez les marins, chez les mineurs, au cours des manifestations des chômeurs, ouvriers et sans-travail doivent porter leurs coups à la bourgeoisie française.

Chaque bataille du prolétariat, chaque coup porté au patronat et à l'Etat bourgeois est un coup porté aux forces de guerre !

Le meeting de Bullier doit avoir une autre signification encore. Il doit être le point de départ d'une action plus large et plus vigoureuse du prolétariat français contre la guerre.

A l'œuvre pour un travail de masse dans les entreprises.

Debout les usines !

Voilà les indications précises qui doivent sortir de l'assemblée de ce soir.



Le véritable objectif de l'agression impérialiste contre la Chine

La S. D. N. prépare l'action commune des troupes impérialistes en Chine

Et les Russes-blancs veulent provoquer des soulèvements en Sibérie

L'Humanité a dénoncé l'œuvre criminelle des milieux bancaires de France poussant à la guerre contre l'Union soviétique, envisageant avec plaisir l'extension de la guerre en Mandchourie en conflagration mondiale pour sortir de la crise.

La circulaire hebdomadaire du Comptoir d'Escompte de Tulle que nous citions hier, disait :

On peut s'attendre vraisemblablement à ce que des troubles éclatent en Sibérie et que des armes soient fournies par les Japonais aux révolutionnaires antibolcheviks qui opèrent contre les armées russes et en arrière de celles-ci en coupant les ravitaillements, en gênant le trafic de l'unique ligne de chemin de fer dont disposent les bolcheviks.

Les événements vont certainement se précipiter maintenant.

Les capitalistes français qui sont à la tête de la coalition des impérialistes pour l'agression contre l'Union soviétique savent que tout est mis en œuvre pour nuire au pays du socia-

les hommes bien trempés, renforcer notre propagande et la diffusion des brochures du parti O.P.C. Surveiller les gens qui détruisent, pour nous nuire, le matériel du parti O.P.C., faire connaître leurs noms pour les publier dans la presse, parce que ces individus travaillent pour le G.P.U. soviétique.

Ainsi donc, dans leur feuille intérieure, les gens du parti ouvrier et paysan cosaque signalent ouvertement que des soulèvements sont organisés par leurs agents en Sibérie, pour, comme écrit le Comptoir d'Escompte de Tulle, couper, en cas de guerre, les ravitaillements de l'armée rouge par le Transsibérien.

L'appui des gouvernements

La preuve que ces bandits travaillent sous la direction des impérialistes nous la trouvons dans le même bulletin. La direction du parti garde-blanc O.P.C. a adressé une note « à tous les gouvernements du monde, excepté l'U.R.S.S. » dans laquelle il

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L'allusion aux troubles qui doivent éclater en Sibérie n'est pas une parole en air. A Paris, les organisations des canailles russes-blancs reçoivent leurs directives de l'état-major français pour aider activement à la préparation de la guerre antisoviétique. Elles sont payées par les banquiers et impérialistes français pour mener à bien leur abominable travail de provocation et de désagrégation à l'intérieur de l'U.R.S.S..

L'ignoble travail des gardes-blancs

Nous avons sous les yeux le *Messenger de l'ouvrier et paysan cosaque*, bulletin des Cosaques de Sibérie, édité en russe, en France et en Chine.

Nous lisons dans le numéro d'avril-mai 1931, la communication suivante :

Service de liaison

Le représentant du parti ouvrier-paysan cosaque de Transbaïkalie informe que la liaison avec le détachement des partisans de Tolstokoulakor dans la Transbaïkalie est établie.

Tolstokoulakor accepte entièrement le programme et la plate-forme du parti O.P.C. et mène intensivement le travail préparatoire d'organisation parmi la population pour un prochain soulèvement.

Le devoir de chaque membre du parti O.P.C. est de faire tout son possible pour propager l'idée du parti O.P.C. et la faire pénétrer dans les larges masses populaires aussi bien dans l'émigration que sur le territoire de l'U.R.S.S..

Pour arriver à ces fins, nous devons faire adhérer au parti les meilleurs parmi

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Certains gouvernements, est-il dit dans le *Messenger*, ont répondu et se sont déclarés officiellement solidaires avec notre note.

D'autres se sont abstenus d'une réponse officielle — vu certaines raisons — mais partagent entièrement les principes mis en avant par notre note pour la lutte contre la III^e Internationale. En partie ils appliquent même ces principes dans la vie, ce qui constitue une grande conquête du Front Mondial anticommuniste et le Parti O.P.C. peut compter sur la Démocratie mondiale.

Nous voudrions savoir si le gouvernement français a répondu officiellement à cette note de ses protégés. Mais il est sûrement dans le nombre de ceux qui « appliquent dans la vie » les principes de lutte contre les ouvriers et paysans soviétiques, en envoyant ses officiers supérieurs enseigner dans les écoles militaires du général Miller, en facilitant toutes les conspirations des gardes-blancs contre l'Union soviétique, en armant les sicaires de Seménov pour des actions de banditisme en Mandchourie.

Ces documents doivent être utilisés au maximum par tous nos camarades dans leur travail de mobilisation des masses contre l'impérialisme français et pour la défense de notre patrie socialiste. Ils prouvent l'immense danger planant sur l'U.R.S.S..

Le danger n'est pas moins grand qui menace les Soviets chinois.

La création de la « zone neutre » dans la région de King-Tchéou est maintenant la préoccupation principale des impérialistes et fait l'objet de toutes les délibérations du conseil de la S.D.N. qui siège en secret à Paris.

L'impérialisme japonais est assuré de rester maître de la Mandchourie. Acceptant la création de cette zone, où se concentreront les troupes de l'impérialisme en vue du déclenchement d'une offensive contre les Soviets chinois, le Japon entend rester libre de « toute action militaire nécessitée par le maintien de la sécurité de ses ressortissants et de ses troupes ». C'est là le sens des réserves du gouvernement de Tokio, soulevées au cours des séances du comité de rédaction de la résolution, qui doit clore cette session du conseil. Au Japon, naturellement, sera donnée toute liberté de mouvements et à cette liberté sera de nouveau donnée une valeur *de jure*. Une lettre de Briand à M. Yoshizama, en date du 29 novembre, ne laisse pas de doute à ce sujet :

Briand affirme que les mesures exceptionnelles envisagées par la création de la zone neutre seront prises « sans préjudice de propositions plus amples » que Tokio peut désirer présenter à Nankin. C'est la voie laissée libre pour l'envoi de troupes japonaises à King-Tchéou sous prétexte de réprimer les mouvements de « bandits », qui sont les soldats et paysans chinois luttant contre l'envahisseur impérialiste.

De plus, le Japon entend se rendre maître du port de Hou-Lou-Tao, placé en face de King-Tchéou et qui concurrence le port japonais de Dairen. On voit donc que tout est préparé à Paris pour que l'occupation de toute la Mandchourie par le Japon soit réalisée. Et en même temps la base d'action militaire contre la révolution chinoise sera créée. Il faut s'attendre à tout moment à l'annonce de l'envoi de troupes métropolitaines ou coloniales en Chine.

D'ailleurs, confirmant ce que nous avons dévoilé des buts poursuivis par les impérialistes qui ont provoqué les événements de Tien-Tsin, la nouvelle nous parvient que de Dairen est parti un bataillon d'infanterie qui doit renforcer la garnison japonaise de Tien-Tsin. Et une bombe a éclaté à Pékin à la résidence de l'attaché naval japonais... sans faire ni dégâts ni victimes, naturellement.

Sous la direction de l'impérialisme français, l'exécution du plan de guerre, et de contre-révolution sanglante se poursuit contre l'U. R. S. S. et contre les Soviets de Chine. Pas un instant le danger ne s'amoindrit, chaque jour au contraire il devient plus menaçant.

Ce soir, à Bullier, la volonté unanime des travailleurs de la région parisienne d'empêcher le crime de la guerre impérialiste, de défendre l'U. R. S. S., de soutenir les soviets chinois, s'affirmera puissamment. Ce sera une étape importante de la lutte de la classe ouvrière de France sous la direction du Parti communiste, pour la paix.

M. MAGNIEN.

Enclosure No. 3 to Despatch No. 2044
of December 4, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE JOURNAL, December 1, 1931.

L'AFFAIRE SINO-JAPONAISE
- devant la S. D. N.

Le conseil entrevoit
un accord avec la Chine
mais au prix de nouveaux
désaccords avec le Japon

On discerne très bien le jeu des dirigeants de la Société des nations. Si on peut établir que, grâce aux bons offices de la ligue et aussi au retrait spontané des troupes japonaises, l'apaisement se fait dans la région Tchén-Tchéou, on peut amener la Chine à considérer ce précédent comme une garantie suffisante pour renoncer à une date ou à un délai ferme d'évacuation et on peut espérer trouver une formule de résolution acceptable par tout le monde.

Encore faudrait-il pour cela ne pas sacrifier au désir de se concilier les Chinois ou à l'amour-propre de la ligue les conditions essentielles du Japon. N'est-ce pas ce qui s'est passé hier et ce qui permet de se demander si le progrès apparent n'est pas, en réalité, l'annonce de nouvelles complications ?

Le progrès apparent est caractérisé par ce fait que, dans la soirée, la délégation chinoise a pu publier le communiqué suivant :

Si les informations d'après lesquelles les forces japonaises se retirent de la région de Tchén-Tchéou et se replient derrière la rivière Liao sont exactes, ce serait important en tant que premier pas déterminé vers l'évacuation. Ce fait doit évidemment être confirmé par les observateurs neutres; mais au cas où ce serait vrai, la Chine dans ces conditions sera prête à accepter en substance le projet de résolution du conseil, tel quel, sans spécifier de délai à l'évacuation complète. Naturellement, et cela est également important, toute nouvelle avance japonaise vers Tchén-Tchéou, ou toute opération agressive similaire créerait une nouvelle situation exigeant un nouvel examen de l'arrangement tout entier.

Il y a dans cette note la constatation du résultat obtenu par les conversations que le Dr Szé a eues, dans la matinée, avec les principaux membres du conseil, dans l'après-midi avec M. Briand, et des délibérations des Douze, dans la soirée. Au cours de cette réunion, les Douze ont arrêté des instructions permettant au comité de rédaction de parachever le projet de résolution dans des conditions jugées acceptables par la Chine.

Ces instructions sont d'ailleurs assez élastiques. Ainsi, en ce qui concerne le nombre des membres de la commission d'études, que le Japon entend limiter à trois, on déclare ce nombre insuffisant, mais on laisse au comité le soin d'arrêter le nombre définitif d'accord avec les parties.

Par contre, en ce qui concerne les réserves du Japon, qui entend sauvegarder la liberté d'action des autorités militaires et la liberté de répression des actes de banditisme organisé, le conseil ne paraît pas avoir redressé le regrettable malentendu qui s'est affirmé dans l'après-midi entre M. Ito et le comité de rédaction.

Il n'y a pas eu dans la journée moins de trois réunions du comité de rédaction. Toutes les trois ont vu la discussion porter sur la question de la procédure à adopter pour réserver la répression éventuelle des bandits organisés. Il ne faut pas perdre de vue qu'en Mandchourie les bandits opèrent par bandes de plusieurs centaines d'hommes.

La méthode la plus simple aurait été évidemment d'insérer une déclaration nette dans la résolution, en escomptant le fait que la résistance chinoise cède quand on sait parler avec fermeté. Pour ménager les susceptibilités chinoises, M. Ito a proposé de ne pas comprendre dans la résolution elle-même, qui réclame un vote unanime, la précision relative aux répressions des actes de brigandage. A une condition, c'est que la liberté d'action des autorités japonaises contre les bandits soit formellement mentionnée dans une déclaration interprétative lue par le président du conseil en présentant la résolution.

La méthode a été approuvée par lord Robert Cecil et par M. de Madariaga. Elle a rencontré d'autres résistances au sein du comité, où la France était représentée par M. Massigli, résistances qui ont donné lieu à une discussion extrêmement vive, où l'on est allé jusqu'à évoquer le régime des zones française et espagnole au Maroc.

Ainsi la question essentielle de la répression des troubles éventuels n'est pas résolue. On ne peut même dire que la question de la zone de Tchén-Tchéou soit réglée. Il y a, en effet, dans cette affaire une équivoque sérieuse dont on retrouve une indication dans le communiqué chinois d'hier soir et dans la correspondance diplomatique échangée.

Le communiqué chinois prend bien soin de relever que le retrait des troupes japonaises doit être confirmé par les observateurs étrangers et il réserve de tout remettre en question, si un nouvel incident survient. Il est si facile d'en faire surgir. N'entrevoit-on pas déjà un nouvel embryon de malentendu dans la

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P.P. 1

Enclosure No. 4 to Despatch No. 2044
of December 4, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE PETIT PARISIEN, December 1, 1931.

Une nouvelle difficulté surgit à propos de la zone neutre de Kingtchéou

Qui y châtiara les bandits ? De la
cavalerie chinoise ou des détachements
japonais ?

C'est le cas ou jamais d'écrire que le conseil se meut en pleines « chinoïseries ». Dimanche, après l'audition du porte-parole japonais, M. Ito, on avait l'impression que si le Dr Sze se présentait, hier matin, devant le comité de rédaction avec des instructions nettement plus conciliantes, c'est-à-dire s'il n'insistait plus sur la fixation d'une date pour le retrait des troupes japonaises d'occupation, une entente pourrait aisément s'établir sur le projet de résolution à adopter par le conseil.

Il n'en a rien été. Le cabinet de Nankin, malgré l'impossibilité où il est de faire accepter, non seulement par les membres du conseil, mais aussi par les Etats-Unis, cette fixation de date, ne s'est pas pour cela montré plus accommodant. Il a, d'une part, maintenu cette prétention inadmissible et, d'autre part, pour compliquer les choses et embarrasser davantage le conseil, proposé de porter à neuf ou à douze le nombre des membres de la commission d'études à envoyer sur place. Il paraît qu'on penche maintenant pour le chiffre cinq, encore que le Japon maintienne sa préférence pour trois...

Comme si cela ne suffisait pas, le Dr Sze, qui paraît assez mal au courant des négociations directes actuellement engagées entre Tokio et Nankin au sujet de la zone neutre de Kingtchéou, a maintenu sa demande d'y établir des détachements étrangers. On lui a fait remarquer non seulement que cette suggestion avait été écartée par le conseil en raison des difficultés d'ordre pratique qu'elle présentait, mais que les discussions en cours entre Chinois et Japonais avaient déjà fait prendre à la question un tout autre aspect. Les difficultés, hâtons-nous de le dire, n'ont pas disparu. Elles sont simplement d'un autre ordre.

La police dans la zone neutre

On sait de quoi il s'agit. Pour éviter que de nouveaux actes d'hostilité ne se produisent entre les deux adversaires, on a songé à établir entre leurs armées une zone vide de tous soldats. Ce sont même les Chinois qui eurent cette idée les premiers et qui se déclarèrent prêts, si les Japonais se retiraient, à se replier eux-mêmes derrière la « Grande Muraille ». Le conseil prit la suggestion à son compte et, le 26 novembre, son président, M. Briand, adressait à ce sujet une lettre aux représentants des deux pays.

La question qui se pose maintenant est la suivante : qui fera la police dans la zone neutre ainsi créée ? Les Chinois ou les Japonais ?

Les Chinois veulent bien retirer leurs troupes, mais, comme les bandits pullulent dans la région et comme la police locale leur paraît insuffisante pour faire face au danger que la présence de ces brigands constitue, ils réclament le droit, pour des détachements de cavalerie chinoise, de pénétrer, en cas de besoin, dans la zone évacuée. Ils proposent, en un mot, de se substituer aux détachements de soldats étrangers dont ils avaient d'abord suggéré l'envoi sur place.

Quant au cabinet de Tokio qui a rappelé ses soldats à Moukden, s'il accepte, lui aussi, de respecter la zone neutre dont il entend laisser l'administration et la police aux autorités locales, il demande, en revanche, au cas où la sécurité des biens et des ressortissants japonais dans cette région viendrait à être menacée par les bandits chinois, la possibilité de dépêcher des détachements de soldats contre ces pillards. Ce sont là les opérations de police et de légitime défense qu'il s'efforce, depuis le début des négociations de Paris, de ne pas laisser assimiler à des actes d'hostilité... Mais c'est aussi la possibilité de collisions entre Japonais et Chinois...

Une tâche malaisée

Voilà devant quel imbroglio les « Douze » se sont trouvés hier soir et qu'il va leur falloir débrouiller. Tâche d'autant plus malaisée que, comme nous le disons plus haut, des négociations directes seraient engagées sur place, entre le commandant des forces chinoises, Tchang Hsue Liang, et le chargé d'affaires japonais à Pékin, M. Yano, et, d'autre part, à Nankin, entre le ministre du Japon, M. Mar-moru Shigomitsu, qui vient d'arriver dans cette ville, et le ministre des Affaires étrangères chinois lui-même, M. Wellington Koo.

Pour le moment, les efforts tendent à obtenir, comme contre-partie du repli chinois derrière la « Grande Muraille », non seulement l'engagement formel du Japon de ne se livrer à aucune incursion dans la zone neutre, mais son assentiment à ce que la mission d'y châtier les bandits soit confiée aux Chinois, sous l'œil des observateurs étrangers. Cet assentiment toutefois ne serait valable que pour la zone de Kingtchéou, la répression des actes de banditisme dans le reste de la Mandchourie demeurant réservée...

Il en a, en effet, été beaucoup question, hier, au comité de rédaction, où on a repris, en présence de M. Ito, l'examen des amendements demandés par les Japonais au projet de résolution. M. Ito ayant maintenu sur ce point la réclamation de son gouvernement, on lui fit remarquer qu'acceptable en soi son incorporation dans la résolution soulèverait de graves objections de principe de la part du conseil. Cette manière de voir a d'ailleurs été partagée par ce dernier qui a chargé lord Robert Cecil et ses deux collègues de se remettre en rapports avec la délégation japonaise, afin d'arriver sur ce paragraphe à une entente analogue à celle qui paraît être établie sur les paragraphes 1 et 5.

Y parviendra-t-on ou devra-t-on

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

recourir, comme le vicomte Cecil et M. de Madariaga en paraissaient hier partisans, au procédé auquel M. Ito avait fait allusion dimanche et qui consisterait à inclure dans la déclaration dont le président accompagnera la lecture de la résolution finale les points un peu contestés qui n'auraient pu trouver place dans cette dernière ? Il semble qu'on soit dès maintenant d'accord pour faire figurer dans cette déclaration présidentielle quelques précisions touchant la commission d'études. M. Briand spécifierait notamment que si les gouvernements chinois ou japonais désirent que telle ou telle question soit spécialement étudiée, ils n'auront qu'à en informer la commission, qui jouira, en somme, d'une certaine liberté d'action et d'appréciation. Il annoncerait de même que cette dernière pourra, à n'importe quel moment, si elle le juge utile, adresser au conseil des rapports provisoires, sans attendre que son rapport définitif soit terminé... Enfin, il ferait allusion aux scrupules constitutionnels qui ont motivé l'une des réserves japonaises au paragraphe 2. Y comprendra-t-il également la fameuse réserve concernant les opérations de police ? Conseil et comité de rédaction ne sont pas encore, on le voit, au bout de leurs peines, malgré certaines rumeurs plus rassurantes qui se sont répandues hier soir.

Jamais le mot « casse-tête chinois » n'a été plus juste que pour qualifier la situation présente.

Albert JULLIEN.

Enclos 2
**Enclosure No. 5 to Despatch No. 2044
of December 4, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.**

Extract from L'ECHO DE PARIS, December 2, 1931.

**Le conflit mandchourien
au Conseil de la S. D. N.**

Echo 12/2

Les douze membres du Conseil ont adopté hier soir le projet de résolution qui, la Société des Nations l'espère, mettra fin au conflit manchourien. Voici le résumé de ce projet :

Le paragraphe n° 1 énonce les engagements pris par le Japon et la Chine aux termes de la résolution du 30 septembre. Le Japon, on le sait, promet de retirer ses troupes dans la zone du chemin de fer aussitôt que la sécurité de ses nationaux aura été effectivement établie, et la Chine promet de prendre toutes les mesures nécessaires en vue de cette sécurité.

Le paragraphe 2 fait état de la promesse donnée par les deux parties de s'abstenir de prendre toutes initiatives qui pourraient entraîner de nouvelles rencontres et de nouvelles pertes de vies humaines.

Le paragraphe 3 déclare que les deux parties continueront à tenir le conseil au courant de l'évolution de la situation. Le paragraphe 4 dit que les membres du conseil transmettront au conseil les informations qu'ils recevront de leurs représentants sur place.

Le paragraphe 5 constitue la commission qui étudiera toutes circonstances pouvant affecter les relations internationales et menacer la bonne entente et la paix entre la Chine et le Japon. Au cas où les engagements que les deux parties ont pris aux termes de la résolution du 30 septembre n'auraient pas été exécutés au moment de l'arrivée de la commission celle-ci pourra adresser aussitôt que possible un rapport au conseil ; sur la situation ainsi que toutes les recommandations qu'elle jugera opportunes. Il est entendu que si les deux parties engagent entre elles des négociations, la commission n'aura pas qualité pour y intervenir. Il ne lui appartiendra pas non plus d'intervenir dans les dispositions d'ordre militaire de l'une et de l'autre partie.

Le paragraphe 6 déclare que d'ici la prochaine session ordinaire du Conseil fixée au 18 janvier, le Conseil charge son président de suivre les travaux de la commission et de la convoquer à nouveau s'il est nécessaire.

En dehors du projet de résolution, une déclaration a été rédigée, dont le président du Conseil de la S.D.N. donnera lecture avant de présenter la résolution elle-même au vote définitif du Conseil. Cette déclaration, assure-t-il, liera les deux parties.

Les six paragraphes analysés plus haut y sont passés en revue un par un et des explications complémentaires sont données. Par exemple, à propos du paragraphe I, le président exprimera le vœu ardent du Conseil de voir l'évacuation de la Mandchourie par les troupes japonaises s'accomplir aussitôt que possible. A propos du paragraphe II, le président déclarera en substance : il est entendu que, pour la protection de la vie et des biens de ses ressortissants et de ses troupes contre les bandits et les éléments de désordre, le Japon sera autorisé à prendre telles mesures qu'il estimera nécessaires.

Après la séance tenue hier soir par le Conseil auquel fut soumis le texte arrêté le matin même par le comité de rédaction, quelques points de détail seuls étaient encore à régler. On ne sait encore quel sera le nombre des membres de la commission. Jusqu'ici il avait été fixé à trois, mais l'Italie a réclamé une place. Le Japon semble décidé à sa demande pourvu que l'on s'en tienne là.

En ce qui concerne la zone neutre qui doit être créée autour de Kin-Tchéou, M. Yoshizawa, représentant du Japon au Conseil, s'est rendu hier soir auprès de M. Briand et lui a fait ressortir combien il était urgent que les troupes chinoises, conformément à la promesse donnée par le gouvernement de Nankin, évacuassent Kin-Tchéou aussitôt que possible. Partout en Chine la propagande chinoise interprète

l'interruption de l'avance des troupes japonaises comme une défaite et l'armée japonaise pourrait être contrainte à rebrousser chemin vers Kin-Tchéou si la garnison chinoise ne se retirait pas vers l'Ouest.

En ce qui concerne la police de la zone neutre le gouvernement japonais paraît être animé de dispositions conciliantes. Il accepterait que la police chinoise entrât dans la zone neutre si nécessaire pour mettre à la raison les troupes de bandits. Mais l'effectif des forces de police devrait être limité. Inutile de faire remarquer que la solution du conflit sino-japonais constituée par le projet de résolution et la déclaration présidentielle que l'on vient de lire, est spécieuse. Le Japon demeure libre de choisir le moment où la sécurité de ses nationaux n'étant pas menacée ses troupes pourront regagner la zone du Sud-Mandchourien et il accorde toute liberté d'agir contre les troupes régulières ou irrégulières qui peuvent le menacer. Les engagements pris par la Chine et le Japon reposent sur le postulat que la Chine est un Etat comparable à un autre Etat, centralisé, capable de tenir ses promesses. A ce postulat la réalité inflige chaque jour le démenti le plus éclatant.

Enclosure No. 6 to Despatch No. 2044
of December 4, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from EXCELSIOR, December 2, 1931.

LE CONSEIL DE LA S. D. N. VA SOUMETTRE UNE FORMULE A LA CHINE ET AU JAPON

Cette formule paraît acceptable
pour les deux parties, mais elle
laisse de côté les questions les
plus épineuses : celles du brigandage
et de la zone neutre.

ON NE DÉSESPÈRE PAS D'EN TERMINER CETTE SEMAINE PAR UN VOTE

Le comité de rédaction du conseil de la Société des nations est enfin parvenu hier, tard dans la soirée, à mettre sur pied un projet de résolution qui, ce matin, sera soumis à l'approbation des délégués chinois et japonais. Ce texte de résolution suit dans ses grandes lignes celui que nous avons maintes fois exposé, mais laisse de côté toutes les questions pouvant amener de nouvelles discussions et le refus de l'une ou l'autre des parties.

C'est ainsi que ce projet de résolution sera précédé d'une introduction du président, et c'est dans ce document qu'on parlera de la question la plus épineuse, c'est-à-dire du droit des Japonais de procéder à la répression du brigandage en Mandchourie et particulièrement dans la zone neutre qui va être créée. Il s'agit d'ailleurs d'un commentaire très nuancé qui peut, peut-être, obtenir l'adhésion de la Chine, mais qui, en réalité, n'engage pas grandement les deux parties. Il fallait d'ailleurs agir ainsi, car on avait la certitude que l'on était là sur un terrain glissant qui empêcherait tout compromis.

D'autre part, au sein même du conseil, l'unanimité ne pouvait pas se réaliser, car on sait que certains membres auraient voulu voir la Société des nations agir avec plus d'autorité. A ceux-là on donne une légère satisfaction, puisque la commission d'enquête, qui sera envoyée en Mandchourie, ne sera plus, comme il avait été prévu tout d'abord, composée de trois membres, mais de cinq. Aux représentants de la France, de la Grande-Bretagne et des Etats-Unis on va, croyons-nous, ajouter deux représentants de petites puissances, dont un Hollandais. L'on assurait hier soir que M. Scialoja insisterait pour qu'un Italien en fasse également partie.

Aujourd'hui donc, le conseil se réunira à nouveau en séance privée pour soumettre le texte définitif de sa résolution et de son préambule aux délégués chinois et japonais, mais, comme on prévoit qu'ils vont vouloir demander de nouvelles instructions à Tokio et à Nankin, et en tout cas leur soumettre ce texte, il sera impossible au conseil de tenir sa séance plénière avant jeudi après-midi. Rien ne dit d'ailleurs que ce sera la dernière, car nous serions fort étonnés si l'une ou l'autre des deux parties, peut-être même toutes les deux, ne présentait pas de nouveaux amendements.

Il se peut toutefois, et c'était l'opinion de nombreux membres du conseil hier soir, que cette fois on passe au vote comme on le fit en octobre à Genève, vote platonique d'ailleurs, puisque, si l'unanimité n'est pas obtenue, la résolution du conseil de décembre restera lettre morte comme celle d'octobre.

On espère toutefois que M. Briand viendra à bout des dernières difficultés, et que si la résolution du conseil ne fixe pas une date pour l'évacuation de la Mandchourie par les troupes japonaises, elle aura eu, en tous les cas, pour résultat immédiat de faire cesser les hostilités. — MAURICE RAYMONDE.

Human 2

Enclosure No. 7 to Despatch No. 2044
of December 4, 1931.

From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'HUMANITE, December 2, 1931.

LA GUERRE D'EXTRÊME-ORIENT

Le conseil de la S.D.N. va consacrer officiellement la conquête japonaise de la Mandchourie

Nouvelles excitations guerrières de la presse française

Les conspirateurs de Paris, dont le but est la préparation de la guerre anti-soviétique et le dépècement de la Chine, sont arrivés au compromis recherché.

Nous avons dénoncé déjà l'essence de ce compromis entre les impérialistes : sanctionner l'annexion de fait de la Mandchourie par le Japon, faire de la Chine une place d'armes pour une agression à l'Est contre l'Etat ouvrier, en écrasant dans le sang la révolution chinoise.

Les communiqués publiés à l'issue des réunions d'hier du conseil de la S.D.N. et du comité de rédaction de la résolution finale du conseil ne laissent pas de doute à ce sujet. Dans la résolution sera défini le caractère de la « zone neutre » de la région de King-Tchéou et le rôle de « gardien de l'ordre » qu'y pourra jouer l'impérialisme japonais. On sait que Tokio entend rester libre d'intervenir avec ses fusils, ses canons, ses avions « pour assurer la sécurité des biens et ressortissants japonais » contre les attaques des « bandes chinoises ». Les représentants des impérialismes qui siègent au conseil lui ont donné satisfaction. Briand a, comme toujours, été le principal promoteur de la formule qui doit assurer la tutelle du Japon sur la Mandchourie et préparer la voie à l'intervention impérialiste contre les Soviets chinois, après avoir obtenu une fois de plus la capitulation honteuse des canailles du Kuomintang.

Demain, peut-être, le conseil, en séance publique, entérinera le compromis élaboré au comité de rédaction.

Il ne faudrait pas se leurrer sur le sens des derniers travaux du conseil de la S.D.N. qui ont, suivant l'expression du *Temps*, « stabilisé la situation en Mandchourie ». En fait, la *position d'attaque du Japon* est renforcée. Les opérations futures, dirigées contre l'Union soviétique, seront placées sous la direction immédiate du collège des « observateurs » des puissances — qui sont les officiers des missions militaires en Extrême-Orient, sous la présidence des officiers français.

Enclosure No. 8 to Despatch No. 2044
of December 4, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE JOURNAL, December 2, 1931.

LE CONSEIL DE LA SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS n'a plus que deux points à régler pour en finir avec l'affaire sino-japonaise

La laborieuse session que le conseil de la Société des nations consacre à l'affaire sino-japonaise va-t-elle finir dans un éclat de rire ? Il est difficile de garder son sérieux quand on connaît le dialogue auquel se ramène une des deux seules difficultés qui restent à résoudre.

Il s'agit de préciser le droit que le Japon entend se réserver de réprimer les agressions des bandes de brigands organisés qui menacent la vie et les biens de ses nationaux en Mandchourie, sans que ces mesures puissent être considérées comme des actes d'hostilité.

Lord Robert Cecil a proposé aux Japonais une formule longue reconnaissant que le conseil ne peut contester le droit réclamé qui constitue en somme un droit légitime et naturel et que, dans ces conditions, le Japon ne doit voir aucun inconvénient à la présence d'observateurs étrangers pour suivre les opérations.

A cela M. Ito répond par cette ironique boutade : Etant donné que nul ne peut dire quand, où, comment se produiront les attaques de brigands, on ne voit pas comment il serait possible de fixer des rendez-vous aux observateurs étrangers, peu nombreux, sans faire la partie trop belle aux bandits. Le Japon croit beaucoup plus raisonnable de proposer de prévenir le conseil de la Société des nations chaque fois qu'une opération de police devra être entreprise.

La délégation japonaise a demandé des instructions à Tokio pour fixer définitivement la rédaction de ce point. Voilà où on en est.

Ce qui a été acquis au cours de la journée d'hier, qui a vu deux séances du comité de rédaction, une conversation de M. Briand et de M. Yoshizawa et une réunion des Douze, c'est que la déclaration relative aux opérations contre les bandits figurera dans la déclaration lue par le président du conseil et non dans la résolution. Dans un esprit de conciliation, le Japon a renoncé à faire amender le texte du paragraphe 2 de la résolution pour y introduire cette réserve essentielle. Cela facilitera, sans doute, la solution immédiate. Ne sera-ce pas au prix de complications futures, puisque la Chine pourra contester la valeur d'un engagement ne figurant pas dans la résolution qui, seule, a valeur légale. Il est vrai que l'on pourra toujours argumenter sur le droit naturel de réprimer des actes de brigandage.

La seconde difficulté qui reste encore en suspens et qui occupera, elle aussi, aujourd'hui le comité de rédaction, est la détermination du nombre des membres de la commission d'étude. On se tromperait en affirmant que ce nombre est dès maintenant porté à cinq, par l'adjonction d'un représentant de l'Italie et d'un représentant de la Hollande aux délégués anglais, américain et français. Il s'en faut de beaucoup que les choses soient aussi avancées.

Ce qui est vrai, c'est que la réunion des Douze a eu, sur ce sujet, une discussion fort animée. Les Espagnols et les Sud-Américains voulaient porter le nombre des commissaires à sept. Certains voulaient même aller jusqu'à neuf et douze.

On est arrivé à faire admettre qu'il ne pourrait pas y en avoir plus de cinq. Mais ce chiffre n'est pas du tout définitif. Et ce qui est encore moins définitif, c'est l'attribution des deux postes que l'on voudrait ajouter.

Il est exact que l'Italie a posé très

nettement sa candidature. Il est non moins exact que cette candidature soulève de très sérieuses difficultés. D'abord parce que l'Italie est ouvertement partisan de la révision des traités. Ensuite parce que la participation de l'Italie risquerait d'entraîner une candidature de l'Allemagne. Or, les Allemands ne cessent de réclamer l'abolition des traités dits unilatéraux, c'est-à-dire des traités analogues à ceux sur lesquels le Japon appuie ses droits. Ensuite parce que l'Allemagne ne possède plus en Chine le droit d'exterritorialité, qui lui a été enlevé par le traité de Versailles.

Le Japon avait pris la position de l'Italie et de l'Allemagne en grande considération en fixant très intentionnellement le nombre de délégués à trois et en désignant les puissances qualifiées. Est-il besoin de dire qu'il n'est pas seul à reconnaître les inconvénients de la participation de l'Italie et de l'Allemagne ?

Il est certain que l'Italie insiste. Hier encore, M. Scialoja disait à lord Robert Cecil que son gouvernement était décidé à obtenir un mandat et a déjà même choisi pour l'occuper un ambassadeur d'Italie au Brésil, particulièrement au courant des affaires chinoises.

Quant à la candidature hollandaise, elle a bien été posée, mais les petites puissances préféreraient un Suisse et les Suédois M. Umden.

Cette affaire nous promet pour aujourd'hui une discussion encore assez chaude. Elle ne peut cependant faire échouer la négociation au point où elle en est arrivée. On peut en dire autant d'ailleurs des derniers détails de rédaction qui restent à régler, soit dans le projet de résolution, soit dans la déclaration du président du conseil, où il faut rédiger avec beaucoup de prudence la formule relative aux droits des Japonais de réprimer les actes de brigandage. On peut vraiment espérer maintenant que le rideau tombera à la fin de la semaine. — S.-B.

Matin 2

Enclosure No. 9 to Despatch No. 2044
of December 4, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE MATIN, December 2, 1931.

LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS

L'adoption par le conseil de la S. D. N. du projet de résolution

M. Briand et ses collègues vont attendre les réponses définitives
des gouvernements de Nankin et de Tokio

Il y a deux jours, nous avons pu exactement exposer les conditions dans lesquelles le représentant de la Chine, après avoir définitivement renoncé à exiger qu'une date précise fût fixée pour la fin de l'occupation japonaise, s'était rallié, en principe, au nouveau texte de résolution élaboré par le conseil de la Société des nations.

Les objections de détail soulevées par le Japon ayant été, d'autre part, largement prises en considération, il ne restait plus à M. Briand et à ses collègues qu'à entériner le projet d'accord.

C'est à quoi ils se sont employés hier après-midi.

Unanimentement approuvée par les « douze », la résolution a été communiquée à M. Yoshizawa et au docteur Sze, qui l'ont immédiatement télégraphiée à leurs gouvernements respectifs.

Maintenant, le conseil doit attendre l'ultime réponse du cabinet de Tokio et celle de Nankin.

Disons tout de suite que la première sera certainement favorable. Quant à la seconde, elle est d'ores et déjà connue ; on ne comprendrait pas, en effet, que M. Wellington Koo, ministre des affaires étrangères de Chang Kai Shek se montrât plus intransigeant que le docteur Sze.

Bref, la pénible négociation, que nous venons de suivre pas à pas, s'achève, sauf événements fâcheux et actuellement imprévisibles, sur le terrain même du conflit, vers une solution amiable.

Il nous serait facile d'analyser paragraphe par paragraphe, le nouveau projet de résolution.

Mais, afin d'éviter des développements inutiles, nous nous bornerons à ces quelques remarques :

Il ne faut pas perdre de vue, en premier lieu, que le texte initial, celui par conséquent qui avait été récemment adopté, avant les modifications ultérieures, par le conseil, l'Amérique, et, sous certaines réserves, par le Japon, subsiste dans ses lignes essentielles. En d'autres termes, la résolution ratifiée à l'unanimité le 30 septembre dernier à Genève, résolution qui ne prévoyait aucun délai pour le repli des forces nippones, constitue toujours la base fondamentale du règlement sur lequel, samedi, au plus tard, les « douze » et les représentants des deux parties en cause seront appelés à voter.

Examinons donc brièvement les modifications qui, au cours des récents débats et sur la demande et des Chinois et des Japonais, les uns et les autres agissant selon leur point de vue particulier, ont été apportées au texte initial.

Le docteur Sze a obtenu, ainsi que nous l'avons expliqué, que, dans le projet n° 2, le conseil incorporât une clause additionnelle dont voici le sens général.

Aussitôt arrivée en Mandchourie, la commission d'étude devra se rendre compte si les relations normales entre Tokio et Nankin sont complètement rétablies.

Et, par relations normales, on sait ce que l'on entend.

Au cas où l'évacuation ne serait pas achevée à ce moment-là, la commission adressera au conseil un rapport qui fera l'objet d'une discussion impartiale et attentive.

Le docteur Sze a encore obtenu que le projet exprimât clairement le désir du conseil de rester saisi du conflit jusqu'à la liquidation totale.

Passons maintenant aux revendications japonaises.

On se souvient de l'insistance avec laquelle M. Yoshizawa avait demandé à M. Briand et à ses collègues que la résolution laissât les mains libres à son gouvernement dans l'hypothèse de nouvelles agressions de la part des bandits chinois.

Sur ce point, le conseil, après réflexion, a tourné la difficulté de la façon suivante : En séance publique, M. Briand, après avoir lu le projet de résolution, fera un commentaire officiel, et dont les termes auront été préalablement approuvés par la Chine et le Japon, de ladite résolution. Dans ce commentaire sera glissée une phrase susceptible d'apaiser les louables soucis du baron Shidehara au sujet des exploits éventuels des bandits.

Voilà, enfin, les variantes qui sont le fait du conseil lui-même :

1° M. Briand et ses collègues ont décidé d'ajouter, non plus dans la résolution, mais dans le commentaire, auquel nous avons fait ci-dessus allusion, que l'évacuation du territoire chinois doit être poursuivie le plus rapidement possible.

Et cette affirmation est, paraît-il, entourée d'une certaine pompe.

2° Le conseil a résolu de porter de 3 (chiffre proposé par le Japon) à 5 le nombre des membres de la future commission d'étude. Celle-ci, en conséquence, comprendrait un Américain, un Français (M. F. Georges Picot), un Anglais, un Hollandais, un Italien.

Telle est présentement la situation. A Tokio et à Nankin de consacrer les réels efforts de tous pendant les semaines passées.

Enclosure No. 10 to Despatch No. 2044
of December 4, 1931.

From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'OEUVRE, December 2, 1931.

**Un projet d'accord a été soumis,
la nuit dernière,
aux gouvernements chinois
et japonais**

Sans crier victoire ni merveille, il faut constater avec joie que le Conseil de la Société des Nations est arrivé à rétablir le contact, à ébaucher la soudure pacifique qui remettront, en Mandchourie, Chinois et Japonais dans des relations de voisinage acceptables.

La journée d'hier a été consacrée à la rédaction d'un texte amiable que le Conseil a adopté et que les deux délégations ont transmis, aussitôt, à leurs gouvernements.

En attendant la réponse de ceux-ci, les Douze consacreront la journée d'aujourd'hui à l'étude de la zone neutre prévue dans ce projet d'accord.

Cette zone-tampon, cet hinterland, fermé aux coups de main et aux coups de tête militaires, neutralisera enfin de redoutables initiatives de violence qui, pour être morcelées et spasmodiques, ne déjouaient que plus dangereusement, de jour en jour, les pourparlers les plus soigneux.

Ce sera un grand résultat.

La Société des Nations aura passé de dures heures. Les ennemis qu'elle a, les incrédules qu'elle fait, ont cru, cette fois, à son impuissance.

Il est infiniment regrettable que le Japon, en compromettant sa force, n'ait pas vu le risque de perdre sa sympathie, tout en étant obligé de se rendre, tout de même, à son arbitrage. C'est la moralité que, de ces longs débats, au moment où ils approchent de leur conclusion, tirent, non sans tristesse, les amis et les admirateurs du Japon.

Ils regrettent que, fort des mobiles qui, à l'origine, le guidaient et dont personne ne mettait en doute la valeur, le Japon, après avoir employé son armée à un avertissement, à une démonstration que l'on estimait alors légitimes, ne s'en soit pas remis, ensuite, arme au pied, à la Société des Nations que la Chine, qui en fait partie, avait le droit de prendre pour juge.

Pourquoi cette brusquerie, cette nervosité, quand les intérêts mêmes du Japon en Chine sont si grands et si multiples que la paix, seule, peut y satisfaire ?

PP 2

Enclosure No. 11 to Despatch No. 2044
of December 4, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE PETIT PARISIEN, December 2, 1931.

Le conseil de la S.D.N. a approuvé hier le texte du projet de résolution finale

L'impression générale était sensiblement meilleure, mais une sérieuse difficulté subsistait encore du côté japonais concernant la répression des actes de banditisme

Les patients efforts de conciliation déployés par le conseil et, en particulier, les amicales objurgations adressées par M. Briand, tantôt au représentant du gouvernement chinois tantôt au chef de la délégation japonaise, vont-ils enfin être couronnés de succès? Les impressions recueillies hier dans les milieux autorisés le laissaient nettement espérer. Non seulement, en effet, le comité de rédaction, présidé par lord Cecil, avait, au cours de deux réunions tenues l'une dans la matinée, l'autre au début de l'après-midi, mis la dernière main au projet de résolution, mais, en fin de journée, les « Douze », réunis, à leur tour, en séance privée, en avaient définitivement approuvé le texte...

Au comité de rédaction

On sait qu'un des obstacles auxquels le comité s'était heurté était la demande formulée par le Japon que ne soient pas considérées comme actes d'hostilités, aux termes de l'alinéa 2 du paragraphe II, les opérations de police, c'est-à-dire la répression des actes de banditisme dirigés contre les biens et les ressortissants japonais en dehors de la zone du chemin de fer. Cette question avait été longuement discutée, lundi après-midi, avec le sous-directeur du bureau japonais de la Société des nations, M. Ito, et, pour tourner la difficulté, lord Robert Cecil, M. de Madariaga et même M. Colban s'étaient montrés assez partisans de recourir au subterfuge suggéré par le porte-parole japonais, à savoir de supprimer cette réserve du projet de résolution, mais de l'inclure dans la déclaration explicative dont le président, M. Briand, accompagnera la lecture de cette résolution. Or on y est revenu hier. Le texte de la résolution s'est trouvé allégé d'autant et c'est pour cela qu'à 16 heures le comité de rédaction avait, en ce qui concerne ce projet, terminé sa tâche...

La difficulté, toutefois, subsiste moins aiguë peut-être, mais encore sérieuse pour la rédaction de la déclaration du président, déclaration d'autant plus importante que c'est à elle qu'on se référera pour saisir toute la pensée du conseil et établir toute la portée de la résolution.

Les textes en présence...

A la séance du comité de rédaction de lundi après-midi, on s'était séparé sans qu'une décision ait été prise au sujet du texte de la note relative à la répression du banditisme.

Hier matin, le représentant de la Grande-Bretagne, en tant que président du comité de rédaction, a adressé à la délégation japonaise une lettre contenant une nouvelle proposition de texte disant en substance que comme le Japon a insisté sur la question de la répression du banditisme, et qu'il s'agirait d'opérations entreprises au grand jour, les troupes japonaises pourront exécuter ces opérations de police (police action) en présence des observateurs neutres.

La délégation japonaise, en réponse a transmis hier après-midi, à 16 h. 30, une contre-proposition à lord Cecil. Cette note déclare que les troupes japonaises, pour réprimer les attaques imprévues et soudaines des bandits, ne sauraient attendre, pour entreprendre ces opérations, l'arrivée des observateurs. Et la délégation conclut en proposant que le gouvernement de Tokio s'engage à informer le conseil, immédiatement après les opérations, de ce qui se sera passé.

La réunion du Conseil

A 17 heures, les « Douze » se sont réunis en séance privée, ont approuvé le projet de résolution du comité de rédaction et décidé que le texte en serait, dès hier soir, transmis aux deux parties puis lord Cecil leur exposa l'incident japonais relaté plus haut. Sans doute on aurait tort d'en exagérer l'importance et il est vraisemblable que le comité de rédaction, qui tiendra demain matin une nouvelle séance, s'efforcera de l'aplanir. Il n'en reste pas moins que la susceptibilité japonaise, après dix-sept jours de pénibles négociations, et au moment où l'accord définitif était en vue, était, hier soir, assez sévèrement jugée dans les milieux du conseil.

En attendant que cette difficulté disparaisse, le conseil a poursuivi l'examen de la déclaration explicative que fera le président et qui contiendra un passage spécifiant de la façon la plus claire qu'il s'agit là d'une situation absolument spéciale, exceptionnelle même, et que les décisions intervenues pour son règlement ne sauraient, en aucun cas, constituer un précédent susceptible d'être évoqué dans une autre partie du monde et notamment en Europe.

A ce propos, nous croyons pouvoir affirmer que ce passage donne entière satisfaction aux représentants de la Pologne, de la Yougoslavie, de l'Espagne et de la Norvège qui ont particulièrement insisté en séance publique pour que cette distinction fût faite.

La police de la zone neutre

Ainsi donc, amélioration de l'atmosphère et approbation par le conseil de la résolution finale, tels sont les principaux résultats de la journée d'hier. Reste la question de la police dans la zone neutre de King-tchéou, que nous avons déjà exposée en détail. Ainsi que nous l'avons signalé, cette question fait actuellement l'objet de négociations directes — à Nankin notamment — entre les représentants de la Chine et du Japon. On en attend à Paris les résultats, mais tout permet de supposer qu'ils seront, eux aussi, satisfaisants, les Japonais paraissant disposés à laisser la police de cette zone aux Chinois. Toute l'affaire pourrait, de la sorte, être liquidée dans les derniers jours de la semaine.

ENCLOSURE 2

Enclosure No. 12 to Despatch No. 2044
of December 4, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE TEMPS, December 2, 1931.

LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS
~~LA GRANDE-BRETAGNE ET L'INDE~~

Le conseil de la Société des nations semble avoir fait depuis vingt-quatre heures un pas en avant dans la voie du règlement du différend sino-japonais. Les perspectives sont aujourd'hui plus favorables et on espère fermement en finir avant la fin de cette semaine — qui est la troisième semaine de la session. On a commencé ce matin la rédaction définitive de la résolution qui, si elle est adoptée à l'unanimité, doit constituer la conclusion utile des travaux du conseil et avoir pour effet de stabiliser la situation en Mandchourie.

L'accord est établi en principe avec les Chinois à condition qu'il ne se produise pas de nouvelles difficultés sur l'interprétation de certains termes. D'autre part, le malentendu qui avait surgi hier au sujet du rôle des observateurs étrangers, le Japon n'admettant en aucun cas une intervention de tiers sur le terrain, est éclairci. On s'achemine, par conséquent, vers un règlement par lequel la Chine et le Japon s'engageront également à s'abstenir de toute initiative de nature à provoquer de nouveaux incidents, mais sans qu'il soit spécifié pourtant que le Japon ne pourra prendre, même en cas de besoin, des mesures pour assurer la sécurité de ses ressortissants. Les troupes chinoises se retireront jusqu'à la Grande-Muraille, laissant ainsi une zone vide suffisamment large entre elles et les troupes nippones. Les Japonais, de leur côté, s'engagent à ne pas pénétrer dans cette zone neutralisée où sera organisée une police solide. On pense que cette précaution suffira pour prévenir efficacement tout contact entre les forces en présence.

Ce résultat obtenu, la tâche de la Société des nations sera terminée dans l'état présent des choses. Mais il ne faut pas se dissimuler qu'en raison de la susceptibilité toujours en éveil des Japonais et des Chinois le rôle des observateurs étrangers sera singulièrement délicat. Quoi qu'il en soit, si la résolution que l'on élabore actuellement est finalement adoptée à l'unanimité dans les termes indiqués, on pourra considérer que le conseil de la Société des nations aura utilement paré au plus pressé, qui est de faire obstacle au développement des opérations de caractère militaire. Quant au fond même du différend, il dépendra de la diplomatie de Tokio et de Nankin qu'il puisse être traité avec des chances de succès. La présence de M. Wellington Koo au ministère des affaires étrangères à Nankin est de nature, croit-on, à faciliter des négociations directes entre les deux gouvernements.

Enclosure No. 13 to Despatch No. 2044
of December 4, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ECHO DE PARIS, December 3, 1931.

**LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS
DE MANDCHOURIE**

**Nouvelle déception
pour le Conseil de la S.D.N.**

Le but s'éloigne de nouveau

Hier, le Conseil de la *Société des Nations* se croyait sûr de son affaire. Il avait provisoirement approuvé un projet de résolution et une déclaration présidentielle (sorte d'annexe explicative de la résolution) qui, en apparence, promettaient l'apaisement sino-japonais en Mandchourie. Nous avons dit : en apparence, car la Chine n'étant pas un Etat organisé, étant incapable par conséquent de tenir des engagements quelconques, les événements se fussent chargés, au premier jour, de rouvrir les querelles. Mais la *Société des Nations* travaille-t-elle pour autre chose que l'apparence ? Tout allait donc à son gré.

Hier soir, la combinaison était compromise. Pour entrer dans le détail, essayons d'expliquer ce qui se passe.

D'abord, soyons convaincus que le Japon ne lâchera à aucun prix l'entreprise mandchourienne, consacrée par les traités qui se sont succédé depuis 1905. Sa population atteindra, dans vingt ans, le chiffre de 100 millions, tandis que son territoire métropolitain n'atteint pas 400.000 kilomètres carrés cultivables pour une petite partie seulement.

Ensuite, voulant persévérer dans l'entreprise mandchourienne et se réclamant de la légitime défense pour empêcher l'anarchie chinoise de prévaloir sur elle, le Japon accepte une solution de ses démêlés avec la Chine entérinée par le conseil de la S.D.N., à condition que cette solution ne le dépouille pas des sauvegardes suivantes :

1° Lui seul choisira le moment où les quelques milliers de soldats, sortis de la zone du sud-mandchourien pour faire œuvre de police, regagneront leurs quartiers réguliers;

2° Il sera à même de prendre les mesures de protection indispensables contre les bandes chinoises régulières ou irrégulières;

3° Il exercera un contrôle virtuel sur la province chinoise de Tsin-Tchéou, à l'ouest du fleuve Liao-Ho, quartier général actuel de Chang-Hsue-Liang, maître plus ou moins nominal des trois provinces mandchoues et qui, contre lui, dirige l'agitation.

Sur le premier point, le Japon a reçu satisfaction. La Chine elle-même s'est inclinée. Sur le second point, le conseil s'est employé à reprendre, mardi soir, ce qu'il semblait disposé à concéder. Dans le passage de la déclaration présidentielle qui traite de la question, il est dit maintenant que, vu la situation spéciale

de la Mandchourie, et si l'organisation administrative chinoise est compromise, le Japon pourra prendre, à titre exceptionnel, des mesures de police suffisantes. Jusque-là, tout va bien ou à peu près. Mais, dans le texte révisé, le conseil ajoute que le Japon, procédant à ces opérations de police, devra demander l'assistance des « observateurs neutres », c'est-à-dire des émissaires des puissances. Le gouvernement de Tokio ne s'accommode pas d'une telle combinaison qui, en pratique, est, du reste, irréalisable.

Toutefois, c'est le troisième point qui, hier, donna lieu aux pires difficultés. La Chine a demandé qu'une zone neutre soit établie autour de Tchin-Tchéou et le Japon en a accepté le principe, arrêtant même l'avance de son armée. En son nom, M. Yoshizawa presse le conseil d'obtenir le départ des troupes chinoises, départ promis à plusieurs reprises. Il a fait suivre sa démarche de lundi soir de la remise d'un mémorandum. De la retraite des troupes chinoises, le gouvernement de Tokio fait une sorte de question préalable. Pour le reste, le Japon acceptera que la police chinoise locale demeure en fonction dans la zone neutre. Mais le règlement de tous les détails devra être conclu directement par le commandement militaire japonais et le commandement militaire chinois, sans intervention des tiers, des observateurs neutres en particulier. Une dépêche Reuter de Tokio ajoute qu'à la suite des troupes chinoises, Chang Hsue Liang et son gouvernement devront, eux aussi, déménager et la zone neutre passer sous l'autorité du gouvernement chinois de Moukden, indépendant de Nankin. Hier cette dépêche a consterné le secrétariat et le conseil.

La délégation japonaise n'a point reçu d'instruction conforme à la dépêche Reuter qu'il ne faut donc admettre, jusqu'à plus ample informé, que sous réserve. Mais la tendance qu'indique tout au moins la dépêche Reuter mérite d'être notée. Si la S.D.N. continue à cultiver et à étendre l'irritation du peuple chinois contre le Japon, à préparer la ruine du commerce japonais en Chine, le Japon sera fatalement poussé à s'installer plus largement que jamais en Mandchourie.

Au sujet de la zone neutre, le Conseil s'est efforcé, hier, de négocier un compromis avec le docteur Sze, délégué de la Chine. Loin de se prêter au compromis, le docteur Sze ne dit rien de net sur l'évacuation et tente de faire pénétrer les puissances dans l'engrenage chinois, non seulement à Tsin-Tchéou, mais aussi à Tien-Tsin. Le problème s'élargit.

PERTINAX.

Enclousure No. 14 to Despatch No. 2044
of December 4, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from EXCELSIOR, December 3, 1931.

LE CONFLIT MANDCHOU N'EST TOUJOURS PAS RÉSOLU

Le Conseil de la S.D.N. a dû
s'ajourner de nouveau hier sans
avoir pu prendre de décision.

*Les causes du désaccord résident
dans l'établissement de la zone
neutre et dans la composition de
la commission d'enquête.*

Au moment où l'on escomptait qu'une entente était sur le point de se réaliser se dresse une nouvelle impasse et, hier après-midi, après une longue discussion, le conseil de la Société des nations dut se séparer sans avoir réalisé l'entente que l'on espérait. Chaque fois qu'une question semble être résolue, elle est immédiatement remise en discussion à la faveur — ainsi que le disait non sans esprit lord Cecil — d'un simple adjectif dans la rédaction. Et les discussions recommencent, comme ce fut le cas hier, de telle sorte qu'à 7 heures du soir le conseil s'ajourna sans avoir pris aucune décision quant à sa prochaine réunion, se contentant de demander à son comité de rédaction de continuer ses négociations avec les délégués chinois et japonais.

C'est sur l'établissement de la zone neutre que se heurtent les membres du conseil de la Société des nations, d'autant qu'ils sont eux-mêmes très partagés sur ce sujet.

Mais ce n'est pas le seul point sur lequel un désaccord complet subsiste : Quelle sera la délimitation du front japonais au nord de la zone neutre ?

Comment s'effectuera le retrait des troupes chinoises ?

Enfin, comment définir les administrations locales, leurs droits et leurs devoirs ? Voilà pour la zone neutre.

Autre mésentente complète en ce qui concerne le droit des Japonais de réprimer les actes de brigandage. Ils voudraient avoir celui d'assurer la police dans cette zone et, au besoin, de poursuivre les bandes de bandits qui pourraient l'infester.

Certains membres du conseil se refusent absolument à accepter cette manière de voir.

Enfin, l'autre grave question sur laquelle le désaccord persiste est celui de cette commission d'enquête dont on parle depuis trois semaines déjà. Un point est acquis, nous l'avons dit hier : elle sera composée de cinq membres, au lieu de trois. Le quatrième a même été choisi : c'est un représentant italien qui occupera cette place aux côtés des délégués français, anglais et américain. Nous pouvons même ajouter que ce délégué sera M. Serrutti, actuellement ambassadeur d'Italie au Brésil. Mais quel sera le cinquième membre ? L'Allemagne a posé sa candidature, mais une objection immédiate s'impose : elle n'a pas, comme les autres puissances représentées, des traités avec la Chine.

La Hollande, elle aussi, pose sa candidature : les petites puissances du conseil qui veulent faire partie de la commission s'y opposent à leur tour, sous prétexte que les Pays-Bas, avec leur vaste empire colonial, ne peuvent être considérés comme une puissance secondaire et, immédiatement, elles posent la candidature de la Belgique pour les représenter. Là non plus, l'unanimité ne peut se faire, le Japon estimant que la Belgique est trop engagée en Chine par ses chemins de fer.

Ajoutons que l'on n'est pas encore tombé d'accord sur la personnalité française qui sera appelée à siéger à la commission d'enquête, toutes celles qui ont été sollicitées n'étant pas très enthousiastes. Le même cas, d'ailleurs, croyons-nous, se produit en Angleterre où sir Cecil Hurst estime qu'il lui serait bien difficile de quitter la cour de La Haye, où il est juge, pour aller en Mandchourie. — MAURICE RAYMONDE.

FIG.3

Enclosure No. 15 to Despatch No. 2044
of December 4, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from FIGARO, December 3, 1931.

Le Conflit sino-japonais

Figaro ————— 12/3

Il y a des mises au point difficiles. Le Conseil de la Société des Nations s'en aperçoit chaque jour. Le fameux projet de résolution n'est pas encore accepté par les deux parties. On discute toujours sur des points de détail. La commission d'études de cinq membres qui sera envoyée en Mandchourie comprendra un Français, un Anglais, un Italien, un Américain. Le cinquième siège sera sans doute attribué à la Belgique ou à la Hollande. Plus difficile est l'établissement de la zone neutre dans la région de Tchén-Tchéou ; le Japon, qui a déjà retiré ses troupes, insiste pour que la Chine en fasse autant et, sous le prétexte de maintenir l'ordre, ne laisse point de bandes armées qui le troubleraient. On parvient difficilement à s'entendre sur la possibilité réclamée par le Japon d'intervenir, dans la zone neutre, au cas où de nouveaux incidents se produiraient. Il serait fastidieux d'insister sur ce qui a été déjà dit maintes fois. Indiquons simplement que le docteur Szé, délégué de Nankin, a été longuement entendu hier soir par le Conseil. Aujourd'hui, on prévoit de simples conversations privées avec le représentant du Japon.

La situation en Mandchourie est la même. On signale des rassemblements de troupes dans la région de Tsitsikar. Mieux que la Société des Nations, le froid semble, pour le moment, devoir arrêter les belligérants.


Enclosure No. 16 to Despatch No. 2044
of December 4, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'HUMANITE, December 3, 1931.

DEBOUT POUR LA DÉFENSE DE L'UNION SOVIÉTIQUE !

Un nouveau document sur la préparation de la guerre contre la patrie socialiste

*Dans un mémoire en date du 3 août dernier,
le général Honjo précisait
les projets d'annexion par le Japon de la Mandchourie
et de la République soviétique d'Extrême-Orient*



Une manifestation chauvine à Tokio

Hier à Paris, le Conseil de la S. D. N. et son Comité de rédaction, faisant traîner les négociations, ont continué à mettre au point la résolution et les termes de la déclaration de Briand qui doivent sanctionner officiellement la conquête de la Mandchourie par le Japon et préparer le dépècement de la Chine et l'agression contre l'Union Soviétique.

Il a été décidé d'augmenter à cinq membres l'effectif de la fameuse « commission d'études ».

Au sujet de la « zone neutre », l'impérialisme nippon est depuis deux jours plus affirmatif encore dans ses exigences concernant l'administration « officielle » de cette région. Le but recherché, nous l'avons dit est, continuant l'annexion de la Mandchourie, de placer de fait entre les mains des forbans japonais la région sud et le port chinois d'Houlou-Tao qui prend une très grande extension.

A Tokio, on annonce qu'il ne suffit pas que les troupes chinoises se retirent en deçà de la Grande Muraille, mais qu'il faut que l'administration chinoise disparaisse également et que la zone soit placée sous la juridiction du gouvernement « indépendant » établi à Moukden, c'est-à-dire des marionnettes du Japon.

Le gouvernement du Kuomintang de Nankin, qui a déjà ratifié en réalité l'occupation de la Mandchourie, ne pourra qu'accepter, car les représentants des impérialistes siégeant à la S. D. N. feront droit aux visées japonaises.

Les traitres du Kuomintang, continuant leur politique de répression sanglante du mouvement antiimpérialiste, ont d'ailleurs accepté depuis longtemps la dénomination de « bandits » donnée par les impérialistes aux ouvriers et aux paysans luttant contre les oppresseurs étrangers. Vils laquais des divers impérialistes, les généraux qui « gouvernent » anarchiquement la Chine, ne font que favoriser tous les desseins de Tokio, de Paris et de Washington. Et le docteur Sze, représentant de Tchang Kai-Shek au Conseil de la S. D. N. ne peut faire d'objection sincère quand la délégation japonaise entend qu'il soit reconnu aux troupes japonaises le droit « de réprimer les attaques imprévues et soudaines des « bandits ».

Les dernières conclusions des membres du comité de rédaction ont été communiquées aux gouvernements de Tokio et de Nankin qui répondront avant vendredi et peut-être samedi aura lieu la séance publique


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Le Kuomintang appelle l'intervention

En ce qui concerne les buts des impérialistes qui provoquent les combats de Tien-Tsin en vue de créer un prétexte pour l'envoi d'un corps expéditionnaire en Chine, le Kuomintang vient d'ouvrir officiellement la voie pour l'intervention ouverte.

En effet, avant-hier a été communiquée aux membres du conseil une lettre adressée au secrétariat de la S.D.N. par le docteur Sze. Dans ce document, il est dit que, pour faire droit aux demandes du Japon, les troupes chinoises de Tien-Tsin ont été retirées à 7 milles de la ville et que « la Chine est prête à envisager le retrait de la police, s'il est possible, grâce aux efforts combinés des autorités locales des nations amies, de prendre des mesures efficaces en vue du maintien de l'ordre ».

« Les autorités chinoises ont donné des ordres interdisant les mouvements populaires dirigés contre le Japon. »

Ainsi, Nankin appelle les puissances à « maintenir l'ordre » à Tien-Tsin et dans la région, contre les mouvements populaires dirigés contre l'impérialisme. C'est là déblayer le terrain pour l'intervention « nécessaire pour assurer la sécurité des ressortissants étrangers ». Comme la presse française a déjà affirmé que les troupes d'occupation étaient déjà insuffisantes dans les concessions, il faut s'attendre à l'envoi de forces nouvelles en Chine.

Un nouveau document

Comme on voit, le danger menaçant les Soviets chinois est loin de diminuer, bien au contraire. Et nous voulons citer encore un document qui, s'ajoutant à notre dossier, montrera le crime préparé contre l'U. R. S. S. par les canailles de Tokio — sous la direction de l'impérialisme français, ne l'oublions jamais.

Il s'agit d'un mémoire que le commandant de l'armée japonaise d'occupation, général Houjo, a remis le 3 août dernier — c'est-à-dire qu'il était connu des impérialistes dès avant le coup de force du 18 septembre — au ministre de la guerre, Mianami. Dans ce document, il est dit :

Pour renforcer la position de notre pays il est nécessaire d'exploiter sans délai la grave situation économique, le non achèvement du Plan quinquennal et la désunion de la Chine. Tous ces facteurs doivent être utilisés pour l'occupation de la Mandchourie et de la Mongolie, pour la réalisation des buts de l'ancienne expédition sibérienne.

L'unification de la Chine, l'existence de l'Union soviétique et l'avance des Etats-Unis en Extrême-Orient vont à l'encontre de nos intérêts. Si nous voulons empêcher l'avance de l'Amérique en Extrême-Orient, nous devons renforcer notre armée et réaliser notre complète indépendance matérielle. Avant de procéder contre l'Amérique nos troupes doivent occuper une position prépondérante en Chine et occuper le territoire d'Extrême-Orient de l'Union soviétique.

Il faut anéantir l'influence des Etats-Unis aux îles Philippines et ramener ce groupe d'îles sous notre contrôle. Nous occuperons le littoral occidental du Pacifique et personne ne nous en empêchera. L'Angleterre ne possède que Singapour et Hong-Kong et ne pourra pas nous gêner.

Nous pourrions occuper la Chine, surtout la partie septentrionale. Il faut d'abord occuper la Mandchourie et la Mongolie et les transformer, avec l'aide des *gardes-blancs russes*, en pays indépendants.

Il faut aussi que nous occupions avec l'aide des Bouriates, la République soviétique de l'Extrême-Orient jusqu'à Verkhneudinsk afin d'y créer un Etat indépendant qui sera placé sous notre contrôle.

Ce plan de conquête est le complément du plan que le baron Tanaka présentait au mikado en 1927. Le cours des événements a montré que ce plan avait été fidèlement suivi. Avec l'aide de la France impérialiste, son exécution va être continuée. Il faut empêcher ces projets immenses de guerre antisoviétique, qui dégénérerait en guerre mondiale tant souhaitée par les financiers et qu'aiment à provoquer les social-fascistes.

Et pour empêcher le crime, il faut mener la bataille, le combat de masse, classe contre classe, contre le patronat, contre l'impérialisme français, contre la social-démocratie, sans perdre une minute, sans ménager les coups.

M. MAGNIEN.

Enclosure No. 17 to Despatch No. 2044
of December 4, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE JOURNAL, December 3, 1931.

LE CONFLIT sino-japonais rebondit sur la question de la zone neutre de Tchén-Tchéou

Journal — 12/3
Un pas en avant, deux en arrière : c'est le rythme de l'affaire sino-japonaise. A ce train, quand arriverons-nous au but ? La journée d'hier ne nous en a pas rapprochés. Non seulement deux questions sont restées en suspens, mais on en a vu reparaître une troisième que l'on avait le droit de croire en bonne voie d'arrangement.

C'est la fameuse question de la zone neutre de Tchén-Tchéou. Le Japon avait pris l'initiative de retirer ses troupes de cette zone en les faisant reculer derrière le Liao. Le fait a été reconnu par les observateurs étrangers, notamment l'agent britannique. Ayant donné ce témoignage de conciliation et ayant manifesté l'intention de laisser à la Chine l'administration et la police de la zone évacuée, le Japon pouvait se croire en droit de penser que les Chinois exécuteraient la proposition faite par eux-mêmes de retirer leurs troupes derrière Chan-Hai-Kouan, la vraie porte de Chine, à l'entrée de la Grande Muraille. Evidemment, si ce retrait n'était pas opéré, il serait difficile au Japon de ne pas ramener ses troupes, surtout quand la mesure de conciliation a été présentée par les Chinois comme une mesure de faiblesse, prise sous la pression américaine.

Voilà la situation qui s'est manifestée, hier après-midi, à la lumière d'une note adressée par la délégation japonaise au conseil. Dans cette note, le Japon s'engage devant le conseil à ne pas pénétrer dans la zone neutralisée, d'en laisser l'administration et la police à la Chine, en demandant seulement que la Chine exécute ses promesses et retire ses troupes.

Le conseil des Douze a fait appeler le délégué chinois pour lui communiquer la note japonaise.

Le Dr Sze a répondu que la proposition chinoise de retrait des troupes derrière la Grande Muraille avait été subordonnée à l'organisation d'une surveillance de la zone neutre par des détachements internationaux. Le conseil a jugé cette proposition irréalisable et a parlé d'un contrôle par les observateurs étrangers. La note japonaise ne fait aucune allusion à ces observateurs. Elle équivaut à proposer l'évacuation militaire par la Chine de la Mandchourie.

Certains membres du conseil ont fait observer qu'il n'est plus question de zone neutre, mais d'une zone vide de troupes et que, dans ces conditions, la demande du Japon est parfaitement logique. Le Dr Sze a été invité à en référer à son gouvernement. Il est d'ailleurs permis de se demander jusqu'à quel point celui-ci a des moyens d'action sur les troupes de Tchang Hsue Liang, qui opèrent dans la région de Tchén-Tchéou.

Et maintenant, que sont devenus les deux points restés en suspens ? Le comité de rédaction s'est réuni hier matin. Il a laissé de côté la formule sur le droit du Japon de réprimer les actes d'hostilité. Il s'est consacré tout entier à l'étude de la composition du comité d'études, le conseil des Douze ayant porté le nombre des commissaires à cinq. On a vu, comme nous l'avions laissé prévoir, se préciser les candidatures de l'Italie et de l'Allemagne, sans que ces candidatures paraissent plus acceptables. A quelles complications n'irait-on pas ! Introduction dans la commission de deux éléments nettement révisionnistes. Accaparement des cinq sièges par les grandes puissances. Réclamation des petites puissances ne participant pas au conseil, mais signataires du traité de Washington et intéressées dans les affaires chinoises, par exemple, le Portugal et la Belgique.

Est-ce pour se tirer momentanément d'embarras que le comité de rédaction a envisagé l'idée de demander aux Japonais et aux Chinois de tâcher de s'entendre, comme s'il ne sautait pas aux yeux que cette question est peut-être celle sur laquelle l'accord des deux parties est le plus impossible à réaliser. On perd du temps et on ne perd peut-être pas que cela. — S.-B.

Matin 3

Enclosure No. 18 to Despatch No. 2044
of December 4, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE MATIN, December 13, 1931.

LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS

*En attendant les réponses de Tokio et de Nankin, le conseil de la S.D.N. discute
l'organisation de la zone neutre dans la région de Tchén-Tchéou
et les modalités des opérations éventuelles de police*

Ce n'est vraisemblablement qu'aujourd'hui que les délégations chinoise et japonaise seront à même de communiquer au conseil de la Société des nations les réponses de leur gouvernement respectif au sujet du projet de résolution.

M. Briand et ses collègues ont donc pu consacrer la journée d'hier à l'examen des questions restées en suspens. Ils ont, par conséquent, procédé à un nouvel échange de vues sur l'organisation de la zone neutre autour de Tchén-Tchéou, les possibilités d'action du Japon au cas où les bandits chinois se livreraient à de fâcheux exploits dans le voisinage de la zone du chemin de fer sud-mandchourien ainsi que sur les pouvoirs et la composition de la commission d'étude.

En ce qui concerne l'organisation de la zone neutre, le cabinet de Tokio a adressé aux « douze » une note dont voici le sens général : le Japon accepte le principe de la création d'un *no man's land* au nord de Tchén-Tchéou, à condition : 1° que les forces chinoises, massées dans cette région, soient ramenées jusqu'à la Grande-Muraille ; 2° que les détails de l'administration de ladite zone (mesures de police, notamment), ne relevant pas de la mission des observateurs des puissances étrangères, fassent l'objet de négociations directes entre le commandement des troupes nippones et les autorités locales chinoises.

Si Nankin se rallie à cette proposition, le gouvernement japonais se déclare prêt à évacuer complètement la zone neutre. Enfin, pour que nul ne puisse douter de ses intentions, le baron Shidehara est disposé à prendre devant le conseil de la S.D.N. l'engagement solennel de respecter la zone neutre, à moins que de nouvelles et dangereuses incursions de bandits ne nécessitent inopinément une action limitée et temporaire.

A moins que... ; cette réserve, il faut le noter objectivement, ne satisfait pas certains membres du conseil. Toutefois, on ne voit pas très bien comment le Japon pourrait donner l'assurance que, dans l'avenir, les bandits attendront la présence, la proximité des observateurs des puissances avant d'exécuter leurs randonnées.

— Chaque fois, affirme M. Yoshizawa, que nos autorités militaires auront été contraintes de rétablir, à l'improviste, l'ordre et la sécurité, nous informerons le conseil le plus rapidement possible. Nous ne saurions promettre davantage.

Les « douze » ont voulu tout de suite savoir ce que le docteur Sze pensait des suggestions japonaises relatives à l'organisation de la zone neutre. Immédiatement convoqué, le délégué de la Chine s'est borné à répondre qu'il allait en référer à son gouvernement.

Nous avons récemment annoncé que, sur la demande de M. Scialoja (Italie) le conseil avait décidé de porter de 3 (un Américain, un Français, un Anglais) à 5 le nombre des membres de la future commission d'étude. Si pressantes, si nombreuses furent, hier matin, les candidatures pour les deux sièges qui restent donc à pourvoir que M. Briand a dû renoncer à faire un choix. C'est au Japon et à la Chine qu'il appartiendra de désigner eux-mêmes les nouveaux titulaires.

Enclosure No. 19 to Despatch No. 2044
of December 4, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'OEUVRE, December 3, 1931.

Il y aura eu, hier, sur le coup de 19 heures, une petite déception au Conseil de la Société des Nations : autour de lui, plutôt.

Les choses avaient si bien marché la veille et pris une physionomie si heureusement globale que, déjà, tous les spectateurs se voyaient conviés aux pompes des grandes conclusions.

Mais, hier, il a fallu en revenir au travail graduel et partiel. Le Conseil s'est réuni à 17 heures et il n'a été question de rien d'autre que de la zone neutre, pas même : de la neutralisation de la région de Tchén-Tchéou, presque uniquement.

L'examen de ce point particulier s'est fait en présence du délégué chinois. Aujourd'hui, il sera repris et, sans doute, dans une intimité plus stricte encore, sans même que les douze soient présents tous les douze, avec le délégué japonais.

Voilà tout. Le Conseil va prudemment, pas à pas, dans le détail, maintenant qu'il a gagné un grand point sur l'ensemble.

Son travail est d'autant plus serré et sec qu'il est entouré d'un fracas de rumeurs, se détruisant les unes les autres, mais dont chacune, sur le moment, semble devoir tout détruire.

A la longue, les oreilles s'y sont habituées. La clairvoyance n'en est pas moins étourdie et surmenée.

Hier soir, on sentait, vraiment, de la lassitude, de l'impatience.

C'est pour cela, sans doute, que l'on s'est mis à conter des histoires de bandits.

Dans les explications ou les excuses que Chinois et Japonais, depuis le début, s'ingénient à fournir pour justifier leurs raids militaires et les incidents qu'ils font éclater, il a été déjà beaucoup question de bandits.

Mais, à présent, les bandits sont en train d'entrer dans les textes diplomatiques eux-mêmes, puisque le Japon entend garder sur la zone neutre un droit de police, précisément, contre les bandits.

Or, de quels bandits veut-il parler ? Une nouvelle, à coup sûr fautive, attribua un instant, hier, au Japon l'intention de comprendre tout le monde dans ce terme, car il exigeait, paraît-il, qu'il n'y eût plus aucun habitant dans la zone neutre, ni militaire ni civil.

Le Conseil aura donc à définir non seulement topographiquement et démographiquement le mot de neutre, mais civilement et moralement celui de bandit.

Il est certain que, présentement, sous le coup des passions qu'entraînent les événements et que les dépêches, en déformant ceux-ci, surexcitent, Nankin a sa définition des bandits et Tokio la sienne.

Le Conseil des Nations va être obligé d'en trouver une troisième.

Celle des Chinois et celle des Japonais peuvent convenir provisoirement tant que la zone neutre demeure, comme nous le disions hier en manchette, un champ de bataille.

Mais quand, pour de bon, la zone deviendra neutre, il faudra bien que les bandits deviennent aussi de vrais bandits.

Pourvu, mon Dieu, que les Chinois et les Japonais ne persistent pas à s'y prendre les uns les autres pour des bandits.

Car c'est toute l'affaire : jouer sur le mot bandit !

PP 3

Enclosure No. 20 to Despatch No. 2044
of December 4, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE PETIT PARISIEN, December 3, 1931.

LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS

La désignation des délégués à la commission d'étude

Nous avons vu que, mardi soir, le conseil de la S. D. N. avait sérieusement déblayé le terrain. Il ne lui restait plus qu'à se mettre d'accord d'une part sur la formule demandée par le Japon et l'autorisant à exécuter, le cas échéant, contre les bandits, certaines opérations de police, et, d'autre part, sur la constitution de la zone neutre de Kingtchéou. La journée d'hier a fait, sinon surgir, du moins s'accuser une nouvelle difficulté à propos de la composition de la commission d'étude qui doit être envoyée sur place.

Le Japon, on se le rappelle, avait proposé que cette commission ne comptât que trois membres : un Français, un Britannique et un Américain. Nous avons eu l'occasion de souligner ici-même quelques-uns des inconvénients que risquait de présenter tout élargissement de la commission. Certains gouvernements, celui de Rome, notamment, se sont mis sur les rangs. La Chine, de son côté, a proposé une augmentation du nombre des commissaires. Bref, mardi, dans leur projet de résolution, les membres du comité de rédaction, et après eux le conseil lui-même, se sont laissés aller à porter ce chiffre de trois à cinq, les deux assesseurs — chinois et japonais — non compris naturellement.

La démarche du Reich

Mais quels allaient être les deux membres supplémentaires ? M. Scialoja qui a, dans l'ambassadeur d'Italie à Buenos-Ayres, un candidat évidemment très distingué, a si vivement insisté que sa cause parut gagnée. Quand il s'agit de désigner le second, en revanche, les choses n'allèrent pas toutes seules. La candidature d'une petite puissance fut très chaudement préconisée. Mais laquelle ? Celle de la Hollande fut particulièrement combattue par les Latino-Américains du conseil. On parla de la Belgique, du Portugal, qui sont signataires du « traité des Neuf » conclu à Washington en 1922. L'affaire fut laissée en suspens.

Or, hier matin, l'Allemagne qui, tant qu'il n'avait pas été question de modifier le chiffre « trois » n'avait pas élevé la voix, a posé officiellement sa candidature, en invoquant d'abord ses intérêts en Chine, et ensuite sa qualité de membre permanent du conseil. Pour résoudre le problème, lord Robert Cecil et ses collègues ont été d'avis de demander aux délégations chinoise et japonaise de s'entendre directement sur la désignation des deux commissaires supplémentaires. Y parviendront-elles ? Cela paraît bien peu probable. Dans ce cas, le conseil devrait lui-même trancher la question. Cependant, comme la résolution se borne à fixer le nombre des commissaires, sans indiquer leurs nationalités, il ne s'agit plus que d'une question de procédure tombant sous le coup de l'article 5 du pacte et se réglant par suite à la majorité des voix.

La zone neutre de Kingtchéou

En ce qui concerne la question de la zone neutre de Kingtchéou, elle a fait l'objet, hier de 17 à 19 heures, d'un examen approfondi de la part des « Douze » réunis en séance privée.

Dans le courant de l'après-midi, M. Yoshizawa a fait tenir à M. Briand une communication dans laquelle le cabinet de Tokio continue à repousser toute immixtion de tiers, c'est-à-dire des observateurs étrangers, dans les affaires de Mandchourie, mais propose en revanche, comme contre-partie du retrait des troupes chinoises derrière la « Grande Muraille », de prendre, devant le conseil, l'engagement solennel de s'abstenir de toute incursion dans la zone neutre dont il laisserait l'administration et la police aux autorités locales.

Cette proposition ayant paru susceptible de fournir une base d'accord, les « Douze » convoquèrent immédiatement M. Sze, à qui M. Briand — dont tous ses collègues louent la patience et la ténacité — chaudement appuyé d'ailleurs par lord Robert Cecil, s'efforça de montrer les avantages d'un engagement qui ne lierait plus seulement le Japon vis-à-vis de la Chine, mais vis-à-vis de tous les membres de la S. D. N., dont le conseil est l'émanation. Le chef de la délégation chinoise, qui a évité de se prononcer personnellement, a promis de transmettre la suggestion à Nankin et de faire ultérieurement connaître la réponse de son gouvernement.

Albert JULLIEN

Pop 3

Enclosure No. 21 to Despatch No. 2044
of December 4, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE POPULAIRE, December 3, 1931.

LA GUERRE EN MANDCHOURIE

Le Conseil de la S. D. N. ne termine pas encore ses travaux

Tokio s'amuse à découvrir chaque jour un autre «malentendu»

Le Conseil de la S. D. N. avait l'espoir de pouvoir terminer ses travaux vers la fin de cette semaine. Mais hier soir, la poursuite des négociations, conversations, entretiens au cours de la semaine prochaine, a paru à peu près inévitable.

Il y a deux jours, on a pu croire que l'accord sur les compétences et la composition de la commission d'enquête qui sera chargée d'aller en Mandchourie, était imminent. De même que les conditions dans lesquelles allait être établie la zone neutre dite de Tchen-Tchéou, ne paraissaient plus devoir soulever de trop grandes difficultés. Aussi avait-on prévu pour la fin de cette semaine une réunion publique du Conseil pour l'entérinement des décisions prises.

Tokio découvre des « malentendus »

Voilà qu'un nouvel arrêt se produit. Non que la Chine ait eu « l'audace » de persister à demander la fixation d'une date pour l'évacuation des zones occupées, contrairement aux traités et pactes, par les troupes japonaises. Mais à Tokio on découvre tous les jours un autre « malentendu » au sujet de l'interprétation donnée aux textes déjà acceptés. Et à Paris, au sein du Conseil, une petite querelle a éclaté au sujet de la composition de la commission d'enquête, qui comptera cinq membres. Qu'il y ait un Américain, un Anglais, un Français et un Italien, c'est admis par tout le monde, même par le Japon, qui aurait cependant préféré que la commission ne comptât que trois membres. C'est le cinquième siège qui fait l'objet d'une compétition entre la Belgique et la Hollande. C'est la moindre des difficultés qu'il s'agit de vaincre...

Les « malentendus » invoqués par le Japon sont bien plus graves. On avait pu croire que Tokio était prêt d'admettre que le maintien de l'ordre dans la zone neutre fût confié, après le retrait des troupes chinoises, à la police chinoise. Mais le Japon veut se réserver le droit de poursuivre les « bandits », partout où ses généraux le jugent nécessaire, « dans l'intérêt de la sécurité de leurs troupes ».

Ce qui soulève un problème compliqué : Quand commence-t-on à être dans les yeux de l'état-major japonais, un « bandit » ?

Quelle attitude le « bandit » doit-il avoir prise, pour que l'intervention japonaise paraisse justifiée ?

Jusqu'où une poursuite militaire de « bandits » doit-elle pouvoir être continuée ?

Un télégramme de Tokio à l'Agence Reuter annonce que les « milieux autorisés », c'est-à-dire, en l'occurrence, le ministère des Affaires Etrangères japonais, déclarent que « si la résolution de la S. D. N. ne donne pas au Japon le droit d'engager des opérations contre les bandits, le gouvernement de Tokio ne pourra pas l'accepter ». Cela rappelle trop les événements en Corse pour ne pas provoquer, malgré la grande gravité du conflit sino-japonais, quelques sourires...

Un autre télégramme, émanant de l'Agence Havas, fait savoir « qu'on annonce officiellement à Tokio, au sujet de l'établissement d'une zone neutre dans la partie sud-ouest de la Mandchourie, qu'il ne suffit pas que les troupes chinoises soient ramenées au delà de la Grande Muraille, mais qu'il faut en outre que le gouvernement de Tschang Su Liang, établi à Tchin-Tchéou, se retire également ».

De plus le gouvernement japonais proposerait, qu'après le retrait de l'administration de Tschang Su Liang, la zone neutre ainsi créée soit placée « sous la juridiction du gouvernement chinois indépendant, qui a été établi à Moukden ; sous la direction de Yuan Chin Kai ». L'on sait que ce gouvernement « indépendant » est actuellement au service du gouvernement japonais...

Il paraît que les représentants du Japon au Conseil n'ont pas reconnu l'authenticité du télégramme transmis par l'Agence Havas.

Il n'est cependant, si ironique ou si audacieux que puisse paraître la demande qu'il contient, nullement en contradiction avec l'attitude observée jusqu'ici par Tokio. Après avoir obtenu le renoncement du Conseil et de la Chine à la fixation d'une date pour l'évacuation des zones occupées, après avoir obtenu le retrait des troupes chinoises de Tchen-Tchéou, pourquoi le gouvernement japonais, sous la pression de son état-major, ne devrait-il pas essayer d'obtenir le départ de l'administration chinoise ?

Si par hasard, l'opération réussissait, Tokio pourrait découvrir un nouveau malentendu et envoyer, la semaine prochaine, un télégramme conçu à peu près de la façon suivante :

« Il semble, dans certains milieux, qu'un malentendu se soit produit en ce qui concerne l'interprétation donnée à la décision japonaise engageant le Japon à ne pas pénétrer dans la zone neutre, en cas de départ de l'administration chinoise. Naturellement cela voulait dire que l'administration devait être accompagnée, dans son départ, par tous les Chinois habitant la zone de Tchen-Tchéou... » Et ainsi de suite, loin au delà de la Grande Muraille !

La patience du Conseil

S'il ne s'agissait pas d'un conflit pouvant engendrer une guerre, si l'autorité du Conseil de la S. D. N. n'était pas en jeu, on pourrait considérer le tout comme une vaste rigolade asiatique. Hélas, on n'a pas le droit d'en rire !

1 - 1714

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Des communications officielles faites au Conseil par les gouvernements de l'Angleterre et de la France, qui ont transmis à Sir Eric Drummond les télégrammes qu'ils ont reçus de leurs représentants dans la région de Tchen-Tchéou, constatent, en due forme, que certaines nouvelles de source japonaise annonçant des mouvements de troupes chinoises dans cette zone étaient inexactes et « qu'il n'y a ni désordre ni brigandage ».

Mais Tokio paraît chercher des prétextes pour ne pas être obligé d'accepter la résolution préparée par le Conseil et destinée à mettre fin à toutes les hostilités, condition sine qua non des négociations qui doivent être entamées.

Le Conseil, à partir du moment où les puissances qui y sont représentées et les Etats-Unis ne se montrent pas disposés à agir plus énergiquement, se voit acculé à faire preuve d'une patience qui ne peut qu'encourager certaines velléités japonaises. Pourvu que cette patience soit, finalement récompensée...

ECHO 4

Enclosure No. 22 to Despatch No. 2044
of December 4, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'ECHO DE PARIS, December 4, 1931.

LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS

Dans l'attente des réponses de Tokio et de Nankin

Quelques détails sur le Conseil des « Douze » de mercredi soir

Journée d'attente, hier, à la Société des Nations. Depuis deux jours, les gouvernements de Tokio et de Nankin sont saisis du projet de résolution et du projet de déclaration présidentielle qui, dans la pensée du Conseil, doivent mettre fin au conflit mandchourien. Depuis 24 heures, le gouvernement de Nankin connaît les volontés du Japon au sujet de l'établissement de la zone neutre de Tsin-Tchéou, volontés plus ou moins approuvées par les douze membres du conseil dans leur séance de mercredi. Ni M. Yoshizawa, représentant du Japon, ni M. Sze, représentant de la Chine, ne semblent encore être munis d'instruction leur permettant de donner réponse.

Mais, déjà, on prévoit que ces réponses ne seront ni oui ni non, qu'elles consisteront en des contre-projets et que le conseil, déjà réuni depuis dix-huit jours, devra continuer à siéger. Inutile d'ajouter que la plupart des membres du conseil, enfin éclairés sur les affaires de Chine et sur les méthodes suivies par le secrétariat pour les régler, envoient à tous les diables sir Eric Drummond, M. Aristide Briand, lord Cecil et leurs chers collaborateurs.

Mercredi soir, la séance des « Douze » fut particulièrement savoureuse. Lord Cecil of Chellwood, la « grande conscience », représenta au délégué chinois qu'encaadraient, comme à l'ordinaire, ses deux conseillers américains, qu'il convenait de faire droit aux demandes japonaises quant à l'établissement de la zone neutre de Tsin-Tchéou. La zone serait délimitée par le commandement japonais et le commandement chinois, le Japon s'engageant devant le Conseil à ne pas la violer et laissant la police chinoise libre de veiller au maintien de l'ordre. Mais si, d'aventure, la police chinoise se révélait au-dessous de sa tâche, l'armée japonaise prendrait alors telles mesures qui s'imposeraient.

Et si le Japon viole ses obligations, qui le rappellera au respect de ses engagements ? demanda M. Sze. Lord Cecil garda le silence.

Comme M. Sze bataillait une fois de plus pour mêler les « observateurs neutres » à l'administration de la zone, lord Cecil lui fit observer

que le Japon ne voulait pas entendre parler d'eux, mais qu'il leur serait toujours loisible de se rendre dans le camp chinois. M. Sze ne semble pas avoir apprécié cette plaisanterie.

Lorsque lord Cecil demanda à M. Sze s'il recommanderait au gouvernement de Nankin d'accepter le projet de zone neutre, tel qu'il venait d'être défini, ce fut le tour du délégué de la Chine de demeurer muet.

Entre temps, comme nous l'avons dit hier, M. Sze avait prié les puissances possédant des concessions à Tien-Tsin de désigner six officiers sous lesquels seraient placés les douaniers et policiers chinois. Il eut la satisfaction d'entendre qualifier sa proposition d'intéressante. En réalité, elle est absurde, parce que propre tout au plus à faire entrer tout à fait les puissances fournissant les officiers dans l'engrenage sino-japonais.

Ces détails font apparaître combien douteuse est la note attendue de Nankin. En outre, n'oublions pas que M. Sze a bien approuvé le projet de résolution, mais qu'il s'est gardé de donner son aveu au projet de déclaration présidentielle. Quels amendements en perspective !

Quant aux Japonais, ils ont découvert, à leur grand déplaisir, que le Conseil avait inséré dans les deux documents des passages sur lesquels il avait jugé habile de ne pas les consulter. En premier lieu, le dernier alinéa du paragraphe 5 de la résolution qui autorise la commission à adresser un rapport au Conseil et telles recommandations qu'elle jugera adéquates si, au moment de son arrivée (en Mandchourie), les Japonais ne sont pas encore rentrés dans la zone du chemin de fer; en second lieu, le commentaire du président sur le paragraphe 2 de la résolution relatif à la liberté d'action laissée au Japon contre les bandits. Le Conseil se contente de dire qu'il « ne l'exclut pas » dans les termes indiqués hier ici-même.

Le dernier alinéa du paragraphe 5 est particulièrement inacceptable pour Tokio parce qu'il semble préjuger le moment de l'évacuation japonaise.

Il ne serait pas surprenant que des contre-propositions japonaises survinssent également sur la faculté laissée aux deux parties de désigner à la commission les localités à visiter, sur la liberté de mouvement qu'elles sont requises de permettre à la commission, sur le droit octroyé à la commission de faire porter son enquête sur toutes les questions posées, bien que les pourparlers à deux et les arrangements militaires échappent à sa compétence. La phrase est obscure pour le moins.

En attendant mieux, voilà pour la dix-huitième journée.

PERTINAX.

Milton O. Gustafson


12-18-75

Enclosure No. 23 to Despatch No. 2044
of December 4, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'HUMANITE, December 4, 1931.

RENFORÇONS LA LUTTE POUR LA DÉFENSE DE L'U. R. S. S.!

Antagonismes impérialistes en Chine et marchandages à Paris



Des officiers japonais étudient la carte

Dans *L'Humanité* d'hier, nous disions que les marchandages traquent en longueur au conseil de la S.D.N. Dans la journée, on pouvait constater que les négociations entre les impérialistes marquaient un temps d'arrêt qui témoigne du heurt violent des intérêts dans le Pacifique.

Le conseil — moins les délégués de la Chine et du Japon — avait approuvé provisoirement un texte de résolution et une déclaration du président qui devaient réaliser le compromis sur les questions de la lutte commune contre l'U.R.S.S. et sur les bases du dépeçement de la Chine.

Pour sanctionner la conquête de la Mandchourie par le Japon, la déclaration de Briand doit servir de complément verbal à la résolution écrite qui, afin de cacher la réalité, serait moins précise.

Mais hier la combinaison reçut un coup sur la question de l'attitude du Japon dans la « zone neutre » de la région de King-Tchéou.

Les exigences du Japon

L'impérialisme japonais s'oppose violemment à certains passages de la résolution et de la déclaration présidentielle. Voici de quoi il s'agit :

a) Le Japon entend rester libre de choisir le moment de l'évacuation des troupes. C'est-à-dire qu'il veut consolider son emprise par le truchement des « gouvernements autonomes » et avoir en mains tous les rouages de la vie économique et politique en Mandchourie avant de rappeler certaines unités pour l'occupation ne peut être suspendue : les buts de guerre antisoviétique exigent la concentration de grandes forces armées et l'édification de bases militaires en Mandchourie).

Sur ce point le conseil a donné à Tokio satisfaction, mais ce dernier entend que cela soit consigné sans détours dans la résolution.

b) Le Japon veut rester libre de prendre « toutes mesures de protection contre les « bandits », (nous avons expliqué de quoi il s'agit en réalité), surtout dans la région de King-Tchéou qui échappe encore à son hégémonie. Le projet de résolution fait droit à cette exigence, mais une phrase ajoute que, pour procéder à ces opérations, le Japon devra demander l'assistance des « observateurs » des puissances. Tokio repousse du pied cette disposition. M. Yoshizawa a fait tenir à Briand une note dans laquelle le gouvernement japonais persiste à repousser toute immixtion de tiers dans ses affaires propres.

c) Enfin le Japon entend exercer un contrôle virtuel de la province de King-Tchéou qui lui donnerait en fait le contrôle sur le port de Moulou-Tao. Pour ce faire, nous l'avons signalé hier, Tokio propose que l'administration de cette région soit remise aux autorités chinoises de Moukden qui lui sont soumises, et exige le départ tant des troupes chinoises que des pouvoirs nankinois.

Ces exigences de l'impérialisme japonais ont singulièrement indisposé certains membres du conseil, et surtout le général Dawes, l'« observateur » des Etats-Unis. Hier jeudi, aucune réunion ne s'est tenue à Paris. Mais les intrigues font leur chemin.

Les contradictions entre impérialismes

Car ces discussions sur la « zone neutre » cachent en réalité la question véritable qui est la rivalité accrue des impérialismes en Chine. Le Japon veut conquérir le nord de la Chine. Le document Houjo que nous avons publié hier ne laisse plus aucun doute à ce sujet. Les impérialistes des Etats-Unis voient dans ce dessein une grave menace pour leurs propres intérêts, une entrave de taille à leurs visées. L'incident Stimson, lors de l'avance des troupes japonaises sur King-Tchéou, est significatif à cet égard.

Aujourd'hui, la question est d'empêcher le Japon, à qui l'on a permis le coup de force du 18 septembre et l'occupation du centre, du nord et l'ouest de la Mandchourie, d'étendre ses griffes sur les territoires convoités par les autres impérialistes.

Les antagonismes interimpérialistes ne font donc que s'accroître pour le partage de la Chine. Toutes les négociations de Genève et de Paris ont eu pour but d'émousser momentanément ces antagonismes pour la réalisation du front uni contre l'Union Soviétique et pour l'action commune contre la révolution chinoise.

Mais la crise s'approfondit chez tous les rivaux. La balance du commerce extérieur du Japon par exemple est en déficit accru chaque mois ; les débouchés font défaut pour écouler la production considérable de l'industrie grandement concentrée et rationalisée ; les grèves se multiplient dans le pays où le mouvement révolutionnaire se développe rapidement. Les autres puissances sont dans la même situation critique et sont prêtes à se battre pour un nouveau partage du monde. Et c'est en Chine que les rivalités se manifestent le plus violemment. Les propos aigres-doux qui s'échangent à Paris n'en sont que le reflet.

Il faut renforcer la lutte

Mais cette exacerbation des antagonismes, que nous avons prévue dès le début de l'invasion de la Mandchourie, ne doit pas nous faire oublier que le but final de ce qui se trame en Extrême-Orient c'est l'agression contre l'Etat ouvrier.

Pendant que les brigands se chamaillent à Paris, les manœuvres japonaises, réglées d'après un plan bien établi par Paris et Tokio, se poursuivent au nord de la Mandchourie. A Tsitsikar, le nouvel agent du Japon, Chang Ching ilui, s'installe à la présidence de la province du Heilung-Kiang. Et à Kharbine, toujours menacée de l'occupation nipponne, les Japonais déploient une grande activité, pendant que les gardes blancs préparent de nouvelles provocations.

Et nous avons dénoncé, à la lumière des événements provoqués de Tien-Tsin, le crime qui se prépare contre les Soviétiques chinois.

C'est en face de cette situation que le Populaire s'attache à défendre la S.D.N., que Grumbach fait les gros yeux au méchant Japon qui, par ses exigences, empêche le conseil de vite aboutir au vote de sa résolution « destinée à mettre fin à toutes les hostilités ». hostilités entre adversaires de l'Union Soviétique s'entend. Car il n'y a que la position de paix de l'U.R.S.S., son renforcement économique, qui inquiètent le parti de M. Blum. Car pour le parti socialiste, le danger de guerre n'est pas le fait des puissances impérialistes, mais de l'Union Soviétique.

Il y a donc lieu de ne pas affaiblir d'un instant notre travail d'agitation et de propagande pour alerter les ouvriers, mais au contraire renforcer la lutte contre l'impérialisme français et ses agents socialistes pour la défense de l'U.R.S.S. pour le soutien des Soviétiques chinois.

M. MAGNIEN.

**Enclosure No. 24 to Despatch No. 2044
of December 4, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.**

Extract from LE JOURNAL, December 4, 1931.

**La réponse japonaise va nécessiter une révision
de la résolution du Conseil de la S.D.N.**

Journée de stagnation apparente qui ne paraît pas précisément nous acheminer vers une solution rapide de l'affaire sino-japonaise.

La stagnation apparente ressort du fait qu'il n'y a eu ni réunion du comité de rédaction, ni réunion du conseil des douze. Toute l'activité s'est concentrée dans les entretiens particuliers dont le moins intéressant assurément n'a pas été celui de lord Robert Cecil et de l'ambassadeur du Japon à Londres, M. Matsudaira.

Officiellement on attend les réponses que Tokio et Nankin doivent donner au projet de résolution et de déclaration qui leur a été soumis le 1^{er} décembre. On attend également la réponse de la Chine, qui a été invitée, on se le rappelle, à se prononcer définitivement sur les conditions de la création de la zone neutre de Tchén-Tcheou. Evidemment, on aurait pu en attendant s'occuper de la composition de la commission d'études qui reste accrochée. Peut-être a-t-on pensé qu'il y a bien des choses encore qui restent en suspens et qu'il est prudent d'attendre des précisions avant de remettre la toile de Pénélope sur le métier.

Les précisions vont venir au moins du côté japonais. La délégation nipponne a reçu dans la soirée d'hier des instructions de Tokio, qui vont permettre à M. Yoshizawa de reprendre la conversation avec M. Briand.

En ce qui concerne le projet de résolution, le gouvernement de Tokio s'en tient rigoureusement aux termes de la résolution du 30 septembre, la seule qui ait une valeur légale. Il désire donc maintenir strictement les termes du projet de résolution qu'il avait communiqué lui-même au conseil dans la soirée du 27 novembre. Il n'admet donc pas les modifications qui ont été apportées à ce texte et qui lui ont été communiquées le 1^{er} décembre.

Il repousse notamment une phrase ajoutée au paragraphe V, laissant entendre que la commission d'études devrait dès son arrivée envoyer un rapport sur les conditions dans lesquelles les deux parties ont réalisé les engagements du 30 septembre. Les Japonais voient dans cette formule d'abord une modification de la condition fondamentale qu'ils ont posée dès le début que la commission d'études ne devrait pas intervenir dans les affaires militaires. Ils

y voient plus encore une tentative indirecte d'indiquer une date pour le retrait des troupes.

Le gouvernement japonais paraît accepter que la formule relative à ses droits de police contre les brigands soit insérée dans la déclaration que lira le président du conseil. Mais il demande des précisions dans la rédaction de cette déclaration.

M. Yoshizawa s'entretiendra également aujourd'hui de la question de la zone neutre avec M. Briand et lui communiquera les dernières informations japonaises au sujet de la situation de cette zone. Ces informations jettent un jour curieux sur le fait que le retrait des troupes japonaises ayant été accompli depuis plusieurs jours, les Chinois tergiversent, au lieu d'entrer franchement dans la voie qui leur a été ouverte.

Cette attitude est d'autant plus caractéristique que le Japon consent à laisser aux autorités locales chinoises de la zone l'administration et la police à la seule condition de la retraite de Tchang Hsu Liang et de ses troupes derrière Chan-Haï-Kuan et la Grande-Muraille.

Or, il apparaît que le jeune Tchang Hsu Liang, qui n'a que 27 ans, qui a des raisons particulières de connaître les Japonais, puisqu'il est le fils de Tchang Tsao Lin, et qu'il a été, depuis la mort de celui-ci, le maître de la Mandchourie, se soucie fort peu d'entrer en collision avec les troupes nipponnes et retirerait volontiers ses soldats. Mais il se trouve pris entre le gouvernement de Nankin, livré à l'inspiration des nationalistes extrémistes, et une alliance de Feng Hu Siang, le fameux général chrétien, et de Ven Chi San, l'ancien toukiou modèle du Chan Si, qui ne veulent pas laisser passer une aussi belle occasion de pêcher en eau trouble et de remettre la main sur Pékin.

Le conseil de la Société des nations est-il disposé à se laisser entraîner dans ces intrigues ? — S.-B.

Deuxième

Enclosure No. 25 to Despatch No. 2044
of December 4, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from L'OEUVRE, December 4, 1931.

Puisque hier fut une journée de loisirs, de vacances — aucun comité ne s'est réuni, aucun des douze ne s'est montré — on a pu se mettre en ordre l'esprit.

Il n'est venu, non plus, aucune nouvelle officielle éclatante.

On a eu le temps, entre autres choses, d'étudier d'un peu près la carie. On aura beaucoup à la regarder, les jours qui viennent. C'est une bonne précaution.

La tâche des enquêteurs et des experts chargés de relever le tracé vraisemblable et acceptable d'une zone neutre dans ces parages ne sera pas commode.

Il s'agit, en effet, d'un véritable delta de voies ferrées où non seulement les raccords sont compliqués, mais où, à côté des lignes de trafic visibles, contrôlables et qui ne peuvent se délimiter, se trouvent des bandes riveraines où les influences adverses sont moins saisissables et se heurtent et se chevauchent, sans qu'on puisse continuer de les bien suivre et séparer. C'est évidemment dans ces couloirs, formant échecaveau, que les fameux bandits opèrent et qu'autour d'eux se créent de si troublantes méprises.

Dans les temps plus calmes, où la Russie et le Japon se partageaient, sur les chemins de fer mandchous, une garde linéaire comportant quinze soldats par kilomètre, ce mince front de bandière suffisait à constituer une zone neutre respectée. Les chemins de fer formaient une sorte de couloir et la paix régnait autour. La comparaison ne vaut plus aujourd'hui. Depuis, il y a eu de nouveaux embranchements de chemins de fer. Il y a eu un chemin de fer chinois et il y a plusieurs Chinois. Cela crée un terrible enchevêtrement d'incursions, d'intrusions rôdantes. Cela justifie qu'on les puisse taxer parfois d'agressions et y riposter.

Devant ce delta qui a pour nœud Moukden, peut-on s'empêcher de songer aussi au grand dégagement de complications de ce genre qu'avait su y imposer le maréchal mandchou dont le fils est devenu à présent chef des forces militaires de Pékin. Les manières rigides japonaises s'accordaient volontiers aux siennes, encore qu'il les contraignît.

Son assassinat rendit à tout le monde les coudées franches. Mais, de ce jour, le delta s'enfuma de menées subtiles et l'on n'y peut plus distinguer de zones franches.

Le Conseil de la Société des Nations doit parvenir à en rétablir. Voilà sa laborieuse mission.

Enclosure No. 26 to Despatch No. 2044
of December 4, 1931.
From the Embassy at Paris.

Extract from LE PETIT PARISIEN, December 4, 1931.

LE CONFLIT SINO-JAPONAIS

LE CONSEIL DE LA S. D. N. A MARQUÉ HIER UN TEMPS D'ARRÊT

Il attend les réponses des gouvernements de Tokio et de Nankin aux diverses communications qui leur ont été faites

Le conseil de la S. D. N. a marqué hier un temps d'arrêt. Il attend, en effet, pour poursuivre sa tâche, les réponses des gouvernements chinois et japonais aux diverses communications que leur ont adressées ces jours derniers leurs représentants et notamment aux projets de résolution et de déclaration présidentielle qui leur ont été soumis.

A cet égard, les nouvelles officielles reçues de Tokio ne permettent guère de croire qu'on pourra en finir à la fin de la semaine. D'après ces dépêches, le cabinet japonais a bien décidé, en conseil, d'accepter le projet de résolution, mais il fait, en ce qui concerne le paragraphe 5, une réserve qui va nécessiter de nouveaux échanges de vues. Il ne souscrit pas, en effet, à la phrase d'après laquelle « la commission d'étude, une fois arrivée sur place, devra adresser au conseil des recommandations si elle constate que les deux parties — où l'une d'entre elles — n'ont pas exécuté, avant son arrivée, les engagements pris aux termes de la résolution ».

Cette phrase, qui ne figurait pas dans le texte précédemment communiqué, fait, à son avis, double emploi avec une autre phrase — appartenant à la déclaration présidentielle, celle-là, et qu'il accepte sans objection — d'après laquelle « la commission pourra adresser au conseil, si elle l'estime nécessaire, des rapports provisoires sans attendre d'avoir terminé son rapport définitif ».

Le cabinet de Tokio — et c'est là certainement l'explication de sa résistance — a attaché une importance excessive aux mots « avant son arrivée », où il a vu une tentative indirecte pour fixer la date de retrait des forces japonaises dans la zone du chemin de fer. D'autre part, le gouvernement japonais accepterait également que l'amendement demandé par lui concernant le droit de répression des bandits ne figurât pas dans la résolution, mais simplement dans la déclaration explicative du président, à laquelle il ne paraît faire aucune objection sérieuse.

Les instructions reçues en fin de journée par la délégation japonaise sont, nous assure-t-on, précédées d'un long préambule touchant la collaboration du Japon avec la S. D. N. en ce qui concerne l'Extrême-Orient. Elles seront vraisemblablement communiquées, dès ce matin, par M. Yoshizawa à M. Briand, et, dès cet après-midi, elles seront portées à la connaissance du conseil. Celui-ci reprendra sans doute aussitôt l'examen de la question la plus délicate qu'il ait à résoudre : celle de la zone neutre de Kingtchéou, au sujet de laquelle, les négociations de Nankin ayant échoué, de nouveaux pourparlers directs seraient, paraît-il, engagés à Pékin, entre le général Tchang Hsue Liang et le chargé d'affaires japonais, M. Yano. De sérieuses résistances chinoises étant à craindre sur ce point, la patience et la bonne volonté du conseil vont, une fois de plus, être mises à rude épreuve.

Albert JULLIEN

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Dec. 11

CR:
Miss Moore:

*I have personally
compared the text in
the quoted portions of
the telegram with
the text as given in
the Congressional
Record.*

M. M. H.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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PREPARING OFFICE
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Department of State



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1-138 TO BE TRANSMITTED
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VIA NAVAL RADIO

Washington,
December 11, 1931.

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AMLEGATION

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The President's message to Congress on December 8

contained the following statement:

QUOTE The difficulties between China and Japan have given us great concern, not alone for the maintenance of the spirit of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, but for the maintenance of the treaties to which we are a party assuring the territorial integrity of China. It is our purpose to assist in finding solutions sustaining the full spirit of those treaties.

I shall deal at greater length with our foreign relations in a later message. UNQUOTE.

On December 10 the President sent a message to Congress on foreign affairs ^{in which is} including a statement with regard to the Manchuria situation as follows:

QUOTE We have been deeply concerned over the situation in Manchuria. As parties to the Kellogg-Briand pact and to the nine power treaty, we have a responsibility in maintaining the integrity of China and a direct interest with other nations in maintaining peace

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-138

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793.94/10

172
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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peace here.

When this controversy originated in September the League of Nations was in session and China appealed to the council of that body, which at once undertook measures of conciliation between China and Japan. Both China and Japan have participated in these proceedings before the council ever since. Under the Kellogg-Briand pact all of the signatories, including China and Japan, have covenanted to seek none but pacific means in the settlement of their disputes. Thus the ultimate purpose of proceedings under this section of the Kellogg-Briand pact and of conciliation proceedings by the league covenant coincide. It seemed, therefore, both wise and appropriate rather to aid and advise with the league and thus have unity of world effort to maintain peace than to take independent action. In all negotiations, however, the Department of State has maintained complete freedom of judgment and action as to participation in any measures which the league might finally determine upon.

Enciphered by

Immediately

Sent by operator M.,, 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1958 1-138

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

- 3 -

Immediately after the outbreak of the trouble this Government advised both Japan and China of its serious interest. Subsequently it communicated its views to both governments regarding their obligations under the Kellogg-Briand pact. In this action we were joined by other nations signatory of the pact. This Government has consistently and repeatedly by diplomatic representations indicated its unrelenting solicitude that these treaty obligations be respected. In the recurring efforts of the nations to bring about a peaceful settlement this Government has realized that the exercise of the utmost patience was desirable, and it is believed that public opinion in this country has appreciated the wisdom of this restraint.

At present a resolution is pending before the meeting at Paris, with hopes of passage, under which Japan and China will agree to take no initiative which might lead to renewed conflict; in which Japan has reiterated its intention to withdraw the Japanese troops to the railway zone as soon as lives and property of Japanese nationals in Manchuria can be adequately

Enciphered by

protected

Sent by operator M., 19.....

1- 1725

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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CONFIDENTIAL CODE
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PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

- 4 -

protected; and under which both nations agree to a
neutral commission to meet on the ground, to which
commission all matters in dispute can be referred
for investigation and report. UNQUOTE.

Repeat to Nanking ^{to 133} and to Tokyo. ^{to 261}

Stinson

Secret

DECLASSIFIED

DEC 11 1981

FE:MMH/VDM

FE

MMH
Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1970 1-138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


1 128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR
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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,



DEC 11 31

December 11, 1931.

AmEmbassy,

Paris.

For the Ambassador.

With the acceptance by the Japanese and Chinese Governments of the League's Resolution, the President and I wish that you would take the earliest appropriate opportunity to make a personal call on Monsieur Briand and convey to him our gratification on the successful termination of the difficult negotiations concerning the Manchurian question.

Please tell Monsieur Briand that the President and I recognize that much of the success of this accomplishment is due to his personal long and patient guidance and skillful negotiation.

Stimson

U VC/AB

Dec. 11 1931.

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-158

793.94/3173B

793.94/a

1 0727

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
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TELEGRAM SENT

1-138

TO BE TRANSMITTED
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NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

December 8, 1931.

793 94 AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (Japan).

262 CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE AMBASSADOR

Your 256, December 9, 9 p.m.

With regard to the question of alleged promises of the Chinese to withdraw from Chinchow, I wish that you be informed as follows:

One. On November 24, the American Minister at Nanking telegraphed Department as follows:

QUOTE In view of alarming reports current as to imminent Japanese action at Chinchow Dr. Wellington Koo, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, has this evening told me and my British and French colleagues that his Government wished to sound our Governments out and if feasible make a formal proposition along following lines:

SUBQUOTE In order to avoid any clash China is prepared as a temporary measure pending a general settlement of the Manchuria question, if Japan insists on withdrawal of troops in the Chinchow area to do so up to Shanhaikwan, provided Japan gives guarantees satisfactory to Great Britain, the United States and France, not to go into that zone leav-

Enciphered by ing the Chinese civil administration intact including police

Sent by operator M
END SUBQUOTE.

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

793.94/3173C

1 1728
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
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Department of State

1-138
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NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

- 2 -

Washington,

QUOTE In view of critical situation we undertook to commend this to our respective Governments and to ask for a speedy reply UNQUOTE.

Two. Under date December 8, the American Minister at Nanking telegraphed as follows:

QUOTE situation at Chinchow. Tentative suggestion of Koo regarding Chinchow communicated to the Department in my telegram of November 24, midnight, appears to have been communicated to Japanese Government by French Ambassador and to have been received by Japanese Government as a firm offer by Chinese. Japanese have chosen to take this stand in spite of fact that Koo merely intended to sound out British, French and American Governments, and made offer contingent upon guarantees by Japan given to those Governments. Japanese stoutly now insist that as they have withdrawn their troops east of Liao, Chinese will be guilty of breach of faith if they fail to evacuate Chinchow. Chinese maintain that they never made such offer and are therefore under no obligation to evacuate Chinchow, last stand of Nationalist Government in Manchurian area. I understand Japanese contend that their withdrawal was due to Chinese offer and I have been told that through Shigemitsu Japanese

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

1 0726
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Washington,

- 3 -

Government has informed Chinese Government that unless Chinese withdraw their troops situation will become difficult UNQUOTE.

Three. On December 8 I telegraphed the above to Dawes and gave instructions as follows:

QUOTE I desire that you see Briand and call to his attention the discrepancy between the project which Wellington Koo put forward tentatively for consideration and the contention which the Japanese apparently now make that the Chinese made a promise to withdraw their troops from Chinchow, that in consequence thereof the Japanese withdrew their troops east of the Liao river, and that the Chinese will be guilty of breach of faith if they now fail to evacuate Chinchow. I feel that Briand should ascertain in what form and terms Koo's tentative project was communicated to the Japanese and, if, as I assume, warrant is lacking for the Japanese present contention that they were given to understand that the Chinese had made an outright offer, Briand should strongly combat that contention UNQUOTE.]

Four. On December 9, Dawes telegraphs me at length quoting a statement which has been made to him in Paris, on good authority which I do not feel it advisable to dis-

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 80.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1955 1-138

1 0730

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
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TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

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CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Washington,

- 4 -

close, with regard to the whole transaction. From this it appears that Dr. Koo submitted, as stated in paragraph one above, to the American, the British and the French Ministers at Nanking, tentatively, a project, which contained the suggestion that China's troops might be withdrawn from the Chinchow area provided Japan gave guarantees satisfactory to Great Britain, the United States and France; that this tentative project was communicated by go-betweens to Baron Shidehara; that Baron Shidehara gained the impression that it was a definite offer on Koo's part; that Shidehara replied to the go-betweens with acceptance in principle but stated that Japan could not give guarantees to the three powers but would be willing to give a guarantee to the Council of the League; and that thereafter the matter has been discussed in various quarters but without there having been achieved either an acceptance by the Japanese of Koo's original proposal or by the Chinese of Shidehara's counter-proposal.

It would seem, however, that the charge that the Chinese, by virtue of not having withdrawn their troops south of Chinchow, have acted in bad faith is not warranted.

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____, _____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1959 1-138

1 0731
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
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TELEGRAM SENT

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Department of State

- 5 -

Washington,

At the same time, it is evident that there has been a serious misunderstanding and that the Japanese people have gained the impression that China offered to withdraw her troops and now refuses to do so; while the Chinese people have gained the impression that Japan is misrepresenting Koo's tentative effort and is making China's failure to act on an alleged promise a pretext for contemplated further military activity against Chinchow.

My information from Paris is to the effect that the misunderstanding with regard to Dr. Koo's tentative project has been fully explained to the Japanese by one or more of the parties who undertook to act as go-betweens. My latest information is that the Council has decided that it will not further press negotiations in relation to the neutral zone project.

Regardless of fact or fiction as ~~regards~~^{to} the antecedents, such is the situation now and all reports indicate that (a) the Chinese troops at Chinchow are standing quiet on the defensive, (b) the Chinese Government either cannot or will not order and effect their withdrawal, and (c) the Japanese army is threatening to attack Chinchow.

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____, _____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1955 1-138

1 0732

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
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Department of State

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TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Washington,

- 6 -

This being the situation, I feel it imperative that I reaffirm the view which I have repeatedly expressed that it would be most unfortunate for all concerned, and especially for Japan, if the Japanese army attack Chinchow.

With regard to Dr. Koo's project, suggested by him tentatively two weeks ago, it is clear that there has been misunderstanding, but I find no evidence of ~~bad~~ faith in any quarter. The question whether the Chinese troops should or should not voluntarily withdraw from Chinchow involves considerations of practicability and expediency rather than of obligation. It is easy to understand that it would be difficult and may be politically impossible for the Chinese authorities to withdraw these troops without there first having been concluded some definite and satisfactory agreement. After all, they are on their own soil and we have no evidence that they contemplate or would be able to take aggressive action against Japan. Under these circumstances, an attack by the Japanese army on Chinchow ^{would} ~~will~~ be regarded by the world as unwarranted.

I feel that it should be possible, now that the resolution of the Council has been adopted, for the
Enciphered by _____ Japanese
Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

173

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
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Department of State

Washington,

- 7 -

repeat some
 Japanese and the Chinese to negotiate some agreement
 which will ensure against hostilities at or in relation
 to Chinchow. ~~I still feel that there is virtue in the~~ *Skat*
~~idea of a QUOTE neutral zone UNQUOTE; and I think that~~
~~the disputants should solicitously direct their efforts~~
~~toward the consummation of an agreement on these lines.~~

Please talk this matter over with Baron Shidehara.
 Explain to him my views as indicated. State to him
 that I have no doubt whatever with regard to his absolute
 sincerity in the whole matter, that I am aware of and I
 regret the use which is being made of the incident by his
 political detractors and opponents; that I am confident
 that he is doing his utmost to prevent ill-advised action
 by the Japanese army; that I hope that he will be
 successful; and that I am willing, subject to his judgment
 as to expediency, that he say to his colleagues that
 the American Government urges upon Japan the utmost
 self-restraint with regard to any further military
 operations, as either the fact or the appearance of
 (self-restraint would /
 lack of such) will have a decidedly bad effect on world *Skat*
 opinion.

Stinson

Enciphered by FE:SKH/ZMF:VDM

FE

Sent by operator M., 19

1 173

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94

894.002

894.00

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

FROM

GRAY

Tokio

Dated December 12, 1931

Rec'd 11:40 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

DEC 12 1931

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DEC 12 1931

Department of State

259, December 12, 8 p.m. / 3178c

Your telegram No. 262, December 11, 9 p.m.

In view of the resignation of the Cabinet, I shall await appointment of new foreign minister before taking any action unless otherwise instructed. I have just been informed that Inukai, President of the Seiyukai, has been summoned to the Imperial Palace at 8 o'clock tonight. Unquestionably he will be asked to form a new Cabinet. As yet there are no reliable indications of its composition.

FORBES

RR-CSB

A/LS

793.94/3179

FILED

DEC 17 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
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1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
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PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

December 12, 1931.

AMEMBASSY,

TOKYO (Japan).

²⁶⁴
CONFIDENTIAL.

Your 259, December 12, 8 p.m.

I feel that you should talk this matter over with
Baron Shidehara at once unless you feel it ^{not repeat not} advisable
to take it up with other than his successor.

Stimson

793.94/3179
Skp

FE:SKH/ZMF

FE

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19 _____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAN

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

FROM

TOKYO

Dated December 13, 1931

Rec'd 9:40 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

262, December 13, 5 p.m.

Your telegram No. 262, December 11, 9 p.m., 264

December 12, 3 p.m. and my telegram No. 260, December 13, 2 p.m.

I called upon Nagai at 3 o'clock this afternoon and gave him full substance of your message. He listened attentively with few comments and was evidently impressed by your conclusion that no lack of faith was chargeable to either side in regard to Chinchow proposition. He said his government had been frankly surprised at Wellington Koo's proposition and, having accepted it in principle, had done their share by withdrawing troops in the expectation Koo would follow it up. He felt the Japanese had been curtly and perhaps discourteously treated in getting no answer at all to their suggestion for conferences looking to arranging details of the proposal. I made your point very clear concerning unfortunate effect on world opinion of further hostilities and I asked if I should repeat my presentation of it but he said it was perfectly understood and



F/DEW

793.94/3180

FILED

mam

2- #262, from Tokyo, December 13,
1931

and that when Inukai came to take over the portfolio of Foreign Minister later that afternoon he would not fail to give him the American Government's message. He said nothing that could be construed as indicating early resumption of hostilities but gave in detail sundry abuses which are still constantly being perpetrated by bandits requiring joint military and police punitive and protective activities.

I took occasion to ask further about National City Bank affairs about which we have received as yet no satisfactory reply. He said that he had asked his Consul General returning to Mukden to take it up actively. I also mentioned without revealing the source of my information a number of arbitrary interferences ordered by the military with civil concerns in Manchuria to the disadvantage of Chinese and foreign interests and to the direct financial advantage of Japanese enterprises, pointing out that this did not look very much like the open door. He was much impressed with this and asked me to supply him a list of the cases of which I had cognizance.

Baron Shidehara received me afterwards and I delivered to him the personal part of your message which I think gratified him. He expressed cordial appreciation of your attitude and of mine. He has just received a very high imperial decoration.

CSB

FORBES

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PLAIN

FROM

PLAIN

PLAINING VIA NR

Date: December 13, 1931

Rec'd 10:25 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington


1077, December 13, 4 p.m.

Following from Reuter, Tokyo, December 12.

"It is learned on good authority that one of the first questions which the new cabinet must consider is the despatch of a division and half more troops to Manchuria for the purpose of persuading Marshal Chang Hsueh Liang to withdraw the Chinchow garrison within the Great Wall.

It is becoming abundantly clear that the Japanese are determined to remove the last traces of Chang Hsueh Liang's influence from Manchuria, preferably peacefully, but otherwise by force as rightly or wrongly the military authorities are convinced that the restoration of peaceful conditions enabling the Japanese troops to withdraw is impossible as long as Marshal Chang retains a base of operations at Chinchow from which to direct military and political activities against the Japanese in Manchuria.

It is reported from Mukden that the Japanese military authorities have prepared an ultimatum for delivery to



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793.94/3181

DEC 19 1931

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

mam

2- #1077, from Peiping,
December 13, 1931

to Marshal Chang Hsueh Liang through the Peiping Legation
threatening drastic action if he fails to withdraw his
troops within the Great Wall and cease his activities with-
in a stipulated time".

For the Minister


PERKINS

CSB

174

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED



MAN

FROM

GRAY

PEIPING VIA NR

Dated December 13, 1931

Rec'd 8 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

1076, December 13, 11 a.m.

Following from Mukden

"December 12, 1 p.m. Headquarters reports increasing bandit activity near Hsinmin and Yingkow. Yesterday Chinese farmers petitioned Japanese headquarters to eradicate bandits from the region east and west of Liao. Headquarters reports further concentration of troops, air craft and artillery at Chinchow and removal of Third Cavalry Brigade Chinese to Tungliao.

Under the name of Yuan Chin Kai (*) have been sent to Chang Ching Hui at Harbin and Hsi Cha at Kirin to come to Mukden on the 20th to confer on the establishment of central government for Manchuria.

Repeated to Pankung.

For the Minister

(*) apparent omission
CSB

PERKINS

F/DEW

793.94/3182

FILED

DEC 19 1931

793.94
note
893.108
893.01

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
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NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Collect
Charge Department
OR

Department of State

Charge to
\$

Washington,

December 14, 1931.
41

AMLEGATION,

PEIPING (China).

793.94/3182 461
Your 1076, December 13, 11 a.m.

Please repeat first paragraph to Military Attaché
at Chinchow, request his comments and latest informa-
tion, and report same to Department.

Stinson

Sizes

793.94/3182

CR
Dec 14 1931

FE:SKH/ZMF

FE

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19_____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

HSM

FROM

GRAY

Nanking, via N. R.

Dated December 12, 1931

Rec'd 4:37 p. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington,

120, December 12, 11 a. m.


Your 132, December 11, noon.

Following from the American Minister:

There is available to me the Reuter service to
which the Department authorized the Consulate General
to subscribe. My present needs are met by the
^{full summaries}
~~despatches suitably~~ carried by Reuter. Johnson.

PECK

CSB



F/DEW

793.94/3133

FILED

DEC 19 1931

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1 4

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAIL

FROM

GREEN

FILED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Dated December 12, 1931

DEC 16 1931

Rec'd 9:25 a.m., 13th

DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Secretary of State
Washington

889, December 12, 4 p.m.

PERSONAL FOR THE SECRETARY

Your 648/^{3178.2} December 11, 4 p.m. Cannot see M. Briand
until Wednesday when I shall transmit the contents of the
telegram under reference.

EDGE

CSB



F/DEW
793.94/3184

DEC 17 1931

SLIP

174

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

NAM

FROM

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone.

TOKYO

Dated December 13, 1931

Rec'd 1:55 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington


260, December 13, 2 p.m. 3179

Your telegram No. 264, December 12, 3 p.m.

Baron Shidehara said it would be awkward for him
to see me officially as the new premier is to be acting
foreign minister, and he being unfamiliar with details,
it is arranged that I see Nagai, Vice Minister, this
afternoon.

CSB

FORBES



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793.94/3185

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DEC 18 1931

1745


DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gutzfelm NARS, Date 12-18-75



CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY



December 10, 1931.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON
AND THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR, MR. KATSUJI DEBUCHI.

Manchuria.

793.94

I sent for the Japanese Ambassador, and when he came I reminded him of his conference with me on November 28th when he had brought me the Wellington Koo proposal and the Japanese acceptance. I told him that I had been looking into the misunderstandings that had arisen about that matter. Then I explained to him at length my investigations yesterday and the reports which I had received which had led me to believe (1) that Mr. Koo had not intended to make a firm proposal but merely to sound out Japan, (2) that his proposal, such as it was, had not been accepted literally or in terms by Baron Shidehara, although I believed that Shidehara had intended to give sufficient assurance to justify careful consideration of his acceptance by China, and (3) that there had been possibly a misunderstanding by the Council of Mr. Yoshizawa's definition of the neutral zone, on December 7th, extending to the Hsiaoling-Ho River, and that they very possibly did not realize that Japan made that

F/DEW

793.94/3186

FILED

JAN 21 1932

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 2 -

that limitation based upon the Wellington Koo offer, but thought instead that Japan was herself inching up on the original situation. I told him that I had desired to make sure that no misunderstanding, which could be avoided, would arise which would lead to a renewal of hostilities, and that I had telephoned to General Dawes last night on the subject and had heard from him this morning; that he had taken it up with Mr. Sze, Mr. Matsudaira, Mr. Briand and probably others and there seemed some reason to believe that there had been a misunderstanding and that possibly a fresh start could be made, but that I was not at all sure as the Council was very anxious to adjourn tonight. I made it clear, however, to Mr. Debuchi that although I was taking these steps to see whether there was any possible way of avoiding hostilities, it had not at all changed my viewpoint that in case General Honjo's army should now move forward again against the Chinese forces around Chinchow it would be an entirely unjustified act of aggression. I explained to him that I now had very full and accurate reports, not only from our own Military Attachés, Colonel McIlroy and Colonel Margetts, who

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

- 3 -

who were now at Chinchow, but I also had the benefit of the reports of the other foreign observers, and these reports all agreed that there was no aggressive movement under preparation near Chinchow by the Chinese. To illustrate the accuracy of my reports, I pointed out that the Japanese headquarters at Mukden had reported the Chinese 20th Brigade as being at Faku (northeast of Mukden), and I now had reports from our military observers that they had personally inspected the 20th Brigade and that it was in its usual quarters at Chinchow, they having verified the presence of all units. I asked the Ambassador to report all this to Baron Shidehara and he said he would.

HLS.

S HLS:HHR

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

FROM

GREEN

Geneva

Dated December 14, 1931

Rec'd 6:10 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

313

December 14, 11 a.m. 793.94/31742



Department's unnumbered telegram December 11, 2 p.m.

I understand that Sweetser sailed for the United States immediately at the conclusion of the Council meeting at Paris and that he undoubtedly will visit Washington.

GILBERT

HPD

Personal appreciation of the Secretary.



F/DEW

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DEC 17 1931

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
No. _____

AMERICAN CONSULATE,

Dairen, Manchuria, November 14, 1931.

DER403

SUBJECT: Transmission of Illustrated Printed Matter.



THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
PUBLICATIONS SECTION
DEC 15 1931

SIR:

793.94

I have the honor to transmit, as of possible interest to the Department and for such disposition as it may see fit, one copy of a Japanese album of Manchurian war pictures published in Dairen.

Respectfully yours,

Wm. R. Langdon,
American Consul.

Enclosure:

1 copy of "Manshu Nisshi Shototsu Jihen Shashin News" (Photo-News of Sino-Japanese Clash in Manchuria) published by Manshu Shashin Tsushin Sha, Dairen, November 1931.

020
WRL:L

Copy to Consulate General, Tokyo.

F/DEW 793.94/3188

DEC 17 1931

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
Milton O. Gustafson

12-18-75

793.94/3188

變事突衝支日洲滿
眞島スーユニ

PHOTO-NEWS OF
SINO-JAPANESE CLASH IN MANCHU



大連眞島通信社

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure in despatch of Wm. R. Langdon, American
Consul at Dairen, Manchuria, dated November
14, 1931, on the subject "Transmission of
Illustrated Printed matter". 793.94/3188

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

TRANSLATION

FOREWORD

The explosion came at last. It came on the night of September 18, 1931, when conceited Chinese soldiers, who had insulted and outraged our patient people for so long, finally challenged us by blowing up our Manchurian railway and attacking our guard. At this the Kwantung Army immediately occupied the Mukden citadel as security, and since then the mighty torrent of Imperial troops has been sweeping over North and South Manchuria.

Our Company sent a special photographer Yamamoto to the fighting line, and he took pictures in the smoke of battle and at personal risk. By air mail we sent these pictures to the homeland, New York, etc., etc., and supplied the, Hochi, Kokumin, etc., etc., New York Times, etc., etc., with them.

We publish this album as a record etc., etc.

LIBRARY DIVISION

LOBEYCHD

題 言

機會は遂に爆發す。涙を吞んで支那側の幾多の暴擧と暴言とを隠忍せる我が同胞の痛憤その極に達せる際、時恰も昭和六年九月十八日夜、増長せる支那官兵は我が滿鐵線を爆破し我が守備兵を襲撃して公然挑戰し來る、茲に於て關東軍司令部は時を移さず鐵袖一觸、直ちに奉天城を保障占領し爾來連戰、皇軍の威風南北滿洲の野を震撼せしむ。

此秋に當り、弊社は山本技師を急派し、砲煙の中を潜りて、つぶさに戦線の現場を撮影せしめ最も敏速に凡ゆる犠牲を意とする遑なく飛行便を以て母國各地は勿論紐育、倫敦、巴里、伯林等に急送し其の使命を果し内外の賞讃と歡迎を博せる事は報知、國民、中外商業、大阪時事、福岡日日、九州日報、新愛知、中國民報、北滿タイムス、ジャパン・アドヴァンザード、ジャパン・タイムス其他の母國新聞を始め紐育タイムス、S K S 通信社、倫敦、伯林、巴里インター・ナショナル等の歐米一流新聞通信紙上に連載されたる弊社の交戦書報によりても江湖の知悉せる所たらん。

今回各方面の熱烈なる要望と勸説に依り、事變を一掃させる滿洲日支衝突事變ニュース寫眞帳を刊行し彼の暴戾に對する皇軍奮闘の戦跡を記念せんぞす、時局尙多事にして倉卒の間に之を出版す、聊か吾等の使命の一片を果すのみ、江湖幸に之を諒せよ。

滿洲寫眞通信社

社長 萩 野 順 治

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TRANSLATION.

The Nature of the Incident

The action of the Japanese Army in Manchuria arose from the necessity of self-defence, and the activity of the Japanese and Chinese armies cannot be regarded as war in the eyes of international law (Foreign Office).

The Japanese Army's action up to the present has not had war for its purpose, but has been a measure for self-defence. There is no reason for interference by the League of Nations (Army's opinion).

It is too soon for the League of Nations Council to interfere. If it interferes, Japanese public opinion will be aroused and a settlement made difficult. China's claim of non-resistance is false. The fact is she has fled from the battlefield. Has not the Japanese Army suffered numerous casualties? (Ambassador Yoshizawa's contention).

Let us seize this rare opportunity to sweep weak diplomacy aside and show the arrogant Chinese that they cannot kill Japanese soldiers like dogs (Opinion of people of Japan).

TRANSLATION.

General Honjo's Message to Commanding Officers,
September 23, 1931.

關東軍司令部
九月二十三日

The insolent Chinese soldiers blew up the South Manchuria Railway track and dared to attack our guard on duty there. The peace loving Imperial Army resolved to uphold its honor in the face of this insult. By quick and daring action, we crushed the enemy's spirit in a few days and were able to vindicate our honor at home and abroad. In this affair, the brave conduct of our officers and men gave us great satisfaction. Now a portion of the Chosen Army has been ordered to strengthen us. Our army has attained its objective and is upholding its prestige even in North Manchuria, but the field of activity is widening, and our difficulties and burdens will increase. I trust, however, that you will display the ancient warlike spirit and not flinch a hair's breadth from your duty. I expect that you will continue in your advance and fulfil your important responsibility in this foreign land.

Message of the Incident

General Hongo, a message to commanding officers

颯爽たる軍司令官の訓示

本庄關東軍司令官が各地駐屯の軍隊に對し九月二十三日附を以て與へたる訓示の颯爽たるを見よ

暴戾なる支那官兵は南滿洲鐵道線路を爆破し我が守備兵を襲ふの愚舉を敢へてしたるは平素皇軍の武威を冷侮せる結果にして軍はその任務を全うし我軍の威信を保持する爲め斷乎として、これを膺懲するに決したり、爾來敏速なる集中、果敢なる行動は一舉に敵の心膽を奪ひ數日を経ずして潰走に陥らしめ赫々たる武威を中外に發揚せしむる事を得たり、これ一に我が將卒の忠勇機敏なる働きによるところにして本職の深く満足する所なり、今や朝鮮軍精銳の一部を命下に加へ陣容を新にし大いに意を強ふるものあり我が軍事行動は概ね所期の目的を達成しその武威北滿に及びつゝあるも今後寡兵を以て廣大なる區域を守備するは更に一層困難を來すべく軍の負荷愈重きに至るべし諸子は更に奮闘士氣を振作し軍規を峻嚴にし皇軍の威容に對し寸毫の微隙をも與へざらん事を切望す、本職元より期する所あり諸子を信憑し相共に仆れて後止むの概を以て國外の重責を全うせんことを期す。

關東軍司令官 本 庄 繁

事變と其の性質

今次滿洲に於ける日本の軍事行動は自衛權の發動にして日支兩軍の發動は國際公法上に云ふ交戦状態と解すべきではない（外務省意見）
日本軍の今日までの行動は戦争を目的とせず、支那の不法行為に對する自衛手段である、國際聯盟が干渉すべき筋合ではない（軍部意見）
國際聯盟理事會が調停をなすは尙早である、若し干渉せんか、日本の輿論を刺戟し解決を困難ならしめよう、支那の云ふ所の無抵抗云々は謔で、事實は挑戦だ、日本軍は多數の死傷者を出してゐるではないか（勞澤代表主張）
此の千載一遇の機會に、斷じて軟弱外交を排せよ、支那の増長を徹底的に膺懲し、皇軍をして大死せしむる勿れ（國民の輿論）


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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




The chart of Manchurian accidents between Japan and China.

0760


Milton O. Gustafson

12-18-75



官公同軍 官公同軍 官公同軍 官公同軍

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



官令司軍東聯
 將中繁正本
 Lieutenant General
 S. Honjo.



長陸兵衛
 將少宮二
 Major-General Nishimura



長陸兵衛
 將少治光宅三
 Major-General M. Miyake.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Lieutenant-General R. Mori.

Lieutenant-General J. Tamon.



官令司隊備守立獨
將中速森

Major-General R. Amano.

長團師二第駐洲滿
將中郎二門多



長團旅成混
將少郎次達村嘉

Major-General T. Yoshimura.

長團旅五十第兵步
將少郎六野天


長團旅三第兵步
將少佐膳部谷長

Major-General A. Hasebe.

0763

Milton O. Gustafson

12-18-75



《時局照片第九十九號》 九段左の二砲台、觀察、敵の撃たぬ軍用壕に、野兵が潜伏、日本
Japanese troops on the front, at the western fort of Mukden. (8 a. m. 19th Sept.)

0764


Milton C. Gustafson

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 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

The Totaiei Barracks under Japanese flag. (12.45 p. m. 19th Sept.)




ぐ掲を旗白軍率の營大東てしすへ交を火銃（分五十四時零後午日九十月九）舎兵營大東の下旗日旭
 るあがのもし歩進るさは能る見もに軍我はき如の銃開機、し積山等砲兵歩銃開機るな銃精はに内營

0766

Milton O. Gustafson


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0767

Milton C. Gustafson


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1 1768

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
Front gate of the Liao Ning Governmental Office occupied
by the Japanese troops. (9 a.m. 19th Sept.)



時九點半在九門口，日軍佔領了該處，並在此設立了司令部。

1769

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



日九十月九親壯の城入に城天奉軍皇
 天奉に共さ領古藤保天奉半時六前午
 崎六十第陽途守備守常衛隊備守立獨
 景光の城入々堂軍我てしと發无な隊

Marching to Mukden—Japanese Troops.

0770

Milton O. Gustafson

12-18-75




宣令司兼東亞月平の軍務省の局長に就任した
Lieutenant-General S. Honjo, commander-in-chief of the Kuan Tung Troops at Mukden.

1 0771

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



(1)



(2)

（張路の頭離通候半時（前午日九十月九）） 那の動出（大木）池の（大）上二第
On the departure the 30th regiment, (at Lu Shan, 3 a.m. 19th Sept.)

(13)

0772

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



第...司令部...
The Headquarters of the Kuan Tung Troops and the second division at Mukden.

0773

Milton O. Gustafson


12-18-75



我與許多人在大馬場集會

1 774

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




(日九十月九) 部一の軍我は前手、舎兵營大北るあ、つえ燃

Burning Hokuraiei barracks, Uta (Sept 9)

0775

Milton O. Gustafson

12-18-75



0776

Milton O. Gustafson

12-18-75




跡の火薬るた機銃 の特大北天本




Wretched shot marks. Hokutaiel, Mukden.

12-18-75




DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Captured Chinese aeroplanes. (11 a. m. 20th Sept.)
(時一十前午日十二月九) 機行飛の敵るを獲捕



部本軍空航北東の後領占
Headquarter of the
North-Eastern aerial corps.

1 0779
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




備準の射發銃關機はるめ路に方前（近附驛陽濟日九十）軍が我るふ備に降衣便
Preparing for the Chinese Koi-tai Japanese troops. (near Shen Yang Station. 19th Sept.)

0780

Milton C. Gustafson

12-18-75




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0781

Milton O. Gustafson


12-18-75



0782

Milton C. Gustafson


12-18-75



0783

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12-18-75



Mukden volunteers. (20th Sept)

(25)

0784

Milton O. Gustafson

12-18-75




Men in military uniforms riding horses down a street. The horses are carrying equipment, and a horse-drawn carriage is visible in the background.

0785

Milton O. Gustafson

12-18-75

Taking the captured by trucks to the quarter at Mukden.



Emancipated Chinese after
disarmament, at the Mukden
boulevard, (19th Sept.)



0786

Milton C. Gustafson

12-18-75




Photo of the subject in uniform

UN

0787

Milton O. Gustafson

12-18-75



1 0788

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

The Hung Ting Shan camp at Chantu where Japanese flag waves. The forlorn hope.




よ興平は、飛に雲上、隊糧白が我々兵山頂紅雲昌を越す日
 (時八前年日十二月九) 守領古後の戦激、機闘戦我々を来飛)

0789

Milton C. Gustafson

12-18-75



My home in the country. The house was built in 1910 and is now owned by my son, Milton C. Gustafson. The house is a two-story house with a chimney and a small porch. The house is surrounded by a large field and a line of trees in the background.

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Firing of the Japanese guns at
 Hachimakiyama that menaces
 the Hung Ting Shan Camp.




懸威を山頂紅の方前米百五千八らか山巻鉢
 (時六前午日十二月九) 射砲が我るす



の日の其るす脱睥な地敵の山頂紅
 懸幕下以官令司隊備守森
 Commander Mori of the garrison
 and his staffs-glaring at the
 hostile camp at Hung Ting Shan.

[1791

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



營兵の嶺南るた見りよ上機行飛
Aeroplane view of the camp at Nan Ling.


12-18-75



る上に名に十七者焉。我て之に果結の賦苦軍我に錦古の品南北東、春長、此也。新に續進
(時四後午日九十月九)

1 0793

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NAHS, Date 12-18-75




營兵の子城寛るた見りよ上機行飛
Aeroplane view of the Kuan Cheng Tzu camp.

(35)

12-18-75

Picking up the killed to bury them was a task in Cheng Izu battle.



我生多病，又值年荒，著中外生民，同受飢寒。思此，一紙書，誠恐無益，但聊寫一時心曲，前年（一九四二）冬，在板橋，將此言寄友人，以誌不忘。大觀（一九四三）

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



の此 景の送輸車列な者傷負軍我る、於に戦場の時時夜深南、兵隊員を助ける
 (す傷負者多し) 以長隊大、第隊留守守主公家河、(す傷負者多し) 兵隊員を助ける

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75




の此 景の運輸車列を者傷負軍我るけ於に戦激の子城宛南兵傷負我の兵戦激
 (す傷負數多下以長隊大第一隊備守登上公原河小と戦數多以府大本合て戦激
 The wounded Japanese soldiers to the hero battle

0797

Milton C. Gustafson

12-18-75



1798

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



(日十二月九) 機闘戦我るす懸威を陣敵の山頂紅
Japanese fighting planes --Menacing enemies' camp on the Hung Ting Shan. (20th Sept.)

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



(四四十二月九) 隊行機軍我たれき設置に近附地空射軍団主務長
 Japanese aerial corps at Chang Chun. (24th Sept.)

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75




民難避林吉るけ於に頭驛春長

Refugees from Chirin Chang Chun Station.

0801

Milton O. Gustafson

12-18-75



0802

Milton C. Gustafson


12-18-75



0803

Milton C. Gustafson


12-18-75



0804


Milton O. Gustafson

12-18-75



(45)

(45)



12-18-75

Milton O. Davidson

0805

1 180 F

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



(のりせ撃射なれこ軍我め爲るさせ應に除解装武)(日一十二月九)跡模の舎宿團備警局路鐵長吉
Burnt-down dormitory of the Chichang Railway Garrison.


0807

Milton O. Gustafson

12-18-75



Highway Construction
Equipment - Gustafson



Highway Construction
Equipment - Gustafson

0808

Milton O. Gustafson

12-18-75



0809

Milton O. Gustafson

12-18-75



Men of the 1st Cavalry Division, 1914-15
Marching past the main entrance to the
Fort Huachuca, Arizona

(49)

0810

Milton O. Gustafson

12-18-75



Marching Band - 1975

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 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

旅訓
 我民族受強鄰之
 壓迫危在目前凡
 我旅官士兵夫等
 務本
 總理遺囑及
 司令長官意旨
 牲一切努力工作
 以互助之精神結
 成團體共赴國難

旅長王元吉

子材圖
 日有之時實行時急
 合以今深目自作規定此
 子材圖
 子材圖
 子材圖

Secret despatch in plotting for the destruction of the S. M. Railway, and the posters for stirring anti-Japanese movement.

見圖：(一) 旅長王元吉於大北 王元吉旅長遺囑及司令長官意旨
 和見圖：(二) 旅長王元吉於大北 王元吉旅長遺囑及司令長官意旨
 和見圖：(三) 旅長王元吉於大北 王元吉旅長遺囑及司令長官意旨

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



にめたの兵親正都支て於に方地南桃 佐少村中わら歸魂英
典支對の野朝が我にめたの其がたれさ殺處に共さ長曹杉井
る殘に朽不は續功たい導を速促決解案懸諸蒙滿し化硬論
Major Nakamura, the late.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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掘替大連三四四〇

定價金八拾錢

Enclosure in despatch
Consul at Peking
14, 1931, on the
Illustrated

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定價金八拾錢


1815

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By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


Copy for the Department

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE

America Consulate, Dairen, Manchuria, November 9, 1931.



Thoncrable
W. Cameron Forbes,
American Ambassador,
Tokyo, Japan.



F/DEW
793.94/3189

Sir:

In the event that they may not reach the Embassy, I have the honor to send herewith copies of two interesting reports on conditions in Manchuria prepared by Mr. C. E. Christopherson, Assistant Trade Commissioner at Mukden.

The report on the railway situation concludes with the statement that competing Chinese lines have been transformed into feeders of the South Manchuria Railway by the action of the Japanese Army.

The report on Japanese control of Chinese banks in Mukden conveys an idea of the extent of administrative powers usurped by the Japanese military authorities in Manchuria. Incidental mention is also made of the stoppage by the Japanese military authorities of disbursements by the Peking-Mukden Railway to the Netherlands Harbor Works Company for work done on Hulutao Harbor.

Respectfully yours,

Wm. R. Langdon,
American Consul.

Enclosures:
As stated.

800
WRL:L

Copy to Department.
Copy to Legation, Peking.
Copy to Consulate General, Tokyo.

one copy of
signed origi-

a.m.l.

Form 457

ECONOMIC AND TRADE NOTES NO. 28.

Mukden, China, October 29, 1931.

Submitted by: C.E. Christopherson, Assistant Trade Commissioner.

THE RAILWAY SITUATION IN MANCHURIA AS OF OCTOBER 29

Although it is impossible to give accurate information as to what has happened to the different railways in Manchuria the following report will give some idea of the present situation. All news agencies except those controlled by the Japanese have been suppressed. All Chinese officials of any importance have fled to Peiping and such Chinese as are in official positions are under Japanese control or Japanese advisers and are afraid to give out any information so that the only information we receive is through the Japanese Military Headquarters and from travelers passing through Mukden.

Immediately upon occupying this territory the Japanese destroyed the Peiping-Liaoning (Peking-Mukden) Line between Huangkutun and Mukden. Huangkutun is the Peiping-Liaoning terminus just outside the city. The destruction of this track severed connections between the Shenyang-Hailung (Mukden-Hailung) and Peiping-Liaoning Lines and, of course, put an end to the Kirin-Pukow through service. Peiping-Liaoning trains cannot enter the South Manchuria Railway station in Mukden as has been the custom in the past. The Japanese also connected the Shenyang-Hailung line with the South Manchuria line at Mukden and freight is now moving from points along the Shenyang-Hailung line directly to Dairen. Newspaper reports state that locomotives and cars of both railways are running on both lines all the way from Dairen to Kirin.

It has been reported by a traveler from Kirin that connections have been made between the Kirin-Hailung and the Kirin-Changchun lines at Kirin. We know that a temporary connection was made as the Japanese sent armoured trains down the Kirin-Hailung line some weeks ago. However, it is not known whether freight is being carried from the Kirin-Hailung line to Changchun.

Shortly after the 18th. of September the Tahushan-Tungliao line was cut just south of Tungliao and to date we have been unable to learn whether service between Tungliao and Tahushan has been resumed, but we believe that it has not. The Paonan-Angangchi line was cut at two places south of Tsitsihar by the destruction of two bridges. This was done either by troops under General Chang Hai-Peng who is supposed to be supported by the Japanese and was moving on Tsitsihar from the south or by the troops of General Ma Chan-Shan who is loyal to Marshal Chang Hsueh-Liang and defeated General Chang at Tsitsihar.

There

- 2 -

There has been considerable bandit activity along the Ssapingkai-Taonan line, particularly in the vicinity of Maolin, and the Japanese have finally stationed troops at Chengchiatun. According to recent newspaper reports the Japanese have taken over the operation of the Ssapingkai-Taonan line and it is rumoured that they sent engineers north of Taonan to inspect the damaged bridges but they were driven away by General MaSa troops. The Japanese are also in control of the Yingkow-Kopangtse (Newchwang-Koupangtze) line.

In spite of persistent rumours that the Japanese are constructing the line between Tunhua and Huining, Korea, we are quite certain that no actual work has been done on this project. According to a report from a very reliable source the Japanese have two regiments and sufficient supplies and equipment to build the line stationed at Huining.

From the foregoing information it can be seen that the Chinese lines are all disrupted in such a way that they now operate as feeders to the South Manchuria Railway and there is no possibility of any parallel freight service being operated.

C. E. Christopherson
Assistant Trade Commissioner in Charge

CEC/FAL

Form 471

SPECIAL REPORT NO. 17

Mukden, China, October 29, 1931.

Subject: Japanese Control of the Chinese Banks in Mukden.

Submitted by: C. E. Christopherson, Assistant Trade Commissioner
in Charge.

While it is still too early to state what will be the final disposition of the Chinese banks, the following information regarding their reopening and present operation will probably be of interest.

All of the Chinese banks were immediately taken over by the Japanese on September 19, and while the Bank of Communications and the Bank of China were permitted to reopen on September 28, when the other foreign banks reopened, the Frontier Bank and the provincial Bank (Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces) were not permitted to open until October 15.

The Bank of China and Bank of Communications are operating with their own staffs but are subject to inspection by the Japanese Military authorities. The other two banks are operating with Chinese staffs but are under the direct supervision of Japanese advisers. All four banks are required to submit a daily report regarding their transactions to General Honjo, who is in command of the Japanese forces. As of possible interest, a copy of the daily report blank is attached.

The Provincial Bank has a capital of Mex.\$20,000,000.00 and is a governmental bank, while the Frontier Bank, with the same amount of capital, is a private organization although a number of its shareholders are government officials. The Japanese Army removed Mex.\$500,000.00 from the Provincial Bank for public welfare (according to their explanation). They also ordered the bank to transfer its deposit of Mex.\$700,000.00 from the Bank of China at Dairen to the Yokohama Specie Bank in that city. The Frontier Bank was ordered to remove its deposit of ¥130,000.00 from the National City Bank of New York in Mukden and place it in the Bank of Chosen in this city. These changes in deposits were made the first day the banks were open.

Immediately after the occupation of Mukden, the Japanese Army seized ten cars and trucks belonging to these four banks, valued at ¥41,500, and up to the present time none of them have been returned.

None of the four banks are permitted to pay out from any of the Chinese Government funds that were on deposit prior to September 19. Similar instructions were sent to all foreign banks but these banks refused to comply. In one case that has been brought to our attention the Frontier Bank refused to pay a check of Mex. \$400,000.00

drawn

- 2 -

drawn on them by the Peiping-Liaoning Railway in favor of the Netherlands Harbor Works for work on Hulutao Harbor. This check was turned over to the National City Bank by the Netherlands Harbor Works as the National City Bank handles the exchange from silver to gold. When the comprador from the National City Bank arrived at the Frontier Bank he was refused admittance by Japanese soldiers on guard outside and when he tried to show them his pass and explain to them who he was he was severely beaten. They finally let him into the bank but the authorities then refused to pay the check. This happened more than one week ago and although the matter of releasing the funds has been taken up with the Japanese Consulate nothing has been accomplished to date.

The following rules and regulations were issued by the Japanese authorities for the operation of these banks:

I. A. Concerning restrictions on Public Funds

- (1) Public funds heretofore deposited are to be temporarily retained and not to be paid.
- (2) Hereafter, public funds, when deposited, shall be written in a new account book.

B. Concerning restrictions on ordinary deposits

- (1) Depositors when found to be debtors to the banks their debts shall be paid first out of their deposits.
- (2) The above rule does not apply to fellow-bankers.
- (3) Depositors of below \$5,000 mark may be allowed to draw the entire sum at once but those who have deposits of above \$5,000 and below \$10,000 are allowed to draw only \$6,000 while those having more than \$10,000 are allowed to draw only \$1,000 per \$10,000 (namely: depositors of \$20,000 may draw \$7,000, of \$30,000, \$8,000 etc.)
- (4) Depositors may be allowed to draw once a week.
- (5) New depositors may draw as they please.

II. Concerning Loans

- (1) Use every means possible to take back all moneys lent out heretofore.
- (2) Do not lend out any more money hereafter unless for the sake of necessity.
- (3) All branch offices must get the General Bank's consent before any loan is made.
- (4) All advanced money for subsidiary business shall be cleared up gradually.

III. Concerning

- 3 -

III. Concerning remittances

- (1) Remittances are only allowed to merchants who carry on trade transactions with each other and to individuals who have rightful uses of the sums they send.
- (2) All of the branch offices, which are located outside of South Manchuria Railway Zone, are temporarily required to get the General Bank's consent before they can remit any large amount of remittances to the General Bank.

IV. Concerning Bank-notes

- (1) All unissued bank-notes shall be sealed up and kept separately.
- (2) If new bank-notes are required to be issued so as to take the place of worn-out bank-notes, it is not limited by the above rule.
- (3) Appropriations shall be made before-hand when it is necessary to issue new bank-notes.

V. Concerning Exchange

- (1) An exchange station shall be established in the city and each person is allowed to exchange only 50 silver dollats per day.
- (2) To carry more than 100 silver dollars out of Mukden is banned.

VI. Concerning Violations

- (1) Any one, who violates any of the above rules and regulations, is liable to be fined and punished according to the formerly established rules and regulations besides the severe penalty which is to be decided by the Local Maintenance Committee and be inflicted on the violator.
- (2) The above rules and regulations shall be null and void when the new government is established and takes back the Provincial Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces and the Frontier Bank.

As of possible interest, there is quoted below order #25, issued by General Honjo of the Japanese Army, regarding the reopening of the Frontier and Provincial Banks:

"Order is hereby given to the Local Maintenance Society concerning the reopening of Provincial Bank and of the Three Eastern Provinces and the Frontier Bank.

The order is given by the Commander-in-Chief of Kwantung Force S. Honjo and the Chairman of the Local Maintenance Society Mr. Yuan Chin-K'ai.

Concerning the reopening of the Provincial Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces and the Frontier Bank attention is called to the articles mentioned below hoping earnestly that

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 4 -

I and the Local Maintenance Commission can at this time absolutely guarantee the restoring of public order and peoples' livelihood by means of quickly restoring the old Provincial Government's finance to its former conditions so as to carry out exactly the maintenance of local status.

- (1) The Japanese force following the customary military law, article No. 43, for the purpose of restoring and guaranteeing public order and livelihood, consents to the reopening of the Provincial Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces so as to make it convenient to the money market.
- (2) When the Bank is opened for business it shall, according to the military law, article No. 53, guarantee the advantages of the Japanese Army and shall, according to the military laws, article No. 43, restore absolutely guaranteed public order and livelihood necessary to every day life.
- (3) The Japanese Army, for the purpose of fulfilling the above aims, must send supervising officials to the Bank to supervise matters and these supervisors must be invited from among the Japanese people and be made advisers or councilors by the Provincial Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces; not only these invited ones but also the Japanese Army Corps may send officers at any time to the bank to inspect the bank's business. These advisers and councilors must be paid by the bank concerned.
- (4) The Japanese Army Corps, when seeing necessary, may stop at any time partly or completely the business of the Provincial Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces.
- (5) When the Local Maintenance Commission gets ready to make the roll of candidates of administrative officers for the Provincial Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces, it must be recognized by the Japanese Army Corps.
- (6) The Provincial Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces can by no means be allowed to have any enemy action or thought toward the Japanese Military Corps.
- (7) Concerning business administration any order from the Local Maintenance Commission and the business administrator of the Provincial Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces, must be first recognized by the Japanese Army Corps before it is issued.
- (8) The Provincial Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces must not allow its branch offices to keep large sums of money in their respective banks.
- (9) The above regulations apply equally well to the Frontier Bank.

- - - - -
 C. E. Christopherson
 Assistant Trade Commissioner in Charge.

GEC:TMS:Y

TRANSLATION

To

The Commander-in-Chief of Kwantung Force S. Hsiao

The fixed date report of the Frontier Bank

Superintendent Officer



Show 6th year month day

Classification	Original Currency	Standard Currency (Silver Dollar)	Remarks
Amount of Exchange of paper money			
Amount of payments of deposits			
Amount received for payments of loans			
Total amount of money order drawn between Head & Branch Offices			
Amount of money order drawn to Shanghai & Tientsin			

Copy for the Department of State

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE

American Consulate, Dairen, Manchuria, November 17, 1931.



The Honorable
W. Cameron Forbes,
American Ambassador,
Tokyo, Japan.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose herewith a statement showing the distribution of Japanese nationals in the Northeastern Provinces of China. The figures, taken from the 1931 Manmo Nenkan (Manchuria-Mongolia Yearbook), are official. It is believed that they are of some interest in connection with Japanese political literature regarding Manchuria and with the claim being made to the League of Nations Council that continued military occupation of Chinese territory is necessary for the security of Japanese life and property.

It will be observed that the total number of Japanese nationals in Manchuria and Mongolia is 840,000, of whom 223,000 are Japanese and 617,000 Koreans.

The Japanese population is roughly distributed as follows:

In Japanese administered areas	209,000
In Chinese municipalities adjoining Japanese concessions	5,000
In Harbin and along Chinese Eastern Railway	5,000
In Korean frontier cities	2,000
In Kirin City	1,000
At other places	1,000

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- 2 -

The Korean population is thickest along the Korean frontier, approximately 500,000 being settled there. Chinese administered areas adjoining Japanese concessions and remote districts near the Siberian Maritime Province draw the next greatest number of Korean settlers, while the Kwantung Leased Territory appears to be the least popular field of Korean immigration. The Korean immigrants in Manchuria are distributed as follows:

Along the Korean border	484,000
Lower Sungari and Ussuri districts	35,000
Chinese Municipalities adjoining	35,000
Japanese concessions	
Yungki Prefecture, Kirin Province	17,000
Hailung district, Liaoning Province	17,000
Japanese administered areas	16,000
Harbin and Chinese Eastern Railway Zone	6,000
Other districts	7,000

With the vast majority of Japanese nationals in Manchuria residing either in Japanese concessions or in regions remote from the occupied areas, the mooted issue of their security after the withdrawal of Japanese troops appears to lack reality.

Respectfully yours,

Wm. R. Langdon,
American Consul.

Enclosure:

Distribution of Japanese Nationals in the
Northeastern Provinces of China.

800
WRL:L

Two copies to the Department.
Copy to Legation, Peiping.
Copy to Consulate General, Tokyo.
Copy to Consulate General, Mukden.

the signed original
aml

Enclosure in despatch of Wm. R. Langdon, American Consul at Dairen, Manchuria, to the American Embassy at Tokyo, dated November 17, 1931, on the subject "Distribution of Japanese Nationals in the Northeastern Provinces of China.

DISTRIBUTION OF JAPANESE NATIONALS IN THE
 NORTHEASTERN PROVINCES OF CHINA.

<u>District</u>	<u>Japanese</u>	<u>Koreans</u>
<u>As of July 31, 1930.</u>		
Kwantung Leased Territory	111,484	1,682
South Manchuria Railway Zone	97,924	14,898
In Chinese municipal areas adjoining South Manchuria Railway towns (Mukden, Tieling, Newchwang, Changchun, Liaoyang, Antung)	4,944	34,516
<u>As of end of 1939.</u>		
Eastern Marches (mostly in Yalu River settlements)	203	118,453
Tumen River district (Yenki, Hunohun, etc.)	2,158	365,671
Hailung	133	14,710
Liaoyuan (Tungliao)	249	1,421
Hsinmintun	167	2,384
Taolu	70	3,245
Yenki	35	17,401
Pingkiang, Fuchin, Yushu, Aohang, Wuchang, Sansing, Hulin, Mishan, Aigun, Hailun, and other closed areas in North Manchuria and near Russian frontier	40	34,645
Harbin	3,834	1,557
Kirin	967	258
Chinese Eastern Railway Zones	754	4,251
Other districts	363	2,097
Total	223,323	617,189

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gutzman NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

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Enclosure:
 Distribution of Japanese Nationals in the
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Two copies to the Department.
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As stated above,
 the signed original.
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amk.

NO. _____

AMERICAN CONSULATE

Dairen, Manchuria, November 17, 1931.

SUBJECT: Transmission of Japanese Political Pamphlets.

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THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

As of possible interest to the Department, I have the honor to transmit herewith the following pamphlets sent to this Consulate by local Japanese bodies for distribution to interested Americans:

- (1) "Truths Underlying the Manchurian Affair", article from THE CHINA DIGEST of October 17, 1931, reprinted and distributed by South Manchuria Railway Company (2 copies).
- (2) "Declaration on Sino-Japanese Clashes Issue", October 1931, distributed by Servants' Society of South Manchuria Railway Company (2 copies).
- (3) "Incisive Analysis of Pending Manchurian Issue", Special English Edition of MANSHU NIPPON (Japanese), Dairen, November 13, 1931 (2 copies).

Pamphlet (3) above refers to the 2,000,000 Japanese subjects in Manchuria. This is an exaggeration which has been noted elsewhere in recent polemical literature of Japanese origin.

Respectfully

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DEC 16 1931

- 2 -

Respectfully yours,



Wm. R. Langdon,
American Consul.

Enclosures: ✓

Three - as stated above.

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In duplicate to Department.
Copy to Embassy, Tokyo.
Copy to Legation, Peiping.
Copy to Consulate General, Tokyo.

Enclosure No. 1 in despatch of Wm. R. Langdon, American Consul at Dairen, Manchuria,
dated November 17, 1931, on the subject "Transmission of Japanese Political Pamphlets"

October 17, 1931

THE CHINA DIGEST

120

POLITICAL

Truths Underlying The Manchurian Affair

Chang Hsueh-liang's Elimination as a Military Power

Underneath the eye-wash of political publicity there are truths in connection with the Manchurian affair which nothing can really or for any length of time hide. It is of course true that what is washed up on the beach does not always belong to the sea and that while the many interpretations given to Japan's actions in Manchuria seem to have something to do with the matter they do not really apply. Irrelevances are to political arguments what diversions are to a trend of thought. To keep to the subject in question is as difficult as it is to be consistent when reason prompts a change. In the face therefore of reports that are not confirmed and of events for which no explanation of a convincing nature has been forthcoming it is not always easy to remain true to the belief that Japan's actions in Manchuria are altogether justified. To the wavering it is necessary to point to realities—to refer them to truths which they are apt to forget in the face of plausible arguments to the contrary. What are these truths?

The Effects of Young Chang's Affiliations

Students of Far Eastern affairs need not be told how Japan came to secure control of the Kwangtung Leased Territory and of the Railway zone in south Manchuria. That she has been there for so many years during which peace and progress have gone hand in hand to the satisfaction of Chinese and Foreigner alike is recognition by the whole world that she is not there illegitimately. She has been and is working there as everybody knows to the advantage of both Chinese and Foreigner. Then, slowly, but with insidious persistence, little annoyances and hindrances to her successful administration became more and more serious. They started shortly after Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang's ascension to power and his close working arrangement with the Kuomintang through its government at Nanking. Tanapus, or semi-official groups which act in all provinces in China that are nominally under control of the National Government, were at the bottom of these obstacles to a smooth working. How far they received the support of the local Manchurian authorities is seen today when the Japanese have by their swift descent upon the Manchurian army completely eclipsed Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang as a military power. This son of the strong Marshal Chang Tso-lin who met his death by a bomb explosion which destroyed the train on which he was returning to Mukden from a sojourn in Peiping, has a few soldiers left in Hopei province, but without the resources of Manchuria from which to feed them he is no longer a military power to be reckoned with. He

has been effectively reduced to a position of military inconsequence and it is very likely that he will be dishied by the Nanking militarists for whose favour he has foolishly pitted himself against the Japanese in Manchuria. It is clear that the procrastination and the evasion with which Japanese efforts to reach an understanding have been met was the considered policy of the Manchurian military authorities influenced by the Kuomintang and by the pro-Nanking leanings of their leader. Chang Hsueh-liang's affiliations with the Nanking Government have cost him his power. That is the answer to the question as to how far the Tang-pus in Manchuria have received Chang Hsueh-liang's support. To say that Japan struck in Manchuria because she has territorial ambitions and chose a time when not only China seemed to be suffering from the effects of providential disfavour but the rest of the world was seriously engaged in financial and unemployment troubles is plausible enough to a prejudiced public,

but it is to ignore the truth that the Chinese attack on, and their undermining of Japan's legitimate enterprise in Manchuria was the only cause.

Incident after incident can be produced to show how far the admirable restraint of the Japanese has been tested, and that this restraint has now been removed is the inevitable result of an attack that has gone too far.

Chinese soldiers bolting from the Japanese have alighted on some of the defenceless villages near the railway and driven clean away the poor innocent countrymen, seizing their houses and belongings. I heard some local people discussing the matter in very emphatic terms. I broke into the conversation and asked which they would prefer to come to their villages the Japanese soldiers or their own Chinese troops. They answered at once and with very positive emphasis—the Japanese. *N. C. D. N. Peitaho Correspondent.*

Similar Acts by Foreign Powers Long Overdue

That the restraint of the Foreign Powers in China has been longer exercised is no credit to them. In the face of extreme provocation they have allowed the position of their nationals in China slowly to be undermined till they stand today on the brink of bankruptcy and in danger of being swept into the sea. This is not to exaggerate. Murders of foreigners, bandit outrages, legal irregularities, antagonistic activities, boycotts, tax increases, treaty abrogations, are too numerous here to be enumerated, let alone such a case as the Thorburn case. They are all submerged into obscurity today by the exciting and sensational Manchurian affair, but they are no less true for that matter. They are land marks in China of the same slow but steady attack that the Chinese practice in Manchuria. Because of the international aspect of the China situation however their work against Foreigners in China proper has not been so swift as it has been in Manchuria. Japan's commendable efforts to deal with the Chinese in Conference, to come to an understanding about the Manchurian tangle, were inspired by an

THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE RETURNED TO THE
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

exceedingly liberal policy which bordered upon the pacific. This policy was misunderstood by the Chinese to mean that Japan felt herself too weak to exercise greater pressure, just as the very friendly and weak-kneed policy of the other Powers in China has been misinterpreted, so China pushed it to the point where there was only one thing remaining for Japan to do. Japan has done what the Powers must have done in time if the security of the lives and the properties of their nationals and of their future businesses in China count at all.

These are truths which the irrelevances of minor

incidents and the plausible reasonings of clever Chinese debaters and propagandists cover at the present time. But they are not lost to those who look deeper and see in the Japanese activity in Manchuria the defence against an attack that was designed to make a mockery of Japan's rights and to destroy her economic structure there and to sweep her people back to the islands across the sea. And this defence is the only kind that is possible with a people whose diplomatic or political strategy is at all times inconsistent with their official and public expressions. Goodwill that is merely an expression is valueless.

Japan's Note To China

Mr. M. Shigemitsu, the Japanese Minister to China, was instructed by his home Government to forward to the Chinese Government the following Memorandum under date of October 9th:—

"1. The Japanese Government has already made it clear that the Manchurian affair is nothing but an outcome of the deeprooted anti-Japanese feeling in China which has taken a specially provocative form in the recent challenge to the Japanese troops compelling the latter to resort to measures of self-defence. The responsibility for the present situation naturally lies with the Chinese Government.

"The Japanese Government has time and again requested the Chinese Government to take proper steps to check the anti-Japanese movement so systematically carried out in various places in China. Being desirous of maintaining cordial relations between the two countries, this Government has exercised greatest patience and forbearance in the hope that this deplorable state of affairs may yet improve. Unfortunately, however, this anti-Japanese agitation seems now to be assuming alarming proportions.

"It is learned that anti-Japanese societies at Shanghai and elsewhere have passed resolutions not only to enforce prohibition of trading in and transportation of Japanese goods but to order cancellation of existing contracts and otherwise to prohibit all business transactions and to cancel contracts of employment between Chinese and Japanese in order thus to effect the so-called 'severance of economic relations with Japan.' For that purpose examination and detention of goods and persons, intimidation and violence, and various other means are being employed to give effect to such resolutions and severe penalties are meted out to any who may fail to comply with these orders, some societies even going so far as to threaten capital punishment. Moreover cases of expropriation and detention of goods owned by Japanese people and of threats and violence against their lives and property have become so numerous and insistent throughout China that they have been forced to withdraw totally or partially from various localities.

"2. It is to be noted that the anti-Japanese movement in China is conducted as an instrument of the national policy under direction of the Nationalist party, which, in view of the peculiar political organisation of China, is inseparable in function from the Government. That movement must, therefore, be clearly distinguished from one which originates spontaneously amongst people. It is, therefore, evident that the present anti-Japanese movement in China is not only in contravention of the letter and spirit of the treaties existing between the two countries but constitutes a form of hostile act without use of

arms contrary to all standards of justice and friendship. The Chinese Government will be assuming a very serious responsibility if it should fail to take prompt and effective measures to quell that agitation. Moreover, in meeting out penal sentences to individual citizens, the anti-Japanese societies which are purely private organisations are clearly usurping the authority of the National Government.

"3. It will be remembered that at the recent meeting of the Council of the League of Nations at Geneva the Chinese Representative as well as the Japanese gave assurance that their respective Governments would endeavor to prevent aggravation of the situation. The Chinese Government obviously acted against that pledge in actually aggravating the situation by making no honest or effective effort to restrain the activities of the anti-Japanese societies which are jeopardizing the lives and property as well as the liberty of trade of the Japanese subjects in different parts of China.

"4. The Japanese Government desires to call once more the serious attention of the Chinese Government to these actions on the part of the anti-Japanese societies, and to declare at the same time that the Chinese Government will be held responsible for whatever may be the consequences of its failure to suppress the anti-Japanese movement and to afford adequate protection to the lives and property of the Japanese subjects in China."

BRITISH GOVERNOR ON THE HONGKONG RIOTS

Colony's Name Besmirched by Disgraceful Acts

His Excellency the Governor, at the meeting of the Legislative Council, on Oct. 1 on behalf of himself and the Government, expressed their most intense horror at the disgraceful acts which were committed and the tragedies which occurred during the anti-Japanese riots. His Excellency tendered the deepest sympathy to the Japanese residents of Hongkong on the treatment they received and the hardships they experienced.

In the course of his address His Excellency said.— "The events of last week have besmirched the name of this Colony and it behoves all those who live in it to help to clear that name. There is some satisfaction, perhaps, in knowing that the more responsible Chinese citizens most strongly reprobate what has happened, and that the acts committed were, in the main, by less responsible people, and that probably evil influences were behind them."

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 2 in despatch of Wm. R. Langdon, American Consul
at Dairen, Manchuria, dated November 17, 1931, on the subject
"Transmission of Japanese Political Pamphlets".

DECLARATION

ON

SINO-JAPANESE CLASHES

ISSUE

By
THE SERVANTS' SOCIETY
of
The South Manchuria Railway Company
Dairen, Manchuria
October, 1931

THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE RETURNED TO THE
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

DECLARATION BY 20,000 S.M.R. CO. MEMBERS

On Sino-Japanese Clashes Issue

The following declaration has been made in the names of 20,000 members of the South Manchuria Railway Co. Servants' Society, the largest Japanese organization in South Manchuria, based upon their conception of duty as Japanese subjects.

Convictions of Japan and Japanese

To establish the peace of the Orient and to realize the racial solidarity, thereby contributing to the advance of civilization, as Japan's national policy has been since the Meiji Restoration, is considered as the mission of the Japanese race.

The Sino-Japanese and the Russo-Japanese Wars were caused by the necessity of Japan's strategic security, the former owing to the aggressive policy of China and the latter Russia's, but at the same time, each was the effluence of Japan's spirit to answer for the peace of all the Orient, as may be seen plainly from the Imperial Ordinance proclaimed at the outbreak of each war and the public opinion in the country.

The World is asked to remember the historic events that Liaotung Peninsula was ceded by China to Japan as part of the victor's spoils, but was retroceded to China in the name of the peace of the Orient. China gave it away to Russia at once, and entered upon the secret offensive and defensive alliance treaty with Russia with Japan for their common enemy. China, more-

Russia to build a military railway to Port Arthur (Dairen), surrendering practically all Manchuria, sowing the seed of another war (the contents of this secret treaty was put on record by the Chinese request of the Washington Conference).

After, Japan was forced to fight again in Manchuria, a frightful stake, sacrificing 100,000 lives and

liberated from China's bad faith. Fortunately Japan has been victorious again, and has taken over Russia's concessions in Manchuria and Mongolia, but as a matter of fact, she has only what she lost through China's bad faith and the Powers' Interference.

Wars fought by us at the stake of the country's future have taught us that the Japanese can never leave Manchuria and Mongolia to China's sweet pleasure. We have learned that, in order to preserve the peace of the Orient and for strategic security, Japan's interests must first be satisfied in Manchuria and Mongolia. For this reason, Japan's interests in Manchuria and Mongolia cannot be considered from the conception of justice and right of the Chinese or from that of her strategic security. These facts make the minimum claim for the right to exist of the Chinese and race and also the guaranty indispensable for the peace of the Orient.

What We Have Done in Manchuria and Mongolia

10 years ago, Manchuria and Mongolia was regarded as a region, wild and neglected. Japan, in opening up, invested ¥1,700,000,000, and through the cultural influence has laid out therein and her financial help, its

territorial integrity has been preserved; railways have been built; mines opened; industries started one after another; the vast wilderness has been converted into a fertile field, and annually hundreds of thousands of Chinese immigrants have come to Manchuria. In the course of 20 years their population has increased by about 10,000,000. The Japanese and the Korean settlements have reached 1,000,000. Thus has been created a large popularizing Sino-Japanese solidarity.

In foreign trade, before the Russo-Japanese War, it amounted to only Tls. 58,000,000 which increased to Tls. 670,000,000 in 1927, taking up 35% of China's entire trade. Now Manchuria has become the richest country in all China. With all the progress of the people by the warlords and despite the lax policies of the South Manchuria Railway Area, the 30,000,000 inhabitants in Manchuria and Mongolia are enjoying their life more than anywhere else in China, and this may be called the result of the Japanese perseverance and effort, testimony of the so-called Sino-Japanese solidarity realized, and to its realization an empty boasting (cf. the "Second Report on Progress of Manchuria to 1931", published by the S. M. R. Co.).

How China has Behaved to Japan

Since Head Chiang of Nanking Government joined with Marshal Chang-hsuehliang, Mukden, both his reality have been ignored; neighbourly friendship and terms have been trampled upon; the rights held legitimately by the Japanese been threatened with a radical undermining.

We should ask the public to turn their profound attention to the following facts:

(1) What makes us dread most is that the schools compiled by Chinese Government are teeming with a

over, permitted Russia to build a military railway to Port Arthur and Dalny (now Dairen), surrendering practically all Manchuria, thereby wilfully sowing the seed of another war (the contents of this Russo-Chinese secret treaty was put on record by the Chinese delegates on the request of the Washington Conference).

10 years later, Japan was forced to fight again in Manchurian field at a frightful stake, sacrificing 100,000 lives and ¥2,000,000,000.

This originated from China's bad faith. Fortunately Japan came out victorious again, and has taken over Russia's concessions in South Manchuria and Mongolia, but as a matter of fact, she has recovered only what she lost through China's bad faith and the Triple Powers' Interference.

The two Wars fought by us at the stake of the country's destiny have taught us that the Japanese can never leave Manchuria and Mongolia to China's sweet pleasure. We have further learned that, in order to preserve the peace of the Orient and to ensure our strategic security, Japan's interests must first be firmly established in Manchuria and Mongolia. For this reason, our interests in Manchuria and Mongolia cannot be considered separately from the conception of justice and right of the Japanese people or from that of her strategic security. These interests are in fact the minimum claim for the right to exist of both our State and race and also the guaranty indispensable for maintaining the peace of the Orient.

What We Have Done in Manchuria and Mongolia

Till some 20 years ago, Manchuria and Mongolia was regarded as a frontier region, wild and neglected. Japan, in opening it up, has invested ¥1,700,000,000, and through the cultural installations she has laid out therein and her financial help, its

territorial integrity has been preserved; railways have been built; mines opened; industries started one after another; and the vast wilderness has been converted into a fertile field, attracting annually hundreds of thousands of Chinese immigrants in recent years. In the course of 20 years their population has increased by about 10,000,000. The Japanese and the Korean settlers have reached 1,000,000. Thus has been created a large paradise realizing Sino-Japanese solidarity.

In foreign trade, before the Russo-Japanese War, it amounted to only Tls. 58,000,000 which increased to Tls. 670,000,000 in 1927, taking up 35% of China's entire trade. Now it has become the richest country in all China. With all the bleeding of the people by the warlords and despite the lax policing outside the South Manchuria Railway Area, the 30,000,000 inhabitants in Manchuria and Mongolia are enjoying their life much better than anywhere else in China, and this may be called the crystallization of the Japanese perseverance and effort, testifying to the so-called Sino-Japanese solidarity realized, and to its not being an empty boasting (cf. the "Second Report on Progress in Manchuria to 1931", published by the S. M. R. Co.).

How China has Behaved to Japan

Since Head Chiang of Nanking Government joined issues with Marshal Chang-hsuehliang, Mukden, both history and reality have been ignored; neighbourly friendship and Treaty terms been trampled upon; the rights held legitimately by the Japanese been threatened with a radical undermining.

We should ask the public to turn their profound attention to the following facts:

(1) What makes us dread most is that the school text-books compiled by Chinese Government are teeming with anti-foreign

articles. In what books we have so far collected, there are more than 500 chapters containing such articles, describing the events of aggression by Great Britain, America, France and Japan, and against Japan more than half the space is devoted to inculcate anti-Japanese ideas. That China should educate her innocent children and young people on such text-books is the expression of undisguised hostility to the Powers and Japan, bound to ferment a crisis in the Orient in future. It is a defiance to humanity, a cancer to mankind, and the violation of international good faith. How can Japan sit tight with a neighbour sharpening his sword to strike her at an unguarded moment?

(2) What causes us the deepest regret from a standpoint of the advancement and welfare of mankind is that the Chinese side should daub as a cultural aggression the purely scientific researches conducted by the Japanese in Manchuria and Mongolia (like geology, archaeology, ethnology and folklore), such educational and hygienic installations like schools and libraries, hospitals, the epidemic prevention system, and free medical dispensary service that have been founded from a purely humane motive. (Imagine what an elementary sense of hygiene is held by the Chinese inhabitants and in what stage of paucity and infancy are Chinese like institutions in South Manchuria). They have issued instructions in secret to the educational and other local authorities to close up schools, to stop the children from attending school, or to hinder the prosecution of scientific investigations, which offences are against all accepted usages of civilized activity.

These are not the experiences of the Japanese only. How the Chinese showed their appreciation of like cultural works by Great Britain, France, the United States, etc., is still fresh in our memory.

The Chinese specialists are ready to say that science transcends geographical borders. In fact, the Chinese are raising barriers even in those scientific fields. It will not only be a loss to the Chinese people alone; it is also a profanity to humanity.

(3) Next, what makes our blood tingle is that Head Chiang of Nanking Government, Foreign Commissary Dr. Wang, since resigned, and other government exponents should cry for Japan's downfall on public occasions, heaping insults on the head of our country in daylight. The Northeastern authorities (under Marshal Chang-hsuehliang) have also been issuing anti-Japanese ordinances and notices openly throwing the gage in Japan's face.

The principle of primary education and the attitude of Chinese Government heads being as above stated, it is small wonder that Nanking Government and the Nationalist Party men should play anti-Japanese stunts. No more wonder that the anti-Japanese Leagues should carry on the unlawful Japanese boycott as a matter of course. The Japanese people have been holding their patience to all these anti-Japanese antics openly directed, or connived at, by Chinese Government people, knowing that they are a challenge to Japan. This forbearance may have been mistaken by the Westerners following the events as a sign of lack of the spirit to resent.

Railway Commissary Sunko (heir to the late Dr. Sun-yatsen) of Canton Government, in a declaration issued by him at the outset of the Manchurian clashes, attributed the outbreak to the extremely indiscreet utterances and conducts of Head Chiang and Marshal Chang-hsuehliang, plainly endorsing our statement.

Anti-Japanese Drives in Manchuria and Mongolia

How systematic and thorough the anti-Japanese programme

in Manchuria and Mongolia was will be seen from the following:

(1) Movement to Recover Dairen and Port Arthur

The lease of Kwantung Leased Territory has been taken over from Russia, in terms of the Portsmouth Treaty, with the consent of Chinese Government, and by virtue of the subsequent Treaty the term of lease is made to expire on March 29, 1997, as the world may know. There is still 66 years left. Still China declares the treaty invalid and has been carrying on an energetic movement for recovery. Moreover, this is being made an excuse for avoiding negotiations with Japan.

(2) Trespass Upon Japan's Right to Manage S. M. Railway

(a) Japan holds the treaty right to deny the construction of a parallel line to the S. M. Railway. Ignoring this right and despite Japan's protests, competitive lines have been built within the territory that should properly be served by the S. M. Railway. The Northeastern Communications forward steadily its plan to envelope the S. M. Railway with Chinese lines with a view to constructing a trunk line parallel to the S. M. Railway on either side. The fruit reared by the S. M. R. Co. by the perseverance of the past 20 years is in danger of being plucked ruthlessly by China.

(b) Japan, hoping to cooperate with the Chinese Government and people in opening up Manchuria and Mongolia, assisted China with capital and talent in building Chinese lines. The Ssuningkai-Taonan Line has been financed by Japan. Both the Taonan-Angangchi and the Kirin-Tunhua Lines have been constructed by the S. M. R. Co. on contract. The Chinese side has been making use of them all to "freeze up" the S. M. R. Lines, while the loans advanced by the S. M. R. Co. for their building,

much less the interest thereon, or even any of the construction contract money have not yet been paid. Not having paid a dollar for their construction, the freight rates have been lowered down to the limit, to divert freights from the S. M. R. Lines.

(3) Obstruction of Land-Lease Concession

China has once signed the treaty permitting the Japanese to lease land. By the exercise of this treaty, pieces of land in the interior may be leased to enjoy the benefit of development conjointly with the Chinese inhabitants. During these 16 years, China has resisted right along Japan's advances to agree upon detail arrangements regarding the land lease, turning the treaty provisions to a dead letter, at the same time issuing a number of unpublished laws obstructing enterprise by foreigners (including Japanese). Moreover, the Chinese land and house-owners having Japanese tenants have been locked up behind the bars for no other offence, and in a few outrageous cases, the offenders have been beheaded or shot, depriving by such indirect means the Japanese of the freedom of conduct of business.

(4) Pressure upon Trade and Industry

Because of the deferred solution of the Land Lease question the only area in which the Japanese may reside and carry on business or work with freedom is the mere narrow strip of land in the Railway Area. Because of good policing, not only the Japanese and Chinese, but also the Westerners have set up various industries in the Railway Area, creating modernly planned towns. The Chinese authorities, plotting to blockade the Railway Area economically, levied discriminate taxes and have hindered supply of raw materials, thereby obstructing foreign trade and industry. In one extreme case the Chinese authorities

egged on the ignorant Chinese peddlers to suspend the supply of vegetables to the Railway Area (Changchun) for a long period.

(5) Pressure on Forestry Enterprise

By the forest law, etc., China has tabooed the transfer of the concession to work a forest to foreigners and the contracting of a loan on the security of a forest, thereby practically denying the Japanese the privilege to work the forests, as acquired by the Treaty. In consequence, several Japanese firms have been compelled to suspend their work. What few of them still exist have been put in financial embarrassment mainly through Chinese Government's interferences and arbitrary taxes.

(6) Pressure Upon Korean Farmers

What floods of Chinese refugee-immigrants from the devastations of civil wars into Manchuria have been running since Japan entered South Manchuria is as above stated. At the same time, Koreans crossed the borders into Manchuria, principally North Manchuria, reclaiming swampy and other wild lands left in neglect by the Chinese who did not know what use to make of them. The Chinese in Manchuria being ignorant of how to raise rice, the paddy fields in Manchuria, now running up to 100,000 "cho" (or 250,000 acres) have all been reclaimed by the hardworking Koreans. The Chinese land-owners would watch the Koreans reclaim the wild land toiling and mowing, till after it is converted into fertile rice fields, then to persecute the Korean tenants to extort cereals from them, and to seize the rice-fields, the fruit of years' industry. Such outrages cannot be forgiven by God and man. This forms one of the chief pending items of Sino-Japanese negotiations.

(7) Pressure on Mining

The concession to work the Fushun Collieries was taken over by Japan from Russia. Since then ¥80,000,000 has been laid out. All modern equipments of engineering triumphs have been installed, the Collieries outputs furnishing good fuel for household and industrial uses for all people in Manchuria. The export tax on Fushun Coal was definitely fixed by agreement at the outset. China has, however, raised the tax one-sidedly up to two-and-half times the original amount. The Fushun Oil Shale Plant is pointed to by the Japanese with a just pride as another crystallization of engineering ingenuity and resources of the Japanese specialists. China has made an attempt to usurp even this industry, as their pet game has been to usurp the fruits of another's perseverance.

It is provided in the Sino-Japanese Treaty to work conjointly certain other mines along the S. M. R. Lines. The Liaoning Provincial Government has issued a notice to work the mines in the Province under joint government and private management, and has applied hard pressure to such mines as lie under Sino-Japanese management, denying permission to open maiden mines in terms of the Treaty provisions.

(8) All Japanese protests against these Chinese breaches of the Treaty privileges have been coolly ignored by China. Or they have been countenanced by anti-Japanese boycott under government connivances, never manifesting a whit of sincerity to settle any of the cases. Thus, the Japanese Consulate-General, Mukden, has on the tapis over 300 cases awaiting a solution, which fact has only abetted the contempt of Chinese Government and people to the Japanese.

In China there runs an old proverb, "Till the Yellow River

becomes clear", which corresponds to the Western saying: "Until the Greek Kalends". Like a fool, Japan has been waiting with amazing patience for a chance of a peaceful solution, but with China in the mood as described, Japan could never catch one.

What has Made the Chinese so Violently Anti-Japanese

The offensive utterances and conducts of Chinese Government and people of late to the Japanese cannot be possibly tolerated between any two nations in the civilized world. What has made China take such a provocative attitude in contempt of the simple international courtesies must be another riddle hard to solve to any sane mind.

Since the World's War, Japan has been situated internationally in rather an awkward situation. The Powers' opinions on the Sino-Japanese problems have been anything but strictly fair or just. At the international conferences, Japan has been forced to give way to China's contentions more than once. This has taught China to make the most of the Powers' support, and to nerve her to cry out loudly against Japan's aggression, while playing the part of the oppressed to fish for the Powers' sympathy. At the same time, Chinese Government has been fanning anti-foreign feeling at Japan's expense, partly to divert the people's attention from domestic affairs. This has served to the Military Government of China to head off the people's severe criticism of its despotic rule, while holding the antagonistic warlords under restraint. All these have been a well thought out intrigue between Head Chiang-chiehshih of Nanking Government and Marshal Chang-hsuehliang of the Northeast.

The success in setting up the so-called Revolutionary Government, synchronizing with the rupture of concert among the Powers in dealing with China, has swelled the heads of the two

War Lords, beclouding their judgment of Japan and her peculiar position in Manchuria and Mongolia. This has carried away both on the roaring current of fortune, to despise Japan and her people heartily.

Their delirious ravings and violences would not have stopped till Japan goes out of existence altogether.

Then, which country would step into Japan's shoes to keep up the tragedy?

The Sino-Japanese Clashes

For long years Japan has kept her patience, submitting to China in the Shantung problem, the extra'lity question, the Customs Autonomy issue, etc. She has respected the self-awakening of New China, showing her every good will, while discharging what obligations Japan considers as due to her neighbour in the matter of developing Chinese resources and advancing culture, to share the resultant benefits with the Chinese people. Japan feels proud of all these. China, however, has failed to come to her senses. On the contrary, she has gone from bad to worse. In recent years, the Chinese interferences with the S. M. Railway operations and the Japanese communications systems have been of alarming frequency. The persecutions of the Korean settlers in Manchuria have been kept up with increasing cruelty. The Northeastern army butchered Capt. Nakamura and party. As the climax, at dead of night on Sept. 18, the Northeastern army blew up the S. M. Railway track which constitutes the artery of Japan's vested interests in Manchuria, and moreover delivered a night attack on the Japanese Railway Guard, thereby openly throwing the gauntlet in Japan's face.

Moreover, the shipload of sympathy gifts collected from all

over Japan in relief of the flood victims was refused with supreme scorn before the world's eyes.

Deliberate Plot of Northeastern Authorities

The wrecking of the S. M. Railway track (near Mukden) by the Northeastern soldiers (Chinese) was an unbelievable outrage. But, anyone who has carefully followed how insolent the Chinese authorities and people have lately been to the Japanese will easily understand that the outrage was not made on the impulse of the moment. After the North Barracks (Mukden) were occupied by the Japanese troops, posters without number, all of strong anti-Japanese colour, were seen inside. One of them was inscribed: "Look at S. M. Railway Track running southwest of Barrack Yard!".

To Japan who has been praying for the peace of the Orient and been guided right along by her constant principle of Sino-Japanese solidarity, recourse to arms was highly distasteful, but the challenge hurled right into her face has convinced the Japanese people that the limit of forbearance would mean the collapse of the magnificent structure of modern culture and industry built up by the Japanese on tremendous capital during more than 20 years past. It would mean the throwing away of all Japan's concessions in Manchuria, to leave the one million of fellow countrymen (Korean settlers) under the lashings of the warlords' whips. It would mean the desecration of the ruddy blood shed by our seniors on Manchurian soil. It would mean a servile submission to outrage and injustice. It would also mean to stand by and look on the Orient turning to a scene of more bloody wars.

If such a thing could be forborne, what else could not be?

Such has been how the Japanese people have felt and do feel, and it also reflects the public opinion in Japan.

To S. M. R. Co. Servants

We, the servants of the S. M. R. Co., directly exposed to danger, have accepted as an act of selfdefence the activity of Kwantung Army in performance of its duty to protect the one million fellow countrymen, to safeguard Japan's jeopardized interests, and to redeem the country's prestige long dragged into the mire, and have supported the Army with all enthusiasm, hoping for a thorough hiding to be given the outrageous North-eastern army.

We admire the way the army has reapt the biggest fruit at the smallest sacrifice in only a couple of days, leaving no room for criticism by the League of Nations or a third Power as regards the army discipline.

We admire the Army's prowess in accomplishing the object of self-defence against the enemy 20 times as strong (the Chinese regulars then in Manchuria being estimated at 220,000 strong).

In particular, the strict discipline of the Japanese army, standing out in so striking a contrast with the Chinese soldiers no better than the hunghudze, has struck the Chinese people with wonder, teaching them to rely upon the Japanese soldiers as days go by, a fact to which we might point with pride.

At the news that the Japanese Army counselled Marshal Chang-hsuehliang, Peiping, to hurry home to Mukden to fix up everything, and to look after the peace and order, the Commercial and Industrial Guilds of Liaoning Province, branding the Marshal as a big swindler and robber, begged Lt.-Gen. Monjo, commanding the Kwantung Army, to prevent the Marshal's return. This shows how the Northeastern officialdom and people feel towards the Marshal.

We can also discern a patent drift in the public opinion in

the Northeast towards establishing a Self-Government for all Chinese. This also points to with what heartlessness the late Chang-tsolin and his heir and son, Marshal Chang-hsuehliang, have bled the honest, industrial Chinese white, and how heartily he is hated by them as the despotic sucker of their life-blood.

Our Hope to Chinese People

For the present unfortunate Sino-Japanese issue China must answer. We should like to advise the powers that be in China to own their error and respect international good faith and concert. Furthermore, we hope that for the sake of Manchuria and Mongolia and for their people, they will get rid of the greedy warlords and will start with a steady tread on the high road to racial solidarity by devoting their energies to the cultural and economic developments under a fair and just administration.

What we emphatically demand of the Chinese people is to respect Japan's Treaty rights and to remove the direct and indirect causes that have brought about the present clashes, to revert to their normal temperament, to awake to the stupidity to dance to the music of the despotic warlords, to find out who is their true enemy, and to cast off at once the wrong and idiocy of hating and doing violences to their good neighbours who give them no offence.

What We Expect of the Fair-minded World

What we expect of the fair-minded world is first to get familiar sufficiently with the intricate relation of Japan to Manchuria and Mongolia, and to the rest of China, so as to be in a position to pass a fair and correct judgment on the Sino-Japanese Clashes Issue.

Manchuria, like Mongolia, Hsinking and Tibet, lying on China's borders, is included in the so-called special zones, over which China has never exercised a perfect sovereign right. Neither has Manchuria ever been in perfect peace and order. The law abiding people in Manchuria have been kept under the merciless squeeze of the warlords, constantly terrorized by the armed and organized hunghudze.

Our S. M. R. Lines, with their mileage only less than 700 miles, have been molested by the hunghudze at the average rate of once a day.

Such is how things stand in Manchuria. But, even in Mongolia and China proper, matters are only a little better.

The Chinese call their country the "Middle Flowery Republic", but where the sovereign right is invested, in the matter of domestic administration, and also in her international relations, China can hardly be regarded as a State in its modern sense.

Lately in China, the warlords have been riding the high horse, driving anti-foreign movements, far "off their track" as the Western slang goes. Unblushing instances of international bad faith are charged against them without number. Part of the blame must be borne by the Powers who, instead of enquiring into the facts, are too ready to regard China to be on the same plane as themselves, often being misled by her clever propaganda, and have neglected to demand of China to render an account for her outrages and insolences behind the attractive name of the people's movements of New China.

If the Powers were to show sympathy to China's hysteric appeals, without probing the core of real China, and were to turn the head of this internationally "Spoiled Child", abetting her bad faith, and distrusting Japan and her people who have stood

loyally to the cause of the peace of the Orient and the world, the Japanese people might possibly not be able to hold themselves within restraint.

We shall hope again that the Powers will take the present opportunity to open a new epoch by correcting China in the name of justice and to bring China to her right senses by upholding righteousness.

On Our Attitude Once More

We shall close this article with stating that the Japanese people, though alive to the existing Sino-Japanese tension and the present clashes issue originating from the outrages of Nanking and Northeastern Governments, have not the slightest hostile feeling even to part of the Chinese people cutting anti-Japanese capers under the instigation of the Chinese authorities, loyally adhering to our fundamental principle of Sino-Japanese solidarity.

Enclosure No. 3 in despatch of Wm. R. Langdon, American Consul at Dairen, Manchuria,
dated November 17, 1931, on the subject "Transmission of Japanese Political Pamphlets".

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Incisive Analysis of Pending Manchurian Issue

Introduction

We feel most acutely a sad lack of understanding about the pending Sino-Japanese Manchurian issue on the part of the foreign peoples.

We hold the Manchurian questions as the key to the peace and war in the Orient.

We must eliminate the possible cause of war in the Far East and establish permanent peace.

The present seems to afford a fine opportunity for this.

Considering what influence will be exerted by the criticisms abroad over the proper solution of the pending issue, we are hoping for fair criticism, and knowing that a fair criticism must be based upon a good understanding of the matter in question, we beg to present this article for the reference of the foreigners in hopes of helping them to form a correct understanding of the question.

Question not to Aggravate the Situation

Ill-grounded Fear of Westerners

As the Sept. 18 night incident broke out, Tokyo Government declared its intention to work towards preventing the trouble from getting enlarged.

Notwithstanding, in the League of Nations and among the Westerners, at large, they seemed to think that it rested with Japan's discretion to prevent the situation from becoming aggravated.

To our mind, at the outset, China exaggerated the trouble in her clever propaganda, giving the impression to the Westerners that Japan had effected the military occupation of all Manchuria. Naturally, the Westerners conjured up, before their startled eyes, the nightmare that Japan seized Manchuria in breach of the League of Nations Pact, and the Nine Powers' Treaty, thereby provoking war in the Orient that might spread to another world war.

Alarmed at this nightmare, they jumped to the idea that they must first check Japan.

Such an idea came out of various misunderstandings.

Motive, Aim & Nature of Japanese Military Activity

The trouble was the upshot of the wrecking of the S.M.R. track and the night attack upon the Japanese Railway Guard by Chinese soldiers.

Japan had to answer for the safety of 2,000,000 Japanese subjects in Manchuria.

concern need be felt about a breach of its spirit or Covenant.

Never-the-less, misunderstandings still remain abroad.

To us, the wherefores for these misunderstandings might be traced:—

The world finds it the most difficult to understand that (1) The Japanese army in South Manchuria is only nearly one-thirtieth of the Chinese army; (2) What poor, degenerated material the Chinese authorities and soldiers are made of and how dangerously exposed the 2,000,000 Japanese subjects in Manchuria will be to fall victims to their cruelty and outrages; (3) How the Japanese concessions held in South Manchuria constitute Japan's very life line.

What Abet the Aggravation of the Situation

While Japan is trying to prevent the aggravation of the situation, event does not admit of an optimistic outlook.

There must be other causes for it.

Firstly, we hold China answerable for this.

We should like to point out that China's courses are aggravating the situation.

In China, for more than a dozen years, anti-Japanese movements have been carried on all over the country persistently and systematically. The school text-books are teeming with anti-Japanese clauses. Newspapers, magazines, and posters are full of bitter malice against the Japanese. The anti-Japanese boycott has been carried far beyond the bounds of encouraging domestic products.

All these are in pursuance of the anti-Japanese economic blockade with the intention of "starving" Japan out economically.

Apart from the outcome of this national campaign, in spirit, it is a hostile act, though without the use of arms. This should not have broken out before this.

It is owing to Japan's forbearance. Since the outbreak of the pending question, various anti-Japanese movements have become more furious. Demonstrations of anti-Japanese boycott, cries to declare war on Japan, the attitude of Chinese troops ready to attack the Japanese army, anti-Japanese counter-propaganda, and China's refusal of direct negotiations all work to aggravate the situation.

They not only render the solution of the issue the more difficult, but also remain a source of lasting turmoil in the Orient.

Next, want of knowledge of the Orient by the Westerners, and

the right lay of things, and the intervention of any party short of having a full grasp of the truths will only complicate matters. What make the same relations extremely intricate and delicate are chiefly owing to China's internal condition and the peculiar data surrounding Manchuria, which will now be rue over by us.

Peculiar Nature of China's Condition

China used to be a monarchy till it has become a republic recently. Lately, like Soviet Russia, she might be called to be under a uni-party government.

The change of form of government has, however, not altered the traditional custom of supremacy of the army and the Mammon. Government's authority is not respected. Few government laws are observed faithfully.

Under the uni-party government, where the government authority ends and the uni-party authority begins is not clear, and the uni-party government will make nothing of breaking the laws and taking all liberties with the people's person and property.

In these respects, China is different from a well-ordered State in the West. Without a good knowledge of these, to get at the truths of the practical problems in China is impossible.

Peculiar Nature of Manchuria

Manchuria used to be regarded as other than China's integral part from old.

Even, as late as the late Chang-tsolin's time (father of Marshal Chang-hsuehliang), it was a special district looked upon as not strictly China's integral part.

So were Tibet, Outer & Inner Mongolia, and Hsinkingang.

None of these special districts should be confounded with the integral parts of China.

Japan's Peculiar Relation to Manchuria

In this connection, Japan's special relation to Manchuria must be looked into.

When the Muscovite Russia got hold of Manchuria to get the strongest voice in the Orient, Japan, from her necessity to keep in existence, fought Russia, staking her very life and at a tremendous sacrifice. Kwantung Leased Territory and the running of the S.M. Railway Line were the fruits of her sacrifices. Since, by well sustained effort, she has built up in Manchuria the outermost line of her national defence and people's living. To-day, the relation of Manchuria to Japan has become bound up inseparably from the

from the struggle for supremacy among the warlords. If things were left alone, Japan's national defence and her people's living would be seriously menaced, and this has forced Japan's hand.

The above aim will never be accomplished, unless the dual fundamental principle—China's territorial integrity and the Equal Opportunity—are respected.

Japan's self-constituted task having to be carried on within the bounds of these dual fundamental principles, the volume of difficulty she is up against might well be imagined.

The crystallization of Japan's overcoming this difficulty has assumed the form of the so-called Japan's interests in Manchuria which are grounded on the Treaty. The protection of Japan's interests lies in getting China to respect this Treaty.

Once the history and nature of Japan's interests in Manchuria are learned, the reason why Japan attaches so much importance thereto may also be understood.

Japan's interests having thus originated under such peculiar circumstances in such special district of China, any critic who regards China as an ordinary State, and looks upon Manchuria as a perfectly integral part of China will be hindered from seeing Japan's interests in Manchuria and her actions thereanent from the correct angle.

The core of these peculiar interests being so intricate and delicate, the intervention of a third party will not only hinder solving the question, but, on the contrary, will entangle the complications worse.

This is why Japan firmly sets her face against a third party's intervention.

Why China Dislikes Direct Negotiation

China is afraid that Japan, with her aggressive military backing, will advance her demands.

However, for a truth, China is seeking a settlement favourable to herself by playing upon the dangerous half-knowledge of conditions in China and in Manchuria on the foreigners' part.

Nanking Government presumed that any solution of the issue, if worked out upon the assumption that China were a well-ordered State, and Manchuria a perfectly integral part of China, would be to advantage to China, seeking to take a mean advantage of the foreigners' want of information.

Groundless Fear of the Occidentals

Question of Japan's Troops Withdrawal

Why Japan Cannot Name a Date for Unconditional Withdrawal

The withdrawal of the Japanese troops to within the S.M. Railway Area is taken for the primary condition towards a solution of the pending issue among the Western Powers.

No doubt, the Powers had been severely shocked at the first news of the Japanese military activity before they could learn that it was only in self-defence. They jumped to the wrong conclusion that Japan had started to take a slice of China's territory, horrified at the spectre of another world war. Naturally they thought it imperative to check Japan by making her withdraw her troops.

Since they became informed that the Japanese army only acted in self-defence, that her force in Manchuria was within the bounds allowed by the Treaty, and further that what troops were kept outside the Railway Area were only in a small number.

This knowledge ought to have undeceived the Powers. Nevertheless, the Powers cannot apparently get away from investing the matter with importance, seeing that, at the League Council sessions, this subject was always emphasized.

Especially, at the meeting on Oct. 24, while failing to assume the form of a resolution because of Mr. Yoshizawa's firm opposition, the hope of the overwhelming majority to Japan to start the withdrawal at once and to conclude it by Nov. 16 (1931) was put on record.

The Powers appear inclined, if possible, to compel Japan to effect the desired withdrawal within a specified time. On the other hand, Japan was opposed to it from start to finish.

It is not because Japan objects to the withdrawal proposition, but to naming a date therefor.

Why? Because the peculiar condition in Manchuria forces her to do so.

By the League Council proposition, the Chinese army is to take delivery of the Japanese occupied points as the Japanese troops are withdrawn, and to make special provisions to protect the Japanese at once.

The Powers should know that the Chinese troops, at least in the Northeast, are no better than the insurgents or hunghudze who overrun Manchuria.

If, as matters stand, the Japanese troops were to be withdrawn

China Incapable of Protecting Japanese

Why Japan Cannot Rely on China's Word

The Japanese troops withdrawal is always associated with China's responsibility to protect the Japanese life and property. The Powers seem to think that since China is ready to answer for it, Japan ought to trust China and do as requested.

Such an idea is another offspring of want of information.

The authority and orders of Chinese Government are far from respected and obeyed in China, as they are in a Western country. The Government is powerless. The police are more in name. The Chinese soldiers are as bad as the hunghudze.

Then, the Nationalist Headquarters people will set the existing laws at naught to outrage the innocent Chinese and Foreigners. The Japanese in Tientsin, Shanghai, Nanking and at other Yangtze points have been compelled to withdraw under the threats and menace that could not be ignored.

Nanking Government, afraid of being taken to task by the League Council, is willing enough to control the anti-Japanese demonstrations, but is sadly wanting in power.

Especially in Manchuria left to the mercy of hunghudze, the Chinese authorities are merely looking on helplessly, and the protection of the Japanese by them is an absolute impossibility.

No matter what a holy vow may be repeated by Dr. Alfred Sze at Geneva, the real value of such vows must be too obvious to anyone familiar with the true state of affairs.

Conclusion

We have already explained how want of information about the peculiar condition obtaining in China, particularly in Manchuria, is chiefly responsible for the foreigners' impossibility to pass a right opinion as regards the pending issue.

With a good hold upon the truths in China and in Manchuria, Japan's stand will be understood better, and a fair view of the case will be possible.

Of course, interests clash between Japan and China in many respects. Such is only natural in any two countries contiguous to each other.

However, there lies the high road running between the two countries demanding mutual interdependence.

Introduction

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Motive, Aim & Nature of Japanese Military Activity

Once the truths are known, all misgiving against Japan aggravating situation seems uncalled for. Any territorial ambition on Manchuria on Japan's part is out of question. It will be as plain as a pikestaff that the Japanese military operations have nothing to do with either the Nine Powers' Treaty or the Warless Pact. With the League of Nations, not the slightest

What Abet the Aggravation of the Situation

We should like to point out that China's courses are aggravating the situation.

Japanese boycott, cries to declare war on Japan, the attitude of Chin-

ese troops ready to attack the Japanese army, anti-Japanese counter-propaganda, and China's refusal of

On the other hand, Japan declined intervention by the League of Nations or any other third party, insisting upon Sino-Japanese direct negotiations.

Why Japan insists upon this point is because the Sino-Japanese relations are too intricate and delicate for any third party to get

ernment's authority is not respected. Few government laws are observed faithfully.

Under the uni-party government, where the government authority ends and the uni-party authority

In these respects, China is different from a well-ordered State in the West. Without a good

an, from her necessity to keep in existence, fought Russia, staking

her very life and at a tremendous sacrifice. Kwantung Leased Territory and the running of the S.M. Railway Line were the fruits of

Therefore, Japan has hit upon the happy plan by which, while accomplishing her own aim, she might build up a country in which she may share the benefit with the others.

Japan has been driven to formulate such plan, because firstly China has no power to defend her own territory. Secondly, the country is in ceaseless disorder

The protection of Japan's interests lies in getting China to respect this Treaty.

Once the history and nature of Japan's interests in Manchuria are learned, the reason why Japan

of China, any critic who regards China as an ordinary State, and looks upon Manchuria as a perfect-

Nanking Government presumed that any solution of the issue, if

worked out upon the assumption that China were a well-ordered State, and Manchuria a perfectly integral part of China would be

It must be understood that these five fundamental principles not only redound to Japan's good, but also to the common good of both Japan and China, serving to perpetuate the peace between the two countries.

Question of Japan's Troops Withdrawal

horrified at the spectre of another world war. Naturally they thought it imperative to check Japan by

This knowledge ought to have undeceived the Powers. Never-the-

delivery of the Japanese occupied points as the Japanese troops are

withdrawn, and to make special provisions to protect the Japanese at once.

assured that her interests in Manchuria are adequately protected and the safety of her subjects is guaranteed, but not before that.

That the League Council should have kept demanding Japan's withdrawal of her troops, ignoring Japan's reasons, must be a mistake arising from overrating the Chinese soldiers and authorities, as if they were equal to their counterparts in the West.

China Incapable of Protecting Japanese

Chinese soldiers are as bad as the hunghudze.

Then, the Nationalist Head-

Nanking Government, afraid of being taken to task by the League Council, is willing enough to con-

an's stand will be understood better, and a fair view of the case will be possible.

Of course, interests clash between Japan and China in many respects. Such is only natural in

by China's propaganda, they will take an unbiased survey of how things stand in China and in Manchuria, what the past of Manchuria has been and how it lies at present, and how China and Japan stand to each other, so that they may be able to pass a correct judgment on the case under notice, and will take the trouble to guide events in the direction of a proper settlement of the question.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (F)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Sturtz NARS, Date 12-18-75

满洲日报 特别英文号

Manshu Nippo Special English Edition

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DAIREN, FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 1931

(本報附張第一號)

本報附張第一號

Incisive Analysis of Pending Manchurian Issue

Introduction

We feel most acutely a lack of understanding about the pending Sino-Japanese Manchurian issue on the part of the foreign peoples.

We hold the Manchurian questions as the key to the peace and war in the Orient.

We must eliminate the possible cause of war in the Far East and establish permanent peace.

The present seems to afford a fine opportunity for this.

Considering what influence will be exerted by the action abroad over the proper solution of the pending issue, we are hoping for fair criticism, and knowing that a fair criticism must be based upon a good understanding of the matter in question, we beg to present this article for the reference of the foreigners in hopes of helping them to form a correct understanding of the question.

Question not to Aggravate the Situation

Illegitimized Fear of Westerners

As the Sept. 18 night incident broke out, Tokyo Government declared its intention to work towards preventing the trouble from getting enlarged.

Notwithstanding, in the League of Nations and among the Westerners, at large, they seemed to think that it rested with Japan's discretion to prevent the situation from becoming aggravated.

To our mind, at the outset, China exaggerated the trouble in her clever propaganda, giving the impression to the Westerners that Japan had effected the military occupation of all Manchuria.

Naturally, the Westerners conjured up, before their startled eyes, the nightmare that Japan seized Manchuria in breach of the League of Nations Covenant, the Warlord Pack, and the Nine Powers' Treaty, thereby provoking war in the Orient that might spread to another world war.

Alarmed at this nightmare, they jumped to the idea that they must first check Japan.

Such an idea came out of various misunderstandings.

Motive, Aim & Nature of Japanese Military Activity

The trouble was the upshot of the wrecking of the S.M.R. track and the night attack upon the Japanese Railway Guard by Chinese soldiers.

Japan had to answer for the safety of 2,000,000 Japanese subjects in Manchuria.

Later on, as it was found that the blowing-up of the railway track by the Chinese soldiers had not been made on the impulse of the moment, but had been part of a systematic plot to destroy all Japan's vested concessions in South Manchuria, as conceived and planned out by the highest Chinese authorities in the Northeast, Tokyo Government was forced to spend careful consideration regarding the protection of Japan's interests.

The Japanese military activity has self-defence for its motive and the protection of the Japanese subjects for its aim. In nature, it is the exercise of the right of self-defence, and nothing more.

Throughout, the Japanese military operations in South Manchuria have never overstepped these bounds.

Once the truths are known, all misgiving against Japan aggravating situation seems unravelled. For any territorial ambition on Manchuria on Japan's part is out of question. It will be as plain as a plaid that the Japanese military operations have nothing to do with either the Nine Powers' Treaty or the League of Nations, not the slightest

concern need be felt about a breach of its spirit or Covenant.

Never-the-less, misunderstandings still remain abroad.

To us, the undersigned for these misunderstandings might be traced—

The world finds it the most difficult to understand that (1) The Japanese army in South Manchuria is only nearly one-thirtieth of the Chinese army; (2) What poor, degenerated material the Chinese authorities and soldiers are made of and how dangerously exposed the 2,000,000 Japanese subjects in Manchuria will be to fall victims to their cruelty and outrages; (3) How the Japanese concessions held in South Manchuria constitute Japan's very life line.

What Ahet the Aggravation of the Situation

While Japan is trying to prevent the aggravation of the situation, even does not admit of an optimistic outlook.

There must be other causes for it.

Firstly, we hold China answerable for this.

We should like to point out that China's courses are aggravating the situation.

In China, for more than a dozen years, anti-Japanese movements have been carried on all over the country persistently and systematically. The school text-books are teeming with anti-Japanese clauses. Newspapers, magazines, and posters are full of bitter malice against the Japanese. The anti-Japanese boycott has been carried far beyond the bounds of encouraging domestic products.

All these are in pursuance of the anti-Japanese economic blockade with the intention of "starving" Japan out economically.

Apart from the outcome of this movement, the Chinese are declaring a hostile act, though without the use of arms.

It is a lesson that we should not have taken out before this. It is owing to Japan's forbearance.

Since the outbreak of the pending question, various anti-Japanese movements have become more furious. Demonstrations of anti-Japanese boycott, cries to declare war on Japan, the attitude of Chinese troops ready to attack the Japanese army, anti-Japanese counter-propaganda, and China's refusal of direct negotiations all work to aggravate the situation.

They not only render the solution of the issue the more difficult, but also remain a source of lasting turmoil in the Orient.

Next, want of knowledge of the Orient by the Westerners, and particularly the courses followed by the League of Nations have become more furious. Demonstrations of anti-Japanese boycott, cries to declare war on Japan, the attitude of Chinese troops ready to attack the Japanese army, anti-Japanese counter-propaganda, and China's refusal of direct negotiations all work to aggravate the situation.

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At the same time, the feelings between the two peoples have become all the more strained. The evil result of the anarchical condition in Manchuria have multiplied, whilst the relations between the two contiguous countries have become more enmeshed, all helping to make things worse.

Question of Sino-Japanese Direct Negotiations

Why Japan Insists upon Direct Negotiations

China, from the start, appealed to the League of Nations for intervention or interference.

On the other hand, Japan declined intervention by the League of Nations or any other third party, insisting upon Sino-Japanese direct negotiations.

Why Japan insists upon this point is because the Sino-Japanese relations are too intricate and delicate for any third party to get

the right lay of things, and the intervention of any party short of having a full grasp of the truths will only complicate matters. What makes the same relations extremely intricate and delicate are chiefly owing to China's internal condition and the peculiar data surrounding Manchuria, which will now be run over by us.

Peculiar Nature of China's Condition

China used to be a monarchy till it has become a republic recently. Later, like Soviet Russia, she might be called to be under a unitary government.

The change of form of government has, however, not altered the traditional custom of supremacy of the army and the Manchu. Government's authority is not respected. For government laws are observed faithfully.

Under the unitary government, where the government authority and the military authority begins is not clear, and the unitary government will make nothing of breaking the laws and taking all liberties with the people's person and property.

In these respects, China is different from a well-ordered State in the West. Without a good knowledge of these, to get at the truths of the practical problems in China is impossible.

Peculiar Nature of Manchuria

Manchuria used to be regarded as other than China's integral part from old.

Even, as late as the late Changtsoin's time (father of Marshal Changchuehshang), it was a special district looked upon as not strictly China's integral part.

So were Tibet, Inner Mongolia, and Sinkiang.

None of these special districts should be confounded with the integral part of China.

Japan's Peculiar Relation to Manchuria

In this connection, Japan's special relation to Manchuria must be looked into.

When the Muscovite Russia got hold of Manchuria, it was the strongest voice in the Orient, Japan, from her necessity to keep in existence, fought Russia, sinking her very life and at a tremendous sacrifice, Kwantung Leased Territory and the running of the S.M.R. Line were the fruit of her sacrifices. Since, by well sustained effort, she has built up in Manchuria the outermost line of her national defence and people's living. To-day, the relation of Manchuria to Japan has become bound up inseparably from the existence of the home-country.

This is why Manchuria is regarded as Japan's life line.

However, Japan is not after her own gain only. She is hoping to share the resultant benefit with the Chinese inhabitants and other residents in order to set up a zone of joint labour and enjoyment.

Such a plan might sound rather meddling with part of a neighbour-country's territory. Still, the recent events in China have driven Japan to conceive such plan.

Japan is perfectly aware that any idea to annex Manchuria would create a fresh cause of war in the Orient, and run further ahead at her own interest.

Furthermore, she knows as well that it is also against the well-being of the Orient for Japan to aspire either political or economic monopoly in Manchuria.

Therefore, Japan has hit upon the happy plan by which, while accomplishing her own aim, she might build up a country in which she may share the benefit with the others.

Japan has been driven to formulate such plan, because firstly China has no power to defend her own territory. Secondly, the country is in ceaseless disorder

from the struggle for supremacy among the warlords, if things were left alone, Japan's national defence and her people's living would be seriously menaced, and this has forced Japan's hand.

The above aim will never be accomplished, unless the dual fundamental principle—China's territorial integrity and the Equal Opportunity—are respected.

Japan's self-constituted task has to be carried on within the bounds of these dual fundamental principles, the volume of difficulty she is up against tonight will be limited.

The crystallization of Japan's overcoming this difficulty has assumed the form of the so-called Japan's interests in Manchuria which are grounded on the Treaty. The protection of Japan's interests lies in getting China to respect this Treaty.

Once the history and nature of Japan's interests in Manchuria are learned, the reason why Japan attaches so much importance there to may also be understood.

Japan's interests having thus originated under such peculiar circumstances in such special district of China, any critic who regards China as an ordinary State, and looks upon Manchuria as a perfectly integral part of China will be hindered from seeing Japan's interest under such peculiar circumstances therefrom the correct aspect.

The core of these peculiar interests being so intricate and delicate, the intervention of a third party will not only hinder solving the question, but on the contrary, will entangle the complication worse.

This is why Japan firmly sets her face against a third party's intervention.

Why China Dislikes Direct Negotiation

China is afraid that Japan, with her military backing, will advantage an inordinate demand to annex Manchuria. Therefore, she is seeking a settlement favourable to herself by playing upon the ignorance and self-knowledge of conditions in China and in Manchuria on the foreigners' part.

Nanking Government presumed that any solution of the issue, if worked out upon the assumption that China were a well-ordered State, and Manchuria a perfectly integral part of China, would be to advantage to China, seeking to take a mean advantage of the foreigners' want of information.

Groundless Fear of the Occidentals

The foreigners still appear to entertain more or less misgiving about China's insisting upon direct negotiation. They seem to share China's fear that Japan might make some tall demand with her military backing.

To clear this misgiving, the Cabinet Council, Tokyo, on Oct. 26 laid down the five fundamental principles and published them as follows—

(1) Each to withhold from trespassing on the other's territory; (2) stoppage of anti-Japanese movements and anti-Japanese education; (3) to confirm the right of the Japanese to reside and to carry on the commerce and agriculture in Manchuria; (4) to respect China's territorial integrity; (5) respect of all existing treaties.

Not stoppage of anti-Japanese movements and anti-Japanese education; (3) to confirm the right of the Japanese to reside and to carry on the commerce and agriculture in Manchuria; (4) to respect China's territorial integrity; (5) respect of all existing treaties.

The so-called Japan's concessions being contained in these demands, what misgiving is held about foreigners is utterly without ground.

It must be understood that these five fundamental principles not only redound to Japan's good, but also to the common good of both Japan and China, serving to perpetuate the peace between the two countries.

Question of Japan's Troops Withdrawal

Why Japan Cannot Name a Date for Unconditional Withdrawal

The withdrawal of the Japanese troops to within the S.M. Railway Area is taken for the primary condition towards a solution of the pending issue among the Western Powers.

No doubt, the Powers had been severely shocked at the first news of the Japanese military activity before they could learn that it was only in self-defence. They jumped to the wrong conclusion that Japan had started to take a slice of China's territory, horrified at the spectre of another world war. Naturally, they thought it imperative to check Japan by making her withdraw her troops.

Since they became informed that the Japanese army only acted in self-defence, that her force in Manchuria was within the bounds allowed by the Treaty, and further that what troops were kept outside the Railway Area were only in a small number.

This knowledge ought to have undeceived the Powers. Nevertheless, the Powers cannot apparently get away from investing the matter with importance, seeing that, at the League Council sessions, this subject was always emphasized.

Especially, at the meeting on Oct. 24, while failing to assume the form of a resolution because of Mr. Yoshizawa's firm opposition, the hope of the overwhelming majority to Japan to start the withdrawal at once and to conclude it by Nov. 16 (1931) was put on record.

The Powers appear inclined, if possible, to compel Japan to effect the desired withdrawal within a specified time. On the other hand, Japan was opposed to it from start to finish.

Why? Because the peculiar condition in Manchuria forces her to do so.

By the League Council proposition, the Chinese army is to take delivery of the Japanese occupied points as the Japanese troops are withdrawn, and to take provisions to protect the Japanese at once.

The Powers should know that the Chinese troops, at least in the Northeast, are no better than the insurgents or hungnads who overrun Manchuria.

If, as matters stand, the Japanese troops were to be withdrawn at once, to give room to the Chinese soldiers, the latter would take a devilish advantage of the exposed state of the Japanese troops to attack the latter and to take the butchery and other outrages to the Chinese and Koreans.

Then, there would be no guaranty that the victims would be the Japanese soldiers and people only. Good, innocent Chinese would also suffer in consequence, as might be easily understood.

The Chinese executive authorities are little better in material as everyone conversant with them knows.

Tokyo Government, knowing this only too well, cannot possibly agree to withdraw its troops under whatever pressure. The sense of responsibility to its people forbids it.

Japan will effect the demanded withdrawal as soon as she feels assured that her interests in Manchuria are adequately protected and the safety of her subjects is guaranteed, but not before that.

That the League Council should have kept demanding Japan's withdrawal of her troops, ignoring Japan's reasons, must be a mistake arising from overrating the Chinese soldiers and authorities, as if they were equal to their confederates in the West.

China Incapable of Protecting Japanese

Why Japan Cannot Rely on China's Word

The Japanese troops withdrawal is always associated with China's responsibility to protect the Japanese life and property. The Powers seem to think that since China is ready to answer for it, Japan ought to trust China and do as requested.

Such an idea is another offspring of want of information.

The authority and orders of Chinese Government are far from respected and obeyed in China, as they are in a Western country. The police are more in name. The Chinese soldiers are as bad as the hungnads.

Then, the Nationalist Headquarters people will get the existing laws at naught to outrage the Chinese and Foreigners.

The Japanese in Tientsin, Shanghai, Nanking and at other Yangtze points have been compelled to withdraw under the threats and menace that could not be ignored.

Nanking Government, afraid of being taken to task by the League Council, is willing enough to control the anti-Japanese demonstrations, but is sadly wanting in power.

Especially in Manchuria left to the mercy of hungnads, the Chinese authorities are merely looking on helplessly, and the protection of the Japanese by them is an absolute impossibility.

No matter what a holy vow may be repeated by Dr. Alfred Sze at Geneva, the real value of such vows must be too obvious to anyone familiar with the true state of affairs.

Conclusion

We have already explained how want of information about the peculiar condition obtaining in Manchuria is chiefly responsible for the foreigners' impossibility to pass a right opinion as regards the pending issue.

With a good hold upon the truths in China and in Manchuria, Japan's stand will be understood better, and a fair view of the case will be possible.

Of course, interests clash between Japan and China in many respects. Such is only natural in any two countries contiguous to each other.

However, there lies the high road running between the two countries demanding mutual interdependence.

This high road must be seen by the intelligentsia of each country to guide their people forward to the common goal.

This is the very way to mutual solidarity and to peace in the Orient.

Nanking Government's present policy to Japan is to shut its eyes against the reality, and is only playing before the Chinese people only the points where the mutual interests clash.

Under such abnormal condition, no harmonious intercourse can ever be expected between the two countries.

We fervently pray that the powers that be in China will open their eyes to the existence of the high road, above referred to, and lead the Chinese people forward on that road.

Again, our appeal to the Powers is that, without being led astray by China's propaganda, they will take an unbiased survey of how things stand in China and in Manchuria, what the past of Manchuria has been and how lies at present, and how China and Japan stand to each other, so that they may be able to pass a correct judgment on the case under notice, and will take the trouble to guide events in the direction of a proper settlement of the question.

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by NSA on 08-06-2013 pursuant to E.O. 13526, dated 08-01-75

1844

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RADIOGRAM



December 11, 1931.

9:30 A.M.



From Peiping,
To The Adjutant General

CONFIDENTIAL

Number 309. December 11th.

Military Attache reports from Chinchow (Fengtien) Chinese troops
not moving although preparing for defensive action in case of attack by Ja-
panese.

Tenney.

793.94

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

Declassified by d. Phillipsman on May 3, 1973
NARS Date Mar 1973


JUN 4 1932

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F/DE 793.94/3192

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS



December 8, 1931.

S/H:

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I have consulted with Major Crane about the two telegrams hereunder and we agree:

(1) That the telegram from Colonel Margetts, December 7, 6 p.m., (Peiping's 1056, December 8, 2 p.m.,) in which Margetts reports a statement of the foreign military observers at Chinchow, including the American Military Attaché from Tokyo, is to be understood to mean that these observers had personally checked the units of the Chinese forces in the Chinchow area (approximately 20,000), particularly those of the 19th and 20th brigades and the 13th artillery regiment which were reported by the Japanese headquarters at Mukden to be at Fakumen (to the north of Mukden?); and that the observers had found that these forces were, as they have previously been supposed to be, in the immediate vicinity of Chinchow and have not, as claimed by the Japanese headquarters, been moved to Fakumen.

(2) That the telegram from Colonel McIlroy, of the Tokyo Embassy, (Peiping's 1055, December 8, 1 p.m.) who had come from Mukden to join Margetts at Chinchow, is to be understood to mean that the Japanese military reports of recent movements of Chinese regular troops were wholly incorrect; that Margetts and other military attachés

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
attachés from Peiping had continually checked the Chinese units; that he himself had personally checked and counted many of the units since his arrival; and that Chinchow and vicinity were absolutely quiet.

The two telegrams above referred to confirm the previous reports from Colonel Margetts to the effect that there was "absolutely no troop concentration or other movement by the Chinese" in the Chinchow area and that there had "been no change in the disposition of the Chinese troops this area since withdrawal of Japanese troops to Hsinmin and Liao River". (See Peiping's Nos. 997, November 25; 1017, November 28; 1030, December 2; 1040, December 4 and 1047, December 7, copies and summary attached.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

RECEIVED



DEC 9 1931

SECRETARY'S OFFICE

Colonel Margetts, reporting from Chinchow, has repeatedly since November 25 reported that the situation was quiet and no evidence of an increase of Chinese forces in that area. (See Peiping's 997, November 25; 1017, November 28; 1030, December 2.)

On December 3 (Peiping's 1037) Colonel Margetts reported that all Japanese forces had been transferred east of the Liao River "except 300 for guard **duty** at Hsinmin and to patrol railway between Hsinmin and Paikipu". (This statement was later confirmed in Peiping's 1040, December 4.)

On December 3 (Peiping's 1040) Colonel Margetts reported that "our observers passed three times between here and Tahushan December 2, 11 a.m., in special trains reporting absolutely no troop concentration or other movement by the Chinese".

On December 6 (Peiping's 1047) Colonel Margetts again telegraphed from Chinchow that there had "been no change in the disposition of the Chinese troops this area since withdrawal of Japanese troops to Hsinmin and Liao River".

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 462.00 R 296 A/71 FOR MEMO.

FROM State Department
Under Secretary (Castle) DATED Dec 10, 1931.
TO NAME 1-1127 o.p.

REGARDING:

Manchurian situation.

Discussion of - with the German Ambassador in which he was informed that the Japanese felt that the Chinese had not played the game fair because Chinese troops had ^{not} been withdrawn from the neutral zone.

793.94/3194

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JS

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone.

FROM

PEIPING

Dated December 15, 1931

Rec'd 6:14 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington, D.C.

PRIORITY

1079, December 15, 3 p.m.


Legation is reliably informed that young marshal
left this morning secretly for Nanking by aeroplane.

Repeated to Nanking

For the Minister

PERKINS

JS



F/DEW 793.94/3195

DEC 18 1931

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 500. A 15 A 4/625 FOR MEMORANDUM.

FROM State Department (Miller) DATED October 21, 1931.
TO Division of Far NAME 1-1172 ...
Eastern Affairs

REGARDING:

Manchurian situation.
Memorandum prepared by Mr. Dooman in which he points
out that the - constitutes a serious problem for
the section of the Japanese public which favors
reduction of armaments.

hs

793.94/3196

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.101-Tientsin/1 FOR Tel.#- 1 pm.

FROM Tientsin (Lockhart) DATED Dec.10,1938.
--TO-- NAME 1-1127 070

REGARDING: Relations between local Chinese and Japanese officials
at Tientsin: Resignation of Changsh Ming as Mayor of
Tientsin will contribute to a better understanding
between these officials. Further on situation.
(Copy attached)

fpg

793.94/3197

MET

BRAY

Tientsin via N.R.

Dated December 10, 1931

Rec'd 7:08 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington

December 10, 1 p.m.

The following telegram has been sent to the
Legation:

"December 10, noon. The resignation of Changeh Ming as Mayor of Tientsin, or rather his alleged extended leave of absence which has been granted, gives promise of contributing to a better understanding between the local Chinese and Japanese officials. Well founded rumors have been current here for some time that the relations between the Mayor and provincial chairman Wang have not been entirely harmonious. Chow Lung Kwang, who was educated in Japan and speaks Japanese, has been appointed acting Mayor and Wang I. Min has been appointed acting Commissioner of Public Safety. All departmental chiefs and senior staff members in Mayor's office and Bureau of Public Safety have tendered their

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-Tientsin via N.R., December
10, 1931

their resignations to enable new officials to effect
reorganization. Conditions are steadily becoming
more normal and Chinese refugees are gradually return-
ing to Chinese city.

Repeated to Department and Nanking."

LOCKHART

WSB

185

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RADIOGRAM

December 8, 1931.

1:45 P.M.

793.94

From Peiping, China,
To The Adjutant General.

CONFIDENTIAL

Number 307. December 8th.

Report from adviser to Chang Hsueh-liang received radio from T. V. Sung dated 5th stating that negotiations for neutral zone in Chinchow (Fengtien) area were expected to break down. That in such event Japanese attack was probable and that Chang Hsueh-liang should resist so far as possible with force available.

Trains to and from this city still held up by students who are demanding free transportation to Nanking and crying down with Chang Hsueh-liang. Evidence that students demands are being met.

Chang Hsueh-liang and Nanking suffering from lack of funds and popular support.

Tenney

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

NARS Date

1973

793.94/3198

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON

In reply refer to No.
Op-16-E-12

8 December 1931.



The following dispatch, dated 8 December 1931, was received from the Naval Attache, Peiping:


"Strongly rumored Japanese advance southward on Chinchow imminent. 30000 Chinese forces there, ordered by Nanking to resist but no reinforcements these troops contemplated. Japanese planes daily reconnoitering Chinchow district. Japanese marines withdrawn Tientsin replaced by 350 soldiers from 77th Infantry recently in Mukden. Students demanding war and free transportation to Nanking have disrupted railway communications past week between Peiping Tientsin and Fukow. Non payment for several months northeastern Chinese army causing serious concern officials this army. If Japanese advance southward it is probable Chinese forces will retreat and throw North China in complete chaos. Lack of coordination between various elements north of Yellow River will contribute to this state. Japanese repeatedly declaring that Chang-Hsueh-liang must be driven out before negotiations can take place.

793.94/3199

793.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RADIOGRAM



December 9, 1931

9:30 A.M.


From Tokio

To The Adjutant General

CONFIDENTIAL

Number 201

Dec. 9th



Following from McIlroy at Chinchow "December 7th

Japanese military report claiming recent forward movement
Chinese regular troops wholly incorrect; American and other
military attaches from Peking are continuously checking units
and I have personally checked and counted many units. Chin-
chow and vicinity absolutely quiet. I am going to Tientsin
tomorrow. General Staff thinks bandits are same as soldiers.
Also no intention of sending reinforcements from Japan in
case of attack on Chinchow. It appears that military author-
ities desire to start offensive but long delay further orders
ing influence in Tokyo. Press still predicts early

Cranford

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

NARS Date

Mar 19,
1973

793.94/3200

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR

Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

December 12, 1931.

TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

AMERICAN EMBASSY

DEC 12 31

TOKYO (JAPAN).

265
CONFIDENTIAL.

793.94/A
Repeat to the American Consul, Nanking, for
confidential information of the Minister, Department's
262, December 11, 9 p.m., omitting (a) texts of,
Nanking's telegrams of November 24 and December 8 and
(b) final paragraph of ~~your~~ ^{the} instructions concerning
the special ~~message to~~ ^{talk with} Shidehara.

Johnson is being instructed to make corresponding,
explanations and representations to the Chinese Minister
for Foreign Affairs.

Stinson

FE:RSM:EJL

FE

Dec. 12, 1931

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 711.61/233 FOR #347

FROM Lithuania (Fullerton) DATED Nov. 19, 1931
TO NAME 1-1127 ...

REGARDING: Manchurian situation.
Conversation with Michael Karsky, Soviet Minister to Kovno,
who stated that his Govt. would not consider except under
most provocative circumstances a declaration of war upon
Japan as a result of her activities in Manchuria. He believes
that if Japan is able to annex Manchuria she will then turn her
attention to conquest of the Philippines.

793.94/3201

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM PL..IN

Peiping via N. R.

Dated December 15, 1931

Rec'd 1:10 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1078, December 15, 9 a. m.

Legation's 1077, December 13, 4 p. m.

The following statement was issued on the night of
December twelve by Marshal Chang Hsueh Liang:

"Japanese press correspondents at Shanghai report
that the Japanese military authorities there have issued
a statement to the effect, despite the withdrawal of
Japanese troops to the east of the Liao river, my troops
in cooperation with General Ma Chian Sahn have menaced
the Japanese rear and in addition have been disguised as
bandits to molest Japanese troops. They threaten that
unless the Chinese troops in Chinchow are withdrawn
within the Great Wall a very serious situation will be
created in the near future.

If certain Japanese military authorities did make
that statement then the project is to mislead the world
in order that the last vestige of the authorities of the
Chinese Government may be driven out of Manchuria as
has



F/DEW 793.94/3202

FILED
JAN 2 1932

REP

2- #1078, from Peiping, Dec. 13, 9 am

has been frequently threatened in the immediate ~~Past~~ ⁿ ~~Past~~.

The Council of the League of Nations knows perfectly well that the old allegation that I was concentrating troops at Chinchow is untrue and the neutral official observers know that there has been no movement of Chinese troops calculating to aggravate the situation in any way nor have the Chinese authorities utilized bandits. The observers know however how widespread banditry has been instigated and they know also how Chinese have been threatened previously. If there are now any serious developments around Chinchow full responsibility for them will rest upon Japan."

For the Minister

~~(n)~~ ~~apparent omission~~

WSB

11

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

December 31 1981.

Prentiss B. Gilbert, Esquire,
 American Consul,
 Geneva, Switzerland.

Sir:

The Department encloses for your information and for transmission to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, for his very discreet use, confidential as to source, a summary of certain telegrams received by the Department bearing on the Manchuria situation. The Secretary-General should not disclose the names or designations of persons mentioned in these messages.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

JAMES GRAFTON ROGERS

793.94/3203

793.94/3203

Enclosure (in duplicate):
 Summary of telegrams.

CR
 DEC 28 1981 P.M.
 12 1981

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12/19/31

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Summary of certain telegrams bearing on
 the Manchuria situation.

793.94/3126/
 1. In telegrams dated December 8, the American Consul General at Harbin reports that the Japanese Consul has informed him that the first plane of a Japanese commercial air service between Mukden and Harbin will arrive at Harbin on December 9. It appears that the commercial aspect is a blind to cover aviation activities of the Japanese Army.

General Ma Chan-shan, who has about 10,000 soldiers in the Koshan-Hailun region, is pressed for funds. Japanese will make efforts to induce him to take over the military affairs of Heilungkiang Province.

Publicity and financial representatives of the South Manchuria Railway are visiting Harbin and Tsitsihar, both of which places are coming more and more under Japanese military occupation.

793.94/3165
 2. In a telegram dated December 10, from Mukden, the American Consul General states that he feels, from conversations which he has had with the Japanese Consul, that certain Japanese military authorities not only desire but have planned, pending its complete organization, to exercise supervisory functions over and protect from aggression the proposed independent Manchuria-Mongolia Government. Meetings of interested Chinese, Mongolians and Japanese and the general attitude of the press and officials at Mukden are all evidences of the movement for an independent republic of Manchuria and Mongolia. The Consul General feels that the movement is not spontaneous and would collapse without Japanese military support. He adds that the expression of foreign objection or the early convening of a Chinese-Japanese conference

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

conference is the only means to prevent the forming of the new republic.

793.94 / 3182

3. In a telegram dated December 12, the American Consul General at Mukden states that invitations have been sent out under the name of Yuan Chin-kai to Chang Ching-hui at Harbin and Hsi Chia at Kirin to come to Mukden on December 20 to confer in regard to the establishment of a Central Government in Manchuria.

793.94 / 3203

4. In a telegram dated December 15 from Feiping, the Counselor of the American Legation states that the Japanese have strengthened their garrison at Shanhaikwan.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

FROM

PLAIN

Peiping via N.R.

Dated December 15, 1931

Rec'd 10:20 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington


1080, December 15, 6 p.m.

Following from Reuter, Mukden, December 12:

"The Japanese authorities here state that General Ma Chan Shan, the defender of Anganohi and Tsitsihar, has consented to meet General Chang Chin Hui, Governor of Harbin, and Japanese nominee for the chairmanship of the Government of Heilungkiang. The meeting is to take place at Hulan north of Harbin and the two will discuss the formation of a Heilungkiang Government.

According to official sources the Mayor of Mukden, Mr. Chao Chin Po, has requested the Japanese on behalf of the suffering people to send troops to suppress bandits both east and west of the Liao River, no limits to Japanese operations are suggested.

The stoppage of traffic on the Peiping-Mukden Railway yesterday



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MET

2-#1080 from Peiping via N.R.,
December 15, 1931.

yesterday is now known to have been due to the transportation of one thousand tons of railway sleepers by the Japanese military authorities.

It is learned that the Japanese troops in the vicinity of Hsinmintun have dismantled the Chinese telegraph office there taking away all the machinery and rendering the station useless. Hsinmintun had been used for sending messages to other parts of China and abroad, without them being subject to Japanese censorship the dismantling of the Hsinmintun station means that all messages from Mukden must go out either through the Japanese imperial post office established in the Japanese section of Mukden or else through the Chinese telegraph office here where they will also be subject to Japanese censorship as the Chinese office is under Japanese control".

For the Minister,

WSB

PERKINS

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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THIS COPY FOR STATE DEPARTMENT.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


NAVY DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON

In reply refer to No.

Op-16-B-13



10 December 1931.

The following was received from the Naval Attache Peiping.

Reported that Japanese Charge d'Affaires Yano has intimated to Young Marshall that Shidehara will allow Young Marshall to remain in North China if he will consent to direct negotiations. Marshall said to have refused unless so directed by Nanking. Reliably reported that T. V. Soong has promised Young Marshall 2 divisions and a chief of staff parenthesis name unknown parenthesis for use in resisting possible Japanese advances southward. This to placate Young Marshall who is displeased at Nanking non-support of him. Reported Japanese on 9 December bombed and attacked with machine guns small towns North Kuopangtze. Japanese have constructed landing field outskirts undoubtedly for military use.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

File
8/1
October 7, 1931.

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8-10-1931
S. K. H.

The Japanese Ambassador told the Secretary on September 24, 1931, when the subject was brought to his attention by the Secretary, that he (the Ambassador) would "communicate with his Government and let me know."

The Department's instruction to Tokyo on this question was sent on October 3. Tokyo's reply, dated October 5, stated that the Vice Minister "would look into the question of the wireless station and the reasons, if any, why it is kept idle."

Is there not danger of over-emphasizing this question of the radio station in which our interests are indirect rather than direct; and if the question is to be taken up again at this time would it not be better to follow up the promise made by the Ambassador to the Secretary on September 24?

Rm
FE:RSM:EMU
[initials]

793.94/3207

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

REP

FROM

Geneva

Dated December 15, 1931

Rec'd 11:30 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

315, December 15, 9 a. m.

Drummond asked me to call on him late yesterday afternoon. He discussed the present status of the Sino-Japanese question with particular reference to paragraph five of the Council's resolution of December 9th which provides for the appointment of a commission. He covered the following points:

One. The present program is that the Commission will be comprised of one national each of Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and if the United States Government acquiesces of a national of the United States. A national of a smaller power might be added in which case no objection is seen to the increase, if necessary, of the number of commissioners to six. The question appears to be not so much, which small power may be selected but rather the obtaining of a competent individual from among the smaller powers regardless of nationality.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEC 21 1931

DIVISION OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

tel to Paris.

12.17.31

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DEC 15 1931

Department of State

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2- #315, from Geneva, Dec.15,9 a.m.

nationality.

Two. Drummond, at the direction of the President of the Council, is undertaking the work of arranging for the membership of the Commission and other details connected therewith.

Three. The British, French, German, and Italian Governments are suggesting a limited number of names from their respective nationals from whom selections may be made.

Four. Drummond gained the impression from Ambassador Dawes that the United States would be favorable to one of its nationals serving.

Five. Briand and Drummond are giving thought to Walker D. Hines as the American member. as it is felt that his qualifications would make him particularly suitable. In connection with Hines, it is felt that his services would be valuable respecting the railroad problems involved and also from the fact that men with other special qualifications will probably be selected from among the other nationalities.

Six. If an invitation to Hines to serve is favorably regarded by the United States Government it would be issued at once. Drummond points out, however, that time would be saved

REP

3- #315, from Geneva, Dec. 15, 9 a.m.

saved if the United States Government could sound Hines out to determine if he is prepared to serve.

Seven. Any other suggestion on the part of the United States Government would, of course, be welcome.

Eight. It is planned that the Commission proceed to Manchuria about the middle of January and the probable duration of its labors is estimated at nine months. I understand that the only terms of reference for the Commission are those to be inferred from the Council resolution of December 9 and the "President's declaration" of the same date.

I am transmitting the foregoing as statements made to me by Drummond. It is obvious that he expects an answer to the implied questions. I would appreciate instructions.

GILBERT

KLP
WSB

1874

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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PREPARING OFFICE
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PLAIN

Department of State

1931 DEC - 17 - PM 7:02 Washington,

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
December 17, 1931.

793.94/3208

6pm

American Consul,
Geneva, (Switzerland.)

135 / 3208
Your No. 315, December 15, 9 a. m.

This Government has no objection to the
appointment of Mr. Walker D. Hines on the League Com-
mittee to investigate the situation in Manchuria. The
Department has communicated with Mr. Hines confidentially,
who says that the matter interests him greatly, ^{but} that he ^{will}
has not yet received the formal invitation, ~~and that~~ He
fears other work he now has in hand might make it impos-
sible for him to accept, ^{but} should the invitation reach him,
he will give it most careful consideration.

793.94/3208

U WRC/AB

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Enciphered by _____
Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____




AM RECD



LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Riga, Latvia.

December 4, 1931.

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FOR DISTRIBUTION - CHIEF		Yes	No
To the Field			
In U. S. A.			

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

No. 8231

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my telegram No. 52, of November 21, 4 pm, 1931, and to report that the existing situation in ^{the} three cornered situation in the Far East in Manchuria has become the subject of considerable interest in the Riga diplomatic corps. The Japanese

DEC 19 1931
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-2-

Japanese Charge d'Affaires, Mr. Sugishita, continues to keep the Latvian Foreign Ministry currently informed of the Japanese official point of view and, for a person of his nationality in his calling, is surprisingly ready to talk about the matter. The local German language daily, the RIGASCHER RUNDSCHAU, on November 17, 1931, carried an interview with him, translation of which is enclosed. 1/ Mr. Sugishita has stated that the interview was not sought by him and that it is very incomplete - "the most important things having been left out."

The subject of the attitude of the United States toward the Japanese military advance and increase of control in Manchuria has been brought up in conversation with me by the Polish Charge d'Affaires who seemed to derive evident satisfaction from his own view that "the American Government would probably not interfere decisively in favor of China," as he put it, and later inquired directly whether I thought my Government would, or would not, "restrain" the Japanese. My reply was, of course, entirely evasive.

The meaning of this interest of the French, Polish, and Rumanian representative here in the present Manchurian conflict appeared clearly from a recent conversation of several of them with a member of the staff of this Legation, in which the hope was openly expressed that the Japanese would come into violent conflict - war, even - with Soviet Russia, that this would provide, at last, a golden opportunity for war against Russia from this side and the "end of the Bolshevik regime." The enclosed translation of what purports to be a reproduction of an article by one Studnicki in a recent issue of the Polish newspaper SLOWO summarizes the attitude. 2/

The

-3-

The Latvian officials, and the Riga press, except for the article forwarded in my despatch No. 8283, of December 4, 1931, have been very reserved on the matter. ³²¹⁰

It is of interest that a Japanese Military Attache was assigned to Riga and presented himself here on June 10th, last. The staff of the Japanese Legation here consists of the permanent Charge Mr. Yujiro Sugishita (stationed at one time at Moscow), a Secretary, Mr. Jiro Otania, the Military Attache Captain of Infantry Saketo Kawamata (whose only apparent foreign language is Russian), and a "Chancelleriste", Mamotsu Kirooka. The Minister accredited to Latvia is Mr. Yukichi Obata, Minister at Berlin. No representation is maintained at either Kovno or Tallinn.

The Legation is informed that the Japanese Legation in Riga was reestablished mainly for the purpose of providing a skeleton organization which is to take up the work of the Japanese Embassy in Moscow should relations between Japan and Russia be broken. The Riga Legation shows but slight interest in Latvian affairs and at present most of its work consists in relaying mail and telegrams between Moscow and Tokyo.

Respectfully yours,

Felix Cole

Felix Cole
Charge d'Affaires a.i.

Enclosures:

1. The Japanese-Chinese Conflict in Manchuria. RIGASKE RUNDSCHAU, November 17, 1931.
2. The Poles Praise Japanese Arms. RIGASKE RUNDSCHAU, November 17, 1931.

3 Carbon Copies

FC/mhg

Received *[Signature]*

Copy to American Embassy, Tokyo, via Department.

Copy...

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-4-

Copy to E.I.C., Paris.

Copy to American Embassy, Warsaw,

Copy to American Embassy, London.

In triplicate to Department.

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 8231
of December 4, 1931, from Legation
at Riga.

SOURCE: RIGASCHE RUNDSCHAU,
No. 259,
November 17, 1931.

THE JAPANESE-CHINESE CONFLICT IN MANCHURIA

(Translation)

- zd - The Japanese Charge d'Affaires in Latvia, Wushiro Sugishita, has given the following details to our reporter:

"Without doubt the Japanese-Chinese conflict in Manchuria is one of the most important world events at the present time. I must declare that many of the reports in the European press, emanating from Chinese sources, have given an entirely false picture of the situation. The origins of the conflict are naturally known generally. When it is stated that the conflict has become more aggravated recently it must be said that Japan is doing everything possible to settle it. Nevertheless the Chinese Government continues to carry on a Manchuria policy which can only result in making the situation worse. Japan has no political aims in Manchuria and would settle the controversy at any time if China would recognize Japan's just and legal demands. Japan has troops only in the railroad zones, which are subject to protection, and in the neighborhood of such zones. In all there are 14,000 Japanese soldiers in Manchuria whose duty it is to assure the safety of life and property of Japanese subjects.

Present circumstances in Manchuria are due in large measure to the existing general hatred of foreigners in China. A number of groups of the Chinese population are waging

-2-

waging a lively propaganda against foreigners and agitate against them in an unbelievable fashion. The boycott of foreign merchandise is being carried through with severity - there have even been cases in which the death penalty has been exacted for breaking the boycott. The Chinese government should not support such agitation. Japanese troops in Manchuria have recently had many conflicts with Chinese bandits and deserters.

There have been many recent reports in the last few days concerning Chinese-Japanese battles for the Ponni River bridge. This railroad belongs to the Chinese but was built by Japanese money derived from long term credits. This line is one of the principal routes of the soya bean trade. The interruption to traffic on the line, due to the blowing up of the bridge over the Ponni River, has caused Japanese industry gigantic losses. The reconstruction of the bridge is therefore of the greatest interest to the Japanese. As soon as the repairs are finished the Japanese troops will withdraw to their previous location. Japan herself has the greatest possible interest in a speedy solution of the Manchurian conflict, for China is one of Japan's principal customers. Large amounts of Japanese capital are invested in Manchuria and also in other regions of China. For instance, in Shanghai 2,000 million* Yen are invested in 50 textile plants. About 1 million Japanese now live in Manchuria.

I do not believe that any differences of opinion will arise between Japan and Soviet Russia because ^{of} events in Manchuria. There is not the slightest ground for believing that

* (?)

-3-

that we could injure Soviet Russian interests in North Manchuria. In addition, the Japanese Government has ordered that no Chinese Separatist leaders are to be supported because Japan has no intention whatever of interfering in the internal affairs of China. Also, Japan has not and will not support any Russian White Guardists, either in Manchuria or elsewhere.

A large number of Latvian citizens live in Manchuria. -"

In reply to the question as to whether Soviet Russia is gathering troops along the Manchurian frontier the Charge d'Affaires replied that the director of the foreign affairs of Soviet Russia has informed the Japanese Government that this is not the case. All Japanese political parties fully and completely approve of the measures taken by the government in Manchuria.

Enclosure No. 2 to despatch No. 0291
of December 4, 1931, from Legation
at Riga.

SOURCE: RIGASCHER RUNDSCHAU,
No. 259,
November 17, 1931.

THE POLES PRAISE JAPANESE ARMS

(Translation)

WARSAW, November 12. The Polish newspaper SLOWO
prints an article worthy of serious attention, written
by the well known publicist Studnicki, and which gives
an indication of the hopes nourished in Poland in connection
with the East Asiatic conflict. The article says:

"The Polish point of view must be the following;

"Bolshevik Russia is a large country that nurses
destructive plans directed against our civilization.
Russia is an extreme danger to Poland/^{and}to Russia's European
neighbors. Should this danger be destroyed by Japanese
arms then we would praise those arms just as we greeted
the Japanese victory in 1905."

The article, written by a leading Polish publicist,
will presumably have a prompt repercussion in the Soviet
press.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75



AM LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Riga, Latvia.



December 4, 1931.

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EASTERN EUROPE AFFAIRS
DEC 15 1931
COPY TO THE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
DEC 15 1931
Department of State
Copy in FE

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FOR DISTRIBUTION - CHECK		Yes	No
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In U. S. A.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

No. 0203

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

1/ I have the honor to enclose a translation of
an article by one William Blumberg, which appeared in
the local Riga German language newspaper "Rigasche
Rundschau," issue of November 24, 1931, dealing with
the prevailing situation in Manchuria and certain

possible

DEC 21 1931

FILED

-2-

2/ possible repercussions in Europe. I also enclose the original German text. Blumberg is of Riga German-Jewish extraction but travels a great deal throughout Europe writing free lance articles on political subjects.

Respectfully yours,

Felix Cole

Felix Cole,
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

✓
Enclosures:

1. Russia-Japan-Poland-Ourselves.
(Riga RIGISCHE RUNDSCHAU, (German), No. 264,
November 24, 1931.)
2. Original copy of the foregoing article.

(In quintuplicate.)

Copy to E.I.C., Paris.

Copy to E.I.C., Paris for Tokyo.

Copy to American Embassy, Warsaw, direct.

Copy to American Embassy, Berlin, direct.

FC/hs

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 0200 of DEC 4 1931
 from the Legation at Riga, Latvia.

SOURCE: Riga RIGASCHE RUNDSCHAU,
 (German),
 No. 264,
 November 24, 1931.
 Page 1.

RUSSIA -- JAPAN -- POLAND -- OURSELVES.

By William Blumberg.

(Translation.)

Below we reproduce an article that without doubt is of considerable interest. We cannot verify the author's assumption that sundry states cherish certain political aspirations. We leave the responsibility for this to the author.

The Editor.

Owing to the battles around Tsitsihar, Japan has come dangerously near a serious conflict with the Soviets. As heretofore, the League of Nations views the Japanese advance disapprovingly, and admonishes and tries to mediate. So far as one can see various individual governments are doing the same. But it seems to be a fact that certain private influences are at work in an opposite direction.

It appears that in certain quarters efforts are being made contrary to the official attitude of the League of Nations to increase the resistance of the Japanese. There are people who -- actuated by business considerations or implacable hatred of the Soviets -- long for an armed clash between Japan and the U.S.S.R. Sundry comments in the anti-soviet press bear out this assumption. Some reports from Paris even surmise that
 what

-2-

what is happening in the Far East has been under preparation for some time past and that ~~tity~~ ~~have~~ not come unexpectedly to certain circles.

If this is the case, the loosing of the war fury in Eastern Asia would indeed fulfill one hope: certain interested parties in France, America, and elsewhere, would make big war profits. It is a different question whether a war would bring Bolshevism to its knees, and make the Five-Year Plan collapse. It should not be overlooked that this time, in distinction to 1904, Japan would have to fight not only the Russians, but China also. Russia would no longer be obliged to transport armies and supplies over huge distances. Russia would furnish war stores and military guidance, while China would supply the man power.

As regards numbers, Japan will be tremendously handicapped. And how will it be in regard to war stores? God knows! We may safely assume that Russian military industry compares much more favorably with Japanese than in 1904. The five-year plan has already produced concrete results, — in this sphere certainly more than in any other respects.

The next war will be a war in the air and a gas war. The Soviets know that very well, they are preparing for it, and their aviation technique has achieved notable advances. The way to Tokyo from Eastern Siberia is just as long or as short as the way from Tokyo to Eastern Siberia. But if the Japanese military fliers want

-3-

want to advance to the west, they will have to cover thousands of miles before they could do any material damage. The Russians on the other hand need not go far beyond the borders of their own country in order to turn thickly settled industrial Japan into a heap of debris by gas and incendiary bombs.

Not to mention the fact that if there is war the League of Nations and the Kellogg Pact would cease to exist. But the friends of the idea that through the instrumentality of Japan Bolshevism might be throttled, tamed and punished, should bear in mind that the secession of nationalistic China from Moscow, which has been brought about with great difficulty, would be neutralized through the common front of Moscow and China. And further, that the hegemony of the Soviets in China would be firmly clinched in a formal alliance between the two countries. Chinese have plenty of ambitions. They already have a ten-year plan of their own, and it is a plan that deserves attention. And it is not difficult to imagine what the Bolsheviks might make out of China with its natural wealth and the vastness of its man power. Anybody who encourages Japan and pours oil, as it were, on the Japanese military fire, should think of the consequences. Always provided that a person who welcomes and stimulates war is at least capable of logical thinking.

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-4-

But there is no cause for alarm. There will hardly be any war, and in the end the hopes of the war enthusiasts will not come true. The responsible governments will probably recognize the possible consequences and the risk much more clearly than the press of the former allies of Russia, which in its hankering after red scalps, preaches freedom of action for Japan. But since there is that tendency, it might not be amiss to further elucidate the eventual consequences of a danger which for the time being has only been outlined here theoretically, as it were.

In an article sent to the VOSSISCHE ZEITUNG from Warsaw certain tendencies [of opinion] are mentioned according to which a possible Japanese-Russian clash should be utilized to start a Polish preventative war against Russia. In 1904, Pilsudski and the present Polish Ambassador in Washington, offered Japan the aid of revolutionary Poland. But Roman Dmowski discredited them very thoroughly and the alliance did not come to pass. Referring to those events, the correspondent writes about Polish bellicose tendencies, the most prominent protagonists of which are the deputy of the Polish Sejm, Mackewicz, and Professor Studnicki -- both of them belonging to the Pilsudski camp (Mackewicz has recently traveled in Russia, and described these travels in a book which has attracted great attention.) In a leading editorial Professor Studnicki has expressed the hope that "1904 may repeat itself." But while some of Pilsudski's disciples
vociferate

-5-

vociferate in this way, Pilsudski himself is profoundly silent. Dmowski, now the leader of the Polish opposition, is, as in 1904, absolutely averse to embarking upon so dangerous an adventure.

Poland has in its time greatly sinned against the national sentiments of the Germans, Russians, and Ukrainians, and it has lived ever since in fatal expectation of a reaction that in natural law is bound to come. For this Poland, the idea of a war of prevention in the near future against the feverishly growing power of the Soviets, must indeed be enticing. But much less so for France, which is much threatened itself and without whose support Poland could never hope for any success.

It is certainly very difficult to gauge the purely military chances of a war on the Russian western frontier. It may be taken for granted that Poland, as well as Russia, has developed considerably in a military respect since 1920, but the Russians to a much greater extent and more rapidly than the Poles. Poland, apart from this, has organized minorities within its territory, whose sympathies are with the Ukraine and with White Russia. On the other hand, it would be useless self-deceit if the Poles were to rely upon the anti-government dispositions of the Russian rural population. On the contrary, collectivization has actually strengthened the political and military position of the Soviets. If in no other way, at least by a rigid organizational welding together ^{the} of/work and production of the rural population. To say nothing

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nothing of the fairly favorable prospects opened out before the collectivized peasants as a consequence of the agrarian reorganization and the concomitant increase of production and rise of the cultural level.

One thing is sure — for Poland at any rate — that there is no certainty as to the outcome of a military demarche against the Soviets. Even if Germany remains neutral, it is quite possible that the Poles will be definitely overthrown at the Russians' first onslaught. Massed cooperation of cavalry, columns of tanks (every tractor being a potential tank), and the airfleet, may be expected on the part of the Russians. And lastly, there is more than a sufficiency of social fermentation in Poland — and partly even further west. And if it is to be a real war, these circumstances will prove a powerful ally to the Soviets. If Pilsudski should feel inclined to stake all on one card, and once more risk the Sovietization of Poland, this might lead to social upheavals that would be little pleasant to the rest of Europe.

* *
*

It is difficult to forecast what would be the position of the Baltic states should be in the event of a Polish-Russian conflict. Lithuania's attitude seems to be predestined by the Vilna problem. As regards Latvia, whose frontier is contiguous with Poland and with Russia, it will be just as difficult, to foresee, since

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since it is of vital interest for her to preserve her neutrality. Even in the event of the greatest possible reservation, Latvia's geographical position would put her under a heavy strain. And if we were eventually successful in avoiding the danger of military occupation, and of becoming a theater of war, our economic life would most likely be doomed to a complete chaos. Our Foreign Office has therefore every reason to do as much as it can to encourage sobriety in Warsaw. One thing must be made perfectly clear to the Poles to meet all possible emergencies: Latvia, if she wants to remain Latvia, can not make war against Russia a second time. The situation has changed too radically in the past 15 years (and more especially in the more recent years).

js/hs

Rußland — Japan — Polen — Wir

Von William Blumberg.

Im nachstehenden bringen wir unseren Lesern einen Artikel, der ohne Zweifel ein starkes Interesse beansprucht. Ob die Annahme gewisser politischer Bestrebungen in einigen Staaten auf Tatsachen beruht, können wir nicht nachprüfen. Wir müssen die Verantwortung dafür dem geschätzten Verfasser überlassen. Die Schriftleitung.

Durch die Kämpfe um Mittailar ist Japan in bedrohliche Nähe eines ernstlichen Konfliktes mit den Sowjets gelangt. Der Völkerbund verhält sich zum japanischen Vormarsch nach wie vor ablehnend, mahnt und vermittelt. Ebenso, soweit bekannt, die einzelnen Regierungen. Dagegen scheint es Tatsache zu sein, daß gewisse private Einflüsse in der umgekehrten Richtung wirken.

Im Gegensatz zur offiziellen Haltung des Völkerbundes versucht man anscheinend von mancher Seite, den Japanern den Rücken zu steifen. Es gibt Leute, die — sei es aus geschäftlichen Erwägungen oder unversöhnlichem Haß gegen die Sowjets — eine bewaffnete Kollision zwischen Japan und der UdSSR herbeiführen. Dafür sprechen verschiedene Kommentare der sowjetfeindlichen Presse. Manche Pariser Berichte gehen sogar von der Vermutung aus, daß die Ereignisse im Fernen Osten von langer Hand vorbereitet worden und für gewisse Kreise nicht unerwartet gekommen seien.

Sollte dies der Fall sein, dann würde die Entfesselung eines Krieges in Ostasien wohl eine Erwartung erfüllen: gewisse Interessenten in Frankreich, Amerika und sonstwo werden an Kriegslieferungen schwer verdienen. ... Anders sieht es mit der Frage, ob der Krieg den Bolschewismus auf die Knie zwingen und den Fünfjahrplan zum Scheitern bringen kann. Es darf nicht übersehen werden, daß diesmal, zum Unterschied von 1904, Japan nicht nur gegen die Russen, sondern auch gegen China Krieg führen muß. Rußland wird es nicht mehr nötig haben, Armeen und Verpflegung über große Entfernungen zu transportieren. Es wird das Material und die Führung, China die Menschenmassen liefern.

In bezug auf die Masse wird also Japan ungeheuer unterlegen sein. Und wie wird es mit dem Material stehen? Wer weiß! Man darf ruhig annehmen, daß die Kriegsindustrie Rußlands heute bedeutend besser als 1904 den Vergleich zur japanischen aushält. Der Fünfjahrplan hat bereits konkrete Ergebnisse gebracht — auf diesem Gebiete sicherlich mehr wie auf allen übrigen.

Der nächste Krieg wird ein Luft- und Gaskrieg sein. Das wissen die Sowjets, sie bereiten sich vor und ihre Aviationstechnik hat bereits Hervorragendes geleistet. Von Sibirien ist der Weg bis Tokio ebenso lang oder kurz wie umgekehrt. Wenn die japanischen Flieger aber nach dem Westen vordringen, werden sie über Tausende von Meilen streifen müssen, bevor sie wesentlichen Schaden anrichten können. Die Russen dagegen brauchen sich gar nicht weit von ihrer Heimat zu entfernen, um das dicht bestedelte industrielle Japan durch Gas- und Brandbomben in einen Trümmerhaufen zu verwandeln.

Daß Völkerbund und Kellogg-Pakt durch den Krieg in die Brüche gehen würden, davon sei hier ganz abgesehen. Für die Freunde der Idee, daß der Bolschewismus durch Japan gedroht, gezähmt oder gelyhtigt werden könnte, müßte aber die Ueberlegung von Wert sein, daß die mit Mühe gelungene Ablenkung des nationalistischen China von Moskau durch die gemeinsame Front wieder gegenstandslos werden, die Hegemonie der Sowjets in China durch einen formellen Waffenbund feste Wurzeln schlagen würde. In Ambitionen fehlt es den Chinesen bereits heute nicht. Ihren Fünfjahrplan haben sie schon entworfen und — er läßt sich sehen. Was die Bolschewiken aus China mit seinem Natur- und Menschenreichtum machen können, das dürfte nicht schwer sein, sich auszumalen. Wer Japan in seinem Vorhaben irgendwie ermuntert, seinen Militärs Del in ihr Feuer schüttet, der hätte sich die Folgen überlegen sollen. Wenn jemand, der zum Krieg ermuntert, die Fähigkeit des Ueberlegens überhaupt besitzt.

Man kann sich beruhigen. Es wird wohl nicht zum Krieg kommen, die Hoffnungen der Kriegsenthusiasten werden schließlich nicht in Erfüllung gehen. Die verantwortlichen Regierungen dürften die Konsequenzen und das Risiko klarer erkennen, als die für Japans Elbogenfreiheit eintretende, sich auf eine rote Schlagjagd einrichtende Presse der ehemaligen Verbündeten Rußlands. Da die Tendenz aber vorhanden ist, so mögen die weiteren Konsequenzen der zunächst theoretisch gegebenen Gefahr weiter dargelegt werden.

In einer Korrespondenz der „Voss. Zeitung“ aus Warschau wird von Bestrebungen gesprochen, den eventuellen japanisch-russischen Zusammenstoß für einen polnischen Präventivkrieg gegen Rußland auszunutzen. 1904 boten Rußland und der jetzige polnische Vorkämpfer in Washington Japan die Hilfe des revolutionären Polens an. Sie wurden

"Rigasche"

Rundschau

14.1.1911

indessen von Roman Dmowski nachdrücklich desavouiert und das Stadium zum nicht zustande. An diese Ereignisse anknüpfend, berichtet der Korrespondent von militanten Stimmungen in Polen, als deren lauteste Wortführer der Abgeordnete Mackiewicz und Professor Studnicki — beide zum Pilsudskilager gehörig — auftreten (Mackiewicz hat vor kurzem Rußland bereist und hierüber ein aufsehenerregendes Buch veröffentlicht). Professor Studnicki sprach in einem Zeitungsartikel die Hoffnung aus, „die Situation von 1904 möge sich erneuern“... Während einige seiner Zuhörer derart laut sprechen, hält sich Pilsudski selbst in tiefes Schweigen. Dmowski, jetzt Führer der polnischen Opposition, verhält sich, wie 1904, dem gefährlichen Abenteuer gegenüber durchaus ablehnend.

Polen hat sich seinerzeit gegen das nationale Gefühl der Deutschen, Russen und Ukrainer schwer verständigt und es

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lebt seither in der fatalen Erwartung einer Reaktion, die mit naturgesetzlicher Sicherheit einmal fällig werden muß. Für dieses Polen dürfte der Gedanke an einen baldigen Präventivkrieg gegen die im Fiebertempo steigende Macht der Sowjets gewiß verlockend sein. Weniger für das minder gefährdete Frankreich, ohne dessen Unterstützung ein Vorgehen Polens keine Aussicht auf Erfolg haben kann.

Schwer ist es sicherlich, die rein militärischen Chancen

eines Krieges an der russischen Westgrenze abzuschätzen. Vorausgesetzt werden darf, daß sowohl Polen als auch Rußland seit 1920 sich militärisch bedeutend weiterentwickelt haben, die Russen jedoch in weit größerem Umfange und rapidem Tempo als die Polen. Letzteres hat obendrein mit organisierten Minoritäten zu tun, deren Sympathien nach Ukraine und Weißrußland gerichtet sind. Es wäre dagegen ein eitler Selbstbetrug, wenn die Polen auf eine regelungsfeindliche Gesinnung der russischen Landbevölkerung bauen würden. Die Kollektivierung hat — umgekehrt — die politische und militärische Stellung der Sowjets objektiv gestärkt. Allein schon durch die straffe organisatorische Zusammenfassung des Dorfes, seiner Arbeit und Produktion. Von den recht günstigen Perspektiven, welche die Agrarumwälzung und die damit verbundene Produktions- und Kulturhebung den Kollektivbauern eröffnen, ganz abgesehen.

Sicher bleibt, daß — für Polen jedenfalls — bei einem militärischen Unternehmen gegen die Sowjets nichts sicher ist. Selbst wenn Deutschland neutral bleibt, ist es durchaus möglich, daß die Polen mit durchschlagender Wucht bereits im ersten Anlauf von den Russen überrannt werden. Ein massiertes Zusammenwirken von Reiteret, Panzersonnen (jeder Traktor ist ein potentieller Tank) und Luftflotte ist russischerseits zu erwarten. Schließlich gibt es sozialen Gärungs- und Bündstoff in Polen — und auch weiter zum Westen hin — übergenug. Im Ernstfalle haben die Sowjets hierin einen mächtigen Bundesgenossen. Wenn Pilsudski geneigt sein sollte, alles auf eine Karte zu setzen und die Sowjetisierung Polens nochmals zu riskieren, so birgt die Aussicht gefährlicher sozialer Erschütterungen für das übrige Europa wenig Anziehendes in sich.

Die Lage der Baltischen Staaten im Falle eines polnisch-russischen Konfliktes, ist nicht schwer zu übersehen. Litauens Stellungnahme wäre durch die Wilnafrage vorausbestimmt. Für Lettland, das gemeinsame Grenzen mit Polen und Rußland besitzt, wird es ebenso schwer wie lebenswichtig sein, seine Neutralität zu bewahren. Selbst bei größter Zurückhaltung würde seine geographische Lage es unter starkem Druck halten. Gelänge es uns schließlich, den Gefahren des Kriegsschauplatzes und der Okkupation auszuweichen, so wäre unser Wirtschaftsleben allenfalls einem vollendeten Chaos preisgegeben. Unsere Außenpolitik hat dabei allen Anlaß, in Warschau nach Möglichkeit ernüchternd zu wirken. Für alle Eventualitäten muß den Polen eines klargemacht werden: Gegen Rußland wird Lettland, wenn es solches bleiben will, nicht ein zweites mal im Kriege stehen können. Dafür hat sich die Lage in den verfloßenen 13 Jahren (und ganz besonders in den letzten Jahren) zu radikal geändert.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By MILAN O. DUTSCHEN NARS, Date 12-18-75

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



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


LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Riga, Latvia.

December 4, 1931.

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No. 8268

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that some of the Soviet newspapers have continued, with varying zeal, the attack upon the United States, in connection with the Japanese-Chinese conflict, which was noticed in the Legation's despatch No. 8268, of November 27, 1931. Of the several surmises as to the possible motives actuating the Soviet authorities in making this attack,

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the last mentioned in paragraph 2, page 3, of that despatch, appears to be the most consistently displayed. The United States is at a safe distance, and an attack upon it may be thought to be a plaster for Soviet hurts.

The Moscow IZVESTIA has remained silent since the outburst on November 24, noted in the above cited despatch.

1/ The Moscow PRAVDA took a wide detour in its editorial of November 25, but managed to return to the subject of Washington and Paris, as "centers of a provocative campaign" and as playing "a particularly hideous role in this criminal provocative game."

2/ The Moscow ECONOMIC LIFE, of the same date, merely echoed the attack of the IZVESTIA and PRAVDA of November 24, as did the Moscow TRUD No. 320, of November 26.

3/ The Moscow PRAVDA on November 28 made a historical and strategic excursus into Japanese-American relations, mentioned the books of General Graves, Scott Nearing and Joseph Freeman, reverted to the Legge wheat purchases, and then returned to the American Secretaries of State, who "have never missed a chance of getting hold of some prey or another on the occasion of some international complication," and the present Secretary in particular. At the end of October, the PRAVDA sets forth, he arrived at a threefold plan, which may be read on pages 10-12 of the enclosure. Briefly, the Moscow PRAVDA expanded the

-3-

the attack of November 24.

4/

On December 1 the PRAVDA padded the theme with statistics, and on December 2, in a lengthy editorial on the "policy of French imperialism," found that "Paris has become one of the most important centers of the European reaction; along with Washington, it is an organizer and skirmisher of a new war, an organizer and instigator of all the interventionist plans against the U.S.S.R."*

A sketch map of a part of Manchuria, printed in the same issue, appeared under these headlines:

Concentration of Japanese forces at Tsitsihar.

Preparation of the ground for action in the region of the station Manchuli.

Respectfully yours,



Felix Cole,
Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

Enclosures:

1. A New Sharpening of the Imperialistic Conflicts of Interest.
(Moscow PRAVDA, No. 324, November 25, 1931.)
2. Preparing for a New War.
(Moscow ECONOMIC LIFE, No. 268, November 25, 1931.)
3. The Diplomacy of War.
(Moscow PRAVDA, No. 327, November 28, 1931.)
4. The Tactics of Mister Stimson, and their Sequels.
(Moscow PRAVDA, No. 330, December 1, 1931.)

* Passage printed in raised type.

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(In triplicate.)

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Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 0400 of DEC 4 1931
from the American Legation at Riga Latvia.

SOURCE: Moscow PRAVDA,
No. 324,
November 25, 1931.

A NEW SHARPENING OF THE IMPERIALISTIC CON-
FLICTS OF INTEREST.

(Translation of leading editorial).

The knots of the international conflicts of interest are tightening more and more. The world economic crisis, which has already lasted more than two years, is becoming ever sharper and deeper. Bourgeois economists try to prove that the crisis may be overcome by the solution of such problems as, for instance, the reparations problem. But in reality, the reparations question is not the cause of the crisis. Howsoever much the German, and partly the American and the English imperialists may try to show that the reparations payments in respect of the international debts are precisely the cause of the crisis, they cannot prove it. The roots of the crisis lie much deeper. They lie in the very nature of the capitalistic method of production.

There cannot be, however, a doubt that the reparation payments in respect of the international debts complicate the crisis as it goes on, as does also the whole Versailles regime on which the monstrous system of international debts is based.

Germany and France have started negotiations concerning the reparations problem, and the German Government

-2-

ment has already broached the question of appointing an international commission of experts to be attached to the Reparations Bank, for elucidating the degree of Germany's solvency. The very fact that this question was broached has caused a sharpening of the conflicts of interest on the ground of the Versailles treaty. Germany tried to link the reparations problem with the problem of its short-term indebtedness to other countries. While the French Government rejects this point of view, and insists that the question of reparations and of international debts be dealt with separately. In this connection France demands that the so-called political debts, that is, reparations payments, should be given preferential treatment.

This dispute between the German and the French Governments has on its merits not been settled. The French and the German Governments have avoided all "sharp corners," having agreed upon the appointment of a commission of experts and each having reserved to itself the right of stating its final opinion after the commission of experts will have rendered its decision.

But in the question of reparations and international debts all imperialistic Powers are interested. Germany's short-term debts amount to about 12 billion marks, about 37 per cent of that sum having been advanced to Germany by the United States; about 20 per cent by England; 13 per cent each by Holland and Switzerland, etc. It is clear that these countries have an interest in getting back the amounts of those
short-term

-3-

short-term credits granted by them to Germany, and they try in every way to link the reparation payments with the question of repayment of the short-term credits.

It is by no means a mere coincidence that exactly at the time when the Franco-German negotiations were going on, at the English House of Commons Baldwin made a statement referring to the interestedness of England in the short-term German credits, and also saying that, in the opinion of the English Government, the whole system of the reparation and the inter-allied debts has been crushed by the crisis. According to Baldwin, England intends to stress its point of view at the international conference which is to be convened after the work of the commission of experts has been finished. It is by no means a mere coincidence that at the time when the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Grandi, was on visit to the United States, he had an interview with the Chairman of the senate foreign relations committee, Borah, who is well-known for his negative attitude to the French demands. After the interview, it was stated semi-officially that Grandi and Borah agree on that point that the question of the reparations and inter-allied debts should be revised.

There is no necessity for emphasizing once more that the matter under discussion is not only an economic but also a political problem. French imperialism would like to take advantage of the reparations question for gaining control over Germany, for drawing Germany into France's imperialistic group, and thereby also into the

-4-

the anti-Soviet bloc.

The rumors to the effect that shares of the largest German metallurgic enterprises will be sold to French capitalists, that certain French circles are seeking a rapprochement with the National-Socialists, and lastly, the whole internal situation in Germany (more especially the new campaign against the Communist Party), go to show that the ground is being prepared for an agreement between French and German imperialism. In view of the prevailing proportion of forces, such an agreement would be tantamount to a capitulation of the German bourgeoisie to the French bourgeoisie.

At the same time, French imperialism tries to garrote Austria and Hungary with the noose of the debts, and to draw these countries into the orbit of the French imperialistic system. Bulgaria is becoming the arena of the struggle between French imperialism and Italian imperialism for power and influence. It is perfectly clear that a strengthening of French imperialism will cause resistance on the part of the other imperialistic Powers, chiefly on the part of the United States and Italy. And even the English Conservatives, who are oriented towards a rapprochement with France, are not particularly enthusiastic about the prospect of a further strengthening of the French positions in the capitalist part of the European continent. Economic interests are intermingling with political interests, and the knots in the international conflicts of interest become still tighter.

After the general elections, the English bourgeoisie

-5-

geoisie have endeavored, by means of the introduction of customs duties, to ease, be it even partly only, the situation in which English imperialism finds itself. England parts with the principles of free trade. The English Parliament has openly adopted the road of protectionism. The House of Commons has granted to the Government the right to impose upon all finished and half-finished articles imported into England, a duty up to 100 per cent of the value of the goods. The question of customs duties on raw materials and food supplies has so far been left open, with a view to discussing it with the Dominions at the impending Imperial Conference. But one need not doubt that the pressure of the Conservatives will be strong enough to introduce protectionism on an extended scale.

By means of the new customs duties the English bourgeoisie endeavors to overcome the passivity of its commercial balance, and incidentally also of its payments balance. But the world economic crisis has sharpened the struggle for the markets. The victory of protectionism in England means a further narrowing of the world markets, and creates tremendous difficulties for a whole number of other countries.

No wonder that around these matters a sharp struggle between the imperialistic Powers has set in. A number of countries have already responded with reprisals to the introduction of customs duties. Italy has increased its duties 15 per cent. France has increased its duties for countries with depreciated currencies from 7 to 15 per cent, and the increase of the customs rates

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rates corresponds exactly to the degree of the depreciation of the currency of the given country. In addition to this, France imposes a duty of 2 per cent on the value of imported raw materials, 4 per cent on half-finished articles, and 6 per cent on finished articles. The United States is preparing an increase of the customs rates to counter-balance the measures of the English Government. Thus, by the introduction of customs rates in England a new knot is being tied in the imperialistic conflict of interests.

There is no need to emphasize that the impending disarmament conference (but in reality, armaments conference) in the month of February will also turn out to be a battle field of the struggle between the various imperialistic countries.

The Chinese question is at present the most conspicuous proof of how the imperialistic conflicts of interest have sharpened. Only the swindlers from the League of Nations and the Second International are still bold enough to deny that in Manchuria a predatory imperialistic war is going on against the Chinese nation. There is no difference of opinion between the members of the League of Nations when it comes to inciting Japan against the Soviet Union, and vice versa. In this criminal provocative game a particularly hideous role is played by the American and the French bourgeoisie. Washington and Paris have become the centers of a provocative campaign.

The seismograph, the international stock exchange, has recently signalized the approach of an earthquake - war. The prices of wheat, cotton, non-ferrous metals, silver,

-7-

silver, etc., rose. The sharks of the stock exchange already began speculating on the war danger. In France the economic crisis still deepens, and the dividends of the largest banks and enterprises drop. At the same time, the largest war industrial concern in France, Schneider-Creusot, had this year the same profit as last year, and paid a dividend amounting to 20 per cent of the joint-stock capital. This fact proves once more Comrade Stalin's words: "All spheres of production, all branches of industry, experience a deep crisis, with the exception of the war industry."

Japanese imperialism is getting ready to seize the whole of northern China. French imperialism supports it, trying to use Japan in its, France's, struggle against the United States. The United States and England fully agree to the enslavement and the robbing of China, but they object to Japan's getting hold of too big a piece. Thus, on the ground of the struggle for the dividing-up of China, a new knot is being tied in the imperialistic conflict of interests.

The struggle between the imperialistic countries grows sharper. But the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie also grows sharper. The proletariat seeks a revolutionary way out of the crisis, in order to bury under the debris of the capitalistic regime the crisis as well as the conflicts of interest, rampant in the capitalistic world.

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Enclosure No. 2 to despatch No. of DEC 4 1931
from the Legation at Riga, Latvia.

SOURCE: Moscow ECONOMIC LIFE,
No. 268,
November 25, 1931,
Page 1.

PREPARING FOR A NEW WAR.

(Translation of editorial.)

The recently concluded extraordinary session of the Council of the League of Nations, which was devoted to the so-called "conflict" between Japan and China, and also the attitude of the United States in this matter, which during and after the session has taken definite shape, have bared all the roots, and exposed the motives^{ting}/factors, of the sanguinary adventure started by the imperialists in the Far East.

It is a well-deserved irony of history that the questions connected with the Japanese military invasion of China are discussed in the very same lavishly decorated rooms of the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs, where three years ago, in a still more solemn entourage, the "famous" Kellogg Pact was signed with the participation of the representatives of Japan and China.

Statesmen and quilldrivers from the newspapers, mercenary politicians and Social-fascist literary men, assured at that time gleefully the esteemed public that the Kellogg Pact means a new era of prosperity throughout the world, an era that precludes the possibility

or

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of war as a "method of settling international conflicts."

A little time has passed since then, and the very same people, with the participation of General Dawes -- the representative of the United States, the custodian of the Kellogg covenant -- but practically without the representative of China, have brilliantly proved the real meaning of the Kellogg Pact, and the real role of the League of Nations as a tool of the great imperialistic Powers.

Japanese imperialism has taken advantage of the favorable international situation for pressing its "historical rights" in the north of China. The Japanese invasion of China interests the world imperialistic Powers inasmuch as this is now a unilateral, as it were, dividing-up of China. There cannot be a doubt, for instance, that the offensive of Japanese imperialism in Manchuria interferes in the most direct way with the interests of American imperialism. But the very serious sharpening of the economic crisis prevents at the present moment American imperialism from engaging in a decisive grapple with Japanese imperialism for the colonial possessions in China. In a certain measure this refers also to the other imperialistic Powers which have their spheres of interest in China.

What could be the position of the League of Nations in these conditions? The tried bourgeois politicians who were in session just recently in Paris, knew very well that with quotations from the Kellogg Pact, with moral sermons, and with references to

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to the Constitution of the League of Nations, the advance of the Japanese troops in Manchuria could not be stopped. In this matter more weighty arguments of an equivalent nature would be required. But for a number of economic and political reasons, neither America, nor any other state, can make up its mind to adopt this road.

All the countless notes and "ultimatums" and all the other diplomatic correspondence done by the League of Nations in connection with the Japanese-Chinese war, are only attempts to disguise by a peculiar "energy of inactivity" the truly imperialistic face of the Geneva "peacemakers." The bourgeois journalists and politicians call this "preservation of prestige."

In reality the League of Nations has fully sided with Japanese imperialism. It has supported all the predatory tendencies of Japanese imperialism, deeming it even unnecessary to drape this outwardly with some sort of pacifist gossamer veil.

The decision to send a "commission for studying" the situation in China is in reality the usual method of the League of Nations to bury solemnly with all funeral pomp an awkward problem, but even in this "innocent way out" of the situation the League of Nations encounters serious obstacles. Japan, fully aware of its domineering position at the Paris session, demands maliciously that the activities of the commission should first extend to China proper, and only after China has been "studied," Japan will kindly admit the commission into Manchuria. On this occasion

Japan

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Japan did not even in mere words give any promises as to the evacuation of the troops of the army of occupation. And this notwithstanding the fact that the character of the commission's work is sufficiently clear from its composition, the representatives of "pacifist," France being the not unknown/Marshal Petain, member of the Supreme Aviation Council, and General Weygand, Vice-President of the Supreme Military Council, who is not less notorious for his anti-Soviet work.

No wonder therefore that the Paris press describes the work of the session of the League of Nations as an attempt to "satisfy Japan in substance, and China -- only in form." Foreign correspondents state that apparently "Japan finds greater sympathies in the League of Nations than was the case heretofore." And this is perfectly easy to understand. To use just now against Japan the arsenal of moral and formal arguments would mean for the League of Nations to court a revision of the colonial policies of modern imperialism. And, probably, Japan would find not a few arguments which would hit like pebbles the glass-house of the peacemakers from the League of Nations, who have much bigger colonies than Japan has. Latin America, India, Indo-China, etc., might serve as concrete topics for such a discussion.

It is only natural that the leaders of the League of Nations have not the slightest desire to start a discussion in this direction.

The general strategic task of world imperialism is to try and make use of the Japanese-Chinese problem

for

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for another sally against the U.S.S.R.

The countless provocations emanating from the Japanese press and the Japanese military faction in regard to the mythical aid alleged to be rendered by the Soviet Union to Chinese generals, the canards of the newspapers about the presence of "red officers" in the armies of Manchurian generals, etc., etc., are only attempts to draw the Soviet Union into participation in the Japanese-Chinese war. The latest article by Stephan Lausanne in the MATIN exposes with particular candor the true intentions of the imperialists.

Lausanne writes: "Behind the two parties which, as the League of Nations believes, await the League's judgment, there is a third party which uses its best endeavors to increase the anarchy of which it is a past-master — Soviet Russia. It is Soviet-Russia that stands behind China, that urges China on."

With still greater candor the matter is treated by the Austrian newspaper, the NEUE FREIE PRESSE, the paper saying that "Japan carries on war not only against China, but also against the U.S.S.R." And in this case it is natural that the League of Nations sides with Japan — the "gendarme and guardian of good order," as Lausanne has it.

The anti-Soviet character of the Japanese military adventure becomes still more distinct in the light of the latest news from Shanghai and New York, which were published yesterday in the Soviet press. From this information it appears that American imperialism is trying
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its best to draw Japan into an armed conflict with the U.S.S.R. Under the mask of the League of Nations, the United States and other Powers try to turn Japan into a "bulwark against Communism" in the Far East.

"The task which in Europe is performed by Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Rumania, as buffer states forming an anti-Soviet front — writes the Paris correspondent of the NEW YORK EVENING POST in summing up the results of the Paris session of the League of Nations — will on the Asiatic continent be done by Japan. This is the real diplomatic background of Japan's military measures."

American imperialism which is just now in the throes of a most serious economic crisis, which is suffocating from an over-abundance of merchandise and a lack of sales markets, is not in a position to engage in a warlike "discussion" with Japanese imperialism on the subject of a division of China. That is why the American bankers and industrial circles are eagerly trying to turn the Japanese invasion of China into a broad Japanese intervention in respect of the Soviet Union. The idea of the American imperialists is that a Japanese-Soviet war will create vast markets for the sale of those raw materials and industrial products that fill the American storehouses. This idea of a new war which would create a very absorbing market for the sale of the overflow of the goods produced, of a new war as a method for solving the

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the prevailing economic crisis of capitalism, becomes ever more and more popular not only in the American but even in the European press. Under this flag the leading circles of the bourgeoisie try to mobilize bourgeois public opinion in favor of new and sanguinary slaughter.

The American bourgeoisie is very much interested in provoking a Japanese-Soviet war, because it hopes that such a war will wreck the socialistic development of the U.S.S.R., and hamper the fulfillment of the five-year plan — that most dangerous enemy of the capitalistic world-economic régime. The American bourgeoisie conceives a Japanese-Soviet war as something that will create a united capitalistic front against the U.S.S.R., with the active participation of some of the Powers, and the support of other Powers. If Japan will come out of that war defeated, even this circumstance will not much worry the American bourgeoisie. It will then be able all the more quickly to oust weakened Japanese imperialism from those parts of China, on which American imperialism itself has its eye.

At the session of the League of Nations as well as since that time, American imperialism has been pursuing consistently the tactics of turning the Japanese-Chinese "conflict" into an anti-Soviet intervention. It is no mere coincidence that General Dawes, the representative of the United States, was one of the most active participants
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of the Paris session of the League of Nations. It was Dawes himself who took an active part not so much at the official session as at the unofficial session and the negotiations with a view to arranging a compromise between the opposing parties. That "compromise," which in reality would have amounted to China accepting the Japanese demands, was meant as a preliminary step for turning the Japanese-Chinese war into a Japanese-Soviet war.

After the session of the League of Nations, the American bourgeoisie too has continued to open out a whole system of measures that in reality amount to provoking a Japanese-Soviet clash.

The consistent and energetic policy of peace, pursued by the Soviet Union, the clearly defined attitude of the Soviet Government in respect of the Japanese-Chinese "conflict," and the forced abandonment by the Japanese Government of the slanderous inventions of their various official and unofficial representatives, are a considerable obstacle in the way of the materialization of the anti-Soviet schemes of imperialism. But still, provocation after provocation, and slander after slander, fill the columns of the Japanese, American, and European bourgeois press, in which the Soviet Union is represented as the reason why Japan is "compelled" to occupy one Chinese town after another.

We know perfectly well the value of the formal statements and assurances of the bourgeois governments.

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ments. But none of those provocations will induce the Soviet Union to abandon the decidedly pacific attitude which it has assumed from the very beginning on the Japanese-Chinese conflict. That position of the Soviet Union is understood and approved by the broad masses of toilers not only in the Soviet Union, but also throughout the whole world. America's playing with war is likely to turn out very bad for those who try to kindle a new war and a military intervention against the U.S.S.R.

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Enclosure No. 3 to despatch No. 200 of DEC 4 1931
from the American Legation at Riga, Latvia.

SOURCE: Moscow PRAVDA,
No. 327, p. 2,
November 28, 1931.

THE DIPLOMACY OF WAR.

By I. Krukhimovich.

(Translation).

"The supremacy in the Pacific must belong to
the United States." (Roosevelt).

"Never are so many lies told as before a war."
(Bismarck).

I.

More than eight thousand kilometers separate the Japanese Islands from the Pacific coast of the United States. The largest body of water in the world (160,000,000 square kilometers) divides these two imperialistic systems, these two rivals and irreconcilable enemies: the United States and Japan. These geographical peculiarities give undoubtedly their impress to the mutual relations between Japan and America, to the conflicts of interest, and to the struggle between them.

With the bourgeois students of the imperialistic mutual relations in the basin of the Pacific, the geography of those parts is an outstanding factor, and one not to be eliminated, that prevents the origination of war between the United States and Japan.

But in reality this is not so.

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The Japanese-American mutual relations can be understood only in the light of the struggle between Japan and the United States for the hegemony in the Pacific and in China. The American "open door" policy pursues not only the aim of "equal rights and equal possibilities" for American capital throughout all China, but also another aim: the aim of destroying the bases in the rear of Japanese imperialism on the Asiatic continent. So long as Japanese imperialism has a firm foothold in Manchuria, in the north of China, and in the provinces along the coast of Central and Southern China, no American strategy whatsoever will be able to overcome the economic power that nourishes the imperialistic policy of Japan.

The whole history of the Japanese-American mutual relations consists therefore of consecutive stages of struggle: Japan's struggle for a foothold in Manchuria and in China; the United States' struggle for destruction of the bases in the rear of Japanese imperialism on the Asiatic continent. If American imperialism were to succeed in ousting Japan from China (with the aid, the neutrality, or even the resistance, of Great Britain), and, let us presume, even in getting hold of Manchuria (for which American imperialism would have to strain ^{its} all/strength), even in that case Japan could not be considered as strategically hemmed in; there would remain, true, the only one, but still a sufficiently broad, "window looking towards Europe," direct European-Asiatic communication via the Siberian trunk-line, and the possibility of extending economic intercourse with
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the U.S.S.R. This is the center of gravity of Pacific strategy.

It is no mere chance that in the plans of the American militarists (we have in mind the plans for a war in the Pacific) greatest attention is given to the naval bases of the United States in the Northern Pacific. Summing up all the numerous opinions expressed on this point, it may be safely said that the so-called "northern variant" (that is, the shifting of the struggle to the north-western part of that ocean) of a Japanese-American war in the Pacific acquires ever greater importance from year to year. This is proved by the fact that the principal naval bases of the United States in the Pacific are removed ever further and further from the zone of the Panama Canal and the contemplated Nicaragua Canal. Not Galapagos, nor San Diego, neither San Pedro, nor San Francisco, and not even the Hawaiian Islands, to say nothing of the Philippines, -- but Bremerton, on the Canadian-American border, is becoming the principal base, and Sitka and Dutch Harbor in Alaska, the auxiliary bases of the American Navy. The American Navy Department has already expended about 100 million dollars on the equipment of these bases.

One of the principal advantages of the "northern variant" is that it permits of shortening the distance that divides the adversaries. The Panama Canal and the naval bases of the United States in its vicinity are 8,060 miles distant from the Japanese Islands (a sea mile equals 1-3/4 kilometers). The three other bases of the United States to the north of the Panama Canal

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(San Diego, San Pedro, and San Francisco) are 4,530 miles from the Japanese bases. From Bremerton to Japan the distance is 4,200 miles, and from Dutch Harbor, 2,533 miles in all.* In other words, the "northern variant" creates the preliminary conditions for tactically hemming-in Japan, and simplifies considerably the struggle with Japan.

But of decisive importance nevertheless is the strategical encircling of Japan. In order to garrote completely Japanese imperialism by a blockade, the United States must cut off Japan from the western coast of the Pacific, i.e., the coast of China and of the U.S.S.R. This alone will bring Japanese imperialism to the verge of doom. This is why a component part of the "northern variant" and of the plans of the American imperialists is the landing of a large force on the territory of the U.S.S.R.

If the northern part of the west coast of the Pacific did not belong to the U.S.S.R., that is, if the political conditions were in favor of the plans of hemming-in Japan, which plans are the principal lever of American strategy, then the Pacific basin would have long ago become the arena of the most exasperated sanguinary struggle, which would have been a struggle on a world-wide scale. In other words, the fact that one of the largest Pacific places d'armes belongs to the U.S.S.R. which latter in principle is averse to any

policy

* A sketch, inset in the text shows the location of the naval bases of the United States, Great Britain, and Japan, and the distances mentioned in the text.
Translator's note.

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policy of military alliances, and seizures, and which pursues a firm policy of peace, -- is the most important factor that prevents an outbreak of war in the Pacific. Thus the principal factor of peace in the Pacific and in the Far East is the U.S.S.R.

This is why the whole scheme of the American imperialists in connection with the Manchurian conflict is to set Japan against the U.S.S.R., and to sow enmity between the two contiguous countries. The bourgeoisie of the United States is prepared to promote war against the Chinese nation, so that Japan may conquer the keys to this place d'armes, and hand them to Mr. Stimson, who after that would not fail to look therewith the doors on the Japanese Islands airtight!

Although from this point of view, the unexpected "pro-Japanese" sympathies of the Department of State of the United States and of its plenipotentiaries in Paris are a broadly conceived provocative maneuver for the purpose of complicating Japanese-Soviet mutual relations, they still remain a single link in the general chain of anti-Japanese acts in American policy. This maneuver will scarcely throw dust in anybody's eyes. True, it may lead Mr. Stimson himself into a blind alley (for Japan will undoubtedly strengthen its position with the friendly cooperation of Mr. Dawes in Paris!), and besides, it may entice certain groups of the Japanese militarist and feudal clique. But so much the worse for them.

II.

American imperialism is preparing for war, under
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the camouflage of hypocritical pacifist shouts and a noisy advertising of peace. But at the same time the American imperialists do not conceal their hostile feelings for the toilers of the Soviet Union.

Hostility towards the U.S.S.R. is characteristic of the narrow-minded politicians who stand at the head of American Governmental institutions, as it is characteristic of the magnates of American capitalism, anxious in their greed for colonial super-profits, and characteristic of the militarists who have already long ago formed a very influential clique. The American bourgeoisie hankers after the dubious laurels of leader of the anti-Soviet front.

General Graves, formerly in command of the American expeditionary force in Siberia and the Far East in the years 1918-1920, has in a book published by him under the title, "America's Siberian Adventure," disclosed recently the secret springs of the interference of the United States in the domestic war in Russia. General Graves discloses the aims which the American expeditionary force was to attain, namely: to prevent the strengthening of Japan on the Asiatic continent, to cooperate in the destruction of the Soviet power in Siberia and in the Far East, and to create thus the necessary preliminary conditions for American imperialism to gain a foothold on the Pacific territory of the U.S.S.R.

There cannot be a doubt that, in the event of the intervention having been successful, the Soviet Far East would have become the prey of American imperialism, which

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which has not forgotten the covenant of McKinley*:
"Where the American flag has been hoisted once, it remains forever." It is also beyond all doubt that this would have caused exasperated struggle between Japan and the United States.

The Siberian adventure of American imperialism proved a failure with a vengeance. The American flag had to be struck! Just now, in connection with the Manchurian conflict, the plans for dividing, and dividing not only the spheres of influence in China, are cropping up again. The American interventionists are little by little, at leisure, making ready for an anti-Soviet war.

As far back as a year ago our press exposed the true meaning and the purpose of the purchase of wheat (about 500 million bushels) by the so-called Legge Committee, under the pretext of aid to the farmers. As it transpired, it was proposed to sell there grain quantities at profitable prices to the anti-Soviet interventionists.

In connection with the Manchurian events, the prices of wheat have again begun to rise on the American exchanges. A particular upward leap of the prices was observed in the month of October, and they rose all the more rapidly, the more deeply Japanese imperialism penetrated into northern Manchuria.

But that time, too, the grain profiteers were caught red-handed. The New York newspaper, the NEW
WORLD,

*Secretary of State of the United States in the nineties of the XIX Century. Footnote in the text.

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WORLD, unexpectedly raised a corner of the curtain, and our eyes caught sight once more of the same "honorable gentlemen" buying up millions of bushels of wheat in hopes of a war in the near future.

But it is not only grain profiteers that take part in this repulsive game of kindling war. Also not a few financial and industrial magnates may be found mixed up in it, and in the end Mr. Stimson himself. This is no mere coincidence.

The American Department of State has never lost sight not only of the general interests of American imperialism, but also of the private interests of separate groups of the American bourgeoisie. The American Secretaries of State have never missed a chance of getting hold of one or the other prey on the occasion of some international complication. The American Department of State is the initiator of thirty interventions in South American States. "An agent for capitalistic affairs" — this is how Scott Nearing and Joseph Freeman in their book, "The Diplomacy of the Dollar," dubbed the American Department of State. To this may be added — also organizer of war.

The United States is the initiator of the Kellogg Pact. The American bourgeoisie is the one who babbles most of all about peace. But as soon as it began to smell of gunpowder in the Far East, that very same bourgeoisie, shaken by the unprecedented crisis, but not having lost the hope that "prosperity" may return (be it even on the road to death!), and longing for a "war conjuncture" began to incite Japanese imperialism to war. Thus, the Kellogg Pact is to guarantee peace

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up to the first war that will be organized by American imperialism! Or more correctly, it guarantees (without quotation marks) the fact of American imperialism making preparations for war.

III.

Ever since the beginning of the Manchurian events, the tactics of the American diplomacy have been of tremendous interest and of great importance as a topic of the day. From the very first days of the occupation of Manchuria by Japanese troops, American imperialism has taken up a negative attitude to that occupation.

But the ways of imperialistic diplomacy, and more especially in so grandiose a conflict as the Japanese-American conflict is, do not lie in a straight line.

At first Mr. Stimson's institution simply lost its head. For the blow was indeed all too unexpected. Stimson made statements, sent notes, but did not take any steps whatsoever which in some measure might have restricted the freedom of action of the American imperialists. Up to the middle of October, the United States, "watches vigilantly the development of events."

The end of October was the turning point in the tactics of the Department of State. The United States adopted the road of encouraging Japanese occupation in Manchuria, although Stimson avoided speaking about it openly. All through the first part of October Stimson kept silent, or gave utterance to vague phrases. He thereby camouflaged the turn that had taken place. For this time it was a question of war.

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What caused that change in Stimson's tactics? In the prevailing situation the United States is not in a position to interfere in the conflict directly for the purpose of barring the road to the Japanese troops. And so Stimson selected another road, a more complicated one, but one that also promises more; since it is impossible to get rid speedily of the army of occupation, all endeavors must be used to drag out the conflict. And then wait and see.

From that moment, that is, from the beginning of November, Stimson's tactics assumed the shape of a well conceived plan. The plan pursues simultaneously three aims:

First, to drag out the Manchurian conflict, to create foreign-political conditions in which Japanese imperialism would be tied up in that conflict in earnest and for a long time, so that Japanese imperialism could be ousted from the rest of China to the greatest possible extent. This more particularly explains why the United States is now courting Chiang Kai-shek;

Secondly, to provoke a Japanese-Soviet conflict which, according to the idea of the American imperialists, would on the one hand weaken the first labor state in the world, and on the other hand, weaken Japan's position on the Asiatic continent;

Thirdly, to cause the outbreak of a great war in the Far East, that is, to create the "war conjuncture" of which the American industrial and financial magnates are dreaming. Apart from this, such a war could create a pretext for the United States to participate
in

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in the occupation of the Soviet Far East which latter, as we have already pointed out, takes a prominent place in the plans of the American militarists.

These tactics in their turn have biased the conduct of the American representative in Paris, Dawes, whose whole mission, it appears, has consisted in setting Japan against the Soviet Union, thereby promoting Stimson's scheme. And for this purpose the theater of war had to be shifted to a territory somewhere between Tsitsihar and the regions to the north of it:

However, no "pro-Japanese" maneuvers undertaken by Dawes can conceal the fact that the unexpected care of American imperialism about the Japanese "rights" in Manchuria, is nothing else but a proof that the Japanese-American imperialistic conflict of interests has grown sharper. Every time (and this begins to partake of the character of a peculiar regularity), when American imperialism adopts some measure or some decisive step against its Japanese rival, it precedes that step with a certain number of vague pro-Japanese phrases.

While conniving at the robbing of the Chinese nation by the Japanese occupiers, Mr. Stimson simultaneously ousts Japanese capital from interior China. If the Japanese exports to China continue to drop with the same catastrophic rapidity as at present, the Japanese bourgeoisie will very soon have to abandon all its dreams about the conquest of China. If certain venturesome circles of Japanese imperialists will adopt the road pointed out to them by Stimson, they will very soon lead Japan into the trap which the Secretary of State of the United States has set for her.

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The tactics of Stimson and Dawes have also a point against Great Britain, for a weakening of Japanese imperialism would also substantially change the whole political and strategical situation in the Pacific, and that not in favor of Great Britain. But first of all the tactics of Stimson and Dawes are turned against the U.S.S.R., which latter, the circles that are provoking and kindling war are anxious to depict as the cause of all the grave events that are going on just now in the Far East.

But who is it really that desires war? Who is kindling war? Who is provoking war? It is American imperialism, with the approval of the French and other imperialists. Who seeks salvation in rivers of blood? It is bankrupt capitalism, and first of all American capitalism. Who is it that unleashes the hounds of militarism? This is done by the orders and in the interests of the magnates of American capitalism, to save the thoroughly decayed capitalistic system.

The fundamental line of our own foreign policy remains as heretofore our firm intention to protect the peace. And we are bound to assure the imperialistic diplomacy of the United States, as well as some of the Japanese military circles sympathizing with that diplomacy, that all attempts at drawing the U.S.S.R. into a military conflict, are doomed to failure.

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Enclosure No. 4 to despatch No. 0400 of DEC 4 1931
from the Legation at Riga, Latvia.

SOURCE: Moscow PRAVDA,
No. 330,
December 1, 1931,
Page 1.

THE TACTICS OF MISTER STIMSON, AND THEIR
SERUELS.*

(Translation.)

The tactics of American imperialism in the Manchurian conflict have come about under the pressure of the magnates of American capital, who thirst for new wars and for new profits. These tactics simultaneously pursue also other aims with which they are bound up inseparably, namely: the weakening of Japan, that principal rival of the United States in the Pacific and in China, and the opportunity of dealing a blow to the U.S.S.R.

In a certain phase, these tactics have led to a concrete contact between Japanese and American imperialism. Now, after the steps taken by Stimson, there can be no further doubt about it. In this connection, the authorized representative of the American Department of State in Paris, Dawes, has based himself on the following premises: Japanese imperialism will get stuck in Manchuria for a long time, and more particularly so in Northern Manchuria - with the assistance of the United States. Further, conditions are being created which aggravate the Japanese-Soviet mutual relations,

* The word "Mister" written in full is meant to be sarcastic. Translator's note.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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relations, and stimulate a big war in which the United States is not to take a direct part. That war will weaken the competitor of the United States, Japan, as the late world war has weakened other competitors and rivals.

American imperialism, shaken by the crisis, endeavors to provoke a new war, hoping in this way to revive the faded "prosperity." The American capitalists have not forgotten those exceptional advantages which the first imperialistic war brought to them. The European states lost 21 million men killed, wounded, and crippled, in the war. Three-fourths of all the gold reserves of the world got into the hands of the capitalists in the United States.

The public debt of the United States increased during the war by 24 billion dollars. The lion's share of this sum got into the hands of the American factory owners, bankers, and profiteers.

The exports from the United States, which in 1914 amounted to 1,460,187,814 dollars, increased in 1916 to 3,505,773,718 dollars. That is, only the exports into the countries of the "allies." In 1914 the profits of the steel trust during the last quarter of the year did not exceed 8 million dollars. In 1916, for the same period, they amounted to 96 million.

At that time the American imperialists carried on a stubborn struggle against a "premature peace." The London DAILY TELEGRAPH printed on December 23, 1916,

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the following information from New York: "The rumors of peace which circulated last week caused much alarm on the New York stock exchange, and resulted in a sharp drop of many stocks. The prices of wheat fell sharply. Everybody speaks of the calamities that would be the result if peace were concluded."

"Everybody speaks of the calamities that would be the result if peace were concluded!" This is a most remarkable comment on the present noisy clamoring for peace on the part of the American imperialists - is it not?

But the rumors circulating now about the possibility of war have created a joyous frame of mind on the New York stock exchange, and have caused many stocks to rise. The prices of wheat have increased.

The central press organ of the American Communist party, the DAILY WORKER, reports that Japan is purchasing war stores in the United States. Japan has already bought in America 9,000 tons of nitro-glycerine. The bourgeois press reports that in Wall Street rumors are circulating to the effect that "Japan will require copper and zinc for military purposes." Such are the first signs of the approaching "war conjuncture."

At the same time, American diplomacy takes advantage of the events in Manchuria for weakening Japan's position in Inner China. While dragging out and kindling the Manchurian conflict, American imperialism simultaneously applies the anti-Japanese boycott as a weapon for undermining

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mining Japanese exportation to China.

The losses of Japanese foreign trade even now amount to hundreds of millions of yen. According to Japanese sources, Japanese-Chinese trade has diminished in 1931 to one-half in comparison with previous years (from 1,028 million yen to 559 million yen.) Also the Japanese shipping concerns, banks, and insurance companies have suffered enormous losses. The Japanese cotton factories in China have almost suspended their production. According to the NORTH CHINA DAILY NEWS, forty Japanese cotton factories in Central China have been closed. According to the TRANSPACIFIC, quotations of Japanese stocks have on an average dropped to 35 to 20 yen.*

Along with this the increased pumping of gold out of Japan into the United States continues, and American exports to China strongly increase. Partly also English industry is benefited by the anti-Japanese boycott, having in a considerable measure increased its exports to China. Not only the American imperialists cherish hopes for war; other imperialists, and first of all the French, do the same. But the decisive role played by the United States in Paris, at the formulation of the so-called "compromise" in the Manchurian question, should be taken into consideration. Without the consent of the United States, no "compromise" could have been accepted by the Council of the League of Nations. At present it is perfectly clear that

* Literal translation. Meaning not clear. Probably mean have dropped from 20 to 35 per cent. Translator's note.

-5-

that that "compromise" was arrived at in order that the center of gravity of the military operations in Manchuria might be shifted north. The American bourgeoisie certainly cherished great hopes that the U.S.S.R. would allow itself to be provoked. However, this was not the case.

At the very moment when the Japanese troops turned south, having with Mr. Stimson's aid, sufficiently strengthened their position in the north, the tactics of the American Department of State turned against the department itself.

What attracts the Japanese imperialists to Chinchow? It is the interests of Japanese imperialism in Inner China. It is no mere coincidence that simultaneously with the march of the Japanese troops on Chinchow, the well-known events in Tientsin took place. Japanese imperialism senses the menace hanging over its interests in Inner China. And so it hurries south, to Chinchow, to the Shanghaiwan Pass, to Tientsin, and eventually to Peiping. But there it encounters Mr. Stimson who tries to slam the Shanghaiwan door that leads into the Chinese house in which American imperialism is making serious efforts to establish itself for good.

However, stranger it may be, Mr. Stimson does not object - to a certain extent, of course - to the increase of the Japanese forces in Tientsin, which is the citadel of English interests in northern China; let England and Japan have it out between them. But Mr.

Stimson

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

-6-

Stimson cannot tolerate that General Honjo becomes the master of the situation at the most important strategical point of northern China - the Chinchow and Shanghaiwan region.

The wrangle between Tokio and Washington has raised a corner of the curtain over the secret conferences of the imperialists, that are going on in Paris. The first that caught the eye is the genuinely anti-Soviet plot that was got up on the banks of the Seine in order to kindle war on the coast of the Pacific.

The further development of events in Manchuria will lead to a considerable sharpening of the imperialistic conflicts of interest. No efforts on the part of Stimson will be able to conceal the fact that American imperialism has suffered defeat. But this does not mean at all that the menace hanging over the Far East has disappeared.

Around Chinchow the salvos of guns are thundering. And from Manchuria the war is shifted to northern China where the interests of all the principal imperialistic powers conflict with one another.

The tactics of Mister Stimson become more and more distinct. American imperialism more and more unmasks itself as the organizer of a new war.

js/hs

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00/11664 FOR Tel.#123-noon

FROM Nanking (Peck) DATED Dec.15,1931.
TO NAME 1--1127 070

REGARDING:

Student riots in Nanking. Buildings of Ministry of Foreign Affairs wrecked. Students stormed Central Party Headquarters where general conference of Government leaders is in progress, discussing threatened resignation of President Chiang Kai Shek.
(Copy attached)

fpg

793.94/3212

MET

GRAY

Nanking via N.R.

Dated December 15, 1931

Rec'd 7:20 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

123, December 15, noon.

At about eleven A.M. crowds of students rushed the two main buildings of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and wrecked them. Four students were injured by the police. The crowds of students then proceeded to the central party headquarters of the Nationalist party where a general conference of Government leaders is in progress discussing the threatened resignation of President Chiang. The students disarmed the police at the gates and smashed some windows upon which police reinforcements fired warning shots in the air and scattered some of the students, the main body of whom still remain in front of the headquarters. It is reported that the President's resignation has been prepared and that probably he will telegraph it to the country today but this point has not been decided.

PECK

JHR-WSB

1934

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MAM

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be- FROM
fore being communicated
to anyone.

NANKING

Dated December 15, 1931

Rec'd 6:15 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

December 15, 7 p.m.

Your 135, December 12, 3 p.m.

Confidential for the Secretary

One. Tokyo is repeating to me Department's tele-
gram ^{but} message is coming through in such garbled state
that I have not yet been able to completely decipher.

Two. On December 13th while I was absent in Shang-
hai Peck mentioned to Wellington Koo the Department's in-
terest in the question of establishment of neutral area
at Chinchow. Koo informed Peck that the Chinese people
were very strongly opposed to the idea of agreeing to any
neutral zone at all. He pointed out that the territory
in which Chinchow is situated was all that remained in
Manchuria under Chinese administration and that popular
sentiment was very opposed to any advices by the Chinese
Government that its forces should be withdrawn from that
area.

Three. Today Chinese students agitated before the
Foreign Office and almost penetrated into a meeting of the
Central

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
DEC 16 1931
Department of State

F/DEW 793.94/3213

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Anderson &
Meyer

893 00

mam

2- from Nanking, December 15, 1931

Central Executive Committee at the party headquarters. They were forcibly ejected by the police after having attacked some of the responsible members of the government who were attending the meeting. The President has resigned and Lin Sen, head of the legislative Yuan has been made Acting President of the Government. General Chen Ming Shu has succeeded General Chiang Kai Shek as Acting President of the Executive Yuan. I expect at any moment to hear that the resignation of Wellington Koo from office has been accepted. Sentiment here at the present time is so inflamed and hostile against any suggestion of direct negotiations between China and Japan on the subject of a neutral zone about Chinchow or on the whole question of Manchuria (until Japanese troops have been evacuated) that I am of the opinion that it would be useless, if not actually dangerous for me to make any suggestions on this subject to responsible people lest the fact that I had made such a suggestion should become publicly known and merely serve to transfer to the United States the hostility that is now taking vengeance against the government heads who have been responsible for the policy hitherto followed in regard to Manchuria and whom the public blames (perhaps unreasonably) for not having resisted the Japanese in Manchuria. Students and public argue (not without some justification)

1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

mam

3- from Nanking, December 15, 1931

justification) that the policy hitherto followed by the government has merely resulted in permitting Japan effectively to drive out of Manchuria all vestiges of Chinese control and to establish there an independent regime amenable to Japanese ^{dictation} ~~aftermentioned~~ which will be prepared to ratify Japanese control of Manchuria.

Four. The national authorities are so preoccupied at the present moment with domestic politics that it is difficult for me to find anyone to whom I can go but I shall seize the earliest opportunity to see some one in authority to urge upon them the utmost self-restraint with regard to any further military activities or demonstrations and to express the hope that it may be possible for the Chinese to reach some understanding that may prevent further acts of warfare in and about Chinchow or in any other place in Manchuria although I feel that it would be useless or unwise to suggest to the Chinese that they evacuate the Chinchow area which has now become to the Chinese a symbol of Chinese sovereignty in that area

(END SECTION ONE)

OX

JOHNSON

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

FROM

Nanking

Dated December 15, 1931

Rec'd 16th, 5:05 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

December 15, 7 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

Five. All of the information that I have received from the Consulates and American observers in Manchuria indicates that, while at Geneva and Paris the Powers have been concerning themselves with resolutions and advice, the Japanese have wasted no opportunity to make effective their control. An American merchant in Shanghai who had sold electric power equipment to the Chinese municipalities of Mukden and Antung informed me the other day that at Antung the Japanese have entirely cut off the Chinese electric power plant and have introduced mains from their own power plant in its place and that at Mukden the Japanese are extending into the area hitherto monopolized by the Chinese municipal public utilities, such as water and electric light - water from the Japanese plant and electric light and power from the big plant at Fushun. I have seen reports from the American Trade Commissioner at Mukden indicating

893.6463
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Anderson
Meyer

1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2--from Nanking, December 15, 1931.

indicating that all American business in Manchuria direct with Chinese has ceased and that Japanese merchants are taking advantage of the Japanese controlled regime that has been set up. In other words the history of the days that immediately followed the Russo-Japanese war is being repeated in Manchuria. When the Commission of the League arrives in Manchuria it will find that Manchuria is completely in the control of the Japanese. Thus the Chinese see their hopes, that Manchuria might be freed from Japanese control through the agency of the League, the signatories to the Nine Power Treaty and to the Kellogg Pact, defeated. It is impossible to persuade the present Chinese Government that it should enter into direct negotiations with Japan for the settlement of outstanding questions between the two countries while Japan remains actually and physically in control of the area and administration where these outstanding cases have arisen and can use this fact to compel Chinese acceptance of Japanese terms. The present Chinese authorities feel that to commence negotiations under the circumstances would in itself be an acceptance of the Japanese position and a confirmation of Japan's right to remain.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

3--from Nanking, December 15, 1931

remain. In fact they are convinced that when the settlement provided by the League will have been reached they will find that all of the outstanding cases existing prior to September 18th will have been settled in Japan's favor and that new Japanese interests will have been created far beyond those previously existing which may not then be disturbed without rendering China liable to the charge of attacking vested rights - property and otherwise. (END MESSAGE)

JOHNSON

HPD

194

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE

MET

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated December 16, 1931

Rec'd 5:20 a.m.

FROM
RECEIVED OF

Secretary of State,

Washington

1082, December 16, 11 a.m.

Department's 461, December 14, 4 p.m.

Following from military attaches at Chinchow:

"December 15, 3 p.m.

Japanese reports bandit forces Hsinmin, Lichia,

Wopu, areas may be classified as no man's land, incapable

being policed by either side without danger clash or

mutual accusations of aggression. During observers

December 11 inspection of the area ten miles from Yingkow

bombarded by Japanese with aerial torpedoes, no evidence

bandit activity was reported or observed. Reports of

further concentration of troops, aircraft and artillery

at Chinchow false. Third cavalry brigade is guarding

Tahushan-Tungliiao Railway with headquarters at Changwu.

There is no troop movements or change in the situation in


Chinchow⁴.

Repeated to Department and Nanking.

For the Minister,

KLP-WSB

PERKINS



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793.94/3214

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JUN 29 1933

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no to
893.108

194

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated December 16, 1931

Rec'd 5:20 a.m.

FROM
U.S. DEPT. OF

Secretary of State,

Washington

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further concentration of troops, aircraft and artillery

at Chinchow false. Third cavalry brigade is guarding

Tahushan-Tungliao Railway with headquarters at Changwu.

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
Chinchow^h.

Repeated to Department and Nanking.

For the Minister,

KLP-WSB

PERKINS



134

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

FE
WE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

GREEN

FROM

Paris

Dated December 16, 1931

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Rec'd 9:15 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

DEC 17 1931

DIVISION OF

WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Division of

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DEC 16 1931

Department of State

893, December 16, noon.

FOR THE SECRETARY.

793.94

I saw Briand this morning and conveyed to him the message contained in your 648, December 11, 4 p.m. I also left with him copies of the excerpts from President's messages and of your statement.

He asked me to express his great appreciation of your cooperation throughout the whole negotiations. He expressed great satisfaction that the value of the Briand - Kellogg Pact had been vindicated.

In answer to my question he said he did not think there was anything further to be done at present. The Chinchow situation he thought had improved and he is hopeful that the direct negotiations between Japanese and Chinese will be successful.

EDGE

WSB

F/DEW

793.94/3215

DEC 17 1931

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194

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

Tokio

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone.

FROM

Dated December 16, 1931

Rec'd 9:45 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

267, December 16, 9 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL.

793.94

I was received by Prime Minister Inukai today who informed me Nagai had imparted to him the purport of your telegram No. 262. After consultation with the British, French and Belgian Ambassadors, consensus of reports indicates inactivity of Japanese military forces in Manchuria pending developments of the course of events in North China. Yoshizawa ordered to return by Siberian railway and undoubtedly will be appointed Foreign Minister. Nagai probably will go to Paris.

FORBES

JHR-WSB



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FILED

DEC 22 1931

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75





LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Tallinn, Estonia,

November 28, 1971.

DEC 15 31



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793.94/3217

793.94

FOR DISTRIBUTION - CHECK	Yes	No

No. 154 (Diplomatic).

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

JAN 5 1982

FILED

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to the Department's
Instruction of February 21, 1927, File No. 711.00/
162 A, entitled "Reporting of Foreign Press Comment",
and to transmit, in compliance with the provision there-
1/2 of, an English translation and the original Estonian

text


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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 2 -

text of an article which appeared in the Tallinn Estonian daily newspaper "Paevaleht" of November 23, 1931, (No. 320), under the heading of "Foreign Political Observations".

The article is of interest inasmuch as it sets forth (1) Estonia's attitude towards the Sino-Japanese conflict in Manchuria, (2) Estonia's disappointment because of the apparent failure of the League of Nations to bring about an amicable settlement of the above dispute and (3) the Estonian viewpoint as to the participation of the United States in the work of the League of Nations.

Respectfully yours,


Harry E. Carlson,
Charge d'Affaires, a.i.

✓
Enclosures:

- 1/ Translation.
- 2/ Original Estonian text.

File No. 710
HEC/EP

Original and four copies to the Department of State.
Copy to the American Mission, Riga, Latvia.
Two copies to E.I.C., Paris.
File Copy.

144

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

American Legation,
Tallinn, Estonia.

Enclosure No. 1, to
Despatch No. 154,
(Diplomatic), dated
November 28, 1921.

Source: Tallinn Estonian daily newspaper
"Päevaleht", of November 23, 1921.
(No. 320).

Title: Foreign Political Observations.
Sub-title: Manchuria and XIX Century Fire
Brigades.

TRANSLATION.

Estonia has no direct interests in Manchuria; if such exist, they concern largely the security of a few hundred Estonian residents in that country and the general political and economic stability of the world--the latter point constitutes one of the main conditions for the improvement of the world economic crisis, by which we are also strongly affected. The expression of our wishes and demands in the solution of questions of such world wide political importance, as is the Manchurian problem, can be compared to the sneezing of a mouse in a concert of roaring elephants and other gigantic animals. This, however, does not mean that we should be entirely indifferent as to the manner in which the solution of this difficult question is to be brought about.

At the beginning of the Manchurian conflict China, through its representative, appealed to the League of Nations, with the request that the latter body act as the sole and supreme judge in the settlement of the Sino-Japanese conflict which has arisen because of Manchuria. One must not, however, believe that China took this action because of its great respect for or its noble devotion to the ideas of the League of Nations, or because of its abhorrence of war, - its action had a much more prosaic foundation. Namely: at present the Chinese giant, despite its hundred of millions of people is practically a military nonentity as compared with Japan; China can not even dream to evict from Manchuria by its own power the regiments and divisions of the country of the rising sun. Thus China as the weaker party in the

conflict,

- 2 -

conflict, approached the League of Nations, a body which considers itself as being the supporter of international justice and the arbitrator in world conflicts or in disputes between individual governments.

All countries, especially the small ones, may at some time or other be faced with a situation equally as difficult as that now confronting China. May God and all worldly powers save Estonia from a similar fate. It is precisely for this reason that the progress of events in Manchuria is of such importance to us. As there was nothing else to be done, Estonia has made its security and its international status dependent to a considerable degree upon the League of Nations; affirmation of this is contained in the foreign political sections of declarations made by each new Estonian Government.

However, the sad and deplorable truth must be admitted at once: The League of Nations has not succeeded in supplying sufficient authoritative power to effect the settlement of the above conflict in such a way as to protect the interests of the weaker party. This has not even been done to the extent of justifying the annual payments which all Governments, including the poor Estonia, are obliged to pay to the League of Nations. This is hard to hear, but it is the truth - and to know the truth in advance will perhaps save our country from many future disappointments.

When, a few weeks ago, the Council of the League of Nations met in Geneva at the request of China in order to come to a decision in respect to the Sino-Japanese question, a representative of the United States was also invited to take part in the meeting. The United States, however, is not a member of the League of Nations, but Japan and China, as well, are members of this body. The United States has great interests in the Far East and it is in general the most powerful country in the world. The fact that the League of Nations had not the courage to undertake the solution of the conflict between China and Japan alone, that is, without having asked the participation of the United States, which is not a member of the League of Nations, and which can be certain to pursue its own interests in the first place, already shows that no great confidence nor unshaken faith can be placed in the morals and justice of the League of Nations. But the affair has a still sadder aspect. According to a resolution of the Council of the League of Nations, Japan was to evacuate Manchuria. The decision was opposed by one member, that is, by Japan: hence it was not valid, since, on the basis of the second Statute of the League only such resolutions are valid as have been passed with the unanimous support of the League's Council. (As though the League of Nations idea, alone, had already transformed all Governments to such a degree, that in the interests of justice, they are now willing to vote against themselves). At the conclusion of the League of Nations meeting, the parties to this conflict were given

the

1948

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

- 3 -

the advice to come to terms with one another. At that very moment, however, major military operations commenced at the Nonni river: Ma-Ishan-Shan was destroyed, Tsitsikari was taken, and thousands were killed. Matters have since gone so far that Japan has become the master of nearly one half of Manchuria.

The supremacy of Japan in Manchuria is recognized by the League of Nations Council in Paris, despite the fact that the representative of China called the attention of the respected world leaders to the fact that such a situation is contrary to that which was established prior to the conquest of Tsitsikari, at which the destruction of Ma-Ishan-Shan's armies by Japan took place.

Without going into details as to which one of the both parties should be blamed for the Manchurian events, one must, taking into consideration the above mentioned facts, agree with the statement of a German newspaper, that the League of Nations resembles the fire brigades of the past century, which arrived at a conflagration when the house was already burnt down, and which then began to break in the windows and doors of neighboring houses, flooding them with water, and ruined pianos located therein.

The occupation of Manchuria by Japan can be compared with conflagrations of this kind, and the neighboring houses with its smashed doors and windows - to the hopes of the weaker parties for support and justice on the part of the League of Nations.

It is easy for the New York "Sun" to state, ironically, that the League of Nations with its Briands is, unfortunately, very much in need of angelic hosts, upon the arrival of which at the arenas of action, the weaker members of the League of Nations would have nothing more to fear.

American Legation,
Tallinn, Estonia.

Enclosure No. 2, to
Despatch No. 154,
(Diplomatic), dated
November 28, 1921.

Source: Tallinn Estonian daily newspaper
"Päevaleht", of November 23, 1921.
(No. 320)..

Title: Foreign Political Observations.

Sub-title: Manchuria and XIX Century Fire
Brigades.

ORIGINAL ESTONIAN TEXT.

Wälispoliitilisi ringwaateid.

**Manchšuuria ja „läinud sajandi tuletõrje“. — Sesseni walimised.
Briti impeeriumi majanduslik ümberkujundamine.**

Estil iseenesest pole Manchšuurias mingi-
suguseid otsetõbeid kummitid, ehk kui siiski, siis
ainult nii palju, kui see puutub paarikümnel aastal
elama eestlaste julgeolekusse ning üldse maailma
poliitilise ja majandusliku stabiilsuse, mis on
üheks peatähtsuseks ka meil waluselt riiklooma
maailma majanduskriisi paranemise wäljawaatamisel.
Meie loome wõib tohtimiseks arweldada niisuguses
üldmaailmalises poliitilises tähenduselga kättemu-
sajomes, nagu on juba Manchšuuria probleem, tun-
dub siiski naeruwäärse hääre-awastusena wägewate
elewantide ja muude hiigalloomade mõirgami-
sõnserbis. See aga ei tähenda ometi kuidagi
juba, et meile oleksid tähenduseta niisuguste suur-
kättemuuste lahendamise wiisid.

Juba Manchšuuria konflikt alul pöördus Hi-
ina oma esindaja kaudu Genfis Rahwaste-
liidu poole, et see oleks ainjaks ja ülemaks
kohtunikuks Hiina-Jaapani tüli lahendamisel
Manchšuuria pärast. Et maffa uskuda, et Hiina
oleks nii talitanud suurest lugupidamisest ja il-
last andumusest Rahwasteliidu ideele ning põlgu-
sest sõjaliste poliitikameetodite wastu, wad ta
teguwiisi täuseiduseks oli palju proosajallsem põhjus.
Nimelt: praegune hiiglamaa Hiina waatamata
oma sadameliiklusele elanikemassidele, on sõ-
jaliselt Jaapani wastu peaaegu null ega wõ-
uneski heilitada meelekut mõtet oma jõul Manch-
šuuriaist merre wälata täuswa pätte poegade
riigemente ja dwiitse. Mit oli Hiina pöördumine
Rahwasteliidu poole siiski nõrgema poole
abipalwe end üldmaailmalises ja üldhüüet ri-
kidewaheliseft tükilüsimuseft kõrgemale asetawale
ning rahwuswahelise õigluse teostajaks lugewale
rahwuswahelisele mõimule.

See nõrgema täbar seikuford oli seega jar-
nane, millises wõib kord ohtuda iga riik, eriti
määratult, seega ka — mille eest Mit hoibdu Ju-
mal ja muud maailma-autoriteetid — Eesti.
Ja just seepärast ongi Manchšuuria kindmuse
edashibine areng meile tähtis. Sest on ju Es-
ti oma julgeoleku ja rahwuswahelise seikuforra
õige suurel määral sõnund Rahwasteliiduga, na-
gu meil polegi teist teed ja nagu kinnitatud pea-
aegu iga uue walituse deklaratsioonil wälispoli-
tilises osas.

Peab aga tohe alul üttema kurtwa ja kass-
ahastawa tõe: Rahwasteliit pole end sellise sõja-
lise konflikti lahendamisel suutnud näidata kuigi
autoriteetse ning nõrgemate lootsi andwa jõuna.
Nõgi mitte sel määral, et see õigustaks neid iga
aastaga airta lerkimaid liikmemasse, mis peawad
talle maksma kõik riigid, ka kogu Eesti... Seda
on walus kuulda, aga see on ometi tõe ja juba ta
etteteadmine ehk hoia ära mõnegi palju suurema
waku tulewitus!

Kui mõne nädala eest Rahvasteliidu nõukogu Genfis Hiina rahvel tuli kofu asja otsustama. Kutsuti nõupidamistest osa võtma ka Ameerika Ühendriikide esindaja. Ühendriigid aga ei ole Rahvasteliidu liige, mida aga on nii Hiina kui Jaapan. Siin on aga Ameerikal suuri huviseid Kuuges Kdas ja ta on üldse vägevaim maailmaritt. Juba see asjaolu, et Rahvasteliit ei julgenud astuda oma kake kiirne mahelise tüli lahendamisele muidu, kui tundis end olevat sunnitud juure kufuma ka Rahvasteliitu mitte kuuluma, asja vastu ainult o m a seisufohast huvitundma ja seejuures vägeva suurriigi — juba see asjaolu ei võt äratada kuigi suurt usku Rahvasteliidu sigluse ja moraalse ning tegefikü mõju taljufindlusse. Aga asi läks üha kurvemaks: Rahvasteliidu nõukogu siis mõttis vastu otuse, mille järgi Jaapan pidi algama Mandshuuria evakueerimist. Ohtus tehti küll ühe (Jaapani) häälte vahetusemisel ega olnud keppärast maksem, kuna 2.-l. statumt näeb ette maksvatena ainult ühel-häälte tehitud otuseid. (Nagu oleks juba R.-l. niste muutnud ksil riigid seewõrd inglitels, et nad sigluse nimel ka enda seisufohtade vastu hädletatfid ...) Nõukogu laialhminekul soovitati kstt-fajail pidada rahu. Ka just siis tulidki suuremad lohingud Nonni jsel, Ma-Tshan-shani purustamine, Tsififari vallutamise, tuhanded furnud ... kuni praegu on asi nii laugel, et Jaapan on tähe-line peremees vähemalt pooles Mandshuurias.

Ning Jaapani selle ülemõtmu, mõtte peaaegu veldu fõjalise vägiw alla kinnituseks nüüd Rahvasteliidu nõukogu Partifis mõtab omaks Jaapani seisufohad, kuigi Hiina esindaja juhib lugupeetud maailmajuhitide tähelepanu tšfiasjale, et need seisufohad on wastupidised neile, millel afutt enne Tsififari vallutamist, Ma-Tshan-shani vägede purustamist jaapanlaste poolt.

Sifufiselt arutamata kummagi poole jüüd mõi füllitust Mandshuuria sfindmustes, peab fiksli kõige eelbeldu põhjal peaaegu ühinema ühe Saksa lehe ütetusjega, et „Rahvasteliit“ tegutseb nagu läinud sajandi tuleõrje, mis jõudis kohale ainult siis, kui maja oli juba maha põlenud, mil siis löödi naabrimajal ukked-aknad sfisse, walati maja wett täis ja kshuti flamer ära“. Tulekahjuks on Mandshuuria haaramine Jaapani poolt ja naabrimajuks, millel nüüd löödud sfisse aknad-ukked, on nõrkade lenine lootus siglusele ja fairsale Rahvasteliidust ...

Mis miga New-Yorgi „Sun-il“ ironiseerida, et Rahvasteliidul ja ta Briandidel seni kahjuks purduwad inglite leegionid, mille saabumisel aga ei olemat R.-l. nõrgemal liitmetel midagi enam karta.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

FROM

GRAY

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Peiping via N.R.

Dated December 16, 1931

Rec'd 10:30 a.m.

DIVISION OF

Secretary of State,

Washington

1087, December 16, 7 p.m.

Legation's December 15, 3 p.m.

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
DEC 16 1931

Department of State

After proceeding as far as Tsinanfu young Marshal
returned here same day. He has abandoned plan of going
to Nanking for the present.

For the Minister,

PERKINS

JHR-RR

F/DEW

793.94/3218

FILED

DEC 22 1931

793.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

MET

GRAY

RECEIVED

FROM

Peiping via N.R.

DIVISION OF

Dated December 16, 1931

Rec'd 10:45 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

1084, December 16, 4 p.m.

Following from American Consul General at Mukden:

"December 15, 11 p.m. Tsang Shih Yi, chairman
of this province, who has been under detention since
September 18 at Mukden was released Sunday and according
to reliable information, he was installed as governor
late this afternoon. In my opinion this event fore-
shadows an early attack on Chinchow.

Confirmation to follow". Repeated to Minister at
Nanking and Military Attache at Chinchow.

For the Minister,

OSB

PERKINS

FK 793.94/3219

FILED

DEC 22 1931

793.94
note
893.01

1952

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138 TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Collect
Charge Department **RECEIVED Department of State**
OR
Charge to
\$ **1953 DEC-16- PM 6:20** **Washington,**

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS & RECORDS
AMERICAN EMBASSY

December 16, 1931.

Carleton
PARIS (FRANCE). *(Sintgall)*
CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE AMBASSADOR

793.94/3219

Your 893, December 16, noon, last paragraph.

One. Under date of December 16/³²¹⁴ the American Legation at Peiping repeated a report from the military observers at Chinchow dated December 15 that QUOTE During observers December 11 inspection of the area ten miles from Yingkow bombarded by Japanese with aerial torpedoes, no evidence bandit activity was reported or observed. Reports of further concentration of Chinese troops, aircraft and artillery at Chinchow false. Chinese third cavalry brigade is guarding Tahushan-Tungliao Railway with headquarters at Changwu. There is no troop movements or change in the situation in Chinchow UNQUOTE.

Two. Under date December 15/³²¹⁹ American Consul General at Mukden reported to the effect that Tsang Shih Yi, who had been under detention at Mukden, was released on Sunday and according to reliable information was

Enciphered by _____ installed
Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

793.94/3219

1 1954

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

Department of State

Washington,

- 2 -

installed as governor on December 15; and that in the
opinion of the Consul General this event foreshadows
an early attack on Chinchow.

Three. ~~You should give the above to M. Briand~~
~~for his information confidential as to source and~~
~~Inform Drummond~~
~~Report to Gilbert at Geneva for his confidential~~
~~information of Drummond.~~ (as to source. SK49)

Stinggo

SK49

Wly

FE: RSM: EJJ FE

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19 _____

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1953 1-138

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00/11665 FOR Tel.#124-10 pm.

FROM Wanking (Peck) DATED Dec.15, 1931.
TO --- NAME 1-1127 o.p.o.

REGARDING: Chinese policy in regard to controversy with Japan: The Government has scattered leaflets from airplanes over student demonstrations setting forth its policy and plans in regard to the controversy with Japan, and asking the students not to believe Japanese counter-propaganda. Demonstrations by students continue.
(Copy attached)

frg

793.94/3220

12
NAM

GRAY

NANKING

Dated December 15, 1931

Rec'd 4:40 p.m.

note
893.001
793.94
Secretary of State

Washington

124, December 15, 10 p.m.

My 123, December 15, noon. /11664

The damage inflicted by the students on the Foreign Office buildings was comparatively slight. When they reached the Central Party headquarters a meeting of the central executive committee of the Nationalist Party was in progress and had just taken the following action:

The resignation of Chiang Kai Shek from all his posts had been accepted and Lin Sen, who is President of the Legislative Yuan, had been appointed acting President of the National Government and General Chen Ming Shu, commander in chief of the National Guard had been appointed acting President of the Executive Yuan; the committee refused to accept the resignations of the other Yuan presidents. After the students had forced the main entrance they were opposed by party officials and were met by Tsai Yuan Pei and Chen Ming Shu. The two latter were seized by the students and received severe injuries. The students were armed with staves and iron rods and at least one revolver, from which shots were fired. Some of the students wore

893.001/11665-

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

mam

2- #124, from Nanking,
December 15, 1931

wore communist insignia. There appears to be no general disorder here and there are no present indications of other important resignations or departures from the capital. Chiang Kai Shek has been persuaded by the central executive committee to remain in Nanking and T. V. Soong returned from Shanghai while the arrival of Chang Hsueh Liang is expected. During the last few days the government has utilized airplanes to scatter hand bills over the student demonstrations. The following is a translation of a typical leaflet: "Patriotic fellow students. The Government has repeatedly announced that (one) it definitely will not negotiate directly with Japan, (two) it definitely will not create a neutral area at Chinchow but will on the contrary oppose that measure and, (three) there is no proposal to create joint control of Tientsin. Do not believe Japanese counter-propaganda".

Legation at Peiping and Embassy at Tokyo informed.

PECK

CSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/3220

1930

See
893.00/11664

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Jan. 17, 1931.

~~MMH~~
RSM:

I do not think that
this material, dealing with
attempts to General Ma,
of Komin River fame, are of
much moment just now.
Later, if an attempt is made
to analyze that incident,
it may be of value.

H

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

No. 5278

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

HARBIN CHINA, November 30, 1931

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTING COPY OF DESPATCH TO THE LEGATION

793.94
THE HONORABLE
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

SIR:

I have the honor to enclose herewith, for the information
1/ of the Department, a copy of my despatch No. 2284, of even
date, transmitting to the Legation a copy of a memorandum
handed to me by Mr. S. Ohashi, the local Japanese Consul
General, on the subject of the last ultimatum delivered to
General Ma Chan Shan, Acting Chairman of the Heilungchiang
government.

Respectfully yours,

G. C. Hanson

G. C. Hanson
American Consul General

1 enclosure as indicated

800
TLL/tll

F/DEW

793.94/3221

DEC 22 1931

FILED

No. 2284

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL

HARBIN CHINA, November 20, 1931

SUBJECT: TRANSMITTING MEMORANDUM OF CONSUL GENERAL OHASHI

The Honorable

Nelson Trusler Johnson,

American Minister,

Peiping, China

Sir:

1/ I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of a memorandum sent to me by Mr. S. Ohashi, Japanese Consul General at Harbin, on the subject of the circumstances under which General Honjo's ultimatum, mentioned in my telegram dated November 15, 1.00 P. M., and subsequent telegrams, was delivered to and rejected by General Ma Chan Chen, Acting Chairman of Heilungchiang Province.

On November 19th Mr. Ohashi invited Messrs J. B. Powell of the Chicago Tribune, Victor Keen of the Chicago Herald-Tribune, Snow of the New York Sun, Frederic Muhn of the United Press, Sweetland of the Chicago Daily News, and Rabb of the Associated Press, and myself to a Japanese luncheon party at 1.30 P. M. After at first accepting, the American journalists informed Mr. Ohashi that they would leave at 3 P. M. for Tsitsihar and could, therefore, not attend his luncheon party.

Mr. Ohashi explained in regard to this ultimatum to Mr. L. Dupey of the London Daily Mail and to myself, who attended the luncheon party. Subsequently Mr. Ohashi sent to me the memorandum mentioned above.

Inasmuch as Chao Chou Jen, mentioned in the memorandum as representative of the Heilungchiang Government at Harbin, constantly kept me informed in regard to the progress of the negotiations,

-I am-

-2-

I am actually sure that Mr. Ohashi has set down in the memorandum the truth as indicated by the records in his office. It was his intention to explain this matter to the American journalists whom he had invited to the luncheon party, which was also attended by a Japanese officer from the local Japanese Military Mission.

Respectfully yours,

G. C. Hanson
American Consul General

1 enclosure as indicated.

Copies have been sent to:

the Department,
the Embassy at Tokyo,
the Mukden Consulate General

800
GCH/TLL

196 -

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Stutzman NARS, Date 12-18-75

(a) General Honjo ordered Major Hayashi at Tsitsihar to deliver the last ultimatum to General Ma Chan Shan at 6 p.m. on the 14th Nov., but at that time Major Hayashi was at Harbin, having left Tsitsihar on the 14th November owing to the danger to which Japanese staying at Tsitsihar had become exposed. The ultimatum was accordingly communicated to General Ma on the morning of the 15th November by telephone, by Chao Chung Jen, representative of the Heilungkiang Government stationed at Harbin.

The outline of the ultimatum was as follows:-

1. Chinese troops should evacuate to the north of Tsitsihar within 10 days from the time of the delivery of the ultimatum.
2. Chinese troops cannot come to the south of the Chinese Eastern Railway.
3. General Ma to guarantee the safety of the traffic on the Tao-Nan Angangchi Railway, which is mortgaged to the South Manchuria Railway because of the non-payment of the expenses of construction of the railway undertaken by the South Manchuria Railway.
4. Japanese troops will evacuate to the south of Taonan immediately when they see the Chinese will have fulfilled the above mentioned conditions.

The Japanese military at the time of the delivery of this ultimatum, demanded a reply from the Chinese by noon of the 16th.

(b) The reply from the Chinese did not arrive by noon of the 16th November. As an excuse for the delay the Chinese said that it would take some time for General Ma to persuade the officers and soldiers to comply with the Japanese demands.

At about 9:40 p.m. on the 16th November Governor Chang Ching Hui called an officer of the Japanese Consulate General to the telephone and told him that he (Chang Ching Hui) had just received a definite reply from General Ma accepting the whole of the Japanese proposals, and that General Ma had already sent a special messenger to Harbin carrying with him a written document containing his answer.

(c) The train arrived at Harbin at about 8 a.m. on the morning of the 17th November, but the expected messenger had disappeared, and was not found by the Chinese officials until 12 p.m. on the same day. Then the Chinese officials examined the document, but found that the answer did not agree with what General Ma had told Governor Chang Ching Hui on the telephone the previous day. The document was accordingly not handed over to the Japanese Military representative, but the contents were explained verbally. The essence of the answer was as follows:-

- (1) Heilongjiang troops will evacuate (it was not said to what place) but the Chinese demanded that the Japanese troops evacuate at the same moment as the Chinese troops.
- (2) They reserved the right to send Chinese troops south of the Chinese Eastern Railway should this become necessary on account of trouble with bandits.
- (3) They considered favorably the Japanese proposal that the Chinese should safeguard the freedom of traffic on the Taonan-Angangchi Railway, provided that the Japanese would not allow the invasion of the Heilongjiang Province by Chang Hsi Feig.

This reply was taken as unsatisfactory by the Japanese military.

(d) Governor Chang Ching Hsi late on the evening of the 17th November again called the Japanese Consulate and stated that he had received another telephone message from General Ma to the effect that the document sent the previous day did not express his real views, but was forced from him by the adherents of General Wan Fu Lin in Tsitsihar. Therefore he had despatched a further document expressing his real views.

On the morning of the 18th November, the document was brought to Harbin by a so-called relative of General Ma's and transmitted to the Japanese military. However, it was again discovered that General Ma's statement the previous evening to the effect that he accepted the whole of the Japanese proposals was not true. The contents of the afore-mentioned document ran as follows:-

- (1) The Chinese could not evacuate Tsitsihar, but are willing to evacuate their present front line and will try (not promise) to fulfil this condition within 10 days.
- (2) They will not send troops south of the Chinese Eastern Railway after the present situation has been settled.
- (3) The Taonan-Angangchi Railway being a Chinese railway it is up to the Chinese to safeguard the traffic on it.

(e) In the meantime fighting broke out on the morning of the 18th November, and in consequence all negotiations broke down.

1965

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

JS

FROM Gray
PEIPING

Dated December 17, 1931

Rec'd 4:15 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

1091, December 17, 1 p.m.

This Legation would appreciate it if the Embassy
at Tokyo could be instructed to repeat here occasionally
such of its telegrams to the Department as would assist
the Legation in following Sino - Japanese relations.

FOR THE MINISTER

PERKINS

JS

793.94

Division of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DEC 17 1931

Department of State

Tels to Tokyo

Re: Peiping

DEC 17 1931

F/DEW

793.94/3222

DEC 21 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

Department of State

1931 DEC-17- PM 7:02

Washington,

December 17, 1931.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS & RECORDS

AMEMBASSY

TOKYO (Japan)

793.94/3222 270
The Department desires that ^{in the future} you repeat ^{why}
to American Legation at Peiping for its information
such of your telegrams to the Department as would
assist the Legation in following Chinese-Japanese
relations. The Legation has been requested to
repeat to you similar telegrams ^{addressed} ~~sent~~ to the Depart-
ment.

793.94/3222

Shinson
why

FE: ^{RAM} AT

Dec 17 1931.

FE

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19____

Index Bu.—No. 60.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-138

1 1967

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

RECEIVED
Department of State

1-128
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

1931 DEC-17- PM 7:02

Washington,

December 17, 1931.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
AMLEGATION

PEIPING (CHINA)

793.94/3222
465
Your 1091/ December 17, 1 p.m.

The Embassy at Tokyo has been instructed as requested. The Legation should also send to the Embassy at Tokyo copies of similar telegrams to the Department. ^{addressed}

Stinson
my

793.94/3222

RAM
FE: RSM: AT

M.M.H.
FE

8222

Dec 17, 1931.

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19_____

196

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

77E

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

cib

FROM

PLAIN

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Peiping

Dated December 17, 1931

Recd 6:10 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington.

1093, December 17, 3 p.m.

Following from Reuter, Tokyo, December 17:

Owing to what are considered to be indications that Marshal Chang Hsueh Liang is preparing to withdraw the Chinchow garrison within the Great Wall it is learned that the proposal to despatch an additional one and one half divisions of Japanese troops to Manchuria mentioned on December twelve has been dropped but the Japanese cabinet today will consider the despatch of a mixed brigade to the Kwantung leased territory where it would be available to provide reliefs for the troops in Manchuria.

If the despatch of this briagde is sanctioned it is expected that one or two battalions will be embarked to proceed to Tientsin in the event of disturbances in North China arising from General Chiang Kai Shek's resignation."

For the Minister

PERKINS

JS


F / DEW

793.94/3223

DEC 17 1931

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75





LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Cairo, November 27, 1931.

No. 355

DEC 16 31

TRIPLICATE



F/DEW 793.94/3224

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit, as of possible interest to the Department, a copy of a letter, together with its enclosure, which I have received under date of November 25, 1931, from Dr. Robert P. Wilder, Executive Secretary of the Near East Christian Council, relative to the Sino-Japanese incident in Manchuria.

Respectfully yours,

W. M. Jardine
W. M. Jardine.

Enclosure as stated.

File No. 710
WMJ/icg

DEC 22 1931

FILED


793.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75



REGU

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA




Cairo, November 27, 1931.

No. 355

DEC 16 31

TRIPLICATE



793.94

F/DEW 793.94/3224

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit, as of possible interest to the Department, a copy of a letter, together with its enclosure, which I have received under date of November 25, 1931, from Dr. Robert P. Wilder, Executive Secretary of the Near East Christian Council, relative to the Sino-Japanese incident in Manchuria.

Respectfully yours,

W. M. Jardine.

Enclosure as stated.

File No. 710
WMJ/icg

DEC 22 1931

FILED

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

Enclosure No. 1 to despatch No. 355 of
November 27, 1931, from the Legation, Cairo.

C o p y

NEAR EAST CHRISTIAN COUNCIL

For Missionary Coöperation.
13 Avenue Fouad El-Awal, Cairo.

November 25, 1931.

The Hon. W. Jardine,
American Minister,
American Legation,
Cairo.

Dear Mr. Jardine:

Please find enclosed a letter from Mr. T. Z. Koo, a graduate of St. John's College, Shanghai, who for nine years after graduation served in the Administrative Department of the Chinese Railways. From 1918 to the present year, he has been on the staff of the National Committee of the Y. M. C. A. of China with special responsibility towards universities, schools and the cultivation of better international relations.

In 1925 he was in Geneva, serving as a member of the second Opium Conference called by the League of Nations. He has also served as the first oriental travelling Secretary of the World's Student Christian Rederation. Personally I have the greatest confidence in his ability and straight-forwardness.

The enclosed will, I am sure, interest you. I am sending a copy of it to Lord Robert Cecil, whom I know personally. Do you know General Dawes? Had I known him personally, I would have also sent him a copy of the enclosed. I do hope that the League of Nations will help to a satisfactory solution of the conflict between Japan and China. It looks from the papers as if the three representatives the League will send to Manchuria will be American, British, and French.

Yours most sincerely,

(Signed) Robert P. Wilder.

197

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

C o p y

29 Li Lu Hutung, West City, Peiping,
October 20, 1931.

Dear Friend,

My last letter was written just on the eve of the outbreak of the Japanese incident in Manchuria. Then, very few people realized the seriousness of the incident. Now the whole world is aware of the gravity of the situation. In order to get a personal impression of what is actually going on in Manchuria during these days, I made a brief visit to Mukden from October 8 to 13. In this letter I will give a brief account of the impressions gained on this trip together with some of my own reflections upon the situation.

The train for Mukden left Peiping at 8:25 p. m. on October 8. Travelling on the same train with me was Mr. Chester Rowell of California, publicity director of the Institute of Pacific Relations. The first evidence of the trouble in Manchuria met our eyes when our train reached Chinchow, an important city on the railway 246 miles west of Mukden, the center of Japanese occupation. Chinchow was bombed by twelve Japanese Military planes at 1:00 p. m. on October 8. Our train was the first train to reach Chinchow from the outside after the bombing. The objectives of bombing were the wireless station, the railroad station and yards, and the temporary offices of the civil government which were in the buildings of the Communications University. The bomb intended for the station missed its mark and hit a provision store just across the street, tearing a jagged hole in the roof and killing two of the inmates. Mr. Rowell visited the railroad yards where most of the casualties were reported. In all, three bombs were dropped on the wireless station, about 15 on the railroad yards and about a dozen on the University.

We continued our journey towards Mukden after spending about two hours in Chinchow. When our train reached Chu Liu Ho just beyond Hsin Min Fu, we came upon the second evidence of the Japanese occupation. Two Japanese soldiers with fixed bayonets came into the car in which I was sitting. One of them pointed his bayonet at me while the other searched my person, presumably for hidden arms. This was done to every passenger in the car. A little later, two more soldiers came through to inspect our baggage. At 1:30 a. m. on October 10, we reached Huang Ku Tun, the station just before the Mukden city station. Our train could not actually go to Mukden because the Japanese have torn up a section of the Peiping Mukden Line between Huang Ku Tun and Mukden City. As it was not safe to go into the city after dark, Mr. Rowell and I spent the rest of the night in a service car placed at our disposal through the courtesy of some British members of the Railroad staff at Huang Ku Tun.

At 8:30 the next morning (10th) we entered Mukden. Fortunately for me, our car was not challenged by the Japanese sentries and so we slipped in without attracting undue notice upon

ourselves

-2-

ourselves. The city looked like a Chinese city passing the first three days of the Chinese New Year. Most of the shops were closed and the streets looked deserted. A temporary force of Chinese policemen controlled by the Japanese were patrolling the streets. At every police station I passed on the way I saw Japanese soldiers quartered in it. The Headquarters of the Japanese army of occupation is established in Mukden and the city government is in the hands of a Japanese Mayor assisted by the usual departments also administered by Japanese nationals.

In addition to these Japanese military and civil administrative organs, Mukden also boasts of a Chinese Committee called the Committee for the Preservation of Order. The Chairman of this committee is Mr. Yuan Chin Kai, an old-time gentry of the city. This committee is really a dummy committee formed at the instigation of the Japanese. It can do nothing without the approval of the Japanese Mayor's Office. One then begins to wonder why create such a committee? On closer scrutiny I found that the Committee serves two purposes for the Japanese. The first is that the Committee, being a Chinese body, provides a convenient peg upon which to hang the pseudo-independence movements in Manchuria. You will undoubtedly have read in your papers reports of independence movements emanating from Tokio. Mr. Yuan Chin Kai's committee was saddled with one of these independence movements. A second purpose is the more subtle one of using the dummy committee as a cover for anything the Japanese want to take over or do in the city in which they do not want their own name to appear. So far this committee has tried to hold to its single purpose of preserving order in the city of Mukden and has resolutely refused to have anything to do with the independence movements or the sequestration of Chinese properties. But its role is becoming increasingly difficult and several members were contemplating flight from the city when I was there.

Japanese military and civil authorities have made a clean sweep of all Chinese governmental organs in Mukden. This is true not only in Mukden but also in the whole occupied area of over a million square miles bounded on the east by Antung and Kirin, north by Changchun, west by Ssupingkai and Hsin Min, and south by Yingkow. In this area, the Japanese have completely throttled the Chinese civil and military administrations, thereby destroying the only existing check against banditry and lawlessness in South Manchuria. Having created this state of affairs, they turn round coolly to the world and say they cannot withdraw their forces because of China's inability to protect the lives and property of their nationals.

Japanese tactics in Manchuria can be summed up under four categories. First, the occupation of strategic centers of military importance. The occupation of Ssupingkai and the seizure of Tunhua are examples. Ssupingkai is a Railroad junction northwest of Mukden with lines radiating to three points of the compass, namely north, west and south. Tunhua is the terminus of the Kirin Tunhua railway on the border of Korea. Since its occupation, the Japanese have been forcibly extending the line to connect with the Japanese railway system in Korea thus completing the strategic route from Korea into north Manchuria.

Second,

-3-

Second, the seizure of economic resources and the disruption of Chinese industries in the occupied area. The Chairman of the Provincial Government and the Commissioner of Industry are still prisoners in the hands of the Japanese and it is commonly reported in Mukden that pressure is being brought to bear upon these two men by the Japanese to compel them to sign away the economic resources of Manchuria and other valuable properties belonging to the Chinese government. In Mukden, the Japanese have appointed Japanese managers to operate Chinese mills. They are operating the Chinese railway from Kirin to Mukden. What they cannot use, the Japanese are dismantling or destroying. Even if this occupied territory is returned to China later, the loss and damage to us on this score alone will be incalculable and will take our people many tens of years to recoup.

Third, the creation of puppet committees or persons to declare the independence of Manchuria from China. This will bring Manchuria under the tutelage of Japan and reduce her to the same status as Korea before her annexation by the Island Empire. On the same train on which I returned to Peiping (October 13), I found the Mongol Prince Taherhan travelling in disguise with his family. I learned that he was escaping from Mukden because the Japanese have been importuning him to declare the independence of Mongolia. When the Japanese entered the city of Mukden on September 19, they placed a military guard over his residence and then sent emissaries to induce him to start a Mongolian independence movement. This he resolutely refused to do and the Japanese began to double and treble the guards. So finally he decided that Mukden was not a healthy place for him just then and he smuggled himself out disguised as a servant. The Japanese have been making frantic attempts to secure other puppets for these independence movements, including the ex-emperor Pu-yi, but so far without success.

Fourth, the bribing and arming of the Hunhutsu (Manchurian bandits). As far as the ordinary people in South Manchuria are concerned, this move is the most cruel one for them. These bandits are incited by the Japanese to rob trains, villages and cities. I myself very nearly became a victim of these bandits as the train I came back on to Peiping was bandited on the way. My heart aches for the peaceful farmers of Manchuria during the long winter months which will soon come upon them when they have to face the double hardship of Japanese military occupation and widespread banditry.

In the next few paragraphs, I wish to share with you some of my personal reflections as I observed the situation in Manchuria on this trip. My first reaction is that in this Japanese coup-de-tat, we see militarism gone mad. I have seen for some time that when nations go on piling up armaments indefinitely, a point will be reached when the itch to use these armaments becomes irresistible. I think this is what has happened with Japan. The Japanese people probably no more desire war than the people in China. But the military junta in Japan, drunk with its own sword rattling, has precipitated the nation into a situation which has practically damned an otherwise admirable people as a pariah in the eyes of the whole world. Today, we see in Manchuria Japanese militarism running amok with all its attendant evils of brutality, murder, rape and lies. Let all who still

believe

-4-

believe in big armaments for 'defensive purpose only' take warning and realise what a dangerous plaything they have in their hands.

My second reflection is in the realm of the future. The status quo in Manchuria presents a picture of Russia in the north and Japan in the south with China sandwiched in between the two. If Japan is allowed to get away with her bluff this time in South Manchuria, she would have brought herself face to face again with her traditional enemy, Russia. Once before when their territories were contiguous, it brought on the Russo-Japanese war. It requires no special foresight to see that with militant Japan facing directly in Manchuria a rejuvenated Russia still smarting under her last defeat, war is inevitable. Thus, unless the status quo is restored, a standing threat to the peace of the Far East will have been perpetrated in Manchuria.

My third reaction comes to me because of my interest in the movement for the outlawry of war. Through Japan's action in South Manchuria, a situation is dramatised in such a way that the whole world sees a nation armed to the nth degree invading another nation which is utterly unprepared militarily to resist the invasion. Under any other circumstances, war between China and Japan would have been unavoidable. But China's rulers adopted a policy of non-military resistance to Japan's act of war and appealed to the League of Nations for arbitration. This has placed before the League an unique opportunity to prove to the world once for all whether it has a right to its existence. If the League takes an effective stand in this trouble between China and Japan consonant with the growing sentiment in the world for peace and co-operation between nations and for the outlawry of war, the whole cause for world peace would be immeasurably advanced.

The entire world is asking "Can the League function effectively in such a situation?" My answer is emphatically yes. There are people who do not have any faith in the League because they say the League has no military force to enforce its decisions. These people do not understand that for the League to use military force to enforce its decisions is to negate the very purpose for which the League is created, namely, to do away with war. But the League has an instrument at its disposal far more effective than military force. India through Mr. Ghandi and now China has demonstrated to the world that armed force can be resisted without resorting to armed force. The use of the boycott method by all the signatory powers of the League Covenant against an offending nation will quickly bring that nation to her senses. This international boycott can be applied in three stages. The first stage is for all the member states of the League simultaneously to break off diplomatic relations with the offending nation. After an interval of a fortnight, if the nation is still bent on making war, then the member states will close their sea ports to the shipping of the offending nation. Perhaps a month should be allowed after this declaration for the offender to think over its own actions. If it proves to be still recalcitrant, then the final stage should be applied, that is, withdraw all financial credit from the offending nation. I feel sure that the use of this method by the League when it has a clear case of international aggression before it will put an effective stop to war.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

-5-

I believe, as all fair-minded men believe today, that in this Sino-Japanese situation in Manchuria, the League has before it a clear case of international aggression, pure and simple. Our Government has counselled the people to remain calm under provocation and await action by the League reserving the use of military force for self-defense until every other means to settle the trouble is exhausted. Hence, much is being expected from the League by the Chinese people as indeed by all the world. I earnestly hope the League will not fail this time. If it fails not only its own existence is threatened but the whole cause of disarmament and world peace is doomed beyond recall.

Forgive me for devoting this whole letter to our own trouble in Manchuria. In these days of suffering and death there I have no place in my heart for anything else.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) T. Z. Koo.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

GRAY

FROM Peiping via N. R.

Undated

Rec'd 4:15 a. m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1089.

Legation's 1084, December 16, 4 p. m.

Following from American Consul General at Mukden:

"December 16, 7 p. m. Receipt of the report of Tsang's assumption of office of governor yesterday is confirmed. Red banners were displayed throughout the city today. According to a report a formal installation will be held on December 18th. Local press reports of his election of representatives of the gentry, merchants, farmers and laborers are not substantiated.

Two. Headquarters reports the return from Tiling of Japanese forces which yesterday engaged and dispersed a force of one thousand irregulars.

Three. Four sections of Japanese troops have been sent to disperse Chinese irregulars who today destroyed a bridge of the Kirin-Tunhua Railway at Lafachang.

Repeated to Department and Nanking.

For the Minister

PERKINS

JS


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7E

F/LS

Tokio

Dated December 17, 1931

Rec'd 8:25 a.m.

8:25 a.m. *Let to Secretary*
 DEC 17 1931
 Division of
 FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
 DEC 17 1931
 Department of State
Let to Secretary
 F/L/S
 he has been

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note
894.24

Confidential File

informed by the general staff that the Cabinet has approved the movement of additional troops to Manchuria and Tientsin; we estimate at 14,000 and 1,000, respectively. These to relieve the Korean brigade which is to be withdrawn "if situation permits". A like movement of reinforcements was previously announced to have been made for the same purpose; (see my telegram No. 216, November 13, 5 p.m.) Details are being cabled to War Department. (END GRAY)

FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION OF THE SECRETARY.

ONLY: It is reported that the military feel much stronger than before Cabinet change. A representative of the general staff stated to Lieutenant Cranford in substance his belief ~~that~~ in order to relieve the bandit situation it is best to take Chinchow as they are connected with and

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#270 from Tokio, December 17,
1931.

and supplied by Chinchow; but he hoped that they could
frighten them away by sending new troops and thus avert
warfare. He asked Lieutenant Cranford what the attitude
of the United States would be. I directed him to reply
that we had already expressed very strong^{ly} the hope that
no further military movement against Chinese troops be
undertaken, fearing that it would unfavorably affect
world opinion. In the light of telegram No. 267, 3216
December 16, 9 p.m., we are inclined to believe the
opinion expressed by the general staff that this movement
is a gesture made in the expectation of inducing
peaceable withdrawal Chinese troops.

FORBES

WSB

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

793.94

SEE 893.00/11669 FOR Telegram 1088 10am

FROM China (Perkins) DATED Dec.17,1931
TO NAME 1-1127

REGARDING:

Resignation of Marshall Chang Huih Liang. Probably be succeeded by
General Tso Hsiang as Commander of the North Eastern Forces.

ek

793.94/3227

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

WP

PLAIN

Peiping

Dated December 17, 1931

Rec'd 1:00 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

1088, December 17, 10 a. m.

893.20
795.94
Marshal Chang Huih Liang last night tendered his resignation as Commander in Chief of North Eastern Frontier Defense forces and as Deputy Commander in Chief of National Army, Navy and Air Forces. According to press report General Chang Tso Hsiang may succeed him as Commander in Chief of North Eastern forces and the National Government is said to be considering creation of a North Eastern Political Council composed of some twenty seven members with perhaps the young marshal as chairman.

For the Minister.

PERKINS

JS

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustig NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DEC 14 1931

December 8, 1931.

MR. KLOTS

Mr. E. C. Carter, Mr. Blakeslee, Mr. Hornbeck.

SUBJECT: Manchuria Situation.

Mr. Carter is Executive Secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations. He attended the Shanghai Conference of the Institute, which closed about November 4, and has recently returned from Japan. Outstanding among his statements were the following:

LIBERAL OPINION IN JAPAN.

Liberal opinion in Japan as a whole has come to support the action of the Japanese Army in Manchuria. As evidence, Mr. Carter stated that at the closing session of the Shanghai Conference, a Japanese speaker had the courage to declare that young Japanese liberals were opposed not only to war but also to acts of war committed when no state of war existed; but that some days later the same Japanese, upon meeting Mr. Carter in Tokyo, told him that he had discovered that his statement was entirely incorrect, that seven-eighths of the young Japanese liberals had gone over to the military point of view.

Japanese, including the liberals, Mr. Carter said, believed that all the leading newspapers in the United States, except the WORLD-TELEGRAM, were supporting Japan's actions in Manchuria. Mr. Carter attributed this belief to the Japanese censorship which strictly excluded all news not favorable to the military party. He expressed the conviction that it would be to the interest of the United States to make clear in

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- 2 -

some public statement, its opposition to the military measures in Manchuria, in order that this information might gradually, despite the censorship, reach and influence Japanese liberal opinion.

Referring to the well-known Japanese leader, Dr. Nitobe, Mr. Carter stated that he was "torn in his own soul" between his desire to support liberal principles and to support the action of his Government.

JAPANESE PLANS FOR MILITARY ACTION.

Mr. Carter talked with a number of the officials of the South Manchuria Railway shortly after September 18, and was told by them, with considerable frankness, that they had desired and planned for some such military action as had recently taken place; and that only a few days before the Mukden incident they had visited Tokyo and presented their views before the authorities. These railway officials said that most of them had believed that if Japan should issue a public statement describing the three hundred instances of Chinese aggression and violation of Japanese rights, world opinion would probably regard military action as justified, but that some were of the opinion that, before striking, it might be better to wait "for the three hundred and first instance". Fortunately, ^{they said,} the Chinese had obligingly furnished such an incident sooner than was anticipated. When Mr. Carter remarked that neutral opinion in Manchuria regarded the incident of September 18 as a "frame up", the Japanese replied, "What does it matter?"; and stated that they had created

[?]

- 3 -

created the kind of a situation which they had desired.

JAPAN'S MILITARY OPINION.

From conversations with Japanese Army officers and from other sources, Mr. Carter is convinced that Japanese military officers do not all hold the same views regarding Manchurian policy. Recent action, he states, has undoubtedly been carried out by a group of younger officers who are clear as to their objective and have been able to push through the plans which they had adopted. But many of the Army officers, especially the older men, did not favor such drastic measures as have been carried out.

IMPORTANCE OF AMERICAN OPINION AND ACTION.

It was evident from many conversations that Japan, as a whole, regards the views of the American Government and the American people and the possible action of the United States in regard to Manchuria as of far greater importance than those of any other power, or group of powers, or of the League of Nations.

UNOFFICIAL SINO-JAPANESE CONSULTATIONS.

At the conclusion of the Shanghai Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Mr. Charles P. Howland of New York was elected Chairman of the International Research Committee of the Institute, and it was arranged that he would start for the Far East probably toward the end of January, in order to hold meetings of the Chinese and Japanese research committees. The Chinese and Japanese have agreed that they will

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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

will meet together with the announced object of studying their research projects, but that they will also consider unofficially what may be done to solve the present problem in Manchuria.

GHB/REK

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

NO. 1558

AM RECD
DEPT. OF STATE
AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL
Montreal, Canada, December 15, 1931.
DIV. COM. & REC.



SUBJECT:

1-1221 ***

The Manchurian Question as Viewed by the
Honorable Vincent Massey.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to report that on December 14, 1931, the Hon. Vincent Massey, recently Canadian Minister at Washington, addressed the Canadian Club at Montreal on the Manchurian question, the writer being present and seated near the speaker.

It may be of interest to report that Mr. Massey, while apparently exerting an effort toward being impartial, appeared to lean distinctly toward the Japanese side of the controversy. He opened his remarks by bringing out clearly that Canada's trade interests with Japan are far greater than those with China; and emphasized the juridical validity of Japan's railway and mining concessions in Manchuria. After setting forth the traditional rights of sovereignty on the part of China, he concluded by suggesting an arrangement which would leave China her sovereignty while granting Japan very extensive economic domination. (He advocated conciliation rather than arbitration as the best method for reaching a solution.)

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
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- 2 -

It may likewise be of interest that Colonel William M. Birks who has been prominent among the Canadian delegates to the Institute of Pacific Relations, as well as other Canadian members of the Institute with whom the writer has conversed personally, admits to an increasing sympathy with Japan as against China.

Respectfully yours,



Wesley Frost,
American Consul General.

WF/LPO
800

Copy to the American Minister, Ottawa.

X

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 500. A 15 A 4/637 FOR MEMORANDUM.

FROM State Department (Rogers) DATED Dec. 4, 1931.
TO A-R NAME 1-1172 ...

REGARDING:

Crisis in Manchuria.
Circular letter being sent out by the National
Council for Prevention of War in connection
with the - .

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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TELEGRAM RECEIVED

WP

FROM GRAY

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

Peiping

Dated December 18, 1931

Rec'd 3:00 a. m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

1095, December 18, 11 a. m.

Following from Military Attache at Chinchow:

"December 17, 3 p. m. In company with British and French Military Attaches am going by special train December 18, 3 a. m., for inspection trip Hsinmin and possibly to include Mukden returning Chinchow December 19, 11 p. m. Conditions this place quiet, no movement Chinese troops. Japanese aircraft have not been over Chinchow during the last week". Repeated to Department and Nanking.

For the Minister.

PERKINS

JS

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FAH EASTERN AFFAIRS
DEC 18 1931

Department of State

F/DEW 793.94/3231

DEC 22 1931

FIELD

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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PREPARING OFFICE
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OR
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Department of State

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TO BE TRANSMITTED
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NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE ☒
PLAIN

Washington,

DEC 18 1931 4:27

December 18, 1931.

AMERICAN CONSUL

GENEVA (Switzerland)

CONFIDENTIAL FOR GILBERT

One. Under date December 17, the American Ambassador at Tokyo reports that the American Assistant Military Attache' has been informed by the Japanese General Staff that the Cabinet has approved the movement of additional troops to Manchuria and Tientsin, estimated by the Embassy at four thousand and one thousand, respectively. These troops are to relieve the Korean brigade which is to be withdrawn QUOTE if situation permits UNQUOTE.

Two. Under date December 18, the American Legation at Peiping repeats a report from Military Attache Margetts at Chinchow dated December 17 that QUOTE In company with British and French Military Attaches am going by special train

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1929 1-128

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-138
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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Charge Department
OR
Charge to
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Department of State

Washington,

- 2 -

December 18, 3 a.m., for inspection trip Hsinmin
and possibly to include Mukden returning Chinchow
December 19, 11 p.m. Conditions this place quiet,
no movement Chinese troops. Japanese aircraft
have not been over Chinchow during the last week.
UNQUOTE.

Three. Inform Drummond confidential as to
source.

Simon
12/18

FE:MMH:AT

M.M.H.

RMH
FE

18, 1931
MMH

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

Index Bu.—No. 50.

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

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PLAIN

COPIES SENT TO
O.N.I. AND M.I.D.

FROM

Peiping via N.R.

Dated December 18, 1931

Secretary of State,

Washington

1100, December 18, 6 p.m.

Legation's 1093, December 17, 3 p.m.

Following from Nippon Dempo, Tokyo, December 17th:


"At this morning's cabinet conference decision was reached in favor of War Minister Arakis' proposal for a despatch of contingents of army forces from a home division to Manchuria and Tientsin in relief of the Chosen contingents. The strength of these new contingents will be nearly the same as those which will be recalled".

For the Minister,

PERKINS

WWC-HPD

Rec'd 9:37 a.m.



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793.94/3232

DEC 22 1931

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793.94

Japanese Forces in Manchuria

Normal Garrison

2 ^d Division	8,000
6 R.R. guard Battalions	<u>4,000</u>
	12,000

Reinforcements in Manchuria

Reinforced brigade from Korea	4,000
Reinforced brigade from Korea, Akita etc	<u>4,000</u>
	8,000

Reinforcements ordered to Manchuria.

Reinforced brigade from Himeji, Tokushima, and Tokyo	<u>4,000</u>
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<u>Grand total</u>	<u>24,000</u>
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whereby Maj. Crane


Pg

1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

RADIOGRAM

December 17, 1931



From Tokio

To The Adjutant General



CONFIDENTIAL

Number 204

Dec. 17th

793.94

Cabinet approved sending following troops to Manchuria, one mixed Infantry Brigade from 10th Division ^(from Hiroze and Tottori) augmented by auxiliary troops from the 1st Division, Guards Division, and Guards. Total number to equal present Korea Brigade. Also 11th Infantry ^(from Hiroshima) 5th Division to Tientsin, estimated at 1,000. Korea troops in Tientsin to be withdrawn to Manchuria. Korea Brigade to be withdrawn if situation permits. Japanese claims whose trouble caused by bandits and irregular Chinese soldiers whom they believe are cooperating with and are being supplied by Chinchow is critical and General Staff unofficially states that Chinchow must be reduced but it is hoped that these detachments overawe them and warfare will be averted. General Staff also states that prior to any action being taken these activities will be made and later a warning issued. They also claim observation of foreign observers of true conditions between Chinchow and Mukden impossible and unduly influenced by Chinese. Appointment of Araki strengthens military authorities powers.

793.94/3233

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E) Cranford

Dec 17, 1931
By M. O. Gustafson NARS Date Mar 19, 1973

1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

RADIOGRAM


BFS

December 12, 1931.

12:30 P.M.

From Tokyo

To The Adjutant General.



CONFIDENTIAL

Number 202. December 12th.

Inukai will form complete Seiyukai cabinet. This strengthens military authorities' position. Gold embargo more probable. War Department to-day admitted to United Press having more than treaty allowance in Manchuria and are debating on sending 15,000 more.

Cranford.

793.94

Handwritten: By Allyson Date Mar 19, 1973

JUN 4 1932

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F / DEW 793.94/3234

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.74/941 FOR Telegram

FROM United Press(Karl A Becker) DATED Dec 9, 1931
TO _____ NAME _____ 1--1127 o.p.o.

REGARDING:

Mukden Radio. United Press will lodge protest with Japanese Government
if agreeable with Department.

ek

793.94/3235

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

GREEN

TELEGRAM RECEIVED
Geneva

Dated December 18, 1931

Secretary of State,

Washington



317, December 18,

Department's 135, December 17, 6 p.m.

Conveyed to Drummond attitude of Hines, respecting

service on Manchurian Commission. Drummond is informing Briand. Briand will communicate direct with Hines asking him if he will indicate his willingness to accept an invitation. This is regarded as tantamount to an invitation as subsequent procedures are largely proforma. Should Hines' reply be in the affirmative, these procedures are that Briand will present Hines' name to his colleagues on the Council and upon receipt of agreement on the part of Council members (which is regarded as virtually certain) a formal invitation will go forward.

The present plan is that the League will advance the cost of the Commission but it expects to obtain reimbursement from Chinese and Japanese Governments. Details respecting expenses and compensation of commissioners not yet worked out but will undoubtedly follow satisfactory precedents.



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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#317 from Geneva, December 18,
1931.

precedents. Estimate of duration of labors of Commission
of nine months in my telegram of December 15, 9 a.m.
includes travel to and from Manchuria. Estimate of time
actually required in Manchuria is six months.

GILBERT



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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

793.94/3237

TRANSFERRED TO 793.94 COMMISSION/II

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY STIMSON
AND THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR, MR. KATSUJI DEBUCHI.

Manchurian Commission.

793.94 The Japanese Ambassador came to ask me whether we had approved of the suggestion of Mr. Walker D. Hines to be on the Manchurian Commission. I told the Ambassador that that was under consideration by the President. He discussed Mr. Hines' reputation, and asked me about it. I said that I had known him personally and that he had conducted the difficult negotiations after the war in regard to European river shipping, and I had never heard anything but commendation; so I thought that that indicated he was a fair man. But I said it would not be decided until I heard from the President.

I asked the Ambassador about the situation in Manchuria, pointing out the news about Marshal Chang's retirement. He said he thought that an attack upon Chinchow was now very remote.

HLS.

S HLS:HHR

JAN 21 1932

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793.94/32338

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

file
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

December 17, 1931.

M:

Subject: POINTS OF DISPUTE IN MANCHURIA,

Tokyo office of the Military Attache,

November 10, 1931.

File No. 793.94/3239

- 1.- Statement of Japanese claims, etc. against China -not confined to Manchuria- , taken from Tokyo press. 53 are listed. (The Japanese have stated that there are over 200 such)


Comment: While this is not based on official information, it covers the basic Japanese complaints, in a general way.

793.94

RPA/

100

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



JAPAN.

Points of Issue in Manchuria.

1. The following is a list of what the Japanese view as representative of the Chinese violation of Japanese rights and interests in Manchuria, as published by the Japanese officials through their Legation in China. It includes what they term as "illegal constructions", "illegal levies", "illegal restrictions", confiscation of property, interference with mining interests, and land expropriation and arrests of Koreans, also special reference to the Manchurian Incident, anti-Japanese propaganda, and default of loan obligations.

Parallel Railway Lines

1. Construction of the Mukden-Hailuian and the Hai-an lines (two parallel lines):

a. The authorities of three eastern provinces commenced, in August 1928, the construction of the Mukden-Hailuian railway; and in spite of Japanese protests, proceeded with work and inaugurated its traffic on November 10, 1929.

b. The authorities of three eastern provinces commenced on the work of construction of the branch line of the Mukden-Hailuian line, for a distance of about 40 miles from Hailuian Cheng-su to Tsing-feng. Utterly ignoring the frequent protests from Japan, they completed its construction by the end of the same year.

2. Disregard of the agreement relating to the extension of the Peiping-Hukien line:

In violation of Article 6 of the agreement relating to the extension of the Peiping-Hukien line, the Peiping line through trains to the South Manchuria Railway, have been made to stop first at the Mukden station of the Peiping-Hukien line and then to proceed to the Mukden station of the South Manchuria Railway.

3. Construction of the Hailuian-Kirin line:

By disregarding unilaterally preliminary agreement of four railway lines relating to Manchuria and Mongolia, the authorities of three eastern provinces proceeded freely to construct the Kirin-Hailuian line and completed it in May, 1929.

Chungchun-Tsai Line

4. Disregard of the agreement to construct the Chungchun-Tsai line and the Kirin-Kai-riang line:

Although the South Manchuria Railway hoped to commence on the construction of the Chungchun-Tsai Line and Tung-Hwai line, which was provided for in the agreement between it and the Minister of Communications of May 1929, China obstructed its commencement, claiming that the time had not as yet been ripe for it.

State (FE)

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1932

- 2 -

5. The illegal restriction to the rights of the advisor to the Rao-An Line:

In violation of the exchanged notes supplementary to the Rao-An railway loan, the Chinese authorities refused to give the rights stipulated for the advisor of the Rao-An line, dispatched by the South Manchuria Railway.

6. Non-employment of the Chief Accountant for the Xi-lung Railway:

Contrary to the stipulation of the construction contract of the Xi-lung line, China has refused to employ a Japanese Chief Accountant, and has employed a Chinese in his place.

Linking of Rail Lines.

7. Connection between Ho-lung and Rao-Tao lines, at Lung-Hiao.

The Chinese authorities, disregarding Japanese protests, completed the connection facilities between the Ho-lung and Rao-Tao lines.

8. Non-recognition of the Through Traffic Agreement between the South Manchuria Railway and the Rao-Tao Lines:

The Through Traffic Agreement was concluded in September 1929 between the South Manchuria Railway and the Rao-Tao Railway Bureau. However, the Committee of Communications refusing to give sanction to the amendment of the Through Traffic Agreement, via South Manchuria line, Korea and Rao-Tao lines, which is inseparable from the aforesaid agreement, neither the agreement nor the amendment is at present being executed.

9. Objection to the statement of the construction expenses of the Xi-lung and Hsien lines:

The Chinese authorities, by placing obstructions to the construction expenses amounting to Yen 24,000,000 for the construction of the Xi-lung line which was completed in October 1929, and Yen 15,920,000 for the construction of the Rao-An line which was completed in June 1929, have made it impossible to come to a final settlement on the amount of construction expenses.

10. Traffic obstructions by Chinese to the South Manchuria Railway:

Damage to

Following are the damages, done by Chinese within the railway zone of the South Manchuria Railway.

Kind of Cause.	Year.	
	1929	1930
The obstructions to the operation	87	84
Robbery during the operations of the trains	114	75
Robbery of the railway equipments.	17	75
Robbery of the telegraph lines.	13	13

11. Illegal levy upon the materials of the South Manchuria Railway:

- 3 -

In violation of Article 3 of the agreement supplementary to the treaty relating to Five Pending Cases in Manchuria, the Chinese authorities are exacting since February 1, 1929, from Chinese merchants the half of the lumber tax on the sleepers for the use of the South Manchuria Railway. Since the burden of incidence is shifted to the sleepers, the South Manchuria Railway is suffering a loss of about Yen 60,000 annually.

12. Illegal restrictions to the purchase of railway materials by the South Manchuria Railway:

As soon as the number of the sleepers purchased by the South Manchuria Railway reached 1,000,000 pieces in 1928, had the Chinese authorities contended that the number was excessive and they did not furnish the necessary and agreed permits for the exemption of the taxes. It took the whole year before they were issued for the entire number.

Obstruction at Quarries

13. Obstruction to the quarrying of stone materials by the South Manchuria Railway:

Pursuant to the treaty provisions the South Manchuria Railway enjoys the right of quarrying stone materials to be used for the railway purposes, and enables them to freely lease such quarries. Recently the Chinese authorities have been exhausting all means in order to obstruct the operation. The obstruction, just mentioned, has been carried out in the following places:

Jieliaokou, Neuchiatun, Langrenghuan, Chichiapao, Wanshan, Jaitushan, Luchiatu, Wangtu, Chienpyangpao, Chashowan-toustan, Hutushan.

14. Obstruction of the operation of mines along the South Manchuria Railway:

In spite of the agreement between Japan and China to the effect that all mines along the Antung-Mukden line should be operated by their joint enterprise, China by disregarding the above agreement, refused to operate the mines on that basis in Tsichengtau, Wenhainan, Hianshinfu and other places.

15. Non-recognition of the purchase of land for the use of the Fushun mine:

Although the South Manchuria Railway bought private land for the Fushun mine through the intermediary of the head of a Chinese helen, in accordance with the regulations of Fushun mine, the Chinese authorities have, since 1934, refused to recognize the transaction. Recently, they have resorted to all sorts of means to obstruct any land transactions.

Cases Pending

16. Obstruction of the purchase of land for the South Manchuria Railway:

In spite of the stipulation of Article 6 (of the agreement relating to the construction and operation of the Chinese Eastern Railway, which right Japan inherited) through which the South Manchuria Railway could lease land along its railroad necessary for the protection and

- 4 -

operation of the line. From 1929 and 1930, the Chinese authorities have determinedly obstructed the purchase of such land by the Railway. There are no less than 50 cases now pending of that sort.

17. Obstruction of the construction of railway for the transportation of mining products from Funchangling Mines.

In spite of the official recognition given for the joint Sino-Japanese agreement between the Liaoning Provincial Government and Yentaro Ida, for the purpose of transporting mining products by the Funchangling Mining Corporation when applied last year for the commencement of the work, the Committee on Economic Affairs of the Liaoning Province questioned the wisdom of the new construction and endeavored to reject the required rights.

Permits Revoked

18. Non-recognition of the right to purchase clay at Foonow:

In May 1930, the Foonow Mining Corporation concluded a contract to buy, under a regular official permission, from the Bureau of Agriculture and Mining of the Foonow City Product Corporation, which possessed the controlling interest. In July 1930, the authorities suddenly revoked the permit, without any regular procedure.

19. Confiscation of the permit of the Magessite Ore and Folepar Mining district:

In August 1930, the Hsiao Hsiao Corporation, being a Sino-Japanese joint enterprise, presented a written permit for the Magessite Ore and Folepar mines in answer to the request of the Chinese authorities, who refused to return it, under various pretexts, which was complied with by the company. They claimed that the taxes were not necessary inasmuch as the permit for Magessite mines was already rescinded, but they most arbitrarily added that the amount was applied toward the iron taxes.

20. Operation of the Hsiao Hsiao Joint Mining Enterprise:

The Chinese authorities at Hsiao Hsiao, by dispatching the Chinese police force to the exit of the coal mine of the Hsiao Hsiao Company, which is a Sino-Japanese Joint Enterprise, and by threatening the local inhabitants, obstructed their patronage of the coal.

21. Rescinding of the Fencheng Hsiao Lead Mining rights:

The authorities of Fencheng Hsiao notified illegally, in August 1929, rescinding the mining rights by the Sino-Japanese concern known as the Chinchensatzu Mine, although the Japanese representative protested frequently. While continuing its operation the Chinese authorities demanded the withdrawal of Japanese and arrested their drivers and confiscated their horses, making it impossible for Japanese to continue their operation.

- 5 -

Iron Tax Held Illegal

22. Iron taxes by Chenshain Corporation:

In September 1930, the Chinese authorities demanded the payments of 40 cents per ton as taxes from the Chenshain Corporation at Anshan. This is an illegal tax which the company, heretofore, has never paid.

23. Forcible recovery of the Fenchifu coal mine:

In spite of the fact that Japanese have heretofore, conducted peacefully and openly mine mines at Fenchifu, through the agreement with the Chinese people, the Chinese authorities have convicted the Chinese parties in question as "Traitor Landlords". And not only did they confiscate the property of the Chinese leaseors, but also in August 1929, they dispatched troops in order to forcibly recover the mining property.

24. Pressure to the Fenchifu Iron Mining Corporation:

As the lease to the reservoir of Fenchifu, expired on November 1, 1927, the North Manchuria Railway approached several times for its renewal, without any result.

25. Prohibition of the transportation and consumption of Fushun coal:

From about 1929 onward, the Chinese authorities placed restrictions upon the transportation of Fushun coal by the Hen-Hai Railway. During 1930, Liu, Acting chief of the Department of Agriculture and ~~Ministry~~ of the Liaoning Province, obtained permission of the North-East Administration Commission to issue an order of prohibition of the use of foreign coal to firms, factories, and other institutions under his control.

Discrimination in Rates.

26. Salt monopoly.

Since 1931, the four north-eastern provinces are enforcing the monopoly of salt for the purpose of bringing pressure upon the manufacture and importation of salt by Japanese subjects.

27. Discriminative Railway rates.

In spite of the repeated protests of Japan and other foreign countries, the Chinese railways in Manchuria are giving discriminative treatment to Japanese as well as foreign goods by applying lower rates to the goods of Chinese origin.

28. Double taxation at Dairen.

With regard to goods imported to an open port being transported to another Chinese port, double imposition of import duty has hitherto been avoided by means of drawback. After the drawback was abolished in May, 1931, Exemption Certificates were issued at the ports of export for goods reexported to Chinese ports (Dairen not included among them), and thereby double taxation was avoided. But no Exemption Certificate is now issued for goods shipped to Dairen, and in spite of the Japanese Government's repeated protests the Chinese

- 8 -

Government has taken no steps to remedy the double taxation on such goods.

Export Duty Increased

29. Undue increase of export duty on Fushun coal.

By the agreement concerning the Fushun and Yantai coal, the export duty on the same coal is prescribed as 4.001 per ton, and the same agreement is in force for 60 years from 1911. The Chinese Government put a higher rate of export duty on June 1, 1931, and the Japanese Government have been negotiating with them pointing out the new rate of export duty is in contravention of treaties but no final settlement has yet been reached.

30. Imposition of consumption tax within the South Manchuria railway zone.

The Chinese authorities are collecting consumption tax within the railway zone at Hsingtaitzu, Tsingpinkai, Anshan and Chienmenshan in violation of treaty provisions.

31. Collection of business tax within the railway zone.

The Chinese authorities proceeded to impose business tax on Chinese citizens in the railway zone, and in spite of protests made by the Japanese authorities they are forcing, in violation of treaties, the collection of the tax by all possible means such as pressure brought to bear upon the Chinese people, imposition of fines, and posting guards on the boundary of the railway zone.

Harbin's Electricity Supply

32. Pressure upon the North Manchuria Electric Company of Harbin.

In order to bring pressure to bear upon the North Manchuria Electric Co., which was established in Harbin in 1919, the Harbin municipality made the supply of electricity a concession, and established a semi-official company called the Harbin Electric Co., to which was given the concession in disregard of the already acquired privilege of the Japanese company. In May 1930, the Chinese authorities turned the Harbin Electric Co. into an official enterprise, and are since bringing all possible pressure upon the North Manchuria Electric Co. alleging the same company to be an infringement of the monopoly.

33. Pressure upon the South Manchuria Electric Co. of Antung.

The South Manchuria Electric Co. has been supplying Chinese citizens with electric light for over 20 years upon an understanding reached between them and the Chinese authorities. In March, 1930, the municipality of Antung established an electric lighting company for the purpose of competing with the Japanese company.

34. Illegal deal in a tender for railway material.
In a public tender for 10 locomotives in August 1929,

- 7 -

The Chen-Hai Railway awarded the contract to the Loda Company in spite of the fact that the lowest offer was made for the same specified material by the South Manchuria Railway Co. and the second lowest by the Mitsubishi Company.

35. Interference with the Japanese and transportation in Kirin Province.

In 1930, the Kirin Province authorities suddenly prohibited the felling of green pine, the Kirin-Langou Railway, for the purpose of giving a blow to the same railway (which was built with a loan from Japan) and the Japanese exporters of wood.

36. Pressure upon the Chansien Lungsan.

The South Manchuria Railway Company invested a large sum of money in the Chansien Lungsan (company) which has timber camps in Hainanlin, Heilunghing. The Chinese authorities attempted to deny this fact and asked for another large investment from the South Manchuria Railway Co. They did not only fail to perform the agreement on the Chansien Forestry concluded between the South Manchuria Railway Company and the Heilunghing Province authorities in 1923, but also obstructed with force the putting of the agreement into operation.

Default on loan

37. Non-performance of the loan contract relating to the mines and forests in Kirin and Heilunghing.

China is in default of performance of obligations arising from a contract for the loan of ¥ 30,000,000 concluded between the Finance Department of the Peking Government and the Japanese Empire Bank on August 3, 1912, on the security of gold mines and state forests in the Kirin and Heilunghing provinces and the revenue therefrom.

38. Appropriation of Yen 10,000,000 advanced in accordance with the loan contract relating to the Ki-tai Railway.

In accordance with the agreement of April 1, 1927, regarding the Main and Ki-tai Railways and the agreement of September 4, 1909, regarding Chientsao, a preliminary loan contract relating to Ki-tai Railway was signed between three Japanese banks and the Ministry of Communications of the Chinese Government on June 18, 1913, and the three Japanese banks advanced Yen 10,000,000 to the Chinese Government. The Chinese Government attempted not only to evade the construction of the Ki-tai Railway, but also to deny the loan itself.

39. Evasion of contract regarding the purchase money of rails for the Ki-tung Railway.

China refused to sign a formal contract for about Yen 200,000 which the South Manchuria Railway Company advanced as purchase money for rails in accordance with an agreement with the Ki-tung Railway Administration.

- 3 -

40. Forcible construction of a railway across the Sakakibara Farm.

In 1925 China constructed a railway from Kuangtung Station to the airbase across the Sakakibara Farm without first obtaining the approval of Mr. Sakakibara who had leased the land. The Japanese Consulate-General in Mukden demanded the payment of compensation for the use of the land. But the Chinese authorities alleged the lease to be invalid, and Mr. Sakakibara was compelled to remove the railway on June 27, 1929.

Pressure on Mukden residents.

41. Pressure upon the Japanese residents in the walled city of Mukden.

In spite of the fact that Mukden was open to trade and residence by the Sino-American Treaty of Commerce of 1903, the Mukden Chinese authorities designated a certain restricted area outside of the walled city of Mukden as an international mart, for the purpose of trade and residence by foreigners. At this point, by applying pressure upon the Chinese landlords of Japanese residents within the walled city, and in disregard of the protection of Japan as well as other interested countries, the Chinese authorities compelled the Japanese as well as foreigners to withdraw from the Chinese native city, where there remain at present only 14 Japanese householders.

42. Pressure upon the Japanese residents residing within the walled city of Manchung.

In spite of the fact that Manchung, in the Kirin Province, was opened to trade and residence by an annex to the Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1905, the Chinese authorities resort to the same unreasonable excuses as in the case of Mukden. And by bringing about direct or indirect pressure upon the Japanese within the walled city of Manchung they have made it impossible for them to reside or carry on trade there. As a result there are only five or six Japanese residents remaining, and establishing of new residences or shops by Japanese is absolutely impossible.

Telegraph rights infringed

43. Pressure upon the Japanese telegraph convention within the walled city of Mukden.

According to the Sino-Japanese Convention of 1906, Japan possesses the right to install telegraph lines between the Mukden Railway zone and the walled city of Mukden. About two years ago the Chinese authorities requested the moving of telegraph poles, due to the replanning of the walled city. Thereupon negotiations took place which finally arranged to change the pole into the cable system in order to minimize the number of poles. Towards the end of last year the work was started on the entire system. About August this year, the Mukden telegraph administration upon a trifle technical pretext obstructed the work of effecting the connection at the international mart (Shangfu Tze) causing considerable damages to the Japanese enterprise.

- 9 -

44. A regulation for punishing circumvent land sellers:

The Liaoning Provincial Government, in disregard of the treaty provisions with a view to obstructing the leasing of land for the purpose of commercial, industrial and agricultural purposes by Japanese, adopted in July 1929 the "Provisionary measures for punishing the circumvent land sellers," and gave out secret orders to local governments to prohibit the mortgaging of land to foreigners. According to this order those who violate the measures were made liable to death sentence; life sentence or heavy fine. In June 1931 the above mentioned measures were somewhat amended, and are now known as the "regulations for punishing the circumvent land sellers". As a result of the above regulations, within the last year or two, some of the following illegal acts have been perpetrated:

- (1) At Chinshien, a land-owner of Chinshien happened to sell his property to a Japanese, and the chief of the Maen imprisoned the said Chinese.
- (2) In Linho Maen, a Chinese, by the name of Chiao Tsu-to, sold land to the East Asiatic Industrial Corporation (Japanese). The authorities confiscated the above property and drove away the Japanese therefrom. (The so-called Tongshan Farm Incident).
- (3) At Fenchien, a Chinese leased land to a Japanese for lime mining. The former was imprisoned, and the seizure of the mines was attempted.
- (4) At Hsiansia, a Chinese was imprisoned on the excuse that he rented a house for a Japanese police post.

Koreans Refused Leases.

(5) In Kirin Province the authorities refused to give permission for the leasing of land by Koreans. At present they are endeavoring to change the tenancy into an employment contract.

The Kirin Provincial Government in violation of the Chinese agreement which entitles Koreans to various rights to land, has also issued the regulations for punishing the so-called circumvent land sellers. Not only have the Chinese authorities of various parts of the Kirin Province, made it impossible for Koreans to buy land, but they are interfering even in matters of land tenure or the terms of tenancy.

45. Oppression of Koreans:

Recently the Chinese authorities are oppressing Koreans, directly or indirectly, as regards their residence and agriculture. The driving out of new Korean settlers, prohibition of leasing houses to them, obstruction to their carrying on of enterprises, at times the authorities characteristically forced the Chinese landlords to compel the Koreans to move out, and in extreme cases they have even employed force for the purpose.

(1) In July 1931, the authorities of the Kirin Province, in order to drive out the Korean Farmers of Sanpaoshan, illegally interfered with tenantry and the Koreans were finally forced out which leads to the so-called Sanpaoshan incident.

- 10 -

(2) In July of the same year, at Taolishao in the Kirin Province, under the pretext of controlling the communistic element, the authorities drove away many new Korean settlers.

46. Illegal arrests and conviction of Koreans:
Recently the Chinese authorities in three Eastern Provinces in disregard of the treaty rights, arrested and imprisoned Koreans promiscuously, and confined them to prisons for several months, even over a year, without any process of law. It has been discovered, actually, since the present Mukden Incident took place, there were 60 such prisoners in the Mukden penitentiary, 140 in Jungkwa, 230 in Kirin and about 40 in Harbin.

Anti-Japanese text-books

47. The universal use of anti-Japanese text-books:
Recently the Chinese Government has inserted many anti-Japanese materials in the books of public schools throughout the country, nursing thereby, the spirit of revenge in the minds of the coming generation of China. (This is actually true.)

48. The North-eastern Cultural Association's anti-Japanese propaganda:
The association is the official organ of the Mukden administration. It has been constantly broadcasting anti-Japanese stories, for instance:

When in February of this year, there was a natural combustion in the Gyeon pit of the Fushun Mine, (which can hardly be said to be an explosion) although there was not one casualty, the above association announced far and wide that 3,000 miners were buried alive by the explosion in the Japanese mines.

49. The anti-Japanese movement by the Liaoning People's Diplomacy Association:
The above association was organized in June 1930, chiefly for the purpose of conducting anti-Japanese propaganda. Recently it issued an official publication and conducted frequent meetings. By utilizing the press it tries to conduct anti-Japanese propaganda to the detriment of the Sino-Japanese friendship.

50. The oppression of the Chengkang Shinpo. (Chekyojiho):

This Chinese language newspaper in Mukden is a Japanese enterprise. By applying pressure, the Chinese authorities undertook to obstruct thoroughly the Chinese patronage between 1928 and 29 for a period of about 10 months and made it impossible for the management to carry on business. Again, from June 1930 to August of the same year, by persecuting the Chinese sales agents of the paper, they made its distribution impossible; and from July to August this year, the Chief of the Bureau of Public Safety, secretly allied with the Liaoning People's Diplomacy Association, imprisoned the important Chinese distributors of the paper in Mukden, in the above named bureau and persecuted them.

Japanese travellers restricted

51. Discriminatory treatment of the visa of the Japanese traveller in the interior.

With a view to obstructing, within the last 10 years, Japanese travel in Manchou and its eastern districts or the Northern section of the Kirin province, the Mukden and Haiyuan Commissioners of Foreign Affairs and in order to regulate the Japanese sojourn in Huludao which is being planned to compete with Dairen, they have invariably placed an allonge to a Japanese passport for the purpose of restricting Japanese movements. This is an open discrimination against Japanese nationals as compared with other foreigners. In spite of the frequent Japanese protests, recently the similar instructions, to place a restrictive allonge, were given to the Commissioners of Foreign Affairs of Tientsin, Liacynan, Antung, Yingkou, Fungheia and Kailung.

52. The Captain Nakamura Incident:

Captain Nakamura, accompanied by Y. Isami, one Korean and one Russian, while travelling through Fungheia Reclamation District, on July 26, 1931, was arrested by the 3rd Regiment of the Reclamation Army, stationed at the above named district, and was later murdered with his party, by the Commander of the said Regiment.

53. Obstructions at the Fungheia Farm:

When the East Asiatic Industrial Corporation was constructing a dyke, in the spring of 1931, at Fungheia, the Chief of the Bureau of Public Safety of the Haikou accompanied by a number of Chinese policemen, set fire on the "scories" mine and drove away the workers.

Source: Local Press. Translation not corrected grammatically.

Note: As far as the Foreign Office has not published a complete list of their disputes with China in the press in Japan. The above will no doubt be amongst the first questions taken up between the Japanese and Chinese after they have satisfactorily settled the occupation of Manchuria by the Japanese. It is not being forwarded as a report, but mainly for reference.

For and in the absence of the Military Attache:

Thomas A. Crawford, Jr.
1st Lt., U.S.A., (M.I.)
Assistant Military Attache

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 893.00/11679 FOR Tel. #1099 5pm

FROM China (Perkins) DATED Dec. 18, 1931
TO NAME 1-1127 o.p.o.

REGARDING: The resignation of Marshal Chang as Vice-Commander came as a natural consequence of the resignation of Chiang Kai Shek as Commander-in-Chief. The Marshal cannot afford to run away in face of the present crisis but he may find a way to retirement. On the other hand it is maintained that Marshal Chang is in a stronger position than before.

MET

GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

Dated December 18, 1931

Rec'd 9:12 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington

1099, December 18, 5 p.m.

Legation's 1096, December 18, noon.

One. The resignation of Marshal Chang as Vice-Commander came as a natural consequence of the resignation of Chiang Kai Shek as Commander-in-Chief. As to the significance of his reappointment as Chairman of the new office of pacification in Peiping, there is wide difference of opinion here. From sources close to the Marshal it is learned that he is (#) of his political responsibilities and would like to shift them to the new Northeastern Political Council whose constitution it is expected Nanking will shortly approve. The Marshal cannot afford to run away in face of the present crisis but he may find a way to retirement through the organization above mentioned which is to be composed of leading military and civil officials as well as of representative private citizens in the northern provinces.

MET

2-#1099 from Peiping via N.R.,
December 18, 1931.

provinces.

Two. On the other hand it is maintained that Marshal
Chang is in a stronger position than before -

(END PART ONE)

PERKINS

RR-HPD

(#) apparent omission.

D

GRAY

Peiping, (via Naval Radio)

Dated December 18 1931,

Rec'd 11:20 A. M.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1099, December 18, 5 p. m. (Part two)

since his reappointment means that he has received at least the present support of the new government at Nanking - and that the formation of the new political council will serve to relieve him of his task of doing what he can to salvage China's losses in the northeast.

Three. The situation is very confused: At the moment it appears that Chang has changed his title, not his job; and that however unacceptable he may be to the new officials at Nanking they cannot afford to throw him overboard at this stage of the crisis especially if, as is freely alleged, the resignation of Chiang entails no real impairment of his military strength and his purpose is merely to reassert himself as soon as the new government begins to flounder in the foreign and domestic difficulties now ready to engulf it.

Repeated to Nanking. (End message)

For the Minister,

P E R K I N S

RR
CSB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

FROM


GRAY

Nanking

Dated December 19, 1931

Secretary of State,
Washington

Rec'd 8:55 a.m.



DEC 19 1931

F/DEW

793.94/3241

December 19, 5 p.m.

793.94

Doctor Koo has just asked me to confirm to him a
Reuter's report dated Washington, December 18, to the
effect that the United States had addressed a further
note to Japan in regard to Manchuria expressing solicitude
that Japan's obligations under the Washington Nine Power
Treaty and the Kellogg Briand Pact should be respected.

Can the Department give me information for Koo?

JOHNSON

ARL-HPD

DEC 24 1931

1 1018

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

Collect
Charge Department
OR
Charge to
\$

TELEGRAM SENT

1-128
TO BE TRANSMITTED
CONFIDENTIAL CODE
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Department of State

Washington,

December 19, 1931.

AMERICAN CONSUL

NANKING (CHINA).

FOR THE MINISTER.

Your December 19, 5 p.m., from Nanking.

For your confidential information, this

Government has not repeat not made any formal communications on the subject of Manchuria since the adoption by the Council of the League of the Resolution of December 10. However, on December 13 the American Ambassador at Tokyo, under instruction, spoke with the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs on the subject of Chinchow. The nature of his instructions was indicated to you in Department's 135, December 12, 3 p.m., to Nanking and telegrams from Tokyo.

For your guidance. You may inform Dr. Koo that the press report to which you refer is in error but that the Department has previously repeatedly affirmed its solicitude with regard to obligations under the treaties. Department suggests that you say to him, as on your own initiative, that the attitude of this

Enciphered by _____

Government

Sent by operator _____ M., _____, 19_____, _____

Index Bu.—No. 80.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1928 1-128

793.94/3241

1 1010
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

1-128
PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

1-138 TO BE TRANSMITTED
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NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE
PLAIN

Collect
Charge Department
OR

Department of State

Charge to
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Washington,

- 2 -

Government with regard to the whole question at the present stage is expressed in the Secretary's statement to the press of December 10. This statement was telegraphed in Department's 455, December 11, 11 a.m., to Peiping, for repetition to you. Your attention is particularly called to its last paragraph. Department suggests that you read *it*, *especially* that paragraph, to Dr. Koo.

Stinson
SKH

FE:SKH:EJL

[Signature]
FE

Enciphered by

Sent by operator M., 19.....

(NOT FOR THE PRESS)
(FOR DEPARTMENTAL USE ONLY)

Department of State
Division of Current Information

MEMORANDUM OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE, WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 16, 1931

At the press conference this afternoon Under Secretary Castle said that Secretary Stimson was still at the Capitol where he was being questioned concerning intergovernmental debts. The Secretary made a statement in the form of a letter to the committee on the subject of debt postponement, which Mr. Castle said would be made available to the press.

The Under Secretary announced the release of the remarks of the new Minister from Ecuador and the President's reply on the occasion of the presentation of the letters of credence of the Minister.

793.94 } SINO-JAPANESE SITUATION *File*

Mr. Castle said a number of informative telegrams concerning the situation in Nanking had been received and would be released to the press. He called attention to one which he found rather interesting which gave the text, in part, of Chiang Kai-shek's circular telegram on his resignation. The Under Secretary said it was rather interesting reading because it was the way a Chinese would resign, not the way an American would resign.

A correspondent enquired whether the upset in Nanking had been identified with the Cantonese movement, whether it had been forced by the Cantonese or was purely local. NOT FOR ATTRIBUTION, Mr. Castle said he thought it all was to a certain extent the result of conversations which have been going on between the Canton faction and the Nanking National Government. He recalled that the Cantonese, from the beginning, have said they wanted Chiang Kai-shek to resign and he thought the whole thing was undoubtedly the political result of the conversations that have been carried on.

F/DEW

793.94/3242

1361 61 330

-2-

A correspondent enquired whether the Under Secretary had seen the article in the press, written by a very able journalist, regarding an alliance between France and Japan. The journalist pointed out that he had not said "alliance." The correspondent then corrected his question by using the word "understanding." Mr. Castle said he had read that very interesting article. Not for attribution, the correspondent enquired what information the State Department had regarding the understanding referred to. In reply, Mr. Castle said the State Department had no information regarding it whatever. He characterized the story as an interesting speculative article.

A correspondent observed that during the past week the Japanese Commander in Manchuria, General Honjo, made various statements to the effect that, although he hated to do it, he was afraid he would have to go down and take Chinchow. The correspondent enquired as to what this country's diplomatic observers reported as to that probability. In reply, Mr. Castle said they did not report as to the probability of that move. The only reports we have had from the various observers in Chinchow say that there does not seem to be any concentration of Chinese troops. AGAIN NOT FOR ATTRIBUTION, Mr. Castle added that he thought General Honjo's movements would depend a good deal on the attitude of the new government in Japan, and he thought the new government presumably, if press reports are true, will have more influence on the army than the other government. He hoped very strongly the influence of the new government would be in the interest of restraint. A correspondent asked if it was not true that the new government advocated even a stronger policy in Manchuria than the last government. In reply, Mr. Castle said he did not think that could be said since the new government had come into power. A correspondent pointed out that more troops were being sent into Manchuria. Mr. Castle

-3-

agreed and added that the Seyukai party, possibly partly as political measures, criticised the old government for not taking strong enough action, but, as the correspondents very well know, a political party which is seeking power is often very different from that same party when it gets power.

A correspondent observed that a press despatch received this morning at 10:00 o'clock from Mukden said that the Japanese flag was hoisted on the principal building and that a man who had heretofore been held prisoner had been appointed Governor General of a unified Manchuria. He enquired whether the Department had received any such information. Mr. Castle replied in the negative.

A correspondent asked if this country's observers at Chinchow had reported the presence of bandits. Mr. Castle replied in the negative. . . A correspondent enquired just what constituted a bandit in China. Mr. Castle replied that he would leave that definition to the press.

A correspondent referred to the fact that the Nanking Government is recognized by the United States as the Chinese Government and enquired whether the continuance of that recognition to the new regime was a matter in question. Mr. Castle said he thought not as we had seen nothing so far to indicate that. Chiang Kai-shek resigned and the commission appointed somebody else as acting President. Mr. Castle said he did not think that would involve recognition. We will simply carry on.

A correspondent enquired whether the State Department regarded the so-called Cantonese group as merely a political faction, analagous to the Farmer-Labor party in Minnesota, or as a separate government. He added that he knew this country had never recognized the Canton group as a government, but enquired whether the Department looked at it unofficially as a separate

-4-

government. NOT FOR ATTRIBUTION, Mr. Castle replied that we certainly did not. It is a political faction. We recognize only one government in China, the Nanking Government. If another group sets up a little regime somewhere else we obviously do not recognize it as a government.

A correspondent asked if that meant that we would not recognize the alleged new government in Manchuria. Mr. Castle pointed out that this new government, according to reports, has not proclaimed itself a government of an independent country, demanding recognition from the United States. It probably maintains that it is under the Chinese government.

DEBTS AND REPARATIONS

A correspondent referred to a press report from Basel this morning to the effect that, in view of Congressional opposition to revision of war debts, some step looking toward extension of the Hoover moratorium would have to be taken. He enquired whether the Administration was considering any such plan. The Under Secretary said they might be considering it in Basel, but it was not being considered in Washington.


The correspondent said that the opposition of some of the Administration's supporters made it quite obvious that war debt revision was not going through, and, with the condition of affairs in Germany and other parts of the world, some step would have to be taken. The correspondent asked if the Under Secretary could say if any steps were being considered. Mr. Castle replied that steps were not being considered. He referred to Senator Reed's statement in the Senate yesterday afternoon in which he brought out the point that if there is necessity for further postponement the different nations desiring postponement under the terms of the war debts may ask for it. That, as Mr. Castle understood the Senator's speech, was why he was opposed to re-formation of the debt funding commission.

M. J. McDermott.

1 1024

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

G-2 Report.



793.94

Subject: The "China Critic's" publication of
Baron Tanaka's Recommendations
to the Japanese Emperor.



There is forwarded herewith an extract from today's
issue of the "Morning Post" of London, which contains
alleged revelations concerning the recommendations of the
Japanese Prime Minister in 1927 regarding the national
policy of Japan. These recommendations indicate the
necessity, from the Japanese point of view, of crushing the
United States and of conquering all of eastern Asia.

M.A. London.

Report No. 31305.

November 6, 1931.

CORIELANDT PARKER,
Lt. Col., F.A.,
M.A., London.

Incl.

793.94 - WPB - 3568 new C

JAPANESE AMBITIONS

ASTONISHING DOCUMENT

Bid for World Domination

HEAVY FIGHTING IN MANCHURIA

Heavy fighting, it was reported yesterday, has taken place in Manchuria, between Japanese and provincial troops, and Japanese forces in the country are being reinforced.

Meanwhile, we reproduce (from a recent issue of the "China Critic," a Chinese weekly paper in English), extracts from an astonishing memorial presented to the Emperor of Japan on July 25, 1927, by the then Prime Minister, Baron Tanaka, outlining "a positive policy" in Manchuria, with the ultimate object of world domination. The authenticity of this document has not been denied.

The salient points in the memorial, which is about 20,000 words long, are included in the following summary. The opening paragraph explains that the memorial is the result of a special conference held from June 27 to July 7, 1927, "in order that we may lay plans for the colonisation of the Far East and the development of our new continental Empire." The conference was attended by all the civil and military officers connected with Manchuria and Mongolia.

In the course of a preliminary review of Japanese aims and policy in Manchuria and Mongolia reference is made to the Nine Power Treaty. The restrictions of this Treaty, it is asserted, "have reduced our special rights and privileges in Manchuria and Mongolia to such an extent that there is no freedom left for us. The very existence of our country is endangered. Unless these obstacles are removed our national existence will be insecure and our national strength will not develop."

After mentioning that the late Emperor Taisho had called the conference of Yamagata to find a way of counteracting this new engagement and that Baron Tanaka had been sent to Europe and America to ascertain secretly the attitude of important statesmen towards it, the memorial proceeds "for the sake of self-protection, as well as the protection of others, Japan cannot remove the difficulties in Eastern Asia unless she adopts a policy of 'blood and iron.' But in carrying out this policy we have to face the United States, which has been turned against us by China's policy of fighting poison with poison.

"CRUSH THE UNITED STATES"

"In the future, if we want to control China, we must first crush the United States just as in the past we had to fight in the Russo-Japanese War. But in order to conquer China we must first conquer Manchuria and Mongolia. In order to conquer the world we must first conquer China.

"If we succeed in conquering China, the rest of the Asiatic countries and the South Sea countries will fear us and surrender to us. Then the world will realise that Eastern Asia is ours, and will not dare to violate our rights. This is the plan left to us by Emperor Meiji, the success of which is essential to our national existence. . . .

"After studying the present conditions and possibilities of our country, our best policy lies in the direction of taking positive steps to secure rights and privileges in Manchuria and Mongolia. These will enable us to develop our trade. This will not only forestall China's own industrial development, but also prevent the penetration of European Powers. This is the best policy possible.

"The way to gain actual rights in Manchuria and Mongolia is to use this region as a base, and under the pretence of trade and commerce penetrate the rest of China. Armed by the rights already secured, we shall seize the resources all over the country. Having China's entire

JAPANESE AMBITIONS

ASTONISHING DOCUMENT

Bid for World Domination

HEAVY FIGHTING IN MANCHURIA

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The salient points in the memorial, which is about 20,000 words long, are included in the following summary. The opening paragraph explains that the and commerce penetrate the rest of China. Armed by the rights already secured, we shall seize the resources all over the country. Having China's entire resources at our disposal we shall proceed to conquer India, the Archipelago, Asia Minor, Central Asia, and Europe." After reiterating Japan's famous Twenty-one Demands, the memorial proceeds to

(Continued on Page 12, Column 1.)

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Co. Ltd., Northern Ireland ;
North of Scotland Bank Ltd.,
xecutor and Trustee Co. Ltd.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

MET

FROM

PLAIN

Peiping via N.R.

Dated December 19, 1931

Rec'd 9:50 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington


1107, December 19, 6 p.m.

Following from Reuter, Tokyo, December eighteenth:

"While official circles here continue to express the hope that Marshal Chang Hsueh Liang will withdraw the Chinchow Garrison and so far still the possibility of a head-on collision, it is learned from authoritative sources that the orders to the Japanese troops not to advance westward of the Liao River which were issued after the operations on November twenty-seventh have been countermanded.

It is widely rumored that the Japanese Government is contemplating establishing a central organ in Manchuria for the purpose of coordinating the military and civil policy of the administration which at present is under four separate seals; namely, the Civil Governor of Kwantung leased territory, the President of the South Manchuria

Railway,



F/DEW

793.94/3244

DEC 21 1931

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

MET

2-#1107 from Peiping via N.R.,
December 19, 1931.

Railway, the Commander of the Kwantung Army and the Consul General of Mukden. But official circles are extremely skeptical though they intimate that General Minami, the former Minister of War who is leaving on a special mission to Manchuria shortly, is likely to be appointed to succeed to the civil governorship of Kwantung.

It is also learned that Mr. Hayassi, the Consul General Mukden, has been recalled and will probably be succeeded by an official of ambassadorial rank, indicating the growing importance attached by the Japanese to their policy of administration in Manchuria."

For the Minister,

PERKINS

ARL

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

SINO-JAPANESE SITUATION

Mr. Castle said a telegram had been received saying that Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang tendered his resignation as Commander in Chief of the Northeastern Frontier Defense Forces and Deputy Commander in Chief of the National Army, Navy and Air Forces. A correspondent asked if Mr. Castle thought the resignation of Chang would have the effect of virtually turning over Manchuria to Japanese administration. NOT FOR ATTRIBUTION, Mr. Castle said it might be that the resignation of Chang would very much ease the situation in Manchuria. He explained that, if the Japanese were possibly worried over the alleged anti-Japanese attitude of Chang, it might be that Chang's resignation would ease things up considerably.

A correspondent referred to press reports concerning economic "mopping-up" in Manchuria which said that financial

Press Release
12/17/31

F/DEW 793.94/3245

FILED

DEC 19 1931

-4-

houses and railroads were taken over by the Japanese. The correspondent enquired as to the character of the taking over, whether it was confiscation. The Under Secretary said the Department had received no information concerning the matter and that those were questions which he did not want to comment on, inasmuch as presumably the committee of enquiry will shortly be going to Manchuria and those are questions the committee will have to look into.

A correspondent enquired whether the State Department had yet indicated its approval or disapproval of the appointment of Mr. Fines. Mr. Castle replied in the negative. The correspondent asked if Mr. Castle expected the Department to make such indication. Mr. Castle said he did not know. He added that he talked with the Secretary yesterday afternoon, but he had not heard what the Secretary thought about the appointment.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

December 17, 1931.

✓
Subject: REPORT OF INSPECTION TRIP THROUGH KOREA,

Assistant Military Attache to Tokyo

(Cranford), October 30, 1931.

File No. 793.94/3246

This a running account of a trip through Korea to Mukden and return to Japan via Tientsin and Peiping. Attention is invited to the following paragraphs:

- 6.- "Before the annexation there were many British and American firms in Seoul" - 3 are left now.
- 15.- Soviet economic aggression into Manchuria, reaching
- 16.- as far south as Mukden and injuring American as well as other business interests.
- 18.- Many of the older factions which served under Chang Tso-lin resented his son's (Chang Hsueh-liang's) support of Nanking.
- 24.- Japanese interference with the National City Bank (opened in 1928) in Mukden. "Most of the American business men look upon the continued occupation of South Manchuria by the Japanese as the death knell of American trade in that section of the Far East.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75


DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

27.- "At first the Japanese military men in Manchuria were very much worried about what ~~impression~~ their action would cause in Foreign countries, especially in America. After about a week, when they saw it had not created such a great reaction, they became more confident."

RPB/

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
 Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
 By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75



2063-343
 Tokyo, Japan.
 October 30, 1931.
 AIR DEPARTMENT

793.94

Subject: Report of Inspection Trip through Korea.

To: The Military Attache, Tokyo, Japan.

1. I left Tokyo on the night of September 10th, arriving at Shimonoseki the following evening, where I booked passage for Fusan, Korea. Our boat left Shimonoseki at 11:00 P.M., and was due in Fusan early the next morning, but we were several hours late due to a heavy typhoon which we encountered shortly after midnight. According to the first officer of the boat, rough weather and fog are common in the Tsushima Straits, but that this was the most severe he had encountered in 10 years. Our wireless antennae was blown away, and the covers on the life boats were blown to shreds. The life boat was stove in.

2. There was little activity in the harbor, which is excellent and has all of the latest improvements for handling and docking ships in the coastwise trade. After a short trip about the town, I left for Seoul. There is quite a contrast between the well-built modern Japanese section of the town of Fusan, and the squalid native section, but as I discovered later, this is true throughout all Korea.

3. The route from Fusan to Seoul is quite interesting, and very picturesque, passing through fertile valleys and low green hills. I had made this same trip six years before, and was amazed to find the great amount of reforestation which had been carried out since that time. This is especially noticeable in Southern Korea, while very little has been done in Northern Korea. The towns along the railway seemed to be clean and well-built, but just on the outskirts of these, were squalid native villages, showing that the lot of the Korean is still bad.

4. On the train I met two missionary ladies who had worked in Southern Korea for many years. Their description of the life of the average Korean evoked for almost sympathy. However, they admitted that conditions were better under the Japanese than under the old regime. They both were very loud in their praise of what Admiral Kato and Count Kowama had done for the country, and for the natives; also, for the assistance they had given the missionaries. According to them, the average Korean farmer, - they are all essentially agriculturists - was barely enough to live on. The land all belongs to large land-owners who squeeze the peasants as much as they can. Many of these land-owners are Japanese "carpet baggers" who moved into Korea after Japan annexed it, and forcibly seized much of the most desirable land. However, they said that the majority of the Japanese land-owners are not as severe on the peasants as are the wealthy Koreans. The average daily wage is around 20 cents, upon which they strive to eke out an existence. The chief crop is rice, but, as in Japan, rice is too expensive for those who raise it to eat it. They subsist mainly on millet, barley, and vegetables, with meat and fish reserved for special occasions. Conditions, they said, in the country are deplorable, and one of them told of a Korean who came to their mission hospital for a major operation for which he was only able to pay the equivalent of 10 cents gold. Upon one's visit to the old

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Stat (12)

M/A Tokyo

Report No. 5985

30 Oct. 1931.

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regime and to the present domination by the Japanese, but they also blamed the people too for their shiftless, unenterprising life.

5. I questioned them quite closely on the feelings of the Koreans for the Japanese, and they both replied that while many of the more educated Koreans appreciate that the Japanese have done for them since the revision of Japan's policy toward Korea in 1920, under Admiral Saito, they deeply resent the occupation of their country by the Japanese, whom they claim exploit it only for their own good. The other Koreans look upon the Japanese with deep resentment and even hatred. The military domination under General Iwanooni, and the massacres of 1919 are still fresh in the minds of all of the people, and in view of their past suffering, look upon the Japanese with the greatest distrust. They said the desire of independence, or, at least, more power in their own government is very strong, and that it will take many years of wise ruling, such as that initiated by Admiral Saito, to erase the hard feelings that exists. Both of these ladies were very apprehensive about the policies of the new Governor-General, General Ugaki, and that effect his appointment would have on the Koreans, who hated anything to do with the Japanese military men. Both of them were very sincere and impartial, and as I found out later, presented a very true picture of conditions of the class of Koreans with whom they came in daily contact.

6. I arrived in Seoul the evening of the 14th of September and spent the next day looking over the city. This too had changed tremendously during the last six years, and its wide streets, trams, motor cars and fine buildings would do credit to any city. Of course, it still had a Japanese air about it, and you could feel the sense of Japan's mastery. In such a city one would expect to find many Europeans and Americans doing business, but that is not so. Before the annexation there were many British and American firms in Seoul, but now only Sase and Company, the Standard Oil, and the Singer Sewing Machine Company, are left. The Japanese have monopolized the rest for themselves by placing such restrictions on the foreigners that they had to withdraw.

7. That afternoon I had quite a long talk on economic conditions with the manager of Sase and Company, British, whom I had known for years. According to him the depression had not been felt so badly in Korea as in Japan. Korea, too, had had a bumper crop of rice the previous year, and this had caused some trouble, but as a whole he thought Korea to be better off than Japan. Some years previous, Sase and Company had cut down on their trading business due to Japanese encroachment, continuing only a few lines in which the Japanese could not compete, but he added, that the Koreans still prefer to do business with his company rather than with a Japanese concern. They are the agents for Ford Cars and he said that this year, they have so far sold more cars than in any previous year. This he attributed to the increase in taxis in the larger cities, and to the growth in the number of bus lines, which he claims, within a few years will establish a net-work over the whole peninsula. This increase in means of rapid communication will no doubt prove very beneficial to the

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country. Just before the recent change in Governor-Generals he had practically closed a deal with the Government for a large loan for road construction so badly needed throughout the whole country. He had not been able to see the new Governor-General, but was still hopeful of putting his deal through for the Guarantee Trust Company of New York, which his company represents. He, and the other foreigners I met in Korea, corroborated the statement of the two missionary ladies as to the Koreans' feelings toward the Japanese. As evidence of this they cited the trouble in the Korean schools during the past year.

8. On Monday morning I paid my respects to General Hayashi, commanding the Japanese troops in Korea. I was telephoned out from the hotel, and was met at the door of the headquarters building in Ryusan by a Captain on the Staff. He stated that both the General and his Chief of Staff were busy and could not receive me that day. I talked with this Captain for some time but could not get any information from him. I asked him when they expected to add the other division to the Korean Garrison, but he stated that as far as he knew, it would be sometime yet. I then tried to find out where it would be stationed, but again failed to get a satisfactory response. However, I gathered that it would probably be in Southern Korea, and more than likely at Ulsan. Between Ryusan and Seoul, I noticed quite a large military depot with several large brick warehouses. As far as I could ascertain that portion on the south side of the road had about 8 store-houses, and that on the north, about 4 or 5.

9. In Ulsan, the military were conspicuous by their absence. I saw only one military policeman, and an officer of the 30th Engineers, who had met some friends at the boat. Between Seoul and Ryusan I saw detachments of the 28th Cavalry and 25th Field Artillery. On Sunday in Seoul I saw several groups of soldiers from the 72nd and 78th Infantry regiments and a few from the 30th Engineers, evidently on pass.

10. Later on Monday morning, I paid my respects on the Governor-General and was received by a young secretary, bright but very evasive. The rest of the morning and part of the afternoon I spent with our Consul-General, Mr. Davis, who dwelt at length on the Chinese massacres in Korea in July. He advanced three theories about the origin of the trouble; the first two of which he discarded. They were; first, that the trouble had been instigated by Hankins to embarrass the Japanese, and to gain popularity with the Cantonese faction; second, that it was instigated by the Japanese. This latter theory, others besides himself, admitted could have been true, but they placed little stock in it even though some Chinese claimed they recognized Japanese dressed in Korean clothes in the mob at Peking (Ping Yang). Mr. Davis's explanation of what took place in brief is as follows. Without a doubt some Koreans have suffered badly at the hands of the Chinese in Manchuria, and many of them had returned home bringing their ill-feelings with them. These Koreans were spreading it to others. The press had for years, - probably instigated by the Japanese, - been playing up these incidents in Manchuria; thereby swelling the indignation of the people. When the

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Wanpaoshan incident occurred, feeling ran high and the situation got out of control. It first started in Chemsulpo on Friday, but did not reach its height until Sunday when the worst massacre occurred in Peijo. That the Japanese authorities did not know that trouble was impending is untrue, for they had advised American missionaries in Peijo on Friday not to venture out of their houses at night as they expected a clash between the Koreans and Chinese. That they did nothing to prevent it is evident. This, according to Mr. Davis, was due to the fact that it occurred after the retiring Governor General and Vice Governor-General had left, and before the new appointees had arrived. Consequently there was no one in authority who would take the initiative to order out the troops, or to use the police to prevent it. This trait of the Japanese, a dislike for responsibility, is only too well-known. But there was more back of this than just that racial characteristic. When Admiral Hailo first took over control of Korea in 1920, and tried to bring order out of the chaos caused by the military rule of Japan, the first thing he did was to replace the soldiers with policemen; his second thing was to issue strict orders that no force or firearms should be used against any Koreans. This, Mr. Davis claimed, was so inculcated in the officials and none of them dared take the initiative in preventing or putting down the riots after they had started. This explanation seems very plausible, and it sounds more true than any explanation I have yet heard. Of course, since the Manchurian occupation, I have heard many tales, claiming that the Japanese instigated it in order to have the Koreans friendly with them when they occupied Manchuria. None of them I believe can be proved. The whole affair was forgotten in the more serious question which so shortly followed it. Yet it is another thorn in the flesh, and widens the rift between the Japanese and the Chinese.

11. In the Japanese press we are continually reading of Korean Communists, both in Korea and in Japan. I was unable to find many signs of Communism in the short time I was in Korea. Across the border there are many exiled Koreans who are tainted with "Red". Occasionally they slip across the borders and stir some trouble such as the school troubles last year, but there does not seem to be an organized Communist group, - the police keep too close a surveillance for that. There are a few scattered about, but they appear negligible.

12. Before proceeding to Hsuden I spent a day in Chingishu and Antung. Chingishu is on the border, and the railroad join for New Hiju, which lies at the mouth of the Yalu on the Korean side. I was very anxious to see this on account of the recent controversy between the Governor-General of Korea and the President of the South Manchurian Railway, over the location of the new government steel works. The Governor-General wanted it at New Hiju, while the President wanted it near Anshan. The question has not yet been settled but plans are afoot to construct a harbor at New Hiju, and I understand some survey work is going on there now. This section is also interesting since it was the scene of the battle of the Yalu, during the Russo-Japanese war, and also lies on the old Peking Road, the trade route between Peking and Korea.

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in older days. Chingishu and New Siju are dirty little Korean towns, with nothing much to recommend them. There is a large Government-owned lumber mill in Chingishu, and that is about all.

13. Antung, just across the river in Manchuria, is a bustling city, and a lively port, quite a contrast to the sleepy Korean town opposite. The Japanese concession here has wide streets and excellent buildings. However, the shops make it look like an ordinary street in Japan, as do all the streets in Japanese concessions in Manchuria. It is strange to say, but most of the Japanese who have business in Chingishu, live in Antung rather than in their own possession. The hotel man explained that it was because it was cheaper and a nicer place to live. The Japanese population in Antung is large and they have so monopolized the business there that Japanese are the only foreigners used in the Chinese Spatone Service there. Japanese troops guard the Chinese end of the railway bridge; policemen on the Korean end.

14. I arrived in Mukden early the morning of the 14th, and called at the Consulate. The discussion which took place there, and the ones I had with other Americans in Mukden, I have mentioned in my other report on the Manchurian situation; as well as the Japanese occupation of Mukden on the night of September 18 - 19th. Suffice it to say, here that after these discussions I was more convinced than ever that a clash between the Japanese and Chinese in Manchuria was inevitable; when, I could not tell. My call at the Japanese Consulate brought forth no information. I was received by a young Vice-Consul and treated pleasantly enough, but could not get him to discuss the Mukden incident. This was two days before the Japanese occupation, and the Consulate showed no signs of excitement or impending trouble. I believe Mr. Hoyer, the Japanese Consul General, was truthful when he stated that the whole affair came as a complete surprise to him.

15. Mr. Christopherson, our trade commissioner, and American business men I met in Mukden, gave me some surprising details in connection with Soviet trade activities in Northern Manchuria. I had heard something of this in Tokyo, but lacked details. It seems that for the past year and a half the Soviet trade representatives have been active in completing their organization in North Manchuria, preparatory to dumping their manufactured articles on that market. About a year ago the dumping began with the Soviets underselling all of their competitors, or else granting longer terms of credit which others could not do. Their idea not only being to crumble their competitors, but to attract as much ready cash their way as possible. By the spring of this year, their organization was perfect, and the whole of Manchuria was flooded with Soviet goods. According to the Manager of the Standard Oil Company at Mukden, in July the foreign oil companies, Standard, Asiatic Petroleum Company, and Texas Oil had 70% of the business in North Manchuria, while in September they had only 30%. During the summer the Soviets flooded the markets with cotton piece goods, greatly crippling the Japanese business in that line. The International Harvester Company perfected a special

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plow for that section which could be sold very cheap, but before the shipments arrived in large quantities, the Soviets had copied it and flooded the market below the American production costs. The result of this has been that many old established houses have been forced out of business, and the Soviets dominate the markets of all of North Manchuria. As the Japanese are more vitally interested in Manchuria, this is a severe blow to them, and might account somewhat for their military aggression, as much indicates that originally they had intended to push on to Harbin from Changchun.

16. Not content with their work in Northern Manchuria the Soviets began last spring to try to perfect a distribution system in South Manchuria. Under pressure of the Japanese no doubt, the Chinese authorities in South Manchuria closed down on the Soviet trade activities. The Soviets circumvented this, however, by immediately appointing all of their employees members of the Consulate, and placing the wholesale and retail stores in Mukden under the consul. These stores had just opened when I was in Mukden, and their stocks were small, consisting mainly of cigarettes, candles, canned goods and fish, all of which sold for less than other foreign merchandise. They said they would be in full operation within a month, but that is unlikely now that Japan has taken over control of this section.

17. On the whole the American business men in Mukden were rather gloomy, as not only had the Soviet invasion hurt their business, but the continued depression throughout the world had almost paralyzed the soya-bean industry, - Manchuria's main export. Thousands of tons of beans are in storage, but there are no buyers. In addition to this the purchasing power of the people had been greatly decreased by the depreciation of the Fengpao, the currency of the Mukden Government. During the early part of September, the Fengpao was worth about ten per cent of its face value. The Mukden Government purchased the soya-beans from the farmers at a fixed rate and paid for them in Fengpao. They then exported the beans and pocketed not only the profit, but the difference in the depreciated currency. One of the real reasons, though, for the depreciation of the Fengpao was Chang Hsueh-ling's participation in the Nanking government. This required large sums for his army, and as the depression grew more serious in Manchuria, the drain became more severe. This resulted in him moving a large portion of his army south of the Great Wall in order to try to extort money from that section. But the depreciated currency had already placed Manchuria in a bad condition.

18. One to the above, and to his personal enemies, Chang Hsueh-ling was none too popular in Manchuria. Many of the older factions who had served under his father resented his support of Nanking. Without a doubt, had he not joined forces with Nanking, Manchuria would have been greatly better off financially. Some claim the reason for his joining forces with Nanking was due to his pride in being lord of North China, as well as Manchuria, and that being appointed second in command of the land, navy, and air forces of all China gave him a swelled head. This seems to be the Japanese idea. However, I believe it to have been for political reasons. He deeply hates the Japanese, not only for their aggression in

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Manchuria, but for the murder of his father. (It is said by those close to him that he firmly believed the Japanese planned his father's death, because he opposed their plans in Manchuria.). Conditions were becoming worse and the Japanese were attempting to bring more pressure on him, naturally he believed his strength lay with Kankung. This is well illustrated by Japan's many demands that they negotiate directly with Mukden concerning Manchurian questions and his refusal to deal with them except through Kankung. Be that as it may, he still had his large army, and thereby held his power over Manchuria.

19. At this time there was no open anti-Japanese demonstration in Mukden, but conditions were shaping themselves for one which was shortly to come. The number of so-called incidents increased, many of them of minor importance, but yet reflected the ill-feelings between the two peoples. Then came the Senjokan affair, followed closely by the massacre of Chinese in Korea, and the Yokosuka case, and Japan surprised the world by her military occupation of Manchuria. Japan claimed she had more than 200 cases pending with China to which she could not get the Chinese, especially Manchuria, to negotiate. None of this is possibly true, but Consul General Myers of Mukden told me during the later part of September that the Chinese had already readily settled any of the minor cases, but that when important issues such as the railroads, came up in which the Chinese could arouse public interest, they were passed up for political reasons, and, too, to take the Japanese. These are all past history now the Japanese have occupied Manchuria. When they will withdraw is difficult to state.

20. In my report on the Mukden situation, 8/1/31, 5968, and in my telegram to you from Mukden, I covered the military occupation of Mukden and Changchun, the movement of troops and the distribution of troops on September 18th when the situation crystallized. These you have added with your own reports and forwarded to Washington. However, there remains a few points which I wish to bring out.

21. Since the occupation we have several times seen the name of Lt. Col. Bohara mentioned. As far as I have been able to ascertain, he is a member of the staff of the Kwantung Army, but has been in Mukden for some time, under the title of Resident Military Officer of Mukden. This can only imply that he was placed there before the trouble, possibly sometime before, as a military observer. Since this was his job, he was probably very well-acquainted with the situation in Manchuria before the eventful night of September 18-19th; the strength of the Chinese troops and their distribution. Early in September, this Lt. Col. Bohara was called to Tokyo for a conference with the War Department and the General Staff. Presumably he left Tokyo on Friday the 18th, for on Sunday, September 20th, he was interviewed on the train in Korea, where he stated in substance that Japan will not withdraw from Manchuria until China has met her demands. This was just the day after the incident, and even before the occupation of sections outside the railroad zone was completed; also before Tokyo had made any statement to this effect. It is apparent to me that he had previous knowledge of the occupation. On September 22nd, he was appointed mayor of Mukden, and instructed to organize a temporary government.

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22. Col. Ishihara's first attempts to form a temporary municipal government failed, as they could not find Chinese who would cooperate with them. It was therefore necessary to continue to patrol the streets with Japanese soldiers of the 77th and 78th Infantry. However, about September 15th, they were more successful, and a form of municipal government was started in Mukden. The first step taken was to organize a police force, as all of the former Chinese police had fled. On Saturday the 30th, they had succeeded in enlisting a few hundred police. These were not armed and were used more as traffic police. By the 10th, they had succeeded in securing about 1000 Chinese for this work, and a few of these were armed. However, up until I left there on the 28th, it was still necessary to keep Japanese soldiers in the Chinese and called cities to prevent looting, for on the 28th six Chinese attempted to rob a store. An old woman reported to the police and six Japanese soldiers were sent to the place. They encountered the robbers in the basement of a building in the called city, who immediately opened fire on the Japanese, killing one and wounding another. The Japanese killed one and captured two others whom they had wounded. This was the only sign of disorder I saw in Mukden during my stay there.

23. When General Hange issued his proclamation to the Chinese on the 10th, he stated that the military occupation was necessary because the Chinese soldiers had interfered with traffic on the A.M.R., and that the presence of the Japanese troops was to protect the lives and property of the Japanese in Manchuria. He stated that no harm would come to the civilian population and urged them to continue their pursuits as usual. This had little effect for the Chinese put up their shutters and could not open up their shops. Business was at a standstill. The Japanese had seized all of the Chinese banks on the 10th, and would not permit them to be opened. They also placed guards on the three banks, but they were powerless to do business since the Chinese merchants were afraid to open them, and too, the sources of silver, the Chinese banks, were held by the Japanese. By the 25th a few small shops were opened but none of the larger ones. Little business, though, was opened by the 25th. On Monday the 26th, all the banks opened except the "Frontier" and the "Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces". These were held by the Japanese because they were the banks of the Mukden Government. This naturally was still a severe handicap to the business as they were the other sources of silver. An interesting fact about the seizure of the Chinese banks, and one which shows procrastination, is that soon after the occupation Japanese were placed in each bank to examine their books, and there was a large corps of Japanese to do this. The Japanese called on the Mukden Branch of the National City Bank of New York, and demanded to know Chang Hsueh liang's balance. This was politely refused. The manager of this bank told me that for some time past, the Chinese had been withdrawing their money from Japanese banks, and depositing it with him. More was offered him than he could handle, as he could not dispose of it. This conversation was on September 17th, and would indicate that trouble was pending.

24. The American business men in Mukden were very gloomy, as they looked upon the occupation as the first step towards annexation. The manager of the National City Bank established the branch in Mukden in 1922. It was one of the most prosperous branches in China, but he was particularly troubled,

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because he said that when the bank was first established there, the Japanese did everything they could to prevent it from opening, and after it was opened, to interfere with it. Most of these American businessmen look upon the continued occupation of Manchuria by the Japanese as the death knell of American trade in that section of the Far East. The Americans are not alone in this fear; all other foreigners there feel the same way. Fortunately for the Americans, though, they actually lost very little in the overthrow of the Peking Government. They had been unable to grant long terms of credit, and they had very few experts in the employ of the arsenals. Hence the Poles, the Czechs, and the Germans were the heavy losers, as they had given Manchuria such large credits. Manchuria is more of a potential market than it is at present, and it could, indeed, be a great loss to American trade if the Japanese are allowed to monopolize it further.

25. In my former report I mentioned the refugees from Mukden. There was a general exodus; the like of which I compare with the French fleeing in the face of the German invasion. Through the strenuous efforts of the British Staff of the Peking-Mukden Railway, that line was kept opened to Hsinkington, - its station in the Chinese section of Mukden. They managed to dispatch six trains a day from there to Hankow and Lintun. All of these trains were loaded to their fullest capacity, and even the roofs were covered with fleeing Mukdenites. This was not only during the first few days, but continued on, I know, until the 25th. The Chinese were panicky; at first they feared the Japanese, later it was a fear of their own people of banditry. It is roughly estimated that, besides the soldiers, some fifty thousand Chinese fled from Mukden during the last ten days of September. The scenes at Hsinkington station at this time was a pitiful sight. It was crowded with men, women, and children, with their few belongings in bundles, all of the people filled with a dreadful fear.

26. As soon as the foreign observers and the newspaper men began to gather in Mukden around the 23rd, Major Katori, (Retired), of the Foreign Affairs Section of the South Manchurian Railroad, opened up a form of information service in the Yasato Hotel, to disseminate news from the Japanese Army. At first they gave us some reliable information, but within a few days it became less so, and finally by the 28th it was pure propaganda. They were poor liars though, and we could see through all of their stories. For instance, they reported that Mr. Steel of the Peking-Mukden line had requested the Japanese to protect that railroad as far down as Hankow, or at least as far as Hsinkington, after the line was interrupted by bandits on September 26th. This Mr. Steel emphatically denied, but they had succeeded in getting it in a few papers. The information they gave us concerning the Soviets was very meager. The only fact we could establish was that the S.M.R. was withdrawing its rolling stock from the Harbin-Changchun line, and concentrating it at Manchuli and Puchingaya. Major Hirata of the General Staff in Tokyo flew to Seoul by plane, and arrived in Mukden on the 28th to act as liaison officer with the foreigners. I saw him two or three times a day, but he had little information to divulge; in fact, he knew less about the situation than we did. Not once could he give us an immediate answer. He would write down our questions and call later for the answers. On the 28th he gave us the only

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useful information I got from him, - the troop distribution of the 24th, which I carried you. However, he filled me full of stuff about the Chinese desiring them to help form governments independent of Nanking, and the Chinese dislike for Chiang Kuoh-liang, and repeated many times that they had no idea of annexation, but would withdraw as soon as possible.

27. At first the Japanese military men in Manchuria were very much worried about what impression their action would cause in foreign countries, especially in America. After about a week, when they saw that it had not created such a great reaction, they became more confident, and it was almost impossible to get any reliable information from them. I had expected to see considerable arrogance on the part of both the Japanese soldiers and civilians in Mukden, and was surprised to find none in those with whom I came in contact.

28. I left Mukden on the 29th, and spent the 30th in Tsien. I called up my friend, Colonel Kurasaki, Chief Ordnance Officer of the Kwantung Army, by phone, but found that he had gone with the 2nd Division to Changchun. I had intended going out to Myojan any day, but as there were no few troops left there I spent the day with the British and French military attaches from Peking, discussing the situation. They both were very skeptical about the incident at Mukden, and believed the move to have been premeditated. They also believed that since Japan had strengthened her hold on Manchuria, it would be very difficult to dislodge her. In Peking I discussed the case with our Minister and also with our Assistant Military Attaché. Also in Tientsin I talked with Colonel Taylor of the 13th Infantry, but learned little more than I already knew.

29. Before leaving Tientsin, I asked Mr. Oi. Akouchi there, if the Japanese had entered Manchuria from Kainai, to which he replied he had no knowledge of such a movement. I then asked if the Japanese had been working on connecting the Airin-Iumun line with Kainai, and suggested that this was a very good time for going so. He said he didn't know, but laughingly admitted that this was the last chance they would ever have. In both Peking and Tientsin there was much agitation for boycotting Japanese goods, and placards were posted on walls in many parts of both cities, but very little had been done along these lines up until October 27th. It was generally expected that on October 10-15 large demonstration lines would be held throughout all of China, and a general boy-cott would take place. Plans for this evidently fell through. In the Japanese concession in Tientsin, there were more Chinese in the streets than in either the French or British concessions, and everything seemed peaceful enough. On the 27th of October, I had quite a long talk with Mr. Okada, Tientsin manager of the Osaka Shosen Kaisha, which operates a large fleet of ships between Japan and China. He stated that his line was already feeling the effect of the boycott as the Chinese avoided their boats as much as possible. In Peking I saw only three Japanese steamers in the river, whether this was caused by the boycott or not, I cannot say, for there are usually more Japanese boats in the river there than that.

30. The captain and officers of the Japanese boat upon which I returned to Japan went out of their way to be nice to me, and were more courteous than I had a right to expect. As soon as we anchored in Koji, four Japanese newspaper reporters besieged me. They wanted to know what I thought of the situation, and

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that America's impression was. To these questions I replied that I knew no more about it than that which Major Hirst had told or showed me, and as for America's opinion, I could not say since I had not seen any American newspapers. I did not have any statement of my personal impressions, nor of the attitude of the United States. The supposed interview with me which the Asahi printed is a pure fabrication.

31. As for the final outcome of the Japanese occupation of Manchuria I cannot make any conjectures. Japan has one outside the railroad zone, and I believe it will be very difficult to make her withdraw. She is attempting to organize governments in Manchuria, independent of Peking and the old Mukden regime. These of course would be under Japanese control, and could ease their position there. It is also very important since it would establish some measure of police control, and prevent banditry, which without some control will undoubtedly spread. Of course China is demanding that Japan withdraw immediately to the railroad zone. Personally, I am somewhat skeptical about the advisability of this. From all indications the Government of Manchuria is in a very demoralized state, and have no control over their people. Hence, should Japan withdraw immediately it would not only expose the lives and property of Japanese subjects to almost danger, but those of other nations as well. True, Japan has a use for this occupation and must take the consequences, but it would certainly be unadvisable to leave these sections unprotected as it will, without a doubt, bring even more serious consequences than the present Japanese occupation.

32. Needless to say my knowledge of Japanese served me well on this trip. I only regret that I could not speak Chinese too, for then I would have been able to secure some information from the Chinese. While in Mukden I worked with Capt. Meyer from Peking and his knowledge of Chinese was most useful. It would seem to me that had an officer's knowledge of both languages he would be of utmost value when such a situation occurs again.

Thomas H. Tranter, Jr.
1st Lt., U.S.A., (1st)
Assistant Military Attache.

1st Ind.

The Military Attache, Tokyo, Japan, December 18, 1931. To:-
The A. S. of A., C-2, War Department, Washington, D. C.
1. Approved.

3. The last sentence of paragraph 14 is another evidence of the fact that the military authorities planned and carried out the occupation of Manchuria without the approval of the political government.

J. J. McIlroy
Lieut. Colonel, U.S.A.
Military Attache.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

REP

This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PEIPING

Dated December 19, 1931

FROM

Rec'd 9:20 a. m.

Secretary of State, .

Washington.

1104, December 19, 3 p. m.

Legation's December 17, 11 a. m.

Following from American Consul at Mukden.

"December 18, 4 p. m. CONFIDENTIAL.

793.94

Tsing called on the various consuls this afternoon under the chaperonage of a Japanese "student" who was with him in his car. Although only his Chinese interpreter was present during the call, the governor was nervous and fearful - not his former self at all. In reply to my question he stated that he resumed duties at the request of the people but his demeanor belied his statement; rather he gave the appearance of having been forcibly inducted into office. It is understood that the Japanophile, Mayor of Lukden, played a prominent part in bringing about his assumption of this post. It is to be expected that he will be the mouthpiece of his Japanese advisers.

Myers also reports that twenty thousand suits clothing have been delivered to the Japanese troops obviously in preparation for advance on Chinchow.


JHR

For the Minister
PERKINS

F/DEW

793.94/3247

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
December 22, 1931.

~~SKH:~~

~~MMH:~~

~~RAM:~~

I have underlined certain passages in the attached editorials from THE LEADER of Peiping and the PEKING AND TIENTSIN TIMES of Tientsin in regard to the Manchurian situation.


On pages 1 to 4 will be found criticism of the United States for not having taken a more active part in opposing the Japanese occupation of Manchuria and on pages 7, 8, 11 & 12, similar criticism of the League.

JBJ





PM REGD



LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA


Peiping, November 27, 1931.

No. 1281

DEC 19 31

793.94

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.



Sir:

In continuation of Legation's Despatch No. 1259 of November 12, 1931, I have the honor to transmit herewith five additional editorials which have appeared in THE LEADER of Peiping during the past few weeks, together with one editorial from the PEKING & TIENTSIN TIMES, all dealing with the Manchurian situation.

Further editorials and news items on events in Manchuria will be found among the press clippings going forward in today's pouch.

Respectfully yours,

For the Minister:

Q. Van H. Engert
Van H. Engert,
First Secretary of Legation.

Enclosures:
1-5/ As noted above

RLB:MM

F/LS

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THE LEADER, Friday, November 13, 1931.

THE KELLOGG PACT AND WORLD PEACE

The United States Government has been extraordinarily reluctant to do anything in the present crisis in Manchuria. It was to be thought that the Anti-War Pact would at once have brought the American Government, which sponsored and engineered it, to recognize the gravity of what took place when Japanese troops seven weeks ago shot down non-resisting Chinese soldiers, police, and civilians, and occupied Chinese territory. But the first statement from Washington, days after the Japanese invasion, was that what had happened apparently did not come under the Kellogg Pact. Only after the League, recognizing the world gravity of the situation, began to take it up, did Washington finally show a belated interest in Manchuria.

The only argument which could possibly support a statement that what had happened did not affect the Anti-War Pact would be an argument that as Chinese troops had been non-resistant, there had been no war. Had this attitude been made clear by Washington it might have been far better for all concerned. It would have meant, first of all, that they accepted fully the Chinese and neutral reports of what had taken place in Manchuria, and rejected absolutely the Japanese. The Japanese statement referred both to an attack by the Chinese and to bitter fighting by them. What the Japanese reported, indeed, was war, and had these reports been true the Kellogg Pact would most certainly have been violated. But apparently Washington knew that the Japanese were lying, just as did every other capital.

But Washington's disclaimer created an extraordinary situation. It is true that it takes two to make a war. If one side is non-resistant there is no war. But if an armed attack and invasion are not to be regarded as war, and war begins only with resistance, then the onus of blame is thrown upon the defending country. Japan would not be guilty for an armed occupation which was unresisted. But if China resisted invasion it would mean war, and China would presumably be reponsible.

We need not inquire here what attitude the United States Government would take were Japanese troops to surprise and scatter American forces in the Philippines, occupy towns there, and bombard from airplanes towns and passenger trains outside the occupied area. We need not inquire whether Washington would consider this a violation of the Kellogg Pact. We need not inquire whether Washington would sit complacently and say, "We cannot violate the Kellogg Pact by resisting. Grabbing the Philippines and terrorizing the Pacific coast is not an act of war, for we have not resisted. The Kellogg Pact is not contravened, and every thing is hunky dory." No sane man can imagine Washington taking any such attitude. But if this happens to China the attitude of Washington is exactly that outlined.

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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Well, now this stage has passed, and Washington is still not ready to move. The argument that the invasion had produced no war is now finished, as the Heilungkiang forces under General Ma have resisted, and resisted heroically. Had China not desired to rely upon and live up to the League and the Kellogg Pact, to which she was a signatory, the Fengtien and Kirin troops would have done the same as Heilungkiang, and Japan would have had to pay dearly for every mile of our territory she seized.

Non-resistance in the face of invasion cannot go on indefinitely, until the whole of our country is occupied by the enemy. China's non-resistant attitude has rendered her position above criticism internationally, but has permitted the occupation of vast stretches of territory in which the enemy are settling down permanently. If the western world contents itself with watching the process "with grave concern" while it goes steadily ahead, China cannot so content itself. We cannot abandon our homeland to the enemy, waiting week after week for action which never comes, depending upon western hypocrites who talk sweetly and do nothing whatever to stem the invasion. General Ma's action was to have been expected. Our patience cannot last for ever.

P. O. T.

THE LEADER, Saturday, November 14, 1931.

WHY IS WASHINGTON AGAINST ACTION?

The argument that the Kellogg Pact was not contravened because there had been no actual war, but only massacre, in Manchuria, has proved untenable, owing to General Ma's defence. But where is Washington's awaited action under the Kellogg Pact? Will the gentlemen at Washington still argue that the Pact has not been contravened? Or will they say that China has contravened the Pact by defending her homeland against foreign invasion? In any case, it is far better to say something than to stick to silence or an ineffective note-writing. It is time for those who stand for world peace to come out in the open. China is being invaded. Day after day and week after week the enemy are pushing further. Is the desire for peace so impotent?

The provocation in Tientsin brings up another thing,—the matter of Japanese concessions. Just as the Japanese Government has used extraterritoriality for the purpose of sending protected spies and trouble makers throughout the country in preparation for the present seizure of Manchuria, just as it used the Japanese railway zone base of military operations in Manchuria, so is it attempting to use the Japanese Concessions in China Proper as a basis for new subversive acts against the Chinese Government, forcing its way further and further into our homeland.

The Japanese Concession in Tientsin has been the base of operations this week which call for the immediate abolition of this special area. China's self-preservation demands it. This concession was intended for the peaceful residence and trade of foreigners, but is being used as a center of plots for the forcible overthrow of the Chinese authorities with little-disguised Japanese co-operation. If the League of Nations desires to see peace in China, one of its first moves should be the abolition of the Japanese Concessions everywhere in the country, and first of all in Tientsin. It must be done quickly if North China is not to be occupied with this Concession as a base for action which may possibly endanger the peace and well being of the surrounding concessions.

Will the League fail us again at the next Council meeting? And will the United States, the Sponsor of the Kellogg Pact and the Washington Nine-Power Treaty, permit these documents to be and to remain mere scraps of paper? The League's twice-made decision, calling on Japan to withdraw her troops, makes clear Japan's violation of the pacts she has signed.

When the United States was invited to join the deliberations of the Council of the League, the world expected that America would stand for justice against an international bully. The application of the League's Article XV was expected. But the United

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

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States came out with definite instructions to its representative not to pledge it to this act. If there was to be a boycott, America, so it seemed, would not participate.

Last week another project was broached,—the severing of diplomatic relations with Japan, just as the United States invited China and the neutrals to do with Germany in 1917. But last week the United States again issued a statement which makes it apparent that they would not be a party to such action. For the second time America has thrown cold water on the evident desire of most members of the League to take decisive action against the invaders and plunderers of China. What greater encouragement could there be for Japan's defiant stand than this American reluctance!

What does Washington's action mean? What is the meaning of her reluctance to recognize any violation of the Kellogg Pact, her announcement that she would not be a party to a punitive blockade of Japan, her announcement that she would not be a party to the severance of diplomatic relations with Japan? Is this connected with her business depression, and with her trade, the continued gold shipments from Japan to the United States, which according to a *Reuter* dispatch from Osaka, November 7, had amounted to the enormous sum of Y.172,500,000 since October 1? Is this the real point, and is Hoover's administration, unlike Roosevelt's, just what it advertises itself to be—a "business" administration? Does this Japanese gold glean brighter than the scales of world justice?

P. C. T.

THE LEADER, Friday, November 20, 1931.

**KIRIN-KWANEI RAILWAY AND MANCHURIA'S
DEFENCE**

Students of the Manchurian situation will remember that shortly after the Japanese captured Tunghua on the Kirin-Tunghua line, the Japanese High Command held a conference in Tokyo and decided to totally disregard the objections of the Chinese Government and people and go ahead with the construction of the Kirin-Kwanei line on the strength of the fact that it is one of the so-called "vested" interests.

For decades the Japanese have been planning railway lines that will penetrate into the very heart of Manchuria and Mongolia for commercial as well as military purposes. Any sign of railway construction on Chinese territory by Chinese is looked upon by imperialistic Japan as "an infringement of Japan's vested interests." Every Chinese railway line in Manchuria is branded as parallel lines by the Japanese, in spite of the fact that not one Chinese line is really parallel to the South Manchuria Railway, and most are separated from the Japanese-owned line by from fifty to three hundred miles. The Japanese have interfered so much with the Chinese railways in Manchuria in the past that they even protested vehemently when the Mukden-Hailung railway shifted some rolling stock from the Taonan-Angangchi railway a few years ago, and raised violent opposition that China should dare to construct a line with Chinese capital running from Mukden to Hailung and from Hailung to Kirin.

To the Japanese mind, the construction of a railway with Chinese capital on Chinese territory is an outrage. But the forcible construction of a railroad on Chinese territory against Chinese public opinion and in derogation of China's sovereignty is a "vested" interest.

The Japanese are determined to construct the Kirin-Kwanei railway, come what may. From the strategic standpoint, the importance of the projected railway cannot be overestimated. The Japanese are now able to move troops and goods as far as Tunghua, but they cannot go through Korea without going back by way of Mukden and Antung. The Kirin-Kwanei line will connect the port of Seishin in Korea by means of the Kwanei-Seishin line. Military movements would be greatly facilitated by the construction of this line, for it would be possible not only to move troops and supplies in two directions by way of the seaports of Dairen in the south and Seishin in the north, but troops stationed in Korea would also be able to reach the heart of Manchuria by an encircling movement by way of the Antung-Mukden railway on the one hand, and the Kirin-Kwanei line on the other. If Dairen were blockaded and if Antung were taken by Chinese troops,—a possibility or an impossibility—the existence of the Kirin-Kwanei line would enable Japanese troops to be rushed to Seishin in a twinkling of an eye, where they can advance towards Kirin. Thus, by the construction of this line, Japan will have the means of fastening her poisonous fangs still deeper in Manchuria, leaving aside the fact that the Vulture of the Rising Sun is setting up "independent" governments and is menacing Tsitsihar with a view to making Heilungkiang another "independent" government.

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Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigsm NARS, Date 12-18-75

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From the commercial point of view, the construction of this line will give Japan a greater stranglehold upon the whole of Manchuria. It will have the effect of diverting some of the trade now enjoyed by Vladivostok and will greatly facilitate the development of the Korean port of Seishin at the expense of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Some of the cargo instead of going direct to Dairen or even Yingkow and Hulutao would move to the seaport of Seishin, so that the Changchun-Kirin and the Chinese-owned Mukden-Hailung-Kirin lines will act as feeders for the Kirin-Kwanei railway.

Very little information has reached us concerning the progress of construction of this important line, but it is common knowledge that the Japanese militarists are determined to finish its construction as soon as possible.

The war-mad Japanese militarists justified the bombing of the defenseless city of Chinchow on the plea of "self-defense," and are launching a violent attack on General Ma Chan-shan's valiant troops with the object of capturing Tsitsihar for the sake of repairing the Nonui River bridge, although the Japanese organ *Nihon* was frank enough to say that "Japan must continue what she has started. It is not for the sake of repairing some small bridge that she has sacrificed the lives of two hundred soldiers in the last fighting." To add insult to injury, the construction of a railway having for its object the choking of Manchuria is shamelessly justified on the flimsy pretext of "vested interests." The fangs of Japanese imperialism have sunk deep enough!

E.B.-S.L

THE LEADER, Saturday, November 27, 1937

TALK

With the defeat of the Heilungkiang forces and the capture of Tsitsihar, the Japanese have occupied the third provincial capital in Manchuria. All three capitals—Mukden, Kirin, and Tsitsihar—are now in Japanese hands. It took almost exactly two months for the occupation, from the time the Japanese seized Mukden and other points to the time they defeated the ill-equipped forces of Ma Chan-shan at Anganchi.

Much of the occupation took place between sessions of the League, but this last move was made while the Council was actually in conference. The Japanese military had clearly not the slightest apprehensions as to the League ever doing anything. They simply ignored it. General Minami many weeks ago frankly referred to it as a weak and incapable body, and we have no evidence that the General was wrong.

While the Japanese have been occupying Manchuria the League has been talking. It is talking now. The members of the Council have talked to one another, they have talked to China, they have talked to Japan, they have talked to the United States. They are talking yet, while Japanese military have occupied the one remaining provincial capital of Manchuria. If Japan decides to seize Tientsin and Peiping next, the Council will undoubtedly view the situation "with grave anxiety," and go on talking about it.

It is unfortunate that the League could not have the honesty of the American Government. Washington was at least straightforward. While sending a note to Japan expressing America's disfavor of the occupation of Manchuria, the United States at the same time let it be known that they had informed the Japanese Ambassador that they had no intention of backing up their note by any action, even economic or diplomatic. It is one of the most extraordinary things of recent years. Imagine a Government sending a Note to another asking for evacuation, and then saying to the other's ambassador with a grin—"It's all right. This was clearly our duty—this protest. But don't worry. We're not going to take any action whatever, even if you occupy the whole of China."

Is this the attitude of the League as well? If so, the gentlemen of Geneva might have had the decency to say so beforehand. Had they stated, at the time of their first resolutions, that these were only polite expressions of disapproval and no measures were to be taken to enforce them, China would have known better how to act. China might not have continued her policy of non-resistance. China might have shown that, in spite of her admitted military weakness, she can at least make the enemy pay for the territory he takes.

But the League, so far, has simply fooled China, and rendered her an easy prey to the enemy. It has passed resolutions addressed to both China and Japan, it has not only asked Japan to evacuate but has had the insolence to ask non-resistant China to discontinue the peaceful economic measures she was taking against the enemy. And this in the face of an invasion going deeper and deeper into Chinese territory, an alien administration organizing and strengthening itself day by day.

If the League has any sense of responsibility, any sense of decency or honor, it must undo the wrong it has done China, and see to it that the same thing will not happen again in this way. At the present time it is actually talking over with Japan the matter of interpretation of treaties, when Japan has utterly violated the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Kellogg Anti-War Pact, and the Nine-Power Treaty. Imagine a policeman sitting in a house with a burglar, and arguing with the thief about legal technicalities while the latter packs away the silver and cuts the throat of the householder. Imagine a convicted liar and perjurer in court, arguing that his accuser had broken a promise. Imagine a judge on the bench, inviting a convicted murderer, thief, perjurer, cocaine-peddler and pickpocket up on the bench with him to discuss gravely whether such crimes were legally justifiable.

If the League is to keep the respect of decent people it must at once declare Japan an outlaw, must join China and assist China in a complete economic boycott of Japan, must sever its diplomatic bonds with Japan. It must do this until the Japanese troops are withdrawn, when it will be time enough to talk about treaties.

But beyond this the League must prevent a repetition of Japan's crimes. The Japanese have used their special concession zones in Manchuria as military bases, have used their extraterritorial privileges for spying out the country and organizing attacks upon the Chinese Government. If further invasion is to be prevented, the Japanese Concessions throughout China must be abolished at once and turned over to Chinese authority, extraterritorial rights for Japanese must be abolished at once, and the participation of Japanese in the government of the International Settlement at Shanghai done away with.

If the League were against Japanese aggression it would act. But so far there is no evidence whatever that it will do anything at all.

Except talk!

F. G.

PEKING & TIENSIN TIMES, SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 21/1931.

CHINA'S APPALLING DILEMMA.

THE occupation of the Heilungkiang capital and the overthrow of the pre-occupation Authorities there will presumably be followed by similar efforts to reduce Chinchow and to eject the Provisional Government established there directly after the seizure of Mukden. The adventure of Lin Yen-ching came to a very abrupt end. He failed even more badly than Chang Hai-peng, whose enterprise speedily collapsed, whereupon the Japanese took on the job themselves. How the expected attack on Chinchow is to be engineered we cannot tell, of course. But, as we pointed out when the trouble began here, the Japanese Military have virtually declared war on Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang and are determined to uproot his influence, while even if they did not hold him personally responsible for the fatal change of policy since 1928 in Mukden, it would nevertheless be essential for the furtherance of their aims and temporary stabilisation in Manchuria to eject a hostile Government whose administrative power stretches northward virtually to the Liao River. Their immediate programme is perfectly clear. They are determined to establish new authorities in Manchuria who can be depended upon to do their bidding, and to negotiate with China—when she is of a mind to do so—with all the cards in their hands. A realist view of the true position is indispensable, whether one rejoices at the punishment that has descended upon the Chinese authorities in Manchuria and is prepared for any amount of self-deception, or whether illusions of quite another sort are cherished.

The Chinese authorities in Mukden have been flatly refused permission to start recruiting on their own. If there is any protection to be done, it will be done by the Japanese troops, and by nobody else. This was swiftly communicated to Yuan Chin-kai and his colleagues when they thought of

raising a force of some 2,000 armed men soon after they took office and before the actual proclamation of the new Provincial Government. No more Worlords, was the slogan in the Japanese Press, and the point was reinforced by the complete disappearance of any military grants from the provincial Budget as drawn up by the Japanese Military Authorities and made public before the Chinese officials had even seen it. Lin Yen-ching was expected, according to Japanese despatches, to take Kou-pang-tze and then Chinchow, all in the twinkling of an eye, so to speak. Instead, he was captured and executed. In view of the Japanese policy outlined in the beginning of this paragraph, and the sorry experience already gained of the pro-Japanese militarists, it is hardly likely that this technique will be employed again. More plain clothes gunmen organised by malcontent ex-Generals thrown out of office may appear, to cause terror and panic in Chinchow and possibly Peiping, or the Japanese troops, may attack direct, as in North Manchuria, especially if Chiang Kai-shek goes to Chinchow.

Tientsin was full of rumours yesterday that the Chinese Government had formally declared war on Japan. At the moment of writing we have had no confirmation whatever of that. But many things have been said and done to indicate that the policy of non-resistance has been abandoned. Even in Tientsin, despite the accusation of the Chinese Authorities that the daring and singularly persistent gunmen still operating here are in league with the Japanese, the local authorities refused to evacuate at once, as in Mukden and so many other places in Manchuria. But whilst the very youthful Mayor—who finds the responsibilities of office a great deal more onerous than they were when he was pitchforked into the job—would probably be only too glad to be relieved of his office, to which so utterly inexperienced a young man ought never to have been appointed, Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang ignores both threats and menaces and the most pointed

forms of invitation to resign. The Japanese, however, are obviously determined to get him out of the way, and accordingly it is idle to expect the restoration of normal conditions along the railway from Peiping to Chinchow until he does submit.

No doubt the rumours of declaration of war arose out of the message received yesterday morning, that Chiang Kai-shek had announced his intention to proceed to Manchuria immediately. The question of the crisis with Japan has been discussed at considerable length in secret sessions of the Party Congress at Nanking. Sentiment outside was no doubt reflected inside the Congress. Moreover, we think it is not a shot in the dark to suggest that the signs of renewed political agreement, recently noted when it seemed that the peace negotiations had completely collapsed, owing to the refusal of the Generalissimo to carry out his stated intention to resign, have had something to do with this decision. In Canton the alleged surrender of the delegates in Shanghai evoked sharp criticism. Important representatives were sent to Shanghai to request Wang Ching-wei to break off relations and return. The Canton Congress was postponed.

But some new understanding was evidently reached between Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei, causing Canton to alter its attitude and to open the Congress. And the essential feature of that understanding, undoubtedly, was the consent of Chiang Kai-shek to go to Manchuria and "fulfil his duty and obligations and prove his loyalty to the country and the Kuomintang." One message says he intends to go to "North China," which would presumably mean Peiping, and the other "Manchuria," meaning, we take it, Chinchow. It is possible to take a very cynical view of both the understanding on which this action was apparently based, and of the dramatic scenes which attended the announcement of the decision. However, the position is much too serious for that sort of thing. We adhere to the opinion that if nothing was gain-

ed except credit among peace workers abroad, and an enormous territory temporarily lost, by the policy of non-resistance, under present conditions little more is to be gained by the other policy. Indeed, it may prove far more disastrous.

China is, as a matter of fact, between the devil and the deep sea. It is something, perhaps, that she is unprepared to submit to further humiliation without resistance. The Soviet have been sensible enough to do nothing but shout their protests for all to hear, and leave it at that, until, perhaps, a more opportune time arrives in the future. China's leaders have been busily committing national suicide by civil wars; they almost estop others from recommending prudence in a national crisis when they are up against a proposition too formidable to be overcome in their present unprepared, chaotic state. Moreover, the Powers have failed to find a way out. Resistance does mean war, of course. It was war on the Nonni, or we do not understand the meaning of the word.

But if this decision is based on tangled domestic politics, and is made merely to get one man—even the head of the State—and the Party leaders out of an inextricable tangle of dissensions, it is a pretty desperate manoeuvre and likely to be ruinous to the people directly affected. We repeat what we have asserted over and over again, that China's wisest course is to withdraw her government to the interior, to undergo there a period of discipline such as that which renewed the Turkish will and capacity to survive as an independent State. It would mean, as in Turkey, the temporary creation of a buffer along the coastal regions until the Nationalists were ready to come back. Resistance would lead to this, anyhow, and the enlargement of Japanese operations elsewhere than Manchuria. Probably, if Count Uchida is to be believed, direct negotiations at once would find the Japanese not so unreasonable as feared and be much the best way out. But one is only too conscious that it would be futile to press such a course upon the Chinese under present circumstances.

THE LEADER Sunday November 22, 1931

EDITORIAL NOTES

The League Has A "Solution"

After weeks of anxiety and watchful waiting on the part of the Chinese people during which the Japanese militarists took every available opportunity to extend their area of control, and are threatening to spread their poisonous tentacles all over the Province of Heilungkiang now that they have taken Tsitsihar—the League of Nations has at last come out with a "solution," which we hope will not be the last.

This "solution" provides for the despatch of a mixed commission to Manchuria to look over the situation, but "will not affect the evacuation of Japanese troops which will remain at the Japanese discretion and depend on the security of Japanese lives and property and Chinese willingness to negotiate a general treaty." The Japanese vigorously opposed the first League proposal for a commission of investigation because the so-called "independent" governments were not yet consolidated, but now they are receiving the mixed commission with open arms, since the capital of Heilungkiang Province is being added to the list of "independent" governments.

By the time the League observers arrive, they will be able to report that the Japanese have the situation well in hand and that the "independent" governments in Manchuria are running smoothly. (?)

The Week's Most Perfect Asininity

We are not quite certain as to what is the most perfect and complete asininity of the week. As of greatest importance, perhaps, is the fatuous and puerile observation, actually accredited to the Council of the League of Nations, that the sending of a commission to Manchuria "has afforded a suitable solution of the present crisis." Locally, there has been a monstrous asininity which we prefer—for the sake of peace in our little community—not to mention. But there is one extraordinary item, so extreme in its betrayal of an utter lack of anything corresponding to human intelligence, as to be worthy of framing.

This is the statement credited to the ingenious Mr. Yoshizawa, that the resistance of the Chinese people to Japanese aggression in Manchuria was simply the result of the xenophobia of the natives. Xenophobia, we should add for the unenlightened, is not a skin disease, but simply means "dislike of strangers." The Chinese, it appears, are supposed to enjoy being shot at and plundered, and seeing their country invaded, and any opposition is an unreasonable "dislike of strangers."

Extraordinarily widespread is this "xenophobia." If we are not mistaken, France showed the same characteristic when her territory was invaded by Germany, Germany felt the same strange impulse when Russian forces crossed her borders, Soviet Russia developed a most virulent case of it when invaded by an international counter-revolutionary army, and the United States was afflicted with it as far back as 1776.

Japan, presumably, is an exception. Japan's response to an invading army, bombing her cities, murdering her subjects, plundering her property, occupying her territory, would probably be to hold out

arms of trust and affection, to lead the invaders to treasures they might otherwise have overlooked, and to take their savagery as a beneficent and worthy act for which the natives must be grateful. Unless, of course, Japan were to have a sudden attack of xenophobia.

Japan's Five Fundamentalist Points

(By Charles James Fox in the *North China Star*)

Japan has what might be termed Five Fundamentalist Points that ought to be carefully catalogued and borne in mind in attempting to arrive at a real understanding of her aims or purposes in China. These points are:—

1. When we can't keep a promise to the League we simply renew it.
2. Any Chinese who opposes us in Manchuria is a bandit.
3. We won't interfere with the Chinese Eastern Railway unless the Chinese use it.
4. The Treacherous Treaty of 1915 is sanctified; all others, such as the League Covenant, the Nine Power Treaty, and the Kellogg Pact, are beyond the pale.
5. The League may send a Commission to Manchuria after all the fundamental points are fully recognized.

1057
DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Lustigson NARS, Date 12-18-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

met

GRAY

Peiping via N.R.

FROM

Dated December 19, 1931

Rec'd 11:13 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington

1105, December 19, 4 p.m.

Following from American Consul General at Mukden:

"December 18, 4 p.m.

Reliably informed that Japanese planes bombed
Tungliac on the 15th, killing three Chinese. City was
in a panic".

Repeated to Department and Nanking.

For the Minister,

PERKINS

won



F/LS

793.94/3249

FILED
DEC 24 1931

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DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

December 16, 1931.

~~MMH:~~
RSM:

This despatch would indicate that the dispute between the National City Bank of New York at Mukden and the Chief of Staff of the Japanese Military Authorities there has been settled as the Japanese Consul General at Mukden in a letter to the American Consul General of November 6, 1931, states that there are no laws or regulations which authorize the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army to issue orders to the National City Bank.

FE
JEJ:AT



rh

PLAIN

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

PEIPING VIA NR

Dated Dec. 20, 1931

FROM

Rec'd. 7.50 am

SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

1110, December 20, 6 pm.

Following from Reuter, Tokyo, December 19th.

"The Chinese Minister to Japan, General Chiang Tso


Pin, is leaving for Nanking this evening in response to an
urgent summons from the Chinese Government.

This afternoon he visited Mr. Imukai, the new
Japanese Premier, when it is reported that they "exchanged
views on certain important affairs for nearly an hour"
though the nature of their conversation has not been re-
vealed.

Reports from Mukden that the Japanese are preparing
to deliver an ultimatum to Marshal Chang Haues Liang to
withdraw from Chinchow area virtually confirmed in
authoritative quarters.

It is understood that the Japanese Government is
sending one warning to Marshal Chang through the Peiping

Legation



F/DEW

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793.94

DECLASSIFIED: E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Department of State letter, August 10, 1972
By Milton O. Gustafson NARS, Date 12-18-75

rh #2 of No. 1110 from Peiping

Legation while General Honjo will send a similar warning
direct to General Jung Chen, Marshal Chang's Chief of
Staff.

The warnings would demand withdrawal inside the
Great Wall within a stipulated time."

For the Minister

PERKINS

GW

MICROCOPY

976

ROLL

7

